A TEST OF READINESS: THE OHIO NATIONAL GUARD AND THE
MEXICAN BORDER MOBILIZATION, 1916-1917

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts

by

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Approved by

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Adviser
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>pp. 1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>The Mobilization: The Preliminary Stages</td>
<td>pp. 7-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>The Frustrations and Mismanagement of Camp Willis</td>
<td>pp. 32-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>Serving On The Mexican Border</td>
<td>pp. 45-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>The Intricacies of Demobilization</td>
<td>pp. 63-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>pp. 74-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>pp. 82-84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>The National Guard and the Small-town Community</th>
<th>p. 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Personnel Strength of the Ohio National Guard, June, 1916</td>
<td>p. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Assembly Dates of the National Guard in the Central Department</td>
<td>p. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Causes for Rejection In Medical Examinations</td>
<td>p. 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Personnel Strength and Departure Dates of the Ohio National Guard for Border Service</td>
<td>p. 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Military Districts and Commanders in the Southern Department</td>
<td>p. 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Aggregate Strength of the National Guard in Federal Service, June-November, 1916</td>
<td>p. 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Demobilization Statistics of the Ohio National Guard</td>
<td>p. 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

One of the themes dominating American military policy during the first decades of the twentieth century was the issue of military preparedness. A fundamental element in the study of national readiness was the role and the identity of the nation's land reserve forces. Nineteen sixteen was a pivotal year in the history of the country's reserve forces, particularly the National Guard. For years, the National Guard had been struggling to achieve recognized status as the nation's front line reserve land force behind the regular Army. On the other hand, the disciples of the theorist Emory Upton wanted to relegate the National Guard to an internal constabulary role.¹

With the passage of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, the champions of the National Guard achieved a tremendous legislative success. The new preparedness legislation confirmed the fact that the National Guard was the regular Army's first line reserve force, and it institutionalized the national integration of the National Guard at the War Department by establishing the Militia Bureau of the General Staff. Under the provisions of the National Defense Act, the armament, equipment, and the uniforms of the National Guard were, as far as practicable, to be identical to that
of the regular Army. In addition, the law required all Guardsmen to take a dual oath of allegiance to the United States and their respective individual states. Most importantly, the legislation compelled the National Guard to enter federal service in the event of a national emergency whenever Congress should authorize the use of the armed land forces of the United States for any purpose requiring the use of troops in excess of those in the regular Army. Under the provisions of the 1916 law, the President could use the federalized Guard outside the continental limits of the United States for an indefinite period, but only in the event of a declaration of war.

In addition to the passage of the National Defense Act, the year 1916 provided the National Guard an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to furnish an effective military force to augment the regular Army. Faced with an international crisis with Mexico, President Woodrow Wilson exercised his powers under the new preparedness legislation to federalize the National Guard for the protection of the American-Mexican border.

The Mexican imbroglio was the most vexatious non-European problem to trouble United States policy makers during Wilson's first administration. Wilsonian moralism, coupled with an extremely volatile political situation in revolutionary Mexico, aggravated the crisis and increased the tensions between the two governments. Following Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico on March 9, 1916,
relations reached a breaking point. To punish Villa and end the border outrages, Wilson ordered Brigadier General John J. Pershing to pursue the bandit leader into Mexico with a force that ultimately numbered 12,000 men and destroy his bands as organized threats. A subsequent raid on Glen Springs, Texas on May 5 prompted Major General Frederick Funston, the commander of the Southern Department, to request the services of additional troops to protect American interests along the border. On May 9, Wilson called up the militia from Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona to protect the border against "further aggression upon the territory of the United States." Continued border skirmishes increased the probability of war between the United States and Mexico. In an effort to bolster American military strength on the border and to prepare for the conduct of possible offensive operations if the situation warranted such action, Wilson summoned the Organized Militia and the National Guard of the remaining states into federal service on June 18, 1916.

Wilson's unexpected summons caught many National Guard organizations unprepared to conduct immediate military operations. As always there were numerous inherent problems with the National Guard mobilization. Any mobilization of the nation's reserve land forces involved a plethora of potential problems including mustering personnel, equipping the Guardsmen, and providing for the transition of the National Guard's tactical organizations from state to federal control.
Complicating the 1916 mobilization was the recently enacted National Defense Act. Many state and federal officials were unsure of the implications of the preparedness legislation, and this misunderstanding only complicated the mobilization process.

As was the case with other states, Ohio was in a process of transition as its military forces moved from the old militia concept to the system prescribed in the National Defense Act of 1916. The subsequent mobilization of the Ohio National Guard earned derogatory comments from the War Department and one of its geographical subcommands, the U. S. Army Central Department, Major General Thomas H. Barry commanding. Both departments launched investigations to determine the reasons why Ohio's mobilization of its Guardsmen was tardy and ineffective.

The performance of the Ohio National Guard during the Mexican border crisis of 1916-1917 provides the focal point of this study, which strives to demonstrate that the Ohio Guardsmen were not the ineffective force implied by Major General Barry's criticism and the War Department's investigation. In spite of state and federal mismanagement during the mobilization phase, the Ohio National Guard performed its duties in an exemplary manner. So well did Ohio's contingent of Guardsmen perform during the border crisis that the War Department selected a regiment of the Ohio National Guard to constitute a regiment of the Forty-Second "Rainbow" Division during the First World War. Thus,
the Ohio National Guard was not ineffective, but rather an efficient military force that overcame numerous obstacles in responding to a national crisis.
NOTES

1 For the best examinations of the struggle of the National Guard to achieve its desired status as the nation's first line reserve land force, see Martha Derthick's The National Guard In Politics (Cambridge: 1965), William H. Riker's Soldiers Of The State: The Role Of The National Guard In American Democracy (Washington D.C.: 1957), and Jim Dan Hill's The Minute Man In Peace And War (Harrisburg: 1964). Russell F. Weigley presents a brief synopsis of the differences between the National Guard's defenders and the Uptonian minded officers of the General Staff in his History Of The United States Army (New York: 1967), pp. 342-350.

2 See Section 82, National Defense Act as quoted in Report On Mobilization Of The Organized Militia And National Guard Of The United States, 1916 (Washington D.C.: 1916), p. 161. There are two copies of this report that are readily accessible to the public. One is in the National Archives in Washington D.C.; the other is at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Hereafter this report will be referred to as Militia Bureau Report.


4 "Nevada had no National Guard organization at this time.

5 Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood On The Border (London: 1969), p. 289. There is a growing historical debate as to the reason Wilson deemed it necessary to federalize the National Guard on June 18, 1916. Secretary of War Baker stated that Wilson acted to prevent further aggression upon the territory of the United States. "Report of the Secretary of War," War Department Annual Reports, 1916, pp. 11-12. Arthur Link suggests that Wilson acted due to political considerations, 1916 being a presidential election year. One of the central planks in the Democratic platform was Wilson's emphasis that he had kept the country out of war and preserved honorable neutrality. Wilson's Mexican policy was an extension of the party platform. Arthur Link, Wilson: Campaign For Progressivism And Peace 1916-1917 (Princeton: 1965), p. 38. Harley Notter claims that Wilson's action was merely a continuation of his policy of "watchful waiting" and his belief that American intentions were oriented to "protect our border and [secure] respect for our sovereignty." Harley Notter, The Origins Of The Foreign Policy Of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore: 1937), p. 535.
CHAPTER I

THE MOBILIZATION: THE PRELIMINARY STAGES

In 1916, Frank B. Willis was the Governor of Ohio, and Benson W. Hough was the Adjutant General. On June 18, Willis received a telegram from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker:

Having in view the possibility of further aggression upon the territory of the United States from Mexico and the necessity for proper protection of that border...the President has thought proper to exercise the authority vested in him by the constitution and laws and call out the Organized Militia and the National Guard for that purpose. I am, in consequence, instructed by the President to call into service of the United States...the following units...Two brigades of three regiments each of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, one battalion of field artillery [and various supporting units].

Under the provisions of the National Defense Act, Wilson had federalized the National Guard, and the mobilization of Ohio Guardsmen began in earnest.

As the state's Adjutant General, the burden of the mobilization fell upon Hough. Hough was both a prominent public official and a long time member of the Ohio National Guard. Born on March 3, 1875 at Delaware, Ohio, Hough was a 1899 graduate of The Ohio State University. In 1892, he enlisted as a private in Company K, Fourth Infantry and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by January, 1906.
During the interval, Hough served five years (1892-1897) as an enlisted man, three years (1902-1905) as a company commander, and one year (1906) as a staff officer. Although he did not serve in the Spanish-American War, Hough saw extensive service with his regiment during Ohio's labor disputes and civil relief programs. On January 11, 1915, he resigned his commission to become Adjutant General. Following the June 18 mobilization call, Hough placed himself on the retired list in order to return to his former regiment. Immediately reenlisting in Company K, he accepted his commission of Lieutenant Colonel the same day (July 8). Due to his long experience in civil government and as a member of Willis' administration, Hough remained the acting Adjutant General until Edward Bryant assumed that office on September 6. Hough finally joined the Fourth Regiment at El Paso on September 7; it was the resumption of a proud and illustrious career that brought Hough new honors during the First World War.

Immediately upon receipt of the mobilization telegram, Willis and Hough prepared to execute the orders from President Wilson. In June, 1916, the Ohio National Guard contained eight regiments of infantry: the First Regiment with headquarters at Cincinnati, the Second Regiment at Lima, the Third Regiment at Dayton, the Fourth Regiment at Columbus, the Fifth Regiment at Cleveland, the Sixth Regiment at Toledo, the Seventh Regiment at Marietta, and the Eighth Regiment at Bucyrus. In summation, two brigades of
three regiments each, two unattached infantry regiments (First and Seventh), and a separate battalion (Ninth) of black troops comprised the infantry component of the Ohio Guard.

In accordance with Wilson's directive, the Adjutant General's Department issued General Orders No. 12 on June 18. The order designated the units that would form Ohio's contingent for the border service:

...certain organizations of the Organized Militia of the State, to be hereafter named will assemble at their respective stations on June 19, 1916...The following are the organizations placed in service.
First infantry brigade, consisting of the Second, Third, and Sixth Regiments; Second infantry brigade, consisting of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Regiments; First Squadron of Cavalry, First Battalion of Field Artillery, First Battalion of Engineers, Field Battalion Signal Corps, First, Second, and Third Hospitals, First and Second Ambulance Companies. 4

Hough's order did not include the First and Seventh Regiments as these units did not fall under the command of the First or Second Brigades. 5 Brigadier General William V. McMaken commanded the First Brigade; his regimental commanders were Colonels J. Guy Deming (Second Regiment), Robert L. Hubler (Third Regiment), and Lloyd A. Howard (Sixth Regiment). Brigadier General John C. Speaks commanded the Second Brigade; his regimental commanders for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Regiments were respectively Colonels Byron L. Barger, Charles X. Zimmerman, and Edward Vollrath. 6

The first problem confronting Ohio officials was the establishment of a skilled cadre to supervise the mobili-
zation. Hough issued Special Order 128 simultaneously with the mobilization order on June 18. This order instructed Colonel W. H. Duffy to report for duty as the Guard's Chief Quartermaster, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Hall to serve as Chief Surgeon, and Colonel Edward S. Bryant and Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Crutchfield to serve as special assistants to the Adjutant General. Due to pre-existing mobilization assignments, Hough designated these personnel to serve as his staff by virtue of their rank and position within the Guard.

