DEMOCRACY ON THE BARRICADES: THE POWER OF WORDS AND IMAGES

A Thesis

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by

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To My Grandmother, Birdella W. Tiffany
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study traces the establishment of a solid democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany after a long crisis over the nature of responsible government. It analyzes the critical attitudes toward authoritarianism and democracy that are of fundamental importance to a parliamentary political culture. Following the Second World War, many Germans feared that "Bonn is not Weimar but...,". The historic instability of German democracy came to the fore in the late 1960s when a significant test occurred. In particular, this study will investigate the conflict between Axel Springer, the newspaper magnate and upholder of the postwar consensus, and the radical fringe of students who took to the streets in 1967-1968 to protest what they labeled an "authoritarian society". The urgency of this struggle between the Left and Right was echoed by members of the political elite in the Bundestag debates which took place in 1967-68.

The civil unrest rocking the Federal Republic in the late 1960s arose in large measure from the belief among elements of German society that democracy was in crisis. Certain events which took place in West Germany from 1949 to 1968 led
segments of the Right, epitomized by Axel Springer, and the Left, typified by the student activists, to conclude that democratic society was threatened. Ironically, the rioting and violence associated with the student protests in the late 1960s caused many politicians to blame the radical Left and far Right for producing this crisis. The final act in this story of democratic crisis was the political battle over the controversial Emergency Laws which were made a Constitutional Amendment on May 31, 1968. By examining the words and images of these debates, one can see that German society of the 1960s was plagued by doubts and questions about the stability of its democracy and the steps proposed to alleviate the crisis.

The first part of this study will deal with the conflict over the nature of German democracy in public culture as typified by the Springer-student conflict. In this section, the basic issue of democratic crisis will be revealed through the words and images of the Springer media and the rhetoric of the student activists. The second part of this study will show how the use of similar words and images revealed a conflict over the nature of German democracy within the political culture of the Federal Republic as reflected by the parliamentary debates of 1967-1968.

Axel Springer’s right wing media empire expressed, in an extreme form, the doubts and fears of many conservative Germans had for the future of democracy, especially after the resignation of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1963. The
activists in the universities, created a hostile climate in which the embattled students took to the streets thereby legitimizing the conservatives' fear that democracy was threatened by the Left. Springer's headlines, photographs, and political cartoons vilified and marginalized the Left. By misuse of historical analogies equating the new Germany of the 1960s to the Weimar Era and the Third Reich, Springer's press successfully condemned the Left and the student activists. Communications theorist Marshall McLuhan noted the power of the words and images of the media and its effect on modern history:

"All media work us over completely. They are so persuasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the massage. Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as environments."

The power of the media to shape events in society is clearly evident in an analysis of the rhetoric and iconography of the student-Springer debate, which reveals how certain terms and images reinforced the belief among the Left as well as the Right that democracy was in crisis. Rhetoric is the use of certain terms to promote action, and iconography, the use of pictures and symbols to evoke powerful emotions in the viewer. Thomas Childers has argued that the "actual language of political discourse" shaped politics in Weimar Germany. This study similarly argues that the social and political discourse between elements of the Right and Left shaped the conflict of
the late 1960s, in the public realm of the Springer-student conflict, as well as in the political realm of the West German Parliament. Certain terms and images associated with the German past, capitalism, communism, authoritarianism and democracy entered the Springer-student discussion and took on symbolic meanings which served to intensify the fear among the Left and the Right that democracy was in crisis.

Ironically, this conflict also demonstrated the degree to which the authoritarianism of the German past had been discredited, and democracy legitimized, among Germans of all generations. In a larger sense, the events of the late 1960s demonstrated West Germany's acceptance of a traditional pattern of West European democratic culture. Democratic culture may be defined as a healthy parliamentary system in which a significant group of minority views act as a brake to the possible tyranny of the governing majority. Democracy also includes a set of ideals by which everyone in the polity ought to have the right to voice their opinions and the right to peacefully dissent from the government. The decision of the Social Democratic Party, traditionally the party of the Left, to join in a coalition government with the center-right Christian Democrat/Christian Socialist Unions in 1966, effectively eliminated the function of the traditional opposition party role in the West German Parliament. To some of the highly politicized left-wing students, the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966 was interpreted as a signal to
begin an extraparliamentary opposition to what they felt was a dysfunctional government. In 1967-1968, extraparliamentary protest reached its height in the Federal Republic. The protesters came to focus much of their activity on a campaign against Axel Springer, who had attacked the Left and student demonstrators in his newspapers.

Axel Springer was a conservative newspaper publisher who represented the economic miracle and the society it had created. An ardent supporter of the center-right Kiesinger government which came to power in 1966, he controlled nearly 40% of West Germany's national newspapers. His near monopoly of the German press led the students to consider him a threat to democracy. The students believed Springer's ability to control one of the main vehicles of public opinion enabled him to "manipulate" the political culture of West German society. The students arrived at this conclusion by combining the neo-Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse's critique of the repressive nature of post-capitalist society with what they felt to be a revival of authoritarianism in German culture. By authoritarian, the students meant that German society was pervaded by structures which concentrated power in the hands of a few individuals similar to the high-handed methods of the professors in the German universities. The student activists believed that Springer's nationalist press could "manipulate" or subversively lull the West German citizens into unquestioning acquiescence in the policies of the Federal
government.\textsuperscript{7}

While there has been much historiographical and political debate on the student protests of the late 1960s, most treatments have been very superficial. Most historians have offered international generalizations to explain the student protests in the Federal Republic. Many like Geoff Eley, Ronald Fraser, and Mary Fullbrook have argued that the student movement in West Germany was simply part of a broad generational conflict which occurred throughout the Western Nations.\textsuperscript{8} Other scholars such as Erwin K. Scheuch and Karl Dietrich Bracher posited psychological and ideological explanations for the student demonstrations along broad international lines.\textsuperscript{9} Paul Piccone offered a less superficial but equally vague suggestion that Vietnam and the international framework of the Cold War were not the main points at issue, rather, each country had more specific and unique problems that led to the civil disturbances of the 1960s. Piccone does not however, provide any alternative analytical framework for the investigation of the unique West German problems that led to the protests of 1968.\textsuperscript{10}

Political scientists such as David Conradt, Gordon Drummond, and Geoffrey Roberts, all tend to minimize the importance of the protest movement in 1967-1968.\textsuperscript{11} These political scientists all note that the radical nature of the protesters deterred the generally "apolitical German"\textsuperscript{12} from becoming involved. The political scientists have argued that
the student protesters’ inability to gain significant trade union support essentially negated their having any major effect on German society. Most, like David Conradt, argued that the postwar economic success; the relatively easy integration of West Germany into NATO; and the failure of the neo-Nazi party to gain representation in the Bundestag has shown that the Bonn Republic had achieved a smooth transformation from Nazi fascism to parliamentary democracy.\textsuperscript{13} However, some of these political analysts have offered deeper insights into the extraparliamentary protest of the 1960s. Following from his discussion of the "apolitical German", Kurt Sontheimer argued that by the 1960s many Germans began to lose faith in their politicians to truly represent their interests in government. Sontheimer further argued that the radical students represented an extreme form of this feeling that democracy was being withheld from the population.\textsuperscript{14} By this Sontheimer meant that although the stage and backdrop were those of a democracy, the students felt that politicians were not playing their roles correctly, because the voice of the minority went unheard. Also important for this study is political scientist Gordon Smith’s theory that a sense of crisis was a feature of political life in the Federal Republic and the extraparliamentary protests of the 1960s had exposed a raw historical nerve.\textsuperscript{15} Despite Smith and Sontheimer’s insights, the success of democracy in the FRG has caused many political scientists to gloss over the
challenges to West German democracy that occurred in the late 1960s.

The political and historical explanations of this time period are superficial because they posit broad generalizations for the causes of the civil unrest in West Germany in 1967-68. The Cold War, Vietnam War, generational conflict, rise of the right wing NPD, and rise of the New Left have all been offered as historical explanations of the unrest of 1968. Although not incorrect, these explanations tell an incomplete story. A key to understanding the issues involved in the West German civil unrest in 1967-1968 may be found by an intensive study of two of the main protagonists: the Springer press and student activists. An analysis of their debate, their language and visual symbols reveal the issues that were at stake in West German society during the 1960s, not as separate entities but intertwined. The Cold War, the generational crisis, the rise of the New Left, questions about the German past (particularly the crisis of democracy which paralleled the Weimar era) were linked because they shaped the conceptions of democracy held by the Right and the Left. Both Springer and the APO upheld democracy as an ideal which had to be defined, struggled for, and protected. The two adversaries exemplified the articulate opposites of the 1960s; the older, more conservative faction (Springer), and the younger, radical faction (student activists). Ultimately, the civil unrest which resulted from the conflict between these two factions in
1968, and its eventual resolution in the collapse of the Grand Coalition, may be considered a defining point in a long history of problems the Germans have had with democracy. There exists consensus among historians that 1968 represents a watershed in the history of West Germany. Scholars as diverse as Ronald Fraser, Michael Balfour, and Hans Dieter Müller agree that the late 1960s was a period of crisis for the Federal Republic; in 1968 the worst street fighting since the Weimar Era occurred. According to public official Bruno Heck and the Spiegel editorialist, Ludwig Herrmann, this crisis was more crucial to understanding recent German history than the Nazi era. Its resolution can be considered a crossroads, or, as Rob Burns wrote, "caesura" for German history, which permanently discredited previous authoritarian attitudes in German political culture. Thus an explanation of the civil unrest of the late 1960s is essential for understanding contemporary German history.

**The Historical Failure of German Democracy**

German history has been haunted by the failed attempt in 1919-1933 to construct a democracy during the Weimar Republic. Before 1919, moves toward German liberalism and representative institutions were also impeded by authoritarian rulers. As early as the student supported revolutions of 1848, during which the majority of Western Europe experienced a broadening
of political participation by the citizenry, Germany did not experience a corresponding political liberalization.\textsuperscript{19} Bismarck’s ability to declare the Prussian Parliament in a state of emergency and rule by decree in the 1860s showed how even early German attempts at a Parliamentary system were subverted by a few authoritarian leaders.\textsuperscript{20} According to Arno Mayer, this same strand of authoritarian leadership, in which a few ruled with only a pretense of democratic government, persisted through the end of World War I.\textsuperscript{21} The civil unrest which occurred during the last days of the Weimar Republic was related to the German people’s rejection of parliamentary democracy. As Eberhard Kolb has suggested, many people considered the Weimar Republic a "makeshift democracy" which failed because the ideals of representative democratic government had never taken hold among the German people. The Third Reich witnessed the apogee of anti-democratic impulses under the wholly nationalist and authoritarian leadership of Adolf Hitler.\textsuperscript{22}

Following the Second World War, 1945-1949, the Allied forces sought to create a pluralist, democratic, decentralized government in the Western Zone of Germany. The Allies also sought to exorcise the former nationalism and militarism that had led to the Nazi nightmare by a program of denazification and demilitarization. However, the widespread devastation and lack of food pushed aside any considerations of politics by the German people and the policy of denazification was only
partially successful. A national survey conducted in 1949, indicated that over 40% of the West German population had little interest at all in the new government. Also based on an analysis of public opinion surveys conducted annually after 1951, sociologist Frederick D. Weil concluded that older Germans like Axel Springer, who had come of age during the Third Reich, had a strong attitude of skepticism toward the new Bonn Republic. Following the period of reconstruction in West Germany, there evolved a political and cultural consensus among the German people of the Federal Republic which was fundamentally pro-NATO, politically conservative, and capitalist-consumer oriented. This consensus society arose under the paternalistic leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the chancellor of the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1963. During Adenauer's chancellorship, a degree of co-operation between industrialists, labor unions, the press, and government officials helped bring about a tremendous economic upswing, the "Wirtschaftswunder," in West Germany. Mary Fullbrook has argued that because of the German "economic miracle" of the 1950s, the West Germans came to associate democracy with prosperity, unlike the Weimar period. The press also aided this feeling of democratic success by portraying the communist German Democratic Republic, as the permanent other. Springer's media in particular arose to champion the new Germany.
Events of the Adenauer years caused left-wing intellectuals like Ralf Dahrendorf and Heinrich Böll to feel that West Germany was slipping into a kind of apolitical, "passive authoritarianism" due to the Germans' submersion of political interests to consumer interests. Many events of the Adenauer years seemed to confirm the Left's fears that postwar Germany was headed in a conservative, nationalistic direction. Adenauer's decision to join NATO in 1955 and his refusal to recognize the communist state of East Germany, known as the Hallstein Doctrine, were interpreted as dangerous steps toward a new nationalism in West Germany. Overlooked by the far Left however, was the Adenauer government's payment of large reparations to Israel during the 1950s, and the West German support for the European Common Market in 1959. Ultimately, Adenauer's constant emphasis on economic growth and slogan of "No Experiments!" helped cement the dominance of the right-wing Christian Democrat/Christian Socialist Parties, while the left-wing Social Democratic Party continued to languish in the role of the minority party. One of the businessmen who benefitted from the postwar economic boom was Axel Springer. By 1949, Die Welt, a newspaper originally established by the British occupation administration, was under the control of Springer. Springer later became a friend and political supporter of Adenauer, and used his media to paint a favorable picture of the chancellor.

While the conservative elements of German society had
taken control of parliamentary politics, the left-wing members of German society were in great disarray. The Social Democratic Party, which was the only Party in Weimar Germany to vote against the Enabling Act, allowing Hitler to assume presidential rule, had retained at least an ideological commitment to Marxism after the war. Under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher, who had been tortured and imprisoned by the Nazis because of his socialist beliefs, the SPD called for nationalization of major industries and reunification with East Germany, and spoke against NATO and German rearment. Until his death in 1952, Schumacher ran the SPD in sharp opposition to the policies of the CDU/CSU. He was succeeded by his protege, Erich Ollenhauer, who also refused to compromise any of the SPD’s socialist principles.  

The German public, however, had found a sense of security in the economically successful policies of Ludwig Erhard’s "social market economy" and the strong, western-oriented defense policies of CDU/CSU leader, Konrad Adenauer. Under Adenauer, West Germany achieved a degree of "Europeanness" as the Federal Republic became integrated with the West through the European Coal and Steel Community in 1959, and their reacquisition of the Saar from France. The center-right CDU/CSU’s electoral success of the 1950s caused the SPD to consider fundamental reevaluations of its platform by the late 1950s. As political historian Gordon Smith noted, the SPD lost out to the CDU because it overestimated the appeal of
reunification and socialism, and underestimated the West Germans’ fear of Stalinist communism in the East and the CDU’s ability to achieve economic success. The East German uprising of 1953 and the attempted revolution in Hungary in 1956, both of which were crushed by the Soviets caused the West German electorate to fear the SPD’s ambivalent stance toward communism. The electorate continued to vote for Adenauer through the 1950s and especially up to 1961 when the Wall was built.\textsuperscript{31} Political scientist David Conradt also pointed out that the SPD had fallen victim to the demographics of postwar West Germany. The large Protestant, working class areas that had contributed the majority of the SPD’s votes in the past had become part of East Germany after the war. The SPD’s former stance of anti-clericalism was anathema to German Catholics who represented 45% of the Federal Republic’s population.\textsuperscript{32} By the late 1950s, the SPD realized that major changes were necessary to regain votes. Under the leadership of new leaders, Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, and Helmut Schmidt, the SPD set out to shape a "new look" for the party. In 1959, the Social Democratic Party decided at Bad Godesberg to drop its Marxist rhetoric which called for socialist transformation of society; it upheld a western-oriented defense policy committed to anti-communism and claimed to be a "catch-all" party encompassing all progressive elements.\textsuperscript{33} Herbert Wehner enunciated the SPD’s new course on June 30, 1960, when he told members of the Bundestag that
the SPD was now ready to cooperate with the CDU/CSU on matters of defense and foreign policy. Wehner, along with Brandt and Schmidt continued to guide the new SPD closer to the center throughout the 1960s.

At this point, the SPD’s youth organization, the Socialist German Student Union (SDS), grew more pro-Marxist in reaction to the "betrayal" of its parent party. In 1961, the SPD, formally cut all ties with its youth affiliate due to ideological differences. Despite the SDS’s charge that the SPD had sold its socialist soul for the center vote, a group of SPD members continued to hold left-wing views into the 1960s, an ideological faction which would bedevil the SPD’s unity during the years of the Grand Coalition.

Before the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966, the conservative CDU/CSU had maintained a strong majority in the Bundestag from 1949 until 1966 in coalition governments with the small Free Democratic Party. During those years, the socialist SPD had acted as the main opposition party within the Bundestag. In 1966 however, the CDU/CSU could no longer maintain a majority position with the FDP. The FDP decided to abandon the CDU/CSU in 1966 due to the failure of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to inspire confidence in conservative voters and the rise of a civil libertarian faction in the FDP. This faction led by members Herbert Scheel and Hans Dietrich Genscher represented a growing constituency in the FDP composed of young white collar workers who were critical of
Adenauer's policies. The loss of the FDP and the SPD's new centrist platform convinced the CDU/CSU to join in a coalition with the opposition. The SPD on the other hand, with its "new look" snatched the chance at a coalition with the CDU to gain more center votes and prove to the West Germans that they could govern effectively.\textsuperscript{35} This government, under the chancellorship of Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a member of the CDU/CSU and former Nazi official, was called the Grand Coalition with the small Free Democratic Party acting as the sole opposition party. The CDU/CSU and SPD coalition comprised a voting bloc of over 80% of the Bundestag deputies and therefore rendered the FDP's opposition inconsequential. The lack of a significant interparliamentary opposition led key intellectuals such as Günther Grass to call upon students, Leftists, intellectuals, and other citizens to form a grass roots extraparliamentary opposition to the Grand Coalition.

