Nationalism, Ethnic Politics, and Democratic Consolidation:  
A Comparative Study of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina  
Volume I  

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by  

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To Ann-Marie Rajhmundhani
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ABBREVIATIONS

BH -- Bosnia-Hercegovina
DA -- Dalmatian Action
DEPOS -- Democratic Movement of Serbia
DS -- Democratic Party
DSK -- Democratic League of Kosovo
DSS -- Democratic Party of Serbia
DZHV -- Democratic Community of Croats in Vojvodina
DZVM -- Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians
FRJ -- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GSS -- Citizen's Alliance
HDZ -- Croatian Democratic Community
HNS -- Croatian National Party
HOS -- Croatian Defense Forces
HPSS -- Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party
HSLS -- Croatian Social Liberal Party
HSP -- Croatian Party of [State] Right
HSS -- Croatian Peasants' Party
IDS -- Istrien Democratic Alliance
IMRO -- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
JMO -- Yugoslav Muslim Organization
JNA -- Yugoslav Peoples' Army
JO -- Yugoslav Committee
KNS -- Coalition of National Understanding
KOS -- Yugoslav Counterintelligence Services
LSVJ -- League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina/Yugoslavia
MASPOK -- Croatian Mass Movement
MBO -- Muslim Bosniak Organization
MUP -- Ministry of Internal Affairs
NDH -- Independent State of Croatia
ND-PzS -- New Democracy-Movement for Serbia
NRS -- National Radical Party
NS -- People's Party
RSK -- Republic of Serbian Krajina
SANU -- Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
SAO -- Serbian Autonomous Regions
SAOK -- Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
SDA -- Party of Democratic Action
SDF -- Serbian Democratic Forum
SDS -- Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ -- Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIV -- Federal Executive Council
SK -- League of Communists
SKBH -- League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina
SKJ -- League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKH-SDP -- League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes
SLS -- Serbian Liberal Party
SNO -- Serbian National Renaissance
SNS -- Serbian Peoples' Party
SNV -- Serbian National Council
SPO -- Serbian Renewal Movement
SPS -- Socialist Party of Serbia
SRH -- Socialist Republic of Croatia
SRS -- Serbian Radical Party
SRSJ -- Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia
SSJ -- Serbian Unity Party
SSS -- Serbian Peasant Party
UJDI -- Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative
ZAVNOH -- Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia
ZNG (Zengas) -- Croatian National Guard
CHAPTER I

The Theoretical Framework

A. Statement of the Problem

A recent article in the New York Times surveying the incidence of ethnic wars around the world since the end of the Cold War arrived at a total count of 48 conflicts currently in progress. Characterizing this as the "third wave" of ethnic conflict in this century -- preceded by the phase of state-creation after World War I and the anticolonial and national liberation movements in the aftermath of World War II -- the authors ominously remark that this wave is "even more complex, potentially more threatening to international peace and almost certain to grow in the years ahead."1 In response to the

ubiquity and gravity of ethnic wars in the post-Cold War era there has been an unprecedented expansion of the United Nations' military activities. Since 1988 there have been 14 new peacekeeping operations; that compares with a total of 7 such operations between 1956-1987. Many areas currently in the throes of ethnic strife can be loosely categorized as "developing" countries. Based on the New York Times count, this category encompasses the great majority of cases: 15 separate conflicts in Africa South of the Sahara, 6 in the Middle East and North Africa, 12 in Asia, and 4 in Latin America. If one considers the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there have been 10 ethnic wars since 1988, and at least 14 crisis points or potential crisis points. Finally, even in the old "nation-states" of Western Europe and North America ethnic tensions have surfaced -- often with violent results -- in Spain, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and Canada. Taking note of such trends, scholars have spoken of an "ethnic revival;" "politicized ethnicity" has been characterized as "the world's major

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3 These figures do not include former communist countries that are geographically part of these regions.

4 Three in the former Yugoslavia, 2 in Russia, 1 in Moldova, 2 in Georgia, 1 in Azerbaijan, and 1 in Tajikistan.

ideological legitimator and delegitimater of states, regimes, and governments;" and nationalism has been deemed "very much an ideology with a future."

Alongside the global diffusion of nationalism and ethnic-based political movements there has occurred a worldwide victory, at least at the level of ideology, of western-style democracy. With the international discrediting in this century of first fascism and then communism as historical alternatives to liberal-democracy, the ideas and values of the latter are now attaining universal recognition and are increasingly becoming the sole acceptable source of regime legitimation. Of course, this is not

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to say that there has been a great surge of democratic regimes in practice. Where democracy has won is in the battle of ideas, and this is evinced by the fact that even dictators and movements that flagrantly violate human rights often feel the need to justify their behavior in quasi-democratic language. As it will be seen in this dissertation, all significant political elites in the former Yugoslavia verbally support democracy regardless of their actual responsibility for ethnic cleansing and systematic murder.

The simultaneous proliferation of both ethno-nationalist consciousness and democratic ideals around the globe behooves scholars to address theoretically and empirically the nature of the relationship between the forces of nationalism, the occurrence of ethnic conflict, and the prospects for building successful, stable democracies. In many respects, current theories of democratization\(^8\) offer little in the way of explanatory help. The

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\(^8\) This concept is generally used in juxtaposition to liberalization, the latter meaning the mere granting of certain rights to individuals and groups that protects them from arbitrary power and allows a degree of freedom in civil society. Democratization in this dissertation will be used to subsume both democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. Democratic transitions are defined as the period between the signal that an authoritarian regime is open to political reforms and the installment of a new democratic regime by a free, competitive election. Democratic consolidation, on the other hand, denotes the establishment of a stable democracy in which all politically significant groups consent to the rules of the game and no such groups or significant sections of the public challenge the legitimacy of democratic norms. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence
substantial body of literature that has developed in this field has been based on intensive studies of the post-war democracies (Germany, Italy and Japan), the Southern European democracies that emerged in the 1970s (Spain, Portugal, and Greece), and the breakdown of authoritarianism in Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Paraguay) in the 1980s. Aside from the Basque problem in Spain, in none of these instances has ethnic conflict represented a defining feature of the democratization process. Hence, there has been little practical


need to articulate explanatory frameworks that capture the unique patterns and dynamic of ethnic politics. Now that the terrain for the next likely democratic transitions has shifted to the developing countries and the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union -- two areas of the world in which nationalist ideologies and ethnic mobilization are basic elements of political life -- it is imperative to reconceptualize and re-equip democratic theory so that it may continue to have theoretical and explanatory utility.10

B. The Basic Research Question

This dissertation explores the relationship between nationalism, ethnic politics, and democratic consolidation in the context of the fragmented republics of the former Yugoslavia. Democratic consolidation is treated as a dependent variable and

various dimensions of nationalism and ethnic politics serve as independent variables. The basic research question centers on how nationalism and ethnic politics may impede and/or facilitate democratic consolidation.

The possibility that ethnic politics may facilitate democratic consolidation has been, for the most part, underappreciated. A far more common conception of nationalism and ethnic politics characterizes them as irrational emotions, inherently divisive, immune to compromise and tolerance, and prone to violence and collective punishment.\textsuperscript{11} This assessment, however, does not, and has never exhaustively accounted for the range of national ideologies or the patterns of ethnic politics. Elizabeth Kiss, for one, reminds us that historically "strong links between East-Central European national or religious allegiances and democracy have roots going back to the revolutions of 1848."\textsuperscript{12} With regard to the Western experience, Ghia Nodia argues that nationalism and democracy have always had an interdependent relationship in


which nations served as the basic political units out of which democratic government emerged.\textsuperscript{13} Victor Zaslavsky contends that the nationalist program advanced by the Baltic Republics and Ukraine (which encompassed a call for a "return to Europe, to a 'normal' economic system and political democracy"), worked to break the back of the pillars of the Soviet state -- i.e., the \textit{nomenklatura}, the military-industrial complex, and the security apparatus. In this way, the "destruction of the Soviet empire by forces of nationalism and separatism represents ... a necessary precondition for a successful transition to political democracy and a market economy."\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, Larry Diamond notes two ways in which the ethnic factor has had a "positive benefit" in Africa: (1) ethnic fragmentation has created problems of governability that exceeds the managing capacity of the generally weak political institutions of African authoritarian regimes; and (2) the salience of multifarious ethnic identities serves as an ever-present base for the flourishing of political pluralism.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Nodia, pp.7-9.


In short, contrary to the prevalent view of nationalism and ethnic politics as intrinsically prone to illiberalism, chauvinism, pogroms, and mass expulsions, there is a growing number of scholars who recognize it may, in some cases, prove beneficial for democratization. Therefore, it is incumbent on the researcher to determine empirically the precise relationship between these variables and to specify under what conditions ethnic politics encourages democratic consolidation and under what conditions it undermines democratic consolidation. As Ivo Banac warns: "A proper understanding of nationalism, by the Left no less than by Western governments, presupposes political analysis. Nationalisms can be as far apart as the socialism of Francois Mitterand is from the socialism of Pol Pot."\(^\text{16}\)

Overall, the purpose of this study is three-fold: (1) determine the relationship of nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democratic consolidation in the former Yugoslavia; (2) confirm or disconfirm the explanatory value of the concepts and the theoretical framework that is employed; (3) gain insights and draw conclusions that may be used to upgrade democratic theory and expand its applicability for further comparative inquiry in other multinational societies undergoing democratization.

C. Why Study the former Yugoslavia?

Perhaps no other society in Eastern Europe exemplifies the difficulties that nationalism and ethnic conflict pose for democratic consolidation better than the former Yugoslavia. The depth of ethnic fragmentation in the "land of the South Slavs" is its defining feature: this region is composed of 2 alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic), 3 major religions (Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Islam), 6 major languages (Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Magyar, and Albanian), and 14 national or ethnic groups (Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, Muslims, Slovenes, Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Romi/Gypsies, Slovaks, Turks, and Italians). Historically, the area has been subject to long periods of foreign occupation which has produced distinct Byzantine, Ottoman, Hungarian, Germanic and Italian cultural zones. In this century, there have been four ethnic wars (the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, WWI, WWII, and the current conflicts) and 4 major attempts to find a viable political solution (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of 1918; the Royal Dictatorship of 1929; Tito's communist regime; Tito's consociational regime). Since 1990 governments have been elected in all the republics on a nationalist platform, old fears and hatreds have been revived, the validity of the borders has been disputed, the authenticity of some nations has been challenged, and ethnic tensions have been provoked over new constitutional formulas. Civil war eventually broke out in
1991 in Croatia and spread to Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992. Simply stated, the lands of the former Yugoslavia represent a paradigmatic case for testing the impact of ethnic politics on democratic consolidation.

The specific cases to be studied will be Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. (I am thus omitting from the analysis Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia.) The chapters are arranged such that each is area-specific. At the same time, the concepts and hypotheses discussed below will drive the analysis and function to highlight what is unique to each case and what is comparable across cases. In the final chapter, a brief analysis of recent ethnic politics in South Africa will be conducted. The goal of this comparison is to apply the theoretical framework outside the context of post-Yugoslav politics and thereby broaden and deepen the explanation. South Africa's success thus far in consolidating its democracy stands in stark contrast to political realities in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The inclusion of South Africa therefore constitutes what Eckstein calls a "crucial case study" that will test the ability of the theoretical framework to explain the variation in political outcomes.\[17\] If factors outside

those posited by the theoretical framework prove to be relevant in the South African case, then theory-repair work may be required.

Before embarking on an extended discussion of the research program, let us turn to a brief survey of how the ideas of democracy and nationalism spread across Europe between the 18th and 20th centuries. The intended upshot of this exercise is to illustrate the historically variable relationship between nationalism and democracy and the greater difficulties nationalism poses for democratic consolidation in the contemporary world.

D. A Historical Excursion: Nationalism and Democracy

The classic relationship between nationalism and democracy is found in the history of Great Britain, France, and the United States. In these instances, both states and nations were forged


in the early stages of modernization, which meant that mass demands for inclusion and participation were limited and elites enjoyed considerable autonomy. Therefore, both state-building and nation-building preceded the establishment of fully consolidated democratic regimes. In 18th century political discourse nationalism had a "revolutionary, democratic" character and was based on the individual consent of the "sovereign citizen-people." In the British, French, and American point of view, the nation was constituted by those willing to submit to, and


19 Ernest Gellner makes the argument that nationalism is a by-product of industrialization which requires an amorphous, mobile, highly educated society that shares a single culture. And before nationalism there were no nations. This view prevails in the literature. The important point for my argument is that a definite conception of the nation was formed before regimes permitted voices "from below." Ernest Gellner, _Nations and Nationalism_, (Basil Blackwell: Great Britain, 1983).

20 The state is understood to be the centralistic, administrative, resource-extracting, coercive agency that claims the right to rule and to be obeyed over a given territory. Following Weber, territory is considered to be a key element of the state. Regime is defined by the constitutional order, the accepted rules of the political game, and the prevailing values operative in the political community. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., _From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology_, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.78; David Easton, _A Systems Analysis of Political Life_, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), chaps., 11, 12, 13; Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy," _World Politics_, v.XLII, n.3 (April 1990), pp.422-440.
participate in, the laws and liberties of the land. An additional factor that helped to make nations, especially in the American case, was the presence of assimilatory incentives in the form of economic opportunity. At the same time, such a liberal conception of the nation and nationalism did not preclude the use of forcible assimilation, genocide, and compulsory education into the dominant culture when such practices were deemed necessary (which found their most extreme expression in French and American history). Overall, there was a favorable sequencing of the historical tasks of political development in Western Europe and the US. The building of states and nations before modernization processes came into full swing allowed for the gradual incorporation of different segments of society through the progressive extension of the suffrage. By the time ethno-nationalist consciousness became a universally recognized principle of political mobilization (i.e., after WW I and especially since the 1960s), states were firmly institutionalized on a rational-legal foundation, a definite conception of the nation was hegemonic and reproduced by ideological state apparatuses (e.g., schools, the legal system, cultural institutions), and democratic regimes were at least "partially" consolidated.21

21 I say partially because elite consensual unity was not attained in France until the early 1970s when the French Communist Party agreed to play by the rules of the game; and in the US in the 1960s African-Americans were denied full citizenship rights making the American regime fall significantly short of the indicators of democracy. For a brief analysis of democratic consolidation in France, see Burton, Gunther and Higley, pp.24-30.
The ideas of nationalism and democracy descended on Central Europe in the first half of the 19th century by way of British economic supremacy and French military and political dominance. In this way, German and Italian intellectuals were forced to confront their own relative backwardness and, at the same time, were provided with a model -- the national state -- that would enable them to compete effectively on the world's stage. It should be no surprise then that insurgent German and Italian nationalists looked upon Great Britain and France with a mixture of envy, reverence, and resentment.\(^{22}\)

The differential timing of these concepts with modernization, however, was not the only difference between the Western and Central European experience. In the case of the latter, nations preceded states. In other words, the nation was already a meaningful cultural entity -- at least from the perspective of the nationalist intelligentsia -- despite the fact that no state existed to nurture and sustain it. In order for a nation to progress and exercise political influence commensurate with the greatness of its

\(^{22}\) Gellner writes: "As the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the world, it makes sure that almost everyone, at some time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the culprits as being of another 'nation'. If he can also identify enough of the victims as being of the same 'nation' as himself, a nationalism is born. If it succeeds, and not all of them can, a nation is born." Gellner, p.112. Greenfeld sees the differential timing of nationalism as a key variable and employs Nietzsche's notion of reseitement to account for the genesis of nationalism in the belated nation-states. Greenfeld, pp.8-17.
cultural achievements, German and Italian nationalists fervently believed it was necessary to organize all of their respective peoples into a state. In this context, a very different conception of nationalism began to develop -- i.e., one based not on individual consent and political liberties found in the West but rather on the primordial criteria of language, ethnicity, and religion. Although nationalism originally had a liberal form in both Germany and Italy, states based on cultural nations rather than political nations felt soon after their founding to be incomplete as long as their co-nationals would be forever "lost" to other states. The new form of nationalism, therefore, had two components: (1) it regarded its own nation as superior because of its unique primordial traits; and (2) it demanded congruence between state boundaries and the geographical extension of its cultural nation. The consequence of this formulation was the encouragement of a collectivist and violence-prone political culture that found in revanchism and irredentism its spiritual redemption; in the end, it led to the emphatic repudiation of democracy and the installment of totalitarian regimes.23

When the demonstration effects of nationalism and democracy rolled across Eastern Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries it was tempting to see them as having a salutary effect -- for both ideas were used to justify the break up of the onerous empires of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. However, the patchwork distribution of ethnic groups representing different cultures and traditions precluded the workable application of principles such as "nation-state" and "national self-determination." Consequently, when the Western Entente powers set down to draw the map single ethnic groups were in many instances divided between several different states and mutually suspicious, if not hostile, ethnic groups were combined within the same state. Rather than explicitly reject democracy, the governments of the time construed it as a tool of nationalism and sought to build "nation-states" (ostensibly following the Western pattern) in a manner that denied heterogeneity within. They also stoked mutual animosities by advancing a host of revisionist-irredentist threats. The demand therefore to make polity and nation congruent, although effective against the old empires, turned against the new states with a vengeance. Because the terrain of competing nationalisms was densely populated, because the masses were considered to be malleable into several different "nations," and because the

24 Hence, the competition in Yugoslavia between pan-Slav movements (Illyrianism, Yugoslavism, and narodno jedinstvo (national oneness)) on the one hand and, on the other, various forms of an exclusive Croatianism and an exclusive Serbianism. It is interesting to note that as late as 1891 it was possible for intellectuals to adopt voluntarily a new national identity,
small Slav states all faced bigger neighbors who menaced them with imperialist ambitions, there was a terrible insecurity and pervasive distrust among them that readily lent itself to authoritarianism and "unusual brutality." Ultimately, the failure in the interwar period to build inclusive nations and consolidated democracies led Eastern Europe once again into the lair of its predatory neighbors.25

Unfortunately, the conditions for contemporary democratic transitions and consolidations are far worse. The tasks of state-building, nation-building, and democratization confront elites simultaneously and demand urgent attention. Modernization and its concomitant processes -- mass communication, mass education, such as Croat who consented to Serbianization, or a Bosnian Muslim who declared himself a Croat. Among Bosnian Muslims it was quite normal for individuals to swing back and forth over the course of a lifetime between Serb and Croat identities. Moreover, in many Muslim families siblings would choose diverse ethnic identities. For example, in the family of Mehmed Spaho (the head of the interwar Muslim party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization), one brother called himself a Serb and another a Croat (the latter, interestingly enough, was a reis ul-ulema (Muslim religious authority). Spaho himself was a declared Serb as a youth but later rejected any ethnic designation. See Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp.310, 362, 370, 375.

increased expectations, a highly trained, mobile labor force -- has created a public that demands full and instant participation. And the global diffusion of ideas has made ethno-nationalist consciousness a universal principle of political mobilization. In the ethnically-divided societies of Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the former USSR, there are four general ways in which ethnic politics and nationalism can complicate democratic consolidations:

(1) Once ethnic mobilization has begun there is a tendency for a ripple effect or "chain reaction" to set in whereby all issues are cast in an ethnic zero-sum, all-or-nothing logic. It is generally recognized that ethnic conflicts are more intractable than other types of cleavage and less amenable to distributive solutions.\textsuperscript{26} If ethnic issues begin to supersede all other concerns on a nation's agenda, the development of the democratic art of compromise and bargaining is likely to be fettered.

(2) Nation-specific identities often have greater affective appeal than supranational loyalties. In such cases, ethnic groups tend to perceive the regime not as a neutral umpire but rather as partial to one ethnic group. Consequently, the engendering of diffuse support for the regime that cross-cuts ethnic communities will be exceptionally difficult.

(3) Regimes struggling to establish their democratic credentials must confront secessionist movements that also claim the mantle of democracy and equate it with self-determination. In this instance, the normative legitimacy intrinsic to democracy is exploited by competing groups to serve mutually incompatible ends; namely, the unity of the state and its partition. Because democratic values can be used to justify both the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the separate nations that compose the state, democracy per se cannot solve this dilemma.27

And (4) the territorial integrity of the state itself is often disputed and directly challenged on the basis of irredentist and/or revanchist claims.28

As a result, key elements of the classic, Anglo-American majoritarian model are no longer adequate institutional tools for the aggregation of interests and the mediation of conflict. For example, in ethnically-politicized societies citizenship rights are

27 Ted Robert Gurr writes that in democratizing or quasi-democratic regimes, there is a tendency to "justify restrictions on the rights of communal minorities in the name of the 'democratic will' of the dominant nationality." Gurr, p.361.

dismissed as insufficient means to protect the liberty and equality of all; majority rule is judged to be a method that dooms the minority to perpetual political exclusion; and a market measuring performance on the basis of merit is perceived either as a threat to a traditional way of life (if a complementary and harmonious ethnic division of labor is institutionalized) or, as an ideological rationalization of stratification (if upward mobility and life-chances are disproportionately biased against one group).\textsuperscript{29} It is also questionable whether the alternative European, consensus-based, consociational model of Switzerland, Austria, and the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) can effectively manage ethnic conflict in the post-communist and developing countries.\textsuperscript{30} A regime undergoing democratic consolidation in a multiethnic society must pull off a number of delicate balancing acts between majority rule and minority rights, between the rights of citizens and the rights of nations, between a competitive and a redistributive political economy, and between merit and ascriptive values of social mobility. An important component of this dissertation will be to assess, at various points in the text, the ability of Lijphart's consociational prescriptions to effectuate political stability.

\textsuperscript{29} Horowitz, pp.109-113; Rothschild, (1981), pp.81-2.

The state problematic poses a particularly grave problem that justifies further elaboration. In a word, problems of stateness must be settled a priori to the democratization process proper. As Dankart Rustow observed in a 1970 essay, prior to the building of a democracy there is one essential background condition that must be fulfilled -- consensus on the territorial unit of the state itself. In his words, "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to."31 And the paradox for the democratization process is that the democratic method of majority rule cannot make right a territorial unit that is perceived otherwise by a minority. In a perceptive article, Robert Dahl reasoned that Gorbachev's use of a referendum to save the Soviet Union from disintegration was bound to fail because the proper domain to use majority rule was in question. Whenever there is an issue of secession before a body politic, it is in the interest of the minority to accept only the majority opinion of its own people, and not the majority in the larger state unit. In Dahl's words, "the principle of majority rule cannot rightly be used to decide its own domain. A justifiable decision on the question of the proper political unit cannot be arrived at by majority vote, because the principle itself presupposes that a proper unit already exists."32


In short, securing the legitimacy of the state is actually the first of a long list of conundrums with which the crafters of democratic consolidation in ethnically-divided societies must come to terms.

E. The Research Design and Hypotheses

I propose to examine three dimensions of ethnic politics that are generally regarded as relevant to the constructs of ethnic mobilization and nationalism: (1) national ideology as articulated by elites, political parties, and opinion-makers;  

33 Zaslavksy provides a succinct definition of each concept: "Ethnic mobilization may be defined as potential or actual participation in joint actions when collective membership is based on belonging to the same ethnic group (nationality). It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of nationalism. The latter is understood as a political doctrine and social movement which strives 'to make culture and polity congruent' and has the principal aim of creating a modern nation-state possessing sovereignty over a given territory." Zaslavsky, p.106; Gellner, pp.1-7; Ernst B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" International Organization, v.40, n.3 (Summer 1986), p.727.

34 By elites, I mean "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially." Burton, Gunther, and Higley, p.8. Opinion-makers are a subset of elites but are more narrowly defined as significant figures outside the formal channels of power who nevertheless actively shape popular perceptions and indirectly contribute to setting the terms of political discourse and the range of possible policy options, such as the mass media and prominent intellectuals in cultural and academic associations. See Allen H. Barton, "Determinants of Leadership Attitudes in a Socialist Society," in Allen H. Barton, Bogdan Denitch, and Charles Kadushin, Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia, (New York: Praeger
(2) the attitudes, values, and beliefs of the mass public (insofar as the availability of mass survey data permits the testing of this dimension); and (3) the behavior of elites, political parties, and politically significant groups. On the other side of the equation are the various dimensions of democratic consolidation. Actually, what is involved in the latter variable are two conceptually distinct phenomena -- the creation of a democracy, on the one hand, and the consolidation of democracy, on the other. Let us first explore the dependent variable.

1. The Dependent Variable: Democracy and Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation is a term enjoying wide currency in the democratization literature and yet it is very far from a single, agreed-upon definition. At one end of the pole is a maximalist conception advanced by Geoffrey Pridham, who synthesizes the work of Schmitter, Morlino, and Whitehead. In this view, democratic consolidation is a long-term process that is likely to take a generation to complete. It is conceptually distinct from the transition phase proper and involves a number of developments: (1) the institutionalization of a democratic regime (i.e., the conversion of "patterns into structures"); (2) the transformation of key actors from that of instrumental support for democracy to...
that of principled support; (3) the gradual removal of transitional uncertainties, anti-system parties, system-focused instability, and the prospects for authoritarian reversals; (4) the "rooting" of political parties in a system which requires a variegated set of relations between parties and the state, parties and society, and interparty relationships; and (5) the internalization of democratic values by the mass public which works to legitimize democracy. In addition, the peaceful alternation in power between parties is highlighted as a crucial test of progress towards consolidation. On the basis of these indicators, neither Spain, Greece, nor Portugal is fully consolidated.35

At the other end of the spectrum is a minimalist definition provided by Guiseppe Di Palma. According to him, the concept democratic consolidation has little theoretical or empirical utility. While some equate it with institutionalization and routinization, Di Palma notes that institutional fuzziness and incoherence are often intentional parts of a democratic agreement (e.g., Italy). He also rejects the idea that the peaceful turnover of power is a valid indicator of consolidation, for this would have the effect of

mistakenly classifying both Italy and Japan as unconsolidated. Finally, the cultivation of legitimacy as a litmus test of consolidation is objected to on the grounds that what passes for legitimacy is often a simple calculation of material interests, the absence of regime alternatives, and/or behavioral adjustments in light of new opportunities. In the end, Di Palma rephrases the whole problem of consolidation into the question "when can democrats relax?," to which he gives the answer as soon as a democratic agreement is reached among the relevant parties during the transition phase. Ultimately, for him, "the decisive role in establishing democracy belongs to the agreement phase, not to consolidation."36

Situated between such minimalist and maximalist definitions of democratic consolidation is that advocated by Richard Gunther, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and Nikiforos Diamandouros.37 They argue that prior to measuring the degree of democratic consolidation of a regime, one must first determine


if in fact the regime is democratic. The importance of distinguishing between democracy per se and democratic consolidation is that many regimes may meet all the procedural requirements of a democracy and yet rest on a very precarious foundation susceptible to an authoritarian regress. A historical analogy illustrates this point well: by all appearances the French 4th Republic was democratic, but in the absence of democratic consensus among all politically significant groups the regime eventually collapsed after 12 years of existence.\textsuperscript{38}

A procedural definition of democracy has been chosen for this study and is justified on the grounds of its suitability for empirical testing and comparative analysis. The following definition by Juan Linz, Larry Diamond and Seymour Martin Lipset superbly conveys the core meaning of democracy:

"... democracy ... denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties --

freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations -- sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.\(^3^9\)

Democratic consolidation, on the other hand, is closely associated with the stability and long-term survivability of a regime. According Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros, a democracy is consolidated when attitudinally all politically significant groups accept the democratic rules of the game as legitimate and behaviorally all politically significant groups respect democratic norms.\(^4^0\) They further specify these dimensions by clarifying when politically insignificant groups outside the democratic consensus can become politically significant and possibly threaten the stability of the system. If anti-system groups begin to gain popular support their capacity to affect the system grows, pari passu. In this sense, there is a "numerical component" to what constitutes "politically significant":


\(^4^0\) Linz and Stepan articulate a similar definition, only adding that structurally no reserve domains of power from the non-democratic regime remain to affect output or system performance. Linz and Stepan, "Democratic Transitions and Consolidation," p.4.
the more numerous anti-system parties are and the more support they receive, the less consolidated the system must be regarded. Furthermore, there is a "strategic location" factor that is relevant. If anti-system groups are concentrated in the military, for example, they would pose a much greater threat to democracy than if they were marginalized political parties. Overall, democratic consolidation is measured by the following criteria: (1) the degree of diffuse support for democracy among both elites and the mass public; (2) behavioral conformity with democratic rules; and (3) the absence of politically significant anti-system and semi-loyal parties. If these indicators are met, a regime may be pronounced "sufficiently consolidated."41

The virtue of the Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros theory is that it avoids the excessive conditions cited by Pridham (which makes democratic consolidation exceptionally difficult to attain) while furnishing the concept with the theoretical substance and empirical applicability Di Palma says it lacks. Because this perspective will be adopted for the present study, it is necessary to expound on a few central concepts in more detail.

First of all, it is critical to underscore the predominance of the elite variable. It is virtually axiomatic in the democratization literature that although the masses are capable of pulling down a regime, they cannot create one. According to Rustow, the elite

41 Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.
variable is most pronounced during the "decision phase" to reconstrcut a political community in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience.42 And in the perspective of Burton and Higley, elite politics are "empirically distinct" from, and "causally prior" to, the establishment of democratic institutions.43 The acceptance of these arguments need not entail the neglect of the role of mass politics and political culture. In fact, a democracy should be considered more secure if the mass public has been socialized by democratic rather than authoritarian institutions.44

42 Rustow, pp.355-7. Although Rustow considered this part of the transition to democracy, the agreement on elite procedural consensus is the *sine qua non* of consolidation. Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros argue that in Spain the transition and consolidation phases cannot be neatly separated since important elite decisions for consensual unity were made during the transition from authoritarianism. Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.


At the same time, one need not wait for generational change to pronounce a regime consolidated -- as long as the masses are not attitudinally disposed towards an authoritarian alternative and are not mobilizable on this basis in sufficient numbers to affect the system regularly and substantially, the conditions of sufficient consolidation are fulfilled.45

It is a premise of this research program that elites bear primary responsibility for transforming their relations from that of dissensus and violence to that of procedural consensus, whereby the democratic formula of "certain rules, uncertain outcomes"46 is institutionalized. Under this framework, all contenders for power enjoy the right to organize a political base and appeal to the electorate -- this effectively ensures that all have an equal chance of winning. Those who lose in the electoral contest need not fear state repression or permanent exclusion. Rather the right to participate in the next elections is guaranteed. In this way, consenting to lose is a precondition to win. According to Di Palma, such coexistence is both an imperative of democracy and an incentive for it: imperative, in that democracy cannot function in the absence of pluralism, competition and the opposition of groups; incentive, in that otherwise hostile groups can now peacefully compete in a civil society that ensures mutual

45 Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.

Burton, Gunther, and Higley discuss two routes by which elites may attain consensual unity. The first path, elite settlement, represents the decision of politically significant elites to reorganize their relations away from mutual extermination and towards peaceful coexistence. Such settlements are concerned with the "production of contingent consent," described above as the agreement to institutionalize uncertainty. What may serve as a decisive push towards intra-elite accommodation is the recent experience of a bloody, inconclusive, protracted struggle in which all elite groups suffered. In other cases, a major political crisis that demonstrates the incapacity and dispensability of the regime can bring elites together to formulate a settlement. One factor that facilitates the arrival at a settlement is a considerable degree of elite autonomy from mass pressure so that elites are afforded the latitude to secretly negotiate and compromise.

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47 Di Palma, pp.27-32, 42, 45, 55, 115-6.