Hough now concentrated on the establishment of the state mobilization camp. The selection of the state mobilization site had an interesting history that began long before the June 18 mobilization directive. On September 11, 1911, the Adjutant General of the Army instructed Division (Department) Commanders to inspect existing camp sites within the limits of their commands and after consultation with state authorities, to ascertain whether or not the camps were suitable for mobilization purposes. At this time, federal and state authorities selected Camp Perry near Port Clinton, Ohio as the mobilization camp for Ohio's militia. On May 4, 1914, the Division of Militia Affairs received a report from the Central Department Commander dated April 28, 1914 that transferred the mobilization site to Columbus. The basis of the report was a recommendation from Major George C. Saffarrans, U. S. Army, the Inspector-Instructor of the Central Department.
According to Saffarrans, a board of officers appointed by the Adjutant General of Ohio had tentatively selected a site for the state mobilization camp in the outskirts of Columbus, the state officers having determined that Camp Perry was no longer suitable. As Inspector-Instructor, Saffarrans forwarded a favorable report as to the suitability of the Columbus site on May 2, 1914. In his report, Saffarrans did not address the problem of land rental cost and other possible expenditures, but restricted his remarks to the quality and character of the soil, out-croppings of rock, drainage, space for camps and drill, and proximity of public utilities and transportation systems. From May, 1914 until June 13, 1916, neither the Militia Bureau nor the Central Department received any subsequent reports as to the suitability of the Columbus mobilization site. In a memorandum dated September 22, 1916, the Bureau of Militia Affairs disavowed any knowledge of the reason for changing the state mobilization site from Camp Perry to Columbus.  

In any case, Willis and Hough decided to construct a semi-permanent camp from a portion of the Henry Miller farm northwest of Columbus due to the farm's multiple advantages of high ground, easy drainage, and ready access to the city. Hough named the mobilization site after the Governor, and the camp became Camp Willis. Although he wanted to begin sending troops to Camp Willis by June 23, Hough directed the company size units to remain at their
respective stations until they received orders for movement.\(^{10}\)

At newly established Camp Willis, state officials experienced the first serious problems that plagued the rapid mobilization of Ohio forces. Despite the selection of the Columbus mobilization site in 1914, as of June 18, there had been no effort to construct any type of mobilization camp in the Columbus area. Due to the increasing international tension with Mexico and the fact that Wilson had already federalized the Organized Militia of three states, this lack of foresight was an obvious deficiency. At the very least, state officials should have developed various contingency plans, but this was not the case. As a result, Hough had to start from scratch, but he met the crisis with his usual vigor. On June 19, he instructed Colonel Duffy, the Chief Quartermaster, "to prepare the mobilization camp to receive shelter, maintenance, and supplies."\(^{11}\) Plans to receive the Guardsmen by June 23 complicated matters, but Duffy took steps to install water supply systems, construct latrines, establish veterinary hospitals, stake out the camp site, and construct roads, culverts, and drainage systems. In addition, Hough provided Duffy with a staff of eight field grade officers and a like number of junior officers to supervise the camp construction.

The initial construction of Camp Willis proceeded at such a rapid pace that on June 21 the Ohio State Journal
reported:

Camp Willis which yesterday was 600 acres of timothy by nightfall was crossed by a mile of crushed stone road, 18 feet wide, 5 miles of sewer trenches, and 3,000 feet of trenches for water mains.\textsuperscript{12}

Local hired labor and two hundred penitentiary prisoners were instrumental in the construction. In addition, Hough ordered the entire Ninth Battalion under command of Major J. C. Fulton to report for preparation of Camp Willis.\textsuperscript{13}

The contemplated duty involved the protection of military property and camp construction. Despite the efforts of the Ninth Battalion and two companies from the Fourth Regiment,\textsuperscript{14} Camp Willis was not ready to receive Ohio Guardsmen until June 27. This delay was significant because Guardsmen from other states were already enroute to the border before Ohio troops arrived at the state mobilization site.

Actually the decision to construct any semi-permanent camp caused a delay in the mobilization process. Many states, including Illinois, simply assembled their Guardsmen and prepared for immediate entrainment to the border. Illinois infantry mobilized at the state fairgrounds at Springfield. The site proved convenient under the circumstances, but it was unsuited for more than temporary use. Hough's chief motivating factor in constructing a semi-permanent camp was an attempt to correct the deficiencies of the 1898 mobilization during which Ohio Guardsmen were often without proper tentage and adequate support facili-
ties.

Ohio was not the only state that experienced problems concerning the selection and construction of mobilization camps. During the course of the national mobilization, ten states changed the sites of their respective camps. Since the War Department and the federal supply departments had made prior preparations for logistical support, these alterations were extremely annoying and created delays in the efficient mobilization of many National Guard organizations. In the case of West Virginia, the War Department sent supplies to the state mobilization camp only to discover that the state had changed the site for its Guard encampment, and a state tuberculosis sanitarium now occupied the former mobilization site. In the case of Kentucky, state officials changed the original mobilization site from Fort Thomas to Earlington and then back to Fort Thomas. The net result of these last minute changes was a delay of five days in mobilizing the Kentucky National Guard.

The failure of the Ohio National Guard to mobilize as rapidly as some of the other states forced War Department officials to direct transportation to those states whose Guardsmen were prepared for immediate departure. The first National Guard unit to reach the border was the 1st Illinois Infantry, which left its assembly camp on June 28 and detrained at San Antonio on June 30. By midnight of July 4, National Guardsmen from fourteen states
were at their assigned stations on the Texas border.16

State-wide, the Ohio National Guard had to recruit from their peace-time strength of 7,295 to war-time strength of 13,541.17 Although most Ohio regiments reached their war-time strength prior to their arrival at Camp Willis, the screening of applicants by federal inspectors thinned the ranks by the time the Guard departed for the border. In this respect, Ohio was typical of most National Guard organizations in that no state dispatched its troops to the border at full war strength.

As was the case across the nation,18 the prevailing attitude around the state at the time of the mobilization was one of immense patriotic fervor. Governor Willis' call to arms placed great emphasis on the sacred traditions of the state:

The call to arms has been sounded. Men are needed in the service of their country. Ohio is the home of patriots. Her battle flags always have been in the van. Let Ohioans not falter now. Buckeye traditions must be preserved. Enlistments are needed to fill up every Ohio organization to its war strength.19

Community newspapers throughout the state echoed the Governor's patriotic summons. A political cartoon in the Ohio State Journal depicted Uncle Sam shouting "Guard" to an enthusiastic volunteer dressed in full battle attire.20 The Ada University Herald called for massive meetings to honor "our boys who are responding bravely to their country's call."21 The Kenton Graphic News Republican headline for June 29 read: "Men, show your patriot-
ism now. Captain Irving McCann of the Illinois National Guard summed up the feeling of many Guardsmen when he stated that the National Guard had come to think that our government did not give a "tinker's damn" for the lives of its citizens or the honor of our flag. Guardsmen were impatient with Mexican "atrocities." Filled with indignation that Mexican bandits were actually killing American soldiers and unarmed civilians, one private remarked that the pity of it "all is that if we must go to war, we must fight such a pack of ignorant fools like the Mexicans." Obviously chauvinism and racism formed an incentive for raising troops to fill the ranks of the Guard.

Rural and small-town community pressure played an important role in the 1916 mobilization process. As depicted in Table 1, the local community formed the cornerstone of the Guard's structure.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Norwood</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
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<th>Hillsboro</th>
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Second Regiment (cont.)
F Company
G Company
H Company
I Company
K Company
L Company
M Company
Headquarters Company
Supply Company
Machine Gun Company
Spencerville
Ada
Bowling Green
Kenton
St. Marys
Sycamore
Ottawa
Van Wert
Lima
Ada

Third Regiment
A Company
B Company
C Company
D Company
E Company
F Company
G, H, K Companies
I Company
L Company
M Company
Headquarters Company
Supply Company
Machine Gun Company
Dayton
Covington
Springfield
Piqua
Urbana
Hamilton
Eaton
Dayton
Xenia
Sidney
Greenville
Dayton
Columbus

Fourth Regiment
A Company
B, I Companies
C Company
D Company
E Company
F Company
G Company
H Company
K Company
L Company
M Company
Headquarters Company
Supply Company
Machine Gun Company
Columbus
Greenfield
Columbus
London
Marion
Marysville
Circleville
Newark
Chillicothe
Delaware
Lancaster
Washington Courthouse
Columbus
Columbus
Columbus

Fifth Regiment
A Company
B Company
C, F, I, K Companies
D Company
E Company
G Company
H Company
L Company
M Company
Cleveland
Berea
Elyria
Cleveland
Warren
Geneva
Norwalk
Youngstown
Conneaut
Youngstown
### Fifth Regiment (cont.)
- **Headquarters Company**
  - Cleveland
- **Supply Company**
  - Cleveland
- **Machine Gun Company**
  - Cleveland

### Sixth Regiment
- **A, C, H, L Companies**
  - Toledo
- **B Company**
  - Sandusky
- **D Company**
  - Fostoria
- **E Company**
  - Bryan
- **F Company**
  - Napoleon
- **G Company**
  - Defiance
- **I Company**
  - Clyde
- **K Company**
  - Fremont
- **M Company**
  - Oak Harbor
- **Headquarters Company**
  - Defiance
- **Supply Company**
  - Toledo

### Seventh Regiment
- **A Company**
  - Marietta
- **B Company**
  - Zanesville
- **C Company**
  - Marietta
- **D Company**
  - Pomeroy
- **E Company**
  - Somerset
- **F Company**
  - Cambridge
- **G Company**
  - Gallipolis
- **H Company**
  - Logan
- **I Company**
  - New Lexington
- **K Company**
  - Ironton
- **L Company**
  - Portsmouth
- **M Company**
  - Athens
- **Headquarters Company**
  - McConnellsville
- **Supply Company**
  - Zanesville
- **Machine Gun Company**
  - Athens

### Eighth Regiment
- **A Company**
  - Bucyrus
- **B Company**
  - Bucyrus
- **C Company**
  - Akron
- **D Company**
  - Canton
- **E Company**
  - Wooster
- **F Company**
  - Ashland
- **G Company**
  - Akron
- **H Company**
  - Wadsworth
- **I Company**
  - Shreve
- **K Company**
  - Tiffin
- **L Company**
  - Alliance
- **M Company**
  - Galion
- **Headquarters Company**
  - Mansfield
- **Supply Company**
  - Akron
- **Machine Gun Company**
  - Mansfield
Throughout the state, communities pointed with great pride to the fact that their sons were answering the country's call. Huge mass meetings and social activities were the order of the day during June and July. Crowds of curiosity seekers actually impeded the functioning and drilling of the Guardsmen. In Columbus, the Ninth Battalion had to turn away twenty thousand spectators from Camp Willis. Typical of the small-town community involvement was Ada, Ohio. At Ada, the townspeople organized an automobile parade and a mass meeting to honor the local
Guardsmen. When the Ada contingent departed for Camp Willis, over three thousand people gathered at the railway park to bid them farewell. In Hardin County, postmaster Carl W. Smith took the initiative and outlined a plan to aid the members of the families of the departing Guardsmen. Smith organized committees that continuously checked on the welfare of the Guardsmen's families and insured that they received proper care.

