FREEDOM OF OPINION IN A ONE-PARTY STATE:
THE CASE OF TANGANYIKA

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been increased interest in the meaning and essential qualities of democracy as a form of government. Much of this interest has been created by the emergence of several independent nations in Africa which have one-party government, but claim to be democracies. The leaders of these nations have attempted to develop both a theory and a practice of government which will suit the needs of a developing country and still lay claim to the descriptive title of democracy. Most of these theories entail a re-definition of democracy and require a difference of practice which set them apart from more traditional Western views of democracy. This development has led to criticism of these re-definitions of democracy and to defenses of a more Western concept of the meaning of democracy.¹

Some of the more crucial differences in practice and theory concern the extent of freedom to be allowed for public opinion to criticize government policies, to organize in opposition to them, and to have ultimate control over the broad aspects of public policy. The African view tends to

place restrictions on these freedoms, especially the freedom to organize political parties, and tries to justify these restrictions in terms familiar to Western democratic theory. These restrictions, it would seem, tend to reduce the ability of those affected by government policies (or lack of government action) to influence or to maintain control over the broad directions of public policy.

These restrictions and differences in practice raise problems of classification for this type of political system, especially when the system manifests certain patterns of operation which are not characteristic of oligarchic (or non-democratic) one-party political systems, but which are more characteristic of Western democracies. Since the time of Aristotle's six-fold classification of political systems there have been many attempts to classify types of political systems and to formulate theories about the essential features of each one and about the differences and similarities of the various types. In recent years there has been a tendency to classify political systems as either one of two basic types - either as a democracy or as an oligarchy (dictatorship or authoritarian are sometimes substituted for oligarchy in this classification). Theories concerning the essential features of each basic type have been developed which attempt to explain their mode of operation and which offer a list of the crucial differentiating characteristics which can aid in classifying individual political systems or
features thereof in one of the two categories. Two characteristics of a democracy (from the viewpoint of several Western political theorists to be discussed more fully in the next chapter) are that it has a competitive-party political system and certain broad freedoms for opinion expression and opinion organization. Judging by these Western standards of democratic practice it is often assumed that these broad freedoms for opinion expression and organization are mutually interdependent with the competitive party system, the one supporting and giving effect to the other. If this set of characteristics and this assumption are correct or adequate in explanatory power, a one party political system is by definition not democratic. But if a one party system also exhibits several opinion freedom characteristics in spite of the assumption that it cannot, the problem of classification becomes more difficult and an empirical examination of the issues involved seems to be called for to resolve the problem.

One of the major questions to be explored, therefore, is whether this assumption is correct - whether or not opinion freedoms can exist and operate in a one-party state. To test this hypothetical assumption the second major question is posed concerning the problem of whether a particular one-party state exhibits any of the characteristics of opinion freedom. The answer to this question will serve to test the validity of the hypothesis as applied to this par-
ticular case and will aid in classifying the state under examination. In addition the results of the examination may be helpful in explaining certain characteristics of operation of the political system to be examined which will enable some tentative predictions to be made concerning future trends in its political development.

To establish whether or not freedom of opinion exists in a one party state several features of its political system and social structure must be examined to establish whether or not certain conditions exist which are deemed important for opinion freedom. If freedom of opinion does exist one would expect the following conditions, based on the criteria to be developed in the following chapter, to be true at least to some degree:

(1) There will be a variety of news communication media and news sources other than official ones;

(2) Press censorship will be minimal;

(3) Public discussion of official policies and other matters will be freely permitted;

(4) Various autonomous associational interest groups will be operative and able to express their views freely (Autonomy, for associational interest groups and for business enterprises, shall be defined throughout this paper as having freedom from governmental ownership and freedom from direct governmental influence over operations, policy formation, or activities);

(5) Access to governmental policy-making centers will be available for the articulation and representation of
public and group opinion;

(6) Government policy statements and actions will encourage and protect free opinion expression and organization;

(7) Government policy will be responsive to the demands of autonomous associational interest groups and to the more general shifts in public opinion.

To gather data which can demonstrate the extent to which these conditions are true I plan to examine various books, newspapers, and articles which deal with pertinent aspects of the social structure and organization of a one party state and which describe its politics and political development.

Through this examination of written materials various indices will be developed to give empirical support to some of the conclusions, and where specific data are lacking more general information will be used in an attempt to arrive at meaningfull generalizations.

There are several limitations to this study which must be mentioned. First of all, the scope of the study is limited to a consideration of those aspects of democratic theory and practice which seem to be most closely related to freedom of opinion. It is not a critique of any one theory of democracy but an examination of a western democratic viewpoint concerning the meaning of democracy. As a result it is hoped that too much violence is not done to
any individual theory as it is incorporated into a common viewpoint of democracy in the next chapter.

Those areas which are examined will not cover all the aspects of policy and practice which could bear on freedom of opinion but will be limited to those which can be explored primarily through the secondary materials available in this country. This necessarily will restrict some of the conclusions which can be made, but care will be taken to point this out during the course of the paper. It is hoped, nevertheless, that the preliminary conclusions to be made here would indicate the desirability of obtaining primary material for future investigations in this subject area.
CHAPTER I

DEMOCRACY AND OPINION FREEDOM

Throughout the world there are a wide variety of institutional and social arrangements by which the citizens of various states are governed. Several of these political systems have long been classified as democracies, and theories about their operation and essential qualities have been developed which attempt both to justify the classification and to provide a basis for theories of ideal types of democracy. These theories have been revised in certain respects over the years, but many of the essential features of these theories have remained the same and seem to have maintained their validity as over the course of years certain values have been preserved in states which have been classified as democratic. One of these values is the creation and maintenance of a system which holds governmental power responsible to those over whom it is exercised. One of the crucial elements in the maintenance of this responsibility is related to the freedom of public opinion which exists in a given state. Since certain theories developed in the Western world concerning freedom of opinion and its relation to democracy seem to have been validated by the experience of certain Western countries, it appears useful to incor-
porate several of them into a common viewpoint of the essential features of freedom of opinion that are required in a democracy. These essential features can be used as the criteria by which to evaluate the character of those freedoms under the government of a one-party state.

In general, Western theories of opinion and democracy are based upon the experience and practice of democracy in North America and certain countries of Western Europe, and the expounders of these theories tend to confirm either explicitly or implicitly that present day practices in these countries are either within the bounds of variation acceptable in a democratic political system or that these political systems are the closest approximations of the ideal democratic state. Freedom of opinion in these countries and in democratic theory entails freedom for a variety of activities related to the expression and organization of opinion for political purposes. These freedoms, to be discussed more fully in the following pages, are held to be essential to the democratic process and must be present and operative in a political system in order for it to be considered democratic by Western standards. These standards

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are considered to be applicable to all political systems which function within a modern and complex socio-economic environment, such as those in which the Western democratic systems operate, as well as to those which are taking part in the building of such a pattern of relationships. They are considered applicable because they are founded upon what are deemed to be characteristics of human behavior common to people everywhere, and they become especially important when political relationships are extended beyond those of the primary familial group. Although it may be more difficult for a country to enjoy freedom of opinion while it struggles to develop a national identity and to build a more complex economic and social structure, the requirements for opinion freedom remain the same if that country is to avoid having the opinions and the ends of the few imposed upon the many. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of these requirements as they are presented in some of the comments and observations of various writers in the field of Western democratic theory.

**Freedom of Opinion Expression**

The first feature of a democratic political system that is of paramount importance for effective freedom of opinion is that it allows the broadest possible freedoms for individuals under its jurisdiction to hold and to express their opinions or ideas. The free expression of political opinion by the people is a central feature of the
democratic state and of the democratic political process. Members of the public should be free to express their opinion on all policies and practices which affect them, whether of a public or private nature, and should be free to promote these opinions if they are deemed necessary for the good of a general or particular interest. As MacIver points out, "... the state should not seek to control opinion, no matter what the opinion may be." The democratic state should seek to remove restrictions from the expression of opinion and guarantee freedom from reprisal for such expression.

Since there are a multitude of interests which motivate men and a wide variety of experiences which shape the opinions and desires of people, there will of necessity be conflicts of opinion over many matters of national and local governmental policy. Differences of opinion and conflicts arising therefrom exist in all political systems, but only in a democracy are they given free play as a matter of right. Only a democracy "... makes conflict in ideas the very basis of the state." The conflict of ideas and opinions is not, however, simply an exercise in debate or a

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3R. M. MacIver, The Modern State (Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 150. (Italics in original.) He points out that there are two seeming exceptions: "The state is entitled to suppress an incitement which itself is an attempt to dethrone the rule of opinion," and it can control libel calculated to do injury, pp. 151-152.

safety valve to disperse public dissatisfaction. Rather the discussion of opposing views and the argumentation and rationalization of differing beliefs, in an atmosphere that is free of reprisal for so doing, is a method of arriving at a more accurate evaluation of existing situations and problems and a way of presenting disparate interests for the consideration of those in authority. Indeed, it is a method of discovering the truth of the matter.\(^5\)

To realize fully the free expression of opinion and the discussion of opposing points of view there must exist some system of communication other than that which is controlled by the government, and it must have the means to facilitate the communication of ideas on the widest possible basis. Expression of all points of view to a wide variety of people requires a "neutral system of communications" which is free from undue regulation or influence from any governmental or private agency.\(^6\) Such a system of autonomous communication helps to focus public attention upon abuses of power and failures in policy in both the private and public realm, and aids in bringing pressure to bear upon officials and groups responsible for such abuses and failures. Democratic freedom of opinion would, therefore, not only allow various interests to express their views in attempts to influence the decision-

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 155.

making process of government, but it would also allow independent opinion to be expressed which could help to regulate the various interest groups, whether public or private in nature.

**Freedom of Opinion Organization**

In addition to the freedom to hold and express varying opinions on the policies and practices of governmental and private power structures, a democratic political system will allow people who hold similar opinions to organize into groups in order to express their views more effectively and more broadly. The power and effectiveness of opinion expressed by individuals is not usually very great due to several difficulties such as those presented by lack of finances, shortage of time, inadequacies in personal capabilities, and difficulty of access to the decision-making structure. To overcome the disadvantages of independent action, people of like views find it practical and effective to band together into organized pressure groups (or associational interest groups) to press their claims before the responsible decision-makers and to propagandize in attempts to gain adherents to their point of view. A democracy encourages this process by recognizing that "... all groups, all interests, have the right to appeal and to propagandize."  

A variety of such interest groups freely organized for the advancement of their claims may indicate the existence of a democratic political system. These autonomous organizations, which are free from government control of their policies, can act as an independent check on government activities and can help bring important matters to the attention of the government, thereby helping to maintain the "boundary" between polity and society, and fulfilling a requirement of a democracy.

Godd boundary maintenance is attained by virtue of the regulatory role of associational interest groups in processing raw claims or interest articulations occurring elsewhere in the society and the political system, and directing them in an orderly way and in aggregable form through the party system, legislature, and bureaucracy.⁸

By presenting these claims to the government and by maintaining an operation and existence that is independent of direct governmental influence or control, these organized interest groups help to maintain the diversity of opinion that is required in a free and open democratic society, and they give these opinions the force and effect that they are unable to obtain when they are presented or advocated by unorganized individuals. The existence of an organization also helps to insure that certain interests will have a permanent representation and remain in active competition with other interests, and that the regulatory function of the independent observer and critic of public action and policy will not be-

⁸Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
come silenced.

The freedom of interest groups to advocate certain opinions and to present claims to the government is not enough, however, in a democratic political system. The democratic system must offer some chance for the various interest representations to produce the desired results. This point is made by Dahl in his examination of the democratic system of the United States when he says of the system that "with all its defects, it does nonetheless provide a high probability that any active and legitimate groups will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision." As one element of opinion freedom, therefore, a democracy will allow organized opinion to help shape the policy decisions it makes, as well as allow the freedom to discuss and criticize policies already made.

Although a democracy will provide a situation wherein popular opinion, usually organized, can influence its policies and actions, there is no easy way to measure the extent of such influence or to determine how much influence is present in a democratic as opposed to an oligarchic political system, or to know whether such influence generally can be termed as "effective." The variety of influence and the multitudinous methods whereby it can be exerted defy an easy

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9 Dahl, op. cit., p. 150.

gauging of its effectiveness either in one system or in comparison to another. What makes popular influence more obviously effective, however, is if it can change the composition of the government; if it can replace one set of decision-makers with another or effectively threaten the tenure (through legal means) of a representative or official if he acts contrary to the wishes of a majority of the public. The ability to threaten a change in the composition of the government, is, according to one view, "what gives popular influence its sanction,"\(^{11}\) and makes this influence, both organized and unorganized, more apparent and real. In a democracy this sanction is most readily applied through the electoral process and is institutionalized in a manner which allows popular influence to be felt in regular popular elections.

**Political Party Organization and Competition**

To give effect to the votes of the people, and to enable popular influence to gain its most obvious control of the government, requires special organization of interests for this purpose. This special organization is considered necessary because freedom to dissent from government policies and freedom to organize for the purpose of propagandizing against government policy is not enough in modern democratic political systems. To give real effect to popular criticisms

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 61.
and opinion a democracy must combine freedom of dissent "... with the right to join with others in efforts to seek redress by ousting the government through electoral means." 12 Popular influence must be allowed to organize itself in such a way that it can replace an unpopular government through peaceful means.

Such an organization would combine various interests and interest groups into a political instrument which, though trying to include a wide range of opinion, is capable of winning enough popular support to enable its general political views legally to prevail. The organization which usually fills this function in a modern democracy is the political party. 13 In Western democracies the political parties help to simplify the choices facing the electorate, give a continuing point of view on large issues, and help to soften the clash of interests by trying to incorporate many views under one organization. In so doing the political party helps to form an effective opposition to the prevailing government party and gives the voters an election alternative which is essential for democracy. 14 The opposition provided

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12V. O. Key, op. cit., p. 6. MacIver also points out that the right of the people to "make and unmake governments" through constitutional action is necessary in a democracy. The Ramparts We Guard, p. 33. See also MacIver, The Modern State, pp. 201-202; Spitz, The Liberal Idea of Freedom, pp. 12, 166-167.

13Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 40; MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard, p. 27.

in a political system by at least two political parties is
looked upon as a guarantee that government policies will not
go unchallenged and that the voting procedure at election
time is not a mere exercise to drum up popular support for
the party in power. Voting in an election and popular sup-
port can be faked, but the opposition provided by a party
system of two or more parties and the criticism they provide
through a free press and other means of communication cannot
be faked. The political party in opposition does not
merely criticize the government in hopes that its views
will be followed. Rather the opposition party hopes to form
its own government through electoral means, thereby giving
greater assurance that when the majority of the public sup-
ports the opposition party position this shift in opinion
will be registered in government policies. In this view,
therefore, a party system having two or more freely operat-
ing political parties is essential in a democracy. Only a
competitive party system of this kind allows popular opinion
to organize effectively. Anything less would be oligarchic.

A democratic political system must assure that opposi-
tion parties are given assurances of freedom for expression
of their views and be permitted to form peacefully a govern-

15 Mayo, op. cit., p. 147.


17 MacIver, op. cit., p. 197, and Leviathan and the
People, pp. 76-77; Mayo, op. cit., p. 149.
ment if elected. The opposition in a democracy is recognized as legitimate, is allowed to gain popular support for its cause, and is able to present itself as an alternative government which when freely elected will support policies that are in certain broad terms different from those of the incumbent government.\(^{18}\) The freedom to oppose the government in power and to run for office to replace it gives public influence and control its effectiveness in Western democracies. The discussion of alternative policies and issues which is allowed in a democracy, discussion carried on between citizens, among government officials, and through organized groups of all persuasions, must finally culminate in an effective vote for one of several broad views, as expressed by a political party, in order to complete the democratic process.\(^{19}\)

The votes of citizens in a democracy do not decide every issue to be decided. Rather they determine the broad directions of policy to be taken, as well as the people to implement them, and as a result the changes in public opinion in a democracy can be registered by changes of government policy and personnel.\(^{20}\) The policies of a democratic govern-

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\(^{19}\)Lindsay, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-276.

\(^{20}\)R. M. MacIver, *Leviathan and the People* (Louisiana:
ment, therefore, are not restricted to the mold of an autonomous point of view held by those in authority, but they are subject to the influence and changes of public opinion, and these changes are most obviously and effectively registered in periodic elections which are contested by competing political parties. Other forms of popular influence are free to operate on the decision making of elected officials and the bureaucracy, but the election of the principal decision-makers from lists of party candidates presenting meaningful alternatives to the voters makes these decision-makers responsible to the people and, therefore, most positively responsive to the broad shifts in public opinion. The Western democratic political systems, following these procedures and allowing these liberties, permits, in the views of these theorists, the opinions of the people to exercise their fullest freedoms and control as compared to any other type of political system yet developed in practice.

In theory, however, these same theorists point out that democratic freedom of opinion can perhaps be served by organizations other than political parties and by other procedures as long as certain principles are observed. It is pointed out, for example, that "the mechanism of democracy must always change if conditions change . . .," but that a democracy still will allow freedom for public discussion and opposition

and that also in a democracy "... the free tides of opinion will determine who shall govern, who shall be entrusted with power."\(^21\) Another point of view, however, would imply that the public and periodic determination of who shall govern may not be necessary in a democracy as long as certain other conditions are met. This view holds that as long as freedom of speech and organization prevail and the public can control those in power and make them and their policies responsible to the changes in public opinion, the democratic principles of public opinion freedom are secured.\(^22\) Political parties which could form alternative governments, if elected for that role, would not then be a necessity for popular opinion freely to exercise its control. More than one political party, however, has usually appeared in practice as democratic systems have developed in the past, and Sorauf points out that "the party is to a great extent an essential instrument, a necessary condition or ingredient of democracy as we know it."\(^23\) But in theory, under other conditions and other institutions, the necessity of a political party, or of several, may not be evident. What has developed in the past under one set of circumstances may not always be appropriate at another time and under other

\(^{21}\) MacIver, *Leviathan and the People*, pp. 69-70.