Another route to elite procedural consensus is through a gradual process of "elite convergence." This is a two-step process whereby a section of elite groups initiate consensual unity. However, significant actors remain outside the game of electoral politics and continue breakdown games, "blackmail," and other destabilizing postures. Eventually, the prospect of political marginalization convinces obstructionists to moderate their programs and accept coexistence and the rules of the game. This evolution is neatly conveyed by Di Palma's term "bandwagon effects," by which he means the incentives to play the democratic game when it becomes "the only game in town." As he explains, "[t]he more ... the game goes on, and the more actors practice it, the more costly it seems not to play it. If nothing else, there may be no other or safer way of attending to one's interests."

Although violence may serve as the catalyst for an elite settlement, there is recognition in the democratization literature of the dilemmas and difficulties posed by the recent experience of atrocities, widespread torture, and other such inhumane acts. While O'Donnell and Schmitter analyze the issue of "settling past

50 Burton, Gunther, and Higley, pp.31-7.

51 Di Palma, pp.113, 58, 96, 168. (The term "blackmail" is borrowed from Di Palma. pp.57,127.) In this same vein, Rustow speaks of a "double process of Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats: one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties." Rustow, p.358.
accounts" as a transitional task, if the transition itself is particularly bloody the same dilemmas could apply in the consolidation phase. Specifically, the issue is how to handle those responsible for crimes against humanity. If they are strategically located, such as in high offices in the military, they could represent an obstacle to consolidation if they fear reprisals. This problem is exacerbated when the military-as-an-institution was involved in the crimes, as opposed to special units or paramilitary forces. While admitting the lack of a "satisfactory resolution" to the problem, O'Donnell and Schmitter suggest criminal proceedings against those responsible for the most heinous crimes but caution that this must be conducted in the context of due process and respect for the military-as-an-institution. In the end, confronting a past episode of terror and bloodshed may provide society with the moral regeneration and cultural catharsis necessary to "make its future livable."\textsuperscript{52}

Finally, the relationship between stability and democratic consolidation requires clarification. As Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros note, one cannot deduce consolidation by the presence of stability. While unconsolidated regimes are indeed inclined towards instability (since no consensus exists among rival elites who have the capacity to affect the system), consolidated regimes may face a normal amount of turmoil (e.g., strikes, street protests) without the prospect of deconsolidation. Thus, key

\textsuperscript{52} O'Donnell and Schmitter, Part IV, pp.28-32.
political institutions could be the subject of criticism and social conflict without democracy itself being jeopardized.\textsuperscript{53} Ernst Haas' thoughts on the conceptual problematic posed by instability are worth considering: "Civil strife is a very tricky indicator because we cannot assume that every strike, every riot, every assassination of a political figure provides evidence of deep-seated and widespread dissatisfaction. These events have varying diagnostic significance, depending on the extent of social mobilization, the degree to which the state penetrates the society, the nature of urban-rural, high culture-low culture split."\textsuperscript{54} For the purposes of this study, two measures will be taken as decisive: (1) the target of such instability -- only if the central pillars of democracy (meaningful and extensive competition, inclusive participation, regular and fair elections, and civil and political liberties) themselves are the object of mobilization is there a genuine threat to the democratic order; and (2) the motivational presence of an ideology representing either a historical alternative to democracy or employing pseudo-democratic language.\textsuperscript{55} In this respect, anti-system and semi-loyal parties require

\textsuperscript{53} Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros; Pridham, pp.13-14, 38.

\textsuperscript{54} Haas, p.735.

\textsuperscript{55} In the typology of democratic regimes furnished by Burton, Gunther, and Higley, pseudo-democracies are regimes that maintain a facade of democratic institutions and rhetoric but in actuality are one-party regimes that restrict competition and engage in mass intimidation. Burton, Gunther, and Higley, pp.6-7.
definitional rigor. The former is denoted by its implacable hostility to the regime and its programmatic goal to thoroughly transform it; the latter by its partial embrace of regime values -- reflected in its participation in parliamentary life but its use of obstructionist tactics -- and its instrumental support for democracy.\footnote{56}

If a system has attained consolidation, it should be able to weather important "tests" of its stability, such as the alternation in power between mutually hostile groups, economic hardship, or an attempted coup by a faction in the military.\footnote{57} Given the predominance of the ethnic variable in the politics of the former Yugoslavia, the crucial tests will have to reflect its unique dimensions: challenges to the integrity of the state, interethnic clashes and violence, and demands for various degrees of separation (federal or confederal arrangements, autonomy, and secession). If national programs seeking hegemony and/or separatist movements seeking exit receive widespread popular support, and if ethnic elites and ethnic-based political parties violate democratic norms in practice, then a system must be designated as unconsolidated. In this case, a system will be highly


\footnote{57} Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros.
unstable and authoritarian reversals or the disintegration of the state itself becomes likely.

2. The Independent Variables: Ideological, Attitudinal, and Behavioral Dimensions

Before discussing in detail the dimensions of ethnic politics that have been chosen for analysis, an argument will be presented that explains why some factors often associated with the ethnic variable will not be formally examined. First of all, this study will not attempt to hypothesize on the basis of economic variables. Many have theorized that ethnic cleavages get politicized through the mechanism of unequal economic relations. For instance, Hechter's theory of "internal colonialism" rests on the argument that a cultural division of labor overlays a structure of class inequity, such that stratification patterns coincide with ethnic divisions. It is on this basis that Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism emerged and persisted despite modernization. On the other hand, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that a separatist sentiment is likely to be stronger in areas that are economically dominant. The pitfall of such economic reductionist arguments is that empirically nationalism and separatist movements have flourished in both economically advanced and economically depressed areas. Consequently, economics as an independent variable admits of no precise and consistent relationship to ethnic
politics. It therefore must be conceived as a spurious variable.\(^5^8\)

A second explanation of ethnic politics that is fundamentally specious centers on the demographic context as a major explanatory variable. It is hypothesized in a recent paper by Timothy Frye that "the greater the number of ethnic groups, the more difficult it is to find a formula to satisfy them all."\(^5^9\) In other words, the more diverse the demographic context, the less likely a democracy will consolidate. Not only does this claim contradict the experience of other multiethnic societies, such as in India where multifarious and overlapping ethnic cleavages

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\(^5^8\) For economistic-rationalist accounts of ethnopoltics, see Ronald Rogowski, "Causes and Varieties of Nationalism," pp.87-108, Mario Polese, "Economic Integration, National Policies, and the Rationality of Regional Separatism," pp.109-127, and Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties," pp.128-146 in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). Of all these thinkers, Mario Polese is the only one who acknowledges the limitations of economic reductionism: "Economic grievances may well be among the factors that impel a region to seek full political autonomy but they will rarely suffice to explain why independence is entertained at all as a possible option." (Polese, p.112.) For the critique of economistic-rationalist theories, see Walker Connor, "Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism?" Ethnic and Racial Studies, v.7, n.3, (July 1984), pp.342-359; Horowitz, pp.63, 82-3, 131-2, 233-259; A. Smith, pp.26-44. Timothy Frye's recent study successfully correlating Wallerstein's thesis with "early sovereignty seekers" in Eastern Europe has been undermined by events as even the lesser developed areas have sought sovereignty. Frye, pp.609-617.

\(^5^9\) Frye, p.618.
actually affords the Indian state greater flexibility and policy options; but also, reversing the statement exposes its superficiality -- a small number of ethnic groups does not mean stability is any more probable. If two groups perceive each other with mutual hostility and fear, then the possibility of finding a peaceful solution is extremely remote. Moreover, if the two groups are aligned along the ethnic stratification pattern of a "bipolar balance," in which one group dominates politically and the other economically, the polity could be full of tension as neither group is fully secure nor content with its status.

In essence, it is not the demographic context per se that has explanatory value but how this objective factor and patterns of ethnic stratification are perceived by national elites and the mass public. To be sure, in the case studies of this dissertation different types of ethnic cleavage are noted. Croatia is labelled an instance of ethnic bipolarity (i.e., Croatians vs. Serbs), Bosnia-Hercegovina is a tripolar case (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats), and Serbia is classified as a dominant ethnic group (Serbs) surrounded by peripheral ethnic minorities (notably, Albanians, Muslims, and Hungarians). All the same, "what matters is not simply the degree


of ethnic division, but how it is structured and managed.\textsuperscript{62}

Consequently, this study will place a premium on political variables and treat the demographic situation as a contextual or background variable against which elites must make decisions, formulate programs, choose policies, forge alliances, and conduct relations. As Joseph Rothschild argues, the existence of objective ethnic markers is a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in ethnic mobilization and conflict. The politicization of ethnicity, the descent into interethnic violence, and the curbing of such violence is in fact overwhelmingly the product of political decisions by ethnic leaders and elites.\textsuperscript{63}

a. The Ideological Dimension: National Ideologies

A key variable to be examined in this study will be the influence of national ideologies. National ideologies represent the collective consciousness of nations. They provide group members with a sense of identity, relative group worth, and status; they define who belongs to the political community and who is endowed with full citizenship rights; and they stake out a given territory over which the group claims the legitimate right to rule. Ernst Haas has devised an excellent definition of national

\textsuperscript{62} Diamond, p.19.

ideologies, from which I quote:

"A nationalist ideology is body of arguments and ideas about a nation advocated by a group of writers and accepted by a specific political movement. Nationalist ideologies embody political programs. ... [They] make assertions about the nation's claim to historical uniqueness, to the territory that the nation-state ought to occupy, and to the kinds of relations that should prevail between one's nation and others. Nationalist ideologies also contain constitutional and institutional programs on how the nation ought to be governed. Finally, these ideologies advance ideas on the historical mission of the nation, ranging from quiet self-perfection to conquest or the restoration of some golden age."\(^{64}\)

In Haas' essay he goes on to build a typology of 7 distinct national ideologies, the specific differences of each emanating from their response to the challenge of modernity. Each is based on historical examples and is internally coherent and rationally

\(^{64}\) Haas, pp.727-8. Haas defines nationalism as the belief that a people ought to form a nation, or that they already are one. It is thus divested of the political import he attributes to national ideologies. Following Geilner, I have defined nationalism above as the desire to make polity and nation congruent. I therefore see national ideologies as types of nationalisms. Banac presents a definition of nationalism that is comparable to one adopted here: "The ideology of nationalism seeks to change the world. It promotes the idea of fraternity, interdependence, and common purpose among conational and sometimes tends to channel social disputes onto the plane of relations with other national communities." Banac, (1984), pp.27-31.
ordered. The present study will identify four national ideologies -- pluralist nationalism, civic nationalism, monistic nationalism, and primordial nationalism. The fundamental distinction upon which these national ideologies are based is how they propose to structure interethnic relations. Hence, pluralist nationalism promises the protection of both individual and collective rights; civic nationalism advances the idea that the basic building block of the polity should be the citizen and not the ethnic group; monistic nationalism advocates the dominance and priority of one group over another; and primordial nationalism represents a denial of heterogeneity altogether and the desire to physically remove it. Each ideology will be framed as containing definite characteristics on several dimensions. Methodologically, they will serve as ideal types; that is, as measures against which real world approximations will be assessed rather than as empirically-grounded constructions. The formation of these ideal types derives from two sources: (1) Donald Horowitz's empirical analysis of ethnic conflict in Asia and Africa; and (2) their prima facie relevance to the politics of the former Yugoslavia. Horowitz's study led him to scale ethnic claims on a continuum from equality, to priority, to exclusivity. Because the effort here to design ideal types goes beyond his analysis (which focuses on group claims, legitimacy, and group worth), it is incumbent on this study to validate that the dimensions of each national ideology cluster in the assumed manner. And such constraint can

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65 Horowitz, pp.196-228.
only be established *a posteriori*; in other words, only after the data has been collected and goodness-of-fit tests have been conducted. If the component parts of each ideal type indeed hang together as outlined, an analytic tool for evaluating the influence of specific national ideologies on democratic consolidation will be furnished. Otherwise, evidence may be on hand that nationalism contains overriding affective, inchoate, and irrational components that preclude a precise typology.

One additional point needs to be clarified before an exposition of the national ideological types begins. The hypothetical relationships drawn between national ideologies and democratic consolidation are conceptualized with the caveat that all else remains equal, such as the institutional setting and the dynamic generated between competing political parties. One facet of this study will be to examine the interrelationship national ideologies have with other factors and to assess the relative causal impact of national ideologies on the dependent variable.

The essence of pluralist nationalism is a realistic awareness that ethnic diversity is an unalterable fact of a polity and that in order to procure the consent and cooperation of minorities substantive measures protecting their rights and way of life must be forthcoming from the dominant group. Pluralist nationalists, therefore, will seek to ensure the constitutional recognition of both the rights of citizens and the rights of nations. National
rights are viewed as necessary features of a successful democratic formula in multinational societies. An example of national or collective rights would be adopting a system of "linguistic parity" whereby multilingualism or alternative official languages are recognized. Short of that, the majority group's language could be deemed official for state purposes while the languages of minorities are officially recognized where they are territorially concentrated. Despite the fact that this would technically be a claim of linguistic priority by the dominant group, its symbolic significance for relative group worth could be tempered and made palatable by a heavy dose of linguistic liberalism at the local level, such as giving the minority language either a priority or an exclusive status in the areas of traffic signs and street names, the local television channel, public schools, and the local government.66

66 An exemplar of the pluralist nationalist approach to the language question can be seen in the Spanish constitution of 1978. Article Three states: "1. Castellano is the official language of the state. All Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to use it. 2. The other languages of Spain will also be official in the autonomous communities in accord with their respective statutes. 3. The richness of the different linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage that will be the object of special respect and protection." Cited in Shabad and Gunther, p.460. Spain also typifies some dangers with this policy. Official bilingualism has given Càtalan a superior status within Catalunya, and this has led to charges of job discrimination by non-Càtalan speakers. Shabad and Gunther, pp.469-471.
In terms of other symbolic issues, pluralist nationalists would guarantee the use of cultural symbols that identify minority groups (such as flags, national anthems, and religious ceremonies) and they may adopt an inclusive definition of sovereignty in the constitution, such that all ethnic groups are deemed founding nations of the state. In the political arena, various approaches could be utilized to undercut any rationale for "exit" that minority groups may harbor and to ensure them a "voice" in the system -- reserved seats in the legislature or executive branch, proportional ethnic representation in the state bureaucracy, a special parliamentary commission to handle interethnic matters, the use of qualified majorities when making decisions on ethnic issues, and various divisions of the state (federal or confederal arrangements and/or administratively autonomous territories or provinces). In a word, pluralist nationalism epitomizes the values of inclusiveness and interethnic cooperation and peace. It is articulated by groups who are confident\(^6\) of their group worth and harbor no ressentiment towards others.\(^6\) In the area of state-to-state relations, it will promote neither irredentism nor

\(^6\) Joseph Rothschild writes "conflict-containing mechanisms and procedures ... require politically secure ethnic leaders and brokers, immune to being outbid by more militant challengers or ousted by grassroots revulsion against the compromises that these devises necessarily entail." Rothschild, (1981), p.164.

\(^6\) Liah Greenfeld theorizes on the social psychology of ressentiment and its import for nationalism. The term itself derives from Nietzsche and conveys a mixture of envy, resentment, and hatred. Greenfeld, pp.15-17.
revanchism. All things being equal, if ethnic groups -- either
majorities or minorities -- adopt a pluralist nationalist ideology,
then the integrity of the state is on a more secure footing and a
fledgling democracy is more easily consolidated.

Civic nationalism is based on Anglo-American liberal-
democracy and its emphasis on majority rule, the rights of
citizens, the philosophy of individualism, and the rule of law.
National rights are rejected for imposing ascriptive -- and
therefore unjust -- criteria for the distribution of offices and
goods. In a word, national rights are identified with invidious
forms of discrimination. Rather than institutionalizing an
elaborate system of ethnic-based quotas, civic nationalism
promises all individuals equal life chances through the medium of
formal equality before the law and social mobility based on merit.
The mass public will be asked to attach their allegiances not to
ethnic symbols and markers but to an overarching ideal (e.g., a
supranational identity like "Americans," or an ethnically neutral
state tradition) in which all groups have shared values and
interests. If a program of federalism or decentralization is offered
by civic nationalists it will be built around principles other than
the ethnic factor, such as economic rationality, population, or
geography. In essence, civic nationalism seeks to redefine the
basic state identity of "we the people" away from the *ethnos* and
towards the *demos*. Ethnic elites that articulate this ideology will typically come from the dominant group in society that is more urban, educated, professional, and westernized. They will uphold the liberal heritage of the West as a model worthy of emulation and will express optimism and confidence that democracy can be consolidated. At the same time, the ethnic elites that advance civic nationalism may be poorly informed as to how minority groups will react to their program.

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69 In a review article of Liah Greenfeld's *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Hugh Kearney argues that civic nationalism is not, properly speaking, a national ideology. By his reasoning, nationalism defines membership on the basis of ascriptive markers and therefore is different in kind from ideologies that define group membership on the basis of a contract or free association. According to Kearney, this means that "the United States is not strictly speaking a nation." And far from being an national ideology, civic nationalism is simply synonymous with what we define as the "modern state." Hugh Kearney, [Book Review], "Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. By Liah Greenfeld," *Political Quarterly*, v.64, n.3, (July/September 1993), pp.364-6. I feel, however, that it is too restrictive to define nations merely on the basis of objective, ascriptive markers. Following Ernest Renan, a nation is any body of people who think of themselves as such ("a nation is a daily plebiscite"). Historically, nations have been created on the basis of widely divergent and often patently false notions, such as shared historical experiences, ancestral and religious myths, and alleged blood ties. (Again to quote Renan: "Getting history wrong is part of being a nation.") It is therefore only appropriate that contractual relations among individuals be considered as a genuine basis for nation-building. See Hobsbawm (pp.1-13) for the presentation of this argument.
In ethnically-divided societies in which nationalism has become a potent force, civic nationalism will more than likely find an unreceptive audience among minority groups. Through the politicized eyes of an ethnic minority, the exclusive recognition of the rights of citizens has the hidden effect of institutionalizing the hegemony of the dominant group.\(^7^0\) This is so simply because the largest group has the most citizens. As a result, the identity and symbols of the state, the culture of society, and the policy output of the regime will inordinately reflect the values and interests of the dominant group. From the vantage point of the minority, the attempt of civic nationalism to parade notions like a colorblind society is nothing more than a duplicitous effort to mask hegemony behind a facade of equality. Under these circumstances, minority groups will be quite wary of the new regime and will interpret all its pronouncements on democracy, equal rights, the rule of law, etc. as simply a Machiavellian ploy designed to deny them their rights as a nation. The expected recourse for minority groups will be to withhold their consent for the regime and state as long as their national rights remain

\(^7^0\) I use the word "hegemony" here with its full Gramscian overtones. In other words, hegemony is a form of domination that is established by consent. It takes on the appearance of the general interest and the public good when in fact it conceals the power, privileges, and unequal distribution of benefits enjoyed by the dominant group. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., (New York: International Publishers, 1971). Rothshild also indicates minority dissatisfaction with a meritocracy (or in his terminology, a "cross-patterned reticulate model" of ethnic stratification). Rothshild, (1981), pp.81-85.
unrecognized. It follows then that civic nationalism is not conducive to the consolidation of democracy.

Monistic nationalism occurs among groups demographically dominant in a given area and who claim political rights commensurate with this. Essentially, they insist that their language, their symbols, and their political interests take priority. More than likely the ethnic group represented by this ideology will be in a position of political power but, psychologically, they will be insecure about their status and may carry with them a sense of grievance that they have been wronged historically. Such insecurity provides the motive for ethnic elites to affirm publicly their group's worth through constitutions and the symbols of the state. Accordingly, they will compel the minority, whom they view with suspicion, to acknowledge at every turn their "preeminence" in the state. In the domain of language rights, the majority's language will be adopted as official for the entire state. Whatever concessions are

71 To continue with the Gramscian parallel, if civic nationalism is similar to his notion of hegemony, monistic nationalism represents a form of "direct domination." Gramsci, p.12.

72 This psychological profile of monistic nationalist elites comes from Rothschild who describes politically insecure ethnic leaders as "apt to protect themselves by taking rigid and aggressive stances," as unable to gain credibility in the eyes of other national communities, and as "anxious, suspicious, and easily distracted" from the work of forging conflict-mediating institutions. Rothschild, (1981), p.164.
granted to minority groups in the area of symbols -- language, flags, ceremonies, etc. -- there will be an accompanying stipulation that ensures the primacy of the dominant group's culture (e.g., a hierarchical arrangement of flags, the mandatory playing of the national anthem before the anthem of the minority group at cultural events, etc.).

A constant theme of monistic nationalism is to deny diversity and to push for a homogeneous state identity. Towards this end, various legitimation or "ownership" claims over a given territory are advanced, such as "prior occupation" of the land, a "special mission" to spread a religion or fulfill an honorable duty, and a history of "traditional rule" over a given territory (otherwise known as historic rights).\(^7\) Based on such legitimation claims, the sovereignty of the state will be located solely in the dominant group while others will be consigned to a second-class citizenship status, such as "guests" or "migrants."\(^8\)

\(^7\) Horowitz explains: "Ethnic claims to priority or exclusion are supported by appeals to moral principles. The principles are invoked to justify departures from strict equality. The moral basis of ethnic claims lies in group legitimacy within a territory. Legitimacy is asserted to be distributed unevenly among ethnic groups." Horowitz, pp.201-9.

\(^8\) The refusal to grant citizenship rights to minority groups is quite prevalent in ethnically-divided societies. For instance, in Malaysia Chinese were granted citizenship in a constitutional bargain that obligated them to acknowledge the predominance of Malays in politics and the civil service. (Horowitz, pp.582-7.) In the United States it was a mere thirty years ago that African-Americans were guaranteed full citizenship rights by the federal government.
such as autonomy will be sternly opposed as the dominant group prefers instead to build a centralized state. Hence, whatever regions had autonomy will come under attack for weakening the state and for cultivating a secessionist sentiment among the people. Eventually, the dominant group will move to overturn all autonomous jurisdictions. At the same time, it will be preoccupied with the status of its irredenta in other states, often arguing for rights and recognition it denies its own minorities. Its stance vis-à-vis irredenta will consequently be one of active protectionism, to be followed by an irredentist policy if it believes it co-nationals are in imminent danger.

Confronted by a monistic national ideology, minority groups are likely to respond initially with demands for parity\(^75\) (or pluralist nationalism) which could harden and blossom into secessionist movements if not adequately addressed or if repressed. Much depends on the degree of respect minorities give to the majority's legitimation claims,\(^76\) and that in turn depends on the presence of their own unique sovereignty claims. If they

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\(^75\) Horowitz finds that minorities, when faced by a powerful group advancing exclusivist or priority claims, will typically appeal for equality of treatment. "The asymmetry of group claims means precisely that demands for priority confront demands for parity." Horowitz, pp.250-1.

\(^76\) Horowitz notes that "of all the foundations of legitimacy, prior occupation is most likely to compel respect across group lines." On the other hand, special religious mission does not carry moral weight across groups who do not share the religion. Ibid., pp.212-3.
have articulated their own ownership claims over the regions in which they are a demographic majority, then the appearance of monistic nationalism could only make them more resolute for exit from the state. In the words of Donald Horowitz, "[i]f there are several bases of legitimacy, it follows that one group may claim priority on one ground, another on another ground. Where claims based on history and geography clash ... moderation will be in short supply." 77 When groups speak in different ideological idioms, they have no shared concepts or common values against which different interests and claims can be assessed and mediated. The situation is analogous to the incommensurability of paradigms Thomas Kuhn examined in the history of the sciences: there can no agreement on the "facts" because the standards on what constitutes facts are paradigm-dependent. 78 When competing ethnic groups debate their respective national ideologies in the marketplace of ideas, their conversation is likely to be "mutually unintelligible" and "incomprehensible." 79 In this context, a democratic agreement will be exceptionally difficult to attain. By contributing to a public discourse marked by

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77 Ibid., p.213.


incompatible demands, monistic nationalism is not likely to facilitate democratic consolidation.

The final national ideology to be discussed is primordial nationalism. It shares many goals with monistic nationalism, such as the desire to promote homogeneity and to extirpate heterogeneity. However, whereas monistic nationalism promotes a political claim of priority, primordial nationalism advances a claim of exclusivity; and whereas the former relies chiefly on political means to establish homogeneity, the latter chooses forcible expulsion and physical elimination as a first option and a final solution. The crux of primordial nationalism is to define the legitimate members of the political community on the basis of ethnic-marker criteria (religion, race, kinship, language) and to base group rights on such distinctions. In this way, primordial nationalism articulates ownership claims similar to monistic nationalism -- prior occupation, special mission, and historic rights. If it is possible, it will assimilate or absorb minorities with whom it has close ethnic or historical ties. Otherwise, the group will either be made politically quiescent through repression or, if possible, driven out entirely so as to create an ethnically pure state.\footnote{This is, unfortunately, a familiar by-product of ethnic politics: India and Pakistan engaged in wholesale population exchanges and so have India and Sri Lanka; Chinese have been forcibly removed from Vietnam, Bengalis from Burma, Asians from Uganda, etc., etc. (Horowitz, p.198.) See also Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, (Summer 1993), pp.111-121.} Primordial nationalists are also inherently expansionist
as they see in the recovery of lost irredenta the completion of their goal to make polity and nation congruent.81

Primordial nationalism has an enormous propensity for aggressiveness and barbarism. The chief psychological disposition of its adherents is ressentiment. Like the integral nationalism of Nazi Germany, it sees in the exercise of violence and terror a purifying act to revenge past injustices and/or fulfill a historical or religious mission.82 Because it is preoccupied with the promotion, glorification, and maintenance of the marker-criteria of its own group and insists that they represent the total definition of the individual's who share the markers, it tends to see others as something less than human. Basically, it perceives minority groups through the medium of an "enemy stereotype"83 whereby they are defined as posing grave threats to the continued way of life and existence of one's own group. As Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot point out, this "tendency to 'demonize' the enemy population" by defining them as on par with the animal world is a "necessary condition for 'crimes against humanity'."84 In sum, if a politically significant group in either


82 Greenfeld, pp.275-396; Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, "Nationalism and Aggression," manuscript, June 15, 1991, pp.7-9, 22-6.

the majority or the minority adopts primordial nationalism, then the attempt to consolidate democracy will be seriously jeopardized.

The first hypothesis of this study is formulated in the following manner: Holding everything else constant, if politically significant groups in ethnically-divided societies articulate a national ideology that approaches the ideal type of primordial nationalism, then both democracy and democratic consolidation are expected to face severe challenges. Primordial nationalism is incompatible with democracy because it directly contradicts democratic values such as universal citizenship and tolerance. If the protagonists of primordial nationalism practice forcible population expulsions, then the basic protections of civil liberties that democracy provides will be violated. The ensuing animosities between ethnic groups will substantially reduce the incentives for ethnic elites to be moderate and conciliatory. Instead the conditions will be in place for them to develop war-like relations. In this sense, primordial nationalism is the most dramatic antithesis to both democracy and democratic consolidation.

If politically significant groups advocate a national ideology that approaches the ideal type of monistic nationalism, then both democracy and democratic consolidation are assumed to face formidable obstacles. Because monistic nationalism demands the

84 Greenfeld and Chirot, p.9.
supremacy of one group over another, elites that represent it may feel compelled to utilize repressive measures that trample democratic values (such as free speech and association, political competition, offices open to all) under foot. In terms of democratic consolidation, the chauvinism and superiority expressed by monistic nationalists does not encourage elites from other groups to enter into settlements or engage in regular patterns of interaction and communication with them. As such, monistic nationalism does not contribute to the structural integration or mutual understandings of elites across ethnic lines. To borrow Di Palma's phrase, when a monistic ideology is present there is no point at which minorities feel comfortable enough to "relax." In short, monistic nationalism is conducive neither to democracy nor democratic consolidation.

If politically significant groups articulate a national ideology that approaches the ideal type of civic nationalism, then conditions are somewhat more favorable for democracy but not for democratic consolidation. Analytically, civic nationalism is not contrary to democracy. Based as it is on western liberal-democracy, civic nationalism supports all essential dimensions of procedural democracy. The problem for this ideology arises when

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85 By structural integration, Burton, Gunther, and Higley mean overlapping communication and influence networks found among consensually unified elites. Burton, Gunther, and Higley, p.11.

the task at hand is to gain the consent of minorities for the consolidation of the regime. By treating national rights as outmoded solutions suitable only for collectivist societies, civic nationalism ignores the real sense of security that such rights provide minority groups. The dismantling of such rights or the refusal to institutionalize them works to create an atmosphere of interethnic suspicions and fears that is antithetical to the core of democratic consolidation, viz., rational discourse, mutual trust, and the guarantee that no group will be systematically excluded from power. Since the practical effects of civic nationalism will be to marginalize or exclude minority groups and render them unable to affect substantially policy output, minority consent for the regime and/or state is not likely to be forthcoming. In sum, civic nationalism is conceived to be poorly equipped to meet the challenges of democratic consolidation in ethnically-divided societies.

Finally, if politically significant groups articulate a national ideology that approaches pluralist nationalism, then the greater chance that elites representing different communities will enter into a democratic agreement and express allegiance to it and the more they will respect democratic norms in their behavior. Pluralist nationalism is strongly conducive to democracy because it embraces its key values and even extends them to groups that
otherwise would not be able to compete effectively. Furthermore, by cultivating interethnic trust and guaranteeing minority representation pluralist nationalism reduces the risks of playing the game of democracy and therefore creates a favorable climate for attaining minority consent for the regime and the state. In a word, pluralist nationalism is framed as the national ideology most likely to produce democratic consolidation. (See Table 1)
### Table 1: A Typology of National Ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>pluralist</th>
<th>civic</th>
<th>monistic</th>
<th>primordial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political claims</td>
<td>substantive equality</td>
<td>formal equality</td>
<td>priority</td>
<td>exclusivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychological disposition</td>
<td>confident</td>
<td>confident</td>
<td>insecure</td>
<td>ressentiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of the state</td>
<td>all citizens and nations that compose it</td>
<td>sovereignty of citizens</td>
<td>sovereignty of unique ethnic group</td>
<td>sovereignty of unique ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance between civil/national rights</td>
<td>both</td>
<td>only civil rights</td>
<td>asymmetrical national rights</td>
<td>only national rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude towards minorities</td>
<td>acceptance</td>
<td>indifference</td>
<td>suspicious</td>
<td>hated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>program for minorities</td>
<td>measures to ensure security</td>
<td>equality of opportunity</td>
<td>measures to ensure subordination</td>
<td>expulsion/extinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>likely reaction by minorities and regime</td>
<td>acceptance of state demands for national rights</td>
<td>demands for parity/civil war</td>
<td>secessionist movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitude towards irredecenta</td>
<td>respect other states' sovereignty</td>
<td>respect other states' sovereignty</td>
<td>active protectionism/revanchism</td>
<td>revanchism if necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impact on democratic consolidation</td>
<td>facilitates</td>
<td>obstructs</td>
<td>obstructs</td>
<td>strongly impedes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Having discussed the impact of national ideologies on democratic consolidation in the abstract, it is important at this point to highlight specifically how they are linked to the dependent variable. National ideologies do not necessarily serve as windows to deeply-held elite values. There are various motivations that compel elites to propagate an ideology, not the least being the perceived popularity of its message. National ideologies are also not inexorably linked with policy outcomes. If a politically significant group identified with a national ideology gains political office, the national ideology itself may become just one of many factors that influence policy choice. Policy output is just as likely to reflect the present balance of forces as well as new opportunities and constraints.