In an effort to examine the military problems of mobilizing the National Guard, one should ask the question: "Why did a young man join the Guard?" There were patriotic reasons to be sure, but social rewards and economic motives were prevalent. Since the townspeople exhibited such great pride in a youth who answered the call to arms, recruits soon found themselves the objects of the town's affection. Like many youths across the nation, Ohioans entertained romantic notions as to what military life would entail. Many of the Guardsmen expected to fight Mexicans soon after they arrived on the border. Pay was attractive by 1916 standards, especially when one considered that many young men were on summer vacations and unemployed at the time of the mobilization. One of the stipulations of the preparedness legislation of 1916 was that Guardsmen received federal drill pay. Pay ranged from $16.67 a day for general officers to $4.72 for second lieutenants. Enlisted men earned $.60 a day if they were privates to $1 if they were sergeants. During the time
when National Guardsmen were serving on federal duty, they received federal funds, like their regular Army counterparts. In addition to community pressures and fiscal rewards, the social club and entertainment atmosphere that surrounded most local organizations attracted many men to enlist in the National Guard. Many of the old militia companies had long served as community social clubs. Every considerable city possessed a National Guard unit composed of "the best young men in the city, socially and professionally."31 Since the enlisted Guardsmen elected their officers, it was common for company commanders to entertain their companies with annual receptions and elaborate ceremonies. Such activities strengthened the bond between the local communities and the National Guard organizations. In Ohio, the athletic club features of the National Guard had a special significance. Target practice was the most popular athletic competition between various state organizations, and after 1907, Ohio hosted the national competitions at Camp Perry.

Except for the activities at Camp Willis, the early efforts of mobilization centered on the company stations. Since the state mobilization camp was unable to support the arrival of troops until June 27, the delay gave local commanders a little over a week to recruit, screen applicants, equip personnel, and prepare their commands for transfer to Camp Willis. The movement from the company rendezvous site to Camp Willis was under the control of
state authorities. Movement to the border was under the
direction of the War Department.

The first order of business confronting the officers
at the company mobilization sites was recruitment. Al-
though recruitment was continuous throughout the summer,
there was an initial surge to join the ranks. By the end
of June, the federalized National Guard contained 443
officers and 10,758 enlisted men.\textsuperscript{32} Community and social
pressure also influenced the units of the Guard that were
not to serve on the border. Statistics of the total en-
rollment of the Ohio National Guard in the military service
of the state and federal governments included 572 officers
and 13,855 enlisted men.\textsuperscript{33}

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff department</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff department</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>10,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary troops</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval militia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Typical was the performance of the Third Regiment stationed
at Dayton. By June 23, there were 53 officers and 898 en-
listed men in the regiment. By June 29, this figure rose
to 1,070 enlisted men, and by July 3, it had increased to
1,285 enlisted personnel.\textsuperscript{34} In addition to recruiting en-
listed men, company officers had to supervise the election
of officers to fill the positions of officers who had sub-
mitted their resignations prior to the mobilization order or relinquished their position for other reasons. Former enlisted men occupied the majority of the vacant positions. In fact, three regiment sergeant majors: Donald C. Warner (Second Regiment), Frederick W. Marcolin (Fifth Regiment), and James V. Easley (Sixth Regiment) accepted commissions as lieutenants in the Guard. As was the case with all officers, these men were subject to examination by a state review board.

The second obstacle that local officials had to overcome was arming and equipping the Guardsmen. Under existing regulations, supplying the equipment needed to cover the difference between the peace-time and war-time levels of the National Guard was the responsibility of the U. S. Army. Unfortunately, the storage of reserve supplies for the National Guard in a few depots proved to be a failure on which the Chief of the Militia Bureau said:

The mobilization thus far has demonstrated beyond question, to all who have been charged with the responsibility of forwarding supplies and preparing troops to be moved to the front, the undesirability and shortsightedness of storing the reserved supplies for the bulk of the militia...in one depot. Never again should it be possible to permit so unsound an arrangement to be made.

Due to the mismanagement of the federal supply system, many organizations did not receive the necessary supplies in a timely manner. Other units received the equipment only when they reached the border.

Shortages in field equipment hindered the Ohio National
Guard's mobilization at the small unit level. Individual and organizational equipment generally fell under three major categories in 1916: medical property, ordnance property, and quartermaster property. With respect to individual medical equipment, Ohio units were short 13 medical emergency cases and 1,405 first aid packets. Organizational shortages amounted to only 17 litters. Far more serious shortages existed in the category of ordnance property. A total of 32 pistols, 268 pistol magazines, 2 blacksmith sets, 177 entrenching shovels, 271 wire cutters, and 369 wire-cutter carriers were missing as of June 18. The most serious shortage of quartermaster property was the absence of 3,781 waist belts and 115 march kits.\textsuperscript{37}

Given the size of the Ohio National Guard, these shortages were excessive enough to warrant an investigation by a Central Department inspector. After conducting a detailed inspection, the officer reported that he was unable to fix responsibility upon any individual or individuals and that the main reason for shortages was the inability of depots to supply all the articles of equipment C. The officer further commented on the confusion and delay caused by the method of forwarding invoices, by shipment of property for the Ohio National Guard in cars destined for other places, and by misunderstandings between the senior mustering officer and the camp quartermaster as to property on hand in camp.\textsuperscript{38}

In all fairness to the Ohio National Guard, certain
factors that were beyond the immediate control of Guard officials complicated the entire mobilization process. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for the transition of the Organized Militia into the National Guard by taking the dual oath prescribed by law, and this transition was in progress when Wilson issued the call to arms on June 18. Secretary Baker realized the complexities of the problems confronting the Guard in his report on November 20, 1916:

To have worked out each detail, completed the transition of such state organizations, and recruited it to its full strength before transferring the forces to the border would have taken more time than the exigencies of the situation permitted. Instructions were therefore given on June 23 to the commanding generals of the Eastern, Central, and Western Departments to transfer each unit to the border as soon as it was reasonably equipped for field service.39

The implications of Baker's message were abundantly clear. Most National Guard organizations would spend only minimum time at their mobilization centers before the men departed for border service. As a result, the entire mobilization process was more haphazard than would have been the case under less hurried conditions.

While Ohio was beginning to send its Guardsmen to the state mobilization site, the national mobilization of the National Guard proceeded at a more rapid pace. New York's Seventh Regiment received movement orders on June 27. Troop trains rolled to the border in unbroken succession for days thereafter. By July 1, there were 122 special
trains converging upon the Southwest with 46,000 Guardsmen aboard, and in another five days, 101 additional train-loads of troops were enroute to predesignated border camps. By the end of July, 112,000 Guardsmen were serving on the border. While the National Guard from other states conducted training in Texas, Ohio Guardsmen were just beginning to arrive at Camp Willis where federal officers prepared to induct them into federal service.

Judged in comparison with the national mobilization, the state of Ohio was substandard in assembling its Guardsmen. The loss of nine days in preparing the state mobilization site meant that Ohio Guardsmen could not begin the mustering ceremonies until most of the nation's National Guardsmen had already departed for the border. In his after-action report to the Adjutant General of the Army, Major General Barry, the Central Department Commander, reported that Ohio had been extremely lax in assembling its Guardsmen:

The delay in the case of Ohio was primarily due to the fact that the site selected for the mobilization camp was absolutely unsuitable and secondarily, to the fact that the State authorities considered it necessary to construct a semi-permanent camp with shelters, sewer systems, etc., all of which resulted in unusual expense for work of no permanent value, and much of which was entirely unnecessary. Every effort was made by department Headquarters to expedite the assembling of Ohio troops, but it was impossible to get the State authorities to hasten assembly.

With respect to the other states encompassed in the Central Department, Ohio was the last state to assemble its National
Guardsmen:  
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Assembly</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 23</td>
<td>Missouri, Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24</td>
<td>Illinois, Kansas, Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 25</td>
<td>Colorado, Michigan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nebraska, North Dakota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28</td>
<td>Iowa, Minnesota, South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dakota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ohio's delay was due to the time lost in constructing Camp Willis when it would have been more expedient to have used the existing facilities at Camp Perry. The decision made by Willis and Hough to build any type of semi-permanent mobilization camp certainly impeded the rapid mobilization of Ohio forces and lent credence to Barry's claim that the state authorities were delinquent in assembling its Guardsmen, but if the situation was as serious as Barry implied, then either he or the War Department should have intervened to remedy the problem. Unfortunately, the Ohio Guard's problems did not limit themselves to the construction of Camp Willis. Far more serious problems awaited the Guardsmen when they arrived in Columbus.
NOTES

1 Telegram 16NY CY 525, GOVT PNS ONE WORD, June 18, 1916, as quoted in Ohio General Statistics (Springfield: 1917), p. 249.

2 Hough's National Guard experience included participation in the Mt. Sterling "Hobo War" (1894), Wheeling Creek labor disputes (1894), aid to civil authorities in Washington Courthouse (1894), and strike duty at Springfield (1906), Jefferson Community (1906), Columbus (1910), Bridgeport (1910), and Newark (1911). R. M. Cheseldine, Ohio In The Rainbow (Columbus: 1924), pp. 37-41.


5 On June 19 and June 21, Secretary Baker received telegrams from Colonels Alfred Bettman and Harry D. Knox, the respective commanders of the First and Seventh Regiments. Both commanders urged Baker to permit their respective regiments to participate in the state mobilization. Copies of these telegrams are located in AGO Document File, 1890-1917, File #2414738, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1780-1917, Record Group (RG) 94, National Archives of the United States, Washington D. C. Hereafter cited as AGO Document File, 1890-1917, RG 94. The First and Seventh Regiments, as well as the Ninth Battalion, did not participate in the mobilization of the Ohio National Guard in 1916. Although the Ninth Battalion did furnish support in the construction of Camp Willis, the infantry units that did not receive mobilization orders reported for annual training at Camp Perry for a period of two weeks beginning August 19. The regimental units became integrated in the Third Infantry Brigade the following year. Ohio General Statistics (Springfield: 1918), pp. 281-282.


8 For a detailed examination of the War Department's investigation, see the Quartermaster General of the Army's
memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated September 22, 1916. AGO Document File, 1890-1917, RG 94.


10 Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Special Order 129 (1916), June 20, 1916.

11 Ibid.


13 Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Special Order 130, (1916), June 20, 1916.


16 Clendenen, Blood On The Border, p. 290.


18 Reaction across the nation to Wilson's mobilization telegrams emphasized the tremendous amount of patriotic fervor of the National Guard. The official report on the 1916 mobilization of the Missouri National Guard states: "Every officer and man responded. There were no deserters." A Guardsman in Minnesota remarked, "In those days we wanted to get in and stay in." The recruiting stations of New York's Seventh Regiment reported large crowds eager to enlist. National Guardsman, June, 1966, pp. 1-9.

19 Governor Frank B. Willis Papers, Ohio Historical Society, State Archive Series 325.5.17.

20 Ohio State Journal, June 20, 1916.

21 Ada University Herald, June 30, 1916.

22 Kenton Graphic News Republican, June 29, 1916.


24 Ada University Herald, June 30, 1916.

25 Adjutant General, State of Ohio, General Order 27
(1915), November 14, 1915. See also File #27134, List showing changes in organization of the Ohio National Guard, Records of the National Guard and Its Predecessors, Record Group 168, Washington National Record Center, Suitland, Maryland.

26 The First Regiment was the youngest of Ohio's regiments. Prior to 1912, twelve separate companies composed the First Regiment. By authority of Special Order 1 (1912), January 2, 1912, the twelve unattached companies formed the First Regiment.