The 1960s and West German Political Reawakening

During the first half of the 1960s, several events stimulated an anti-authoritarian mentality among the Left wing academic community of West Germany. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 destroyed nearly all hope of reunification with the Eastern Zone, and clamped West Germany more firmly into the arena of the Cold War. Fritz Fischer's epochal work on Germany's war aims in the First World War shattered the myth that the Germans had accidentally stumbled into the war
and stirred a virulent debate on the German past between conservative and revisionist academics.\(^{36}\) In 1962, what became known as the "Spiegel Affair" occurred when the offices of the left-liberal news magazine, Der Spiegel, were seized under orders from Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss for having publicized military deficiencies of the West German Army during recent NATO maneuvers. Public outcry against the Federal government’s action led to Strauss’s resignation as well as Adenauer’s agreement to resign the following year. This incident demonstrated the growing power and influence of the media in West German political culture, and also seemed to indicate that the postwar government was not averse to using unconstitutional measures against the press, chillingly reminiscent of the Nazi regime.\(^{37}\) Intellectuals such as Karl Jaspers, Günter Grass, and Heinrich Böll saw these events as warnings that the Federal Republic was sliding back to its authoritarian tendencies.\(^{38}\)

In 1964, philosopher Herbert Marcuse published The One-Dimensional Man, which became the handbook of many of the leaders of the student movement and brought the term "manipulated society" into common usage. By "manipulated", Marcuse meant that modern people would submit to nearly any outrage, including the production of nuclear weapons (or the rejection of democracy), as long as they were able to lead a comfortable existence. This situation was the end product of what Marcuse felt to be the overextended rationalization of
human needs in an irrational world. Marcuse further argued that the mass media had no trouble in selling these rational absurdities to modern people, because the media was one of the great products that this rational society had produced. Following from Marcuse’s theory, it was "rational" for the Springer press to denigrate the students because this policy sold newspapers— it was a policy the consumer demanded. Marcuse was to become the main ideologue for the student movement in West Germany. The students saw the Springer media’s support for NATO and German rearmament as a perfect example of how the economically "comfortable" West Germans had come to accept political decisions without question.

By the middle of the decade, the overburdened West German universities found they could not cope with the deluge of enrollments by members of the post-war generation. The overcrowding of the universities in the mid-1960s resulted from the increased prosperity of the West Germans and the neglect of educational reforms by Adenauer’s government. Throughout the spring of 1966, there were numerous student demonstrations protesting against the arcane teaching methods in the German universities; the implementation of de-registration procedures, which specified a time limit for students to complete all the courses in their major; and the numerus clausus, which threatened to limit the number of students who could attend universities. Before these new procedures, any German student who passed the Arbitur (final
exam to graduate from the Gymnasium) was able to attend a university, and there was no time limit for completion of a university degree. These new developments, coupled with the fact that the student population had more than doubled from 1950 to the early 1960s, fostered a climate of discontent among many of the students.⁴¹ These early demonstrations were based on the legitimate grievances of the students and were, for the most part, peaceful.

The Springer press, which according to Hans Dieter Müller was in the "Happiness Business," chided the students for being spoiled and ungrateful.⁴² Springer’s editorial criticism of the students triggered a pattern of reactions against what they perceived as the slanderous statements by the press and the Right. The students’ discontent mounted with the SPD’s decision in 1966 to abandon its traditional role of the opposition and join a coalition with the conservative parties. At this time some left-wing student leaders and intellectuals in the Federal Republic called on the people to support an "Extraparliamentary Opposition" (APO) to the government in Bonn. Springer’s right-wing, pro-government press provided a tangible, as well as symbolic target for this opposition.

In response to the students’ and intellectuals’ calls for an investigation of the Springer press monopoly, the Kiesinger government asked the Parliament to form a commission to investigate press concentration.⁴³ In Germany as in most
of Europe, unlike the United States, the press is openly partisan in conformity with its political orientation. Accordingly, the leftist student activists viewed Springer’s hugely successful right-wing publications as a threat to the German Left.\textsuperscript{44} Previous attempts to investigate the issue of press concentration revealed the power of the press over politicians. The Social Democratic Party leader Helmut Schmidt had labelled participation in such an investigation, "political suicide" due to the ability of the German press to destroy political careers, as the Spiegel Affair had demonstrated.\textsuperscript{45} Nevertheless, the commission was formed in 1967 under the leadership of Dr. Eberhard Günther, head of the Federal Central Office for Cartels. Günther sought to investigate, and if necessary, break the power of large press monopolies. The Günther Commission was composed of five representatives from the newspaper industry in order to provide an unbiased investigation of press concentration. Unfortunately for Dr. Günther, Axel Springer was appointed to the commission and effectively stymied the commission’s attempts to investigate his monopoly of the press. Eventually in 1968, the Günther Commission recommended to Parliament that the federal government should set a limit of 40% of the market share of newspapers and 15% of magazines for any single publisher.\textsuperscript{46} Ultimately, the Parliament chose to disregard the commission’s findings and asserted that the German press was not in danger of an "opinion monopoly" by any publishing
Also in 1967, the Federal Government in Bonn took up the politically volatile issue of Emergency Law legislation. The Emergency Laws, which had failed to win approval twice in the past due to lack of support from the SPD and the trade unions, stated that in case of a domestic emergency, the Federal Government could curtail certain democratic procedures in order to defend the nation. The APO feared the proposed Emergency Laws which under Weimar had allowed the central government to assume dictatorial powers. The Left also viewed the Emergency Laws as a further regression to authoritarian government. While the government slowly moved toward eventual passage of the Emergency Laws (May 31, 1968) and the Günther Commission half-heartedly attacked the issue of press concentration, an extra-parliamentary opposition (APO) made up of student groups, left-wing intellectuals, disarmament groups, and radical Marxists, attempted to invigorate democracy from below - by settling the questions of German democracy on its city streets and in its university campuses.

Escalation and Crisis

From the spring of 1967 until the passage of the Emergency Laws in May 1968, six key events occurred which saw the Springer-student conflict shift from a journalistic smear campaign against the student demonstrators to pitched battles
with police. The first event occurred on June 2, 1967, when Benno Ohnesorg, a student in Berlin was shot by police at a demonstration. Ohnesorg’s death essentially radicalized many of the student activists emotionally and convinced them that their grievances extended beyond the university campuses and into society itself. During the fall 1967, January and February 1968, three events took place which indicated that the activists had turned to broader political and social issues in German society. In November 1967, the protesters ran an "Expropriate Springer" campaign. This campaign not only designated Springer as the bete noire of the German Right, but also indicated the German Left’s concern over the problem of press monopolies. In January 1968, the student’s held an "Anti-Fascist Springer Tribunal" which "convicted" Springer of attempting to revive old German nationalism and authoritarianism through his media. In a larger sense, the trial evinced the radical Left’s belief that the Adenauer years saw little sweeping changes in society after the war, and were little more than a "restoration" of the former attitudes which had led to German fascism. In February 1968, students and Left wing activists held a Vietnam Congress in West Berlin. Predictably, the participants condemned the war as an act of imperialist aggression led by the United States. In a uniquely German sense, however, many of the participants condemned the atrocities in Vietnam as similar to the Nazi war crimes. The young activists also felt a certain empathy to the
Vietnamese because the Germans also lived in a divided nation. In April 1968, in what may be viewed as the most radical phase of the student protests, riots broke out in all the major cities of the FRG after one of the leaders of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke, was shot by a right wing fanatic. The violence of the Easter riots marked the culmination of long brewing hostilities between the radical Left and conservative German society. The Easter riots, most of which were directed at Springer properties, also symbolized the Left’s frustration caused by the lack of political action in the direction of needed social reforms. The final event in the series of protests occurred in May 1968, when the extraparliamentary opposition, comprised of student activists, Left wing radicals, and trade unionists marched on Bonn to protest the ratification of the Emergency Laws. This last march, less violent than the Easter demonstrations, was the final and most broadly supported attempt by the Left to halt what it saw as West Germany’s descent back to fascism. These are the main issues at stake in the events of 1967-1968, a more detailed account will however, be useful in understanding the role of words and images associated with these events.

The students’ anger against the government and the Springer press exploded in the spring of 1967. On June 2, 1967, the increasingly politicized student movement demonstrated against the Shah of Iran, who was considered a NATO supported dictator, during his state visit to West
Berlin. Police and pro-Shah Iranians attacked the students, and in the course of the melee, a 26 year old student, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot in the back of the head by a policeman. Ohnesorg was not a member of the SDS nor an active participant in the demonstration. His death polarized sections of the student body and left-leaning members of the population against the conservative elements of German society who sided with the Berlin police.\(^5\)

Ohnesorg's death ushered in a new phase of student protests in which the student movement fell increasingly under the influence of Marxist ideologues. The Socialist German Student Union (SDS), which had moved to the forefront as the organizer of the student movement, came under the radical left-wing leadership of students such as Rudi Dutschke and Bernd Rabehl.\(^5\) These radicals sought to channel the student voices into a general critique of West German and western capitalist society. These leaders called on the students to use "direct action" to bring about change in all of society. By direct action, the SDS leaders meant a physical attempt to stop Springer's newspapers from being delivered, interrupt lectures in the universities, and stage sit-ins. Simply changing the universities would not be possible in a society that had been "manipulated" by the right-wing press. The anti-student rhetoric which permeated the Springer press coverage of the Ohnesorg shooting elevated Axel Springer to the status of an exemplar of technocratic, bourgeois, and
manipulated society.

In November and December 1967, the APO led a campaign to "Expropriate Springer" in nearly all of the major cities of the Federal Republic. The campaign sought to physically hinder the distribution of Springer newspapers in West Germany so that his editorial views could no longer influence the political consciousness of the Germans. Ironically the demonstrations against Axel Springer caused his media sales to skyrocket and his editorial policies to be even more caustic in regard to the students. In January and February 1968, the APO continued its protests against Springer, and the SDS sponsored a mock "Anti-Fascist Springer Tribunal" at the Technical University of Berlin which "convicted" Springer of being the vanguard of a new authoritarianism and nationalism in West Germany. The SDS also sponsored a Vietnam Congress attended by international anti-war activists and speakers such as Tariq Ali, and symbolized the opposition many young West Germans felt against their country's support of the United States' war in Vietnam. Both the Anti-Fascist Springer Tribunal and the Vietnam Congress revealed more information about deep-seated fears of the German youth than about Springer or the Vietnam conflict. These events showed that a segment of the West German population felt that fascism had not been stamped out, and the post war division of Germany by the superpowers was not acceptable to many Germans.
The growing frustration of the student activists and the Left erupted two months later, on Easter weekend 1968.\textsuperscript{54} The day before Good Friday, Rudi Dutschke, the chief leader and ideologue of the APO, was shot nearly to death in Berlin by a right-wing fanatic. Many of the more radical members of the APO saw Dutschke's near assassination as part of a plot by conservative elements of German society, including the Federal government, orchestrated by the red baiting headlines of Springer's papers.\textsuperscript{55} The leaders of the APO called for a mass rebellion against those forces which had attempted to take away their leader. The Easter riots of April 13-18, 1968, have been recorded as the worst civil unrest in Germany since the early and last Weimar years.\textsuperscript{56}

The Easter demonstrations represented the acme of the SDS's control over the APO. Ironically, rather than "exposing Springer's dictatorship of manipulation"\textsuperscript{57} by their street battles with police, the students turned the majority of German citizens, including most leftists, against their cause.\textsuperscript{58} After April 1968, the APO's unity swiftly began to crumble because of the violence associated with the Easter riots. The German Campaign for Disarmament withdrew its support of the APO because it had come to be dominated by the radical members of the SDS. The SDS meanwhile, had lost its base of student support due to the increasingly violent nature of the movement.
In May 1968, the SDS, along with some left-wing trade unions managed to organize a protest march against the Emergency Laws in Bonn, but Parliament voted in favor of the laws on May 31, 1968. The women members of the SDS voted to break with what they called the "patriarchal nature of the SDS" in June 1968 and started their own women’s movement.59 By the fall of 1968, especially after the crushed revolt in Prague, the SDS and student movement had a greatly diminished affect on West German society.

These six events illustrate the radical Left’s rapid evolution from a peaceful dissent movement within the universities to a violently active force throughout the major cities of the FRG. Initial concerns for the problems of higher education were transformed by both radical Left wing leaders and the provocative Springer headlines into an attack on the basic political structures of West German society. That is, what had initially been a peaceful demand for more student representation in university politics had become an attack on West Germany’s consensus society constructed during the Adenauer years. The words and imagery utilized by Springer and the students during this period of turmoil reveal some of the powerful forces acting on the political culture of West Germany in the late 1960s. By examining these words and images, three themes are evident - the lingering problems of Germany’s Nazi past, the continuing struggle between capitalism and communism, and the struggle for Germans to
define democracy.

Axel Springer's "Unmasterable Past"

The role of what Charles S. Maier calls Germany's attempt to "master the past" - that is, coming to terms with the experiences of the Nazi period - is a key to understanding the Right's perception of democratic crisis in 1968. For Axel Springer, born in 1912, and for many of his fellow Germans who had lived through the Weimar Era and the Third Reich, Adenauer's government represented the first stable democracy in their lifetime. Consequently, for the older Germans, the young protesters of the 1960s, who waved anti-government banners, seemed to represent a threat to the only stable democratic government they had ever known. Also threatening to the older Germans was the academic debate on the German past which had been opened by Fritz Fischer's re-evaluation of German war aims in World War I. Ernst Nolte's The Three Faces of Fascism, which relabeled Nazism as "German Fascism", marked the beginning of a long debate among West German intellectuals over the historic role of the Hitler years in German culture. Part of this debate on the German past, which was epitomized by the phrase "Bonn is not Weimar but...," dealt with Germany's fear over Bonn's prospects of maintaining a stable democratic government.

In the rhetoric of the Springer press and the student protesters', the Left and Right were both searching for a
"usable past", a past that would explain the meaning of the Weimar Era, Third Reich, and the Holocaust in the context of the new Germany two decades later. On the Right, people like Axel Springer believed that the instability of the pluralist democracy of the Weimar years had led to Hitler's seizure of power. Springer felt that the public disorder caused by the APO was a sign that the democratic state was in danger of collapsing from within due to pressure from "young rowdies", just as Weimar democracy had collapsed under the pressure of the Brown Shirts.

Springer’s newspapers made continuous references to the German past, particularly the Weimar years, and his editorials attempted to link the early Nazi mobs with the student protesters of 1967-68. A Bild commentary following the Springer Tribunal in February 1968 announced: "End of the Twenties, Now Begins the Start of the Thirties". The article argued that because Weimar Germany had not dealt effectively with disorder, the battle between the extreme Left and Right had produced Hitler and the destruction of Germany and Europe. Springer told Anne Armstrong that 1960s Berlin was in a similar state of moral decay as in the early 1930s. "Berlin is more licentious in the past few years than it was during the Weimar Days". Other older Germans also shared this Nietzschean view of cultural decay. Many disapproved of the "sexual liberation" and counterculture of the young people and saw the university "Kommune" and emerging drug scene as a
return to the decadence of Weimar. Figure 1 ("Enough with Sex and Beat- We Want Discussion") shows three university professors demanding that the students stop their hedonistic behavior and face real political issues such as university reform.

In a further allusion to the Weimar era, the Springer press equated the APO demonstrations with the rallies of Hitler’s SA (Stormtroopers). A June 1967 Bild article proclaimed, "We have something against SA methods. The Germans want no brown and no red SA. They want no columns of toughs, rather peace". Pictorially, the Springer press worked hard to portray student leader Rudi Dutschke as the kind of psychopathic demagogue who had seized power in the 1930s. Figure 2 ("Difficult Diagnosis") shows doctors trying to examine Dutschke’s brain to see what is wrong with it. This picture ironically appears over an article entitled, "It is different than 1932". This article is self-contradictory because it allegedly tries to outline the differences between 1968 and 1932, but subtly links the above Figure 2 with the events of 1932. Figure 3 ("Cold Dutschke"), which played on the rhyme of Dutschke’s name with the German word for shower, Dusche, was typical of Springer’s caustic and ironic presentation of student leader Rudi Dutschke whose dangerous rhetoric threatened to drown German society. Also note the despair of the older generation symbolized by the plummer.
Figure 1
Die Welt, January 27, 1968, p. VI
Es ist anders als 1932

Figure 2
_Die Welt, February 21, 1968, p. 2_
Figure 3
Die Welt, February 12, 1968, p. 2
Springer’s rhetoric and invocation of symbols of the street gangs of the Weimar years soon became common currency. Many government officials took Springer’s side. For example, Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss stated that student attacks on Springer facilities were similar to the Nazi attacks on Jewish businesses.\textsuperscript{69} West Berlin Justice Minister Hoppe was quoted in Bild as referring to the student protests outside the Berliner Morgenpost as, "...fascist methods".\textsuperscript{70} Even the neo-Marxist political philosopher Jürgen Habermas denigrated the APG’s departure from non-violence to attacks on property as a kind of Linksfaschismus or "Left-wing fascism".\textsuperscript{71}

**Axel Springer’s views on Capitalism and Communism**

Another one of the key debates between the students and Springer which altered the West German view of their economic and political system was the debate over capitalism and communism. Springer’s views on communism can be attributed to his own personal experiences with the Stalinist version of communism. During World War II, Springer’s father’s newspaper, the Altonaer Nachrichten, had been forced out of business by the Nazis. After the war, Springer became one of the chief beneficiaries of the economic miracle as he was able to buy Die Welt from the British for a very reasonable price.\textsuperscript{72} Springer came to associate the Allies and Germany’s
new democracy with prosperity. When the Soviets built the Berlin Wall, and the reality of the communist threat to German unity became a fact. Springer equated Hitler’s totalitarianism with that of Stalin’s, and in particular, the Stalinist form of socialism which Ulbricht promoted in the "Eastern Zone" (GDR). As a consequence of his own personal views, in which he claimed to oppose all forms of totalitarianism, Springer began to wage his own personal struggle against the communists.  

Springer personally felt that Marxism as an ideology had been buried in the 1950s when both the German SPD and the British Labour Party had repudiated the nationalization of industry. Springer applauded the decision of the SPD in 1959 to "clean off their dirty Marxist goals" as evident in Figure 4 ("After the Bath"). Figure 4 shows the new, clean SPD party man after he has discarded his old soiled clothes. This cartoon also indicated that by choosing to work with government in the Grand Coalition, there will be prosperity for Social Democrats as evident by the shiny shoes and hat waiting for the "cleansed" SPD man. Springer therefore, saw the rise of the New Left as a dangerous precedent:

"But now, you see, we have a new generation of young socialists who are espousing a kind of neo-Marxism, and the tragedy is that some of the older socialists who had long since discarded Marxist views are jumping on the neo-Marxist bandwagon..."  

He attacked the students and intellectuals because they represented a communist threat to democracy from within the
Nach dem Bad

Figure 4
Die Welt, February 14, 1968, p. VI
Federal Republic: "If you ask me, there are more genuine communists in West Berlin than in the whole of East Germany."\textsuperscript{75}

Springer, like many other Berliners, felt the only protection against communist encroachment lay within support of NATO and the United States, and that the students were foolish to think otherwise:

"I support greater unity with Europe but always within the framework of cooperation with the United States. This makes me unpopular with the radical students, who think every defense of the United States is a sign of imperialist war mongering, but I am used to that."\textsuperscript{76}

If the FRG maintained a strong tie with the US, an outright communist conquest could be discouraged. But Springer warned that the communists might subvert German democracy from within through conspiracy. Thus he tried to shape the German consciousness through his rhetoric and pictorial presentations by playing on several basic ideas.