All the same, nothing precludes the possibility that national ideologies guide policy and become institutionally-embodied. In order to have a causal impact on democratic consolidation, however, national ideologies need not attain this level of influence in government or among politically significant elites. All that is necessary is that they be promulgated by the elites of one group and believed by members of another group. The ambience of ethnically-divided societies is punctuated by a host of fears and anxieties -- fears of subordination, anxiety about relative group worth, worries about the prospects of permanent political
exclusion, and fears of extinction. Often it is the case that the public utterance of a certain word (if it is invested with historical meaning or meant to convey relative group worth) can be a lightening rod for ethnic mobilization. Once such emotionally-laden terms enter public discourse, ripple effects shoot through each national community as its opinion-makers react by articulating their own counter-ideologies and programs. It is precisely in the creation of a political climate in which group demands, aspirations, expectations, and fears are played out that national ideologies have causal efficacy. Pluralist nationalism, for instance, is conducive to democratic consolidation because it creates an atmosphere of interethnic trust and security in which a consensus on the rightness of the territorial unit of the state can be secured -- a prerequisite to the crafting of a democratic regime. Civic, monistic, and primordial nationalism, on the other hand, generate various degrees of distress and panic. The ensuing ethnic tension, marked by a crescendo of hyperbolic charges and conspiracy theories in the media and outbreaks of violence among the public, tends to push competing ethnic elites towards a variety of breakdown games -- maximalist demands, extremist posturing, a zero-sum game mentality, and inflammatory rhetoric. As a result, these three ideologies do not promote the moderation and conciliation necessary to strike a democratic agreement.

87 Horowitz, pp.166-181.

88 At the level of individual interethnic contact, these become "fighting words."
The causal influence of national ideologies is accentuated during times of political and social transformation. Large-scale social changes and regime transitions bring with them profound and sometimes overwhelming uncertainty.\textsuperscript{89} When traditions begin to falter, when institutions and their concomitant interests are suspended, when routines are interrupted, and when lives become "unsettled," ideologies step forward to help construct new "strategies of action," define interests, and organize social life.\textsuperscript{90} Significantly, in Gurr's study of the worldwide trends in ethnic conflict, it was found that both the number and intensity of ethnic conflicts were correlated with the onset of political transitions.\textsuperscript{91} It is specifically in such transitional periods that "bursts of ideological activism occur" and do "battle to dominate the world-

\textsuperscript{89} In one rather dramatic historical example, Stalinist industrialization and collectivization in the USSR produced among the nascent working class "a colossal growth of industrial traumatism" (i.e., alcoholism, hooliganism, and criminality) while among peasants there were widespread reports of visions of the Antichrist. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," (p.30) and Moshe Lewin, "Society, State, and Ideology during the First Five-Year Plan," (p.61) in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).


\textsuperscript{91} Gurr, pp.359-363.
views, assumptions, and habits of their members." Because national ideologies offer competitive models of identity, justice, authority, and utopia, political transitions present unique opportunities for them to play an exceptional role in the determination of human behavior.

Other important factors to consider are that different national ideologies may be found among elites within the same ethnic group and any group's acceptance of a particular national ideology does not remain static over time. Politically significant groups and elites can move up and down the continuum in response to new conditions and new calculations. The increasing support for primordial nationalism in one community can lead to a reformulation in this direction by another community who feels threatened and begins to believe only equally drastic solutions can safeguard its interests. The incidence of violence can also radicalize demands by undercutting support for pluralist nationalism in favor of a more confrontational approach. Such violence can be capitalized on by more radical elites who exploit it as confirming evidence of whatever insecurities and xenophobia the group may be nurturing. Furthermore, competing elites and parties within ethnic groups can seize on the perceived failure of the dominant ideology by articulating either a more moderate conception or a more chauvinistic one. Finally, all of the

92 Swidler, p.279.
behavioral patterns examined below -- chain reactions, census elections, tripolar coalitions, and flanking -- could have an enormous impact on the content of national ideologies.

The data source for gathering measures on national ideologies will be the public statements of elites, political parties, and opinion-makers. At this juncture, a practical question comes to mind -- given that in any given national community one is likely to find a multitude of ideologies, how does one determine which to analyze? The solution to this problem is similar to that employed in delimiting the boundaries of what signifies politically significant groups. First of all, it is necessary to determine the strategic location of the articulators of the given ideology. In the former Yugoslav context, if a prominent government official, a leading figure in a significant political party, a member of the military high command, or a party leader who also controls his own "party-army" enunciates an ideology, this will be considered politically significant. In addition there is the "numerical component": the greater audience a national ideology finds among the mass public, the more politically significant it is. This last criterion leads a consideration of the relationship between public support and national ideologies.

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b. The Attitudinal Dimension: The Values, Beliefs and Attitudes of the Mass Public

National ideologies are able to affect the functioning of a political order not merely because they are formulated by elites who have resources of power at their disposal, but also because they "strike roots in mass sentiments, apprehensions, and aspirations."\(^{94}\) A constant theme of the literature on nationalism and ethnic politics is the relative ease with which ethnic groups are mobilized compared to other bases of social cleavage, such as class. One explanation of this is that the conceptualization of a class identity often entails "the difficult task of pushing up the psychological-stereotypical gradient" to a wider and more abstract frame of reference whereas one needs merely to "slide" down the gradient to primordial traits in order to mobilize on an ethnic basis.\(^{95}\) It is here that the most intense emotions, the most basic identities, and the most ingrained stereotypes can be tapped by ethnic elites.

In the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, the availability of ethnicity as a base of political organization was only accentuated by the general "flatness" of civil society. Due to the atomization of society and the absence of class distinctions, elites (both new and old) moved directly to the

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\(^{94}\) Horowitz, p.105.

exploitation of old interethnic animosities and historical grievances as a source of popular appeal. What is pertinent for this study is the type of national ideology that has hit the most responsive chords within the various national communities. Is there an empirical basis to say that a single national ideology has become modal for a given ethnic group? Or is there a range of ideologies each competing for support? Consistent with the discussion above on the role of the public in democratic consolidation, the masses need not demonstrate a deep-seated commitment to pluralist nationalist values; far more significant is whether or not ethnic groups are mobilizable in support of or in reaction to civic, monistic, or primordial nationalism.

Hypothesis II suggests that if public opinion expresses support for either the ideal type of primordial nationalism or monistic nationalism, then a democracy will enjoy less public support and will have a difficult time consolidating. Both primordial and monistic nationalism promote a type of politics that is incompatible with tolerance, peaceful competition, and respect for civil and political liberties. If the public supports either of these national ideological types then a social base will be in place for demagogues to incite for the purpose of protests and

violence aimed at vulnerable minorities. As stated above, civic nationalism does not contradict democracy per se. But if a minority group overwhelmingly opposes a civic nationalist program of the majority, the minority may refuse to participate in democratic institutions and thus compromise their legitimacy. By so doing, democratic consolidation could be undermined. With regard to pluralist nationalism, the more public support that it receives the greater likelihood that the regime will be democratic and consolidated. Testing this hypothesis is dependent on the availability of mass survey data.

c. The Behavioral Dimension: Political Parties and Politically Significant Groups

The third and final dimension for analysis will encompass a series of hypotheses that focus on the behavior of ethnically-based political parties. A democracy is considered consolidated when all politically significant groups play within the democratic framework. The logic of ethnic politics, however, has a way of inducing behavior that runs contrary to democratic norms. Two questions will be addressed from which will be culled a number of hypotheses. First of all, what is the numerical ratio and balance of electoral strength between ethnic and nonethnic parties? This question is significant for determining the saliency of ethnic politics as opposed to other social cleavages. Secondly, given that political parties are organized on an ethnic basis, how many
parties are there per group? The number of ethnic parties representing ethnic groups has ramifications for the type of politics that will unfold. The Diamond, Linz, and Lipset studies show that if each ethnic group has one dominant party, then this acts as a stabilizing influence on politics and opens up the possibility of multiethnic coalitions and accommodative stances. On the other hand, the presence of more than one party per ethnic group tends to set up a destructive trajectory of intraethnic outbidding that turns parties away from interethnic compromises and alliances.  

Once again the exposition that follows (with the exception of the second hypothesis) is based on the research of Donald Horowitz. The general theme of the following hypotheses considered in toto is that if ethnic elites forego an initial window of opportunity to be conciliatory and accommodating, the emergence of ethnic politics will compel a gradual transformation in the complexion of a political order from one of civil competition and peaceful coexistence to a politics of intolerance, exclusion, and ultimately, authoritarianism.

1. The Chain Reaction Hypothesis. The first empirical question that has to be addressed is the character of the party system. Upon which types of issues and cleavages are political parties organized? Have ethnic parties completely overtaken

nonethnic parties in electoral strength? Have parties representing the ideology of primordial nationalism marginalized parties representing pluralist nationalism? There is a tendency in ethnically-divided societies for ethnic parties to drive out nonethnic parties. For example, if a society is evenly divided between two ethnic groups and one decides to vote as a bloc whereas the other splits its vote along class and ethnic lines, the party representing the former group is put at a collective advantage. This is precisely what happened in Trinidad and Guyana in the 1960s when a major party in each society became popularly identified as an ethnic party. Indian ethnic voting in Guyana and Black ethnic voting in Trinidad compelled nonethnic parties, willy nilly, to line up on the ethnic dimension. Increasingly, elections took the form of a "census." In essence, a "chain reaction" is established when one major party decides to organize on an ethnic basis. This "structural innovation" compels all other parties to adopt an ethnic stance, no less than the "catch-all" party in Otto Kirchheimer's classic analysis forced the "class-mass" and "denominational" parties in Western Europe to broaden their appeal or die.98 To quote Horowitz: "As ethnic party

98 Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, Sixth edition (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), pp.325-340; Horowitz, pp.311-334; 194-6. The chain reaction may also be considered the ethnic equivalent of Di Palma's notion of "bandwagon effects." Both constructs describe a changing structure of opportunities that compel parties to adapt to new practices. However, whereas bandwagon effects represent a centripetal dynamic that leads to democratic consolidation, the chain reaction is a centrifugal force that can tear apart a
systems grow, the stakes become too high and the pressures toward the census-type election too strong to permit the luxury of representation outside the ethnic group. ... Whatever the number of parties, ethnic party systems leave little room for parties organized without regard to the preeminence of ethnic issues in a severely divided society or for politicians aiming to struggle for ethnic interests outside the ethnic party. In such a system, there is a single axis of political conflict and a single way of pursuing that conflict: through the ethnic parties."\textsuperscript{99}

In order to grasp why a proliferation of ethnic parties does not bode well for the stability of a regime, it is necessary to consider the character of an ethnic party vis-a-vis the voluntary-associational parties of the West. The latter is inclusive in its membership and seeks to represent the interests of a number of different segments of society; hence, the interest aggregation function normally attributed to such parties. Ethnic parties, on the other hand, define membership ascriptively. Since their pool of support is found within the ethnic group and not outside it, they tend to reinforce cleavages rather than bridge them. In this way, the ethnic party behaves more like an interest group as it promotes its own ethnic interests regardless of their impact on the whole. As Horowitz explains, the ethnic party's "overall mission is state.

\textsuperscript{99} Horowitz, pp.341-2.
to foster the interests of the group it represents. There are no countervailing competitive incentives."\textsuperscript{100}

The upshot of this displacement of nonethnic parties is that there is "little relief from the ethnic character of politics in the form of alternating issues."\textsuperscript{101} Ethnic parties tend to become immersed in a politics of ethnic symbolism and institutionalizing relative group worth and status. Furthermore, the ethnic dimension becomes all-engrossing as all other salient issues get redefined in ethnic terms. This leads to an increasingly circumscribed national political discourse, for the identification and definition of problems and the formulation of possible solutions can no longer be conducted in nonethnic terms.\textsuperscript{102} Once the ethnic cleavage reaches this level of significance in the polity, the possibility of utilizing the democratic methods of negotiation and compromise becomes increasingly remote.

In sum, the hypothesis reads as follows: if the number of ethnic parties increase at the expense of nonethnic parties, then the more ethnic cleavages become intense, the more time is devoted to divisive, symbolic ethnic issues, and the less likelihood

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp.296, 295-8.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.346.

\textsuperscript{102} Shöpflin calls this a "process of reductionism" (pp.56, 58) and Rothschild dubs it the "overethnicizing" of public issues (1981, p.63).
that a democratic accord can be struck. This hypothesis will be considered falsified if nonethnic parties remain a permanent feature of the political landscape, and/or if they increase in electoral strength. In this event, ethnic cleavages are becoming less important and the possibility of pacifying ethnic interests by cross-cutting them with other types of cleavage becomes possible.

2. The Generosity Moment. The second hypothesis to be expounded is gleaned from the insights of a number of thinkers who advise dominant groups to exercise self-restraint, generously accommodate minorities, and act promptly in introducing confidence-building measures so as not to leave political space for militants to disturb interethnic relations beyond repair. Larry Diamond, for one, compares the very different political outcomes between India and New Guinea on the one hand, and Sri Lanka, on the other, and arrives at a "powerful generalization." In the former cases, elites from the dominant group have pursued flexible and inclusive strategies that run the gamut from symbolic gestures to carving out new federal units (in India). Such policy approaches have been quite successful in maintaining interethnic peace and stability. Sri Lanka, however, is the epitome of what not to do -- the obstinate refusal of the Sinhalese to acknowledge Tamil concerns "transformed the Tamil sense of grievance into a militant and ultimately violent separatist movement."\(^{103}\) Both George Schöpflin and Joseph Rothschild agree that ethnic leaders

\(^{103}\) Diamond, vol.3, pp.20-22.
from the dominant group must bend over backwards and sacrifice some their own short-term interests in order to maintain the integrity of the state in the long-term. And both emphasize a timing factor -- if ethnic elites in the majority community do not act swiftly to address minority interests, mobilization and politicization on the ethnic fault lines will rapidly dissolve any basis for dialogue and compromise.  

Given that elites from the dominant group present a program to minority groups and do not simply ignore, repress, expel, or annihilate them, the program contents could span quite a range. Rothschild provides the following list: removing barriers to integration, social mobility and equality of opportunity; official recognition of cultural pluralism; the granting of cultural autonomy; creating political/cultural satrapies for ethnic elites; and various schemes of devolution, cantonization, and federalization. Because every ethnic group has its own definition of what constitutes a minimal threshold for living together, and because this definition can be historically variable, it is difficult to specify in a universal sense what the elements of a generous package would be. Certainly it is not up to the analyst to determine a priori if a given policy proposal adequately meets the needs of an ethnic group. Perhaps the most that can be done in this area is to determine whether or not the dominant group is


willing to adjust its package in light of minority demands. How do the elites of the dominant group react when their initial proposal is rebuffed by the minority as inadequate? Do they harden their position and display an unwillingness to compromise or do they regroup and return to the bargaining table in a spirit of mutual adjustment and reciprocity? If the latter approach is followed, the prospects for undermining the support of primordial nationalists and secessionists in the minority is enhanced.

The formal statement of this hypothesis reads as follows: if the political representatives of the dominant group adopt a conciliatory, flexible, inclusive, and tolerant approach towards minority groups, then the prospects of democratic consolidation are enhanced. Conversely, if the political representatives of the dominant group exhibit a reluctance to reevaluate and reshape their program in accordance with minority concerns then the interethnic goodwill necessary to lead to democratic consolidation is unlikely to be cultivated. This hypothesis will be considered disconfirmed if the elites of the dominant group prove exceptionally generous but either interethnic violence, civil war, or secession occurs anyway.
The Competitive Configuration: Census Elections, Coalitions, and Flanking. The number of political parties representing each ethnic group structures the range of politically possible relations between parties. Horowitz writes that "[t]he possibilities of competition and coalition are affected by the number of parties per ethnic group and how they divide the total vote."\textsuperscript{106} What then determines how many parties represent a given ethnic group? Horowitz cites such factors as the existence of social cleavages, the existence of ascriptive differences, a collective conception of how many parties should represent the group without weakening its overall electoral strength, differences of opinion concerning interethnic strategies, leadership rivalries, and the incentives provided by the electoral system.\textsuperscript{107} Another element that has to be taken into account is the explosion of parties that normally occurs in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience. This is virtually a universal law in the democratization literature, and it is only amplified in the post-communist societies where autonomous forms of political organization had been suppressed for so long. It is to be expected then that in the early stages of democratic consolidation there are likely to be hundreds of different parties that compete for office. Eventually, most will wither away as the party system begins to stabilize in response to the rewards and penalties of the electoral

\textsuperscript{106} Horowitz, p.349.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., pp.349-350.
system.108

Under normal conditions the electoral system not only has an impact on the number of parties that compete per ethnic group, but it also structures party competition and coalitions as well. A major point Horowitz makes in his comparative study is that ethnic parties do respond to the electoral environment. In other words, ethnic elites are not so irrational and single-minded as to be immune to electoral incentives and disincentives.109 At the same time, the institutional choice concerning types of electoral systems reflects the distribution of power among politically significant ethnic groups.110 In this sense, electoral systems are recursive variables -- they are crafted by parties seeking to further their own interests but in their "proximal" and "distal" effects they are capable of establishing an incentive structure that


110 Claus Offe remarks that "the situation of extreme contingency invites opportunism, and the veil of ignorance is lifted. Now actors are in a position to see which constitutional design and which ethnic boundaries of the state will best serve their interests in policy outcomes, or their passions for ethnic identities and resentments. The situation is replete with opportunities, rightly perceived to be unique in their scope, to improve one's 'original endowment,' or to take revenge." Offe, p.872.
works to determine elite behavior.\textsuperscript{111} Although this study is not focused on the role of political institutions, careful attention will be paid to how the choice of an electoral system reflects the relative configuration of ethnic group strength and how the system in turn structures ethnic elites towards behavior conducive to democratic consolidation and behavior antithetical to it. Suffice it to say, there is consensus in the literature on both democratization and ethnic politics that proportional representation is better suited than first-past-the-post to convince reluctant actors (be they authoritarian holdouts or anxious minorities) to join the democratic game.\textsuperscript{112}

There are a number of different patterns of competition and coalition that can commence in ethnically-divided societies, those patterns being dependent chiefly on how many parties there are per ethnic group. What follows will contain an elucidation of hypotheses based on census elections, tripolar coalitions, and flanking. Each hypothesis describes behavioral tendencies destructive to a democratic order.

\textsuperscript{111} Gunther cites the conditions under which electoral laws can have a deterministic effect on elite behavior, although in his case study such conditions did not obtain. Richard Gunther, "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," \textit{American Political Science Review}, v.83, n.3, (September 1989), pp.835-858.

\textsuperscript{112} Horowitz, pp.628-651; O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp.60-1.
3. **Census Elections.** The ideal typical case involving the negative repercussions of a census elections is a bipolar society in which one group composes 60% of the population and forms a majority in 60% of the electoral districts, the other group has 40% of the population with a majority in 40% of the electoral districts, and each has one ethnic party to represent it. Under these conditions, neither a single-member district plurality system nor a proportional representational system will change the fact that the majority ethnic group will always form the government. Electoral uncertainty only exists until a "crucial, polarizing election" takes place in which voter turnout mirrors the "census" and thereby seals the fate of each party for the foreseeable future. Prior to this point, politics is especially violence-prone. This is so because the question concerning voter turnout in these conditions is not for which party members of an ethnic group will vote, but if they will in fact vote. Hence, party mobilization drives are conducted to maximize voter turnout and usually take the form of appealing to ethnic stereotypes and animosities, exaggerating the consequences of an electoral defeat, sanctioning deviants within one's ethnic group in order to ensure everyone tows the ethnic line, threatening and intimidating members of other ethnic groups in order to reduce their overall turnout, etc. Once a "census election" takes place, the minority group finds itself suddenly and
permanently excluded from the political process.\footnote{Horowitz, pp.83-6, 324-332, 363, 348-9.}

At this point, the impact on democratic consolidation must be made perfectly clear. A central motif of the democratization literature is the incentive that the "certain rules, uncertain outcomes" formula provides to hard-liners from the authoritarian regime distraught over their removal from power (and who therefore constitute a potentially destabilizing element). The basic promise of democracy is that no one will ever face permanent political exclusion since the system will remain open to all contestants. Given the dynamics outlined above, however, it is apparent that in ethnically-divided societies such an electoral incentive will fall on deaf ears -- for an excluded ethnic minority remains an excluded ethnic minority whether or not it agrees to play by the democratic game. Under these circumstances, "contingent consent" is simply of no avail. In the words of Horowitz, the outcome of a census election "provides good reason for the excluded minority to depart from the electoral road to power -- since that road in fact does not lead to power."\footnote{Ibid., p.360. Lijphart also discusses this problem and poses the grand coalition as a solution. Lijphart, (1977), pp.29-30.}

Even from the perspective of the winning party all is not necessarily well. Because political exclusion generates such
uncertainty and hostility in the ranks of the minority group, the ruling party cannot rest content with its victory. In order to ensure stability it may ban the minority party and institutionalize a one-party authoritarian regime. Another route to authoritarianism in the aftermath of a crucial, polarizing election is if strategically located members of the minority group in the military conduct a coup d'état in order to reverse the election results. As Horowitz explains, "Regardless of whether an ethnic party system falls victim to civilian or military authoritarianism, whether party rivalry is suppressed by those who already captured power through the party or by those who have been shut out of power, an ethnic party system is highly vulnerable to being transformed into an authoritarian but no less ethnically partial regime." 115

The hypothesis is as follows: if a minority group is territorially concentrated such that it is a majority in a given region and it gives its vote solely to one party, then this party will do either one of two things: either seek some form of "exit" (ranging from confederalism, to autonomy, to secession) from the state as it is presently constituted, or attempt to violently reverse the election results. Given the same conditions, the party representing the demographically dominant group is likely to suppress the minority party in the name of public order and national security. If the minority party agrees to join the

115 Ibid., p.363.
dominant party in a coalition government or participates in parliament, then census elections cannot be said to have such deleterious consequences for democratic consolidation and this hypothesis will be considered falsified.\textsuperscript{116}

4. \textit{Tripolarity and Ephemeral Coalitions}. Insofar as the system of ethnic stratification involves three primary groups and each group has its own party, then coalitional politics becomes possible and the risks associated with losing elections are reduced. Often the third group is numerically smaller than the other two and is capable of shifting its electoral support from one party to the other in order to produce a majority-backed government. However, tripolarity is not a durable arrangement and more often than not tends towards bifurcation. This is so because the third party comes under intense pressure to choose sides and often gets absorbed into one or the other larger ethnic parties. In other cases, there is a sub-cleavage within the third ethnic group that leads it to form two mutually antagonistic parties which accordingly align on opposite sides with the larger ethnic parties. When either process occurs, "the stage is set for bifurcation" and

\textsuperscript{116} A bipolar case is not necessary in order to apply this hypothesis. A cursory glance at the former Yugoslavia yields the observation that generally it is only minority groups who have a single, dominant party to represent their interests. This is true of the Serbs in Croatia and the Croats, Hungarians, Muslims and Albanians in Serbia. All of these instances will be used to test the impact of census elections on democratic consolidation, although the dominant ethnic group in each case (i.e., the Croats and the Serbs, respectively) has a multitude of competing parties.
the dynamics described in the previous hypothesis begin to take shape.\textsuperscript{117}

If a multiethnic coalition happens to be forged after an election, it will take one of two forms. A coalition of convenience finds its sole purpose in the need for parties to combine their electoral strength in order to create a government. Because of this limited objective, coalitions of convenience are extremely short-lived. Their demise is usually attributable to the efforts of one party to dominate the coalition, or the sheer incompatibility of coalition partners (which stems from a calculated decision to avoid partnership with parties that compete for the same clientele). Empirically, no coalition of convenience in Horowitz’s study lasted for more than one election and their average life was slightly more than a year.\textsuperscript{118} A coalition of commitment also comes about for the purpose of creating a majoritarian-backed government, but it goes beyond mere convenience and seeks to reduce ethnic conflict and searches for an interethnic consensus. The forces that tear it asunder originate outside the coalition in the form of competing parties who capitalize on the perceived concessions that the coalition partners have made. The one coalition of commitment Horowitz examined -- Sri Lanka in 1965 -- failed, like the coalitions of convenience, to survive beyond one

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., pp.360-2.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., pp.369-378.
election.119

The hypothesis formulated for this scenario holds that if a tripolar ethnic party system is in place and a coalitional government is formed, such coalitions will prove unstable. In the event that the third party is absorbed and a bipolar contest ensues between the two largest parties, then the second largest party will be excluded from power and pressures will build for it to exit from the state. If flanking parties outside the coalition contribute to its disintegration, then the regime will be unstable and will have difficulty creating a workable government. On the other hand, if a tripolar party system proceeds in relative peace and if any coalitions that are founded prove durable and stable, then the negative impact of tripolarity on democratic consolidation shall be considered falsified.120

5. Flanking. The existence of more than one party for each ethnic group mitigates census elections but does not diminish the probability of conflict and the recourse to authoritarian solutions. This is due to the centrifugal quality of ethnic party competition. In ethnic party systems, party competition occurs not between ethnic groups but within them. Because party identification is

119 Ibid., pp.378-395.

120 Obviously this hypothesis has prima facie applicability to the politics of Bosnia-Hercegovina and will be tested accordingly.
ascriptively defined, vote transferability by "floating voters" is precluded. In Horowitz's succinct formulation, "[t]here are many working-class Tories, but very few Hindu Akalis ..."\textsuperscript{121} Such is not the case in nonethnic party systems in which parties tend to compete for undecided voters located in the ideological center. This gravitation towards the middle gives parties an electoral incentive to moderate their positions. In ethnic party systems such incentives are not present. What intragroup competition occurs is located on the "flanks" of each party as insurgent and more radical ethnic parties push the dominant parties to extreme positions. The existence of flanking parties puts pressure on dominant parties to shun moderation and interethnic negotiations lest they be branded with the stigma of selling out or betraying one's nation. As Horowitz notes, there "is nothing in the competitive equation [that] requires moderation." The "absence of countervailing electoral incentives" (that would come from the ability to appeal across ethnic cleavages) can produce a "politics of intraethnic outbidding" that makes any interethnic "reconciliation difficult."\textsuperscript{122}

For the most part, Horowitz specifies the range of patterns that unfold when flanking occurs against a multiethnic alliance in control of the government. In order to craft the hypotheses so

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p.346.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pp.342-8, 357, 359.
that they are applicable to the former Yugoslavia, this study will analyze how flanks push a system away from democratic consolidation and towards authoritarian remedies. In the event that there is a clear majority party representing the interests of the dominant ethnic group, flanking will produce one of three possible outcomes: (1) the flanks will erode the support of the dominant party committed to interethnic reconciliation; (2) the dominant party might choose to act in an "anticipatory" fashion and preempt the flanking party's core program; or (3) the dominant party might choose to "simplify" the flanks through repressive measures.123 In the event that the second possibility occurs, the dominant party basically takes care of the flanks by appropriating their stance. In the third possibility, flanking parties gain enough electoral strength to provoke worry and agitation within the dominant party. In this instance, the sentiment might develop that "something has to be done about the flanks." As Horowitz notes, "[m]ost often the move to a one-party state occurs as a reaction to flanking."124 All three possibilities stand to destroy the consolidation of a democracy. If flanks have no noticeable impact on the politics and behavior of the dominant party, then the phenomenon of flanking will not be considered

123 For various "anticipatory" elite actions and means to "simplify" the flanks, see Ibid., pp.309, 420-4, 429-439.

inherently negative for a democracy.
CHAPTER II

A Brief History of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics in Yugoslavia

A "... Serb, no matter where he lived, wishes to unite with Serbia, without asking about its internal organization."\(^1\)
-- Nikola Pasic', Serbian Radical Party, 1920

"If the Serbs really want to have such a centralist state and government, may God bless them with it, but we Croats do not want any state organization except a confederated federal republic."\(^2\)  -- Stjepan Radic', Croatian Peasant Party, 1918

To say that Yugoslavia was founded under different intentions and with different expectations is a major understatement. It was a precarious union from the beginning, a product of the conditions of war, the collapse of empires, the


\(^2\) Ibid., p.226.
product of the conditions of war, the collapse of empires, the menace of predatory neighbors, the wishful thinking of many in the Croatian political class, and the wariness of the leadership of the independent state of Serbia. Over the course of its seventy-two year existence, a plethora of ideologies, strategies, institutions, and regimes encountered its ethnic cauldron. A constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government, a royal dictatorship, foreign occupation, Stalinist-style communism, socialist pluralism, and authoritarian consociationalism all confronted the South Slav national question but, in the end, were overwhelmed by it. This brief history chapter will chart the central themes of Yugoslav history and will provide a backdrop for the case studies that follow. It will largely be a descriptive chronology that is aided, here and there, by concepts from the theoretical framework. The final section of this chapter will be more analytic in approach and contain a critique of Yugoslav consociationalism. The historical account will focus primarily on the former Yugoslav republics that comprise the subject of this dissertation (thus, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia are omitted).

A. Pre-1918 Historical Experiences and Political Culture

When Yugoslavia was created in 1918 it brought together approximately 12 million people who had vastly different historical experiences, levels of political development, and degrees of national identity. What is known today as Croatia was never politically united prior to 1918. For over 800 years, Croatia-
Slavonia existed as a kind of semi-autonomous subkingdom of Hungary, Dalmatia was under the jurisdiction of Austria (and was connected to Croatia proper only in 1939), and Istria experienced successive Roman, Venetian, French, Austrian, and Italian tutelage. Istria was joined to Yugoslavia only after World War II. Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH) was under Turkish rule from 1463 to 1878. After the second Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878), BH came under joint Austrian-Hungarian rule for 40 years. Serbia had fought wars of national liberation against the Ottoman Empire and won its independent statehood in 1878. The Serbian state expanded considerably after the Balkan Wars of 1912 - 1913 and brought into its fold territories that had predominantly non-Serb populations -- Macedonia, the Sandzak, and Kosovo. Vojvodina was annexed to Serbia (i.e., Yugoslavia) in 1920. Before that, it was a district of Hungary. Given their varied historical experiences, it is not surprising that political elites in the newly-constituted Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had difficulty developing regular patterns of interaction and trustworthy communication networks. The fact that the South Slav peoples had never lived together and instead had lived next to each other -- separated by different cultural zones and civilizational fault lines -- cannot be underestimated as an explanatory factor for the subsequent political trajectory of Yugoslavia.

Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbia all had medieval kingdoms that crossed each others lands at different points in
history. In fact, what exactly is meant by the terms "Croatia," "Bosnia-Hercegovina," and "Serbia" is historically variable. It is for this reason that Ivo Banac writes "the history of the Balkans is the history of migrations -- not just of peoples, but of lands." The medieval Croatian state led by King Tomislav (910-928) was centered in Knin and extended into Bosnia. The origins of Serbia are found in Raska (now within the Sandzak). From this base, Serbian tsars gradually extended their realm northwest to Dubrovnik and Hercegovina, south to Macedonia, and north to the Danube. Under Tsar Stefan Dusan the Serbian empire reached its zenith. From 1331 to 1335 Serbia meant all the land between Hercegovina, present-day Belgrade, and Western Thrace to the Aegean Sea. At this time, Tsar Dusan moved the capital to Skopje and declared himself "Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks." Approximately 50 years later Serbia came under the assault of the Ottoman Turks, to whom they eventually succumbed. Once the Turks began to consolidate their control and the Albanians converted en masse to Islam, Serbs began a historical migration northward. The territorial designation of "Serbia" moved accordingly. When the Serbian empire began to wane in face of Turkish incursions, the medieval state of Bosnia, which had been in existence since 1180, took the opportunity to expand and eventually included all the Dalmatian cities (except Dubrovnik and Zadar), the Bay of Kotor (Montenegro), and the Serbian Sandzak. In light of such successes King Stephen Tvrtko I (1353-1391)  

3 Ibid., p.33.
proclaimed himself the "King of Bosnia and Serbia." The point of mentioning all this is that ownership claims to land often revolve on ideas such as "prior occupation" and "traditional rule." In the Balkans, such historical claims are ubiquitous, overlapping, and antinomic.

