CULTURE OF LIBERTY:
HISTORY OF AMERICANS UNITED
FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1947-1973
VOLUME I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Ronald James Boggs, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1978

Reading Committee: Approved By
Marvin Zahniser
John C. Burnham
Bradley Chapin

Adviser
Department of History
© Copyright by
Ronald James Boggs
1978
TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to give sincerest thanks to the following persons, all of whom greatly aided me in completing this dissertation: to Marvin Zahniser, who guided me through every stage of the dissertation (and my graduate career) and whose many beneficial suggestions greatly improved this work and whose aid went well beyond normal editorial duties; to John C. Burnham, whose advice was always acute and made this work far better than it otherwise would have been; to Gary Reichard, who read earlier drafts of this dissertation and whose suggestions were incorporated into the final version of this work; and to Bradley Chapin and John Seidler.

I would also like to thank Americans United for unlimited and full access to its files at national headquarters and I would like to thank the staff of AU for their time and willingness to answer my questions. I would particularly like to thank Glenn L. Archer, for his graciousness and hospitality, and C. Stanley Lowell, Albert Menendez, Edd Doerr, Gioele Settembrini, and E. Mallory Binns.

My fondest appreciation goes to my father and mother, James and Helen, for their patience and for standing behind me when the end seemed far into the future. I would also
like to thank Nancy L. Hines.

Ronald J. Boggs
Columbus, Ohio
August 15, 1978
VITA

January 20, 1942...... Born - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
1967................. B.A., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
1968................. M.A., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
1971-1977............ Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: American Foreign Relations. Professor Marvin Zahniser

American Social and Economic History. Professor Mary Young

Latin American History. Professor Donald B. Cooper

European Social and Economic History. Professor Robert Gates
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................. Page iii
VITA................................................................. v
LIST OF TABLES..................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................... ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS....................... x
LIST OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CHURCH-
STATE DECISIONS.................................................. xii
LIST OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN HISTORY OF
AMERICANS UNITED.............................................. xiii

Chapter

I. PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC TENSIONS AFTER
WORLD WAR II.................................................... 1

Three Areas of Conflict......................... 14
Broader Issues and Framework............... 30
Conclusion................................................. 41

II. THE FORMATION OF POAU THROUGH 1947..... 54

Early Efforts: 1941-1946......................... 54
The May 15, 1947 Meeting: Broadening
Support, Strategies, and the
Question of Anti-Catholicism.............. 59
Morrison and POAU Ideology................. 63
October 13, 1947 Meeting: Organizational
Momentum and Anti-Catholicism........ 68
The Founding Meetings of November 19
and 20, 1947: Identity, A Mani-
fecto, Immediate Objectives, Early
Structure, and Anti-Catholicism... 73

III. BATTLELINES ARE DRAWN: THE DAWSON
YEARS, 1947-1948................................. 86
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catholic Response to POAU's Founding</th>
<th>88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Response to POAU's Founding</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCollum and the Secularism- Sectarianism Axis</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson and the Beginning of POAU's Activity</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV. ARCHER ORGANIZES "THE BATTLE FOR FREEDOM": 1948-1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glenn L. Archer</th>
<th>165</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finances and Fundraising</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization and Methods: Membership, Chapters, and Independence</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Struggle of Ideas&quot;: Education, Propaganda, and Publicity</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedial Activities</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing the &quot;Battle for Freedom&quot;</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**V. THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION, 1948-1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lobbying and Tax-Exemption</th>
<th>246</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying and Federal Aid to Education Bills, 1949-1950</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of Public Schools and Sectarianism-Secularism</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassadorship to the Vatican Controversy</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Catholicism and Anti-Communism</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Problems and Divisions</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VI. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS: 1954-1960.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finances, Organization, and Support</th>
<th>329</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Establishment, Law, Locals and Legislatures</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giveaways-Takeovers</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educating the Public and Pressure Politics</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Americans United Finances</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yearly Percentage Change in Income</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Selected Average Rates of Income Growth</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Average Rate of Income Growth After Loss of Tax-Deductibility</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Yearly Percentage Change in Expenditures</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Selected Average Rates of Expenditure Growth</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Average Rate of Expenditure Growth After Loss of Tax-Deductibility</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dollar and Percentage of Income Saved, Invested, Reserved(S,I,R)</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Income Saved, Invested, Reserved</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Average Percentage of Income Saved, Invested, Reserved</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Percentage of Total Income Saved, Invested, Reserved</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Approximate Income from Dollars Saved, Invested, Reserved</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Americans United Income and Expenditures</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCC American Council of Christian Churches
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union
AHA American Humanist Association
AJC American Jewish Congress
AU Americans United for Separation of Church and State
CAP Michigan Council Against Parochial Aid
CAPE Council of American Private Education
CEF Citizens for Educational Freedom
CREDIT Citizens Relief for Education by Income Tax
CURE Citizens United for Religious Emancipation
FCC Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
FCPC Fair Campaign Practices Committee
IRS Internal Revenue Service
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAC National Advisory Council, Americans United for Separation of Church and State
NAL National Association of (Catholic) Layman
NCC National Council of Churches of Christ in America
NCCJ National Conference of Christian and Jews
NCWC National Catholic Welfare Conference
NEA National Education Association
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEARL</td>
<td>Public Education and Religious Liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POAU</td>
<td>Protestants and Other Americans United for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separation of Church and State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent Teacher Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCC</td>
<td>United States Catholic Conference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

CHURCH-STATE DECISIONS

1939  Cochran v. Board of Education (Textbooks)
1947  Everson v. Board of Education (Bus transportation)
1948  McCollum v. Board of Education (Released time)
1952  Zorach v. Clauson (Dismissed time)
1961  McGowan v. Maryland (Sunday Closing Laws)
1962  Engel v. Vitale (New York State school prayer)
1963  Murray v. Curlett
      Abington School District v. Schempp
      (Bible reading and Lord's Prayer in public schools)
1968  Flast v. Cohen (Standing to Sue)
      Board of Education v. Allen (Textbooks)
1970  Walz v. Tax Commission (Tax exemption for houses of worship)
1971  Tilton v. Richardson (Aid to church-related colleges)
      Lemon v. Kurtzman (Purchase of educational services)
      Earley v. DiCenzo and Robinson v. DiCenso
      (Salary supplement program)
1973  PEARL v. Nyquist and PEARL v. Levitt (Tax credits, tuition reimbursements, maintenance and repairs, and mandated services)
LIST OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN HISTORY OF AMERICANS UNITED

1939  President Franklin D. Roosevelt appoints a personal Envoy to the Vatican

1945  End of World War Two

1947  North College Hill Controversy
       Federal aid-to-education Controversy
       Everson v. Board of Education
       November 19-20: Founding Meetings of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State

1948  January 12: Publication of A Manifesto
       McCollum v. Board of Education
       Beginning of Dixon, New Mexico legal case
       September 1: Glenn L. Archer officially becomes Executive Director

1949  Federal aid-to-education Controversy
       Cardinal Francis Spellman-Eleanor Roosevelt
       Publication of Paul Blanshard's American Freedom and Catholic Power
       Stanley Lichtenstein hired as Editor of Church and State

1950  Internal Revenue Service grants tax-exempt, tax-deductible status
       Beginning of Missouri "Captive School" cases
       John C. Mayne hired as Director of Organization

1951  Defeat of Mark Clark nomination as United States Ambassador to the Vatican

1952  Zorach v. Clauson

1953  Appearance of G. Bromley Oxnam, Vice-President of Protestants and Other Americans United, before the House Un-American Activities Committee
Paul Blanshard petitions for revocation of American citizenship of Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, Papal Nuncio to Ireland

1954
Beginning of Bradfordsville, Kentucky legal case

1956
Exposure of Christian Brothers tax-exemption for wine-making
Martin Luther film controversy
Questioning of television channel licenses for Loyola University, New Orleans and St. Louis University, St. Louis
Paul Blanshard hired as part-time special counsel
C. Stanley Lowell becomes Associate Director

1957
Controversies over Fordham University, Lincoln Square, New York City and St. Louis University, St. Louis urban renewal projects
Beginning of Protestant-Catholic Dialogue
Criticisms of POAU in Christianity and Crisis

1958
"Questions for a Catholic Candidate"
June 1: Appearance on NBC's Meet the Press
Beginning of controversy with Fair Campaign Practices Committee
Questioning of citizenship of American Cardinals who voted in 1958 Papal election

1959
Successful negotiation for payment of public land by Presbyterian College, St. Petersburg, Florida
Pope John XXIII calls for convening of Vatican Council II
Colonel Edward P. Felker hired as general counsel

1960
POAU educational campaign during election of 1960
Endorsement of POAU by Methodist General Conference
Citizens for Religious Freedom and Peale Controversy
John F. Kennedy's Houston appearance
John F. Kennedy elected President
Won Vermont tuition payments legal case

1961
Federal aid-to-education controversy
Defeat of New York State Constitution amendment permitting parochial aid

1962
Engel v. Vitale
Increased ecumenical activities
1963

Passage of Higher Education Facilities Construction Act
John M. Swomley Report
Resignation of Ellis H. Dana, Founder-Trustee of POAU
Glenn L. Archer appears before National Conference of Christian and Jews to answer charges of bigotry

1964

Loss of endorsement of Methodist General Conference
Passage of Economic Opportunity Act
Church-State Consortium
National Study Conference on Church and State

1965

Passage of Elementary and Secondary Education Act
Legal Conference on the Establishment Clause and Formation of Church-State Legal Consortium between Americans United, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Jewish Congress
End of Vatican Council II

1966

Horace Mann League successful legal challenge to Maryland aid to church-related colleges
"Voluntary Prayer" Amendment to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

1967

Defeat of New York State Constitution that would have permitted parochial aid

1968

Loss of Tax-deductible status
Board of Education v. Allen
Flast v. Cohen
"HUMANAET VITAE" Encyclical of Pope Paul VI
Proliferation of state parochiaid laws

1969

New national Americans United headquarters in Silver Spring, Maryland
Americans United Research Foundation

1970

Nebraska constitutional referendum rejects tuition grants
Michigan constitutional referendum rejects purchase of services
Walz v. Tax Commission
1971  Voluntary "non-denominational" Prayer Amendment to the First Amendment
Formation of National Council on Religion and Public Education
Tilton v. Richardson

1972  Maryland referendum rejects tuition voucher law
Americans United, American Jewish Congress, and American Civil Liberties Union successfully challenge the Ohio tuition reimbursement law and tax credit act
Formation of Citizens Relief for Education by Income Tax (CREDIT)
Formation of national anti-parochial coalition

1973  PEARL v. Nyquist
PEARL v. Levitt
CHAPTER I

PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC TENSIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II

After World War II, Protestant and Roman Catholic leaders in the United States showed antagonism toward each other. The antagonism grew out of changes in the relationship between the two groups after a decade and a half of relative calm following the controversy that surrounded the Presidential campaign of the Catholic Alfred E. Smith in 1928. Separation of church and state became one of the major focal points of the changing relationship.

A number of elements governed the relationship between Catholics and Protestants. One element was the concentration of Catholics in certain geographical areas and regions. Over half of all Catholics lived in fifteen large cities like San Francisco, New Orleans, Buffalo, Cleveland, St. Louis, St. Paul, Trenton, and Providence. One-third of all Catholics resided in Chicago, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Newark, and Los Angeles. The Roman Catholic Church in 38 of the 50 largest cities in the United States was the largest denomination. Moreover, more than eighty percent of all Catholics lived in fewer than 12 states, many of them in the northeast, especially New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Other states with a significant Catholic population were Illinois, Michigan, California, New Mexico, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

Another element involved the numerical inferiority of Catholics as compared to the number of Protestants in the United States. As a percentage of the total population, 27 percent of all adult Americans claimed to be Protestant compared to 16 percent who stated that they were Catholic in 1926. After insignificant growth rates for the two faiths through 1940, Protestant adherents in 1950 had reached 34 percent of the population, while Catholic followers grew to 19 percent. By 1955, the figures rose to 35.5 percent and 20.3 percent, respectively. The Catholic increase was 10 percent greater than the Protestant growth, but the difference, according to Lerond Curry, was not significant. Catholics constituted 30 to 35 percent of Americans who claimed religious affiliation.

A high degree of organization that resulted in part from Catholic concentration was another element. The most conspicuous postwar expression of this organizational ability was the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), a national political arm of the bishops of the church. While one among many Catholic organizations, the NCWC was the most important and the most influential of these organizations. Also, Catholics carried on concerted action on issues of
concern beyond anything a divided Protestantism could hope for.

Catholics made up for their numerical inferiority, in other words, by concentration, organization, and a semblance of unity on important political issues. Furthermore, Catholic politicians and urban communities were part of the New Deal coalition formed under the influence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A good political foundation existed for Catholics to flex their muscles on issues that concerned them, and with their access to mass media they were able to attain high visibility.\(^5\)

One of the most important components governing the relations between Protestants and Catholics involved cultural separatism. This cultural separatism entailed more than a system of Catholic schools, a host of Catholic organizations, and Catholics living in ghettos in the cities. Donna Merwick, in her study of Boston priests from the mid-19th century until 1910, showed how the Vatican gained control over the church in Boston after the turn of the century through William Henry O'Connell, Cardinal of the archdiocese of Boston. The aim of O'Connell and the Vatican was unity with Rome, and the "Romanism" of O'Connell lasted until the Vatican Council in the 1960's.\(^7\)

The church in Boston lost its independence from Rome as O'Connell centralized and organized the church under the leadership and authority of the Pope in Rome and to the
values of the Vatican. O'Connell's institutionalization aimed at ideological conformity to Rome. According to Merwick, the result of O'Connell's work was "thought control" over the church in Boston.

One major goal of the Vatican and the institutionalists was to squelch the ideological separatism from Rome of "Americanism," best represented by John Ireland, Archbishop of St. Paul, Minnesota and James Gibbons, Cardinal of Baltimore. Americanists valued independence from Rome. They believed the European Church was corrupt, authoritarian, absolutist, and lacking in freedom. The Americanists, according to Merwick, regarded the church in America as different from the church in the rest of the world because of its democracy and freedom. They believed that the ultimate ruler was conscience not the Pope. Right to worship seemed assured in the United States, and they supported religious pluralism, where all faiths were regarded as equals and each faith was free to pursue its ends without interference. Concomitantly, separation of church and state to these Americanists, as opposed to the Vatican, was regarded as healthy, viable, and an aid to Catholicism. Consequently, the Americanists saw virtue in the Protestant heritage of the United States and tended to downplay the importance of religious intolerance in the country. This desire to make the church as American as possible by adjusting the church to American culture, by integrating into and promoting America's
pluralistic culture, and by advocating ecumenical activities with Protestants brought Americanism into conflict with the Pope in Rome. The Pope wanted unity of government as well as unity of doctrine.

The Vatican and the institutionalists successfully promoted the emphasis on a Catholic culture modeled on Rome and a docile Catholic lower class. While officially condemned, Americanism nevertheless retained the loyalty of a number of Catholic officials. The Vatican and the institutionalists, however, wanted no reconciliation with the American culture. Their aim was to make America as Catholic as possible and to get as much support as possible for Catholic culture from the American society.

These elements of the governing relationship between Catholics and Protestants, by way of comparison, had a Protestant side to them. Protestants were far less concentrated and far more divided organizationally, institutionally, and on issues than Catholics. On certain issues such as separation of church and state, however, there was among Protestants an appearance of consensus in support of separation as a constitutional principle. Moreover, Protestants held, in relation to their numbers, a disproportionate share of economic, social, and political power and status in the 1940's. As individuals, they dominated most of the important American institutions and established the norms for American culture. In turn, Protestants tended to identify
the American culture as a Protestant one. The majority of Americans in the upper middle class were Protestant. The base of Protestant power resided in the rural areas and small towns, although Protestants were also powerful in the suburbs. Also, Protestants held a large numerical advantage in areas outside of the East. In north central, southern, and western United States, Protestants were in a two-thirds majority. Only one quarter of all Protestants resided in urban areas of over 100,000.

By the mid-40's, the relationships between Protestants and Catholics were changing. One change was a symbolic one. The American Catholic Church had become the "majority" denomination in the United States, its followers surpassing in numbers the largest Protestant denomination.

A second change related to growth in church membership. Overall church membership in America as a percentage of the whole population grew from 43 percent in 1920 to 49 percent in 1940. Membership during the 40's, especially in the later part of the decade, rose to 57 percent, one of the largest rates of growth in church membership in any decade in American history. By 1956, church membership reached 62 percent. The increase in the '40s resulted from the revived interest in religion as a result of the anxieties and tensions of World War II and the Cold War.

Conservative Protestant denominations and independent faiths accounted for much of this growth. They grew at a
faster rate than moderate "mainline" Protestant denominations like Presbyterians and Episcopalians. The Federal Council of Churches (FCC), the name of which was changed in 1950 to the National Council of Churches (NCC), represented many of the mainline denominations. Pentecostal and fundamentalist groups grew especially rapidly during the ’40s and ’50s. The Seventh Day Adventists and Christian Scientists, which were aligned with no other church groups, also experienced significant growth. The fastest growing church was the Southern Baptist Convention, surging from 2.3 million adherents in 1936 to 10 million in 1962. This growth eventually made it the largest Protestant church, surpassing Methodism which was growing at a slower pace. Those Protestant groups who were the most suspicious of the Roman Catholic Church and its influence prospered and were the main beneficiaries of the religious trends and mood in America during the era.

In the early ’40s, two organizations were formed that were to play important roles in the formation of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (POAU). Both organizations represented the conservative and rapidly growing wing of Protestantism.

In 1941, four national Baptist bodies, representing approximately fifteen million members, formed the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs. The guiding force behind the formation of the committee was Dr. Rufus W. Weaver,
Southern Baptist minister, educator, and one-time President of Mercer University. Weaver chose Joseph M. Dawson, a Southern Baptist minister who had been a pastor for thirty-one years in Waco, Texas, and for several years a Texas staff correspondent for The Christian Century, as the committee's first Executive Director. The Committee, which opened up its offices in 1946 in Washington, D.C., carried out public relations and lobbying activities for the various Baptist denominations it represented. In the process, the committee developed superbly effective ties in Congress and Washington and, as near as was possible among Baptists, became the national voice of Baptists on public issues.

One year later, in 1942, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) was founded. It represented various evangelical and fundamentalist churches such as the Assembly of God, Church of God, the National Association of Free Will Baptists, and dissident groups from among Baptists, Disciples of Christ, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists. Other member churches were Nazarene, Christian Missionary Alliance, Wesleyan Methodist, and Free Methodist.

The membership of NAE consisted of churches not associated with the FCC; in fact, the churches who joined NAE were constitutionally prohibited from participating in the FCC, although their denomination might be affiliated with the FCC. Disagreements with the theologically modernist and politically liberal positions of the FCC helped to bring the NAE
into existence as a national evangelical counterpart of the FCC. Moreover, the founders of NAE had been embarrassed by what they saw as the excessively strident defense by fundamentalists of their scriptural interpretation of the Bible. The leaders aimed to give evangelical Protestants a more responsible and a less extreme leadership.

The NAE grew rapidly, its positions claiming the adherence by 1947 of a million and a half followers. It favored strict separation of church and state, especially as the state might interrelate with the Roman Catholic Church. Secularism posed a threat for the members of NAE that equalled, and at times surpassed, the threat posed by the Catholic Church. Additionally, ardent anti-Communism claimed the allegiance of the NAE.

The third and most important change occurred because of the rise of militancy on the part of Catholic Americans and of Catholic clergy. This militancy arose in large part because of the movement of Catholics from their traditional status in the lower classes into the middle classes. The substantial socio-economic differences between Catholics and Protestants of the pre-World War II period began to narrow after the war. By 1948, 37 percent of the Catholic population worked in the professions, business, or white collar jobs—the same percentage as Protestants. By 1955, the percentage of Catholics with an income over $7,500 equaled the percentage of white Protestants with such income. By 1965,
according to Andrew Greeley, Catholics had surpassed white Protestants in all of the above categories and in the percentage of each group in the non-manual occupations, although Catholics continued to lag behind in terms of college education. Despite these advances, Protestants dominated at the higher income levels and were overrepresented in the economic elite.

The second- and third-generation Catholic Americans caught up to Protestants as a result of the country's economic and urban prosperity not because of the alleged Americanization of the above generations. As they emerged from the Catholic enclaves in the cities, their church threw off its "carefully cultivate(d)...picture of its minority status." Catholics attempted to leave their "minority consciousness" or "ghetto mentality" behind, although not always successfully. The rising middle class within the Catholic communities acted as a vanguard translating the enhanced social and economic position of Catholics into political power.

In the '40s, many Catholics sought what their spokespeople portrayed as their rightful place, position, and power in American society that had been so long denied to them. A new self-image developed among Catholics, according to Curry, in consequence of the movement of world Catholic leadership to the American church. American church officials sought to exercise that leadership. Moreover, a new
assertive self-image emerged because Catholic activities in the United States, according to Catholic spokespersons, should intensify and spread as individual Catholics and the Catholic Church grew in importance, respect, and influence.

By the postwar era, Catholic writers pictured America as a culturally pluralistic society. For these writers this pluralism should replace Protestant domination of American life. They saw America as no longer exclusively Protestant but as their own country as well—and one which should reflect Catholic ideals.

Faced with assertive Catholic statements and actions and requests for state aid for their church schools, the major Protestant answer to these challenges revolved around strengthening the concept of separation of church and state. Protestants regarded separation as a patriotic expression of American life and a constitutional principle written into the religious clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This constitutional principle acted as a bulwark of religious freedom by prohibiting an establishment of religion. Aid to church schools, Protestants believed, established religion.

These challenges thus had important implications for Protestants. Protestants feared that if aid were given the Catholic schools the result would be governmental support for private, church interests and, most importantly, would mean the destruction of the public schools. The
consequence of these events would be the destruction of the cultural function of the public schools: to serve the public interest by culturally unifying a diverse population and a multi-religious society into American values. Protestants believed that Catholic actions and requests were divisive to American unity.

At the same time, Protestants feared a cultural unity of a different kind. Giving in to Catholic demands for aid would mean the destruction of separation of church and state, the destruction of religious freedom for non-Catholic faiths, and for some Protestants such aid portended the destruction of Protestantism itself. America would become a Catholic culture with the American Catholic Church dominant, and, because, according to Protestants, the church did not believe in religious freedom or diversity, it would control American culture to its own advantage. Such a cultural unity would mean Protestants would have as little freedom to practice their religion as Protestants in Spain.

In turn, Catholics viewed Protestant recourse to separation as a means by which Protestants sought to promote their faith. Because of previous anti-Catholicism, nativistic outbursts, and majoritarian threats to American Catholicism, the free-church tradition of Protestantism was deeply suspect as a legitimate expression of American religious values. Thus separation of church and state seemed to be a mask for an old Protestant cultural expression in
America: bigotry. For example, John Courtney Murray, S.J. a prominent American Catholic thinker, characterized separation of church and state in 1947 as a "negative, ill-defined, basically un-American formula, with all its overtones of religious prejudice...." According to Murray, separation was a watchword for a clerical Protestant crusade motivated not by reason or patriotism but by religion and emotion, namely fear of Catholic control of American democracy. Separation was merely a negative idea, and the idea had nothing to do with the positive ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience.

Three major sources of contention (analyzed below) between Catholics and Protestants (and secular liberals) created anxiety among Protestants over the viability and future of separation. The anxiety was shared by a wide spectrum of Protestants and eventually evoked among certain segments of the Protestant leadership the desire for a broadly organized and united response to the Catholic challenge. These three issues, whether to send an American ambassador to the Vatican, the separation of education and religion, and the issue of anti-Communism helped to precipitate the desire to organize. The main problem was how to be as united and as assertive as Catholics.
THREE AREAS OF CONFLICT

An American Ambassador to the Vatican. In 1939, President F. D. Roosevelt appointed Myron C. Taylor, an Episcopalian, as his personal envoy to the Vatican. Representatives of several Protestant denominations as well as Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists met with and tried unsuccessfully to get the President to end relations with the Vatican. These religious groups saw the appointment chiefly as the product of Catholic pressure on a vote-conscious President. Sending a personal representative implied extension of American diplomatic recognition to the Holy See for these Protestant groups, which meant, they insisted, that a first step had been taken toward establishing a union of church and state. The Taylor appointment led to renewed tension between Catholics and Protestants. The Vatican mission imbued Catholics with self-esteem and spoke of their potential strength and influence.

Protestant protests of the United States-Vatican relationship subsided with the coming of war. Nonetheless, by the mid-forties a majority of Protestant organizations, like the FCC in 1944, had officially called for termination of Taylor’s mission. The original Protestant reaction, however, was meager compared to the protests following President Harry S. Truman’s promotion of Taylor in May of 1946 to the rank of ambassador.
The response to Truman's action was broad and intense. The Southern and Northern Baptist Conventions, the Baltimore Conference of the Methodist Church, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America, and the Executive Committee of the FCC passed resolution condemning the appointment. In June of 1946, Samuel McCrea Cavert, general secretary of the FCC, led a group of Protestant denominational leaders who represented over thirty million Protestants on a visit to the President. The leaders protested the American-Vatican tie because it was "contrary to the historic American principle of the separation of church and state." Truman stated that the Vatican embassy was temporary and would be abolished with the coming of world peace. Other Protestants feared that the Vatican officials planned to "rule the world through states subservient to its will." Taylor's appointment, it was argued, would help the Catholic hierarchy gain a privileged position in the American power structure. Others simply believed Truman had buckled under Catholic pressure with an election coming up.

Catholics reacted to Protestant protests as well as to the Taylor mission. In 1946, the Catholic War Veterans of America resolved that the Vatican embassy should be made permanent. Other Catholics denounced the President's intention to bring an end to the mission after the world was at peace. Francis Spellman, Cardinal of New York and a
protege of O'Connell, excoriated the June, 1946, delegation as "anti-Catholicism of unhooded Klansmen sowing seeds of dissension and disunion."

Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, President of the FCC, quickly replied to Spellman's condemnation. Spellman believed that "the separation of church and state in this country does not and never did mean opposition or hostility on the part of the state toward the church or its policies."

To this criticism, Oxnam retorted:

Cardinal Spellman knows that Roman Catholic Church does not believe in the separation of church and state. Protestants do so believe.... The Roman Catholic Church insists upon being both a church and a state. How can an American citizen be at once loyal to his country and his President and also loyal to another political state and its political rulers, if the two states differ on international policy? ...I, of course, do not question the personal patriotism of Cardinal Spellman or any Roman Catholic.

The ambassadorship issue continued to be source of antagonism between Catholics and Protestants through the '40s. The controversy was symbolic of changes within American life that had altered the relationship between the two religious groups.

Catholic Anti-Communism. Officials of the American Catholic Church were bitter opponents of the Soviet Union and what they believed to be international Communism. As the Cold War developed, many church officials called on the American government to resist the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe. In November 1946, for instance, the annual
NCWC Bishop's statement dealt with post-war Europe and called attention to the "imminent conflict between Russia and the West..." arising out of "Soviet aggression." According to the statement, the United States Government did not seem to perceive correctly the threat posed by the communist expansion.

Catholics had for some time vigorously argued that true Americanism agreed with and was even one with orthodox Catholicism. The American Catholic Church, to a number of Protestants, had now become so bold as to presume openly to tell American foreign policymakers what United States policy should be. The newly aggressive and prescriptive tone of the NCWC statement especially disturbed these Protestants, whose suspicions were confirmed by later NCWC statements. This boldness reflected a new posture by the church, these Protestants argued, one that sought to identify American social and political interests with Catholic ones.

The above NCWC statement also alarmed a number of liberal Protestants. For example, Ossian spoke in alarm about the "Holy War" that the Roman Catholic Church had "declared...on Russia by announcing a world wide war on Communism." Fellow liberal New Yorker Guy E. Shipler, an Episcopalian minister and editor of the Episcopalian magazine, The Churchman, and who had had a number of verbal duels with the conservative Spellman, was also fearful. These two and other strongly anti-fascist political liberals were
extremely antagonistic toward Catholic anti-Communism in major part as a result of the American Catholic hierarchy's support of General Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War. These liberals in their statements expressed the concern that a crusade against Communism led by American Catholics gained Catholics national prestige and power which they would use to justify tying their church to the American state. Many of the liberals believed that clerical fascism, Catholic numbers and power, and the clerical cloak of Catholicism was more of a threat to American freedom than was Communism, either overseas or at home.

This type of thinking led to a particularly memorable incident during the summer of 1947. Upon returning from a tour of Yugoslavia, a group of seven Protestant clergymen, led by Shipler, announced their support for Tito's actions against an accused Nazi collaborator in Croatia, Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac. "Poison spread in America," accused Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston in mid-August, was being carried not by "wily political agents" but by men of the cloth. He saw in the clergymen's statement proof that

...the wave of anti-Catholicism and particularly foreign-inspired anti-Catholicism, which is gaining momentum in the United States and elsewhere at the moment can no longer be dismissed as being due to 'crackpots' or irresponsible fanatics disavowed by their non-Catholic churches or committees.

These Protestant clerics, the archbishop continued, had carried out the promise they had made to Tito and to themselves
to "sell the American people the Red, Fascist 'line' with regard to what is happening to religion in Eastern Europe." 54

Such statements as Cushing's hardly decreased general Protestant "uneasiness," as a Time magazine writer put it, with the Roman Catholic Church. Nor did Shipler's reply ease Roman Catholic fears of a renewed anti-Catholic campaign. He said that he would not be "bullied, even by the politically powerful Vatican" but would resist "the type of political clericalism which has been so disastrous to other countries." 57

Religion and Education. One type of conflict in the area of education was the widely reported controversy in North College Hill, Ohio, a suburb of Cincinnati. Origin of the dispute went back to 1940 when a Roman Catholic elementary school became part of the public school system. This arrangement led to division within the community and became an issue in the 1942 school board election. The voters of the suburb elected a Protestant majority to the school board, which then ended the relationship.

In 1945, following a campaign split along religious lines, Catholics regained the Board majority, 3-to-2. The Catholic majority and the superintendent of schools, Dr. William A. Cook, who had been hired when the Protestants were in the majority, quickly found themselves in constant conflict for control over the school system. When the Board voted in February of 1947 not to renew Dr. Cook's contract
as superintendent, charges of anti-Catholicism and clericalism flew back and forth. In March, as a result of a student school strike that was to last two months in support of Cook, the controversy became a topic of national discussion. A meeting of the school Board in which twenty-eight of the thirty-one teachers in the public school system resigned en masse ended in rioting.

The Ohio Education Association and the National Education Association, which had few Catholic members, investigated the situation in North College Hill. The NEA supported Cook and blacklisted the school system when the Board refused to rehire him. By June, pressure led the school Board to resign en masse and the new Board rehired Cook as superintendent. The official findings of the NEA investigation reported that the conflict had produced an upsurge and spread in tensions between Protestant and Catholic members of the community.

A second type of conflict in the area of education centered around federal aid to education, which was becoming an important national issue. In late November, 1946, a speech by Dr. James Bryant Conant, President of Harvard University, opened exchanges between the two religious groups. He stated that all federal aid to education should go to only public schools because of their distinct contributions to American democracy and a free society. His support of aid to public schools only received strong Catholic criticism.
The reason for the strong criticism of the Harvard President came from the new Catholic position on federal aid to education.

This new Catholic position related to two issues: federal control over Catholic schools and aid to parochial schools. Before 1944, the NCWC officially objected to aid which would lead to federal control over Catholic schools and objected to any aid bill that excluded parochial schools from receiving benefits. In other words, the NCWC wanted public monies with as little control as possible by the government over the expenditure of public taxes. Public taxes should not be restricted and could be used for religious purposes by the church schools. In 1945, the NCWC, for various reasons, including financial strains on Catholic schools, hinted in Congressional hearings that it would support federal aid to education in return for support of the Mead-Aiken bill. This bill would have guaranteed federal funds to non-public schools even in states which by law forbade public aid to sectarian education.

Opposition by Protestants groups and the NEA, which was one of the main groups lobbying since the late '30s for federal aid to public education, prevented passage of the bill. The main reason for opposition by these groups was the Mead-Aiken bill included non-public schools as recipients of federal money.
Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft's introduction of what he thought was a compromise bill in the Senate on January 31, 1947 raised the decibel level of the national exchange as, according to Luke Ebersole, "(r)ighteous indignation ran rampant." The Taft bill (S.472) proposed a federal grant of aid to the states which would distribute the money to public schools only, although as Taft stated, if a state recognized non-public schools as part of its educational system, federal funds would be permitted to aid those schools. The NCWC opposed the bill because it did not guarantee aid to parochial schools, while Protestants came out against it because aid to non-public schools was possible under the bill.

Father William E. McManus, Assistant Director of the Educational Division of the NCWC, argued the Catholic case before the House Committee on Education and Labor. He emphasized the "norms of distributive justice" in his testimony:

The financing of schools through public taxation is the responsibility of government, especially of local and state government. This responsibility entails an obligation to observe the norms of distributive justice in distributing tax funds among the schools within the community. Since government itself has nothing to teach, and because government receives the full return from its educational investment when a school produces well trained citizens, therefore, every school to which parents may send their children in compliance with the compulsory education laws of the state is entitled to a fair share of tax funds. Local and state government which refuse to support schools not under the control of the local school board are guilty of an injustice against other qualified schools within the community.

McManus emotionally argued that Catholics had to pay a
double tax: one for support of public schools and one for their parochial schools. Since no public funds collected from Catholics, the priest stated, went to support their schools, such double taxation, especially burdensome in an inflationary period, was unfair and discriminatory. Catholics, however, who sent their children to Catholic schools, which were tax exempt, paid tuition for doing so; they did not pay a tax. Moreover, many Catholic who sent their children to the public schools received the benefits of public funds without discrimination.

Later, McManus also took aim at the most powerful and effective opponent of parochial aid, the NEA. His main thrust concerned the supposed monopoly of education enjoyed by the public schools:

...the N.E.A. wants all the funds or nothing. ...be-ware of the anti-social and anti-democratic policies expressed by the leadership of the N.E.A. ...Catholic schools ask for a reasonable and limited amount of public funds, just enough tax funds to make Catholic schools an integral part of American education, just enough money for our schools to disabuse the public school professional groups of any anti-democratic notions they have a monopoly of American education. He was calling for an equality of treatment for Catholic schools, one that recognized the contribution Roman Catholics made to American society. Couched in as nationalistic terms as public school advocates, McManus' statement aimed to get societal support for Catholic institutions and ideas.

Cushing spoke at the annual convention of the National Catholic Educational Association of the dangers of federal
control and separation of church and state. Protestant opposition to measures like the Taft bill which would aid private schools was a "smoke screen for secularism or bigotry." He put it in this way:

Whether it be in questions of school buses or emergency school subsidies or any other democratic aids to education, no phony plea of conflict between church and state, or any like smoke screen for secularism or bigotry, must be allowed to obscure the sovereign right of the parent to choose the teacher of his children.... ...totalitarianism is a disease the tendency toward which is present in some degree or other in all purely secular states.71

The prelate, representing a large number of Catholics, viewed separation as a major device for the secularization of the public schools as well as a main obstacle to aid, and insisted opponents to aid were merely bigots.

Protestant churches and organizations explained their reasons for opposition to the Taft bill and parochial aid both inside and outside the halls of Congress. Samuel Cavert represented the FCC before a Senate hearing on federal aid to education. Quoting Oxnard, he stated that since parents freely chose to establish and send their children to private schools, they should be willing to pay for that private education without public support. He went on to say, using the same vocabulary of threat, totalitarianism, and the same end, unity as had Cushing:

Public support for parochial schools would divide the community into sectarian educational systems and destroy the unity essential as democracy faces the totalitarian threat to freedom.73
Charles Clayton Morrison, editor of The Christian Century, in 1947 said that if Congress yielded on the Taft bill, the Catholic Church would have advanced one more step in its campaign to achieve more favorable legislation in the states. The Taft bill set no limit on the states in the distribution of the grants in aid and, more importantly, opened the way to passage of the Aiken bill or one like it, which granted all that the church wished in terms of federal funds. He saw such aid as an incipient form of union of church and state. By depriving Catholic church officials of access to public funds, separation prevented their access as well to other instruments of government. By preventing such an eventuality, separation protected Protestant power vis-à-vis Catholicism, and it aided, according to Morrison, the survival of Protestantism in America, an emotional concern that a number of Protestants expressed.

Quite a few educators, noting Catholic pressure for sectarian aid in various communities and at various levels of government, expressed, during the early months of 1947, their support for the view expressed by Dr. Conant, who had been criticized by McManus for his testimony in support of the Taft bill. Many of these educators were affiliated with the NEA, which was increasingly concerned with Catholic inroads in the public schools, with religion being injected into public schools, and, above all, with keeping public funds flowing only to public education. The leaders of the NEA
worked for federal aid in order to aid the public schools which were strapped for money because of the postwar inflation. The NEA leaders supported separation as a function of their concern for public education.

As controversies over North College Hill and federal aid to education were occurring, the Supreme Court ruling in the *Everson v. Board of Education* on February 10, 1947, further exacerbated tensions. *Everson* was the first important decision in the twentieth century by the United States Supreme Court on the "no establishment" clause of the First Amendment. The ruling laid out some of the constitutional grounds for subsequent Court interpretations. The ruling also defined many of the issues that were to be the continual source of disagreements over the next two and one half decades on the appropriate relationship of government and religion. In a 5-to-5 decision, the Court declared constitutional a New Jersey law authorizing free public bus transportation for parochial school students. Controversy and confusion arose from the majority's argument on the First Amendment, the application of the child benefit theory, and the closeness of the decision.

The majority opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black, expounded the Court's interpretation of the no establishment clause in what would become a famous, often quoted passage:

> The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organization or any group or vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.'

The minority opinion, written by Justice Wiley Rutledge, and a dissenting opinion, written by Justice Robert Jackson, concurred in this definition of the no establishment clause.

Having forcefully argued his opposition to aid to religion, Black went on to argue that state or local tax funds to finance bus transportation to parochial schools was constitutional. He gave as the reason for his opinion the fact that such aid fell under the state's police powers to provide for the public safety of children, who would through such funds be kept off hazardous streets. The New Jersey legislation came within the purview of general welfare legislation and was intended for the benefit of the child, and therefore no government money went to support the parochial schools. "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state," Black's opinion concluded, "That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it."

The justices in the minority, through Rutledge, argued that the logic of the First Amendment prohibited all forms of public funds from being used for religious purposes. Public funds raised through taxation were used in New Jersey to defray costs of parents who sent their children to a sectarian school in order to get religious training and education. The cost of transportation was part of the cost of education or religious instruction. Irrespective of its public welfare nature, the New Jersey legislation promoted religion through such aid; therefore, the law was an unconstitutional establishment of religion. In the minority's opinion, the wall had been breached by the majority:

Neither so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the wall raised between church and state by Virginia's great statute of religious freedom and the First Amendment, now made applicable to all the states by the Fourteenth. New Jersey's statute sustained is the first, if indeed it is not the second breach to be made by this Court's action. That a third, and a fourth, and still others will be attempted, we may be sure. For just as Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, has opened the way by oblique ruling for this decision, so will the two make wider the breach for a third. Thus with time the most solid freedom steadily gives way before continuing corrosive decision....

An editorial written in The Christian Century hoped Everson would finally wake the mass of Protestants to "encroachments by the Roman Church" on the wall of separation. The "ultimate purpose" of those encroachments, the writer asserted, was "to shift to the public treasury the entire burden of financing its parochial schools while the church
retains control of the educational process in them." Later, in another editorial, Morrison clarified how members of the hierarchy worked to shift the burden: they followed a long range "strategy of gradualism" that avoided frontal assault on the Constitution in order to mask their ultimate aim. In order, he said, to "crack the constitutional principles of separation," the church officials shrewdly chose some trivial or "sentimental or humanitarian" measure like welfare for children to erode the principle. They then used the break in the principle to justify further ones until the wall of separation disappeared. He saw Everson as an "un-American development."

Other Protestant groups, too, responded to Everson, including the Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church. In May, the council expressed the fear that the ruling posed "a serious threat to our public education system which is the bulwark of democracy." In June in New York, Reverend Stanley I. Stuber, Director of Public Relations of the Northern Baptist Convention; Clyde R. Miller, Associate Professor of Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, and Guy Shipler objected to Spellman's characterization of the "dissenting justices as 'bigots'." The statement was in response to Spellman's protest against bigotry in Protestant opposition to the majority decision when he explicitly censured The Christian Century and Morrison for their opinions. Spellman had not stated the justices in the
minority were bigots, but the three Protestants made clear in their statement that their position and that of the Protestant position were the same as minority justices; to accuse Protestants of bigotry for their position meant that Spellman was so characterizing the Supreme Court justices.

Although pleased with the majority's opinion on bus transportation, Roman Catholics did not like the majority's line of argument supporting the wall of separation.

By the mid-forties, and clearly by 1947, all of these controversies had helped to exacerbate tensions thus creating a highly charged atmosphere and mutual feelings of distrust between Protestants and Catholics. Distrust and anxiety were particularly strong among certain segments of Protestants as well as liberals. To these people, Catholics seemingly challenged established ideas and ways of doing things. This challenge caused these Protestants to counterattack and consider ways of providing some unity against the challenge that would counterbalance growing Catholic influence. The result was the founding in late 1947 of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (POAU) as an interest group for the defense of separation of church and state. The motive force behind that founding, however, went deeper than separation and beyond specific controversies.

**BROADER ISSUES AND FRAMEWORK**

These Protestants, both liberal and conservative, saw the new Catholic assertiveness and more militant exercise
and acquisition of power by Catholics as part of the goal of a monolithic Roman Catholic Church to increase Catholic ecclesiastical power. They saw the church as a political church with a plan for America: at least partial union of the church with the American state in order to obtain special privileges and power. Then, they believed, the plan entailed using this special position to acquire religious domination over the United States. Once this had been accomplished, cultural, social, and economic dominance would follow with the result that the country would become a Catholic country, totally under the thumb of the Catholic hierarchy. Thus, the fact that the Roman Catholic Church was now the largest denomination in the United States in terms of numbers, size, and wealth took on more than symbolic value for these Protestants. This new circumstance foreshadowed dominance by the church, and that the church could begin to work to accomplish its goals.

These goals were ominous because, as these Protestants argued, the Roman Catholic Church did not believe in religious expression or exercise. According to Lawrence Fuchs, these Protestants often cited a book on Catholic politics written in 1949 by two priests, John A Ryan and Francis J. Boland, and under the Imprimatur of Spellman. The work stated, among other things, that if the United States became a Catholic nation where Protestants were numerically
inconsequential, Protestants would lose their tax-exemption and would have their activities restricted. The church, moreover, these Protestants believed, would enforce its power and control through a centrally controlled organizational system of power. But in order to achieve its goal, the church had to destroy separation of church and state as it was written into the First Amendment, according to these Protestants. And in trying to destroy separation, the Roman Catholic Church sought to substitute foreign and un-American ideas for indigenous ones.

The American Catholic Church had acquired the organizational wherewithal to accomplish the goals of the church outlines above, according to Harold E. Fey, a member of the staff of *The Christian Century*. He wrote a series of influential articles, "Can Catholicism Win America?" which appeared in the above magazine from November, 1944 through January, 1945. Fey argued that the American Catholic hierarchy had changed its basic scheme within the past generation and that the direction of that change was now clear. The leaders of the church for the first time worked "as a unit" on questions that affected the church in America. Leaving behind the "inferiority complex" of an "alien minority," the leaders had forcefully and aggressively stepped forward to brandish their strength through organizational structures, such as the NCWC. They had assiduously and systemically built their structures for the purpose of
exercising power in order to shape the total body of American culture to Catholicism.

The consequences of this strategy and the acquisition of the means to carry it out, Fey argued, could be seen in the pressures applied upon all levels of government by the American Catholic hierarchy. Fey cited various examples of successful hierarchy pressure to get the church's way, such as with the United States Government in foreign affairs. More importantly, the church leaders operated through their various structures in such areas as education, social welfare, motion pictures, newspapers, radio, family life, industry and labor and agriculture, and health and hospitals—in every school, in every parish, in every community, every day, in every way. The organizational network was under the direction of the Catholic "hierarchy" which had a unity of direction from Rome and acted as one in regard to the Catholic plan for America, according to Fey.

This organizational behemoth "altering its (America's) institutions to conform to the authoritarian conceptions of the Roman Church" operated as "a system of power to control this country." It was to this system of power and to its effects on America to which Fey turned in his concluding article, "The Center of Catholic Power." The church had through "its officially sponsored teaching...vowed its intention to win America to obedience to Rome"—that is, to the Pope who claimed to rule by spiritual divine right, to be absolute
sovereign of a state church, and to have the religious truth, and who furthermore had little use for freedom or democracy. To attain the end which "only the hierarchy sees clearly" the church must cause "a fundamental revision of the Constitution of the United States and a radical change in the character of the American culture." 98

Fey summed up what this all meant for the future of America:

Today America includes Catholicism with other faiths and makes them equally at home. It includes them all, however, on Protestant terms. Protestants claim religious liberty for themselves and grant it to others, including Catholics. This element of religious liberty is fundamental to all other freedoms in American democracy. Roman Catholic doctrine and the Roman Catholic organization of power are committed to the radical modification of this basic freedom. The Roman Catholic hierarchy has launched a program which will, if it succeeds, include other faiths in American culture only on Catholic terms. It is mobilizing powerful forces to move this nation toward a cultural unity in which the Roman Catholic Church will be dominant. 99

Would Protestantism and freedom, or Catholicism and authoritarianism, dominate American life? Fey identified the continuance of the American tradition of liberty with Protestant dominance over Catholicism. To lose America to Catholicism, he said, was to lose the liberty that Protestants were primarily responsible for institutionalizing. While the American Catholic Church could legitimately win America over to Catholic ideas, Fey argued that the church should not be permitted to win its victory through a change in the First Amendment because such a change was unconstitutional.
These problems posed by Catholicism were political not religious ones, Fey maintained. The drive of the church for public funds for parochial schools was not primarily a religious issue—although no public funds should go to a church that taught authoritarianism and the denial of religious liberty to other faiths in its schools. The drive for public funds involved a question of political power to be fought for and settled politically.

Fey gave his solution to the problem of the possible loss of freedom in America, one to which Protestants, as the primary force behind freedom, should pay heed. "No comparable unity of effort," he wrote, "is visible in Protestantism to recover and maintain the responsibility which it once carried for the character of American society. Until such unity appears, the answer to the question "Can Catholicism win America? is—Yes." Control over American life was slipping from Protestant hands, and this loss of power Fey blamed upon the purposeful plans of the Roman Catholic Church.

On Reformation Day, October 28, 1945, Oxnam, a political liberal in the sense of favoring the New Deal and social welfare measures as well as in leading the FCC, made more specific the nature of the Catholic threat elaborated upon by Fey: clericalism. And clericalism primarily involved political and not religious questions. Clericalism, he said, threatened the United States with the same "political domination" that "cursed" other countries. Clericalism, to
Oxnam, was "'the pursuit of power, especially political power, by a religious hierarchy, carried on by secular methods, and for purposes of social domination.'" Moreover, Roman clericalism in these "cursed" countries demanded religious liberty when Catholics were in a minority while denying it to other religions when Catholics became a majority of the population. The church followed a policy of expediency in this regard, in the bishop's opinion. These other countries, according to Oxnam, were a forecast of things to come in the United States.

Moreover, the bishop seemed to be frustrated at the fact that "When Protestants have protested against intolerance upon the part of the Roman Catholic Church, their protests have been called intolerance." Denial of freedom was intolerance. It was not intolerant of him, he believed, to condemn the denial of freedom involved in the support of Franco's fascistic Spain, in policies against Protestant missionaries in Latin America, and in threats of consumer boycotts upon newspapers and radios to prevent their use by Protestant ministers by the Roman Catholic Church. The church sought to deny access by Protestants to major avenues of expression in the United States, desiring only the promotion of the Catholic point of view. "It is not intolerance," he believed, "when Protestants repudiate Roman Catholic theories of church and state which lead logically to a subservient state dominated by an absolute church."
Oxnam did not consider himself anti-Catholic but a positive defender of true freedom because of the nature of Catholic teachings. He believed that the charge of anti-Catholicism derived from the desire of church officials for political advantage and from the belief of church officials in the church's teaching that the Roman Catholic Church was the one and only true church. As Oxnam put it, the Catholic theory stated that the religious truth resided in the church, which justified the denial of freedom to other faiths and churches that did not have this truth. These other churches were thus in error, and error in Roman Catholic doctrine had no rights—the right of religious liberty was for the Roman Catholic Church alone.

Oxnam began at the same place Fey had—Americanism and Protestantism met at and rested upon liberty, with separation of church and state the constitutional guarantor of that liberty. "Where Protestantism has gone," the bishop proclaimed, "freedom has come." Freedom resided in such Protestant countries as Holland and Scotland but was absent where "the Roman Catholic Church has been dominant for centuries." He asked his listeners to "(s)study the literacy rate; study the health statistics; study such questions as freedom of conscience; study social advance." On the other hand, America nourished freedom because of the Protestant culture and values, so the bishop spoke, he claimed, to defend "Our Heritage of Freedom," meaning primarily the Protestant heritage but also
the American heritage.

Catholics understood the argument concerning their supposed threat to freedom. Cushing, for example, spoke in 1947 on the cause of the increased tension between Catholics and other Americans. He attributed the cause to "the new bigotry":

While professing to find no fault with the faith the prophets of the new anti-Catholicism assert that they oppose us only because of a defect in our idea of freedom. It is being said with increasing insistence that...Catholics...do not mean what other Americans mean when they talk of freedom, and that their religious principles concerning freedom make them a menace to the freedom of others in any community where they become a power. 106

Cushing was referring to criticism similar to Oxnam's and Fey's, both of whom claimed to be concerned with political questions and not with questions of the religious faith of Catholics. Both of them argued the teachings and practices of the church denied religious freedom to other faiths, and, when Catholics became the majority or a power in a community, these Catholics followed the Catholic clergy in carrying out the Catholic teachings. Cushing, however, asserted that the Protestant attacks on Catholicism in the name of freedom merely masked their hatred of the Roman Catholic Church and their fear of the church as a cultural and social force in American society.

An editorial writer in The Christian Century in October, 1947 answered the archbishop. He stated that the above statement by Cushing was accurate but not anti-Catholic.
Protestants did not criticize the Roman Catholic faith but the doctrine of power and privilege as explained by a number of Catholic writers and canon law on the Catholic idea of freedom and religious liberty. The editorialist concluded that "If non-Catholics consider defective an idea of freedom which withholds liberty from the individual and subordinates the freedom of the state to the pope, they are thoroughly justified. And they can be trusted to say to the archbishop, "'If this is bigotry, make the most of it!'" 107

Catholic historical experience in America helped to account for the way Catholics responded to Protestant criticism, categorizing that criticism as bigotry. Looking back in 1963, William V. Shannon wrote that Catholics thought of religious freedom "as the right to exercise religious belief and live in a religiously oriented milieu—a right menaced on all sides by secularism and irreligion. The contrary idea that Catholics are themselves a threat to religious liberty of others is a notion not much examined...." 108 In explaining the appeal of McCarthyism to the American Irish, Shannon explained, in the context of anti-Communism, how religious freedom related to the idea of true religion and past discriminations.