28 Ada University Herald, June 30, 1916.
29 Kenton Graphic News Republican, June 29, 1916.
33 Ibid., p. 248.
36 Militia Bureau Report, p. 25. The War Department immediately took steps to prevent logistical supply problems from happening again. By authority of paragraph 32, Special Orders 177 (1916), War Department, July 31, 1916, the War Department convened a board of officers to submit a new plan for supplying the National Guard and Volunteers when mustered into federal service. Militia Bureau Report, p. 26.
41 Major General Thomas H. Barry assumed command of

42 Militia Bureau Report, p. 130.

43 Ibid.
CHAPTER II

THE FRUSTRATIONS AND MISMANAGEMENT OF CAMP WILLIS

Largely because of the administrative efforts of Benson Hough and the supervisory efforts of William Duffy, Camp Willis was able to receive the initial contingent of Guardsmen by late June. On June 29, members of the Eighth Regiment from Bucyrus began to arrive at camp. Within a week the majority of both infantry brigades was at Camp Willis. Brigadier General William McMaken, the First Brigade commander, was the camp commander. Adjutant General Hough furnished McMaken with enough staff personnel to operate the mobilization camp. The senior mustering officer for the United States Army was Major Robert W. Mearns, U. S. Army. Mearns' job was critical; he had to supervise the induction of the Guard into federal service. Mearns' responsibility was twofold: the supervision of the physical examinations and the administration of the dual oath. Both of these tasks proved burdensome during the upcoming weeks.

Immediately upon the arrival of the Guardsmen at Camp Willis, state medical examiners began screening the troops to determine if they measured up to federal enlistment standards. The officer in charge of the physical examination...
tions was the Ohio Surgeon General, Colonel Joseph Hall. The official records of the Central Department of the rejections for various physical reasons demonstrated how lax Ohio had been in meeting the physical requirements set as federal standards. The percentage of rejections at the final muster of the Guardsmen into federal service ranged from a low of 10.3% in Colorado to 25.2% in Ohio.³ Due to the rapidity of the mobilization, Ohio medical officers did not establish an extensive program of examinations prior to the Guardsmen’s arrival to Columbus. That state examiners were negligent was undeniable, but the extent of their culpability pertained only to the men examined by them. Many Guardsmen enlisted in the Guard without physical examinations. Many received civilian examinations; others enlisted against the recommendations of medical officers. The average rejection rate for the fourteen states in the Central Department was 15.5%, or 9,230 rejected out of 59,021 reporting.⁴ Data from five states in different sections of the country reflected 5,526 rejections out of 35,824 persons examined for the following causes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Condition</th>
<th>Rejected Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venereal diseases-----------------</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor physique, under height</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective vision--------------------</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deformity of feet and flat feet-----</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputations and deformities---------</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goiter------------------------------</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective mentality-----------------</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diseases of nose and throat---------</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veins, arteries, and varicosities---</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrocele and varicocele-------------</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernia-----------------------------</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective dentition-----------------</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overweight, obesity-----------------</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective hearing--------------------</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nervous diseases-------------------</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemorrhoids-------------------------</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart and lungs---------------------</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy--------------------------</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin diseases-----------------------</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholism, drug habits-------------</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified------------------------</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
So great was the number of physical rejections in Ohio that the *Ohio State Journal* printed a column entitled "Grand Army of the Rejected." According to the newspapers, an average of 25-30 men from each company failed to pass the physical examinations. In the Eighth Regiment, mustering officers rejected four hundred men due to physical reasons. Despite the growing number of rejections, Major Mearns insisted on a high standard of excellence:

> What right have we to accept into federal service a man who has a physical imperfection which we know and he knows may cause him trouble later... I would rather take to the border 65 good, fit, and able-bodied men than 100, a part of whom couldn't stand the pace.

The War Department was very sensitive to bonus politics and post-service claims due to its experience in the Spanish-American War, after which 108,258 of 211,161 men subsequently applied for pensions, hence Mearns' insistence on high standards. The depletion in the Guard's ranks caused an Ada Guardsman to lament:

> We will be very sorry to see these men leave us as they seem to belong to the family. We have been working together for almost a month now.

Community loyalties obviously were still strong in the local units.

If the mustering officers thought that they were experiencing problems with the physical examinations, they soon encountered another obstacle, the administration of
the dual oath of allegiance. What complicated the process was the fact that officials at the state and federal levels did not fully understand the regulations governing the administration of the oath. According to the Militia Bureau of the War Department, the essential difference between the old Organized Militia laws (the Dick Acts of 1903 and 1908) and the new law (National Defense Act of 1916) lay in the new oath of allegiance to the United States. The effect of the dual oath was to add a degree of compulsion and to make unnecessary the administration of a new oath of allegiance every time the President federalized the National Guard.

Within the Guard, there was much confusion over the dual oath. Some Guardsmen felt that they were enlisting in the regular Army for a seven year term (three years active duty, four years in the reserves), but the oath obligated them to serve only the unexpired term of their enlistment in the National Guard. The Kenton Graphic News Republican reported that at least a half a dozen men in each company refused to take the oath, but this was an exaggeration. In Company C of Canton, twenty men refused to swear to the United States until the regimental commander, Colonel Edward Vollrath, explained the oath and its implications with respect to length of service. The Fourth Regiment, Colonel Byron Bargar commanding, had the splendid record of not having a single man refuse to take the dual oath. By July 13, Major Mearns reported the en-
tire Second Brigade as present for federal service. The remaining units entered federal service by July 15. Thus it took the Ohio National Guard almost a complete month to muster for service. By the time Mearns notified Major General Barry that the mustering was complete, numerous National Guard regiments from other states had been serving on the border for several weeks.

Following the mustering ceremonies, the first order of business was to equip the Guardsmen and make up the shortages in organizational property. On July 22, Major General Barry informed the Adjutant General of the Army that no Ohio troops would be ready to depart Camp Willis until the necessary supplies reached camp. In addition, Barry reiterated the fact that Camp Willis was totally unsuitable for mobilization purposes, and he recommended that the Ohio mobilization camp be transferred back to Camp Perry as soon as the Ohio Guardsmen departed for the border.16

Despite the numerous problems confronting them, the Ohio National Guard prepared to increase its combat effectiveness. While the men awaited orders for movement to Texas, military drill and training filled the summer months. Herbert T. O. Blue, a correspondent with one of the Kenton newspapers, described life at Camp Willis:

Morning the first call is made at 5:30, the assembly is at 5:45, and mess at 6:15. The troops drill from 7:40 until 11:00. Mess is at 12:00, and drill begins at 1:30 and continues until 4:15.
Guard mounting call is at 4:40 and Assembly at 4:50. Mess is at 6:00. The men have the evenings, but the call to quarters is made at 9:45 and taps at 10:00.

Although Blue's press release accurately described the Guard's training schedule, it did not examine the more rigorous aspects of military life. As the summer progressed, the Guardsmen participated in intense military training. Brigadier General Speaks marched elements of the Second Brigade up to twenty-five miles a day, but marksmanship suffered due to the lack of a field fire range in the Columbus area.

Nation-wide most National Guard organizations experienced severe problems with respect to training. The organizations that the War Department immediately dispatched to the border were in different stages of instruction, though the difference was not very great due to the large number or recruits without prior service. It was therefore necessary to devote a large amount of time to elementary recruit instruction. For those organizations at the mobilization camps more than two weeks, the instruction in general was still unsatisfactory, due primarily to the lack of regular Army officers to act as instructors, the unsuitability of the ground in the vicinity for tactical instruction, and the lack of adequate target ranges. In spite of these shortcomings, most National Guard organizations, including that of Ohio, learned the fundamentals of small unit tactics, camp sanitation, and individual skills.

By late summer, there was still no news as to when
the Ohio Guardsmen would depart for the border. John C. Lehman, an attorney from Fremont, Ohio, wrote to Secretary Baker and asked, "Why don't you let the boys at Camp Willis go home and get to work?"18 His inquiry prompted a letter from the Adjutant General of the Army's office in which Baker stated that the Ohio National Guard was "being held in mobilization camp for training purposes, in order to better fit them for the ultimate duty of guarding the Mexican border against aggression."19 The War Department was obviously in no hurry to dispatch the Ohio Guardsmen to the border. Their delay was understandable to a degree for the immediate crisis between the United States and Mexico had passed. The arrival of thousands of National Guardsmen to the border had the desired diplomatic effect. The strengthening of the border and the diplomatic overtures from the Wilson administration had lessened the tension between the two countries. Henceforth, the War Department would make plans to rotate the National Guard organizations on the border.

Since many recruits had joined the Ohio National Guard for the opportunity of seeing action on the border, they were naturally disappointed by the relative inactivity of camp life at Camp Willis. Predictably, the morale of the Ohio Guardsmen deteriorated during the summer as officers and enlisted men alike began to express their discontent at the War Department's failure to send them to the border. "Either go into Mexico or go home" became a popular slogan
that was to follow the troops long after they departed for Texas.\textsuperscript{20} The \textit{Cleveland Leader} summed up the general feeling:

\begin{quote}
Homesickness is prevalent. They marched away "to war." And now they can't find the war. The feeling is that Ohio troops are being made the "goats by the Washington administration."\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

The \textit{Kenton Graphic News Republican} reported:

\begin{quote}
The eyes of 12,000 Ohio soldiers now are turned to the United States War Department. What is looked for and what the troops hope will come soon is an order to move to the Mexican border.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

A young private from Ada, W. D. Akers, best summed up the attitude of the Ohio Guardsmen as he wrote, "I am hoping we will be able to hold a reunion...in Mexico City."\textsuperscript{23}

The growing discontent did not confine itself to the ranks of the enlisted Guardsmen. Growing frustration at the Wilson administration's failure to issue orders that would allow Ohio Guardsmen to join their comrades on the border prompted Colonel Zimmerman, the Fifth Regiment commander, to write:

\begin{quote}
If the country needs our services, and we thought it did at the outset, every officer and man in my command would be eager for action. But if the government is making an example to us, to show how rotten the National Guard is, or how good it is, or if we are an example of the country's unpreparedness, then none of us want to be "it."\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Colonel Zimmerman's fiery statement was indicative of the growing discontent that surfaced not only among the members of the Guard, but also in the surrounding communities. The local Guard organizations were a direct re-
lection of the communities from which they came. Within
the small-town and rural communities, the novelty of sol-
diering and seeing "their sons off to the war" had worn
thin. Many Ohioans felt that the mobilization was more
of a political instrument than a national necessity. This
change of mood affected the local populace to such a de-
gree that one soldier remarked as his unit finally boarded
the train for the border, "The one outstanding feature was
the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the Columbus people."25
In addition, many of the troops began to press for hard-
ship discharges in order to return to work and support their
families or attend universities during the autumn. Ru-
mors concerning release from military duty were prevalent,
and on August 25, commanders received authorization to
discharge all Guardsmen who could show a bonafide intent
of entering college in September. Fortunately, few Guards-
men took advantage of this opportunity because rumors be-
gan to filter down the ranks that Ohio troops were next
on the list for entrainment to the border.