If the middle ages represent the highmark of Slav power in the Balkans, it was also the period under which the medieval states fell to foreign domination. The Croatian kingdom contractually consented to Hungarian protection in 1102, Serbia gradually buckled under Ottoman military power after the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389, and Bosnia relented to Turkish suzerainty in 1463 after decades of Ottoman invasions. The national memory of independence and statehood was maintained in each case but by different institutional vehicles. In Croatia, it was the Sabor (Assembly) that preserved Croatia's past. The Hapsburgs allowed the existence of the Sabor and it was here that Croatian spokesman fought a perennial legalistic battle with the crown in an attempt to augment political autonomy. According to Banac, this is "one of the major motifs of Croat parliamentary life" -- "Sabor after Sabor sought to marshal old documents and privileges against the Hapsburg and Hungarian usurpations." This led to a

political culture described by Joseph Rothschild as "defensive obstructionism." The confinement of Croatian political life to the privileged classes and the multifaceted regional character of Croatia meant that there existed no widespread sense of Croatian identity until the early twentieth century. Much of the efforts of mid-nineteenth century Croatian "national awakeners" was thus directed towards educating and molding the mass populace into a national mindset.

In Serbia, the Orthodox Church proved to be the glue that kept intact a common identity among Serbs. The millet system of the Ottoman Empire granted civil authority to local churches. From this base, the church conveyed to its congregation a sense of historical mission, a memory of past glories, national heroes, and statehood, and dreams of national resurrection. Consequently, prior to Serbia's emancipation from the Turks there existed an ingrained sense of national identity. This pre-existing national


mentality greatly facilitated the mobilization of peasants to expel the Ottoman invaders. When Serbia finally was liberated, it found itself with a simplistic social structure. The aristocracy had been liquidated by the Turks leaving behind a largely undeveloped, egalitarian, peasant-based economy. Given such backward conditions, it is quite remarkable that Serbia developed a parliamentary system complete with a constitution, an independent judiciary, a rational-legal bureaucracy, a free press, and a party system. The political culture this experience spawned is neatly conveyed by Rothschild:

"The Serbs, with their political experience of successful nineteenth-century insurrections by a socially homogeneous people to carve its own independent and populist kingdom out of the decaying Ottoman Empire, tended toward a postive, proud, and possessive view of the state; they were prone to assertive, even aggressive, and sometimes violent, strategies to achieve their political aims, and they were inclined to be rough and ready in dealing with recalcitrant elements. *Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava* (Only Solidarity Saves the Serb) was their historic aphorism and current watchword."

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10 Rothschild, p.207.
It was only in Bosnia-Hercegovina that a clear national idea failed to crystallize. The mass conversion to Islam under Ottoman rule (by the seventeenth century 3/4 of Bosnia's population was Muslim), led to the prevalence of confessional forms of identity. Thus, the Catholics referred to themselves as "latinci" (Latins) or "kriscjani" (Christians) and the Orthodox as "Vlasi" (Vlachs) or "hriscjani" (Christians). The Ottomans themselves used the term "bosnakler" (Bosnians) to refer to all the inhabitants and this notion was revived under Austro-Hungarian rule. Seeking to head-off the spread of Croatian and Serbian national ideologies in the late nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian regime headed by Benjamin Kállay (1882-1903) cultivated the notion "bosnjastvo." However, nationalist ideas proved too seductive. By the turn of the century only Muslims had shown any inclination for a Bosnjak appellation; Catholics and Orthodox were fast on their way to becoming Croats and Serbs, respectively.11

B. National Ideologies: From the Nineteenth Century to the Creation of Yugoslavia

National ideologies first began to emerge in Croatia and Serbia in the mid-nineteenth century. Nationalist conceptions were far more uniform in Serbia than in Croatia. Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864) is usually credited with developing a "modern Serb ideology." He was the first to champion a definition of Serbian identity based not on affiliation to the Orthodox Church, but on the

11 Malcolm, pp.147-9; Banac, pp.38-42, 360-1.
"scientific" basis that anyone who spoke the stokavian dialect was ipso facto a Serb. The practical consequence of this new definition was assimilation as stokavian speakers included many Catholic Croats and Macedonians, and all Bosnian Muslims. Complementing this national ideology was a political program developed by Serbian interior minister, Ilija Garasanin (1812-1874). His Nacertanije (Outline, 1844) represents the first formulation of a Greater Serbia project. Defining Serbs linguistically, Garasanin called for Serbia's borders to be coterminous with Serbian population settlements. This program is often condemned for being expansionist and assimilationist. It is only fair to note, however, that its primary motivation was to create a large South Slav state that would pose a credible deterrent to the territorial ambitions of external powers. Of all the social forces that came to characterize the Serbian political outlook of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, none was more definitive than the Serbian National Radical Party (NRS). Founded in 1880, the NRS was credited with having "created democratic Serbia out of peasant boots." The Radicals were the dominant force in Serbia since 1903 and were the first real modern political party in Serbia complete with

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12 Banac, p.80.

13 Dragnich and Todorovich, p.81; Banac, pp.82-4.

14 Banac, p.154.
organizational coherence, national-local linkages, and the development of a mass social base. Furthermore, they took Serbian nationalist discourse to a hitherto unprecedented emotional level. For example, Serbia was described as our "bloody and tear-washed homeland," an anti-Austrian sentiment was propagated, and the "holy idea of Serbian liberation and unification" was espoused.\footnote{Stokes, pp.3-4, 196-200, 300-2.} In a word, the Radicals posed themselves as champions of a Greater Serbia. Nevertheless, when the moment for union drew nearer, the NRS and its leader, Nikola Pasic\footnote{Banac, pp.160-2; Rothschild, pp.205, 211.}, began to indicate serious reservations.\footnote{Banac, p.132.} Specifically, Pasic worried that the multiethnic fabric of the South Slav lands would overwhelm Serbian national identity. He therefore made it clear that "Serbia does not want to drown in some kind of Yugoslavia, but to have Yugoslavia drown in her."\footnote{Stokes, pp.3-4, 196-200, 300-2.}

The Serbian state expanded considerably after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Serbia had fought to regain the lands of its medieval empire -- the Sandzak, Kosovo, and Macedonia, to which Serbs fondly called "Old Serbia" and "Southern Serbia." Much to their dismay, however, Serbs discovered their newly-liberated ancient lands were inhabited predominantly by non-Serbs. For centuries Serbs had been reared on the myth of Kosovo, which was a tale of collective Serbian sacrifice for the protection of
Christendom. The preponderance of Muslims on Serbian holy land was psychologically traumatic and difficult to acknowledge. As a result, Serbian propaganda sought to downplay ethnic heterogeneity and dehumanized Albanians and Macedonians. Albanians in particular were singled out as "prehumans" who lived in "Blutschande" (incest). A pattern of "ethnic cleansing" and "Serbianization" was conducted by the state and involved the wholesale massacre of population settlements, the razing of villages, the expelling of Bulgars teachers and clergy, the Serbianization of family surnames, and colonization by Serbs. By 1929, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could confidently (but dishonestly and scandalously) conclude "there are no national minorities in our southern regions."\(^{18}\)

The genuine democracy Serbia developed when it was socially and ethnically homogeneous was lost when the state became ethnically heterogeneous. Pre-1918 Serbian national ideologies had an assimilationist and expansionist character that gave an exclusive legitimacy to Serb rights, denied the existence of ethnic heterogeneity, and used the power of the state to oppress national minorities. On the eve of the creation of Yugoslavia, the modal national ideology found in Serbian political life was primordial nationalism. No other ideal type better matches the Serbian attitude towards interethnic relations or Serbian nationalist rhetoric. Stojan Protic', a leading NRS figure (and eventually the first prime minister of Yugoslavia), best epitomized this

\(^{18}\) Banac, pp.291-328.
orientation when, during the First World War, he said: "As soon as our army crosses the Drina, it will give the Turks [that is, the Bosnian Muslims] twenty-four -- perhaps even forty-eight -- hours to return to the faith of their forefathers [which, in Protić’s view, was Orthodoxy] and then slay those who refuse, as we did in Serbia in [the] past."¹⁹

Croatian national ideologies have historically exhibited far greater variation than their Serbian counterparts. Prior to the advent of Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalist expressions oscillated between supranational versions of "Yugoslavism" and exclusive Croatian national formulations based on a "state right." Among the Yugoslav manifestations, there was the Illyrian Movement of 1830-1840, the "Jugoslovjenstvo" (Yugoslavism) of Josip Strossmayer (1815-1903), and the "narodno jedinstvo" (national oneness) of Ante Trumbić (1864-1938) and Frano Supilo (1870-1917). The common denominator of these various trends was the awareness of Croatian vulnerability to external powers and the need to unite with Serbs for protection. However, the merger that Croatian Yugoslavists proposed was altogether different from how Serbian nationalists perceived a South Slav union. First of all, Croatian proponents of Yugoslavism were usually willing to trade some national characteristic in exchange for the benefits of common association. Thus, for example, the Illyrians voluntarily adopted the stokavian dialect at the expense of their own

¹⁹ Banac, pp.105-8.
kajkavian tongue in the hope that this would facilitate cultural unity. And many advocates of *narodno jedinstvo* adopted "Serbophilism" on the grounds that the Croats were "less national and dynamic than the Serbs."20 Secondly, the articulation of Yugoslavism in Croatia normally included a strong element of "Slavic reciprocity" and the goal of national preservation within a larger whole. Far from wanting to blend indiscriminately their national identity into a South Slav hybridization, Croatian Yugoslavs expected to maintain national individuality and equality in any new association.21

Exclusive Croatian national ideologies were first propounded by Ante Starcevicō (1823-1896). Starcevicō argued that a historical "state right" belonged to Croats who by virtue of their "primary acquisition" of land and the establishment of a medieval Croatian state were duly constituted as a "political people," i.e., "bearers of the indivisible Croat state right." His definition of who were Croats extended to all the South Slav nations, with the exception of Bulgars. Slovenes were called "Highland Croats" and the expression of Serb identity was attributed to the successful inculcation of propaganda from external powers, namely, Vienna and St. Petersburg. In fact, Starcevicō denied any existence whatsoever to the Serbian people. He regarded them as an "unclean race" whose nomenclature is

20 Banac, pp.75-8, 89-91, 96-103.

etymologically found in the Latin term "sclavus" (slave). In an attempt to deprive Serbs of a history, he dubbed the Serbian Nemanjić dynasty as the "most illustrious Croat family." Moreover, Starčević disseminated the idea that Croats are imbued by God with a historical mission to defend Christian Europe. He treated all his opponents as enemies and traitors of the Croatian people, and directly courted the Bosnian Muslims as candidates for assimilation by flattering them as representative of the "true Croatian spirit." Rather than seek strength through an equal association with other South Slavs, Starčević redefined all other South Slavs into Croats and said that strength is best attained by an integral and independent Croatian state.  

Overall, the emphasis on equality, the acceptance of diversity, the promotion of "Slavic reciprocity" and the generally liberal political character of Yugoslavism places that national ideology within the rubric of pluralist nationalist ideal types. Starčević's ideology, in contrast, is closer to monistic nationalism. In Starčević's scheme, the fact that the Croats had a historical state means that their claims to present-day statehood are more valid than any supposed universal, natural right that nations have to exercise self-determination. Such a state right lends to its bearers priority and preeminence and relegates those outside the cultural markers to an unhistorical and subordinate position. According to Banac, Starčević's Party of [State] Right was the modal national

ideology among the Croat opposition in the last decades of the nineteenth century. But what made Yugoslavia possible was that narodno jedinstvo "became the most influential idea in prewar Croat politics."23

C. Approaches to the National Question, Part I (1918-1945)

The first Yugoslavia (1918-1929) was a Serb-dominated entity that really made no effort to accommodate other ethnic groups. To be sure, the Corfu Declaration of 1917, signed by the Pasic' government and the Yugoslav Committee (JO, which represented the peoples of the Hapsburg territories), committed the future state to the preservation of equality among its three primary "tribes" (i.e., the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), the coexistence of three flags and three religions, and the official acknowledgment of two alphabets. At the same time, the Serbs vetoed any designation of the new state as "Yugoslavia" considering it an affront to Serb national sensibilities. Serb interests were also granted for a unitary state structure with the Karadjordjevic' dynasty, the Serbian ruling house, at its head. Finally, the Serbs rejected a proposal by Trumbic' of the JO that the future constitution be subject to a "qualified tribal" vote and

23 Banac, pp.89, 98.
instead ensured the passage of a "qualified majority."\textsuperscript{24}

The basis of Serbian domination lay in the fact that the institutions of the new state were in fact mere extensions of the Serbian state and the laws of Yugoslavia for the first two years of its existence were Serbian laws writ large. The crown, the military, and the civil service were all explicitly Serbian and operated to the advantage of Serbian political interests. Even the governments of the parliamentary era (1918-1928), which required multiparty coalitions to create cabinets, were preponderately Serb. In the 121 months of the parliamentary period, Serbs held the Premiership 116 months, Defense 121, Interior 111, Foreign Affairs 100, Finance 118, Education 110, and Justice 105.\textsuperscript{25} To add insult to injury, the Serbs handled the national question with an iron fist. They introduced corporal punishment in Croatia, which had been unknown since 1869. The Serbian gendarme harassed peasants in Croatia and BH who did not express sufficient loyalty to Pasic' and Serbia on demand and they punished Croats who refused to use the Cyrillic script. Paramilitary groups (notably the Chetniks of WW I) were allowed to run rampant in BH. Former officers of the Austro-Hungarian

\textsuperscript{24} Banac, pp.121-5; Alex N. Dragnich, \textit{The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System}, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), pp.7-8.

\textsuperscript{25} Rothschild, pp.206, 278-9; Thompson, p.201; Banac, p.217. For an attempt to debunk the thesis of Serbian hegemony in the first Yugoslavia, see Alex N. Dragnich, "The Anatomy of a Myth: Serbian Hegemony," \textit{Slavic Review}, v.50, n.3, (Fall 1991), pp.599-662.
empire faced systematic discrimination, opposition figures that advocated secession from the new state were repressed, and the "ethnic cleansing" tactics of the post-Balkan Wars period were repeated in Kosovo and Macedonia.26

In light of this style of rule, Cohen and Warwick designate the first Yugoslavia as an instance of "charter-group hegemony." This is a political strategy in which "the values and customs of a politically dominant group are considered to be a model which members of other cultural groups must accept and emulate through a process of acculturation or assimilation."27 In the language of national ideologies, this was the institutionalization of primordial nationalism.

In many respects, the Serb domination of Yugoslavia was unavoidable and practicable in that it was only the Serbs that had the institutional wherewithal and the necessary experience of statecraft to lead a new state. Serbia was widely regarded (even by many Croats) as the "Piedmont" of the Balkans, as the only power capable of uniting the South Slav lands and providing sufficient protection from outside interests. It was in fact this threat from the outside (principally Italy) that compelled the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to rush into union. And it


was by keenly understanding ex-Hapsburger fears that the NRS could periodically raise the issue of "amputating" Croatia -- i.e., of severing it from Yugoslavia and putting it at the mercy of Italy -- and thereby try to exact compliance with Serbian rule.  

The position of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Muslims in particular, was precarious at best in the first Yugoslavia. Since the 1890s fierce polemics had broken out between Croats and Serbs over the land and people of BH. The Muslims themselves formed a privileged class under Ottoman rule. This is reflected, most palpably, in the class structure of BH. In 1910 Muslims accounted for 32.25% of the population, and yet constituted 91.15% of all landlords. Serbs represented a plurality of the population at this time (43.4%), but were disproportionately disadvantaged -- 73.92% of the serf population were Orthodox. Croats were 22.97% of the population and 21.49% of the peasantry. Tensions between Muslims and BH Serbs began to fray as the Ottoman Empire slowly receded from view in the Balkans. The Muslim population watched with considerable consternation as Serbia celebrated its victory over Turkey in the First Balkan War. A cycle of violence soon descended on BH as Serbs were subject to an ethnic cleansing campaign under the aegis of Austro-Hungarian authorities and the predominantly Muslim Schutzkorps, an Austro-Hungarian militia. The founding of Yugoslavia brought Serbian retaliations against

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28 Banac, pp.118-9, 236; Dragnich, (1983). pp.9, 52; Rothschild, p.205.

29 Banac, pp.360-7.
Muslims, land reform, and a propaganda campaign that denigrated Muslims as parasitical, "Asian," hedonistic, homosexual, and suitable for assimilation or genocide. Understandably, a massive exodus of Muslims left for Turkey in 1918.\textsuperscript{30}

The primary voice of Muslim interests in the interwar years was the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), founded in 1919. The party was a supra-class and supranational organization. It was supra-class in that party leaders tried to unite all Muslims in order to defend Muslim landlord interests, and by implication, the Muslim way of life. And despite the fact that the JMO became the de facto party of the Muslim community, it was a party open to all national labels. At this point in time, the idea that a universalist religion could provide the basis for an ethnic "nationality" seemed absurd. Even among the leadership of the JMO most declared either a Croat or Serb ethnic affiliation.\textsuperscript{31} Under the leadership of Mehmed Spaho, the party had both a Yugoslav perspective and a demand for the autonomy of BH. In the realm of practical politics, the JMO followed a pragmatic line continually shifting its support between the Serbs and the Croats in light of immediate opportunities. Over the course of the parliamentary era, it participated in many cabinets and even provided the crucial vote to ensure passage of the 1921 centralist constitution. In exchange, Pasic' guaranteed the territorial integrity of BH and the protection

\textsuperscript{30} Banac, pp.149, 366-8, 372.

\textsuperscript{31} Banac, pp.368-375.
of Islamic practices.\textsuperscript{32}

The Serbs of Croatia were politically represented by the Democratic Party (DS), whose most colorful figure was Svetozar Pribicevic'. The DS was unitarist, a proponent of \textit{narodno jedinstvo, etatist}, and dedicated to obliterating any and all forms of Croatian autonomy and nationhood. Moreover, the party demonstrated quasi-totalitarian traits. It opposed the expression of any differences between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and it conceived nation-building to be an act of voluntarism. It sought "to do away with all regional governments, all autonomies, all historical provinces," and it looked forward to the creation of "one people, one state, one party."\textsuperscript{33}

The fundamental drive of Pribicevic' was to ensure that the minority Serb community in Croatia would not be smothered by the majority Croat community and lost forever in the "state right" of Croatia's history and culture. Pribicevic' had previously been a deputy in the Zagreb Diet under Austro-Hungarian rule, and he convinced Belgrade that his firsthand understanding of Croats made him an indispensable leader for the new Yugoslavia. The DS was the second largest party after the 1920 elections and together with the Radicals formed an all-Serb government. Pribicevic' was awarded the post of Minister of the Interior. From this


\textsuperscript{33} Banac, pp.169-189.
institutional base, he demolished Croatian institutions, purged Croats from the state apparatus and promoted Croatian Serbs, imposed a unitarist curriculm on Croatian schools, hounded the opposition, and imprisoned Croatian separatists and communists. By promoting a program based on the exclusive rule of Serbs (albeit under the cover of *narodno jedinstvo*), by repressing any manifestation of Croatian culture and political traditions, and by attempting to assimilate Croats into a Yugoslav (i.e., Serbian) identity, Pribicevic' personified the ideology of primordial nationalism.

The unchecked, authoritarian rule of Pribicevic' enraged the Croatian population and lent greater electoral strength to the Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party (HPSS), and its leader, Stjepan Radic'. By 1923, the HPSS had become the second largest vote-getter in the country and the Radicals found themselves engaged in ways to induce the HPSS to join a coalition government. When Radic' eventually accepted a partnership with the Radicals in 1925, Pribicevic' was unceremoniously dropped by the Radicals. Overnight he turned from the regime's chief enforcer in Croatia to its most vociferous critic.34 This manipulation of the "precani card" by the *srbijanci* Serbs in the interwar period established a precedent that would eventually be repeated in the post-

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Overall, the JMO and the DS were ancillary players in the first Yugoslavia. They were junior coalition partners whose significance and influence were dependent on circumstances and the immediate array of forces. At one moment they could be capable of extracting concessions from more dominant players and at another moment they would be incapable of preventing their marginalization when those forces perceived them as disposable. In short, they were not the principal sites of the interwar dynamic. The real demiurge of the first Yugoslavia is found in Serb-Croat relations, or between the Radicals and the HPSS.

Serbian authoritarianism indeed found its nemesis in the uncompromising secessionism and dogged obstructionism of Radic and his HPSS. In 1904 Radic was a proponent of an "Austro-Slav" alliance, believing that Croatia's interests would best be protected

35 The precani Serbs are those who live "beyond" the Drina, Una, Sava, and Danube rivers. In other words, the Serbs of BH, Vojvodina, and Croatia. The srbijanci are the Serbs of Serbia proper. Pribicevic was to later write of his experiences with the srbijanci: "Belgrade power holders always called upon the Serbs of Croatia for help when it was feignedly necessary to defend imperiled state unity or to fight against 'Croat separatism.' But as soon as official Belgrade felt that it could profit from some sort of compromise with the Croats, it would sacrifice the Serbs of Croatia without hesitation and with merry heart, making them a red rag to the Croat eyes." (Quoted in Banac, p.189.) It will be seen in subsequent chapters how contemporary leaders of the precani have shared a similar fate at the hands of the Belgrade.
in a federal state under the Hapsburg Monarchy. Once the Austro-Hungarian state dissolved, Radic’ immediately raised the issue of a "Croat peasant republic." He was the only member of the National Council (which replaced the JO as the representative organ of the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs in October 1918) to vote against union with Serbia and on the eve of that vote famously warned that the South Slav delegates are "roaming like drunken geese into a fog."36

Radic’s national ideology may best be described as an example of monistic nationalism. Abandoning an early attachment to narodno jedinstvo, Radic’ became a diehard protagonist of the Croatian state right. The South Slav peoples, he reasoned, shared many characteristics, but their similarities did not reach a magnitude that justified a common state project. On the contrary, national distinctiveness and separate state traditions meant that the Croats could go neither "with" nor "under" Serbia. In this respect, Radic’ was the interwar carrier of Starcevic’s ideology. In the lands that comprised historical Croatia, Croats had a preeminent right to pursue their own historical course and destiny. Consequently, the two fundamental elements of Radic’’s program centered on a refusal to accept unification and a demand for a Croat peasant republic. His talk of a "federal Yugoslavia" (i.e., a joint state with Serbia) was purely tactical. Federalism to Radic’ actually meant Croatian independence "at an opportune

In his efforts to build support for a Croat peasant republic, he flattered, wooed, and idolized the Croatian peasantry. In the mind of the average Croatian peasant, a republic conveyed the idea of "no taxes" and "no military obligations." Radic' exploited this sentiment in his struggle against the Serbian monarchy (he characterized World War I as a "king's war") and mobilized the peasants as the historical vehicle for the realization of the Croatian "state right." As such, his HPSS became a bona fide mass movement and successfully posed itself as the chief representative of the Croatian nation.  

Radic’ s political behavior during Yugoslavia's parliamentary period is the locus classicus of Balkan obstructionism and political irresponsibility. Radic' and HPSS deputies boycotted any participation in parliament for the first seven years of Yugoslavia's existence. When they finally did participate (upon realizing that their abstention had barren results), they practiced a politics of divisive ethnic symbolism, grandstanding, hyperbole, and intrigue. Radic' regularly hurled insults at the monarch, cabinet ministers, and fellow deputies, and parliamentary sessions... 


38 Banac, pp.136, 229, 237.

were little more than shouting matches. Under these circumstances, Yugoslavia's parliamentary life careened from one cabinet crisis to another (there was a total of 24 cabinets between 1918 and 1928), reaching its logical conclusion when a Radical Serb deputy from Montenegro, Puniša Racić, fatally shot three HPSS deputies and seriously wounded Racić at a Skupština (Assembly) session.\(^{40}\) In the assessment of Rothschild:

"Yugoslavia had proven too big and too diffuse, and it had come into existence too 'suddenly' for the capacities of the Serb elite. The Croats, in turn, had behaved too negatively, too carpingly, too erratically to be of help. Clique [i.e., Serb] government had provoked the opposition into irresponsibility which had then corroded the hopes for conciliation of even the most reasonable Serbs."\(^{41}\)

Six months after the Skupština murders, King Alexander stepped forward and proclaimed a royal dictatorship (January 1929). The reigning monarch had come to the conclusion that democracy had failed to deliver a consensus among Yugoslavia's national communities. As the guardian of the state, he felt obliged to impose consensus from above. During this authoritarian phase (1929-1939), the Skupština and the constitution were suspended, ethnic parties were abolished, and the only political parties legally

\(^{40}\) For an excellent presentation of inter-party relations and elite politics during the parliamentary era, see Dragnich, (1983), pp.20-73.

\(^{41}\) Rothschild, p.235.
permitted were those that evinced a genuine Yugoslav orientation. Alexander hoped to solve the national question on the basis of an "integral-Yugoslav national unitarist" ideology. This was basically a supranational ideology based on the assumption that a new Yugoslav identity could be molded out of the raw material of South Slav tribes. Towards this end, Alexander changed the name of the country from the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" to "Yugoslavia," allowed only the public display of the Yugoslav flag, and internally reorganized the country from 33 administrative districts into 9 banovinas (governorships) that were named in accordance with major waterways (and not national, cultural, or historical appellations). Despite the ostensible Yugoslav orientation of the Alexandrine period, Serbian control of the government, the military, and the bureaucracy remained.\footnote{Rothschild, pp.237-245; Dragnich, (1983), pp.74-98; Cohen and Warwick, pp.41-5.}

Alexander's pan-Slav approach proved to be too little and too late. By 1929 fascist and integral nationalist groups had been formed in Croatia (the Ustasha (Insurgent)) and Macedonia (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)). These two forces were committed to a strategy of terror and violence which they hoped would tear apart the delicate fabric of the state. Together they engineered the assassination of Alexander in 1934, on the eve of expected reforms to liberalize the dictatorship.\footnote{Rothshild, pp.245-8.}
The last significant attempt to strike a deal between the Croat and Serb communities came in 1939 amidst the Nazi dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Vladko Macek, Radic's HPSS successor, exploited the looming European crisis by flirting with Mussolini's Italy for possible support of Croatian independence. The royal house, led by the regent Prince Paul (Alexander's first cousin and the custodian of the crown until Alexander's eldest son had come of age), and Paul's appointed prime minister, Dragisa Cvetkovic, wanted to avoid any fragmentation of the state. Consequently, significant concessions were offered to Macek in what became known as the Cvetkovic-Macek Sporazum (Agreement). Under the terms of this agreement, Croatia was enlarged to a size covering 30% of Yugoslavia and was designated the "Croatian Banovina." Large tracts of territory from Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Eastern Srem (Vojvodina) were ceded to the new banovina. Croats would henceforth have their own Sabor, an executive Ban (governor) appointed by the king but responsible only to the Sabor, and decision-making power over all internal matters except defense and security, communications and transportation, and foreign affairs. The Croats had in effect attained political autonomy.44

44 Rothshild, pp.258-261; Dragnich, (1983), pp.99-122. Cohen and Warwick characterize the Sporazum as an instance of consociationalism, which I feel is completely erroneous. Lijphart makes it clear that the most important element of consociationalism is a grand coalition among the primary groups, and this was not part of the Sporazum. Rather than regard it a form of consociationalism, the Cvetkovic-Macek pact is best
Opposition to the *Sporazum* sprung up immediately after it was promulgated. The Democrats demanded a comparable unit for the Serbs of Croatia and the JMO made similar appeals for BH. Spahotic himself sternly opposed the loss of BH territory but was powerless to revise the agreement. The *srbijanci* felt humiliated and offended by the pact. From their perspective, they had struggled and sacrificed for a unified Yugoslavia, not its partition. When Prince Paul was convinced by Hitler that the best way to save Yugoslavia was membership in the Axis' Tripartite Pact, the Serbian military took matters into its own hands. On March 26-27, 1941, it disposed of "the foreigner" Paul and "the gypsy" Cvetkovic in a military coup d'état. Fourteen days later Hitler's forces established the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska*) in Zagreb and two days later Belgrade fell to the Nazis.45 Yugoslavia was dead, but its ethnic leviathan had an appetite for destruction that was only just beginning to stir.

During the wartime occupation of Yugoslavia, three simultaneous wars erupted. First of all, Tito's communist-led Partisan movement fought a war of national liberation against the Axis invaders and their quislings in Zagreb. Secondly, there was


an ethnic war between the Croatian Ustasha and the Serbian Chetniks. And finally, a class war was fought between the Partisans and the Chetniks. Both the Ustasha and the Chetniks pursued primordial nationalist programs. The Ustasha, led by Ante Pavelić, controlled the NDH (which stretched territorially to include all of BH, Eastern Srem to the outskirts of Belgrade, and a good deal of Montenegro). The machinery of the NDH state was used to create a Croatia "thoroughly cleansed of Serbian dirt." In a speech in 1941, the NDH Minister of Education and Religion charted the general direction of the regime when he proclaimed "we shall kill some Serbs, we shall expel others, and the remainder will be forced to embrace the Roman Catholic faith." So appalling in fact were the atrocities committed against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies that even the Nazis were reported to have been troubled. The Chetniks were the defenders of the crown and had their social base in Serbia. Under the leadership of Colonel Draza Mihailović, the Chetniks launched a campaign of terror and destruction in BH that collectively punished Croats and Muslims for the massacre of Serbs in Croatia. Mihailović was of the opinion that Croats were guilty as a nation for betraying Yugoslavia to the Nazis and had to face retribution for crimes against Serbs. Altogether, an estimated 500,000 to one million people lost their lives at the hands of the Ustasha, and as much as 500,000 were killed by the Chetniks.46

The Partisans were the only social force in wartime Yugoslavia that espoused a multinational ideology and had a multiethnic base. The precani Serbs composed the bulk of the Partisan makeup (the srbijanci were overwhelmingly Chetnik) while Croats entered communist ranks in droves after Italy was defeated in 1943. The formula Tito sought to galvanize all South Slavs was "bratstvo i jedinstvo" (brotherhood and unity). Unlike the melting pot vision of narodno jedinstvo, bratstvo i jedinstvo meant greater respect for the individuality of nations. And in opposition to Serbian unitarism and centralism, it emphasized the full equality of nations.47 The postwar period ushered in a new phase in which the communists would take responsibility for untwisting the Gordian knot of Yugoslavia's tangled interethnic relations.

