FROM GRAFFITI TO GENOCIDE: WHY ARE THERE DIFFERENT FORMS OF
ETHNIC VIOLENCE?

DISSERTATION

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By

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Abstract

In the past, scholars have sought to explain why ethnic violence occurs, who it benefits, or whether “ethnic” conflict is really “ethnic” at all. Others use studies of ethnic conflict as a way of generating insights into the nature of ethnicity as a phenomenon itself- a way of testing the claims to venerable antiquity of members of an ethnos against the facts on the ground. It is not surprising, then, that few ask why violence takes different forms in different circumstances- from graffiti to genocide. Yet this question stands to generate insights into many of those listed above, by indicating not just whether “ethnicity” can mobilize but the manner in which it does as well and so bearing on the question of how “ethnic” such violence actually is. Why are there different forms of ethnic violence? This is the question which motivates this research, seeking to explain why participants in ethnic violence sometimes choose to use one form and sometimes another.

In answering this question, I elaborate a typology of forms of ethnic violence that sees such acts as essentially communicative. Whatever else it does, violence sends a “message” to those on the receiving end. This typology juxtaposes two axes to give four types or forms of ethnic violence: Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Genocide.
I argue for using the contemporary situation in the Russian Federation—where Neo-Nazi skinheads are visiting horrific violence on ethnic minorities almost every day—as a testing ground for theories. While the results of tests conducted in this environment will necessarily be limited in their application, positive findings will allow us to transport the theory to different settings.

The literature review confirmed that this question had not been asked in the past, and identified the gap in our theoretical knowledge that it would fulfill: how linguistic practices may mobilize people for violence. Although no existing work has focused on this question, those that do exist nevertheless imply answers. Therefore, the literature review concludes by extracting hypotheses from the literature which I test against my own theory.

My theory was formed from two sources. First, I extend the theory of Donald Horowitz (2001) concerning the deadly ethnic riot. Second, ethnographic fieldwork with skinhead gangs in Moscow, and St. Petersburg. In particular, I obtained videos of the movement’s activities which they use to propagandize their struggle and attract new recruits. The theory that comes from this, I call the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. It claims that perpetrators of ethnic violence conceive of themselves as defenders of an indigenous community who punish ethnic minorities for alleged “criminal” acts. The form of the “punishment” dished out to various ethnic groups thus corresponds to the nature of the alleged crime: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

The dissertation provides four tests of this theory: cluster analysis of a database of skinhead attacks; content analysis of skinhead media; interviews with skinhead
participants in violence; and through case studies. The database of skinhead attacks was constructed from a Human Rights publication “Bigotry Monitor” and contains details of every reported skinhead attack from 2001 to 2008, over 800 cases in all. In line with the theory, I find that the ethnicity of the target group is the best indicator of the form of violence perpetrators will use.

In order to further test the theory, I performed a content analysis of Far-Right materials taken from the internet and bought in Russian nationalist-fascist bookstores. This showed that the stereotype of ethnic minorities being involved in crime appeared far more frequently than any of the competitor explanations, a finding which again supported the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. Similarly, the responses of the interview subjects also provided support for the Theory of Ethnic Criminality, often using the language of proportionality when discussing violence. I then extend the analysis to the mass media in order to see how far down into Russian society these stereotypes stretch.

The final test looks at how well the theory travels beyond the instances of skinhead violence originally used to test it. I evaluate the competing theories in the cases of violence against Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai, Southern Russia, and the “anti-Georgian campaign” of 2006, where political authorities used the Moscow police to deport to Georgia not just Georgian citizens but ethnic Georgians as well. I find that the theory works well in explaining particular forms of violence in both, promising greater external application to other instances of ethnic violence. These combination of tests allow me to assert with confidence that ethnic violence is a proportionate response to the perceived “crime” of an ethnic minority.
Dedicated to my mother and father and to my fiancé.
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Completing the doctoral degree has been the second-hardest thing I have ever had to do in my life. I imagine this to be similar for all aspiring doctoral candidates. I have given four years of my life to the study of ethnic violence in general and Russian skinheads in particular because I believe them to be and remain important topics not just for observers in the West and in Russia but for the whole world. Sustaining me on this endeavor have been my parents and my fiancé, Kerry Hodak. I would not have been able to finish this at times dangerous and depressing work without the love and kindness that these people have shown to me throughout my graduate career—supporting me emotionally when I wondered whether I was doing the right thing by pursuing a doctorate and helping me out financially at times.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In Northern Ireland over the years of the “troubles” since the late 1960s, loyalist and nationalist paramilitaries marked prominent neighborhood buildings with murals. In the Deep South of the United States of America, African-Americans suffered at the hands of lynch mobs. In cities across India and Pakistan since independence, rioters have at various times destroyed the property of Hindus and Muslims. And the specter of the Holocaust has never been far from the repeated mass killings the 20th century (and now the 21st) has witnessed. What links these disparate events is that they are famous examples not just of ethnic violence but of particular kinds of ethnic violence. Why are there these different forms of ethnic violence? Why do perpetrators choose to use violent actions in different ways?

This question strikes us as an interesting one for a variety of reasons. Perhaps foremost among them is that despite the wealth of attention lavished on ethnic violence in the scholarly literature (Alexseev et al. 1999; Azrael & Pain, 1998; Beissinger, 2001; Brubaker, 1996, 2004; Drobizheva, 1991; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Gagnon, 2004; Goldhagen, 1999; Horowitz, 1986, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006; Kaufman, 2001; Laitin, 1998; Oberschall, 2000; Palmer, 1998; Pain, 1996, 2004; Petersen, 2002; Ross, 2007; Snyder, 2000; Sternberg, 2003; Shlapentokh, Sandrich & Pain, 1994; Tilly, 2003; Tishkov, 1996,
1997, 2003; Valentino, 2004; Varshney, 2002), little work claims to answer this particular question. Indeed, “one of the most interesting yet infrequently asked questions about nationalist violence is why it assumes the forms it does.” While scholars have certainly been concerned about ethnic violence, only a handful raise the question about the form of violence and none explicitly offer answers.

This omission strikes one as all the more glaring when one considers the wealth of theoretical insights such a question can offer. Is there a similar process used to produce different forms of ethnic violence or are they produced in different ways? How do the perpetrators see themselves in performing different acts of violence and does this bear relation to efforts to provoke “ethnic violence?” What are the advantages to a disaggregated concept of “ethnic violence,” how does it allow us to talk about ethnic conflict differently? Can this question tell us anything about how ethnic violence per se comes about? Does this give us any prescriptions for democratizing societies? What is the importance of “ethnicity” to this thing that we call “ethnic conflict?”

Indeed, the implication of being able to link certain variables to particular kinds of violence is the de-mystification of the concept “ethnic violence.” Many current analyses state the concept as if it were homogeneous and uniform, yet it is obvious to even the most casual observer that ethnic violence takes different forms and at differing intensities. We will gain theoretical knowledge from uncovering the processes by which

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1 Beissinger, M. (2002: 306). See also Brubaker, R. (2004: 114-5 who makes a plea for disaggregation, critiquing the view that takes “ethnic violence” as a homogeneous substance varying only in magnitude.”
different forms of violence are generated. Moreover, the practical implications of such a theory pay off in spades: there is the promise of better policy for dealing with instances of ethnic violence as well as the hope of uncovering a single conceptual motor for the phenomenon itself. The question thus promises a rich harvest of theoretical insights.

Moreover, it is a question for Political Science because ethnic conflict around the world threatens governmental stability and because any use of violence is inherently political. Returning to the first point, ethnic violence is one of the major challenges facing governments around the world. On the human cost of ethnic violence, Kwame Wamwere (2003: 22) argues that ethnic violence has claimed more lives in Africa than both AIDS and malaria combined. Moreover, it is not just the fact that people are killed in ethnic violence but the gruesome manner in which they are killed prompts outcry from Human Rights watchdogs and calls for government intervention. From genocide in the Sudan to riots in the French banlieues and even the ethnic dimension of international terrorism, ethnic violence is an issue of prime concern for both national and international politics.

There is also a connection to theoretical issues of politics as violence is one way of managing the plural human condition.2 There is more than one person on earth and (whatever else it is) politics is the art of managing this fact. As violence is one means of managing this plurality, it must be political. If Clausewitz hit upon a truth when he declared that “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” then the axiom can also be reversed so that politics is the continuation of war. Violence, in some measure, is

2 See Hannah Arendt’s book “On Violence” (1970: 42) where she states the plurality-denying properties of violence by stating that “the extreme from of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All.” Similarly, she expands on this point in a later work (1994: 438) when she describes totalitarianism as using “total domination which strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all of humanity were just one individual.”
politics. Understanding the processes which lead to violent outcomes is thus crucial for any comprehensive account of political behavior. For both these reasons, then, a comparison of the forms of violence is an inherently political question.

However, in asking why there are different forms of "ethnic" violence the scholar at some point is required to define just what is meant by "ethnicity." This is an issue which causes debate in itself because the ontological status of ethnicity is disputed: some maintain that ethnic differences have a foundation in the objective realities of skin color or language. Ethnic groups are the "natural kinds" of the social world. Others maintain that the appearance of supposedly preternatural "ethnic" differences is itself a social construction, a metaphor whose origins we have forgotten. To constructivists, ethnicity is "a belief in a common descent… whether or not an objective blood relationship exists in fact."

Interesting though this debate is, it is not the focus of this research which instead tries to deal with the fact of ethnicity in our modern life. All I require is a working definition of the phenomenon of ethnicity as it is important for political action. What makes ethnicity important for politics is thus the belief that it is important, irrespective of whether it is a metaphysical truth or product of human agency. Therefore I offer what I see as being the two most important characteristics of ethnicity: its ascriptive character and its function in informing perspective.

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3 Gellner, E. (1983: 47) uses this phrase to describe the nationalist’s understanding of the historical inevitability of the nation. The idea of ethnic group or nation as inherent to mankind owes its intellectual origin to Johann Herder (1986; 2004) who saw human beings as formed into nations over millennia from a dialectical relationship with their local climates.

4 Students of philosophy will recognize my paraphrasing of Nietzsche’s axiom “truths are illusions of which we have forgotten they are illusions” (in Guess, R. & Speirs, R. [Eds], 2004: 146). This appreciation of the stuff of the social world itself renders moot the debate about the ontological status of social concepts because even if social categories are not ordained to be the naturally occurring groups in society, an appreciation of them as such means that for practical purposes they are.

The ascriptive character of ethnicity\(^6\) means that one is able to identify others as belonging to given ethnic groups. Our mental atlas is sketched with the ethnic topography as a most salient feature.\(^7\) Benedict Anderson (2006: 9-10) pithily illustrates the relevance of ethnicity and nationality to modern individuals when he compares the “tomb of the unknown soldier” to the “tomb of the unknown Marxist.” The former exist in many countries of the world, thanking co-nationals for sacrifices made in war. The very idea of the latter strikes us as somewhat odd. Trying to imagine a man without an ethnicity (or several of them) is like trying to imagine one without a heart, lungs, or other vital organ. Moreover, these ethnic affiliations matter for us because ethnicity is a matter of worldview: it is “fundamentally not a thing in the world, but a perspective on the world.”\(^8\) To see the world with ethnic eyes is to consider the ethnicity of others as well as oneself a salient characteristic. We hold ethnicity to be close to one’s soul in part because our own comprehension of a situation depends on this categorization.

As mentioned previously, violence is a way of dealing with plurality. Yet it is a particular way of dealing with this fact and one which dominates rather than accommodates. It renders subjects into objects by treating them as things which can be violated or treated as without will of their own. This is the premise of Orlando Patterson’s (1982: 38) concept of slavery as being a situation of “social death.” By depriving the slave of the characteristics of a human life- principally through depriving their patrimony or what Patterson calls “natal alienation”- the slavers rendered their

\(^6\) See Varshney, A. (2002: 4) and Horowitz (1985: 41-54)
\(^7\) Some theorists of ethnicity and ethnic politics hold that ethnicity (and, by implication, other social groups) is a feature of evolutionary psychology that provides us with informational shortcuts as to the social topography. It is, Hale (2008: 33) argues a means of reducing “uncertainty” in everyday life without having to expend too much energy.
victims lump matter and not equal agents with themselves. Violence is a way of dealing with plurality which renders the plural components as lump objects, dominated at any given time.

This abstract definition of violence suggests that there are degrees of violence and different extents to which others may be dominated. Indeed, “if we understand the forms which violence assumes as expressing subject-object relationships, then shifts in the form of violence must logically be linked to underlying changes in authority relations.”

Different types of violent activity dominate in different ways and objectify Others to points at which the relationship between Self and Other takes on new meanings.

Moreover, this definition can be shown to have practical importance as ethnic groups who fear violence will usually express a fear not of violence in general but of particular kinds of violence. Intersubjective webs of meaning position ethnic groups in a hierarchy that informs their fears and concerns. This provides heartening evidence that the forms of violence should be considered comparable a priori. If there were no logic governing the forms of violence, then ethnic targets would not be able to express their fears so concretely. This definition of “violence” is purposefully vague so that I may build a typology of forms of violence in the next section

1.2: A Typology of Ethnic Violence

Violence treats other subjects as if they were objects and this may be done to different degrees. One function of violence is to communicate this conceptualization to

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10 For example, a newspaper in Kaliningrad Oblast asked the question in 2003 of whether pogroms targeting the Jewish community were imminent (See the report “Kaliningrad Politicians Get AntiSemitic Death Threats” in Bigotry Monitor [2003: 3: 30])
the target and remind them of this. Consistent with this definition, the meaning of different violent acts may be expressed as different commands. I say “commands” rather than “requests” because one does not ask an object to do anything, one commands or instructs. I develop this insight in this section, saying what those commands are and how they relate to different forms of violence. I then develop two axes that relate to four distinct types- and meanings- of ethnic violence. Finally I offer justifications for the names given to the types of violence and examples of how the typology may be applied.

In the next section, I argue for Russia as being a good case in which to develop and to test theories. Before this, however, I turn to the idea of violence as communication.

Violence is an act which sends certain messages. Although it may be an inefficient way to communicate, there are nevertheless communicative functions to violence. This understanding of violence as fundamentally a communicative act is also used by Charles Tilly (2003: chapter 2). Moreover, it can be seen in the claim of Countess Waldeck that “Rumania says it with murder.”11 Rather than going to the effort of peacefully conveying the impression of the status of the target group, violence simply enforces it. In using violence against ethnic targets, Rumanians informed them of their position in the ethnic hierarchy. This said, only negative “messages” could be communicated in this manner: violence can hardly be used with other intent. Four of these possible “messages” are shown in figure 1.1:

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Figure 1.1: Four types of messages transmitted by violence

| 1. Cower! |
| 2. Behave! |
| 3. Leave! |
| 4. Perish! |

The content of these messages is fairly intuitive. The first message of “cower!” re-states awareness of the boundary between groups and reminds the target of their inferior position. Violence reminds people that they are different and inferior. The second message (“behave!”) punishes for an alleged infraction of norms. Violence is a kind of warning not to repeat an action. The third message of “leave!” indicates an unwillingness of the majority group to live beside the other group any longer. In this case violence aims to make a certain group unwelcome so that they are forced to flee. Finally, the message of “perish!” represents an utter rejection of the right of the other group even to exist. All these hypothesized messages are not just literal commands but also expressions of the underlying conception of ethnic relations, telling ethnic others their position in the status hierarchy.

How does one map these four messages onto distinct kinds of violence? After surveying the literature (Horowitz, 2001: 17-28; Mann, 2005: 12; Tilly 2003: 14-16) for nascent typologies of violence, two characteristics seem to be especially important. First is the legal division between whether violence focuses on people or on property.12 This

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12 Interestingly, Michel Foucault (1995: 76) noted “a general movement [which] shifted criminality from the attack of bodies to the more or less direct seizure of goods” and suggests that the practice of targeting things rather than people coincided with the construction of patterns of bourgeois ownership. While this
intuitive distinction is also enshrined in law: the penalties for violating the property of another are usually less severe than violations against another’s person because we recognise the lesser nature of damage thus involved. Whether practitioners of ethnic violence harm the property or the very person of ethnic others has important implications for the command.

The second characteristic is somewhat more abstract and concerns the scale of the violence used. Again, there is an intuitive sense in which violence that aims to systematically destroy a group or their property is different from that which is more sporadic. The difference might be between Hitler’s “factories of death” and particular killings of individual Jews in the Weimar republic, for instance. The “messages” sent by these acts were very different. Therefore, this division between a few and many targets constitutes the second characteristic of ethnic violence.

When these two axes are juxtaposed to one another we get four distinct types of ethnic violence. Each of the “messages” listed above corresponds to these types of violence. These types and their meanings are displayed in figure 1.2 below:
This gives four distinct forms of violence which I name as Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre. These forms of violence express qualitatively different “messages” to the target group and so underlying group relations. I assume that there is a hierarchy of negative action implicit in the typology, so that some acts of violence are more severe than others. Symbolic Violence is the least severe, followed by Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre. Although this concept of severity is not the distinction that motivates the typology, it is one to which I refer later in the text. Below I offer some examples of these types of violence.

A good example of symbolic violence is the case of paramilitary murals in Northern Ireland. According to Rolston (2004: 118), Loyalist murals glorifying the achievements of William of Orange and depicting Protestants in mythological form first appeared about 100 years ago, at roughly the start of agitation for Home Rule. Because murals were a reaction to the agitation of the Irish for equality, the implication is that the
artists consciously designed these murals to instruct the Catholic minority to cower\textsuperscript{13} as suited their inferior position on the ethnic hierarchy. Indeed, one paramilitary argued that murals are necessary “because people forget,”\textsuperscript{14} implying an intention to evoke awareness of difference and casting it in terms of inferiority.

One may object that this is reading too much meaning into the act: graffiti is simple “fun”\textsuperscript{15} and so not a form of violence. If this happens to denigrate ethnic others, then it may simply be because that was at the front of the artist’s mind when they began to draw. However, such an objection misunderstands the basis of the typology: it is not intentions that order the types but the message that the society picks up. One can hardly draw a swastika on a wall in a black neighborhood and not provoke an outcry. Symbolic Violence instructs its victims to cower, reminding them of their difference and less-honored status.

Lynching is a term that refers to violence aimed at a few people and is most commonly associated with the Deep South. Despite the associations the term has today, however, it did not originally refer solely to murder. As a phenomenon, it dated back at least as far as the American Revolution and “referred to a variety of forms of punishment, including beating, whipping, tar and feathering, and, only occasionally, killing.”\textsuperscript{16} All of these were punishments aimed at the body, at the actual person, rather than at their property. Therefore, any attack on a person’s body could be called a lynching. Further,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{13} See Rolston, B. (2004: 121) when he quotes leader of the Black Caucus in the United States Donald Payne- reacting to attempts to portray celebrations of Orange culture as defences of Human Rights- as saying “these [Orange] marches have been symbols of intimidation and oppression” (my emphasis). So-called symbolic violence had at its heart the intention to intimidate.
\textsuperscript{14} Stewart, P. & Strathern, A. (2002), p.186
\textsuperscript{15} Halsey, M. & Young, A. (2006: 281). Their conclusions on this were from interviews conducted with a group of non-ethnic graffiti artists in Australia. Even in this context, however, the psychological desire to “interrupt our sense of the familiar” (297) and own space emerged as a strong motive. Rather than constituting an objection to my typology, then, this observation actually argues in favor of my contention.
\textsuperscript{16} Markovitz, J. (2004), p.xxiii
\end{flushleft}
perpetrators of a lynching focused only on few targets, normally just one individual held responsible for an alleged violation of the norms of Southern society, often accusations of murder or rape. The message sent by lynchings was that violators from a particular group were subject to vigilante justice and so had better behave.

Similarly, one might describe the 1922 assassination of German Jew Walter Rathenau after negotiations on the Versailles treaty as a “lynching.” Rathenau was detested by Rightist forces in Germany at this time due to the humiliating terms of the treat of Versailles. The assassins considered Rathenau an example of the negative impact of Jewish involvement in the political life of Germany. By shooting him in Paris, they sent a message informing Jews all over the Reich not to get involved in government or they would be punished. In so doing, violence hardened the boundaries separating Germans and Jews.

Pogroms concentrate on the property of an ethnic minority and attack many targets. These violent actions command the target group to “leave!” the area. While some physical injuries may occur to people in the wake of a pogrom, I assume that these are the result of property-owners trying to defend their livelihoods and not the perpetrators’ first target. There are many targets because all the property of the target group is potentially at risk, no logic being apparent to the selection of targets save the fact that they belong to the other group. Pogroms demonstrate the unwillingness of the majority group to tolerate the presence of the minority any longer and so mark attempts to force them out, to make them “leave!”

18 Kershaw, I. (1998), p.174; 663n Rathenau’s assassination sparked fears of a general threat to the constitutional order of the regime
This proposed meaning to a pogrom gains support from the etymological origin of the word. Originally a Russian term, the stem of the term погром (pogrom) is the verb гремить (gremiit) and the noun гром (grom), which mean to thunder and thunder respectively.\(^\text{19}\) This implies a general sense of intimidation that causes one to flee, thunder and lightning being inescapable by any other means. Pogroms re-create the sense of intimidation felt in such a circumstance and so send a message to the ethnic targets that they should leave. In this sense, then, the implied meaning to “pogroms” is consistent with the origins of the word.

Moreover, there are historical examples of where pogrom-style violence actually forced people to leave the community: In 1938 the infamous Nazi pogrom Kristallnacht destroyed around 100 synagogues and at least 8000 shops\(^\text{20}\) causing 80’000 Jews to flee Germany from 1938 until the beginning of the war.\(^\text{21}\) Once pogroms had been sanctioned by the state and the German people had risen all across the Reich to damage Jewish property, the Jews got the message and the number of applications for emigration increased exponentially.

Similarly, Donald Horowitz (2001: 434-6) gives evidence that rioters in Bombay destroyed the homes of Bangladeshis and destroyed another time once they has been rebuilt. He also provides slogans displayed during riots such as “Bongal Kheda ! [Drive out the Bengalis]”, “Russians get out… a war has begun.”\(^\text{22}\) Whatever the objectives of the rioters were, the message they sent to Bangladeshis was that they should leave and

\(^{19}\) See any Russian-English dictionary for verification. The one I used was Romanov, A. (1975), p.78. I thank Professor Ted Hopf for suggesting this to me.
never return. De-colonization also witnessed many such examples of forced separation as people left their homes for neighboring “homeland” states. Clearly, therefore, the experience of a pogrom is meant to instruct an ethnic group to leave the country and present evidence of the dangers of not complying.

The final space on my typology is filled by what I term “massacre”. Massacres are both concerned with killing actual people and many people, as all members of the target group are liable to be persecuted. In some ways this form of violence both contains a message and is that message, as the judgment is enforced upon a group. However, if we are to attribute a message to this form of violence in order to be consistent with the other types, then the only command it could contain would be “perish!” Examples are thankfully rare and the most well-known are those of a large scale, such as the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide of 1915.23 Smaller-scale massacres might include the Zulu custom of exterminating rival tribes defeated in battle.24 Massacres communicate the “message” of perish by enforcing that judgment on the victims.

One might object that this typology leaves some instance of ethnic violence rather hard to place.25 For example, it is not obvious where mass ethnic rape would fall on it. Rape, or sexual degradation of others is frequent in ethnic conflict26 and as a meaningful

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24 Arendt says that “extermination had been the rule in all African native wars, and it was not abolished when a black leader happened to unite several tribes under his leadership.” (1994: 192)
25 This violates George & Bennet’s (2004: 238) advice that typological theories should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
26 See the UN report on Sexual Violence (2006: 9) where the President of Liberia Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf said that in the 14 years of Civil War in her country, over half of the country’s women aged 18-30 had been victims of rape. Dara Cohen (unpublished) challenges the belief that rape is used in a majority of ethnic conflicts, but does not disagree with the idea that conflicts are sometimes characterized by rape. In recent years, rapes have been recorded in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda.
action should have a place on my typology. However, it is rather a hard case to place for two reasons. First, there is confusion over whether sexual crimes are fundamentally those against property or people. Such crimes usually take place against the female members of an ethnic group and the “message” that would be sent would be dependent on the particular cultural understanding of those women. Second, it is not clear whether the picture gains from the introduction of a gender dimension, aside from complexity. Because while rape can be a form of ethnic violence, it is also a gender crime and “not just something a man does to a woman (although it is that); it is something men do to women.” For both these reasons, therefore, I do not assign rape a place on my typology and admit that it causes conceptual problems.

Similarly, one may object that mass violent action— for example, a pogrom— will contain some damage to people as well. How does one decide in which category they belong? Kristallnacht caused millions of marks worth of damage to Jewish property the Jews and the deaths of 100 Jews. Where does it belong on the typology, therefore— as a pogrom or a massacre? While I admit the validity of this criticism that fitting events in the typology is necessarily a matter for interpretation, I respond with two observations. First, Kristallnacht was a series of pogroms all across Germany and so should be counted as many, not one. In those cases where deaths occurred, the analyst would have to decide

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27 This idea is brought forward in Nietzsche (1989: Kaufman, Ed: 64) when he is discussing the origin of the idea of guilt: “the debtor made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he would substitute something else that he ‘possessed’, something he had control over; for example his body, his wife”. This is also illustrated by the fact that until recently women surrendered many rights when they married. For instance, until recently it was not even possible for a man to rape his wife (see Burgess-Jackson, 1999: 92-117), which implies that women renounced control of themselves when they entered the marriage contract.

28 Indeed, the idea was raised that maybe the meaning of rape depends on the status of women in a society so that in principle it could fit any one of the boxes on my typology. I thank Caleb Gallemore for suggesting this idea to me.


whether those specific events constituted massacre. Second, and a more general point to that just made, each specific case will have its own circumstances that should inform the coding rubric of the analyst. I provide these for my test case- contemporary Russia- in the next chapter.

With this section, I have finished elaborating my typology of ethnic violence. Starting from the intuitively plausible observation that different kinds of violence send qualitatively different messages to victims, I developed a parsimonious typology which followed the advice of George & Bennett (2004: 238) that typologies be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The typology has two axes: whether violence focuses upon property or people and the number of targets involved in violence, whether few or many. The juxtaposition of these two dyads generated four types of violence: symbolic violence, lynching, pogrom and massacre. In the next section, I propose an empirical case in which all four of these types of violence are present, the Russian Federation.

1.2: Ethnic violence in the Russian Federation

The question of why there are different forms of ethnic violence is very broad. In order to make it more tractable, the theory should focus in upon a few cases of violence and preferably one which has all four forms of violence. An exemplary case comes from the Russian Federation, where racist skinheads have been attacking ethnic minorities using all four of the forms of violence on the typology in particular manners. This means that the question now becomes one of why Russian skinheads use different forms of violence. By focusing in on a single case, I hope to render the problem more tractable. In this section I provide the background for and a broad description of skinhead violence
in Russia and justify this choice of case. I then turn to the criticism of whether theories
generated in just one country will in principle be generalizable to other circumstances. I
conclude the chapter with an overview of the dissertation.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Russia were suddenly brought into a world where the discourse of nationality reigns supreme.\textsuperscript{31} The Soviet Union had existed with a formal policy of the “friendship of the peoples.” National partiality was an atavism only found in the capitalist world. It came as some great shock, then, when nationalist revolutions that had only begun in 1989 brought the Soviet Union to an end on Christmas Day 1991. Nationalism stood triumphant over its slain enemy of international socialism. From this corpse 13 new nation-states would rise to find acceptance in the world.

Yet for some peoples this event marked the first time they had ever been asked to conceive of themselves as modern sovereign nations. For perhaps the first time in its history, Russia had to conceive of itself as a nation-state and not an empire. This debate over the nature of Russian identity still lingers on today in the confusion over the correct term for Russians: \textit{Rosski} (ethnic Russian) or \textit{Rossianie} (citizen of the Russian state). There was also disagreement over the purpose of the state. Among some there was nostalgia for the Soviet Union and the esteem belonging to an empire. Others claimed that as a homeland state Russia had a duty to protect fellow Russian-language speakers in the newly independent countries which had formerly belonged to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} See Ozkirimli, U. (2005: 5-7)
\textsuperscript{32} One of the most memorable cases of this was Estonia, where the authorities passed a law requiring proficiency in Estonian as a pre-requisite for citizenship. As a Finno-Ugric language, Estonian is a completely different language family to Russian and would be next to impossible for many Russian-speakers to learn by the time required. The net effect of this law was thus to de-nationalize millions of Russian-speaking Estonians. See Laitin, D. (1998) for more details.
Scholars around the world began to whisper of “Weimar Russia” and the possibility of a return to the 1930s.

While these fears have not (yet) come to pass, in one respect at least Russia does resemble Weimar Germany: Skinhead or neo-Nazi (the two are synonyms) violence. Skinheads frequently use violence against their opponents: ethnic minorities; Human Rights activists; and anti-fascist Russian youth. For example, in 2001 around 100 skinheads launched an assault on the Tsaritsino market in Moscow where Caucasian traders work. In 2004 skinheads shot and killed researcher on racism Nikolai Girenko in his apartment. Attacks on the Russian “anti-fa” movement are a regular occurrence. Disturbing incidents like these have resurrected the ghost of Weimar and prompted the international newspaper ‘The Economist’ to speculate that Russia is in danger of sliding into fascism. Indeed, in 2006 the United Nations sent the special rapporteur on ethnic violence, Doudou Dienne, to Moscow to assess the situation. Ethnic violence is rife in the country that defeated Hitler.

Moreover there are other reasons why skinhead violence in the Russian Federation is a good place in which to develop and test theories about the different forms of ethnic violence. First among these is the fact that Russia evidences all four kinds of violence outlined in the typology within a single country. This has enormous advantages as it allows us to rule out a number of explanations from the start. The variations we see

33 See Brubaker, R. (1996: 107-147). Brubaker identifies three similarities between Weimar Germany and contemporary Russia: the recent loss of empire and great power status; a new focus on homeland nationalism; and fellow language-speakers in newly independent states.
36 See http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,674718-1,00.html for more details, including the description of Russia’s neo-Nazi movement as “a white man’s al-Qaeda”.
37 The Hardest Word (381: 8499: pp.55-6)
cannot be caused by (national-level) institutions, culture or economics. By locating the
study in just one country, the number of possible explanations is reduced and the analysis
is simplified.

A second reason- and one just as important as the last- is that Russia presents one
of the clearest cases of an unequal numerical relationship between the ethnic majority and
minorities. This implies that the use of particular forms of violence is a matter of free
choice and is not forced on the perpetrators by either the makeup of the country or cycles
of retaliation. According to the CIA world factbook,\(^{38}\) 79.8% of the population of the
Russian Federation in 2002 was ethnically Russian whereas the largest minority group-
the Tatars- constituted 3.8% of the population. While it would be false to say that all
Russians condone ethnic violence perpetrated by the skinheads, it is fair to say that this
case represents one which is less likely to be susceptible to retaliatory spirals and
escalations of violence.

Continuing this last point is the observation that while skinhead violence is at
high levels, it is not (yet) so extreme that it threatens the unity of the state or the
possibility of a coup d’etat. Skinhead violence is still low-level, meaning that it is
repeated and there are numerous cases for the analyst to process. Such features should
make the patterns that exist easier to discern. Further, because the skinhead groups are
still active and violence is ongoing there is the rare chance of gaining insight into the
process of violence as it is being produced. Finally, the relatively low levels of violence
mean that research- ethnographic and archival- is not so dangerous as to be non-feasible,

\(^{38}\) See the profile on “Russia” in https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
The figures are taken from the Russian census of 2002.
although to be sure researchers still have to be extremely careful. One can still go to Russia and carry out interviews with violent perpetrators. For all these reasons, therefore, Russian skinhead violence represents an excellent case on which to carry out research as to why there are different forms of ethnic violence.

One criticism that such a focus will face, however, is the criticism that such a focus will only yield insights into ethnic violence perpetrated by Russian skinheads. In order for research to be relevant, critics will say, we need to construct generalizable theories. Rather than quasi-journalistic accounts of ethnic violence in particular countries, we want to uncover processes and mechanisms that are independent of particular instances that can be applied to all cases. Because I am focusing upon ethnic violence in Russia, one could object that the utility of my theory remains limited solely to Russia.

I respond to this criticism with a twin rebuttal. First, generalizations I make will cover the entire skinhead/neo-Nazi movement around the globe and not just in Russia. Given that there are sickeningly neo-Nazi movements in practically every European country and in the United States the immediate findings of this theory could be applied to these neo-Nazi movements in other countries as well. It would certainly be useful to be able to predict what form of violence racists around the world might use. Second, this concern with the particular instance of ethnic violence promises to reveal generalizable mechanisms in principle applicable to other situations as well. Of course, it is an

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39 Indeed, one of the most hair-raising of my research experiences in Russia occurred following an interview with a member of the People’s National Party. Before the interview, the interviewee had requested a photograph of me to be sent across the internet. I presumed this was because he wanted to be able to identify me at the meeting place. However, I did not want this person to have my photograph, so I said I had none on my computer. After the interview, he pulled out a camera and took a picture of us both—the need to be polite meaning I didn’t feel I could refuse. Since this incident, however, I was stopped on several occasions by skinheads and told to “be careful”. While I have no proof that the events are connected I believe they were.
empirical question as to whether they actually do explain other situations, but that is a matter for future research. Therefore, for both reasons- the widespread nature of neo-Nazism in our world and the prospect of finding generalizable mechanisms- I do not consider the criticism of the generalizability of the theory to be a major problem.

1.3 Conclusion

Why do Russian skinheads use different forms of violence in attacking their targets? Why do skinheads focus on the property of some targets and the actual members of ethnic groups in others? What determines the size and intensity of the violence? These are the questions which forms the basis for this dissertation. They promise to yield insights into the more general question of why there are different forms of ethnic violence at all. Understanding the process by which different forms of ethnic violence come about promises a theoretical Klondike of return on insights into ethnicity, ethnic violence and the logic of group insights. In this introductory chapter I have argued for a typology of ethnic violence which understands it as expressing certain “messages.” I have also argued that the worrying rise of neo-Nazi ideology in Russia presents an excellent opportunity to answer this question.

I will argue that stereotypes of other ethnic groups orchestrate the production of particular forms of ethnic violence. The next chapter reviews the literature and illustrates the contribution that my research will make to our understanding of the phenomenon of “ethnic violence.” I argue that present works ignore the motivations of the perpetrators in explaining violence and so cannot be considered satisfactory causal accounts of violence. Chapter three then develops my own theory which builds on insights found in Donald
Horowitz’s work and was developed through ethnographic fieldwork I carried out with skinhead gangs in Moscow in 2006 and 2007. This theory places the stereotypical understanding of ethnic others at the center of any explanation.

Chapter four tests this theory and its competitors implied by the literature review against a database of skinhead attacks in Russia from 2001-2008. The data clearly demonstrate that the form of violence skinheads use is *characteristically* associated by ethnic group. This is backed up by qualitative analysis of the cases themselves and further analysis shows that just four groups exemplify each particular form of violence: Jews, African, Caucasians, and Gypsies. Chapter five tests the mechanism specified in chapter three against its rivals with a content analysis of skinhead media. I also supplement this analysis with the analysis of interviews conducted with neo-Nazis. Once again, my theory outperforms its rivals. I then make a preliminary venture into how far these images are shared in the mass media.

Chapter six provides two further tests of the theory with case studies of the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai and the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006. These case studies are also used as plausibility probes to test the generality of the explanation. The fact that the theory works in these two cases as well as in the case of skinheads in Russia suggests that it might have more general application. Chapter seven concludes this research, pointing to future avenues along which the analysis might proceed. Before we get ahead of ourselves, however, the next chapter concentrates on operationalizing and analyzing the Dependent Variable.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Although the literature on ethnic violence is vast, there is a dearth of attention to causes of different forms of ethnic violence. No theory explicitly addresses the question of why ethnic violence takes different forms. This provides an opportunity to add to our knowledge on the process of ethnic violence. That said, some existing theories imply answers to this question, reasons as to why the form of violence differs. For example, Donald Horowitz (2001), Michael Mann (2005), and Benjamin Valentino (2004) each compare a particular form of ethnic violence in different circumstances. Others offer theories of particular cases of ethnic violence (see, for example, Goldhagen [1997] or Gagnon [2004]) and hint why they think ethnic violence takes on particular forms. In doing so, extrapolations of these theories provide possible explanations for the puzzle. This chapter reviews the literature both to show its contribution and possible hypotheses explaining different forms of ethnic violence.

The literature on ethnic violence is vast, even focusing on that most relevant to this project (Alexseev 1999; Azrael & Payin, 1998; Beissinger, 2001; Brubaker, 1996; Drobizheva, 1991; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Gagnon, 2004; Goldhagen, 1999; Horowitz, 2001). Donald Horowitz makes the case that different “deadly ethnic riots” which occur in various situations are comparable phenomena. Similarly, Benjamin Valentino argues that mass ethnic killings in different situations follow the same causal pattern. This is also the assumption behind the Journal of Genocide Research, which compares situations of genocide to draw out important causal patterns common to them all. By focusing on one form of violence, these studies implicitly acknowledge that the form of violence is important (if not, why compare only violent episodes of this type?) yet they also assume that these violent episodes are only comparable with similar events. While these are undoubtedly worthy studies, this makes the inattention to comparing different forms of violence even more surprising.
1986, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006; Kaufman, 2001; Laitin, 1998; Palmer, 1998; Pain, 1994, 1996, 2004; Petersen, 2002; Ross, 2007; Snyder, 2000; Sternberg, 2003; Tilly, 2003; Tishkov, 1996, 1997, 2003; Valentino, 2004; Varshney, 2002). In that sample, I found no work which focuses explicitly on the question of why violence takes different forms. Instead the research concentrates on separatism or “ethnic war” as an ill-defined concept. The result is that all forms of “ethnic violence” are grouped together. Consequently, the means by which individuals are actually moved to commit particular acts of ethnic violence is reduced to an assumption and is not theorized. This chapter provides an overview of the literature on ethnic violence relevant to this project.

The next section of the chapter elaborates on a common assumption made by theorists of violence, namely unproblematic cooperation under conditions of ethnicity. I then show how this flaw has its origin in the concept of causal depth. Using the concept of causal depth, I argue that the literature can be divided between proximate and distal causes. Section 2.2 deals with the distal theories of ethnic violence and infers hypotheses that explain why ethnic violence takes different forms. Section 2.3 repeats this process with those “proximate” theories of violence and identifies a promising theory. Section 2.4 provides a conclusion. In the next chapter, I develop one of the suggested explanations into my own theory of ethnic violence, showing how it fills the theoretical hole left by others. Chapters four and five test my theory and its competitors taken from this chapter.
2.1: Assumed Cooperation

Contemporary studies of ethnic violence assume that cooperation among perpetrators of ethnic violence is automatic and so do not theorize the ways in which violent acts (let alone different forms) are produced. It is taken as a matter of course that “ancient hatreds” may mobilize people to commit hideous acts of violence, or that unscrupulous politicians can mobilize passive masses in their own interest. Yet the exact manner in which this is achieved has yet to be explicitly theorized and tested. This section demonstrates how this assumption, which comes from the ontological debate over the nature of “ethnicity,” has left a hole in the literature. I begin by recounting the primordial-constructivist dichotomy of ethnicity and show how each fails to specify exactly how ethnicity aids cooperation. I then link this to the concept of causal depth.

Current studies of ethnic violence usually divide on the question of whether ethnic allegiances come from primordial loyalties or constructed identities. The primordial school of thought argues that ethnic groups are the “natural kinds” of the human species, coherent entities throughout history. Ethnic identity is part of the metaphysics of humanity and something that cannot be altered. Under the extreme version of this perspective, contemporary ethnic groups are the direct descendants of their forebears and linked by an invisible chain back to the past. This paradigm posits “ethnicity” as something imprinted in genetic codes and passed seamlessly from one generation to the next, a “primordial” loyalty.

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41 Gellner, E. (1983: 49) argues against those who invoke a “political version of the doctrine of natural kinds” in order to explain nationalism and ethnicity. The doctrine of natural kinds suggests that certain objects in the world appear to us as Nature designed them and are naturally occurring types, such as molecules, dogs or water (see Wendt, A., 1999: 58-60 for more on the doctrine of natural kinds). Gellner’s observation is that nations are not the “natural kinds” of the political world in the same way molecules are the natural kinds of the physical world.
The primordialist comprehension of ethnicity is usually incorporated into “Ancient Hatreds” explanations of ethnic violence. Under this paradigm, ethnic hatreds are so vicious and lasting that they must have some foundation in the ancient past. For people to hate so much that they are willing to commit violent acts, there must be a historically evolved reason. The focus of these theories thus lies on explaining the source of that hatred, with the assumption that if the hatred can be explained then so too can violence. A good example of this is Goldhagen’s (1996) theory of the Holocaust, where he argues that the “eliminationist anti-Semitism” which evolved in nineteenth-century Germany motivated ordinary twentieth-century Germans to commit genocide. However, Goldhagen fails to say how this eliminationist anti-Semitism caused ordinary Germans to choose to kill Jews, only that it did so.

Conversely, the constructivist paradigm argues that ethnic identities are the product of contingent human action. The meta-theoretical basis for this paradigm is the axiom that truths are “illusions of which we have forgotten they are illusions.”42 What we hold to be true is nothing more than the skeletal remains of an ancient statement, repeated so often it has come to seem like a component of the world. There is nothing necessary about the categories which human beings use to categorize the world: these categories are not ‘in the nature of things.’ Mankind has created the reality under which they operate. The classic work of the constructivist school is Berger & Luckmann’s

42 See Nietzsche, F. (2004: 146) for more details. These two- primordial and social constructivist-ontological positions on the nature of ethnic identity may be related to the Enlightenment and Nietzsche’s reaction to it. Under Enlightenment or essentialist thinking the Socratic notion of “essences” dominated the intellectual world. Ethnicity had to be real as people operated within the bounds it set every day. Nietzsche led the reaction to the Enlightenment which challenged the vision of a singular objective reality. Instead, perspective held an important place in our comprehension of the world: “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be.” (Nietzsche, F. 1989: 119) With such a venerable pedigree, this debate has links back to other areas of social science.
(1966) work, *The Social Construction of Reality*. Here the authors present an argument which explains how human beings can come to forget their own agency in creating the world through the process of reification. Indeed, “reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world”\(^\text{43}\) and this forgetting means that people comprehend the world as a preternatural entity. Although categories have a human origin, they come to look like a product of nature and not man. This paradigm has been used to understand a plethora of social identities including, nationalism\(^\text{44}\) and ethnic violence.

Some theorists have extended the social constructivist paradigm to argue that elites can consciously manipulate identities to provoke conflict.\(^\text{45}\) Under this view, known as political constructivism or instrumentalism, elites cause people to commit crimes on the basis of their ‘ethnicity’ through manipulating the meaning of “ethnic” identification. Examples in the literature reviewed include Milosevic in Yugoslavia and contemporary Russian elites. Because instrumentalists concentrate on the actions of elites in propagating a message of ethnic antipathy, they assume that these images drive perpetrators to commit acts of violence. This may be so, but exactly how this process works is left untheorized. As with the primordialist paradigm, we are left with the assumption that images cause appalling acts of violence. Neither paradigm explains how particular acts of ethnic violence occur.

\(^\text{43}\) Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1966: 89)
\(^\text{44}\) For an example, see Anderson, B. (2003: 163-186) where he talks about how innovations of the colonial governments were appropriated by the nationalist regimes in South Asia.
\(^\text{45}\) Rogers Brubaker (2004: 12-3) stresses the difference between the categories we use to analyze the world and “groups.” Categories are conceptually prior to the groups they may become, categories being “at best a potential basis for group-formation or ‘groupness.’” Asking how people “do things with categories” - one result of which may in fact be to strengthen “groupness” - leads to the instrumentalist or political constructivist approach.
This common assumption results, I contend, from an inattention to the notion of causal depth. “Causal depth”\^{46} is a term referring to the intuition that theories explain outcomes at different degrees of conceptual distance from the occurrence itself. This is best explained by using the analogy of the morning newspaper: our explanatory variables of how it got to our front doormat might include the paperboy or the local newsagent where he works, but deeper causes would be the journalists, the news sources and even the actions of other men which make news. Each of these elements had a role to play in the morning news ending up on our breakfast table, but they explain at different distances from the end result itself: in order to link them together, we need a causal chain. I demonstrate how this is missing in theories of ethnic violence after introducing the two levels of “causal depth.”

Formally, this is the notion that some theories are *proximate* whereas others are *distal*. Proximate theories specify explanatory variables that are very close to the outcome they try to explain. In the above example, they would focus on the paperboy. Distal theories, on the other hand, specify explanatory variables not obviously related to the outcome we are trying to explain. Their concentration would be on the journalists or the events which “cause” the news. The problem with distal explanations is that they do not explain exactly how the events they describe influence the outcome. While they do not need to do so, distal theories often “lack an adequate micro-logic and are therefore unacceptable as explanatory accounts.”\^{47} For such mundane regularities as the morning newspaper, this is not important. However, for social science theories the issue is one of great importance.

\^{47} Kitschelt, H. (1999: 11)
Causal depth is an issue of great importance due to the concept of explanatory value. Explanatory value is the idea that we want our theories to tell us something useful about the world. Theories that explain action by reference to a component of that action itself do not tell us very much worth knowing: “how much explanation is there if we know that bank robberies take place because that is where they keep the money?”

When our theories explain events only by recourse to the exceedingly obvious, then they have low explanatory value and are close to tautology. Knowing that the paperboy is the cause of morning papers is true but uninteresting.