When the orders finally arrived, there was an under-
current of excitement in the camp. On news of the im-
pending departure, one Guardsman wrote:

Everybody seems happy at the outlook. The
months spent here have been full of activ-
ity, but there is a sameness about every-
thing that almost amounts to stagnation.26

As the Ohio Guardsmen boarded the trains that would
take them to the border, the first major phase of the 1916
mobilization came to an end. In comparison to other National Guard mobilizations around the country, Ohio’s mobilization had not been very expeditious. The decision by state officials to build a semi-permanent camp certainly contributed to the delay in assembling the Guardsmen. Property accountability was an area that demanded increased attention by state and federal authorities, and the War Department took corrective actions to remedy the problems of logistical support of the various National Guard organizations. With respect to medical examinations, Ohio officials were lax in that the state had no effective screening process prior to the arrival of the Guardsmen to Columbus. This was another area that merited reevaluation by state officers. Unlike many organizations nation-wide, the Ohio National Guard conducted much of its training in the state mobilization camp. This was due solely to a decision from the War Department. Since the grave situation on the border demanded that many National Guard organizations be dispatched with only a minimum of training, many of these Guardsmen arrived even though they were not yet ready and fit for active field service. Since Ohio experienced problems in assembling its Guardsmen, the immediate crisis on the border passed. Thus, Ohio troops had time to conduct part of their field training in the state mobilization camp instead of in the border stations. In summation, the Ohio National Guard experienced many problems during the mobilization phase for the Mexican
border crisis. Like any military mobilization, there were areas that demanded more attention, but by July the Ohio National Guard was ready for border service in the same state of preparedness as most of the national organizations that were already serving in the border encampments. Unfortunately, the Ohio Guard found itself entangled between state and federal politics, and it was only when the Guardsmen arrived in Texas that it was free to demonstrate that the Ohio Guard was capable of conducting its primary combat mission.
NOTES

1 Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Special Order 138 (1916), June 28, 1916.

2 Central Department, United States Army, Special Order 50 (1916), June 20, 1916.

3 "Report of the Muster in or the National Guard in the Central Division," NG File 370.01 Reports (Box 433), National Archives of the United States as quoted in DA PAM 20-212 History Of Military Mobilization In The U. S. Army, p. 200.

4 Ibid.

5 Militia Bureau Report, p. 55.

6 Section 7 of the Dick bill provided: "That every officer and enlisted man of the Militia who shall be called into the service of the United States shall be mustered for service without further enlistment, and without further medical examination previous to such muster. This, not being inconsistent with the National Defense Act of 1916, was still in force. The normal procedure therefore was to accept into federal service all National Guardmen from states that had adopted the federal standard and subsequently to make the required physical examination. Thus Ohio Guardmen enlisted in the ranks of the Guard prior to being examined by federal medical examiners; hence, they had no effective screening before they arrived at Camp Willis.

7 Ohio State Journal, July 6, 1916.

8 Ibid.

9 Militia Bureau Report, p. 58.


11 All officers and enlisted men in the National Guard had to take the following oath in accordance with Section 73 of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916: "I,____, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of____, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of____;
that I make this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office of in the National Guard of the United States and of the State of upon which I am about to enter, so help me God." Militia Bureau Report, p. 160. See also Roger Batchelder, Watching And Waiting On The Border (Boston: 1917), p. 24.


13 The confusion over the dual oath did not limit itself to the Ohio National Guard. See Clendenen, Blood On The Border, p. 287 and Irving McCann, With The National Guard On The Border (St. Louis: 1917), p. 102.


19 Ibid. Letter, W. M. Wright to Lehman, August 18, 1916.


21 Cleveland Leader, August 3, 1916.

22 Kenton Graphic News Republican, July 6, 1916.

23 Ada University Herald, August 3, 1916.

24 Cleveland Leader, August 3, 1916.

25 Ibid.

26 Ada University Herald, September 1, 1916.
CHAPTER III

SERVING ON THE MEXICAN BORDER

On August 29, the first Ohio Guardsmen departed for the border. By the middle of September, all the Ohio Guardsmen who had trained at Camp Willis had arrived in the Texas border camps. No regimental-size unit was at its war strength; expired enlistments and stringent acceptance standards had thinned the Guard’s ranks considerably since early summer, and the great patriotic fervor that had once attracted thousands of youths in June and July had all but died. Major General Funston, U. S. Army, commander of the Southern Department, to which the War Department assigned the Ohio National Guard, reported the arrival of the Ohio Guardsmen:

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Regiment</td>
<td>August 29</td>
<td>54-877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Regiment</td>
<td>August 30</td>
<td>51-1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, Second Brigade</td>
<td>August 30</td>
<td>2-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Regiment</td>
<td>August 31</td>
<td>51-975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Ambulance Company</td>
<td>September 1</td>
<td>4-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Field Hospital</td>
<td>September 1</td>
<td>7-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Squadron Cavalry</td>
<td>September 1</td>
<td>16-351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Battalion, FA</td>
<td>September 2</td>
<td>19-383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Battalion Signal Corps</td>
<td>September 3</td>
<td>8-119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Regiment</td>
<td>September 5</td>
<td>54-775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Regiment</td>
<td>September 6</td>
<td>50-803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, First Brigade</td>
<td>September 6</td>
<td>1-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Regiment</td>
<td>September 7</td>
<td>53-874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45
Table 5 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>September 7</td>
<td>20-429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Ambulance Company</td>
<td>September 8</td>
<td>5-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Field Hospital</td>
<td>September 8</td>
<td>5-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Field Hospital</td>
<td>September 8</td>
<td>3-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>403-6887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On September 9, Major General Barry notified the Adjutant General's Office that he had dispatched all the Ohio Guardsmen to the border.²

When the Ohio Guardsmen arrived on the border, they formed part of the Tenth Provisional Division, Brigadier General Charles G. Morton commanding.³ Conditions on the border were a far cry from the sedate life at Camp Willis. A Massachusetts Guardsman described the area at which the Ohio troops encamped:

A level stretch of desert, absolutely free from smaller vegetation, with scarce a dozen trees growing upon it, extended along a dusty road for half a mile. The burning sun beat down upon the waste and an occasional breath of scorching wind raised the dust and sand scattering it in stifling clouds along the plain.⁴

The major assembly areas on the border were San Antonio, Brownsville, El Paso, Texas and Douglas, Arizona.

On May 18, 1916, Major General Funston had divided the Mexican border comprising the limits of the Southern Department into the following districts:

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Brigadier General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brownsville District</td>
<td>James Parker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laredo District</td>
<td>William A. Mann</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Pass District</td>
<td>Brigadier General H. A. Greene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del Rio District</td>
<td>Colonel Frederick Sibley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Bend District</td>
<td>Colonel Joseph A. Gaston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso District</td>
<td>Brigadier General George Bell Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico District</td>
<td>Colonel H. G. Sickel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona District</td>
<td>Brigadier General Thomas Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nogales District</td>
<td>Colonel William H. Sage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuma District</td>
<td>Colonel F. H. French</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Surrounding El Paso were numerous National Guard encampments, one of which was Camp Bliss, the site that became home for the Ohio Guardsmen.

The arrival of the Ohio contingent did not significantly increase the size of the border forces as the War Department was already making plans to release certain organizations from their border stations. Secretary Baker reported that on August 31, the troops in the Southern Department consisted of 2,160 officers and 45,873 enlisted men in the regular Army and 5,446 officers and 105,080 enlisted men in the National Guard, making a total of 7,606 officers and 150,953 enlisted men in that department. In all there were 7,003 officers and 133,256 enlisted Guardsmen in federal service by November, 1916. The aggregate strength of the National Guard in the service of the United States was:

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1916</td>
<td>82,927</td>
<td>82,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 1916:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On border duty</td>
<td>110,957</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In state mobilization camps</td>
<td>40,139</td>
<td>151,096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>On border duty</th>
<th>In state mobilization camps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 31, 1916:</td>
<td>111,954</td>
<td>26,643</td>
<td>138,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 1916:</td>
<td>102,527</td>
<td>19,711</td>
<td>122,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 30, 1916:</td>
<td>96,447</td>
<td>4,181</td>
<td>100,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the time that the Ohio National Guard arrived at El Paso, the border was relatively quiet. The district commander, Brigadier General Bell, had been transmitting the same message to Major General Funston in his weekly reports: "Conditions unchanged. No violation of neutrality. No exportation of arms or ammunition." Due to the tranquility of the border, the remainder of September was a period of intense training for the Ohio National Guard. Unlike the training exercises at Camp Willis, regular Army officers supervised the drilling. Under the direction of district commanders, the regular Army officers performed duties as instructors and adopted schedules that called for instruction periods of four to six hours daily. Although many Guardsmen found fault with their own officers who often pretended to "put on airs," most of the enlisted Guardsmen maintained a wholesome respect for the regulars. As an Ada Guardsman stated:
They [regulars] are lanky, clean-cut fellows, know exactly what they are doing all the time, and are apparently glad to help us out.10

In the same letter, he added:

The captain of the company of regulars will give a thorough inspection of the entire company and his men will work alongside our officers and men, to see that we understand our business. It is to be no half-way training this time. The aim is to make us efficient.11

Private Roger Batchelder, Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, echoed the praise that the National Guardsmen had for the regulars:

Contrary to general opinion, their treatment of the Guard was very good....What if their advice were given in a somewhat superior way? They were masters of their trade; we were merely apprentices.12

The weeks of intense training in range finding, patrolling, map reading, marching, target practice, and weapons maintenance began to turn the Ohio Guardsmen into field soldiers. From the training standpoint, the highlight of the September maneuvers was a mock battle between the Second and Fourth Regiments. Most of the Guardsmen appreciated the sham battles and "battle practice," in which companies competed against each other with respect to accuracy and distribution of fire as a break from the monotony of camp drilling and equipment maintenance.

October was perhaps the most grueling month of training on the border. Both brigades of Ohio Guardsmen participated in the Las Cruces hike during the first two weeks
of the month. A total of eighteen thousand Guardsmen marched the seventy-five miles to Las Cruces, New Mexico and then returned to Fort Bliss. Tactical units covered an average of ten-fifteen miles daily with one day off during the hike for inspections. During the entire march, Guardsmen "fought" battles against imaginary enemies. Of particular interest were the Guardsmen's views of the march. A Guardsman from Company G, Second Regiment, reported that he thought the entire exercise was an experiment to see how his general could handle large bodies of men. An Eighth Massachusetts Regiment Guardsman felt that Major General Funston ordered the march since there was nothing else to do with the National Guard.