\(^{23}\) Sorauf, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.
circumstances. Even MacIver agrees that "no vital principle, such as democracy, can be tied to the body of its own past."\textsuperscript{24} Because the existence of political parties has been the rule in working democracies does not necessarily dictate their continued existence as conditions change. Public opinion may find other methods of exercising its freedom and control.

There is some agreement that democracy is a matter of degree and that all democracies are not equally "democratic."\textsuperscript{25} But even though actual democratic states do not reach the ideal of democracy in all respects, there is a dividing line for freedom of opinion between a democratic state and an oligarchic state. This line is drawn at the point where freedom of discussion and opinion organization is allowed and the decision-makers and their policies are subject to popular control. As pointed out before this line is hard to draws especially in a one party state. But at a minimum in a democracy individuals and organization leaders must be free to criticize and to carry on discussion, and they must be effective in controlling government policy to keep it in conformity with the broad changes in public views. As Lindsay points out, "the key to democracy is the

\textsuperscript{24}MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard, p. 19. Lindsay also points out the appropriateness of different "institutional expressions" of democracy in The Modern Democratic State, p. 259.

\textsuperscript{25}Mayo, op. cit., p. 60; MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard, p. 25.
potency of discussion."26 It must register itself in government policy. "For if democracy means anything," reminds Almond and Verba, "it means that in some way governmental elites must respond to the desires and demands of citizens."27 Most Western theorists feel that this potency or effectiveness is best achieved through a freely operating party system, or that this is the way it is maintained in present democracies. They do not deny, however, that other institutions may also work effectively to preserve opinion freedom and control, but there is skepticism about the democratic character of one-party states.28

The basic requirements for democratic freedom of opinion still remain, however, as spelled out in the previous pages. They are, (1) absolute freedom to hold any opinion, (2) maximum freedom for discussion and for criticism of all political questions, (3) freedom to organize opinion and to oppose government policy, (4) freedom of opinion to control the decision-makers in guiding official policy toward conformance with broad-gauge popular opinion. These basic requirements will be used as the theoretical guidelines for an examination and evaluation of African one-party democracy.

26Lindsay, op. cit., p. 281.


28Lipset, op. cit., pp. 45-46; Mayo, op. cit., p. 150.
CHAPTER II

TANGANYIKA: BACKGROUND OF A ONE-PARTY STATE

To test the question of opinion freedom in a one party state I have chosen to examine the political system of Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania), primarily as it operated during its period of independence from 1961 through 1964. This political system merged with the government of Zanzibar in mid-1964, but seems to have continued operating much as it did prior to this event. The political system of Tanganyika had been a de facto one party system prior to independence and became a de jure one party system a year after independence was obtained. Several features of this system, however, indicate that it may provide for several elements of opinion freedom. For these reasons the political system of Tanganyika would seem to fit the qualifications desired for the purposes of this study.

In order to gain a clearer perspective with which to view and to analyze the elements of public opinion freedom in Tanganyika, it will be necessary to fill in some of the details of the constitutional and legal framework of that country as well as to sketch briefly its socio-economic and ideological setting. This background information will be presented historically, for the most part, and we will defer
the analysis of the implications involved until later chapters.

**Historical Background**

The East African state of Tanganyika, which formed a union with Zanzibar in 1964 known as the United Republic of Tanzania, is slightly larger in area than France and the whole of Germany combined and, according to a 1962 estimate, has a population of over 9½ million, over 98 per cent of whom are of African decent.²⁹ Although not much is known about the pre-colonial social and political structure of the indigenous peoples of Tanganyika, it has been hypothesized that the many and diverse tribal elements of that country were contained in three major ethnic groupings: the Bantu (a linguistic grouping of many separate tribes), the northern Nilotic-Shushitic peoples, and a small group related to the South African Bushmen.³⁰ Within these broader groupings the patterns of political organization and loyalty were not constant or centralized. New political entities were formed as families moved about to different areas, and where families or clans grouped together in an area the pattern of authority often tended to remain familial rather than tribal. This pattern of political fragmentation has prevented the formation


of a large scale and monolithic tribal government organization in Tanganyika, and this fact has had important consequences for the development of the present governmental patterns of Tanganyika.

In the 1880's Germany, in a struggle for colonies with France and England, won control of the area which includes Tanganyika and maintained that control, with varying degrees of difficulty, until the end of World War I when Tanganyika became a League of Nations mandate under British administration. The British generally followed their pattern of colonial rule and established in 1920 a colonial administration with a Governor as the legislator and executor of local ordinances. In addition an Executive Council of appointed civil servants was set up to assist the Governor and an independent High Court was established. In 1925 the second British Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, introduced the system of indirect rule, which attempted to use African traditional authorities and institutions for local administration, and in 1926 an appointed Legislative Council was created to assist in forming territorial policies. Only Europeans were appointed to the Council until 1938 when three Asians became members.

This institutional framework remained in effect until after World War II, when several changes were made or attempted. In 1945 the first African members were appointed to an enlarged Legislative Council. Changes were also made
in local administration, after encouragement from the Colonial Office, to permit local councils to be elected as representative bodies and to relate them institutionally to the central government. In the 1920’s there had been some successful attempts to initiate cooperative arrangements in East Africa among the territories of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika which had resulted in a common postal service and customs union. Similar further attempts at interterritorial cooperation in 1948 brought opposition from African leaders who feared domination by the Kenyan European community. The development of this opposition was a factor which helped to spur the formation of Tanganyikan political parties.

The increased political participation by the Africans in the Central and local government, the political issues raised by interterritorial cooperation attempts, and the gaining of independence by former British colonies (such as India) led to increased political activity in the 1940’s and 1950’s by educated Africans and African organizations. This activity was further spurred and given sanction by the fact that Tanganyika became a Trust Territory and was therefore to be governed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which in Article 76 stipulates that one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system shall be

... to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence. ... 

The increased expression and organization of political
opinion was a cause for some concern among the colonial administrators because of the implications it had at times for public order, not to mention the problems it presented for continued colonial administration in the prevailing patterns. British Colonial Governors were authorized under the 1939 Emergency Powers Order in Council to use, if necessary, a series of emergency powers

... to make regulations for securing the public safety, the defense of the territory, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion, and riot, and for the maintenance of essential supplies and services.\(^{31}\)

To implement these emergency measures, the Governor had the power

... to provide for the detention and deportation of individuals, the requisitioning and control of property and the payment therefore, the fixing of fees for necessary licences, and for the trial of offences constituted by the regulations.\(^{32}\)

The Governor of Tanganyika made use of these powers only to help control disturbances in the Northern Province caused by the Kenya emergency during the 1950's. To help regulate domestic political activities other methods were used. In 1953 the government forbade its employees to join political parties, and in the Societies Ordinance of 1954 required all associations to register with the government and to submit to supervision of finances and activities.\(^{33}\)


\(^{32}\)Ibid. \(^{33}\)Bates, op. cit., pp. 422-423.
framework of these and other regulations the activities of the African political movements were somewhat curtailed, as will be discussed in a later chapter dealing with political parties.

With encouragement from the leading Tanganyikan political party and inspiration from Kenyan trade unionists, the size and importance of the trade union movement in Tanganyika developed until it also had political influence. To help keep this growing force under control the government in 1957 enacted legislation based largely on the United Kingdom pattern of union regulation. All trade unions were required to be registered, to follow lawful practices and to maintain a valid registration. In addition they were to refrain from contributing money to political parties.\(^\text{34}\)

Despite some attempts to slow or alter the course of development, the road toward independence, especially after 1958, was travelled without much difficulty or disorder. After the 1960 legislative elections "responsible government" was established in the Legislative Council, with the nationalist Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in control of 70 of the 71 seats. Internal self-government was achieved in May, 1961, and independence was granted on December 9, 1961.

Socio-Economic Situation

The social and economic problems faced by the newly in-

\(^{34}\)Cole & Denison, op. cit., pp. 197-198.
dependent country were many and formidable. Although parts of the social structure and economy were modernized, in terms of urbanization and cash marketing, traditional patterns of life continued to predominate. Only about 3 percent of the population lived in cities of 10,000 people or more, and much of the rural economy was still based upon subsistence level production. Although racial harmony had been a feature of Tanganyikan life for many years, most of the urban commercial businesses and light industry operations were owned and operated by non-Africans. Because of non-African control of much of the market economy, both urban and rural, a disparity of wealth and of living standards existed which was a cause of envy among many Africans.

Tanganyika has depended upon the export of agricultural products for most of its development capital and consumer goods. There has been some diversification of production and exports (primarily sisal, cotton, coffee, tea, and tobacco) but price fluctuations on the world market can have an adverse affect on export income. Some minerals are

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36 Per capita contributions of Asians and Europeans was about £400 while that of Africans was about £8. Bates, op. cit., p. 440. By 1963 per capita income was still about £20 compared with £25 for India and £375 for the United Kingdom. East Africa and Rhodesia XXXX (February 27, 1964), p. 519.

37 Sisal exports account for about one-third of the total principal exports of Tanganyika (about £15,000,000 annually) and constitute nearly one-half of the world's supply. The Statesman's Year Book 1964-65 (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 530.
also produced and exported, primarily diamonds and gold, but there is little mineral potential for building an extensive industrial or manufacturing establishment.

In the field of education there had been many advances made by 1961, but much remained to be done. The percentage of children in elementary school had risen to 53 per cent by 1960 and plans called for a substantial improvement in primary education in the 1961-64 period. Secondary education lagged far behind in enrollment, but made some increases by 1964, while teacher training schools and vocational education institutes started to develop the ability to train local citizens in needed skills. Still there remained a shortage of trained manpower to fill the many positions in the civil service, in various professional fields such as teaching and medicine, and in the business world.

Compared to other African countries Tanganyika has been one of the most underdeveloped, and despite attempts at broad-scale economic and social improvement, it still is in need of an extraordinary effort to overcome its difficulties. Despite this need for extensive and concentrated development and change, Tanganyika has maintained an image of moderation

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38 Bates, op. cit., p. 437.

39 There were about 15,500 students in secondary schools in 1961 (compared to about 500,000 in primary schools) and about 20,000 in 1964. Technical and vocational schools enrolled 300 full-time and 1,000 part-time students by 1964, and about 2,000 students were enrolled in teacher training centers in 1963. The Statesman's Year Book 1963-64, p. 550; 1964-65, p. 529.
and stability. According to one observer this image will continue if the present leader of the ruling party, Julius Nyerere, continues to lead as he has in past, and if the country can produce a new generation of leaders sharing his ideals.\(^{40}\)

**Political Theory and Ideology**

The efforts which have been made toward improving conditions in Tanganyika, as well as the recent developments in the political system, have been largely directed and inspired by the country's leading political figure, Julius Nyerere, and a brief examination of his background and ideas will help in understanding the quality of Tanganyikan politics and social development efforts. Nyerere was born in 1921, the son of Chief Burito Nyerere of a small Northern Province tribe. He attended Roman Catholic mission schools, Tabora Government school, and earned a teacher's diploma from the University College of East Africa in Uganda. In 1949 he became the first Tanganyikan to attend and to earn an Arts degree at a British University (Edinburgh).\(^{41}\) He returned to Tanganyika in 1952 and became a teacher in a Roman Catholic school not far from Dar as Salaam. In a short time he became involved in the African political movement and in

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1954 became (and remains) the President of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the political party which led the country towards political independence and which today is the only legal political party in Tanganyika. Both before and after independence Nyerere worked closely with African leaders of both the modern and traditional sector of the society as well as with various leaders from the Asian and European communities, but he remained the principal theoritician for the party and the government.

One of Nyerere's most important statements of political theory appeared in a Dar es Salaam journal a short time before independence was achieved.\(^{42}\) In this article he maintains that the African concept of democracy is similar to the ancient Greek idea of democracy which called for government by discussion among equals. The people talked until agreement was reached. There was no need to have an organized opposition group to make the system democratic. The same is true, he feels, of a large and complex state where elected representatives are needed to conduct the business of the state. An organized opposition is not necessary because

basically, democracy is government by discussion as opposed to government by force, and by discussion between the people or their chosen representatives as opposed to a hereditary clique.

The Anglo-Saxon tradition of a two-party system, Nyerere

\(^{42}\) The following statements and quotations are taken from this journal article which appeared in Spearhead (Dar es Salaam, November, 1961), and reprinted as "One-Party Rule" in Atlas, III (March, 1962), pp. 185-187.
continues, was based on the class division between the "haves" and the "have-nots." In new nations such as Tanganyika, however, there is no ready made division such as this once independence is achieved. Rather there is a need for unity in the common struggle to establish a national identity, to overcome the political intrigues of foreign countries which desire to exert economic or political influence over the new nation, and to build the country's economy and living standards. The new country is in a time of emergency and cannot afford to be sabotaged by irresponsible and self-seeking opposition. The government, once freely elected, must be free to lead the fight against poverty, discrimination, indignity, disruption, and other enemies of full and meaningful freedom of the individual.

Where, then, you have the freedom and well-being of the individual, who has the right freely and regularly to join with his fellows in choosing the government of his country, and where the affairs of the country are conducted by free discussion, you have democracy. (Italics in original)

A final important element of true democracy, Nyerere concludes, is its dependence or the attitude of mind which respects and defends the individual. This is more important than the form that democracy takes. This attitude is as important for opposition groups as it is for individuals. But such opposition groups, he feels, are not easily found in a new nation.

Too often the only voices to be heard in "opposition" are those of a few irresponsible individuals who exploit the very privileges of
democracy—freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom to criticize—in order to deflect the government from its responsibilities to the people by creating problems of law and order.

Opposition forces in new nations often display their irresponsibility by failing to have a definite alternative policy in which they believe and with which they hope to win enough popular support to be elected to power by peaceful and responsible means. Such opposition cannot be treated with as much tolerance as might be safely allowed in a long-established democracy.

This does not mean, however, that a genuine and responsible opposition cannot arise in time, nor that such an opposition would be less welcome in Africa than it is in Europe or America. For myself, as I have said, I would be the first to defend its rights.

Nyerere concludes, therefore, that

There is nothing in our traditional attitude to discussion, and current dedication to human rights, to justify the claim that democracy is in danger in Africa. I see exactly the opposite: the principles of our nationalist struggles for human dignity, augmented by our traditional attitude to discussion, should augur well for democracy in Africa.

In other statements Nyerere has expressed his belief that the people can express their opinions and control the direction of policies through the structure of the single party. In an interview some time after independence he pointed out that in Tanganyika every citizen was eligible for TANU membership and was free to express his opinions within the party and to help elect party officials. The
party, therefore, was to control the government since the people's will was expressed through TANU.⁴³ These relationships between the people, the party, and the government were not to be rigidly formalized according to some dogma, but were to be worked out pragmatically as more experience was gained.

This same undoctrinaire approach seems to be evident in the attempts that Nyerere has made to develop a guiding ideology for the nation in its development struggles. The ideology that has been put forward is termed African socialism (Ujamaa). It envisages a mixed economy involving cooperation between public and private enterprise, with much of the initiative in new projects to come from the government, and it urges the people to work together as equals in the spirit of traditional African cooperative efforts.⁴⁴ It does not envisage any type of inevitable struggle or development, but it does recognize that much hard work will be needed to overcome the many difficulties which face Tanganyika.

Nyerere gained much respect among Tanganyikans as the leader of the independence movement, and he has enjoyed much prestige and popularity as the country's political leader. He has not capitalized on this popularity, however, to build


an image of himself as the True Leader of the people. On the contrary, he has spoken out against attempts made by others to surround his person and office with pompous display, and he has condemned the pretensions of grandeur among lesser political leaders. He wants to maintain an image of democracy (discussion among equals) by avoiding any obvious differentiation between the government elite and the general public.

As Tanganyika became self-governing and finally independent, the theories, ideals, and moderation of Julius Nyerere played a very large role in shaping the quality and direction of its development toward modern nationhood.

**Independence: The First Year**

The Independence Constitution of 1961 remained in effect for only one year. Some of its provisions were retained in the 1962 constitution and others were revised or eliminated. The 1961 constitution provided for the continuation of the parliamentary pattern of government as a member of the British Commonwealth, owing allegiance to the Queen. The leader of the majority party in Parliament was appointed Prime Minister by a Governor-General who acted in this capacity on behalf of the Queen. Other ministers were appointed on the advice

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45 *Kenya Weekly News*, July 12, 1963, p. 13; Cliffe, op. cit., p. 140. The *Daily Telegraph* of November 6, 1963 reported that Nyerere vetoed a proposal by the Dar es Salaam City Council to replace a war memorial by a statue of him.
of the Prime Minister and collectively they were responsible to Parliament. Ordinary legislation was to be passed by majority vote, and constitutional amendments required a two-thirds vote. This system was designed to be operated with at least two major political parties, but the fact that one party controlled 70 of the 71 elected seats (with 10 additional members to be nominated on the advice of the Prime Minister) made this feature inoperative. The 1961 constitution did not define "human rights" or "fundamental freedoms" but it did begin with the following preamble:

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace;

And whereas the said rights include the right of the individual, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property, the protection of the law, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, and respect for his private and family life;

And Whereas the said rights are best maintained and protected in a democratic society where the government is responsible to a freely-elected Parliament representative of the people and where the courts of law are independent and impartial;

This Constitution makes provision for the government of Tanganyika as such a democratic society. 46

How well the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association were protected is a question that is complicated by the fact that the ordinances from the colonial period which pro-

46 Cole and Denison, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
vide for collective punishment, detention and deportation of individuals, and the control and registration of associations remained in effect after independence was granted. The Order in Council which established the 1961 constitution provided that the emergency powers available to the Colonial Governor—related primarily to arbitrary detention and deportation—"... should cease to have effect in Tanganyika on June 9, 1963, or on such earlier date as the Parliament of Tanganyika might prescribe.\textsuperscript{47} The effect of this provision, however, was abrogated by Section 28 of the Republic of Tanganyika (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act which established the 1962 constitution and which specifies that the emergency powers
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\ldots \text{are to continue to have effect as part of the law of Tanganyika and are to be read and construed with such modifications and adaptations as are necessary to bring them into conformity with the Republican Constitution, or as are specifically provided for by that Act.}\textsuperscript{48}
\]
These emergency powers, therefore, were always in effect in independent Tanganyika and were legally available for use by the governing officials.