The distal counterparts of proximate theories suffer from a different flaw. While these theories reveal many new and interesting things about the world, they do not join the causal dots. To put it in the parlance used previously, distal causes are high on explanatory value but lack a micro-logic. They tend to present conceptually interesting explanations of events that are not necessarily intuitive. They are “‘long distance’ [accounts of] causality [that] span centuries and postulate transformation rules between social structures.” To return to our running analogy, they would focus on the events in other countries as a cause of the morning newspaper.

The problem is that when these two kinds of explanation are pitted one against the other in statistical regressions, theories with greater attention to proximate variables nearly always outperform their more distal counterparts. Indeed, when these theories are pitted against one another “it is likely that temporally prior, ‘deeper’ causes ‘wash out’ in the hunt to find a statistically efficient explanation of some outcome.”

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newspapers came from the same paperboy, whereas only a selection of the articles came from a single journalist. In looking for statistical indicators of political outcomes there is a bias to the more proximate explanation, privileging explanations that tell us very little.

This does not just present obstacles but also poses an intellectual danger. There is the danger of constructing false dichotomies, ‘either-or’ situations, between theories that are not necessarily opposed. Theories with varying degrees of causal depth are not logically opposed to one another precisely because of the concept of causal depth. For example, one theory could provide the efficient mechanism for the morning news and the other the cause that brought the mechanism into being, say the field-journalists or regional news agency. It would be ridiculous to say that the positive correlation of paper boys meant that field-journalists could not be the cause of the morning news. If we fail to consider the concept of causal depth, then theories that do not in principle contradict each other may appear to do so.

How does this discussion relate to theories of ethnic violence? First, this explains why no theory has explicitly answered my question in the past. The concentration on producing explanations of great seeming value explains how the mechanism that produces violence has been overlooked. Ancient Hatred theorists, quick to defend the importance of their work, have not shown how the hatreds they discuss cause the violent episodes they claim. Instrumentalists do not explain how manipulative elites stoke up the passions of their ethnic pawns. Consequently, extant theories only imply answers to my question. Second, the Ancient Hatreds and Instrumentalist literatures are not logically contradictory. The assumptions of one paradigm do not necessarily dismiss observations from the other. “Ancient Hatreds” may themselves be constructed. Third, the discussion
of causal depth has revealed a need to explain “chains of causation.”\textsuperscript{50} In order for our theory to tell us something interesting, it needs to link distal causes through a chain of intervening variables to the outcome.

Therefore, I do not discard explanations from either distal or proximate paradigms a priori but instead seek hypotheses from each of them to explain causes of different forms of ethnic violence. However, this division between distal and proximate theories forms the basis of a critique of the existing literature.\textsuperscript{51} The division is based on the distance of the explanatory variables from the perpetrators of violence: do theories focus on the perpetrators or not? Section 2.4 deals with those proximate theories that show clearly how the putative cause leads to violence. I demonstrate how these theories bid to gain explanatory value by seeking the historical origins of Ancient Hatreds. In the next section I turn to the distal (Instrumentalist) theories of ethnic violence and ask how they would answer my question.

\textbf{2.3 Distal Approaches To Ethnic Violence}

Distal theories of ethnic violence offer explanations which are not obviously linked to the phenomenon they seek to explain. They fail to show how the cause they stipulate produces acts of violence. Yet the explanations they offer are interesting because they are not close to the outcome and so may open our awareness to ‘new facts.’ The next section reviews the proximate literature and develops hypotheses from the

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 12
\textsuperscript{51} It should be noted that this binary classification is not absolute and some of the theories grouped under the same category will not logically exclude each other either. Not all distal theories are equally distant nor all proximate theories equally proximate. Nevertheless, I utilize this division for the sake of simplicity and because it identifies an important cleavage in the literature.
theories. This section interrogates distal explanations of violence looking for answers to the question of why violence takes different forms. I divide the literature into ideational, capacity, manipulation, and structural approaches.

The ideational approach centers its explanation for violence on the ideas which define an epoch. For example, Mann (2005) argues that “murderous ethnic cleansing is modern, because it is the dark side of democracy.”

Mass murder results from the confusion of two terms: *ethnos* (defined as a group of people joined by a common culture) and *demos* (a group of people joined by common class position). In its modern form democracy, according to Mann, became a possibility after the impact of the salvation religions that established conceptual equality between all worshippers of the same religion regardless of class. Democracy appeared in Northwestern Europe as a corollary of this equality and became a way of solving antagonistic class relations between people who lived in the same state regardless of ethnicity. Indeed, “after 1688 in Britain all mainstream property owners were confirmed as political citizens—whether they spoke English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic.”

However, in the rest of the world (with a few exceptions, including the United States) these terms “ethnos” and “demos” became confused. The poly-ethnic empires of the past had an ethnic division of labor which meant that class and ethnicity were

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52 Mann, M. (2005: 2- his emphasis). Good examples of liberal democracies doing this are the American policy as regards native Americans and the British policy in Tazmania.

53 He says that “with the emergence of salvation religions preaching that people of all classes and regions had the same soul and the same capacity for salvation. This democratized the sacred but not the secular realm of society” (Mann, 2005: 36-7).

54 See Mann, M. (2005: 60). Of course, one can critique Mann for asserting the position that religion is not similar to ethnicity—the common Protestantism of Britain may have worked as a substitute for common ethnicity for example. However, this criticism does not impact greatly on his argument apart from suggesting ways in which ethnic conflict can either be avoided or solved.
inseparable.\textsuperscript{55} Conquered peoples were all reduced to the level of the working class. The result was that when the group struggled for freedom, they did so along ethnically homogenous lines. Retaliatory measures to continue ideational separation of the dominant and subaltern groups attempted to do so through discrimination, cultural suppression, and ultimately murderous cleansing based on the dominant group’s understanding of the minority.

The implication of this theory is that perpetrators’ different comprehension of other groups leads them to use alternative violent methods to attack the victims. How someone thinks of her victim determines her action. This implication is incorporated into Mann’s typology which features ‘levels’ of cleansing- partial and total- that correspond to forms of violence such as cultural suppression, forced sterilization, pogrom and rape.\textsuperscript{56} The actual form of violence perpetrators use depends first and foremost on the perpetrators’ understanding of the nature of the minority within the state: when understood as a class or a religion, forcible coercion or conversion will be tried; but when that minority is understood as an ethnic group or race then the only option is murderous cleansing because conversion is not enough to change their identity.

This strikes one as inherently plausible, but the theory suffers from two major flaws. First, because Mann does not theorize or test how these conceptions of ethnic groups lead to violence, we have no idea of how it works. There is no knowing, for example, whether these different comprehensions of minority groups justify different treatments to violent actors or whether the action stems from their own self-perception.

\textsuperscript{55} See Mann, M. (2005: 55-61)
\textsuperscript{56} Indeed, this reminds one of Arendt’s observation that “anti-Semitism, a secular nineteenth-century ideology- which in name, though not in argument, was unknown before the 1870s- and religious Jew-hatred, inspired by the mutually hostile antagonism of two conflicting creeds, are obviously not the same”(1994, xi)
This inattention to the mechanism shows the extremely distal nature of the theory. Speaking in terms of historical epochs is good for a grand theory of ethnic violence but weak on predictions in individual cases and can say nothing about non-cases. The second problem is that Mann’s theory assumes that certain forms of violence are limited to given periods in history, because the dominant understanding of otherness is an historically limited phenomenon. Yet present-day Russia sees all 4 types of violence in the same historical period. Both weaknesses mean that this theory is ultimately unsuited to explaining multiple forms of violence in the same social setting, although the general ideas are promising ones which will be revisited by other theories in the next section. Therefore, I do not draw a hypothesis from this theory.

The capacity theory of Charles Tilly (2003) does not focus explicitly on ethnic violence but rather on all types of violence. His typology of violence is replicated in figure 2.1 below. He thinks that types of violence are comparable and he sees violence as “a kind of conversation, however brutal or one-sided that conversation might be.”

Different types of collective violence are comparable precisely because they require some degree of cooperation. Notwithstanding the focus on a larger population, his theory may imply answers for the question of ethnic violence. People resort to violence, he says, when “rising uncertainty spurs wielders of violent means on either side of an us-them boundary to direct their means of destruction at those on the boundary’s other side.”

His focus is on explaining types of violence rather than its forms.

57 Tilly, C. (2003: 6)
58 Tilly, C. (2003: 229)
59 I conceive of the difference in the following manner: A “type” of violence concerns the overall classification of a violent incident. Examples are civil war, protests against the government, and ethnic violence. The “form” of violence, on the other hand, refers to the exact manner in which violence is carried out, such as lynching or pogrom. There may be many forms within a single type.
The forces that generate different types of violence may also be responsible for the different forms and Tilly posits a central role for capacity of both perpetrators and the state. The type of violence depends on first, the extent of coordination among violent actors and second, the salience of short-run damage. The first variable is the extent of coordination among violent actors. This depends on how established the protesting group is. Certain groups which have cooperated over long time periods are more likely to produce better organized forms of violence, as they are more easily organized by violent entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{60}

The second variable, the salience of short-run damage, is determined by the capacity of the regime and the level of democracy within it. High capacity regimes “draw sharper lines between prescribed and tolerated claim-making processes on one side, and forbidden performances, on the other.” If the regime can enforce its will effectively, then the consequence of violence will be less severe. On the other hand, “democratic regimes (governmental capacity held constant) generally host fewer violence rituals than undemocratic regimes because they shelter fewer violent enclaves.” Because democracies allow open competition, they are less likely to shelter groups who may act against them. A high-capacity highly democratic regime will prevent actors from using the most destructive forms of violence. The type of collective violence can be determined from these variables and these types are shown in figure 2.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{60} Tilly, C. (2003: 92; 26-54)}
According to this approach, ethnic violence is a type of violent ritual where *ex ante* the extent of coordination among violent actors is high. Citing the Balkans as a case, Tilly (2003: 94-7) claims that the low capacity of the collapsing Yugoslavian state allowed violent entrepreneurs to stir up ethnic hatreds that caused violence. Entrepreneurs could easily mobilize ethnic groups to produce extreme forms of violence because ethnic groups were used to working together. The opportunity for them to do so was provided by a low state capacity after the fall of the Communist Party.

Once again, this theory obscures the actual process by which violence is produced and relegates it to the role of an assumption. It is assumed that all protagonists of violence have to do is “sharpen previously blurred us-them boundaries” and violence will

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61 Taken from Tilly, C. (2003: 15)
be the result. How this sharpening happens is not discussed\textsuperscript{62} and so is assumed not to be linked to violence at all. This is not to say this is not the correct causal path to violence only that this link is both not theorized and not tested. The result is that the manner in which this “sharpening” produces violence remains a mystery, yet the central variable in determining the type of violence—state capacity—is one which may yield insights into the production of violence.

The implication of this theory is that the form of violence will also be determined by regime capacity. The form of violence will be a reaction to the (in)ability of the state to prevent it. If a state is weak, then one will see massacres whereas strong states will be characterized by either no violence or only symbolic violence.\textsuperscript{63} This might be considered to be inapplicable to Russia because it is one state and so capacity should remain constant across it. However, Russia’s system of asymmetrical federalism means that it is made up of units which have differing levels of government capacity. National republics, for example, might be expected to have greater capacity than autonomous Okrugs. Region stands here as a proxy for state capacity. This is a testable implication of Tilly’s theory, so from it I draw hypothesis 1:

**Hypothesis 1** The form of violence is determined by the region in which the attack happens. Regions which have high-capacity states will be able to prevent the more severe forms of violence whereas those with low-capacity states will see the worst forms of violence.

\textsuperscript{62} Tilly, C. (2003: 230). In fairness, Tilly (2003: 16) says that he assumes this will not be important in explaining the form of violence: “variation in participants’ motives neither defines nor explains differences among the types of collective violence… the classification locates types of violence in terms of the social processes that generate them, not in terms of the motives and emotions carried by damage-doing people.”

\textsuperscript{63} Excepting, of course, those situations in which the state itself wants to pursue ethnic violence. In my mind, these fall under the category of “weak” states, because captured by a single party or ethnicity.
A variation on the capacity approach to understanding violence is the elite manipulation approach. Theories in this vein come from Gagnon (2004), Tishkov (1996; 1997; 2003), and Valentino (2004). At its extreme, this school of thought rejects the mass-nature of ethnic conflict and holds that public opinion does not matter. Elites consciously strive to change the meaning of ethnic identification and so stoke up conflict for their own purposes. Ethnic conflict can be explained as a result of elite interests to which the common man means very little. Just as with the other theories in this section however the mechanism by which elites cause violence is assumed and not subject to theorization or testing. Thus these theories do not explain why violence takes different forms although the implication is that the form of violence follows from orders.

First of these theories is that of Russian academic Valery Tishkov (1996; 1997; 2003). He focuses on “analyzing [the] role of elite elements capable of manipulating malleable masses”\(^64\) to explain the fall of the Soviet Union and applies this perspective to contemporary Russia. In contrast to many Russian academics, Tishkov views the primordial image of nations as homogeneous entities acting “with one voice and acting with one will”\(^65\) as incorrect. Ethnic groups and nations (presumably, all social groups) are such diverse and multi-faceted phenomena that although there may be some degree of memory common to them, it is insufficient to provoke action in the present.

Yet despite his discounting of such primordial conceptions of ethnicity, he assumes and so naturalizes the concept in his theory. According to Tishkov, elites create

\(^64\) Tishkov, V. (1997: 155)
\(^65\) Tishkov, V. (1997: 45). He argues that this view is itself a holdover from the Soviet times, which understood nations in a primordial fashion as the natural divisions of mankind. By considering nations as ‘hard’ social realities the Soviets laid the seeds for their own destruction as the reified social reality of nationhood (between 1926 and 1989 the number of official classifications of nations increased exponentially) became the basis for political mobilization of those dissatisfied with Communist rule (1-22).
negative conceptions of ethnic others through speech acts but why this has to be ethnic others (as opposed to other others) is unclear. For example, in explaining the Ingush-Ossetian conflict he says that the Ingush nationalist manifesto “bristles with highly emotional remarks to inflame the popular consciousness”; in North Ossetia there were “strongly negative stereotypes”; and in central Russia there were claims that “with the exodus of the Russians, the whole society is becoming more primitive.” There is no explanation of why these speech acts have to be and are aimed against ethnic groups (as opposed to any other kind of group, such as class). More importantly for our purposes, he offers no insight into exactly how these “highly emotional remarks” motivate conflict.

Nor does Gagnon’s (2004) theory illuminate this process at all. Like Tishkov, he opposes the Western assumption that groups in “ethnic war” are unitary actors with a single sense of purpose or will. The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were “a strategic policy chosen by elites who were confronted with political pluralism and popular mobilization.” In order to consolidate his domestic power, Milosevic presented Croatia and Slovenia as villains who wanted to destroy Yugoslavia and so created a politically useful us-them boundary: “The violence served to reconstruct political space at home… by disqualifying anyone who disagreed with the president or ruling party as enemies of justice.” Presenting a conflict in group terms brought home its immediacy to each individual. The speeches and symbols used by elites in both Croatia and Serbia created the conflict of the 1990s.

66 Tishkov, V. (1997: 170; 176; 124)
67 For more on the importance of this assumption of primordial “ethnic hatreds” in both theories and policy communities, see Wilmer, F. in Debrix, F. [Ed] (2003:231). Of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, he writes that “American foreign policy debates about Bosnia increasingly relied on the language of fated ethnic rivalries and primitive brutalities… [which meant that] the language of Vietnam began to emerge as the framework for evaluating political costs and the likely outcomes of military intervention.”
68 Gagnon, V. (2004: 7)
69 Gagnon, V. (2004: 182)
Like Tishkov, however, Gagnon does not illustrate how these ‘speeches and symbols’ motivated violence. Instead his theory concentrates on the motives elites had for creating such a situation, saying that “violence is clearly an effective way to create the image of hard boundaries where none existed before.” This means there is great explanatory value to the theory, although it robs ordinary people of agency in doing so. The assumption is that elites can provoke violence through negative descriptions of others. Different forms of violence would presumably correspond to different descriptions of the other, although we are left with no idea of what these would look like from Gagnon’s work.

This line of theorizing presents the reader with some questions. First, it lacks empirical support. Tishkov and Gagnon only show that negative portrayals of ethnic others preceded conflict, not whether they influenced it. Without such evidence, these theories do more to muddle the scene of violence than illuminate it. Second, one might object that the model of elite control over the meaning of a particular ethnic identity is naïve: political elites may be authoritative, but they are not the only sources of authority in society. These are both flaws that a comparison of different forms of violence promises to remedy by illuminating the micro-logic of violence.

A more extreme version of the same theory is given by Valentino (2004). Like Tishkov and Gagnon, he rejects the idea that “severe ethnic, racial, national, or religious

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70 There is theoretical backing for this causal process. See, for example, Arendt, H. (1977: 20)- “that such a beginning must be intimately connected with violence seems to be vouched for by the legendary beginnings of our history as both biblical and classical antiquity report it: Cain slew Abel, and Romulus slew Remus; violence was the beginning and, by the same token, no beginning could be made without using violence”. Clearly here social organization and boundaries proceeded from violence and did not necessarily precede it. Such an understanding lays a greater scope for violence than Tilly’s theory allows it.

71 See also Jamieson (1999) who argues that central to the Nazi Holocaust was the 1939 publication of Jewish American Theodore Abel’s pamphlet Germany must be destroyed! The Nazis used this to lend credence to the image of a threatening Jewish other who must themselves be destroyed for the good of Germany.

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divisions” are required to explain mass killings. Unlike them, however, he does not think that elites need to create such divisions amongst the populace in order to promote violence. All leaders need in order to carry out policies of mass killing, Valentino argues, are small groups of exceptionally violent thugs. Leaders order genocide and the thugs deliver. Leaders will choose to follow policies of mass killing when they aim to achieve the radical communalization of their societies, when a perceived threat can only be countered through elimination or when faced with a major guerilla insurgency.  

Valentino makes his case with reference to three politically-charged “mass killings” of the twentieth century: the Armenians in 1915, the Holocaust, and Rwanda in the 1990s. In each of these cases, he argues, elites picked psychotic individuals from their own societies to carry out mass killing. People commit violence against other ethnic groups because they are directly told to do so by respected figures in their society. Although he only accounts for what he terms “mass killings,” there is no reason why this logic should not also explain different types of violence. If leaders in pursuit of their strategic goals can order genocide, then they can surely order a pogrom or a lynching. Different forms of violence can be explained by the preferences of leaders dependent on their strategic goals.

Although Valentino’s argument is to be praised for its parsimony and clear description of how it is violence happens, it raises more questions than it answers. First among these is the contention that the number of potentially genocidal maniacs in any society is sufficient on its own to explain the perpetrators in a mass killing. One of the premiere scholars of the Holocaust, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, estimates that at least

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72 Valentino, B. (2004: 2-5)
100,000 people were involved in the Holocaust and probably more.\textsuperscript{73} Considering the eighty million people in Germany in 1939, this represents over one tenth of one percent of the population at that time. If we are to apply this to today, one has to wonder where Valentino is living if even one in every one thousand of his neighbors is a psychotic maniac.

Similarly, the claim that public opinion is of so little importance also seems false. If popular opinion is so unimportant, then one is forced to wonder why genocidal states spend a great deal of resources on manipulating it?\textsuperscript{74} This is particularly poignant for the Holocaust, where vital resources were diverted away from the war effort to prop up anti-Semitic activities. Further, Valentino contends that ideology does not inspire the killers but his argument for this actually supports the opposite position. He says that rather than soldiers being intimately familiar with Nazi ideology, “the rank and file German soldiers involved in the mass killings seemed to understand little more than that Jews were inferior beings somehow responsible for much of the world’s problems and that they had to be exterminated for the good of Germany.”\textsuperscript{75} This statement is the essence of Nazi ideology and it seems disingenuous to suggest that it would not direct the desired result. The average citizen of a liberal democracy may not understand the intricate moral

\textsuperscript{73} See Gergen, D. “Newshour Online: Professor Daniel Goldhagen,” available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/goldhagen.html. Although Valentino disputes this figure (2004: 43), Goldhagen is a greater authority on the Holocaust and so his estimates are backed with more evidence.

\textsuperscript{74} See Koonz, C. (2003, especially 190-274) for a thorough analysis of how the Nazi state tried to manufacture consent for the vitriolic hatred toward the Jews.

\textsuperscript{75} Valentino, B. (2004: 49). It should be mentioned that were one to give a pithy statement of Nazi ideology at this point this would seem to be a good synopsis. Valentino’s assumption- that one has to understand a complex ideology in terms of its complexity in order for it to drive action- seems dubious. Indeed, one of the leading authorities on the Nazi form of government speaks of “the ill-coordinated attempts of the fractured government machine to ‘interpret’ the will of the Fuhrer” (Broszat, cited in Kershaw, I. 2000b: 76): not giving direct orders but rather letting people guess what it was he wanted and striving to do just that.
justifications for voter representation but still insists on the vote. These two criticisms show serious holes in Valentino’s argument.

Objections to these theories aside, however, they do imply a testable hypothesis for the current project. They all state that the form of violence will vary by the ethnic identity of the victims because elites somehow directly incite or instruct this violence. In Valentino, this happens as elites openly exhort particular acts of violence against ethnic minorities. Although it is not quite so clear in their theories, this logic is presumably present in Tishkov and Gagnon as well: through some means, elites instruct their populaces to commit hideous acts of violence. The prediction we may thus draw is that the form of violence will vary by the ethnic group of the victims. It will do so because it elites instruct violent perpetrators to use violence against particular groups. This gives us hypothesis 2:

**Hypothesis 2)** Elites will directly incite the perpetrators to carry out particular forms of violence based on the ethnicity of the victims.

The final “distal” approach to explaining ethnic violence is the *structural* approach. Beissinger (1999) exemplifies this approach when he argues that bids for national status by ethnic republics in the Soviet Union made others more likely to do so as well- those that bid for national status at t-2 did so because of the revelation of preferences for nationalist mobilization at t-1. This utilizes the logic of public preference falsification given by Kuran (1990: 17-21) which states that when one person starts the ball rolling, the revealing of their private preference caused what Beissinger pictures as a “tide” where discontented others bandwagon to effect a change in the very structure of
society. The “bandwagon” turned the seemingly impossible into the inevitable in a very short space of time.

Beissinger uses this theory to describe the breakup of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, “the disintegration of the Soviet state could not have taken place without the effects of tidal influences of one nationalism on another.”76 When the Soviet Union was established, the republics had an incentive to outwardly support it even if they would rather be independent. But when another republic withdrew its support, this increased the likelihood of others to “come out” as well. The nationalist movements in Eastern Europe facilitated the nationalist movement in Ukraine which in turn facilitated nationalist movements in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Beissinger employs the same logic to explain the occurrence of nationalist violence in these cases. Those struggles for nationalist recognition which displayed the most violence also came latest in the overall sequence of struggles for nationalist recognition.77 This approach could account for different forms of violence through their position in a chain of violent events. Nationalist struggles that occur late in a cycle would be more likely to exhibit intense violence than those that come earlier because as obvious contenders for nationalist status form independent polities, sustained and organized violence becomes more necessary to validate the claim of those less-obvious contenders for sovereign status.78 He who laughs last, laughs loudest. As it continues over a period of time, ethnic violence should assume more “severe” forms. This is a very

77 Beissinger, M. (1999: 272)
78 See Beissinger, M. (2002: 306-317). In his account of ethnic violence, Beissinger separates between those forms of violence that require mobilization of the population (pogrom) versus those that require organization (genocide) by the government. Beissinger’s comparison is between the Sumgait pogroms and ethnic cleansing in Fergana valley. The movement from mobilized to organized forms, in the former Soviet Union was marked by the intrusion of new weapons into conflicts and the formation of semi-militia units and the penetration of state structures by criminal elements.
“distal” approach, one removed from the actual occurrence of violence but claims to explain it within an overarching framework.

The main problem with this approach is the same as the other theories in this section, that it does not explain how violence actually occurs. We are left with the idea that the occurrence of an attack in a sequence of events is important, but with little impression of how or why. There is no accounting for what changes from the perspective of the perpetrators. Do they conceive of violence as retaliation? Is it that later incitement to ethnic violence defames others more completely? Is it simply inspiration by the news of other violent attacks and an attempt to up the keep up with and outdo others? These questions are not answered by Beissinger’s theory.

The implication that comes from this theory is that particular groups will suffer more intense forms of violence as time progresses. If earlier seemingly unimportant nationalist mobilization contributed to the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union, then a similar pattern could hold with the most severe forms of violence. The pattern we would expect to see in this scenario is with the more mild forms of violence occurring first followed by those forms which are more severe. Thus, violence as well as nationalist mobilization takes on the form of sequences. This extrapolation of Beissinger’s theory is expressed in hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3) The form of violence of any one incident is determined by the forms of violence which have preceded it. Events which occur earlier in a cycle will be milder, whereas those which occur later will be more severe.

This concludes the section on distal theories of ethnic violence. What these theories all have in common is the failure to identify exactly how their putative causes generate violence, relying instead on untested assumptions such as a simple command-
obedience procedure being a sufficient condition for the production of ethnic violence. In other words, there is no accounting for the coordination we see amongst perpetrators. The result is to leave us unclear as to how exactly violence occurs, which has implications for the important question of why it takes different forms. This objection notwithstanding, however, this section inferred three plausible hypotheses to test against my own theory in chapters four and five. The next section continues this search amongst those theories of a more proximate nature.
2.3 Proximate approaches to ethnic violence

Proximate approaches to ethnic violence concentrate on the calculus of individual actors in explaining its occurrence, reflecting a commitment to “methodological individualism.” The psychological state and motives of the perpetrators are crucial in explaining ethnic violence. This attention to the subjectivity of violent actors promises to yield insight into our question, and reveal their means of coordination. However, as mentioned above, their focus on just one incident of violence means that the causal relationship remains unspecified and untested. This literature may be subdivided into three kinds: those that focus on non-group elements; the perpetrators; and the victims. This section infers hypotheses as to why Russian skinheads use different forms of ethnic violence from each of these kinds.

The non-group approach to ethnic violence (Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Kalyvas, 2000; 2006) maintains a strong commitment to methodological individualism, explaining collective identity as essentially a mechanism for gaining information at a low cost. Motives for “ethnic” violence have nothing to do with ethnicity per se but may be explained using the familiar reasons people go to war. Stories of ethnic hatreds are mere rationalizations and other, non-group, mechanisms are really responsible for violence.

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79 “Employing [proximate theories] in explanation, we move from a highly aggregate level of social entities (sets of human beings, structures and institutions) to the level of the conduct of individual actors in order to account for higher level outcomes. This weak methodological individualism… only requires that we treat individuals’ actions as critical ingredients in any account” (Kitschelt, H. 1999: 8) Methodological individualism came into Political Science to “show how [social institutions and social change] arise[s] as result of the action and the interaction of individuals” (Elster, J. [1989: 13]). It originates with economic theory in Adam Smith and emphasizes the contingent nature of emergent social phenomena in opposition to the social and historical determinism inherent in such theories as those of Marx. See Arrow, K. (1994: 4) for more details.

80 See Hale, H. (2008: 33) for a more formal account of how this works. He argues that “ethnicity is about uncertainty,” and an attempt to categorize the world in order to render it more comprehensible. Ethnic identities, therefore, are shorthand ways in which to decipher human society.
Fearon & Laitin (1996: 716-7) epitomize this view when they argue that ethnic violence is actually rare compared to the universe of possible cases: the number of actual incidences of ethnic violence is much smaller than the number of potential incidents (conceptualized as one for every dyadic relationship between ethnic groups). \(^{81}\) If “ethnic” violence is rare among the universe of possible cases they argue, then it suggests that there is nothing essential to the nature of ethnic identity that causes violence which can instead be accounted for by different mechanisms.

Both theories (Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Kalyvas, 2006) argue that this violence is a reaction to situations of state collapse. Fearon and Laitin argue that when the state is absent, other mechanisms have to work to establish trust between potential trading partners. Acquiring individual-level information is expensive so group members use ethnic identity as a proxy. This furthers the approach of Landa (1994: 27-9) which incorporates insights from the New Institutional Economics to conceive of ethnic groups as facilitating trading relationships. Under this perspective, the reputation of an ethnic group is used as a cheap way of gaining information about their trustworthiness. Ethnic groups thus have an interest in protecting their collective good name.

One way of doing this is through the punishment of those who defect on trade deals. In Fearon & Laitin’s (1996) view, mass violence results when the task of

\(^{81}\) It is unclear on what basis they make this claim. It is unclear what might be considered a situation likely to witness ethnic violence and so they calculate the total number of violent incidences across ethnic dyads. This approach has two substantial flaws. First, it is not clear what counts as “ethnic violence.” It may be the case that no people got involved in fistfights, but were there any other measures (like graffiti) which might qualify? Second, the exercise can also be critiqued on the grounds that it violates Goertz’s (2004: 21-2) “possibility principle:” The “Possibility Principle expresses a widely held intuition- for both quantitative as well as qualitative scholars- about what constitutes relevant control cases.” The idea is that it makes far better sense to explain variation within the range of possible cases than with the universe as a whole. An analogy might claim that because the total number of stranger rapes in the American population is small compared to all instances of anonymous male-female interaction then it is not such a significant problem as people think. Yet restricting the sample to males with a criminal record (at a minimum!) allows the analyst to draw more coherent conclusions.
punishing defectors is left to the partner trading-group because they have incomplete information about the identity of the culpable party. The aggrieved party is forced to punish the collectivity because they do not know who in particular to punish. On the other hand, where the defector’s own ethnic group punishes its’ members (as a way of protecting its reputation) then they know the identity of the perpetrator and so we are likely to see individual-level violence.

One can extrapolate from this to argue for a fundamentally economic cause to violence and the different forms of violence. Ethnicity is not something in itself which is able to promote conflict, but the material harm- or perceived material harm- which comes from the bad reputation of a particular ethnic group can. The implication is twofold: first, some ethnic groups have worse economic reputations than others and so the forms of violence will vary by ethnic target; second, that the more damaging is the consequence of an ethnic group’s presence in a place, then the more punitive will be the form of violence used against them. Both implications are presented in hypothesis 4.

**Hypothesis 4)** The form of violence is determined by the economic reputation of a particular ethnic group. Ethnic identity stands as a proxy for the economic reputation of individuals and those with a worse reputation will suffer the most severe forms of violence.

Another theory in this train of thought comes from Stathis Kalyvas from which I do not draw a hypothesis. His focus is on violence in Civil War situations (a war conducted “through the people”82) and why some Civil Wars have more violence than others. His argument follows the logic of individual denunciations- because violence is costly, Civil War actors have an interest in being judicious with its application and rely

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on individual denunciations to identify traitors.\textsuperscript{83} Individuals will denounce others based on their own inter-personal feuds and rivalries. There are no systemic-level pressures arising from the fact that it is ethnic groups who are fighting, rather the fighting provides an opportunity for individuals to get even by informing on their neighbors to either one of the opposing sides. So-called “ethnic” violence is really a product of individual dislikes.

The theories in this section all leave something to be desired. For instance, Kalyvas’ theory may be suitable for civil wars, but it lacks the ability to explain anonymous ethnic conflict. Or again, Fearon and Laitin’s approach begs the question of why ethnicity is so central and emotive an association to people in the first place.\textsuperscript{84} Dismissing ethnicity as just one kind of association amongst many possible ones fails to explain why many people hold ethnicity to be the locus of their highest loyalties. Fearon and Laitin (1996: 715) admit as much when they say that “a richer story would surely include those narratives of interethnic injury.” This problem is not just ontological but also logical- if people are more willing to believe nasty things about ethnic others than brethren, it is hard to see what work is not being done by ethnicity.

Finally, all the theories also do not account for the performative aspect of ethnic violence. One can infer from the fact that violent actors regularly violate the bodies of their victims (as a mild example, stuffing cash in their mouths\textsuperscript{85}) that meaning is central to this action yet this approach offers no explanation for this. Indeed such theories imply that ethnic identification is simply a genus of the species group identification.

\textsuperscript{83} Although such denunciations are often based on “personal enmities, family feuds, and local fractionalism” Kalyvas, S. (2000: 9)
\textsuperscript{84} Ted Hopf (2005: 2) pithily observes that in Fearon and Laitin’s theory “intersubjectivity disappears as an object of theoretical or empirical interest.” The gruesome, ritual aspects of ethnic violence cannot be explained without reference to the socially-held meaning of ethnicity, and that is something which these theorists do not include.
\textsuperscript{85} This example comes from Kalyvas, S. (2006: 28).
Presumably, inter-group identifications all work in essentially a similar matter and by the same logic. Yet if the theoretical work is being done by the fact that ethnic groups are just kinds of collectivity, it is not clear that other kinds of groups could not perform the same functions equally well. To turn Fearon and Laitin’s “finding” about ethnic violence on its head, we would be forced to ask why violence between ethnic groups is so frequent compared to other forms of group association. Indeed, considering trade organizations would be more reliable indicators of trading reliability, (not to mention more rational objects of allegiance) we are left wondering why there is not violence between members of rival groups. Or again, we wonder why societies do not dissolve into classes upon state breakdown, but into their ethnic components. For this reason, then, I do not draw another hypothesis from the theories reviewed in this section.

The second set of theories within this paradigm concentrates on the characteristics of the perpetrators in explaining ethnic violence. They do not ignore the role of the victim (who is indeed presented, if only by implication, as the comparative standard for the perpetrators) but rather foreground the characteristics of the perpetrators as providing the impetus for violence. These may be either subjective or objective qualities. The ‘subjective’ qualities of the perpetrators relate to what might be called their ‘cultural characteristics.’ The ‘objective’ qualities, on the other hand, refer to their capabilities. Each of these elements holds the key to understanding conflict in these approaches to ethnic violence.

86 The authors say as much: “any formal or informal institutional practices that allow people to learn at low cost about the prior history of a potential business or social partner may help resolve the problem of social order in groups larger than a family” (Fearon, J. & Laitin, D. 1996: 718)
The cultural characteristics approach is substantiated by Emil Pain. Pain (1994, 1996, 2004) argues that conflicts in the Former Soviet Union are a reaction to modernization and the discovery of difference. The aspect of modernization which generates hostility is the mixing of ethnic cultures as globalization causes people from different parts of the world to move to new areas. The degree of “ethnic distance” between two cultures determines the ease- or otherwise- of integration. Ethnic distance is conceived of as “the cultural differences between the representatives of different ethnic groups that limit capacities for mutual adaptation.” Similar to Berger & Luckmann’s (1966: 104-116) strategies of universe-maintenance, differences cause distress which the dominant culture deals with in differing ways.

He uses this approach to analyze ethnic conflict in present-day Russia. The ethno-political balance in Russia (2004: 3-13; 171-194; 249-254; 306-313) has changed from a danger of separatism under Yeltsin in the 1990s to ethnic tensions within Russian cities under Putin in the present day. He accounts for this with three explanations, only one of which may be attributed to modernization. That component is the stratification of the labor force. The ethnic “unmixing” that takes place as certain kinds of jobs become the near exclusive property of various ethnic groups furthers social atomization. The media plays a similar role in furthering atomization through conjuring up ethnic phobias

87 Pain, E. (2004: 7). His research concerns the Russian-speaking diasporas in the ‘near abroad’ and specifically how likely they are to integrate. He argues that “Research revealed that the smaller the ethnic distance between Russians and titular majority populations, the lower the incidence of Russian emigration from the ‘Near Abroad’” (1996: 53). His argument is a reworking of a familiar argument linking globalization to a re-invigoration of nationalism. See Jusdanis, G. (2001 166-9); Mudde, C (2000: 169-71). For a good overview of the literature surrounding this topic, see Ozkirimli, U. (2005: 126-137)

88 Pain, E. (1996:53). The concept of ethnic distance was originally used to identify which Russian-speaking diasporas were more likely to return to Russia. See Laitin, D. (1998) for more on the return of the Russian-speaking minorities in the new national republics.

89 Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. identify the following mechanisms of universe maintenance: socialization, mythology, therapy and nihilation. The focus of Pain’s work would be on the latter two, assuming a situation in which socialization (and its enactment through mythology) are ruled out a priori.
and the proliferation of stereotypes of minorities,\textsuperscript{90} but it does not by themselves cause conflict.

The main problem with the “cultural distance” argument is its objectivist ontology. First, it reifies ethnicity by stating that there is something tangible in the space between these groups. The corollary is the implication that differences by themselves will provoke conflict (let alone account for its form), although it is not clear why. For this to be the case, there needs to be something essential or perceived as essential about ethnic identity, yet Pain leaves this as an assumption. Therefore, Pain betrays a conception of ethnicity as something natural. A more complete account might explain how ethnicity came to be seen as such an essential characteristic and how the very notion of “cultural distance” is socially constructed.

Another problem that arises from this “objectivism-by-the-back-door” is the critique of endogeneity- we might think that cultures are distant because of violence rather than distance causing violence itself. “Cultural distance” would have to be shown to precede conflict and directly relate to its form in order to overcome this criticism.\textsuperscript{91} To show this while maintaining Pain’s objectivist notion of ethnicity, one would have to make truly heroic assumptions about those aspects of culture which are most important to individuals which would undermine the very enterprise in the first place.

\textsuperscript{90} Pain, E. (2004: 190-191)
\textsuperscript{91} An example of how this could be done comes from the work of David Laitin (1998: 201-242). He writes concerning whether the Russian-speaking minorities of the Baltic states will assimilate to the newly-ascendant Baltic cultures and languages. In writing, he offers many indicators of so-called cultural distance. These include urban/rural environment, religion and religiosity, occupation, average age of population, and degree of education (the last is particularly important given Gellner’s [1983: 19-30] concentration on the importance of universal education for modern nation-states). A further measure Laitin used to gain insight into how people reacted to those speaking in a different manner was the Lambert technique (217), which uses an experimental design to test people’s reactions to those speaking in a different dialect or language to their own.
These problems do not, however, prevent Pain’s theory from being a fecund source of theory. While there may be some logical inconsistencies, they may be fixed. The central implication that arises out of Pain’s theory is that more “culturally distant” minorities will be subject to the most radical mechanism of universe-maintenance, nihilation. Those who are less different will be treated with other mechanisms and so the form of violence becomes a proxy for the degree of cultural distance between dominant and subaltern. This insight is useful as it deals directly with the motives of the perpetrators who actually commit violence: ethnic violence is a reaction to the fear and distress engendered by the presence of difference. This is rendered into a testable proposition in hypothesis 5:

**Hypothesis 5**) The forms of violence will vary by the “cultural distance” between perpetrators and ethnic victims. The greater the degree of cultural distance, the more severe the form of violence will be.

The *capabilities* explanation of ethnic violence views that violence as an expression of the power of perpetrators. Ethnic groups inherently mistrust the build-up of power in the hands of ethnic others and so conflict is probable at any time due to the latent fears between them. The timing of conflict will be determined when either uncertainty or efficiency make war a more rational option. The motives for ethnic conflict remain constant, but what changes is the efficacy of violent attack. The mechanism that links cause and effect is thus the capabilities of the groups and the absence of a Leviathan to prevent or punish them.

According to Barry Posen (1993: 104-111), four factors determine the capabilities of the group and so make ethnic war more likely: the inability to distinguish offensive and defensive weapons; offensive action being more efficient than defensive; the
isolation of co-ethnics in vulnerable islands; and the cohesion of the group that is under threat. The absence of state authority is a necessary condition of Posen’s theory, for ethnic clans will not be stronger than the state. The fact that these groups are fighting is explained by the assumed eternal “ethnic hatreds.” The particular way and time in which this happens is determined by their capabilities. While my focus is not ethnic war, these variables could also plausibly explain ethnic violence.

The idea of capability thus provides a mechanism through which violence takes place and may take different forms. The form of violence might be explicable as a function of an ethnic group’s capacity. The more powerful the group, the more severe the form of violence would be. Conversely, groups with only scant means would only cause the least severe forms of violence. In terms of the low-level violence which is practiced by Russian skinheads, the most important determinant of a group’s capacity is its number of members. Therefore, we would expect the form of violence to vary with the size of perpetrating group. This leads to hypothesis 6:

**Hypothesis 6** The form of violence is determined by the number of perpetrators involved in an incident of ethnic violence. The most severe forms of violence will involve a greater number of perpetrators.

The final category of theories to be reviewed consists of those that focus on the victims of ethnic conflict. Under this line of thought, the identity of the victims is itself the cause of violence. For some reason- either those familiar “Ancient Hatreds” or the fact that there is a negative image given to the ethnic group by the media- the very

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92 Other theorists have cited the importance of group size to collective action also. For example, Mancur Olson (1971: 43-52) argues that there is an optimal size for groups in any kind of collective action, although his theory operates under the assumption that all actors involved are completely rational. His theory suggests that groups that are too large will not operate efficiently. For a different conclusion and cause path, see Emile Durkheim (2001: 157) who observed, that “within a crowd moved by a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own.” Here, larger groups are the most likely to produce great incidences of collective action.
identity of the ethnic group under attack is a source of hostility for the perpetrating group and violence seeks to punish the minority because of this. Ethnic violence is a reaction to threat and not to power. People operate “as if” an ethnic group were a greater danger than an objective measurement of its power would imply. This line of theorizing is different from those concerning cultural distance because here it is the (intersubjective) mode of representing others and not their “objective” cultural distance(s) that motivates violence- people do not simply react to difference with a policy of nihilation. The link between the negative images of ethnic others and violence against them can be explained by emotions.

Petersen (2002), Gurr (1970) and Ross (2007) present different ways in which emotions stimulate conflict and these ways are worth recounting. Petersen argues that emotions coordinate groups of people in producing acts of violence.93 Gurr works with the insights of frustration-aggression theory to generate a theory of violence as a response to Relative Deprivation (RD), “the discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is.’”94 Ross emphasizes the role of “psychocultural dynamics”95 in sustaining long-running ethnic conflict, arguing that “cultures and cultural differences do not themselves cause conflict but are the lenses through which the causes of conflict are refracted.”96 Conflicts become understood through narratives that make the threat posed by other ethnicities more emotional.

93 Petersen, R. (2002: 25). See also Sternberg, R. (2003) for the importance of the experiential quality of hate in causing (at the individual level) terrorism, massacres and genocide. Sternberg agrees with Petersen that stories fabricate feelings of hate and that these account for the cognitive element of acts of ethnic violence. As it seems intuitively plausible that coordination requires cognition, it would logically follow that different acts of violence have a basis in different kinds of story.
95 Ross, M. (2007: 315)
96 Ross, M. (2007: 18)
The implication of this paradigm is that different emotional states generate different forms of violence. If emotion is such an important component of violence, then differences in emotionality should correspond to different forms of violence. The method which perpetrators use against victims is not simply random but itself contains meaning and acts out an inner frustration. Indeed, Gurr expresses this intuition when he says “that the violence of any revolution is proportional to the degree of repression.”97 The more these are frustrated, the more severe the form of violence. Putting emotion at the center of an explanation for ethnic violence provides us with an intuitively plausible explanation as to why ethnic conflicts continue for so long and may be characterized by such enmity. Because different ethnic groups represent different violations of the normative worldview of those who perpetrate violence, then perpetrators do not feel remorse- or remorse sufficient to stop them- in attacking ethnic others.

There are two problems with this approach, however. First, it is proximate to the point of tautology. Explaining violence by emotion is similar to explaining the origin of newspapers by reference to the delivery boy: of course there will be emotions present in cases of violence, but establishing their causal role is more difficult. Second, there is an inherent difficulty in observing the emotional state of violent perpetrators. A possible solution to both these problems is to specify the causes of those emotions and test them. Accordingly, the rest of this sub-section concentrates on the different origins of emotional states suggested by these theories as a way of uncovering testable hypotheses. The alternative sources of these emotions are group size, ancient hatreds, and rumors.

Gurr (1970) argues that Relative Deprivation, the gap between what ought to be and what is, is the cause of violence. This can be thought of as expectations and

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97 Gurr, T. (1970: 38)
capabilities. Gurr conceives of these concepts in primarily economic terms, relegating expectations and capabilities simply to finances. When the capabilities of perpetrators are low, then frustration will be high as they are unable to achieve their expectations. Violence comes into play as perpetrators scapegoat other ethnic minorities to release their emotions. It follows that the more ethnic minorities are believed to be responsible for inhibiting the life chances of the perpetrators in some way, then violence will be more severe. This causal path has already been identified in hypothesis four and I see no need to repeat it here.

A more complex causal account of the emotional state of perpetrators would bring in a role for ideology also. Ideologies inform the worldview and expectations of those who carry them, suggesting their direct contribution to inflating those desires which may be frustrated. Indeed, Petersen argues that at the root of all forms of violence are ideological emotion-causing phenomena. He identifies three particular ways in which this can happen: sudden changes in the esteem granted to different groups cause the emotion of resentment; ancient myths lead to hatreds; and physical superiority lead to fear. Because hypothesis eight deals with the Ancient Hatreds explanation, I concentrate here on the emotions of resentment and fear.