D. Approaches to the National Question, Part II (1945 - 1980)

The communist experiment with the national question evolved over time and took many different forms. After World War II the party took a Stalinist approach, which upheld the ideal of ethnically homogeneous socialist men and women. No public

airing of the national question or the interethnic fratricide of the war was permitted. Instead, the regime concentrated on cultivating a revolutionary élan among the masses and exhorted them to build socialism. The communists did seek to promote new opportunities for minorities and diluted the authority of Belgrade by the establishment of a federal political system with six republics and two autonomous provinces, which were carved out of Serbia. Tito expanded the number of state-forming nations from three in the interwar period (i.e., Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) to five -- the Macedonian and the Montenegrin nations were now formally acknowledged with their own titular republics. It would appear that Tito was guided in his nationalities policy by the understanding that Serbian dominance had wrecked the first Yugoslavia and alienated ethnic groups throughout the country. In order to garner the consent of disaffected groups, Tito felt he had to diminish Serbia's power by creating two autonomous provinces at its expense. In addition, he sought to preempt a return of the bipolar conflict between Serbs and Croats by introducing more players into the system; hence, the Macedonian and Montenegrin republics. So confident, in fact, was Tito with communist policy that he declared in 1948 that "the national question has been solved in our country, and very well at that, to

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the general satisfaction of our nationalities."49

Excommunication from the Soviet bloc in 1948 forced the communist leadership to reconsider the Stalinist model. In an effort to articulate a Yugoslav path to socialism free of Stalinist distortions, the communist elite forged an innovative model that emphasized decentralization, market socialism, workers' self-management, and the reconfiguration of the party into a "league" divorced from the exercise of power. While the general trend between 1948 and 1965 was one of increasing liberalization and the emergence of a polycentric system, it is worthwhile to note that some ethnic groups, such as the Albanians, remained suspect in the eyes of the state. In 1944 Tito had to counter an armed uprising by Albanians with violent suppression. Subsequently, the Albanians were treated to a harsh system of police rule under the direction of Alexander Rankovic', a Serb and head of the security services. It was only in 1966 when intraparty debates between liberals and conservatives came to a close that Rankovic' was purged from the party and the last vestige of Serb power was dismantled. From this point on, human rights in Kosovo improved immensely and provincial autonomy became more than just constitutional formalism.50

49 Cohen and Warwick, pp.66-71.

50 Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," Problems of Communism, (March-April 1983), pp.61-74; Victor Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," Problems of
While self-management and the decentralization of power to the republic level could be justified as in keeping with Marx's prescriptions about the withering away of the state, the practical consequence was very un-Marxist -- the proliferation of nationalist disputes over economic resources and the distribution of political power. Because the republics were coterminous with officially recognized nations, interrepublican economic conflict necessarily took an ethnic form. The first warning shot fired on this front was the Slovene road building crisis of 1968-1969, but this proved to be merely a prelude to the "Croatian Spring" of 1969-1971.

Since the interwar period and especially in light of the Ustasha atrocities, the Croatian question was a delicate issue to raise. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) took the position that the Ustasha crimes sullied all forms of Croatian nationalism. In the early years of the communist regime, not a few Croatian nationalists were tried and sentenced to long prison


terms.53 Once the regime began to relax in the 1960s and even encouraged the pluralism of interests, perennial Croatian complaints began to resurface.

The Croatian Spring was initiated by the intellectual class who took exception to what they saw as fundamental inequities in interethnic relations. Croatian discontent centered on a number of economic, cultural, demographic and constitutional issues. In the economic arena, Croatian economists and business elites complained that the socialist market was systematically biased in favor of Serbia. They argued that Belgrade banks used their control of capital to exploit Croatian enterprises and redirect profits to Serbia. Greater openness to the international market had encouraged a hotel and tourist industry in Dalmatia, but here too Serbs flocked from the hinterland, opened up their own resorts, and took advantage of Croatia's natural resources. Linguistic polemics erupted in 1967 between the cultural organizations Matica Hrvatska and Matica Srpska.54 Croat philologists were miffed that a dictionary ostensibly of the Serbo-Croatian language consistently omitted Croatian words but included their Serbian counterparts. The Matica Hrvatska reacted by issuing a "Declaration" which called for the recognition of Croatian and Serbian as two separate languages and insisted that in all areas of life -- from education, to mass communications, to interpersonal dialogue -- Croats should be addressed only in

53 Cuvalo, pp.47-9.

54 Matica is translated roughly as "home" in this dissertation.
the "Croatian literary language." Croatian nationalists also began to interpret the preponderance of Croats among the Gastarbeiter (the "guest workers" who emigrated to Western Europe in search of work) in conspiratorial terms -- the protagonists of a Greater Serbia were luring young Croats out of the country and encouraging Serbs to move into Croatia in an overall strategy of demographic displacement. Finally, Serbia was charged with engineering an autonomist sentiment among Dalmatians and striving to sever the lucrative Dalmatian coast from Zagreb's authority. The articulation of these issues created a "mass movement" (MASPOK) in support of a Croatian nationalist program and even induced the Croatian League of Communists (SKH) to provide the MASPOK with ideological cover.

Within the party, key elites such Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo, immediately came to the defense of the Matica Hrvatska. At the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the SKH (January 1970), Dabcevic-Kucar denied that Croatian nationalism was a problem in the republic and instead asserted the primary danger was "unitarism," i.e., Serbian dominance. Moreover, she explicitly defended the Matica Hrvatska as an organization composed of "progressive members." 56  


56 Burg, pp.107-8; Cuvalo, pp.126-139.
1970 and 1971, the Matica grew into a formidable social force. Its membership swelled to 41,000 and it became increasingly ready to exercise and test its political strength. For example, it established cells in economic enterprises where it took "head counts" to determine if Serbs were "overrepresented." If this were found to be the case, "adjustments" were demanded. It also set up a "shadow government" with functional portfolios and began to assert authority over the SKH. In every respect, the Matica became a de facto "nationalist party" and an alternative source of power in the republic.\(^{57}\) Spurred by the Matica the MASPOK grew, engaging in nationalist demonstrations and acts of interethnic violence. By the spring of 1971, most observers reported an intense, emotionally-charged political atmosphere in Croatia in which everything Croatian was exalted. In the summer of 1971 nationalists inside and outside the party began to raise the specter of an independent Greater Croatian state that would include Hercegovinian and Montenegrin territory. The mass movement reached a fever pitch in November when Zagreb students carried out a strike and demanded "full Croatian sovereignty," which included Croatia's separate membership in the UN and the formation of a separate Croatian army. Amidst growing internal struggles within the SKH, Dabcevic-Kucar presented a report to the SKH Central Committee in which the MASPOK was described as ideologically progressive and politically

\(^{57}\) Burg, pp.121-5; Cuvalo, pp.139-146.
correct.\textsuperscript{58} In effect, the party leadership donned the mantle of "national communism" and placed itself at the disposal of a separatist, Croatian national movement.

At this point, Tito swung into action. At a November 1971 meeting with Croatian leaders in Karadjordjevo, Tito labelled the student strike counter-revolutionary, the mass movement thesis of Dabcevic-Kucar was rejected, and a massive purge of the SKH apparatus was initiated.\textsuperscript{59} The clampdown in Croatia touched all spheres of social life and involved mass arrests, firings at educational institutions and the news media, and the shutdown of cultural associations and various publications. It was so severe and extensive that Ivo Banac argues its "real effect, at least for the Croats, was the lasting delegitimization of Yugoslavia."\textsuperscript{60} The subsequent rise of party hacks and opportunists to positions of power, and the equation of Croatian nationalism with counterrevolution, imposed a "silence" on Croatian political life that was to last until the end of communism.

In the aftermath of the Croatian Spring, Tito moved forward with his most ambitious and far-reaching approach to the national


\textsuperscript{59} Burg, pp.151-9; Cuvalo, pp.179-186.

\textsuperscript{60} Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry," p.158.
question. In 1971 a series of amendments were passed and in 1974 a new constitution was drafted that had the effect of introducing consociational elements into Yugoslavia's regime. A central motif of this constitutional engineering was to establish a system of rules and institutions that could successfully channel, regulate, and mediate Yugoslavia's multifarious conflicting interests. A by-product of this new orientation was a significant enhancement of the rights of minorities throughout Yugoslavia. In official Yugoslav discourse, "nationality" denoted the ethnic groups whose co-nationals had their own nation-state outside of Yugoslavia. Rather than constituting state-forming "nations," such ethnic groups were perceived as "protected nationalities." They included Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, and Italians. These groups enjoyed a plethora of cultural rights that encompassed the publication all laws and regulations in their native tongue, news broadcasts and publications geared specifically for each nationality and issued in its language, the right to be educated in one's language, and government subsidies for various cultural programs and institutions.  

The Bosnian Muslims were also upgraded to a nation in 1971 and saw their rights and status increase accordingly. In an effort to avert a growing Serb-Croat contention over BH, Tito turned to his tried-and-true method of introducing more players into the game. The formal recognition of the Muslim nation now gave

61 Ramet, pp. 54-7.
Bosnian Muslim politicians greater legitimacy in pursuing their interests and they gradually came to take a more leading role in the republic. The problem with this generous approach to nationalities is that it generated the ire and frustration of many nations, particularly the Serbs. Because the Serb nation had its own titular republic, precani Serbs were not entitled to the elaborate cultural rights of other minorities. In BH, the creation of a Muslim nation occurred at the expense of Serbs who had hitherto played the dominant role in the republic. In exchange for Serbian compliance, Tito allowed for the overrepresentation of the precani in the Croatian and BH civil service, party apparatus, and police. Nonetheless, Tito's nationality policy was taken to be uneven and unfair. Indeed by the 1980s Serb intellectuals began to talk of the punitive nature of Tito's policy and how it was deliberately prejudicial to Serb interests. This perspective was propagated by the Serbian intelligentsia and gradually became widespread in Serbian society. As such, a climate of opinion was created that was receptive to the reemergence of Serbian nationalism.


The final section of this history chapter will be more analytical in scope and will include a critique of consociational practices in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Arend Lijphart's consociational model is based on a study of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland and is promoted as an effective tool for developing countries to adopt as a means to ensure state stability and interethnic harmony.\textsuperscript{64} An analysis of Yugoslav politics in the 1980s indicates otherwise. Therefore, the burden of proof of this final section will be to show that consociationalism in Yugoslavia exacerbated interethnic relations and put in place the conditions favorable for a revival of nationalism in the post-communist transition.


There is widespread agreement among Western scholars that a primary source of the crisis that beset Yugoslavia in the 1980s and early 1990s was the political system.\textsuperscript{65} An ever-growing number of scholars have characterized this system as

\textsuperscript{64} Lijphart, pp.1-3.

"consociational" and have considered this aspect of the regime to be its basic defect. Although the constitutional designers of the Yugoslav regime did not have consociational prescriptions in mind when they wrote the 1974 constitution, there is a close correspondence between Arend Lijphart's recommendations for fragmented societies and the structures and rules that evolved in Yugoslavia.

According to Lijphart, a consociational democracy would have the following key features: a grand coalition of all ethnic groups, a mutual veto rule in decision-making, ethnic proportionality in the allocation of offices, and ethnic autonomy or federalism. Underlying these proposals are arguments stressing the value of

inclusiveness and a balance of power in which all groups have input, the benefits of ethnic insularity and boundary maintenance in minimizing interethnic contact and, as a result, conflict, and significant elite autonomy enabling elites to compromise in private interethnic negotiations and thereby restrict the public discussion of politically explosive issues.67

The Yugoslav political system utilized the consociational practice of collective power sharing. The SKJ’s Central Committee was organized on a collective basis whereby each republic would send 19 representatives and the autonomous provinces 15. The Presidium was composed of three representatives from each republic and two from each autonomous province. Leadership of the Presidium alternated on a yearly rotational scheme.68 The State Presidency operated under the same collective and rotational principles, with the exception that it had only nine members -- that is, one from each republic and autonomous province and one from the party.69 For all practical purposes, Yugoslavia met Lijphart's condition of a grand coalition of all ethnic groups.

The 1974 Constitution committed Yugoslav elites to a mutual veto rule. This was reflected in the requirement that federal

67 Lijphart, pp.21-44; 53-104.
decisions be made on the basis of a "harmonization" of views (usaglasavanje). This meant that no decision could be made if it did not receive the assent of all republics. On major issues such as monetary policy, prices, the distribution of foreign exchange earnings, etc., usaglasavanje gave to each republic, no matter how big or small, a practical veto over any bills they perceived as threatening to their interests.\(^70\)

The result of this principle was political paralysis as the most pressing political and economic issues were left unattended. One indicator of political paralysis and the declining effectiveness of federal decision-making was the increasing use of "temporary measures" by the Federal Executive Council (SJV). Temporary measures were a constitutional nicety that permitted the SJV to bypass the unanimity requirement operative in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and adopt legislation for a one year period. From 1974 to 1980, temporary measures were resorted to only 3 times; between 1981 and 1983 they were relied on a total of 14 times.\(^71\) While Lijphart acknowledges that abuses may occur with a veto right "if it is not handled with caution and restraint," it is nevertheless "essential in order to induce all of the

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subcultural groups to participate in grand coalitions ..."72 While this rule may have indeed been "essential" in order to gain the consent for decision-making rules in the post-Tito era in the sense that many ethnic groups, particularly the Croatian and Macedonian elite, objected to majority rule (majorizacija),73 there is also little doubt among contemporary observers of Yugoslavia that this principle contributed to paralysis, dissensus, and eventual disintegration.

Yugoslavia also institutionalized the consociational idea of ethnic proportionality. Each republic had the right to select personnel to all federal positions. Known as the "national key," the size of the federal delegation from each republic was determined by a regional quota system which abided by the principle of "equal representation of the Republics and a corresponding representation of the Autonomous Provinces." This principle applied to both branches of the Yugoslav legislature -- the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, and the Federal Chamber -- which made Yugoslavia the only bicameral legislative system in the world organized on the basis of equality among its constituent units. As a result, larger republics were underrepresented and smaller republics were overrepresented. Hence, Montenegro's


579,000 citizens had the same number of delegates in both federal assemblies as did Croatia's 4.6 million and Serbia's 9.3 million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{74}

It has already been noted that Yugoslavia was established as a federal political system after World War II. The subsequent direction of political reform, despite numerous zigzags and temporary reversals, was the movement of power away from the federal government and towards the republics. The 1971 Amendments and the 1974 Constitution continued this decentralization trend.\textsuperscript{75} The autonomous provinces were also significantly enhanced in power and status. Beginning in the 1970s, they were granted the right to amend their constitutions without any input or consultation from the organs of authority in Serbia proper. Furthermore, they had veto power over the implementation of Serbian law within their jurisdictions and the right to conduct their own foreign economic relations. In federal bodies, they pursued their own interests independent of Serbia and they participated as equals (although they were entitled to less representation) with the republics. By the 1980s, the autonomous provinces were republics in every respect but

\textsuperscript{74} Burg, (1983), pp.110-6, 204-247; Mostov, p.118n26.

\textsuperscript{75} Burg writes that "the devolution of power and authority to the regions following the ouster of Rankovic" has been decisive" and "despite repeated efforts during the 1970s to assert central authority in the party, the regional leaderships today dominate Yugoslav politics." Burg, (1983), pp.204-259, 346-7; Ramet, pp.70-5.
The combination of Yugoslavia's decentralized federalism (or confederalism) and its mandatory ethnic proportionality meant that there existed no political institution that directly represented the *demos*. In other words, the people of Yugoslavia were represented only as microcosms of their nation, not as citizens. While the legislatures were expected to represent the interests of their respective nations-as-republics, this was expressly forbidden for the executive bodies which were, in theory, supposed to represent the interests of the Yugoslav nation. However, because the republics had the power of appointment to these positions, and because when tenure in the federal government was completed federal officials were dependent on the good will of their regional governments for their next appointment, federal executive bodies were staffed by individuals who were de facto representatives of the republics. The upshot of this regionalization of the state is that there existed no political institution that represented in an unqualified sense "Yugoslav" interests. Instead, all interests in Yugoslavia were articulated and aggregated at the regional level and consequently took an ethnic form. This mitigated any possibility that a transethnic liberal coalition for reform could materialize.  

76 Ramet, pp.76-9.  
In essence, Yugoslav consociationalism contributed not to national integration but to further separation and ethnic distance. Yugoslavia not only lacked an autonomous civil society due to the post-totalitarian character of the regime, but it also lacked an "all-Yugoslav" civil society. The ethnic segmentation of Yugoslav society is seen in many dimensions of social life: the fragmentation of the party along republican lines which rendered it incapable of serving an integrative function; the absence of any all-Yugoslav organization along commercial, trade union, or professional lines; the republicanization of the economy on an autarkic basis;78 demographic trends towards the increasing homogenization of federal units as individuals moved to the republic representing their national home; the paucity of self-

identified "Yugoslavs" who amounted to a meager 5.4% in the 1981 census; the high rates of intraethnic marriages among all national groups; and, in elemental aspects of everyday life, such as travel: in 1983 it took an hour longer for a train to cross the country than it did in 1973.79

Overall, the promised results of Lijphart's consociational structures were not realized in Yugoslavia. In part, this is due to an erroneous conception of the factors that generate political integration and diffuse support for a regime. Steven Burg's and Michael Berbaum's study of the Yugoslav census found that interethnic contact was one of the most statistically significant predictors of Yugoslav identity. It follows that Lijphart's emphasis on mass segmentation so that elite efforts at cooperation and system maintenance may be enhanced is inappropriate and counterproductive. While consociationalism may have been conducive towards achieving interelite consensus in the short-term, its longer-term impact was to keep ethnic loyalties tied to the nation-as-republic rather than the Yugoslav state. Each nation-as-republic developed its own intelligentsia and political

class, it had the right to use its own language, it published its own newspapers and ran its own media, and it funded and maintained linguistic and cultural institutions to promote the nation's history and cultural achievements. Consequently, ethnicity stood out as the most readily available base for social mobilization in the post-communist period. This is so not merely because of the absence of class distinctions, but because ethnicity was already organized and socialized with a national perspective. In this way, consociationalism bears partial responsibility for the onset of ethnic conflict and the failure of democratic consolidation.
A. Democracy and Nationalism in Croatia's Recent Experience

Nineteen eighty-nine was the year the Croatian republic broke the "silence" imposed on it after the "mass movement" (masa pokret, MASPOK) was crushed by Tito in the early 1970s. Of the many factors that made up the context in which Croatian political society found its voice -- the sweeping changes across Eastern Europe and the USSR, a growing disenchantment with the institutions of Yugoslav socialism, the example of Slovenia which was willing to forge ahead with widespread liberalization, disgust over the Serbian reign of terror in Kosovo -- none was more galvanizing and urgent to address than the resurgence of Serbian nationalism under the direction of Slobodan Milosevic. Under the banner of "strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia," Milosevic had abolished the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, he had toppled the regime in Montenegro, and there were strong indications that
the next stops for his "anti-bureaucratic revolution" would be Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia.¹ In a word, the spectre of a Greater Serbia was beginning to haunt Croatia again. The looming menace posed by Serbian nationalism provided the raison d'être for the resurfacing of Croatian nationalism. Because Serbia and Croatia contained the two largest nations in Yugoslavia and were the principal focus of conflict the state had had to confront under all its various regimes since 1918, neither one could begin to play the nationalist card and not have the other respond in kind.

Croatian nationalists themselves had a long list of grievances with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) that had been simmering for some time. Specifically, Croats felt that ever since the unfortunate experience of World War II, in which the fascist-inspired Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) committed mass genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, the Croatian people had been unfairly stigmatized as

genocidal by nature. This use of collective guilt against Croatia led to a disparagement of Croatian culture and prohibitions against the expression of Croatian national pride. Some of the perennial complaints Croatians had with Yugoslavia -- and that were manifested most conspicuously in the MASPOK -- included the economic exploitation of the Croatian tourist industry by Belgrade banks, Serbian linguistic dominance, the alarming immigration of Serbs into Croatia that threatened to change the republic's demographic structure, and the efforts among Serbian nationalists to separate Dalmatia from the rest of Croatia.

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3 In his public speeches Tudjman often cited examples from "45 years of persecution" against Croatia: the monument of the 19th century Croatian military governor Josip Jelacic was removed from Zagreb's square; streets and squares named after Croatian kings were changed; Croatian children were not allowed "to sing innocent Croatian songs;" Croatia was "forced to parade a Yugo-ideology and Yugo-names;" " Croatian man could neither find nor use the normal Croatian language;" and Croats could not "display with pride Croatian symbolism." Borba (April 18, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 24, 1990, pp.65-7; Zagreb Radio Croatia Network (May 30, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 31, 1991, pp.19-22.

There was a widespread sense in Croatia that it was simply never an equal republic in the SFRJ. Many Croatian nationalists even questioned the degree to which Croatian consent was ever given for its incorporation into Yugoslavia.5

In the aftermath of the defeat of the "Croatian Spring" in 1972, draconian measures were instituted to eradicate Croatian nationalism. Such measures included wholesale purges of the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH), a strict recruitment policy designed to weed out anyone remotely inclined towards a nationalist sentiment, and severe repression of intellectuals and dissidents who expressed Croatian nationalism.6 In light of such tight controls, Croatia became known in the SFRJ as the "silent republic." Ultimately, Tito's repressive policy only served to force Croatian nationalism underground. When the SKH began to

5 According to one of the leading figures of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), Sime Djodan, the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a completely illegitimate state that had "occupied" Croatia. With the ascendancy of the HDZ to power, this idea was enshrined in the constitution. The December 1990 preamble to the constitution reads: "the Croatian Sabor never sanctioned

the decision of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes ..." Tanjug (April 8, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 11, 1990, pp.68-9; "Ustav Republike Hrvatske," Narodne Novine, n.56, (December 22, 1990).

liberalize the regime in 1989, all the old players of MASPOK reappeared -- Sime Djedan, Valdo Gotovac, Marko Veselica, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Miko Tripalo, Franjo Tudjman, Drazen Budisa, Ante Paradzik, Dobroslav Paraga, and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak.

The election of the nationalist-oriented Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in the April 1990 elections released all the tensions and pent-up frustrations in Croatia. Rather than seek to build a bridge of understanding between Croatians and the minority Serb population and thereby consolidate democracy, the HDZ elite sought to institutionalize the "Croatia first" message of its electoral campaign. To this end, the newly-elected president of the republic, Franjo Tudjman, called for the reorganization of Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of sovereign states that would allow maximum autonomy for each republic. He also promised to address the discriminatory policies that favored Serbs in employment opportunities in the state administration. Moreover, the government adorned itself with regalia and symbols from Croatia's past, irrespective of whether or not they were tainted by the fascist experience. As a result, the Serb population (which bore the brunt of the genocidal policies of the NDH) became frightened by and alienated from the new regime. Encouraged by propaganda from Belgrade which portrayed HDZ rule as a return of fascism to Croatia, the Serb minority balked at Tudjman's efforts to alter Croatia's place in Yugoslavia and the status of Serbs in Croatia.
Taken together, the unapologetic chauvinism of the HDZ and the refusal of the Serbs to accept any minority role set the two national communities of Croatia onto a course of ever-increasing confrontation that brought about a ruinous civil war and the failure to consolidate democracy. Democratic values and practices were also violated by the punitive character of HDZ public policy - e.g., forcing Serbs to sign loyalty oaths at their place of work, the bureaucratic ethnic cleansing of Serbs from the state administration, new citizenship requirements that made it difficult for Serbs to be Croatian citizens, and the passage of a new constitution in which Serbs were demoted from a state-forming nation to that of a national minority. As it stands now, the Croatian state is internally divided with one-third of its territory under the control of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina (RSK). Interethnic elite relations remain acrimonious and irreconcilable as the HDZ insists on the restoration of state authority over the entire republic and Serb elites demand complete independence.\(^7\)

B. Ethnic Structure, Regional Subcultures, and the Challenges to Democratic Consolidation

The Croatian population takes the political shape of an asymmetrical bipolar structure. According to the 1991 census, Croats number 3,708,308, or 77.9% of the population. Serbs at this time stood at 580,762, or 12.2%. There are many other nationalities in Croatia, such as Hungarians, Slovenes, and Italians, but for all practical purposes Serbs are the only minority group that is politically significant. The civil war has taken a severe toll on the Serb population as its size has been reduced dramatically. Recent estimates indicate that the Serb population now stands somewhere around 376,000, with between 192,000 to 216,000 residing within the jurisdiction of the Croatian state and 140,000 to 160,00 inhabiting the break away RSK.

While the demographics of Croatia are relatively straightforward, the regional or subcultural aspect of Croatian society is multifaceted and complex. In the 1991 census 47,603

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8 The number of Serbs was undoubtedly higher than this figure given that there were 104,728 Yugoslav identifiers in 1991, a category disproportionately filled out by Serbs. "Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva, 1991," Jugoslovenski Pregled, n.s. (1992), pp.3-22.

9 It is interesting to note that Tudjman has taken advantage of this dwindling Serb population by emphasizing in his public speeches that Serbs are only "8%" of the population of Croatia and therefore cannot expect to be recognized as a sovereign nation. Stan Markotich, "Ethnic Serbs in Tudjman's Croatia," RFE/RL Research Report, v.2, n.38, (September 24, 1993), p.28, 30; New York Times, (October 14, 1992), pp.1, 10.
inhabitants of Croatia (1% of the total population) proclaimed their ethnic identity to be "regional." While the absolute numbers are small, this figure represented a 450% increase from the 1981 census. \(^{10} \) From the vantage point of the cultural diversity of Croatian inhabitants, one may designate three main cultural zones: Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Istria. Croatia-Slavonia is the traditional heart of Croatia. From 1102 to World War I, it was ruled directly from Budapest. Demographically, Croatia-Slavonia may be subdivided into the Zagorje of Central Croatia with its relatively homogeneous Croatian population and Slavonia in which Croatians, Serbs, Hungarians, and Czechs live in highly mixed settlement patterns.

Dalmatia only became part of Croatia in 1939. It has a Mediterranean cultural heritage and during the course of its history has experienced Roman, Venetian, and Austrian rule. During the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Vienna had jurisdiction over Dalmatia. The 951,641 inhabitants of Dalmatia (19.9% of Croatia) have their own dialect and self-consciously regard themselves to be different from the rest of Croatia. Regional parties have sprung up in Dalmatia, such as the Dalmatian National Party and the Dalmatian Action (DA), which have pressed for various forms of

self-administration and the protection of local traditions. In the August 2, 1992 elections, the DA sent three deputies to the Chamber of Deputies, and in the February 7, 1993 regional elections, the main opposition party to the HDZ, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), gained control of Split.

Istria, a peninsula which has a long history of self-government under a succession of Roman, Venetian, French, Austrian, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian tutelage, also has a very strong regional identity. Among its 250,000 inhabitants (nearly 12% of Croatia's population), there are 30,000 Italians. Like Dalmatia, residents of Istria readily identify themselves by their regional designation, "Istrians." According to the 1991 census, the town of Labin in Istria registered the highest percentage of "regionals," 36%, in the whole of Yugoslavia. In the 1990 elections, Istrians gave a majority of their votes to the League of

11 Luka Miceta, "Da za Da," NIN, (December 20, 1990), pp.20-2; Tanjug (March 10, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 12, 1990, p.79; Tanjug (October 17, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 22, 1990, p.54; Tanjug (December 16, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 17, 1990, p.73.


Communists of Croatia--Party of Democratic Changes (SKH-SDP).  
At this time, the HDZ's programmatic emphasis on an indivisible and unitary Croatia was so disliked in Istria that Tudjman was actually shouted down in one campaign stop in Pazin. Of the many regional parties in Istria that advocate various schemes of autonomy -- the Istrian Democratic Convention, the Popular Party of Istria, and the Istrian Democratic Alliance (IDS) -- the IDS has attained political significance for its impressive electoral successes. In the election of August 1992 the IDS received 51% of the vote in Istria; and in the February 1993 elections it won 72% of the Istrian votes to the upper house of the Sabor (the Croatian Assembly) and took control of the Istrian local government with 35 out of 40 seats in the county parliament.

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14 Thompson, pp.62-3.


Like the Croatians, there are many important cultural fault lines that divide the Serb minority. The most salient cleavage is that between the so-called "urban" and "rural" Serbs. The former comprised the vast majority of Serbs in Croatia (approximately 73%). They are well-integrated into Croatian society and live as minorities in populous Croatian cities, such as Zagreb (approximately 100,000 Serbs, or 5% of Zagreb's population), Rijeka (8%), Zadar (9%), Split (4%), and Osijek (18%). The problem-area for Tudjman's regime lay in the rural areas of Croatia, particularly in the thirteen opstinas that rounded out the series of regions that Serbs collectively called the Krajina (Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, and Kordun). It was here that Serbs stood as an absolute majority in eleven opstinas and a plurality in two.

Knin is the focal point of the Krajina and the home of militant Serb nationalism in Croatia. In World War II Knin (along with the Lika area) was the only Serb settlement in Croatia that overwhelmingly supported the Chetniks against Tito's

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19 Nevertheless, Serbs residing here amounted to only 26% of all Serbs in Croatia. Of all the urban Serbs, only 25% lived in this area. Croats composed 22% (45,000) of the Krajina's population. Cohen, pp.129, 134; Paul Shoup, "The Future of Croatia's Border Regions," Report on Eastern Europe, (November 29, 1990), p.28.
Partisans. Historically, Serbs migrated to this and the larger Krajina area under the pressure of Ottoman military advances and the incentives issuing from the Hapsburg empire which sought to establish a military frontier (Vojna Krajina) to stave off the encroaching Turks. In return for their military services, Serbs were granted religious freedom and were ruled directly from Vienna, thus freeing them from feudal obligations to the Croatian and Hungarian nobility. Being a military outpost, the Krajina celebrated the gun as a defining trait of its culture. A cultural division of labor eventually developed around the historically strategic function of the Krajinska Serbs as they came to be disproportionally employed by state institutions. In the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRH), Serbs constituted 67% of the police force

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20 In contemporary discourse in the former Yugoslavia, the label Chetnik has two connotations: (1) all the various paramilitary groups emanating from Serbia; and (2) Serbs who feel that a common life with Croats is impossible. The word "Ustasha" describes Croatians who feel a common life with Serbs is impossible, and "Partisans" refers to both Croatians and Serbs who support a multiethnic, multicultural society. See Misha Glenny, "On the Brink," New Statesman and Society, (June 5, 1992), pp.24-5; James Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," RFE/RL Research Report, v.1, n.20, (May 15, 1992), p.21; Paul Hockenos, "Riding the Nationalist Roller-Coaster," New Statesman and Society, (November 1, 1991), pp.12-13.

(in 1990), 40% of the government apparatus, 61% of the trade union administration, and 24% of the SKH membership (in 1985).\textsuperscript{22} In the December 1990 elections, the five deputies elected from the nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) all hailed from Northern Dalmatia and Lika.\textsuperscript{23}

The demography and history of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem differs substantially from that of Northern Dalmatia and Lika. Contrary to the World War II experience in the Krajina, Slavonian Serbs enjoyed good relations with Croats even during the reign of the NDH and contributed to the Partisan cause in the civil war. Furthermore, despite the fact that over 100,000 Serbs live in Slavonia, it is only the opština of Pakrac that has a plurality of Serbs. In the approximately 18 other opštinas of Western and Eastern Slavonia, Croats equal or exceed Serbs.\textsuperscript{24} The travails of war in this region have brought about in an increase of the Serb


\textsuperscript{23} They were Ratko Licina (Gracac), Dusan Zelenbaba (Knin), Dusan Ergarac' (Donji Lapac), Jovan Opacic' (Knin), and Radoslav Tanjga (Knin).