And how do Catholics know that they alone possess religion and must go to any lengths to save it? Because in past generations other Americans have persecuted Catholics and tried to prevent them from having full religious freedom. The memory of the Maria Monk fraud, the Know Nothing riots, the bigotry of the A.P.A., the Ku Klux Klan, and the
defeat of Al Smith seemed to demonstrate that other Americans hated true religion. This religious bigotry in the past had in some ways isolated and set apart the Irish, who were the leaders of the Catholic community. The cultural isolation and the residual resentment against past discrimination convinced many Irish that they had a special mission to save America for religion in the struggle against communism. They felt that only they knew what the struggle was all about and that the liberals and the atheists and the Jews and the half-agnostic Protestants did not know.

Religious freedom depended upon Catholics, just as for Protestants the survival of religious freedom, which they believed they originated and practiced, was their responsibility.

Protestants, who were to organize POAU, translated their fear of the loss of Protestant's premier position of power in the United States to Catholicism into a threat to freedom. Catholic officials did seek to substitute a united Catholicism for a divided Protestantism, especially but not solely as the spiritual center of American life. These Protestants were concerned with the implications of such a substitution. Catholicization of American life and society was alarming to these Protestants because of their perception of the lack of freedom within Catholicism, the motives and aims of church officials, and the political nature of the church.

Protestant concern for freedom, however, was not merely rhetoric or a rationalization for retaining Protestant power. These Protestants way of thinking about freedom permeated their whole thinking about American culture and culture in general. They believed separation guaranteed religious
liberty, and religious liberty was the basis of civil liberty. To destroy or reinterpret the meaning of separation of church and state in the First Amendment foreshadowed the destruction of liberty in America. Destruction of liberty was foreshadowed because separation had been the condition upon which rested the existence and growth of liberty in the United States. Moreover, the major concrete issues between Protestants and Catholics involved in one degree or another the question and nature of freedom: the nature of Catholic thinking on religious freedom, freedom of public schools from clerical control, freedom from taxation to support a religion one did not believe in, and freedom of the state from church control through governmental aid. In general terms, these Protestants saw freedom being challenged by totalitarianism, the modern form of tyranny.

CONCLUSION

Postwar religious tensions as described by the press and Protestant and Roman Catholic sources broadened and deepened concern among a portion of Protestant leaders. These tensions and the Catholic challenge caused them to grope for an adequate response to the new phenomena of Roman Catholic political and cultural power in American life. Protestant denominational lobbies in Washington, D.C. expanded and cooperated in the face of the growth of Catholic power and influence. Such power was magnified by the unity of effort
by Catholics in comparison with Protestant diversity.

"Trigger" events, like the persistent and especially exacerbating Vatican issue, explained the timing for the founding of POAU. Other issues were involved besides the Vatican ambassador issue. These other issues were Catholic anti-Communism, federal aid to public and parochial education, what constituted aid to religion, and Everson as it raised questions of the relationship between government, religion, and education. Except for Catholic anti-Communism, each of the above issues directly involved the concept of separation of church and state.

These trigger events, however, did not explain the larger context, ideology, and underlying emotions that contributed to the eventual founding of POAU. In his study of 83 public interest groups, Jeffrey M. Berry found that the motives for action in founding two-thirds of these groups came less from disturbing events than actions of leaders and cultural changes. He found the skill of the leaders to be of even more importance than the quality of the cause they promoted. In the case of POAU, the specific events signified larger cultural questions to some Protestant leaders. The growth of Catholic power represented larger and more extensive cultural changes which would not only change the cultural context within which these Protestants operated but their style or way of life as well.

Those persons who found POAU conceived of it as the
Protestant ideological and organizational answer to growing Catholic power and challenge to freedom. Protestants were to be fortified against accepting these changes as a valid expression of their way of life. The "defense of freedom" was thus as real to these people as the concrete issues mentioned above. This "defense of freedom" provided a broadly based and deeply felt conviction that could unite those of different denominations and differing theological and political persuasions as well as non-Protestants with Protestants into an interest group.
CHAPTER I: FOOTNOTES


3. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, p. 42.


8. Ibid., pp. xii and 192.

9. Ibid., pp. 147-162.


12. Protestant and Catholic churches count church membership on a different basis. Protestant churches, usually, count as members only those persons who have in one way or another made a commitment to the particular church. The American Catholic Church count as Catholic all children born of Catholic parents. As a result, the relationship between the


18. Greeley, Why Can't They Be Like Us?, pp. 53-55 and Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, pp. 59-60.

19. Anderson, White Protestant Americans, pp. 146-148 and Greeley, Why Can't They Be Like Us?, pp. 66-68. Also Harold E. Fey, "Can Catholicism Win America?" (series of eight


22. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, p. 42.


28. Ibid. and Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, pp. 42 & 59-60. Free churches have been defined as "those churches under the system of separation of church and state," that is churches which from long tradition have been independent and autonomous from the state in the institutional sense. The organizational form of the free churches which evolved between the American Revolution and the Civil War is the denomination. The denomination is "a voluntary association of like-hearted and like-minded individuals, who are united on the basis of common beliefs for the purpose of accomplishing tangible and defined objectives," such as the "propagation of its point of view." Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 103-104.


31. For the origins of the appointment see *New York Times*, October 21, 1951, p. 27.


44. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, pp. 37-38.


50. Ibid., p. 22.

51. Ibid., pp. 16 & 22.


54. Ibid.

55. Time Magazine, August 18, 1947, p. 74.


63. Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, p. 170.

64. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, pp. 52-53.


68. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, p. 133 and Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, p. 50.


71. Ibid., April 10, 1947, p. 18A.


73. Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, p. 270. For FCC policy on federal aid to education, see Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Federal Aid to Sectarian Education, pamphlet (New York: FCC, April, 1947), in POAU files.


81. Everson v. Board of Education, Tussman, The Supreme Court on Church and State, pp. 16-18. The division of the Court reflected the diverse practices among the states. By 1947, twenty-two states, according to Butts, permitted either by legislation, attorney general's ruling, or ruling by state departments of education publicly funded bus transportation for parochial school students. The other states constitutionally prohibited such transportation. See Butts, The
American Tradition in Religion and Education, pp. 151-153. These diverse practices occurred despite the fact that 46 of 48 states in one way or another prohibited aid to sectarian education, Hartnett, Federal Aid to Education, p. 39. See also Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 26.

82. Everson v. Board of Education, Tussman, The Supreme Court on Church and State, pp. 16-18.

83. Ibid., pp. 33 & 44-47.

84. Ibid., p. 29. The Supreme Court ruled in Cochran that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the use of publicly funded textbooks in private schools served a public, not a private, function. Although religious schools were involved, the First Amendment was not involved. The textbooks were a benefit to the child; the public funds did not go to the private schools. See Appendix A, p. 3. See Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education, pp. 170-172.


86. Morrison, The Separation of Church and State in America, pp. 8-11 and Appendix A.


92. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, pp. 137-139 and Kane, Catholic-Protestant Conflicts in America, p. 7. The book, while not authoritative as some Protestants claimed, did have an impact on Catholics. Elwyn A. Smith, Religious Liberty in the United States: The Development of Church-State


94. Fey, "Can Catholicism Win America?", pp. 1 & 24.

95. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

96. Ibid., pp. 2-4 & 23-24.

97. Ibid., pp. 4 & 16.

98. Ibid., pp. 22-23.


100. Ibid., pp. 22-24.

101. Ibid., p. 24. For the causes and effects of this division and diversity within Protestantism, see Hudson, American Protestantism, pp. 131-135 & 153-154.


103. Oxnam, Ibid., pp. 16-18.

104. A statement, frequently cited by Protestants, appeared in the Jesuit Civilita Cattolica of Rome in April of 1948 on tolerance and freedom. The statement read:

The Roman Catholic Church, convinced, through its divine prerogatives, of being the only true church, must demand the right of freedom for herself alone, because such a right can only be possessed by truth, never by error. As to other religions, the Church will certainly never draw the sword, but she will require that by legitimate means they shall not be allowed to propagate false doctrine. Consequently, in a state where the majority of the people are Catholic, the Church will require that legal existence be denied to error, and that if religious minorities actually exist, they shall have only a de facto existence without opportunity to spread their beliefs.... In some countries, Catholics will
be obliged to ask full religious freedom for all, resigned at being forced to cohabitate where they alone should rightfully be allowed to live. But in doing this the Church does not renounce her thesis, which remains the most imperative of her laws, but merely adapts herself to de facto conditions, which must be taken into account in practical affairs.... The Church cannot blush for her own want of tolerance, as she asserts it in principle and applies it in practices.


109. Ibid. How and why Catholics merged the APA and the KKK with the rise of the KKK in the 1920's, despite the differences between the two, see Donald L. Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 240-249.


111. Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, pp. 180-181.


CHAPTER II

THE FORMATION OF POAU THROUGH 1947

The founding of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (POAU) did not result from a mass outpouring of grassroots anti-Catholicism. The leadership responsible for the formation of POAU came from established ecclesiastical and lay individuals and bodies and from highly respected and educated men and women. The Protestants who provided the major leadership in founding POAU represented a distinct minority of Protestantism's elite. These leaders, however, represented views of a considerable portion of Protestantism. While these Protestants may not have represented the majority of Protestants in their view on the expansionist nature of Roman Catholicism, they expressed most Protestants' view of separation of church and state.

EARLY EFFORTS: 1941-1946

Rufus Weaver played a prominent role in providing guidance toward efforts at a multi-denominational approach to the Catholic challenge to separation. He had come to Washington, D.C. in the '30s. The lack of knowledge about the observance of separation in the capital appalled him. For a Southern Baptist like Weaver, separation of church and
state was akin to a theological belief. This separationist belief rested on the doctrine of the free church and the idea of individual freedom. One was free to search for communion with God only if the individual, and his church, were free from coercion by the state. Only through separation could one freely exercise one's individual religious liberty. The church and state represented two separate spheres of authority.

In 1941, he organized a National Conference on Church and State to deal with the problems related to separation. The inability of Protestants to organize adequately to prevent or end President Roosevelt's sending of a personal envoy to the Vatican especially stirred the minister. Weaver saw that aware Baptists alone could not do what he thought needed to be done. Members of the Religious Liberty Department of the Seventh Day Adventists and the Scottish Rite Masons, Southern Jurisdiction, a Protestant institution that was generally considered to be anti-Catholic, attended the conference.

Especially significant was the presence of Charles Clayton Morrison. Morrison was the founder and editor, from 1908 until 1947, of the highly respected and influential, non-denominational Christian Century. He gave especial emphasis in his magazine to the issues of church and state and religious freedom. A member of the Disciples of Christ Church, Morrison was also an advocate of ecumenical Protestantism,
which sought to overcome the denominationalism that dominated Protestantism. He was a follower of the Social Gospel teachings of Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbush and a member of the National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). With the exception of Weaver and his successor, Joseph M. Dawson, Morrison helped more than any other person to found and form POAU.

From the conference a commission emerged whose aim was to keep before the American public the concept of separation. Morrison; Weaver; Adna W. Leonard, a Methodist Episcopal bishop; and Daniel C. Roper, former United States Secretary of Commerce, made up the commission. The members hoped to establish a permanent organization to carry out the above purpose. World War II and the death of Leonard on May 3, 1943, however, prevented any organizational work from being accomplished.

When the war ended and the Vatican controversy once again stirred Protestants, Weaver picked up where he had left off. Following some discussions, of which little is known, he organized a series of small meetings during 1946 in Washington, D.C. Meetings were held in the Senatorial office of Olin D. Johnston (D., S. Car.), a Southern Baptist; in the Scottish Rite Temple; and in the Carroll Arms Hotel, the place of the last meeting, September 19, 1946. Few specifics on which occurred at these meetings were recorded. What is known is that Weaver desired, if feasible, organization on a
national scale, and those present at the meetings agreed on
the need for cooperation between the various Protestant de-
nominations for the protection of religious liberty. They
could not decide however on how best to resist encroachments
on separation or what type of organization was needed.
Weaver's idea of a new national alliance of Protestants or-
ganized for defense of separation had once again been given
an airing.

Meanwhile, that same year, Weaver became involved in
helping to organize a small, secret organization known as
Citizens United for Religious Emancipation (CURE). CURE ori-
ginated from concern for the outlawed Protestant minority in
Italy. Another concern involved the misuses of United States
Government relief goods and property to enhance the Roman
Catholic Church in Italy. When these facts were presented to
committees in the House of Representatives, the Congressmen
did not react. As a result and with an initial $500 contri-
buted by John Cowles, Sovereign Grand Commander of the Scot-
tish Rite Masons, Southern Jurisdiction, a number of Protes-
tants organized CURE. Weaver was President of CURE and El-
mer E. Rogers, Associate Editor of the Scottish Rite Maga-
zine, The New Age, was Vice President. Clyde W. Taylor, head
of the Office of Public Affairs of the NAE, became secretary.
Other important members consisted of two influential elders
of the Seventh Day Adventists and Charl O. Williams, later
President of the NEA and Chairwoman of the Democratic Women's
In Italy, CURE representatives worked to end the 1929 Mussolini-Papal Concordat and to end religious restrictions on non-Catholic religions. CURE also aimed to have written into the new Italian Constitution the right of religious freedom and separation of church and state. In the United States, CURE, according to Frank B. Gigliotti, sought to counter the "organized minority of Roman Catholics in Congress and Washington." The founders of CURE believed this minority had joined with Italian Catholics and the Pope to deprive Italy of religious liberty and to prevent the American people from finding out about it.

At a luncheon meeting of CURE members, Charl Williams suggested that a defensive organization comparable to CURE might be what was needed. She made the suggestion because CURE had, according to Gigliotti and Dawson, been successful in ending some of the religious restrictions against non-Catholic religions in Italy and had had a hand in the writing of religious clauses of the new Italian Constitution. Shortly afterward, on February 5, 1947, a meeting was held following the funeral of Rufus Weaver, who had died on February 3, 1947. Dawson, who had been convinced by Weaver of the need for a national alliance of Protestant churches, took over the leadership position of Weaver and presided at the meeting. The representatives at the meeting, consisting mostly of CURE members, decided that a national
defensive organization should be formed to provide the means to defend separation. They also decided that another meeting, to be held in May, would be needed to work out details.


Dawson, as Weaver's successor and as Executive Director of the Baptist Joint Committee, took over the duties of organizational leadership. To insure that the next meeting in May would be representative and national in scope, he contacted representatives of churches and groups across the country, whom he believed saw the need for organizing. He assured those he contacted, in the words of one POAU founder, that the new institution would consist of people whose "single and only purpose" would be "the maintenance of the American principle of separation of church and state upon which the Federal Constitution guaranteed religious liberty for all...."

By the time of the Dawson-sponsored May meeting, representatives of some Protestant churches had become sufficiently distressed to speak out on what Bishop O'Nan warned was a Catholic "cultural offensive." At the annual convention of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (Southern) in early May, the Committee on Christian Relations drew attention to the ability of the American Catholic Church through its political power to tap public funds for the interests of the church. It requested recommitment to the separation
principle. At the same time, Louie D. Newton, President of the Southern Baptist Convention, then in session, pictured Protestants as "confronted by the most determined and adroit campaign to alter the traditional American understanding of the proper relationship of church and state." He emphasized the need to exercise the "Baptist witness" for the principle of separation. The Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church, then representing the largest denomination in Protestantism, meanwhile, accused "the Roman Catholic Church of political activities in this country and abroad" that "amounted to bigotry and denial of religious liberty."

More than fifty individuals attended the May 15th informal conference on church and state held at the National Memorial Baptist Church in Washington, D.C. Dawson presided over the meeting and was aided by influential fellow Baptists Louie Newton; Stanley Stuber; and E. Hilton Jackson, a constitutional lawyer and Chairman of the Baptist Joint Conference Committee, as well as by the Secretary of the Baptist World Alliance. Morrison attended the conference, along with the Executive Secretary of the Disciples of Christ. Samuel Cavert, as General Secretary, represented the FCC. The President and Executive Vice President of the Wisconsin Council of Churches and a few members of other local and state councils of churches also participated. Other familiar faces were present: Elmer Rogers; Clyde Taylor; two representatives of the Seventh Day Adventists; and William
Cook, superintendent of North College Hill schools. Bishop William Scarlett of the Episcopal Church, who was also a member of the National Committee of the ACLU, and two Southern congressmen also took part in the meeting. The following churches were also represented: Methodist, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (Southern), Society of Friends, Congregational Christian Churches, Lutheran, and Washington Federation of Churches. In addition, a national spokesman for the Christian Scientists, a few Jewish leaders, and a few educators attended the May conference.

Morrison later summarized why these people attended the spring conference. The Protestant leaders, he stated, had discovered that as heads of their individual churches they could do very little in the area of separation. And separation, the editor observed, was the core issue between Protestantism and "Romanism," or the Roman Catholic philosophy. Feeling powerless to protect the line of separation, the various denominational leaders realized that through coordinated cooperation a wider base of support for separation could provide the solution to the problems posed by Roman Catholic actions. Protestant churches had not been able to organize effectively against church-state encroachments; a new defensive organization provided the answer. The new organization must not be anti-Catholic per se, i.e. composed of people who had a personal animosity against Catholics as individuals or as members of a religion. Only an organization designed for
the maintenance of separation fitted the need.

Discussion at the meeting centered on the best strategy for the new organization. The CURE approach and work on the Italian Constitution were discussed. E. Hilton Jackson and Elmer Rogers argued for a legal approach. The President of the Wisconsin Council of Churches spoke about how in 1946 Protestants had organized to defeat an amendment to the Wisconsin State Constitution that would have permitted public bus transportation to be used by parochial school students. Similar political action might prove effective. When church sponsorship for the new group was suggested, critics feared that such sponsorship would lead the public to question whether the group's "single and only purpose" was really the maintenance of separation. Such suggestions led Cavert of the FCC and other Council of Churches participants to urge caution to avoid possible condemnation as anti-Catholic. Time and further discussions were needed.

Certain decisions had nevertheless been made. The issue of anti-Catholicism would hopefully be resolved through private meetings and compromises. The new organization should be formed and be part of a Protestant movement but should not be exclusively Protestant. Non-Protestant allies had to be found in order to avoid the appearance of being a new Ku Klux Klan.

The conference established two important committees. One committee investigated a legal approach for the new
group. More importantly, another committee was set up to propose programs and purposes from a Protestant viewpoint. Morrison chaired this committee, which formulated PCAU's basic approach and manifesto. Southern Baptist Newton and Episcopal Bishop Scarlett were the other members, until, sometime during the summer, Methodist Bishop Oxnam, who was also a member of the National Committee of the ACLU, and Presbyterian John A. Mackay became committee members. Mackay became, along with Oxnam and Morrison, the initial Vice Presidents of PCAU. Mackay, sometimes called "Mr. Presbyterian," was President of the Princeton Theological Seminary. He was also, along with Oxnam and Morrison, a leader in the Protestant ecumenical movement that culminated in 1948 with the founding of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam, Holland. Mackay became a member of the central committee of the WCC, while Oxnam became co-President of WCC in 1948.

MORRISON AND PCAU IDEOLOGY

Charged with devising the purposes and a workable program for the new institution, Morrison grappled during the summer and fall of 1947 to articulate these ideas into a manifesto. The manifesto he wrote was, after thorough and careful scrutiny, adopted with minor revisions. Morrison's ideas constituted the working premises of the "action" agency. The manifesto became PCAU's only definitive statement of policy, other policies being determined on situational bases.
Incorporating Weaver's idea, Morrison thought the institution's prime task revolved around defending and maintaining religious liberty through the "dissemination of knowledge" concerning the constitutional principle of separation. The organization was not to be a religious or theological institution; it was to be an educational and ideological one. It would revive the idea of separation—a native American idea-written into the Constitution. The source of this cultural action and politics linked "religious and patriotic concerns." Freedom was that source.

American society, Morrison stated, was a free and open society because the Founding Fathers had separated that society from the American government through the separation of church and state. American society, where the churches operated, constituted the area where individual choice, not governmental authority, reigned supreme. The Founding Fathers, through the Bill of Rights, made the decision that the American state would not be a totalitarian one, that is one where the church was a servant of the state. Instead, these men, he believed envisioned a society in which they "drew a circle around government, and proclaimed that the entire area outside that circle was a realm of freedom." Government involved coercion and power, while the society at large was the area where freedom reigned. Morrison ignored the interactions between government and society. He argued that the "whole cultural domain" of belief, conscience, speech, and
worship and the institutions which embodied "these liberties" were free, part of a free culture. A culture of liberty thus emerged in the United States, and "the American state...became the guarantor of a free pulpit, a free altar, and a free church."

Government should not interfere with religion, Morrison continued, nor grant special favors or privileges, nor establish a state religion, nor make any bars to religion, nor interlock its official processes or institutions with those of religion. Moreover, the Constitution, Morrison observed, forbade not only the establishment of religion, it also forbade the "making of 'any laws respecting the establishment of religion'--that is, pointing in the direction of such establishment, or carrying implications that might develop into such establishment." This broad definition, in accord with the majority and minority opinions in Everson, meant also no entanglement by "official act in the administration of law." Thus, one small step or one seemingly insignificant precedent could portend toward establishment, and one act of special privilege violated the religious liberty of all other churches. The "American system" was one with "a free church side by side with a free state, both of them in a free society."

Freedom bound America together, Morrison declared. The Founding Fathers had "committed this country to this great democratic idea" as an "act of faith--faith in the patriotic
Patriotism was loyalty to certain founding American ideas, and Americans, as lovers of liberty, should conform ideologically to the highest manifestation of American liberty, religious liberty as represented by separation of church and state. Liberty bound Protestantism and Americanism, "religious and patriotic concerns," together.

Being heirs of such tradition of liberty based on the "spirit of American Protestantism," Protestants had a duty to all "lovers of religious liberty" to keep "open this forum of freedom." While a Protestant belief, separation was as well a constitutional doctrine. The Roman Catholic Church, Morrison maintained, held a different conception of the relation of church and state, one in which the church was above the state operating as a super-national state. The Roman Catholic church-state competed with the American state and attempted to control it. In Morrison's view, an American ideal was threatened. Now that Catholics were a "strong formidable minority," the Church claimed special relations with the state, and if Protestants did not resist, and if government yielded, they doomed themselves to be a "minority sect on the margins of American life." Assuming that a religious majority determined culture, Morrison claimed that "the mainstream of our culture will flow in the channel determined" by those favored by government.

Patriotism or defense of liberty slipped easily into
defense of a way of life. Keep the idea of separation alive in American life and one kept alive the American culture of liberty, which Protestants had done so much to formulate. The love of liberty became the emotional impulse and justification for founding POAU.

Dissent from the Roman Catholic Church theory of church and state, Morrison concluded, was not anti-Catholicism. Their theory had nothing to do with Roman Catholic worship, doctrine, and ecclesiastical organization. The church, he observed, despite pronouncements to the contrary, did not believe in the principle of religious liberty, and as Catholics gained power and political influence the denial of the principle through political power became a real threat. In other words, Catholicism had raised the issue in the political arena and Protestantism had to meet the political and cultural challenge in the political arena, even though, he believed, such a struggle had obvious religious implications.

The Roman Catholic Church threatened to close the open forum of freedom guaranteed in the Constitution. The forum of freedom should not be used to question that freedom. The First Amendment should not even be questioned, let alone changed. Patriotism as much as religion motivated the men of POAU. Deeper than these two motivations and tying the two into a highly combustible compound was the love of liberty. POAU was to be the institution of American liberty. Americanism was the lover of liberty shown through patriotic
action in defense of separation. The love of liberty, the idea which was supposedly ingrained in the American people and their way of life, illumined the religious imaginations of the founders of POAU. With such a belief behind the "single and only purpose" of POAU, the organization aimed to ensure that the Jeffersonian wall of separation between state and church was well fortified and high. Nothing less than complete, strict separation between the two spheres of authority could be countenanced by the founders of POAU.

OCTOBER 13, 1947 MEETING: ORGANIZATIONAL MOMENTUM AND ANTI-CATHOLICISM

Morrison submitted his partially completed manifesto entitled, "Protestantism United to Defend the Separation of Church and State" to the National Conference on Maintenance of United States Constitutional Separation of Church and State. The conference met on October 13, 1947 at the Calvary Baptist Church, Washington, D.C. with approximately the same sixty persons in attendance who had been at the May conference. After discussing what Morrison had submitted, the members present, in response to the wishes of Newton and Dr. Willard Givens, decided to include education in POAU's purposes. As Executive Secretary of the NEA and Director of Education for the Supreme Council of Scottish Rite Masonry, Southern Jurisdiction, Givens, particularly, wanted a specific stance taken on public aid to sectarian education.
With accommodations made and the phrasing polished, a Steering Committee of Nine, on the motion of Cavert, was appointed to perfect Morrison's document and to write a constitution. Another task involved formulating a plan of operation for the new national organization, tentatively called, as a compromise, "The National Council of Citizens on Church and State." The steering committee, chaired by Oxnam with Dawson as Secretary and including Morrison, Mackay, and Newton, had the task of organizing an agency to act against encroachments on separation and to serve as an advocacy and educational agency for separation.

Despite the decision to organize nationally, qualms remained. Quite a few representatives present voiced fear that too much emphasis was being placed on defense and resistance; Protestants, they thought, would not go along with such a negative approach. One person who voiced such an apprehension was Ellis H. Dana, a Congregationalist and an Executive Vice President of the Wisconsin Council of Churches. His conviction that some type of organization was needed to counter the Roman Catholic Church did not prevent him from counselling caution. He feared those at the meeting were heading into the thicket of anti-Catholicism, negativism, and narrowness that would their intentions. Later, he sought the advice of public relations specialists who told him the organization was "anti," not objective enough, unrepresentative, and in need of a broader, more positive approach.
Dana nonetheless remained in the organization; the need for Protestants to stand up and yield no more to the Roman Catholic Church and its interests overrode his fears, as it did those of most of the others who were present at the conference.