The first of these ideas was a conspiracy theme which pervaded many of his newspapers and political cartoons. For many of his readers, the headlines from 1966 to 1968 imparted a sense of urgency against a conspiratorial threat which played on their basic emotions of fear and insecurity. As early as February 1966, a reader of one of Springer's dailies, the \textit{Berliner Morgenpost}, postulated that the communist "Trojan Horse" could be found among Berlin students.\textsuperscript{77} In April 1967, radical left-wing students of Kommune I allegedly threatened to assassinate U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey
with a bomb. Although the whole incident was a hoax, the Berliner Morgenpost still ran the headline, "Free University Students Complete Bombs with Explosive Material from Peking." The Springer press would often refer to "Drahtzieher," or wire pullers, who coordinated and led the students secretly. On April 28, 1967, just a few days before the riot during which Benno Ohnesorg was shot, Bild reported the following:

"The wire pullers sit on the other side of the wall, in the Chinese embassy in East Berlin. From it, the Red Guardists obtain newer propaganda material for their countless flyers and stage directions." Even Springer's more respectable daily, Die Welt, fostered an atmosphere of conspiracy. An article which appeared on the front page of the daily, on January 10, 1968, was entitled, "Communists Intensify Activity : Increasing Infiltration in the Federal Republic Expected". It noted that the number of labor union members who were sympathetic to the position of the Soviet Zone increased by 4,000 from 1966 to 1967.

The political cartoons of the Springer press played on the Cold War's conspiracy theme of a world-wide Communist movement against capitalism; Figure 5 ("Are the peace offers genuine?") illustrated the idea of an orchestrated communist revolution in Vietnam directed by Moscow. Figure 6 ("Reunification - only communistically, lovely lambs!") shows a common characterization of Ulbricht (Communist Party leader of East Germany) as a wolf who may pounce on the Federal
Sind die Friedenspalmen echt?

Figure 5
Die Welt, January 9, 1968, p. 4
„Wiedervereinigung — hör kommunistisch, liebe Geißlein!“

Figure 6
Die Welt, February 2, 1968, p. 2
Republic at any moment. Also note that the lambs in the picture are clearly female thus playing on the gender stereotype of the "frail female" who needs to be protected.

A second tactic which Springer employed, played on the basic emotive distrust of the younger generation by their elders, as Springer's cartoons caricatured the students as unruly brats. Figure 7 ("Demonstrators attempt to break through the police chain in front of the Frankfurt US-General Consulate") shows Rudi Dutschke (center), the leader of the SDS, madly trying to break through in what almost looks like a "fun" game of protest. Figure 8 shows young "Reds" under the leadership of Dutschke, repudiating all the past efforts of the US to support West Germany such as the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift. Lastly, Figure 9 ("We demand more freedom!") shows the foolishness of West German students who demonstrated against capitalist society, as compared to the students in Warsaw who had also staged protests in the universities. Also note the hair style of both mice is similar to that of Rudi Dutschkes', insinuating that there were "Dutschke type" troublemakers in the East as well as the West.

Springer equated capitalism, that is a free market economy, with democracy, and consequently saw communism as a threat to both capitalism and its associated ideals.\textsuperscript{81} Having climbed economically from the ownership of a small book publishing firm after the war, to the largest publisher in
Figure 7
Die Welt, February 7, 1968, p. 3
Figure 8
Die Welt, February 24, 1968, p. VI
Studenten-Demonstration in Berlin (links) und Warschau

Figure 9
Die Welt, March 16, 1968, p. VI
West Germany, it was no wonder that Springer was a staunch supporter of capitalism, and, "... what we in West Germany call the social market economy in the Erhard tradition." Springer combined the themes of communist conspiracy with the resentment many Germans felt toward the "spoiled youth" of the late 1960s in his media. It was Springer's newspaper, Die Welt, which first gave Rudi Dutschke his nickname, "Red Rudi". Die Welt also noted on February 16, 1968 that, "In the SDS Revolutionaries now set the tone". The Springer press often portrayed the student demonstrators as rebels or revolutionaries, a description which heightened their spiritual self-image as heirs to the nineteenth century revolutionaries. The more inflammatory Bild heightened the German populace's fears of communism with frequent exhortations to, "Stop the Terror of the Young Reds!", and in an article which appeared after the Springer Tribunal,

"What will be done about those who: show a film about Molotov cocktails and agitate for murder and destruction ...try to take away and yes, even destroy other people's property?" Springer's pictorial depiction of the students' anti-capitalist stance was particularly vigorous. Figure 10 ("Stop You Idiots! You have gotten hold of my Car!") satirizes the "young reds" as crazed semi-human vandals but also exposes the underlying bourgeoís instincts of many of the anti-capitalists. In this way, Springer emphasized the underlying anomaly of the New Left of the 1960s. The New Left required the reactionary Springer press to not only give publicity to
Figure 10
Die Welt, March 16, 1968, p. VI
their movement but to reinforce their own identity as the "new revolutionary intelligentsia". From a more recent perspective, Cyril Levitt has similarly argued that the student protesters were self-contradictory in wanting to retain their bourgeois privileges as an intelligentsia, but at the same time rejecting the values of their class.\textsuperscript{86}

Springer's rhetorical and pictorial characterizations of the students shaped the consciousness of many West Germans in regard to an internal communist threat to their young democracy. To the extreme far right, there was a deluge of "readers' letters" to Springer publications after the attempted assassination on Rudi Dutschke. The majority said that they were glad, "...that Dutschke had been put out of action", or "When will this communist pig Dutschke finally croak?".\textsuperscript{87} A more subtle example can be gleaned from a Berlin cab driver's opinion of Axel Springer:

"He's a big man (Springer), our students and radicals don't like him, but he knows what's what. Over there, (he gestured with his thumb in the direction of the Wall) they hate him, and that says a lot."\textsuperscript{88}

In a later survey from 1970, David P. Conradt notes that of the topics which adults complained about most, "long-haired lazy young people ranked second, and radical students ranked fifth". This survey indicated that many Germans retained a Springer type attitude through the late 1960s and into the 1970s.\textsuperscript{89} The pervasiveness of Springer's opinion is further borne out by the tremendous popularity of his press, particularly his highly incendiary Bild, which 98% of West
Germans knew about, 34% read regularly, and 9% bought daily. Essentially only the trademark, "Volkswagen" was more commonly known in the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{90}

\textbf{Springer’s Conception of Democracy}

The most significant portion of the debate over German political and social culture between Springer and the students centered around the concepts of authority and democracy. Springer was in favor of a strong state, and authority was considered a positive quality of democratic government. In an interview with \textit{Der Spiegel}, Springer indicated the relationship of his newspapers with the government:

"The pages of the Springer House are not government loyal, rather state loyal, there is a difference which is today often overlooked."\textsuperscript{91}

As previously indicated, Springer felt that a lack of central authority had led to the collapse of Weimar democracy. Consequently, the Springer Press, which Hans Dieter Müller believed became a silent partner to the state in the early 1960s, campaigned for stabilizing measures such as the Emergency Laws and the Grand Coalition.\textsuperscript{92}

Springer’s headlines were particularly inflammatory in their portrayal of the "anti-democratic" actions of the students. After the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg, the \textit{Bild Zeitung} declared, "These people have left the grounds of democracy" and "Their terror must be broken!" During this same time period, the president of the Munich police told
Bild, the demonstrators were, "a criminal minority who can’t spell democracy". After the shooting of Rudi Dutschke, the Bild Zeitung called for an:

"...appeal to the politicians and judges of this country: Stop the terror before it’s too late. Bring to court those who take advantage of our democracy to commit criminal acts of violence."  

Aside from provocative words such as "terror" and "Left-wing radicals", the Springer press was able to visually transmit a subtle message of authority and democracy. One of the most interesting phenomena of this visual message was Springer’s frequent relativization of the German situation with that of other countries. Compare Figure 11 ("No Eros at the Foot of the Barricades") which shows the benevolent authority of the West German police, to Figure 12 which shows an ominous French police cordon protecting the National Assembly against protesters. Figure 12 employed dreadful images similar to those of Hitler’s SS troops as if to tell Germans that things were not as bad in West Germany as in France where police adopted draconian measures in the face of student-led riots.

Springer was even able to turn the students’ demands for freedom of the press and freedom of opinion against them. The student attacks on the Springer buildings were later interpreted by his media as an attack on his democratic right for a free press. An article on the front page of Die Welt declared, "Freedom of opinion: Yes - Terror: No". Springer himself felt that the wide circulation of his periodicals was
Kein Eros am Fuß der Barrikaden

Figure 11
Die Welt, February 3, 1968, p. I
Gegen demonstrierende Studenten durch einen dichten Polizeihorden abgeschirmt, hingegen die Nationalversammlung.

Figure 12
Die Welt, May 24, 1968, p. 1
a market plebiscite for his editorial policies. Axel Springer did not believe that there was a danger of press concentration threatening the freedom of opinion in West Germany. He commented in *Bild*, "Today everyone can voice, publish, and express his opinion in the free, democratic part of Germany". Consequently, Springer intentionally attempted to hinder the Günther Commission’s investigation of press concentration which he correctly saw as a politically motivated attack from the Left. Springer, in reference to his firm, told some members of the Commission, "Uncontrolled powers, prepare yourselves to decompose the life’s work of a great personality - with flimsy Purposes."  

**The Students Answer Springer**

The student activists and left wing intellectuals had very different views from Springer on the German past, capitalism, communism, authority and democracy. In most cases, the Springer press first posited a particular meaning for these terms and images after which, the students reacted with different meanings for these same terms and symbols. On either side, the variety of meanings both acted to foster a belief among the Right and Left that modern democracy in West Germany was in peril.

The students had very strong political and cultural reasons for rebelling against the older generation directly tied to their own view of the German past. Bark and Gress
surmised that the vast majority of young people had less in common with their parents' and grandparents' generations than any other generational cohort in German history. This difference was not, however, simply the result of age or the absence of a suitable father figure, in the Bonn Republic. The students reacted to the apolitical nature of their parents who had refused to become politically engaged after the war. As sociology professor and Liberal Democratic Party candidate Ralf Dahrendorf concluded, it was not that older Germans refused to vote, but that they refused to question their political system which evolved after the war. In 1968, Der Spiegel took a poll of 80 SDS members on the reaction of their parents to their joining the SDS. Only 8 of the students had a positive reaction from their parents. The majority of students said that their parents were apolitical (in Dahrendorf's sense). It is important to note that the majority of young Germans were also apolitical but, they were a silent majority as public culture from the late 1960s was overwhelmingly shaped by the student movement.

The Students versus the Hitler Legacy

Many of the students reacted to what they felt had been their parents' political acquiescence in the face of Hitler's rise to power. To the student activists who joined the APO in the late 1960s, it was their way of facing the Nazi past and stopping the new nationalism and authoritarianism which they
felt the Springer press fostered. Like Springer, Weimar and the Third Reich were not objective realities but subjective historical devices which aided the students in their condemnation of contemporary German society. Armstrong’s interview with Sigrid, a pro-SDS student in Berlin reveals:

"In some families the children blame their parents for the Nazi crimes, for the war, and for losing it. The parents try to explain the conditions in Germany in the 1930s, but, of course, they rarely succeed. The young people ask how their parents could have let it happen, and they despise them. The parents resent the failure of their children even to try to understand."¹⁰⁴

Another student interviewed by Armstrong voiced the connection many students felt their protest against the Vietnam War had to the legacy of the German past:

"For years I’d had nightmares about the terrible bombing of Dresden at the end of the Second World War. I could see the houses burning still. And that’s why I identified with the Vietnamese - the campaign against the war was a kind of working through my personal history..."¹⁰⁵

The students activists’ view of the German past was also a significant issue in their campaign against Springer. The students saw many parallels to Springer’s press monopoly and the Hugenberg press empire which fostered the radical nationalism that destroyed the Weimar Republic and helped catapult Hitler to power.¹⁰⁶ Frankfurt professor, Theodor Adorno, hypothesized that the students of the Federal Republic had appropriated the role of the Jews as objects of persecution by the state.¹⁰⁷ According to Adorno and Max Horkheimer, both political philosophers of the Weimar Era, the modern mass media constituted a "culture industry" which could
brainwash the proletariat into accepting the values of bourgeois society. This "culture industry" was not unlike the Nazi propaganda machine.\textsuperscript{108}

Karl and Frank Wolff, two leading members of the SDS, wrote in a commentary on the Easter riots that the proposed Emergency Laws were not unlike those used by Hitler to gain absolute power in 1933. In the hyperbolic rhetoric of the student activists, the Hugenberg press resembled Springer’s nationalist media and the Grand Coalition was equated to the oligarchy of Hitler’s regime.\textsuperscript{109} A speaker for the German Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament asserted that the very same politicians who condemned the students’ fascist actions had once been the supporters of a fascist regime.\textsuperscript{110} These former Nazi supporters included, the Chancellor of the Grand Coalition, Kurt Georg Kiesinger. The Berlin Evangelical Student Community connected Springer’s boulevard press directly to the Third Reich by noting that "Springer journalism = pogrom journalism" and "The crooked Jewish nose in 'Stürmer' (Nazi magazine) = Bild’s bearded caricatures of students".\textsuperscript{111} During the Easter riots of 1968, the rhetoric of the Weimar Era eerily and anachronistically returned to the city streets of the Federal Republic when students gathered outside the Springer offices in Hamburg and called Springer and the police, "Nazis" and "SS", while the police returned these taunts with, "communist swine!"\textsuperscript{112}
By the end of the decade, the question of a "usable past" for Germany, which had lain dormant for nearly twenty years, was opened by both the Right and Left. Springer, like many other politically conservative Germans, felt the Third Reich was an aberration which had emerged from the weak government of the Weimar Republic. The far Left, particularly some of the young Germans, saw the Third Reich as a logical culmination of Germany’s authoritarian history. Many of the members of the student movement justified their activism as a reaction to their parents’ compliance to the Nazi regime and political inactivity after 1945. By protesting against Springer, the students felt they could play a historic role as evidenced by Bernd Rabehl, a leading member of the SDS, who said after the shooting of Rudi Dutschke:

"The Springer campaign had already been prepared, we had an objective, an analysis, facts and figures ready to hand out for teach-ins... The events made us realize we had an historic role to play.”

The Left’s Critique of Capitalism and Anti-Communism

As Charles Maier has noted, many Leftist intellectuals insisted that a capitalist system had led to the Nazi nightmare. They further insisted that West Germany’s subsequent embrace of capitalist tendencies, despite Erhard’s window dressing of a "social" market economy, would lead inevitably back to an authoritarian system. According to the intellectuals, what was needed to save democracy was an applied socialist critique of West German and Western
society's structures. Intellectuals such as Golo Mann, Walter Jens, Eugen Kogon, Heinrich Böll, Theodor Adorno, and Alexander Mitscherlich, linked the dangers of capitalist society to Springer's Right-wing press in a signed manifesto after the shooting of Dutschke, which stated that:

"The alliance of unscrupulous consumer journalism and revived nationalistic ideology has for years systematically defamed the democratically committed students and intellectuals and fostered a climate of violence."

The students utilized the arguments of the intellectuals as a weapon against Springer's fervent anti-communism. At the twenty-second Delegate's Conference of the SDS, held in September 1967, the delegates formulated an "action program" by which the SDS would: "lead with all its anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist powers a continuous campaign for the exposure and shattering of the Springer Concern." The SDS campaign was to be a "coordinated action to break through manipulation". The New Left's and students' concepts of capitalism were thus defined by the alleged evils of consumer tyranny and the supposed ability of large corporations to manipulate or control the consciousness of the masses.

The students further reacted against Springer's characterization of their Marxist ideas as being equivalent to Stalin's brand of communism. The anti-communism of the Cold War era was, to the Left-wing students, simply an attempt to cover up the capitalist nations' neo-imperialist exploits in the Third World. Dutschke noted the functional importance of
the Cold War for German society, when he told Der Spiegel that the Cold War was, "an apparent conflict with real content," in that it contained a "formula" by which the Grand Coalition could not succeed better.\textsuperscript{117} Dutschke had recognized the political importance of maintaining an external foe to insure domestic tranquility. He also believed that an anti-communist mentality served to crush the emerging new Leftist elements in West Germany which the students felt were necessary for a pluralist democratic culture. John Sandford's study of the German media also noted that Springer's media constantly called for unity within by reminders of an enemy without, that enemy being the Communist East.\textsuperscript{118}

The harsh reality of the conflict between capitalism and communism was revealed to the young Germans in very real and concrete terms. In 1961, the German Democratic Government constructed a wall separating East and West Berlin. The building of the Wall had a great political impact on the consciousness of the postwar generation. Many of the students were teenagers when the Wall was built; they understood that the western portion of Germany and the eastern portion might be separated forever but they blamed the Western powers rather than the government of the GDR. Many Left wing intellectuals and university students saw the Berlin Wall as the "pay-off" for Adenauer's dogma of anti-communism. The students believed Springer's hardline stance toward East Germany had exacerbated tensions between East and West. In what may be termed a pre-
Ostpolitik, the radical students essentially wanted a cooperative relationship with East Germany that would recognize its existence as a socialist state in an effort to improve relations among all Germans.\textsuperscript{119}

Many members of the SDS felt that Springer was part and parcel of the West’s refusal to reduce the Cold War due to the widely circulated pro-US articles of his newspapers. Members of the German Campaign for Disarmament also supported an anti-Springer campaign because they felt that Springer had:

"...heated-up the Cold War, (and) made Berlin the front city. ...(Springer) has connected the possession of atomic weapons with national dignity and carried on a ‘come-back of Strauss’."\textsuperscript{120}

One student linked the Cold War with the Left’s anti-capitalist campaign in the following assumption:

"You said that West Berlin should play a special role in the process of détente as a link between East and West, so to speak. Wouldn’t this link be somewhat de-rusted if the Springer press were to be expropriated?"\textsuperscript{121}

Although the majority of the West German populace supported the United States’ war effort in Vietnam and the West’s role in the Cold War, the students’ attacks on Springer and demands for a re-evaluation of Cold War anti-communism did sway the opinions of some Germans at the end of the 1960s. Anne Armstrong’s interview of a young woman who was not involved in the West Berlin demonstrations revealed the following:

"There are real problems, and the average Berliner just doesn’t want to know about them. All they can worry about is the Wall and their fixed idea of communism. They are frozen into the attitudes of the Cold War; they
can’t see that we have moved into a different era with new and different problems.”

The Student Left’s Conception of Democracy

The students’ perceptions of authority and democracy were very different than Springer’s. The Left-wing student activists believed that the loss of any real opposition party in the Bundestag with the SPD’s decision to join the Grand Coalition, the proposal of the Emergency Laws, and the rise in popularity of the neo-Nazi National Democrat Party, were all examples of postwar Germany’s movement away from democracy and toward authoritarianism. To the Left, all these indicators suggested that democracy was in peril, and the most naked example of an orchestrated return to authoritarianism was the pro-state, nationalist rhetoric of the Springer press.