\textsuperscript{24} Shoup, pp.26-33; Glenny, p.2.
population; in Baranja the percentage of Serbs has jumped from a pre-war level of 25% to more than 70% today.\textsuperscript{25}

Slavonia is an especially complicated area in Croatia that contains a plethora of subcultures. After World War II, the communist regime sponsored the resettlement of indigent Hercegovinian Croats and Dalmatian Serbs into areas vacated by expelled Germans and Hungarians. These dosljaci (settlers) were terribly belligerent and xenophobic and represented a potentially lethal factor tucked inside the tolerant and pacific milieu created by the indigenous Slavonian peoples. When interethnic relations began to crumble in Croatia in 1991, local police records disclosed that colonized villages had ten times more cases of conflict and violence than noncolonized villages. In short, "Pannonian" traditions of interethnic peace were overwhelmed by "Dinaric" violence.\textsuperscript{26}

Croatia's bipolar ethnic structure, its legacy of violence and interethnic strife, and its regional multiculturalism placed several potential hurdles in the path of democratic consolidation. A new government that truly sought to consolidate the fledgling democracy of Croatia would have to earn the consent of Serb nationalists in the Krajina as well as embrace the regional

\textsuperscript{25} New York Times, (September 21, 1992).

\textsuperscript{26} The geographic references relate to the Pannonian plains of Slavonia and the Dinaric Alps of Dalmatia. Milos Vasic', "Osijek, na Drava," Vreme, (December 2, 1991), pp.20-2; Glenny, pp.101-115.
complexion of Croats in Dalmatia and Istria. Both achievements would require patience, the show of good will, and a keen sensitivity to minority concerns. Zagreb would also have to undermine propaganda from Belgrade that sought to stir the Serb diaspora into revolt. This would require not just kind words towards the Serb minority but substantive measures to guarantee inclusion and security. The cultural diversity and varied demographic structure of the Serb minority posed its own set of difficulties in the area of interest aggregation. More than likely, several principles and ideals would have to be articulated that reflected the exact conditions and region in question. If Serb nationalists were historically, legally, and morally correct in arguing that the borders of the SFRJ were purely administrative and therefore open to revision, then any secessionist program of the rural Serbs would still require area-specific claims: while the militants of the Serb-dominated Krajina could justifiably advance the "ethnic principle" as the basis of their actions, the lack of concentrated majorities in Slavonia meant that the SDS would have to rely on the more dubious grounds of "historic rights." And if the rural Serbs as a whole adopted the Greater Serbia goal of uniting all Serbs in a single state, what would this entail for

27 "Historic rights" is an ownership claim based on a history of traditional rule over a given area. It is not dependent on the present existence of a demographic majority in the target area. The ethnic principle, on the other hand, is based on the will of a majority. Considering the areas of Slavonia, Western Srem, and Baranja, only the latter could accurately be claimed by Serbs as belonging to them historically. From 1918 to the end of World War II Baranja was part of Vojvodina and was only annexed to Croatia in 1945.
their far more numerous brethren in the cities -- the urban Serbs? What sort of protection, opportunities, and future could they realistically hope to attain in a divided Croatia?

What follows is a detailed examination of a number of hypotheses -- national ideologies, public opinion, the chain reaction, census elections, and flanking -- from the theoretical framework that offer some hope of explaining the interethnic and intraethnic relationships that began to unfold in Croatia in 1990.

C. National Ideologies

1. The Monistic Nationalism of Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)

In the elections of 1990, the Croatian Democratic Community billed itself as "the most Croatian party." Indeed, the HDZ was something more than just a political party representing particular interests; it was founded as a movement or front for the entire Croatian nation. Franjo Tudjman, a Partisan war hero, a former general in the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA), a leading figure in MASPOK, and a professor of history, spoke a language that was, according to Borba, "comprehensible to ordinary people."  


tapped into long-seething grievances of the Croatian nation that had roots not only in Tito's Yugoslavia but in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as well. Tudjman presented the HDZ as a synthesis and grand reconciliation of all the trends in the "vertical line" of Croatian history -- from Starcevic to Radic, from Ustasha to Partisans, and from the NDH to the ZAVNOH (Regional Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia). His "Community" proudly resurrected the symbols of Croatian nationalism and his lieutenants -- Sime Djodan, Vladimir Seks, Zarko Domljan -- aggressively attacked Yugoslavia as "Serbslavia," condemned leading figures of the SKH (particularly Stipe Suvar) as cowardly and compromised, rallied against Serbian expansionism, and protested over the privileged position of Serbs in Croatia. Tudjman increasingly became perceived as the only figure capable and willing to stand up to Milosevic. Over the course of the 1990 elections, Tudjman articulated three issues relevant to this study: the status of Serbs in Croatia, the national identity of the Bosnian Muslims and the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Croatia's fascist past. All three are definite themes of his earlier scholarly writings, indicating that they form part of his core belief system. These and related components of Tudjman's national ideology will be examined in this section.

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Europe), March 8, 1990), p.68. For a sample of the HDZ's party platform, see "For A Free and Sovereign Croatia!," East European Reporter, (Spring/Summer 1990), pp.86-7.
A major theme in the HDZ 1990 election campaign was the issue of the overrepresentation of the Serb's in Croatia's state administration. This was the first time Croatian political elites had challenged Tito's tacit social contract between Yugoslavia's two largest communities. The "terms" of this contract had two parts: (a) Serbia would be internally divided with two autonomous provinces which would allay the fears that Croatia and other republics had of Serbian dominance; and (b) in return the Serbian diaspora was allowed overrepresentation in the Croatian and Bosnian SK, the republican bureaucracies, and the police.  

While constantly reiterating that Serbs would be protected by a system of civil and national rights, and by promising no settling of accounts upon taking office, Tudjman nevertheless made it clear that the status quo would not be allowed to stand. In a euphemistic statement for the purges that were to follow the HDZ's ascension to power, Tudjman said "we need to create normal conditions in which the nationality composition of the services will correspond to the nationality composition of the population."  

Judging by Tudjman's earlier writings, this is an issue that had been smoldering in his thoughts for some time.  

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30 For a discussion of the Titoist system of reciprocal benefits and sacrifices, see Glenny, pp.12-13; Thompson, pp.92-3.  


with the end of the civil war and the decrease in the number of Serbs residing in Croatia that Tudjman suggested that "Croatia can and must approach the Serb issue from fresh historical grounds ..." In a speech delivered to the Sabor in September 1992, Tudjman reasoned "now that the proportion of Serbs in the entire population has been reduced ... no one should ... see any danger in the proportional employment of Serbs and in the guaranteeing of their civil and ethnic rights."\(^{33}\)

Along with the reevaluation of the status of Serbs in Croatia came a host of ill-advised statements from Tudjman that actually betrayed his real feelings towards Serbs. For example, during the election campaign and the early part of his administration he made the following remarks:

-- "in Croatia are all equal, but one has to know who is the host and who is the guest;"\(^{34}\)
-- "fortunately my wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish;"\(^{35}\) and
-- "we will not harm the interests of either Jews or Serbs, provided they are capable and loyal citizens."\(^{36}\)


\(^{35}\) Cohen, p.112,n57.

\(^{36}\) Goldstein, p.66. Other leading members of the HDZ and the government
With such words, Tudjman made it perfectly clear who has political priority and a legitimate claim to statehood in his republic. In his perspective, if a sovereign nation means anything, it implies that the bearer of that sovereignty enjoys the right to run its own affairs. These ideas were codified in the December 1990 constitution whereby Croatia was designated as "the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality ..."37 In this formulation, Croatians were given pride of place as the state-forming nation whereas Serbs were relegated to an inferior position and equated with politically insignificant nationalities. The ethnic character of the Croatian state was vigorously defended by Vladimir Seks, a leading member of the HDZ and the head of the commission that drafted the constitution. While acknowledging the HDZ sought to blend ethnic and civil concepts, Seks argued a purely civil definition of the state was out of the


question: "There was no dilemma at all about whether Croatia should be organized as an ethnic and antifascist state. Only the Yugoslavs, the members of the SDS, the members of the UJDI (Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative), and renegades from Croatism favored a pure civil state, whereby they fitted perfectly into what Milosevic’ was saying at that time: 'One man, one vote.'"  

To buttress the claims that Croats are a unique, sovereign group entitled to a claim of political priority, Tudjman increased the ethnic distance between Croats and Serbs by assigning each to different world civilizations. According to him, Croatia is an inherent part of the progressive, pluralistic, democratic heritage of Central Europe while Serbia is linked to the backward, despotic, Byzantine culture of the Orient. The upshot of this "symbolic geography" is an enhancement of Croatian group worth at the expense of Serbs. Tudjman even takes this analysis a step farther by typologizing the nationalisms of Europe into progressive and regressive camps: to the first belong Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, Macedonian, Basque, Catalanian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Estonian, Scottish, and Welsh.


nationalisms; in the second group are Romanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Russian national movements. The rationale separating these groups is that the former promotes national identity, sovereignty, equality, and democracy, while the latter represents hegemony, expansionism, and authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{40}

A second theme that received a good deal of attention during the campaign of 1990 was Tudjman's opinion that the Muslim national identity is a fabrication of the Titoist regime and that in fact Muslims are really Croats. Furthermore, he insisted that Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH) represent an indivisible whole incapable of being separated. In the event that Yugoslavia should collapse, Croatia must emerge with its "historical and natural borders" which go beyond the present administrative unit.\textsuperscript{41} Such views also have roots in his previous writings. In \textit{Nationalism and Contemporary Europe}, Tudjman examined how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia flagrantly violated the rights of nations to live in their own national republic when federal boundaries were drawn. Especially cheated was Croatia which actually lost territory in comparison with what it received in 1939


by the Cvetkovic'-Macek agreement.\textsuperscript{42} Of all the disputed tracts of land between Serbia and Croatia, BH was surely the most aggravating for Tudjman. The fact that Muslims are in "ethnic character and speech incontrovertibly of Croatian origin" was ignored in favor of Serb interest. In Tudjman's words, "the creation of a separate Bosnia and Hercegovina makes the territorial and geographic position of Croatia extremely unnatural in the economic sense and, therefore, in the broadest national-political sense, very unfavorable for life and development and in the narrower administrative sense unsuitable and disadvantageous."\textsuperscript{43} Once the war in BH began in 1992, Tudjman cultivated relations with extreme nationalist political elites from Hercegovina to the detriment of Croats from central Bosnia who have typically been more moderate in their political outlook. This


\textsuperscript{43} Tudjman, pp.110-7, 166; Oslobodjenje (December 9, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), December 20, 1990, pp.54-6.
"Hercegovinian Lobby" became so strong that it secured key posts in the government and became an important pillar of the right-wing faction within the HDZ. It is only since the March 1994 Croatian-Muslim agreement in which a confederation between Croatia and BH was brokered that Tudjman appears ready to step back from his partitionist position and accept the territorial integrity of BH.44

During the campaign of 1990, Tudjman set off a furor over his remark that the NDH was "not just a product of the whim of the Axis powers but also a consequence of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people." When faced with a barrage of criticism for such an irresponsible statement, apart from the expected disavowal that the HDZ did not intend to establish another NDH, he turned the tables and emphasized how official Yugoslav history has downplayed the crimes against humanity committed by the Chetniks.45 This ideological defense of the NDH is a constant in


Tudjman's nationalist paradigm. In his scholarly writings he has claimed that the NDH originally represented Croatian interests but was later corrupted by the Ustasha movement. Moreover, he has challenged the number of NDH victims (which scholars have estimated to be between 350,000 - 450,000) as nothing more than a Serbian plot to besmirch the Croatian national character and has offered his own calculation of no more than 70,000.\textsuperscript{46} The uncritical attitude of the HDZ towards the NDH is most poignantly demonstrated in the adoption of an old Croatian symbol that the fascist regime used as its main emblem, the sahovnica (a checkerboard, tri-colored flag that was later to become the official flag of Croatia). Most recently, the government chose to replace the dinar with the kuna, which just happened to be the national currency of the Ustasha regime.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, the HDZ government has systematically replaced every street, monument, square and statue that honored the victims of fascism with names and monuments celebrating Croatian heroes and events.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} Thompson, pp.267-9; Tudjman, p.106.


Another key element of the national ideology of Tudjman and the HDZ is the ideal of a centralized, unitary state structure. This has been a persistent feature of the HDZ program, showing up in everything from pre-election campaign fliers, to the December 1990 constitution (which defined the state as "unitary and indivisible"). to the territorial reorganization plan of 1992 that fragmented the regional blocs of Slavonia and Dalmatia, undercut the authority of local governments, and monopolized power at the center. In tandem with the vertical redistribution of local


authority has been a concentration of power in the office of the president. The opposition in Croatia regularly complains about the hypercentralization of state power in the office of the president and the proliferation of "paraconstitutional" organs, such as the Office of the President for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. The government rarely consults the Sabor when it makes decisions and in December 1992 the Sabor was persuaded to relinquish its veto power over government acts.\textsuperscript{52} To borrow a line from the journalist Jelena Lovric, "[i]t is as though the power of the president were the only, or certainly the most important, attribute of the state."\textsuperscript{53}

A final component of Tudjman's national ideology is seen in his tendency to treat Serbs as a homogeneous entity and hold


them collectively responsible for the extreme nationalists in their own community. After the civil war broke out in Croatia, Tudjman would periodically make appeals to the Serbian community to dissociate itself from the Chetniks. The curious thing about this is that he would put all the burden of controlling the extremists on the shoulders of moderate Serbs rather than have his government undertake innovative initiatives that could either win the consent of the majority of Serbs or extinguish the rhetorical firepower of the Chetniks. The following passage is quite typical of his appeals: "One should expect that the voice ... coming from the sensible Serbs in Croatia will be heard to an even greater extent and that the Serbs themselves will neutralize those elements among their ranks who are really jeopardizing normal coexistence ...."54 Tudjman's attitude toward the politicized and militarized rural Serbs was no better. He summarily dismissed their complaints and regarded them as nothing more than agents of Belgrade whose mission was to create a Greater Serbia. In no instance did he ever acknowledge that the nationalist excess of the HDZ could be responsible for the alienation of the Serb community.

By the end of the war, Tudjman was apparently ready to assign collective guilt to the entire Serb nation in Croatia for the terrible tragedies and crimes against humanity that occurred. In a speech to the Sabor in December 1991, he said "we warned the

Serbian population in Croatia that, with their approval of the policy of the SDS ... they were assuming the responsibility for everything that was happening in Croatia. Our assessment that Serbs in Croatia had been assigned the role of a fifth column and diversionary units in the war ... was shown to be correct."  

Since the civil war (and particularly since the troubled year Croatia faced in 1993 in BH), Tudjman has sounded a more moderate note. With respect to Croatia's BH policy, Tudjman's alliance with the partitionist "Hercegovinian Lobby" came to an end as he moved to mend fences with the Muslims of BH and the Bosnian Croat integralists. This was preceded by an October 1993 HDZ general assembly at which Tudjman undercut both the hardline and moderate factions within the party and promoted a new breed of younger technocrats who would ostensibly work to transform the HDZ along the lines of a Christian democratic party. In still other signs of change, he issued a public apology in February 1994 for earlier writings that were interpreted as anti-Semitic and his government chose not to observe the 53rd


56 In 1993 the BH Croat forces took a beating on the ground, losing 40% of their territory in central Bosnia to the Muslims. In addition, Croatia came under international condemnation for its sizable military force in BH. Moore, "A New Stage in the Bosnian Conflict," p.34.
anniversary of the NDH.\textsuperscript{57}

The HDZ national ideology finds its closest fit in monistic nationalism. As the largest nation in their nominal republic, Croatians and their symbols, language, and interests were to take priority over all other groups. While the democratic rights of all would be recognized, it is only the Croatian nation that may legitimately advance an ownership claim over Croatia itself and be the bearer of sovereignty. At any rate, Croatia was not a heterogeneous nation requiring elaborate consociational prescriptions. As indicated by his writings on nationalism, Tudjman felt that any state with a single nation that composed nearly 80% of the total population is "nationally homogeneous."\textsuperscript{58} Tudjman's preoccupation with the Croatian diaspora, particularly in BH, indicated a stance of active protectionism which segued into an outright irredentist policy in BH that lasted from 1992 to 1993. The HDZ was equally obsessed by the rate of Croatian emigration abroad. Reflecting a fundamental disposition of insecurity vis-a-vis the larger Serbian nation, the HDZ promised to end the "biological dying away of the Croatian people" by the promotion of

\textsuperscript{57} Moore, "A New Stage in the Bosnian Conflict," p33-5; Moore, "Croatia and Bosnia," pp.113-4; Moore, "Croatia," p.82.

\textsuperscript{58} Tudjman, p.148.
a "demographic renewal." The stress on Serb overrepresentation in the Croatian bureaucracy conveyed a suspicion of Serbs and presaged their constitutional demotion to a national minority. Tudjman's dismissal of the Serb community in Croatian politics is nowhere better displayed than in his failure during the 1990 campaign to visit a single village in which Serbs constitute a majority. In addition, the HDZ presided over the centralization of the Croatian state which undermined the ability of historic and cultural-based regions in Croatia to press for their own self-interests. In all these instances -- the political claim of priority, the creation of an ethnic state, an irredentist policy in BH, the effort to downgrade the status of Croatia's Serbs, the manifestation of a suspicious attitude towards Serbs, and the centralization of the Croatian state -- HDZ national ideology approximated the dimensions of monistic nationalism.

59 Part of this program involved plans to alter the demography of Istria by resettling 20,000 Croats from Romania. "For A Free and Sovereign Croatia!," p.86; Tanjug (February 25, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), March 2, 1990, p.90; Tudjman, p.156; Vjesnik (May 31, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), June 19, 1990, pp.82-3; Tanjug (August 13, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 14, 1990, pp.55-6; Tanjug (September 18, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 19, 1990, pp.64-5.

60 Goldstein, p.65.
a. **Impact on Democratic Consolidation.** In this section I will analyze how the most politically significant group in the Serb community, the SDS, responded to the monistic nationalism of the HDZ. It is necessary to examine the political vocabulary of the SDS because democratic consolidation is predicated on the development of networks of communication and mutual understandings among political elites. According to the research program, if a dominant group advances a claim of political priority the minority group will react first with a claim of equality which may easily blossom into a demand for secession if the dominant group appears oppressive.

1. **The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS): From Pluralist to Primordial Nationalism.** The SDS was organized in Knin in February 1990. In the five years of its existence the party has experienced numerous factional divisions and several leadership changes. An important factor determining the direction of the SDS is the ever-changing immediate political interests of the Milosevic government. From 1990 to the present Milosevic has pursued several different tactics and this has had repercussions for the top personnel and the national ideology of the SDS. Under the leadership of Jovan Raskovic the SDS adopted a minimal demand of cultural autonomy and a maximal demand of political autonomy. In October 1990 Raskovic was unseated from his post by Milan Babic. This marked a major change of course for the party as the new minimal goal became political autonomy and the
maximal goal became secession. Since the end of Babic's leadership in February 1992 the SDS and the Serbian Republic of Krajina (RSK) have been led successively by Goran Hadzic and Milan Martic, both of whom have been resolutely committed to the independence of the RSK. The differences that separate Babic, Hadzic, and Martic are personal rather than ideological and center around power, positions, and shifting alliances with political elites in Belgrade. Let us now turn to a more detailed look at the national ideology of the SDS as it has evolved over time.

At the founding assembly of the SDS, Jovan Raskovic, a psychiatrist from Sibenik, was elected president. The assembly decided that the party should push for an autonomous province within Croatia subject to a popular referendum. A month later, Raskovic stepped forward with his own agenda which was considerably more moderate than the program of the assembly. Specifically, he characterized the SDS as an "ethical party" (and not


an ethnic party) that stood behind the ideals of democracy. Rasković felt that the national question in Yugoslavia could only be solved by a democratic federal structure based on one man, one vote, and not the consensual system put in place by Tito.\textsuperscript{63} On the internal politics of Croatia, Rasković repudiated "immature" and false assessments that attributed the HDZ's election victory to a "manipulated, loud minority." He proclaimed respect for the right of the Croatian people to a sovereign state and only requested that Serbs have an equal position within it. To his mind, Serb equality would be satisfied by the institutionalization of cultural autonomy. In practical terms, this meant the right of Serbs to speak their own language, write in their own script, and have their own schools, educational programs, cultural institutions, publishing houses, and newspapers. Furthermore, he distanced himself from nationalist extremism by coming out "against speculation over a state for the Serbian people in Croatia" and insisted that the Serbs of Croatia will always find their homeland in Croatia.\textsuperscript{64}


The Raskovic' position coincides with the expectations suggested by the theoretical framework; namely, when faced with a majority group advancing a claim of political priority, a minority's first demand is simple equality. Of the range of alternatives the SDS was openly discussing -- cultural autonomy, an autonomous province within Croatia, and a federal Yugoslavia -- none could be construed as involving a claim of political priority. This rather mild political program is actually quite surprising given Knin's rich history of fierce independence and the war psychosis that was being cultivated by Belgrade. The moderation of Raskovic' s position in fact made possible negotiations with Tudjman in June 1990 over cultural autonomy. However, the HDZ effort to implement the program of monistic nationalism quickly stymied any further progress in this area.

In mid-July the HDZ had proposed a number of amendments to the Croatian constitution that significantly revised interethnic relations in the areas of national symbols, the official language, and decision-making rules over interethnic issues. More exactly, the Croatian government enshrined the Croatian literary language as the official language of the state, adopted the sahovnica as the official emblem, and abolished constitutional amendment 59.

65 For example, Politika in October entitled a story "Pogrom Against Serbian Population in Croatia: Croatian Special Forces Throw Serbian Childrea Around." In the story, it is reported how the Croatian police are "extremely vulgar" toward Serbian girls. Politika (October 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 4, 1990, p.56; Vanja Bulić', "Tiha Likvidacija Ljudskosti," Duga, n.442 (February 2-16, 1991), pp.16-19.
which had subjected all issues that affect interethic relations to a two-thirds majority. Adding insult to injury, the HDZ passed these acts with a simple majority and in opposition to Serb deputies in the SDS and the SKH-SDP. These three amendments were a serious affront to Serb sensibilities and provided tangible evidence for the claims of Knin Radio and the Belgrade media that fascism had reared its head again in Croatia. The SDS took the opportunity it was handed by the regime and organized a mass demonstration in the town of Srb where it laid out the ideological groundwork for the possible exit of Serbs from Croatia.

At the mass rally in Srb held on July 25, Raskovic made it clear that the HDZ's constitutional amendments were responsible for what he characterized as "a Serbian uprising without arms." A public show of hands was made by those present (estimates ranged from 50,000 to 200,000) for the sovereignty of the Serbian people and their right to autonomy. It was agreed that in the present circumstances Serbs would seek only cultural autonomy within Croatia, which would involve securing linguistic, educational, and media rights. In the event that Yugoslavia became a confederation, however, Serbs would be entitled, on the basis of this acclamation, to political and territorial autonomy. This became the basic position of the SDS under Raskovic's

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leadership. In order to pacify the suspicions Croatians had with the SDS program, Raskovic' shunned any talk of war and insisted "we want our children to play and be friends with Croatian children." He made every effort to convey to the Croatian people that the Serbs would be quite content with cultural autonomy. Before the Serb public, Raskovic' spoke on how ruinous a Greater Serbia program would be and asked Serbs that, should a civil war develop, they go to battle only against the "Ustasha" and not the Croatian people. Raskovic' s perception of Tudjman was that he was not an Ustasha but, on the contrary, someone with whom the Serbs could negotiate. There was, at the same time, he felt, an "Ustasha core" in the HDZ that worked to restrict the maneuverability of Tudjman.67

With respect to national ideologies, Raskovic' was closer to pluralist nationalism than any other type. To be sure, during his reign as the undisputed spokesmen of the Serbs of Croatia (from February 1990 to October 1990), he was often taken to task by both the Croatian and Serbian press for being fickle and shaping his message to fit whatever audience he had before him. A careful analysis of his speeches does indicate a tendency towards volatility (moving between an amicable and agitated rhetoric, integrative and secessionist goals, aversion and adoration for

Nevertheless, Raskovic' was at heart a moderate who exhibited a flexibility that made dialogue and a negotiated settlement a real possibility. The cornerstone of pluralist nationalism is peaceful coexistence between groups based on relations of equality, and Raskovic' s public statements reflected these values. He accepted the sovereignty of the Croatian nation and sought cultural autonomy within the Croatian state (although he eventually entertained the idea of a Krajina state linked to the

68 Raskovic' normally tried to distance the activities of the SDS from any connection with the Milosevic' regime, so it was most surprising to see him figuratively prostrate before Milosevic' in an open letter in September 1990. In this letter, Raskovic' wrote that Milosevic' is the "most important person in the modern history of the Serbian people"; that he is the "spiritual, moral, and, quite certainly, physical protector" of the SDS; that he personally considers Milosevic' the "paradigm of everything Serbian"; and that he offers his "sincere and personal devotion" to the Serbian leader. Such adulation can be attributed to a number of things -- the heightened fear and panic in Knin after the August 1990 referendum for Serb autonomy, Tudjman's leaking of the transcripts of his talks with Raskovic' which was designed to embarrass and discredit the latter since he spoke of the Serbs as a "crazy nation," and rumors bandied about in the Croatian press that Raskovic' had been saying unflattering things about Milosevic'. By January 1991, Raskovic' was less inhibited insisting Milosevic' cannot negotiate with Tudjman on behalf of the Croatian Serbs and that the SDS would reject "any guardianship imposed on us." Dnevnik (September 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 13, 1990, p.66; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 29, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 30, 1990, pp.57-8; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 19, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 20, 1990, p.66; Belgrade Domestic Service (August 30, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 31, 1990, p.50; Vjesnik (January 10, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 18, 1991, pp.43-4.
Bosanska Krajina as interethnic relations within Croatia deteriorated). He assured the Croatian minority in the Krajina that they would receive equal treatment and not be offended or threatened; he consistently spoke out against war; he despised Chetniks from Serbia like Vojislav Seselj; he never tired of calling Croatia his home; and he constantly reminded Serbs that their problems lay not with the Croatian people but rather with the HDZ regime. Furthermore, he was always ready to reopen dialogue with the regime even after bloody encounters (such as at Plitvice, March/April 1991) and remained to the end opposed to the idea of a Greater Serbia.69

Raskovic's more radical speeches can usually be traced either to pressures from within the SDS or the sheer heavy-handedness of HDZ policy (such as his militaristic language after the Pakrac drama, March 1991).70 When the fall of his successor, Milan Babic', was being prepared in February 1992, the by-then marginalized Raskovic spoke about the opportunities this presented for constructing a "golden bridge" with Croatia that could make possible a new common life between Serbs and


Croats. In the parlance of Yugoslavia he was a "Partisan," not a "Chetnik."

The successor to Raskovic', Milan Babic', is a different case altogether. This former dentist from Vrlika was originally the protégé of Raskovic', who reportedly loved him like a son. But like many sons, Babic' rebelled against his "father" and engineered a coup within the SDS in October 1990 while Raskovic' was on a trip in the United States drumming up support for the Serbs of Croatia. During the absence of Raskovic', Babic' travelled to Belgrade and built-up an array of political and military contacts. From this point on he began to direct the political course of the Serbs of Croatia. The organizational base he used to do this was his appointed post as the president of the Serbian National Council (Srpsko Nacionalno Vijece). The SNV was created during the mass meeting in the town of Srb and was designed to be an extralegal vehicle to represent and protect the Serb nation during the looming crisis. The SNV was granted the right to organize plebiscites on crucial issues of national interest and accordingly organized a Serb referendum on autonomy which


was held August 19 to September 2.\textsuperscript{73} Henceforth, this unconstitutional, unelected body and its president, whose only legally elected position was the mayor of the Knin opstina, would present itself as the interlocutor for the entire Serb nation in Croatia.

Both in style and substance the leadership of Milan Babic\textsuperscript{7} represented an intense radicalization of Serb politics. A cursory content analysis of speeches from Raskovic\textsuperscript{7} and Babic\textsuperscript{7} that were given at the time of the clash at Plitvice National Park illustrates the very different temperament of these two men. Speaking in Knin, Raskovic\textsuperscript{7} told his audience "yesterday was a crime, but ... Serbs should not respond to it with a crime." Rather than see Serb mothers give birth to children for armies and graves, Raskovic\textsuperscript{7} pleaded that they be born for freedom. And he warned Serbs that if they wanted a war leader they would have to look elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{73} The referendum was held throughout Croatia (although it was suppressed by the police in many areas with a Croatian majority), and in Belgrade, Ljubljana, and Vojvodina among Serbs who had formerly lived in Croatia. The initiative read simply "For Serbian Autonomy: Yes or No." Out of 567,317 Serbs who participated within Croatia, 567,127 voted yes. Overzealous Serbs at the local level reported approval percentages of 125%, 160%, and 400%! Tanjug (July 25, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), July 26, 1990, pp.59-60; Vjesnik (July 25, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), August 2, 1990, pp.42-3; Politika (July 26, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), July 31, 1990, p.72; Tanjug (July 31, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), August 1, 1990, pp.65-6; Andrejevich, (Sept. 28, 1990), p.43; Milan Andrejevich, "Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I)," \textit{Report on Eastern Europe}, (September 14, 1990), pp.38-9; Tanjug, in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), October 1, 1990, pp.62-3.
That "elsewhere" was in fact Titova Korenica where Babic’ was in the process of explaining that "the neo-fascist and reestablished Ustasha state that calls itself the Republic of Croatia has carried out a terrorist attack against the Serbian people ..." Babic’ then announced an SNV decision to join Serb areas of Croatia to Serbia proper.74

The political strategy of Babic’ never deviated from the secession of the Krajina from Croatia. His tactics seemed to be based on obstructing any rapprochement between Serbs and the HDZ and keeping one step ahead of whatever the government was willing to offer. For example, he successfully thwarted the continuation of the HDZ/SDS negotiations over the constitution that had commenced in October 1990; he flatly told Croatian delegates planning to attend talks between the SFRJ and Knin authorities that their security could not be guaranteed in Knin; prior to the promulgation of the Croatian constitution he presented his own plan for the political autonomy of Serb areas which single-handedly moved the minimal goal of the SDS beyond cultural autonomy; and immediately after the Croatian constitution was approved he invited Milan Martic’ (a former Knin police chief who lost his job when the HDZ reorganized the police forces) and "Captain Dragan" (a paramilitary leader from Serbia) to organize a

Serb militia for the Krajina.75

Babic's ideological contribution to the Serb national question came in the form of a statute he had written announcing the formation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAOK) in December 1990. In this document the near-unanimous Serb referendum and the "positive experience of regional autonomy in modern Europe" were invoked to justify the creation a Serbian autonomous region that would include the "historic territories of the Dalmatian and military Krajina" and other areas in which a majority Serb population has voted for accession.76 The powers delegated to the SAOK in Babic's statute were considerable and included police and judicial functions, economic planning, and authority over language, education, and the media. The central government could only intervene in SAOK areas of competence through the constitutional court. Such an audacious usurpation of power led Borba to make the following comment: "If all these


powers were to be delegated to Knin county, the quite logical question arises of what the Knin authors have left Croatia. It seems, almost nothing.\textsuperscript{77}

One specific point about Babić's view on the right to self-determination is that this principle could only be exercised if Serbs constituted a majority in a given area. In other words, Babić defined "Serbian ethnic territory" on the basis of the ethnic principle, and not the historic principle.\textsuperscript{78} Babić's consistency on this point is observed in March 1991 when the Serbs of Slavonia began to bargain with Tudjman over their status. It was Babić's contention that while it was "understandable" for Serbs in minority areas to discuss a scheme of national rights with Tudjman since they would continue to reside within Croatia, any areas of Slavonia that had Serb majorities would become part of the SAOK.\textsuperscript{79}

The significance of Babić's SAOK statute was that it represented a substantial escalation of demands from the


conditional autonomy of the August referendum. Now the SNV was set on political autonomy no matter what happened to the status of Croatia within Yugoslavia. Such a position was directly at odds with Zagreb's emphasis on centralism. Even more, in the hands of Babic' the SAOK was essentially a vehicle to engineer the exit of Serbs from Croatia. In 1991 a flurry of SAOs were set up in Croatia that covered the following areas: Krajina (Eastern and Northern Dalmatia, Banija, Lika, and Kordun), Eastern Slavonia (Baranja and Western Srem) and Western Slavonia (Packrac, Grubisno Polje, and Daruvar). The efforts of the rural Serbs to organize the SAOs led to a series of clashes between the Marticevci (or militiamen of the SAOK, nicknamed after Milan Martic') and the Croatian MUP (special police forces of the Croatian Internal Ministry) and Zengas (Croatian national guardsmen). By December 1991 the SAOs were consolidated into the Serbian Republic of Krajina (RSK), with Babic' standing as the president of the RSK.