Petersen connects resentment to a change in the ethnic status hierarchy. All multi-ethnic societies have an implicit pecking-order amongst the ethnic groups which constitute them. Seeing others, formerly less-esteemed, become equal to or get ahead of one’s own ethnic group creates resentment proportional to the group’s former position. This resentment will first and foremost be stirred up by seeing ethnic others in their

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98 This is the intuition behind the saying that “every society is just three meals away from revolution” and Gurr cites Aristotle as a source for this contention (Gurr, T., 1970: 37)
99 Petersen, R. (2002: 26)
society, so skinheads attack that which they identify with the minority. A good proxy for this is the ease with which the ethnic group is identified, as it provides the reason we see different forms of violence. If ethnic minorities are hard to identify, then their property will be attacked instead as this is easier to identify. On the other hand, if ethnic minorities are easy to identify because of differences of skin color, then actual people are more likely to be attacked. I state this expectation formally in hypothesis seven:

**Hypothesis 7** The form of violence is determined by how identifiable the members of an ethnic group are. If the members of an ethnic group are easy to identify, then they will be attacked. If the members of an ethnic group are hard to identify but have readily identifiable property, then the latter will be attacked.

Consistent with another prong of Petersen’s theory, ancient hatreds theorists argue that our most intense emotions come from primordial ethnic associations and thus it is these that produce the most severe forms of violence. One such theorist is Stuart Kaufman (2001) who tries to rehabilitate insights from the primordialist school of thought which is currently out of intellectual vogue. He argues that ethnic conflict is an emotional reaction to fears of group extinction and driven by “meaning.”\(^\text{100}\) There are two different pathways to ethnic war: either elites can distort the threat of extinction in order to promote violence or events can bring pre-existing fears into focus in the public consciousness. What determines which path to ethnic mobilization (top-down versus bottom-up) will be taken is the content of the myth itself. For example, the Chechens’ warrior ethos means that they are “more prone to ethnic violence”\(^\text{101}\) and more likely to mobilize without goading from elites.

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\(^{100}\) Kaufman, S. (2001: 28)

\(^{101}\) Kaufman, S., (2001:30).
The implication of this theory is that certain perpetrators are most likely to use particular acts of violence. If in his theory, groups with a warrior ethos are more likely to commit ethnic violence than others, then it makes sense that there is an important role for these myths of group identity in explaining different forms of ethnic violence. Those groups which possess ritual elements in the myths of their identity will be more likely to enact those mythical elements when carrying out the practice of violence. However, although this may be an interesting insight for a situation where multiple groups are causing violence, it is unsuitable for such a model of violence as used in this theory where there is only one perpetrating group. Therefore, further development of Kaufman’s ideas is not germane to the study.

Complementing this approach is another ancient hatreds theorist, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen (1996), who seeks to explain the Holocaust and argues that “the re-creation of the phenomenological reality of the killers is crucial for any explanation.”\(^{102}\) The incredible horror of what the perpetrators were doing has to be accounted for in any explanation which we are to find convincing.\(^{103}\) His approach concentrates on reconstructing the evolution of “eliminationist anti-Semitism”\(^{104}\) in nineteenth-century Germany which cleared the trees for the final desertification under the Nazi regime. Germans could justify their horrific mistreatment of the Jews because the ontological

\(^{102}\) Goldhagen, D. (1996: 22)
\(^{103}\) Goldhagen, D. (1996: 19) himself asks “why did the horror, brutality, and frequent gruesomeness of the killing operations fail to stay the perpetrators’ hands or at least substantially daunt them?” This question is particularly appropriate when one considers Kershaw’s (2000: 520-23) claim that Hitler himself only ever referred to the extermination of the Jews by euphemism and implication and never directly. Indeed, there is no record of Hitler ever having visited a concentration camp, suggesting that if the most fanatical anti-Semite who ever lived could not bear this experience then it must have been worse for those who were not so passionate.
\(^{104}\) Goldhagen, D. (1996: 69)
conception of the Jew had become an essentialist and racial one almost one-hundred years before the Holocaust started.

According to this theory, it was the historically formed understanding of the Jews as different from other human beings (or, at least, white western Europeans) that led Germans to treat them differently. Just as today we act towards friends and strangers differently, the Germans acted toward Jews and other races differently also. It was “not economic hardship, not the coercive means of a totalitarian state, not social psychological pressure, not invariable psychological propensities, but ideas about Jews that were pervasive in Germany and had been for decades”\(^{105}\) that pushed the genocide. Perhaps similarly deep-rooted and action-dictating ideas would explain different forms of violence.\(^{106}\)

However, Goldhagen’s theory does leave the question of why the Jews were singled out for this treatment. He claims that a racial understanding of the Jews evolved in the nineteenth-century which meant eliminationist anti-Semitism became the “common sense” of the Nazi period. This seems unproblematic until one considers that all nations were considered as racial entities around this time. Why were they not eliminated also? Why were British and American prisoners of war treated much better than Russian or Jewish prisoners? How were the Jews portrayed differently? This objection does not

\(^{105}\) Goldhagen, D. (1996: 9)

\(^{106}\) Interestingly, this concentration on culture suggests a reason for Hannah Arendt’s observation that participation in the Holocaust was not equally fanatical from all countries of Europe allied to the Nazis. See the claim of Arendt, H. (1992: 154) that “it came as a great surprise to the Nazis, who were genuinely convinced that anti-Semitism could become the common denominator that would unite all Europe… [that] there existed great differences among anti-Semites in the various countries. What was more annoying, although it might easily have been predicted, was that the German ‘radical’ variety was only fully appreciated by those peoples in the East- the Ukrainians, the Estonians, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, and to some extent, the Rumanians- whom the Nazis had decided to regard as ‘subhuman’ barbarian hordes’. In Denmark, the Nazis met with “open native resistance” (175) to the deportations whereas Rumania’s Antonescu was “simply always a step ahead of German developments” (193). If the pace of anti-Semitism varied in different countries, then maybe anti-Semitic legacies also differed in these countries.
repudiate his theory but merely delves deeper into the mechanism which he claims 
brought about violence. There must be some emotion- be it fear, loathing or resentment-
attached to the idea of the “Jew” in Nazi Germany that allowed Germans to enact the 
cruellest punishments on them even without orders.

This theory also does not explain why forms of violence less than genocide ever 
happened in Germany. In fact, the pogrom form of violence- including, but not limited to 
Kristallnacht- was frequent in Germany before the Final Solution. If the nineteenth-
century comprehension of the Jews was so vital to the production of genocidal violence, 
why did it take ten years of the Hitler regime to produce the Holocaust? Why was the 
popular hatred of the Jews satisfactorily expressed by damage to their property? Again, 
this is not to repudiate Goldhagen’s theory but merely to state that the role of this hatred 
is under-theorized. Unless this process is specified, it is hard to explain why ethnic 
violence took the form it did.

Nevertheless, Goldhagen’s theory does imply a hypothesis for my question. It 
seems that the historically evolved meaning given to ethnic groups coordinates the 
production of violence against them. The comprehension of what the group is and the 
nature of the threat that they pose coordinates violence against them. Of course, we do 
not have the ability to literally look inside the head of an individual we are studying to 
observe the process so we are forced to rely on the social expression of these ideas which 
reproduce such patterns of thought. Particular forms of violence will thus be sustained by 
reference to historical antipathies of another ethnic group. From this theory, we can 
postulate hypothesis eight.

**Hypothesis 8) The form of violence is determined by perpetrators’ 
historically-formed understanding of an ethnic minority.**
The final cause of the fear emotion comes from the *rumor* theorists, who argue that the perception of the ethnic other as a threat is a reaction to rumors in society. Rumors create emotions of fear which lead to violence. Donald Horowitz (1985; 2001) illustrates the psychology behind this when he argues that at the bottom of all ethnic struggles lies the individual’s desire for self-esteem which originates in the group: “group worth is important, for self-esteem is in large measure a function of the esteem accorded to groups of which one is a member.”

Working in those former colonies where there is an “ethnic party system,” he argues that politicians seek to mobilize the vote near elections by publicizing fears of group extinction by another ethnic group. This leads others to do the same and individuals conclude that retribution for past wrongs merits violence. As each side seeks its own justification, society spirals into violence.

This approach is continued in Horowitz (2001), where he argues that the deadly ethnic riot is an essentially comparable phenomenon “across the centuries and across the continents.” Far from being unstructured and chaotic events, Horowitz argues that deadly ethnic riots are phenomena all of their own with common causes, distinguishable phases and a number of identifiable features. The most important causal element in the deadly ethnic riot is played by rumors. Rumors provide a sense of justification for

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108 This role for rumors - whether coming from the society, press or politicians - is central also to Varshney’s (2002) theory of how to prevent ethnic violence. Varshney’s study takes place in India where, using paired comparisons and the method of process-tracing he argues that networks of civic *inter-ethnic* engagement “killed rumors” (10) and so kept peace. Where cities lacked such networks, rumors were allowed to get out of control and so cause violence. The implication is that it is rumors and beliefs about what other ethnic groups are doing that causes violence, although Varshney does not demonstrate this proposition empirically.
violence about to be committed by projecting\textsuperscript{110} crimes onto others that the ‘victims’ will avenge with violence. This logic of projection provides the coordination Horowitz claims to be so visible in riots.

However, Horowitz only deals with ethnic riots, by implication comparing other forms of violence for the sake of distinction. While he draws attention to the necessity of such rumors in explaining ethnic violence, he does not make explicit what characteristic of the rumors in particular prompts violence. Yet if rumors are necessary for riots to occur, it is not clear why the logic of projection would not also hold true for different forms of violence. If riots throughout the world are precipitated by rumors, then other forms of violence might also be coordinated through rumors. One can imagine how certain feelings or emotions which originated inside the group itself could be projected onto ethnic others to form justifications for types of violence. However, the prior existence of rumors by itself does not predict variation in the forms of violence, only showing that they are a necessary condition for the occurrence of violence.

In the next chapter, I extend Horowitz’ theory and argue that skinheads project responsibility for violence onto others through accusing them of crimes. Just as there are different types of crime, therefore, there are also different kinds of punishment. The character of the crimes of which ethnic others are accused is what leads skinheads to use different forms of ethnic violence. ‘Crimes’ are met by appropriate ‘punishments.’ I construct this theory after recounting my ethnographic work with skinheads in Moscow which makes clear that they see themselves in the role of vigilantes and those who are

\textsuperscript{110} “the expectation of aggressive behavior from the target group is properly viewed as a form of projection, the attribution of motives or emotions to others because of motives or emotions experienced by oneself.” (Horowitz, D. 2001: 86)
punishing ethnic minorities for crimes against ethnic Russians and the white race in general.

This ends the review of the literature concerning ethnic violence. As mentioned in the introduction and made apparent in the preceding literature review, no theory focuses explicitly on why there is variation in the form of violence. Instead, answers to this question were inferred from the answers to the questions they did pose. Table 2.3 lists the hypotheses gleaned from the literature review.
Hypothesis 1) The form of violence is determined by the region in which the attack happens. Regions which have high-capacity states will be able to prevent the more severe forms of violence whereas those with low-capacity states will see the worst forms of violence.

Hypothesis 2) Elites will directly incite the perpetrators to carry out particular forms of violence based on the ethnicity of the victims.

Hypothesis 3) The form of violence of any one incident is determined by the forms of violence which have preceded it. Events which occur earlier in a cycle will be milder, whereas those which occur later will be more severe.

Hypothesis 4) The form of violence is determined by the economic reputation of a particular ethnic group. Ethnic identity stands as a proxy for the economic reputation of individuals and those with a worse reputation will suffer the most severe forms of violence.

Hypothesis 5) The forms of violence will vary by the “cultural distance” between perpetrators and ethnic victims. The greater the degree of cultural distance, the more severe the form of violence will be.

Hypothesis 6) The form of violence is determined by the number of perpetrators involved in an incident of ethnic violence. The most severe forms of violence will involve a greater number of perpetrators.

Hypothesis 7) The form of violence is determined by how identifiable the members of an ethnic group are. If the members of an ethnic group are easy to identify, then they will be attacked. If the members of an ethnic group are hard to identify but have readily identifiable property, then the latter will be attacked.

Hypothesis 8) The form of violence is determined by perpetrators’ historically-formed understanding of an ethnic minority.

Figure 2.3: Hypotheses extracted from the literature
Much has been gained from the literature review. First, I have provided evidence of my claim that the question of why violence takes different forms has not been addressed by any previous theorist. To be sure, some have come close to asking this question, but in this exact form no theory touches upon it. Second, the literature review has also revealed an intellectual poverty of theories that consistently show the linkage of cause to effect, putative cause to instance of violence. The only paradigm to do so was that which concentrated on the victims and even this only implied the function of emotionality. This linking mechanism needs to be developed and I do so in the next chapter which elaborates my own theory for why there are different forms of ethnic violence. Third and finally, where the reviewed theories did not identify a mechanism which linked cause and effect, I extrapolated from them to construct hypotheses. I test my theory and its competitors in chapters four, five, and six.

2.4 Conclusion

As I noted in the introduction and have demonstrated throughout this chapter, there are many theories which purport to explain ethnic violence but none attempt to do so by asking why there are different forms of ethnic violence. The serious consequence of this is that previous theories of ethnic violence do not specify exactly how the cause they stipulate leads to violence. Moreover, even in those few places where this is theorized it is not explicitly tested and so many of the hypotheses identified in this section have inferred answers into how a particular theory would answer this question. The result yielded 8 hypotheses which I evaluate throughout the empirical chapters of the dissertation.
In the next chapter, I present my own theory of ethnic violence and show how it fills this gap by clearly linking the outcome of violence to a theoretical cause. I test this theory and its competitors against a database of skinhead violence from 2000-2007 in chapter four. Chapter five then provides further tests of the theory, concerning how the mechanism identified explains the forms of violence produced better than does its competitors. Chapter six tests the generalizability of the theory and applies it to cases other than skinhead violence. Chapter seven concludes and provides avenues for future research.
Chapter 3: The Theory of Ethnic “Criminality”

Chapter two reviewed the literature looking for explanations as to why there are different forms of ethnic violence. Although no-one directly addresses this question, existing theories do nevertheless imply answers and these were recorded as a succession of eight hypotheses. This chapter develops the approach found in proximate theories of ethnic violence that descriptions of other ethnic groups justify certain forms of behavior to the perpetrators. Because they make an action seem appropriate, this justification also constrains perpetrators as it makes a certain form of violence seem appropriate. In doing so, I draw especially on Donald Horowitz’s (2001) theory of perpetrators projecting violent sentiment onto ethnic others to form their own justification.

The chapter is divided into three components. In section 3.1, I recount my ethnographic fieldwork among the skinhead population of Russia to justify why this hypothesis seems the most worthy of development. It uses available data to reconstruct the skinhead worldview, arguing that skinheads see themselves as involved in a “racial war” fought on the streets of Russian cities. Section 3.2 then builds on this insight and Horowitz’s logic to theorize an explanation of the different forms of violence: Skinheads associate ethnic groups with particular forms of crime and their attacks are punishments for these crimes. Just as the lawpunishes crimes using the criterion of proportionality, so too do the skinheads. Section 3.3 lists the observable implications of this theory and draws hypotheses. Section 3.4 then outlines the research design and discusses the
methods I have chosen to use for testing my theory and its competitors. Chapters four, five, and six then test the theory against its competitors, looking to see how well each fares. Before this I ask what the skinhead movement in the Russian Federation is like and how we can come to comprehend it.

3.1: Understanding the skinhead movement

This section recounts what is known about the skinhead movement in the Russian Federation so that we may better theorize about why they use different forms of ethnic violence. It is based on fieldwork I conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Krasnodar (a city in the North Caucasus part of Russia) in 2006 and 2007. On these trips I met with members of Human Rights agencies, non-governmental organizations, independent researchers,\textsuperscript{111} leaders of far-right parties, and skinheads themselves. I also worked quite extensively with the neo-Nazi organization Slavyansky Soyuz (Slavic Union). I obtained DVDs of skinhead activities\textsuperscript{112} from these subjects, video stills from which are used in this ethnography to provide visual evidence of the rituals and customs associated with the skinhead groups. Based on this evidence, I argue that skinheads understand themselves as defenders of white culture in a “racial war.” This section proceeds with a recounting of my method of ethnographic inquiry, a brief account of the origin of the skinheads,

\textsuperscript{111} I would like to thank for their time in meeting with me Alexander Brod, Galina Kozhevnikova, Alexsander Verkhovsky, Leokhadia Drobizheva, Igor Kuznetsselsoy, Alexander Ossipov and the Skhola Mira Human Rights Organization in Novrossiyisk. Also worthy of mention are the NGO reports of Panorama, SOVA (2005, 2006, 2007) and the Moscow Bureau of Human Rights (2006) and the work of individual academics, such as Vera Malikova (2003), Igor Cholmogorov (2006) and Viktor Shnirelman (2007).

\textsuperscript{112} The DVDs were video clips which evidently had been posted to the websites of various skinhead organizations. These websites had been hacked and brought down, presumably by Russian anti-fascist youth. This makes possession of the hard copies of this material even more valuable. Furthermore, given the number of organizations represented on the DVDs, it is fair to conclude that the DVDs are representative of the wider skinhead movement.
their symbols, and the specific activities of Russian skinheads. I begin with an account of
my method.

Although this is an ethnographical recovery of the skinhead worldview, it is not
one based on intense and deep participant observation. My work did not involve “going
native.” There are two reasons why I saw “going native” as undesirable: because it is
methodologically unsound and not suitable for the work I was doing. First, “going
native” is methodologically undesirable as acquiring the trust of the skinhead gangs
would be difficult. Gaining the trust of the skinheads would probably have required me
to support beliefs I oppose and possibly participate in illegal actions. If one does not gain
the trust of one’s subjects, then there is little point in going native in the first place.

Second, understanding without “going native” is possible and in this instance may
be better. Indeed, Clifford Geertz (1995: 27) notes that the attempt to understand one’s
subjects does not require “some inner correspondence of spirit” with them but a quest “to
figure out what the devil they think they are up to.” The task is to render intelligible the
actions of others and this does not necessitate becoming one of those others. Of course,
some might object that because I did not “go native” then there is a danger that my own
evaluations will ensure that evidence stops “meaning what it meant in its earlier
context.”113 However, any mode of ethnographical analysis would run into the same
problem. I would also retort that because the skinhead movement is not a disciplined
organization, close observation of just one gang might actually paint a biased picture.
This would be avoided by a more distant perspective. For both these reasons then, I

113 Ted Hopf (2002: 25) in his recovery of Soviet and Post-Soviet identities speaks to Garfinkel in warning
off this criticism.
chose not to “go native.” One does not have to be a skinhead to see the world with skinhead eyes.

One point of clarification is that not all “skinheads” (britogolovoy) are marked by their physical appearance. While it is true that many (or even most) skinheads do have a close-shaven haircut, it is generally a popular haircut in Russia and some “skinheads” have long hair. There is no identifiability attached to the fashion, in other words. Rather, the term ‘skinhead” is one applied by Russian media, political groups, Human Rights watchers and the skinheads themselves to denote a particularly xenophobic brand of militant racism-nationalism. They do, however, understand themselves as skinheads (so form a coherent social type) attested to by the links between national-level entities. Potentially more revealing than national links, however, are the international links of the skinhead movement.

Skinheads are not an indigenous social movement in Russia. While ethnonationalist chauvinism has a strong heritage in that country, its particular present incarnation hails from the West. With the fall of Communism, many far-right groups saw a chance expand their influence and so set up branches in Russia. For example,

114 Indeed, one of the rare moments of humor involved in the ethnographic research came as I was trying to explain in Russian to two self-declared “skinheads” that the term literally meant “people without hair”.
115 As evidence of this one can look to events attended by a plethora of skinhead groups. One example is the “Russian March” of November 4th 2006 where skinhead groups from all over the country took place in simultaneous marches. If they march together in support of a cause, then we can infer that they share an ideological background.
116 See Shnirelman, V. (2007: 58). Also the international flavor of the social movement is apparent in the appearance of people dressed like Ku Klux Klan members at a torchlight procession in St. Petersburg. Similarly, many of the demands of skinhead or far-Right parties resemble those of Far-Right parties in Europe, particularly the replacement of ethnic distinctions with racial ones. See Mudde, C. (2000: 169-171).
117 Indeed, this is revealed in the use of phrases such as “white power.” As one of the skinheads I interviewed complained, understood in the Russian context “white power” slogans might be thought of as pro-Tsarist rather than racist as the Russian civil war of 1918-1922 was fought between the Reds (led by Trotsky) and the Whites pro-Tsarist forces. The leader of the quasi-fascist Movement against Illegal Immigration changed his surname to belov, the Russian word for “white.”
the U.K. based organization “Combat 18” has established “Combat 18- Russia.” Second, international racist groups have also joined with Russians on protest marches through Russian cities\textsuperscript{118} and some Russian racists have adopted the uniform of the Ku Klux Klan. Third, in 2006 Western ‘academic’ and former grand wizard of the Klan, David Duke, travelled to Moscow to participate in a conference on the “Future Of A White World” organized by the Russian journal “The Athenaeum. Russians who had been at the conference mentioned frequently to me with clearly some pride that such an infamous international racist had been at the conference. All three observations clearly imply that the skinhead movement is an international one, which suggests a need to go back to the origins of the movement to understand them.

The skinhead phenomenon began in Great Britain in the late 1950s as a reaction to years of immigration from the former colonies. Initially, “they were actually identified with black culture.”\textsuperscript{119} At first considered a splinter group of the Mods- a fashion culture associated with rock and roll- the skinheads were greatly influenced by Jamaican Ska music and they were originally concentrated around these elements as a class phenomenon. Most skinheads at this time were working class youth who were deprived of opportunities for advancement by the entrenched British class system. Skinheads identified with black West Indian culture\textsuperscript{120} and their rituals were limited to venting aggression on homosexuals and “Paki-bashing” immigrants who were less easily assimilated into the culture.

\textsuperscript{118} The DVDs bought showed American Confederates and members of the British National Party marching alongside Russians, for example. Skinhead websites also put out some announcements in English which of course would not be necessary if the movement were purely Russian.
\textsuperscript{120} Hebdige, D. quoted in Ridgeway, J. (1995: 182)
However, in the late 1960s there was a schism in the skinhead subculture between left and right around the issue of race. Left-wing “skinheads” rejected racism as an organizational principle. Some of these groups still exist today, for example the organization SkinHeads Against Racial Prejudice (SHARP). Right-wing skinheads, on the other hand, started incidents of racist violence against immigrants in the late 1960s and were hijacked in the 1970s by neo-Nazi interests. Since that time, the term “skinhead” has become synonymous with racism and a devotion to neo-Nazi ideals. From this point on, all references to the “skinhead” movement or subculture specifically refer to right-wing skinheads.

One of the most prominent members of this skinhead subculture was an Englishman named Ian Stewart Donaldson who was born in Blackpool. In 1976, Donaldson founded the band “Skrewdriver.” Donaldson performed as their vocalist and frontman but gave a more political leaning to their activities. The band began to raise money through record sales for white nationalist organizations and the militant racist organization “Combat-18.” Combat-18 began life as the militant section of the National Front but split from them in the early 1990s. Donaldson himself died in a car crash in 1993 but his unfortunate influence lives on.

The symbols of the skinhead movement are reflective of the ideology of the far-Right. One of their main symbol-complexes is the use of a code in which numbers are substituted for the corresponding letters of the Latin alphabet. Certain numbers refer to initials which convey meaning to other skinheads. In the above example of Combat-18,

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121 The website of this organization is available at http://sharpskins.co.uk/ and features slogans such as “wake up Nazi scum, it’s time to die.” This organization also has manifestations in Russia through the anti-fascist youth organization (http://www.antifa.ru) and also through SHARP in Russia.

122 See the website http://www.bloodandhonour.com/forum/register.php for more details.
the first letter of the alphabet is “A” and the eighth “H,” so “18” represents “AH” or “Adolf Hitler.” Another commonly used example is “88,” which stands for “HH” or “Heil Hitler.” Although hardly elaborate in its workings, this use of a “secret” code communicate an idea that the skinheads have to work in secrecy to avoid detection by a culture hostile to their ideas. Similarly, it also allows members of the movement to indicate their “insider” status and to provide a means of uttering statements of faith in public (“Heil Hitler”- 88) that substantiates the romantic vision of themselves as oppressed “racial holy warriors.”

There are also other symbols worthy of note. First, skinheads explicitly venerate the Nazi movement and identify with the swastika as a statement of ideology. Other racist movements, such as the Ku Klux Klan, are also common points of reference and skinheads will dress like Klansmen. A symbol peculiar to the skinhead movement is the “Celtic Cross,” which is a cross imposed on a circle. This supposedly symbolizes the union of Christian traditions with the Pagan Gods in Celtic Culture. This symbol historicizes the “conflict” between races and links it to a mythical past. The clash between “races” is a war of preternatural enemies who are defined by nature. It also shows the British roots of the movement as the “Celts” were supposedly the original inhabitants of the British Isles. I photographed an example of this symbol when I was in Krasnodar in 2007 which had the initials “W P/ S H” (White Power/ Skin Head) on each side of the cross lines and it is shown in figure 3.1.
The skinhead subculture in Russia thus has Western origins. While the subculture remained marginal in the West, skinhead groups saw an opportunity for their advancement in Russia. In the mid-1990s, Western skinhead groups, thinking that Russia presented fertile territory for the seeds of racism, established branches there. This movement quickly took off in popularity and table 3.1 gives estimates of the number of skinheads in Russia by year.
### Table 3.1: Absolute numbers of skinheads in Russia, by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of skinheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>60-65,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another authority on the skinhead movement in Russia is Belikov (2002), a Russian who did in fact “go native.” His work (2002: 114-7) offers insights concerning the demographic and the class structure of the movement. Demographically, he gives 4 types of skinheads active in Russia: spontaneous; friends; ideational; and political. The first two groups are composed mainly of teenagers who patrol their neighborhoods but stay within a fixed area. As there are likely to be fewer “enemies” on residential estates and because children are generally more noisy than violent, it is reasonable to presume that most actual violence comes from the remaining two groups. The “ideational” skinheads are gangs of teenagers led by an older teenager who comes under the influence of ideas. Finally, “political” skinheads are cells usually led by a single individual and involved with the work of propaganda.

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123 These figures are taken from Tarasov and are cited in both Shnirelman, V. (2006: 26) and Pain, E. (2004: 186) although the latter’s figures only extend up to 2004. This testifies to their accuracy.

124 One of the most surreal of my experiences in Moscow in 2006 came one night as I was lying in my apartment bed. The housing complex formed a hexagon, in the middle of which was a communal playground where the local youth would gather to drink and smoke. The children did this every night, so I was not surprised to hear their voices when I opened the balcony door to combat the oppressive Moscow heat. After a little while, however, I heard the tones of “Deutschland, Deutschland Uber Alles” coming from the playground and the children down there. Clearly, the ideology of neo-Nazism has a strong grip on Russian youth.
Although it is impossible to know the distribution of Tarasov’s estimate of skinhead numbers in this typology, it is possible to know the names of the most prominent gangs in Russia. This list is by no means comprehensive but contains a surprisingly great number of gangs considering the secrecy which they try and maintain for fear of “oppression.” In some cases, data on skinhead gangs also includes approximate numbers and cities of operation. Table 3.2 displays the fullest information that is known about these gangs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skinhead Group</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Numbers (est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schultz-88</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Disbanded 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad Crowd</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood and Honor (Combat 18 Russia)</td>
<td>Moscow, Rostov, Novorossiysk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Skinlegion</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Brigades 88</td>
<td></td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavic Union</td>
<td>Moscow, St. Petersburg, Krasnodar, Vladivostok, Blagoveshensk, Lipetsk, Surgut, Kaluga, Kostroma, Murmansk, Tver and Tyumen</td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White bulldogs</td>
<td></td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lefortovo front</td>
<td></td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Hammerskins-Russia”</td>
<td></td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Goal</td>
<td></td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th hour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Fist</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Totenkopf”</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solstice</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Nizhny Novgorod</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skinhead brotherhood</td>
<td>Ivanov</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“White Bears”</td>
<td>Yaroslavl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Will</td>
<td>Izhevsk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brotherhood of skins</td>
<td>Novosibersk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Alliance</td>
<td>Tyumen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryan Hosea</td>
<td>Pskov</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: known skinhead groups, city of activity and estimated numbers.

125 Names without quote marks are translations from Russian. Names with quote marks are Russian groups that use the Latin alphabet to give their names.
Although it is difficult to know about active skinhead groups, those that have disbanded may build on Tarasov’s insights about the organizational structures of these movements. Two skinhead movements (Schultz-88 and Mad Crowd) were disbanded after the authorities imprisoned most of their members for involvement in hate crimes. Schultz-88 was disbanded after a St. Petersburg court sentenced the leader, Dmitri Bobov, to 6 years imprisonment for involvement in the death of an expert on skinheads who was giving evidence in a court case, Nikolai Girienko. Similarly, the Mad Crowd gang disbanded after police shot and killed its leader Dmitrii Borovikov while resisting arrest for involvement in the May 7th 2006 shooting of a Senegalese student. In both cases, the gang fell apart in the absence of its leader, suggesting the accuracy of Tarasov’s model. Secondary members of skinhead gangs cluster around one individual.

This model of organization is also evident in the skinhead gang which is active and about which I gathered information. The name of this gang is Slavic Union (Slavyansky Soyuz). According to its website, this “national-socialist movement” has an impressive geographical coverage and it would be surprising if this were not the most influential. Exact estimates of numbers of members are difficult to attain but its geographical spread suggests it is also the largest in terms of absolute numbers of members. The organization of the movement is similar to that of the other gangs,

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127 This is the message on their website where the subtitle nationale-sozialistye dverenie greets the visitor. The message was also reaffirmed by interviews with two rank and file members of Slavic Union and with a member of the Slavic Union ruling council. I have also been in contact with Demushkin himself and nothing in that correspondence has led me to believe differently to this impression. Other skinhead gangs also have websites but none are as forthcoming with information as Slavic Union. It is worth mentioning that several Russian academics have assured me that Demushkin is an agent provocateur, sponsored by the government to stir up racial antagonisms, although there is no direct proof of this. However, the readiness of Slavyansky Soyuz to talk to all and sundry certainly supports this argument although it is no more than circumstantial evidence.
Schultz-88 and Mad Crowd. The leader of the group, Dmitrii Demushkin,\textsuperscript{128} was offered a particularly exalted place in skinhead communications. Given that leaders are often influenced heavily by ideology, this suggests an important role for ideology in motivating the actions of skinhead gangs.

The “followers” in skinhead gangs are easy to describe. Belikov argues that skinheads come from all social classes of Russian society with many being students at prominent Russian universities. Indeed, as if to underscore this claim, two students were arrested in 2006 for an explosion using a homemade bomb at the Cherikozskiy market which killed at least 10 Asians.\textsuperscript{129} Although one might still maintain that the majority of skinheads are working class youth angry at the lack of opportunities for material improvement in their lives, the growth of the movement alongside the development of the Russian economy since 2000 suggests otherwise. If economic opportunities are developing but there is still exponential growth of the racist movement, then it suggests this movement is not primarily a reaction to economic dissatisfaction. The skinhead movement cannot be understood solely as a venting of the working-class spleen at minorities responsible for taking jobs of the indigenous population. Understanding the nature of it rather requires contemplation of their activities.

The skinheads in Russia understand themselves as fighting the “fourth world war” of the races against one another. Their activities must be understood within the context of this “war.” They are the defenders of the white race and strive to protect white society from colored foreigners. This narrative of conflict is lent substance by the activities of

\textsuperscript{128} Demushkin rose to national prominence after publicly threatening to murder civil rights activist D. Krayhukhin.

organized skinhead gangs where members are taken out into the woods and trained in the use of firearms and combat techniques. These camps are located in rural areas and were clearly aimed at making gang members prepared for some upcoming confrontation which the organizers thought inevitable. Figure 3.2 is a still taken from one of the DVDs showing just one of these “training sessions.” The clip itself was filled with activities such as crawling under nets with fires burning on top of them, training for urban combat, practicing hand to hand combat, and rock concerts. While this “training” is clearly reminiscent of the military, it does not resemble any skinhead conflicts to date. There are no pitched battles which require guerrilla warfare of the kind seen in the videos, for example. What is true of this “training” however, is that it substantiates the climate of militarism and tangible threat skinheads feel.

Figure 3.2: Nazi Training
This is shown again in figure 3.3 where a member of the “Blood and Honour” organization instructs the viewer on how to use weapons of various kinds, including a gun, a bottle, nunchuks, the gas Zyklon-C, and bomb-making equipment. In the video presentation, he instructs the viewer as to which weapon is most appropriate for which circumstance. The black balaclava he is wearing is reminiscent of terrorist organizations throughout history, (most notoriously the Irish Republican Army and Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland) and allows the presenter anonymity whilst giving “important” lessons. This is clearly preparation for imminent conflict. The atmosphere of militarism created by such propaganda materials lends credence to the skinhead claims of a real “war.” By posting videos on how to use weapons properly and in which situations, the skinheads create an atmosphere of militarism both for themselves and for the viewer. Yet the imagined conflict goes further than simple preparation as skinheads actually take it to the level of violence. Clips of this violence were also contained on the DVDs.

Figure 3.3 Nazi Weapons Training
There were two recorded types of violence evident on the DVDs: street violence and ritual (*qua* ritual) violence. They glorified the use of violence against ethnic minorities, presenting them as just acts. The first type of recorded violence, street fighting, featured beating and pogrom-style violence. Figure 3.4 is a still of an attack on an Azerbiajani water-melon vendor. The attack was clearly orchestrated, as attested to by the fact that the attack was recorded. In the full clip, the skinheads beat the merchant to the point where he is no longer able to defend his property and then they turned over the watermelon stand. Another example of street violence on the video showed skinheads trapping an Asian man who was walking across a park by blocking each of the available paths of retreat. Three skinheads then jumped on him and beat him up. There were many more clips of violence similar to these two. The “racial war” is fought via small scale attacks on members of racial minorities.
This image of “racial Holy war” was reinforced by perhaps the most horrific kind of violence visible on the DVDs: ritual violence enacted on members of different races. In these ritual attacks, ethnic minorities were killed in a particular manner. Figure 3.5 is a still from perhaps the most disturbing clip on the DVDs. In this case skinheads dressed up like Ku Klux Klan members, burnt a wooden cross and then proceeded to hang a man who they claimed was a Tajik\textsuperscript{130} caught dealing drugs. Having watched the man die, the members then proceeded to hack off his hands and feet (in accordance with “an old Russian tradition for dealing with criminals”) and place them in the hot coals. I inferred from this that the accusation of criminality justified (to the skinheads) the violence they visit on others, making clear that what is meant by the skinhead contention of a racial war is resisting those who (allegedly) violate the indigenous community. Because skinheads believe that the Russian government does not represent their interests or protect the Russian population, they feel forced to take the law into their own hands. Skinheads thus see themselves as fighting the racial “war” in order to protect the indigenous community of Russians from racial others, whose malign intent is proven by their association with criminality. Russian skinheads see themselves as \textit{punishing} criminals when they persecute ethnic minorities.

\footnote{The man had a hood on and so it was impossible to tell his ethnicity.}
This idea of punishment is brought out again in a video posted to the internet by Russian extremists. The video was at first denied as a forgery but its authenticity was later verified when someone in Dagestan claimed to know one of the victims. The video features three skinheads allegedly from the organization “National Socialists of Rus”\textsuperscript{131} who capture two migrant “colonists.” One is allegedly from Dagestan and the other from Tajikistan. As shown in figure 3.6, the migrants were forced to kneel in front of a giant swastika. They were forced to say that they were “colonists” being punished by the National Socialists of Rus. After this statement, a masked man cut off the head of one of the migrants with a knife while the other is shot in the head and buried in a pre-prepared grave. The point made by this grisly scene is that the skinheads see themselves as some

\textsuperscript{131}“Rus” is the ancient name for Russia. It is worth mentioning that Alexander Verkhovsky of the Human Rights organization SOVA claimed that no-one had heard of this group and so they could be spurious. However, the executioners lend authenticity to their claims to be from a real group as they call for the formation of a new government by Dmitry Rumantsev, leader of the National Socialist Society, and the release of the imprisoned leader of Format-18.
kind of policemen and protectors of the Russian nation. The Dagestanis, they claimed, had committed the “crime” of colonization, the punishment for which was death.

Figure 3.6: Execution of colonists

The skinhead movement can thus be understood as conceiving of themselves as a sort of police. They perceive racial minorities as committing crimes against Russians and so they punish them. This conception of crime and skinhead regulators of those crimes informs my theorized explanation as to the cause of different forms of ethnic violence. Skinheads, I claim, order racial groups into a hierarchy and the treatment appropriate to them through the metaphor of crime. If the accusation of crime was a meaningless rationalization of violence then there would be no clear pattern to the crimes of which they accuse. A characteristic nature to the crimes, however, would discard the “mere” rationalization hypothesis and testify to the causal impact of rumor in promoting specific kinds of crime. Section 3.3 lists the observable implications of my theory and section 3.4
discusses the methods used. Before this, however, section 3.2 develops the theory of ethnic “criminality.”

3.2: The theory of ethnic criminality

Section 3.1 argued that skinheads see themselves as soldiers in a racial “war” who protect Russian society from ethnic criminals because the government either will not or cannot. In this section, I argue that these imagined “crimes” explain the different forms of violence through the idea that the punishment should fit the crime. I begin by connecting this to existing theories of ethnic violence and identify precisely both the mechanism and the role it plays in causing violence. Having elaborated the theory, I then provide specific predictions which follow from it: which alleged crimes lead to which form of violence. Section 3.2 then identifies the observable implications and states them as hypotheses for which section 3.3 designs research. I test these observable implications against competitors in chapters four, five, and six. Before this I elaborate on the theory of ethnic “criminality.”

This theory has two foundations. The first is the insight of Horowitz (2001: 75-6) that rumors “project onto the future victims of violence the very impulses entertained by those who will victimize them.” As an example of this he provides evidence from India where “after Hindu families fled to a Muslim area, some 200 Hindus were reported to have been massacred.” Here the power of the social imaginary was harnessed to promote violence between these two religious groups, trying to evoke retaliatory violence for a reputed crime. Another example may be found in the Hitler regime where Cohen (1967) calls the infamous forgery “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” a “warrant for
In both these cases, rumors inflamed passions and stirred up hatreds. Projection, then, is an important part of the causal story of violence.

The ethnography developed in the last section is the second founding component of the theory. In that place, I argued that skinheads understood themselves as fighters in the “Racial Holy War.” In other words, they project violent attitudes and criminal intent onto racial minorities which legitimates violence against those racial groups (at least, to skinheads). This acting as if something were real even if it has no basis in fact is the key to understanding the nature of the skinhead movement. And given that this “war” is mainly fought through “criminal activities,” skinhead violence can be understood as punishment for these supposed “crimes.” However, “justice” is not dispensed without consideration of the “crime” and so the different forms of violence can be accounted for as proportional responses to these “crimes.”

Indeed, in most modern civil and criminal law codes those guilty of different criminal acts are punished in accordance with the nature of their crime. This is the sentiment embodied in the saying “an eye for an eye” or a “tooth for a tooth.” The notion of reciprocal harm was central to Nietzsche’s (1989) essay on the origin of human memory and guilt. Indeed, Nietzsche (1989: 63) argued that behind the idea of punishment is the notion that “every injury has its equivalent and can actually be paid back, even if only though the pain of the culprit.” Punishment has a mimetic function,

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132 The Protocols was a book that, incidentally, I was able to buy in Moscow at no less than three locations in the downtown area. Admittedly, the places I was able to buy it were makeshift book stalls where merchants set up shop at the side of the road next to walls or metro stations but the point illustrates the level to which ethnic phobias have penetrated Russian society. In their study of fascism in Germany and the Holocaust, Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (2001: 187) attributed both phenomena to projection which "confuses the inner and outer world" and attributed the motive of wanting to destroy Germany to an external social group, the Jews.

133 See Verkauik, O. (2004: 111-136) who writes on the experience of “fun” and violence. He argues that for the Pakistani militants, violence challenged “propriety and the symbolic coherence of the dominant
imitating the harm caused to the victim. This is the logic behind the use of different forms of violence by skinheads. The punishment ought to fit the “crime,” but what is the origin of these accusations?

Both the far-right and mainstream media convey the impression that racial others commit certain kinds of crime. Galina Kozhevnikova (in Verkovsky, A. [Ed], 2007: 12-13) of the Human Rights organization SOVA has carried out a monitoring project on the mass media that collects data on “stereotypes as such.” She provides a typology of 17 different kinds of stereotypes, 6 of which include the idea of a criminal act. Empirically, she applied this typology to a representative sample of the Russian mass media and looked for the distribution of stereotypes. Those ethnic stereotypes that feature crimes and project the responsibility for socially malign actions onto racial others constitute roughly two-fifths of the total number. Some newspapers have presented other racial groups as ”culpable nations, where everyone is a criminal.” Clearly, the impression that racial groups are connected to crimes is perpetuated by the media.

I say “perpetuated” rather than “caused” because it is not clear that the media is the original cause of these impressions. Rather, they are the cause of the stereotype of criminality. An impression is different from a stereotype because the former implies individual and the latter collective understanding. That individual understanding of racial minorities as criminals could be ex post rationalization of violence whereas stereotypes discourse in a ludic way” (117). Such violence was justified, however, by the repression at other times of the rights of the community.

I considered the following categories of Kozhevnikova’s typology as connected or related to crimes: Confirmation of inferior moral qualities of other groups; confirmation of historical crimes; confirmation of criminal tendencies; Confirmation of cultural or intellectual inferiority of other groups; Reasoning from assumption of moral or cultural inferiority; and charges of damage to society by an ethnic group. Although one might argue that these do not all directly involve crime, they are all clearly connected to crime.

See Kozhevnikova, G. in Verkhovsky, A. [Ed] (2007: 49-52). In all, there were 689 instances of the ‘language of conflicts” and 273 related to crime.

are able to play a more systemically causal role. There may even be truth in some instances to allegations of criminality. Yet individual instances of action do not by themselves cause stereotypes. By definition, only a collective medium could do this. That collective medium is both Far-Right and mainstream media.

The language of impressions and stereotypes also provides an answer to another foreseeable objection, that of endogeneity. Endogeneity is the problem that “exists when the explanatory variables are caused, at least in part, by the dependent variable.” In this case, one may claim that stereotypes are rationalizations generated by violence which do not actually serve any causal role. However, for the purposes of patterned events the reason given for an action at time x may become the cause of action at time y. Skinheads may rationalize their violence in time T with the accusation of crime, but this accusation then inspires other skinheads at time T+1. The endogeneity critique thus makes little sense when explaining skinhead violence which is frequent and patterned. The media waft the flames of the “racial war” by creating the stereotype that racial others are inherently connected to crimes and it is for these crimes that skinheads punish racial minorities with different forms of violence.

The theory posits that skinheads will react with mimetic violence to the perceived crimes of racial minorities. The reason is that this provides a salve to skinheads’ consciences. By perceiving of others as responsible for crimes, skinheads take the moral responsibility from off their collective shoulders and make unwarranted violence seem more like justice. They can act without equivocation because what they are doing is a rightful action ordained by some eternal principle of dialectical reciprocity. Moreover,

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this theory implies that only a certain kind of response will be justified, not any action regardless of scope.

The instant objection that comes to this theory is that skinheads do not have a conscience and so this cannot be the case. I should respond with three points that argue against the “conscience-less skinheads.” First, it is naïve to assert this and also possibly a gut reaction to the disgusting scenes of violence. Saying that “they” who can commit such violence are without conscience means they are not connected to “us,” and so separates us from such phenomenon. It may make it easier for people to sleep at night when we deny our own similarities with the “monsters” that perpetrators of ethnic violence (in this case, skinheads) are, but this does not explain them or their actions. Those who would deny that any one of use could do such things do not assist in understanding the problem, but relegate it to another moral universe.

Second, skinheads themselves spin a narrative of victimization which portrays their struggle against ethno-racial minorities as a reaction to the “crimes” of these groups. Leaving aside the question of whether there is any basis in fact to support this narrative, the very fact that it exists is itself important. If they had no conscience or constraint by morality, why would this exist? If they did not feel they had to justify their actions because they had no conscience, why would they frame their actions as saving the holy Russian nation? These facts can only make sense if one allows that skinheads need to

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138 Chirot, D. & McCauley, C. (2006: 51-57) invoke the psychological concept of “dissonance theory” to explain how people change their opinions to rationalize their behavior. Others become seen as deviant ‘others’ who endanger ‘our’ security and threaten to pollute our world and who therefore must be killed. In this way, “each additional killing makes the next one easier because each killing leads to changes in beliefs and values.” While I do not agree that these changes in beliefs and values only arise as a consequence of killing, the same causal pattern is identified here as in my theory.
justify their actions because at some level they really do not want to be acting without justification.

The third and final reason is because other perpetrators of the most hideous ethnic violence similarly demonstrated evidence of a conscience. In her theory of the Holocaust, Arendt (1994: 85) argued that the redescriptions of mass murder made carrying it out easier on the perpetrators. The author of the Final Solution, Adolf Eichmann, was advanced to the role of a “bearer of secrets” who hid the moral consequences of “extermination” from the ordinary Germans who took part in the Holocaust by describing the actions as “special treatment” or “change of residence.” In his defense at Jerusalem, Eichmann argued that he “sensed a kind of Pontius Pilate feeling, for I felt free of all guilt.”¹³⁹ Not content in deceiving the soldiers about their participation in the most immoral act of all time, Eichmann had to justify before his own conscience his complicity in the Holocaust. He was not consciously killing, but doing his duty. These are not the acts of either a man without conscience or one who expects less of other people. Yet if one allows that even such a mass-murderer as Eichmann might have had a conscience, then it is disingenuous to deny this same possibility to the skinheads. For these three reasons, then, I do not think that the charge that skinheads could not possibly have consciences stands.