A few had qualms they could not satisfy. Along with a few others, Scarlett and Cavert, feared being misunderstood if the organization carried out the stated purposes. Shortly after the October meeting, both men disassociated themselves from the developing institution. Cavert withdrew as a representative of the FCC ostensibly because the variety of opinion within the FCC made it impossible for the FCC to ally itself with such a projected organization.

The issue of anti-Catholicism made the members cautious and deliberate in what they were forming and where they were going, and precise and specific in what the new organization was to do and what its intentions were. This delicate issue limited and circumscribed what kind of organization would emerge and prolonged the process of founding an organization.

Each articulation of purpose and method brought out the issue and put the men in a quandary. When, at the October 13th meeting, someone rose and "pleaded" that sufficient steps be taken to avoid "instituting an anti-Catholic movement," another person responded that charges of anti-Catholicism were to be expected from Catholics irrespective of what one did to avoid them. One just had to stand up under
the attack and take it. While pushed to avoid the appearance of anti-Catholicism, the members found the pull toward a militant, strong stand for separation compelling, come what may. The need to end Protestant timidity countered their fear of being misunderstood. The charge of being an anti-Catholic would just have to be borne.

The men who remained in the organization satisfied themselves that they themselves and the new institution were not anti-Catholic. Dawson later recalled how as early as the September 19, 1946, meeting, fear of being involved in "another frenzied anti-Catholic crusade" arose. Those persons at the meeting resolved the problem, according to Dawson, by asserting that they were patriotic. They were not against any one church nor were they personally anti-Catholic because, unlike the members of the Ku Klux Klan, American Protective Association, or Know-Nothing Party, they did not hold any prejudice or hate against Catholics personally or as representatives of any religious group.

Patriotism could not be prejudice, they contended. They aimed not to promote the Protestant faith but a patriotic idea; they stood for something positive. That something was the culture of liberty created in America. The changing social and cultural conditions threatened that culture with redefinition. Moreover, one could not possibly be for religious liberty and thus for American liberty, as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson had been, and at the same time be
anti-Catholic. Showing the Roman Catholic Church theory of church and state was un-American and subversive to the American Constitution was not anti-Catholicism but an act of patriotism, of cultural fidelity to the United States. From their own perspective, no anti-Catholic movement was under-way; their motives were pure and patriotic.

The conferrees decided to seek allies to broaden the base of the new organization. They unanimously adopted a resolution that was later published in The Christian Century. It appealed to "all Americans who profess allegiance to Protestantism, Judaism or any other religious faith, and those who though professing no church allegiance believe in the American form of government, to join in demanding that legislatures and executives and courts shall defend the Constitution against all efforts to subvert it." The spokespersons of the new institution tried to avoid religious rancor by focusing on officials of the governments in the United States who gave in to Catholic demands and not the officials of the Roman Catholic Church.

Specific objectives approved at the conference were also released to the press. The new institution would keep church and state separate by preventing support of church schools from public tax funds, especially for parochial student transportation and through federal aid. The takeovers of public schools by any particular sect would be contested, referring to the controversies at North College Hill as a
foretaste of bitter conflict to come if such Catholic actions were not halted. Also, Myron C. Taylor should be recalled as United States Ambassador to the Vatican and the relationship permanently ended.

The participants also decided to hold one more organizational and promotional conference. They wanted time and consultation to assure the organization was on the right track. In order to emphasize the national character of the emerging institution and to attract more members of prominent stature, Chicago, instead of the nation's capital, was chosen as the site of the next meeting. A Methodist Temple, instead of the usual Baptist surroundings, was chosen as the place of the meeting in order to stress interdenominationalism.

THE FOUNDING MEETINGS OF NOVEMBER 19 AND 20, 1947: IDENTITY, A MANIFESTO, IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES, EARLY STRUCTURE, AND ANTI-CATHOLICISM

The founding meetings of POAU took place on November 19-20, 1947, at the Methodist Temple in Chicago in a charged atmosphere. Just a few days before the conference, the Bishops of the NCWC had issued a statement attacking secularism as a growing danger to the American way of life. The Bishops' statement reiterated what many Catholic spokesmen had said before about the oversecularization and Godlessness of the public schools. Formerly when the representatives of the Catholic hierarchy had attacked the public schools,
Protestants had interpreted it as an attempt to get financial support for Catholic schools. Now, some persons at the conference feared that the hierarchy sought to pressure the state to promote religion in the public schools. Of the sixty to eighty people at the conference, most had attended previous meetings, providing a continuity of leadership for the developing "movement." While the main organizational leadership came from conservative Protestants, a broad spectrum of theologically and politically liberal Protestants were represented as well. A number of church educators and editors of church magazines also attended the meetings. Three of the most influential figures in Protestantism at the time participated in the conference: Methodist Bishop Oxnard, Southern Baptist Dawson, and Presbyterian Mackay. The Scottish Rite Masons, who financially guaranteed ROAU's first year of existence, were well represented. In addition, Unitarians from the American Humanist Association and American Ethical Union took part in the conference. They came because of their concern over the problem of released time in public schools, an originally Protestant idea whereby school students were released during school hours to attend a religious education class of their choice.

The question of allies for the organization led to a dispute. When Morrison proposed the name "Protestants United and Allied Americans for Separation of Church and State," an objection came from some Southern Baptists who felt the
name excluded them from prominence, since they did not claim a Protestant heritage. One objection even arose to the name being shortened to "PU!" Likewise, when the name "Protestants United for Separation of Church and State" was suggested, someone feared that the organization would become known as "PUS" or "PUSSYFOOTING ORGANIZATION." In a more serious vein, the objectors wanted to emphasize that the institution was to be an alliance, separate and independent of the churches, and national in scope. Almost everyone present expected a united Protestantism to support the organization when the institution fought the battles of the churches for separation on the frontlines.

Morrison defended the stress on Protestantism over a name that emphasized an alliance. While Americans were predominantly Protestants to such an extent that they could go it alone in this effort, they did not want to do so. Those "other Americans" who believed in religious liberty and those "non-churched" who had "a Protestant heritage - not a Roman Catholic heritage" would follow Protestant leadership if Protestants gave these other Americans that leadership. These people knew what "Protestantism" stood for, whereas "Citizens United" or "Americans United" did not mean anything and would not give the institution the clear identity it needed. Do not be put off, Morrison concluded, by the word Protestant:

To some the name of 'Protestant' is squeamish-why? The answer to that question is found by reason of
the Roman Catholic Church using the term 'Protestant' as a SMEAR word. PROTESTANTS CAN CRINGE UN- UNDER SMEAR WORDS OR THEY CAN GLORIFY THEIR PROTES- TANTISM AND TAKE AWAY ALL ODIUM CREATED BY THE ROMAN CATHOLICS. THEY CAN GRASP THE THISTLE WITH A FIRM HAND and say we are TOGETHER.

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State was chosen as a compromise.

The conference did not resolve whether the new institu- tion was to be primarily Protestant or identified as a broad- ly based coalition of Protestants and non-Protestants. As indicated by the manifesto, which was approved with one dis- senting vote, the founders of POAU envisioned Protestantism as providing the core supporters but with prime emphasis on a broad alliance with non-Protestants.

A Manifesto trenchantly summarized the controversies and tensions of 1947 between Protestants and Catholics. The paper summarized under "Immediate Objectives" the rea- sons for Protestant-Catholic tensions. The Manifesto urged the need for pressure to halt the erosion of separation; POAU must apply pressure swiftly and massively. The applica- tion of pressure was to be at specified points and in speci- fied areas, mainly where the controversies of 1947 had clari- fied the issues and helped to agitate the founders into form- ing POAU. There was an undertone of emotional intensity in the Manifesto, as one might expect given the deep convictions and anxieties of its authors.

The POAU proposed to fight through legal, political, educational, and propagandistic means. Representatives
would fight at all levels of governments and their various agencies to stiffen the "Americanism of people's representa-
tives...to resist the aggressive activities of those who would subvert the Constitution to their own sectarian inter-
est." The manifesto attacked the objectives of the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy as "plainly subversive of religious liberties..." and the Church's idea of church-state relations as "incompatible with the American ideal...." Despite these attacks, the approach spelled out in the manifesto aimed to focus on giving in of governmental officials to the demands of Catholics. In this way, the spread of Catholic power could be stopped without directly attacking or primarily focusing on the Roman Catholic Church. Or at least this explanation provided the rationalization for POAU's approach. Through this approach the founders hoped to avoid the appearance of being part of another anti-Catholic crusade and to blunt the issue of anti-Catholicism.

As the manifesto made clear, the founders believed that most Americans still held to the idea of separation despite the confusion caused by "specious propaganda...." In face of successes of Catholic propaganda, POAU would elevate separation to a preeminent position in the minds of Americans and show how it related to constitutional freedom and "cul-
tural and spiritual democracy." Besides its new emphasis, POAU would challenge recent violations of separation such as Cochran and Everson and would resist "further encroachments,"
especially in areas like parochial aid. The major thrust in accomplishing these goals involved educating and enlightening the American people in order to mobilize them into a powerful force in American society.

The November 20th meeting officially founded FOAU. Oxnam, who chaired the conference, seemed to be the most likely candidate for president of FOAU but refused because of his other duties. Later, Dr. Edwin McNeill Poteat, President of Colgate-Rochester Divinity School and a Southern Baptist, who took no part in the organizing meetings, agreed to become president. The conference set up a National Advisory Board with a projected membership of one hundred and fifty. Designed to represent the broad political and theological spectrum from left to right, the primary reason for the board involved the desire to involve prestigious persons in order, once again, to counter the expected charges of anti-Catholicism. The conference projected a budget of $100,000 for the first year. The Manifesto, 100,000 copies of which were soon printed, would be issued after the Christmas holidays.

When the founders returned to their normal duties, they left FOAU established only on paper. It had been set up by clerical officials at the national level. An interim committee consisting of, among others, Morrison, Newton, Dana, Williams, and Taylor existed under January, 1948 when it reconstituted itself as the Board of Trustees. No administrative structure existed, and the new institution lacked
managerial executives to take care of daily operations. Dawson had been made Acting Director and to him was left the task of giving some direction and devising some institutional structure for the organization he had done so much to bring into existence.

Weaver's aim to keep separation alive and in the minds of the American people had been broadened and transformed by the founders of POAU into the major strategic aim of the new institution. The major advocacy of the POAU leaders would be educational, a broad category that could encompass many techniques and tactics like propaganda, public opinion formation, and using the courts as educational tools. The degree of emphasis on education differentiated POAU from the 83 public interest groups studied by Berry. The educational strategy resembled that of the Anti-Saloon League of America, which more than any other organization was responsible for the passage of national prohibition in the 1910's. The League leaders translated the power acquired largely through their educational efforts into political power. As Weaver's successor, Dawson was the natural choice to head POAU and to carry out its educational objectives.
CHAPTER II: FOOTNOTES


7. Author's interview with Glenn L. Archer, Headquarters of POAU, Silver Spring, Maryland, July 2, 1973 in author's tape file, and Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 29.


15. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
20. Ibid., p. 22.


33. Appendix A.

34. Morrison, The Separation of Church and State in America, pp. 4-5.

35. Ibid., p. 5.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 12 and Appendix A.


39. Ibid., p. 14 and Appendix A. Morrison, as did the other founders of POAU, stressed belief in and conformance to the principle of religious liberty as well as to the principle of separation of church and state. This philosophical point Smith found to be characteristic of earlier Americans who adhered to the separatist tradition. These separatists, requiring a philosophy or religion to be loyal to the new country and liberty, opposed "all other systems (which they) believed to be hostile in principle to civil and religious liberty." (Emphases added.) Smith, Religious Liberty in the United States, p. xii.


45. Dawson, A Thousand Months to Remember, p. 196 and Appendix A.


47. Appendix A.


53. Margaret G. Cragg letter to Mr. John C. Pitzer, President, Schools Improvement Association, North College Hill, Ohio, November 20, 1947, pp. 1-2, released to AP, UPI, INS on the above date, a copy is in POAU files. A list of those present is attached to POAU, Church and State Newsletter, No. 1 (Washington, D.C., March 15, 1948).


55. Dawson, "Minutes of National Meeting...," November 20, 1947, p. 1; Dawson, The Birth of POAU, pp. 2-4; and Notes from Lowell interview with Morrison, pp. 3-4. See Appendix A.

56. Cragg to Pitzer, November 20, 1947, p. 2 and Notes from Lowell interview with Morrison, pp. 3-4.


58. Emphasis is in the original. Cragg to Pitzer, November 20, 1947, pp. 3-2.


61. Appendix A.


63. Appendix A.


65. Appendix A.

in POAU files.


68. Dawson, "Minutes of National Meeting..." November 20, 1947, p. 2; Cragg to Pitzer, November 20, 1947, p. 2. See also Notes of Lowell interview with Morrison, pp. 3-4, and Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 44.

69. Cragg to Pitzer, November 20, 1947, p. 4.


CHAPTER III
BATTLELINES ARE DRAWN: THE DAWSON YEARS, 1947-1948

Dawson directed POAU from November 22nd, 1947 until September 1st, 1948. In those nine months the Baptist minister worked to broaden the base of the clerically elite, Washington based organization. Dawson received some initial assistance in the day-to-day operations of POAU from Morrison, who as third Vice President was chairman of the public relations committee, and from the Baptist Joint Committee, which provided office space and a modicum of personnel.

With this aid and some guidance from POAU's Board of Trustees, the head of POAU sought to institutionalize the three R's of policy: the revival of the concept of separation of church and state believed to have been eroded by Roman Catholic propaganda and efforts; the redress of violations of separation that had already occurred; and resistance to any further breaches in the constitutional wall of separation. POAU was, according to Dawson, to lead a "great crusade arousing America to safeguard the birthright of religious liberty." The ultimate, long range goal of the organization was to prevent the loss of American liberty. The loss was to be prevented through a nationwide, clerically
led grassroots movement to provide Protestant, and hopefully national, unity on the question of separation.

Dawson, however, was reluctant to proceed too far in setting up the working arms of POAU. He had accepted the job as Executive Secretary with the understanding that it would be temporary and that a permanent executive director would be found as quickly as possible. As head of the Baptist Joint Committee, he was the leading Baptist spokesman on public affairs and the major representative of Baptists in Washington, D.C., where he had important contacts in Congress. He felt that he could not give enough time to organize and manage POAU while remaining faithful to these primary obligations. Dawson was especially fearful that the public would confuse the two institutions and identify POAU as an arm of the Baptist Joint Committee. For these reasons he felt obliged to keep a low profile, which in the long run he believed would serve neither the best interests of the Committee or POAU. He also did not want unnecessarily to bind his successor to his policies.

Consequently, Dawson did not hire any permanent personnel, he did not set up an organizational structure, nor did he make any binding or important policy decisions. Nevertheless, some direction had to be given to the ongoing day-to-day operations, and, in doing so, Dawson and the Board cautiously worked to carry out the objectives laid out in the manifesto without developing the structure needed to
implement them fully.

The controversy following the announcement of the existence of POAU adversely affected the early organization and stability of POAU. When the four thousand word manifesto was printed in full in the New York Times on January 12, 1948 and The Christian Century and in part in the Christian Science Monitor and by the Religious News Service, the manifesto had the impact the founders had planned and hoped for. As the declaration succinctly and cogently summarized the ongoing conflicts and arguments between Protestants and Catholics of the last decade, the response to the manifesto was immediate.

CATHOLIC RESPONSE TO POAU'S FOUNDING

The first response to POAU came the day following the manifesto's publication from the Catholic-related Knights of Columbus. John E. Swift, Supreme Knight, charged that the men of POAU were "wolves in sheep's clothing," religious bigots wearing the garb of Protestant ministers, whose aim was to impose a biased view of the First Amendment, i.e. strict separation of church and state. The inference was clear, this view of the First Amendment derived from the Protestant's prejudicial view against Roman Catholics, and this accusation continued as the chief tactic of Roman Catholic spokesmen who entered the controversy. The Catholic Church, Swift vigorously asserted, was not subversive of religious
liberty or disloyal to the American tradition of separation.

These accusations by the men of POAU were compounded, in Swift's mind, by their questioning of Catholic patriotism. He reminded them of the role of Catholic Americans in helping to win World War II and recalled earlier American nationalists, whom he still vividly remembered, who questioned Catholic loyalties to America. In short, he said, POAU stood in a long line of anti-Catholic organizations whose nativism led them to question the patriotism and Americanism of American Catholics. Mr. Swift hoped POAU would fall of its own weight, presumably meaning the weight of its anti-Catholic prejudice.

Significantly, Swift implicitly recognized the "symbiotic" relationship of religion, patriotism, and First Amendment politics in POAU's thinking. The symbiosis derived from mingling concepts of civil and religious liberty. This mingling and relationship, although in a different way, also permeated Catholic responses to POAU.

One Catholic strategy for counterattack arose out of the political climate of the late '40s. In February, Jesuit John Courtney Murray compared the manifesto of 1948 to Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto of 1848. Murray's comparison reflected the church hierarchy's posture in the Cold War. The longstanding militant anti-Communism of the American Catholic Church had acquired by the mid-'40s a national spokesman in Francis Spellman of New York.
His obsession with internal subversion of the United States by Communists was one with his concern to see his church survive in Communist countries. This most famous American Catholic prelate, a favorite of members of the press when they wanted a definitive statement of the Catholic position, preached a simple credo, according to Donald F. Crosby:

Communism was evil, Catholicism and America were good, therefore Catholicism and Americans must join together in combating atheistic Communism. ...Communist subversion was making 'tools and fools' of Americans, anti-Catholic bigotry in America was caused by Communists, and America would be unsafe until every Communist was removed from influence in American life.12

Anti-Catholics were, therefore, in this view, at minimum, fellow travellers whose anti-Catholicism aided the cause of Communism, imperiling America from within.

Leaders of Catholic organizations such as the 200,000 member Catholic War Veterans, the 600,000 member Knights of Columbus, NCWC, and the Catholic Information Society of New York shared the viewpoints expressed by Spellman. These organizations provided political muscle for effective pressure, protests, censorship, boycotts, and propaganda. They provided as well the necessary stories and rumors to pass from person to person to keep alive the sense of the danger of Communists to American society. Liberal Catholics differed with conservative Catholics only over the means of defeating Communism and not over the end of eliminating a subversive element from American life.
Catholic anti-Communism had political effects that formed the world in which POAU operated. Clark Clifford, advisor to President Truman, observed in 1947 that "distrust and fear of Communism" was "the controlling element" for American Catholics in their attitude concerning political affairs. He made his remark against the background of the 1946 Congressional elections that saw urban Catholic voters, particularly Polish Americans, swing into the Republican camp over the United States' Eastern European policy, contributing to the Democratic defeat of that year. That anti-Communism had become a political issue and a vote-getting device in 1946 was not lost on the Truman Administration. In 1947-1948, for reasons of its own, the administration instituted its own brand of anti-Communist programs and rhetoric.

For Catholics, anti-Communism had become, as Crosby observed, "a common denominator, the bulwark of both true Americanism and authentic Catholicism," a "heady brew that would fire the blood of American Catholics for at least the next two decades." The world was divided between "our Western Christian world" and the "atheistic Communist world" in a struggle for the future of mankind. The forces of freedom were led, so the leadership believed, by the Roman Catholic Church and the United States. Catholic and secular anti-Communism intermingled, and, because the outcome of the struggle was so important, dissent from the concordance or
national disunity caused by anti-Catholicism was tantamount to treachery.

The association of Americanism and Catholicism had deep historical roots. Besides the Vatican policy of making America as Catholic as possible described in chapter one, Protestant nativism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had generated among Catholic leaders a defensive nationalism. This nationalism aimed to show how Catholic America was and how American the Roman Catholic Church was. In both cases, the Catholic leaders sought to prove the Catholic immigrant and his church were loyal to and shared beliefs and ideas consistent with the American nation. They sought "to show the identity of the two-Catholicism and Americanism," arguing that America had deep Catholic roots, because the United States, in its origins and ideas, owed much to Catholic beliefs and teachings. Spellman, especially, fully affirmed America's messianic mission and identified the actions and goals of America with those of the deity.

The final powerful justifying link in the historical transition, from reconciling and accommodating Catholicism and Americanism, to a full-fledged and confident identity of the two, was provided by the anti-Communism of the '40s. "In fighting the red peril," David O'Brien has observed, "the Catholic could dedicate himself to action which was both Catholic and American. Few would disagree that he was proving his worth as an American and demonstrating the
compatibility of faith and patriotism." Anti-Communism became an avenue to acceptability in the American mainstream and a device for spreading Catholic influence and ideas. Anti-Communism helped to ease and to justify the Catholic rise as a group into the middle class.

Anti-Communism as a criterion of loyalty to America was an issue Catholics had helped to define, and to taint one's opponents with the Communist label or associate one's opponents with Communism in the public mind had obvious advantages. Murray, and a number of Catholic critics of POAU, took advantage of this device. An additional advantage of associating POAU with Communism derived from associating the organization with the stereotyped ideas of deceptions, lies, and propaganda of the Communists. POAU's criticism of the Catholic Church were as well deceptions, lies, and propaganda and should be ignored. More extreme Catholic critics of POAU saw little difference between Communism and POAU, since both movements were to them motivated by hatred of the Catholic Church, an ancient defender of non-material values, and both worked for the destruction of the church.

The official response of the American Catholic Church to POAU came in a January 26, 1948 NCWC statement by the bishops entitled "The Catholic Church in American Democracy." The bishops went to great lengths to refute the manifesto's arguments on the Roman Catholic church-state theory, the aims of the hierarchy, the interpretation of the First Amendment,
and the position of the church on parochial aid and on federal aid to education. In answering the manifesto, the bishops summarized Catholic arguments and positions of the last decade. They applied to POAU (on whom they stuck) the epithets used to counter Protestant criticism, and they criticized POAU in terms which became standard for later Catholic criticism of POAU.

First, the Catholic bishops denied "absolutely and without any qualification" that they now sought or would seek in the future a union of church and state in the United States. "If tomorrow Catholics constituted a majority in our country," the bishops emphasized, "they would not seek a union of Church and State." To argue as the manifesto had done that Roman Catholic theology and tradition of church-state union somehow subverted the American ideal of separation or religious liberty was not only wrong, according to the bishops, but "brands Catholics as aliens in America, who will and cannot be assimilated." The statement, however, did not define union of church and state, e.g. whether aid to church schools was necessitated by Roman Catholic theology for the good of society or was permitted under the tradition of separation.

Second, the bishops took the offensive and accused POAU of being "not only anti-Catholic but anti-American" and of having an "un-American mentality," because the manifesto had accused the Catholic Church of being unpatriotic. From their
viewpoint, the accusations contained in the manifesto, while "not as crude as those issued by Know-Nothingsm or APA-ism or Ku Kluxism...." were proof of a reincarnation, in modern dress, of nineteenth and early twentieth century American nativism.

Third, the bishops perceived, as they saw in earlier nativism, religious prejudice behind POAU's criticism of their church. They dismissed POAU's expressed political motivation as a cover for advocating and spreading Protestantism under the banner of church-state separation. The bishops pointed to the equation made in the manifesto between the founders of POAU ideas of church-state separation with the American ideal as proof of their assertion. Whatever the American ideal may be, the bishops implied, it did not necessarily coincide with the teachings of Protestantism or have to include an absolute position on separation.

Finally, the bishops felt that the times called for the three major faiths to unite in national concord against a "common enemy--atheists, secularists, and materialists." The effects of the manifesto, the bishops contended, instead aroused "intolerance, suspicion, hatred, and conflicts between religious groups" at a time when fighting was required against the true enemies of religion and America.

A statement by John T. McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati and Chairman of the NCWC Administrative Board, supplemented the views of the bishops. He addressed the
question of whether the NCWC considered parochial aid and the Vatican mission a union of church and state or fully within the tradition of separation. Catholics, McNicholas said, considered the United States' Vatican mission to be a purely diplomatic affair. American policymakers, in their pursuit of world peace, thought it was in the American interest to have official access to the Pope. Like other countries which had relations with the Vatican, no special privileges or advantages were asked for or given. If the Vatican Ambassadorship happened to be a religious issue, the cause resided with such groups as POAU who made it one. As for parochial aid, the Supreme Court, McNicholas pointed out, had made "no authoritative interpretation of the First Amendment declaring unconstitutional federal aid for children attending other than tax-supported schools." Catholics were merely asking the court for an interpretation because "despite the dogmatic assertions" of the signers of the manifesto, governmental aid to "private schools"—religious schools were not named—had many precedents.

Moreover, McNicholas argued, the public school system did not have a monopoly on the education of American children. The unanimous Supreme Court decision in the Pierce v. Society of Sisters(1925) gave parents the right to send their children where they wished and, he believed, "gives us (Catholics) the charter for the American system of education and guarantees its freedom." 

"Destroy freedom of education
in America," the archbishop commented, "and you will soon destroy all the other basic freedoms." The point of the argument aimed to extend the legal right of Catholic schools to exist into justification for Catholic schools as a part of the fundamental educational system in the United States, on par with the public schools.

McNicholas' statement concluded that Catholic activities were fully within the American tradition of separation. Tax aid to parochial schools was not unconstitutional. The Roman Catholic Church did not seek union of church and state or the destruction of the guarantees to religious freedom in the Constitution. The church had no sought to destroy the wall of separation, he insisted. The charge of Catholic subversion by this "strange" and "tragic" organization was an "outrageous indictment" which lacked proof. Rather, POAU, in its charge of "criminal weakness" by the majority of the Supreme Court in allowing free bus transportation in the Everson decision, reflected what they accused the Catholic Church of, an "un-American mentality." Since the founders of POAU had no evidence for its charges, there was no reasons for the existence of POAU, he concluded.