In his capacity as the leader of the rural Serbs Babic' controlled Knin radio. The nationalist rhetoric he brought to the airwaves was particularly inflammatory as he regularly referred

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80 In Pakrac, the town's municipal assembly decided to secede from Croatia and seized the local police station, thereby prompting intervention by the Croatian MUP; in Plitvice, the Marticevci attempted to take over the Plitvice Lakes National Park and transfer it to the authority of the SAOK. Milan Andrejevich, "Crisis in Croatia: The Pakrac Drama," Report on Eastern Europe, (March 22, 1991), pp.37-41; For various reports on the situation in Plitvice, see FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 1, 1991, pp.45-54.
to the Croatian government as "Ustasha" and "fascists" and never took the time to delineate between the regime of Croatia and the Croatian people as Raskovic’s coterie -- such as SAOK Minister of Information, Lazar Macura, who remarked "we could do whatever we want to them [i.e., minority Croatians within the SAOK] but they are completely safe" -- were equally ominous.\(^81\) It is thus not surprising to find that Croats who lived in the Krajina complained of constant harassment.\(^82\)

The unravelling of Babic began when Milosevic recalculated the costs of engagement of Serbia and JNA in the war. The threats of international isolation, the economic sanctions against Serbia imposed by the US and the EC in November 1991, the fact that Serbs presently controlled one-third of Croatian territory and were now unable to budge Croatian forces any further, and the opportunities for expansion now wide open in BH all convinced the Serbian leader to sign on to the Vance peace plan in December 1991. Babic considered the plan capitulation since it provided for the disarming of the Marticevci and the eventual reincorporation of Serb areas within Croatia.\(^83\) With the lead of Milosevic,


official Serbia and significant party elites in the RSK began to turn against Babic'. By February 1992 Babic' was relieved of his post as president of the RSK and in his place was selected Goran Hadzic', a man who was willing to sign the Vance peace plan and was therefore pliable to Milosevic's short-term political interests.84

Babic's political position matches the ethos of primordial nationalism. Under his rule plans were implemented for the unconditional secession of Serb areas from Croatia, rural Serbs


were organized into a militia to fight against the state of Croatia, an enemy-stereotype of the HDZ regime and Croatians was fostered, all Croatian symbols were abolished from Serb-held areas, and the Croatian minority was placed under duress which led to their mass exodus. For Babic, a common life with Croatians was simply out of the question. In a comparative assessment made by Borba on the political differences between Raskovic and Babic, it was noted that the former always advocated "a policy that is based on political means in the hands of intellectuals"; the latter, however, felt it was "sufficient to distribute arms to the people or to secede and end the whole story." According to Vreme, "Babic goes for all or nothing; he wants the recognition of Krajina as a state and international troops

85 The SNV in July 1990 banned the use of any Croatian symbols, such as the sahovnica in Serbian ethnic territories. In May 1991 the Cyrillic script was made official in the SAOK while the Croatian linguistic standard was permitted where Croats reached 8% of the population. Tanjug (July 31, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe) August 1, 1990, pp.65-6; Tanjug (May 29, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 30, 1991, p.26.


between Knin and Zagreb, and his own internal civilian authority - or war.”

And in Misha Glenny’s estimate, Babic' “proved that he was one of Milosevic’s only equals in the politics of deceit and manipulation. Perhaps he was his only equal.”

2. **Summary Statement on Democratic Consolidation.** The mobilization of Serb nationalism in Croatia forced Croatian nationalists to confront their greatest test. Could Croatia enter its state of independence as a genuine bi-ethnic polity in which it enjoyed the consent and loyalty of its Serb minority? Unfortunately, the HDZ was so obsessed with asserting the primacy of the Croatian nation that they missed the opportunity to strike a deal with the pluralist nationalist Raskovic'. Their program of constitutional revisionism, which had major ramifications for comparative group worth and the politics of ethnic symbols, worked only to provoke the more radical elements in the Serb community and undermine Raskovic’'s efforts to attain a civil reconciliation. Furthermore, Tudjman’s historicism, his celebration of everything Croatian, and his mission to rewrite the fascist experience in Croatia greatly irritated Serbs and exemplified an insensitivity and outright arrogance with regard to the sentiments, historical memories, and dignity of the Serb community. In this way, Babic' was as much a product of

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89 Glenny, p.18.
Tudjman as he was of Milosevic. His arrival at the helm of the SDS represented an ideological shift from pluralist to primordial nationalism, from integration to secession, and from Partisan to Chetnik. In a word, it marked the beginning of the end for democratic consolidation.

b. **Impact on Democracy.** In the discussion of the national ideology of the SDS, it was indicated how respect for human rights deteriorated in areas under SDS control. In this section the relationship between the monistic nationalism of the HDZ and the practice of democracy in Croatia will be considered. It should first be stated that the regime in Croatia falls well below the standards of procedural democracy.\(^90\) To be sure, three multiparty elections have been held in the post-communist period without

serious questions regarding their fairness and integrity. At the same time, many important fundamentals of democracy are lacking in Croatia. For one, the government has made a concerted effort to control and stifle the media. It has placed HDZ party members, Antun Vrdoljak and Milovan Siblj, in charge of Croatian television and of the national news agency, respectively. Direct control, however, is not the only way the government influences public discourse. The HDZ has also revived the verbal offenses law (a holdover from the communist period) and ingeniously-crafted "privatization laws" that make it easy for the government to take over or close down publications under the pretext that they are bankrupt. Through these and other machinations the critical magazine Danas and its successor Novi Danas were run out of business, the equally critical Slobodna Dalmacija was tamed, and moves were made against Rijeka's Novi list and Novi Vjesnik. Justifying the government's treatment of Danas, Siblj explained that the magazine was "against the Croatian state," and that most of its writers were "children of Yugoslav People's Army officers, children of mixed marriages, or children of Communist Party members." For such heavy-handed treatment of the


press, the government earned the ire of the International Federation of Journalists who petitioned the Council of Europe to deny membership to Croatia.\textsuperscript{93}

Prominent individuals, opposition politicians, and independent journalists also face limitations on their freedom of expression. In his capacity as state prosecutor, Vladimir Seks has initiated proceedings for violations of the verbal offense law -- which encompasses "spreading false reports" and "disquieting the public" -- against Ivan Zvonimir Cicak of the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), Milorad Pupovac\textsuperscript{c} of the Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF), the journalists Tanja Torbarina, Jelena Lovric\textsuperscript{c}, and the writers Slavenka Drakulic and Dubravka Ugresic, to name just a few. The regional parties have also been pressured by the ruling party -- the government has vehemently denounced the Istrian Democratic Alliance (IDS) for its stand on regional autonomy and the Dalmatian Action has seen mass arrests of its leadership.\textsuperscript{94}


In essence, there has been an alarming reduction in the range of acceptable opinions. Criticism of Tudjman, the HDZ, the Croatian state, or any question about the quality of democracy is met with a flurry of government and media attacks. The "enemies" of Croatia today are charged with being "Yugo-nostalgic" and "Yugoslav patriots;" in some cases, their nationality and family history are questioned.\textsuperscript{95} The promotion of everything Croatian has reached a fever pitch in the republic and it is has become almost obligatory for opposition politicians, intellectuals, and journalists "to love Croatia loudly and clearly."\textsuperscript{96} In the assessment of Novi Danas, the fact that the opposition is under the constant suspicion of being "anti-Croat" and even wanting to "destroy Croatia" is the direct product of the HDZ's tendency to


equate itself with the state of Croatia. Since the HDZ perceives itself as the Croatian community in miniature, interests expressed outside this sphere are, ipso facto, anti-Croatian. This generally oppressive atmosphere in Croatia has brought condemnation from Helsinki Watch and has led many to suggest a "creeping authoritarianism" in Croatia.

Another domain in which the regime's undemocratic practices are exemplified is in its failure to protect the rights of Serbs within its jurisdiction. The first instance of Croatian nationalist excess occurred in Zadar. In this port city (which is a stronghold of fierce Croatian nationalism), Croatian nationalists took to the streets in May 1991 and proceeded to smash and loot Serb

97 Novi Danas (June 29, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), July 22, 1992, pp.19-20. Vlado Gotovac of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) even felt the need during a debate in the Sabor on Serb citizenship to protect himself by noting that he is not calling into question Croatian democracy "in any respect." In the same vein, the president of the HSLS, Drazen Budisa, has been labeled "not a good enough Croat." Novi Vjesnik (December 1, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 9, 1992, pp.36-7; Novi Danas (August 7, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 21, 1992, p.26; Novi Vjesnik (May 9, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 22, 1992, pp.23-4.

Not a word of condemnation followed from the
government. During the civil war, there were numerous reports
of ethnic cleansing committed against Serbs by Croatian
government troops and Croatian paramilitaries in West Slavonia,
Zadar, Zagreb, and Ogulin (by one count, 20,000 Serbs were
affected). Since that time, there has been a steady flow of
reports on the destruction and confiscation of Serb property, the
arbitrary detention of Serbs, their summary dismissal from their
place of work, unequal treatment in social welfare policy,
difficulties in obtaining Croatian citizenship certificates, and the
pressures placed on Serbs to "catholicize" themselves. A principal
investigator of these cases was Milan Djukic, a Serb who was
eventually appointed the head of the Office for Interethnic
Relations. According to Djukic, this pattern of discrimination
against Serbs in Croatia was the fault of the government and the
Supreme Court which failed to halt such conduct and resulted in a
severe compromise of the "democratic character of authority in
Croatia."

99 This was done at a time of increasing clashes between the government
and the rural Serbs. Thompson, A Paper House, p.261-2; FBIS, Daily Report
(Eastern Europe), May 3, 1991, pp.36-41.

100 Tanjug (November 5, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe),
Report (Eastern Europe), November 13, 1991, p.37; Tanjug (May 21, 1991), in
FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 23, 1991, pp.24-5; Tanjug (June 5,

101 Slobodna Dalmacija (July 17, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern
Europe), July 30, 1992, p.29; Tanjug (September 15, 1992), in FBIS, Daily
In addition, the expression of Serb interests has barely been tolerated. In the Sabor in October 1990 HDZ deputy Ivan Bobetko assaulted SDS deputy Radoslav Tanjga for speaking about the oppression of Serbs in Croatia and Djukic testified in 1992 that "whenever I mention the 'Serbian people,' I produce an allergy in the Assembly." 102

Overall, the monistic nationalism of the HDZ has made for only the partial realization of a democratic regime. The claims of political priority embedded in this national ideology have led the HDZ to elevate the interests of the Croatian nation above any other consideration. Many observers have pointed to the fixation Tudjman and the regime have with the trappings of power and the symbols of statehood. It seems fair to say that securing the sovereignty of the nation and the independence of the state are Tudjman's primary, if not the sole, objectives. Democracy is seen only in terms of its instrumental value and has been allowed to


languish whenever it has proven ill-suited to nationalist ends. The regime's obsession with finding domestic enemies has engendered a political climate in which one is compelled to present oneself as a "good Croat." In these conditions, democratic values such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association are quite circumscribed. In the words of the intellectual Zarko Puhovski, "the old right-wing ideology has come to life again in Croatia" and "in its practical implementation, [it] is undemocratic, which can ... be seen from its attitude toward the Serbs, the opposition, and the media."\(^{103}\)

D. Public Opinion

The public opinion hypothesis is presented to determine if the concepts and values found in the nationalist parties' programs correspond with the vox populi. If Tudjman's monistic nationalist ideology or Babic's primordial nationalist ideology find approval in their respective national communities, then additional obstacles will be placed in the path of democratic consolidation.

Survey research conducted by Ivan Siber (a Zagreb political science professor) prior to the 1990 elections offers a glimpse into the party preferences, ethnic identities, value orientations, and perceptions of ethnic (in)equality of the Croatian electorate. An

\(^{103}\) Delo (December 12, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), December 30, 1992, p.34.
examination of the party preference of members of nationality
groups indicates that 41% in the Croatian community identified
with the HDZ, while 46% in the Serb community chose the SKH-SDP
and 23% the SDS.\(^{104}\) The smaller proportion of support in the Serb
community for the SDS reflects the fact that the SDS was not well
organized for the elections and was barely noticed. As a result,
the SKH-SDP cornered 70% of the Serb vote in Croatia.\(^{105}\) This
outpouring of Serb support for the communists can be explained
by the fact that the SKH-SDP was well-staffed by Serbs and had a
pluralist nationalist program geared to make Serbs feel secure in
the new Croatia. A Serb refugee who had voted for the SKH-SDP
but a month after the elections became a member of the SDS told
me, Serbs made their choice on the basis of "who offers less
blood."\(^{106}\)

A study of the value orientation of party identifiers
demonstrates that the supporters of the HDZ and the SDS were

\(^{104}\) Ivan Siber, "The Impact of Nationalism, Values, and Ideological
Orientations on Multi-Party Elections in Croatia," in Jim Seroka and
Vukasin Pavlovic', eds., The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of
Democratic Transformation, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992),
pp.142-3.

\(^{105}\) Thompson, A Paper House, p.281.

\(^{106}\) Personal interview, Ames, Iowa, 11/18/92. The ethnic composition
of the HDZ and the SDS membership did indicate ethnic polarization: the
rank-and-file of the HDZ were 98% Croatian, and the SDS was 100% Serbian.
Siber, pp.142-3.
motivated by different issues. HDZ identifiers chose "Croatian autonomy" (69%), and a "European orientation" (51%) as their two most salient values while SDS identifiers selected "ethnic equality" (69%) and the "Yugoslav community" (57%). In the general public, a plurality of 35% of the Serbs advocated that Yugoslavia be transformed into a federation with a strong federal component (the position, incidently, of the Milosevic government), 31% favored the existing federal structure, and 23% desired a single state without republics. Among the Croats 64% preferred a confederation of autonomous states (only 11% of the Serbs accepted a confederal Yugoslavia) and 15% saw Croatia's future outside of Yugoslavia. On the issue of ethnic (in)equality, over one-third in the Croatian community and over one-third in the Serb community felt that the other group has a privileged status. This attitude among the Serbs was especially pronounced in the areas where they constitute a majority. If we break these figures down along the lines of party identifiers, the differences in perceptions are even more glaring: 56% of the HDZ identifiers agreed that Serbs are privileged whereas 71% of the SDS identifiers contended that Croats are privileged. Finally, authoritarian attitudes were tested and Siber found that the level of authoritarianism among the electorate was quite high, as enough SDS and HDZ identifiers exhibited authoritarian traits to designate their respective parties as authoritarian (the SDS had

107 This observation on the geographic concentration of Serb perceptions of inequality comes from Cohen, p.99.
the most authoritarian identifiers on the Croatian scene).\textsuperscript{108}

Research conducted by \textit{Danas} in March 1990 focused on the degree to which potential voters supported the elements of the major parties' platforms. The researchers found that 82\% of HDZ supporters advocated the \textit{sahovnica} as the new national flag, 54\% wanted Croatia to regain its "natural borders," 61\% supported the phrase "state of the Croatian people" as the new state definition, and 54\% demanded the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia. A comparison with the supporters of the two other major competing parties -- the SKH-SDP and the KNS -- showed that the details of the HDZ program did not enjoy unanimous support among the Croatian electorate. Among the potential voters of the SKH-SDP, 77\% wanted the existing flag to remain, 96\% did not want to change the borders, 53\% preferred the state to be defined as a "state of all its citizens," and 64\% supported a federal Yugoslavia. According to the data collected by Siber, the SKH-SDP had a multiethnic membership at the time of the elections: 52\% Croatian, 28\% Serb, and 17\% Yugoslav. Among the identifiers of the Coalition of National Understanding (the KNS, a multiparty coalition headed by former leaders of the Croatian Spring, such as Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo), 45\% accepted the existing flag, 82\% sought no change in borders, 80\% wanted Croatia to be a "state of all its citizens," and 51\% advocated a confederal Yugoslavia. When we consider that the ethnic

\textsuperscript{108} Siber, pp.146-168.
composition of the KNS was 93% Croatian, 1% Serb, and 2% Yugoslav, the conclusion is inescapable that the Croatian electorate was not uniformly monistic nationalist at this time.\textsuperscript{109}

The popular vote the HDZ has received in the three elections since 1990 provides further evidence that the Croatian nation has not been politically homogenized\textsuperscript{110} behind its platform. For example, in the April 1990 elections to the most important chamber in the Sabor, the Sociopolitical Chamber, the HDZ received only 42% of the vote. In the August 1992 elections two electoral procedures were used: under the proportional system the HDZ earned 44% of the vote and under the majority system the party received 34%. And in the February 1993 elections to the Chamber of Counties and local units of government, the HDZ failed to obtain an absolute majority in seven out of twenty-one zupanijas (including Zagreb), two-thirds (43) of the towns, and nearly one-half of the municipalities. In each election, the HDZ popular vote was greatly magnified by the electoral system when it came to the


\textsuperscript{110}The term "political homogenization" is used frequently in the former Yugoslavia by scholars, journalists, and politicians to denote a situation in which an ethnic group bridges its internal differences and lines up collectively behind a single party or national ideology.
distribution of seats in the assemblies. Thus, in the 1990 elections the first-past-the-post system devised by the outgoing communists translated a 42% popular vote into 67.5% of the seats. In the August 1992 elections the mixed electoral system awarded the HDZ 50% of the seats under the proportional representation and 90% of the available seats under the majoritarian system. The elections to the upper house in 1993 stands outside this pattern as the two-thirds popular vote the party gained only earned it 59% of the seats. But even here the HDZ crafting of the electoral law ensured it certain advantages, such as granting Tudjman the prerogative of appointing 5 additional members to the chamber and endowing him with lifelong membership in this body upon the end of his tenure in the presidency.\(^{111}\)

In December 1991 the *Danas* research team carried out a study on Croatian attitudes towards Zagreb's plan to create two autonomous districts for the rural Serbs, popularly known as the "Law on the Serbs." In a sample size of 896 (79% Croatian, 12% Serb, and 9% other), three-fourths felt that the law grants Serbs a privileged position in Croatia. In response to the question "would you personally agree to a proclamation of territorial autonomy for

the Serbs in Croatia if this guaranteed an end to the war in Croatia?,” 90% answered in the negative. While 94% of the respondents expressed acceptance of democratic principles for resolving interethnic disputes, 53% thought the adoption of such procedures could not help solve the Croatian-Serb conflict. In a final question, the respondents were asked if there were current a Serb politician with whom Zagreb could negotiate a new deal. Thirty-six percent said "there is no such politician at the moment," while 29% and 15% chose Zivko Juzbasic and Milan Djukic, respectively, two Serbs who had cooperated with the government and are regarded as traitors by the rural Serbs. This and other data (which indicate that the Croatian electorate would support the government if it decided to take the Krajina back militarily) suggests a certain hardening of attitudes towards Serbs since the end of the civil war.

Still, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Croatian electorate has aligned itself with the HDZ program of monistic nationalism. A study conducted by the Croatian magazine Globus in July 1993 indicates that even the membership and sympathizers of the HDZ are divided between the liberal/Partisan faction (Josip Manolic´, Stipe Mesic, Franjo Greguric´, Slavko Degoricija, and Zarko Domljjan) and the conservative/Ustasha

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faction (Vladimir Seks, Gojko Susak, Vice Vukojevic', and Ivica Pasalic'). In a sample size of 600, 44.6% of the HDZ members and sympathizers supported the liberal-Partisans and 30% supported the conservative-Ustasha.  

In conclusion, the survey data and election results presented here show that the monistic nationalism of the HDZ has not attained modal status within the Croatian community. While it is true that in 1990 the overwhelming majority of Croatians desired a confederal Yugoslavia, this is the point at which political uniformity ended. If we examine the key dimensions of the ideology of the HDZ, such as Tudjman's emphasis on the privileged status of Serbs, the transformation of Croatia into an ethnic state of Croatians, the change of the flag to the sahovnica, and the extension of Croatia's borders, we see in 1990 most Croatians (51%) felt that Serbs and Croats were equal, most did not want to alter the border, and many had reservations about adopting the sahovnica and creating a state based on the priority of


115 Siber, p.152.

116 In the Danas study of March 1990, 69% in Zagreb, 66% in Split, and 78% in Rijeka did not want to change Croatia's borders. Danas (April 3, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), April 17, 1990, pp.54-5.
Croats. Hence, there is evidence on hand that indicates the political class in the HDZ is more radically nationalist than the general population and that its political dominance has been made possible by electoral laws that give it an unfair advantage.

E. The Chain Reaction

According to the chain reaction hypothesis, when one political party organizes itself on the basis of nationalism and achieves political success in an election, other parties will be forced to follow suit or risk permanent political exclusion. The upshot is the withering away of nonethnic parties and the rise of ethnic parties preoccupied with the institutionalization of relative group worth and divisive, symbolic issues that tend to reinforce, rather than cross-cut, ethnic cleavages. If a chain reaction has set in, then the prospects of democratic consolidation are reduced since parties committed to dialogue, moderation, and compromise are marginalized.

A survey of the Croatian political landscape since 1989 leads one to conclude that nationalist parties have basically defined the party system. The HDZ, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), the Croatian National Party (HNS), the Croatian Democratic Party (HDS), the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), and the Croatian Party of

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117 As mentioned above, most KNS and SKH-SDP supporters accepted the existing flag and advocated a Croatia defined as a state of all its citizens.
[State] Right (HSP) are all ethnic parties. The nonnationalist parties -- the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), the Party of Democratic Changes (SDP, the party dropped the SKH prefix in November 1990), and the Social Democratic Alliance -- have been few in number and have, for the most part, slipped into obscurity.

When the political transition began in Croatia there was a flood of nationalist parties that tended to drown out voices that spoke from a nonethnic perspective.\textsuperscript{118} Nonetheless, the SKH-SDP managed to be the second largest vote-getter (with approximately 37% of the vote) and won 19 of 80 seats in the Sociopolitical Chamber (and 90 of 349 seats in all three chambers). The SKH-SDP position on the national question reflected the ideal type of pluralist nationalism. It called for, among other things, promoting the cultural identity and national equality of Serbs and it rallied equally against Serbian hegemonism and the "unitarist conception of Croatia." In the words of its party leader, Ivica Racan, it is "impossible to struggle enough for national equality."\textsuperscript{119} The


party's national ideology plus its proven track record in protecting the privileged status of Serbs in the republic made it a safe vote for the Serb electorate.

The SKH-SDP's downward political tailspin began, pari passu, with the escalation of the Croatian-Serb conflict. Once interethnic hostilities became the centerpiece of Croatian politics in the summer of 1990, the logic of the chain reaction began to take its toll on the SKH-SDP -- in June the party suffered internal fissures on ethnic lines and by August was in the process of being totally eclipsed by the SDS. The mass rally the SDS held in the town of Srb in July was the critical moment when the party succeeded in portraying itself as the best defender of the Serbs. The subsequent referendum for autonomy "homogenized" the rural Serbs behind the SDS and stripped the SKH-SDP of the electoral mandate it had won from the Serb community. In the testimony of Simo Rajić (a member of the SKH-SDP, the vice-president of the Sabor, and a Serb) who spoke before the Sabor in August 1990, "moderate politicians are not popular today. For my people I am also a traitor who is asked to resign. The SDS wants me physically liquidated. The SKH has lost the trust of Serbs ..."


121 Vecernji List (August 25, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe),
Subsequently, the SKH-SDP became a loyal and very quiet opposition in Croatian politics.\textsuperscript{122}

The political trajectory of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) epitomizes a completely different pattern that does not correspond with the chain reaction hypothesis. Since its founding the HSLS has been a party of civic nationalism. It has placed particular emphasis in its program on the tasks of creating a law-governed state, a market economy, a democratic regime, and a civil society. In its original program, the HSLS described itself as a party of "old-style liberalism" with an "individualistic world view in which the individual is the highest value."\textsuperscript{123} It defined the state of Croatia as "the homeland of all who live in it" and supported proportional representation so that all nationalities could be represented. The party has not taken a clear stand on the type of autonomy Serbs should receive but has stated that any solution should not "be harmful to the interests of the majority people or put in question Croatia's territorial integrity."\textsuperscript{124}

Early in Croatia's democratic transition the HSLS actively played the nationalist card. In October 1989 it was able to attract


between 30,000 and 70,000 people to Zagreb to demand the return of the statute of Governor Jelacic, a symbol of Croatian national pride that had been removed from Zagreb's main square by the communists. Moreover, as the Croatian-Serb conflict began to flare in 1990 the HSLS sponsored a number of "all-Croat" forums inviting all Croatian parties to discuss events in the republic and to close ranks in defense of the Croatian state.

Since the August 1992 elections the HSLS has emerged as the second strongest party in Croatia. It won 14 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and in the February 1993 elections to the Chamber of Counties it won 16 seats, second behind the HDZ. The party's president, Drazen Budisa, finished second in the 1992 presidential elections with 22% of the vote. The interesting thing about the party's electoral successes is that they have been accomplished as the HSLS has continued to de-nationalize itself. In fact, the HSLS now calls itself a "post-nationalist party." In Budisa's explanation, this means that "with the creation of the Croatian state and the establishment of a situation in which we are not challenged as Croats, Croatian awareness itself loses the dimensions that it had


in the Yugoslav state ... Now we are in a new situation ..."\textsuperscript{127} In this "new situation," the HSLS has spoken out against all forms of chauvinism, it has advocated greater attention be given to marketization, and it has appealed for the building of bridges with the Serb community on the basis of minority rights and the equality of all citizens.\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Vreme} characterized Budisa himself as the only politician on the Croatian scene who is capable of obtaining the votes of both the supporters of the extreme right-wing HSP and the urban Serbs.\textsuperscript{129} In sum, the HSLS has improved its electoral status not by becoming more nationalist, but by divesting itself of its nationalist characteristics. This obviously contradicts the expected patterns suggested by the chain reaction hypothesis.

Overall, the chain reaction hypothesis cannot be sustained. The experience of the HSLS demonstrates that a party of civic nationalism will not necessarily be marginalized by extreme nationalist parties or be forced to radicalize its program in order to compete effectively. Instead, such "post-nationalist" parties can


attain electoral success and have a very promising future. Although the fate of the SKH-SDP fits the logic of the chain reaction, this explanation could be spurious. An equally plausible argument that explains the decline of the SKH-SDP would be the natural reaction against communist parties seen everywhere in the first post-communist elections in Eastern Europe.

F. Census Elections

Census elections occur when each ethnic group votes primarily for its own ethnic party. When this happens, the minority group will find itself permanently out of power. In these conditions, it is hypothesized that the excluded ethnic party will push for some form of exit from the state and the dominant group will respond with repression.

In the April 1990 elections, the SDS sent only 5 deputies to the Sabor. In addition, 24 Serb deputies earned seats representing the SKH-SDP. Consequently, one cannot accurately describe the Croatian elections as a census type. Despite the fact that the media war in Yugoslavia had been in full swing since late 1989 and the Krajinska were bombarded by a torrent of yellow journalism from Belgrade that was designed to enrage them and conjure up images of a revamped NDH, the Serbs of Croatia were politically unprepared for the elections and failed to line up collectively behind the SDS. Still, Serbs were drastically
underrepresented in comparison with what they had enjoyed in
communist Croatia so one could make the point that this was
functionally equivalent to the traumatizing realization of exclusion
produced by a census election. Many Serb citizens were reported
to have been upset with the election results and flooded the office
of the president with letters complaining that the SKH-SDP could
not represent them since it was a communist and not a Serbian
party.\footnote{Zagreb Domestic Service (August 24, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report}
(Eastern Europe), August 27, 1990, pp.49-52.} However, at no time after the elections did the SDS
openly complain about the paucity of its representation in the
government. As a matter of fact, the SDS only began to
incorporate a stand of exit officially in its program in August 1990
at the mass rally at Srb -- and this was prompted by the HDZ’s
amendments to the Croatian constitution which altered state
symbols and the interethnic balance of power. The evidence of
this case, therefore, points to the falsification of the census
election hypothesis.

G. The Generosity Moment

The generosity moment refers to the window of opportunity a
new regime is given by ethnic minorities to demonstrate its good
will. If the regime presents a generous and meaningful package
of minority rights and exhibits flexibility and accommodation at
the bargaining table, the outlook for both democracy and
democratic consolidation should be enhanced. The operational
definition of the generosity concept encompasses two measures: (1) what the incoming government offers minorities; and (2) how the government conducts the negotiation process. If the majority group is dismissive of minority concerns and unyielding at the negotiating table, then democratic consolidation is likely to fail as the alienated elites of minority groups turn towards solutions that invite the collapse of the regime, the partition of the state, and the violation of democratic tenets.

On the heels of its euphoric election victory the HDZ was eager to make good its campaign promises of restoring a sense of Croatian national pride, establishing national sovereignty, and reversing the disadvantages Croatia was saddled with in Tito's Yugoslavia. As already mentioned, a major area of grievance the HDZ focused on was the preponderance of Serbs in the state administration. Although Tudjman promised there would be no revenge against Serbs employed by the state and attempted to play down the changes by suggesting it is normal in democracies that after a transfer of power the bureaucracy is shaken up, wholesale purges did begin and are well-documented. Serbs at many state factories were forced to sign loyalty oaths to the new state or face dismissal.\(^{131}\) Not only did the more educated urban Serbs suffer from this kind of collective punishment, but Serbs residing in rural areas were particularly hard hit. Misha Glenny

has noted how the farther one moves from Zagreb the further to the right the HDZ becomes. And it is here in regional cities like Osijek, Split, and Zadar that the "hardline dogs" of the HDZ, such as Branimir Glavas\textsuperscript{132} and Vladimir Seks, unleashed a wave of "bureaucratic ethnic cleansing" against local Serbs.\textsuperscript{133} Seks exemplified the priority claims of monistic nationalism when he vowed that "these people in Knin will definitely respect the Croatian banner."\textsuperscript{134}

As could be expected, Knin police were not about to wear uniforms with the \textit{sahovnica} or sign loyalty oaths to the new Croatia.\textsuperscript{135} The creation of a Croatian National Guard (ZNG) also

\textsuperscript{132} Glavas, the regional leader of the HDZ in Osijek, has been dubbed a "serial killer in fatigues" by Glenny. Glavas' political activities fit the primordial nationalist type. He hails from western Hercegovina, the traditional stronghold of Croatian extremism; he organized the paramilitary unit, the "Wolves of Vukovar" out of the ranks of the fanatical Croatian \textit{dosljaci} of Osijek; he has verbally justified ethnic cleansing; and he single-handedly acted as a catalyst for the war in Tenja. Glenny, \textit{The Fall of Yugoslavia}, pp.104-113; Vasic', "Osijek, na Drava." pp.20-2; Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations," pp.17-18; Tanjug (December 10, 1991), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), December 12, 1991, p.35.