Initially the students revolted against what they viewed as the oppressive authoritarian power of the professor in the German universities. In the past, German professors held power over all academic and administrative functions within the universities. The huge influx of students, many of whom came from blue collar homes, presented a new group of students who questioned the German professors’ omnipotent role in the universities. The students perceived the policies of forced deregistration and time limits for completing degrees implemented by the Federal government to ease overcrowding in the universities, as an attack on academic freedom. As Siegward Lönnendonker, SDS member and co-author of Kleine
"The student revolt broke the century old hegemony of the right-wing, nationalist and conservative-to-fascist influence on German higher education and the teachers in it. Apart from their commitment to social justice, democracy, individual liberty, students rebelled because they felt like alienated cogs in the academic process which in turn was part of a gigantic and confusing industrial or state machine."\textsuperscript{124}

At first the students thought they could change German higher education by protest within the universities, but when this showed little results, the students protested authority in society in general. The students felt the authoritarian structures they saw in the universities were simply one strand bound among many fibers of authoritarianism that remained in Germany after the Third Reich. As Rudi Dutschke argued:

"As the university is increasingly determined by society and any form of autonomy becomes meaningless because of the demands made on the university by society, we may as well give up university politics. We are concerned now only with the politics of society."\textsuperscript{125}

Dutschke felt that after the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg, on June 2, 1967, broad sections of the student population reacted against the "authoritarian and undemocratic forces of the state".\textsuperscript{126} Shortly after the shooting of Ohnesorg, intellectuals began to open a public debate on the nature of freedom and democracy in the Federal Republic. Heinrich Böll clearly took a swipe at Springer when he told Die Zeit in August 1967:

"It is about time Germans started availing themselves to their freedom instead of delegating it. Freedom must be accepted, shouldered - it can not be delegated to individuals or a newspaper."\textsuperscript{127}
By the winter of 1967-68, during the "Expropriate Springer Campaign", the students articulated their most substantial reasons for attacking Springer. The SDS argued that private enterprise had led to the Springer press monopoly which was controlled by private interests, and that this control of the media threatened the rights of free information and opinion which was a cornerstone of democratic society.\textsuperscript{128} The students feared that the Springer press's control over popular opinion, due to its large circulation, could be utilized to turn the public against minority views which were crucial to the democratic process. The students' fears of Springer's editorial bias were fairly accurate. At the "Springer Tribunal" in February 1968, Kai Hermann, a correspondent for the neutral paper \textit{Die Zeit}, reported that the Springer papers had falsified the truth or omitted important details about events in Berlin. Hermann noted specific examples such as an article from \textit{Bild}, in which a furniture store fire was blamed on student protesters, but was actually lit by a thief who had robbed the store.\textsuperscript{129}

Ultimately concern over police brutality and questions about Springer's press concentration was expressed by non-students. A week after Ohnesorg was shot, the Mayor of Berlin finally admitted that the population of the city had been motivated by a general feeling of hostility toward the students encouraged by the Springer press.\textsuperscript{130} An article in \textit{Der Spiegel} claimed that Springer's reporting of the Ohnesorg
shooting came close to violating Paragraph 130 of the criminal penal code law against inciting people.\textsuperscript{131} A friend of Anne Armstrong also noted in June 1967 that, "The head of the police must go!" and "We are supposed to be living in a democratic city with a government responsible to the will of the people!"\textsuperscript{132}

Throughout the fall and winter of 1967-68, parts of the West German populace began to listen to the students. Mayor Albertz and the head of the Berlin police were forced out of office for their handling of the Ohnesorg shooting.\textsuperscript{133} The shooting of Dutschke in April 1968 was, according to the students, "carried out by the systematic agitation of the Springer Group and the (West Berlin) Senate in increasing amounts against the democratic forces in this city".\textsuperscript{134} A photograph from Der Spiegel, Figure 13, indicated the kind of "benevolent" authority which confronted the students during the anti-Springer Easter demonstrations.\textsuperscript{135} The rioting and violence of these demonstrations, however, destroyed most of the public sympathy for the student movement.\textsuperscript{136} After the Easter riots, the Berlin authorities called on the people to stage a massive anti-protest against the APO, an event which was heavily reported by the Springer press.

In May of 1968, the student activists and trade unionists made a final attempt to "save democracy from authoritarianism" by protesting the Emergency Law legislation in Bonn. Figure 14, ("Demonstration against the Emergency Laws in front of the
Figure 13

Der Spiegel, April 22, 1968, p. 31
Figure 14
Die Welt, May 18, 1968, p. 5
Berlin Technical University") visually evinces the protesters' belief that the Emergency Laws were the legal arm of a police state, as signified by the banner showing a policeman firing a gun (at the viewer). Later that summer, the Günther Commission published its findings which called for a commission to monitor the press as well as regulations restricting press ownership, but the Parliament ignored the commission's recommendations and declared that no danger of press concentration existed.\textsuperscript{137} By the summer of 1968 the SDS collapsed due to its own authoritarian tendencies.

**Parallels in Student - Springer Press Political Discourse**

Similar to Childers' theory that the National Socialists' successful use of language associated with Stand (or occupational/class standing) enabled them to gain votes and eventually destroy Weimar,\textsuperscript{138} both the student activists and the Springer media used everyday words and symbols in highly provocative ways. This mutual provocation eventually created real political effects as witnessed by the riots in the spring of 1968. In light of the rhetoric and iconography of the Springer-student conflict, a number of interesting parallels and contradictions are evident.

The first of these parallels, and most important, is the fact that both Springer and the students believed that democracy was an ideal that must be fought for and protected. From the rhetoric of both the students and Springer press, one
can see that both groups felt they were the true representatives of this abstract concept of democracy. Both Springer and the students assumed, correctly, that the majority of West German citizens associated democracy with positive qualities. The student activists and intellectuals believed that the Germans had "fallen asleep at the wheel" when they did not act against the formation of the Grand Coalition. Consequently, the students viewed the Coalition as a further step away from democracy. Contrastingly, Springer viewed the peaceful coalition of diverse political parties in the Grand Coalition as an implicit acceptance of postwar democracy by the Germans. Therefore, Springer felt the Left's demands to abolish the Coalition were an explicit attack on democracy.

The second parallel concerns the issues of communism and capitalism, which related to the ideals of democracy held by Springer and the students. Both the students and Springer felt the Stalinist brand of Marxism was detrimental to society. Springer however, associated all forms of communism with its totalitarian manifestation in East Germany. Springer saw communism as antithetical to capitalism which he held to be a cornerstone of West Germany's democratic society. Therefore, the students' banners and Marxist slogans were perceived by Springer and the Right as an attack on democratic ideals. The students on the other hand felt that the communism of the New Left, a humanist Marxism, could correct
the faults of capitalist society. The students and Left wing intellectuals felt that the excesses of capitalism in post-war West Germany had lulled the Germans into a "passive authoritarianism" or withdrawal from political engagement which they deemed necessary for a democratic society.\footnote{140}

The third parallel concerns the symbols and terms associated with the German past. Both Springer and the students felt that the Weimar and Nazi periods of German history were very dark times for the German people. Both Springer and the students saw in the German past very important lessons for modern German society. Ironically, both the student activists and Springer misread the history of Weimar and the Hitler eras in an effort to draw parallels to the West Germany of the 1960s. Both mistakenly believed that contemporary Germany was regressing to the previous troubles associated with these sad times. For example, both sides called each other fascists- the students, because Springer appeared similar to Alfred Hugenberg; and Springer, because the protesters reminded him of Hitler’s Brown Shirts. In either case, both used forms of vituperation which drew on well-known negative words and symbols of Weimar and the Nazi eras. Springer’s use of the term "Left-wing Fascists" for the students was, to the average German citizen, more powerful than calling them "young Marxists." Likewise, the students’ designation of Springer simply as "Fascist" was more likely to stir emotion than labelling him a "dictator of manipulation".
The word "terror" was probably used by Springer and the students as frequently as the Directory of the French Revolution. Springer’s "terror" of the "Red SA" and the students’ "terror" of "Springer-Nazi" effectively escalated a climate of fear and tension in West Germany in the late 1960s.

A fourth parallel is that both the student activists and Springer mutually antagonized each other and escalated violent activities in 1967-68. Although Springer personally felt the student demonstrators represented a serious problem for the Federal Republic, his political cartoons continued to exude a patronizing tone in regard to the students, as if to say, "Oh, it’s just those crazy college kids, again!" This antagonized the students and caused them to step-up their campaign against the Springer firm. Ultimately, the infuriated protesters attacked Springer property and caused a great deal of damage. Needless to say, the student attacks simply provided more material for Springer’s campaign against the students and the Left.
CHAPTER II

THE PARLIAMENTARY ECHO

As these parallels have suggested, the radical Left and Right had serious doubts about the viability of democracy in West Germany in the late 1960s. These four parallels of extra-parliamentary discourse on the nature of German democracy were also expressed in parliamentary debates. Both members of the Left and Right in the West German Parliament adopted portions of the rhetoric and imagery used by Springer and the student activists. By analyzing the Bundestag debates of 1967-1968, one can see that both the student activists’ and Springer’s demands found a voice among members of the Federal Republic’s political elite. Interestingly, many of the participants in these debates had been born between 1920 and 1925 and had experienced the social turmoil of the Third Reich. A few of the older, conservative politicians were born between 1910 and 1915 and, like Axel Springer, had experienced both the collapse of Weimar and the horror of the Hitler years.
To understand how the rhetoric and iconography of the public Springer-student conflict affected parliamentary politics, one must first understand the nature of the West German political system, and then follow the debates which occurred in the Bundestag in 1967-1968. From the debates a number of issues came to light concerning the nature of a viable, working democracy. These issues are not only relevant to West German democracy, but to all western democracies. The Bundestag debates, intensified by the Springer-student conflict, can therefore be considered a case study in how a modern democracy struggles to define democratic government.

The Basic Law, the Constitution the Allies devised for West Germany in 1949, created a decentralized, parliamentary system for the Federal Republic. The individual Länder or states, were given a great deal of autonomy; consequently, the Länder which retained exclusive power over their police forces and educational institutions, dealt with the student protesters in varying degrees of severity. At the Federal level, the majority party in the Bundestag held the most political power. Political scientists, Kurt Sontheimer, David Conradt, and Ian Derbyshire have all characterized the Federal Republic’s government as a "Party State" because the Constitution has legally ascribed the parties the role of "...taking part in forming the political will of the people." Therefore an analysis of the debates in the
Bundestag would effectively reflect elite political reaction to the civil unrest of the 1960s and the questions posed to German democracy.

Generally, the conservative Christian Democratic/Christian Socialist Union echoed a tone similar to Springer’s media in Parliamentary debates. The CDU/CSU’s coalition partner, the Social Democratic party, also contained a large faction of conservative members who spoke in tones similar to the Springer press. Significantly however, 40% of the SPD’s members had voted against the formation of the Grand Coalition, including Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, and several left-leaning members of the SPD criticized the Right and Springer’s rhetorical attack on the students. This internal dissent within the SPD became evident in the ambivalent positions SPD members took during the Parliamentary debates on issues relating to German democracy. The main voice for the students was found among the representatives of the Free Democratic Party. The FDP, in response to growing fears by its members in the late 1950s that the party may be swallowed up by the CDU, and in a reemergence of its civil libertarian tradition, decided to leave its CDU/CSU alliance and act alone as the opposition party. Although the FDP was a small opposition party to the Grand Coalition, it continuously expressed many of the views of urban white collar workers who were concerned with protecting the rights of the individual. Although never a party of the Left, the FDP, due to its
historic commitment to individual liberties, emerged as the students' voice in Parliament. On a broader historical note, the FDP's move away from the CDU/CSU in 1966 was the beginning of its new image as an untrustworthy coalition partner which shifted back and forth between the SPD and CDU/CSU from 1966 to the present.

Although the extraparliamentary opposition collapsed when Parliament passed the Emergency Laws at the end of May 1968, the West German Parliament was forced to confront the nature and credibility of democracy during the 1967-68 period. Credibility in the sense that German politicians had to convince the voters and themselves that the Federal Republic really was a working parliamentary democracy like those in France and Britain. The Bundestag debate opened by the Springer-student conflict revolved around three broad questions that are crucial to a viable democracy. The first involved the basic rights of German citizens, in particular, freedom of the press and freedom of dissent. The second dealt with the identity of the federal government in regard to the domestic conflict between federal and states' rights, and internationally in relation to the world-wide reputation of the Federal Republic, particularly the bad reputation Germany had as the instigator of two world wars and the Holocaust. The third concerned the stability of German democracy in the late 1960s, both externally due to the new threat posed by the reemergence of the far Right and continuous fear of the
radical Left, and internally due to the Parliamentary doubts as to the viability of German democracy. All of these issues coalesced in the final debates on the Emergency Law legislation, held in May 1968, in West Germany’s lower house of Parliament, the Bundestag.

A Question of Basic Rights

One of the initial questions raised by the student-Springer conflict was the right of press freedom and freedom of dissent. The right of press freedom was questioned in relation to its power to shape society. The question of press power had arisen periodically during the history of West Germany. The Michel-Gutachter Commission conducted the first federal investigation of the media in the early 1960s. However, this commission focused on the effect of radio and television broadcasts on the sales of newspapers and did not address the rhetorical power of the media. The Günther Commission, which was to investigate areas left open by the Michel-Gutachter Commission, formed later, in 1967. Eberhard Günther’s Commission set out to tackle the question of press power from an economic viewpoint, by investigating press monopolies and how they limited public opinion. However, heated parliamentary debate did not arise until Springer’s inflammatory rhetoric brought the press question to the attention of West Germany’s elected leaders.
On January 18, 1967, due to the Left's outcry against the Springer press, parliamentary representatives debated the issue of press monopolies. Nearly all officials believed that the Michel-Gutachter Commission's report which dealt with private ownership of television and radio stations and their effect on printed media sales, was not relevant to the latest problems with the German press. As a result, Federal Minister of the Interior, Paul Lücke (CDU/CSU), agreed to form a new commission (later known as the Günther Commission) to investigate the issue of press concentration. Two months later, in March 1968, during another debate on press concentration, Deputy Max Schulze-Vorberg, himself a former journalist, articulated the role of newspapers in a democratic society, "Freedom of the press is guaranteed in the Basic Law. The work of the newspaper is a service to democracy." Max Schulze-Vorberg later became one of the most vociferous advocates of press issues in opposition to his fellow CDU/CSU members. On May 11, 1967, the issue of press power was debated again by members of Parliament. Deputy Sänger (SPD) proposed that the Günther Commission disclose its findings in October 1967.

Four weeks later, as a sad stream of students attended the funeral services of Benno Ohnesorg, the federal government met to debate the civil unrest during the Shah of Iran's visit to Berlin. Most of the debate revolved around questions of security for foreign visitors and police conduct during the
riots. Once again Dr. Schulze-Vorberg raised the question of the press’s role in the events of June 2, asking if the mass media might not have affected the "psychological treatment" of the civil unrest in Berlin.\textsuperscript{149}

Again in the winter of 1968, Springer’s coverage of the APO’s Anti-Fascist Springer Tribunal and Vietnam Congress (January-February 1968) viciously denigrated West Berlin students.\textsuperscript{150} In reaction to the Bild’s coverage of the winter 1968 events, Parliament changed its stance on the press issue. In a reassertion of the left faction within the SPD, Deputy Rolf Meinecke\textsuperscript{151} stated,

"... I would like to draw attention to the mass media that can produce a hysterical escalation and neurotic presentation of these events, which can not be useful to developments, and in comparison with past times, is not the real measure of the situation."\textsuperscript{152}

In a further example of the press’s ability to shape politics, Deputy Lothar Haase\textsuperscript{153} (CDU/CSU) told Parliament members that he read in the press that foreigners intended to participate in demonstrations. Haase adopted a Springer tone, when he inquired about the government’s plans to deal with, "international Left-wing extremist groups who intended to disrupt peace and order?"\textsuperscript{154}

Unlike the Weimar Republic, which had been incapable of curbing the radical nationalism of the Hugenberg Press, the Bonn Republic began to consider the press’s power to escalate tensions within German society. Three weeks after the Easter demonstrations, on May 7, the Free Democratic Party proposed
resolutions in regard to press concentration. The FDP called for five idealistic and unrealistic goals for the press: fair and objective reporting of events, a more independent and objective position for editors, better job security for journalists, an end to the abuse of market power by the large publishers, and the establishment of objective criteria for the German national dailies based on foreign models such as the Times and Le Monde.\textsuperscript{155}

Three weeks later, on the eve of the ratification of the Emergency Laws (May 30), echoes of the student protesters were heard when Federal Press Chief Günther Diehl\textsuperscript{156} reported to Parliament on the "Manipulation of the Press". Diehl quoted a report from representatives of several German newspapers assembled in the German Press Council on May 8, 1968, concerning the dangers of suppression, distortion, and one-sided reporting which gave readers a false impression by their inflammatory language. Most of the Council’s investigation had been devoted to the Springer press. The Report also questioned the manipulation of reports by the government’s Federal Press Office. According to Press Chief Diehl, this had occurred because of suggestions by some Bundestag members that the Federal Press Office use propaganda to fight those who were against the Emergency laws.\textsuperscript{157}

The ill-fated Günther Commission and the parliamentary debate drew attention to the issue of press power. The government initially attempted to investigate press monopolies
and ended with a serious contemplation of the media’s ability to influence political views as evident from Deputy Meinecke’s remarks. Press Chief Diehl’s commentary also showed that the federal government was not only forced to consider the power of the Springer media to exacerbate political tensions, but the government’s own ability through the Press Office to shape German and international perceptions. As a career civil servant and former member of Hitler’s Foreign Office, Press Chief Diehl was acutely aware of the power of the press to affect public opinion both at home and abroad.

The second component of the question of the basic rights debate dealt with the freedom of dissent. The rights to assemble and of free speech were guaranteed to all citizens in the Basic Law, but the riots during the Shah’s visit to Berlin and the Easter demonstrations had tested the boundaries of these rights. The violence and the magnitude of these protests forced the federal government to question the limits of dissent. A week after Benno Ohnesorg’s death, Deputy Werner Müller (SPD) asked the Parliament if the untrammeled right of free speech was compatible with the rights of other individuals. Reports of police brutality and the cold-blooded killing of Ohnesorg raised the question of when political protest oversteps the boundaries of civic peace and what actions the police can take in these cases. The question of the boundaries of protest continually resurfaced in Parliament for over a year.
The Springer Anti-Fascist Tribunal and Vietnam Congress during the winter of 1968 provoked a strong reaction from right wing members in Parliament. Deputy Pohle (CDU/CSU) asked what the federal government was doing in the face of numerous protests in the universities by left wing radicals who did not want to discuss university reforms but wanted to establish, in his view, a "totalitarian council system".159 Using a vocabulary charged with threats and reproach, Pohle, like Springer, revealed the German Right’s fear of the radical Left. Dr. Rainer Barzel,160 a party leader of the CDU, followed Pohle by quoting Article 2 of the Basic Law which said,

"Everyone has the right to the free development of their individual ideas so far as they do not harm the rights of others."161

Barzel then criticized the radicals as a "mini minority" who sought to spread "terror and violence" through anti-Americanism which was "stupid and traitorous".162 Barzel articulated the belief held by many Germans, including Springer, that an alliance with the United States helped defend West Germany’s democratic society.