The POAU leadership responded in turn to the statement by the bishops a month and half later in "An Open Letter" published on March 8th in the New York Times. The POAU Treasurer, E. H. DeGroot, Jr., a Washington, D.C. attorney, signed the letter, although Morrison apparently wrote it.
In the letter, the Catholic hierarchy was accused of shrewdly maneuvering to subvert the Constitution while claiming loyalty to it. The real issue, one that the Catholic Church ignored, was the constitutional right not to be taxed to support any church, even one's own church. The constitutional issue was a political and not a religious question, and POAU leaders would work in the public arena when the hierarchy warred on the Constitution and threatened potential warfare among the American people.

POAU leaders, the letter writer stressed, would not be fooled about the true nature of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by the insulting cry of "bigots." The cry hid the aggressive intent of the church. In speaking out, POAU founders prevented intolerance because they spoke out in support of the guarantee against religious bigotry, separation of church and state and religious liberty. Sectarian bigotry or ethnic hatred did not motivate POAU founders, Morrison wrote. Rather, the real source of religious bigotry in the present day was the destructive attack by the Roman Catholic Church upon the Constitution. Until the church changed its aims, any intolerance or bigotry expressed would be the responsibility of church officials. In effect, the letter writer absolved the leaders of POAU of responsibility for any intolerance or bigotry on their part.

The letter writer went on to explain what the manifesto meant by "alien." The founders of POAU believed that
Catholics were full citizens of the United States and were integrated and assimilated into American society. Catholics as people were not unpatriotic. The Catholic hierarchy in America, however, held to the Old World religious theory of church-state union. This alien religious theory was behind the current Catholic drive for political power.

Besides the purported non-American nature of the Catholic idea of church-state relations, the hierarchy itself, Morrison asserted, held to other principles inimical to the United States. He put it this way:

The Catholic Church is 'alien' to the American ideal of separation of church and state. Its ecclesiastical organization embodies a principle of absolutism and authoritarianism that is conceptually incompatible with the ideal of American democracy.31

In striking back in this way, POAU had violated one of the strictures set out in the manifesto; a POAU leader had attacked the ecclesiastical organization of the Roman Catholic Church.

Frederick G. Hochwald, director of the educational department of NCWC, responded to the POAU's open letter, and most of his response related to educational matters. In defense, he concentrated on the North College Hill, Ohio, controversy, in which Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati had been involved, as well as on a growing national controversy in Dixon, New Mexico. Like North College Hill, the Dixon case involved nuns in Catholic garb teaching in and being paid by the public school system.
Hochwalt noted that wherever nuns were employed in public schools they did so at the behest of their community's legally elected or appointed school boards or of state officials. He argued that whether a majority on the school board in North College Hill or Dixon were Catholics was irrelevant since they were employed by the constituted officials of the community. In the case of North College Hill, the school board had incorporated a parochial school into the public school system and paid $6,000 for annual rental of the parochial building. This situation church authorities "merely tolerated" whenever local sentiment permitted it. Whenever local public opinion and the legal authorities decided otherwise, parochial schools and nuns were taken out of the public school system. The Catholic Church was not imposing its will on unwilling people. Hochwalt pointed out that POAU's "melodramatic" and "one-sided" presentation of the North College Hill situation gave one the inaccurate impression "that the Catholic Church was deploying its teaching staff in the public schools."

POAU leaders had concentrated more on the Roman Catholic Church in the two controversies than, as the manifesto promised, on the proper role of government officials.

Meanwhile, Oxnam, first vice-president of POAU, and Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston clashed over the radio in Manchester, New Hampshire. Cushing, in a broadcast on February 1st, essentially, repeated the charges made by
the NCWC against the men of POAU as "fomenters of bigotry" and the manifesto as an anti-Catholic pronouncement. Cushing pointedly remarked upon anti-American and anti-Catholic groups who, as in the past, hid behind the mask of patriotism and harbored traitors and traitorous groups. The archbishop as well accused liberals of a "tempest of talk in behalf of communism." The POAU Board requested and, through the intercession of the local Protestant ministerial association, received equal radio time on February 15th for the liberal Bishop Oxnam to answer the charges of the Archbishop of Boston.

By the time of the radio broadcast, Oxnam was incensed, for his numerous sharp criticisms of the Catholic Church (and he was one of the few prominent Protestant churchmen to be so openly critical) had, the day before, brought equally sharp criticisms of his stance. A group of Catholic clergy, protesting his scheduled appearance at a Washington Birthday gathering in Morrisontown, New Jersey, accused him of being pro-Communist and unpatriotic. Oxnam used the clerical protest in his radio speech as an example of the pattern of suppression and censorship carried on by and characteristic of the Catholic hierarchy.

Oxnam described in his broadcast what he believed to be the different cultures of Protestantism and Catholicism, which had led to divergent ideas on religious liberty. Protestantism believed in freedom; the political structure in
which freedom was best expressed was democracy; and democratic principles were the organizational principles of the Protestant churches. Threatening this freedom and democracy, as well as civil freedoms, was the theory of religious truth held by the Roman Catholic Church. The bishop argued that the theory made the church political in organization and aim because Catholics were bound in conscience to deny religious liberty to others whom they believed should not have a right to speak and preach religious error. The state, moreover, had a positive duty according to this theory to support the Roman Catholic Church since it represented religious truth. Consequently, in compliance with their church's teaching, the goal of American Catholics was to promote their church through political means, according to Oxnam.

The theory was intolerant, Oxnam argued, and in contradiction with American ideals. The theory assumed the Catholic Church had the truth; true religious liberty assumed that no position represented the truth and that everyone should therefore be free to search for God's truth in his or her own way. Moreover, true religious liberty could not exist when a church sought to translate its religious power into political power through official and religious sanctions upon its adherents.

Concluding, Oxnam stated that he was no religious fanatic concerned with the religious teachings, forms of worship, ecclesiastical organization, or internal policies of
of any church in the United States. In other words, he was not a bigot nor was his criticism anti-Catholic or directed against the Roman Catholic Church per se. He reiterated his firm conviction that criticism of ideas which had political consequences should occur in the political realm without being interpreted as propagandizing for the Protestant faith. This bishop saw himself motivated by a patriotic and religious concern for the "American form of government" that protected all religions.

Criticisms of the Roman Catholic Church by POAU leaders had a number of effects. Insofar as POAU was seen as an anti-Catholic organization, separationism could be touted by Catholic officials as an expression of anti-Catholicism, the very association the founders of POAU had worked to avoid. Archbishop Cushing, discussing the controversy, stated, "He who defames the hierarchy defames the whole Catholic body, and he who deprives the Catholic laity of their fair share in civil benefits strikes at the whole church." Much opposition to the Catholic position as well as measures and actions backed by Catholics were defined as anti-Catholic. POAU's criticism did nothing to change this politically advantageous stance and broad definition of anti-Catholicism. The labelling and national identity of POAU as an anti-Catholic organization grew out of thoughtless statements and emotional responses of POAU leaders as well as out of the deliberate attacks of Roman Catholic Church spokespersons.
POAU officials continued, of course, to blame Roman Catholic leaders for this unwanted and, POAU leaders believed, unwarranted identity.

**PROTESTANT RESPONSE TO POAU'S FOUNDING**

In contrast to the protests of Catholic officials to the manifesto and to POAU, the response among Protestant leaders was for the most part silence, except for the editors of two magazines. Their responses were different and reflective of different approaches to church-state relations that would have an effect on POAU in the future.

*Christianity and Crisis*, an influential Protestant magazine, was critical of POAU, reflecting the views of its founder and editor, Reinhold Niebuhr. The neo-conservative and neo-orthodox theologian started the magazine in 1941 to counter the social gospel, the liberalism, and the moralism that he believed dominated Protestant thinking at the time. The leading social gospel and liberal Protestant journal since the mid-20's had been Dr. Morrison's non-denominational *Christian Century*, where Niebuhr at one time had served as contributing editor. One of the most fundamental disagreements between Niebuhr and men like Morrison was, according to Niebuhr, their fusion of theology and politics, making religion a function of politics. Niebuhr also objected to what he regarded as the worship of America's secular religion, humanistic democracy. On the issue of separation of church and state and Catholicism, Niebuhr stated that "there is a
greater danger that the separation of church and state be interpreted too rigorously in our country than that Catholics achieve some undue advantage."  

*Christianity and Crisis* reflected other influences important to the future of FOAU. The magazine reflected Niebuhr's Lutheranism. Lutheran's theological outlook denied "absolute separation between the religious and political dimensions of life," favoring institutional separation between the church and state but close and friendly functional cooperation between church and state. Additionally, the church taught the need for the church to influence the society and the state. The Lutheran church had begun as an established church in Europe so that the American solution was only one of a number of possible relations between church and state. Lutherans were also concerned with the influence of secularism and the role of religion in private and public schools. Quite a few leading Lutherans, like Niebuhr, who had been ordained in the Evangelical Synod of North America, held moderate views toward Roman Catholicism. Moreover, the conservative and staunchly anti-Catholic Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, was the strongest Protestant advocate of and had the largest number of Protestant parochial schools.  

*Christianity and Crisis*, co-edited in 1948 by John C. Bennett, a Congregationalist, was as well a primary avenue of expression for a group of liberal Protestant clergy connected with the influential Union Theological Seminary,
the leading figures of which were Niebuhr and Bennett.

Bennett, in an early February editorial that paralleled the NCWC’s criticism of POAU, said that he feared that POAU might herald "an alliance between Protestants and secularists...." Secularists were against religion in the form of the church in public schools, Bennett argued, but they believed in a religion of their own in the form of "a humanistic religion of democracy which they seek to incorporate in public education." Bennett also thought that the separationist position of POAU denied any meaningful relation between religion and society. POAU had an important and, as it turned out, persistent Protestant foe--one associated with private schools and traditionally with Catholics in politics.

The Christian Century was brought to the defense of POAU in mid-February by an ongoing controversy in Rochester, New York. Dr. Edwin Poteat, President of POAU and of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, and the founders of POAU were attacked by the Catholic diocesan paper and diocesan bishop of Rochester as well as by Archbishop Spellman. In a speech in Rochester, Spellman charged POAU with what the Christian Century called the "usual charges of 'bigotry', 'intolerance'." In addition, Communists within POAU were named: Poteat, Oxnam, Louie Newton, and John MacKay. Poteat and POAU were supported, according to the Religious News Service, by two hundred Protestant ministers at a meeting
of the pastors' union of Rochester, before which Poteat spoke.

A "preponderant majority of Americans" led by all of Protestantism, the Christian Century editor asserted, "believe that certain policies and positive acts of the Roman Church are incompatible with the Constitution and a threat to religious liberty." The founders of POAU were defended against the "hysterical" and "explosive reaction in Rochester and similarly ill tempered reaction of the Knights of Columbus and the hierarchy's official utterance through the National Catholic Welfare Conference (which) will be repeated in other localities and in further general pronouncements" until "this hysterical reaction...exhaust itself". The writer of the editorial obviously thought this exhaustion would come and sooner rather than later.

The main thrust of the editorial dealt with the question of tolerance. The timidity, indifference, and excessive tolerance on the part of Protestants had allowed the Roman Catholic hierarchy to get as far as they had in their aggressive designs.

What now disturbs the Catholic authorities is the discovery that Protestants and many other Americans may not be so timid and complacent as has been assumed; that there is a great body of American opinion which is ready to assert itself in defense of a fundamental principle of this government concerning which they hold a conviction contrary to that upon which the Roman Church is proceeding.

The Roman Catholic Church, the editorial continued, had used
epithets to prevent Protestants from presenting their side of an issue for at least two reasons.

Does not such language betray the true location of the religious hatred it professes to deplore? Does it not also betray a consciousness that certain ends which are being sought in American society cannot be validated by fair argument and persuasion, but only by trying to scare the opposition into non-resistance through fear of being smirched with vulgar epithets?

The conception of tolerance that Protestants had observed was a false one, really a "psychosis of fear", that had led to cringing, bowing, appeasing, handwringing, and silence before Roman Catholic aggressiveness. The men of POAU, said the writer, forthrightly spoke their convictions to reverse this deplorable state of affairs.

The editorial writer wrote of the frightful alternatives to POAU. Protestants could continue to cringe and do nothing in which case the pressures and propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church would force governmental officials in Congress, in the White House, and on local school boards to give the church open access to public funds. Protestant would then belatedly react, possibly violently. The other alternative was to let the opposition movement to the Roman Catholic Church be led by "the fanatical anti-Catholic fringe of Protestantism" who had "their own weird conceptions of the Protestant faith." They would attack the Roman Catholic Church's doctrines, form of worship, and ecclesiastical organization, and religion would become intermixed with the
political issues of separation. If more representative Protestants did not act, the effect would be "religious war in the political arena."  

**McCollum and the Secularism-Sectarianism Axis**

The Supreme Court's **McCollum** decision, announced on the same day *An Open Letter* appeared, March 8th, dealt for the second time in approximately a year with the relation of religion and education. The decision set off an even greater and more divisive nationwide controversy than the earlier **Eвerson** ruling. It further accentuated the differences between POAU and the Roman Catholic Church, adding more combustible legal wood to the mutually fanned fire. Although the ruling gave further constitutional support to the viewpoint of POAU, the case raised the thorny issue of "secularism" for POAU. The issue was potentially very damaging to the organization if secularism became associated with separation in the minds of Protestants.

**McCollum** originated with a suit brought by Mrs. Vishti McCollum, a "rationalist," on behalf of her son against the "released time" program operated by the Champaign, Illinois, 50 Board of Education. Students in the Champaign public schools were released for twice weekly religious education classes. The program was conducted by church authorities of the three major faiths in the public school buildings during school hours under the supervision of public school teachers.
Terry, Mrs. McCollum's son, had to leave the classroom during the program since his mother had not given written permission for him to participate in the program. He was sent to study hall where attendance was taken. Mrs. McCollum thought this type of program violated the First Amendment.

Justice Hugo Black and most members of the Supreme Court agreed with her. The Court ruled in an 8 to 1 decision that the Champaign released time program violated the strict wall of separation between church and state because it was conducted in the public school room and involved public school officials in religious instruction. Black, quoting the "no aid" formula in Everson, based the Court's decision on the strict separation interpretation set forth in the Everson case.

The justice explicitly rejected the two major arguments of the Champaign Board of Education. He denied the validity of the narrow interpretation of the establishment clause, i.e. that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the clause, and the states were free of its prohibition. He also found unacceptable the argument that the First Amendment prohibited only governmental preference. The amendment also prohibited "impartial" and equal governmental assistance to all religions.

Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion, with three of his fellow justices joining in his reasoning,
helped to confuse what the Supreme Court said concerning the establishment clause. As absolute as Black on separation, he went farther than Black on the need to keep religion and public education separate. They must be kept separate, he argued, in order to keep divisiveness from tearing apart the public schools and destroying these American symbols of democracy and common "destiny." The opinion strongly denied the rights of churches to influence the public schools and seemingly implied complete separation of public education and religion. The inference made from this line of reasoning was that public schools should teach only secular values.

Frankfurter as well commented on constitutional separation.

The case, in the light of the Everson decision, demonstrates anew that the mere formulation of a relevant Constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a problem, not its answer. This is so because the meaning of a spacious conception like that of the separation of Church from State is unfolded as appeal is made to the principle from case to case. We are all agreed that the First and the Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of government than merely to forbid an 'established church'. But agreement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect a 'wall of separation between Church and State', does not preclude a clash of views as to what the wall separates. Involved is not only the Constitutional principle but the implications of judicial review in its enforcement. Accommodation of legislative freedom and Constitutional limitations upon that freedom cannot be achieved by a mere phrase.

He went on to state that "separation means separation not something less."
Justice Robert Jackson, who had concurred in Frankfurter's opinion, further confused the issue by writing a separate concurring opinion. He believed that the Court had neither the jurisdiction in this case nor a way to determine when secular education ended and sectarian education began. He believed the First Amendment provided no legal guidance in deciding such cases as the Court had before it except its "own prepossessions." Jackson feared that the result would be that the legal wall of separation would become as "winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded."  

Justice Stanley Reed, who had not participated in the Everson decision, was the lone dissenting voice, basing his opposition on the "close association of church and state in American society." Reed reasoned that American tradition and culture provided federal governmental aid to religions with such actions as Chaplains in Congress and the Armed Forces, although they involved no disbursement of federal funds. Reed, then gave an inch and took a mile. Arguing that the establishment of religion clause should probably be interpreted to mean no aid to a state church (i.e. no preference to any religion), he concluded that American precedents and "customs and practices" permitted non-preferential (non-sectarian) treatment of religion by government. To Reed, separation of church and state was not absolute. "(D)evo-

...
justine wrote in criticism of the Frankfurter opinion, "should not lead us into a right interpretation of our constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted habits of our people." He declared, in a sentence often quoted by Catholic authorities, "A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech." 57

Given the times, the Supreme Court decision in the Campaign case was bound to be controversial. The Court found itself in a delicate and difficult situation, as described by Cushing Strout:

Legal disestablishment of the churches in the nineteenth century functioned in the context of a Protestant cultural establishment that was challenged in the mid-twentieth century by those who had stood outside that tradition. Jehovah's Witnesses, Catholics, Jews, and agnostics fought their case to the Supreme Court, where so many political problems eventually arrive in American history; and the justices hacked out a tortuous course in trying to reconcile a legacy of separatism that was both liberal and evangelical with the modern pluralistic realities of an expanding Catholic influence, a waning Protestant hegemony, and a more aggressive secular liberalism. The Court's engagement with these problems forced it to formulate its own conflicted sense of what republican religion and religious republicanism had meant and should continue to mean in new circumstances.

...Yet the Court cannot be blamed for the difficulty of reconciling eighteen-century agreements and compromises with twentieth-century pluralistic conflict over basic assumptions. 58

In the scramble for the right to define republican religion and religious republicanism, the Supreme Court decision seemingly came down on the side of secularism which raised a hornet's nest of controversy.
The strong fear of secularism spanned the differences between Protestants and Catholics. One prominent religious educator and member of the FCC, Dr. F. Ernest Johnson, in the autumn issue of *Religion in Life*, wrote that the *Campaign* decision made the strict separationist position of the minority in *Everson* into the majority. It completely separated the sphere of religion from government and the public schools. Released time was the Protestants' "child," he pointed out, but "This time it is our ox that is gored." Protestants would have to rethink their positions on church and state, Johnson argued, because separation now was being used to support secularism and no longer promoted the interests of Protestants in public education.

Up to now we have thought of the separation of church and state as virtually synonymous with religious liberty, a principle with which we consider ourselves closely identified historically. It has been something of a Protestant slogan. Now we find it used to challenge one of our most distinctive enterprises. We have regarded the separation of church and state almost as an aspect of Protestant strategy. This is a striking irony in the turning of the tables.59

Such a changing Protestant attitude held dangers for the Protestant unity POAU aimed for, especially, when, as Dr. Johnson feared, separation led Protestants into an "Unnatural Alliance."

For we Protestants have been slipping into an unnatural alliance between churchmen and extreme secularists. Whereas our main concern from the beginning has been to defend religion against the state, their main concern is to defend the state against religion. The two are complementary, of course, not contradictory, but close preoccupation with either throws the
relationship out of balance.

The explanation of this rather curious alliance is not difficult. The clash between Protestant and Catholic philosophies and interests has predisposed our leadership toward a militancy which accepts as allies all who share the militant attitude. I suggest that this tendency has led us to lose sight of the realities of the situation. It was largely Protestant urgency that created an atmosphere congenial to the new judicial line....

The NCWC annual statement by the Catholic bishops summarized Catholic reaction to the McCollum decision, which was extremely hostile. Prior to the ruling, practice in regard to released time varied among Catholics from diocese to diocese, some participating as in New York and Boston but not in other metropolitan areas. While local Catholic participation continued to vary after the decision, the Roman Catholic Church began for the first time to defend the principles behind the system of released time, although never to the exclusion of promoting parochial schools. The bishops in their November 21st statement entitled The Christian In Action singled out two main enemies as destructive of religion in American life. The most important enemy was secularism, that is, life not centered on God; all of the various opponents of the church seemed to be manifestations of this secularism. The other enemy was statism, whereby the American state sought a monopoly over education in the United States.

The bishops asserted that the majority justices in the McCollum decision, and the minority justices in Everson, had expounded a novel interpretation of the Constitution because
they did not know American history. Supporting Justice Reed's dissent, the prelates argued that the background to the formation of the religious clause of the First Amendment made clear that the federal government could not extend preferential treatment to one religion over another religion or compel or forbid any state from doing so. This background made it equally clear, according to the bishops, that the federal government as part of the practical policy of the general American pattern of cooperation of religion and government could extend aid equally to all religions. The bishops were especially disturbed by the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the First, thereby applying the strictures which had formerly only applied to the federal government to the states.

The bishops stated their position in what became a controversial dictum:

If this practical policy be described by the loose metaphor 'a wall of separation between Church and State,' that term must be understood in a definite and typically American sense. It would be an utter distortion of American history and law to make that practical policy involve the indifference to religion and the exclusion of cooperation between religion and government implied in the term 'separation of Church and State' as it has become the shibboleth of doctrinaire secularism.

The Catholic Church, the bishops made clear, would work "...peacefully, patiently and perseveringly..." for a reversal of the Supreme Court interpretation. They would do so because the decision accelerated the "...secularization of
our culture..." in law, public life, and in education. The secularists who propounded the view now held by the Court, the priests contended, had ended religion in the public schools in the past. It must not end "all cooperation between government and organized religion in the training of our future citizens." Otherwise, the result would be an "establishment of secularism" barring God from public life.

While less intense than Catholic reaction, Protestant response was generally adverse, and so POAU leaders had to move cautiously and carefully on the issue of secularism raised by the released time decision of the Court. Released time had been started, as noted above, by Protestants to give youth religious and moral instruction in the public schools. The idea was pronounced in Gary, Indiana in 1914. The released time program had spread, according to the International Council of Religious Education, to 2,200 communities by 1947, involving close to two million public school students. Although the numbers of students involved may have been as low as 1.2 million, between five and nine percent of public school students were enrolled in released time programs at this time. The majority of Protestants favored released time, according to Leo Pfeffer, in order to provide religious education in the public schools that would combat irreligion, secularism, and the growing influence of Catholicism.

Many of the programs were in urban areas such as New
York City, Chicago, Cincinnati, Dayton, Toledo, Indianapolis, St. Paul, Boston, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, Spokane, Los Angeles, Kansas City, and St. Louis. Of these cities only St. Louis discontinued their programs, while the others continued released time for religious study in other than public school buildings, a practice not involved in McCollum. The national extent of participation by Catholic public school children in released time programs was not clear; but Catholic children constituted eighty percent of New York City public school students participating in the program during the 1940's.

The NEA conducted a survey in 1948 on the effects of McCollum. It found that over 70 percent of the superintendents in public schools in 2,160 communities did not think that religious instruction was necessary. It also found no difference between large and small communities in regard to released time. In the 480 communities where there was religious instruction in connection with the public schools, 40 percent of the public school superintendents did not think such instruction was necessary.

POAU thus had to state its position within a divided Protestantism. McCollum drew praise from the liberal Methodist Zions Herald as well as from most liberal Christian groups and many Baptists. Besides most Jewish agencies, the Seventh Day Adventists and the Christian Century supported the decision. A Christian Century editorial writer observed that those Protestants who were primarily concerned with
separation of church and state were favorable to the Campaign ruling. While critical of the confusion caused by the various concurring opinions, the editorialist was even more critical of Protestants and Catholics who participated in the released time programs and advised them to stop participating, especially Protestants. He believed such programs did not do much to combat secularism and caused embarrassment when Protestants tried to halt Roman Catholic encroachments.

One of POAU's main conservative supporters was more concerned with secularism than separation however. The NAE, whose head of Office of Public Affairs, Clyde Taylor, "Mr. NAE," sat on POAU's Board, vigorously opposed McCollum because the Court, it was believed, had endorsed secularism and humanism. Leaders of NAE sent out feelers, according to the Christian Century, for "a national movement of protest against anti-religious teaching" in all of the schools of the United States. The NAE had already gone on record in 1946 in support of the Christian Amendment movement that was designed to have the United States acknowledge Jesus Christ as the savior and itself as a Christian country. The NAE was against any impartial definition of the First Amendment when it came to Christianity.

This theocratic idea of the American nation had led a number of fundamentalist and evangelicals to found the National Association of Christian Schools in May of 1947 to
provide fundamentalist primary and secondary education. They believed the public schools and the NEA were espousing anti-Christian ideas and moving away from the religious and educational traditions of the original settlers of the United States. The NAE had provided the initial effort for the Christian day school program, and the movement was given an added impetus with McCollum. The Christian day school movement, moreover, was part of a larger trend of the greatly increased growth of non-public schools. In 1930, they had enrolled 9% of all American pupils in school and, by 1952, had reached 13%. Between 1945 and 1951, non-public school enrollments increased 36%, while public school enrollments increased only 14%. The National Association of Christian Schools which represented viewpoints prominent within the NAE had an enrollment slightly over 12,000 students by 1954 in 123 schools, over one hundred of the schools began after 1948.

To the NAE, separation of church and state was seen as a way to combat Roman Catholic influence; separation must not be used as a tool to enhance secularism.

Baptists were deeply and contentiously divided over the Court's decision. Although Southern Baptists though there should be close cooperation between government and religion and the teaching of religion in the public schools, they also believed as well in the neutral state. The neutral state, however, was not a secular one. A neutral state to Southern
Baptists meant one that could favor religion as long as the state did not support or favor any sectarian group in so doing. The state should not be anti-religious.

Dawson later stated that nothing during his term as Executive Secretary of the Baptist Joint Committee caused such tumult as the committee's development of a position on McCollum. Attorney E. Hilton Jackson, President of the Committee and an important member of POAU, wrote a 'friend of the court' brief for the Committee and argued before the Court on behalf of Mrs. McCollum's suit. Elements of the Northern and Southern Baptists Conventions, as well as the head of released time programs for Baptist denominations, condemned Dawson's leadership and the Committee's role in the case. The Committee supported the decision and eventually brought many Baptists along toward acceptance of it.