Indeed, in order to appreciate the full importance of conscience in this case, we need to underline again just how horrible the actions of skinheads towards ethnic minorities are. Stabbing a nine-year old girl in the chest, blowing up market traders, purposefully designing anti-Semitic signs and erecting them by the side of a highway, breaking into a Gypsy camp and beating the inhabitants with iron bars, cutting the head

from another man with his blood flying everywhere: all these actions are ones that come with extreme moral consequences and which in everyday life most people would not do. Those that do commit such acts are usually locked up as psychopaths. Committing such actions as these therefore bears a social stigma or fear of punishment which can only be overcome by inverting the moral worth of another person. It is not “psychopathic” or as “morally reprehensible” to punish “criminals” in the ways outlined above.

In order to test this theory we need specific predictions. Specific predictions require identifying the constitution of these different kinds of “crime.” To this end, I hypothesize that there are two axes of criminal action, the “targets of crime” and the “scope of the crime.” These axes can be juxtaposed to create a typology of four distinct types of crime. The predictive axes of the independent variable will resemble the typology of the dependent variable, an inference which is entirely in line with the theoretical implication that violence will assume a mimetic character.

The first axis is the “targets of crime.” This is the division between people and property which again assumes a fundamental difference between attacking the actual person of another as compared to their livelihood or other property. A racial group may be accused of crimes that focus either on people or on property. The second axis, on the other hand, concerns the scope of the crime. I include this because the notion of whether the consequences of a crime are immediate and concrete or distant and abstract is likely to affect one’s reaction. A concrete crime is one where the consequences are immediately felt and specific such as assault, killing or the taking of something which belongs to someone else. Conversely, an abstract crime is one where the results are not immediately felt but a non-specific negative consequence follows. Just like in the
typology in chapter one, moreover, from the juxtaposition of these two axes 4 different types emerge which are detailed in figure 3.7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of targets</th>
<th>Severity of Crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.7: Typology of crimes of which victims are accused

Figure 3.7 contains four different kinds of crime of which an ethnic group may be accused. This typology deliberately resembles the typology of ethnic violence in chapter one. In figure 3.7, the names of the forms of violence have been replaced with numbers corresponding to accusations of particular criminal activities. I did this in the hope of lessening confusion between the two typologies. Crimes of type 1 legitimate Symbolic Violence, type 2 corresponds to Lynching, type 3 to Pogrom, and type 4 to Massacre. I identify these specific types of criminal accusation as a guide to exposition and in future have referred to the crimes by their axes. Because skinheads act as if the ethnic minority were responsible for the crimes of which they are accused, particular forms of violence seem proportionate as a punishment.

Therefore, in this section I have argued for an understanding of different forms of skinhead violence as reactions to accusations of different crimes leveled at various ethnic groups. By punishing ethnic groups for these crimes, skinheads substantiate their self-appointed role as protectors of “white” culture in the “racial war.” Racial others bring a
“negative” impact on white Russian culture and this “negative” impact has to be punished. Skinheads, who have appointed themselves protectors of white culture, use violence to punish ethnic “criminals.” The next section lists the observable implications of this theory and section 3.4 discusses the methods used.

3.3: Observable Implications

Skinheads use different forms of violence because they perceive ethnic minorities as responsible for particular kinds of crime. The “punishment” they enact upon a minority is a proportionate response to the “crime” committed. This was the core insight of the theory laid out in section 3.2. This section outlines some observable implications of this theory and states them as hypotheses which will be tested in the rest of the dissertation. The observable implications are that there will be a strong correlation between particular ethnic groups and certain forms of violence, that the minorities with the strongest correlation will be held responsible for commensurate crimes, and that the skinheads themselves will use the language of proportionality when talking about their reasons for attacking ethnic minorities. I enlarge upon each of these points below.

The most readily observable implication of this theory is that the form of violence will differ depending on the ethnic group which is targeted. Because the theory states that certain groups will be targeted in particular ways, the ethnic identity of the victims should show patterns to the form of violence. This is not to say that ethnic identity will be the only determining factor of the form of violence, but that it will be amongst the strongest correlations we see. Certain groups will be attacked in particular ways as
skinheads seek retribution for the “crimes” of that minority against the Russian people. This implication is contained within hypothesis 9.

As should be clear from the literature review in the last chapter, however, there are many ways in which the correlation of ethnicity to a particular form of violence could be explained. The second observable implication is thus that skinheads blame ethnic minorities for particular crimes in their discourse. If skinheads punish ethnic minorities for the alleged involvement in “crimes” and if they do so through the logic of proportionality, then it stands to reason that ethnic minorities will actually be accused of crimes commensurate to their “punishment.” An easy test would show these accusations to exist in the far-right media, which I assume to have the most influence in shaping the skinhead worldview. The skinhead worldview originates with those social resources which inform it, therefore if they are punishing ethno-racial minorities for their alleged involvement with particular “crimes,” then the media should also accuse them of those “crimes.” This is stated as hypothesis 10.

A third observable implication would be that the theory works in cases other than those of the skinheads. Because both of the above implications refer only to skinheads, we cannot be sure it will also explain instances of ethnic violence not perpetrated by skinheads. This implication would use the theory as a plausibility probe to see whether it can explain cases beyond those of solely skinhead violence. If the theory explains why ethnic violence from different perpetrators also varies, then we may have greater confidence that it is generalizable and conduct more rigorous tests elsewhere. Section 3.4 discusses the methods which I use in testing these hypotheses.
Hypothesis 9: Skinhead perpetrators of ethnic violence will project responsibility for crimes commensurate to their “punishment” onto their victims.

Hypothesis 10: The form of violence will differ by the ethnic identity of the target group. Skinheads will explain their violence against ethnic minorities using the language of proportional response.

3.4 Research Design

This section identifies and justifies the choice of the methods used to test the hypotheses identified in section 3.3 and their competitors identified in chapter two. In this section I first briefly remind the reader about the nature of the Dependent Variable and then in turn identify four tests for the Theory of Ethnic Criminality and its rivals: cluster analysis; content analysis; interviews; and case studies. The combination of these methods amounts to a mixed-methods battery of tests. This allows us to feel greater confidence in our testing of the theory, as we are not open to the critique of relying on only one kind of method. Before I discuss the methods I use, however, I remind the reader of the nature of the Dependent Variable.

The Dependent Variable in this research is the form of ethnic violence. This is divided into four nominal categories (Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre) which have already been discussed in chapter one. These categories are mutually exclusive and based on the insight that different forms of violence send qualitatively different messages to their ethnic targets. While I do not assume that instances of ethnic violence will slot perfectly into one of these categories I do assume that most instances of ethnic violence will have a “character” to them. This might be, for
instance, a concentration upon the property of ethnic others as opposed to their persons. This “character” means that I can classify given instances of ethnic violence as either one type or another. General measurement guidelines are given in chapter 4, but ultimately the placement of an instance of ethnic violence is a matter of interpretation.

The first method I use to test the theory is cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is a basic form of statistical analysis which visually scans data looking for “clusters” which might reveal characteristic relationships between variables. This method allows me to evaluate all the hypotheses simultaneously as they all specify a correlation between a given variable and the form of violence. Those variables are the ethnicity of the target group, the timing of violence, the number of perpetrators, and the region in which violence occurs. Identifying a correlation between one of these variables and the form of violence is an important first step in establishing a causal argument.

I used cluster analysis because the Dependent Variable is a nominal variable which would not be amenable to regular regression-techniques. There is also no baseline expectation of whether there would be violence (let alone a particular form!), which again makes the case against using more high-powered statistical analysis. Finally, there is also a danger from these sophisticated statistical methods that the because the number of observations of ethnic violence is fairly small- 884- meaning some relationships might be ruled statistically insignificant but that we would want to investigate further.

The second method is that of a content analysis which will uncover the manner in which ethnic minorities are represented by the skinheads to themselves and so provide an additional test of the hypotheses. Content analysis is a well-established method in the Social Sciences, which Kimberley Neuendorf describes as “a summarizing quantitative
analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method.”

In its most basic form it is the simple counting of phrases that emanate from the “meaning-making factories” of a group that appear within a politically relevant text in order to show relationships in how a speech is presented. Other searches may look for patterns of word association— for example, how frequently the word “brave” appears within ten words of “America.” It is by far the most well-known method of textual analysis. Its purpose is the testing of hypotheses by showing relationships in data and so focuses on the traditional standards of science—accuracy, reliability, and replicability— as the benchmark of its validity. I give two examples of studies that used content analysis in Great Britain and the Soviet Union below.

Sanders and Gavin (2004) use content analysis to evaluate the role of the media in informing people’s support for the British government. Building on the commonplace that the performance of the economy is the most salient issue for voters, they argue that “[economic] evaluations derive more from the way in which the media, and in particular television news programs, present economic development than they do from “objective” changes in the “real” economy.” The ways in which the media portrays economic news are condensed into categories (“positive,” “negative,” etc.) and the correlation between voters’ beliefs about the economy and positive economic news demonstrates a far greater fit than that of how the situation really is.

Similarly, Tetlock & Boettger (1989: 212) use content analysis to determine the public reasoning of Soviet apparatchiks and how similar they are to their American

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140 Neuendorf, K. (2002: 10)
141 Hart, R., Jarvis, S., & Lim, E. (2002: 418). The word “factory” should not be taken as implying the total creation of meaning as, especially in Discourse Analysis, this space is shared with the daily practices that constitute agents’ lives.
142 Sanders, D. & Gavin, N. (2004: 1246)
colleagues. Drawing on the psychological literature, the authors argue that issues may be analyzed in either differentiated or highly integrated fashion and they show how Soviet bureaucrats operate in an integrated manner. The categories are fixed and firm in such a manner that objective language statements can be taken without regard to context and fitted into them. These examples demonstrate some of the assumptions behind content analysis.

I choose to use content analysis because it is able to include a more broad set of data than more concentrated methods such as discourse analysis. Discourse analysis views text as constructing reality, establishing the power relations that in some way mediate actor’s relations.\textsuperscript{143} It is thus necessarily limited to highly detailed readings of just a few sources. Content analysis, on the other hand, views language as reflective of a reality already established and slots observations into already pre-established categories.\textsuperscript{144} It therefore has the advantage of being able to systematize data from a wide variety of sources to identify patterns. Moreover, the “thick description” ethnographic method of discourse analysis would only be repeating some of the findings already stated in this chapter through analysis of skinhead videos. For both these reasons, then, I justify the choice of content analysis.

An additional method used to provide another test to the theory is the qualitative analysis of what skinheads say in response to open-ended interview questions. Open-ended interviews provide an additional data point with which to test the theory. Open-ended interviews- conversations in which participants are free to expound on a given question in their own words- give a chance for the respondents to answer without having

\textsuperscript{143} Hardy, C., Harley, B., & Phillips, N. (2004: 19)
to make their answers conform to pre-existing multiple-choice categories. Ellen Carnaghan (2007: esp. 43-74) used 60 in-depth interviews with ordinary Russians to determine the origin of Russian political values, finding that recent experiences shaped Russians’ contemporary values far more than a trans-historical predilection for authoritarianism.

This method is peculiarly well-suited to research on skinheads. The biggest drawback— that the sample is not representative— is offset by other considerations. First, with intensive interviews “the sample is considered sufficient when the topic is saturated, that is, when additional interviews provide little new information.” Given that skinheads are a difficult (and dangerous) group to contact, the in-depth interview method promises greater insights than either structured interviews or surveys. Second, allowing skinheads to explain their actions in their own words provides a more rigorous test of the theoretical link than would a structured interview where answers might be suggested to subjects. Lastly, it is important to note that this method is not the only test of the theory but is instead used to compliment other methods. Our results will be seen in the context of the results from other tests.

The final method which I use to test my theory and its rivals is the case study method. The case study method is a good “plausibility probe” for a theory, in this case testing whether the same logic works under different conditions. A case study is “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a large class of similar phenomena.” More concretely, it is

146 This term comes from Arend Liphardt’s (1971) typology of case studies: atheoretical, configurative, heuristic, plausibility probes, and building block. See George, A. & Bennett, A. (2004: 75)
147 Gerring, J. (2004: 341)
“the detailed examination of an aspect of an historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”\textsuperscript{148} These two definitions relate the essential features of the case study—its comprehensive analysis (or “thick description,”) largely descriptive method, and aim of uncovering general theory. Case studies are an analytical inquiry into “the facts” of a particular case or variety of cases with the aim of uncovering something about the process which went into a particular historical example.

Case studies are good for identifying the causal process by which some X causes some Y, a method that has come to be known as “process tracing.” Indeed, “case studies… allow one to peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and is purported effect… Hume’s billiard ball crossing the table and hitting a second ball.”\textsuperscript{149} This is a good method for inquiring into the generalizability of a theory because it entertains all possibilities that violence could have occurred in different ways in a manner which adjusts itself to the specifics of a particular situation.

Admittedly, the method of the case study (distinct from my analysis of skinhead violence) is by its very nature limited to the analysis of few cases and so might not seem a good candidate with which to evaluate the generalizability of theories. However, especially in the case of a phenomenon like ethnic violence, there are so many competing elements that need to be taken into account the detailed analysis of a few cases is more reliable than a more superficial analysis of many. Additionally, the case is not intended to a be a full-on test of whether the theory holds a high level of “external validity,” but rather whether it is feasible to investigate doing such a study. We are not looking for

\textsuperscript{148} George, A. & Bennett, A. (2004:5)
\textsuperscript{149} Gerring, J. (2004: 348)
verification of the theory in all instances, just whether it offers explanatory purchase in a few cases. For all these reasons, therefore, I believe the choice of the case study as a test of the theory is justified.

To conclude for this section, I have identified the Dependent Variable and the methods which will be used to test my theory and its competitors throughout the dissertation: cluster analysis; content analysis; qualitative interviews; and case studies. This combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques stands the theory in good stead to resist challenges from outside and also shows its flexibility. Furthermore, each of these methods tests a different implication of the theories of ethnic violence, providing a battery of tests that should allow the theory to gain the confidence of the reader. Section 3.5 below concludes, and chapter 4 begins on testing the theory and its competitors.

3.5: Conclusion

This chapter has argued for a theory of the forms of ethnic violence that links the form of violence as a reaction to particular kinds of crime. Section 3.1 gave an ethnography of the skinhead movement in order to understand how they conceive of themselves. Skinheads understand themselves as involved in a racial “war” conducted on the streets and fighting “crime.” Section 3.2 used the findings from this ethnography and from the literature review in chapter two to argue that the logic of projection accounts for the different forms of violence. Skinheads “punish” ethno-racial groups for their supposed “crimes” in a proportional manner. Because they understand themselves as enacting just sentences on these minorities, there is no compunction in doing so. Section 3.3 then relayed the exact logic of how this mechanism worked and drew three
hypotheses to test the theory. Section 3.4 provided a research design for the rest of the dissertation.

The next chapter tests the hypotheses against a database of skinhead violence to see which independent variables provide the strongest correlation with the form of violence. Here I present a database of skinhead violence in the Russian Federation for the years 2001-2008. Having established that the ethnicity of the target group provides the strongest correlation to the form of violence, chapter five then evaluates those hypotheses which link ethnicity to violence with a content analysis of skinhead-rightist media. I follow up on this with data from interviews conducted with skinhead perpetrators of ethnic violence. This data was collected through in-person interviews and in a more imaginative manner over the internet. I also conduct a shorter test with a content analysis of materials from the Russian mass media. The last test is in chapter six which uses two case studies as plausibility probes of the generalizability of the theory. Finally, chapter seven provides a conclusion to the dissertation.
Chapter 4: Ethnic Violence and Cluster Analysis

This chapter tests the theory developed in chapter three and rival explanations identified in the literature review against a database of skinhead violence using cluster analysis. In doing so, I measure and correlate data on particular instances of violent attacks with supposedly “objective” criteria, such as ethnicity, the number of perpetrators, and the frequency of violence. Data on skinhead activities is somewhat difficult to come by- the UN rapporteur on racism, Doudou Diène, found that the Russian government keeps no publicly available statistics on racist violence. Yet there are Human Rights organizations which monitor this phenomenon. This chapter constructs a database of skinhead ethnic violence from these Human Rights organizations and tests the theory and its competitors against that data.

I proceed in six stages. First, I detail how I compiled a database of skinhead violence in the Russian Federation, using a weekly report from a Human Rights organization which monitors instances of skinhead violence. Second, I operationalize the typology and use it to analyze the database. The data shows that not only is the occurrence of violence in that country getting more frequent, but so is the severity of the form. Third, I re-state the hypotheses from chapters two and three. I then test the hypotheses against the data on instances of violence that measure place, month of occurrence, the number of perpetrators involved, and ethnicity of the target group. I contend that the clearest pattern evident in the data concerns the ethnicity of the target
victims. I make the case that just four of these groups (Jews, Africans, Caucasians, and Gypsies) exemplify the relationship between ethnic identity and the form of violence and so I use them in the next chapter to evaluate the theory concerning the mechanism that produces particular forms of violence. Section five provides qualitative examples of violent attacks against particular ethnic groups. Section six concludes. Before this, however, we need to uncover the origin of the data.

4.1: Data on skinhead violence in the Russian Federation

Although skinhead violence is a significant problem in Russia, comprehensive details on all their activities are rather hard to obtain. Indeed, special United Nations rapporteur Doudou Dienne who went to investigate racist violence in 2006 found that the Russian government itself was keeping no (public) statistics on the occurrence of violence. This section details the origin of the data which forms the basis of this project and specifies coding decisions made regarding individuating cases, violence, perpetrators, and the targets. It ends by presenting evidence that the frequency of skinhead attacks on ethnic minorities is increasing to worrying levels. The next section applies the typology of ethnic violence developed in chapter one to this database. Before this, however, I recount the source of the data.

In the case of Russia, there are two obstacles in the way of obtaining ideal systematic data. One is peculiar to Russia and the other is not. Beginning with the latter, a significant problem is incomplete data. Very often, people will not report incidences

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150 This is not to mention the fact that a great number of racist attacks in Russia are not even reported. See the article “Reported Racism Declines, Political Extremism Surges” in Bigotry Monitor (2005: 5: 44) for more details.
of racist violence because they are afraid of the consequences of doing so. If someone is scared and does not feel that the authorities or other people will do anything about an attack, then they may not report incidences of ethnic violence. There is a similar situation with domestic rape, where many rapes go unreported\textsuperscript{151} because the victims do not think that anyone will believe them and are afraid of the consequences. This problem, however, is one which all social scientific projects face (although perhaps especially so in cases of such sensitivity as this) and so is universal. This problem is unavoidable and means that truth-claims are limited by available data. Yet this does not jeopardize the project: because something is hard to study, it does not mean that we should not study it.

This first data problem is compounded by a second that is peculiar to Russia, namely the absence of an official centralized reporting agency which tracks racist violence. Indeed, Nikolai Butkevich, head of the Union of Councils of former Soviet Jewry, complains that “the government refuses to implement a comprehensive and transparent system for monitoring hate crimes.”\textsuperscript{152} However, empirical problems do not jeopardize the research but call for creative solutions. One such solution in this case was to enlist the aid of the Human Rights community in Russia. There are many Non-Governmental Agencies who are set up to monitor just these incidences of racist violence in Russia. Moscow alone has the Moscow Bureau of Human Rights, the SOVA information-analytical center,\textsuperscript{153} the Memorial Human Rights Center, Amnesty

\textsuperscript{151}See, for example, Krauss’ article “Rape Was Underreported Because No-One Asked,” available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE7DB1530F933A1575BC0A963958260

\textsuperscript{152}See the report “Hate Crimes Number The Tip Of The Iceberg” in Bigotry Monitor (2008: 8: 15) for more details, available at http://www.ucsj.org/bigotry-monitor

\textsuperscript{153}Itself a branch of the Russian anti-fascist institute “Panorama,” which was established upon the fall of Communism to guard against the danger of “Weimar Russia.” To the best of the author’s knowledge, SOVA is not an acronym.
International Russia, and the Union of Councils of former Soviet Jewry. Each of these organizations utilizes reports from the national and regional press to ensure that racist violence is recorded.

One of the most systematic and longest-running sources comes from the Union of Councils of former Soviet Jewry (UCSJ). This organization publishes on the internet\textsuperscript{154} an English-language weekly summary of racist incidents from around Russia called “Bigotry Monitor.” This evidently records incidences of violence reported by either the national or local media. Postings of varying lengths detail what is known about particular acts of violence in Russia. In a joint project to create a comprehensive database, Professor Mikhail Alexseev of San Diego State University and I attempted to catalogue these events. Providing summaries of the news stories in the online publication, I read each report from 2001 until 2008.

UCSJ began publishing Bigotry Monitor in 2000 when it became evident that Russia had a substantial problem with racist violence. I do not include data from 2000 because it starts three-quarters of the way through the year and contains more information about Human Rights violations than it does about skinhead violence \textit{per se}. Alexseev checked the data for the years 2001-2005 against the other most credible source, Russian-language reports on ethnic violence of the SOVA center. He found a correlation of over .90,\textsuperscript{155} indicating that the UCSJ database does a good job of capturing all ethnic violence in Russia.

\textsuperscript{154} See http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/bigotrymonitor.shtml for the full catalogue, including back issues, of Bigotry Monitor. Author has a hard copy of reports not currently available.

\textsuperscript{155} This correlation was computed by Professor Alexseev to whom I would like to extend my warm thanks for being able to be included in this project and also for providing much advice on interpreting the data.
Given the high correlation between the two sources, this project considers the UCSJ data alone to be sufficient catalogue of the true universe of cases of skinhead violence in the Russian Federation. I make this coding decision for two reasons: the lack of benefits and the substantial costs involved. On the first point, the correlation is very high and the focus on skinhead actions in the UCSJ data complete. Moreover, SOVA reports are often cited as a source in the UCSJ data and so there appears to be little benefit from adding reports from the SOVA data. Furthermore, the data promises to be exceptionally difficult to obtain due to being in a foreign language and often repeating what is present in Bigotry Monitor. For these two reasons, therefore, I utilize just the UCSJ data.

Of course, by using one source only the project is more likely to be influenced by bias- in particular the bias toward over-reporting of anti-Semitic violence, considering that the source is a Jewish organization. While I admit that there may be a tendency to over-report acts (which may go unnoticed if committed against different ethnic groups), the database gives two solid reasons why it is a sufficient data source. First, the database is replete with violence against non-Jews as well as Jews and in fact non-Jewish victims are more frequent. Second, UCSJ gets its data from regional news agencies and newspapers and does not rely on self-reporting of crimes. Unless one wants to accuse these news agencies of selecting which stories are important and which are not- and this is a charge for which there is no evidence- then the data cannot be biased in any particular way. For these reasons, I do not consider the bias toward reporting of anti-Semitic violence to be a problem.
I developed two databases from the Bigotry Monitor reports. The first recorded all incidences of discrimination perpetrated against minority groups in Russia from 2001-2006. This included court rulings, insults, acts of violence, distribution of xenophobic newspapers, Cossack abuse, and police harassment. The targets were not just ethnic targets but included evangelical Christian sects (e.g. the Pentecostals and Jehovah’s Witnesses), Russian youth who listened to “racially inferior” music, and the anti-fascist movement “AntiFa.” By contrast, this project required data with a much more explicit focus on skinhead violence against ethnic groups. While other targets of violence may be interesting, they are not the relevant subject of analysis. Therefore, I created a refined version of the database which concentrated solely on skinhead violence against ethnic targets for the years 2001-2008. Both versions of the database are available on my website at http://polisci.osu.edu/grads/arnold. Below I detail how I determined “event,” violence, the perpetrators, and what I meant by an “ethnic” target.

In recording separate events of anything (but in this case, violence), one inevitably comes up against the question of how one separates out actions into things called “events.” This question is addressed by Horowitz (2001: 63) in his work on the deadly ethnic riot. At what point do actions become separated from one another as opposed to a different part of the same act? For instance, if one lynching occurs half an hour before another and in the close geographical proximity, are they one lynching or a massacre? Where does one “event” start and another end? In resolving this question, I see no real option but to trust the data. If violent actions are clearly referenced as happening on separate occasions (even within the same day), then I code them as separate

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events. Otherwise, I assume all the violence in a report to be part of the same “event” and code accordingly.

There is an additional conceptual problem, however, with instances of mixed violence. Some of the reports, especially those of pogrom-style violence, mentioned not just violence against property but violence against people as well- for example, the 2002 raid by 12 skinheads on a Caucasian market in Moscow where they destroyed property and beat a few of the traders.\textsuperscript{157} For a typology which asserts the importance of whether the target involves people or property, defining this as one event or two is a question of extreme importance. I demonstrate the consequences of this coding decision later. For now, however, I consider it sufficient to state that (in line with the specifications of pogrom given in the typology) I considered cases where there was significantly more damage to property than to people to be focused on that and so, a single event.

Concerning the nature of violence, I considered as violence only those cases where a marking is left with an ethnic other or their property. This is consistent with the definition of violence given in chapter one because violent exclusion from a community presupposes some actual physical damage or marking. This meant that anti-Semitic or anti-Caucasian statements made by politicians, popular protest marches, and video screenings- for example Communist party candidate Nikolai Kondratenko’s 2003 statements that Zionism is worse than Fascism,\textsuperscript{158} or skinheads distributing anti-Semitic literature in Red Square-\textsuperscript{159} do not constitute instances of violence. On the other hand, a

\textsuperscript{157} See the report “Skinheads Storm Market, Police Deny Racist Motive” in \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2002: 2: 44) for more details on this attack.
\textsuperscript{158} See the report “Top Communist Blames Jews, Election Officials Silent” in \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2003: 3: 46) for more details.
\textsuperscript{159} In a protest against the Iraq war in 2003, skinheads and the virulently anti-Semitic National Great Power Party of Russia (NDPR) distributed copies of “\textit{Mein Kampf}” and “\textit{The Protocols of Elders of Zion}.” For
swastika drawn on the side of a synagogue did constitute such a case. I limited the nature of what was considered violence to actions for two reasons, theoretical and empirical. In theoretical terms, such violations are more meaningful and of greater permanence. In empirical terms, limiting the range of what was considered “violence” to actions made coding the incidents much easier.

Consistent with this above definition, I consider acts to constitute “violence” where perpetrators begin an assault but are stopped in the course of it for example, by the police. A good example of this comes from a 2003 skinhead assault on a group of Indian students in St. Petersburg. According to the report, skinheads were in the middle of assaulting the students when a policeman scared them off by firing shots in the air. This act still maintained its meaning, I argue, although its perpetrators ultimately did not inflict as much harm as perhaps they would have wished. Or when St. Petersburg skinheads planted a landmine outside a synagogue in 2004, they still sent a “message” to the Jewish community although the mine was discovered and defused before it could cause any damage. These acts, although not complete, maintained their communicative function.

On the other hand, I do not consider cases when the perpetrators are stopped before they can do anything because such acts do not send a message. In order for a message to be sent to a minority community, there has to be some intentional act which transmits this communication. A good example of such an event came when the FSB

more details, see the report “Far-Right Party Holds Moscow Rally Against War On Iraq” in Bigotry Monitor (2003: 3: 7).
160 See the report “Booby-Trapped Antisemitic Sign Wounds Teenager” in Bigotry Monitor (2003: 3: 49) for more details.
(Russian internal security service, the successor group to the KGB) arrested skinheads with explosives on April 19th, 2006. The skinheads may have been preparing or planning an attack on an ethnic minority in Russia but were not successful in carrying out the attack. If the skinheads had placed the explosives by the side of a Mosque, then this could have been considered an act of violence (even if they had been defused), but because they did not do so this incident is too vague to be considered “ethnic violence.”

Regarding the perpetrators, Bigotry Monitor records all ethnic and religious violence perpetrated in the Russian Federation. This includes violence committed by skinheads, Islamic and Orthodox extremists, Cossacks, and the state. An example of violence perpetrated by the last group comes from Bigotry Monitor (2002: 29) which reported the state-initiated operation “Tabor” in the suburbs of Moscow, Leningrad, and Samara. Here police evicted Gypsies from the local area on the pretext of fighting crime. While this “violence” is an important component of understanding the mosaic of ethnic conflict in Russia, this project is concerned only with violent acts perpetrated by skinheads. Therefore, the shortened database contains only information about skinhead attacks and not these other groups.

The reports did not always name the perpetrators of a given violent act. In fact, many of the reports simply said that “someone” had committed a crime or used the passive voice when describing an action. Indeed, perhaps owing to the nature of the incident, the reports used the passive voice frequently in cases of vandalism and graffiti. In these cases, I assumed that where it was not explicitly stated otherwise, the perpetrators were skinheads. I do so for three reasons: the consequences of not doing so;
the common occurrence of skinhead violence; and the character of the crimes. First, one consequence of not making this assumption was a vast reduction in the number of cases open to analysis. As a way of estimating the effects of only including those cases where skinheads were explicitly named, I analyzed the data from 2006. In total, there were only 68 cases of violence where skinheads were named compared to 132 where the perpetrators were most probably (i.e. assumed to be) skinheads. This represented 51.5% of the data. Not making this assumption would thus result in a loss of around half the number of cases.

Moreover, those cases where the perpetrator was not explicitly named were not randomly distributed among the 4 types of violence. Omitting them would clearly distort the data. For 2006, 51% of the cases where the perpetrators were not named were Lynching-style violence, 25% Symbolic Violence, and 17.6% Pogrom. Not making this assumption would therefore underestimate Lynching and Symbolic Violence (where evasion of the law is relatively simple) to a much greater extent than it would to Massacre (where the perpetrators were frequently identified). We might gain the wrong impression, therefore about the frequency of these kinds of violence.

The second reason showing this assumption to be justifiable is that skinheads are the most frequently named perpetrator in the data. Indeed, of all the perpetrators named in the data- skinheads, Muslim extremists, religious fanatics, the police, and the state-fully 58.5% attacks explicitly named skinheads as the perpetrators. One can also eliminate other groups as being likely perpetrators for other reasons: the state would always be named if it were involved in an incident; Islamic extremism mainly occurred in the Southern republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan; religious fanatics made
their involvement in actions well-known. Additionally, many initial reports of violence did not name the perpetrators but subsequent reports (up to 3 years after) reported that skinheads had been found responsible for this crime.\textsuperscript{163} Given the wealth of evidence, therefore, I believe it reasonable to assume skinhead perpetrators.

The final reason why I make this assumption concerns the character of the crimes and in particular graffiti. The overwhelming majority of cases of graffiti evidenced a neo-Nazi symbol or message (e.g. swastikas, the Celtic cross,\textsuperscript{164} etc.) so that where the content was of more ambiguous origin (e.g. “send the Chechens to Auschwitz” is a statement which- though consistent with neo-Nazi ideology- could come from a number of groups), I assumed skinhead perpetrators. Another favored skinhead mode of attack is to stab a victim many times, usually between fifteen and sixty.\textsuperscript{165} Because such methods suit the \textit{modus operandi} of neo-Nazi groups (and they certainly suit it more than those of any other perpetrator named in the database), it seems reasonable to assume skinhead perpetrators. For these three reasons, I assumed skinheads to be the perpetrators of incidences of violence in the database, unless other perpetrators were explicitly named.\textsuperscript{166}

The final measurement question concerns what was considered to be an “ethnic” target as opposed to a non-ethnic one. While Bigotry Monitor reports violence against all minorities, not all minorities are ethnic and there were cases of violence against the Hare

\textsuperscript{163} See, for example, the \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2002: 2: 49) report “Skinheads Found Guilty Of Murders And Grave Desecration” on skinhead youth in Krasnodar Krai who were arrested for desecrating Armenian gravestones on April 19\textsuperscript{th} of that year. \textit{Bigotry Monitor} for that month simply records that “someone” did this to the gravestones. Given the wealth of evidence suggesting the skinhead involvement, I assume that where perpetrators are not mentioned then skinheads are involved.

\textsuperscript{164} This is a skinhead symbol, see chapter 3 (figure 3.1) for more details.

\textsuperscript{165} For instance, skinheads murdered Uzbek student Azimov by stabbing him 56 times in April 2007. See The Observer article “Putin’s worst nightmare” from February 8\textsuperscript{th}, 2009 for more details. The article mentions the skinhead “pattern” in stabbing victims between 15 and 60 times.

\textsuperscript{166} For example, reports of the 2003 Moscow police deporting Chinese and Vietnamese citizens on grounds of preventing the SARS virus. See the \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2003: 3: 22) report “Citing SARS, Moscow Police Deport Chinese And Vietnamese.”
Krishna movement, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian anti-fascists, and fans of “racially inferior” rap music as well as ethnic groups. This has especially been the case in recent years, as skinheads have targeted anti-fascist activists heavily. Although some theorists speculate about the common origin of religion and ethnicity, for analytical rigor I do not consider violence against religious targets to constitute “ethnic” violence. I also excluded instances of violence recorded against “un-Slavic looking people” or “non-Russians,” as these terms are simply too vague to be recorded as definitive acts of ethnic violence.

There were two exceptions to this rule concerning religions- Jews and Muslims. First, Jews may be understood as both an “ethnic” and “religious” group. Indeed, it was for this reason that the Jews provided the template for “race-thinking” in the twentieth century. By prescribing endogamy for their members, the Jewish religion took on the appearance of an ethnic group and ultimately a “race.” Second, I know from personal experience that “Muslim” in Russia carries the connotation of a person from the

167 For example, skinheads attacked an ethnic Russian dressed like a fan of rap music on 19th April, 2003 in the far Northern city of Murmansk, according to the newspaper “Vercherny Murmask”. See the report “Rampaging Skinheads Get Suspended Sentence” in Bigotry Monitor (2005: 5: 2) for more details.

168 Some theorists believe that religion and ethnicity have a common origin in any case. Both are expressions of the totality. As the father of this line of thought, Emile Durkheim’s (2001: 42), put it “religious beliefs proper are always held by a defined collectivity that processes them and practises the rites that go with them. These beliefs are not only embraced by all the members of this collectivity as individuals, they belong to the group and unite it.” Religion, as an important (some might say the most important) determinant of culture, is in effect synonymous with ethnicity. It is no accident that the way the world is divided into civilizations is based on religion. While this viewpoint is interesting and may even strengthen my findings and could certainly be incorporated by my interpretivist method, I do not include it in order to simplify the analysis.

169 This may have led to a underestimation of attacks on Central Asians and Caucasians because attacks on the Islamic religion may have been intended to send messages to this group. For instance, the attack on an Islamic graveyard (such as the one that took place on the 22nd January, 2005- see the report “Muslim Cemetery In Moscow Desecrated” in Bigotry Monitor 2005: 5: 4) where vandals knocked over some gravestones and sprayed graffiti on others could not be coded because “Islamic” is not an ethnicity. It may turn out later that this assumption is not warranted but for now the database does not include attacks on religious groups or cultural property.

170 See Arendt, H. (1994: 158-184). The Jews represented the perfect model of a “race,” which although dispersed throughout Europe maintained a strong kinship structure and a group that performed the same customs irrespective of country.
Caucasus or Central Asia. It is a reasonable inference to connect attacks on Islamic targets as attacks against the Caucasian presence in Russia. Both Judaism and Islam are associated with ethnic groups in ways which Baptists, Pentecostals, and Hare Krishna (many of whose members are Russians) are not. Moreover, some of the violence against these groups has come from Russian Orthodox radicals and not skinheads. From an empirical standpoint, therefore, it also seems better to omit them. With these conceptual questions cleared up, I turn to the empirics.

All told, the data illustrated that there were 884 reported attacks on explicitly ethnic targets for 2001-2008. To demonstrate the number lost by excluding non-ethnic minorities as targets, I compared data that focused explicitly on ethnic targets with data that focused on all cultural targets for the period 2001-2007. Including all possible cultural targets (with skinhead perpetrators) for this period yielded an additional 198 cases. A wider definition of all cultural targets thus would have increased the size of the database by 26.75%. Although a substantial percentage, I did not believe that the gains from including these cases outweighed the loss of theoretical parsimony it would entail and so decided to focus solely on explicitly ethnic targets. With these measurement guidelines in place, then, table 4.1 gives aggregate figures of ethnic violence by year.

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171 The 2001-2007 data showed that there were 740 attacks on explicitly ethnic targets. 198 is 26.75% of 740.
Table 4.1: Incidents of skinhead violence by year, 2001-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N [Attacks]</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 demonstrates that there were 884 recorded instances in which solely skinhead perpetrators used violence against specifically ethnic targets in the eight years since the millennium. These qualifications are important as they obscure many incidences of discriminatory actions not perpetrated by skinheads as well as violence committed by skinheads against non-ethnic targets. The fact that even this highly circumscribed number has increased five-fold since the first year of record and shows a steady increase year-on-year provides evidence to the assertion of member of the SOVA institute, Galina Kozhevnikova that ethnic violence is increasing in its frequency in Russia. From this data alone the reader should get an impression of the dangerous situation in which Russia finds itself these days. The next section analyzes this data according to the typology in chapter one as a way of testing Kozhevnikova’s claim that violence is also getting more severe.

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172 The data for 2008 must be considered incomplete, because violent incidents do not make their way onto Bigotry Monitor sometimes until as much as six months after the incident. This data includes reports from the first three weeks of 2009 which mention violence in 2008, but it is not comprehensive.

173 Both claims may be found in Kozhenikova’s online report “Winter 2007-8, an epidemic of murders against the backdrop of elections” [English version]. Available at http://xeno.soava-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/ACE26E6
4.2: Operationalization: the typology of violent events

The last section provided evidence of the surge of racist violence in Russia which showed that the problem is getting more frequent. This section analyzes these violent attacks by operationalizing the typology presented in chapter one. This typology categorized violence according to the nature of its target (people or property) and their number (many or few). This produced four distinct types of violence: Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre. Below I detail how the distinctions of people-property and many-few targets are operationalized. I then discuss some examples of each of the four forms of violence and end this section by applying these coding rules to the data presented above.

The typology has two axes, the nature of targets and their number. Because the distinction between people and property is the simplest to operationalize, I deal with it first. This distinction is simply a dichotomy: if violence does not aim at people then its target is property. If an action aims at neither, then it is not violence. “Violence against people” means actual physical harm caused to human beings. I do not differentiate between scales of harm caused to human beings (e.g. murder versus beating) because theoretically the focus on people in any way sends the same “message.” Indeed, chapter one traced the etymology of the term “lynching” to show that it did not refer solely to
murder but to any punishment which had the body as its target. Therefore, by definition all other violence focuses on property.

There are two problems with this definition, however. First, it is not always the case that violence focuses on solely people or property. Indeed, most often both will be affected. For example, in a market pogrom skinheads attack mainly property but also have to hit a couple of traders to ensure no resistance. How would one assign the nature of targets in this case? To do so, I introduce the concepts of primary target and the greatest severity. The “primary target” assumes that skinheads are concentrating on one or the other in their attacks and that if they had a completely free hand they would only cause damage to either people or property. The trader who tries to stand up for his livelihood may be injured, but it is clearly only as a means to allowing skinheads to damage his stall.

Alternately, skinheads may begin by attacking property but later turn to the persecution of actual people. In such cases, I err on the side of caution and categorize the attack according to its greater severity. This is especially important when one considers that sometimes threats to the integrity of a building might jeopardize lives. An example would be the arson of a dorm used to house African students at the University of Patrice.

174 Indeed, pogrom was an especially difficult conceptual category to fill. The last section alluded to the problems which arose from whether violence against people which occurred in a pogrom (targeting property) could be considered one event or two. In line with the specifications in the introduction, I decided to code such instances as one event. Coding those pogroms where violence against people was also detailed in the report produced 38 additional cases of violence, taking the total to 932. Of these 38 extra cases, 34 of them were Lynching and 4 were Massacres. Having analyzed the data in this way, we are able to see that the consequences of not separating out pogrom-style events from those that contained physical violence in them are relatively minor. For the greater rigor this gives us, then, I decided to not disaggregate such events.
LaMumba in southern Moscow which killed thirty-six.\textsuperscript{175} It would not only be a stretch but also an insult to the memory of the deceased to determine that this was primarily an attack on property. Therefore, if the structural integrity of a building would have been threatened and it was obviously inhabited, I coded this as an attack against people. Everything else was considered an attack on property. Having dealt with this distinction, I turn to the division between many and few targets.

What constitutes “few” and “many” is a topic on which no two people are likely to agree. Yet some distinction is needed for the project to go ahead. Just as with the earlier classification, therefore, the best way to proceed is to impose a dichotomy. This dichotomy has to take into account the fact that most occasions of skinhead violence are (thankfully) still low-level. Therefore, I operationalize the dichotomy as the distinction between one-two targets and three or more. This is an important distinction as the focus shifts from individual to group and the message sent by violence changes. If one should object that three is too small of a number to constitute a group and so a “massacre,” I should like to point out that the Boston “massacre” only saw five people shot but is remembered as a “massacre.” This was because of the message it sent to the colonists, and this is a message which can be sent by the killing of three people just as well as five.

Of course, one might object that there are further gradations to be added. The message of an attack on more than ten people is substantively different than one on just three and so it is somewhat false to group them together. I admit the validity of this criticism, but feel that the complications this would add to the coding would not contribute significantly to the project. In any case, there were no instances of attacks on

\textsuperscript{175} See the report “Skinheads Attack Foreign Students In Moscow” in Bigotry Monitor (2003: 3: 47) for more details. The university was started under Soviet rule as “the people’s friendship university” and designed to allow Third World students to study in Russia.
more than ten people (although not their property) in the database and so while this is a valid theoretical objection, it has no empirical bearing on the case under study. On the other hand, such a dichotomy has the advantage of being a simple and clear means by which to code the data. Therefore, for both theoretical and practical reasons, I make the division between one-two targets and three or more.

This means that Symbolic Violence is considered damage to property that occurs in only one or two places. If three sites belonging to the same ethnic group in the same town are vandalized in the same night, then this constitutes a Pogrom. Attacks on markets invariably contain many targets and so these are considered Pogroms also. The other two types, Lynching and Massacre, are consistent with the message first attributed to Lynching and so all violence against the body of a person is theoretically equal. This means that Massacres, on the understanding of the category used in this research, are not only situations in which individuals die. The data contained one instance of rape, which I omitted from the analysis. Table 4.2 presents the data from table 4.1 coded according to these measurement rules
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Symbolic Violence</th>
<th>Lynching</th>
<th>Pogrom</th>
<th>Massacre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Ethnic violence 2001-8, by type

The table shows that there has been a general increase in all forms of violence since 2001, but the increase is disproportionately weighted toward bodily punishments. Skinheads are getting more personal in their attacks. For example, in 2001, the number of crimes committed against the body of ethnic others constituted 40% of all recorded against ethnic groups. In 2006, the number was 72.4%. Assuming that crimes against the body are more “severe” than crimes against property, this is also \textit{prima facie} evidence in support of Kozhevnikova’s contention that the severity of skinhead violence has increased. This is also evidence in favor of Beissinger’s theory concerning “cycles of violence.” The next section reminds the reader of the hypotheses which came from chapters two and three. Section 4.4 tests these hypotheses by identifying variables around which certain forms of violence cluster.
4.3: Hypotheses

The primary test seeks to correlate the form of violence to variables within the dataset. In this way, it will test the theories outlined in the literature review and theory chapters. These hypotheses will be tested by checking to see whether certain forms of violence cluster around particular values on independent variables. If a particular form of ethnic violence, for example, graffiti, is used to avoid detection for the crime by a high-capacity state, then we would expect certain forms of violence to be more frequent (“cluster”) according to the region in which they occurred. Although somewhat crude, this method of detecting clusters of instances of ethnic violence, I consider it to be more suited to the current project than more standard modes of analysis as the categories are based on nominal, not ordinal, data. We would not expect nominal data to fit neatly onto a regression line. Besides, such a method allows for multiple causation and looks to see only the most important variable in causing forms of ethnic violence. In this way, we can establish correlation between variables and so determine those theories which are worthy of further testing and those which are not. On the other hand, theories that imply the capabilities of the perpetrating group influence the form of violence would suggest that more severe forms of violence will cluster around larger numbers of perpetrators. For the benefit of the reader, I recount those hypotheses below in table 4.3.
**Hypothesis 1**) The form of violence is determined by the region in which the attack happens. Regions which have high-capacity states will be able to prevent the more severe forms of violence whereas those with low-capacity states will see the worst forms of violence.

**Hypothesis 2**) Elites will directly incite the perpetrators to carry out particular forms of violence based on the ethnicity of the victims.

**Hypothesis 3**) The form of violence of any one incident is determined by the forms of violence which have preceded it. Events which occur earlier in a cycle will be milder, whereas those which occur later will be more severe.

**Hypothesis 4**) The form of violence is determined by the economic reputation of a particular ethnic group. Ethnic identity stands as a proxy for the economic reputation of individuals and those with a worse reputation will suffer the most severe forms of violence.

**Hypothesis 5**) The forms of violence will vary by the “cultural distance” between perpetrators and ethnic victims. The greater the degree of cultural distance, the more severe the form of violence will be.

**Hypothesis 6**) The form of violence is determined by the number of perpetrators involved in an incident of ethnic violence. The most severe forms of violence will involve a greater number of perpetrators.

**Hypothesis 7**) The form of violence is determined by how identifiable the members of an ethnic group are. If the members of an ethnic group are easy to identify, then they will be attacked. If the members of an ethnic group are hard to identify but have readily identifiable property, then the latter will be attacked.

**Hypothesis 8**) The form of violence is determined by perpetrators’ historically-formed understanding of an ethnic minority.

**Hypothesis 9**) Skinhead perpetrators of ethnic violence will project responsibility for crimes commensurate to their “punishment” onto their victims.