\textsuperscript{133} Glenny, pp.13, 77, 107; Misha Glenny, "War Returns to Europe," \textit{New Statesman and Society}, (August 9, 1991), pp.10-11; the term bureaucratic cleansing comes from Hayden, p.668.

\textsuperscript{134} Tanjug (October 6, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), October 9, 1990, pp.68-9.

\textsuperscript{135} For example, in Dvor na Uni, a Serb-majority opština in Kordun and
disturbed Serbs and appeared to them as another means of making Serbian policemen superfluous. Reports in the respected Belgrade newspaper *Borba* noted that this 4,000-strong unit would be composed of individuals with a "pure Croat" lineage, membership in the HDZ, and a signed document of loyalty to the regime. Its chief function would be to secure order in problem areas of Croatia.\(^{136}\) Between August 1990 and the end of the Slovenian war in July 1991, a series of police wars erupted between the *Zengas* and the MUP on the one hand, and Serbian policemen/irregulars on the other. The first two rounds of violence -- in the Knin area in early August and in Petrinja in late September -- were prompted by the HDZ government's decision to seize weapons in police reservist stations so that they would not fall into Serb hands. Both times Serb citizens reacted angrily setting up barricades and violently clashing with Croatian special forces. The SDS and Radio Knin capitalized on these events warning that "we will not allow anybody to disarm us" and

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promising resistance to "the last drop of blood."\textsuperscript{137} While the Croatian government naturally insisted on the extension of its authority throughout the republic and did not desire to see weapons proliferate into the hands of enemies of the state, why the government acted so recklessly in Petrinja is difficult to explain given that earlier in September a deal had been brokered (between Slavko Degoricija representing the government and Milan Babic' of the SNV) which allowed for the reinstatement of the Knin Secretariat for Internal Affairs in exchange for the return of weapons.\textsuperscript{138} In a larger sense, the attention the HDZ gave to the reorganization of the police forces was a poor decision since it, as Misha Glenny explains, "involved depriving the Serbs of their most important possession, the gun."\textsuperscript{139}

Equally counterproductive from the vantage point of making a minority feel safe was the ubiquitous and ostentatious display of symbols and banners marking the supremacy of the Croatian nation. In the months following the election Croatia was awash

\textsuperscript{137} For the situation in Petrinja, see FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), October 1, 1990, pp.61-71; Goldstein, p.66.


\textsuperscript{139} Glenny, p.13.
with the sahovnica. Once Croatia neared its independence in June 1991, a law on citizenship was passed requiring Serbs not only to prove that their families had resided in Croatia for generations, but that they knew and publicly respected Croatian culture. In still more alarming indications of the institutionalization of Croatian supremacy, Cyrillic road signs were removed in favor of the Latin script and memorials honoring the victims of World War II were renamed to commemorate Croatian history and historical figures. Finally, it never occurred to Tudjman or any high ranking HDZ official that one way to minimize the knee-jerk reaction many Serb citizens would undoubtedly have after seeing the Ustasha flag being raised again would be a public apology for the genocide of World War II. When Stipe Mesic (then the Croatian representative on the SFRJ Presidency) was asked by a Swedish newspaper why Tudjman did not do something comparable to Willy Brandt's gesture of

140 Glenny, pp.12, 83-84, 92; Thompson, p.283.


142 For example, the Square of the Victims of Fascism in Zagreb was renamed the Square of Croatian Great Men; and the Museum of the Revolution of the Peoples of Croatia was rechristened the Museum of Croatian History. See Thompson, p.279; Tanjug (August 1, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 2, 1990, p.43; Tanjug (October 16, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), October 17, 1990, pp.56-7; Vjesnik (August 17, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 22, 1990, p.52.
reconciliation with Jews at the memorial for Auschwitz, Mesic scoffed at the suggestion remarking that Yugoslavia has been too obsessed with World War II and that "people should not be overburdened with the past."\textsuperscript{143} In light of all this, the moderate Serb intellectual Milorad Pupovac' was forced to conclude "[w]hat we have is a democratically legitimated tyranny of the majority."\textsuperscript{144}

It appears that Serbs were really an inconsequential element in Croatia to the HDZ. It is perhaps not that surprising to find then that in Tudjman's inaugural address no mention was made of the Serb community and its place in the new Croatia.\textsuperscript{145} By failing to reach out to the Serbian community, and particularly the more rustic and martial rural Serbs, and by casting every Serb protest or rally as an instigation by Chetnik and Greater Serbian elements, the HDZ actually turned local Serbs in eastern Slavonia, Kordun, and Banija -- who otherwise had no sympathy for the Chetniks of Knin -- into steadfast opponents of the Croatian government.\textsuperscript{146}


\textsuperscript{145} Vjesnik (May 31, 1990), in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report} (Eastern Europe), June 19, 1990, pp.82-3.

The personal experience of the Serb refugee that I interviewed represents this general pattern. A resident of Okucani (Eastern Slavonia), he voted for the SKH-SDP in the elections but in the post-election setting he began to feel he had "no choice" but to support the SDS. If decent people are led to believe that their jobs, families, and homes are in imminent danger solely because of their ethnicity, then political choice is reduced to one alternative: support "your" ethnic party or lose everything. Let us now examine how the HDZ leadership interacted with the leadership of the SDS.

The first notable gesture of conciliation happened immediately after the election when Tudjman offered Raskovic the post of vice-president of the Sabor. In June 1990 Tudjman and Raskovic met to discuss this offer and Croatian - Serb relations in the republic. As evinced by a transcript of the talks released by Danas, the two leaders appeared surprisingly tolerant and reached a verbal agreement that Serbs would receive cultural autonomy. It was determined that the next step in forging a "democratically negotiated agreement" would be taken by Raskovic who would present to Tudjman a detailed proposal for autonomy. Despite the congenial nature of the talks,

147 See Thompson, A Paper House, (pp.277, 293) for a discussion on how nationalism imposes the perception of choicelessness.

148 Raskovic gained considerable notoriety from a comment in the talks that was widely disseminated in the Yugoslav press: "There are fools who are capable of calling on these crazy Serbs -- and Serbs are a crazy people."
Raskovic eventually declined the post of Sabor vice-president in the wake of the Benkovac affair. In this incident, the president of the SDS branch in Benkovac was physically assaulted by Croats in an apparent retaliation for the Serb attempt on Tudjman's life in Benkovac a month earlier. The SDS released a statement on this matter contending that it had "all the elements of Ustasha aggression;" SDS deputies accordingly boycotted the first session of the Sabor. The next significant events only increased the mistrust and tension between the two national communities -- in June 1990 the HDZ passed its amendments to the constitution and the SDS responded with the July mass protest and referendum for autonomy in late August. This was a critical juncture for interethnic relations as Babic now began his rise to the forefront of Serb politics.


When the HDZ began preparations for a new constitution, shock waves again rippled throughout the Serbian community. In the highly important symbols of ethnic politics, the draft preamble to the constitution defined Croatia as "the national state of the Croatian people" (nacionalna država hrvatske narode). This formulation implied a significant devaluation in the status of the Serbs. Given that the previous constitutional formula from the communist regime read "the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the state of the nationalities inhabiting it," Serbs now appeared to be excluded from the state via constitutional omission. In the words of Lazar Macura, soon to become Minister of Information of the SAOK and director of Radio Knin, this was tantamount to the "elimination" of the Serbs as a people.

Because of the difficulties Serbs had with the draft of the constitution, a meeting was organized in October between representatives of the SDS and the HDZ. At the meeting an agreement was reached that allowed for the recognition of the SDS as the legitimate representative of the Serb nation and a pledge was made by the HDZ negotiators to throw out the draft.

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151 Vecernji List (October 3, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), September 26, 1990, p.56.

152 Thompson, p.271.
preamble. The SNV entered into the game in early November proposing its own phrases -- "the state of the Croatian and Serbian peoples" (an expression of ethnic parity) and "a democratic, legal, and social state of all citizens living in it" (a civil definition). A few days later Tudjman, in a gesture of good will, publicly proclaimed himself in favor of the civil form: "sovereign citizens regardless of national affiliation." Still, the issue remained unresolved.

Discussing the text before the Sabor on November 23, Zarko Domljan, president of the Sabor, mentioned only the ethnic variant. Evidently a compromise was in the works between the conservative and moderate wings of the HDZ, for the final text of what became the approved constitution read as follows: "the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes, Czechs,

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Slovens, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of ethnic rights in accordance with democratic norms of the United Nations Organization and the free world countries.\textsuperscript{157} In this synthesis of ethnic and civil rights, Croats were assured of their primacy in the state while all other groups were "guaranteed equality" at the level of citizenship "with the Croatian nationality."

When the new constitution was promulgated in late December, Raskovic greeted it with effusive praise. On the Croatian television program, "In Focus," he remarked "Croatia, which a few months ago ... was directed toward ethnocentrism, has taken a stand in favor of civil, that is people's, and not national sovereignty." Focusing on the notion of the "guaranteed equality" of all citizens, Raskovic concluded "I am quite satisfied with such a constitutional definition ... of Croatia as the democratic state of all its citizens."\textsuperscript{158} On the basis of such statements, the moderator concluded that a new consensus between the HDZ and the SDS had materialized. Such a positive outcome, however, was not in the offing. The monistic nationalist orientation of the HDZ


had already given the hard core Chetniks of Knin, through the medium of the SNV, the opportunity to preempt the moderates. In the week preceding the promulgation of the constitution, Milan Babic' seized the initiative and announced a statute, purportedly legitimated by the August referendum, for the establishment of a Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAOK).\(^1\) Having won the upper hand in internal Serb politics, Babic's supporters in the Knin SDS publicly dissociated the party from Raskovic's statement and the SDS deputies walked out of the Sabor on the day the constitution was presented.\(^2\) Obviously under pressure to maintain some standing in the party and not be completely outflanked, Raskovic did an about-face and, before an audience in Beli Manastir (Baranja), condemned the constitution as "ethnocratic."\(^3\) From this point on the politics of Croatia increasingly became a sparring match between Tudjman and Babic'.

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In the month of October, along with preparations for the constitution, Tudjman established a commission to work out a plan for the cultural autonomy of the Serbs.\textsuperscript{162} However, when the constitution finally came out in December the article dealing with cultural autonomy had very little substantive content attached to it. Article 15 expressed the equality of all nations and minorities in Croatia and mentioned cultural autonomy, freedom to express one's nationality, and freedom to use one's language and script as the means to guarantee that equality. No other indications were provided on how cultural autonomy could be realized and which institutional forms it would take. Furthermore, Article 12 had already earmarked the "Croatian language and the Latin script" as the official mode of discourse for the state relegating to "individual local units another language and the Cyrillic or some other script, along with the Croatian language and the Latin script."\textsuperscript{163} Therefore, not only was the Serbo-Croatian language now referred to only as the "Croatian language," but the constitutional writers deliberately declined to mention the existence of the "Serbian" appellation at all.

In a move designed to bypass the hardline Chetniks of Knin, Tudjman personally met with SDS elites from the Regional


\textsuperscript{163} "Ustav Republike Hrvatske."
Committee of Slavonia and Baranja in March 1991. The impetus for this meeting came from Slavko Degoricija, the HDZ's point man in negotiations with the Serbs. It was a clever strategy. HDZ elites had previously ruled out any recognition of Babic' and had been searching for so-called moderate Serbs with whom to negotiate. The Serbs of Slavonia fitted this profile. Historically, Slavonian Serbs had Partisan loyalties and much better relations with Zagreb than the Serbs of Knin. Moreover, the Serbs in this region live in scattered settlement patterns and only amount to a plurality in one out of eighteen opstinas. This confluence of history and demography has worked to produce a more moderate political temperament among Slavonian Serbs and one more open to coexistence in a Croatian state.

Among the prominent Serbs attending the meeting was Vojislav Vukcevic', Ilija Sasic', and Goran Hadzic' (the first two being decisively in the Raskovic' wing of the party). The meeting was reportedly amicable and stood as a real breakthrough for the HDZ. An agreement was reached to set up a joint working body to examine all aspects of the Serbs' position in Croatia and propose solutions. A week later the Regional Committee urged the Serb deputies who had boycotted the Sabor since the end of 1990 to return to their seats.164

Two factors conspired to scuttle this developing rapport. The SAOK immediately launched a tirade of accusations against the accord. Two of Babić's men, Lazar Macura and Marko Dobrijević, attacked the Regional Board delegation as treasonous and illegitimate.\textsuperscript{165} Just as in Krajina there existed the SNV which became the power base of the more radical Chetniks, so the SNV of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem set in motion a coup "according to the Knin recipe." Power was quickly concentrated in the hands of the SNV, Vojislav Vukcević (a leading voice in the area committed to dialogue) was replaced, and it was officially announced that all Serbs are homogeneous in political orientation. At a "conspiratorial meeting" in Vinkovci on March 22, Goran Hadžić was elected the new president of the SNV of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Hadžić, however, defied the expectations built up in the Belgrade press that he would move directly for the secession of Slavonia. Instead, he said the Serbs of Slavonia would only secede if Croatia departed from Yugoslavia. Otherwise, Slavonia would be content in the Yugoslav republic of Croatia.\textsuperscript{166}


The second factor that intervened to disrupt HDZ-Slavonian Serb relations was the outbreak of violence. In the month of March two bloody encounters occurred which were initiated by local Serb leaders: one at Pakrac and the other at Plitvice. The upshot of both incidents pushed the Croatian and Serb leaderships into more extreme, irreconcilable positions. The SAOK, having already passed a resolution to separate from Croatia in February, now made the decision final.\textsuperscript{167} The clash at Plitvice in particular caused Hadzic' to change his mind about the status of Slavonia. Just 9 days prior to Plitvice he had declared secession to be an option only in the event that Croatia secedes from Yugoslavia. But on the day of the skirmish the SNV of Slavonia expressed outrage at the "state terrorist activities of the Ustasha authorities ... aimed at annihilating the Serbian people in the SAOK" and proclaimed Slavonia's unilateral accession to Serbia.\textsuperscript{168} The wave of violence affected the political temperament of Tadic as well. By April, in a state of exasperation with the renegade opstinas, he threw down the gauntlet with the warning "we have played democracy for long enough and it is high time to say that Croatia is a republic.


and that it has the right to establish order."\textsuperscript{169}

Despite the inability of the government to reach a negotiated settlement with the SDS, the work of the constitutional commission continued. On June 25, 1991, when Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, the commission produced a "Charter on the Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities." This act permitted proportional representation at the local level and cultural autonomy, although the latter was qualified by the stipulation that no activity can run counter to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the state.\textsuperscript{170} This plan's lack of substance was overshadowed by the fact that increasing communal conflict had already delivered the coup de grace to Croat-Serb relations. By June 1991 the rural Serb leadership was in no way disposed towards staying within Croatia. Thus, on the eve of independence the window of opportunity for a generous and sincere package of minority rights was already slammed shut.

As the civil war unfolded in the summer of 1991, pressures from within the HDZ rose to the surface demanding a more proactive and genuine approach to the Serbs. Darko Bekic', a


former advisor to Tudjman, wrote in Vjesnik that the regime should drop the constant references to the Serbs of Croatia as a "fifth column of greater Serbian imperialism" and get behind the idea of a new "historic accord." Bekić argued that the Serbs of Croatia were honestly frightened by the new Croatian state and were not merely manipulated by Belgrade.171 Vecernji List, a Zagreb daily usually close to the government, also suggested the old approach should be scrapped in favor of a new strategy for interethnic peace.172 Another advisor to Tudjman, Zvonimir Lerotic, presented a plan at the Sabor which provided for meaningful political autonomy (i.e., authority over legislation, police, administration, education and culture) in opstinas where Serbs compose a majority.173 While there was a growing chorus of voices for a new policy direction, most of the Croatian media agreed that the opportunity for getting the Serbs to accept the new state and regime had been squandered by insensitivity, clumsy statements, and "tribal stubbornness." Vjesnik, Danas, Vecernji List, and Oslobodjenje (the leading newspaper of BH) all took the regime to task for failing to act promptly with an array of


measures designed to ensure inclusion.174

When the HDZ assembled a national salvation government in August to get the regime through the perils of war, another plan for cultural autonomy was presented.175 Considering that the Croatian government had zero authority over the territory controlled by the SAOK and SAO of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, the plan was moot before it was even conceived. The SNV of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem released a statement saying the whole plan was a "waste of time" -- "Serbs have finally come to their senses: They realize that there can be no cohabitation with Croats under Croatian jurisdiction."176

The last law on Serb rights was passed in December 1991. It was imposed on Croatia by the West as a condition for international recognition. The legislation, popularly dubbed the

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"Law on the Serbs," provided for two autonomous districts -- Glina (covering the opstinas of Dvor, Glina, Vrgin Most, Kostajnica, and Vojnic) and Knin (Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gracac, Korenica, and Donji Lapac). The districts are endowed with cultural autonomy and are entitled to local courts, police administrations, and the authority to pass ordinances and decrees. At the same time, there are significant limitations on the exercise of these rights. Each district is to be administered by a government-appointed official, and the police chiefs will also be chosen by the government. In the area of national symbols, minorities are free to choose their own symbols as long as they are not the symbols of another state and the president of the republic has given them his approval. In a statement meant to dispel any doubts about the new law's impact on the integrity of Croatian sovereignty, Vladimir Seks affirmed that "Croatia continues to be unitary, unified, and indivisible." 

In April of 1992 the government had a chance to reach out to moderate Serbs but spurned the opportunity. At this time, Miorad Pupovac's Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF) and Milan Pupovac. 


Djukic's Serbian National Party (SNS) formed a Serbian National Assembly which was aimed at aggregating the voice of urban Serbs and cooperating with the government. The HDZ, however, treated it with suspicion and contempt leading Vreme to conclude the regime was incapable of dealing with this kind of political option from the urban Serbs and felt more comfortable facing off against the aggressive, rural Serbs of the Krajina.  

When the generosity moment arrived for the HDZ, the government simply failed to deliver the goods. This statement should not be read as an exoneration of the SDS, which had no shortage of militants and could afford to play an obstructionist role given its support by the Milosevic' government. Still, HDZ policy had its own independent impact on both the radicalization of the SDS and the alienation of the Serb population. The HDZ never really moved away from its dismissive and contemptuous


180 In Belgrade the Association of Serbs from Croatia was set up in June 1990 to support their co-nationals materially and ideologically. Raskovic' was on hand to speak at the inaugural meeting. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) also get into the act and founded the Nikola Tesla Fund to aid Serbs. Technical help in the area of communications came when Belgrade Radio sent new equipment to Knin Radio, a key disseminator of Serbian nationalism, so it could reach Serbs outside the Knia opstina. Tanjug (June 25, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), June 27, 1990, p.83; Tanjug (June 28, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), July 3, 1990, p.71; Beigrade Domestic Service (August 20, 1990), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), August 21, 1990, p.39; Glenny, pp.20-1.
attitude towards the Serbs. Swept away by the fervor of an independent Croatia, HDZ elites overlooked the need to convince the Serb community they had a place in the new Croatia. Instead, Tudjman and other key figures such as Stipe Mesic' never tired of saying that Serbs have all the rights of a modern European nation, that Croatia has been exceptionally benevolent towards them, that only a vocal minority of indigenous Serbs are opposing the state, that Serbs who do protest the government are duped and in collusion with the Milosevic' regime, and that outsiders and instigators from Serbia are actually the cause of all the problems.

This sort of attitude conveniently absolved Croatia of any culpability for the deterioration of interethnic relations and ascribed every problem to state-to-state relations with Serbia. On the eve of the arrival of UN troops in February 1992, Tudjman was asked by a journalist if any mistakes were made in dealing with the Serbs. Despite the fact that Croatia had just endured a terrible civil war and no longer controlled one-third of its territory, he responded "No." "We have made no mistakes." He then went on to reiterate the familiar tale of conspiracy and expansionism purportedly emanating from Belgrade.¹⁸¹

H. Flanking

In multiethnic societies flanking is a particular form of intraethnic competition. Because the primary focus of party competition occurs not between ethnic groups but among various parties representing the same group, there is a tendency for insurgent parties to stake out a position more extreme (they might say more patriotic or more loyal) than the dominant party. If effective, a flanking party can place enormous pressure on the dominant party to take a firmer stand with minority groups. Flanking can force a dominant party to move away from interethnic reconciliation and adopt a more intolerant, chauvinistic stance. This could have devastating consequences for democratic consolidation as it causes interethnic hostility. The dominant party could also choose to repress the flanks. In this case, flanking has a negative impact on the state of democracy eroding the level of competition, civil and political liberties, and political participation.

The phenomenon of flanking in Croatian politics is seen most vividly in the conflict between the HDZ and Dobroslav Paraga's Croatian Party of [State] Right (HSP). Politically, Paraga's party is a minor player in Croatia. The HSP sat out the 1990 elections, and in the 1992 elections it garnered a mere 5% of the vote. The war, however, gave Paraga an opportunity to expand his influence
through military means and realize his goals of a Greater Croatia. Paraga bases his conception of a Greater Croatia on both ethnic and historical principles. This means that if Croats compose a majority of the population in a given area, or if a given area was ever historically part of Croatia, then Croatia has a right to it today. Based on such ideas, Paraga argues that Croatia should rightfully encompass a good deal of Serbia, part of Montenegro (the Bay of Kotor), and all of BH. The area of Serbia Paraga sets his sights on is Eastern Srem, a historical region stretching eastward all the way to Zemun, a western suburb of Belgrade.\textsuperscript{182} In his mind, this area was stolen from Croatia 74 years ago and the war offered a chance to take it back. Towards this end, the Croatian Defense Forces (HOS, the military arm of the HSP) carried out two attacks on villages inside Serbia.\textsuperscript{183} During the August 1992 election, Paraga promised to "put Serbia to the torch."\textsuperscript{184} It was his hope to inflict on Serbia its "final defeat" and reduce it to the "Belgrade pashaluk" (i.e., the enclave Serbia was confined to under Ottoman rule).\textsuperscript{185}


\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Financial Times}, November 7, 1991.


The HSP is particularly aggrieved by the borders between Croatia and BH and perceives them as a humiliating legacy of communist Yugoslavia. As party spokesman Milan Vukovic explained, "Look at the shape of Croatia now. Can anyone believe in this crescent, this banana republic? We are looking at our former territories in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This is Croatia and it should have the right to unite with us if that is what it wants. If you take the Croat Catholics and the Croat Muslims together they make up 80% of the population. Of course they want to join us. There is no such thing as [a] Bosnian Muslim."\textsuperscript{186} Predictably, a basic tenet of the HSP platform is the "liberation" of BH. According to Paraga, the "thousand-year Croatian state prerogative" is to unify Croatia proper and "Herceg-Bosna" (his term of choice for BH) which together constitute "the same soil, the same blood, and the same nation."\textsuperscript{187}

A particularly ominous component of Paraga's rhetoric is his insistence that once all Croatian territories are unified, "only one people" can live in Croatia; namely, "Croats."\textsuperscript{188} The implication is

\textsuperscript{186} The Daily Telegraph, November 17, 1991, p.18.


that while Muslims (and Croatia's "regionals") can be redefined as Croats, Serbs and Montenegrins would be future candidates for ethnic cleansing in a HSP-led Greater Croatia.

Paraga's nationalism approximates the primordial nationalist type. The party's expansionist goals, its organization of a paramilitary force to fight for a Greater Croatia, its practice of using violence to sabotage peace plans, its redefinition of Muslims as Croats, and its demand for an ethnically homogeneous state, all match key elements of primordial nationalism. Moreover, the HSP sports all the regalia of the former Ustasha movement, its military wing carried the letter "U" on its uniforms, Paraga normally ends his speeches with a Nazi salute, and he has denied the NDH carried out the mass persecution of Serbs, Gypsies and others because of their ethnic origin. In reference to the leader of the NDH, Ante Pavelic', Paraga said "he was a true Croat patriot and we carry on his work."\footnote{The Times, November 6, 1991; Borba (January 1-2, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), January 29, 1992, pp.33-7; Slobodna Dalmacija (May 9, 1992), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), May 28, 1992, p.60-1.}

During the war in Croatia, Paraga was incensed by Tudjman's strategy of "playing the victim" in order to earn international sympathy. Consequently, he directed the HOS (whose size was

\footnote{Chicago Tribune, October 7, 1991.}
estimated between 10,000 - 15,000) to take up the cause of East Slavonia, which was being overrun by JNA and the notorious paramilitary forces from Serbia. Paraga vowed that if Tudjman allowed Vukovar to fall, the same fate would be meted out to Tudjman.\textsuperscript{191} Despite the combined efforts of the HOS and Vukovar Serbs and Croats to defend the city, Vukovar was utterly destroyed.

Seeking to avoid responsibility for the horror of Vukovar, Tudjman moved against both Paraga and Mile Dedakovic', the town's military commander and a Serb, arresting the first for attempting to overthrow the government and the second for being an agent of KOS (the Yugoslav counter-intelligence service). Most of the press defended the two, noting that Tudjman needed a Croatia without neo-fascist paramilitaries in order to win international recognition and pointed to the convenience of setting up Dedakovic' for the fall of Vukovar and Paraga for the crimes against humanity that were reported in the area.\textsuperscript{192} When Paraga


was released his HOS had been subdued and placed under the command of the Croatian army. The government's harassment of the HSP, however, continued and has been linked to a number of violent acts: in October 1991 Croatian police killed HSP vice-president, Ante Paradzik; in early 1992 seven HSP members died defending Paraga in an assassination attempt; and in the summer of 1992 the HOS commander in Hercegovina, Blaz Kraljevic, was murdered at a Croatian police checkpoint. After the party's disappointing performance in the August 1992 elections, Zagreb police searched HSP headquarters and uncovered a cache of weapons destined for BH. This led to more legal proceedings against the party and the attempt to strip Paraga and three other HSP deputies of their parliamentary immunity.\textsuperscript{193} Lately, the HSP has spawned several splinter parties leading Paraga to charge the government with planting moles to fragment the party from within.\textsuperscript{194}

Tudjman's move against the HSP followed the option of simple repression. The HDZ government could have waited for the logic of democracy to marginalize what was already a minor, fringe party. With only 5\% of the vote in the August 1992 elections the HSP was rapidly heading towards political oblivion. At the same


time, the party-army of the HSP did constitute a potential threat to the state and its elimination could serve Croatia's international reputation as well as exonerate the government for any war crimes. Furthermore, the "principled and radical" national program of the HSP made the HDZ national ideology look comparatively meek and compromised. In the analysis of some commentators, this caused a good deal of discomfort within HDZ ruling circles.\(^{195}\) In the end, both the HSP's flanking behavior and the response of the HDZ conformed to the patterns of the flanking hypothesis. The practical result was a political society characterized by violence and the suppression of civil and political liberties.

I. Summary

The public contest between national ideologies defined the central dynamics in Croatian politics. The crumbling of communist authority brought to the forefront the age-old issues that had never been satisfactorily resolved in Croatia, such as the question of statehood and relations between the Croatian and Serb communities. Nationalist perspectives that prevailed in Croatian political society in the interwar period and during the Croatian Spring of the early 1970s again rose to the surface. They rapidly began to dominate public discourse and set the pace of political events. At the same time, the monistic nationalism of the HDZ did

not stand out as the proximal cause of deteriorating interethnic relations. Pre-election public opinion data and the April 1990 election results indicate that the Serb community preferred the communists to their own ostensible ethnic party. The prospects of a permanent Serb minority status in the Sabor also did not incite a general Serb rebellion. Between the SKH-SDP and SDS deputies, there were only 29 Serbs seated in the Sabor. Yet this functional equivalent of a census election did not set in motion any kind of turning point in interethnic relations. On the contrary, it was accepted by the SDS. The SDS itself did not gain the upper hand in the Serb community until the chauvinism and revisionism of Tudjman's campaign rhetoric was matched by his deeds in office. And it was the deeds, not the words, that proved to be the immediate catalyst for Serb mobilization behind a nationalist agenda. More than anything else, the Tudjman government's reluctance to be generous at the appropriate moment (the first major piece of legislation by the HDZ was the revisionist constitutional amendments of July 1990) convinced Serbs to shift their allegiances from the SKH-SDP to the SDS (which began noticeably in the summer of 1990).

Still, one can only understand why the HDZ government so narrowly pursued a policy of Croatian supremacy if one focuses on the HDZ weltanschauung. Given their sense of Serb privilege in the republic and the historic injustices suffered by Croatia and
Croats at the hands of Yugoslavia, Tujman and the HDZ simply did not feel the need to be overly generous towards the Serb community. In this sense, the national ideology of the HDZ was a distal causal factor that conditioned the HDZ approach to the Serb question. It was only after the HDZ's triumphalist-maximalist policy output had provoked a coup by hardliners within the SDS that Croatian politics became mired in a standoff between two incompatible national ideologies -- the monistic nationalism of Tujman and the primordial nationalism of Babic'.

The flanking activity of the HSP was also a very public factor at the marketplace of competing national ideologies. The neo-Nazi inclinations of this group made it somewhat of a public spectacle and earned it a good deal of media coverage. HSP ideology espoused the creation of a Greater Croatia and thereby challenged the "Croatian-ness" of the HDZ. This pricked the pride of HDZ elites. At the same time, the political significance of the HSP was not based on its popular support (which was miniscule), but on its military wing, the HOS. The HOS conducted its own independent military campaign in Eastern Slavonia and Hercegovina, and this led to numerous verbal clashes with Zagreb and physical clashes with the Croatian military. Paraga blamed Tujman personally for the fall of Vukovar and vowed revenge. Tujman subsequently took advantage of such seditious rhetoric by arresting Paraga and allowing the police and the courts to hound the HSP party
organization. In the end, the lack of popular support for the HSP meant that the party did not represent a serious division in the Croatian community that could hamper the consolidation of democracy. The HSP could only have been relevant to the process of democratic consolidation if it had ordered the HOS to overthrow the legitimate authority in Zagreb, which it had no intention of doing. The sparring match between the HDZ and the HSP did contribute to the degeneration of democratic rights in the country, but this was the fault of the HDZ which chose to repress a party whose mere existence tarnished its self-image as the sole repository of Croatian values.

A survey of Croatian public opinion data indicates that the mass public is not monolithic in its support of the HDZ and its ideology. Several important planks of the HDZ program (such as adopting the sahovnica and creating an ethnic-oriented state) failed to receive the endorsement of majorities in the population. As a result, the political preponderance of the HDZ has been attributed to electoral laws that have given the party disproportional representation in the institutions of government. The non-nationalist dimension to Croatian public opinion has enabled a civic nationalist party like the HSLS to remain a politically significant player in spite of the travails of civil war and a subsequent hardening of mass Croatian attitudes towards Serbs. The public opinion factor therefore has overridden any
chain reaction tendency. In Croatia, ethnic parties have not marginalized nonethnic parties. The viable presence of the HSLS stands as a ray of hope if the power of the HDZ wanes in the future. Given the poisoned relations between the HDZ and the SDS, the HSLS could possibly stand as the future mediator of a new modus vivendi for Croatia's polarized national communities.