The infant POAU acted warily amidst these divisions. A committee was appointed to investigate religious instruction in the public schools and to define a policy. The committee consisted of Morrison; Dawson; Frank Yost of the Seventh Day Adventists; E. E. Rogers of the Scottish Rite Masons, a Baptist, and a lawyer; and Charl O. Williams of the NEA and a Methodist. No policy emerged from the committee despite the members' personal opposition to released time programs. POAU did not, at this time, officially oppose released time programs. POAU publicity nevertheless praised McCollum as a victory for separation.
POAU officials approved and defended McCollum through the Church and State Newsletter, begun by Dawson in March of 1948 in order to keep its followers informed on POAU and on the problems and issues of church and state. Dawson wrote that the Court's decision effectively prevented parochial schools from directly receiving state or federal funds, the critical issue to POAU. He also answered the major Protestant criticism of the decision. A June 17th statement by twenty-one prominent Protestant clergymen, including Reinhold Niebuhr, had expressed the belief that the Court, no matter what its intent, through "hardening of the idea of 'separation'" with its "misleading metaphor" would "accelerate the trend toward secularization of our culture. The signers of the statement were desirous of unity among the faiths in order to keep the "religious foundations of our national life."

Dawson contended that Protestants had been giving in to Catholic minority and its point of view. Moreover, Protestants had played into the hands of the Roman Catholic Church by using that church's over-used phrase, "secularization," which to Catholics, he stated, usually meant non-Catholic influences. Protestant churchmen, Dawson advised, should, instead of cooperating with the Roman Catholic Church, settle for the public recognition of God by Americans and for the "historically American ideas" taught in the public schools. Dawson saw McCollum in light of his sectarian view of
of religious education and not as a "mandate for secularism":

It is a positive protection against the menace of sectarianism in our public school system; hence, it is insurance of religious liberty and mutual goodwill among the sects. It is a direct service to the home and church.... It produces a keen sense of obligation to strengthen, yet more and more, the high moral and spiritual values now being taught under the democratic processes of the public schools. 3

Sectarianism, not secularism, was the main divisive enemy.

Dawson in a June 30th Christian Century article implored Protestants to stop working for released time and to restore absolute separation. Otherwise, the consequences for Protestantism vis-a-vis the Roman Catholic Church would be harmful:

Whatever benefits Protestant Christianity expects to derive from attempting to promulgate its faith on public school time and with public school facilities are offset by the fact that it is thus widening the breach in the wall that separates church from state. A wall with a breach is not a wall at all; it is a thoroughfare of infiltration. The smallest breach which Protestants make in that wall works chiefly to the advantage of the Roman Catholic Church in its efforts to draw on the public treasury. Protestants must be content to ignore the potentialities of the public schools as an avenue of religious instruction, for they cannot do otherwise without compromising their own position in the matter of public school funds for transportation of parochial school pupils. The more Protestants agitate against the Supreme Court decision in the McCollum case, the more hollow become their protests against Catholic encroachment in the Everson case.

He appealed to the practical advantage of the wall of separation to Protestants, and he acted to keep that advantage. He had proposed an amendment to the Constitution (H.J. Res. 187) that would have banned Congress and the states
from disbursing public monies for free textbooks and free transportation to sectarian school students. He reassured Protestants, at the same time, that McCollum was not a victory for atheism, an emotional and ad hominem charge that always angered him, because the Court never took a person's faith or lack of faith into account when deciding the law.

A series of detailed articles on McCollum by Morrison in the Christian Century reflected the difference between Dawson and Morrison on the question of religious education in the public schools. Morrison, a long time advocate of religious education in the public schools, believed the decision declared unconstitutional only such teaching by church officials in public schools as an establishment of religion. He advocated a "week-time" period granted by school authorities for the churches to give religious instructions to students apart from the public schools.

Separation of church and state did not forbid teaching of religion in the public schools, he declared. The confusion surrounding the meaning of separation and the establishment clause he laid at the doorstep of Frankfurter's reasoning that "We have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and religion (Morrison's emphasis) is best for the state and best for religion." The vice president of FOAU argued that Frankfurter did not mean what he said when he stated that separation absolutely precluded the teaching of religion in public
schools.

Contrary to Dawson's opinion, Morrison believed the result of such teaching need not be sectarianism but could include the teaching of religious and moral values. He did not believe such practices objected to by Mrs. McCollum like Bible reading, reciting the Lord's Prayer, and similar practices in the public schools were constitutional, although these practices did not constitutionally preclude the non-sectarian study of religion. The churches, but not religion, were barred from the public schools.

Morrison reiterated the manifesto's view of separation and the establishment clause when he criticized Justice Reed's reasoning on cooperation between religion and the state in the United States. The former editor stated that establishment of religion specifically meant a church united to the state by the civil law. It meant use of the civil law by the churches to attain their ends. Released time was such a use of civil law the Court decreed. Morrison's view of the establishment clause and separation was more limited than Frankfurter's.

Separation of church and state as it had been written into the Constitution and American civil law, according to Morrison, had been violated through the interlocking of the institutional functions of church and state. He wrote that the Constitution decreed "no union," it therefore decreed "separation," irrespective of the Jeffersonian metaphor.
He was answering the criticism that law should not be made from a "mere figure of speech," putting separation on more solid ground.

Cooperation of church and state was not forbidden under separation. Cooperation such as Chaplains in Congress and the Armed Forces did not violate separation, although, in Morrison's opinion, tax exemption of churches was cooperation between church and state that went beyond the bounds of separation. He made clear his view that the Founding Fathers meant only to preclude cooperation involving union but not cooperation of church and state, i.e. no "divorce" of religion and the state. Nor, he believed, did the Constitution demand a "secular" government except in the sense that this meant "the opposite of 'ecclesiastical' or 'sectarian', rather than the opposite of 'religious'."

Morrison shared with the Roman Catholic Church and Crisis and Christianity their opposition to secularism in the public schools and the barring of teaching of religion in it. Secularism, he opined, bred "a religion of its own, whose gods are idols in the form of nationalism, democracy, science, humanism." He parted company with them over the means to stop its spread.

He judged Catholicism differently than Protestantism, concentrating on the spectre of Catholic takeover of public schools. While Protestants may desire only released time, he warned that Catholicism stood "poised to take full
advantage of the logic by which its teaching within the public school system is once legalized." Once this "legal logic" began, he continued, the ground for the "Catholic claim that its parochial schools are in reality public schools" since they too teach religion in their schools will have been laid.

End Protestant support of released time, Morrison implied, or the consequence would be horrendous. Once the Roman Catholic Church acquired public funds through this legal logic that destroyed the constitutional principle of separation, Protestants would not be able to resist the "temptation" to acquire their share of public money for their own schools which they would be encouraged to set up. With aid going to well over 256 sects, they would be competing with one another in the legislatures throughout the land for public funds. Public schools would become "a hollow shell," destroying the "cultural miracles" wrought by them in fusing a pluralistic society into a "democratic and cultural solidarity."

Like Dawson, Morrison was primarily worried about sectarianism, as befit his Protestant background. He warned:

Sectarianism is no less a foe of democratic culture than secularism. It is not the cure for secularism which the situation calls for. It leads not only to cultural fragmentation but to political fragmentation. Once the churches are admitted into the legal processes of the state and come to depend upon the civil law for the exercise of their religious functions, we would find the 'religious issue thrust
permanently into the political arena', from which the First Amendment was designed to exclude it.

The consequence would be, in Morrison's mind, "ecclesiastical union with the state," a sure sign of "moral and spiritual enervation." This religious decadence would be prevented by maintaining the "sacred line of separation," which, Morrison argued, had provided America, and only America, with free churches.

McCollum had a positive effect on POAU's fortunes. It gave constitutional reinforcement to POAU strict separationist view of the establishment clause, explicitly rejecting an interpretation similar to the one advocated by the Roman Catholic Church and the NCWC. By once again reiterating the "no aid" doctrine and applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the establishment clause, the Court seemed to state that no federal or state funds could be constitutionally appropriated for parochial schools. Everson with the same reasoning, however, had permitted free transportation for parochial school students. McCollum, along with Everson, provided the constitutional context and the legal controversies within which POAU leaders would have to maneuver. They provided a seemingly solid constitutional basis for POAU's point of view and for future Court decisions.

Negatively, the issue of secularism raised by McCollum brought cross Pressures to bear on a number of Protestants who otherwise supported separation of church and state in
the belief that it had been favorable to the influence of religion on American life. Their religious beliefs and their support for the public schools pulled them in two directions at once. When separation seemed to promote secularism, separation for many Baptists and for the NAE leaders took second priority. It became an opposing force to their religious beliefs, especially as the secularist challenge seemed to grow and was connected with the Soviet Union as the Cold War developed.

The unity and primacy POAU leaders sought on separation and the public schools was threatened by these developments. POAU leaders endeavored to show that separation did not lead to secularism and was not hostile to religion, and that governmental neutrality in regard to religion did not reflect indifference to it. The reality of Protestant religious pluralism required neutrality if civil and religious peace was to be maintained. Moreover, POAU viewed the issue of secularism as a powerful weapon that the Roman Catholic Church wielded to undermine separation, but, in countering the charge, POAU leaders had to be careful to keep the two matters separate. The fears of sectarianism kept churches out of the public schools, but the fears of secularism urged them to intervene. POAU's official endorsement of McCollum combined with the lack of official opposition to released time, although POAU did indicate the programs insurmountable difficulties, was a fine line on which the leaders of POAU
balanced themselves. The balancing act continued as confusion over the decision and local disregard of it meant that POAU would have to deal with the effects of released time and opposition to Champaign for some time to come.

**DAWSON AND THE BEGINNING OF POAU'S ACTIVITY**

Dawson knew what he wanted POAU to do: reorient, redirect, and reorganize the whole of Protestantism for the positive purpose of reviving and perpetuating the constitutional principle of separation. Being positive, the Baptist minister believed that POAU would avoid the history of the KKK. Being organized, Protestantism through POAU would be able to challenge the Roman Catholic Church.

Consider once again the meager organized means of Protestants for promulgating their principle of theirs in comparison with the amazing equipment of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. The latter is set up for using America as a new base of operations in the Catholic strategy for world domination and for capturing the social control of the United States. Those who hold to the American view must have a center from which to operate positively. .... Protestants and Other Americans United may solve the problem. Protestants alone, if they but worked at the job together, have enough churches, enough publications, and enough schools to keep America true to its best traditions.

POAU would need to establish an organization equal in strength to the NCWC in order to match it and win the war of ideas with the Roman Catholic Church. If POAU lost the war, money would flow into that church's coffers. The stakes were high, nothing less than the "Native American culture" where separation prevented church from taking public aid to support
their religious beliefs.

With the high stakes and well-organized and influential and powerful opposition, POAU must education, "mold the public will," "mobilize public opinion," and create a grassroots following, according to Dawson. POAU had been incorporated in Washington, D.C. on January 29, 1948 as a non-profit educational association. Money-raising, education, and promotion of POAU were linked together as a way to accomplish all three tasks, although no organizational departments were set up by Dawson. Dawson did much of the work himself, without institutionalizing POAU. Institutionalization was left to his successor, who inherited a volatile combination of public relations, fundraising, and education. Dawson's tenure was essentially a holding action, developing few means to accomplish the stated goals.

One hundred thousand dollars had seemed a reasonable sum to raise to the founders, needed to cover offices and staff, literature, speakers for mass meetings, and legal and political activities. One group, probably the Scottish Rite Masons, promised $10,000 at the founding meeting to get POAU off the ground.

One hundred thousand dollars proved to far too great a sum for POAU to raise. In the first month of POAU's announced existence, January 12th to February 11th, it received almost $42,000. On some days two hundred dollars flowed into POAU headquarters, mostly from New England and the Midwest, where
newspaper coverage of the controversy surrounding POAU's founding was most extensive. Individual contributions accounted for approximately $3,500 of that first month's income. After a financial study of POAU's needs by Board member E. E. Rogers, a delegation of top officers went to and appealed to the Scottish Rite Masons for $38,000. Grand Commander Cowles, a personal friend of Rogers, Williams, and Dawson, gave POAU the badly needed money, part of which, at Cowles' request, was put into government bonds as an endowment to provide some financial permanence to the fledging institution.

As for the remainder of the $100,000, Dawson, Treasurer DeGroot and the Board though income from the distribution of the manifesto, publication of books and pamphlets and other literature, and mass meetings would suffice. After all, separation was an important issue and POAU was making a name for itself, making itself known and heard. The total income for the year of 1948, however, was only $3,529, of which $31,770 flowed out, leaving a surplus of approximately $22,000.

The POAU Board of Trustees sought, with the help of Dawson, to spread POAU viewpoints through the Protestant churches and communities and educate them concerning the violations of separation. The Board, which could go as low as seven or as high as fifteen members, consisted of thirteen members, including the officers of the corporation. The members
held office for two years and had the power to fill vacancies in offices, elect the executive director and office staff, report POAU's activities to the NAC, submit the annual budget, and to meet semi-annually.

Most importantly, the Board formed itself into the executive committee that could be called to meet in case of emergencies. In 1948, it was made up of representatives of important POAU supporters and contributors. The committee consisted of Louie Newton, President of the Southern Baptist Convention and president of the committee; Elmer E. Rogers, Baptist; Charl O. Williams; Frank Yost, Associate Secretary of the International Religious Liberty Association and Associate Editor of Religious Liberty Publications for the Seventh Day Adventist General Conference; Clyde Taylor of the NAE; and Dr. Arthur Todd, manager of Washington, D.C. office of Committee on Publications, Christian Scientist. Ellis H. Dana, a Congregationalist and member of the Wisconsin Council of Churches, became a member of the Board in July, 1948.

Dawson, with some aid from Morrison, drew up a list of names for the NAC (the official legislative body of POAU) and sent cards and letters to those selected. Although one hundred and fifty was the maximum allowable number of members of the council, the NAC had eighty-three names listed when the membership list was published in the newsletter. Dawson selected prominent names and influential persons who would provide POAU with status among Protestants in order to
encourage endorsement of and participation among the rank and file in POAU activities. Besides giving POAU legitimacy among Protestants, the members of the NAC were selected to give POAU knowledge of and access to Protestant leadership and supporting groups of POAU; it also gave them a voice and representation in POAU. The NAC was supposed to give the POAU director a sense of direction for policy making.

The duties of the NAC consisted of electing the Board of Trustees (who were selected from the NAC), receiving the annual report from the Board, voting the budget, recommending policies, and meeting annually. Heads of local and state units of POAU were required to be members of the NAC and were appointed by the executive committee, giving national headquarters control over these units. The NAC was similar to the National Committee of ACLU, which in 1947-1948 had seventy-two members. The Board of Directors of ACLU consisted of thirty-six members, giving POAU and ACLU a similar institutional structure.

Unlike the National Committee of ACLU, whose members were political, secular, and theological liberal, however, the NAC consisted of a combination of theological and political liberals and conservatives, with few or no secularists. This combination represented a cross-section of most Protestant faiths and most sections of the country. This representativeness was, however, misleading because liberals were definitely in the minority. Besides Bishop Oxnam and lawyer
Paul Blanshard, some liberals whose names appeared on the 1948 list were Guy Shipler; V. T. Thayer, Harry Overstreet, and Lewis Mumford, college professors and authors; Mary McLeod Bethune, member of the NAACP and special adviser to President Roosevelt in minority affairs, 1936-1944; Samuel Guy Inman, a member of the Disciples of Christ, author, and specialist in Latin American affairs; and A. Powell Davies, a Unitarian (although ordained in the Methodist Church) and pastor of All Soul's Church in Washington, D.C.

Writers, educators, and publicists made up almost half of the NAC in 1968. Educators and authors, beside Thayer, Overstreet, and Mumford, included James Luther Adams of Harvard University and Conrad Moehlman, a Baptist and church historian. John W. Bradbury, the editor of the Watchman Examiner, joined Shipler, editor of The Churchman, on the NAC. These men reflected Dawson's belief in the importance of influencing communications and publications in order to mold public opinion.

Protestant ministers numerically dominated the NAC, however. Approximately eleven Southern Baptist ministers appeared on the list, eight Methodist ministers, and three Presbyterian and three Unitarian ministers.  Cavert, General Secretary of the FCC, who had dropped out of the founding meetings, lent his name. Additionally, Congressmen Joseph R. Bryson (D., S.Car.) and Brooks Hays (D., Ark.), one time president of the Southern Baptist Convention, and Senator
Olin D. Johnston (D.S.Car.) lent their names.

In selecting members for the NAC, Dawson had asked those persons whom he thought would be interested in POAU and support the purposes of POAU. He selected on the basis of who he knew and those persons whose name would be of use to POAU. They did not take an active role in POAU, making it difficult for the NAC to work as planned.

Dawson and the Board viewed most of what POAU did as educational, to which other tasks and aims were subordinated. Dawson published literature in order to provide members with weapons so they could educate others to the task and need. Dawson built an archive of newsclippings. He asked the readers of the newsletter to send him local information and photographs, if possible, of violations of church and state so that Frank S. Mead, member of the NAC and former managing editor of the Christian Herald, could analyze and describe them. He specifically asked for photographs of school sessions held in parochial school buildings.

In addition to the newsletter, the manifesto and other literature of POAU were sent to over six hundred churches and organizations to be distributed. The literature sent out to members to advertise, inform, and organize included pamphlets such as Dana's "It's Time for a Showdown;" Frank S. Mead's "Shadows Over Our Schools;" Oxnam's "Reply to Archbishop Cushing;" United States Senator from Missouri Forrest C. Donnell's "Ban of Federal Aid to Sectarian Schools;"
Dawson's "This Freedom Now;" and An Open Letter. Books were also available from POAU including Dawson's recent work, Separate Church and State Now, and Alvin W. Johnson and Frank Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States. Packets for community action and chapter organization and on how to organize mass meetings also were mailed out. POAU also took out advertisements in nine magazines, whose circulation approximated one million, in April. This literature was designed not only to make POAU known and to get the POAU point of view across but also to develop local chapters and grassroots support.

Grassroots support, however, did not develop under Dawson's leadership. Separation was not viewed as a life and death issue to many Protestants and so they were indifferent to working locally for POAU. No sense of crisis among the general body of Protestants existed to aid POAU leadership. Thus, Dawson's other duties made the founders' task given to Dawson, to pay especial attention to state and local organization, quite difficult. Moreover, a later 1948 mail effort and personal solicitation campaign failed to elicit substantial support.

POAU leaders concentrated on working through the existing churches and their organizations. Dawson spoke before church groups and other organization. With the help of Morrison and Todd, he drew up resolutions concentrating on federal aid to non-public schools and especially on the
Taylor Vatican mission. The Southern Baptist Convention, at its May 22nd annual convention, where Newton, pastor of the Druid Hills Baptist Church in Georgia, was ending his two year presidency, commended POAU. It commended POAU after listening to Dawson relate how POAU grew out of the work of the Baptist Joint Committee. The Northern Baptist Convention similarly endorsed POAU. The American Unitarian Association at its annual convention in Boston on May 22nd took a strong stance for separation and recommended cooperation with POAU. All three national bodies similarly requested Congress or the President to recall Taylor. Endorsement of POAU, according to POAU accounts, represented 28 million Americans whose organizations supported POAU. In June, Morrison drew up a resolution on the Vatican mission and tried unsuccessfully, to get it introduced into the Senate through a Senator with whom he had contact.

Dawson and the Board were at the same time moving on the legal, political, and legislative fronts to "educate" and to halt what they considered violations of separation.

Violations of church-state separation at the state level was, according to the Church and State Newsletter, "(w)here battle lines are drawn." Approximately 19 states permitted parochial school students to be transported to their schools at public expense. The newsletter reported that, based on a study done by the NEA, in 28 states public schools were legally able to rent church-owned buildings for public school
purposes. Additionally, in fifteen states, nuns and priest wearing their "distinctive garb" were legally able to teach in the public schools. Nuns and priests teaching in public schools while wearing their religious uniforms had raised controversies in North Dakota and New Mexico in 1948. PUAU was soon to call schools where such teaching took place, "captive schools" and "Catholic public schools." In the instances cited above, religious or sectarian influences and personnel were involved and associated with the activities of the public schools.

Roman Catholic nuns and priests had been teaching while wearing their religious habits and getting paid for it out of public funds for over thirty years in the public schools of North Dakota. The reasons for the practice involved shortage of teachers and public stinginess. The controversy in North Dakota in 1948 reflected the effects of the Protestant-Catholic conflicts of the '40s. The conflicts had heightened awareness of practices that had previously been of little concern to Protestants who now were suspicious of Catholic activities and the intent as well as of the effects of those activities.

A number of Protestants, after failing through legislative action to stop the teaching in the North Dakota public schools by Catholics in their religious garb, initiated in 1948 a successful petition drive. The drive put before the state's citizens the constitutionality of such teaching by
72 nuns and 8 priests in 11 counties and 19 public schools, mostly in Catholic communities, as an annual public cost of approximately $70,000. After a bitter battle pitting Protestants, led by Lutherans who made up three-fourths of Protestant church members in North Dakota, and Roman Catholics, led by their bishops, the referendum was approved in the June 29th primary election. In a large voter turnout, the bill was approved 103,540 to 92,057, a margin of over 11,000 votes and a total well beyond the number of ballots cast for governor. The fact that the referendum received more votes than was cast for the governorship was indicative of the concern felt by both sides, despite the fact that few of the newspapers and radio stations in the state would discuss or allow advertisement of the issue.

POAU leaders viewed the vote on the "Anti-Garb Bill" as a victory: "our side won." POAU's leadership saw the vote as defeat for the Roman Catholic drive to keep Catholic influence in the public schools and receive aid from public funds for their church. Such practices in North Dakota should never have been legal in the first place. POAU leaders claimed the "Committee for Separation of Church and State," organized by Protestants in North Dakota, was of local origin and not connected with POAU. Dana, however, met with the committee and advised it on how Protestants had won in Wisconsin on the Bus Bill in 1946. POAU did cooperate with the committee and gave it $250 dollars. The extent and
depth of POAU participation, although impossible to determine from evidence in POAU's files, does not seem to have been great.

POAU became very much involved in a similar situation in New Mexico. As in North Dakota, the controversy involved approximately one hundred and forty Roman Catholic nuns and brothers legally teaching in the public schools while wearing their religious garb. Appeals to POAU from citizens in Dixon, New Mexico, a small community evenly divided between the two faiths, brought E. Hilton Jackson to investigate. The investigation led to POAU's eventual involvement in its first important legal suit. The plaintiffs in the suit argued for an end to religious instruction and religious control of public schools. By October of 1948, POAU had paid Jackson $2,200 in legal fees and had begun on a case that took many years to resolve.

The viewpoint of POAU on the above situation was best summarized in a POAU pamphlet, "Shadows Over Our Schools," written by Frank S. Mead, who had been suggested for permanent director of POAU. The shadows presented on the front page were the mitre and keys, the traditional symbol of the Roman Catholic Church used by American nativist groups. Basing his story on personal investigation and plaintiff's affidavits, he described what he saw as the "near revolution" in Dixon. He cited the lack of response by county and state education boards to pleas of relief from a Catholic takeover
of public schools in Dixon by Protestants and some Catholics. "There is a stronghold in New Mexico," Mead concluded, "but from Maine to Florida the basic problem grows." The lesson to be drawn from the New Mexico example was clear: "The issue is totalitarianism in American free education. Do we want in public education what Spain and Italy have?" He sought to bring home his point by warning:

You don't think it could happen in your town? My friend it already has begun to happen. The hierarchy isn't interested only in controlling Catholic education where you live, but in controlling all education (according to Catholic teachings, writings, and pronouncements)... Catholics are encouraged to control boards of education and to place Catholics in the key positions in the educational system.

The New Mexico situation was reminiscent of North College Hill, only on a larger scale involving state educational boards, attorneys general, legislatures, and governors. The Roman Catholic Church continued on its aggressive course, Mead argued, and had not been deterred.

A continual worry in the educational field was federal aid to education. POAU officials, however, had to be careful. As an educational, as well as a legal, group, POAU could apply, as it soon would, for tax exempt status as an educational corporation. Such tax exempt institutions could not spend a substantial part of their income (over 5%) to influence legislation. Though Treasurer DeGroot had registered as a lobbyist, at the meetings that led to POAU's founding the idea of a lobbying organization had not found
much support. Lobbying appeared too political, and a number of people expressed their disapproval of it. Moreover, the POAU founders had taken the stance that any adoption of the separation principle should come not from pressure but be "voluntary." POAU as well had explained Catholic advances as a result of pressure and described various Catholic organizations, like the NCWC, as pressure groups. POAU portrayed itself as simon-pure on pressure tactics; it was not a pressure group. The dilemma was how to meet the challenges to separation effectively in the political and legislative realms without using the political and legislative techniques of pressure.

POAU leaders, nonetheless, sought to influence congressional activities. Dawson gathered information for and "counseled" Senator Donnell of Missouri, when he offered an amend- to a federal aid bill that would have prohibited funds from going to sectarian education. Charl Williams, with her connections in the NEA, and E. E. Rogers, a member of the educational staff of the Masons, worked behind the scenes al- so.

A Taft bill(S.472), and a similar Aiken bill, passed the Senate, both without Donnell's proposed amendment, during the 80th Congress of 1948. Like the previous Taft bill, the Taft measure would have allowed federal funds to go to parochial schools in states where such aid was legally permit- ted. Forty-six states had strong church-state separation
clauses and direct public aid had been barred to parochial schools by McCollum, a sentiment expressed by most Senators and Taft himself. Indirect public aid such as textbooks and bus transportation, however, was possible under the bill.