During the first year of independence several other measures became law which have a potential or actual effect on freedom of opinion, expression and organization. A Public Order Ordinance prohibits parties or associations from training or organizing along police or military lines

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp. 80-81. \textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
and bans the wearing of political uniforms or distinctive
dress at public meetings or in public places. In addition
the Police Force Ordinance was amended to transfer the func-
tion of issuing permits for public processions and public
meetings from the police to the Area Commissioner, a politi-
cally appointed official.\textsuperscript{49} The Commissioner must be satis-
ified that public order will be maintained, that the event
is for a lawful purpose, and that the proposed assembly or
procession has not been publicized before the grant of the
permit.

In regard to the trade unions and the problems of strikes
and lockouts, the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act was passed
forbidding strikes or lockouts so long as the Minister of
Labour decides to continue to use a long series of concilia-
tion measures. An additional ordinance, the Trade Unions
Ordinance (Amendment) Act, reduced the varieties of legal
union action in trade disputes, required all unions of em-
ployees to become members of a federation to be named by the
Minister of Labour if the unions were to retain their legal
status, and placed the Minister in a position to veto member-
ship admission to or expulsion from the federation.\textsuperscript{50} In
justification of this action Julius Nyerere held that the
whole population had worked for independence and that no one
group has a right to disrupt the struggle for the progress

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., pp. 257-259.
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., pp. 199-201.
of all or to gain wage increases at the expense of the rural unorganized population.51 The unions were to cooperate with the administration in building the country and, in return for some of their freedom of action, could participate in some aspects of industrial management. In theory Nyerere believes that in a country such as Tanganyika, which has no real capitalist class which the trade unions should oppose, there should be close cooperation between the unions and the government. Both must work together even if it means political control of the unions because they are both working towards the common objective of improving the country.52

A final measure passed in the first year of independence of importance for opinion freedom was the Preventive Detention Act, 1962. This act permitted the Minister for Home Affairs (under the 1962 Constitution the President of the Republic) to detain indefinitely any person who might be classified as a danger to peace, good order, defense, or security either because of actual conduct or because of the potential of such conduct occurring in the future.53 Detention is not subject to court review or to ordinary rules of


custody. The detainee, however, must be informed of the charge against him within 15 days and an advisory committee is set up to review as needed special cases referred to it and to review all detention cases on an annual basis. Nyerere explained that these more explicit and far reaching detention powers were needed because of the threats of undemocratic elements which might wish to remove TANU from power through means other than peaceful appeals to the electorate.\textsuperscript{54} The party, it was claimed, had such widespread support that there was no hope for minority factions trying to achieve power by peaceful means. Therefore the temptation existed of appealing to various group animosities in hopes of disrupting the State as a means of destroying TANU. Since Tanganyika was still struggling for national unity and advancement it really was in an emergency situation and could not allow such factionalism to become widespread. For these and other reasons, according to the Director of Tanganyika's Information Services, preventive detention was needed, although the dangers of this type of legislation were well recognized.\textsuperscript{55}

**The Republican Constitution**

Early in 1962 the Prime Minister announced that the government had been requested by the TANU national executive to initiate steps toward making Tanganyika a republic within

\textsuperscript{54} Segal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 134.

the Commonwealth as soon as possible. On May 31 a government white paper announced measures to make Tanganyika a republic on December 9, and it indicated that a presidential election would be held in mid-October.

The Republican Constitution established a presidential system which provided for the election of a president by universal suffrage to replace the positions of Prime Minister and Governor-General, but which retained the unicameral legislative system. The powers of the Chief Executive in relation to those of Parliament (National Assembly) were increased, giving him veto powers, the power to dissolve Parliament, and the power to enact emergency legislation. In addition the President has the sole right to use the powers under the preventive detention and deportation ordinances, and is not bound to accept the advice of any other official on policy or administrative matters.

The President appoints his own Cabinet from members of the Assembly, but they are responsible only to him. Despite these broad powers the President is limited in several respects. Under ordinary conditions the Parliament must pass on legislation by majority vote, and if the President does dissolve Parliament for some reason he must also stand for re-election at the same time. Parliament can override a Presidential veto with a two-thirds vote and if the President

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does not accept the measure thus passed he must order dissolution and stand for re-election.

Although the executive branch was strengthened under the 1962 Constitution it did not give one man or one group of men absolute power. According to the view of one informed observer the Constitution as a whole provides the executive authorities with sufficient flexibility and power to direct the affairs of the country, but it also

\[\ldots\] unavoidably confers the same power on the other authorities in the State, and it will be from the interplay between all these authorities that those practices and conventions that tend to act as a check on or balance between powers will grow. Thus, in theory, the flexibility of this Constitution will provide sufficient power for Government and sufficient control over that power.\[57\]

How this constitution works in practice has depended in large measure on the operation of the ruling TANU party. This question will be examined in part in the following chapters, especially in the chapter dealing with political parties where it will be shown that TANU also has an important element of interplay between powers.

At the January 1963 meeting of the National Executive Committee of TANU the decision was reached that constitutional changes should be made to make Tanganyika a de jure one-party state. When these changes are effected the Members of Parliament would no longer be bound by party discipline

but could criticize and oppose the Government's policies "... according to their own consciences as individuals." This would be a legal attempt to have and to perpetuate democracy within the single party. In addition to these changes, the distinction between politicians and civil servants was abolished and party membership was opened to all citizens, so that TANU would be identified with the people as a whole and competition at election time could be on an intraparty basis between members of the party as individuals. In this manner disputes could be settled within the party and, it was hoped, dangerous factionalism would be avoided.

On January 29, 1964 President Nyerere appointed a commission to consider what changes were necessary in the constitutions of Tanganyika and of TANU and in the practices of government to bring into effect a democratic one-party state. Certain principles are to be followed in making the recommendations for these changes, such as those of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, political equality and freedom, responsibility of the government to the people, and freedom to choose representatives for legislative bodies. Additional guidelines are to be obtained by asking the public to submit their opinions on some of the questions involved, particularly on the status of the National Executive of TANU

60 J.P.W.B. McAuslan, *op. cit.*., p. 569.
in relation to the National Assembly of Tanganyika. The *Tanganyika Standard* of April 11, 1964 also reported that representatives have been sent to other one-party states such as Yugoslavia and Guinea to see if it might be possible to incorporate parts of their constitutions into the proposed revisions of the Tanganyika constitution.  

President Nyerere, who has made many statements in support of democratic opposition and democratic freedoms, felt that since the electorate did not support an effective and responsible opposition, other means would have to be provided to encourage more discussion of policies. He hopes that the electoral competition within TANU itself will provide this responsible opposition and lead to a more thorough consideration of government policy. Whether electoral competition will provide more discussion than already exists in the government and in the society is, of course, a question that will have to be examined when the *de jure* one-party system is put into effect.

In February of 1964, shortly after the unsuccessful mutiny of the army in which several dozen trade union leaders were arrested and accused of trying to exploit the disturbance for their own ends, it was announced that the existing national federation of trade unions (Tanganyika Federation of Labour) would be abolished. By the end of the month a new


\[62\] Segal, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
federation was created as part of the Ministry of Labour. The Labour Minister was appointed General Secretary of the new federation (the National Union of Tanganyika Workers). The reorganization not only centralized authority over the 11 affiliated unions, but also established government control over the funds of the new federation.\textsuperscript{63} This move towards greater control of the trade unions is a continuation of the past government actions in this field, and seems to be part of a larger trend in developing countries. As one observer has said:

The trend toward centralization is seen even in such presumably moderate political systems as those of Tanganyika and Senegal. Both of these states have moved in the direction of greater labor controls because it is now accepted gospel that free trade unionism may endanger economic planning and political stability.\textsuperscript{64}

As this brief history and selective exploration of the Tanganyikan legal structure indicates, the political system of Tanganyika has never operated on the basis of an effective two party system, either before or after independence. Also it is clear that during the 1961-1964 period of self rule or independence the central government had at its disposal a variety of legal measures which it could use to curb the freedom of opinion expression and organization if it chose


\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Bruce H. Millen, The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries} (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 103.
to do so. Given these conditions the question arises whether or not any freedom for opinion existed at all in Tanganyika, and if it did of what forms it took and how active or influential it was. Subsequent chapters will attempt to answer these questions.
CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATIONS FREEDOM

The importance of freedom for the expression of opinions and for the open examination of public issues and policies has been discussed in a previous chapter. There it was pointed out that individuals and group spokesmen who so desire should be able to express their opinions, within certain limits, on all public issues without fear of systematic or arbitrary reprisal for so doing, and should have access to various autonomous channels of communication in order to gain a wider and more effective expression of their views. As an index of whether such freedom exists in Tanganyika an examination will be made of its press and radio broadcasting industries in an attempt to determine the extent of their autonomy and the degree of their freedom to express views critical of the government and policies. This examination will rely to a large extent on secondary sources of information and indirect evidence, and the conclusions to be drawn concerning degree and extent will necessarily be tentative. It is hoped, however, that the evaluations made will prove useful for the intended purpose.

65 Autonomy, as indicated before, is defined as being free from governmental ownership and free from direct governmental influence over operations, policy formation or activities.
Background

It might be pointed out, as a factor affecting the communication of ideas, that the illiteracy rate of Tanganyika is estimated to be about 90-95 per cent and that the African population is composed of more than 120 tribes which are often clustered in villages scattered about the country. There are often great distances between these villages, and between the villages and the cities, but steps are being taken to improve the inadequate transportation and communications network which connects them. There are, however, some fairly large concentrations of people in Tanganyika, which has nine cities of more than 12,000 population, including Dar es Salaam with a population of more than 128,000. There is also a prevailing and widespread use of Swahili as a lingua franca to help bridge some of the otherwise difficult communications barriers between tribes and races. Illiteracy and communication barriers may well make the effectiveness of free discussion and the operation of democracy more difficult, but as one communications expert has observed, if one asks "... whether communication development per se contributes to wider and more democratic control of national

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66 UNESCO, World Communications: Press, Radio, Television, Film (New York, 1964), p. 123. This figure was based on a 1950 estimate even though the book was published in 1964, indicating the difficulty of obtaining reliable up-to-date figures on this subject.

government—we must say, as before, not necessarily."  

There are other factors involved, not the least of which is government policy and actions regarding free communication, one of the central problems to be dealt with in this paper. The mass communications network of press and radio may not effectively reach every citizen of the country (as it does not even in developed countries), but the relative freedom of operation of the mass communication system that does exist and operate will still be a useful indicator of the presence or absence of some degree of expression freedom in Tanganyika.

Before examining press freedom in Tanganyika it might be useful to make several general observations concerning freedom of the press in the emerging nations of Africa. In a letter to the editor of the Kenya Weekly News by a member of the International Press Institute of Zurich, it was pointed out that "freedom of the press cannot mean the same thing in Africa as it does in England or America."  

In these developing nations, he continues, the press should be a "trusted partner in nation building" and cooperate with the plans for solving the problems which face the country. A captive press will be of little value because in time no one will trust it

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and fewer and fewer people will read it. He feels that for
the press to cooperate well it must be a "mature press" and
should feel independent in its operations even though some
restraint in its statements must be exercised. He concludes
that freedom cannot be imposed by some logical system but
that a free press will survive in Africa only if

... politicians and newspapermen can work out
a relationship which is of real help to the
politicians in their difficult task, and at the
same time gives newspapermen the basic freedoms
without which they cannot function.70

These comments suggest that on the one hand the press in
Africa should not be expected to publish any and all criti-
cisms of a government and its policies, yet on the other
hand there should be an airing of differences of opinion in
an independent press that is responsible to the larger com-
munity. Whether the press in Tanganyika achieves this goal
or a higher one remains to be considered in the following
pages.

The Press in Tanganyika

The newspaper and periodical publishing industry of
Tanganyika has shown increasing diversity and a rise in cir-
culation during the past decade. Publishing activity in-
creased as the independence movement advanced, with the de-
velopment of a non-governmental Swahili press and the pub-
lication of nationalist party newspapers. Table I shows that
the major papers of the independent press have continued to

70 Ibid.
# Table I

**The Press in Tanganyika**

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b. Appears to have become an independent paper in 1962.

c. Ceased publication in December.
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d. Has same editor as MWAFRIKA.
e. MWANANCHI publishing co. is partly government financed.
operate since independence and gives some indication that their circulation has also increased. Two of the colonial government papers ceased publication after 1960, as was to be expected, and the ruling party paper continued to publish its papers, adding a new one in 1964 and ceasing to publish another. In addition to these publications there are at the present time a variety of local papers and periodicals published by both local government agencies and missionary groups in a variety of African and Indian languages, and several newspapers published in neighboring East African countries and in South Africa also are circulated freely in Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{71}

These publications cover a wide range of subject matter, some of them directed towards special minority groups or interests and some designed to cover a particular locality and its problems. There is not, however, a critical "opposition" press in existence primarily, it would seem, because of the absence of a strong opposition political party since there are no restrictive press laws in Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{72} It might be argued that there is no opposition party because there is no opposition press. But it might equally be argued that most of the various politically involved interests in

\textsuperscript{71}UNESCO, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 124.

Tanganyika have been aware that their success and hopes for future prosperity have depended in large part upon the absence of debilitating factional strife and upon the success of the unity and development program of the ruling TANU party.

To be sure, the government of Tanganyika has not hesitated to issue public warnings to the press if it felt that certain published statements were "untrue" or were critical but "unconstructive." On the other hand certain elements of the press refuse to be bullied into abject subservience in spite of the warnings and covert pressures of the government.

Shortly before full independence was achieved in December, 1961 the Minister of Home Affairs announced that in the future if the press criticized the government it would be suppressed. This statement appears not to have impressed certain elements of the press as debate and criticism of government policies developed around two incidents of January 1962. One incident was concerned with the debate and pressures leading to the temporary resignation of party leader Nyerere from the Prime Minister's post. Part of the problem was the lack of speed with which the government policy was geared to the replacement of Europeans and Asians with Africans in government and civil service positions (Africanization). Elements of the African press were harshly critical

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of these policies in direct contrast to the official government attitude of racial cooperation and harmony.\textsuperscript{74} A second incident concerned the summary deportation of several Europeans in connection with the Africanization disputes. One correspondent in Tanganyika observed that because of this government action

public argument is raging so fiercely in the correspondence columns of the local Press, on both sides, and so provocative are some of the letters, again on both points of view, that the Government may well issue a further statement before this appears in print.\textsuperscript{75}

What this statement was expected to be is not known, but it might have been a further warning or it could have been a further explanation of government action. In any event published items in the press were quite critical of government action in spite of previous warnings against such criticism.

Late that year further warnings were given to the press as a result of some published statements that were regarded as untrue or distorted, from the government's point of view. The Prime Minister had

\ldots warned newspapers that freedom of the press did not mean freedom to publish things that damaged the country. He wanted newspapers to operate freely, but would not tolerate them saying what was untrue. . . .\textsuperscript{76}

In order to help rectify this situation the government insti-

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{East Africa and Rhodesia}, XXXVIII (December 21, 1961), p. 400; XXXVIII (February 1, 1962), p. 532.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Kenya Weekly News}, January 16, 1962, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{76}\textit{The Times} (London), May 19, 1962, p. 7.
tuted weekly press conferences in order to establish a closer relationship with the press and to help make the official policies clear. The press conferences seemed to involve a good bit of give and take, with one observer describing them as "... a general free-for-all at which journalists toss in assorted questions seeking amplification of Government statements made during the week."77 It is not clear how long these press conferences were continued on a regular weekly basis, but press conferences with public officials have been and continue to be a feature of the government's relationship with the press. The fact that these conferences are held and were instituted on a regular basis, at least for a time, and the nature of the conferences does seem to indicate that the press was not completely subservient to the government. If it were subservient the government would not worry about holding press conferences to make its positions clear, but would expect its policy statements to be accepted without question, perhaps as delivered through an official news agency. The fact that press conferences were held to explain official positions could also indicate that the government used them as a means to gain a sympathetic press, something it would not have to worry about if the press were tightly controlled.

An interesting incident occurred in mid-1963 which seems to indicate that the press in independent Tanganyika

77Kenya Weekly News, June 1, 1962, p. 18.
is freer to draw and to publish its own conclusions on politically sensitive issues than was the press under the former British colonial regime. The incident centered on the arrest and subsequent acquittal of Chief Abdullah Fundikira on charges of five counts of corrupt transactions (involving £2,500) as an agent while Chairman of the National Agricultural Produce Board. Fundikira had served in several Cabinet posts, had been one of the first chiefs to endorse TANU, and was considered an elder statesman in the party. He believed, however, in a gradualist approach to politics and opposed the TANU plan for legal one-party rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that at least one newspaper published articles which implied that perhaps there were political reasons for charges being pressed against him. On the other hand another paper implied in its columns before the verdict was given that the charges were proper and that he was guilty. Referring to these two newspaper accounts one journalist remarked that

in the days before Independence both reports would have been closely examined by the Attorney General's department, and if action had not been brought for contempt certainly the publications concerned would have been reprimanded, and ordered to apologize.79

Failure to bring charges or to issue reprimands may indicate that the judicial process is surrounded with fewer safeguards.

from press comment than was usual under the somewhat strict
British rules on this matter. It does indicate that the
press has some autonomy in its expressions of opinion on a
politically sensitive subject since the government chose not
to exercise its authority to cite for contempt or to warn
the press even though there were precedents for doing so.