**Hypothesis 10**) The form of violence will differ by the ethnic identity of the target group. Skinheads will explain their violence against ethnic minorities using the language of proportional response.

| Table 4.3: Hypotheses |
There are three characteristics available from the database: region of attack; number of perpetrators; and ethnicity of the victims. The above hypotheses all imply that particular forms of ethnic violence will cluster around one of these characteristics. For example, the implication of hypothesis one is that particular forms of violence will cluster in certain regions of Russia. Hypotheses two, four, five, seven, eight, nine, and ten all suggest that the ethnicity of the target group will provide the basis for clusters of particular forms. The third hypothesis suggests that the form of violence will depend on its timing and this has already been demonstrated somewhat in table 4.2. In the analysis below I test to see whether the increase in bodily punishment can be accounted for by an increase in severity of the form of violence against all ethnic groups or only against some of them. Finally, hypothesis six suggests that certain numbers of attackers are more likely to use particular forms of violence. If this hypothesis is correct, then, certain forms of violence should cluster around particular numbers. Although seven of the ten hypotheses predict the form of violence varying by ethnic group, I do not hold this to be a problem.

For these predictions say nothing about the mechanism that links this empirical correlation. There are six different ways in which the ethnicity of the victims could cause different forms of violence. In order to differentiate between these mechanisms, we need another test. This is provided in chapter five. Chapter six applies the entire causal story to different cases as a plausibility probe of the generalizability of the theory. Before we can get to these chapters, however, we need to establish correlations. The next section concentrates on testing the data to identify those variables around which observations cluster.
4.4: Dispersion of the data

This section utilizes the available data to test the hypotheses outlined above. I present correlations between the form of violence and the place of violence, its time of occurrence, the number of perpetrators (if known), and the ethnicity of the target group. Each of these variables relates to one of the above hypotheses and thus serves to test whether the hypothesis can explain why ethnic violence takes a particular form in certain circumstances. Based on the evidence, I argue that the ethnicity of the target group is the most important determinant of the form violence will take. The next section isolates just four of these ethnic groups so that we may test the mechanism in chapter five. Before this, however, I provide a rationale linking variable and hypothesis and detail how they were coded.

The first variable to be taken into account is the geographical location of violence. The dataset concerns skinhead attacks across all of Russia, yet Russia is a vast country (at two and a half times the size of the continental United States, the largest in the world). Hypothesis one stipulated that the form of violence was a function of state capacity. Assuming that different regions of the Russian Federation will have differing degrees of state capacity, we should see the main determinant of the form of violence being the location of the event. This will also allow us to see the geographical spread of violent attacks (and by implication, active skinhead groups). For these reasons, the first independent variable is the geographical location of violence.

Measuring the number of perpetrators involved in a particular violent incident is a way of testing hypothesis five, that stipulates that the form of violence is a function of
perpetrators’ capacity. In low-level violence, the most important determinant of capacity is usually the number of people involved. If massacres (as the most severe form of violence) are only used by large groups of perpetrators, then it would be reasonable to infer that group capacity plays an important role in determining the form of violence. If, on the other hand, this relationship is not evident in the data, then this is an important finding also. It would suggest that even if they would like to attack in different ways, skinheads do not have a completely free choice when it comes to the manner of violent attack because they are limited by numbers.

The last variable to be taken into consideration on this initial analysis of the data is the ethnicity of the victim. This operationalizes hypotheses two, four, five, seven, eight, and nine which all hold that it is something about the identity of the ethnic target which causes ethnic violence to take particular forms. Alternately, if this is not the case then the “ethnicity” of ethnic violence might seem incidental. Each regularity is an important point to observe and will help with understanding the causes of violence. Therefore, the identity of the victims is an important variable when analyzing different forms of ethnic violence.

As a way of further testing hypothesis three, I analyze the data according to the number of attacks per year and ethnicity. This tests the finding in table 4.2 which suggests that skinhead violence generally is becoming more intense and aims at the body. By breaking down the violence used against particular ethnic groups, we will be able to see whether this increase of violence that aims against the body covers all ethnic groups or only some of them. If hypothesis three is correct, then we should see an across-the-board increase in physical punishments.
These relationships will be tested using single-variable analysis, comparing each variable individually to the corresponding form of violence. This technique will allow us to identify patterns and allow qualitative inferences that may be obscured by more sophisticated statistical methods: sometimes the most important inferences can be drawn from simply “eyeballing” that data. Further, the four independent variables involved in this initial analysis of the data are qualitatively different and so best suited to being measured and compared individually. For both these reasons, then, I use the method of single-variable analysis in analyzing the data.

To measure the variables, I used only information that was present in the database. In most cases, but not all, this included the place, time, number of perpetrators, and ethnic identity of the victims involved in an attack. Where each individual piece of information was not available, I did not attribute a value to the attack. For this reason, sometimes the numbers in the tables below do not equal the number of overall violent attacks reported in table 4.2. This is not a problem peculiar to my project, as incomplete data is a proverbial thorn in the side of social science research everywhere.

The first variable of place was measured by recording the administrative district where an attack happened. Most cities in Russia form their own administrative district, so it is not problematic to include them alongside rural regions. As one might expect, most of the violence occurred in big cities. Indeed, even when violence did not occur in a city with its own administrative region, it often occurred in big towns such as Petrozavodsk in Karelia. That skinhead violence is mainly an urban phenomenon is not surprising when one considers that skinheads in the United Kingdom began as an urban movement.
In the case of the second variable, the number of violent perpetrators, the information simply was not available in many cases. This was particularly the situation regarding Symbolic Violence, where offenders were mostly not detected. Further difficulties arose when reports simply related that a “group” or “gang” of skinheads had committed an act of ethnic violence. I divided the number of perpetrators into five separate groups: one or two; three to ten; eleven to thirty; more than thirty. Where no details were given above the fact that a number of skinheads had committed an action, I recorded the incident as that of a “group.” This is a consequence of the fact that no groups are systematically monitoring ethnic violence.

The third variable, the ethnic identity of the victims, I divided by “race” and not ethnicity *per se*. The reason is that skinhead violence is aimed more at differences of skin color as opposed to differences of culture and as I discovered in my interviews, most cannot distinguish Chinese from Vietnamese, for example. The racial groups I used were Jews, Africans, Caucasians and Central Asians (hereafter just “Caucasian”\(^{176}\)), Gypsies, East Asians (Orientals), South Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis), Hispanic (Iberian and South American) and White (non-Russian). While one might protest that the Jews and the Gypsies are not groups whose identity is premised on the color of their skin, these groups have been racialized\(^{177}\) throughout Europe and their customs identify them as such. When native Russian peoples such as the Tatars were attacked, I categorized them according to the location of their homeland (for example, Buryats were considered East Asian and Tatars, Central Asian).

\(^{176}\) Although the term “Caucasian” is used as a synonym for “white” in the West (particularly the United States), I ask the reader to remember in this project that the term applies to people who are actually from the Caucasus.

\(^{177}\) This is particularly the case with the Jews, who provided the template for Hitler’s idea of a Teutonic race in the Nazi years. See Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, T. (2001: 183-190) for more details.
The final table includes two variables in order to test the third hypothesis. In doing so, I give three years as representative of violence used against particular ethnic groups. These years, 2001, 2005, and 2008 were chosen because they represent the extremities of the available data and a middle time. They are thus representative of the process of ethnic violence and how it has developed in recent years. This table analyzes violence used against 6 particular ethnic groups by year of occurrence, to test whether the increase in bodily violence observed in table 4.2 concerns all ethnic targets or whether it concerns the same ethnic target. Tables 4.4-4.7 below contain the results from these initial analyses of the data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Symbolic Violence</th>
<th>Lynching</th>
<th>Pogrom</th>
<th>Massacre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhny-Novgorod</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorskiy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karelia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Form of violence by place of occurrence 2001-2008 (9 most frequent places)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Type</th>
<th>Symbolic Violence</th>
<th>Lynching</th>
<th>Pogrom</th>
<th>Massacre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Group”</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5: Ethnic Violence 2001-2008, by type and number of perpetrators (if known)
Table 4.6: Ethnic Violence 2001-2008, by type and ethnic target

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Symbolic Violence</th>
<th>Lynching</th>
<th>Pogrom</th>
<th>Massacre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Ethnic Violence 2001, 2005, and 2008, by type and ethnic group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Symbolic Violence</th>
<th>Lynching</th>
<th>Pogrom</th>
<th>Massacre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.4 demonstrates that most of the violence toward foreigners occurs in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Given that these are the largest cities in Russia and financial centers which encourage migrant workers, this is not a surprising result. Indeed, further analysis of the results demonstrates that most violence occurs in European Russia: Voronezh, Kaliningrad, Karelia, Volgograd, and Rostov are all located in the Western part of the country. Nizhny Novgorod and Vladivostock are the only areas not in European Russia. Targets also vary to a degree by proximity to different countries: in Eastern Primorskiy, there is more violence against Orientals- which borders far Eastern countries- than in other cities of Russia. The clearest pattern to emerge from this analysis is the concentration of violence in European Russia.

Similarly, table 4.5 demonstrates emphatically that the form of violence used does not directly correlate to the capacity of the perpetrators. The form that ethnic violence takes is not just a question of how many skinheads are organized to participate in it. This is brought out most markedly in the case of Massacre, which we might think connected to the size of the group. Nearly a quarter of the massacres were perpetrated by only one or two skinheads. A good example of this is the arson of an Uzbek caravan in 2002 where four inhabitants were burnt alive by two people (the perpetrators were later arrested)\(^{178}\) or the shooting of a Roma family by an enraged skinhead in 2006 in Pskov.\(^ {179}\) Modern weapons mean that the form of violence is not solely determined by the number of perpetrators.

\(^{178}\) See the report “Skinheads On The Rampage” in *Bigotry Monitor* (2002: 2: 28) for more details. According to the report, the skinheads wired the door of the caravan shut and poured gasoline all around while the migrants were sleeping.

\(^{179}\) See the report “Extremists Sentenced For Attacking Roma Family” in *Bigotry Monitor* (2006: 6: 22) for more details. Although the man only shot two Roma, the fact that the attacker broke into the home of Gypsy family and killed all within leaves no ambiguity as to the message sent by this attack.
Table 4.6 shows the form of ethnic violence by the ethnic identity of the target and is the strongest correlation seen so far. Certain forms of violence appear to be used almost exclusively against particular groups. This is most clearly the case as regards the Jews, against whom Symbolic Violence is used very frequently. Similarly, despite their small numbers in Russia, Africans suffer a huge number of Lynching-style violent attacks. The suggestion from the data is thus that particular forms of violence are not distributed randomly but are peculiar to specific ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the relative stability of these forms of violence by year and by ethnic group is demonstrated by table 4.7. In the case of Jews, Africans, Gypsies, Arabs, and Orientals there is no noticeable increase in the severity of the form of violence for these three representative years. Indeed, in some cases there is even a decrease which works directly against the theory referred to by hypothesis 3. Only in one case, that of the “Caucasians,” is there a substantial increase which on the face of it explains the increase in the number of attacks aimed against the body. Attacks against Caucasians have gone from targeting mainly property to targeting the bodies of members of ethnic groups since the millennium. While this suggests that the cyclical theory suggested by hypothesis 3 explains different forms of violence against Caucasians its failure to do so for other ethnic groups suggests that this is something particular to Russian-Caucasian relations and is not part of an overall trend. Indeed, by far the dominant impression from the data is that the ethnicity of the target group is the leading determinant of a form of violence.

Figure 4.8 confirms this intuition pictorially by showing data for Jews, Africans, Caucasians, Gypsies, Arabs and Orientals in the form of pie charts. Although there are other ethnic groups who are subject to attack, assaults against these groups constitute by
far the bulk of the violence. They also show the pattern well: when Jews are attacked, the form is overwhelmingly likely to be symbolic; violence aimed at Indians and Gypsies, however, focuses almost exclusively on the body of the victims (Lynching and Massacre). To be sure, the relationship identified here is not determinative but characteristic and only notes the empirical regularity that certain forms of violence are used more frequently against particular groups.
Figure 4.8: Form of violence by ethnic group
Figure 4.8 continued

Violence Against Gypsies

Violence Against Arabs

Violence Against Orientals
Figure 4.8 demonstrates that certain groups are attacked predominantly using particular forms of violence. This is most apparent in the case of Jews and Africans with regard to Symbolic Violence and Lynching respectively. Similar patterns, albeit with weaker trends, can also be observed with the other ethnic targets—Gypsies, for example, being characteristically attacked using Massacre. The choice of a mode of violent attack is determined by the ethnicity of the target group. This relationship may be tested again by analyzing the data according to a particular form of violence. This is shown in figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Distribution of the targets of particular forms of violence
Figure 4.9 continued

Use of Pogrom, by target ethnicity

Use of Massacre, by target ethnicity
Figure 4.9 again shows us that particular forms of violence are used disproportionately against certain ethnic groups. I therefore decided to continue the research by choosing just four ethnic groups which exemplify particular forms of violence. Although there are many targets of ethnic violence in the Russian federation, I concentrate on just four ethnic groups for two reasons. First, it makes the analysis more manageable and reduces the burden on the researcher. This is an important consideration when one is trying to improve the feasibility of the project. Second, comparing cases where the relationship between ethnicity and a form of violence is most apparent promises more readily occurring answers which should also cover other ethnic groups. Explaining why violence takes a particular form in those cases where the relationship is strongest promises to provide more convincing results. For both these reasons, then, I narrow the analysis to just four groups.

Three of these four groups (Jews, Africans, and Gypsies) were already associated with particular forms of violence in figure 4.8. Figure 4.9 reveals nothing to contradict those hypothesized relationships. It does show, however, that Caucasians may be considered as representatives of Pogrom-style violence. Because Pogroms are used nearly exclusively against Jews and Caucasians (and more against Caucasians than Jews), I take the Caucasians as representatives of this form of violence. Having identified these groups as exemplars of particular forms of violence, we now have one group that exemplifies each particular form of violence: Jews- Symbolic Violence; Africans- Lynching, Caucasians- Pogrom; and Gypsies- Massacre. I therefore decided to proceed
with the rest of the analysis by concentrating on just these four groups as representatives of particular forms of violence.

One might object to my association of Caucasians with Pogrom-style violence because they are more frequently targeted with all forms of violence (barring Symbolic Violence) than any other group. In making this critique, however, one should take into consideration that “Caucasians” are believed to be the largest minority in the Russian Federation and so we might expect violence against them to be more frequent overall. They would necessarily be the most targeted group because they are the biggest target. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that certain forms of violence are characteristically used against them.

Similarly, the use of particular forms of violence against other ethnic groups is out of all proportion to their size as a minority. The clearest example of this is the use of Lynching against Africans. The majority of Africans in Russia are there as students at Russian universities. While official numbers are sensitive and so difficult to obtain, the number is probably in the thousands and concentrated in the major cities of Russia (especially St. Petersburg, Moscow, Voronezh, and Nizhny-Novgorod). The sheer number of Lynching-style attacks on Africans is thus highly significant and assures that they exemplify Lynching.

While the relationships between certain ethnic groups and particular forms of violence might be better demonstrated by controlling for the size of the ethnic minority, there were two problems which meant gaining reliable data was impossible. First, although some Caucasians are in Russia legally, the number of illegal immigrants from the Caucasus and Asian is estimated to be much higher. Given that no-one really knows
the number, any figure we have is liable to be inaccurate. Second, and perhaps much more damaging, is that certain ethnic groups are not counted in the official data. This is most obvious in the case of Africans who predominantly come to Russia as students and so do not count for legal residency purposes. For both these reasons, then, I did not add a control for the size of the ethnic minority.

The question has thus become why skinheads use characteristic forms of violence against particular ethnic groups. Specifically, Symbolic Violence against Jews, Lynching against Africans, Pogrom against Caucasians, and Massacre against Gypsies. I use this method because I assume that any explanation which explains why these particular ethnic groups are targeted in the way they are ought to transfer to other ethnic groups as well. This next section provides qualitative illustrations of these relationships between particular ethnic groups and particular forms of violence. In doing so, it emphasizes the element of choice in the particular mode of attack which excludes the possibility that the use if these forms is random. The rest of the dissertation tests these explanations with a content analysis of the Far-Right and mass media.

4.5 Qualitative Evidence

The last section argued that the most readily identifiable pattern we can see in the data is the correlation of particular forms of violence to specific ethnic groups. Skinheads are most likely to attack particular ethnic groups using specific modes of attack. I chose as exemplars of this the use of Symbolic Violence against Jews, the use of Lynching against Africans, Pogrom against Caucasians, and Massacre against Gypsies. Why do skinheads use these specific forms of violence against these groups? This
section provides qualitative evidence of the identified relationships, both to assure the reader of the validity of the coding and to demonstrate that hypothesis 7 is incorrect: skinheads, not the identifiability of ethnic targets, choose to use these particular forms. It is not simply the case that skinheads attack what they can identify as inherently ethnic other, but there is a voluntary element to the form of their attack. In the process, I also bolster our confidence in the reliability of the patterns identified.

The quantitative evidence in table 4.7 and the relationships substantiated by figures 4.8 and 4.9 showed that particular forms of violence are characteristically used against specific ethnic groups. Jews are attacked characteristically with Symbolic Violence; Africans with Lynching; Caucasians with Pogrom; and Roma with Massacre. “Characteristic” in this sense does not mean “determinative” and should instead be thought of as a probabilistic relationship: all other things being equal, skinheads will use a particular form of violence against a particular ethnic group. This may also be demonstrated for each of the four groups through the addition of qualitative evidence.

In the case of the Jews, the qualitative evidence makes clear that it is not just that synagogues have been defiled or cultural centers attacked because they exist. One particular series of skinhead acts stands out as emblematic of their choice of a form of violence to use. This is the plague of anti-Semitic signs which have been erected in public places between 2001 and 2006. According to UCSJ reports, fully twenty such signs were erected in various cities of Russia bearing demonic pictures of Jews and messages such as “Jews, return to your homeland.” In other words, where no cultural property belonging to the Jews could be identified, skinheads erected substitutes. These

signs have been seen in Moscow, Voronezh, Saratov, Kaliningrad, Novgorod, and Vladivostock, so we may be sure that they are not a local phenomenon but are instead a national occurrence. No other ethnic group has been targeted through the use of such signs.\textsuperscript{181} If only Jews of all ethnic groups are attacked in this manner which could be used against any group, then it seems reasonable to assume that this is a form of violence peculiar to Jews.

One could object to reading these signs as instances of Symbolic Violence, however, because some of them have been booby-trapped. Fully eighteen of the twenty signs erected from 2001 to 2006 have been linked to “bombs.” However, on only two occasions have the attached “bombs” actually turned out to be real explosives: most of the time being bricks or other replicas of explosives. Indeed, the only time these “bombs” have caused an injury (a sign exploded when Tatyana Supanova\textsuperscript{182} tried to remove it from the local bus stop. Ms Supanova was later recognized for bravery by then President Vladimir Putin) was right at the start of the “campaign” in May 2002. This provided a warning to those who would try and remove the signs and ensured they would remain in their original positions longer. If the signs have fake bombs attached then we may assume that the purpose is rather to deter those who would remove them, rather than injure people. This deterrent aims to keep the anti-Semitic sign itself in place, which again makes the point that Symbolic Violence characterizes this ethnic group.

\textsuperscript{181} The only exception to this was one anti-Ukrainian sign erected in Kaliningrad on July 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2002 (see the report “Man Killed Trying To Remove Booby-Trapped Sign” in Bigotry Monitor 2002: 2: 27 for more details). No further anti-Ukrainian signs have been reported, however, and so this is not evidence of a tactic widely used against Ukrainians.

\textsuperscript{182} See the report “Booby-Trapped Sign Injures Woman Trying To Remove It” in Bigotry Monitor (2002: 2: 21). The sign exploded when Ms. Supanova tried to remove it, causing major lacerations to her face and ensuring she needed reconstructive surgery)
There is also qualitative evidence that demonstrates that Lynching is a systematic form of violence used against Africans. Two examples— which are representative of violence used against Africans but by no means stand apart from other recorded attacks— bring this out. First, on 14th October 2005, three men stabbed a Rwandan refugee on a trolleybus in Moscow telling him that “Russia is not for black monkeys.”\textsuperscript{183} Given that most Africans in Moscow are there as students of the University of Patrice Lumumba, it would not have been difficult for the skinheads to either choose a more secretive location to attack an African or to attack their “property” at the university. Why did they not do so? Doing so would have better protected the assailants from possible law enforcement agents and allowed them perhaps to attack more people. Yet the assailants did not choose either of these options but assaulted the man brazenly and in the open. The reason why is that Lynching is the characteristic form of violence for this ethnic group.

The second example which provides qualitative evidence of this relationship comes from March 2006 in St. Petersburg. Here the skinheads showed that even those targets who were not objectively threatening would be liable to suffer Lynching-style attacks when they stabbed a 9-year old Afro-Russian girl in her apartment.\textsuperscript{184} No regard was given for age or physical capacity. Rather, the ethnicity of the victim determined that the form of violence used against her was Lynching. Again, we are left wondering why the skinheads attacked an African girl in such a horrendous manner and did not content themselves with simple attacks on her apartment. If even the children of Africans

\textsuperscript{183} See the report “Across Russia, Attacks On Foreign Students Continue” in \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2005: 5: 42) for more details.

\textsuperscript{184} See the report “Two Teenage Skinheads Stab African-Russian Girl” in \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2006: 6: 13) for more details.
are subject to Lynching-style attacks, then we may assert that the Lynching of Africans is systematic, not incidental.

This is also true of Caucasians, who suffer a great deal of Lynching-style violence according to table 4.7 above. Yet they also suffer Pogrom-style violence more frequently than any other ethnic group and so are taken as exemplars of Pogrom. Two examples help to substantiate this relationship. The first comes from the “race riot” of September 2006 in the Karelian town of Kondropoga. According to the UCSJ report, on 30th August some Chechens killed two Russians in a drunken bar fight in the town. In response to this, locals planned a meeting for 2nd September to protest the Chechen “occupation.” The xenophobic nationalist leader of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), Alexander Belov, flew in to address the protest and urge the expulsion of all people from the Caucasus. Violence erupted, however, when a group of young people started to take affairs into their own hands and set light to Chechen-owned businesses. As a result, 30 Chechen families fled to local buses. Hearing the call to expel Chechens, skinheads sought to drive them out.

These events perfectly illustrate the correlation between Caucasian ethnicity and Pogrom-style violence. First, Belov’s call to use governmental power to expel people “of Caucasian nationality,” clearly states the goals of the protestors. The collective action of the young extremists was merely designed to achieve this goal. Caucasians were to be expelled. Second, one should also consider the context in which these events happened:

185 See the report “Brawl In Restaurant Turns Into Race Riot” in Bigotry Monitor (2006: 6; 31) for more details. This race riot also provided the pretext for the Economist article mentioned in the last chapter which raised the possibility of Russia “heading towards fascism.”

186 Note that the phrase “of Caucasian nationality” is not limited solely to Chechens- who were reportedly those involved in the fight- but includes Ingush, Dagestani, Cherkassi, Azeri, Georgians, etc. This adds further validation to my inference in section 4.0 above that it is not the ethnicity of the ethnic group which alters behavior, but rather the race (physiognomy) of the ethnic group.
although these riots were in alleged response for the murder of Russians, no Caucasians were killed in retaliation. There were not calls to find the perpetrators and punish them or to massacre all Caucasian families in the town. Instead, the participants satisfied themselves with the destruction of Caucasian property.

Another example comes from 2001 when neo-Nazi skinheads decided to celebrate Hitler’s Birthday by breaking stalls at the local Yasnevo market. According to the report, 150 skinheads descended upon the market and beat traders from the Caucasus and destroyed their property. The report claims that a young Chechen was stabbed and killed. Once again, this anecdote demonstrates the correlation we see between Caucasians and Pogrom-style violence. Here the skinheads were grotesquely “celebrating” the birthday of their idol and where we might expect them to want pride in what they were doing, however twisted. Here also was a situation in which the thugs could act with almost complete impunity. They vastly outnumbered the traders and the police remained inactive. The fact that they killed only one person 188 despite the palpable ability to do more damage if they wished suggests that skinhead violence against Caucasians is characteristically pogrom-style violence.

The last case of ethnic violence to be discussed is also the most disturbing and concerns the relationship of Massacre to the Gypsies. A people persecuted throughout all of Europe and targeted in the Holocaust, massacres of Gypsies are far and away the most characteristic method of violence in “dealing” with them by skinheads in Russia. This will be demonstrated again through two anecdotes, both from 2006. The first, mentioned

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188 I do not mean to be offensive with this point: killing one person is one too many, from a normative point of view. Yet the fact remains that if they had so wished, the perpetrators could easily have enacted greater violence.
in chapter one, concerns a skinhead massacre on the outskirts of Volgograd. On April 13th (and in celebration of the Fuehrer’s imminent birthday) a group of young men burst into a Roma camp armed with wooden clubs and iron bars and proceeded to beat to death two adults and severely injure an elderly woman and a child. Why did the skinheads massacre the Gypsies in this circumstance?

The rural location of the camp suggests two things: this was probably pre-mediated and a choice of the skinheads. Because the camp lay outside the city town, it is unlikely that the skinheads just happened to be passing (with baseball bats and iron bars!) and spontaneously decided to attack. The much more probable scenario is that they set out with the express intention of attacking the Gypsies. In thinking about attacking the Gypsies, they knew that they had to massacre them and could not be content with less.

The rural location also tells us some important things about the form. Given the lack of state control in the countryside and the clear pre-meditated nature of the attack, the skinheads could have chosen any form of violence that they wished. The form that they chose to use was massacre because the targets were Gypsies. Why did they set out to massacre Gypsies?

Nor was this just an isolated case. In August 2006, a skinhead group in Belgorod (who style themselves as “The Belgorod National Corps”) went to a Roma house on the outskirts of the city. They placed a sign reading “Road Closed” at the end of driveway to prevent witnesses coming and threw a firebomb and smoke canister into the house. When the family came out to escape the smoke, the skinheads pounced on

189 See the report “Extremists Sentenced For Attacking Roma Family” in Bigotry Monitor (2006: 6: 33) for more details. The report states that the ten assailants have been sentenced under the incitement to racial hatred laws to between one and a half to five years in prison, which some might think a meager punishment considering the nature of the crime.
them. The first to emerge was the teenage son of the family. The skinheads stabbed him multiple times. When the parents followed, the skinheads beat them with metal rods, causing the mother’s arm to be broken in three different places. Despite the care which the attackers took not to be discovered, they were arrested within a week of the attacks.

Again, two facts stand out from this particular case which illustrate that skinheads consider the appropriate form of violence against Gypsies to be massacre. First, just as in the last case, this was clearly a planned attack. That is evident from the preparation the skinheads used when planning the assault— the “road closed” sign, the smokebombs, the pattern of attack, etc. If an attack is planned, then its form is also predetermined. In other words, the skinheads made a conscious choice to harm the bodies of a number of Gypsies. Second, the skinheads wanted to actually inflict the pain themselves, rather than just create a situation in which Gypsies died. They could have set the house on fire and blocked up the escape routes. Why did they not do so? After all, such an attack would be more deniable and easier to write off as an accident. Instead the skinheads valued more greatly the message they could send by actively massacring the Gypsies. In other words, only massacre would do in skinhead violence against Gypsies.

With the statistical and qualitative evidence of skinhead violence, I have argued that particular forms of violence are characteristic of skinhead relations to ethnic groups. This is particularly true of violence toward Jews, Africans, Caucasians, and Gypsies. For three out of these four groups, the evidence is decisive that the form of violence neo-Nazi skinheads used was determined in most cases by the race (or ethnicity) of the target group. For the one case where this is not true— that of the Caucasians— it is rather that they are targeted more than any other group with a particular form of violence, namely
Pogrom. The qualitative evidence also suggests the degree to which skinheads set out with these particular forms of violence in mind: it is not simply because some ethnic groups are easier to identify than others. Hypothesis seven does not withstand the test. The question which I attempt to answer in the remainder of the dissertation becomes one of why skinheads use these particular forms of violence against these specific ethnic groups.

4.6 Conclusion

Anti-Semitic signs, the murder of African children, raids against Caucasian market stalls, and mass beatings of Gypsies: why are these forms of violence characteristic of relations between skinheads and these four ethnic groups? This finding is the conclusion of a chapter which operationalized the Dependent Variable - form of violence - and applied it to a database of skinhead violence in Russia from 2001 to 2008. Neo-Nazis in that country are contributing hugely to ethnic tensions as a result of their violence and attacks on ethnic minorities happen almost daily now. I then argued that the best indicator of the form of violence was the ethnicity of the target group. This was most true of four particular ethnic groups - Jews, Africans, Caucasians, and Gypsies. I provided statistical and case-study evidence to support this assertion and in the process showed that the use of these particular forms of violence is systematic and not incidental. The rest of the dissertation concentrates on explaining violence against just these four groups, in the hope of finding a generalizable mechanism.

The next chapter uses a content analysis of Far-Right publications to evaluate the competing mechanisms that link the ethnicity of the target group to a particular form of
violence. These mechanisms are both those specified in the literature review and that identified in the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. I then provide an additional test of these mechanisms with data gathered from interviews with actual skinheads. The final content analysis asks whether patterns legitimating skinhead violence against ethnic minorities in the Far-Right media are replicated in the mass media. Such a battery of tests allows me to assert with confidence that the mechanism linking skinhead use of particular forms of violence to ethnicity has been identified. Chapter six then tests the generality of the theory through two case studies as a way of uncovering its generalizability. Chapter seven concludes and provides avenues for future research.
Chapter 5: “The 5-Minute Hate”

This chapter provides a further test of the theory outlined in chapter three. The last chapter tested the prediction that the form of violence varies by the ethnicity of the target group and showed that the theory survived this test. Yet showing that the ethnic identity of the target group is the most reliable indicator of the form of violence does not substantiate the theory, for many other mechanisms could link these two characteristics. That is why the last chapter also identified four ethnic groups against whom particular forms of violence are characteristic: Symbolic Violence is used most often against Jews; Lynching against Africans; Pogrom against Caucasians; and Massacre against Gypsies. This chapter uses these four ethnic groups to test putative mechanisms taken from the literature review in chapter two and my theory in chapter three. I argue that the data shows criminal stereotypes to be a more efficient predictor than any other.

Section 5.1 outlines the competing theories that link certain forms of ethnic violence to particular representations of ethnic minorities. Section 5.2 tests these various hypotheses using a content analysis of the Far-Right media. I identify what is meant by the “Far-Right media” and analyze a sample of both print and internet sources. I also identify specific coding rules used to analyze these sources. Section 5.3 provides another test in the form of qualitative interviews with neo-Nazis gained both in-person and over the internet. While in-depth interviews are usually considered more valid for hypothesis-generation than hypothesis-testing, I argue treating interviews in this manner makes the
research complete. Finally, section 5.4 asks whether the patterns identified in skinhead media have penetrated into the Russian mass media which might indicate how likely violence is to spread (vide Kondopoga in 2006\textsuperscript{190}). Section 5.6 concludes. The next chapter provides two case studies as a plausibility probe into the generalizability of the theory. Before this, however, I remind the reader of the theories putatively linking the ethnic identity of victims and particular forms of violence.

\textsuperscript{190} A mass ethnic riot erupted in the Karelian town of Kondopoga against Chechens and Caucasians in the town. According to reports, this was initiated by rumors of Chechens killing ethnic Russians in a fight. See the report “Brawl In Restaurant Turns Into Race Riot” in \textit{Bigotry Monitor} (2006: 31) for more details.
5.1: Theories

Chapters two and three provided us with theories linking ethnicity and particular forms of violence. This section summarizes these theories for the benefit of the reader and re-states their central insights. In doing so, I first re-cap my theory from chapter three and then the three theories from the literature review which are consonant with the empirical observation that the victims’ ethnicity correlates to the form of violence. I conclude this summary by re-stating these theories as hypotheses, in table 5.1. Before this, however, it is necessary to remind the reader of the insight behind each theory.

My theory developed in chapter three argued that skinheads punish ethnic minorities for their “criminal” behavior, as contained in stereotypes. There are different forms of violence because skinheads respond to the stereotypical crimes of ethnic minorities with a proportional response. Skinheads punish ethnic minorities in a manner which fits their “crimes.” The correlation of forms of violence with ethnicity identified in chapter four is thus really measuring the stereotypes. It follows that if the “crimes” of which ethnic groups are accused predict the punishment, then the punishment should also predict the “crime.” Therefore, particular ethnic groups will be accused of characteristic crimes. Building on the insight developed in the last chapter that certain forms of violence epitomize skinhead relations with various ethnic groups, we are now in a position to specify the nature of those threats. The typology of crimes designed in chapter three had two axes: whether crimes targeted people or property; and whether the threat of those crimes was concrete or abstract. Because Jews are characteristically
targeted with Symbolic Violence, the prediction is that they will be accused of abstract crimes against property. Similarly, Africans will be accused of abstract crimes against people, Caucasians of concrete crimes against property, and Gypsies of concrete crimes against people. These expectations are stated as hypotheses I-IV in table 5.1 below.

Turning next to those hypotheses which come from the literature review, the identifiability hypothesis has already been evaluated and found wanting. Further, the hypothesis concerning ancient hatreds stipulates that deep-rooted dislikes motivate conflict. Logically, however, this presents us with the same line of causation as the theory of “ethnic criminality” sketched above: just because these dislikes may have deep roots in history does not mean that they do not have to be re-produced in culture to influence conflict. They may ensure that certain rumors are more influential than others but that is a research question for another time. This process of elimination leaves three possible alternative mechanisms linking cause and effect.

First, the “cultural distance” argument implies that the more similar victims are to perpetrators the less severe the form of violence will be. Difference leads to conflict, so the greater the difference the more severe the form of conflict will be. Ethnicity itself is the cause of the form of violence. The most apparent form of cultural distance would be to dehumanize others. Casting ethnic others as non-humans turns difference into concrete reality and those who are more dehumanized will suffer worse forms of violence. Because Gypsies and Africans suffer violence against their persons, the theory predicts that they will be dehumanized to a greater extent than Jews and Caucasians. This is expressed in hypothesis V.
The rationalist explanation discussed in the literature review would link ethnicity to the form of violence as a standard contest over resources. Ethnic others are not to be trusted as trading partners, but the degree to which they are distrusted varies. Indeed, as if to lend credibility to this explanation in 2007 the Russian government forbid foreigners from owning market stalls in an attempt to pacify xenophobic activity.\footnote{See the story “New Tough Migration Law Stings Millions of Foreigners as its Efficiency Questioned” from the Associated Press on Dr. Johnson’s Russia list (2007: 67: 8) available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/default.cfm} If this idea has reached even the level of the government, then it should be evident in the Far-Right media also. Returning to the four ethnic groups identified in the last chapter this implies that skinheads attack ethnic minorities because they see them as a threat to Russian livelihoods: Gypsies and Africans will be portrayed as a greater economic threat than Jews and Caucasians. This idea is expressed in hypothesis VI.

The final hypothesis to be tested is the hypothesis of direct incitement. Coming from the theory of Valentino (2002), according to this explanation ideologues of skinhead gangs order violent acts on ethnic others which skinheads deliver. Skinheads attack ethnic minorities in characteristically different manners because they are told to do so by the ideology. If this theory is correct, then, Neo-Nazi ideology should instruct them to go and graffiti Jewish property, physically assault Africans, destroy Caucasian property, and commit physical violence against Gypsies. This idea is expressed as hypothesis VII. All the hypotheses from this section are listed below in table 5.1:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Jews will be accused of abstract crimes against property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Africans will be accused of abstract crimes against people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Caucasians will be accused of concrete crimes against property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Gypsies will be accused of concrete crimes against people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Africans and Gypsies will be described using more dehumanizing language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>than Jews and Caucasians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Africans and Gypsies will be described as a greater economic threat than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jews and Caucasians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Violence will be directly commanded against different ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: hypotheses for chapter 5

This completes the review of the hypothesized mechanisms. Section 2.0 discusses the method of content analysis as a means for testing each of these theories. Section 3.0 analyses the discourse of far-right movements in Russia and finds that the evidence supports the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. Section 4.0 provides evidence from interviews with Skinheads in the Russian Federation which again supports the theory of ethnic criminality. Section 5.0 then conducts a content analysis of the mass media in order to see how far into Russian society these ideas have penetrated. Such a question is important when contemplating the emergence of xenophobia in Russian society as well as its possible causes. Section 6.0 concludes. In the next chapter, I provide two further tests that stretch the boundaries of the theory: the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006 and the plight of the Meshketian Turks in Krasnodar Krai. Chapter 7 concludes.
5.2: Stereotypes in the Far Right

This section evaluates hypotheses I-VII through a content analysis of Far-Right materials. It proceeds in three parts: Sub-section 5.2.1 describes the sample taken; Sub-section 5.2.2 details the coding guidelines; 5.2.3 then evaluates the data in line with the hypotheses from section 5.1 and finds that ethnic minorities are stereotyped as criminals. These crimes, moreover, conform to the pattern predicted by the theory in chapter 3 and so provide evidence that they are the cause of why ethnic violence takes on different forms. Section 5.3 repeats this process with evidence from interviews with skinheads. To begin this section, however, I need to identify how I determined who was a member of the Russian “racist right.”

5.2.1: The Sample. All scientific work considers sampling to be of the utmost importance. After all, the logic of sampling determines at what we will look and so the results we will get. In this case, I consider the universe of right-wing organizations to be those detailed as such by the SOVA center. The SOVA center is the main Non-Governmental Organization in Russia monitoring skinhead and Far-Right activities and sponsoring research into the activities of these groups. They constitute, therefore, the authority on Far-Right neo-Nazi groups in the Russian Federation. While it is probable that other organizations exist, they are likely to be less influential or not even skinhead groups.

SOVA has two sources that identify skinhead organizations: a list of radicals on the web and annual publications. Concerning the web source, the head of the SOVA
center Alexander Verkhovsky provides a list of radical organizations on the web with links to each of the organizations mentioned (where they have a website). These “radical organizations” are not only skinhead groups but includes Russian Nationalist, Orthodox Nationalists and Fundamentalists, Political Neo-Pagans, Skinheads, Communists, Anarchists, Anti-globalists, Islamic extremists and Others. I counted over 120 different groups on this list in all categories. Such a well-populated list surely contains most of the influential radical groups on the web.

Concerning the actual gathering of materials for analysis, it made sense to use Verkhovsky’s list to access the websites of specific skinhead gangs. While this is not all the skinhead gangs which exist in Russia, it is the most accessible group of gangs and there is no good reason to expect them to put out a different message to other gangs. Not only does this facilitate access to media of which would be extremely difficult to get hold and retain but the skinhead movement in Russia uses the web for a variety of purposes, one of which is recruiting members. Indeed, because inciting ethnic and religious hatred is banned under article 282 of the Russian constitution, skinhead and extremist organizations choose to use websites which are often either based in the United States (where they are protected by the First Amendment) and are cheap to replace.

192 Verkhovsky’s list is available at http://www.averh.narod.ru/extr.html.
193 Consider, for example, the fact that after the first trip to Russia the researcher had to transport officially banned books, such as “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, back to the United States. If one was caught in possession of such literature at an airport, not only would it be seized but the questioning which would undoubtedly follow would not be pleasant.
194 See Kozhevnikova, G. in Verkhovsky, A. [Ed] (2006: 20, 82) where she mentions both attempts by neo-Nazi hackers to take down the websites of Human Rights organizations. Similarly, she documents the propaganda functions of skinhead forums, blogs and websites and the subsequent attempts by the Russian government to bring the internet under control.
I took data from all of the available websites\textsuperscript{195} designated as “skinheads” by Verkhovskiy and some of those designated as “Russian nationalists.” The skinhead websites were: Slavic Union; United Slavic National-Socialist Forum; Russian Will; National-Socialist Front; Combat-18 Russia; and Brangolf. “Slavic Union” is a youth organization led by Dmitrii Demushkin which has offices throughout the country. The United Slavic National-Socialist Forum and the National-Socialist Front are internet meeting-places for neo-Nazis. Russian Will and Combat-18 are actual skinhead groups whose websites had not been hacked by the time I tried to use them. Brangolf is a semi-Pagan organization designated by Verkhovskiy as a skinhead group.

The “Russian Nationalists” on Verkhovskiy’s web-list are those whose nationalism is tinged with the specter of racism. For example, the DPNI (Movement Against Illegal Immigration) was created in 2002 ostensibly to protest illegal immigration. However, the true nature of the organization can be seen in the facts that one of their slogans is the “14 words” of David Lane\textsuperscript{196} and that its leader (a former member of the “Pamyat” [Memory] organization) changed his name from Potkin to “Belov”, a word which comes from the Russian for “white”. I looked at a representative sample of articles and news from the DPNI and the RNE (Russian National Unity). I also included 3 editions of the newspaper “Zavtra,”\textsuperscript{197} randomly chosen from between 2000 and 2008.

\textsuperscript{195} Those that were not available had presumably been taken down by either government officials or members of the youth organization “anti-fa[cism]”.
\textsuperscript{196} “We Must Secure Our Existence And a Future For White Children”. The DPNI will often leave this slogan in its English form and indeed, sells T-shirts bearing it in English. The Russian translation, “Мы должны сохранить само существование нашего народа, ради будущего белых детей”, does not appear very often and this further underlines the international nature of the movement.
\textsuperscript{197} Listed by Verkhovskiy as a nationalist extremist organization and so therefore included in the sample of right-wing organizations.
The second source taken from the SOVA center provides a check to the first and ensures a broad-ranging sample. This was the cataloguing of organizations that do not have a web presence but are mentioned in SOVA print documents. SOVA produces annual reports (2004; 2005; 2006) which mention skinhead groups and publications. These were supplemented with the writings of affiliated Russian academics (e.g. Shnirelman, 2007) which, unlike the list of “web radicals”, focus exclusively on skinhead gangs. While many of the organizations mentioned in these sources are very small regional entities there are some (principally magazines) which have a national reach. This national status indicates that they should be included in a comprehensive survey of skinhead media.

I purchased a sample of these materials from a Far-Right bookshop in Central Moscow.\footnote{In the corner of the Mayanovsky building, next to the infamous Lubyanka buildings, is a shop selling far-right racist literature. I visited this shop to purchase materials in both 2006 and 2007.} This bookshop contained mainly Russian literature but also racist literature from around the world. Many of the magazines presented a more academic and “scientific” basis for racism which does not violate article 282 but still adds considerably to the skinhead worldview. Only those magazines mentioned in SOVA reports were considered influential enough to be included in the universe of cases. Those magazines which were in the bookshop but not mentioned in a SOVA report were not used. This included the magazines “The Atheneum” and “Our Opinion” in the sample. The importance to the racist movement of “The Atheneum” can be seen in that it organized the Moscow Conference “The Future of a White World” (attended by prominent international racists such as David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klab) in
2006. This sampling strategy utilized the knowledge of the premiere research institute into skinheads to define the universe of Far-Right publications.

The texts that I analyzed within the sources sampled depended very much on the form of media used. On the skinhead websites, I looked for news under the assumption that the news changes most frequently and is therefore the place where stereotypes are engrained as part of the skinhead worldview. Where news was not available, I took the most popular weblogs indicated by the number of hits made on that link. Where neither of these was available, I simply took articles of ideology selected at random. I repeated this selection process with Russian nationalist web-sites and I read the entirety of print-sources, having no reason to assume the particular importance of any one element. All sources used are considered to have been simple “articles.” In total I read 2126 articles (N= 2126) of varying lengths, not all of which contained references to ethnic groups. The breakdown of sources read is listed below in table 5.2:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slavic Union Website</td>
<td>1484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Slavic National Socialists’ Website</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Will Website</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-Socialist Front Website</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat-18 Website</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brangolf Website</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Against Illegal Immigration Website</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian National Unity Website</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Atheneum</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Nash Vzyglyad</em> (Our Opinion)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Zavtra</em> (Tomorrow)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2126</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Numbers of articles read by source.

A methodological problem that arises from aligning such a disparate assortment of sources comes from the fact that sources were often of differing length, with some articles being many times the length of individual news posts. When completing the analysis, however, I attributed equal weight to each of the sources taken. The reason for this coding decision comes from two facts: the consistency of each of the pieces and the dictates of the theory. First, the articles and news postings were internally consistent, meaning that they did not contradict claims made earlier within themselves. Second, the theory implies that the important image that comes from the unit of analysis is the stereotype and if text is internally consistent as to the nature of accusations made against other ethnic groups, then one mention performs the same work as many.
Critics may object that my sources are weighted too heavily in favor of one particular website. After all, over half the total material comes from the Slavic Union website and only three articles from the Movement Against Illegal Immigration. However, patterns seen in the data without the Slavic Union material were virtually identical to those where it was included (for verification, see further down) and so I included the Slavic Union data to increase the number of observations. There is also the methodological point that if this data is more readily accessible to those who search for it, then it is probably the most influential anyway. I analyzed the materials using Content Analysis, coding in accordance with guidelines given in 5.3.2 below
5.2.2: Coding. This section deals with the coding criteria I used to categorize the data so that the hypotheses could be evaluated. Critics may disagree with some of the coding decisions employed here, but these are put on display so that criticism may be easier. The purpose is to discover stereotypes of various ethnic groups, not their frequency or scope. As such, individual articles were coded in binary fashion. There were 6 main variables: the ethnicity of the target group; accusations of criminality (coded separately according to imminence of threat and nature of targets); dehumanizing rhetoric; economic harm; and direct incitement to ethnic violence.