In any case, the Ohio Guardsmen profited immensely from their participation in the "long hike" and received laudatory remarks from the federal officers who accompanied them. Lieutenant Robert Ohmer, an officer in the Third Regiment from Dayton, Ohio wrote the editor of the Dayton Rotary Smile that the hike taught the men how to overcome the discomforts of an extended campaign march. After completing the march, the Ohio troops felt that if they received orders to cross the Rio Grande, they would now know how to take care of themselves. To one participant, the excellent showing by his regiment on the march and during the months of border duty was undoubtedly responsible for the War Department selecting his regiment (Fourth Regiment) to form part of the Forty-Sec-
(Rainbow) Division in the First World War.17

Following the Las Cruces march, duty on the border settled down to the monotonous drilling, inspections, and routine camp activity. The greatest relief from such duty was the two weeks of border patrol duty. Most Guardsmen felt that this was the purpose for which the President had summoned the Guard. As a result, they welcomed the opportunity to "get into action." There was a certain excitement that prevailed at Camp Bliss as federal officers rotated each regiment to the border. The first Ohio Guardsmen to participate in border patrol duty were members of the Second Brigade, who arrived on the border during the middle of October. While conducting patrols and serving on the border itself, officers required the Guardsmen "to sleep with their guns and store deadly ammunition at the prescribed place in each mess, additional to each man's supply."18 Border patrol duty was exciting as well as dangerous as Sergeant Guy I. Bair from Bucyrus reported:

On October 19, one trooper in the Eighth Regiment thought he heard someone while he was guarding a bridge that crossed the border. When he ordered the man to halt, a rifle shot answered his call. Immediately the whole guard at this point, 21 men, jumped in the trenches and gave the Greasers about 50 rounds, and the shooting stopped on the Mexican side.19

Life in the camps surrounding Fort Bliss was not all training and field maneuvers. That was the more glamorous aspect of the Guardsman's life. Like the regulars, the Guardsmen spent much of their time preparing for in-
spections and insuring proper sanitary procedures were followed. On the whole, camp life was much more comfortable than that of Camp Willis. Despite the daily encounters with wind storms, alkali dust, and the fluctuating temperatures, Ohio Guardsmen adapted reasonably well to the Texas climate. The months of rigorous training hardened the soldiers, and severe illnesses were surprisingly few. Colonel Edward Vollrath, commander of the Eighth Regiment, stated that he "never had such a hardy bunch of young fellows under his command. They seem to be fit for anything." In October, Colonel Hall, the Surgeon General of Ohio, received permission to make an inspection of all Ohio regiments. Hall found the sanitary arrangements as near perfect as possible and the food good.

In addition to state authorities, federal officers inspected all National Guard installations to insure compliance with regulations governing sanitary conditions. Colonel H. P. Birmingham, U. S. Army, Acting Surgeon General, noted that the sick rate since mobilization was less than 2%, which expressed in terms on non-effectiveness, was equivalent to a rate of 18.13 per thousand. What made the sick rate so low was the excellent supervision by camp surgeons and the enforcement of camp discipline by regular Army and National Guard officers. Lieutenant Ohmer, Third Regiment, reported that General McMaken, the First Brigade commander, received notification that he would be personally responsible if every man did not have
a sufficient quantity of blankets. Ohmer's letter of December 26 gave an excellent portrayal of what an Ohio encampment was like:

The large pyramidal tents are filled with stoves and cots, the wood floors and side walls are covered with heavy roofing paper...the bath houses are warm and the water in the showers is actually hot. The latrines are disinfected daily...The camps are clean and the sanitation excellent. There has not been one death among the men of the brigade of three regiments.

Such a letter reflected great credit upon the medical personnel of the First Brigade.

Conditions in the Second Brigade paralleled those in the First. Although the brigade suffered two fatalities, one of whom drowned while on furlough in Ohio, the camp was always in a high state of cleanliness. Brigadier General Speaks reported that the "health, food, and sanitation in his brigade was in top notch order."

There was one ugly incident that marred one of Speaks' regiments. Several soldiers of the Eighth Regiment signed a "round robin" that complained of the camp conditions and the high sickness rate in the regiment. When the soldiers forwarded their protest over the heads of their officers to certain legislative officials, including Secretary Baker, the Secretary of War instructed Brigadier General Bell to investigate the allegations. Bell conducted a lengthy investigation and the results of his investigation appeared in the Ohio State Journal:

General Bell denies there is much sickness
or that Ohio troops are being improperly cared for. Out of 953 enlisted men and 46 officers, there are 23 on sick call as of the date of inspection.27

The Eighth Regiment's round robin was just one of the difficulties that the Ohio Guardsmen encountered during their service on the border. Despite precautions to eliminate potential problem areas, various crises arose during the tenure in the border encampments. In December, 1916, there was an effort by several Cleveland troops to secure an order to return home through the local news media. The fact that several regiments from other states had received orders to return home prior to Christmas, coupled with the relative inactivity of the Ohio Guardsmen, prompted several Ohio Congressional leaders and newspaper editors to petition the War Department for information on the possible early release of Ohio Guardsmen from federal service. Governor Willis, who recently had lost an election to James Cox, petitioned Senator Warren Harding to intercede with Secretary Baker to allow Ohio troops to return home. Willis enumerated the reasons for his plea: newspapers were filled with stories concerning poor camp conditions, and the general opinion around the state was that the boys had been on the border long enough.28

Much of this political interference in federal military matters was an outgrowth of the round robin, but the press added to the furor by printing stories that only served to alarm the citizens of Ohio. The press releases
and the political attempts to terminate the Ohio Guard's stay on the border led to assumptions that the Ohio troops were ill-disciplined, unmotivated, and poor soldiers. Such claims infuriated the majority of Ohio Guardsmen and led to a rash of letters to federal authorities as well as press releases from Ohio's military authorities. Captain R. L. Conelly, Third Ohio Infantry, informed Baker that his company, the Cleveland Grays, were in no way connected or in sympathy with the efforts to secure an early release from border service through unofficial means. Conelly stated:

The members of the Cleveland Grays...want you to know that they are the same loyal patriotic men and...are ready, willing, and more able than ever before to fight for our Country's flag when called upon, and in the mean time live the life a soldier's supposed to live without complaint.

Conelly's letter was mild compared to Colonel Charles X. Zimmerman's angry refutation of the charges that Ohio Guardsmen desired political influence to shorten their tenure on the border. According to Zimmerman,

Cleveland troops do not want to be babied; they do not want political or other influence to bring them home out of their turn...I want the people of Cleveland to know that the soldiers in the Fifth Regiment have done their duty honorably, faithfully, and cheerfully, and will continue so to do no matter how long the terms of service may be...we are still Guardsmen...and we still feel as we always have, right or wrong, that we will do the duty asked of us.

Zimmerman's press release, along with photos that con-
trasted the physical development of Ohio Guardsmen before the call with the present physically fit Guardsmen, quickly quieted Cleveland skeptics.

In spite of the problems that arose from political pressures and routine military life, such as "goldbricking," delays in paying the soldiers, and hostility from the civilian communities in south Texas, life on the border had many redeeming qualities that reflected the traditions of the citizen soldier concept. As was evident during the Guardsmen's protracted stay at Camp Willis, the border experience reemphasized the close bonds between the National Guard and the small-town communities. In this respect, Ohio was no different than the other states that had furnished troops for the border service. When it became evident that the Ohio Guardsmen would not return home prior to the Christmas holidays, the local townspeople made every effort to let their soldiers know that they were not forgotten. The Columbus Chamber of Commerce wired advance season greetings to the Fourth Regiment and informed them that "Columbus is proud to show her appreciation of her Guardsmen." \(^32\) In addition, the Chamber of Commerce made arrangements that everyone of the 794 Columbus men would receive a separate package of gifts. Mrs. Guy Deming, wife of the Second Regiment's commander, chaired a committee to insure that each of the Ada companies received a Christmas box from the ladies of Ada.\(^33\) F. G. Saxton, a member
of the Toledo Commerce Club, and Mrs. Sophia Duvall, a fellow Toledonian, wrote to Secretary Baker and President Wilson respectively to inquire if the Sixth Regiment and Troop D, First Squadron of Ohio Cavalry, would remain on the border for the new year. The reason for their correspondence was not to pressure the legislative leaders, but rather to determine if they should forward Christmas presents to El Paso.

There were numerous other examples of the community ties between Ohio residents and the National Guard. Until the impending crisis with Germany began making the headlines in March, 1917, many newspapers carried daily accounts of the Guard's activities, and editors frequently published letters from local Guardsmen that described camp conditions, field training, and other aspects of the soldier's life. In addition, a large number of local business leaders toured the various Guard installations on the border and reported the results of their "inspections" to an eager citizenry.

As was the case with National Guard organizations nation-wide, monotony and homesickness gradually developed throughout most of the Ohio regiments. After several regiments from other states received orders to return home, this feeling grew into frustration. Having entered federal service with a desire for active service against Mexican irregulars, many Ohio Guardsmen were disappointed and disillusioned with routine military life. Such com-
plaints as "We came down here to fight; not to sit around camp" were common. During their tenure on the border, no Ohio National Guard organization ever crossed the international boundary. It was this frustration with routine military life, coupled with the departure of many of their comrades that gave rise to complaints and dis-sention from within the ranks of the Ohio Guard.

For the remainder of their tenure on the border, the Ohio Guardsmen occupied their time by performing field exercises and routine duties. For the most part, January, 1917 consisted of tactical maneuvers. Both brigades of Ohio Guardsmen participated in war games from January 8-19. The concentration of the maneuvers was on advance guard tactics, withdrawal techniques, and various battlefield actions. On January 22, regular Army officers conducted a full field inspection of all men and equipment. The results were highly satisfactory. Throughout February and early March, many Ohio Guardsmen conducted extensive marksmanship training and record firing. Immediately upon returning from the rifle ranges on March 3, officers and men began making preparations to return to Ohio. As expected, the Guardsmen were jubilant at the prospect of returning to their families and homes in Ohio.

In evaluating the performance of the Ohio National Guard from September, 1916 to March, 1917, military and civilian authorities found Ohio Guardsmen performed their
duties in an exemplary fashion. The initial establishment of a base camp and the subsequent field maneuvers toughened the Ohio troops mentally and physically. Although federal military officers were critical of the overall training of the National Guard organizations, Ohio Guardsmen received numerous laudatory reports for their field exercises and inspections. Excellent programs of camp sanitation and the medical care by personnel in the Southern Department resulted in an extremely low casualty rate among the Ohio Guardsmen. There were several problems experienced by Ohio troops, but these same difficulties arose in numerous National Guard organizations that performed service on the border. Deteriorating morale and a lack of proper field training prior to their arrival on the border hindered the Guard's overall effectiveness, but regular Army officers were able to correct many of these deficiencies.

Despite the aforementioned problems, the performance of the Ohio National Guard was generally laudatory. The Guardsmen increased their combat effectiveness and their military proficiency. Since most of the Ohio National Guard was in federal service, there was little interference in the Guard's daily operations from state officials. The removal of the state's political leaders and the inclusion of the regular Army's supervision greatly assisted the Ohio National Guard in becoming a more professional military reserve force.
NOTES

1 Copies of the correspondence between the War Department and the departmental commands are located in AGO Document File 1890-1917, RG 94.


3 The plan of developing the Organized Militia into complete and independently organized forces emerged in 1912 as a result of a detailed study by the General Staff and the Division of Militia Affairs, and after prolonged consultation with state authorities. The plan contemplated the formation of twelve tactical divisions corresponding to twelve groups of contiguous states. Only New York (Sixth Division) and Pennsylvania (Seventh Division) merit state divisional size units. The expediencies of the border situation permitted Major General Funston to form Provisional Divisions, and the War Department’s scheme of creating permanent tactical divisions never became a concrete reality. Militia Bureau Report, pp. 48-52.

4 Batchelder, Watching And Waiting On The Border, p. 46.


7 Militia Bureau Report, p. 156. The discrepancy in these figures and those of Secretary Baker’s is due to the fact that the Militia Bureau’s statistics refer only to the National Guard organizations that participated in the border crisis whereas Baker’s include the National Guard units that remained in their respective states and did not participate in the border exercises.

8 Bell received orders on March 14, 1916 to proceed to El Paso and take command of all troops at El Paso, Fort Bliss, and in west Texas. Entry 4435, General Correspondence Southern Department, Records of U. S. Army Continental Commands 1821-1920, RG 393.