The problem of drawing a line between responsible journa-
listism and published criticism which threatens national se-
curity is a continuing problem for all nations where the
press has some autonomy, and is especially difficult for a
young struggling nation. That the guidelines are not too
clear, even where official policy statements and many actions
support a free press, was made clear in a statement by the
Parliamentary Secretary to the Vice President of Tanganyika
at a meeting in London of Information Ministers from Britain,
Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika. He

... said that the fundamental principles of
Press freedom, which that republic upheld,
ought not to be regarded as licence to distort
and cause disunity by unconstructive criticism
of a Government which was preoccupied in
fighting poverty, ignorance, and disease.80

Exactly what distortion or unconstructive criticism is or
entails is certainly not self-explanatory, but must be de-
termined over a period of time as publication of critical
comments continues and government warnings and actions re-
spond to certain of these criticisms. It should not be

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80 East Africa and Rhodesia, XXXVIII (August 1, 1963),
p. 1039.
surprising, therefore, if government warnings are given out from time to time as issues of various kinds are brought to public attention.

An action that appears to have been intended to indicate the limits of government tolerance for criticism occurred in mid-1963. Miss Frene Ginwale, the editor of the Pan-African monthly Spearhead and a correspondent of The Guardian, wrote an editorial in the February issue of the monthly critical of Nyerere's speech concerning the TANU-approved resolution calling for a de jure one-party state. She wondered whether Nyerere appreciated the difficulties involved and questioned whether freedom of discussion would really be preserved, whether the atmosphere and channels for discussion and self-criticism would remain, and whether intra-party election contests would work if TANU had no clear-cut ideology which would permit the opposing candidates to carry on meaningful discussion about methods of implementation.81 The reaction of Nyerere and TANU to these editorial comments is not known. But this editorial appears to have been a contributing factor to an order issued by the government some four months later calling for Miss Ginwale to leave the country within twenty-four hours.82

The limits of press freedom do not seem to have been

81Spearhead, February, 1963, as reported in Africa Digest, X (June, 1963), pp. 191-192.

82International Press Institute Report, XII (July, 1963), No. 3.
unduly constricted by this action, even when the subject was that of one party rule. Although the official policy to establish a de jure one-party state was set by the TANU National Executive early in 1963 and remained only to be implemented through commission studies and surveys of various methods of implementation, the original decision remained a subject of continuing public controversy, despite the action taken against Miss Ginwale. The government had asked for public reactions on methods of implementation of the decision but had said nothing to encourage public discussions concerning the desirability of a legal one-party system. Yet the debate on its desirability did continue into 1964 in the correspondence columns of Tanganyikan newspapers, and the government made no attempt at direct interference with this free expression of opinion.  

This is in sharp contrast to the possibilities for free expression in a one party state such as the Soviet Union. In that country citizens are often encouraged to write letters to the editor criticizing such things as the actions of certain local officials or the problem of production. The letters, however, never touch on matters of domestic or foreign political controversy or on basic policies and actions of the regime.  

party state in Tanganyika was certainly a major policy decision, and the fact that it was openly criticized in the correspondence columns would seem to indicate that individual citizens as well as the editorial staff of the papers themselves are allowed some degree of freedom to express opinions, even on an official policy that had been established long before and in a situation in which the government could easily have interpreted such expression of opinion, as it seems to have done in the case of Miss Ginwale, as "unconstructive" or dangerous to the peace, unity, or progress of the country.

That the limits for press freedom have not been unduly narrowed in Tanganyika in the more recent period since independence is shown by another incident of late 1963. As an outgrowth of the pressures for Africanization and as a response to a perceived slight upon Africans the European Dar es Salaam Club was expropriated by the government. The European Tanganyika Standard sharply criticized this action, causing the influential TANU supporting Mineworkers Union to urge that "... the Tanganyika Standard be similarly expropriated."85 This extreme action was, of course, not carried out. But the response indicates that in its criticism of this action the Standard was not overly fearful of offending the policy position of an important element of the political power structure and was not afraid to condemn a completed government action.

85East Africa and Rhodesia XXXX (December 26, 1963), p. 368.
The foregoing examples of press activity are all related to domestic policies and problems. But there also seems to be some freedom of opinion expression in the area of foreign policy as well. As recently as October, 1964, the two daily newspapers had been carrying articles which expressed strong opinions contrary to the longstanding government position. They were both hostile toward neighboring Malawi in general and critical of its leader, Dr. Banda, in particular. Nyerere was moved to say

... that his government would not countenance any political or other campaign against Malawi from United Republic territory,

and that in spite of what the local press said "... it would nevertheless remain the policy of his government to avoid scrupulously any interference in the internal affairs of Malawi." 86 Since Nyerere made his statement the press attacks have abated somewhat, but again it is clear that the press enjoys some autonomy in its editorial policy.

Another area of relative autonomy is in the access to foreign news. The three East African governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika have government news agencies, as do most other governments. The operation of these agencies can have an effect on information freedom, depending on government policy. In Kenya the Union of Journalists complained that the government news agency was censoring Reuter and TASS

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news releases before passing them on to the press. In Tanganyika and Uganda, however, there is an agreement with the subscribing newspapers that provides for simultaneous reception by the papers of incoming news releases, thereby reducing the opportunities for direct censorship of this source of news.87

A further indication of the autonomy of the press in Tanganyika can be gained by a brief examination of the development of the TANU party press. In 1957, as TANU was gathering momentum as a national movement, it felt the need to start its own publications to compete with the European controlled press for both the modern and traditional sectors of population. The party published Mwafrika, a weekly Swahili newspaper offering news as well as comment upon the political developments of pre and post Independence Tanganyika.88 It is not clear whether TANU continued to control Mwafrika after independence when it switched from weekly to daily publication. Two factors indicate that it did not. The first was that by September of 1962 the government was indicating its desire for a Swahili newspaper that would present the government position. One observer ex-


plained the government's proposal by saying that "at present neither of the two expatriate-controlled major Press groups publishing in Tanganyika can be described as entirely 'pro-Government,' and both are pledged to a free and independent Press in Tanganyika." The government (controlled by TANU) would not have expressed this desire for its own Swahili newspaper, it would seem, if it still was in control of Mwafrika. The second factor indicating the cessation of TANU control of Mwafrika was the fact that the paper ceased publication late in 1964 because of financial difficulties, hardly an appropriate excuse if the paper was controlled by TANU, a well financed party that had expressed a desire for control of a Swahili newspaper such as Mwafrika to present its views. In regard to the financial difficulties of Mwafrika, I have found no reports that government action was a factor in these difficulties or that government influence was involved in the decision to cease publication.

As the above remarks point out the TANU controlled government was very much interested in presenting its views in a more favorable light to a wider segment of the public and hoped to do this by publishing or controlling its own newspaper. The government had expressed concern for some time that explanations for its policies and actions were not getting through to the people adequately. Apparently


it did not feel that the solution to the problem could be found by working with or through the existing press by such means as additional press conferences or news releases. Although the plan to establish a Swahili newspaper was not yet put into effect by the end of 1964, the government did successfully launch an English language daily, the _Nationalist_, to express its views and news to that sector of the population in competition with the only other English daily, the established and European controlled _Tanganyika Standard_ (founded in 1929).

The fact that the Tanganyika government felt it necessary to publish its own daily newspapers in order to gain a wider and more favorable presentation of its views to the literate public would seem to indicate at least two things. The first is that the existing non-governmental press exercises some independence in its presentation of news and opinion and is not easily brought to parrot the official government line. Second, because of the vast development program aimed at reducing poverty, ignorance, and disease in Tanganyika and because of the need to establish a firmer national identity among the people, the government feels an urgent need to present and to promote its plans and policies to all segments of the population in order to gain their acceptance and to guide their implementation. It might be appropriate here to mention that in regard to the efforts by a government to promote its policies through the inde-
dependent press and through its own publications it is useful to distinguish between censorship of the press and the positive guidance of the press. The first restricts criticism, while the other attempts to promote a point of view. One prevents the free expression of opinion and the other emphasizes a particular opinion while not excluding competing views. The resulting effect of the two policies need not necessarily be the same. It would seem, therefore, that the governmental practice of positive guidance, a practice also followed by some Western countries, does not present prima facie evidence of suppression or absence of opinion freedom in the mass media as would, for example, the operation of an official censor's bureau, or the presence of only official newspapers.

Radio Communications

Turning from the press to the other element of mass media communications in Tanganyika, the radio, we find that it is still in the process of being developed to its full potential. By 1964 there were only 118,000 radio sets in use, but this is increasing to take advantage of the broadcasts in Swahili on three wavelengths and in English and other languages on four wave lengths. Radio broadcasting is controlled by the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation, an independent statutory corporation set up by the government.

It is controlled by a Board of Directors and is financed both by government grant and by revenue from radio licences and commercial advertising. The sources of news for its broadcasts are varied even though the Corporation is government regulated. News is supplied by the *Tanganyika Standard* and "... the Broadcasting Service produces Swahili news bulletins and commentaries based on this material and on press releases from the Public Relations Department. For world news BBC broadcasts are used." Without being able to hear the broadcasts or see transcripts of them it is impossible to analyze the content or bias of the Corporation broadcasts. The fact that news sources other than the government news agency are used may be an indication that some freedom of selection and presentation is allowed and that some objectivity is attained in its broadcasts, but this is purely speculative.

Another development in radio broadcasting in Tanganyika may, however, offer an opportunity for greater autonomy in broadcasting. This was the proposed opening for a commercial broadcasting station by the end of 1964 for which advertising experts from overseas were to be recruited. If this venture is undertaken and is a success it may encourage the opening of other commercial stations as the country develops, thereby increasing the potential for some diversity of news.

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coverage and point of view in the broadcasting industry. For the time being future development in wireless communications will remain in the field of radio broadcasting, since the government feels that the scarcity of resources available for development in this industry requires foregoing the development of television broadcasting for some time to come.

Comments and Observations

During the whole of the 1961-1964 period there was only one case of open government censorship. This was as a result of the army mutiny in January, 1964, a time of great instability for Tanganyika. For a period of three weeks censorship was imposed on all news leaving the country, applying to news dispatches, radio broadcasts and press telephone calls. In ending the censorship a government Minister is reported to have said that "Tanganyika has returned to normal and news is being treated in its 'proper perspective', . . . but the Government will not tolerate any 'irresponsible attitudes'."\(^{95}\) Apparently the situation had returned to the previous position wherein the government and the press engaged in a continuing interpretation over where to draw the line between responsible and irresponsible journalism. After the mutiny there was also a ban on the importation of the Nation series of newspapers from Kenya for "'distortion of news about Tanganyika',"\(^{96}\) and a


\(^{96}\)International Press Institute Report, XII (March,
reporter for the Nation was expelled for allegedly sending false reports. This ban was lifted six months later, however, and ended the brief period of direct government interference in the normal flow of news across the borders of Tanganyika. It might be noted that at no time during the state of emergency after the mutiny was any direct censorship placed on the domestic press. Perhaps the local journalists exercised sufficient caution on their own in their reporting of events, thereby obviating the necessity of direct government interference. But this might be expected in any country facing a period of national emergency and would not necessarily indicate a habit of undue subservience to the wishes of the government in more normal times.

It might be noted as an item of negative evidence relating to freedom of the press that the International Press Institute Report, which carries a regular section on events relating to the freedom of the press entitled "Toils of the Press," reported only two incidents of action against press freedom in Tanganyika during the 1961-1964 period. The first of these was the action taken against Miss Ginwale in 1963 and the second was the action taken by the government during and after the 1964 army mutiny. Both of these incidents have been presented and analyzed above and the first was found to have not unduly restricted opinion expression in Tanganyika and the second restricted expression only
temporarily. Since these were the only two incidents reported by the IPI report it might be assumed that this fact lends support to the view the press in Tanganyika has been relatively free from governmental restraint or intimidation.

This same view is supported by a Western journalist who worked in East Africa for several years. He reports that there is no press censorship as such, but only "... tacitly recognized limits beyond which it would be unwise to step."97 He points out that despite such "limits" elements of the press are critical of the government on certain issues even though as a result they often receive appeals from the government to act in a greater spirit of cooperation in the national effort. He concludes that the standards of objective journalism are not as high as they could be, but that they are higher, for example, than those in Kenya or Ghana.

Conclusion

In summing up the data presented on communications freedom in Tanganyika, it seems evident that such freedom does exist, although there remains the difficult problem of reliably ascertaining its extent. A privately owned press industry does exist at or above pre-independence levels of size and circulation and its operation seems to be largely

97 Reported in a letter forwarded to the author (with author's name withheld) by an international news service, March 15, 1965.
autonomous. The radio broadcasting facilities, however, are largely government owned and controled, but there are signs which indicate that a privately owned radio industry may emerge at a later time. The press has felt free to publish articles critical of government actions and policies although these criticisms have usually been within the limits of moderation desired by the government. These limits have been narrower than those generally applied in the Western democracies for controlling libel and incitement to violent overthrow of the democratic system, but they have not been so narrow as to rule out discussion of politically sensitive and important issues such as Africanization and one-party rule. Radio programs, it would seem, are not free to broadcast all points of view, being directly controled by the government. But the government is not as restrictive on news sources as one might expect of such a controled operta-
tion. This may indicate that some flexibility is practiced in setting the limits on subject material for broadcasts or that there is a potential for greater flexibility as the industry continues its expansion.

It would appear from this analysis that Tanganyika ex-
hibits many of the characteristics of communications free-
dom that exist in states which have a competitive party sys-
tem. It also appears that Tanganyika allows more freedom for its mass communications systems than do most of the other states of sub-Saharan Africa, some of which claim to
be multi-party systems. This analysis does not pinpoint the extent of communications freedom on any objective scale.


"Southern Rhodesia has moved to ban the Daily News of Salisbury. Nigeria's Government Gazette has outlined a broad and vaguely worded press control bill scheduled to go before the next session of Parliament. The Congo Republic (Brazzaville) last month set up a commission to censor its press and radio.

"Official control and censorship are complete in Ghana and the Portuguese territories. The Ghana regime owns the country's three daily newspapers, radio station and planned television installation. Foreign newsmen file everything, including radio photos, through stringent and capricious censors.

"The press is carefully controlled in the Cameroon Republic. Press censorship is extensive in Mali and Guinea. The Guinea government owns Moroya, the only daily paper in Conakry, the capital.

"The tendency toward government ownership of news media is widespread in other former French territories. Besides government ownership of broadcasting stations, official or semiofficial news bulletins are circulated in Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal and Gabon. Private newspapers still circulate without hindrance in the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Malagasy.

"Tanganyika has ousted foreign newsmen. During the revolution in Zanzibar all Western correspondents were placed under house arrest and later permitted to file stories only under the strictest censorship.

"Prime Minister Hastings Banda of Malawi has harshly criticized what he terms the Settler Press in his country. South Africa has barred or expelled several foreign newsmen.

"Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya says the press in his country is free but also warns that newspapers will not be allowed, to undermine the Government of Kenya's friends or work against any individual leader or citizen or a section of the society or sew disaffection and dissension.

"Congolese newspapers tend to fall in line with the policies of whatever administration holds power in their areas. There has never been censorship of foreign dispatches in the chaos-ridden Congo."

(The events surrounding the "ousted foreign newsmen" in the above reference to Tanganyika were covered earlier in this chapter.)
Such an attempt will require the development and application of more specific and objective measures of the factors involved, as well as greater access to pertinent data. It would seem, however, that enough information is presented to classify Tanganyika, at least tentatively, as democratic rather than non-democratic in its policies toward freedom of expression in the mass media. An analysis and evaluation of freedom of expression in relation to other areas of political importance, such as in election campaigns, within TANU, and in the National Assembly, will be made in the following chapters.
CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM OF INTEREST ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION

In the discussion of Western views of democracy it was pointed out that associational interest groups have an important role to play in the free and effective expression of opinion on political matters that affect the members of the group as well as on other matters of group interest. It was noted that these organized groups should be autonomous in their policy formation, should be free to express their ideas on various matters of interest to the group, and should be free to recruit members. They should also be able to make appeals to government officials or to criticize government policies without fear of reprisal for so doing. The operation of several groups of this type in a country would give an indication of the prevalence of another type of opinion freedom—the freedom to organize for the more effective expression of opinion—and it would present another focus for examining the presence and extent of freedom of expression. To explore this aspect of opinion freedom in Tanganyika we will examine the operation there of its two major associational groupings, the trade unions and the co-operative societies, and also discuss briefly the role of other groupings such as those of the business community.
The Trade Union Movement

The trade union movement in Tanganyika was slow in developing even though it received some encouragement from the British after World War II. In 1955, however, inspiration from the leaders of the trade union movement in neighboring Kenya led to the formation of the Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL), which helped give a central impetus to union organization and which gave a coordinating focus for the unions affiliated with it. From its beginning the TFL labor movement was supported by TANU, the leading political party of the Tanganyika independence movement. TANU support was given to organizing efforts and to the agitation and strike efforts of the workers. In return the union movement gave support to the nationalist cause of TANU and contributed to the training of leaders who eventually became involved in political activity both before and after independence. Rashidi Kawawa, for example, who was the President of the TFL from its inception in 1955 until 1960, joined TANU in 1956 and became a member of the party's central committee in 1957. As a TANU member he also held both appointive and elective government positions while retaining his post as President of the TFL.99 Upon becoming the Minister of Local Government and Housing in September 1960, however, he resigned his post with the TFL to devote his full time to

government activities. Other labor leaders have had similar experiences in political activity.

It is difficult to find consistent or comprehensive statistics on labor unions in Tanganyika, but the figures in Table II give some indication that the unions have shown much growth since 1955, even though the total number of unions appears to have declined.

**TABLE II**

**TANGANYIKA TRADE UNIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Organization</td>
<td>TFL</td>
<td>TFL</td>
<td>TFL</td>
<td>NUTW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Unions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of TFL Unions</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>179,409 (approx.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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b. This figure includes the eleven unions affiliated with the NUTW. It is not clear whether there are more than three unions which are not affiliated.