Dawson feared the consequence of passage by the House of the Taft version (McGowen bill, H.R. 2953) would be financial pressure on states. Laws would be passed granting indirect aid to sectarian schools out of public funds in order for them to acquire the large amounts of federal money that could be obtained. Dawson and the Board worked in the House, where POAU had some influence, to have the McGowen bill amended to allow no federal aid to church schools.

Other Protestants also opposed such federal aid. The Christian Century, in an editorial, supported the Taft bill with the proviso that it excluded parochial aid. Otherwise, the editorial noted, the Taft bill permitted the Roman Catholic Church to carry on its attempt to create dual or multiple schools systems in the states. The editorial writer also criticized that church's opposition to federal aid to public education without parochial aid as a denial of "equal educational opportunity." Oxnam was so desirous of federal aid that he supported passage of the Taft bill by the House. He believed that public schools would finally get the much needed federal monies while the Supreme Court would in any case declare the parochial aid unconstitutional. Cavert, general secretary of the FCC; officials of the NAE;
Congregationalists, and Methodists testified against federal aid to sectarian education during the House subcommittee hearings. No federal aid to education bill passed the House during the 80th Congress, partly for religious but mostly for political reasons.

While claiming to have "exerted" themselves on the federal education bill without being specific, the role of POAU leaders in the House inaction was not clear. If POAU played any part at all through the Board members working with and through other organizations, the role POAU played would be a very minor one, considering the other pressures, religious and otherwise, involved.

CONCLUSION

A beginning in church and financial support had been made. The three denominational endorsements were significant. In comparison to ACLU, the income of POAU in nine months times surpassed the income of ACLU in its first year of existence in 1921-1922 by more than three times and was only $10,000 under the income of ACLU in 1947-48. Even the literature program was comparable to ACLU, although the ACLU did not give great emphasis to educating and literature distribution. ACLU, however, had stable resource and financial bases and organizational means that POAU leaders had not yet acquired.

Involvement in parochial aid and public school controversies had not gone badly, and POAU had affected these
events, however slightly, which gave those involved reason for optimism. McCollum had reinforced the position of POAU on constitutional separation, and the Dixon case marked the beginning of legal action. The word had been spread on separation through various means. Catholic criticism had been countered without any appreciable rejection of the position of POAU among Protestants. The goal of grassroot organizing was still a possibility, although it was too early to tell how wide and deep POAU's support would be.

There had been no singular victories for POAU. Dawson had been reluctant to act, and this reluctance hampered POAU. Most importantly, POAU lacked financial resources. No organization of any significance had occurred at the national and local levels, leaving POAU with a cause but no means or methods to carry it out. A legal position did not constitute a legal program. No programs were developed to carry out the policies set forth in the manifesto. Dawson reacted to changing circumstances and not from considered judgment based on a long-range plan. POAU had acquired an anti-Catholic image, and, because the leaders of POAU did not view the image as a valid one or as having an effect, the leaders did nothing to systematically counter it.

Dawson had continually prodded the Board to find a per-
manent successor as quickly as possible. Dana had accept-
ed the directorship in December but had declined it shortly afterwards. Frank Mead was suggested, but he accepted a
A search committee consisting of Williams, Oxnam, and Morrison was appointed to find a permanent executive director.

The experiences of POAU during Dawson's tenure indicated that a permanent director should have certain attributes besides integrity, a church background, and belief in strict separation. A person was needed who had a solid background in law, education, and public relations. Also, the person needed administrative and, especially, financial abilities.

When the search committee found the man it was looking for, the members worked to convince him that he should accept the post and why he should do so. So, on September 1, 1948, POAU acquired its first and, for twenty-five years, its only permanent executive director, Glenn L. Archer.
CHAPTER III: FOOTNOTES


2. Elmer E. Rogers, "Report of the Building Inspection Committee to the Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council, POAU," delivered at the Fifth National Conference on Church and State, POAU, Washington, D.C. on January 14, 1953, p. 1, in POAU files. The first vice-president, Oxnam, was chairman of the program committee and the second vice-president, Mackay, was chairman of the membership committee.


4. Writings on POAU have ignored the manifesto as simple propaganda and have stated that POAU began without a program, see Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 52 and Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, pp. 71-72. The manifesto clearly delineated a program and the way that program should be carried out, as Chapter I showed. The difficulties of POAU in 1948 were due to other reasons than the lack of a program. See Church and State Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 15, 1948), p. 1 and Vol. I, No. 4 (September 1, 1948), pp. 3-4. Only Ralph L. Roy in his Apostles of Discord takes the manifesto into account as reflecting more than propaganda, pp. 147-148. His analysis of the manifesto is brief but lucid.


9. See Cushing Strout, The New Heavens and New Earth: Political Religion in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) for a full historical treatment of this symbiotic relationship between politics and religion which he terms "religious republicanism" and "republican religion." He fully investigates Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that the spirit of liberty and the spirit of religion are uniquely combined in the United States and he traces this symbiosis in legal
disestablishment of the churches through which the relationship was strengthened.


16. *Ibid.*, p. 37. However, anti-Communism was not necessarily "the controlling element" for all Catholics in the elections. For instance, Massachusetts went for Truman in 1948, according to Jack Redding, Publicity Director of the Democratic National Committee in 1948, because of a referendum on the ballot permitting birth control information to be distributed by the state health authorities. Redding stated that "The Catholic Church waged a holy war to have its members at the polls to vote against the question. The vast outpouring of Catholic votes, largely Democratic, meant we have every right to expect the Democrats, out to vote on the birth-control referendum, to...vote in the presidential and gubernatorial elections. Our hopes had proved right. Massachusetts was ours." Jack Redding, *Inside the Democratic Party* (New York: 1958), pp. 17-18.


20. Dohen, Nationalism and American Catholicism, p. 165. Catholics, such as Spellman, believed that doctrinal and disciplinary unity should be required in all matters, except politics, in order to give America Catholic teachings, Christian morals, and democracy. See also Cogley, Catholic America, pp. 182-188. Whether there was disagreement within Catholicism when the Catholic Bishops in 1948 reversed the Church's historic position in support of disestablishment and came out for a multiple establishment is not known. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, pp. 72-74; Gleason, "Catholicism in America," pp. 106-110; and John A Ryan and Francis J. Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1948), p. 312.


22. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, pp. 54-55. The rise of Catholics as a group into the middle class and the acceptance of the American Catholic Church as one of the three great religions by the mid-fifties did not mean acceptance of Catholic positions on church-state, federal aid to education, abortion, birth control, and divorce laws. Will Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew, pp. 70-77. Gordon has argued that Catholics have assimilated substantially in terms of changing their cultural or behavioral patterns to the core or Protestant society. Prejudice against Catholics declined, but Catholics had not assimilated in terms of identification.

Charles H. Anderson in his 1970 work on White Protestant Americans qualified Herberg's 1950's observation of the assimilation of Catholicism into the American mainstream in terms of their acceptance by the majority of Protestants. He argued that "In all likelihood, a very substantial number of Protestants still consider Catholicism a "chief leader of alienism," probably more than consider Catholicism one of the "three big sub-communities all equally American."

23. On Catholics "adopting nativist principles" see Dohen, Nationalism and American Catholicism, pp. 48, 69, 87, and,
especially, 175-191.

24. F. A. Fink, Whose Friends Are They - America's or Russia's? (n.p., n.d., pamphlet) and n.a., Who's Who in the POAU (Hungtinton, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, March 28, 1951), Booklets in POAU files.

25. See Chapter I for Catholic attitude toward federal aid to education.

26. New York Times, January 26, 1948, p. 17. Reverend John Courtney Murray, S.J. suggested another organization be formed called "Catholics and Protestants and Jews and Other Americans United for Cooperative Relations Between Church and State in View of the Peril of Secularism, Especially in Education." Murray observed that the manifesto contained none of the earlier noisy anti-Catholicism of No-Popery, Hotel Dieu, Maria Monk, the Scarlet Whore, or Great Babylon. What he saw was, echoing the NCWC bishops: "The ancient spectral threat is now made to walk in the night in much more civilized garb. To change the metaphor, the cry through the palace window is not the hoarse shout, edged with frenzy, the articulation of something elemental in the mob. The voice indeed still carries to the Governor, but its tone is quiet, its accents cultured, its rhetoric restrained." Commonweal, February 8, 1948, pp. 515-516.


38. For similar statements see Oxnam, Our Protestant Heritage and The Protestant Contribution to Freedom, an address delivered at Reformation Day Services of Buffalo Council of Churches and Detroit Council of Churches, November 2, 1947 (New York: The Bishop's Office, n.d.), pamphlet, in POAU files.


41. See, especially, Chapter VII.


States, pp. 145-149.


45. John C. Bennett, editorial, Christianity and Crisis (February 2, 1948), pp. 50-51. The Board of Sponsors of the magazine, which consisted of twenty-one prominent Protestant leaders, issued a widely circulated statement in February, 1948 that pointed toward the subtle but important differences between them and POAU leaders:

We express our concern over the growing tension between Catholicism and Protestantism in this country.

We believe the difficulties arise partly from the fact that mutual cooperation in various fields of common interest has become practically impossible, because Catholic leaders generally regard such cooperation as involving a threat to their church's claim to be the one universal church. They arise partly from the fact that the Catholic Church does not fully accept our system of democratic freedom for all religions in principle. In recent years it has shown a tendency, in localities where it has the power, either to seek to determine the policy of public schools or to assure public support of parochial schools. We believe it necessary to resist such threats to our democratic freedom. We are anxious, however, to explore every available avenue of understanding with our Catholic fellow citizens. We desire to take no position which will obscure what we hold in common with Catholics, both in faith and in piety. We are anxious, moreover, that Protestant opposition to some official Catholic policies be accompanied by a recognition of the genuine devotion of the great body of Catholic laymen and priests to our democratic institutions.

Quoted in full in Dawson, Separate Church and State Now, pp. 115-116, within the context of the question of how Protestantism can maintain itself given such attitudes.


47. Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 34-35.

48. Dr. Morrison stated that Poteat, whose selection as President of POAU some liberal Baptists objected, encountered serious opposition for his stance within the divinity school.
During the controversy, Poteat became ill and returned to his old Baptist church in Raleigh, North Carolina, where he partially recovered his health. Notes from Lowell interview with Morrison, p. 6.


52. See Chapter I for Black's "no-aid" statement. For an excellent discussion of this "no-aid" formula and strict separation, see Paul G. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution (Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp. 59-63.

53. This broad interpretation of the establishment clause consisted of two points: no establishment of any or all church and no government aid to any religious group. See Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, p. 149. For Black's opinion, see Tussman, The Supreme Court on Church and State, pp. 241-245.


55. Tussman, The Supreme Court on Church and State, pp. 257-264.

56. This narrow interpretation of the First Amendment accorded with the Catholic viewpoint. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution, denied the broad interpretation of the Court as "historically and semantically indefensible" and denied that the First Amendment prohibited "non-preferential government aid to all religions," pp. 55-65, 88, 153-188, 219-253. See also John Courtney Murray, "Law of Prepossessions?" Law and Contemporary Problems XIV, No. 1 (Winter, 1949), p. 32; George E. Reed, "Separation of Church and State-Its Real Meaning," Catholic Action, March, 1949, p. 9. These men advocated that separation of church and state was a matter of policy adopted by the Founding Fathers to get the First Amendment passed, was not absolute, and was only one means of allowing religious liberty.

But see Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, pp. 27-55 and 184-186 for an excellent discussion of the effects and the development of separation of church and state in the 19th Century American tradition, although not in the law.
He concluded that by the late 19th Century separation meant to Protestants no aid to parochial schools.

57. Tussman, The Supreme Court and Religion. See, for example, The Christian in Action, Statement of the Bishops of the United States, 1948, p. 4, in POAU files, where Reed is incorrectly quoted as, "A rule of law cannot be drawn from a metaphor."


60. Ibid.

61. Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 391-392 and Anson Phelps Stokes and Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 370. According to Pfeffer, the McCollum decision caused the Catholic Church to change its position in regard to Bible reading and prayer in the public schools. Before the decision, such religious activities were opposed but favored after McCollum. See Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 136 & 219-220.

62. See O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution, pp. 4, 82, and 86-125 for the historical basis of the Catholic interpretation of the formation of the religious clause to the First Amendment. O'Neill concludes only a single, not a multiple, establishment of churches was prohibited by the First Amendment. He also concludes complete separation of church and state is "spurious" and has never been part of the American tradition or constitutional history. "There is no such great American principle," he states, "and there never has been." Also, O'Neill, pp. 46-55 for his refutation of Morrison's and the manifesto's definition of the establishment of religion clause as a recent invention. See Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 152-174 for point by point rebuttal of O'Neill's narrow interpretation, and Dawson, Separate Church and State Now, pp. 49-51 America's Way in Church, State, and Society, pp. 26-33. See also Kauper, Religion and the Constitution, pp. 45-50 for discussion of these issues from a legal point of view. For a bibliography of both views and the latest scholarly syntheses on separation, see George Drago, Roots of the Republic: A New Perspective on Early American Constitutionalism
(New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 77-107 and 171, who finds at the time of the adoption of the Constitution a trend toward separation and rejects the multiple establishment argument; Strout, The New Heavens and New Earth, who finds the evidence on separation "ambiguous," especially as to the intent of the First United States Congress and finds Jefferson's and Madison's efforts in Virginia of no great relevance in determining the meaning of separation in 1789; and Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, pp. 22-24, who finds the evidence as ambiguous and contradictory as Strout does but also sees certain presumptions for no tax money for religious purposes and for Madison's (but not Jefferson's) hard line position. For an excellent discussion of Madison's 'line of separation' as opposed to Jefferson's 'wall of separation' see Sidney E. Mead, "Neither Church Nor State: Reflections on James Madison's 'Line of Separation,'" Journal of Church and State 10 (Autumn, 1968), pp. 349-363, also in Sidney E. Mead, The Nation with the Soul of a Church (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 78-94.


66. Dana, Storm Clouds Over Our Public Schools, p. 42.


70. Bruce L. Shelley, Evangelicalism in America (Grand

72. One must not confuse the NAE with the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) founded in 1941 and led by the Reverend Carl McIntire, although their fundamentalist creed and aims were the same. NAE was founded in 1942 partly because of the belief that the older fundamentalist groups represented by the ACCC had disgraced Biblical Christianity by their vitriolic militancy and aggressive manner against theological modernists and liberals. NAE took a conciliatory approach toward other Protestant theological groups; the ACCC definitely did not. Marty, Righteous Empire, p. 249; Shelley, Evangelicalism in America, p. 61; Roy, Apostles of Discord, p. 150; and Gasper, The Fundamentalist Movement, pp. 23-24.


76. Dawson, ibid., p. 194. E. Hilton Jackson, a constitutional lawyer, also wrote the 'friend of the court' brief for the Seventh Day Adventists, who operated their own parochial school system but were against parochial aid, in the Everson case, see Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, p. 91 and Cragg to Pitzer, November 20, 1947, p. 3.


78. Minutes of "Executive Committee Meeting of POAU," POAU, Washington, D.C., meeting of April 17, 1949, pp. 1-2, in POAU files.

79. Ibid., p. 3.

80. Church and State Newsletter (March 15, 1948), p. 1. Dana, in It's Time for A Showdown, pp. 10-11, drew the following from McCollum: public school officials must stop their
participation, supervision, discipline, registration, promotion, and grade reporting in religious instruction programs; school buildings should not be used during school hours for religious instruction; parochial schools were barred from state, and possibly federal, aid; religious talks were banned during school hours; written permission by parents to allow children to be religiously instructed does not legally authorize such instruction; and released time needed further interpretation but had been constitutionally called into question. See E. Hilton Jackson, Is This Hostile to Religion? Misconceptions About the Champaign Case (Washington, D.C.: POAU, n.d.), POAU reprint from The Churchman, September 15, 1948, in POAU files.

81. A similar July 5th statement by twenty-seven nationally known Protestant leaders including Bennett, Niebuhr, Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Dr. Henry P. VanDeusen stated the signers position on McCollum and separation:

Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have extended the meaning of the constitutional prohibition of an establishment of religion, so that any action by the State that is intended to benefit all religious bodies without discrimination is forbidden. This development of the conception of separation of church and state seems to us to be unwarranted by the language of the first amendment and to bring about a situation in which forms of cooperation between Church and State that have been taken for granted by the American people will be endangered.... Cooperation, entered into freely by the State and the Church and involving no special privilege to any church and no threat to the religious liberty of any citizen, should be permitted. As Protestants, we desire to affirm this interpretation of the American doctrine of separation of church and state, and to protest against the interpretation that has been formulated by the Supreme Court....

"Statement on Church and State," Christianity and Crisis, July 5, 1948, p. 90. See Dana, Storm Clouds Over Our Public Schools, pp. 35-37 and Christian Century, June 30, 1948, p. 643. Howe's thesis that until recently disestablishment had been interpreted to mean evangelical and not Jeffersonian disestablishment explains a good deal of the adverse reactions by Protestants, and Catholics, to McCollum and some later Supreme Court decisions. According to Howe, evangelical disestablishment allowed for a de facto establishment whereby separation of church and state was accompanied by cooperation of the two realms, official piety, friendliness toward religion, and acknowledgements of the spiritual commitments of

82. See Dawson, Separate Church and State Now, p. 49, where he makes clear his belief that any religious teaching by its very nature had to be sectarian.


84. Christian Century, June 30, 1948, pp. 649-651 and Dawson, A Thousand Months to Remember, p. 195. See Church and State Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 3 (August, 1948), p. 3 and E. Hilton Jackson, Is This Hostile to Religion? and "The Meaning of the First Amendment," an address delivered at the National City Christian Church, Washington, D.C., January 27, 1949, (mimeographed), pp. 1-4, in FOAU files. Sanders, in Protestant Concepts of Church and State, pp. 233-237, criticizes Dawson for advocating absolute separation of church and state corresponding to the self-interest of evangelical Protestantism as practiced in the South and by Southern Baptists. In essence, Sanders' argument against Dawson is that absolute separation is being used to promote and defend particular aspects of the Protestant faiths and directed against the Roman Catholic Church. Sanders' opposition to absolute separation of church and state comes from his inference that such a complete separation of these two vital institutions in the United States implies a divorce of religion and society, to which he is opposed.


that parochial schools were in fact public schools since
they performed all the secular duties demanded by the state,
thus they were entitled to public tax funds. The argument
was expressed in the recently published work by Wilfred Par-
sons, S.J., The First Freedom: Considerations on Church and
State in the United States (New York: The Declan X. McCul-
ten Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 5, 122-127, and 162. See also
Charles Clayton Morrison, address "Keep Church and State
Separate," Second National Conference on Church and State,
Washington, D.C. (mimeograph), on January 31, 1950, p. 8,
in POAU files.

90. Morrison, "Church, State, and the Constitution," Chris-
tian Century, September 1, 1948, pp. 877-878.

91. James S. Coleman, Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict," in Religious Conflict in America: Studies of the Problems
Beyond Bigotry, ed. by Earl Raab (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
1964), pp. 91-92.


93. Ibid., p. 85.

94. Ibid., p. 99 & 177-198. For view of POAU, and especially
Dawson, as primarily motivated by sectarianism, see Sanders,
Protestant Concepts of Church and State, pp. 235-237 and
Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 2-10 and 285.

95. Church and State Newsletter (March 15, 1948), pp. 2 & 3.

96. POAU, "Minutes of Committee on Incorporation," Washin-
gton, D.C., meeting on January 29, 1948, p. 1, in POAU files.

97. Glenn L. Archer, "A Look At the Past," speech at Ameri-
cans United retreat, Williamsburg, Virginia, delivered on
September 29, 1969, p. 9, copy in POAU files.

98. Cragg to Pitzer, November 20, 1947, p. 3; Report of
Steering Committee, "Minutes of National Meeting on Church
and State," November 20, 1947, p. 2; POAU letter to Grand
Commander John Cowles, Washington, D.C., January 6, 1948,
in POAU files.

99. POAU, "Executive Committee of POAU," January 19, 1948,
delivered on February 11, 1948, p. 1, and Dana, Remarks on
the History of POAU, p. 3, all in POAU files.

100. POAU letter to Cowles, January 6, 1948, p. 2; "Minutes
of Executive Committee," POAU, January 8, 1948, p. 1; POAU
Board of Trustees, "Report to the National Advisory Council
101. POAU Board of Trustees, "Report to the National Advisory Council of POAU," p. 4.

102. Yost, "History of POAU," p. 6. There is a possibility that the Christian Scientists and the Seventh Day Adventists General Conference, both of whom had representatives appointed to the Board, could have begun their $1,000 per annum contribution to POAU in 1948, Yost, p. 6. POAU letter to Cowles, January 6, 1948, p. 2; Archer, "A Look At the Past," September 29, 1969, p. 8; and Glenn L. Archer letter to Edwin A. Poteat, Washington, D.C., January 3, 1949.


107. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 131-132. For similar use of prominent names, see American Civil Liberties Union, Our Uncertain Liberties, pp. 82-85.

109. American Civil Liberties Union, ibid., and Church and State Newsletter (March 15, 1948), p. 3.

110. American Civil Liberties Union, Our Uncertain Liberties, pp. 82-83 and Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 44, 135-137.

111. Morgan, ibid., p. 137 and Church and State Newsletter (March 15, 1948), pp. 4-5.

112. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, p. 81.


117. Church and State Newsletter, ibid., and "Executive Committee Meeting of POAU," April 17, 1948, p. 2.


121. Ibid., and "Executive Committee Meeting of POAU," April 17, 1948, p. 3.


123. Ibid., June 16, 1948, pp. 602-603.


125. Executive Director, "Report of POAU Activities, 1948,"


130. Armstrong, ibid., p. 754 and Dana, Storm Clouds Over Our Public Schools, pp. 3-5.


133. Ibid.; POAU, "Executive Committee of POAU, Washington, D.C. April 17, 1948, p. 2; and "Executive Committee of POAU," June 10, 1948, p. 3.


136. Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 78.

138. Church and State Newsletter (August, 1948), p. 4 and Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, pp. 70 & 75.

139. "Executive Committee Meeting of POAU, Board of Trustees," POAU, Washington, D.C., meeting on February 12, 1948, p. 1 in POAU files and "Executive Committee Meeting of POAU," April 17, 1948, p. 2 and Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, p. 81.

140. Yost, "History of POAU," p. 2. Dr. Willard E. Givens, Executive Secretary of the NEA and Director of Education for the Supreme Council of Scottish Rite Masonry, Southern Jurisdiction is illustrative of the connections between the two organizations. Givens was one of POAU's founders.


146. Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, p. 53.

147. Ibid. and Munger and Fenno, National Politics and Federal Aid, p. 10.


149. American Civil Liberties Union, Our Uncertain Liberties, pp. 69-78.

150. Dawson, The Birth of POAU, pp. 5-6 and Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 95.


CHAPTER IV

ARCHER ORGANIZES "THE BATTLE FOR FREEDOM": 1948-1953

Glenn L. Archer once told the story that when he was a young boy he was presented a jigsaw puzzle of a map of the world that he could not put together until the world was turned over to reveal the figure of a man. He related that "In putting the man together, the map of the world took an orderly form." Analogously, Archer was the man who for the next twenty-five years put together the world of POAU from the map left him by the founders. Putting together the pieces left by Dawson, Archer sought to build a national action organization. In the process, the map came to reflect the man as the man took on the features of the map. He created the organization and became identified with the institution; Mr. POAU. His fundamental tasks upon accepting the directorship was to develop techniques for funds, organizing, education, and remedial activities in order to develop POAU into a viable and powerful institution.

GLENN L. ARCHER

Archer had taken no part in the controversies of the '40s or in the founding of POAU, but his multifaceted career gave him qualifications for the job of Executive Director.
After graduating in 1928 from Greenville College, a small Free Methodist school in Illinois, where he studied education, history, and English, the Scotch-Irish Archer spent the next eleven years in the public schools of rural western Kansas as a teacher, administrator, principal, and county superintendent. Meanwhile, he continued his education by studying journalism for two summers at the University of Iowa and obtaining a masters' degree in educational psychology from the University of Colorado in 1938. From 1939 to 1942, the Kansan assisted the Republican Governor of Kansas, Payne Rather, as his secretary, doing administrative work as well as carrying out writing and speaking assignments. After his father died in 1940, he ran the family wheat farm in Densmore, Kansas, where he was born and reared, and the family Home, Lumber, and Grain Company. He returned to the educational field in 1942 for a year as director of public relations and associate editor for the Kansas State Teachers Association and also served as a member of the Kansas Board of Education.

Fulfilling a longstanding desire, he entered law school, graduating from the Washburn Municipal University Law School in Topeka, Kansas in 1946 after two years of study, with the highest grade average ever attained from the small school. At the age of forty, Archer became Dean of Washburn Law School. During the years 1946 to 1948, he also practiced corporate law with Alden, Ascough, and Archer in Topeka and
served as special counsel for the NEA. He had earlier worked for the NEA as Associate Director of Legislative and Federal Relations, a job which dealt primarily with public relations. In 1948, Archer's work at NEA had brought him to the attention of Charl Williams who was on the search committee for a permanent director. It was she who recommended him to the POAU Board.

To the Board members, Archer appeared obviously competent, and he had experience in public education, law, journalism, politics, and public relations. Of further value, he had financial abilities, a business-like demeanor, personal discretion, and convictions. Moreover, he was a churchman, a Free Methodist, a church which originated in the revivalism and holiness movements of the ante-bellum period.

On July 1st, 1948, the forty-two year old Archer accepted the Executive Directorship of POAU. One reason that he did so was that he believed the work would allow him to carry on his family's religious and educational traditions. "It seemed to me," Archer explained, "an opportunity to follow the teaching of my religious parents as well as the training I received in a Christian college." He grandfather had been a pioneer who had helped Christianize and civilize the frontier and had had eight children who had survived to become Free Methodist ministers. Archer's parents were, in his eyes, "pioneer missionaries." His father had been a circuit-riding lay preacher whom Glenn had occasionally
accompanied as he made his rounds in a horse and buggy. As a young boy, he had been an "exhorter" in his Free Methodist Conference and a local lay preacher, although he was never ordained. His father also helped to build churches throughout Kansas. The days of frontier building and pioneering were over, but Glenn could build a new institution in the service of his church and build it into a national influence.