Some cases did not fit into the categories specified. In all, there were 76 articles which mentioned an ethnic minority but could not be coded according to the scheme provided. These were mostly factual reports taken from other Russian newspapers or frivolous. For example, there were a few articles about Holocaust denial\(^\text{199}\) and a joke calling for Africans to jump from a plane.\(^\text{200}\) While I could have stretched the boundaries of the categories to include these as examples of either dehumanizing rhetoric or inciting violence, I thought that not doing so would constitute a more stringent test of the theory. Therefore, it was better to omit them from the coded material.

The coding was binary, meaning that if an accusation were made once in an article then for coding purposes it counted the same as if it were mentioned multiple times. The reason followed from the theory: once an article evokes a stereotype, then the rest of the article will be consistent with that image. Indeed, I found it to be the case when analyzing the data that most articles would stay with one image of an ethnic group

\(^{199}\) See, for example, the report on the Slavic Union website (8\(^\text{th}\) February 2007) about the conference denying the reality of the Holocaust in Tehran. Similarly, there is a news posting on the 21\(^\text{st}\) December 2006 about the trial of prominent Holocaust denier David Irving.

\(^{200}\) See Slavic Union’s website posting for the 27\(^\text{th}\) September 2006.
rather than invoke multiple images. Groups were neither simultaneously accused of qualitatively different kinds of crime nor were separate stereotypes frequently used together. Where multiple images were used, an entry was given for each.

The most important variable was the ethnic group at the center of the article. I considered both ethnic groups and ethnonyms\(^\text{201}\) as indicators of group ethnicity. Simple mention of a place was not taken as an indicator of ethnicity, unless that place was directly linked to the group. For example, “Chechens”, “people born in Chechnya” and “men of Caucasian nationality” all counted as explicit statements of ethnicity whereas a story simply starting “in Chechnya” did not. A further problem comes from the issue of how and whether to count implied references to ethnic groups. For instance, the word “oligarch” is strongly associated with the Jews in Russia and so accusations made against “oligarchs” (or a particular oligarch, such as Berezovsky) could be considered references to Jewish people. Another example is the close association between “Chechen” and “terrorist.” Although such terms could be included as references to ethnic groups, I decided not to count them because doing so would turn the subject of empirical enquiry into an assumption.\(^\text{202}\) A future project could count such references as evocations of ethnicity, but for this research I did not do so.

\(^{201}\) Ethnonyms are ethnic insults, indicating the ethnicity of the target group through a shorthand which gives a negative valence (consider the English “kike” or “nigger” for example).

\(^{202}\) To give the reader an impression of the data that was excluded by this coding decision, I analyzed a sample of 6 months of Slavic Union data (October 2007- April 2008, about a quarter of the total) looking for implicit references to both Jews and Caucasians. The results yielded 1 and 7 entries respectively. The sole entry concerning the Jews referred to Boris Berezovsky being in league with the government. Conversely, those referring to Caucasians were headlines without articles attached written by an author with the name of “South.” There were reports of 2 explosions, 2 reports of illegal immigration, 1 about drugs, 1 about a “national project: the denigration of the indigenous \(korenatsoi\) population, and 1 concerning “terror in Cherkassia.” The nature of these accusations mirrored the rest of the data and so we can conclude that including implied references would only increase the number of references.
The second variable was that of crime. I coded as crimes all references to ethnic groups connected to illegal (and immoral) activity or explicitly stated as crimes. It is important to cover both illegal and immoral activities because the two terms are not synonymous and many of the accusations made were not in themselves illegal. For example, the Caucasian or African “occupation” of Russian land does not violate the legal code in any way but it does violate the unspoken moral norm that Russian land is a Russian possession. I included all types of crime under the same category in order to test their presence against rival explanations, but afterwards I categorized them separately.

Accordingly, I coded crimes with reference to two axes: imminence of threat and nature of targets. The imminence of threat axis could be either concrete or vague. Concrete threats were those that were imminent and for which specific details were given. Examples would be actual reports of recent violence. I coded as vague those threats which were written about in general terms lacking specific details. By definition, all historical, foreign or future threats were coded as “vague.” An example of how this worked in practice was that if Caucasians were said to be swindling people in Moscow markets, then the threat counted as concrete. If an article said Caucasians in general were swindlers, then I coded it as vague.

The second axis of the crime variable was a focus on either people or property. This division replicates the coding in Chapter 4. Crimes aimed against people were those that had specific ramifications for the victims (e.g. murder, torture, slavery) whereas crimes aimed against property were those where an individual’s livelihood might be

203 Crimes against whites in other countries were also included if they were reported in the data due to the fact that skinheads see themselves as warriors of the “fourth world war”. Indeed, one of the chief claims of the ultranationalist march in Moscow on National Unity Day in 2007 was that “we Russians are part of the white race” (see http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,515380,00.html for more details). Such a worldview means that threats to whites everywhere constitute data.
affected, but not their body (e.g. swindling, dealing drugs). This division might be considered arbitrary (because, for example, narcotic addiction has implications for health) but fundamentally crimes against property can be remedied. I also somewhat controversially coded “crimes” of rape and sexual relations between racial groups as crimes against property because my ethnographic work in chapter 3 specified that the skinhead worldview views women as such.

The third variable was the use of Dehumanizing Rhetoric, which involved groups being compared to animals or accused of being a lesser form of humanity. I also included accusations of certain ethnic groups have inherently lower intelligence under this category because the clear meaning is to denigrate them. I did not include ethnonyms (e.g. “Kike”, “Nigger”) as instances of dehumanizing rhetoric because while they may contain negative associations, ethnic slurs are not in themselves explicit references to dehumanizing rhetoric. Including this would also have biased the results, as slang terms for Jews and Africans are substantially better known to the outside than those applied to Caucasians.

The fourth variable was whether a group was accused of economic harm. This term included all activities which were not violations of neo-Nazi morality but brought economic pressure on the native population, such as accusing ethnic others of taking “our jobs.” In order to avoid duplicating the measurement of crimes against property, I specified that the economic aspect of action had to be the focus of the article. Therefore, while the Caucasian “occupation” might count as a crime against property it does not count as an allegation of economic harm. Nonetheless, despite the care I took to avoid

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204 Indeed, one might say that the implication was the opposite: a large number of cheap workers provide a pool of cheap labor which keeps prices down.
double coding in some cases it was unavoidable that crimes against property were also
coded as an allegation of economic harm.

The fifth and final variable was the direct inciting of violence. This was an
instruction to go out and perform specific acts and there were two main forms: commands
and emulation. The commands took the form of imperative verbs telling people to do
certain things, for example, “drive the Chechens from Moscow”! Emulation normally
held up certain acts as worthy of emulation and included both reports of skinhead and
popular violence and photographs of people who had been killed. An example of the
latter was the glorification of lynched African-Americans. Section 5.2.3 provides details
of how this coding worked out, as well as analysis of the material. The coding guidelines
are summarized in table 5.3 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Guidelines</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanizing Rhetoric</td>
<td>Accusations of primitiveness, comparison to animals</td>
<td>(photo): “which one is the monkey?”, “Caucasians are less intelligent”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Non-Criminal behavior that detracts from the economy of the country.</td>
<td>“they are stealing our jobs”, “Armenians control the markets”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Inciting</td>
<td>Commands to execute a particular sentence, idolization of violence; photographs of violent acts.</td>
<td>“Drive the Chernye from Kondropoga and other Russian cities”, (photo) lynched black man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: Coding guidelines and examples
5.2.30: The results of the coding of the articles are presented on table 5.4 on the next page. Overall, there were 584 articles that mentioned ethnicities. The other 1542 articles in the samples did not mention ethnic others at all but were instead calls to organize, jokes, notices about rock concerts, or other matters that did not mention ethnicity. Similarly, there were articles which focused on ethnic groups (divided into Orientals, Arabs, Indians, and Westerners) not included in the number of those under scrutiny. Indeed, 90 articles of the 584 total concerned with ethnicity did not explicitly mention Jews, Africans, Caucasians, or Gypsies, leaving 494 articles left to code. Of these 494 articles concerned with these four groups, 99 either reported the activities of ethnic organizations or did not contain information which fit into the categories. This left 395 articles for scrutiny. In 42 cases, ethnic groups were accused of more than one crime, and 15 articles mentioned more than one ethnic group. Table 5.4 below shows how these 395 cases dispersed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Property, Abstract</th>
<th>People, Abstract</th>
<th>Property, Concrete</th>
<th>People, Concrete</th>
<th>All Crimes</th>
<th>Dehumanizing Rhetoric</th>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>Incitement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA/Caucasians</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4 demonstrates that there is a predominant association of ethnic groups with criminal activities in the Far-Right media.\textsuperscript{205} This is particularly evident in the case of Jews and Caucasians/ Central Asians where accusations of criminality appear from two to four times as regularly as all other negative references (104: 27 and 176: 72 respectively). Similarly, almost every mention of Gypsies by this media represented them as connected with some form of criminality. It was even true of Africans, of whom there are only very few in Russia. One of the articles\textsuperscript{206} claimed that “criminality is nationality,” implying that particular crimes are characteristic of particular groups which is exactly the understanding of ethnic others that the theory predicts. The evidence thus clearly supports the hypothesis that ethnic groups are stereotyped through accusations of criminal behavior and in showing this it warrants a further explanation of theorized causal links.

There is only scant support for the dehumanizing rhetoric hypothesis from table 5.4. To be sure, Africans were most frequently referred to in this manner of any of the ethnic groups- 19\% of the time versus 6.1\% for Jews, 6.4\% for Caucasians, and 7.7\% of the time for Gypsies. Such dehumanizing rhetoric often compared Africans to monkeys

\textsuperscript{205} It is at this point I am able to provide evidence backing up the assertion made earlier, that the Slavic Union data does not distort the representation of ethnic minorities. Table 5.5 below shows the same analysis without the Slavic Union data included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abstract, property</th>
<th>Abstract, people</th>
<th>Concrete, property</th>
<th>Concrete, people</th>
<th>Dehuman</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Direct Incitement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 5.5: Data without Slavic Union articles.}

As the reader can see, the crimes hypothesized to be most frequent for each group are all still present, with the exception of only the Gypsies, just as was the case with the complete data set above. Because of this, I decided to increase the array of data at my disposal and include the Slavic Union data.

\textsuperscript{206} Slavic Union news posting 29-04-2007
or accused them of being “the lowest race”. One picture on the Slavic Union website showed an African tribesman next to a monkey and asked “which one is the monkey?” and another featured a picture of US president Barack Obama under the heading “A president from the zoo?” While such accusations may be very hurtful to those at whom they are aimed, they are not frequent enough to warrant any kind of support for continued investigation of this hypothesis.

There was even less support for the realist hypothesis that ethnic conflict is a product of economic problems. Most damaging to the hypothesis was that at no point were Gypsies accused of bringing harm to the economy and that despite their frequent appearance in media of this kind, the negative economic consequences of having the Jews in the country were only mentioned once. Conversely, in fact, Jews were portrayed as a benefit to the economy if anything at all, as implied by the Russian Will article that “China has achieved its economic success without the aid of the great Jew.” To be sure, there were economic complaints made against Caucasians and Africans but there are still many more accusations of criminality. For both of these reasons, the evidence does not support the hypothesis of economic harm.

Finally, there is relatively consequential support for the direct incitement hypothesis. Websites and magazines reported actions to be emulated by Russian neo-Nazis and directed them to undertake certain kinds of action. This is particularly true in the cases of Africans and Caucasians. Further analysis of this data shows that in the case of Africans at least, most instances of direct incitement originated with the same source. The NS-Front website featured nine black and white photographs of hanging corpses, presumably from the Deep South, and one of a black man who had been shot in the head.
Similarly, in the case of the Caucasians the Combat-18 website posted a report on the 24th October 2006 of a near-pogrom of Chechens in the city of Tyumen. There is, therefore, substantial support from the data for the incitement hypothesis.

However, there are three problems with this that show the incitement hypothesis offers only a partial explanation. First, there is the observation that despite the Russian Will website showing images of Jews being lynched, the data in chapter 3 showed that the characteristic form of violence against Jews was symbolic, not lynching. Similarly, the Gypsies were only mentioned rarely and even where there was direct incitement of violence against them it was not specified to take the form of massacre. This suggests that some other accusation causes the particular form of violence used against Gypsies.

Finally, many of the web posts incited a particular form of violence as a response to the criminal characteristics of ethnic groups and so provide support for the criminal hypothesis. For example, the United Slavic National-Socialist Forum weblog on 15th April 2008 argued that because the Caucasians are armed bandits, they need to be forced into ghettos. In other words, they incited an honor culture of “justice” and portrayed ethnic violence as a punishment for a supposed crime. The incited action was not independent of the reputed crime, but rather a response to it and so supported the logic of the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. The specific predictions of this theory are tested below.

*The Theory of Ethnic Criminality:* The data in table 5.4 clearly show that the dominant description of ethnic groups was to associate them with crimes. The hypotheses concerning dehumanizing rhetoric, accusations of economic harm, and direct
incitement to violence do not come anywhere close. However, even though accusations of criminality may be the dominant means of understanding ethnic groups the theory of ethnic criminality requires that these accusations of criminality fit a certain pattern. In this section I argue that the disaggregated crime data supports the predictions of the theory: ethnic groups are not just accused of any old crime, but of particular characteristic crimes. To do so, table 5.5 takes the data given in table 5.4 and calculates particular types of criminal action as a percentage of all crimes of which an ethnic group was accused. The predicted highest values are highlighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vague threats to property (type 1)</th>
<th>Vague threats to people (type 2)</th>
<th>Concrete threats to property (type 3)</th>
<th>Concrete threats to people (type 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6: Accusations of criminality against each ethnic group, by type of crime.

Table 5.6 shows the breakdown of accusations of criminality into the four specific types of crime specified in chapter 3. The highlighted figure in each row is the one predicted to be most frequent by the theory. The table shows that in 3 out of the 4 cases the theorized allegations of criminality occur most frequently. This prediction is
strongest in the case of the Jews (77.1%), moderately strong in the case of Caucasians and Central Asians (36.8%) and Africans (36.7%). The one case where the predicted crime is not the most frequent is that of the Gypsies (27.3%). These relationships are shown pictorially in Figure 5.7 below. In all the figures below, one particular kind of crime is clearly the dominant impression of the ethnic group and, moreover, this is the crime specified by the Theory of Ethnic Criminality in all but one case (that of the Gypsies). Even in the case of the Gypsies, however, the predicted accusation counts for a substantial amount. I elaborate on the nature of these accusations below.
Figure 5.7: Stereotypes as a percentage of criminal accusations
Figure 5.7 continued

![Criminal Stereotypes of Caucasiants](image)

![Criminal Stereotypes of Gypsies](image)
The criminal stereotype of Jews is that they are responsible for damaging Russian property rather than concrete human beings. Table 5.6 demonstrated that 77% of all accusations of Jewish “criminality” involved this claim. The most frequent accusation of this nature was that the Jews ran the government not just of Russia (“ZOG”) but of America (“Jewish-American bankers”), the European Union (“the kikes enslave… they won’t let Belorussia join the European Union”) and of Communist Russia (“Jewish-Communists”207). Similarly, Jews are held responsible for the vicissitudes of capitalism and of having a privileged position in the Russian transition to capitalism.208 These violations of the neo-Nazi worldview are violations of property and not of people.

Only rarely were Jews accused of crimes against people. Indeed, even when they were accused of such crimes the acts themselves were connected to property crimes. For instance, an Atheneum (8: 29) article had a picture of a vampire and the words “who drinks Russian blood?” under which was the accusation that the Jews were taking blood from Russian blood banks and shipping it to Israel. Even this article which seemed at first glance to involve a physical crime actually referred to a property violation. Similarly, the accusation that “the Jews killed our Tsar!,”209 had two implications. On the one hand is the actual claim of bodily violence against Russians, but on the other the implication is that the Jews were responsible for Communism, a form of government which brought extensive harm to Russian “property” and interests. Such proximity to property crimes makes the case that the stereotypical crime of the Jews is one that involves property.

207 Slavic Union (27-10-2006)); RNE (article 3); Slavic Union (22.07.2006); Pobedohocev in Atheney 8: 40 (2006)
208 “In the Russian economy, it comes in handy to be Jewish”- Viktor Alksis in Nash Vzglyad (2007: 31)
209 Slavic Union news posting 17-07-2007
On the other axis, nearly all the crimes of which Jews were accused were non-imminent. Table 5.6 shows that over 90% of the crimes used to stereotype Jews were coded as vague. This meant that they were either set in a mythical past/future or that they were performed at a great degree of abstraction from their effects. Jewish “crimes” were those of the shadowy villain and the Machiavellian prince, not the street bandit or murderer. One of the most frequent examples of this was the accusation that the oligarchs who stole their wealth from Russia in the 1990s are “kikes.”

Taken together, this classification of Jewish “crimes” attributes responsibility to them for vague property crimes, exactly what is specified by the theory.

The stereotypes surrounding Africans more frequently conformed to the predicted pattern than to any other single case, although even here results are less distinct. The crimes were equally split between property and people. Property “crimes” included the “country being occupied by the sight of Negroes”, “Negroes want[ing] to establish their way of life on our land” and the accusation that African students at the University of Patrice Lamumba in Moscow are “drug dealers.” Crimes against people, on the other hand, focused on the supposed innate aggressiveness of Africans which made them all “thugs.” Similarly, much of the dehumanizing rhetoric aimed at them featured accusations of innate aggressiveness. Other articles focused on the (retaliatory) attacks of African students of St. Petersburg on skinheads.

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210 Slavic Union news posting 29-01-2007. One might object to this being a slanderous observation because a disproportionate number of those on the Forbes’ list of the 25 richest Russians are Jewish (Khordokovsky, Berezovsky, Abramovich, Gusinsky, Friedman). This means that not even a quarter of the richest Russians are Jewish and so claiming that all oligarchs are Jewish is manifestly false.

211 RNE (3); Slavic Union (12-10-2006); the Atheneum (5: 36)

212 Slavic Union (24-08-2007); “Vlad” in Nash Vzglyad (7: 18). The article in Nash Vzglyad was titled “African terror in St. Petersburg”
property crimes were so varied compared to like charges against people, I find that the evidence supports the position that Africans were accused of crimes against people.

Similarly, most of the crimes were vague and a general sense of threat rather than concrete examples which would warrant immediate and massive action. African crimes against whites were remote: Africans were decried as innately aggressive, carriers of knives, or perpetrated crimes in foreign countries like Zimbabwe. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, there were reports of actual African violence against Russians in St. Petersburg when the organization “African Unity” beat up skinheads who had been pestering students at the local metro station but these reports were the minority. Overall, the theory works in the case of Africans who most frequently appear as perpetrators of the second type of crime.

The Caucasians present a picture similar to that of the Africans. While a majority of the accusations (58.9%) made against them featured property crimes, there were also allegations of harm to people. Although not the predicted outcome, this is actually in line with the data in chapter four which shows that the Caucasians are targeted with violence against both people and property, although pogrom-style attacks are characteristically used against them. Because skinheads attack Caucasians with a variety of forms of violence (of which pogrom is not even the most frequent) I argue that the simple plurality of concrete threats to property supports the theory.

This concentration on crimes against people might suggest an intensification of the conflict, although this is a question for future research. As great numbers of Caucasians come to Russia and as the economy worsens, right-wing instigators may resort to ever more inflammatory accusations against them to provoke conflict. Indeed,

213 Brangolf (08/02)
particularly graphic (and obviously forged) photographs alleging that Caucasians killed Russians were taken from the Slavic Union website “news” posting. These photographs feature headless corpses hanging from climbing frames under the headline “killed by Chernye [a derogatory Russian term for people from the Caucasus and Central Asia].” I advise readers that the photographs are highly graphic, but they may be seen via a link on my website (http://polisci.osu.edu/grads/arnold/). In any case, the number of accusations of crimes against property provides evidence for the theory.

The threat represented by the Caucasians was, moreover, represented as imminent. This is borne out by table 5.6. Fully 62.2% of the “crimes” mentioned were coded as concrete. As exemplified in the photographs available on my website, Caucasians and Central Asians were accused not of representing some vague threat in the future or past but a concrete threat that committed heinous acts unpunished. Their crimes were represented as real racial war. Moreover, even the “crimes” of which they were accused that qualified as vague were logical precursors to the accusations that these crimes were being committed here and now: Caucasians were accused of an “occupation” or claims that Chechens and Dagestanis were responsible for all the “filth” in the capital.214

Overall, therefore, the Caucasians were most represented as being responsible for concrete crimes against property. 36.8% of the accusations taken from my sample accused Caucasians and Central Asians of banditism, controlling specific markets, dealing drugs, “Islamicizing” Russia and forging Russian passports and visas.215 While this number is not an absolute majority it is the most frequently occurring stereotype by a

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214 Slavic Union (21-08-2006); (22-06-2007)
215 Slavic Union (15-09-2006); (13-09-2006); United Slavic National Socialist Forum (15-04-2008: 2), Russian Will (3), Combat-18 (05.10.2006)
margin of over 10%. Moreover, the confused message coming from the stereotypes is reflected in the data on attacks on Caucasians and Central Asians which have taken a multitude of forms.

The final group that needs to be mentioned is the Gypsies. The theory of ethnic criminality did not work in the case of the Gypsies. Indeed, this group was mentioned so very rarely in the articles I read. They were the focus of just 11 articles accusing them of crime and only 14 even containing just mention of them as a group. Such sparse mention suggests limits to the predictive power of stereotypes, but this is a criticism I turn to after recounting the data. Of the 11 cases mentioned, they would - according to the theory - predict pogrom as the characteristic form of violence. Conversely, the data in chapter 3 showed massacre to be the characteristic form of violence used against Gypsies. However, analysis of the data suggests that the stereotypes would, in fact, predict pogrom.

On the first axis - that of people or property - the overwhelming focus was on the property of ethnic Russians. Gypsies were accused of dealing drugs, carrying opiates and robbing pensioners.\textsuperscript{216} One article even suggested that “Gypsy” was synonymous was “thief”\textsuperscript{217} and noted that when something went missing the automatic suspect should be the Gypsy. Only rarely were crimes against people mentioned, the most notable case being a DPNI (1) article that reported the Gypsy construction of “a death-camp [\textit{konzlager}] for Russian slaves” where Gypsies were reputedly taking the golden fillings from the mouths of dead Russians. This demonstrates that the idea of Gypsies committing physical harm against Russians was clearly present in the Russian social

\textsuperscript{216} Slavic Union (12-03-2008); Brangolf (09/02); (10/02)
\textsuperscript{217} Slavic Union (11-11-2006)
imaginary. Similarly, some of the property crimes of which Gypsies were accused had a direct impact on people and so may not provide as direct refutation as it first seems.

Yet if there is obscurity over the first axis then the analysis of the data according to the imminence of threat could not be clearer. In 9 of the 11 accusations of criminal activity-81.2%- Gypsies were featured as posing a concrete and imminent threat to Russians and not an abstract one. The theory would suggest that this would lead skinheads to take immediate action to remedy the situation and not be satisfied with a simple protest sign or statement. This is indeed borne out by the data in chapter 3 and so while the specific predictions of the theory are not validated in their entirety, it does promise some measure of predictive validity.

But the most striking result of the data analysis is just how few stereotypes of Gypsies emerged from the sample. The first implication of this could be that the stereotype of Gypsies is so engrained in Russian society that there is no need for it to be reinforced by news articles. As evidence for this idea, Gypsies are hated throughout Europe and not just in Russia which suggests a deeper cultural prejudice against them that does not need the press for transmission. Indeed, Angus Bancroft (2005: 1-2) notes the “naked hostility displayed toward [Gypsies] across the continent in the 21st century, [has meant that] Europe has been a dangerous place for Roma and Gypsy-travelers (‘Gypsies’).” The 2004 Internal Federation for Human Rights’ (fidh) report on discrimination against the Roma in Russia also mentions the “deeply entrenched” stereotypes of Gypsies that permeate Russian culture.218

Indeed, this argument is lent weight by the observation that anti-Gypsy actions are already a component of state policy in Russia. The Russian authorities have, for

218 See fidh, (2004: esp. 7-11) for more on the entrenched anti-Roma attitudes in Russian society.
example, used the excuse of law enforcement and preventing drug dealing to “clean out” suburbs of Kaliningrad and Moscow from the Gypsy presence. Anti-Gypsy sentiment in the Russian Federation clearly has deep roots in the society. Such actions by the *Russian state* indicate the degree to which Russian society understands Gypsies as dangerous and also suggests a different source to these accusations that those examined in this chapter. For this reason I argue that the results concerning Gypsies in this chapter must be treated with caution and that the failure of what few stereotypes of Gypsies present in the data sample to conform to the predicted pattern does not present a major block to the theory.

The results of this section demonstrate that the Theory of Ethnic Criminality passes an important test. For 3 of the 4 ethnic groups examined in this section, accusations of criminality conformed to the pattern which the theory predicted. In the case of the fourth ethnic group, the Gypsies, the accusations were somewhat in line with the predictions made and there is good reason to think that stereotypes concerning them might be more prevalent in other sources. This is, in part, where the chapter goes next. Section 5.3 provides evidence from interviews with neo-Nazis which suggests that this correlation is causal. Section 5.4 then asks just how far into Russian society these

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219 For example: the Autumn 2001 campaign of Krasnodar city authorities against Roma in the suburbs on the pretence of them dealing drugs, the 2002 Operation “Tabor” in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Samara which strove to fingerprint all Roma (See the report “Police Drive To Register Roma” in *Bigotry Monitor*: 2002: 2:29 for details); the Stavropol campaign to fingerprint Roma (See the report “Stavropol Wins Right To Control Migration Independently” in *Bigotry Monitor*: 2003: 3: 27 for more details); the election of a mayor in Archangel who ran on an anti-Roma platform (See the report “Roma Victimized By Growing Intolerance In Russia” in *Bigotry Monitor*: 2006: 11 for more details); and the work of Professor Nadezhda Demeter who reportedly showed a Kaliningrad Roma settlement being bulldozed to the ground in 2006 (See the report “Local Russian Authorities Evict Entire Roma Communities” in *Bigotry Monitor*: 2006: 24 for more details). These examples testify to the popularity of moves designed to curtail the influence and presence of the Roma in Russian society.
stereotypes of ethnic others as criminals have penetrated, with a content analysis of the Russian mass media. Section 5.5 concludes. Before this, however, I present evidence from my interviews with skinheads.

5.3: Interviews

Section 5.2 demonstrated the strong correlation between accusations of criminality and the use of particular forms of violence against particular ethnic targets. Skinheads punish ethnic others in the manner befitting the crime. This section provides another test of the theory, with the qualitative analysis of evidence from interviews with actual skinheads. I begin by reminding the reader of the hypotheses to be tested and dealing with methodological issues, especially the idea of representativeness. Section 5.3.1 concerns how I went about obtaining interviews. Section 5.3.2 evaluates the hypotheses against the results. Once again, the Theory of Ethnic Criminality is a more efficient predictor of the form of violence than its competitors. First, however, I remind the reader of the hypotheses that I will test.

The hypotheses from the content analysis are repeated below. The first four come from the Theory of Ethnic Criminality, the fifth from the theory of “cultural distance,” the sixth from standard rationalist theories of ethnic conflict, and the last from theories which portray ethnic conflict as a direct response to instruction from authoritative figures:

Hypothesis I Skinheads will accuse Jews of abstract crimes against property
Hypothesis II Skinheads will accuse Africans of abstract crimes against people
Hypothesis III Skinheads will accuse Caucasians of concrete crimes against property
Hypothesis IV Skinheads will accuse Gypsies of concrete crimes against people
Hypothesis V Skinheads will describe Africans and Gypsies using more dehumanizing language than Jews and Caucasians.
Hypothesis VI Skinheads will describe Africans and Gypsies as a greater economic threat than Jews and Caucasians
Hypothesis VII Skinheads will claim they are instructed to commit worse forms of violence against Africans and Gypsies than Jews and Caucasians

These hypotheses will be evaluated against evidence from interviews with actual perpetrators of ethnic violence rather than simply those who hold racist views. This follows the methodology of “specialized interviewing”220 or “ethnographic interviews” where the views of non-elites are used. Although interviews are not usually considered a good test of hypotheses, I believe that in this case they are for three reasons. First, skinheads form a subculture and so one can imagine that the precise range of opinions is somewhat restricted. Second, because of the nature of the research puzzle and skinhead gangs, a survey was not feasible. Therefore, any desire to actually include the skinheads in the research would necessitate interviews. The third defense is perhaps the strongest methodological defense- namely that these interviews are a supplement, rather than a substitute, to the causal patterns already identified in section 5.3. For these three reasons, then, I consider the interviews a good supplement to the research.

In total, I interviewed seventeen different skinhead practitioners of ethnic violence. While this sample of skinheads is very small, recruiting subjects was very difficult. There is no “skinhead central” where researchers may freely discourse with Neo-Nazis, nor do many wish to be involved in research. I conducted interviews in two

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ways: in person and over the internet. The in-person interviews were obtained in 2006 and the internet variety in 2008. The 2006 interviewees may be divided into two groups: “street skinheads” (schoolboy associates of a Russian friend of mine); and representatives of the organization “Slavic Union.” Although interview subjects came from only two sources, the division between the two reflected the fundamental divide in the skinhead subculture: organized and unorganized. While it would be overstating the case to say that these constituted a representative sample, it is true to say that one major division had been captured.

Figure 5.8 shows photographs of the two “unorganized” skinheads whom I interviewed, Aymen and Zack (pseudonyms). The guidelines of the research protocol prevented me from obtaining identifying features on the skinheads, but the reader should take the tattoos in the pictures as evidence of their sincere belief in Nazi ideology. Although generally not aggressive to me, neither of the skinheads hid their former violent attacks. Besides the two unorganized skinheads, I interviewed 3 from the organization “Slavic Union” who would not allow me to take pictures of them.
Figure 5.8: In-person interview subjects: [Left] Aymen; [Right] Zack
The 2008 interviews subjects were recruited over the internet. I decided to use the internet to recruit subjects for three reasons: difficulty, danger, and validity. Concerning difficulty, skinheads are far from the easiest people to contact. Many do not want publicity and as they do not wear a uniform or have central offices,\textsuperscript{221} they are difficult to meet. Internet chat-rooms are one of the only places where a number can be safely contacted at once. Further, there is considerable risk involved in meeting with skinheads,\textsuperscript{222} an obvious disincentive to the in-person interview. Finally, many skinhead gangs exist primarily as Web-organizations in any case so the researcher’s best chance of an interview is to contact organizations on the internet. These three reasons make the recruitment of interview subjects via the internet highly attractive.

However, if one is going to recruit subjects via the internet then it is not obvious why the interviews should not be conducted there also. Indeed, there are sizeable benefits from doing so: costs are substantially reduced; subjects can be contacted anonymously and will feel more comfortable answering questions from the comfort of their own homes; there is much less danger to the researcher; and any language difficulties the researcher has are likely to be mitigated because reading is easier than speaking. Indeed, as if to supplement these reasons, I found subjects to be much more

\textsuperscript{221} Even the skinhead organization “Slavic Union” is not really a central skinhead organization but one amongst many gangs. Regardless, despite the fact that I had gained the trust of a member of the governing council it proved difficult to contact actual members, most of whom did not want the publicity.

\textsuperscript{222} Indeed, two anecdotes from my research experience come to mind: the first was from 2006, when I met two skinheads for an interview in Moscow. Because all the cafes were jammed with people, the subjects felt unable to talk freely so we held the interview in their car which was parked nearby. This placed the researcher at considerable risk of harm as the car could have driven off at any moment. The second anecdote comes from 2008 when I was trying to find interviews through e-mail. I contacted the group “Combat-18: Russia” and asked for an interview. They looked at the interview questions and said they would participate but asked for 1000 Euros to do so. As it was obviously unethical to pay (let alone to finance terrorism!) I refused politely. Upon receipt of my answer they began sending me death threats. This was not a problem over email but may have been a very ugly experience if the email had been asking for a face-to-face meeting.
forthcoming over the internet and direct in answering questions. All these reasons suggest significant advantages to interviewing subjects over the internet.

One obvious objection to this method is that one has no guarantee of the identity of subjects when interviews are purely web-based. Someone who masquerades as a skinhead online could, in fact, be a child in another country than Russia who is playing a joke. I would respond observing that many subjects had avatars which bore explicitly racist content that would take time and effort to design. Those who were not serious or genuine about their convictions would not invest so much time in creating such avatars. I also included questions to test subjects’ genuine adherence to the ideology, questioning them on things about which a skinhead would know: certain methods of attack, statements of ideology and particular violence events. For these reasons, I do not consider this objection valid.

A more serious objection might be that the pool of interview subjects is systematically biased because it includes only those skinheads who operate on the internet. As a consequence, the researcher is likely to get wealthier and better-educated interview subjects than if conducting meetings face-to-face. My response to this would be to concede that this is a problem, especially as estimates of those using the internet in Russia arise only to about 12.7 million in a country of 140 million. However, young people are disproportionately more likely to use the internet than older people and that is precisely the age group from which most skinheads come. Similarly, skinheads operate

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223 One avatar that comes to mind is a video of a door swinging open and an African-American man being shot with gory imagery following which I am sure needs no explanation to the reader.
224 I asked them to tell me what a “white wagon” is, what happened at Kondropoga and Tsaritsino and what the 14 words of David Lane are. The “white wagon” tactic is used by skinheads when they board a particular carriage at one train stop, guard the doors and beat all non-white passengers. Kondropoga was the scene of a communal race-riot in 2006 and Tsaritsino a market where a pogrom took place in 2002. For the “14 words” of David Lane, see chapter 5, footnote 9.
225 http://www.spacemart.com/reports/All_Of_Russia_Will_Have_Internet_And_Phone_Access_999.html
primarily on the internet, with many practitioners of violence posting videos of attacks there. However, in an effort to try and ensure a fully representative sample, I also asked interview subjects especially for contacts who did not use the internet normally.

One might also object to remote interviewing because the researcher loses a great deal of meaning as he cannot see the pauses and initial reactions of subjects. Pauses between question and answer on the internet may occur for a variety of reasons that would not be applicable to in-person interviews. I admit that this is a valid objection and that there are definite losses which come from not being able to see one’s interview subjects face-to-face. However, I would maintain that these non-verbal cues are less important than the actual content of what interview subjects say and so for this reason interviews conducted over the internet still yield highly useful information.

Yet objections aside, there are also advantages to using the internet to conduct interviews. Perhaps the biggest is that I could get subjects from all over the country: from Vladivostok to St. Petersburg. Given that Russia is the largest country in the world and some 2.5 times the size of the United States, this is something that would not be feasible if the interviews were to be held only in person. Another advantage is that responses of the interviewees could also be cross-referenced against their previous postings to check for consistency in their answers. This is something that would not be possible if I conducted solely in-person interviews. A further benefit is that responses are already transcribed and so the researcher does not have to commit time to doing so. Finally, there is less chance of a non-native speaker misunderstanding a word. For all

226 See, for example, the report “Racist Youths Arrested For Killing A Turk” in *Bigotry Monitor* (2008: 8: 6) which reports that two Neo-Nazi youth in Novosibersk beat to death a Turkish man with baseball bats and posted a mobile phone recording of the attack on the internet. The video was instrumental in convicting the youths.
these reasons, then, I contend that the method of the internet interview is as valid as regular face-to-face interviews.

In total, I conducted 17 interviews: 5 in person in 2006 and 12 over the internet in 2008. In 2006, I interviewed three members of the organization “Slavic Union” (Patrick, Adam and Michael) and two street skinheads (Aymen and Zack). In 2008, I interviewed the head of Slavic Union, Dmitrii Demushkin, by email and contacted 7 members of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and 5 users of the “forum for Russian terrorists”, National Socialist (NS). The NS website appears to be a replacement for website of Forum-18 which was hacked by anti-fascist activists in 2005.

Of course, not everyone who holds Nazi views acts upon them and so in order to separate those who used violence from simple racists I asked if subjects had been involved in violence. While the in-person interviews readily admitted their participation, internet subjects expressed concern about admitting directly to any specific acts of violence over an anonymous medium, fearing I was in league with law enforcement. Therefore, I followed Tim Frye and worded the question so that denial was still possible, asking if people “similar to themselves commit violence against ethnic minorities.” This method allowed me to exclude from the pool of interview subjects those who merely hold racist views (but do not use violence) and concentrate on those who expressed a connection to violence. All 5 of the subjects recruited in 2006 and 6 of

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227 http://www.dpni.org/ The names the users gave themselves are interesting as well and further make the case for the validity of this method: Andriocha Dmitrovskii, DrSoulburner, Kamerad, Melissa, Strayer, Ultra21 and Whiteright. While some of these user-names are clearly non-aggressive, others are blatantly aggressive and racist.

228 http://ns-wp.cc/ The names the users gave themselves are interesting as well and further make the case for the validity of this method: Whitegods, UznikSovesti, Einherjar, Hess and BornE. Nearly all of these usernames have some kind of connotation of white supremacy and so provide epistemological assurance that I talked to the right people.

229 Frye, T. (2002: 576) used this technique to ask survey respondents about “sensitive topics like bribery and private protection” when investigating the business climate in Russia.
those recruited in 2008 claimed to have used violence in the past against ethnic minorities.

After finding out if “people like you” had committed ethnic violence, I asked the interview subjects to tell me how they felt about each of the four ethnic groups in my theory: Jews, Africans, Caucasians, and Gypsies. I deliberately used open-ended questions at first so as to avoid the possibility of suggesting ideas. This would ensure that the responses I received would be in subjects’ own words. If an interview subject offers up reasons without prompting from an interlocutor, then they are more likely to be actual motives for action. To ensure that it was no left out, however, I then asked subjects directly about whether they considered the form of violence to be influenced by economics. This method attempted to minimize the impact of the researcher on those being questioned while still asking the questions I needed to ask.

The results of the interviews provide support for the theory of ethnic criminality, although other reasons were also mentioned. Most of the subjects provided some reason for why the form of violence differed, with many offering opportunity and the commitment of the skinheads doing the attacking as the key variables. One subject, “Ultra21”, objected to the very premise of the questions asked, saying that he did not think that “the form of violence has any significance.” However, the data presented in chapter 3 clearly show that it is not the identity of the attacker which is important but the identity of the victim. Moreover, the fact that most of the skinheads did not reject the question out of hand reinforces the initial assumption that something orders the use of violence against ethnic minorities. That this reason is the crime for which the ethnic
group is held responsible is borne out in the reasons skinheads gave as a justification for violence and in their specific descriptions of Jews, Africans, Caucasians and Gypsies.

Crime and punishment were the most frequently mentioned reasons given for violence in the open-ended responses. All subjects included the desire to punish criminal activity as a reason for attacking ethnic others. Most subjects agreed that violence was a punishment for crimes innate to particular ethnic groups. For instance, the subject “Hess” told me that “nationality implies criminality” and “borntokill” argued that “80% of crimes in Russia are committed by immigrants.” “Ultra21” stated that attacks were only sanctioned if they came “from FEAR” of the ethnic minority. “Einherjar” went further than this, claiming that “violence is moral and justified when the question is the survival of our Race.” The open stating of such reasoning provides support for the Theory of Ethnic Criminality.

Moreover, skinheads did not just accuse ethnic minorities of abstract criminality but of specific crimes: “Aymen” told me that he hated the Jews because they controlled the government and media in Russia. He felt that the liberal agenda of the Russian government in the 1990s had been a result of Jewish hegemony. Other subjects agreed with this assessment, with “Adam and Michael” calling the Jews “the main danger.” The subject “Hess” told me that drawing graffiti on Jewish memorials was a form of “national revelry” which “avenged the Jews for the fall of the Reich.” These sentiments provide direct support for hypothesis I which frames skinhead violence as a “response” to “crimes” supposedly committed by the Jews.

Of greater interest, however, was the fact that skinheads couched their responses in defensive terms, as if they were reacting to a threat. Indeed, the notion of
proportionality received direct support when skinheads talked about Jews. For instance, “UznikSovesti” stated that skinheads attacked memorials “in order to desecrate them. Jewish memorials desecrate our land and should not be here.” This emphasized the role of reciprocity in determining the manner of skinhead attack: it was because they see the presence of Jewish property on Russian land as an offence that they desecrate it. The skinheads claim their attacks are an eye for an eye.

In a similar vein, interview subjects provided support for hypothesis II when they suggested that the presence of Africans increased the frequency of certain crimes in their country. “Zack” spoke of the innate aggressiveness of Africans and the inevitable involvement of [African] students at the Patrice Lamumba University in “drug-dealing and prostitution.” As another example, “Uzniksovesti” told me that the African presence in Russia was “infectious to whites.” These responses were not prompted by questions about criminality, but they were open-ended: the skinheads could have talked about anything to do with Africans, they chose to do so concerning criminal accusations.

Here again, the argument of defensive reaction was invoked. For instance, the subject “Hess” relayed a story to me of him meeting two African men who were trying to rape a Russian girl whom “nobody would help,” despite the fact that the attack took place in a busy area. Instead he presented the excuse of the black African villain committing a crime which implied his own position as protector of the community. In this manner, the interview subject provided an interpellation casting blacks in a negative and whites in a

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230 He also used the same idiom to refer to the Gypsies in Russia, again suggesting that the two groups offer ontologically similar positions in the psyche of the Russian skinheads.

231 Laffey and Weldes (2004: 28) cite Althusser in claiming that “interpellation means, first, that specific identities are created when social relations are depicted…. Second, in a successful interpellation concrete individuals come to identify with these subject positions”. In describing others as “backward” or “violent”, the subject projects an image of himself as the opposite.
positive light. While there was no stronger hint to the idea of proportionality than this concerning Africans, one may infer that the skinheads clearly thought the Africans deserve whatever is done to them.

There was a mixture of responses of subjects to questions concerning violence against Caucasians. Skinheads seemed generally to have no problem with Caucasians who remained on their own ancestral lands, but they did not want them to come to Russia. Indeed, this theme was spelt out by “Zack” who told me that “as I understand it, all the good people stay on their motherland and all the bad ones come here.” Once again, this idea references the notion that violence is a reciprocal affair. The Caucasians that came to Russia are “drug-dealers” who “rape Russian women” and acted “uncouthly” in Russian cities. They were to be feared because their manners were so bad and because they were themselves intimidating.

Moreover, in agreement with hypothesis III, interview subjects said that Caucasian immigrants sought control of property and were guilty, according to Patrick and Michael, of owning businesses so that the “Georgian Diaspora runs gambling clubs, casinos, prostitution and deals drugs,” “Chechens bring illegal arms to Moscow,” “the Armenian Diaspora runs banking activities” and the “Azerbaijanis and Dagestanis trade on the markets.” Other subjects expressed fear that the Caucasian “occupation” was too great and “Patrick” repeatedly told me that “10% of people in Moscow are now Azerbaijanis.” Caucasians multiplied “like flies” and made the Russians an “ethnic minority” in their own country.

The logic of reciprocity, of repayment of this violation, was a deep theme in each of the interview subjects’ responses. For example, “Uzniksovesti” claimed that the
reason for skinhead pogroms was because “[Caucasians and Central Asians] trade low-quality goods and disturb the Russian trade.” Using violence would force Caucasians out of the marketplace and hopefully back to their motherlands. Not all subjects agreed that attacking their livelihoods was the best way to force them out, however. For instance, the subject “whitegods” told me that “even to kill every tenth person causes them all to leave. If [skinheads] kill someone, then it causes [Caucasians] to lose heart and leave.” What is particularly interesting here is the ordering of the goals: Caucasians needed to leave, but if they would not leave then they would be killed. The goal was to prevent crimes from being committed on Russian soil.

The last group I asked skinhead interview subjects about was the Gypsies. Here hypothesis IV received strong support. “Aymen” evinced a strong hatred of the gypsies stating that “nothing good can come from this minority.” He elaborated on this point and gave the example of when he had been working at a railway station and had frequently seen Gypsies begging for cash. This he put down to a seemingly permanent characteristic- their way of life and culture. “Zack” then linked this impression of permanent criminality to massacres against Gypsies, saying that “if you cannot solve the problem it means that you simply have to kill the man.” The Gypsies presented a mortal threat that needed to be exterminated.

Similarly, the subject “Michael” claimed that Gypsies had throughout history “stolen children” and so “killing them is our right.” Once again, the nature of the threat warranted a particular kind of response. This is also prima facie evidence of the argument that hatred of Gypsies is deeply interred in Russian culture. This sentiment was again replicated by an accusation of Gypsies forcing Russians onto “their” drugs. Adam
recounted a story about when “Gypsies went to a discotheque and injected someone with heroin in order to get them hooked.” Gypsies did not simply deal drugs but actively recruited drug addicts and so were an immediate threat to the health of the body politic. Because they presented such an immediate danger, the most severe forms of violence against them were sanctioned.

Hypothesis V received some limited support from the interviews, with skinheads frequently using dehumanizing terms to describe ethnic others. For example, Einherjar claimed that Whites were naturally smarter than Africans who were “stupid, ugly monkeys.” Similarly, the interview subject Uzniksovesti described ethnic minorities as “untermensches,” and Hess claimed that they were “destroying the purity of nations, and the culture of [our] nation.” Adam laughed at the thought of Africans dancing the “Tumboo-Umboo.” Zack even went so far as to say that his soul was “stressed” by the sight of non-whites. However, Zack’s comment aside, such malign evaluations (excluding crimes) were used more in descriptive terms than as a justification of skinhead attacks. While subjects mentioned dehumanizing images in the interviews, ultimately they do not support the hypothesis.