The total number of organized workers may appear to be small, but they represent a significant part of the stable paid
employment force of Tanganyika. In addition many of the union members are from the more modern elements of the society and, therefore, are located in some of the more vital areas of that society (such as the transportation and mining industries). Because they are in this segment of the economy and because they are organized, they are in a position to exert more political influence than the traditional elements of the society.

There is no simple way to determine how much freedom of organization was allowed in Tanganyika, but there is some indication that such freedom did exist in the post-independence period. It was pointed out in the discussion of the legal regulations affecting opinion freedom that in 1962 the government would not recognize any trade union not belonging to the TFL. Earlier, in 1961, TANU had already indicated that it would recognize only TFL unions. These official positions, however, did not prevent unions from operating outside the fold of the TFL. In 1961 a group of four unions broke away from the TFL in objection to the slow pace of Africanization and in support of affiliating with an All-African international federation rather than continuing affiliation with the pro-

100 Of a total population of about 9,000,000 only 400,000 are in some form of paid employment. Of these 220,000 are in agriculture, 94,000 in governmental employment, and 52,000 in commerce and industry.

Western ICFTU. These unions later returned to the TFL, but other unions continued to be unaffiliated, even after the formation of the government federation of unions (NUTW) in 1964. The fact that unaffiliated unions continued to operate through this period seems to indicate that there has been some freedom to organize and operate autonomous trade unions in Tanganyika in spite of government attempts to assure a greater degree of control over the labor movement.

The successive moves to tighten control over the labor movement during the 1961-1964 period were not the result of a totalitarian philosophy, but were the result of pragmatic attempts to deal with difficult problems of economic, social, and political development. Throughout this period the trade unions had been increasingly outspoken on various economic and political issues and had carried out strike actions which the government felt were too disruptive of the fragile economy and too likely to widen further the gap between the modern and the traditional elements of the society. This disharmony of purpose and action became more evident as self-government and independence were achieved and it contrasted sharply with the previous period when both the labor movement


102 The Europa Yearbook 1964 lists three of the "principal unaffiliated unions" which remain outside the NUTW. These are the African Medical Workers Union (1,540 members), the Tanganyika European Civil Servants Association (960), and the Tanganyika Railway Asian Union (997). It also lists the
and the TANU political movement cooperated in opposing the colonial regime. A brief examination of union actions and protests during the 1961-1964 period will illustrate some of the reasons why the unions were brought under more government control and will perhaps give some indication of the autonomy and freedom of expression which the trade unions enjoyed.

In 1961 Prime Minister Nyerere, in line with his policy of promoting racial harmony, supported a citizenship bill in the National Assembly which would allow aliens who had lived in Tanganyika for five or more years to become citizens two years from the date of application for citizenship. This bill received much criticism in the Assembly and was passed only after the government declared the bill to be a matter of utmost importance.\(^{103}\) One of the critics of the bill was C.S.K. Tumbo, General Secretary of the Tanganyika Railway African Union and at that time one of the top leaders of the TANU party hierarchy. Tumbo took one of the more radical positions in opposition to citizenship for non-Africans and called "... for more extreme action against non-Africans."\(^{104}\) This view was shared by other labor leaders,

\(^{103}\)Lowenkopf, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.

and although the Citizenship Bill became law the issue remained a controversial one for several years thereafter.

Shortly before the end of 1961 several unions threatened strike action for higher wages. Nyerere took a strong stand against this move saying that the country could not at this time afford to meet the wage demands. In addition he threatened to dismiss any government workers who went on strike after their demands had been considered. One labor leader replied that these remarks were "a direct threat to the working people of the Tanganyika labour movement".¹⁰⁵ These wage disputes, together with the problem of Africanization, threatened to disrupt the newly independent country, and the problem was not easily solved. In addition the TFL in January, 1962, opposed the re-election of a TANU nominee as mayor of Dar es Salaam, a position that "... was strongly attacked by TANU's Dar es Salaam District Committee."¹⁰⁶ Instead of forcing a showdown with the unions on these various problems, Nyerere resigned as Prime Minister in January 1962 and devoted his full time as TANU party leader to rebuilding the party. At the same time the government appointed Tumbo as High Commissioner in London and transferred his principal rival from the presidency of the TFL to the Ministry of Labor. In addition two other labor leaders were

¹⁰⁵ Hughes, op. cit., p. 81.
pacified, one by bringing him back into the TFL as its general secretary and the other by appointing him to a government position as parliamentary secretary.\textsuperscript{107} Shortly after this the TFL "... reaffirmed its complete support for TANU and its president told a news conference that 'the TFL executive committee has found a constructive solution to the differences between the federation and TANU'."\textsuperscript{108}

For the unions outside the TFL, however, the struggle continued. A Railway African Union official threatened a nation-wide strike and even the use of violence if necessary to speed up Africanization. The government replied that it would not be intimidated in this matter and that statements which asserted that the government did not support Africanization were false and misleading.\textsuperscript{109} The union official was "suspended" but the matter was still not settled. In addition the National Union of Post Office and Telecommunications Employees also threatened a strike for similar reasons and caused enough unrest in one incident for the police to be called as a precautionary measure, though no arrests were made.

By mid-1962 the government, disturbed over union interference with its development plans, was preparing to restrict


labor union freedom of operation by passing legislation which would limit the use of strikes and would bring the TFL under closer supervision of the government. Despite past statements of cooperation with the government the TFL unions were badly split over the proposed restrictive legislation. The federation came up with the slogan "cooperation, yes; domination, no" and the General Secretary accused the government of trying to "kill" the TFL.\textsuperscript{110} Other labour leaders, including Mr. Victor Mkello, the President of the Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union (the Largest Union in the TFL) and the newly elected President of the TFL also opposed the legislation. As a Nominated Member of the National Assembly Mkello had spoken out against the proposed union control legislation. But after some closed-door discussions with government officials he withdrew his opposition and the legislation passed without further dispute.\textsuperscript{111} One reason the government was willing to negotiate a settlement rather than force acceptance of its will was that both the Prime Minister, Rashidi Kawawa, and the Minister of Health and Labour, M. M. Kamaliza, were past presidents of the TFL. In return for giving support to the government on this matter Mkello and the TFL received, according to one observer, what appeared to be "... quite generous proposals for new mini-

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., July 27, 1962, p. 18; Millen, op. cit., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{111}Kenya Weekly News, July 6, 1962, p. 18.
mum wages, plus provision for severance pay. . . "112 It would appear, then, that the government and the unions both gained at least part of their demands from the settlement and that the unions, though losing some of their autonomy, maintained a strong voice in the government which would regulate them.

With this new system of government-union cooperation the government expected that the unions would settle grievances without strikes and would negotiate peacefully with the employer involved. It also expected that the TFL would cooperate in carrying out government wage policies. The commitment of the government to these positions was demonstrated when 75% of the sisal industry was disrupted by an unofficial strike in January, 1963. The workers were protesting a government wage policy which had been originally asked for by the unions and which went into effect on January 1, 1963. Until that time a "ticket contract" system was used which allowed a worker to complete thirty days' work within forty-two days and which paid a set fee for the contract. Under the new system the ticket contracts were converted into monthly contracts which called for twenty-six days' work at the same daily rate. The reduction in days worked reduced the total amount payable on each contract, something the workers either did not understand or did not want to accept. The government had asked the unions involved to explain the

112Ibid., December 28, 1962, p. 18.
new system to the workers and to make clear that the rate of pay had not been reduced. Apparently the unions did not perform as requested and widespread strikes took place. The government then withdrew recognition from the Plantation Workers' Union branches in the affected areas and sent Kawawa, now the Vice-President of the newly established Republic, into the area to explain the new wage policy to the workers. As a disciplinary measure Nyerere ordered Mkello and the organizing secretary of the Plantation Workers' Union, Mr. Sheshe Amiri, to be deported (exiled temporarily within the country) to a western border settlement in Tanganyika because evidence on oath was obtained that they had been "... conducting themselves in a manner dangerous to peace and good order" in relation to the strikes. 113

Three months later the deportation orders were revoked by Nyerere and the union leaders were returned to their union positions. The official statement on the revocation order said that this act was "... in accord with the prevailing spirit of amity and national unification, and the persons concerned are welcomed back to play their full part in the life of the community". 114 The government actions involving the union leaders demonstrated that union officials were expected to act in support of agreed-upon government


policies and that the government, as headed by Nyerere, had the power and the intention to require such support if it was not given when needed. But it also demonstrated that Nyerere was willing to try to work with union officials if he felt that they were loyal to the national movement.

Despite the difficulties encountered by the TFL in the sisal strikes the unions retained some autonomy and freedom of expression. In a May Day broadcast the Labour Minister welcomed a TFL proposal to establish a Workers' Investment Corporation to undertake projects of economic and commercial development. A short time later the President of the Union of Public Employees issued a protest against alleged "brotherization" (nepotism) in government appointments in the process of Africanization. The initial request for an investigation was turned down by Vice-President Kawawa. But President Nyerere later agreed to let the TFL and the Union of Public Employees investigate the allegations after Kawawa's refusal "... provoked a challenge to appoint an inquiry committee or 'face a showdown'."

A storm of protest arose from trade union circles when late in 1963 the government put forth a proposal for integrating the TFL into the Ministry of Labour. At the end of a three-day meeting the federation president, Mkello, issued a


116 *East Africa and Rhodesia*, XXXX (September 12, 1963), p. 46.
statement saying that "... the proposals were completely unacceptable, as they would destroy the trade-union movement."\textsuperscript{117} Nothing was done to implement the proposals that year, but discussion of them continued on into the following year.

In January 1964 another issue arose that caused bitter comment by several trade unions. Nyerere, at the start of the new year, had ordered the end of discrimination against non-Africans being considered for government positions. This move coincided with the end of the two year period for gaining citizenship under the Citizenship Bill of 1961. The trade unions were split on this issue with some supporting it and others opposed. Among those supporting the President was the large Transport and General Workers Union, while among those opposing the end of discrimination was the Tanganyika Railway African Union, which has always opposed moves to integrate non-Africans into the society as full participants.\textsuperscript{118} The \textit{Tanganyika Standard} of January 9, 1964 reported that the abolition of discrimination had aroused "shock and disappointment" among the labor unions and quoted a Local Government Union spokesman as saying that Nyerere was taking the people "back to the colonial days."\textsuperscript{119} These


\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Kenya Weekly News}, January 17, 1964, p. 35.

were strong words because Tanganyikans were still very sensitive about anything that reminded them of pre-independence subservience to non-Africans. To be accused of colonialism in these circumstances was a very serious charge.

The freedom to speak harshly against government policies seems to have been sharply curtailed, however, after a number of trade union leaders were arrested in connection with the January mutinies in Tanganyika. The number of trade unionists arrested is not certain, but it was announced that ". . . 200 suspects were being held for questioning, including policemen, TANU supporters, and trade unionists."\(^{120}\) According to a news release from the British Traders Union Congress, arrests of trade unionists included ". . . branch secretaries and branch committee members of almost all the unions throughout the country."\(^{121}\) After the mutiny was quelled there were several statements and demonstrations of support for the government from the trade unions. But this did not prevent the government from implementing its plan to incorporate the unions affiliated to the TPL into a new federation under the direction of the Labour Minister. In taking this action the government was, perhaps, not unmindful of the fact that in the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Dahomey it was a combination of the army and the trade unions that

\(^{120}\) *East Africa and Rhodesia*, XXXX (February 20, 1964), p. 499.

\(^{121}\) Reported in *East Africa and Rhodesia*, XXXX (April 9, 1964), p. 632.
overthrew the government.

The new government union federation, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTW), centralized more fully governmental control over the 11 affiliated unions. It also established government control over the funds of the federation. The general secretary of the NUTW is to hold office for five years (at the pleasure of the President), and he appoints assistants who are then responsible to him. The NUTW is organized into nine industrial sections, each supervised by an assistant general secretary. In addition the federation has six divisional directors, ten regional secretaries, and two directors of the Workers' Investment Corporation. The NUTW, unlike the TFL, is not affiliated with any international union.

Despite the increased supervision and control of the union federation by the government former union leaders did not completely lose a voice in union or governmental affairs. Several TFL leaders were retained in official capacities in the new union leadership. It must also be remembered that the Minister of Labour and the General Secretary of the NUTW, Mr. Kamaliza, and the Vice President of the Republic, Mr. Kawawa, were both past presidents of the TFL and presumably remained spokesmen for the unions in government policy formation.

Part of the move toward greater government control of

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the trade unions might also be seen as a step in the direction of more "positive guidance," as opposed to restriction, especially since the proposals to form the NUTW were originally made several months prior to the mutiny. The Minister of Labour, in explaining the government's actions after the mutiny, seemed to support this conclusion by saying that ". . . the movement in Tanganyika had been weakened by conflicts of personalities between trade union leaders, and it was now the intention of the Government to remove this source of weakness and build a strong labour movement which would be able to assist the Government in implementing its socialist policies."\textsuperscript{123} Part of this assistance was to be in the form of funds from union dues, up to 60% of which would be used for social services and investments approved by the Minister of Labour.

The Cooperative Societies

The cooperative societies of Tanganyika form the second of the two major associational groupings. The forerunner of the present-day cooperatives was the Association of African Planters of Kilimanjaro, founded in 1922, which was formed to oppose a campaign by European colonists against coffee cultivation by Africans. In 1932 the Association took on a cooperative character under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance of that year, and became part of a British plan

\textsuperscript{123}ibid.
designed to break the Asian monopoly over the processing of peasant cash-crops and to encourage the pooling of capital and resources. Unlike American and West European cooperatives, those in Tanganyika have been encouraged by making it compulsory to market most major crops through the cooperative network.\textsuperscript{124} The cooperative system, however, has remained a popular type of economic organization, even, in some cases, for the Asian and European sectors as well as for the African. By 1947 there were 70 cooperative societies in operation and their multiplication and growth has continued on through the post-independence period.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Cooperative Society Unions & - & - & 35 & 53 \\
Primary Cooperative Societies & 311 & 691 & 840 & 1.300 \\
Membership & 237,823 & 304,786 & 350,000 & 500,000\textsuperscript{b} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Cooperative Societies of Tanganyika\textsuperscript{a}}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{b} \textit{Europa Yearbook 1964} also estimates that there are 500,000 members in the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika, the largest producer's union. Vol. II, p. 1075. It is not clear whether or not this union incorporates all 53 of the smaller cooperative society unions.

\textsuperscript{124} Bates, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 439.
Through the middle and late 1950's the hundreds of cooperative societies served as covert bases for the extension of the TANU political movement. After independence the two organizations continued to work closely together. Several former cooperative leaders were included in the first cabinet, and a Ministry of Cooperative and Community Development was created early in 1962. With the encouragement of the government, the cooperative movement since 1961 has greatly expanded its operation and its forms of economic endeavor. In 1962 the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika was established, describing itself as "the largest African marketing organization on the continent." This organization was a union of existing cooperative societies and it has remained primarily in the marketing sphere of economic activity. The government decided to use cooperatives to move into new areas of economic enterprise, however, and called in Israeli assistance to organize the Cooperative Supply Association of Tanganyika (COSATA). This associa-

125 These included the Minister for Commerce and Industry, and the Minister for Finance. Hughes, op. cit., p. 81.

126 Ibid. In its membership were 327,000 members in 827 producer societies and 10 recently established consumer societies, which included the bulk of the existing cooperative societies and members.

127 The Israel Foreign Trade Corporation—Amiran—is both a member of COSATA (Cooperative Supply Association of Tanganyika) and its managing agent. The Tanganyika government invested 150,000 and Amiran 40,000. Local cooperative unions have been 'encouraged' to buy shares in COSATA." Fred G. Burke, "Tanganyika: The Search for Ujamaa,"
tion was designed to move whole-heartedly into the consumer supply business by setting up or expanding its own system of wholesale, retail, and import organizations. This effort combined central control and planning, to fit COSATA in with the overall government development plans, with the expansion of local institutions and local authority as much as possible. The purpose of COSATA and the cooperative movement generally was twofold: first, to bring urban Africans into the wholesale and retail business, still largely dominated by Europeans and Asians, and second, to bring the scattered elements of the rural population into a new village structure where the benefits of education, health care, and improved economic organization could be more easily supplied and a new sense of national identity could be developed.

There are several indications that the cooperative societies have enjoyed some degree of autonomy in operation and policy making and remain in a position of political influence even though the government has moved strongly into one area of the cooperative movement. All segments of the cooperative movement have increased in size and activities since independence and seem to have done so with a minimum of friction or disturbance. The largest growth seems to be within the non-governmental Cooperative Union of Tanganyika which grew from 327,000 members in 1962 to 500,000 in 1964.

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One of the largest of these producer cooperatives, the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions Ltd., grew from a federation of 14 unions, 323 societies, and 100,000 members just prior to independence, to one of 19 unions, 435 societies, and 277,500 members in 1964. A former General Manager, Paul Bomani, became the first Finance Minister of independent Tanganyika and remained in that position through 1964. The federation publishes its own journal which has enjoyed circulation of about 4,000 during the last four years. It is difficult to ascertain the political content of this journal. There seems to have been few disputes between the government and the coops during the past several years since both are interested in moving along the same lines of development. Although there has been little need for political disputes to be aired in the federation journal, the potential for airing various opinions would seem to be present, given the fact that other publications in Tanganyika have enjoyed some freedom for published opinion when confronted with a controversial issue.

Despite the fact that no serious disputes have arisen between the cooperatives and the government there is some evidence that certain cooperatives do not always agree with government policy or act in accordance with it. One indication of this was given by Nyerere in a speech at a coopera-

tive manager's seminar. He complained that too many members did not appreciate the real meaning of cooperation and working together for themselves. \footnote{129} Perhaps if they did know how to "cooperate" correctly, he said, they would be less self-seeking and would direct their activities to be more in line with the government development plans, thereby giving the government less cause to complain about their operations.