9 Weekly Reports of Border Conditions, Records of
U. S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, RG 393.

10 Ada University Herald, September 22, 1916.

11 Ibid.

12 Batchelder, Watching And Waiting On The Border, pp. 76-77.

13 For an Ohioan's view of the field training and the Las Cruces march, see the diary of First Sergeant W. L. Perry, Company I, Second Regiment in the Kenton Graphic News Republican, March 29, 1917. See also McCann, With The National Guard On The Border, p. 171, and Batchelder, Watching And Waiting On The Border, pp. 162-200.

14 Ada University Herald, October 13, 1916.

15 Batchelder, Watching And Waiting On The Border, p. 162.

16 Dayton Rotary Smile, January 9, 1917.


18 Ada University Herald, November 24, 1916.

19 Bucyrus Evening Dispatch, October 19, 1916.

20 Bucyrus Evening Telegraph, October 30, 1916.


22 In July, 1916, the Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh L. Scott, ordered Major General Tasker H. Bliss to conduct a thorough inspection of all Regular Army and National Guard units on the border. Although Bliss found several deficiencies, his report was generally favorable. Since he conducted his inspection between July 14 and August 15, Bliss naturally did not inspect any Ohio units, but he did investigate the conditions of the installations at Fort Bliss. For a complete copy of the Assistant Chief of Staff's report, see the Militia Bureau Report, pp. 59-64.


24 Dayton Rotary Smile, January 9, 1917.
25Ibid.
26Ohio State Journal, December 27, 1916.
27Ibid.
29Since Baker was from Cleveland, he had a special interest in the Cleveland Guardsmen.
31Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 31, 1916.
33Ada University Herald, November 24, 1916.
34Copies of the letters are in AGO Document File 1890-1917, RG 94.
36No National Guard organization crossed the border into Mexico although two regiments, the First New Mexico Infantry and the Second Massachusetts Infantry were technically part of the Punitive Expedition. Both regiments were carried in the expedition's station list, but both remained at Columbus, New Mexico to provide guards and base camp security. Clendenen, Blood On The Border, p. 296.
37In his official report, Brigadier General W. A. Mann, the Chief of the Militia Bureau, stated that the instruction by the Regular Army had not been satisfactory. Lack of suitable target ranges for small arms and service practice, the limited amount of ammunition available for practice firing, the divided duties of the instructors, and the lack of systematic instruction hindered the effectiveness of performance oriented training. Mann cited the sacrifice of precision, uniformity, and thoroughness in training sessions to expedite the instruction of the National Guard. He concluded his report by stating that at the end of five month's service, with few exceptions, the organizations as a whole were still not ready and fit for active field service against a well-trained enemy. Militia Bureau Report, p. 146.
CHAPTER IV

THE INTRICACIES OF DEMOBILIZATION

By November, 1916, the international tension between the United States and Mexico had abated to the point that the commander of the Southern Department planned to release over twenty-five thousand National Guardsmen. Consequently, Major General Funston issued instructions that provided for the release of several National Guard regiments. By November 14, 47,707 of 156,414 men who had served on the border returned to their home states.¹

Due to the late arrival of Ohio Guardsmen to Texas, Funston did not include the Ohio National Guard in his initial release of Guardsmen. Although he received orders from Secretary Baker to release National Guard organizations, the responsibility of identifying the regiments for release from federal service service rested with Frederick Funston. The task confronting the commander of the Southern Department was monumental; Funston had to supervise the initial transportation of 158,110 National Guardsmen from the border encampments to their home stations.²

Although Ohio Guardsmen were not in the initial con-
tingent of Guardsmen that Funston designated to depart Texas in November, rumors began to circulate throughout the ranks that most National Guard units would return home before spring. The Kenton Graphic News Republican reported that the War Department announced that 16,000 Guardsmen on duty would be mustered out of federal service, and the remaining 75,000 would stay in Texas until Brigadier General Pershing withdrew from Mexico. 3 Owing to improving conditions on the border and the fact that regular troops would be available to take over border security as soon as Pershing withdrew, Funston received instructions to designate 25,000 more Guardsmen for release from service. When the departmental headquarters announced the mustering out of these units would be complete by February 20, 1917, the War Department directed Funston to send all remaining National Guard organizations home for mustering out. 4 Funston received his instructions on February 16, and the Ohio Guardsmen immediately began preparations to complete their scheduled training and to return to Ohio.

As expected, the Guardsmen greeted the news of the impending demobilization with wild jubilation. Colonel Deming, commander of the Second Regiment, reported to the editor of a Kenton newspaper that, "Every trooper on the border has a big smile on his face and is anxious to return to Ohio." 5 For the first time, the jubilation
was justified. For months rumors had spread throughout the Ohio regiments that the Guardsmen were to return to Ohio. As early as December, unconfirmed reports were in circulation that all Guardsmen would be departing at the rate of one regiment every ten days. By February, an Ada newspaper stated that both brigades of the Ohio Guard would return to Ohio by March 2.6

With the impending departure of the Ohio Guardsmen from the border encampments, state leaders began in earnest to petition and pressure the War Department to muster out the Ohio regiments at their respective mobilization stations. Certain politicians even ventured to use the demobilization of the Guard for their own political purposes. In a letter to Secretary Baker in which he extolled the civic and commercial benefits of having both Ohio brigades muster out in the state capital, Columbus Mayor George J. Karb asked Baker to permit the Ohio Guardsmen to attend the inaugural ceremonies of Governor-elect James M. Cox. Karb had no intention of "handicapping departmental [War Department] affairs," but he and the Columbus Chamber of Commerce hoped to see the inaugural ceremonies as a record breaking event.7 In the past, only one regiment marched in the Governor-elect's inaugural parade; the presence of the entire Guard would bring added prestige not only to Karb, but also the city of Columbus. As with all letters of this nature, Baker informed the writer that the designation of units for demobilization was at
the discretion of Major General Funston, and the mustering out points for the Ohio National Guard was in the hands of Major General Barry, commanding general of the Central Department.

Mayor Karb's request was only the first of numerous letters and telegrams that arrived at Baker's office. The essence of the majority of the correspondence was a request that Ohio regiments return to Ohio for mustering out ceremonies. On January 24, Baker received telegrams from Governor Cox, the mayors of Columbus, London, Cardington, Chillicothe, and Circleville; all the telegrams urged that Ohio troops return to Ohio in the most expeditious manner. It was apparent that state and local leaders feared that the Ohio Guardsmen would receive demobilization orders in the larger military encampments outside Ohio, namely Fort Wayne, Michigan and Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana as had been the case with other National Guard organizations within the Central Department.

Unfortunately, the civilian leaders failed to understand the intracacies of a military demobilization. Whereas it would have been nice to accommodate state leaders and demobilize the Ohio Guard in their respective mobilization sites, Baker understood the complexities of the problem and directed Major General Barry to select those demobilization points that would enable him to muster out the troops in an expedient manner and in the best interests of the service. In selecting the demobilization sites,
Barry chose military stations large enough to accommodate regiment and brigade size units. In these stations, National Guardsmen would clean their equipment, transfer their weapons and field equipment to state authorities, and prepare for the final mustering out formations.

By late February, the Ohio Guardsmen began to entrain for the military demobilization sites in Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana for mustering out purposes. The first contingent of troops to depart Texas was the First Squadron of Ohio Cavalry, who arrived at Fort Benjamin Harrison on February 21. As the cavalrymen boarded the train, the other Ohio commands gave them a rousing salute as they started home. The remaining Ohio units quickly followed, so that by the middle of March, all Ohio Guardsmen had departed the border encampments. Despite several minor medical problems such as an outbreak of mumps due to relaxed medical practices, all units arrived at the out processing sites without major mishap.

With the impending demobilization, state political officials and the Adjutant General of Ohio once again took an active role in the activities of the Ohio National Guard. On February 19, Lieutenant Colonel William Duffy, the state's Quartermaster General, received orders to proceed to Fort Wayne to supervise the transfer of property of the Fourth Regiment from federal to state control. In like manner, two other National Guard officers, Lieutenant Colonel
J. S. Shelter and Captain H. B. Huston, arrived at Fort Benjamin Harrison to facilitate the transfer of the cavalry's equipment.\textsuperscript{11}

Unfortunately, much of the equipment was in serious need of repair. In this respect, the Ohio Guard was no different than the majority of National Guard organizations. The Militia Bureau's after-action report cited a typical inspector's account of the serviceability of field equipment used by the National Guard:

\begin{quote}
All of the property was in poor condition. All of the property showed neglect and an absolute lack of care. The small arms were in a specially poor condition...In spite of over four month's service, the accountable officers, with one exception, knew very little about how to keep property records or render returns.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

The deplorable condition of equipment did not endear the National Guard to the regular Army officers who conducted the final inspection, but the Guard's own officers were now more concerned with maintaining discipline than with the cleanliness of their equipment.

The demobilization of the Ohio Guardsmen received a surprise setback on March 27 when Secretary Baker issued instructions to Major General Barry to hold the Third and Sixth Regiments in federal service. Also included in Baker's instructions was the retention of the First Signal Battalion, First Battalion Engineers, and the First Field Artillery. The growing crisis with Germany necessitated the maintenance of a strong reserve force in federal service. Although community leaders had planned
elaborate receptions for these organizations, the Guardsmen and the local officials acquiesced to Baker's decision.

Aside from the units that Baker retained in federal service, all Ohio Guardsmen completed mustering out procedures by March 24:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Date/Place of Demobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second Regiment</td>
<td>56-614</td>
<td>March 24, Ft. Sheridan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Regiment</td>
<td>54-977</td>
<td>Not mustered out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Regiment</td>
<td>54-834</td>
<td>March 3, Ft. Wayne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Regiment</td>
<td>48-925</td>
<td>March 15, Ft. Wayne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Regiment</td>
<td>16-308</td>
<td>Not mustered out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Battalion Field Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not mustered out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Battalion Signal Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not mustered out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Engineer Battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not mustered out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 17, Ft. Sheridan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, First Brigade</td>
<td>4-0</td>
<td>March 24, Ft. Riley, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, Second Brigade</td>
<td>1-0</td>
<td>March 23, Chicago</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the completion of the demobilization, Ohio's participation in the national mobilization of June, 1916 was over. In addition to the military aspects of the demobilization, the mustering out exercises gave Ohioans an opportunity to reaffirm their relationship with the National Guard. The warm receptions and homecoming ceremonies that greeted the returning Guardsmen demonstrated that the local townspeople maintained a special affinity with the National Guard. In Ada, the citizens held a grand reception to welcome home the veterans of the "Mexican border campaign." On the platform were the "Old Soldiers of '61,
the Spanish War veterans, and the officers of the Second Regiment." 14 More than two thousand people assembled in Kenton to welcome Company I after seven months on the border. As postmaster C. W. Smith noted, "We are justly proud of their loyalty and grateful for the notable service they have rendered to our common country." 15 Although Dayton residents were unable to complete plans for a reception of the Third Regiment due to Baker's retention order, they did establish a special committee for the purpose of organizing a reception for the Third Regiment. 16 In Columbus, the Columbus Citizen portrayed a front page picture in which Uncle Sam was shaking hands with a proud father of a returning Guardsman. In congratulating the father, Uncle Sam said, "Your boy has the proper stuff in him-You're proud of him-So am I." 17 The mayor of Bucyrus urged every citizen to "display the national colors in profusion." 18 When the news reached Bucyrus that the Eighth Regiment would detrain on March 23, city officials urged every one "to turn out and make the welcome of the soldiers one that all would be proud and would cherish the memory of for all time." 19 These demonstrations of public support for the Ohio Guard did not confine themselves to the major cities. One Dayton newspaper listed numerous small communities that scheduled receptions for the returning Guardsmen. 20 The towns included Marion, London, Marysville, Circleville, Washington Courthouse, Delaware, Lan-
caster, Chillicothe, and Newark.