The economic damage migrants caused to the Russian economy, the reasons given by hypothesis VI, received a mixed response. While “Hess” claimed that “Caucasian salesmen are destroying our economy. They don’t pay taxes. The quality of their merchandise is bad and they defraud Russian customers,” the subject “Whitegods” was convinced that “there are no economic reasons [for conflict]. On the contrary, more workers come from white countries.” Indeed, “Einherjar” argued that it was only common people “who don’t like [Caucasians] for economic and social reasons,” Nazi
skinheads disliking them because of the criminal threat they posed instead. However, 
what really illustrated the inability of the economics hypothesis to explain the forms of 
violece was that whereas subjects mentioned Jews and Caucasians in this manner, not 
one once did they connect Africans or Gypsies (outside of crimes) to threatening the 
economic life of the country. For this reason, hypothesis VI did not find support among 
the responses of interview subjects.

The final hypothesis of direct incitement, number VII, was likely to be the most 
difficult to measure using the interview technique. Few people will proudly admit to 
doing something because they were ordered to do so but will normally offer some 
justification. However, there was one good example of this was with “Zack,” “Patrick,” 
and “Whitegods” insisting that white people had become the minority in a white country, 
so violence against ethnic minorities was legitimate. There was no reason given aside 
from the assertion that Russia was historically a white country. The far more common 
response, however, was the same as in the content analysis when subjects expressed an 
imperative to commit violence against ethnic others, but justified it with the idea of 
crime. For example, “Einherjar” told me he hated Jews the most because they 
“committed more crimes against my race.” Thus the evidence does not support 
hypothesis VII.

It should be added that not all of the interview subjects were completely in 
agreement. Interview subjects disagreed over their attitude to particular ethnic groups. 
For example, Zack said that it was “a good thing if Africans come here for education and 
then go back to their countries to improve them,” although he did voice concern over 
miscegenation of Africans with Russian women. He also did not voice concern over the
Jews and in fact seemed to praise them. His ire was rather reserved for the “churka” and Gypsies. However, the views that are relayed in this section of the chapter by far and away characterize the responses of subjects.

The interviews thus provide substantial evidence again that skinheads use different forms of violence because they are punishing ethnic groups for different crimes. Violence is a direct, proportionate response to a perceived crime. This point is clarified by the response of one interview subject who did not own to using violence. Far from being overtly racist, he said he disliked those who “behave themselves like animals—hat[ing] Russia and Russians… racketeering, robbing, bribing officials, selling drugs to kids.” He claimed that nobody hated the Tatars because they know how to conduct themselves as civilized. Once again, the Theory of Ethnic Criminality proves to be the most efficient explanation of the form of violence.

The next section, 5.4, extends the content analysis to the mass media to see how far down the stereotype of ethnic criminality has penetrated in Russian society. In doing so, it provides a means of evaluating the claim of some Russia-watchers and the *Economist* magazine that Russia is in danger of becoming a fascist state. If the stereotypes of ethnic criminality have sunk deep roots into Russia, then there is a real danger that this violence will spread to areas of that society previously not involved. From a theoretical standpoint, it is also important as a means of judging the importance of mass held opinions to such fringe groups as the Neo-Nazis. Section 5.5 concludes.

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232 Presumably a diminutive form of the word “Chernye,” the Russian word for black which refers to those people from the Caucasus and Central Asia who have slightly darker skin.

233 “Dr. Soulburner”, a Russian PhD. who insisted on writing to me in English compared the situation in contemporary Russia with the invasion of fascist Germany, stating that Chechens and other immigrants behaved in a similar manner.

234 See the issue from 14th October 2006 (Volume 381: issue 8489), page 55. It should be mentioned that since the publication of this article, the Economist has not provided any further evidence or accusations that Russia is “heading toward fascism”.

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5.4 The Mass Media

This section asks whether and how far into the Russian national consciousness the conception of ethnic others as criminals has penetrated. This provides some indication of how likely Neo-Nazi violence is to spread from beyond just Far-Right extremists. This evidence also offers a chance to evaluate the tacit social support necessary for extremist groups. I answer these questions with a content analysis of the mass media, focusing on two sources: television and newspapers. The evidence suggests that the stereotypes of ethnic others being involved in crime have spread to a worrying level in Russian society, such that more-or-less explicitly racist positions are acceptable in Russian politics and culture to a degree which alarms the Western observer.

This section progresses through a number of stages. First, I identify the hypotheses which I test in this section. I focus only on accusations of ethnic criminality in this section, believing that this chapter has already shown such stereotypes to be the mechanism which links ethnicity and particular forms of violence. Second, I describe existing attitudes to ethnic minorities, using survey data from the Yuri-Levada center. I then describe the mass media sources used and how they were collected. The fourth section analyzes the data, arguing that stereotypes of ethnic criminality are deeply entrenched in the Russian mass media. This evidence leads me to conclude that ethnic violence is unfortunately likely to spread in Russia over the next few years. Section 6.0 concludes.
First, however, one needs to restate the hypotheses which will be explored in the section. As sections 5.2 and 5.3 produced positive results for the Theory of Ethnic Criminality and not for the other hypotheses, I limit my attention in this section to only those hypotheses which came from the Theory. This means that hypotheses II-V look for exactly the same patterns as those evident in the Far-Right literature. I add hypothesis I, however, which captures all accusations of criminality made against ethnic others. This is important, because while I have not covered all ethnic groups in previous tests, the very stereotype of ethnic others being criminals (regardless of group) is an important validation of the theory. These hypotheses are stated below:

Hypothesis I: The Mass Media will accuse ethnic groups of criminal actions
Hypothesis II: The Mass Media will accuse Jews of abstract crimes against property
Hypothesis III: The Mass Media will accuse Africans of abstract crimes against people
Hypothesis IV: The Mass Media will accuse Caucasians of concrete crimes against property
Hypothesis V: The Mass Media will accuse Gypsies of concrete crimes against people

As a plausibility probe into the validity of doing research into the mass media, I checked the hierarchy of crimes against statistics on public opinion. The Yuri Levada center publishes annual research on Russian public opinion and one of the questions they ask respondents concerns attitudes to ethnic minorities. This provides an ideal source for an initial test to see whether Russian popular opinion endorses the skinhead worldview or not. Table 5.8 shows attitudes to five ethnic groups for the years 2000, 2003, and 2006. While there was more data available on different years, I chose these as complete data was available for all of the ethnic groups under scrutiny and three-year intervals are representative of trends.
I further calculated aggregate scores of positive and negative feelings toward different ethnic groups. I combined the “Liking, interest” response with the “Even, Like to Any Others” response to generate a “positive” score of feelings toward an ethnic group. Similarly, I combined the last two responses to generate a score of “negative” attitudes toward an ethnic group. Further, as both Azerbaijanis and Chechens are representatives of Caucasian ethnic groups, I took the mean average of the scores for each of these groups as an indicator of public opinion toward Caucasians. This score is given in parentheses after the entry for the Chechens.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group 2000</th>
<th>Liking, Interest</th>
<th>Even, Like to Any Others</th>
<th>Annoyance, Dislike</th>
<th>Distrust, Fear</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>53* [42.5]</td>
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<th>Annoyance, Dislike</th>
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<th>Distrust, Fear</th>
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Table 5.9: Surveys on popular attitudes to different ethnic groups: 2000, 2003, 2006,\(^{235}\) in percentages.

\(^{235}\) These statistics were taken from the Levada Center (2007: 126-7) statistics on public opinion. The center (English webpage available at http://www.levada.ru/eng/) used the “Monitoring” methodology in answering this question, where a survey was carried out in 103 localities in 38 regions of Russia with all 2'100 respondents aged 16 or over. Any discrepancy between the sum of characteristics and the nominal total of 100% indicates rounding up or down. (see Levada, 2007: 5)
Tables 5.8 shows that popular attitudes to ethnic others under study remain remarkably consistent throughout the six years for which data are available. The total “positive” and “negative” scores clearly show that levels of antipathy are highest in Russian society toward Gypsies, high in regard to Caucasians, and at similarly low levels for both Africans and Jews. While this is not a test of the extent to which the idea of criminality is associated with ethnicity, it does nevertheless suggest that skinhead patterns of dislike will be replicated as regards Gypsies and Caucasians. People may dislike, mistrust, or fear ethnic others for a variety of reasons, but if they believe ethnic others to be involved in crime then they will necessarily mistrust them. It was on this basis that I began to survey the mass media.

Before any serious analysis of the role of “the Mass Media” in forming Russian attitudes to ethnic others can begin, one needs to define what is meant by this umbrella term. I understand it to be a term that covers television, radio, newspapers, and more recently, the internet. In this study, I limit my attention to television broadcasts and newspapers, as these have the greatest penetration of the Russian populace. Russia’s media industry emerged out of the Soviet monolith into the private hands of the infamous oligarchs. After using their media empires to secure re-election for Yeltsin in 1996, these oligarchs exerted an enormous influence over the Kremlin. In part because of this former influence, when Putin came to power somewhat unexpectedly in 2000 he began clawing back the media from private control. The mass media in Russia came once again under the influence of the government.

236 See Freeland, C. (2000: 169-189, especially 181-184) for more details. The Oligarchs used the media to help Yeltsin secure re-election in 1996 in return for preferential rights to Russia’s most profitable companies in the “loans-for-shares” scandal.
One result of this was that the 2007 Freedom House report ranked Russia’s media as “Not Free.” (2007: 156) This is because it exerts direct control over television channels and indirect over newspapers. In the sphere of television, the government either directly controls or has a controlling stake in the six major television networks (Channel-One, RTR, TV-Center, NTV, Culture, and TV-6).\textsuperscript{237} The television news does not criticize those who fund it. Concerning newspapers, the government has left them relatively free of government control, but forbids discussion on certain topics such as the situation in Chechnya. Journalists who report on Chechnya have a habit of winding up dead, infamously including Anna Politkovskaya. While there is no proof linking the Kremlin to the murders of journalists that have written about the republic, her colleagues from the newspaper “Novaya Gazeta” hold the Kremlin responsible.\textsuperscript{238} Both measures against television networks and against newspapers have contributed to a situation in which the organization “Reporters Without Borders” issued a rank to Russia of 141 out of 173 countries in its 2007 “press freedom index.”\textsuperscript{239}

It is therefore surprising, at least to Western observers, that the degree of public of trust in the media has shown only a slight decline in the years since the millennium. Table 5.10 shows public opinion research by the Yuri Levada center concerning the extent to which the media can be trusted. As is evident from the table, while the public has expressed concern about the impartiality of the media, the number of respondents who believe the media can be trusted actually \textit{increased} in 2007. While the media in Russia may not be as free as Western pundits would like it to be, the Russian public clearly believe in its authority.

\textsuperscript{237} See Oates, S. Table 1 (2004: 22)
\textsuperscript{238} http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7318969.stm
\textsuperscript{239} See http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
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<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quite</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Quite</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not At All</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difficult To Answer</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10: To what extent can today’s press, radio, and television be trusted? (in percentage of 2100 respondents)

The question that emerges concerns the role of the media in contributing to negative attitudes. It is against this background that I chose to analyze both television and newspapers as a sample of the mass media. I did not use the internet or radio precisely because they are less influential. Television remains the most trusted medium in Russia, despite its state control. The three networks that are the most popular in Russia are Channel-1, Russian Television and Radio, and NTV. This is in part a consequence of their enormous broadcast penetration, which Oates (2004: 22) puts at 84%, 71%, and 53% respectively. However, obtaining systematic data from these television stations was extremely difficult due to the absence of systematic archives—until recently, even the stations themselves did not keep old programs but instead re-used tapes. To this end, I used an archive at University College London (UCL) and a website to watch programs.

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240 Levada-Center (2007: 115), Table 12.1
241 See Oates, S. (2004: 7) who says that “despite the rough equality in preference, however, trust remained quite heavily linked to state-run television, with commercial television a distant competitor in the area of faith in the mass media…. 65 percent of the respondents picked national state television as one of the “most unbiased and reliable sources of information” far more than those who selected local newspapers (20 percent), national newspapers (18 percent), Russian radio stations (16 percent), commercial television (13 percent) or even relatives and friends (14 percent).”
The UCL archive\textsuperscript{242} contains programs from Russia since the 1980s which are received via a satellite and programs about Russia which are made by Westerners. I restricted my sample to only those programs actually broadcast in Russia since the year 2000. Professor Julian Graffy at UCL told me that the university randomly chooses selections of documentaries to record and does not record news unless it is contained in a commercial break between programs. This left a total of 220 programs for perusal. I watched all programs that mentioned ethnic groups in their titles and randomly chose every tenth program. This gave a sample of 35 programs ranging from 30 minutes to over an hour in length. I used a website to obtain news programs from Russia.

The web site “ethnic television network”\textsuperscript{243} is based in Canada and provides online subscribers with the chance to watch Russian television. This includes the news programs of the three major television networks- \textit{Vesti} (Channel-1); \textit{Vremya} (RTR); and \textit{Sevodnya} (NTV). The online archives of these television programs extend back to, however, only 2005. Given that the sample of interest is the years since the millennium, however, this is not too great of a problem although the sample is far from ideal. I randomly selected a week of news shows from each station to watch as a representative sample of the 3 years on the website. This yielded 21 news programs of 20-30 minutes.\textsuperscript{244} In total, the sample contained 56 television programs.

I chose a similar research strategy with newspapers. I read a sample of the three most popular newspapers from the Russian Federation: \textit{Argument I Fakty}; \textit{Komsomolskaya Pravda}; and \textit{Moskovsky Komsomlets}. These newspapers have

\textsuperscript{242} The full catalogue is available at http://www.ssees.ac.uk/videos/intro.htm
\textsuperscript{243} http://www.etvnet.ca/
\textsuperscript{244} Specifically, I watched Channel-one’s \textit{Vesti} from 27\textsuperscript{th} August- 02\textsuperscript{nd} September 2006; RTR’s \textit{Vremya} from 5\textsuperscript{th} August to 12\textsuperscript{th} August 2007; and NTV’s \textit{Sevodnya} from 4\textsuperscript{th} May to 11\textsuperscript{th} May 2008.
circulations of 2’750’000, 660’000, and 1’215’000 respectively. The former is a weekly newspaper and the latter two are dailies. All are national in scope, with the exception of Moskovsky Komsomlets which is limited to the Moscow region. These newspapers are nominally independent, but with the threat of persecution hanging over their journalists, practically obsequious. Archives of Russian newspapers are much easier to obtain than television from that country.

Indeed, Russian newspapers are catalogued and available both in microfiche and online through a company called Eastview. Eastview has catalogues of Russian newspapers stretching back to the fall of the Soviet Union. This meant that I could obtain a truly random selection of newspapers since the year 2000. Therefore, I randomly selected three editions of each newspaper and read all of its articles, barring those concerned with sport and show-business. This gave a total of 342 articles to read and check for stereotypes of ethnic criminality.

Taking into account all the sources that I used, I have a considerably large size sample. I covered the most popular exponents of Russian discourse- television and newspapers- and took from each a representative sample. While the sample could have been larger, this is a criticism that can always be made of social scientific work and so I do not consider it a problematic objection. Critics might object that I have not included radio sources, but most of the news they report is covered by the sources I have included in the sample. This sample allows me to test the proposition that stereotypes of ethnic

245 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm
247 For Argument I Fakty, these were editions from the 29th November 2000, the 23rd October 2002, and the 21st March 2001. For Komsomolskaya Pravda, these were the 17th April 2000, the 8th May 2006, and the 21st January 2005. The sample of the final paper, Moskovsky Komsomlets, came from the 31st March 2001, the 14th April 2005, and the 26th September 2005.
others as criminals have penetrated Russian mass consciousness and how likely particular forms of violence are to spread against individual groups.

I coded the data in line with five variables: ethnic criminality; Jewish crimes; African crimes; Caucasian crimes; and Gypsy crimes. I operationalized “Ethnic criminality” as a binary variable, meaning that one statement concerning the criminality of an ethnic group was coded the same as many. I considered as criminal acts those where a violation of the law was implied or directly stated. The latter four variables isolated those ethnic groups identified in section 5.2 and recorded the particular crime of which they were accused. In determining which category an accusation of crime fell into, I followed the coding guidelines given in section 5.2 above. Table 5.1 shows the results of the mass media analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Criminality</th>
<th>Abstract, Property</th>
<th>Abstract, People</th>
<th>Concrete, Property</th>
<th>Concrete, People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11: Results of Russian Mass Media Analysis (number of references in television programs or news articles)

Table 5.11 shows that the idea of ethnic criminality exists in the Russian mass consciousness, but the evidence is not overwhelming. There were just 39 accusations of criminality among a combined total of 562 programs and articles. Yet the idea existed,
so there is some support for hypothesis I. The idea of the ethnic criminal is present but not omnipresent in Russian society. In the sources I sampled, direct criminal accusations were made against all ethnic groups a total of 39 times. This included references to Italians, Columbians, Caucasians, Chinese, Jews, Gypsies, and Africans. Many of these references were simple segments in television shows or one or two lines in newspapers. The conception that ethnicity implies criminality is present in the Russian mass media.

There were no articles or programs praising multiculturalism in itself. A few did praise particular ethnic groups or multiculturalism indirectly, such as Scottish sturdiness in paying taxes\textsuperscript{248} or a parade of the Russian Orthodox Church in New York.\textsuperscript{249} News articles also concentrated on reporting from Europe and America, as opposed to the rest of the world— I counted 62 news bulletins (articles and programs) that featured Europe and America as opposed to 22 that featured the rest of the world. Further, the character of the events reported on from the West was different: cultural phenomena such as the Edinburgh military tattoo\textsuperscript{250} rather than social-political instability such as the arrest of a Russian businessman in Thailand for connections with terrorism.\textsuperscript{251} Such a focus may leave the space which the idea of ethnic criminality can fill.

Two programs I watched in the UCL archive pushed forward the idea of ethnic criminality more than others. These were the “special investigations,” where the reporter expressly addressed the idea of ethnic criminal gangs. The first was titled “the crimes of foreigners in Russia” [\textit{Prestuplennia Inostrantsev V Rossii}] (broadcast in 2006) and the second “ethnic mafias” [\textit{Ethnucheskii Mafii}] (broadcast in 2007). One of the central

\textsuperscript{248} Komsomolskaya Pravda (71), 18\textsuperscript{th} April 2000
\textsuperscript{249} Sevodnya, 8\textsuperscript{th} May, 2008
\textsuperscript{250} Vesti, 05\textsuperscript{th} August, 2007
\textsuperscript{251} Sevodnya, 7\textsuperscript{th} May, 2008
themes of each program was that particular ethnic groups were responsible for particular crimes. The former featured Jewish pimps, an African illegal immigrant, Chinese illegal immigrants, and Turkish arms dealers. The latter featured Georgian mafia bosses, Uzbek drug dealers, and Chechen, Lezgin, and Dagestani money forgers. The conception of ethnic criminality was thus strongly promoted by these programs and figure 5.12 shows pictures taken from the first program.

Both programs were broadcast on the most popular television station, channel-1 in primetime viewing slots. By focusing on the particularly ethnic nature of some criminal gangs in Russia, they contribute to a climate of ethnic intolerance and provide sources of authority for skinhead views. Moreover, these programs blatantly promote the idea that certain ethnic groups are responsible for particular crimes. This suggests that the idea of ethnic criminality may be being promoted by the government and so could be likely to spread. If the form of skinhead violence can be accounted for by the nature of the
criminal acts of which they accuse other ethnic groups, then the promotion of stereotypes of ethnic criminality in the (government-run) mass media may influence a far larger audience. These programs were the most blatant, but not the only, place in which these stereotypes were present.

Indeed, to confirm hypothesis III, Caucasians were accused of being drug dealers, selling faulty goods, money laundering, people trafficking, printing money, terrorism, and controlling casinos in Moscow. They were, moreover, far and away the most frequently mentioned group. While some of these acts threatened harm to people, by far the dominant impression of Caucasians was their responsibility for concrete property crimes. The similarity between the skinhead and mainstream comprehension of this group suggests violence against them is likely to spread to the mass public, as indeed it did at Kondropoga in 2006. This conclusion is also supported by the statistics in table 5.8 which show that the Russian public feels negatively about Caucasians.

The mass media also provided support for hypothesis II. They accused the Jews almost solely of property crimes. Some of these accusations were historical, crimes of which the Jews had been accused before the pogroms of the late 19th century. Others mentioned the ethnicity of the Jewish oligarchs when talking about the costs Russia had to bear in a crisis. One article reported that a man arrested for selling drugs was Jewish. Yet despite these seemingly widespread stereotypes against the Jews, table 5.8 shows that 89% of people in 2006 voiced positive feelings toward Jews. Either violence against the Jews is not likely to spread or that people are afraid of admitting to anti-Semitism. What is undeniably true, however, is that the Russian media is promulgating a similar stereotype of Jews as is the Far-Right.
Further, Gypsies featured relatively infrequently in the mass media. Gypsies were mentioned least of all—two reports about Gypsy murders and one about Gypsies selling worm-eaten eggs to Russian customers and spreading disease. While these images are consonant with the predictions of hypothesis V, they were not frequent. Based on the assumptions of the theory, then, we must conclude that violence against Gypsies is not likely to spread. One should add a note of caution to this prediction, however, as table 5.8 shows that 49% of respondents in 2006 admitted to negative feelings concerning the Gypsies. Stereotypes of Gypsies are thus already clearly entrenched in the Russian mass consciousness, but one might argue that this is unlikely to lead to violence spreading against them because it is already extreme to the point where the Russian authorities can discriminate against them on grounds of ethnicity.252

Conversely, the data suggest that violence against Africans is not likely to spread. Hypothesis III did not pass the test. I reach this conclusion because 91% of 2006 respondents evinced positive feelings toward Africans, they were few negative stereotypes in the media, and there are so few Africans in Russia. Violence is not likely to spread against students and occasional violence, particularly those with whom “crimes” are not associated. The implication is that whatever animus the skinheads hold against Africans is imported from the Western racist groups who tried to stoke up resentment in Russia. Overall, therefore, the data suggest that the weed of ethnic intolerance finds fertile soil in Russia with 3 of the 4 ethnic groups in question being stereotyped in the predicted manner. It remains a question for another time as to when and with what frequency these stereotypes were articulated by the Russian news

252 For example, police operations to remove Gypsies from Moscow (see the report “Police Operation Targets Roma” in Bigotry Monitor, 2002: 11 for more details).
agencies- a question which could possibly evaluate the extent of government involvement. What can be said, however, is that like most weeds, this one is likely to spread in the immediate future.

To conclude, therefore, the chief characteristic of Russian society seems to be an increase in xenophobia toward ethnic or racially different others. This has resulted from the association of particular ethnic groups with particular “crimes.” This is most especially true of attitudes toward Caucasians and seems to have been true for a long time against Gypsies. Perhaps one of the most worrying conclusions about the mass media, however, is that these stereotypes of ethnic criminality are broadcast on government-run television stations. The implication is that the promotion of these stereotypes has at least the tacit consent of the government. Russia may be on the way to becoming, but is not yet, a fascist state.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter tested the mechanism implied by the Theory of Ethnic Criminality in chapter 3 against its competitors. I used content analysis to analyze data taken from neo-Nazi publications. In this test, the Theory of Ethnic Criminality performed well, with 3 of the 4 groups being stereotyped in the manner predicted. I also provided further evidence for a reciprocal logic to skinhead violence with interview data from skinheads. Again, skinheads provided evidence that they take into account the nature of the “crime” of an ethnic group when using violence against that minority. Finally, I demonstrated that these stereotypes have penetrated the Russian mass media to a significant degree, suggesting that the violence is in danger of spreading.
The next chapter provides two more tests of the theory. I provide case studies of violence used in the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006 and of violence against Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai which further suggest the validity of the theory. The case study of the anti-Georgian campaign also provides a way of determining whether the Russian government is in fact sponsoring the promotion of these ethnic stereotypes and what that might entail for the future of Russia. Chapter 7 concludes the project and summarizes what has been learnt.
Chapter 6: Testing the Bounds of the Theory

The last chapter tested the Theory of Ethnic Criminality and demonstrated that the Russian Far-Right media associates particular ethnic groups with characteristic crimes that conform to the predictions in chapter 3. I also provided evidence from interviews with skinheads which testified that they understand themselves as punishing ethnic minorities for “criminal” actions. The connection between ethnic groups and crime is one that is made in the mass media also, although at a lower rate. This chapter is a plausibility probe into the theory’s generalizability by testing it against two case studies—the Cossack persecution of Meskhetian Turks in southern Russia and the police-led 2006 anti-Georgian campaign. These cases do not attest definitively that the theory has general application, but they do constitute tests which it must pass if it is to have this generalizability. If the theory cannot explain these cases, then it will not have general application.

Section 2.0 examines the plight of the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai, persecuted since before the fall of the Soviet Union by local authorities and Cossacks. The theory works well in this case, with Meskhetians being stereotyped as involved with property crimes. Section 3.0 provides a case study of the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006 where at the prompting of government, the police deported Georgian citizens and even Russian citizens of Georgian ethnicity. Here again, the theory of ethnic criminality out-performs its competitors. This evidence indicates that the theory may be
generalizable. Before I recount this information, however, I remind the reader of the hypotheses for evaluation.

Chapter 4 illustrated that the ethnic identity of the victims was the most efficient predictor of the form of violence. The two case studies in this chapter treat this finding as an assumption and focus exclusively on kinds of violence against particular ethnic groups. But whereas the correlation between ethnicity and violence is a premise of this chapter, there are no presumptions about why this is the case. Indeed, in order to show the greater generality of the Theory of Ethnic Criminality, one needs to evaluate it against the other 3 theorized ways in which ethnicity and the form of violence may be linked. To remind the reader of these four ways, table 6.1 re-states the four hypotheses originating in chapters 2 and 3 which link ethnicity and particular forms of violence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1: Perpetrators will accuse ethnic minorities of crimes which warrant their punishment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2: Perpetrators will accuse ethnic minorities of causing economic problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3: Perpetrators will describe ethnic minorities in dehumanizing terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4: Perpetrators will directly incite particular forms of ethnic violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Hypotheses linking ethnicity and particular forms of violence

Hypothesis 1 relates to the Theory of Ethnic Criminality which argues that violent perpetrators project responsibility for violence onto their future victims. These projections justify to the perpetrators their actions. Hypothesis 2 relates to those realist theories that suggest an economic origin of conflict. In this view, the choice of the form
of violence is designed to recapture or secure markets. Hypothesis 3 comes from the theory of “cultural distance” and suggests that because perpetrators dehumanize different ethnic others to varying degrees, they use different forms of violence. Finally, hypothesis 4 casts the form of violence as a response to a direct order delivered to the perpetrators through the media.

The cases for this research will be the anti-Georgian activities of the Russian government and society in October of 2006 and the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai. There were three justifications behind this combination of case studies. First, both cases specify a different perpetrator (the Russian state and Cossack paramilitaries) and so an affirmative finding will strengthen the proposition that the theory is more generally applicable. Extending the theory to cases where skinheads were not the perpetrators of racist violence promises to illustrate its potential for general explanation.

Second, while they are different they are cases where we would expect the theory to work if it had the (external) validity to which it pretends (“crucial” test cases). The case of the Meskhetian Turks is a crucial test because the Meskhetians are a small minority against whom there has been a lot of violence. They are not economically threatening and are too small of a minority to pose a security threat to the population of Krasnodar Krai. Furthermore, most of the violence visited on Meskhetians has come from the Cossacks, a group Igor Kuznetsov told me were “native Russian skinheads.” This is thus a case in which we would expect the theory to work and a failure to do so would severely hamper its claims to general explanation.

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253 George, A. & Bennett, A. (2004: 120-2)
254 There have been 5 instances of skinhead violence against Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Kray, according to the UCSJ data.
Similarly, the anti-Georgian campaign is a crucial test for three reasons. First, the perpetrators of racist violence in this campaign were the Russian police. If the theory explains violence in this case then it promises generalizability. The second reason, related to the first, is that this case constitutes a hardest-case test for the theory. The perpetrators in this case were clearly acting under orders sent from above and would not need stereotypes to order their actions. It thus offers a rare chance to test the scope of the theory. Finally, the sudden timing of mass persecutions against Georgians promises an excellent chance to see what changed that could explain this. For these three reasons, then, the Georgian case is a good test.

The cases are thus good choices because they test the generalizability of the theory and because they constitute crucial test cases. Section 6.2 provides a case study of Cossack persecution of Meshketian Turks in Krasnodar Krai, exploring specifically the understanding of the minority which was reproduced by the regional media. Section 6.3 then provides a case study of the anti-Georgian campaign carried on by Moscow police in 2006 following a diplomatic spat between Russia and Georgia. The focus here is on the role the media played in legitimating police actions. Section 6.4 provides a conclusion to the case study chapter and the next chapter provides a conclusion to the entire project.
6.2 Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai

The Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai have been persecuted by regional authorities and Cossack paramilitaries since the fall of the Soviet Union. They constitute an “easy” test case for the theory because violence has clearly been motivated through the regional media. We would therefore expect it to work here and a failure to do so would severely jeopardize its external validity. The data from this case study comes from a variety of secondary sources,255 which paint a representative picture of what is going on in Krasnodar. This section proceeds with an account of what happened and then asks what the stereotypes are surrounding this group. The last section evaluates the theories against this data and finds that the image of criminality gives us the best explanation. Before this, however, who are the Meskhetian Turks?

The Meskhetian Turks are a Sunni Muslim people originally from Southern Georgia. They were deported by Stalin from their ancestral lands to Uzbekistan in 1944 (along with a number of other ethnic groups) for alleged conspiracy with the German invaders.256 With the revival of national consciousness that accompanied the end of the Soviet Union, the Meskhetians were subject to pogroms in Fergana Valley. These violent attacks forced them to disperse throughout the former Soviet Union, with between fifty

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255 Having read about the plight of the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar in UCSJ’s Bigotry Monitor I gathered information from a number of secondary sources, including the Memorial human rights center, the Novorossiysk center for human rights Skholy Mira, and academic researchers Igor Kuznetsov and Alexander Ossipov. I also traveled to Krasnodar Krai in September 2007. There I met with Kuznetsov, interviewed Cossacks, attended a Skholy Mira human rights conference in Novorossiysk and met with some Meskhetian victims of violence.

256 Suny, R. (2001: 14-6)
and seventy thousand settling in Russia.\(^{257}\) Within Russia itself, the Turks settled in Rostov, Kabardin-Balkaria, Chechnya, Belgorod, Volgograd, Stavropol, Voronezh, and Krasnodar districts.\(^{258}\)

In most Russian regions, the Meskhetians have been able to register their residency (as is the right of former Soviet citizens) and have suffered only minimal discrimination. In Krasnodar Krai (also known as the Kuban), on the other hand, they have been unable to register their internal passports or propiska which has meant they have been unable to work, receive medical treatment, enroll in education, receive social security payments, or legally own property. Worse still, regional authorities have used Cossack\(^{259}\) forces to help police migrants, causing some violent actions against the Meskhetians which have led to fears that Krasnodar could be the next Kosovo. Accordingly, under the auspices of the United Nations, Turks from the region began to be resettled in the United States\(^{260}\) in 2004, although some remain waiting for immigration officials in the United States to approve their migrant status.

Krasnodar Krai is a wealthy region of 5 million people in Southern Russia which borders on the North-East corner of the Black Sea (see figure 6.2). The rural economy is the largest proportion of the Krasnodar economy at 16.5%, although it also has significant manufacturing, mining, and gas operations.\(^{261}\) Further, the area promises

\(^{257}\) See the Center for Applied Linguistics (henceforth, CAL) report “Meskhetian Turks- An Introduction to their History, Culture, and Resettlement Experiences” which is available at http://www.cal.org/resources/pubs/mturks.html. This report was written for the resettlement program of the Turks in the United States and so contains pithy summaries of the factual situation surrounding the Meshkhetians.

\(^{258}\) Ossipov, A. (2000: 12)

\(^{259}\) According to Heje Toje (2006: 1069), the regional authorities have attempted to construct Cossacks as indigenous inhabitants of the region.

\(^{260}\) Principally in Arizona, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania.

\(^{261}\) See the 2008 investment report available at http://www.mmdcee.com/content/rus/Krasnodar.pdf. Pages 6-7 particularly discuss the economic climate and potential of the Kuban.
development as a tourist resort for Westerners, although it is already considered a resort area by many Russians. This climate makes it among the top ten prospective investment regions in Russia for business. The region rose to international prominence in 2007 when it was awarded the Winter Olympics in 2014 (to take place at the ski resort of Sochi.)

Politically, the region is one of the best examples of “managed democracy” on the regional level, with a powerful governor. Boris Yeltsin appointed the governors up to 1996, but since that time two candidates have been elected—Nikolai Kondratenko in 1997 and Alexander Tkachyev in 2001. Until 1997, Kondratenko was also reputedly responsible for the xenophobic stance of the Krai as regards the Meskhetian Turks which he influenced from his position as chairman of the Executive Committee of Krasnodar
Krai. Both ran gubernatorial campaigns on a program of ethnic chauvinism. Kondratenko is an outspoken anti-Semite and Tkachyev has made xenophobic statements against Gypsies and threatened to revive the gulag for the Meskhetian Turks. The powerful position of the governor in the region means that these personal opinions translate directly into policy. Thus, there is a political climate of xenophobia in Krasnodar Krai.

This climate envelops a landscape of ethnic diversity, where non-Russians constitute approximately fifteen percent of the population. According to the 2002 census, ethnic Russians constitute 86.2% of the population, Armenians 5.6%, Ukrainians 2.57%, Tatars, Greeks and Belorussians just over 0.5% each. Other ethnic groups that have less than 0.5% of the population (or 24,000 members) are Tatars, Germans, Georgians, Adyghe, Azeris, Roma, Moldovans, Ezids, Kurds, Chuvash, and Meskhetian Turks. What strikes one as unusual here is that the Meskhetian Turks seem to have been singled out for violence despite rather than because of their small numbers. Although other groups also face discrimination and even violence at times, the

262 See the Moscow Helsinki Group publication Meskhetian Turks As A Particularly Vulnerable Group, available at http://www.mhg.ru/english/1FD0794
263 For example, Bigotry Monitor (2002: 17) reports that the anti-Semitic newspaper distributed by skinheads in Tambov on April 21st 2002 was “most[ly].. taken up by a speech about ‘Zionist’ conspiracies written by Nikolai Kondratenko.” In another issue (2003: 30) the magazine reports that in his election campaign for Russia’s upper house, “Kondratenko has once again made public anti-Semitic slurs… Kondratenko blamed Zionism and Jews in general for many of Russia’s problems.” Similarly, in 2004 he accused “‘Zionists’ of committing ‘genocide’ against Russia and… [he called] for Russians and Muslims to unite against a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.” (Bigotry Monitor, 2004: 29) Kondratenko’s anti-Semitism is indicative of his general xenophobic outlook.
264 See the report “Russian Drive To Register Roma” in Bigotry Monitor (2002: 29) for Tkachyev’s support of “Operation Tabor.” The report “Tkachyov Condemns Meskhetians, Threatens To Revive Gulag” in Bigotry Monitor (2003: 29) also reports the BBC’s news article concerning statements against Meskhetian Turks and the threat to revive the gulag.
265 Available at http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/doc/English/4-2.xls. Although there were some individuals in the census who gave their ethnicity as “Cossack,” any person of Slavic nationality can join the Cossack organizations and so I did not record them separately.
Meskhetians have been singled out for violence disproportionate to their size. Who has done this and what have they done?

Answering the first question is perhaps easier than the second. The perpetrators of violence against the Meskhetians have been Cossack movements. Cossacks were originally the protectors of the borderlands of the Russian empire and faithful to the Russian Tsar. Many fought on the side of the White Russians in the Civil War and as punishment were repressed by the Soviets. Since the lifting of Soviet repression, however, the Cossack formations throughout Russia have experienced a revival. In Krasnodar Krai there are three main Cossack organizations: Veskubanskoye Kazachye Voisko; Kubanskoye Kazachye Voisko; and the All-Kuban Cossack Association. In the early 1990s, the Cossacks were constructed as the indigenous inhabitants of Krasnodar, so allowing regional authorities to justify xenophobic sentiment as the “defense” of the indigenous inhabitants. Indeed, local academic Igor Kuznetsov, described the Cossacks as “native Russian neo-Nazis.”

The regional authorities have used Cossacks to supplement law enforcement organizations in the Krai. The Cossacks have policed many ethnic groups, carrying out passport checks on migrants and “regulating” markets. However, many of their actions have been outside the remit of legitimate law enforcement and have resulted in bodily injuries to subjects. The complicity of the regional authorities in these actions can be seen in Skolhy Mira’s claim that not one of the crimes committed by Cossacks against

267 Ossipov, A. & Cherepova, O. (1996: 64)
268 Popov, A. & Kuznetsov, I. (2008: 238-244)
269 Ossipov, A. (2000: 48)
Meskhetian Turks from 1990-2005 has resulted in a trial. On September 14th, for example, the Cossacks launched a pogrom of Armenian businesses in the town of Slayansk-na-Kubani. However, while there are a number of Cossack attacks against Caucasians, they have paid particular attention to the Meskhetian Turks in the Krai that is out of all proportion to their size. Furthermore, against this minority they have used a great deal of violence in achieving their goals.

While comprehensive data concerning all cases of violence against Meskhetian Turks has been impossible to come by, the data gathered by the Human Rights organizations Memorial and Shkoly Mira organizations has been used in United Nations evaluations of the plight of the Meskhetian Turks. Therefore, it is a reasonable inference to suggest that most major cases of violence will be captured by their reports. Additionally, this was supplemented with data from the Human Rights newsletter “Bigotry Monitor.” Between them, these sources will include most incidences of violence against the Meskhetians, incidences of which are not reported beyond 2005. Eighteen cases of ethnic violence are given in table 6.3 below:

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270 See the report “Racist Violence Targets Foreign Students” in Bigotry Monitor (2004: 4: 36)
271 See the report “Anti-Armenian Riot In Krasnodar Kray” in Bigotry Monitor, (2002: 2: 37)
272 This is also not to say that there are no other racist organizations in the Krai, which has records of skinhead activity. For instance, the report “Skinheads Found Guilty Of Murders and Grave Desecration” in Bigotry Monitor (2002: 2: 49) records skinheads as being convicted of killing two Roma on December 11th, 2002 and on December 8th desecrating an Armenian graveyard in the town. It is also worth mentioning that Slavic Union has an office there.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident Report</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/1991</td>
<td>Cossacks rob 5 Turkish families in the town of Kholmsky</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter 1991</td>
<td>Cossacks force over 30 Turkish families from the village of Economicheskoye</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1992</td>
<td>“Unknown” group, probably Cossacks, destroy 5 Turkish homes</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/03/1994</td>
<td>Drunk Cossacks break into a Turkish home, beating a family</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/03/1994</td>
<td>Drunk Cossacks break into a Turkish house and beat 2 men.</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/03/1995</td>
<td>20-25 Cossacks break into Turkish houses and beat people</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/06/1995</td>
<td>Cossack pogrom against Turks in Kholmsky</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/07/1995</td>
<td>Cossacks inspect documents of Turks in Abinsk market and beat traders</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/1995</td>
<td>60 Cossacks gather at Turkish-owned Tabakosovkhoz farm and flogged with whips and chains 12 men and 8 women. The Cossacks also caused substantial damage to Turkish-owned property.</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/11/1997</td>
<td>Cossacks check passports of Turks and fine them in ‘Operation Storm’</td>
<td>Symbolic Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/11/1997</td>
<td>Cossacks break up a meeting on Turks gathered to commemorate the 1994 deportation</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/12/2001</td>
<td>60 Cossacks in the village of Skolny burst into a Turkish home, firing tear gas and beating 5 Turks.</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>77 Cossacks bring a bus to the village Khutor Skholny, lock Turkish women in a house and clubbed the men in the courtyard</td>
<td>Pogrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/05/2002</td>
<td>Cossacks detain 40 Turks harvesting a field.</td>
<td>Symbolic Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/01/2003</td>
<td>Cossacks seize passports of 5 Turks in Krymsk</td>
<td>Symbolic Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/04/2003</td>
<td>Cossacks check village looking for Meskhetian Turks</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/12/2004</td>
<td>Cossacks beat Turk in Kholsky</td>
<td>Lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/12/2004</td>
<td>A Cossack broke into a Turkish home and killed 2 women with a gun.</td>
<td>Lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/03/2005</td>
<td>Someone, possibly a Cossack, murdered a Turk in Varenikovskaya</td>
<td>Lynching</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: Cossack violence against Meskhetian Turks 1991-2005
As can be seen from the table, the campaign of Cossack violence and intimidation against the Meskhetian Turks has been sustained across time but the characteristic form of violence against Meskhetians has been pogrom. Generally, I followed the coding guidelines in chapter four. In all there were two cases of Symbolic Violence, three of Lynching, one Massacre and twelve Pogroms. The cases of Symbolic Violence were mainly harassment, such as passport checks. All the Lynching-style violence occurred toward the end of the period for which data is available. The Massacre style violence was *sui generis* although frightening in its scope. Overwhelmingly, however, pogrom seems to have been the characteristic form of violence, aimed at making the targets *leave* the territory.

This inferred meaning of Cossack violence is lent further credence by journalist Alexander Rodriguez’s interview with Cossack chieftain Ivan Bezugly. Bezugly is the Cossack leader for the area surrounding the 60’000-strong city of Krymsk. Bezugly said that “we consider it our mission and our duty to *coerce Meskhetian Turks to leave the Krasnodar region.*” If the leader of one of the top hosts in the region is forthright in his ambition to force a migrant group to leave, then an interpretation of the violence of Cossack groups as also containing this message seems inherently more plausible. The *meaning* of Cossack violence is for the Meskhetians to leave.

There has been substantial state complicity in, if not support for, Cossack violence. According to *Skholy Mira*, not one of the crimes committed against

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*274* Indeed, the report describes it as “an event unprecedented even for Krasnodar Krai” (Ossipov & Cherepova, 1996: 68)

*275* See the article “The Cossack Question” in *Bigotry Monitor* (2005: 32) which cites the Chicago Tribune article of August 7th. The emphasis in the quote is mine.
Meskhetian Turks in the fifteen years from 1990 to 2005 has been prosecuted. This includes skinhead as well as Cossack violence against Meskhetians. Further, the regional authorities have supplemented this “message” to the Meskhetians with policies designed to exclude them. According to the Memorial center, the most systematic outline of the regional administration’s position can be found in an appeal letter of April 24th 1996: Turks in the region are only there temporarily; they have no residency rights; they have no legal status; they are stateless persons; they are an ethnic group “ill-fitted” for the region; and the only solution is to remove them from the region. Both the state and the Cossacks have thus been trying to get the Meskhetians to leave. What have the stereotypes been surrounding this ethnic group?

According to Alexander Ossipov (2000: 40), amongst the population of the Krai there is an “idea that Turks have greatly contributed to an increase in crimes.” Turks are assumed to make the local situation worse, regardless of whether they actually committed crimes or not. The role of the local media in promoting these stereotypes is significant. There are six local newspapers in total: Vercherniy Krasnodar; Volnaya Kuban; Krasnodarskie Izvestia; Kubanskie Novosti; Kuban-bizness; and Kuban Segodnya. Two of these titles are dailies and the other four are available four times a week. They have been replete with xenophobic sentiment. Krasnodarskie Izvestia carried a article titled “When in Russia, the Turks should do as the Russian do,” Kubanskie Segodnya an article titled “Is it a country or a hotel?” and Kubanskie Novosti an article titled “We do

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276 See the report “Meskhetian Sisters Murdered, Others Beaten” in Bigotry Monitor (2004: 47)
not want Turkish land so why should the Turks want the Kuban?" Furthermore, the regional authorities spent a great deal of money on the production of a xenophobic film, *Turkish March*, which features the Meskhetians as occupiers of historically Cossack land.

Not all the stereotypes are so mild, however. Alexander Ossipov (2000: 51-4) conducted a survey of two local newspapers between 1997 and 1998, recording many accusations of crime. He gives three examples in the report, the first of which is a “rather typical” excerpt from *Kuban Segodnya* (2nd February, 2002):

> "The settlers have not been socially assimilated: two thirds of them are residing in the Krasnodar territory illegally, engaging in illegal activities. According to data from the territorial Chief Police Directorate, the districts of the Krasnodar territory which contain dense concentrations of the Meskhetian Turks have seen a sharp increase in the turnover of narcotics and weapons. Theft from fields has risen to the level of a genuine disaster. There are more horrible crimes such as murders and rapes of children and old people. The Turkish population is not contributing much to the government budget of the territory and its districts."

Here the Meskhetians are directly accused of bringing in criminal influence, bringing a “sharp increase” in drugs and arms trafficking. Note also the character of the crimes: trading contraband is mentioned twice; theft once; non-contribution once; and the more serious crimes of murder and rape are mentioned only vaguely and in passing. Four of these six “crimes” are concerned with property (contraband [2], theft, taxes) whereas only two are concerned with people (murder and rape). Moreover, the more serious accusations of murder and rape are relegated to the status of the third charge against the Meskhetians, and the most immediate charge concerns property. Therefore, it is fair to say that the Meskhetians are connected with property crimes.

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279 Listed in Moscow Helsinki Group report *Propaganda Campaigns and the Role of the Mass Media*, footnote 32, available at http://www.mhg.ru/english/1FE08C8 The newspapers are from 03rd February, 2001; 07th March, 2001; and 15th March, 2001 respectively.