Minister of Science and Research, Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg163 (CDU/CSU), a former professor of modern history, rose to champion the cause of free speech and assembly. Dr. Stoltenberg asserted that only a small minority had anti-democratic views. The majority of the student protesters had drawn attention to the overcrowding in the
universities and had opened a "legitimate critical debate on the ability of a living democracy to have uncomfortable and unpopular ideas represented". However, Stoltenberg also expressed concern over reports that some left wing radicals had used public access television to propagate radical views and goals. The debate on the limits of political protests was to boil over after the Easter riots in April 1968. On April 30, members of the Bundestag discussed the riots which had occurred across the Federal Republic over Easter weekend. Minister of the Interior Ernst Benda (CDU/CSU) opened the debate with a thorough report on the number of protesters involved, the incidents of violence associated with the riots, and an estimate of the damage to public property. Benda carefully distinguished the difference between the peaceful protesters such as the Easter March participants who had protested for disarmament and the protesters who had attacked the Springer publishing facilities.

Rainer Barzel, speaking for the CDU/CSU, opened his address with the slogan, "Evolution, not revolution". Like Springer, he claimed that "wirepullers" in the SDS had planned "organized violence" and "organized law-breaking" prior to the Easter demonstrations and that the APO had misused the right to protest to engage in anti-democratic actions. As proof of his assumptions, Barzel quoted an official announcement from the Frankfurt SDS which said,

"The rulers want to stamp the APO and especially the students as the national arch enemy. The agitation
against them (students) is a diversion from actual political problems. The systematic construction of an inner enemy - earlier the Jews, today the students - is the method of authoritarian politicians to achieve their goals. "

Barzel utilized the SDS's rhetorical allusion to the Nazi era as a means of turning parliamentary sentiment against the APO. The Holocaust imagery was especially effective in political circles when one considers that most of Bundestag members had been born in the early 1920s and had very painful memories of the end of the Third Reich.

SPD leader Helmut Schmidt also denounced the destructive violence of the Easter protests. Schmidt quoted a colleague, Adolf Arndt, who likened Marcuse to the demagogic leader of the French revolutionaries, Robespierre. "Violence and terror", declared Schmidt, will not be tolerated by the Social Democratic party, and in a reference to the Weimar era added, "we all know where that led before". In an expression of the SPD's continued commitment to liberal views however, Schmidt maintained the SPD's support of the right to demonstrate and noted that every May Day, thousands of trade union members assembled to demonstrate peacefully. Schmidt ended his speech with a call for a common language and open discussions between politicians and protest leaders. The FDP called for further discussions with APO leaders as well, indicating that protesters had found an ear among the liberal members of the Federal government.
As evident from the parliamentary discussion of the basic rights of free opinion and a free press, the civil unrest of 1967-68 prompted political leaders to define the limits of these rights in the two-decade-old Federal Republic. Although conservative politicians expressed fears similar to Springer’s in regard to the abuse of the right to protest by the APO, the CDU did recognize Springer’s abuse of press freedom in his highly inflammatory press reports. The FDP, more to the point, perceived the student protests and the reactionary Springer press as symptoms of a deeper democratic problem, the virtual nullification of legitimate political dissent caused by the formation of the Grand Coalition. As political scientist David Conradt has argued, the FDP had chosen to be the party of opposition during the Grand Coalition in an effort to distance itself from the CDU and in response to a growing number of left-leaning members in the FDP who were critical of Adenauer’s policies. The SPD’s position, best exemplified by Schmidt’s speech, revealed the Party’s inner turmoil. Like Schmidt, pragmatic members of the SPD realized that a limit to political protest had to be drawn, but Basic Rights could not be endangered. Schmidt’s call for a common language with leaders of the APO suggested that the SPD was divided between left-leaning members like Rolf Meinecke who blamed the majority of the violence on Springer’s abuse of press freedom and other SPD members like Werner Müller who felt the protesters had violated the right to dissent. Schmidt’s call
for a "common language" can be interpreted as an inward call to his party to reconcile the views of the left and centrist factions on the issues raised by the civil unrest.

A Question of Identity

The civil unrest of the late 1960s also caused the Federal government to question its own identity externally and internally: externally in regard to the international reputation of the FRG and how it was dogged by its dark past, and internally with respect to the boundary between Federal powers and the powers of the Länder. The civil unrest of the late 1960s, understandably frightened many politicians who had lived through the Third Reich and felt that the world would consider the student protests a return to the troubled Weimar society that had produced Adolf Hitler. Within West Germany, the Federal government attempted to assert its power in areas that had been constitutionally delegated to the Länder. The social upheaval throughout the entire West German nation forced the Federal Republic to take national measures in police, criminal, and educational matters, areas traditionally designated to the Land governments. This conflict between Land and Federal powers in regard to the protests of 1967-1968, reflected the young German democracy's struggle to decide whether a strong or weak central government was best for its people.
Internally, the student-Springer discourse raised significant questions about federal powers in regard to university policies in the Federal Republic. Although educational policies were under the control of the individual Länder according to the Basic Law, the campus revolt which occurred in the late 1960s prompted many federal politicians to believe that the Federal government should implement university reforms if the Länder were incapable. The debate over the Federal government’s ability to implement university reforms began to heat up during the winter of 1967-1968. Deputy Joachim Raffert\textsuperscript{172} (SPD) noted that the Parliamentary debate on academic research and planning of February 7, 1968 involved questions of Länder rights and federalism.\textsuperscript{173} Deputy Hans Dichgans\textsuperscript{174} (CDU/CSU) offered a Springer-type reason for the problems in the universities when he said, "...one reads about students concocting Molotov Cocktails in chemistry labs." Dichgans believed that German university students were older than those of other countries but were being treated as children for too long.\textsuperscript{175} Minister of Education, Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU/CSU) told Parliament that reforms were needed but that past efforts to implement federal reforms had been blocked by liberals as an attack on university autonomy.\textsuperscript{176}

In further debates, a portion of the SPD enunciated a more pro-student and less centralized approach to university reform. Deputy Hans Matthöfer\textsuperscript{177} repeated some of the
students' early demands by referring to the "authoritarian" professors and structures which had caused the initial protests. Matthöfer further argued that the students had learned their political science lessons well, applying what they had been taught about democratic government to their own universities which they had found to be vastly "undemocratic". Matthöfer ended with a call for, "Democratization of the universities and an improved material position for graduate students and assistants." One month later, Helmut Schmidt, faction leader of the SPD, ended his speech by declaring that, "... laws governing the universities are clearly the responsibility of the Länder."

After the Easter riots, the need for drastic university reform at the federal level became apparent. Rainer Barzel, speaking for the CDU/CSU, quoted a letter from a Catholic Youth Group which explained that the students' revolt as a response to the blockage of traditional avenues for change. Barzel called for immediate cooperation between the Länder and the Federal government for university reform. In May 1968, the SPD resolved, in a written statement to the Bundestag, that the administration of the universities should follow democratic principles. The rector system was to be changed to a presidential system with each president elected to a six year term and all councils within the universities to have representatives from the students, faculty, and staff. By 1969, significant reform measures similar to
those proposed by the SPD were implemented in the universities of the FRG. These reforms essentially gave more power to the students and assistant professors in terms of their rights and their obligations vis-a-vis the senior professors.\textsuperscript{182}

In regard to police matters and criminal investigations, members of the Right, the CDU/CSU politicians, advocated vigorous action by the Bonn government that echoed Springer's calls for "strong government to stop those who attack our democracy." In February 1968, after the SDS's Anti-Fascist Springer Tribunal and the Vietnam Congress, Chancellor Kiesinger (CDU/CSU) opened the discussion of the Berlin demonstrations calling for tougher measures against the protesters throughout the FRG. Kiesinger noted that the past measures of restraint had only been perceived as weakness by the radicals. The chancellor ended his speech with a call for a meeting of all major Länder officials to discuss future security measures.\textsuperscript{183} Minister Paul Lücke noted that the Federal Constitutional Protection Office, which investigated individuals or groups threatening the Constitution of the FRG, had been investigating the SDS for over one and a half years (since the fall of 1966).\textsuperscript{184} The conservatives' push for federal measures revealed their belief that the student protests represented a threat which the individual Länder may not have been capable of containing.

After the Easter riots, Federal Minister of the Interior, Benda (CDU/CSU) called on the Federal government to help the
Länder protect the Constitution. To show Bundestag members the immediacy of federal involvement, Benda quoted SDS leader Udo Reichmann, who said,

"... two stores have burned in Frankfurt, I would like to see the Society Publishing House (Springer had an office there) and the American General Consulate go up in flames!"  

Benda argued that such terrorism was a threat to democratic society and that although the Basic Law prohibited the use of federal forces except in cases of trans-regional emergencies, the Federal government should help the Länder police quell the civil unrest that had reached a height over the Easter weekend. Benda also remarked that the Federal Constitutional Protection Office would step up its surveillance of the SDS in the future. Bavarian Land Minister Bruno Merk attacked the actions of the protesters and reiterated the CDU/CSU’s support for the police’s conduct during the Easter riots. But Merk also asserted the autonomy of the Länder by claiming that Bavaria did not need additional federal police to take care of the demonstrators.

The SPD was critical of the CDU/CSU’s unconditional support of the police and of proposals to expand the Federal government’s surveillance of radical groups. In contrast to Bruno Merk’s remarks, Hesse’s Land representative Olaf Radke (SPD) emotionally noted the violence perpetrated by police when he told Der Spiegel that, "It was a massacre.", in reference to police brutality in Frankfurt as pictured in Figure 13. Although no one was killed in Frankfurt,
Radke’s statement clearly indicates that some politicians did not endorse Springer and the conservatives’ unqualified support of police actions during the demonstrations. In regard to the anti-Shah demonstrations in June 1967, SPD representative Deputy Werner Müller pointedly asked Minister Benda if his office was aware that 107 Iranian citizens had been evicted for three days from Upper Bavaria and that an Iranian doctor had been forced to report to the local police twice a day during the Shah’s visit. Minister Benda denied knowledge of this and claimed that other circumstances might have been involved. An equally evasive answer was given when an SPD representative asked if the Federal government approved of General Wulff’s decision to send 50 recruits and officers from the Army Officer School in Hamburg to guard a church where student demonstrations were expected to take place. Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Karl-Günther von Hase, replied that General Wulff had never given such an order and therefore the Federal government had no reason to reproach him. This question would later reappear during the Emergency Law debates in reference to the Left’s fears that such Emergency laws would enable the Federal government to use the Army to quell internal dissent.

The FDP, led by Deputy Wolfram Dorn also questioned the Federal government’s support for police actions and investigative measures. Dorn asked Parliament on September 8, 1967, if press reports were correct that state judicial
authorities were investigating student activities at the University of Cologne, and if those affected by the investigation would be given full disclosure of the investigation's findings. In a later debate, Dorn's colleague, Deputy Schultz asked, "Does it belong to the mission of the Military Counter-Intelligence Service to observe political developments within the German universities?" The Secretary of the Ministry of Defense replied that the mission did not belong to the Military Counter-Intelligence Service but to the Constitutional Protection Office. In November of 1967, amid increasing episodes of protest, Dorn asked Minister of the Interior Benda if the police were to be armed with hand grenades, machine guns and grenade launchers. Benda replied that this may be necessary if the police are to protect freedom and order according to the Basic Law. In February 1968, Deputy Emmy Diemer-Nicolaus (FDP), in an expression of the FDP's commitment to civil liberties, asked members of Parliament if it would be better to train the police in mass psychology and take a different approach to the demonstrations. Interior Minister Paul Lücke (CDU/CSU) answered that this was a matter for the Länder and that "politicians must stand behind the organs of order". The applause which followed Lücke's speech drowned Dr. Diemer-Nicolaus's appeal and validated the conservatives' view that the threat posed by the APO was large enough to warrant drastic measures.
These events revealed the conflict between Federal and Länder powers. In education, the Länder asserted their right to police the universities, but the federal government took steps to reform the political structure of the universities. In matters of political dissent, the Länder were to prosecute any criminal behavior associated with demonstrations, but the federal authorities were to conduct investigations into any activities of radical organizations that might be unconstitutional.

Not only did the protest movement pose internal questions to the politicians of West Germany, it posed external questions as well. After nearly twenty years of rebuilding and reconstructing a modern democratic society from the ashes of the Third Reich, the student-Springer conflict renewed old questions about the German past and the legacy of authoritarian structures in the new Germany. The politicians felt the student demonstrations would harm the reputation of West Germany in international circles. The big problem for the German politicians was that by doing nothing in the face of mounting demonstrations, increased violence appeared certain in the major cities of the FRG. Conversely, steps to put down the demonstrations would invite world condemnation of a new Germany that might not be so different than the old one. As early as January 27, 1967, Secretary of the Federal Ministry of the Interior Dr. Werner Ernst, himself an honorary professor of the Free University of Berlin, told Parliament
that, "politically extreme elements of the Berlin student body have damaged the reputation of the Free University". This was internationally significant because the Free University of Berlin had been founded in competition with the Humboldt University which lay in the Soviet sector of Berlin and the Free University was to be a showplace of the "free" Germany.

Five months later, the anti-Shah demonstration of June 2 provoked further parliamentary discussion of the FRG's world reputation. SPD representative Dr. Werner Müller asked the Minister of the Interior if future state visits of foreign dignitaries would require the drastic measures implemented during the Shah's visit to Berlin during which parts of the Autobahn had to be closed. A further example of the Federal government's desire to preserve the reputation of the new Germany was the fact that the German Tribune, a weekly summary of the West German press published for English speaking readers (incidentally printed by the Springer Firm) gave the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg only a footnote mention two weeks after the incident. The repercussions of the anti-Shah protests were felt again in October 1967 when Federal Minister of the Interior Paul Lücke reported to Parliament the results of his meeting with the Shah during a state visit to Turkey. Lücke reported that the Shah understood the democratic right to protest but had never been treated as he had been in Berlin. Lücke apologized and made it clear that, "those were the actions of a small minority (radical
Left) which the majority of Germans condemned."\textsuperscript{199} FDP Deputy Moersch, in defense of the students, asked Lücke if he had told the Shah that the violence of June 2 had been provoked by Iranians who had entered Berlin shortly before the Shah’s visit. In an attempt to avoid this politically volatile question, Lücke assured members of Parliament that, "nothing remained unspoken in this difficult, open talk".\textsuperscript{200}

As conditions became more volatile in the universities during the winter 1967-68, politicians expressed heightened fears about the reputation of West Germany. CDU/CSU Deputy Pohle announced that the radical minority inspired by Herbert Marcuse and his "outsiders and outcasts" were trying to "...tear down the world’s trust which Germany has been trying to win back for twenty years."\textsuperscript{201} During the spring of 1968, the protests against the war in Vietnam also caused a political reaction from members of the Bundestag. These politicians viewed the Vietnam demonstrations as an attempt by the radical Left to undermine the FRG’s status as a dependable member of NATO. The left wing of the SPD welcomed the political engagement of the young people but, like Springer, condemned the radical minority which claimed that the western capitalists wanted "many Vietnams". The liberal SPD faction noted that US involvement in Vietnam had heightened East-West tensions in Europe, and called for a halt to American bombing raids on North Vietnam.\textsuperscript{202} The FDP called for negotiations in Vietnam and a policy of detente in Europe. The FDP resolution
of April 2 revealed the contradictory nature of West German support for the American occupation of South Vietnam and the division of their own country by the East and West. The FDP proposal to the Vietnam question echoed the national feelings of many Germans:

"Creation of a durable peace for Vietnam which guarantees the Vietnamese people the right to reunification of their country and the right to self-determination without the presence of foreign troops on Vietnamese soil."203

Fear for the reputation of the Federal Republic was also compounded by recent electoral victories of the right-wing, neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) in the spring of 1967. To many politicians, in 1968, it seemed that both the extreme Right and extreme Left were attempting to destroy the world's hopes that the Germans were a decent and trustworthy people. In April 1968, in a rare occasion when the students' views and Chancellor Kiesinger's (CDU/CSU) coincided, the Chancellor spoke to Parliament on the recent gains made by the neo-Nazi NPD in the recent Land election in Baden Württemburg. Kiesinger asked, "What will the world think about the rise of a nationalist party?" Perhaps his own membership in the Nazi Party during the 1930s motivated Kiesinger to call on West Germany's elected representatives to "...not allow the growing trust and respect of the world to be destroyed!"204 In May 1968, students and workers both protested against the NPD. The mutual fear of the new nationalism in West Germany among the students, workers, and politicians which blurred political boundaries suggests that the rhetoric and imagery of the Third
Reich, first used by the Springer press and the APO, had awakened the Germans to the lingering problems of their past. Kiesinger’s speech against the NPD showed that he had decided to take a stand that his generation had avoided during the Hitler era. Kiesinger’s speech also revealed the powerful international self-consciousness the Germans felt due to their not so distant past.

As indicated, the Springer-student conflict caused the politicians of the FRG to question the nation’s identity both internally and externally. The debates over the power of the Länder versus the power of the Federal government reflected the inner doubts and fears of many Germans over the power of their dark past. Moves for educational and police reforms suggested that German politicians had been reminded of the resiliency of authoritarian legacies in German history. The politicians on the center-left, the FDP and a faction of the SPD, raised questions similar to those of the "anti-authoritarian students". On whether to expand the power of the national government into spheres controlled by the Länder, the German politicians attempted to reevaluate the lessons of Weimar that had instructed the Western Allies and Germans of 1945 to create a weak, decentralized government. Internationally, the radical Left’s anti-Vietnam stance and the radical Right’s rise in power as noted by Chancellor Kiesinger, caused the Germans to feel that the world would doubt both their commitment to anti-communism and their
repudiation of fascism.