Other Associations

Among the less important associations in Tanganyika are several types of organizations representing employers and other elements of the private enterprise sector of the economy. These associations represent primarily the Asian and European sectors of the economy, but thanks to the official policy of racial cooperation these non-African elements have not been alienated or suppressed as they have been in certain other African countries. Although the government has encouraged the cooperative movement to move into several areas of private enterprise, such as wholesaling, retailing, and banking, there still exists a substantial free enterprise sector. Within this sector are several associations which are designed to represent special interests or to promote special programs. (See Table IV) Business associations with less than twenty members are free from the regulations of the 1954 Societies Ordinance requiring

\footnote{129} East Africa and Rhodesia, XXXX (April 3, 1964), p. 668.
TABLE IV
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATIONS OF TANGANYIKAA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers' Associations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambers of Commerce</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Corporationsb</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing &amp; Producer's Associations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b. After independence the government, as part of its development program, supplied much financial support for several development corporations.

registration and supervision of finances. The larger associations are subject to these regulations, but they still have been able to speak out both for and against government policies in which they have an interest.

During the debates on the trade union legislation of 1962 the President of the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce expressed general support of government policies. He also expressed great satisfaction with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry because of its "... attitude to the chamber, and [Its] close cooperation."130 The following year, however,

this Chamber of Commerce put forward a motion at the Annual Session of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in East Africa which urged a change in certain Tanganyikan commercial policies.\textsuperscript{131} This session also produced several more general resolutions which were critical of the commercial policies of the East African governments.

As the cooperative movement developed in Tanganyika, certain private businesses were hard pressed and tried to find ways to thwart the movement. This led to several disputes and to warnings from the government that it would not let the cooperative movements be destroyed. In trying to solve some of these problems the government tried to work with the existing business associations. A Business Advisory Council was formed, chaired by the Minister for Commerce and Industry, and it included a wide representation of business interests including the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce and the Dar es Salaam Merchants' Chamber.\textsuperscript{132} The government could have enforced its views in these disputes simply by revoking the trading licenses of the uncooperative businessmen. The fact that it did not resort to this extreme measure, but tried to negotiate and to work things out in a more moderate fashion, seems to indicate that the government made some attempt to work within the

\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., February 15, 1963, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., May 17, 1963, p. 18.
framework of the interplay of powers concept discussed earlier.

Another indication that business associations are free to express their opinions on governmental policies was demonstrated when the government proposed an immigration control bill. This measure was designed to limit the length of time an alien could remain in the country without applying for citizenship. Several business associations felt that this measure would both inhibit foreign investors from coming to Tanganyika in the first place and tend to prevent them from re-investing if they were already in the country but could not remain without severing ties with their country of origin. In order to correct these defects the Tanganyika Association of Chambers of Commerce suggested that four amendments be made to the proposed legislation.\textsuperscript{133} These suggested amendments were not formally incorporated into the final government bill. The Minister responsible for the bill, however, did meet some of the objections raised by giving assurances that the wording of the bill did not imply that residential permits would be limited to two years and by making provision for appeals above the Immigration

\textsuperscript{133}Kenya Weekly News, September 13, 1963, p. 13. This Association "... represents viewpoints from the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce, all up-country Chambers, the Dar es Salaam Merchants' Chamber, and two associate members, the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association and the Tanganyika Motor Traders' Association."
Department. Although the association did not gain as many concessions as it desired, the suggestions made did put the views of that body, and the views of those it represented, on record. This action also demonstrated that in this respect, at least, the business community is free to react to government policies which affect them in much the same manner as would be expected in most open and pluralistic societies.

Besides the associations of trade unions, cooperatives, and business groups there are thousands of other special interest associations in Tanganyika. Many of these associations are registered under the 1954 Societies Ordinance, which stipulates that they must not be used for any purpose "... prejudicial to or incompatible with the maintenance of peace, order and good government or for any purpose at variance with their declared objects." Certain types of associations are exempt from registration, such as lodges, schools, and religious congregations, but they also must not disturb the "peace, order and good government" of Tanganyika.

Despite these regulations the number of these associations have increased greatly since 1954. Within a year after the Ordinance became effective there were 1,283 associations registered under it and by the end of 1960 this

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135 Cole and Denison, op. cit., pp. 257-258.
number had grown to 3,005.¹³⁶ These associations, whether registered or not, represent a wide range of interests in Tanganyika and some of them have political purposes or orientations.¹³⁷

In many developing countries various student groups have played a large political role. This has not happened in Tanganyika. One reason for this is the small number of college students who pursue their education in Tanganyika. The large majority of them attend universities in other East African countries or in overseas countries. This leaves only a small number to attend the single University College of Tanganyika in Dar es Salaam, which became part of the

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 257; Hughes, op. cit., p. 63.

¹³⁷Margaret Bates comments on the many special interest associations in Tanganyika by saying that "in Dar es Salaam and the up-country towns associations are legion and range from football clubs to mutual benefit societies. It is a good introduction to Tanganyika merely to read the list of those registered under the Societies Ordinance: The Cairo Musical Society, the African Tenants Association, Union of Tribal Associations. Some of the groups are religious, others are educational; and some skirt the edges of politics to become pressure groups: They include the tribal associations, the Union of African Traders, the Tanganyika African Parents Association, and the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika. Women's groups have been important on the coast and in many towns, and according to some observers, the Old Boys' clubs (alumni associations) of Tabora Secondary School and Makerere College, to which many Tanganyikans have gone [including Nyerere], have been powers behind the political throne." Bates, op. cit., p. 438. Bates also points out that there has been little pressure to incorporate these groups into the TANU structure as has happened in Ghana. Ibid., p. 455.
University of East Africa in 1963.\textsuperscript{138} Despite the small number of college students in Dar es Salaam, they have on occasion taken part in political demonstrations. In 1962, for example, there was a demonstration against Tanganyika one-party rule,\textsuperscript{139} and a short time later another one in protest against the dictatorial methods used by Nkrumah in Ghana.\textsuperscript{140} The government took action to quell the disturbance caused by the latter demonstration for fear it would upset the cause of Pan-African unity, but apparently did nothing about the former.

The only important organized grouping of young people is the TANU Youth League. Unlike the Youth Leagues in Guinea or Ghana, the League is composed only of youths 18 or over, and has been used to assist in implementing TANU development programs; helping in literacy campaigns, well-digging, road-building, and other projects. The leader of

\textsuperscript{138}In 1964 University College had only 17 teachers and 90 students. \textit{Europa Yearbook 1964}, Vol. II, p. 1076. The Minister of Education announced that same year that there were 2,054 Tanganyika students in "institutions of higher learning" at the University of East Africa or overseas. \textit{Africa Digest}, XII (October, 1964), p. 51.

\textsuperscript{139}\textit{Kenya Weekly News}, October 5, 1962, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{140}E. A. Bayne, "Freedom and Unity?" \textit{American University Field Staff Reports (East Africa Series)}, VI (April, 1963), p. 19.
the League has been Joseph Nyerere, a brother of the President. The League, of course, has been a TANU controlled political body but it has exerted its own pressures within the government, even to the point where its leader became a critic of government policy during National Assembly debates.\textsuperscript{141} Its political loyalty has been unquestioned, however, as demonstrated by the fact that it was used as the nucleus of a new army following the army mutiny in 1964.

The religious elements in Tanganyika play only a minor role in public affairs. There are active Lutheran, Anglican, and Roman Catholic missionary societies in Tanganyika as well as a large body of Muslims, but the large majority of Tanganyikans adhere to various animistic belief patterns.\textsuperscript{142} Religious societies have developed widely and several of them publish their own newspapers. The official government policy insists on separating politics and religion, but assures that religious freedom will be protected.\textsuperscript{143} In pursuit of a larger voice in the protection of Muslim interests several associations have been formed, including trade unions and business associations, but it is unclear whether these various associations are designed to protect religious or secular interests. Several government ministers are Muslims and

\textsuperscript{141}East Africa and Rhodesia, XXXVIII (December 21, 1961), p. 400.

\textsuperscript{142}Taylor, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{143}It should be noted that President Nyerere is a practicing Roman Catholic.
and various Muslim associations such as the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika have attempted to influence TANU policy.\textsuperscript{144}

All of these attempts to dabble in politics, however, have not met with government favor. The President and General Secretary of one Muslim religious organization (Dawat El Islamia) in Dar es Salaam were deported to up-country regions for their activities. The government claimed that they had been "... exploiting religious differences for political purposes in a manner dangerous to peace and good order...",\textsuperscript{145} but did not specify what their activities had been. This action appears to have been another of the continuing attempts by the government to define the limits of acceptable political activity.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The data presented in this chapter is not comprehensive, but perhaps a few tentative conclusions can be drawn. In reviewing the overall picture of Tanganyika society it appears that there are a wide variety of voluntary associational groupings which have retained various degrees of autonomy in policy formation and operations, and which have enjoyed various degrees of freedom in presenting their views to the government or in criticizing government policy. In relation to the major interest groups, however, there has

\textsuperscript{144}\textit{Bates, op. cit.}, p. 444.

been a trend towards greater governmental restriction of action and public advocacy. The government now holds a commanding position over the trade unions, especially at the national level. The consumer supply area of cooperative enterprise has been a government sponsored endeavor, although the marketing cooperatives appear to have retained some degree of autonomy. The business associations appear to have been moderately autonomous and have been able to present their views publically on certain issues. The government appears to have been selective in its control of these groups, but it has restricted activities it felt would be disruptive to the development of the country.

There are some indications, however, that there has remained some freedom for associational interest groups. A great number of groups continued to operate in Tanganyika and membership increased in some cases. The government has worked with several of the most important groups, such as cooperative and business associations, even though they retained an area of autonomy in their operations. Some of these same groups also had direct access to the policy making apparatus of the government, either through the Cabinet or through other less formal means, enabling them to have their views represented in a less obvious manner. The fact that they were not completely integrated into the party structure, as such groups are in non-democratic states, seems to indicate that some margin of opinion and organiza-
tional freedom was allowed. Because some autonomy was re-
tained, especially among the thousands of smaller groups,
it would appear that opinion leaders had the possibility to
use intra-organizational communications freedom, to shape
opinions and to help form organizational policies which
might influence government policy in certain limited respects.

The freedom to organize and to advocate special in-
terest viewpoints in Tanganyika is limited, and a trend
towards greater control of organized group opinion freedom
is observable in some sectors, especially in the trade
union movement. Other sectors appear to have retained some
autonomy, however, and no trend towards greater opinion
freedom restriction is observable. Tanganyika is not
democratic in the freedom it allows to interest association
and expression, but neither is it totalitarian. It appears
to be a marginal case where continued group opinion freedom,
as it now exists, will depend upon the ability of the sys-
tem to satisfy minimal group expectations, thereby obviat-
ing the necessity for greater government activity in con-
trolling groups which might be tempted to exert too much
overt pressure to gain their ends.
CHAPTER V

TANU AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

Western democratic theory, as we noted earlier, assumes that for the assurance of democratic government and for the freedom of opinion there should be freedom not only to organize associational interest groups, but also freedom to organize political groups or parties which are allowed to compete for the legal control of the government. If political parties are not allowed to operate freely, some other means would have to be found that would permit the opinion of the organized groups and of the publics affected by government policies to influence those policies and to hold the government responsible to the groups affected and to the broad shifts in public opinion. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine briefly political party activity in Tanganyika for the past several years, to examine the structure and operation of the ruling TANU party, and to indicate some of the interactions between party and government. It is hoped that this examination will give some indication of the freedom of access which various opinion elements have had to the ruling party structure and to the government, of the freedom of expression which they enjoy therein, and of the actual or potential influence these elements have had on
official policies or actions during the past several years.

**Early Party Activity**

Political party activity in Tanganyika did not start to develop to any important degree until a decade after the end of World War II. The Tanganyika administration's report to the United Nations for 1954 stated that although "no developments in the formation of political parties in the generally accepted sense have yet taken place," there were many local associations, generally tribal in nature, that combined social, cultural, and political functions.\textsuperscript{146} In that same year, however, the Tanganyika African Association, an inter-tribal society of educated Africans founded in 1929, approved a new constitution which transformed that body into the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). This reconstituted society was to become an active political force pushing for the use of the elective principle by all local and central government bodies, and for eventual independence.

Julius Nyerere, who had just returned from overseas after completing his university education, had been elected President of the Tanganyikan African Society in 1953 and had been responsible for drawing up the new constitution. Although TANU was to push for independence and for a larger role for Africans in political and economic affairs, it also was to combat tribalism and other factional tendencies and

attempt to build a unified national movement.\textsuperscript{147} Despite government attempts to restrict the growth of TANU, through the use of the powers granted under the Societies Ordinance, for example, the movement continued to grow, especially among urban workers. With the assistance of the union and co-operatives TANU was able to claim a membership of 150,000 by 1957, and by 1959 the movement had grown to include 500,000 members.\textsuperscript{148}

The first election for the selection of members to the national Legislative Council was scheduled to be held in September, 1958. The voting qualifications for this election were set rather high by requiring, besides age and residency requirements, that the prospective voter have either a

\textsuperscript{147}The constitution of TANU states that its policies will be:

I. To prepare the people of Tanganyika for self-government and independence, and to fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing and independent.

II. To fight against tribalism and all isolationist tendencies amongst the Africans, and to build up a united nationalism.

III. To fight relentlessly for the establishment of a democratic form of government, and as a first step toward democracy, to fight for the introduction of the election principle on all bodies of local and central government.

IV. To achieve African majorities on all bodies of local and central government, and committees, boards or corporations of public service.

V. To fight for the removal of every form of racialism and racial discrimination.

VI. To encourage and organize Trade Unionism and the Cooperative Movement, and to work with the Trade Unions and Cooperative Societies and other organizations whose objectives are in harmony with the aims and objects of the Association. Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika" in \textit{African One Party States}, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter (Cornell University Press, 1962), p.421.

\textsuperscript{148}\textit{Africa Report}, VI (December 1962), p. 2.
Standard VII education (entrance standard for secondary school); or an annual income of £150; or previous membership on the Council, a local government body, or a native authority; or tenure in certain specified offices.\textsuperscript{149} Out of a population of 9 million only about 180,000 were eligible to register under these provisions, and of these approximately 60,000 did register, one-half of them non-African.\textsuperscript{150} The election was to be conducted on a racial "parity" basis wherein the voters in each constituency were to cast three ballots, one for a candidate of each of the three races. This would result in the election of a racially balanced group of representatives to fill the 30 elective seats of the Legislative Council, 10 from each race.

TANU objected to these election provisions because it would make impossible a TANU controlled Council, even though Africans were expected to make up the majority of the electorate in most constituencies. TANU, being an African party, could not control the nominations of the non-African candidates since the electoral law made this procedure largely a racial process. Despite these difficulties TANU decided at its annual conference to accept these election provisions and to contest the election. This decision caused a more militant group, led by the party organizing secretary, Zuberi


Mtemvu, to break with TANU and to set up a new party called the African National Congress (ANC).\textsuperscript{151} This party followed a more racialist line than TANU until it disbanded in 1963.

Opposing TANU in the election was the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), an interracial party formed in 1956 among the unofficial nominated members of the Legislative Council. They endorsed the idea of parity in the 1958 election and were supported by the territorial Governor. The UTP claimed an African membership of 60%, but had concentrated its membership drives in the higher socio-economic groups in urban centers.\textsuperscript{152} TANU, meanwhile, was broadening its base into local and district areas and was turning into a mass movement. As the election approached TANU decided to endorse or seek support from a slate of European and Asian candidates who were not committed to the UTP. This move by TANU was a success and all TANU supported candidates were elected to give that party control of all 30 seats. Though only 10 of these people were TANU members, an Elected Members Organization (TEMO) was set up among the 30 elected members of the Council to coordinate policy among themselves and with the TANU National Executive. Among those cooperating in TEMO were representatives of the Asian Association as well as leaders from the European community. Cooperation within TEMO was a first important step in implementing TANU's

\textsuperscript{151} Bates, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 426.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 425.
multiracial policy and it aided TANU in establishing a broader base of support within the Asian and European communities. As a result of this greater cooperation, together with the election defeat, the UTP gradually disbanded and ceased to be a political force. The ANC, however, continued to function as a small force for a more militant racialism and later served as a base of operations from which other African parties developed, including the PDP, the PCP, and the NEPT (See Table V).

The 30 Legislative Council members who were elected in 1958 were still outnumbered by the appointed officials of the Council, but this election was a major step toward self-government and independence. Two years later another election was held in which all seats in the Council were filled by elected members and "responsible" government established. The events surrounding this election will be examined to give another indication of the quality of party activity, of the quality of public sentiment, and of the extent and effectiveness of opinion groups in influencing TANU party leaders.

Before examining these events the party structure of TANU at this time should be noted briefly (a fuller description will be given later in the discussion of the independence period). According to the 1954 constitution, the party is to be democratically controled by officers elected by local party organizations. These elected officers are to
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<tr>
<th>PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PARTIES OF TANGANYIKA&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1960</th>
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<th>1963</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>United Tanganyika Party (UTP)&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Asian Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT)</td>
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<td>People's Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
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<td>People's Convention Party (PCP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Enterprise Party of Tanganyika (NEPT)</td>
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<sup>b</sup> Parentheses indicate that these parties were unrecognized and unregistered as a result of a TANU resolution to adopt a one-party state, though continuing to exist as indicated.

meet in an annual conference to establish the general poli-
cies to be followed by the national organization. This
method of decision-making, however, was circumvented prior
to the achievement of national independence in 1961. The
reason for this breakdown of democratic control, according
to one analyst, was that

... so long as TANU's primary function was to
mobilize public opinion in support of the demand
for independence, the professional line of con-
trol was much the more important. Tactics, plans
for fund-raising, election strategy, and informa-
tion, were fed out to the branches from Headquarters
via the paid officials. ... and when policy
issues arose which were related to the general aim,
the President, being chief bureaucrat and also an
elected leader, exercised great influence. In fact
TANU at this period of its existence—from its
origins until mid-1961—was a highly centralized,
primarily bureaucratic organization; its democratic
constitution was partly inoperative, because the
issues to be decided were largely tactical and
practical, and partly fused in the charismatic
authority of Mr. Nyerere.153

This lack of intra-party democracy, however, did not prevent
various opinion leaders and district officers from influenc-
ing or attempting to influence party officials in the
events leading up to the 1960 Legislative Council elections,
as will be noted in the following pages.