As a final postscript to Ohio's participation in the Mexican border crisis of 1916-1917, the General Assembly of the state of Ohio appropriated $5,000 on March 29, 1917 for the purpose of striking a Mexican border service badge for every Guardsman who participated in the border exercise. The badge consisted of a bar, showing the national shield, stars, and Roman fasces, from which the medal proper suspended. One side bore the seal of Ohio, surrounded by the words "Mexican Border Service, 1916-1917." On the other side, an inscription read "Presented by the State of Ohio."²¹
NOTES


2. The initial cost of transporting the Organized Militia and the National Guard to the border was $4,489,284. The return of the National Guard to their respective states and the subsequent demobilization of the Guardsmen cost the federal government $5,786,826. "Report of the Quartermaster General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 313.


8. With respect to the demobilization, Baker’s primary concern was the selection of points at which the Guardsmen would be comfortably and safely provided with quarters and supplies. The responsibility for selecting the demobilization camps was Major General Barry’s. Barry considered such areas as Camp Perry, Ohio, the Ohio State Fairgrounds, and the city of Columbus, but he deemed these sites as unable to furnish the proper facilities to the Ohio Guardsmen. Finally he decided on the following locations: Fort Benjamin Harrison near Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, Michigan, Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Sheridan, Illinois. AGO Document File, 1890-1917, RG 94 contains the correspondence between Barry and Secretary Baker. Of particular interest is Barry’s letter to the Adjutant General of the Army, January 26, 1917, in which Barry presents his rationale for selecting demobilization points outside of Ohio.


10. Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Special Order 30 (1917), February 19, 1917.

11. Ibid.
The complete correspondence between the Central Department and the War Department is available in AGO Document File, 1890-1917, RG 94. With respect to the demobilization of the state's medical units, the medical personnel attached to the National Guard's tactical units mustered out with their respective units. The remaining medical personnel departed federal service on March 17, 1917.

Ada University Herald, March 30, 1917.

Kenton Graphic News Republican, March 29, 1917.


Columbus Citizen, March 3, 1917.

Bucyrus Evening Telegraph, March 18, 1917. Bucyrus was the home station of Colonel Vollrath, commander of the Eighth Regiment, as well as the regiment's headquarters.


Dayton Journal, March 6, 1917.

Galbreath, History Of Ohio, p. 715. For a list of Ohio Guardsmen who received the medal, see "Register of Soldiers Receiving Medals For Mexican Border Service," Series 69, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The 1916 mobilization of the National Guard was the outcome of a national emergency demanding an additional military force beyond the existing capabilities of the regular Army. The call for the National Guard occurred just in time to put in operation the provisions of the new preparedness legislation of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916. In effect, the mobilization was the first compulsory national mobilization of the National Guard. In determining the effectiveness of the Ohio National Guard to meet the existing crisis, one must carefully scrutinize the results of the mobilization as well as the performance of the Ohio Guardsmen on the border.

Although National Guardsmen began arriving at their border stations as early as June 28, 1916, Ohio Guardsmen did not depart for Texas until August 29. Various military commanders and inspectors attributed the delay to several factors: the total unsuitability of the site selected for the state mobilization camp, the decision by state officials to construct a semi-permanent camp, the inadequate state of training of the Ohio Guardsmen, and the inability of the state to provide sufficient field
equipment and clothing for its Guardsmen. The combination of these factors reflected discredit not only on the state of Ohio, but also on the Ohio National Guard's capability to conduct its primary combat mission.

Each of these allegations merits careful examination, for the shortcomings experienced during the mobilization were more often than not the result of mismanagement by federal and state officials and not due to the Ohio National Guard's failure to respond to the presidential order for mobilization.

With respect to the suitability of the Columbus mobilization site, the area met all the criteria for an excellent temporary military encampment: level terrain, easy drainage, ready access to the city, ample space for camps and drill, and proximity to transportation and public utility systems. The only drawback was the absence of military ranges, but the Columbus site had the approval of a state board of officers as well as the approval of Major George C. Saffarrans, the Inspector-Instructor of the Central Department. If the site was unsuitable, then the Central Department should have withheld its approval of the transfer of the Ohio mobilization site from Camp Perry to Columbus. The final approval of the area that became Camp Willis in 1916 rested not with the state of Ohio, but with the United States Army.

Major General Barry's consternation with the delay in Ohio's mobilization lay not so much with the site of Camp
Willis as it did with the fact that the state officials deemed it necessary to construct a semi-permanent camp. The construction of such a camp resulted in unusual expense for work of no permanent value. It was the inordinate expense of the camp that sparked the War Department's investigation of the Ohio mobilization. For the decision to construct an encampment on the scale of Camp Willis, Ohio officials must bear the full responsibility. Both Governor Willis and Adjutant General Hough desired to correct deficiencies experienced by the Ohio National Guard's mobilization during the war with Spain. In 1898, only eighteen days elapsed from the time the first company of Ohio Guardsmen arrived at the mobilization center until their departure for Camp Thomas in Chickamauga, Georgia. During their stay in Columbus, the Guardsmen were without the conveniences of proper tentage, adequate public utility services, and other support facilities. In 1916, Willis and Hough desired to correct these deficiencies and improve the conditions of the mobilization center, so they decided to construct a semi-permanent camp instead of subjecting the Guardsmen to the conditions of 1898.

The delay in building Camp Willis certainly contributed to the fact that Ohio Guardsmen would be unable to depart for border duty in as timely fashion as some of the other state organizations, but it did not address a very important question. If the state of Ohio was so lax in assembling its Guardsmen, why did the War Department not intervene to remedy
the situation? Instead of directing Central Department officials to take positive actions to correct the shortcomings of the mobilization, the War Department merely redirected its transportation assets to move other National Guard organizations to their border stations. The reason lay with the improving state of relations between the United States and Mexico. Wilson’s dramatic action of federalizing the National Guard and the diplomatic overtures between the two governments in the immediate aftermath of Wilson’s proclamation lessened the necessity of moving the entire National Guard to the border immediately. The number of Guardsmen that arrived at the border by mid-July was sufficient to bolster the strength of the Regular Army on the border stations. As such, there was no need to dispatch the Ohio Guardsmen to Texas before they received adequate training and equipment. The immediate crisis had already passed.

With respect to the allegation that Ohio failed to equip its Guardsmen properly, the equipping of the National Guard once it entered federal service was the responsibility of the War Department, not the state of Ohio. Shortcomings in the federal quartermaster system impeded the arming and equipping of National Guard contingents across the United States. Many Guardsmen did not receive the proper clothing and supplies until they reached the border encampments. Considering the rapid pace of the mobilization of the reserves, this was understandable. All U. S. Army Depart-
mental Commanders recommended immediate revisions in supply procedures following the 1916 mobilization.

The last point of dissatisfaction concerning the inadequacies of the Ohio National Guard's mobilization phase centered on the alleged poor training of the Ohio National Guardsmen. The Adjutant General of the Army stated that the Ohio troops remained in their mobilization camp for training purposes "to better fit them for the ultimate duty of guarding the Mexican border against aggression." Such a claim was deceiving because other National Guard organizations received their training in the border encampments, not in their state mobilization sites. The Ohio Guardsmen received the same field training as their counterparts in other states. What separated the Ohio Guardsmen from their fellow Guardsmen was the exigencies of the diplomatic situation dictated that most National Guard organizations entrain immediately for the border. As such, they received their training in the border encampments, whereas Ohio Guardsmen trained at Camp Willis until they received orders for movement to Texas.

In summation, the Ohio National Guard experienced many problems during the Camp Willis phase of the 1916 mobilization. These difficulties were not so much the fault of the Ohio National Guard as they were from a poor decision made by state officials and the mismanagement of the federal supply system. During the time lapse that it took to construct Camp Willis, the diplomatic situation improved to the
point where the National Guard organizations that were not already on the border could conduct field training in their state mobilization camps until the War Department dispatched them to the border. The long tenure of the Ohio Guardsmen at Camp Willis was not so much the result of the necessity of correcting deficiencies within the Guard itself as it was a decision of the War Department to rotate National Guard organizations to the border as the situation warranted.

Once the Ohio Guardsmen arrived at their border encampment, they performed their duties in an exemplary manner. As could be expected, they encountered various problems during their tenure on the border, but these problems were of a routine military nature, and they did not confine themselves to the Ohio National Guard. During their six-month stay at Camp Bliss, the Ohio Guardsmen maintained a professional attitude toward their military duties as evident by a low casualty rate, commendable inspection reports, and satisfactory training exercises.

With respect to the demobilization, Ohio Guardsmen experienced the same problems as did the other Guard organizations from across the nation. Generally, field and personal equipment were in need of repair. Weapon maintenance was substandard, and as such, it merited specific comments from the officers from the regular Army who conducted the final inspection. Discipline was difficult to maintain once the Guardsmen began arriving at the mustering out encampments, but officers seemed to make every effort to main-
tain some state of order.

Aside from the military aspects of the mobilization of the Ohio National Guard, the events of 1916 demonstrated the tremendous political pressure placed on national and state officials by local community leaders. During the early stages of the mobilization, businessmen bombarded state officials with a barrage of letters, invoices, and work requests relating to the construction of Camp Willis. After the Ohio Guardsmen departed for Texas, newspaper editors published numerous accounts of border and camp activities, and this often led to erroneous reports of actual camp conditions, as well as false accounts concerning the health of the Guardsmen. The outgrowth of some of the newsmen’s efforts was a strong cry by Ohio residents to allow the soldiers to return home. Residents put pressure on their state and national representatives, who in turn attempted to pressure President Wilson and Secretary Baker to allow the Ohio Guardsmen to return to Ohio.

There were also serious social repercussions of the 1916 mobilization of the National Guard. Specifically, the mobilization of Ohio Guardsmen confirmed several important aspects of the long standing tradition of the citizen soldier concept. Throughout every state of the mobilization, from the initial call to arms on June 18, 1916 to the final demobilization, the close relationship between the National Guard and the small-town community was readily apparent. The initial influx to swell the Guard’s ranks, the
boisterous receptions and farewells rendered by the townspeople, the extensive coverage of "the boys on the border" by local newspapermen, the forwarding of gifts and letters to the soldiers in the field, and the large homecoming receptions testified to the close ties that bound the National Guard to the communities from which they came. In addition, the company level National Guard organizations served to legitimize the role of the nation's armed forces in the eyes of the local communities. These community ties were a hallmark of the Guard and remained so throughout the succeeding mobilization for the First World War.

In summation, the Ohio National Guard performed its primary military mission in an exemplary manner. The Ohio National Guard experienced severe problems during the mobilization phase of its federal service, but these obstacles were the result of actions taken by state and federal authorities. To the immense credit of the Ohio National Guard, the Guardsmen overcame these difficulties. On the border, they accomplished their primary combat mission of augmenting the regular Army in such an excellent manner that the War Department selected the Fourth Infantry Regiment as one of the first regiments that embarked for France in 1917. For this and for the entire border experience, the Ohio National Guard proved once again that it was ready and able to perform its military mission.
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