**A Question of Stability**

Similar to the question of identity, the stability of the federal government was questioned both internally and externally. Internally, members of the Bundestag began to ask whether democracy was viable in West Germany. Externally, the rise of the neo-Nazi NPD and the new Left, led politicians to feel that democracy was threatened by elements of the extreme Right and Left. The members of the NPD were not, however as vocal and visible as the student demonstrators (partly due to the adverse publicity accorded to the students by the Springer press). As a result, the majority of politicians believed the main threat to democracy lay on the Left. Article 21, section 2 of the Basic Law banned "unconstitutional parties" in the Federal Republic. This law was first used to ban the radical neo-Nazi Socialist Reichs Party in 1952 and the West German Communist Party in 1956. These laws indicated that the West Germans had expressed their fears toward fascism and communism by denying them a legal identity. The early prohibition of unconstitutional parties and the later designation of the events of 1967-1968 as "anti-democratic" revealed according to political scientist Geoffrey Roberts, the belief among German leaders that their new democracy was a "fragile" entity.
As early as January 1967, Deputy Albert Probst (CDU/CSU) asked members of the Ministry of the Interior if it considered the student demonstrations in front of the South Vietnamese embassy a sign of communist infiltration.\textsuperscript{207} This fear of outside agents infiltrating the FRG became acute after the anti-Shah demonstrations in June 1967. In an official report to Parliament, State Secretary Gumbel noted that Iranian citizens had built bombs in countries east of West Germany to attack the royal couple, and members of the SDS had supported demonstration plans by Iranian students.\textsuperscript{208} CDU/CSU Deputy Walter Becher\textsuperscript{209} also expressed the fears of his fellow Germans when he asked if the Federal government's investigation of the Shah protest had revealed any, "core agents stuck in among the demonstrators who have caused trouble in Berlin, Munich, and overseas."\textsuperscript{210} Clearly, the Cold War belief that international communism threatened the democratic stability of the West Germany was on the minds of some politicians.\textsuperscript{211}

The threat to democracy from within the republic was also discussed by politicians. In regard to the threat from the right, SPD deputy Kaffka asked Defense Minister Karl Carstens\textsuperscript{212} if he was aware that neo-Nazi literature could be found in the Federal Army library. Defense Minister Carstens confessed his ignorance of this fact, but he assured deputies that guidelines would be drawn up in the future.\textsuperscript{213} In this case, the Federal government was willing to take quasi-legal
measures to shield certain federal employees from neo-Nazi influences. Two months later, on February 9, Bundestag members debated the growing struggle between the radical Right and Left. The CDU/CSU took a particularly anti-Left stance in the discussion of February 9, when Deputy Pohle asked if some professors who sided with the students might not be in violation of the Basic Law Right of Freedom in Teaching and Research which forbids expressing views that attack the Constitution. Pohle’s colleague, Richard Jaeger alluded to the Hitler years by referring to the protesters’ attack on "the establishment", a new American word which was once called 'the system'; "Hitler," Jaeger explained, "campaigned against the system." Jaeger concluded that, "the state must preserve law and order." When asked by Deputy Hirsch (SPD) if the actions of the left wing protesters had stirred the activity among the right wing radicals, Minister of the Interior, Paul Lücke said that it was an old story that the Left claimed to protect democracy from "fascism" and the Right claimed to protect law and order from "terrorists". Echoing Springer’s Bild headlines, Minister Lücke announced:

"The citizens must know that democracy is neither weak nor in anarchy, and that we need no brown protectors to protect us from the terror of the Left."

SPD Deputy Joachim Raffert called attention to the fact that although the term "radicals" referred to elements of both the Left and Right, nearly all the Bundestag discussion had focused on the Left. CDU/CSU member Dr. Stoltenberg responded
that Right wing radicals had far less visible support among the populace than the highly publicized Left-wing protests in the universities.\textsuperscript{213} Thus, paralleling Bild’s campaign against the students, some leading politicians of the FRG targeted the student Left because it was highly visible throughout West Germany and could be tainted as pro-communist.

The Easter riots confirmed the conviction many Bundestag members had that the threat to democracy came from the Left. At the April 30 meeting the deputies debated the significance of the Easter unrest. Minister of the Interior Benda (CDU/CSU) informed the Bundestag that of 827 people arrested, the majority were under 26 years of age. However, students constituted only 378 of those arrested while the other 449 were blue collar or salaried workers. Based on these statistics Minister Benda said, "...it is wrong to term the violent activities as 'student unrest'."\textsuperscript{219} From a statistical standpoint, Springer’s presentation of the Easter protests as student riots was entirely distorted. Despite these facts, Benda self-servingly quoted Rudi Dutschke from Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition (Rebellion of the Students or the New Opposition) in which "Red Rudi" called for an attack on the centers of imperialism and a student revolution. Benda also quoted SDS flyers which indicated that the APO was willing to use forceful measures to make its point. In conclusion, Benda argued that literature of the APO proved that the SDS had violated the Basic Law’s prohibition
against anti-Constitutional organizations. In a further sign of logical inconsistency and political pragmatism, Benda eased his stance. He noted banning the SDS would only cause its members to join other subversive groups. "The world must know," he insisted, "that neither a Communist revolution nor a restoration of Nazism has occurred in the Federal Republic." Benda’s political flip-flops suggested that many conservative politicians, particularly members of the CDU/CSU wanted to place the blame for the civil unrest on the students and make them the scapegoat for problems that had been quietly debated since the Adenauer years. In a larger sense, Benda’s last quote indicated the perpetual "black-red" conflict of the Left and Right which has characterized German political culture since Weimar.

The atmosphere of anxiety was heightened by SPD Deputy Ernst Haar who noted that,

"...today there are two columns of marchers who are putting our democratic state in question. It doesn’t help to point fingers here; that we should have learned from the experiences of the Weimar Republic. Even Hitler began small."  

His fellow SPD member Helmut Schmidt suggested that the rise of the NPD in Stuttgart might have been the result of the inflammatory press accounts of student unrest. Deputy Walter Scheel of the FDP was the only member who attempted to distinguish the "democratic movement of the youth and the authoritarian movement of the NPD." Scheel further noted that an "authoritarian vocabulary" of the Right was entering
political vocabulary due to the Springer House.\textsuperscript{224}

The general tone of the entire debate of April 30, however, was that the main threat to democracy was from the Left, and particularly the student activists. Despite the government's official statistics indicating that over 54% of the demonstrators were not students, Interior Minister Benda belabored the idea that the SDS was a threat to democratic society.\textsuperscript{225} In a Parliament dominated by conservative factions of the SPD and CDU/CSU, the Springer rhetoric had found a receptive audience, and it was easy to blame all of the civil unrest on the student groups.

However, Bonn politicians had to face the larger picture. Despite the external foes of German democracy, the internal members of West Germany's government began to question whether parliamentary government in Bonn was truly representative of the political beliefs of the West Germans or whether the FRG had slipped into a "passive authoritarianism".\textsuperscript{226} Minister of the Interior Benda alluded to this issue when he warned on April 30 that the inner political situation "raises a question of how we see our constitutional order."\textsuperscript{227} The disorders of 1967-68, forced an examination of the credibility of West German democracy. Chief among their concern was the fear, particularly among the parliamentary opposition, FDP, that the Grand Coalition might have subverted the true democratic processes. As early as 1966, Günther Grass had warned Willy Brandt that the formation of the Grand Coalition would cause
the youth to turn to Left and Right wing extremism.²²⁸ Brandt later wrote in his memoirs that even if the students' questions and demands had not forced their way into political discussions of 1968, a real constitutional crisis might still have developed.²²⁹ The APO's skepticism of the Grand Coalition became a reality for Parliamentary leaders during the winter of 1968.

During the Parliamentary debates of February 9 and March 14, 1968, the three major parties of the Bundestag staked out positions on the credibility of the Grand Coalition and the viability of German democracy. Deputy Walter Scheel (FDP) fired the opening salvo in what would be a long and continuous attack on the Grand Coalition by the minority opposition. Scheel opened his speech by quoting a Springer Press headline which asked, "Is the Viet Cong among us?" Terms like "terror", "uproar", and "riots", Scheel argued, could only lead to an unjustifiable and manipulated "anti-student hysteria". The FDP speaker asserted that the source of the protest movement was not to be found in Moscow or in the SED (East German Communist Party); the main issue was whether the Federal Republic was "an open society". To prove his point, Scheel reminded his colleagues that although the newspapers had been reporting on Vietnam for years, the Bundestag had not held a significant debate on the war.²³⁰ A month later, in March, Scheel's colleague, Deputy Wolfgang Mischnick²³¹, who had once been a member of a Young Democrats group, continued the attack on the
Coalition when he asserted that the present intellectual debate on democracy had been neglected by the Bundestag for over a decade. The CDU/CSU’s old slogan of "No Experiments!", Mischnick declared, left many social problems unsolved and "...it is no wonder that the appeal of communism has not been broken." Mischnick further argued, similarly to Marcuse, that even democratic West Germany had limited some basic rights through bureaucratic ways.\textsuperscript{232} The members of the FDP essentially questioned the first seventeen years of the West German democratic experiment of which they were a part. The FDP showed its new shift to libertarianism by launching a very severe critique of the form of democracy constructed under the leadership of Adenauer and his party.

The CDU/CSU gave its characteristic response to the issue at hand. According to Rainer Barzel, "The situation is characterized by difficulties and by problems, but not by a crisis. It also does not involve acute unsolved social questions."

During the March debate Rainer Barzel claimed that the Grand Coalition was working to alleviate the distress caused by West Germany’s minor recession in 1967.\textsuperscript{233} In regard to foreign policy, the CDU/CSU relied on the former policies of Adenauer, as evident by Chancellor Kiesinger’s argument that as in the 1950s, the way to unification still lay in support of the West.\textsuperscript{234}

The SPD recognized the need for political change but still held the protesters at a distance. Calling the youthful
protesters, "worried democrats," SPD leader Schmidt noted that strong government authority was necessary to avoid the weaknesses of Weimar. Schmidt warned all parties by quoting Thomas Mann who during the Weimar era, had criticized the supporters of democracy for taking republican government for granted until the opponents of democracy overthrew the government. \(^{235}\) Schmidt's speech exemplified the pragmatic, centrist-oriented wing of the SPD which understood the fear of older, conservative Germans, like Springer, that the radical Left's attacks on the Federal government would erode its authority as the radical Right had done to Weimar. Deputy Gscheidle displayed the SPD's ambivalence toward the student movement remarking that although politicians found it difficult to discuss problems with youth because of their different language, the students' questions went to the very heart of the Constitution. \(^{236}\) By the late 1960s the SPD realized the urgency of many of the issues brought forward by the student-Springer debate; but it held at arm's length the movement it had helped create by expelling the SDS in 1961. Only after the SPD's electoral victories in 1969, and its alliance with the liberal FDP, was it able to enact reform measures without fear of reaction from the CDU/CSU.

The Bundestag debate of April 30, 1968, also evolved into a discussion of the Grand Coalition's ability to conduct a truly democratic government. Opening the debate with another attack on the coalition, Scheel characterized the government
report on the Easter events as similar to one in the Bild-Zeitung. "Based on Interior Minister Benda’s report of the Easter demonstrations, one would think that only the SDS were wirepullers, stone throwers, and law breakers," said Scheel. "The real discussion," Scheel continued, "is about the credibility of a democratic regime." To show the political implications of his assumptions, Scheel further argued that although the Grand Coalition had a nearly 90% majority, it had done little to enact change and its passivity was a danger for democracy. Ending with another attack on the Grand Coalition’s support of police actions, Scheel warned, "...if a police force is the only means to keep order in a democratic country, then it is practically a police state." His FDP colleague Wolfram Dorn attacked the hypocrisy of the Bundestag by noting that if the Springer press had advocated radical ideas similar to the students, Parliament would have attempted to break the Springer Press monopoly. Dorn’s statement supported Hans Dieter Müller’s theory that Springer was an unofficial supporter of conservative government. Dorn also quoted a London Times article which said, "The Grand Coalition doesn’t want to take on any grand missions - rather it avoids the cold storm of party politics and public discussion". Deputy Dorn concluded his speech with a call for a new Federal policy toward East Germany; an Ostpolitik.
SPD faction leader Schmidt then rose to speak for both his party and to defend the credibility of the Grand Coalition. Schmidt noted that although the present German democracy had a thousand faults, it was vastly superior to all past German democracies and to the East German regime. The youth, Schmidt said, could not understand the sacrifices of the older generation, and blamed the Grand Coalition for their troubles because they felt an "imaginary, conflictless society is possible". As for the Left's criticism of the SPD's union with the CDU/CSU, Schmidt expressed the pragmatism of the SPD's "new look" when he argued, "Many people think it is an unwritten law that the SPD has to make the opposition. That is a mistake." In Schmidt's discussion of the Springer Press, he contradicted himself. First Schmidt claimed that there was too much "hysteria" about Springer's ability to manipulate opinion. Second he conceded that the Springer press's editorial policy did not distinguish between news and opinion. Lastly, he ended his speech by acknowledging that Springer newspapers and television had caused a "psychological escalation" of events during the Easter weekend. Schmidt's speech clearly reflected the ambivalence of the SPD's political position during the Grand Coalition. On the one hand, the SPD felt bound to some of the policies of its partner, the CDU/CSU. These were the policies initiated by Schmidt, Herbert Wehner, and Willy Brandt in 1960; support for NATO and acceptance of the social market economy. On the other
hand, the SPD realized that the public uproar of 1968 meant that Adenauer’s ship was sinking fast. The resignation of Germany’s “Old Man” (Adenauer) in 1963, the slow down in economic growth caused by the recession of 1967, the rise of the radical Right, and the continued tensions with the German Democratic Republic began to turn public opinion against the CDU/CSU. After 1968, the more reform minded members of the SPD took control of the party, advocating school reforms and Ostpolitik.

The Emergency Law Debate

Before Adenauer’s legacy capsized, a significant piece of legislation was passed in 1968. In what may be considered the last victory of Adenauer’s policy of rebuilding and rearming West Germany, the Bundestag passed the Emergency Laws on May 31, 1968. These laws were the final major focus of student protests in the late sixties as the activists considered them the most obvious example of a return to authoritarianism in Germany. The Emergency Laws were to establish a temporary government during an internal or external emergency. Of chief concern to the student activists and left wing members of Parliament were the terms of the Emergency Laws that limited civil rights. During internal emergencies, the Federal Government could call on police, army personnel, and the frontier protection force if Länder governments were unable to deal with an emergency. During external emergencies, the free
movement of individuals might be restricted and people might be called for conscription. Surveillance of phone calls and mail, as well as expropriation of goods without immediate compensation might also be in effect in an external emergency. Individuals arrested during a national emergency could be held without trial for up to four days.\textsuperscript{243}

One can see the apprehension of many of the left and center-left members of the Bundestag towards the new laws during the Parliamentary debates and in the final readings of the Emergency Laws in the Spring of 1968. Members of the right, the CDU/CSU viewed the Emergency Laws as a way to protect Constitutional rights during an emergency and argued that without the Emergency Laws, the Allies could simply enter West Germany and rule without safeguards for the German people. As political scientist R.J.C. Preece has noted, the Germans confronted the paradox of Emergency Powers in the sense that a democratic state might have to use undemocratic means to preserve its government. Preece further compared the dilemma of the Weimar democrats to the Bonn democrats. During Weimar, the politicians delegated strong emergency powers to the president in order to protect the republic from monarchists and communists but were surprised by the fascists. Conversely, Preece notes, Bonn politicians sought to delegate power to the legislature to protect democracy from the president.\textsuperscript{243}
This fear of a presidential dictatorship caused the failure of previous attempts to enact Emergency Powers legislation in 1960, 1962, and 1965. The first of such proposed Emergency Laws was introduced by Adenauer’s Interior Minister, Gerhard Schröder, who declared that an emergency would be "the hour of the executive". This claim scared most politicians away from what they considered an opportunity for the West German president to assume dictatorial powers as Hitler had done in 1933. A second version proposed by Judiciary Committee member, Hermann Höcherl died in committee due to refusal of SPD politicians to compromise with the CDU. The 1965 version of the legislation was blocked by the SPD which was under pressure from the trade unions not to agree to the CDU’s version of the Emergency Laws. The draft proposed in 1967 was heavily opposed by the FDP and a third of the members of the SPD who believed that significant provisions had not been included to protect basic rights. However, the Grand Coalition’s and trade unions’ backing assured that the draft would be approved.\(^\text{245}\) The final debates on the Emergency Laws proposed in 1967 can be viewed as a parliamentary crescendo to the debate on German democracy which had arisen outside of parliament in the public debate between Axel Springer’s right-wing press and the left-wing student activists.

A lengthy debate on the proposed Emergency Laws took place on May 10, 1968 when Minister Ernst Benda (CDU/CSU) opened the debate with an affirmation of the Emergency Laws
and characterized its opponents as communists and enemies of democracy. To support this assumption, he reported that many organizations connected with the campaign against the Emergency Laws, such as the SDS and Committee "Notstand der Demokratie" (Emergency of Democracy), were filled with communists. These communists, Benda further argued, received support from East Germany and had conducted a "continuous defamation campaign" against proponents of the Emergency Laws. When asked about the protesters who planned to march on Bonn in middle of May, Minister Benda replied that whoever said the Emergency Laws were a danger to democracy, helped the SED (East German Communist Party) which had encircled East Germany with mines and barbed wire. The CDU/CSU representatives also argued that defeat of the Emergency Laws would mean continued Allied domination of the Federal Republic. In this tone, Deputy Johannes Even (CDU/CSU) characterized the extraparliamentary opposition as an "anti-parliamentary opposition" which stands for continued Allied powers during an emergency. In both an allusion to the Weimar Constitution, and a call for West German autonomy from the Western Allies, Dr. Lenz (CDU/CSU) announced that the Emergency Laws were,

"...not the way to a dictator, the way to destroy union rights or civil freedom, not the way to civil war, not a weapon in the Cold War, but a way to make extinct Allied Reserved Rights and protect citizens."

The fact that British troop withdrawals had begun in 1967, indicated that the CDU/CSU was motivated more from anti-
foreign, nationalist motives to support the Emergency Laws. Ironically the majority of the SPD supported the Emergency Laws because the Allies were loosening their control of German affairs. SPD leaders felt the Emergency Laws contained sufficient legislative safeguards to stop a presidential dictatorship and not unlike their Weimar predecessors, believed a codified plan for emergencies would protect democratic rights in the FRG. In an earlier March debate, SPD leader Schmidt reiterated his belief that the Germany of 1968 was the most free society in German history. Although his party had not supported the Emergency Laws in the past, it now had a positive attitude towards these Laws. Schmidt countered the conservatives neo-nationalist argument by noting that the loosening of Allied control indicated by British troop withdrawals, strongly justified such legislation.\(^{249}\) Minister of Justice, Gustav Heinemann\(^ {250}\) (SPD), also argued for the necessity of the Emergency Laws by outlining the historical criticisms of the Emergency Laws. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution had given the Reichspräsident extraordinary emergency powers; the Emergency Laws specifically delegated nearly all powers to the legislature, the representatives of the people. After the war, the Western Powers had retained the right to suspend the Constitution in an emergency and rule by martial law. Both of these examples, Dr. Heinemann explained, represented extreme conceptions of Emergency Law for Germany, Heinemann judged the proposed
Emergency Laws as just and safe measures for the Federal Republic allowing the new Germany self-governance but prohibiting a presidential dictator. In Interior Minister Benda also noted that the proposed Emergency Laws guaranteed more civil freedom than any similar legislation in Western Europe. In comparison, political scientist R.J.C. Preece has pointed out the quasi-dictatorial powers granted to the French President in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The fact that the SPD and CDU/CSU supported the Emergency Laws but for opposite reasons, highlighted the fragility of democratic processes in the new Germany. Conservative politicians relied on old German nationalism and the centrist politicians argued that new West German trends were moving toward a stable responsible government.