Second Ossipov also recorded accusations of Meskhetian responsibility for drug trafficking, intimidation, illegal residence, and rape. Indeed, one edition of the newspaper *Kuban Segodnya* reported that “a special worry is raised by the growth in the criminality rate and its especially malicious character… they [Turks] have overtly switched to the tactics of intimidation, threats, law disobedience, and they even declare that in the near future they are going to resort to extremism and terror against the native population.” Again, the image here is of an ethnic minority which is currently committing crimes against property with an existential threat lingering in the distance. This accords exactly with what is predicted by the theory also.

Third and finally, another newspaper, *Kubanskoye Novosti*, contained two accusations. First, it repeatedly accused the Meskhetians of dealing drugs. Second, and as if to attest to Korchagin’s (2007) assessment of the situation in Southern Russia, the Meskhetians were also claimed as a security risk. The newspaper stated that “these people [Meskhetians] are often unfriendly to Russia and represent a serious threat to security in the South of our country.” One stereotype contains a vague statement about the Meskhetians committing property crimes and the other portrays them as an existential threat to the very country.

The idea that Meskhetians commit more crimes than other ethnic groups can be seen as demonstrably false when one considers the actual data concerning Meskhetian Turks in the region. In the period from January to August 1994, Meskhetians committed only 28 of the total 30,697 reported crimes in Krasnodar Krai. Further, most of the crimes with which they were charged were relatively minor, such as traffic offenses and

281 Quoted in Ossipov, A. (2000: 53)
trespassing. This point is attested to again when the Krasnodar department of information and socio-political forecasting calculated that in 1996 Meskhetian Turks only committed 0.18% of all crimes in the Krai, despite making up 0.3% of the population.\footnote{Ossipov, A. (2000: 40)} In other words, the Meskhetians actually proved themselves to be more law-abiding than members of the so-called “native” population. One could also add to this that being such a small percentage of the population Turks could not possibly be responsible for very many crimes in Krasnodar Krai as there simply are not enough of them. The Cossack charge that Meskhetians are inherently criminals may therefore be repudiated.

One may object that the lack of appropriate registration means that Meskhetians are likely to be inclined to criminal activities, because there is no other way for them to obtain money.\footnote{This, indeed, is the substance of the local concern about Meskhetians’ “unearned incomes,” where residents of the Kuban believe that the Turks must have criminal connections because they have wealth. See Ossipov, A. & Cherepova, O. (1996:60)} The Meskhetians must resort to criminal activities, the argument goes, because it would not otherwise be feasible for them to stay in the Krai. Leaving aside the fact that the very Meskhetian residence in the Krai may be considered a “crime” by some, this objection confuses cause and effect. The regional authorities refuse to register Meskhetians in the Krai because they are unwelcome, not because they are not registered there.

Turning now to the theories used to explain different forms of ethnic violence, there is substantial support for the theory of ethnic criminality. Cossacks have inflicted violence on the Meskhetians under the pretense of punishing “criminality.” The Krasnodar authorities formalized the Cossack role in policing the Meskhetians under
Resolution 220 of Krasnodar Krai, “On extraordinary measures in respect to the struggle with criminality.” Similarly, ethnographic conversations with a Cossack also revealed that he thought he was punishing the Meskhetians for their involvement with crimes. While one interview is not representative, the fact that my respondent answered in this way is itself significant.

The specific acts of which the Meskhetians are accused moreover fit with the predictions of the theory. They are met with pogrom-style violence because they are accused of committing crimes against the property of indigenous inhabitants. Further, one needs to look at what is not being said. Right from the time in which they fled to Krasnodar the Meskhetians were associated with particular criminal acts. The three articles analyzed above emphasized Turkish drug-dealing and property crimes, only belatedly giving mention of more serious physical crimes. They were not accused of acts of genocide or of control of authorities but of concrete property crimes. The nature of these “crimes,” moreover, dictated a proportionate Cossack response. The causal role of these allegations is demonstrated by a counter-factual example that follows my review of the other theories.

If there is substantial support for the hypothesis of ethnic criminality, then there is little for the economic harm hypothesis. Not only were the Meskhetians not accused of taking local jobs or of cheapening the local economy of the Krai, they are too small of a minority to have much impact on the economy. Indeed, Ossipov has suggested that one reason the Krai authorities refuse to register Turks is because they wish to maintain a flexible supply of labor for seasonal work. By denying them social services and keeping them desperate for work, the Krai authorities are actually benefitting from the presence of

the Meskhetians. It therefore makes little sense that the form of violence could be a response to the economic harm posed by this minority.

Similarly with the dehumanizing rhetoric hypothesis, there is no empirical support that either the regional authorities or the local newspapers ever described the Meskhetian Turks in this fashion. While they may have stressed the idea that the Meskhetian culture did not “fit” with the indigenous culture of the territory, this does not constitute dehumanizing rhetoric. This is all the more noticeable because human rights organizations would presumably have stressed instances of dehumanizing rhetoric, had it been used. Its absence in this case shows it cannot explain the form of violence used.

Finally, there is more support for the direct incitement hypothesis. After all, the Kuban authorities brought the Cossacks into the law enforcement mechanism and so tacitly contracted with them to go out and punish migrants. However, such a hypothesis in many ways places the trailer before the truck because for the law to be enforced there has to first have been reputed violations of that law. The Cossacks may see themselves as legitimated by the regional authorities in doing what they do but it is still the idea of punishing crime that constrains them in actually enacting that punishment. This logic of proportionality is highlighted by the case of Tabakosovkhoz farm.

Indeed, Tabakosovkhoz farm represents an interesting counter-factual that allows us to determine the causal role of stereotypes in producing different forms of ethnic violence. Consistent with the coding guidelines given in chapter 4, this mass beating at a

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286 This is the implication of Korchagin’s (in SOVA, 2007: 186) observation that the region is undergoing “securitization,” in which ethnic others are excluded from a society on allegations of being a security threat, and specifically bringing in drugs. Note that this also falls in line with the theory of ethnic criminality.
Turkish farm on November 12th 1995 is coded as a massacre.\textsuperscript{287} The Cossacks descended upon Tabakosovkhoz farm that night and flogged fifteen Meskhetian Turks there with the branches of birch trees. Apparently, this highly violent attack was in response to accusations that a Meskhetian Turk had beaten an old man and attempted to rape him.\textsuperscript{288}

Far from their “regular” patrols of Meskhetians which operated on the understanding that the Turks were not a physical threat to the inhabitants of the Kuban, here the Cossacks at Tabakosovkhoz understood the Turks to have committed a major violation against the very person of a native. The threat was both immediate and physical. The proportionate response, like meeting fire with fire, was for them to ensure such a thing would result in immediate and collective consequences for the Meskhetian Turks. In beating the Turks at this farmstead, then, the Cossacks enacted this punishment. While this event might have posed a problem for the theory because it was coded as a massacre and not a pogrom, then, this case in fact argues in favor of it. It is not only skinheads who are guided in their choice of violent attack by the logic of proportionality, but also Cossacks.

This case study demonstrates that The Theory of Ethnic Criminality also holds true in the case of the Meskhetian Turks of Krasnodar Krai. The Cossacks not only persecuted (and for an unfortunate few, continue to persecute) the Meskhetians because they perceived them as responsible for crime but this also drove the form of their response as well. Cossacks tried to make the Meskhetians leave the Krai because they understood them to commit “offenses” against property. The one time that Meskhetians

\textsuperscript{287} It was focused on 3 or more targets and against their actual bodies, as opposed to their property. See Ossipov, A. & Cherepova, O. for more about the attack (1996:69)

\textsuperscript{288} Conversely, a different news article reported on November 18th that the violence had been motivated by an Turkish attempt to rape both a pensioner and a young girl. In any case, this addition in fact bolsters, rather than detracts from, my argument.
were reported to target people, the Cossacks took more extreme action. This case thus suggests that the Theory of Ethnic Criminality does have general applicability beyond the skinhead case. The next section asks whether it also holds true of Russian state actions against Georgians in 2006.

Section 6.3 The “anti-Georgian campaign” of 2006

In the summer of 2008, under the cover of Olympics in China, the Russian Federation went to war against the tiny North Caucasus republic of Georgia. The origins of conflict there had been building up over a long time. This event had been preceded by numerous hostile actions between Russia and Georgia, the most serious of which was the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006 where Russian police purged Georgians from Russian society. The victims were not solely refugees from the Georgian conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also ethnic Georgian Russian citizens who had lived in that country for many years. This shows the police campaign to have not just been business as usual, but ethnically motivated. This section evaluates the theories against the evidence from that campaign.

Georgia is a mainly agricultural republic of the North Caucasus. A mountainous republic, it is populated by Christians and is important strategically for the Baku-Tbli-
Batumi gas pipeline that runs from the Caspian Sea across its territory. Its exact position is shown in figure 6.4. A part of the Soviet Union until 1991 when it voted for independence, Georgia has been plagued by the same ethnic conflicts which have beset that region of the world. In particular, it has two ethnic enclaves- Abkhazia and South Ossetia- that erupted in violence in 1992 and 1991 respectively. The Russian army claimed a peacekeeping role there up until and through the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006.

![Figure 6.4: Georgia and breakaway regions](image)

Since declaring independence in 1991, Georgia was ruled by Zviad Gamsakhudia until 1992 after which Mikhail Gorbachev’s Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze took over. However, Shevardnadze’s rule saw gross corruption and incompetent mismanagement which antagonized the Georgian citizenry. It was no surprise, therefore, that in November 2003 protestors called for Shevardnadze to hold elections. Armed only with flowers, the protestors forced democracy on the authorities in a

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290 From [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1102477.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1102477.stm)

transition that became known as the “rose revolution.” The resulting elections were
won by the champion of the crowd, Mikhail Saakashvili (popularly known as “Misha.”)

The new president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, plotted a distinctly pro-Western course in foreign policy which frustrated Moscow. Two declarations specifically antagonized the Kremlin. First, Saakashvili declared ambitions to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia and rein in the breakaway regions under the de facto of Moscow. Second, Saakashvili declared a desire to integrate the country into such Western international structures as NATO and the EU. Georgia’s membership in these organizations threatened a loss of Kremlin influence.

Russia responded with a number of measures designed to punish the republic: the state-controlled gas monopoly Gazprom imposed higher fuel costs on Georgia nearly doubling the cost of natural gas; Russia launched a boycott of Georgian wine and mineral water on grounds of supposed health and safety violations; and Russia launched an ethnic purge of Georgians throughout its territory. The excuse for this purge came in October 2006 after Georgia arrested several Russian officers on charges of spying. The Kremlin responded by ordering the Russian police to purge ethnic Georgians from Russia using methods of direct expulsion, arbitrary detention, and the persecution of Georgian businesses.

Acting under the orders of the Kremlin, local governments ordered police to prosecute Georgians living in Russia. For example, order 0215 of the St. Petersburg

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292 See, for instance, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4532539.stm
293 The Russian online daily also reported that these officers had allegedly been involved in a terrorist attack in the city of Gori in 2005 and bombing the Liakhvi and Karti-2 power lines in 2004. See the article “The West at the Gates” in the October 2006 edition of Kommersant available at http://www.kommersant.com/doc.asp?id=709217 It should be said that I have yet to see independent confirmation of these activities.
Department of Internal Affairs (GUVD) ordered the police to “conduct large-scale operations to detect and deport a maximum number of citizens of Georgia illegally residing in the territory of Russia.” In total, Russian courts issued expulsion orders against more than 4,600 Georgians with 2,300 being forcibly expelled. A further 2,000 Georgians left Russia by their own means. While these actions cannot be described as pogrom in the same sense as unorganized violence, police actions can still be interpreted to induce or force the Georgians to leave the territory and so fall under the same category as pogrom.

A similar message comes from the detention of Georgians. Some Georgians were incarcerated in detention centers where conditions were horrific. The Memorial Human Rights center offers the example of a Georgian man who was detained in a cell with three other people, no furniture and food only once every three days. Detainees were denied medical treatment and fresh air and were forced to drink from the toilet. By interning people in such camps, the Russian authorities excluded them from civilized society and sent a message that they were not welcome. If this was not an actual pogrom, then it had many similarities.

A more classic case of pogrom comes from the Russian harassment and closure of Georgian business. Throughout the country, police raided restaurants and casinos

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296 See the Memorial Human Rights Center Report “On anti-Georgian campaign launched on the territory of Russia” available at www.ihf-hr.org/viewbinary/viewdocument.php?doc_id=7152
298 Daniel Goldhagen (1996: 172) makes this argument in relation to the Nazi concentration camps which clearly removed the Jews from German society, although not from the Reich.
looking for minor legal violations in order to force their closure.\footnote{See the Guardian article “Kremlin targets Georgians after spy row” available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,1887815,00.html} Human Rights Watch reports that in this time 5,700 businesses were inspected and 58 closed. While the number of those closed is small in relation to those inspected, the fact that so many were inspected is itself significant and marks a selective enforcement of the law. One restaurant owner who returned to Georgia after his business closed told Human Rights Watch said that “they didn’t have the right to deport me… [but I felt that] they forced me to leave.” Once again, actions of the Russian police sent the message of pogrom to the Georgians.

In order to discover what the role of the media was during this time, I reviewed a random selection of the three most popular newspapers in Russia (Argument I Fakty, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Moskovsky Komsomlets- see chapter 5, section 5 for reading figures) between the 27\textsuperscript{th} of September and the 14\textsuperscript{th} of October, 2006. The first date marks the “official” beginning of the crisis when the officers were arrested and the latter a week after the Duma ratified a treaty bringing their officers home. Newspapers are an excellent source of spotting propaganda so close to the point of the mobilization of society because television programs take a much longer time to produce than articles. Criminal accusations that “justified” the actions of the Moscow police are thus more likely to be present here than on the television.

I used the Eastview newspaper service to gain internet copies of all articles written between these dates. I looked at a total of 297 articles, amounting to 131742 words. I used the entirety of the 11\textsuperscript{th} October edition of the weekly ‘Argument I Fakty,’ (110 articles) and every 10\textsuperscript{th} article in the dailies ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ and
‘Moskovsky Komsomlets’ (84 and 103 articles respectively). Of these 297 articles, 23 were concerned with Georgia (10690 words), 11 of which reported the conflict in Georgia and the ongoing process of the spy scandal. The remaining 12 articles (6796 words) made specific accusations of criminal behavior of people of Georgian ethnicity in Russia.

In ‘Argument I Fakty,’ articles spoke of the following crimes of Georgians: illegal immigrants, gaming mafias, illegal vegetable markets, tax evasion, administrative corruption, physical assault, robbery, extortion, street fighting, organized crime, and smuggling. One article commented on the situation that “we do not want war, we want order!” Another claimed that “In past issues of the newspaper, we investigated the crimes of criminal ethnic groups in Moscow. Today [surprise!] we continue that theme with regard to Georgians. Official data shows that only 1 billion dollars is transferred between Russia and Georgia… [but] experts agree that more than 10 times this amount has gone through ‘black’ channels.” The image which accompanied this article is presented in figure 6.5. There were also 2 times where Georgians were accused of taking jobs in both the construction and in the markets. In one newspaper, then, the Georgians were accused of 11 different crimes. Nine of these were concerned with property and the other two with people.

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300 See the article “Za Schto pogubla Anna Politkovskaya” of ‘Argument I Fakty’ for 11th October, 2006.
301 See the article “Kazino pazgryzhili” of ‘Argument I Fakty’ for 11th October, 2006.
The stereotypes used to describe Georgians in ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ and ‘Moskovsky Komsomlets’ were similar to those seen in ‘Argument I Fakty,’ although they were less frequent. For ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda,’ 5 of the 84 articles (5.95%) I read contained accusations against Georgian people. These accused Georgians of taking Russian money, stealing, and orchestrating mafia activities in Russia. There were also *ad hominem* attacks against Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili which accused him of being bullied at school and, alternately, losing his sex drive. Other articles mentioned the USA as responsible for funding the Georgian regime and providing her with the confidence to act in the manner she did. ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda,’ then clearly supported the stereotypes present in previous publications.

Conversely, articles containing accusations against Georgian people were relatively scarce in ‘Moskovsky Komsomlets.’ Of a total of 103 articles in the sample, only 2 contained claims against actual Georgian people. First, there was a joke which

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302 See the article “Kazino pazgryzihili” of ‘Argument I Fakty’ for 11th October, 2006.
claimed that in retaliation for the arrest of Russian spies in Tblisi Moscow police would arrest “Georgian spies in the Chernymuskhy market.” This article came before the response of the Russian state had begun in earnest. The fact that newspapers could make jokes of such a nature concerning the likely response of the Russian government suggests the extent to which this had become a predictable “common-sense” understanding of the contemporary political situation. The second instance of stereotype reported that the “police operation ‘roses’ had arrested the most offensive gangsters from the Georgian organized crime scene,” substantiated by the police seizure of stolen goods and drugs.

Although less frequent, the substance of stereotypes was similar to those seen in previous publications. Which of our theories best explains these facts?

Hypothesis I argued that perpetrators would project responsibility for their actions onto the persecuted. This is exactly how the media represented ethnic Georgians in September-October 2006. Georgians were consistently represented as being involved in nefarious activities and constantly linked to the idea of an illegal presence in Russia society. Moreover, the crimes of which they were accused meant the police response to the threat they posed was proportionate. The media emphasized certain crimes that Georgians supposedly committed: being mafia bosses, thieves, swindlers, and ingrates. While there were also accusations of more serious criminality (murder, rape), these were infrequent. The onus of the articles was thus on Georgian violations of ethnic Russian property and so I find strong support for the Theory of Ethnic Criminality.

303 See the article “Anekdoti. Gorchaya Pyaterka anekdotov MK” in the edition of ‘Moskovsky Komsomlets’ for 29th September, 2006

304 See the article “Sprochno V Nomer! Na Granuze Boodet ‘Odno Okno’” in the edition of ‘Moskovsky Komsomlets’ for 13th October, 2006. The particular irony (probably deliberate) in the name of the police operation “roses” refers to the Georgian ‘rose revolution’ which brought Saakashvili to power.
Hypothesis II suggested that the economic harm caused by the presence of the ethnic minority related to different forms of violence. This hypothesis finds little support in the data from the newspapers. Although newspapers cried out against the Georgian presence in the markets, their complaint was based on a comprehension of criminality and not economics. Only one article\textsuperscript{305} reported an explicitly economic complaint - that the Russian health ministry would add juice from Georgia to the list of banned items (mineral water, wine)- in contrast to the large number of criminal accusations. Also supporting this evaluation is the fact that the number of Georgians in Russia- 100’000 by estimates before the campaign- is far too small (in a total population of 140 million) to cause significant harm. Therefore, I find that there is little support for hypothesis II in the case of the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006.

Similarly, the ‘dehumanizing rhetoric’ hypothesis III is also not supported by the facts. At no point in the reports I read was there ever mention of Georgians being depicted as subhuman. Such accusations would have been particularly salient in newspaper reports from this time, but were not present. Again, some might retort that to depict ethnic others as irremediably criminal is to dehumanize them. I respond to such an objection that there are many ways to dehumanize others of which the idiom of criminality is but one. If dehumanization explained the actions taken by the Moscow police, then we would expect to see different styles of dehumanization and not just the criminal one. For these reasons, I find little support for hypothesis III.

Finally, there is significant support for the direct incitement hypothesis. Newspapers reported that the Moscow police were, after all, operating on orders from the

\textsuperscript{305} See the article “Non-Stop. Rossiyanii schitayoot Moskvichey Cnobamii” in ‘Moskovsky Komsomlets’ for the 09th October, 206
government to persecute ethnic Georgians. The “real” cause of their actions must thus be the objectives of the government which led them to issue this instruction. However, this hypothesis does not explain the facts as thoroughly as does the theory of ethnic criminality. If direct orders were all that was needed, why did the government bother with a propaganda campaign that would provide further ammunition to Human Rights critics and bring condemnation? Furthermore, members of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) volunteered to help the police in response to the propaganda campaign and checked immigration papers of ethnic Georgians. As there was no call to rally volunteers in the cause, we may infer that these people offered their services in response to accusations of criminality, not direct incitement.

The anti-Georgian campaign of 2006 thus provides further support for the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. Further, the last point provides insights into how these stereotypes led to these police pogroms. While needing some degree of public legitimacy for their actions, the police did not want the situation getting out of hand as may have happened if other stereotypes were used.\(^\text{306}\) The need for police legitimacy in these actions can be seen in the “I am a Georgian” campaign run by the radio station Echo Moskvy in response to the ethnic discrimination of the police. The radio station tried to orchestrate mass public protest against government persecution to force it to stop by asking listeners to wear badges in sympathy with the local Georgian population. This campaign failed. If

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\(^{306}\) Indeed, the threat of vigilante violence forced a number of Georgian businesses to close for this time. See the Kommersant article “Georgian Businesses Closing Down” for October 7th 2006 (available at http://www.kommersant.com/archive.asp) reports restaurant owner David Kakachia as giving the following reason for his restaurant’s closure: “We do not want people in masks running in and putting everyone face down on the floor. We’ll reopen when the aggravation of the political situation between Russia and Georgia is over, when mass ethnic persecutions of Georgians are over.” If a restaurateur in Moscow closed the restaurant (and so lost money) because he thought violence was likely then he must have been conscious of the possibility of this violence. Part of the reason it did not materialize was because the government needed to control the situation.
the police had simply deported Georgians without nominal justification, then the public objection would probably have been greater. The crimes of which ethnic Georgians were accused created a sort of legitimacy for police actions.

Further, the non-appearance of mass ethnic violence is of itself noteworthy. There were no street combats, riots, physical persecutions, or massacres of ethnic Georgians. Indeed, from the beginning of the crisis to the end of October, there was only one instance of skinhead violence against Georgians. By accusing Georgians of property crimes and having the police actively punish them, the Russian government prevented direct action on the part of Russians. One might object that the government could only accuse the Georgians of crimes for which there was actual evidence and that there was no evidence of murders. The example of Georgy Giorgadze serves to undermine this objection, however. Despite being under suspicion of killing elderly Muscovites, Giorgadze was arrested for possession of drugs and robberies. Even though the aim of the government was to engender public antipathy to Georgians, they stressed a less severe crime than one which would generate greater public dislike. Why? The theory of ethnic criminality explains this by suggesting that the government wanted to maintain control of the public reaction and feared the reaction that might come from accusations that Georgians were involved in physical crimes against people. Greater

307 Neo-Nazis were “implicated” in the murder of Georgian athlete Gia Gvichini on October 4th. The only other instance of skinhead violence against Georgians happened on October 21st when they attacked the work of Georgian artist Alexander Gjiki (see the stories “One Georgian Detainee Dies, ‘Inhuman’ Treatment Charged” and “Moscow Skinheads Attack Art Gallery” in Bigotry Monitor 2006: 36 and 37 respectively). The fact that there was not more personal violence at this time suggests both that the Russian public saw the police response to the accusations as proportionate and that the accusations themselves were not that inflammatory.

308 See the article “Russia is Generously Making New Laws for Georgians” in the October 4th edition of Kommersant (available at http://www.kommersant.com/archive.asp)
purported crimes would lead to calls for more severe punishment and the threat of public disorder.

In asking what role stereotypes of criminality played in the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006, therefore, one can point to the way in which they legitimated police actions and made them seem proportional to the crime committed. They were thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for police violence against Georgians. Stereotypes made antipathy to Georgians socially acceptable and mobilized society against citizens of the former Soviet republic. Yet these did not risk overly demonstrative displays of violence, by allowing the police to carry out deportations and slake the public thirst for punishment.

A more worrying conclusion from this case study is that the Russian government is clearly manipulating society to support its own agenda. This repeats the conclusion of section 5 from chapter 5. While the newspapers are nominally independent in Russia, the speed at which stories of Georgian criminality appeared in the newspapers suggest the hand of the Kremlin in ordering the news agenda at this time. Of course, there is no direct proof of this pattern of events but seems a likely conclusion given the weight of evidence against Putin’s Russia. The system that Putin created in Russia means it may be already too late for pundits to speak of ‘Weimar Russia.’

Returning to the focus of this case study, the evidence from the anti-Georgian campaign suggests that the theory of ethnic criminality once again performs better than in its rivals in explaining the form of ethnic violence. The Russian government needed public support for its actions but did not want to provoke excessive responses. By accusing Georgians of imminent property crimes they made the actions of the police
seem proportionate and also controlled the level of violence against Georgians. Of course, the government did not need to provoke public support for its actions, but its absence would have increased the costs of those actions. Even in this hardest case, then, the theory of ethnic criminality again shows its contribution to explaining why there are different forms of ethnic violence.

6.4 Conclusion

These two case studies- the Meskhetian Turks of Krasnodar Krai and the anti-Georgian campaign by the Russian government in 2006- again validate the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. Both the Cossacks and the police understood themselves as punishing particular crimes with a proportionate response to the magnitude of the threat posed. As long as the threat remained solely at the level of property crime, no physical violence was warranted. However, when threats became more imposing they warranted a stronger response. This was the motivation for the “Massacre” at the Tabakovskhoz farm and conversely, the reason why the Russian government showed constraint in the crimes of which they accused Georgians.

Moreover, these two case studies demonstrate that the theory has wider applicability than just skinheads and neo-Nazis. It also extends, at a minimum, to Cossacks and to the Russian police in the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006. While the Cossacks, as “native Russian neo-Nazis” constitute a relatively soft (or easy) test for the theory, the Russian police may be considered a much harder test for it is not even clear that the government needed to invoke stereotypes in order to achieve what it did. That
they did testifies to the theory’s wider applicability. This research also suggests two possible ways in which the project could be extended in the future. First, looking at regions in Russia where the Meskhetians are not subject to discrimination or violence and comparing them with Krasnodar would provide a useful gauge of the power of stereotypes. Second, having established the theory’s validity in Russia it should be applied to a non-Russian case. Both projects, however, remains a task for another time as the next and final chapter of this research project concludes the research into the different forms of ethnic violence.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this document I have argued that the systematic element we see in skinhead patterns of violence toward various ethnic minorities can be accounted for by the nature of the crimes for which they hold a minority responsible. Stereotypes of ethnic minorities committing crimes are a necessary condition for certain forms of violence which constrain actors into delivering a proportionate and justified response. I provided a content analysis of neo-Nazi literature which demonstrated the relation of these minorities to “crimes.” I also provided qualitative evidence showing that the skinheads themselves reasoned in this way: the ‘punishment’ meted out to each group was proportionate to the “crime” they had supposedly committed.

The practical import of this finding is twofold. On the one hand, peacekeepers and opponents of ethnic violence now have a tool to help them prepare for ethnic violence. If we know where the hammer will fall the hardest, then we may at least position the anvil so that it may break it. On the other hand, there are many implications for preventing ethnic violence also. Not only does this research lead the way into uncovering exactly how language motivates conflict, but it also provides justifications to curtail freedom of speech. Baseless accusations and general stereotypes in the media can be seen to promote conflict and not lessen its likelihood. This chapter concludes the argument and probes into the possibility of future research projects.
Section 7.2 re-capitulates what was discovered in each chapter and how we came to be where we are. Section 7.3 provides specific insights as they relate to the Russian Federation and raises the possibility of future research projects concerning that country. In section 7.4 I ask what the dissertation has added to ethnic conflict theory and where this leaves the debate. Here too, I identify future research possibilities. Before this, however, I re-capitulate on the structure and findings of the research in a summary of the chapters.

### 7.2 Summary of the argument

Skinheads in the Russian Federation use different forms of violence because they hold different ethnic groups responsible for different crimes. The character of the crime predicts the form of punishment which will be used. Chapter one started this argument by offering a typology of forms of ethnic violence. The central insight here was that violence could be seen as a way of sending messages to the group one has attacked, although assuredly it also does other things as well. Conceiving of violence in this manner meant different violence acts were fundamentally comparable and opened the way for the question of “why are there different acts of ethnic violence?” which I narrowed down to the Russian case to ask why skinheads use different forms of ethnic violence.

Chapter two then gave a review of the state of the literature to see where such a question would fit in and whether existing theories might imply solutions to such a question. In that place, I noted that this question has been hitherto ignored by theorists of
ethnic violence. The assumption has been that the form is unimportant compared to the actual occurrence of violence itself. I took hypotheses from the literature where it made sense to do so and focused especially on the theory of Donald Horowitz (2001) in explaining the deadly ethnic riot.

Horowitz noted that in Indian riots perpetrators project responsibility for their actions onto their future victims. Chapter three developed this insight and postulated the Theory of Ethnic Criminality. This theory stipulated that skinheads conceived of their violence as a proportionate response to the “crimes” supposedly committed by ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation. Skinheads psychologically projected their own intentions onto others, a phenomenon which theorists agree is a noted attribute of fascism.

Chapter four tested this argument against its competitors by looking for indicators of particular forms of violence in a database I constructed from weekly human rights reports. The quantitative data clearly suggested the veracity of the theory of ethnic criminality. Forms of violence clustered around particular ethnic groups. The chapter then used qualitative assessment of the violence to show that this correlation was not simply a product of the way in which these ethnic groups lived or the opportunity to attack them. There was, rather, a greater element of volition involved in the skinhead choice of a form of violence.

This led to another test of the theory and its competitors in chapter five with a content analysis of skinhead literature. My sample of this literature included both paper and web-based materials. The propaganda of the extreme right in Russia showed that ethnic minorities were most frequently reported as involved in crime rather than as
economic competitors, sub-humans, or objects for later violence. Furthermore, the particular crimes with which they were associated were exactly those predicted by the theory. This correlation was further supported by qualitative interviews with skinheads, conducted mostly over the internet. The web-as-medium made it viable to contact these people without jeopardizing the security of the researcher. Neo-Nazis in Russia retaliate to what they believe to be credible reports of the others’ criminality with proportionate violence.

Nor does this theory promise its validity solely in the case of Russian skinheads. Chapter six provided case studies of both Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai and the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006 which showed that stereotypes were instrumental both to Cossack and police violence. While not a systematic consideration of the different situations under which ethnic violence may occur, we nevertheless may conclude that the theory promises to hold true in situations other than that of the skinheads. Stereotypes and rumors of ethnic “others” involved in “criminal acts” orchestrate the violent response that follows.

It is important to consider what is not being said in this theory. I make no claims about the cause of violence *per se*, but rather about accounting for the particular patterns and regularities we see within violence. Stereotypes may a necessary condition for violence, but I do not presume to claim sufficiency. I further make no claims that these stereotypes are deployed with the intention of promoting violence, as if controlled by a homunculus perched on top of the collective Russian brain, but simply that they account for the different forms of violence skinheads use in that country against various ethnic
others. The next section inquires specifically into the conclusions of this research regarding Russia.

7.3 Conclusions concerning Russia

Russia was the country used to substantiate this research and test theories designed to expand our knowledge of what causes different forms of ethnic violence. It was not the only country I could have used and should not be the last (see next section). Nonetheless, there are specific findings about Russia which may be of interest to future scholars and questions that may prompt future research. This section enumerates three findings from the research concerning the skinhead movement: the debate between nationalism and fascism, foreign policy, and the role of elite manipulation.

First, Russia has joined the modern world. The socialist ideology through which the Soviet Union legitimated its existence is dead. The Russian ideology is now wholeheartedly nationalism. However, which kind of nationalism has emerged as an ideological basis for the modern Russian state is at question. Is it the healthy “good” or “civic” kind or “bad” “ethnic” kind?309 The division between the two types is the question of origin of national identity. On the one hand, the “civic” conception of nationality (jus soli) is given to people based on their place of birth or assimilation. On the other, the “ethnic” conception of nationality (jus sanguinus) is quasi-racial, viewing nations as extensions of families or tribes and an inherent characteristic of mankind. When emerging from Communism, Yeltsin’s Russia tried to found the new state on a

309 For a competent review of the distinction between these two kinds, see Ozkirimli, U. (2005: 22-26). Greenfeld (1992) offers a more complex account of this original distinction as to whether nationalisms are individualist or collectivist, but the basis remains the same.
civic conception of nationality but the evidence from this project implies that the traditional ethnic conception of nationalism is proving victorious under Putin and Medvedev. This is highly dangerous in a country with as many indigenous ethnic groups (“nationalities”) as the Russian Federation.

Indeed, the power and strength of the neo-Nazi and nationalist movements in Russia share similarities with other former empires which became nation-states. Germany after the First World War suffered a number of revisionist groups which sought to recover the lost grandeur of the state, most notably the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP: Nazi.) Britain in the era of decolonization also witnessed a “nativist” movement in the form of neo-Nazis protesting against what they saw as reverse colonization. So far, the evidence suggests that Russia is following this trajectory exactly and the skinhead movement there is what we might expect following the end of the “Russian empire” (Soviet Union).

It remains a question for future research why people join these extremist groups in the first place and one which may be profitably studied through comparison between skinhead groups in different countries. Similarly, future research might ask the similarity- or difference- of these racist extremist groups to other extremists throughout the world, most notably Islamic fundamentalists. It may be that angry young men join these movements, but understanding why they do so is an important project for preventing their future emergence.

What can be said is that the mood in Russia is dangerously close to fascism. Not in the sense that a skinhead coup is imminent, but in that parliamentary forces have already voiced xenophobic concerns. A particular worry is that the regime may try to co-
opt elements of this xenophobia in a bid to bolster its own legitimacy. Furthermore, homegrown fascist movements such as Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia may pressure the government to adopt more stridently nationalist policies. Research into when the Russian government began extolling these stereotypes may provide some useful insights into their ultimate purpose in doing so.

Russia’s foreign policy is already starting to reflect these priorities. A recent example comes from the brief conflict with Georgia in 2008. According to reports, the war started because Georgia attacked Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia. The Russian response was completely disproportionate and the subsequent invasion came close to the Georgian capital Tblisi. This Russians tried to justify their response through accusing the Georgians of committing genocide against Russian citizens in the invasion.\footnote{See the BBC monitoring article “Russian chief investigator accuses Georgia of genocide.” Available on Dr. Johnson’s Russia List (http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/default.cfm, article #23, edition #158). While Western news agencies have reported some civilian fatalities, it seems to be rather over-stating the case to denounce this as “genocide.”} This discovery of the “ethnic prerogative” by Russia may provide a new weapon in her arsenal for international conflict. Russia’s foreign policy agenda will increasingly hold the principle of protection of co-ethnic as its basis.

Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the government played a more active role than this in the mobilization of fascist groups, although this is not conclusive. Vladimir Pribolovsky of the anti-fascist Panorama institute and Professor Vladimir Shlapentokh of Michigan State University have both alleged that the government is behind the growth in ethnic tensions.\footnote{Pribolovsky alleged this to me in a meeting in 2006. For Shlapentokh’s opinion, see his article in World Affairs (2007: 3: 138-140)} Specifically, Pribolovsky claimed that Dmitrii Demushkin’s organization \textit{Slavic Union} was funded by the Federal government who enlisted him as an
agent provocateur. Finally, Pribolovsky alleges that the government has mobilized its citizenry around principles of ethnicity in order to create its own constituency. This was the pattern of ethnic relations seen in Krasnodar Krai where governors Kondratenko and Tkachyev have sought to indigenize the Cossacks and so render legitimate their own dictatorial fiefdoms. Future research could substantiate these claims and uncover the purpose of this ethnic discord.

Similarly, an important (if dangerous) question is exactly what role the Russian government has played in the constitution of these movements and what this portends for the future of democracy in that country. It would be particularly interesting to compare the ways in which the Russian state has manipulated society so as to provide support for its agenda to the way this has been done in other countries. This would enable us to see if this phenomenon is peculiar to Russia or whether it is a feature of democratizing former empires more generally. These three points provide a synopsis of the major findings concerning Russia. The next section asks how this research affects the literature on ethnic conflict.

7.4 The State of Ethnic Conflict Studies

The literature on ethnic conflict has increased markedly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conflicts sparked by this event. Theories arose to portray ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia as a result of elite manipulation and in so-called “primordial” hatreds between “eternally opposed” enemy groups. However, a relative stability has fallen over the geopolitics of the region since the end of the wars in
Yugoslavia and so less attention paid to the study of ethnic conflict. My research makes an important contribution to the field of ethnic conflict studies in three areas: first, illuminating the process of ethnic violence; second, it has given us a language with which to talk about ethnic violence; third, the centrality of perpetrators’ beliefs to ethnic violence; and fourth, the “ethnicity” of “ethnic conflict.”

First, the project has illuminated the fact that there are different forms of ethnic violence because different groups are accused of varying crimes. This suggests that there is a similar process to different forms of ethnic violence. The skinheads perceived of themselves as achieving justice for what they saw as crimes against their ethnic group. This was not just any old kind of retaliation, but retaliation proportionate to the magnitude of the supposed “offense.” While crimes are a particularly apt way to mediate negatively relationships between groups, I do not imagine that they are the only way. One might conceive of a hierarchy communicated through the labor associated with members of the lowest group. Similarly, I would be surprised if these accusations of involvement in criminal acts were not reflective and productive of an ethnic hierarchy within a particular society.

This suggests that one way in which politicians or other authorities in society may provoke ethnic conflict is through the metaphor of criminality. As made clear in the Literature Review, all too often the idea that elites can promote conflict is treated as an assumption and the manner in which they do is not identified. This research suggests that the language of criminality is one which may be used to provoke violence. Accusing ethnic others of participation in crimes against the dominant ethnic group may stir up a reaction from vigilantes who seek to right what they see as wrongs inflicted upon them.
It would be an interesting future research project to see how far this usage of the metaphor travels and whether, in fact, there are other ways in which the pecking order in a society makes itself known. Such, however, remains a project for another time.

Second, an important contribution of this project has been the introduction of a language with which to talk about “ethnic conflict.” This brings into the foreground that which was always silently acknowledged: the beast has always been a chimera. Having a more nuanced language with which to describe situations of “ethnic conflict” may prove fruitful in future research as it allows researchers to compare similar and not different events. It also allows us to see what political situations are liable to produce particular kinds of conflict and thus, how our intervention efforts might be more efficiently deployed.

Similarly on this line of thought, the project promises to reveal whether conflicts start out as ethnic or whether they become ethnic through processes of political and social interpretation. Indeed, an unspoken but theoretically plausible insight which underlies the dissertation is that ethnic difference has neither always been so salient nor so negative a category in Russia. Understanding how it came to be this way out of the wreckage of Soviet class universalism promises to tell us important things not only about the situation in the Russian federation but also in our own societies and why we today hold ethnicity to be such an important form of identification. That, however, is a project for another time.

A third contribution this project makes to the ethnic violence literature is to bring belief back into explanations. Many existing theories either operate at too high a level of abstraction to include a role for perpetrators beliefs or treat them as a straw man which hides the “real” nature of ethnic conflict. Such is almost a charge of Marxian false
consciousness that treats perpetrators’ beliefs as incidental. Conversely, this project suggests a need to put the motives of the perpetrators front and foremost in our explanations of ethnic violence. People do not simply react to state breakdown through attacking ethnic minorities, but their socially-influenced beliefs concerning ethnic others are important too. This suggests that such negative valuations of ethnic minorities are vital components of the process of “ethnic violence” to such an extent that negative conceptions of ethnic minorities may be a sufficient condition of ethnic violence.

Contrary to current liberal dogma, therefore, democratizing societies may be best served by censorship of adverse opinions. Acknowledging this will be a bitter pill for advocates of free speech no matter what the conditions of the society. However, the risk of divisiveness and the construction of a narrative of victimization in democratizing states mean that such advocates have to choose between a stable democracy after a period of semi-authoritarianism or an unstable democracy that may lapse into total authoritarianism.

The final contribution of this project is that there is nothing pre-eminently ‘ethnic’ about ‘ethnic conflict.’ This may sound like a contradiction given the focus of the research, but what is meant is that there is nothing in principle which makes ethnic violence sui generis. Perpetrators of ethnic violence are reacting to stereotypes which just so happen to be about ethnic groups and not ethnicity itself. These stereotypes could be about any particular group in society (which helps explain why the class conflict in the French revolution and throughout nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe was so savage), but in our world for the most part they concern ethnic groups.
Of course, one will immediately object that ethnicity is such an immutable characteristic, at least in our world. One might say that “because cultural identity casts itself in the blood and guts of experience, it has the capacity to incite in people emotions stronger than class.”\textsuperscript{312} I rather suspect that this is because modern Western discourse exalts ethnicity and not class or other social grouping as the truest reality, but this remains a topic for a future research project. In this regard, Russia is an especially interesting case as one which struggles to re-conceptualize itself as an ethnically homogeneous nation-state and not as a pan-ethnic class-based empire. Future research might illuminate more clearly exactly how discourses become centered on ethnicity, and not on some other characteristic of people.

This section has shown four ways in which the current research project has contributed to the literature on ethnic conflict. First, it demonstrated the ability of language to motivate or cause conflict. The research showed that certain linguistic descriptions correspond to certain kinds of violence, which illustrates how language can be used to mobilize ethnic antagonisms. Second, the focus of this dissertation gave us a new vocabulary with which to talk about “ethnic conflict.” Third, it called for restoring the role of perpetrators’ beliefs to any understanding of “ethnic violence.” Fourth and finally, I argued that there is nothing especially ethnic about ethnic conflict but that under conditions of stereotype non-ethnic groups could also come to feel intense loathing for one another. Such loathing is, of course, not what we wish to see develop in the world, but preventing this is a project for another time.

\textsuperscript{312} Jusdanis, G. (2001:187)
This project started out as an attempt to show the importance of culturally held beliefs to ethnic conflict and became an inquiry into the means by which ethnic violence is provoked. In the course of this research I have frequently felt overwhelmed and horrified by news reports of violence and through talking to those who perpetrated it. Such encounters, however, only served to convince me of the importance of increasing our understanding of the causes of ethnic violence. I have provided evidence both qualitative and quantitative which suggests the importance of culturally shared beliefs to ethnic conflict and shown specific causes leading to specific consequences. The result is an explanation of ethnic violence which increase our understanding of just how-and why-human beings commit such horrendous acts of violence on one another. It will achieve more than I ever hoped if it helps prevent future incidents of ethnic violence.
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Appendix: Content Analyses Sources

The dissertation contains four separate databases, three of which are content analyses. Listing those sources used in constructing the databases would not be productive. Therefore, appendix A provides readers with a list of sources and methodologies used in making each one. Where articles have been directly referred to or cited, they are listed in the bibliography.

Skinhead violence:

Skinhead and Extremist Content Analysis:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date of Access</th>
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<td>All Available</td>
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<tr>
<td>National-Socialist Front Website</td>
<td>25th April, 2008</td>
<td>Articles chosen at random</td>
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<td>Combat-18 Website</td>
<td>25th April, 2008</td>
<td>News chosen for representative sample of months</td>
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<td>Brangolf Website</td>
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<td>News and most popular articles</td>
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<td>Zavtra (Tomorrow)</td>
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List of sources:

“Athenei” (Moskva: No. 5)
“Athenei” (Moskva: No. 8)
“Nash Vzglyad- molodeznii patrioticheskii zhurnal” (Moskva: 23rd February, 2007)
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Russkii Nazional Edinstva website- list of sources available from author upon request available at http://www.rne.org/stat/pub003.shtml or from the author upon request, (accessed 25th April, 2008)
United Slavic National Socialist Forum website news and blogs- list of sources available from author upon request available at http://www.slavnazi.com/ (accessed 25th April, 2008) or from author upon request
Zavtra (2003: 17)
Mass Media Content Analysis:

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<td>Komsomolskaya Pravda,</td>
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<td>Moskovkiy Komsomlets</td>
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<td>Television Programs</td>
<td>University College London: Documentaries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vesti (Channel-1)</td>
<td>longest program available for a day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Listing of sources:


RTR-Planeta, *Frontovoe Kino. Neprivychnyi vzgliad* (2004), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
RTR-Planeta, *Perezhit’ Tirana. Faust XX veka* (2004), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
RTR-Planeta Aleksei Mares’ev. Sud’ba nastoiaschego cheloveka (2005), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Russkiaa Palestina (2000), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Il-2 Istoria Zhnizni (2002), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Semestvo “Iakov” (2002), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Vse Vertovy (2002), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Dziga I ego brat’ia (2002), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Genii I zlodei ukhodiaschei epokhi. Andrei Tupolev (2003), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Tainaia liubov’ vozhdia (2003), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Liubovnye Istorii- Irina Lobacheva I Il’ia Averbukh (2003), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Kogda vernetsia moia Chechnia? (2003), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Genii I zlodei ukhodiaschei epokhi. Lion Feikhtvanger (2003), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Karateli (2004), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Doping. Lovushka dlia chempionov (2004), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Genii I zlodei ukhodiaschei epokhi. Ivan Pavlov (2004), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Genii I zlodei ukhodiaschei epokhi. Nadezhda Krupskaia (2005) UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Russki Plen (2005), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Genii I zlodei ukhodiaschei epokhi. Tsiokovskii. Predchuvstvie kosmosa (2005), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1 Artem Borovik. Poselednii polet (2005), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
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Kanal-1 Kremli’-9. Zagovor, kotorogone bylo (2006), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
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Kanal-1 Banditi Epokhi Sotisalizma. Genii poddelki (2006), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Futbol’noe shou Vadima Siniavskogo (2007), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
Kanal-1, Genii I zlodei ukhodiaschei epokhi, Anatolii Lunacharskii (2007), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
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Ostankino, Spezialnaya Rassledovannye: Prestuplennie Inostrantsev V Rossii (2006), viewed at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies Russian Television Archive
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Kanal-1, Vesti (27th August – 02nd September, 2006) available at www.etvnet.ca
NTV Sevodnya (04-10th May 2008) available at www.etvnet.ca
RTR-Planeta Vremya (05-11th August, 2008) available at www.etvnet.ca
## Anti-Georgian Campaign Content Analysis:

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