For the 1960 election the franchise requirements were
liberalized so that the electorate was increased from
180,000 to about 1,000,000.154 This allowed a much larger

153 Colin Leys, "Tanganyika: The Realities of Independence,"

154 Estimates vary on the size of the electorate. Carter
places it at 700,000, op. cit., p. 26; East Africa and
proportion of Africans to register, and registration totals showed that they outnumbered the combined total of registered Asians and Europeans for the 1960 election. TANU had also increased in size by 1960. At that time it had almost a million members, organized into 10 provinces, 58 districts, and about 600–800 branches, making the party one of "... the most widely-supported and evenly organized nationalist movements in Africa."\(^{155}\) With this large organization and the expanded electorate, TANO was almost sure to win all the seats it contested and to be able to influence decisively the outcome of the election to the 21 European and Asian seats still reserved for the two non-African groups. As a result almost all candidates sought either TANU nomination or endorsement. This placed much power of discretion in the hands of the party apparatus and presented various groups within the party, such as the trade unions and cooperatives, an opportunity to influence the outcome of various selections.

To receive official support from TANU the prospective candidate is required to apply at the District Branch office of his constituency. The applications are voted upon by the District Executive Committee and the full list of applicants, together with the committee votes on each, is

\[^{155}\text{Leys, op. cit., p. 258.}\]
forwarded to the National Executive which is free to accept or reject District choices. In one case during the 1960 nomination proceedings the Dar es Salaam District gave a strong endorsement to the President of the Asian Association as a candidate for the Asian seat in that constituency, although a rival of the President and a TEMO coalition leader with Nyerere had also applied. The National Executive rejected this recommendation but did not directly flout the will of the District. It selected a third candidate for the Dar es Salaam constituency and endorsed the District-rejected rival for a neighboring constituency. In most cases where differences of preference arose, the National Executive was able to maintain discipline at the local level. But in several cases where the district officers refused to accept the National Executive's choices disciplinary action (including dismissal from office) had to be taken and, at the same time, the leaders had to tour the country in attempts to gain support for their decisions. This would seem to indicate that despite the highly centralized and bureaucratic structure existing at that time the National Executive did not feel that it could impose its will upon the lower levels of the party without steps being taken to justify a reversal of a local decision. The local units of TANU, at this time and at later times, exerted an independence of mind

which was not always welcomed by the party hierarchy.

The trade unions also played a role in the party affairs of TANU. Four union leaders were endorsed by TANU as candidates for Council seats, and one of them, Kawawa, was given his first Ministerial post. Union pressure also prevented the endorsement for re-election of the Deputy chairman of TEMO who, it was felt, had been too anti-labour in the Council.\textsuperscript{157} The trade unions did not achieve all they desired, however, since at least four union leaders who desired endorsement were turned down by the TANU leadership.

Traditional elements also played a role in the 1960 election considerations of TANU. Five chiefs were nominated for election to the Council and one of them, Chief A. S. Fundikira, was reappointed in a Ministerial position.\textsuperscript{158} All of these tribal leaders enjoyed high traditional status and had given their support to TANU, despite a temporarily successful attempt by the Governor to organize them and others into a rival political body. As with the trade union leaders, however, not all the applicants for endorsement were successful. Only a few of the many who applied were accepted.

The cooperative societies were a third supporting force for TANU. Two cooperative executives held Ministerial positions and they and two others were supported by TANU in the

\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., p. 255.

\textsuperscript{158}Ibid., p. 250.
election. Cooperative leaders also blocked endorsement of a strong TANU supporter who had the misfortune of being a spokesman for the winning side in a price dispute which the cooperatives lost to the cotton ginners of Mwanza province.\textsuperscript{159} The role played here by the cooperative societies, together with those played by the chiefs and the trade unions, gives some indication of the influence patterns within TANU and seems to show that no one group was dominant, at least at the time of the 1960 elections. The fact that both traditional and modern elements of Tanganyika society were represented seems to indicate that TANU also enjoyed wide support at that time and deserved to be called the national movement.\textsuperscript{160}

The results of the 1960 election, conducted under Colonial Office supervision, also seemed to give an indication of widespread support for TANU. All 71 seats of the Council were to be filled, and TANU supported candidates won 58 of them unopposed, indicating a lack of a widespread organized opposition. The other 13 seats were contested in apparently fair and open competition by both sides, but only three of the opposition candidates belonged to an organized party, the ANC. All but three of the thirteen, including the three ANC candidates, lost their deposits.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{159}Ibid., p. 256.

\textsuperscript{160}It should be noted that agricultural interest are represented through the chiefs and the cooperative societies.

\textsuperscript{161}Hughes, op. cit., pp. 85-86. The leader of the ANC, Mtemvu, polled only 67 votes against the TANU candidate's 7,498. \textit{Kenya Weekly News}, January 5, 1962, p. 17.
seat was lost by a TANU endorsed candidate. That seat was won by a TANU supporter who had run as an independent after the National Executive rejected his endorsement by the District Committee. 162 His campaign was an intra-party effort based upon personality factors and local issues rather than upon party policy, and this was generally true of the campaigns of the other independents. The election gave Nyerere and TANU one-party control of the government, and this composition of the national legislature remained through 1964.

TANU Party Organization

Intra-party harmony in TANU was not always a feature of Tanganyikan policies during this period, but political discussion and activity increasingly took place within the party as other parties were either absorbed by TANU or legally forbidden to continue operations. The freedom to form an effective opposition party—one that had a chance to win control of the government at some point in the near future or that could command the support of a large minority of the people or of the politically significant interests—was lacking in Tanganyika after the 1960 elections, at first because of a lack of broad support for opposition parties and later (1963) because of a ban on opposition party activity. At the same time TANU encouraged all politically important

162 East Africa & Rhodesia, XXXVIII (December 7, 1961), p. 335.
elements to remain part of the party and to carry on discussions of policy as party members. When several trade unionists indicated a desire to withdraw from TANU, for example, Nyerere appealed to them to remain a part of the party as they had been before and continue to cooperate in achieving common goals.\textsuperscript{163} Also within TANU ranks were supporters of a more militant racist policy, a policy which was similar to that of the rival ANC party and which was expounded very strongly in National Assembly (Name changed from Legislative Council after May, 1961) debates over the 1961 Citizenship Bill by back benchers and at least one Minister.\textsuperscript{164} The diversity of opinion within TANU was noted by an observer of African politics who pointed out that

\begin{quote}
unlike Dr. Nkrumah, Mr. Nyerere has continued to win to his side virtually all the intellectuals and many important chiefs, and his parliamentary team is a good mixture of all the most important African elements—the intellectuals, the chiefs, the Cooperatives and the businessmen.\textsuperscript{165}
\end{quote}

The 1954 TANU party constitution was designed to contain these elements of diversity and opposition. It was to provide a structure that would keep open a two-way communications flow from the villages to the national party levels

\textsuperscript{163} Kenya Weekly News, January 6, 1961, p. 18, cited by Taylor, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 195.


\textsuperscript{165} Guy Hunter, \emph{The New Societies of Tropical Africa} (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 293.
and back again, and it was to provide a framework within which differences of opinion among various interests could be represented and negotiated without the necessity of forming rival political parties. The constitution does define a clear line of communication between all levels of the party structure and tries to combine traditional African processes of government by consensus with those of modern party organization (see Chart I). 166 How well this constitutional structure actually has operated is a question we hope to answer partially in these pages.

The diversity of interests within the party is clearly shown by the makeup of the National Executive. The party constitution provides that this body shall contain, besides the president, vice president, secretary general, deputy secretary general, and national treasurer, nine other categories of membership. A total of 34 members, covering six categories, are entitled to vote in the National Executive meetings. These include two members of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour; two members of the Union of Cooperatives; one member of the TANU Youth League; all 11 of the regional committee chairmen; four members selected (by the president on advice) from the elected members of the National Assembly, and 1100-opted members, one each from the 11 regions of the Annual Delegates Conference. The three

CHART I

THE TANU PARTY PYRAMID

PRESIDENT (with a small group of intimates, which presently includes the Secretary General and the Vice President).

THE "LITTLE BARAZA". An unofficial larger group which includes the intimates above plus the party members who hold ministerial appointments in the government (about 12 members).

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. Approximately 20 members appointed by the President from persons resident near the capital; of special importance in emergencies.

THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. The prime policy and directory body of the party; up to 66 members, but 32 without voting privileges.

THE ANNUAL DELEGATES CONFERENCE. Approximately 81 members, including representatives from all of the regions and areas, plus a few "observers," assembled in Dar es Salaam.

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES. Including the Annual Regional Conferences and the activities of the Regional Committee.

AREAS ACTIVITIES. Including the Area Conference (in some areas) and "Village," "Settlement," and "Bush" activities, which reach down to the peasants and herdsmen (450,000 dues-paying members claimed in late 1962).


categories not entitled to vote include the 11 regional secretaries, the administrative secretary of central headquarters,
and the members of the party central committee. This is an elaborate legal structure for communications flow and interest representation, but it must be asked how well the "grass roots" are represented and how responsive the party (and the government which it controls) is to popular and group opinion.

**TANU Activities: 1961-62**

Some indication of the effectiveness of interest groups and local pressures in the party was given by the role they played in party endorsements for the 1960 election. Other incidents occurred in the following years which also gave some evidence of responsiveness to these pressures. Shortly after independence the more militant African racialist wing of the party became more vociferous and made its influence felt in the higher party circles. Despite the long standing official party policy of non-discrimination, Nyerere signed expulsion orders against one Swiss and four British subjects accused of racial discrimination by the African militants. Racial pressures together with economic interests brought about another change in policy in relation to freehold land rights. Through 1960 and 1961 government Ministers had made statements assuring non-Africans that their freehold land

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rights would be respected after independence,\textsuperscript{169} and similar assurances were given as late as February of 1962.\textsuperscript{170} In March, 1962, however, the government issued a statement saying that freehold land alienated to non-Africans by the Germans was to be expropriated.\textsuperscript{171} In addition all freehold land held by non-Africans was to be converted to leasehold. Both the expulsions and the new land rights position were clear reversals of policy and they seem to indicate that the African Nationalist elements with the party, such as the chiefs and some African trade unions, have sufficient strength to change longstanding policy or to violate the party constitutional provisions concerning racial harmony, or both. These pressures were held within bounds, however, and further expulsions were not made nor was compensation withheld for expropriated land. But it appears that the desires for African ascendancy, which was rather widespread among both the traditional and the more modern segments of society, was effective in gaining at least partial official acceptance.

Some of these same feelings were expressed in budget debates in the National Assembly a short time later. The government's development plans called for substantial foreign investment to help carry out many of the desired programs. There was much vocal opposition to these provisions, however,

\footnotetext[169]{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 211.}
\footnotetext[170]{\textit{Kenya Weekly News}, February 16, 1962, p. 18.}
\footnotetext[171]{\textit{Bates, op. cit.}, p. 472.}
since many Assembly members thought that Tanganyika should no longer be dependent on foreigners as they had been in the past. These attacks on the budget proposals caused much concern and brought statements from government Ministers which branded these attacks as "irresponsible" and which asked potential foreign investors to ignore them.\textsuperscript{172} The government was fearful that the statements made in the Assembly would shake the confidence of these investors in the future of the country and in the security of their invested capital.

Although there were critical comments voiced in the National Assembly expressing opposition to the moderate rate of Africanization followed by the government, most of the general public seems to have favored those policies. The results of the 1962 Presidential elections, for example, showed heavy support for Nyerere over the leader of the more racialist ANC, Zuberi Mtemvu. The ANC was at a handicap during the campaign by not being allowed to hold political meetings until a month before the election and was deprived of radio facilities on an "equal-time" basis because of TANU's refusal to use the radio for political speeches. Election procedures call for a secret vote at conveniently located polling places and provide for the use of officially stamped colored ballots for those who are illiterate. In the 1962 election there were charges made that TANU members

\textsuperscript{172}Kenya Weekly News, June 15, 1962, p. 18.
harassed opposition party members at rallies and intimidated some of them sufficiently to keep them away from the polls. The author has not been able to ascertain the truth of these charges, but given the emotional commitment of some TANU supporters to their cause it would not be surprising to learn that there was some validity in these accusations. In spite of these obstacles to a fair and free election, the results give some indication that Nyerere enjoyed widespread support. Of the 1.2 million votes cast, Nyerere won over 98% of the total while winning at least 94% of the votes in every district,\textsuperscript{173} even where the ANC was considered to be at its strongest. Perhaps we could at least partially agree with the TANU leaders who claimed that the election result was a victory for the non-racial and moderate policies of TANU.

**Recent Developments**

Popular support also seems to be evident for the TANU development program and self-help schemes. The problems of

\textsuperscript{173}Kenya Weekly News, November 16, 1962, p. 18. In one district considered a Mtamvuu "stronghold" Nyerere received over 71,000 votes to Mtamvuu's 3,687. Similar results were reported in other districts where the ANC was considered very active.

There was considerable apathy, however, in voter registration and even in voting. Of the 4 million electorate only 1.8 million registered and 1.2 million voted. E. A. Bayne, "Freedom and Unity?" American University Field Staff Reports (East Africa Series), VI (April, 1963), p. 1. Part of the apathy might be explained by the fact that the electorate had been expanded from 1 million to 4 million since the 1960 election, and most of those added were among the more traditional elements of the society, and were more difficult to communicate with or to interest in national political activity.
economic and social development have been the major concern of the party and government since independence. Party leaders spent much of their time promoting development projects and encouraging the people to work for the betterment of themselves and their communities. The traditional custom of village discussions for solving local problems was utilized by TANU both for building the base of its party organization as well as for the establishment of village development committees. The development committee, composed of the local TANU leader, Youth League and women representatives, and other local leaders, was asked to formulate a plan which was to be sent to the area development committee for coordination and approval.

The plan was then to be forwarded, finally, to a regional development committee and to the Ministry for Development Planning. Projects that were approved by the area committee which require materials not locally available receive supplies from the government. A combination of traditional sanctions and TANU coercion has helped at times to ensure a high degree of participation, and millions of people have turned out a large amount of work, despite some examples of bad planning and lack of coordination.\textsuperscript{174} The

\textsuperscript{174} In Njombe District alone, for example, 28 new roads of 572 miles were completed in 1962, as well as eight dispensaries, 17 schools, 58 community centers, and 151 wells. Fred G. Burke, "Tanganyika: The Search for Ujamaa," African Socialism, eds. William Friedland and Carl G. Hosberg, Jr. (Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 213.
fact that there existed both a tradition of participating in local work projects and some evidence of TANU coercion to enforce participation raises the question of how much popular support existed for the TANU party's schemes for development. After weighing the negative factors against the results obtained, Fred G. Burke concludes that while the question of extent is not clear, it is evident that

... mass participation depends upon something more than traditional custom, colonial habit, and party coercion. Nationalism—an identification with the spirit or "attitude of mind"—prevades the country, and there is an obviously voluntary and enthusiastic element in self-help participation. 175

Perhaps TANU's campaigns to build up support for local and national development projects were not in vain and some popular support for them has been generated.

Within the development philosophy itself, and in the way it has been implemented, there are factors which may tend to increase popular participation as well as local initiatives. The philosophy and its implementation have been developed and controled by the national leadership. It stresses both the higher goals of self-respect and human development and the practical virtues of hard work. The modern elements of society—the trade unions, cooperative societies, local government, TANU branches, and youth leaders—have been used by the national government to help implement the overall development program. At the same time, however,

175 Ibid., p. 215.
its implementation at the local level has featured a more decentralized approach. The traditional patterns of face-to-face association, cooperation, brotherhood, mutual obligation, and consensus have been emphasized in the local institutions.  

Although appointed TANU party men represent the national government at all levels of government, they have not generally dominated locally elected councils. The habit of settling local problems through discussion and agreement among local leaders is deeply ingrained and has been respected by national leaders in setting up village party councils and development committees. Although there have been abuses of this system of local government by overzealous party officials or TANU youth leaguers, there are also cases of the local party appointee being rebuked for interfering in local matters, or being rejected as chairman of a village committee by vote of the village committee over the objection of the area commissioner.  

As more people are brought together from scattered settlements into villages, a development encouraged by the government, there will be more centers of local initiative in village councils and a tendency toward greater pluralism to help offset the central direction of the overall development program.

At the national level there was a continuing move toward

176 Ibid., p. 219.

inclusion of a wider diversity of opinion within TANU.
Shortly after the October, 1962 presidential election the
leader of the ANC, Mtemwu, announced that he was disbanding
the party and that he was reapplying for membership in TANU.
This decision appeared to be a result of a conviction that
organized opposition was not a fruitful position for in-
fluence, and it was probably a decision taken in anticipa-
tion of the legal banning of opposition political parties.
In January, 1963 TANU decided to allow former members to re-
join the party and also to allow non-Africans to join the
party. As a result Mr. Amir Jamal, a former leader of the
Asian Association, Derek Bryceson, a European leader of the
defunct UTP, and Mtemwu with four other ANC leaders were
admitted to TANU membership.¹⁷⁸ Meanwhile the leader of
the PDP, Mr. C. S. K. Tumbo, merged his party with the re-
mainder of the ANC and attempted to continue the promotion
of racist policies, even though all opposition party ac-
tivity became illegal in 1963. With the broadening of TANU
membership to include not only all races but also a wider
range of opinion, however, the remaining political party
moved to identify itself with all points of view and tried
to offset, in part, the loss of representation these opinions
had in independent political parties.