The Emergency Laws also had critics among the Social Democratic Party. Deputy Helmuth Kern (SPD) asked the Budestag if it was aware that on April 29, on Bavarian Radio, Chancellor Kiesinger said,

"No Emergency Laws, why? The more I hear of this sort of clamor, the clearer it is to me, how necessary it is, to care for order in our country." Kern further noted that Kiesinger told an audience in Biberbach that, "The hooligans only prove how pressing Emergency Law legislation is." Kern’s remarks were not only a political attack on the Chancellor’s provocative rhetoric, but also expressed the Left’s fear that the Emergency Laws would be used immediately to crush the student
protests. Liberal SPD deputy Matthöfer pointedly asked Defense Minister von Hase if the West German Army was clear that its mission was directed at external threats not internal opponents. Matthöfer wanted to make certain that the government would not use the Emergency Laws to send Federal troops against its own people. However, faction leader Schmidt concluded the SPD's arguments by noting that the Emergency Laws had been debated for over eight years and the time for decision had come. In a possible attempt to ease the consciences of some of the left leaning members of the SPD, Schmidt denounced the charges that the Grand Coalition was trying to "log roll" the Emergency Laws through the Bundestag and that everyone would vote his conscience.

In spite of a large majority in favor of the Emergency Laws, the members of the opposition, the FDP, continued to speak against the laws throughout the May debates. Deputy Hans-Dietrich Genscher asked the Bundestag if it was keeping the public informed about the second and third readings of the Emergency Laws as it had done in the past. Minister Benda replied that the government had informed the public. Deputy Wolfgang Mischnick declared that as a member of the parliamentary opposition, he wanted the extraparliamentary opposition to know what the FDP was doing and what differences existed between the two groups. Mischnick questioned whether enough time had elapsed between the second and third readings of the Emergency Laws, and warned
Parliament members not to act too hastily.\textsuperscript{260} In the FDP’s written explanation to the Bundestag, it opposed the Emergency Laws for fear that the sense and meaning of the Basic Law would be impaired. The destruction of the Parliament and the creation of a "Little Parliament" (nickname for the Emergency Parliament composed of members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat) were viewed as subversion of German democracy. The FDP also feared that in an emergency this "Little Parliament" might surrender German sovereignty to international organizations such as NATO.\textsuperscript{261}

Ultimately, the majority of the political leaders of the Federal Republic felt confident that the mistakes of Weimar would not be repeated. When the vote on the Emergency Laws was taken on May 31, 1968, 404 deputies voted for the Laws and 101 against them. All but one member of the CDU/CSU voted for the Emergency Laws. Max Schulze-Vorberg, a former journalist who had continuously questioned the power of press monopolies, cast the CDU/CSU’s one dissenting vote. The majority of the SPD voted in favor of the Laws, with 158 in favor and 53 against. Deputies Kaffka, Müller, and Matthöffer, who had expressed doubts throughout the Parliamentary debates about the government’s ability to safeguard basic rights voted against the Emergency Laws. The Free Democratic Party, with the exception of one member, all voted against the Emergency laws. The fact that the Emergency Laws passed with an 80% majority despite all the FDP votes and 25% of the SPD votes
against the legislation, seemed to confirm the APO's belief that the passage of the Emergency Laws had been inevitable given the conservative complexion of the Grand Coalition and the unofficial campaign for the Laws conducted by Springer.
CONCLUSION

The German government has never instituted the Emergency Laws since their ratification on May 31, 1968. It never called upon Federal troops to put down student-led demonstrations. The majority of the lawmakers of the Federal Republic felt sufficiently confident in the new democracy to vote in favor of the Emergency Laws. But ultimately the feverish return to authoritarianism predicted by the student Left and the communist revolution predicted by Springer proved to be an illusion. What the grass-roots student movement and Springer’s massive press campaign against it had done, was to open public discourse over the nature and future of democracy in West Germany. The fears of the Left and the Right were derived from Germany’s historically poor record of democracy. The old struggle between capitalism and socialism, exacerbated by the Cold War ethos of the Adenauer era also led Germans to believe that a showdown between the far Left and Right was imminent in the late 1960s. To make matters worse, both the radical Left and the Right resorted to a provocative use of symbols and words from Germany’s past to stir an emotional frenzy in the population. The echo of this frenzy could be heard in the
halls of the Federal Republic’s highest political institution, the Bundestag. German politicians found they could no longer ignore the growing problems of press concentration, limitations on freedom of opinion, university reform, and a new plan for relations with East Germany. The rhetoric of the student protesters and Springer’s newspapers represented an extreme version of the fears that many Germans felt after the end of the Adenauer years. An uncertainty for the future tempered by the memory of historical tragedies led Springer and his followers to condemn the Left. Conversely, the return of former Nazis to government posts, and the seeming dehumanization of a rapidly expanding capitalist society led members of the Left to believe that Adenauer and his successors represented a restoration of German authoritarianism.

Similar to the political debates of the Weimar Era analyzed by Thomas Childers, the student-Springer conflict intensified the Right and Left’s fears that democracy was in crisis. The widespread conflict, that was played-out in violent speech, image, and deeds, produced a vocabulary that was appropriated by West German politicians to express their own apprehensions as to the stability of Bonn democracy. This vocabulary revealed some of the major psychological forces driving West German politics. In light of the parallels noted earlier in the Springer-student discourse, certain inter-parliamentary discussions in the Bundestag reflected the
extra-parliamentary discourse between student radicals and Springer's media. In regard to the parallels in student-Springer discourse mentioned earlier, lawmakers in Bonn also voiced the idea that democracy must be fought for and protected. On the Left, the FDP constantly expressed doubts for the viability of democracy under the Grand Coalition. Conservative CDU/CSU members on the other hand, believed, like Springer, that the Grand Coalition meant stable government. Following from the second parallel, the conflict between capitalism and communism, the FDP argued the point expressed by the students that past emphasis on a market economy had left necessary social forms neglected. The conservative members CDU/CSU, however, continued to attack communism similar to Springer and as a result, CDU/CSU foreign policy makers refused to consider any policy of rapprochement such as Ostpolitik. In light of the third parallel, both conservative and liberal parties drew upon the highly emotive appeal of the terms and imagery of the German past. Members of all parties, many who were twenty years old at the end of the war, revealed the impact of the Third Reich through their words in the Bundestag debates. The CDU/CSU was particularly fond of the word "terror" in describing the Left wing radicals. The FDP, and some members of the SPD however, were quick to point out the danger of allowing a newspaper to characterize West Germany's young people. Similar to the fourth parallel, the CDU/CSU and conservative members of the SPD believed, like
Springer, that the civil unrest was a serious matter. Publicly, however, the conservatives adopted an attitude similar to Springer’s patronizing political cartoons and offered no response to the students’ demands beyond increased police measures. Conversely, the FDP saw the students’ demands as a signal for major reforms of German government and society.

Significantly however, West Germany of 1968 was not the Weimar Republic of 1933, and the Federal Republic did not collapse. The feared Emergency Laws were passed, but were not used to destroy the Left or erect a presidential dictatorship. The Grand Coalition dissolved in 1969 due to pressure from the SPD rather than right-wing forces. Although Kiesinger’s government ignored the Günther Commission’s Report, Springer did sell five of his successful magazines. The students’ demands for the elimination of authoritarian tendencies in the universities did result in substantial university reforms which went into effect in 1969.261 As evidenced from several public opinion polls conducted in 1968, the majority of the West German people agreed that public criticism of political events, the freedom to express minority views, and an effective parliamentary opposition to the government in power, are all important for a democratic society.263 Ultimately, the Springer-student discourse which ignited the civil unrest in 1967-68 did not lead to a failure of democracy as the unrest of the Weimar Era had, but resulted in the
reaffirmation of democracy among the West Germans. Ultimately, the grassroots struggle between the Left and Right did shake the roots of German democracy. However, the democracy that had been a sapling in 1949, proved to have grown in to a solid oak by the late 1960s, and in the aftermath of 1968, West German democracy emerged stable and reinvigorated from the challenge posed by the Left and Right. Willy Brandt, upon his acceptance of the office of Chancellor of the Federal Republic on October 28, 1969, stated this German affirmation of democracy:

"In recent years, some in this country feared the second German democracy would go the way of the first... We are not at the end of our democracy. We are just beginning."
NOTES

1. The phrase, "Bonn is not Weimar but..." is the title of a chapter from David Child’s From Schumacher to Brandt: The Story of German Socialism 1945-1965 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1966) in which he discusses the continuities, both in structures and personnel of the prior Nazi government and the administration of the Federal Republic. Childs also notes the fear of the new Republic’s return to former authoritarian forms, see p. 66.


5. Der Spiegel indicated that during the Easter weekend of 1968 (April 14-18) 21,000+ protestors demonstrated against the Springer firm and the government in all the major West German cities, Der Spiegel 17(1968): 27. 50,000 protested against Springer in May and 150,000 students and workers protested against the Emergency Laws at the end of May 1968, Der Spiegel 26(1968): 39.

6. At this time, Springer’s Bild Zeitung had a circulation of approximately 4 million copies daily. The Springer press also comprised 80% of all regional newspapers and 90% of all Sunday editions. These statistics are from Hans Dieter Müller’s documentary of Axel Springer’s publishing career, Press Power translation of Der Springer Konzern by J.A. Cole (London: Macdonald, 1969), p. 6.

8. See Geoff Eley, "Germany since '68: From the APO to the Greens," in Socialist Review 18(4) (1988): 93-157, who argues that the events in West Germany were part of, and inseparable from, a broad international phenomena; Ronald Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt (London: Chatto and Windus, 1988), pp. 5-10, argues that a broad generational cleavage had occurred throughout Western society the resulting conflict caused the events of the late 1960s; and Mary Pullbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 283, characterizes the unrest of the 1960s as the result of political polarization between the Left and Right which occurred along generational lines.


12. The term the "apolitical German" was used extensively by Ralf Dahrendorf to describe the German people’s lack of interest in political life after World War II. See Ralf Dahrendorf. Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979). Kurt Sontheimer also notes that the perversion of political culture during the Third Reich, the growing bureaucratization of the government after the war, and cultural traditions which view politics as a dirty business, as factors deterring most Germans from active political interest in their government; see Kurt Sontheimer, The Government and Politics of West Germany Translated by Fleur Donecker, (New York: Praeger, 1973) p. 69.

13. Conradt’s work, although very optimistic, is also one of the clearest manuscripts describing West German political developments and institutions from 1945 to the 1980s, see


16. Fraser wrote of the Easter riots, "Dutschke's (one of the main leaders of the student movement) critical wounding sparked off a virtual student insurrection in West Germany and the heaviest street fighting since the Weimar Republic forty years earlier." in 1968: A Generation in Revolt, p. 165. Michael Balfour describes the "crisis during Easter 1968" in *West Germany: A Contemporary History* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 227. Müller also described the West German demonstrations as the "worst riots since the Federal Republic's inception" in *Press Power*, p. 193.

17. Bruno Heck commented on the political importance of 1968: "The rebellion of 1968 has destroyed more values than the Third Reich. The need to master it is therefore greater than the necessity of coming to terms with the Hitler heritage yet again". Ludwig Hermann believed: "We have now mastered the Nazi past, even though not completely, perhaps. But we have not at all mastered the way that Hitler's heritage was overcome at the time of the student rebellion of 1968, which has led to fundamental reevaluations ever since. The historic turn, which must be brought about, cannot consist in digesting once more what happened in 1933 and 1945; rather, it must enable us to overcome the anti-authoritarianism that replaced the Nazi past". Both quoted in, Rob Burns and Wilfried Van Der Will, eds., *Protest and Democracy in West Germany* (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 100-101.

18. Ibid, p. 100.


20. Ibid, p. 27.

22. Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic translation of Die Weimarer Republik by P.S. Falla (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 4. Also Ralf Dahrendorf argued that past German attempts at parliamentary government failed because German political leaders never accepted the idea that conflict of opinion was necessary and so past German leaders always tried to impose an absolute form of government, i.e. Bismarck and Hitler, in: Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), pp. 137-138.


36. See Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18 (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961), for his controversial theory on Germany's "grasp for world power" in 1914.


39. Marcuse also employed Freudian theories of sexual repression in his critique of post-capitalist society, which added a further negative tone to his attack on rational society. For further reading see Herbert Marcuse, The One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. ix-x.

40. Burns and Van Der Will, eds., Protest and Democracy in West Germany, p. 120.


42. See pp. 182-183 in Müller, Press Power. Also in this work, Müller notes that Springer’s national daily, Die Welt, "...campaigned against Left intellectuals in radio and television, Berlin students, the philosopher Jaspers, and cabaret. It [Die Welt] campaigned for the Federal Government’s Emergency Laws, a new Fatherland Christianity associated with Pastor Evertz, the august figure of the President of the Federal Republic, and the war in Vietnam," p. 115.
43. A national daily, Christ und Welt, noted on May 19, 1967, that "News media mergers cause concern" and further announced that the Federal Government would set-up a three person commission to investigate press concentration and press freedom; cited in: Eckart Kuhlwein, ed., The German Tribune: A Weekly Review of the German Press (Hamburg: Friedrich Reinecke, 1967) June 10, 1967, p. 5. The Commission originally wanted to set-up a group of independent people to monitor the press continuously and notify the Parliament of any dangerous "opinion monopolies" and the government would take measures to break up the monopoly. Instead however, less drastic measures were decided and the press council at Bad Godesborg, which was made up of newspaper publishers (including Springer), was assigned to monitor the press. For further information see Der Spiegel 17 (1968): 44.

44. Not only Left wing intellectuals, but many other scholars wrote about the danger of Springer's press monopoly. Jorg Auferman's edited work, Pressekonkonzentration (Berlin: Verlag Dokumentation, 1970), includes abstracts and citations of more than fifteen articles and books written during the 1960s in the Federal Republic on the issue of press concentration. In nearly all of these works, the Springer firm is one of, if not the main example. See pp. 238-251 for specific examples which mention Springer.

45. Helmut Schmidt quoted in Der Spiegel 17 (1968): 44. Other public officials expressed concern over the power of the Springer media; Wolfram Dorn, Federal Democrat Party Representative said in Parliament, on April 30, 1968, "Opinion and news should be separate things... with the Springer newspapers, that has not frequently been the case in the last year." Otto Brenner, Chairman of the Metal Industry's Labor Union also noted on April 27, 1968, that it was "not good when a press monopoly uses its press organ to make politics." Both citation in: Der Spiegel 19 (1968): 46.

46. The final report of the Günther Commission in 1968 stated that: all publishing firms should be limited to 20% of the market share of either periodicals or newspapers, above 20% would indicate that "a danger to freedom of the press" existed - a 40% of the market share of either newspapers or periodicals was "detrimental to freedom of the press". Ultimately, the Commission stated that a firm controlling 40% of one field (either newspapers or periodicals) should be limited to 15% in another field. A few weeks before the Commission submitted its report to Parliament, Springer owned 40% of the newspaper market share and 17.5% of the periodical market share. Springer’s sale of five magazines reduced his share of the periodical market to 11%. Statistics from John Sandford, The Mass Media of the German Speaking Countries (London: Oswald Wolff, 1976), pp. 130-131.
47. Müller feels that the Kiesinger government may have disregarded the Günther Commissions' findings because of the upcoming 1969 elections, in Press Power, p. 194.

48. Emergency Law legislation was not passed in 1960 and 1965 due to the lack of support from the SPD who felt that the law was similar to that used by Hitler during the Weimar Republic, and the trade unionists who feared the law would allow the Federal Government to use troops to break strikes. The SPD also objected the vague wording of the earlier drafts in regard to executive powers during internal emergencies. See Lewis J. Edinger, West German Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 273-275, on the political ramifications of the Emergency Laws. The Emergency Constitution which was ratified in May 1968 was to govern both internal emergencies, natural disasters, rioting (not strikes); and external emergencies such as a military invasion. During internal emergencies, the Federal Government could call on police, army personnel, and the frontier protection force if the Land government was unable to deal with the emergency and the freedom of movement by individuals may be restricted. In external emergencies, the Federal Government is to be taken over by a 33 member joint committee comprised of 22 members from Parliament and 11 members from the Federal Council; the President retains no special powers. Freedom of movement may be restricted and people may be called for conscription. Surveillance of phone calls and mail as well as expropriation of goods without immediate compensation may also be in effect in an external emergency. Federal elections are suspended until six months after the end of the state of emergency; information from: David Childs and Jeffrey Johnson, West Germany, Politics and Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 38.


50. Some of the other student organizations who supported the APO were: the Liberal Student Federation of Germany (LSD), the Social Democratic University Federation (SHB), the Humanist Student Union (HSU), and portions of the Union of German Students (VDS). Left-wing organizations such as: the Kampagne fur Demokratie und Abruestung (Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament), Kuratorium (an organization of left-wing trade unionists and intellectuals), and Group 47 (an organization of older generation Left intellectuals such as Günter Grass, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, and Reinhard Lettau); see F.C. Hunnius, Student Revolts; the New Left in West Germany (London: War Resisters International, Housmans, 1968), p. 15.
51. A survey from July of 1967 indicated that 53% of the adult West German population disapproved of the student demonstrations against the Shah of Iran, however, the same survey indicated that 31% approved of the students' behavior which indicates that although half the population disagreed with the students, a sizable minority of the populace were not inclined to condemn the students and some supported their actions, see Richard L. Merritt, "The Student Protest Movement in West Berlin" in Comparative Politics 1 (1) (1968-69): 516-533.

52. The student groups supported themselves financially through membership dues, donations from wealthy Left-wing intellectuals, and the sale of Marxist literature around campuses, in: Der Spiegel 26(1968): 50. For more information on the student groups and their leaders see: Uwe Bergmann, et al., Rebellion der Studenten oder Die Neue Opposition (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1968) which Ronald Fraser has noted (Op. Cit. p. 138) went through eight printings and sold 170,000 copies; Rudi Dutschke, Mein Langer Marsch (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1980); Tilman Fichter and Siegward Lännendonker, Kleine Geschichte des SDS (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1977); and Jens Hager, Die Rebellion von Berlin (Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967).

53. The tribunal which was held on February 1, 1968, was attended by 1,500 students. A film on how to build Molotov cocktails was shown and the following day thousands of students protested and used direct action tactics against Springer buildings all over West Germany. See "Kommentar" in Bild (February 5, 1968) (Berlin edition) cited in Karl A. Otto, APO: Ausserrparlamentarische Opposition in Quellen und Dokumenten 1960-1970 (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), Document 125, p. 259.

54. Der Spiegel 17 (1968): 25, noted that on Easter Monday 45,000 protesters in 20 cities throughout West Germany protested against the Springer firm and Springer publications were delayed in most cities. Der Spiegel also notes that some 21,000 police had to be called to put down the demonstrations with tear gas and water cannons.


56. See Note 10.


58. Opinion polls cited in Richard L. Merritt, "The Student Protest Movement in West Berlin," in Comparative Politics 1(1) (1968-69): 530, noted that: 92% of West Berliners disapproved of the protesters use of force, and 75% of the West Berlin
population felt the police had acted correctly.


63. This term was first used by Henry Steele Commager as a title for his book, The Search for a Usable Past (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), and an essay in this work with the same title. Charles S. Maier also uses the term to describe the German perception of its modern history in a chapter entitled, "A Usable Past? Museums, Memory, and Identity," in The Unmasterable Past. In either case, both authors point out the importance of a history for the national identity of a people.


65. Axel Springer quoted in Anne Armstrong, Berliners: Both Sides of the Wall (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. 207. In this work Armstrong held an extensive interview with Springer and many other people in Berlin and provides an astounding amount of first hand information on the thoughts and feelings of Berliners around the late 1960s to early 1970s.

66. An article from Springer's Welt am Sonntag (February 26, 1967) was entitled, "Is the emancipation of women to know no bounds: Repercussions of the Sex Wave," the article argues that the advent of women's liberation and the contraceptive pill has led to sexual promiscuity in modern society. Cited in Eckart Kuhlwein, ed., The German Tribune: A Weekly Review of the German Press (Hamburg: Friedrich Reinecke, 1967) no. 296, p. 5.


71. Habermas criticized the protestors resort to violence based on their claim that they had information from a "higher source" and also said the difference between the theories of the young Marxists and their practices was huge. Habermas quoted in Otto, APO, Document 114, pp. 239-248. The students on the other hand, felt that some calculated violence against property may be necessary to draw the state's attention to university reform.

72. Müller, Press Power, p. 91.

73. For more information on Axel Springer's personal views and editorial policies see: Axel Springer, "Much Ado About a Newspaper Publishing House," Address to the Übersee Club, 26 October 1967 (Berlin: Verlagshaus Axel Springer, 1967), pp. 19-20. In this document Springer outlines the "four principles by which we (editors and staff) abide: (1) Unconditional support for the attempts to restore German unity. (2) Reconciliation between the German and the Jewish people. (3) Rejection of any kind of political totalitarianism, and (4) Acceptance of and support for the social market economy." Points 3 and 4 coupled with Springer's other pronouncements against Communism in the document make it clear that Springer's editorial policies were staunchly anti-Communist and also anti-New Left.

74. Springer quoted in Armstrong, Berliners, pp. 204-205.


78. Berliner Morgenpost cited in: Ibid.


84. Leopold Labedz has argued that many of the student activists were drawn to the mythic, romantic images of the Third World revolutionaries and subsequently sought to act out their own "revolutions" in the industrialized nations, the students also upheld some of the nineteenth century ideas of progress. See Leopold Labedz, "Students and Revolutions," Survey 68 (July 1968): 3-5.


86. Levitt's actual words were, "... the student movement was a movement of privilege, for privilege, and against privilege." See Cyril Levitt, Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties (Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 185.


90. Müller, Press Power, p. 78.

91. Springer quoted in Der Spiegel 23 (1967): 34.


100. Alexander Mitscherlich in *Society without the Father; A Contribution to Social Psychology* translation of *Auf dem Weg zur Vaterlosen Gesellschaft* by Eric Mosbacher (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), argued that the Nazi era had so abused the values of paternalism and authority which had been stabilizing forces in German culture prior to the Third Reich that the student protesters of the 1960s repudiated all paternal figures, such as Adenauer, and attached no importance to related paternal values such as authority and order.


111. Quoted in *Der Spiegel* 19 (1968): 42.

113. Bernd Rabeohl quoted in Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, p. 166.

114. Maier claims that the Left's view of the Capitalist origins of Fascism dominated the historiography of the Nazi period since the 1960s until the recent Historikerstreit (historian's controversy). See Maier, The Unmasterable Past, p. 2.


118. Sandford also noted that in 1961, Springer threatened news dealers that he would stop distributing his media to them if they continued to sell East German television program guides. This action was successfully fought by the news dealers. John Sandford, The Mass Media of the German-Speaking Countries (London: Oswald Wolff, 1976), p. 34.


120. Andreas Buro: 'Überlegungen zur Springer-Aktion der Kampagne'; excerpt from a presentation for the Central Committee Sitting of the Campaign for Disarmament on 4-5 November 1967. Buro was the Speaker of the Campaign for Disarmament; in Otto, APO, Document 124, p. 258.


123. In an early protest against conditions in the universities, 3,000 West Berlin students occupied rooms and held teach-ins at the Free University in June 1966. See Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, p. 104.


129. For more information on the "Springer Tribunal" and further examples of distorted facts in the Springer press, see: *Der Spiegel* 20 (1968): 52 ff.


133. Police Director Duensing was forced to leave his post on June 8, 1967 after the Ohnesorg incident (June 2). Berlin Senator of Internal Affairs Buesch resigned September 13. Mayor Albertz resigned on September 26, although this was due to political infighting of the SPD, see: Hunnius, *Student Revolts; the New Left in West Germany*, p. 7. A survey in *Der Spiegel* from February 1968 indicated that 2/3 of students and apprentices aged 15-25 identified with the protesters; cited in Burns and Van Der Will, *Protest and Democracy in West Germany*, p. 111.


135. See *Der Spiegel* 18 (1968): 34-60, for documented information of hundreds of acts of police brutality in West Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, Esslingen, and Hannover; there was also documented evidence of violence by the demonstrators.

136. In a public opinion poll taken in Berlin after the Easter demonstrations; 92% of West Berliners did not approve of the protesters use of force, and 75% of those polled felt the police had acted correctly; cited in Merritt, "The Student Protest Movement in West Berlin," in *Comparative Politics* 1 (1) (1968-69): 530. The Easter riots also led to a seven hour debate over their causes in the German Parliament on May 1, 1968, but no real conclusions were formulated. Hunnius, *Student Revolts; the New Left in West Germany*, pp. 10-11.
137. The Günther Commission’s final report to the Bundestag concluded that the degree of press concentration did threaten free access to information and legislative action was required. Müller believes the Kiesinger government’s decision to disregard the Commission’s report were due to the impending national elections. Müller, *Press Power*, p. 194.


139. Conradt concluded from a score of public opinion polls on German attitudes toward democratic government that by the late 1960s, there was a consensus among the West German people in support of liberal democracy. See Conradt, *The German Polity 4th Edition*, p. 55.


141. The Constitution that the Western Allies devised for West Germany in 1949, the Basic Law, gave significant powers to the individual German Länder or states. In reaction to the abuse of power by the centralized authoritarian regime of the Third Reich, the Allies decentralized West German government. The Allies gave the Länder exclusive power over cultural affairs (including radio and television broadcasting), education, health services, police, and the organisation of local government. The Länder were also required to institute certain principles of higher education, guidelines regarding hunting and conservation, and took responsibility for the press and film industry. Both Länder and the Federation shared powers in matters of civil and criminal law, the law of association and assembly, and laws concerning the residence and establishment of aliens. For a concise summary of the division of power between federal and Land government, see: Ian Derbyshire, *Politics in Germany from Division to Unification* (Edinburgh, UK: W & R Chambers, 1991), pp. 8-9.

142. Bundestag members are elected through a modified form of proportional representation for four year terms and are responsible for electing a chancellor and his cabinet, supervising the armed forces, and choosing half of the members of the Federal Constitutional Court. The president, who is appointed by a Federal Convention, has a very limited role in West German politics and acts mainly as a ceremonial figure. The chief executive is the chancellor, who is appointed by the governing coalition and serves as both a party and governmental leader. The chancellor tries to maintain cohesion between the varying factions within his coalition in order to
maintain voting majorities for his administration's policies. See Derbyshire, pp. 4-13.

143. These political scientists also note that the FRG is the only western democracy to constitutionally give political parties such broad recognition. See Conradt, The German Polity, Fourth Edition, p. 83; Sontheimer, The Government and Politics of West Germany (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 95; and Derbyshire, Politics in Germany from Division to Unification, p. 12.

144. See note 43 for a discussion of the Emergency Laws.


150. See note 80 for an example of the Bild's attack on the students.

151. Dr. Rolf Meinecke was born in Hamburg in 1917. He was trained as a physician and was a member of the Hamburg Citizens' Council from 1957 to 1965. In 1965, he became an SPD Deputy to the Bundestag from Hamburg. Meinecke represented the left-leaning faction of the SPD that was centered around the large industrial areas in the northern FRG. Otto J. Groeg, ed., Who's Who in Germany: The German Who's Who, Fifth Edition (Munich: Who's Who-Book & Publishing GmbH, 1974), p. 829.


156. Günther Diehl was born in Cologne in 1916. During the war years, Diehl had worked in the Foreign Office and after the war, he continued his career in foreign affairs as the foreign politics editor for the Press Office. By 1967 he had risen to the head of the press and information section of the Federal Press Office. He was a career bureaucrat with no known party affiliation. John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter’s international Red Series (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 407.


160. Rainer Barzel was born in 1924 in East Prussia. He fought in World War II and was a deputy to the State Minister of Federal Affairs until being elected to the Bundestag in 1957. He served as Federal Minister of German Affairs from 1962 to 1963 and was the chairman of the CDU/CSU’s parliamentary group from 1964 to 1973. He was made president of the Bundestag in 1983. See, John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992


165. Ernst Benda was born in 1925, in Berlin. He studied law at the University of Berlin and the University of Wisconsin. He joined the CDU in 1946 and was a member of the Berlin City Council from 1955 to 1957, after which he was elected to the Bundestag as a representative from Berlin. From 1967 to 1970 he was president of the German-Israeli Society and held the post of state secretary for the Ministry of the Interior from 1968 to 1969. Having been educated in the US and Berlin, being a member of the CDU, a member of the German-Israeli Society, and a representative from Berlin, it is no wonder Benda took such a negative stance to the Left-wing student radicals. See, John C. Dove, ed., Who's Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter's International Red Series (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 143.

166. Benda noted that 827 people had been arrested in connection with the civil unrest and were charged with inciting riots, disturbing the peace, resisting state authority, damaging property, and arson. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (5. Wahlperiode): Stenographische Berichte, Band 67 (169. Sitzung, 30. April 1968): 8990.

168. A review of biographical sources for the members of the Bundestag in 1968 revealed that many were born between 1920-1925; see notes in text.

169. Helmut Schmidt was born in 1918, in Hamburg. He was one quarter Jewish and according to Jonathan Carr, joined the SPD because of its clean record during the war and not because he was a socialist. As Interior Minister of Hamburg in 1962, he organized a flood rescue mission which saved 1000s from floods. Schmidt was a pragmatic politician who angered members of both the Right and Left, he had a great deal of contempt for the student rebels in 1968. In 1968, he was made deputy chairman of the SPD and was later made Minister of Defense in 1969. See Jonathan Carr, Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985)


172. Joachim Raffert was born in 1925, in Hildesheim. Raffert was a professional puppeteer and a political journalist and editor for the SPD. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1965 as a representative from Lower Saxony. See, John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter’s International Red Series (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 1796.


174. Hans Dichgans was born in 1907, in Elberfeld. During the war, Dichgans served as Reich Commissar and also worked with the Nazi railroad system. In 1961 he joined the CDU and wrote a book in 1965 entitled, Thoughts on Educational Reform.


177. Hans Matthöfer was born in 1925, in Bochum. He served compulsory military service from 1943 to 1945. Matthöfer was later on the staff of the trade union IG Metall. In 1961 he was elected to the Bundestag and was a member of several committees including the executive committee of IG Metall. See, John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992 Edition:


181. The SPD resolution stated specifically, that "the universities are institutions of the state, and corporate bodies of the public right." See Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (5. Wahlperiode): Stenographische Berichte, Band 67 (170. Sitzung, 7. Mai 1968): 9110. These resolutions are also very similar to the Codetermination Laws which gave labor broad representation in management's industrial planning.

182. See note 132.


187. As seen in Figure 13, the southern region of the Federal Republic, including the cities of Munich and Frankfurt were unusually harsh in their stance toward the demonstrators. Bavarian Land Minister Bruno Merk cited in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (5. Wahlperiode): Stenographische Berichte, Band 67 (169. Sitzung, 30. April 1968): 9031. Bruno Merk was born in 1922, in Swabia. He received a law degree from the University of Munich after serving eight years in the military. He worked for two years in school administration before working for the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior and was the Bavarian Minister of the Interior from 1966 to 1967. Merk epitomized the independent leadership of many of the Länder, particularly the southern Länder. John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter’s International Red Series (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 1505.

188. Quoted in Der Spiegel 18 (1968): 57.


191. Wolfram Dorn was born in 1924 and did not serve in the Army during World War II. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1961 as a FDP deputy from Bonn and also became the FDP Party secretary. Dorn was trained in industrial management and was chief editor of Deutsche Architekten- und Ingenieur-Zeitschrift, see John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter’s International Red Series (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 437.

192. Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jahn told Dorn that the protests against the Shah of Iran were unwarranted because the Shah had allegedly carried out a lot of reforms in his country, see: Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (5. Wahlperiode): Stenographische Berichte, Band 64 (120. Sitzung, 8. September 1967): 6078.


197. Dr. Müller was also interested in how much the Federal government had spent to protect the Shah during his visit to West Berlin, see Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (5. Wahlperiode): Stenographische Berichte, Band 64 (113. Sitzung, 9. Juni 1967): 5482.


209. Walter Becher was born in 1912 in Karlsbad. He served in the German Army during the war and was severely wounded in 1944. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1965 from the Land of Bavaria. See, Walter Habel, Hrsg., *Wer ist Wer? Das Deutsche Who's Who*, XVI. Ausgabe (Berlin: Verlags-GmbH, 1969), p. 52.


211. Another example of the threat of foreign communist subversion arose in Parliament in October 1967 when the Ministry of the Interior was asked if the sale of newspapers by members of a pro-communist Greek organization might have a subversive affect on foreign workers in the FRG. The organization which published these newspapers was the EDA, a pro-communist organization that opposed the military dictatorship in Greece, see *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages* (5. Wahlperiode): *Stenographische Berichte*, Band 65 (130. Sitzung, 27. Oktober 1967): 6609.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number Arrested</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 18 yrs.</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 to 21 yrs.</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 to 25 yrs.</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 yrs. +</td>
<td>286</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number Arrested</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium student</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university student</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white collar worker</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue collar worker</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other employment</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


223. Walter Scheel was born in 1919 in Solingen. He served in the German Air Force in World War II and achieved the rank of First Lieutenant. Scheel joined the FDP in 1946 and was elected to the Bundestag in 1953. He was the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation during the Adenauer and Erhard Chancelleries and was also a member of the FDP federal executive. Scheel later became the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs (1969) and President of the FRG (1974). John C. Dove, ed., *Who's Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter's International Red Series* (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 1969.


225. See note 191.

226. As noted earlier, FDP member Ralf Dahrendorf saw the German people's withdrawal from political culture as a path to "passive authoritarianism", see note 26.


229. Brandt mentions the youth in connection with his speech at an SPD party conference in March 1968, he also blamed the media for increasing disorder, see Willy Brandt, *Willy Brandt: People and Politics, The Years 1960-1975* translation of


231. Wolfgang Mischnick was born in 1921 in Dresden. After serving in the war, Mischnick became a co-founder of the FDP in Dresden. In 1948, he escaped from East Germany and continued his activity in the FDP as editor for Stimmen der jungen Generation (Voices of the Young Generation). He was elected to the Bundestag in 1957 where he served as Federal Minister for Refugees and Expellees (1961-63) and served on the FDP’s parliamentary committee. See, John C. Dove, ed., Who’s Who in Germany, 1992 Edition: Sutter’s international Red Series (Essen: Verlag GmbH, 1992), p. 1537-1538.


245. The first cabinet draft of the Emergency Laws was introduced by Gerhard Schröder on January 13, 1960 and was followed by the drafts of Hermann Höcherl and Ernst Benda who were members of the Judiciary Committee of the Bundestag (1962 and 1965). Schröder’s, Höcherl and Bendas’ drafts all failed to receive the two-thirds support of the Bundestag required for Constitutional Amendments. Minister of the Interior Paul Lücke introduced a draft on March 10, 1967 which had the backing of the Grand Coalition, and was eventually ratified on May 30, 1968, as the Seventh Amendment to the Basic Law. R.J.C. Preece, "Federal German Emergency Powers’ Legislation," Parliamentary Affairs 22 (3)(1969):217, fn 3. Also see Lewis J. Edinger, West German Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 274-276.


250. Gustav Heinemann was born in 1899 in Schwelm. He served in World War I and then studied law and history. During the 1930s he joined the Confessing Church and became a political and religious leader. During the war he served as the Chairman of the YMCA in Essen. After the war, he joined the CDU and was the Minister of the Interior in Adenauer's first cabinet until he resigned in 1951. In 1954 he joined the SPD was elected to the Bundestag in 1958. He served as Federal Minister of Justice from 1966 to 1969. See Otto J. Groeg, ed., *Who's Who in Germany, Fourth Edition* (Munich: Who's Who - Book Publishing GmbH, 1972), p. 575.


255. Ibid.


262. For information on the university reform law that went into effect on August 1969, see Anne Armstrong’s interview of Rainer, a law professor at the Free University of Berlin, in: *Berliners*, p. 32.

263. Conradt cites a 1968 survey which indicated that 90% of the adult population of the Federal Republic agreed with the statement, "Every person should have the right to express his opinion regardless of what the majority thinks." in: *The German Polity 4th Edition*, p. 60. Conradt also cites Rudolf Wildenmann’s study of "Elites in the BRD", a survey taken of West German leaders in social, economic, cultural, religious, and political fields of whom, 97% agreed with the statement, "Democracy lives from constant public criticism of political events and from a steady effective parliamentary opposition to the government in power." in: Ibid, p. 54.

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