The legalizing of only one party was not a decision
incompatible with the political theory of Julius Nyerere, as

noted earlier. Because party membership was open to all citizens and party leaders were elected by the membership, the people still could control the government even though there was only one political party. At future elections for the National Assembly Nyerere envisaged the desirability of having more than one party member contest each seat, thereby giving the voters a choice to make, but a choice within TANU. Discussion and representation of opposing points of view could still take place in Parliament because each M.P. would be free to speak out on the issues as he pleased. With such intra-party democracy, Nyerere felt that a two party system was unnecessary, at least for the immediate future.

There is some indication that intra-party discussion allowed the presentation and consideration of a broad spectrum of views, although the debates within the TANU National Executive have always been secret and it is difficult to tell what views have been presented or how much support various policies received. Nyerere has been regarded as the leader of the party, but intra-party discussion has been encouraged and there seems to be some agreement that he did not dominate the party or prevent discussion of proposed policies within the National Executive.179 A feature of these discussions seems to have been that the traditional

African pattern of "talking until you agree" was followed, with policy decisions emerging as a lowest common denominator. Bayne reports that in an interview with the President's brother, Joseph Nyerere, this version of policy making in the National Executive was put forward.\textsuperscript{180} Whether or not this has been the actual policy making process in the TANU National Executive is difficult to establish, but it seems plausible given the relative lack of major disputes between the top party leaders since the end of 1962.

The policies of the government have been generally those formed within the party hierarchy, primarily the National Executive and the Central Committee. Most members of the government cabinet belong to both bodies, but it has been observed that the cabinet has not automatically accepted the decisions of the party.\textsuperscript{181} The policy measures presented to the National Assembly have generally been approved with little debate, but there have also been extensive and critical debates on some proposals which did not prove satisfactory to all wings of the party.

On the Immigration Bill of 1963, for example, Assembly debate indicated much dissatisfaction with the measure as

\textsuperscript{180}Joseph Nyerere stated that "you have no idea how long it sometimes takes to arrive at a consensus. We will stay up all night, and have done so many times, in order to reach a position to which all of us can agree. Then you would understand that Julius cannot be a dictator, even if we do regard him as the first among us. He will often have to give up his idea, but we all gain from agreement."
Bayne, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{181}Bates, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 453.
proposed. The government did not amend the measure, but
general acceptance of it was gained by giving assurances
that the new immigration law would be administered with a
liberal interpretation of its provisions and by providing
for appeals to be made above the Immigration Department.\(^{182}\)
In another case an Affiliation Bill was introduced in the
Assembly in September, 1963 and met with much opposition.
During the second reading the government withdrew it and
appointed a Select Committee of M.P.'s to examine the measure
and to issue a report. The Report was tabled in the Assembly
in January, 1964 and an amended version of the Bill was
passed by the Assembly in that February.\(^{183}\) On a matter of
foreign policy there was much criticism in the National
Assembly of the "soft" policy of the government toward
white-dominated Southern Rhodesia. Government policy was
not materially affected, but the criticism was strong enough
to cause government spokesmen to urge that more patience be
exercised and that debate be more restrained.\(^{184}\)

If criticism of government policy became too caustic
in the National Assembly, government spokesmen issued warnings
in an attempt to draw a limiting line, as they have done in
other arenas of criticism. But these limits appear to have


been broad enough to have allowed some meaningful debates to take place in the National Assembly. The debates did not always alter government policy, but they at least permitted a public examination of the more controversial policy proposals and facilitated a greater flow of information from the back benches to the government leaders and from the government to the public.

Public expression of intra-party points of views has also been facilitated by TANU's own newspapers. The party paper *Uhuru* consistently took a strong racialist line both before and after independence despite the official party position of moderation and racial cooperation. The new government or party daily, *The Nationalist*, has also urged less moderation on racial questions. In addition it has printed criticism of the government expressed by civil servants and departments to the extent that the government had to issue statements replying to *The Nationalist*'s criticisms. These published expressions of intra-party differences have been additional sources of opinion and information concerning governmental and party policies and actions, and they seem to give an indication that some leeway and freedom for opinion has been allowed within TANU. It does not seem that these divergences of opinion between

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the party and its papers would have been allowed over so long a period of time if the party had been very strict in its limitations on expression of diverse opinions, or if the expression of the differing points of view was completely self-serving. The party, after all, was trying to build an image of unity and harmony which would gain the cooperation of everyone in its development programs.

There have been signs that under TANU one-party rule there may be an opportunity for continued or greater freedom for diversity within the party and a greater opportunity for the voters to exercise a choice at election time. At the time of the proposal for constitutional establishment of a one-party state, it was reported that President Nyerere and most of his colleagues were well aware of the dangers that were involved for free opinion expression.\textsuperscript{187} Opposition within the party and discussion of policies were considered to be essential and suggestions were made to encourage this. Nyerere suggested that under the new constitutional system more than one TANU member could contest each seat in the National Assembly and the elected members, not needing to maintain party solidarity to remain in office, could be free to support or oppose the government according to individual conscience.\textsuperscript{188} This system, not without its


\textsuperscript{188}\textit{East Africa and Rhodesia}, XXXIX (January 17, 1963), p. 429.
difficulties, could allow a greater degree of representation for the local constituencies and possibly a greater degree of debate and opposition in the National Assembly. It remains to be seen how this system would work in practice, but this will be a subject for a future study after elections are held under the new constitution. The trend in thinking, however, suggests that there could be a greater potential for diversity in the future at the national level of government under one-party rule.

**Conclusion**

Although the materials available for my use in examining party operation and activity in Tanganyika have been incomplete (lacking, for example, a full record of National Assembly debates and legislation), this brief examination gives some evidence that TANU, which controls the government in a one-party state, has not been monolithic and has not been unresponsive to the representation of various general or special interests. The qualities which seem to have made this responsiveness at least partially democratic are several. Although the national party leadership maintains control over the formation and direction of national policy, there has been some respect for the decisions made by the representative local councils and development committees, and there have been shifts in policy in response to apparently widespread opinion trends. In addition there seems to be a potential for the development of a more widespread pluralism
at the local level in village representative councils. At
the national level various interests, some of which have
maintained independent organizations outside of TANU con-
trol, have been able to represent their views within the
party and in the National Assembly, and have exerted some
influence on the decision process. Most decisions on major
policies seem to have been reached in secret TANU National
Executive meetings, but various views appear to have been
accommodated in the process. Some of these policy decisions
received public debate in the National Assembly. The argu-
ments presented there by representatives of local constitu-
cencies and several special interests helped to bring opposing
points of view before the public and did influence some leg-
islation. The party and government leaders did push for
the acceptance of their policies, however, and set limits
to the types of debate or criticism allowed.

These democratic qualities of representativeness, re-
sponsiveness, freedom for diversity, and public examination
of policies were present only in part of the Tanganyikan
political system. There was much room for improvement in
each of these categories. But the system has not been
totalitarian and certain freedoms did exist in each category.
If any trends are discernible they appear to be toward
greater pluralism in national representation and in local
government. If the present trends continue, therefore, it
would appear that on the balance the operation of the govern-
ment, despite its one-party nature, would deserve to be classified as a "transitional" democracy—as a political system that exhibits some essential features of a democracy and has a potential to develop towards the Western ideal.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The preceding examination of the communications system, associational interest groupings, and political system of Tanganyika has led to some qualified conclusions about the existence and extent of opinion freedom in that one party state. These findings will now be related to the seven conditions which were presented at the beginning of this paper in order to test the extent of their validity in relation to Tanganyika. The conclusions reached here will be used to examine one element of democratic political theory, to draw some general tentative conclusions about one party states, to make a brief comparison of Tanganyika to other states, and to make a tentative classification of Tanganyika's political system.

(1) There will be a variety of news communication media and news sources other than official ones. In Tanganyika it was found that there were several private newspapers and journals which continued to publish in the post-independence period. In addition newspapers from neighboring countries have been circulated and read in Tanganyika. The radio broadcasting system, however, has been controled by the government and private broadcasting facilities have not yet been permitted. The news which has been available for
both the newspapers and the broadcasting system has been derived from both official and non-official sources, on both domestic and foreign affairs. There appear to have been no significant trends during the 1961-1964 period in the number of news sources available or in the variety and number of non-official news communication media. The size and diversification of the non-official communications network appear to have been relatively small or underdeveloped compared to the complex systems of the Western democracies. Nevertheless, a significant non-official network has been operating in Tanganyika.

(2) **Press censorship will be minimal.** It was found that Tanganyika has no official censorship of news or of news sources and that a variety of points of view have been published in the independent press. The government has exerted indirect influence over these publications, however, to ensure that criticism of its policies did not become too extreme. This governmental influence was characterized as positive guidance of the press towards the maintenance of some unity in support of governmental development programs rather than as a negative suppression of news. These efforts at positive guidance might still be regarded as censorship, but they appear to have been minimal and restrained attempts at censorship of opinion and the news, especially when considered in relation to the problems confronting the government in the post-independence period, and appear to have been
not a great deal more severe in their restraint of the press than those guidelines for press publications which exist in most Western democracies. The press has been restrained in Tanganyika, but there still remains a substantial area of freedom for the publication of a variety of opinions and points of view.

(3) **Public discussion of official policies and other matters will be freely permitted.** Discussions of this type have been allowed in Tanganyika in the press, in the National Assembly and at various public and private meetings of interested persons. These discussions have been restrained in part by government policy and action, but again there appears to have been a substantial area of freedom for the expression of diverse points of view, some of which were effective in helping to shape official policies.

(4) **Various autonomous associational interest groups will be operative and able to express their views freely.** There have been several important associational interest groups in Tanganyika and they have some measure of autonomy and freedom of expression. There has been a trend toward greater governmental control of the labor unions, but this trend has not been significantly apparent in relation to other groups such as the cooperative societies and business associations. In recent years these groups, at the request of the government, have exercised some restraint in the expression of their views on certain issues, but these limi-
tions have not prevented the articulation of partisan viewpoints on public matters which affect the interests of a particular group. In addition to the major associations there are a variety of smaller special interest groups which have grown in size and number since independence was gained. These groups, though registered with the government under the Societies Ordinance, have maintained much of their autonomy.

(5) **Access to governmental policy-making centers will be available for the articulation and presentation of public and group opinion.** The major associational interest groupings of Tanganyika have had direct access to the public policy making centers through representatives in both appointive and elected positions within the ruling party and the government. Other more general interests have gained some limited representation through elected members of the party hierarchy or through the legislative councils at national and local levels.

(6) **Government policy statements and actions will encourage and protect free opinion expression and organization.** Government policy in Tanganyika has generally encouraged the expression of diverse opinions in the press, through interest groups, and in the elected governmental councils and assemblies. Such expression, however, was to be constructive and within the moderate limits defined by the government through a series of statements and exhortations. Government policy and actions have encouraged some types of interest organization,
such as in labor unions and cooperative societies, but has
forbidden the organization of alternative political parties.
The official policy regarding the ruling party, however, has
been directed towards encouraging intra-party discussion
and in practice this has been allowed within moderate limits.
The present party policy contemplates more intra-party dis-
cussion in the future through the encouragement of intra-
party competition for elective governmental positions. In
regard to minor interest group organization official policy
and action appear to have been neutral, although certain
standards of conduct were expected from these organizations
in activities which had a political purpose. Governmental
policy statements and actions would appear, then, to have
offered selective encouragement and moderate protection to
opinion expression and organization.

(7) Government policy will be responsive to the
demands of autonomous associational interest groups and to
the more general shifts in public opinion. In Tanganyika
the major autonomous interest groups have been able to re-
shape government policy on certain issues and they appear to
have been influential enough to have their views considered
on most policy issues, being permanently represented in the
highest councils of the party and the government. In the
absence of a series of competitive elections it is difficult
to say how responsive the government has been to the broader
changes in public opinion, but there has been some indication
that local opinions were consulted on various matters of local interest and that the national government has made some limited effort to shape its policies to prevailing widespread opinions. There has been no attempt by the government, however, to force the various elements of society to accept a uniform official ideology which purports to spell out the goals of the country and the means to reach those goals. Instead there has been a more pragmatic approach taken by the party and the government in trying to solve the various problems of the country. This approach envisages much government action in solving these problems, but the government has tried to develop its policy primarily through an adjustment of interests within a loose framework which calls for social planning geared to widespread economic, social, and political development.

The requirements for each of these conditions relating to opinion freedom appear to be at least partially fulfilled in the case of Tanganyika. It is difficult to pinpoint the extent to which they are fulfilled because no precise measurement of these factors has been developed and it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop one here. Another limiting factor, that has been stressed from time to time, is that much relevant data concerning opinion freedom in Tanganyika has been unavailable to the author for this investigation. On the basis of the evidence presented, however, I believe that it can be tentatively concluded that
the citizens of Tanganyika have enjoyed a significant degree of freedom of opinion with a one party political system.

Given this conclusion, admittedly qualified, it would appear that in this case, at least, the hypothetical assumption of Western democratic theory concerning the interdependence of opinion freedom and a competitive party system is not a valid assumption. There is a workable alternative even though it has been imperfectly developed. The fact that freedom of opinion can exist to a significant degree in a one party state does not demonstrate conclusively that it is a practicable alternative for other countries, but it does demonstrate that this alternative is not impossible and that it is an alternative worthy of further investigation, not only in Tanganyika, but in other one party states as well. Such investigations could not only establish some pattern of relative extent of opinion freedom among one party states, and between them and competitive party states, but could also help to establish a pattern of factors which seem to be necessary conditions for the continued existence of opinion freedom in a one party state.

Using Tanganyika as a case study on opinion freedom has both advantages and disadvantages. Among the latter is the fact that it is a country only recently independent which has not had time to develop an extended history of successful operation. Among the former is the fact that it has been a de jure as well as a de facto one party state and, therefore, it
offers a more extreme test for opinion freedom. A further test for opinion freedom was the fact, mentioned above, that it was only recently independent and could be expected to experience some difficulties during the transition period which might be conducive to the restriction of opinion freedoms. The fact that opinion freedom did continue to exist and to operate to a significant degree, despite these more exacting conditions seems to offer greater assurances that a one party state can provide basically adequate protection for opinion freedom. Perhaps this advantage makes it acceptable to minimize the major handicap of a short history of successful operation.

There are several factors which seem to have contributed to the short-term success of maintaining opinion freedom in Tanganyika. These factors include the ability and willingness of the party elite to work together with the politically effective interest groups in forming government policy, the ability of the government to satisfy the minimal demands and expectations of these interest groups and of the politically active segments of the population, the willingness of the party elite to use a pragmatic approach to problem solving rather than imposing a rigid ideology upon the society, the satisfactory adjustment of racial or ethnic differences, the absence of pronounced regional separatist movements, and the presence among the modern elite of a tradition of political moderation and respect for civil liberties. Although there
are many one party states which have not enjoyed this type of political operation (such as Guinea, Ghana, and Mali), the existence or operation of these factors in Tanganyika does not necessarily make the Tanganyikan experience a unique case. Most of these factors appear to have been present also in such de facto one party states as India, Tunisia, The Ivory Coast, and Mexico.\footnote{See, for example, Wayne Wilcox, "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development in India," \textit{The Annals}, CCCLVIII (March, 1965), pp. 114-122; Charles F. Gallagher, "Tunisia" and Virginia Thompson, "The Ivory Coast" in \textit{African One-Party States}, edited by Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 11-36, 237-324; Carl G. Hosberg, Jr., "Democracy and the New African States" in \textit{African Affairs}, Number Two (St. Antony's Papers, Number 15), edited by Kenneth Kirkwood (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), pp. 39-43; Martin C. Needler, "Mexico: Revolution as a Way of Life," in \textit{Political Systems of Latin America}, edited by Martin C.} In addition these states also appear to have provided protection for opinion freedom to an extent not unlike that which exists in Tanganyika. For these reasons it would seem useful to differentiate these states (and any others that exhibit similar characteristics) from both the democratic states which operate with a free and competitive party system and the non-democratic states which have neither a competitive party system nor a significant degree of opinion freedom. If the trends of development within these countries continue to expand the limits upon the various aspects of opinion freedom they should be classified on the democratic side of the line which separates the democratic from the non-democratic, perhaps as "transitional democracies."
The maintenance of opinion freedom in developing countries can easily become a hindrance to an efficient implementation of development plans. But if opinion freedom is used constructively and moderately it can also be an aid to more rational and cooperative development efforts and perhaps help lay the foundations for a successful competitive party political system. The transitional democracy type of one party state may provide a solution to this problem. By extending its membership to include the vast majority of the population, by incorporating various autonomous and semi-autonomous interest groups into its decision making centers, and by encouraging discussion of common problems within its structure, the single party may be able to establish a national consensus and identity among an emerging people, thereby creating a situation in which more open and far reaching debate can take place. If a consensus on certain values and a national identity can be established it may also allow competing political parties to develop within the older nation-building party (as may develop in Tanganyika), or it may allow minor parties to grow in size and importance to offer meaningful competition to the nation-building party (as may happen in India or Mexico).

If the examination of one party government in Tanganyika and the foregoing analysis have any validity, it would seem

that the redefinitions of democracy which have been made by
the leaders of certain developing nations and the differing
political practices which they pursue are not necessarily
outside the traditions of Western democratic theory. New
problems faced by new nations have encouraged the develop-
ment of pragmatic solutions. These solutions, in the case
of the transitional democracies, have tended to preserve the
vital opinion freedoms of the traditional democracies and
offered the hope that they will be preserved and expanded
in the future. In the case of the recently independent
states such as Tanganyika, however, more time will be needed
to see how these new political patterns will operate and
develop in the future. Additional study of these patterns
and solutions will also be needed to ascertain more fully
their nature, the extent to which they are successful,
and the extent to which they may be applicable to the
problems of opinion freedom in other countries.
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