His mother had been a teacher. His brother and sister, like Glenn, became educators, and Glenn married a school teacher and daughter of a preacher. Archer stated that it was his mother who coaxed him into leaving his family farm to go out and "do some good in the world." He later said the following statement by Horace Mann helped to move him to join POAU: "Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity."

A more important reason for his acceptance of the job was his belief that he was answering the "call" of mission. The concept of a "call" was part of the religious atmosphere surrounding him as a young man, and he had desired since the age of thirteen to be a missionary. He had offered himself for service to his church as a missionary during the Great Depression, but the crash had financially strapped his church and resulted in few missionaries being sent out during the 1930's. He viewed teaching as an alternate form of mission. He was being called again.
He had been asked, he stated later, to come to Washington by Methodist Bishop Oxnard "to serve your God, your Church, and your country." Leadership of POAU, he later indicated, was "a kind of mission of the church." He would, upon assuming leadership of POAU, thus pray to "serve our faith by noble deeds" in the "sacred cause of religious liberty."

As a Free Methodist layman, Archer believed that, like all laymen, he had a mission: to build men who set an example and led good and exemplary lives through the central concept of action in citizenship. These men also saw leadership as service and "stewardship." Part of this mission consisted of "citizenship of the state and nation." "It is one thing," he explained, "to have American ideals written on a scroll and hung on a wall," but he believed it was quite another thing "to enshrine these ideals in one's personality." This practical man sought "to live them and to throb them out to the world...." He concluded that "To be a real American is to live these ideals everyday." Ideals were not abstracts to Archer, but matters of practicality and everyday living. Being an American was a part of one's virtues and character.

"Christian citizenship" also involved acting to preserve America's democratic culture by keeping the "sacred wall of separation," a wall threatened by Protestant apathy and ecclesiastical aggression. A time for a showdown was at hand,
according to Archer, shortly after he took office, to "determine what culture shall be ours; a story...to which Protestantism contributed largely, and Methodism did its part, or an ecclesiastical authoritarianism in which the principle of democratic view in the church organization, are singularly absent." A "battle for liberty" was occurring and America had to be saved from a church that sought temporal power and to impose an "alien believer" upon a country which had staked its "very existence" on the principle of separation. One had to fight for the benefits of liberty, ferreting out the enemies of liberty.

After praying and meditating to determine that he was doing God's will, Archer went out into the world with an iron will as a "leader for right." Because he lived a clean and wholesome life, he could "insist that wrong be stamped out and right exalted." And so, on September 1st, having been voted Executive Director two months earlier, he set out to exalt right and to combat wrong through POAU. In order to do so effectively, he had to develop a financial and organizational base for the institution that would ensure its permanency.

FINANCES AND FUNDRAISING

Archer methodically sought a steady source of income through various patterns of fundraising. He sought support from denominational grants, fraternal organizations,
offerings at public meetings and at church and church group-sponsored meetings, special foundations, local and state chapters of POAU, bequests, and individual gifts and contributions. He stressed personal solicitations by members of the NAC, most of whom he did not then know, and the Board of Trustees. The director also sought through appeals in church and fraternal order publications (such as those of the Masons) to obtain the assistance of interest groups with "allied" purposes to POAU. He concentrated mainly upon seeking large annual donations from church organizations, but in this effort Archer was not very successful.

The mass meeting or religious liberty rally became the main source of funds. POAU organized local, state, and regional mass meetings, and Washington headquarters assisted by sending "platform talent" to stimulate the audience. Every year POAU held a national religious liberty meeting, the National Conference on Church and State, in celebration of the anniversary of POAU's founding. Proceeding from the knowledge that the success of these national mass rallies depended less on the speakers and the event than on organization, Archer proceeded them with two to three months of organizing and advertising and mail campaigns. The first national conference, held in January, 1949, proved a modest financial success. Costing $2,000 to stage, the conference brought in $2,200 in cash and $5,000 in pledges.
Archer believed that a yearly budget of $100,000, a goal set by the founders, was needed in order to "make a dent in the national mind." POAU, however, received only $53,509 in 1948. Consequently, in early 1949, the organization launched a three-year educational campaign to raise one million dollars. In September, 1949, Archer publicly reduced his goal to $500,000, a more attainable yet still respectable sum.

At the same time, Archer announced how he would use the $500,000 in order to halt the "destroyers of freedom." He designated $50,000 for radio education programs; $50,000 for mobilizing and organizing POAU nationwide; and $50,000 for placing advertisements in the religious and secular presses to counter Roman Catholic advertisements. He earmarked $50,000 for a battle alert of Americans on federal aid to sectarian schools. (He alleged that the Roman Catholic Church had $500,000 at its disposal from the Knights of Columbus and $500,000 from the Bishop's fund, all for obtaining aid to their schools.) He tagged $100,000 for the annual budget of POAU's national administrative unit, $100,000 for remedial activities in trouble spots and for test suits in thirty states where public funds were going to the Roman Catholic Church, and $100,000 for publicity to answer "book-size documents of opponents."

POAU's three-year publicity campaign failed to meet its goal (it raised only $278,000 from 1949 through 1951.)
POAU did, however, raise $435,460 in the first five years, an average of approximately $87,000 a year. After an increase of approximately 22% in income during Archer's first full year as director (1949), income reached $101,335 for 1950, almost double that of 1948 and 34% over 1949. Income grew at an average annual rate between 1948-1952 of 14%. Expenditure of funds tripled from $31,835 in 1948 to $93,894 in 1952, an average percentage yearly increase of approximately 14%. (See TABLE 1 and FIGURE 1.)

Archer made judicious use of the revenue he raised. He did not desire, nor could he have afforded, to build a top-heavy bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. He expected double and triple duty from the staff he hired. Besides their main staff assignments, the staff members were expected to go out into the "field" to speak, raise funds, enlist members, and to help to organize. The more time a member spent in the field the better Archer liked it. Travelling expenses took a modest part of the administrative budget, with the director spending as much as 50% of his time travelling, covering as many as 100,000 miles a year. Members had to use the most economical form of transportation and accommodations. In part because Archer acted as POAU's counsel, legal expenses were kept to a minimum. Whenever a deficit occurred, Archer immediately went out into the field for funds. POAU also conducted special year-end campaigns to provide it with surplus funds to convert into reserves or to guarantee money
for lawsuit expenses. Archer used these surpluses to show the membership that POAU was successful; they also witnessed that Archer was doing his job successfully.

Archer delegated little financial responsibility and demanded of himself and colleagues absolute financial integrity. He was forced to carry much of the heavy fundraising load himself in these early years, often neglecting other tasks. POAU ran on a cash basis, borrowing as little as possible so as not to incur debts, and Archer personally supervised money matters every day to insure that sound and precise business practices were followed within POAU. He had a businessman’s concern for detail, insisting that it was "absolutely imperative for a corporation like ours" to maintain financial integrity. No hostile person or authority was to be permitted to destroy POAU, as, according to Archer, had happened so often to institutions similar to POAU, by the discovery of financial irregularities.

Insuring financial permanence of POAU was clearly one of Archer's major goals. One principal means by which he sought to attain their permanence was through soliciting large contributions of established institutions, especially of the churches. In January, 1953, he stated his belief in the following manner:

I suppose that all leaders of democratic voluntary organizations dream of attaining a solid base of mass support so that the major portion of their resources come in the form of small contributions from large numbers of people. That dream, however, is seldom realized, and certainly not without a
good many years of hard struggle during which larger contributions or endowments from a few generous donors supply the life blood.\footnote{47}

During these early years, POAU did not receive the large contributions Archer thought POAU needed, despite prestigious endorsements. The Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church endorsed POAU in 1951, calling for full financial support of POAU, and the Southern Baptist Convention commended POAU in 1952. Revenue nevertheless remained erratic with POAU dependent for its expenditures on daily income. POAU was dependent on the small contributions of a large number of people and therefore its financial future remained uncertain.

The second major means Archer used to attain financial permanence was through an invested endowment fund. He saw that

The long range program of arousing the American public out of its lethargy requires that POAU be made permanent by a 2 million dollar trust fund. This fight is not for a day, but for years. ...The principal of such a trust fund should remain intact, but the revenue therefrom would guarantee POAU's permanence.\footnote{49}

(The two million dollar trust fund was obtained in the '70s. See TABLE 11) The organization spent only between 51% and 59% of the income received in 1948-1950, although the percentage rose to an average of 80% over the following three years. Archer invested the unspent income so that by the end of 1953 POAU had invested in reserve at least $115,019 and perhaps a good deal more. (This reserve was mainly for the purpose of paying for lawsuits.)
Financial security continued to elude Archer during his first five years as director. While maintaining financial integrity, doubling yearly income, and building a reserve trust fund, he still lacked a steady source of revenue from popular or institutional sources. Though pursuing a long term investment policy, Archer used methods and language that was not conducive to attracting conservative institutional investors. Without financial stability and permanence, concentration on highly visible controversies became a necessary strategy for fund-raising efforts. This strategy as well as the one of making a "name" for the institution was a common one among public interest groups.

**ORGANIZATION AND METHODS: MEMBERSHIP, CHAPTERS, AND INDEPENDENCE**

During these early years, Archer had to do much of the organizational spadework with minimal staff assistance. An editorial assistant for the newsletter was hired in September, 1949, but not until September, 1950, two years after he had assumed control, did Archer hire a man to be his assistant and Director of Organization in charge of promotion. These two men, whom Archer hired only after assuring himself that he had the necessary money, were the Executive Director's only important staff appointments in the first five years.

Archer was able to set up only a rudimentary bureaucratic structure at headquarters in Washington, D.C.
He envisioned POAU divided into four departments: research, publication, legal, and organization and finance—which combined fundraising and chapter formation. Although Archer had an assistant, as late as 1954 he did not have an associate director to share responsibilities for the departments and the tasks of public appeals, fundraising, organizing chapters, preparing articles, and conference work. Each year, he proposed departments of litigation and research, each with a projected budget of $10,000, but did not establish them because of the need for a "broader base" of finance. Research went undone and Archer did much of the legal paper work himself.

In lieu of a staff, Archer sought the aid of the Board of Trustees and members of the NAC, using them where he thought they would do the most good. For example, Paul Blanshard, a nationally known controversial writer highly critical of Catholicism and a member of the NAC, gave lectures for POAU's religious liberty rallies. On the Board, James Watts, manager of the Christian Scientist Committee for Publications, and Harold C. Fitz, a retired Rear Admiral and lawyer, who replaced Watts on the Christian Scientist seat on the Board in the summer of 1952, were POAU's principal contacts with the above faith—which, incidentally, contributed $1,000 a year to the budget. Dawson and DeGroot organized the Baptists while Archer and Frank Yost worked with the Seventh Day Adventists. Archer and C. Stanley
Lowell, a Methodist minister, first non-founder appointed to the Board, and Archer's man on the Executive Committee, were, with Charl Williams, the primary workers on the followers of John Wesley. Archer and Williams were the contact persons with the teachers in NEA; Dawson, DeGroot, and Williams were the principal contacts with Masonic leaders with whom POAU maintained close relations, especially for financial purposes. Ellis H. Dana was especially helpful with the Religious Liberty Department of the NCC from 1950-1960.

In general, from 1948-1953, the official makeup of POAU consisted of sixteen members, including the Board of Trustees (of which the officers of the corporation were a part), Archer, and the Director of Press Relations and Director of Organization. There were among them two Congregationalists, four Baptists, four Methodists, and one Presbyterian, Disciple of Christ, Seventh Day Adventist, NAE member, Christian Scientist, and Jew. Lutherans and Episcopalians were not represented on the Board or on the NAE, despite Archer's search for suitable representatives from these two denominations. Of the officers, the most active were Dawson and Morrison. The majority of the officials were ministers.

Membership in the National Advisory Council (NAC) increased from eighty-three in 1948 to somewhere around one hundred throughout the period, 1950-1953. A significant portion of the most active members of the NAC were theological and political liberals, such as Blanshard and Shipler.
Archer had asked Harold C. Fey, managing editor of Morrison's old paper, *The Christian Century*, and a former member of the national board of directors of the ACLU, to join the NAC. Fey refused because he believed that his paper had to retain an independent position, and that such an association was a potential embarrassment to both of them. He thought, however, they would on the same side most of the time. Fey did appear at a number of POAU gatherings and used his influence to aid POAU.

This help by the Board and the members of the NAC was hardly sufficient. Most members, in fact, either were indifferent or ineffective, did not work "zealously for POAU's cause," or refused to take a larger share of responsibility. Moreover, Board members' primary duties lay elsewhere.

At the same time, the Board, which was supposedly responsible for policy, was divided over a number of issues, including specific applications of separation. On a number of occasions the Board was unable to give Archer clear policy guidelines. Archer consequently either did not act or did so very carefully. He also began to propose policy of his own and because of his knowledge and diplomacy usually, but not always, was able to guide POAU on or along the paths he desired to go. Archer, who as Executive Director was supposed to follow the dictates of the Board and the NAC, the official policy-making body of POAU, was gradually becoming the major POAU policy-maker.
Archer early made a fundamental decision to concentrate upon organizing local and state chapters. Shortly after POAU was organized, the Executive Committee of the Board decided to organize local units but not to give them first priority. Dawson, who became Recording Secretary, had worked primarily through the existing institutional channels and structures of the churches. Archer believed the churches were not equipped to do the things necessary in order to carry out the immediate objectives of the manifesto. If the broadly based coalition proposed by the manifesto was to be attained, POAU, in his opinion, would need solid roots in communities throughout the United States. Most importantly, he desired an independent financial and organizational base not dependent on the pleasures and policies of the churches or any particular denomination.

The decision was a controversial one. A number of Board members thought working through church and professional organizations was the best way to make POAU a national influence. The new Executive Director, however, succeeded in gaining the freedom to develop POAU along lines adapted to his style of operation.

Archer's decision to rely primarily on independent local and state units as "the strength of POAU nationally" made the Department of Organization and Promotion the most important section in the new national structure. The department aimed at mobilizing "means and manpower" and linking organizing and
fundraising; in fact, developing new chapters was, in these early years, one prominent form of fundraising. Providing POAU with an arm for action, the department guided locals as they reported, protested, and acted on local violations of separation. As a knowledgeable public relations man, Archer was capable of generating publicity in the field by means of groups and occasions created for the purpose.

He hired John C. Mayne as his assistant and director of organization in September of 1950. A Congregational minister, Mayne had been Associate General Secretary of the St. Louis Council of Churches when Archer met him in the fall of 1950 while investigating a possible lawsuit in Missouri. Before meeting Archer, Mayne had done much of the organizing of the Missouri Association for Free Public Schools, a POAU affiliate. His new general duties were "to mobilize public opinion and to secure enthusiastic support of individuals and groups for the national religious liberty work." He was to do advance work, promote public meetings, collect funds, and lay the groundwork for future organization in a local area before moving on to another place. He became Promotional Director in November, 1950 and Associate Editor of the newsletter in December, 1950.

At the time he hired Mayne, Archer claimed that in two years' time the newsletter's mailing list had increased forty times, membership had increased twenty-fold, to well over 12,000, and POAU had seventy state and local chapters.
Archer of course sent *Church and State* to those with lapsed memberships and distributed free copies as he could. And he did put the best possible light on his statistics, since some of the local units were temporary committees for legal and publicity purposes and thus not full-fledged chapters.

The health of chapters fluctuated and the solidity of units depended on local, state, or national controversy, giving these locals a fluid nature and a variable political effectiveness that required recurring attention from headquarters. Stressing that "strength of voice" depended on effective organization, Archer noted in September, 1949 the formation of at least twenty-one active chapters in twenty-one cities in seventeen states. Fewer than half of these chapters, however, were currently viable in September, 1950.

Convinced of the "great financial potential in the cities," Archer organized POAU's first regional office in Chicago, Illinois, in November, 1950. The formation of the Chicago office seemed more for the sake of publicity than anything else, because the office was regional in name only and had to soon be closed as a regional office. Besides performing the same functions as the other POAU units, a regional office served as a secondary headquarters with a few paid staff members. Its tasks were to develop financial resources in the metropolitan areas and to provide dependable institutional support for developing locals in the
region. The office staff helped to gather intelligence on the political activities of the Catholic Church in such large metropolitan areas as Chicago. Archer planned six such regional centers.

By October, 1951, a year after Mayne's appointment, POAU claimed 30,000 members and ninety local chapters, a 29 percent increase in chapters for the year. The reason for these significant jumps within a year was that POAU workers increasingly concentrated on and took advantage of the growing Vatican issue that had resulted from rumors that President Truman might appoint an official ambassador to the Vatican after Myron Taylor, his personal envoy to the Vatican, retired in January, 1950. An indication of growing Protestant anxiety over the possibility was a flyer entitled, "Who Will Be the Next to Kneel?" issued by POAU in July, 1951. It had, according to Mayne, an immediate and amazing effect on revenue.

When Truman nominated General Mark Clark in October, 1951 as the American Ambassador to the Vatican, Archer took advantage of the controversy that followed his appointment as a golden moment for organizing. At the time of the appointment, he was already in the process of organizing a systematic series of mass meetings through which he hoped to reach every American city with a population of over 10,000. The mass rallies during the Vatican controversy of 1951 was the most successful POAU had yet held, and the most prominent
and widely attended were those featuring Paul Blanshard.

Blanshard was a Congregational minister, a Unitarian, a former socialist, and a lawyer. His articles in The Nation critical of Catholic views on medicine, birth control, the family, and education had led the New York Board of Superintendents in 1947 to ban the liberal magazine as "offensive" to the faith of Catholics, after Catholics had protested against the articles. In late 1949, his American Freedom and Catholic Power caused an enormous outcry by Catholics against the book and Blanshard. He wrote what he considered a thorough indictment of various aspects of Catholic canon law that raised questions about the hierarchy's loyalty to American liberty, the American way of life, and to the freedom of the individual conscience. He also emphasized "The Catholic Plan for America": once Catholics became a majority, the hierarchy would implement canon law as the law of the land, repealing, among other things, the First Amendment.

He reiterated these themes when he toured the Midwest and Far West from November 9 to December 9 during the height of the controversy over the Clark nomination. He spoke before overflow audiences and evoked, as his previous tours had one, bitter condemnation by Catholics of his talks and of his being allowed to speak in their communities. When General Clark requested the President to withdraw his nomination in December, many subsequently active POAU chapters
and study groups were in the process of forming, many in the
wake of Blanshard's tour, according to C. Stanley Lowell.

By June, 1953, POAU claimed approximately 115 local
and state units in thirty-nine states, and the monthly mail-
ing list for Church and State had reached 55,000 copies.
POAU now gave the appearance of having a considerable na-
tionwide following and an impressive presence in communi-
ties across the United States. The institution probably had
only between twenty-five and thirty truly active chapters,
an active membership of between one to two thousand, and a
total mobilizable membership of between 20,000 to 40,000.
While far less than POAU advertised, these numbers indicated
impressive growth when compared with the growth in member-
ship in the ACLU. Irrespective of the effectiveness of the
units and their members, numbers and the growth in numbers
were important to Archer--as in similar organizations, the
appearance of power was a form of power. POAU had a pres-
ence in a community where it organized, even if the presence
was not especially active in many communities.

The locations of the units highlighted where POAU re-
ceived much of its support. In June, 1953, there were state
chapters in Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri.
Florida, largely as a result of Blanshard's tour, had the
greatest number of local chapters(twelve), while North Caro-
lina and California were next(eight local chapters each).
The chapters in thirteen southern states, including Texas,
made up forty-five percent of the 115 units. Together with the twenty-two units in seven mid-western states, they constituted virtually two-thirds of the total number of POAU units. One-third of the local chapters were in six states: Texas, California, Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, and Ohio. In general, then, the two regions where evangelical Protestantism was strongest and where there were fewest Catholics in proportion to the population produced the majority of support in terms of chapters.

As stated previously, Archer sought to organize chapters in cities. A number of the units were in small towns and cities under 10,000, but most of them were in the 50,000-100,000 range. In the dozen states where over 80 percent of American Roman Catholics lived, POAU had thirty-three units out of a total of 115, or 20 percent. In the fifteen cities where well over half of the Catholic population lived, POAU had chapters in all but Newark and Trenton, New Jersey, and Providence, Rhode Island.

The majority of support for POAU may have come from rural areas, but POAU had significant organizational strength in cities of moderate size and where most Catholics lived.

Archer concentrated his energies on organizing the largest city or cities in a state and the state capitals. He was, indeed, "addicted to the idea of 'offices in major cities,'" as Morgan put it, partly for reasons of visibility but largely for financial reasons. Such units could be
self-supporting and income-producing. Moreover, organization and stability were easier to achieve in the cities than rural areas; rural areas could be expected to support POAU's cause in any case and could be organized through networks radiating from the cities. Finally, access to national opinion-makers, the rich and powerful, and state legislators and lawmakers was provided POAU through its contacts in the cities.

Archer could thus provide a challenge to the Roman Catholic Church authorities where they were strongest. Wherever the church operated, POAU would be present to awaken urban dwellers to those activities. As a result of Archer's approach, POAU had a base in the states and in the larger urban areas independent of, but working with and through, the churches and their organizations, which supplemented its rural support.

The local units were replicas of the national organization and existed so that they would provide the needed challenge to any non-separationists. Archer and Mayne worked out a program for the chapters to follow for each of the four seasons, emphasizing graphic and dramatic presentation of church-state problems. Locals worked through ministerial alliances or associations and councils of churches if possible, using them, for example, to organize a city-wide Reformation Week in which churches would use "source material" supplied by POAU and a portion of the offerings would be
donated to POAU.

The chapters held discussion sessions and public meetings. They emphasized current topics or themes such as Are We Winning the Battle for Freedom, Our Vanishing Religious and Civil Liberties, or Does Separation of Church and State Benefit All Religious Groups. The POAU distributed book like Avro Manhattan's *The Vatican in World Politics* and Paul Blanshard's *Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power*. The author of the latter book stressed the parallel between the techniques, practices, and aims of the Kremlin and the Vatican.

Chapters, also, were to "expose to public view the devious ways in which church-state separation laws were violated..." and were, with the aid of headquarters, to correct them. In order to find these problems, if they were not obvious, they were to conduct surveys of "Vatican Power in the Local Community," as well as of state-supported hospitals, schools, institutions, and governmental units. State and Catholic school directories were also examined to discover how many nuns and priest were teaching in the public schools in a community and how many public schools were listed in the Catholic directories. Locals were supposed to keep abreast of local, state, and federal legislation, and to focus on "Educating and influencing legislators and public officials." They were also to be a "positive witness for religious liberty" in their communities, and, as Church
and State pointedly emphasized, to advocate "freedom for all groups with malice toward none."

Because POAU concentrated on disputes with the Roman Catholic Church, religious bigots and fanatics posed a problem for POAU leaders at the local level. The Virginia chapter had such problems in 1949. The Baptist co-president stated that there was "no place in POAU for religious bigots because our crusade is not in the realm of religious doctrine or faith. Our crusade is one that stands to uphold the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."

POAU was, he declared, "a crusade for freedom of all groups."

The newsletter reported the above problem in the context of a "Note to California POAU'ers." The School Facts Committee in that state set up to do the work of POAU had been discontinued by Archer in order to avoid conflict of authority. Archer emphasized that units must have "representative and responsible leadership." The real reason he had dismissed two people from the committee was that the unit was threatened by what he termed "self-appointed" leaders.

Obviously, POAU continued to have problems with such people, for in October, 1950, the newsletter carried a story entitled, "Steer Clear of 'One-Man' Organizations, Archer Warns." The author identified the real problem in one California unit and apparently in other units and stated that while POAU "may have a fundamental difference of opinion
with other groups—it should not seek to deprive other groups of their civil rights." The director spoke of the spuriousness of one-man organizations, the multi-denominational nature of POAU, and the need for leaders and sponsors of "unquestioned integrity," especially on the financial committees. The "very nature of POAU's program" required, according to Archer, careful management because one chapter "could imperil (the) entire movement." Thereafter, Archer ever more closely supervised chapters and their personnel, attempting to keep out, though not always with success, religious fanatics and bigots.

In carrying out the manifesto, Archer sought to create a non-sectarian, multi-denominational organization. POAU, Archer argued, was "the only group representing all Protestants" and "a non-sectarian body, through which all churches channel their requests." He further explained, "POAU is not a church, it is a bulldozer to clear the roadblock so that all religions may be free. We move in and run interference for a denomination whose toes have been stepped on."

The "Other Americans" of POAU's title, however, were absent in the field. The "representative and responsible leaders" in the local and state units were predominantly Methodists, Baptists (who were prominently represented in the South), and Presbyterians (principally outside of the South). Although Archer had to depend on those who volunteered to develop a chapter, he let them organize an
official chapter only if there was a broad range of sponsors 
and dependable support which would not drain the national 
112 
treasury.

The St. Paul, Minnesota "Protestant United" group, for example, had on its board a Presbyterian, a member of the 
local council of churches, a member of the Lutheran Council, 
113 
and members of the local NAE. Seventh Day Adventists, 
Christian Scientists, Unitarians, local ministerial assoc- 
114 
iation members, Congregationalists and Episcopalians also 
dotted the leadership structure of these units. Despite 
advertisements embodying the aspiration that POAU be an 
alliance between educational groups, fraternal organizations, 
and ministers and laymen, clerics predominated at this level. 
115 
as well as at the national level. Clergy staffed the 
chapters, and they came from denominational conventions and 
congregations but were independent of them, which perhaps 
made many churches reluctant to support an institution of 
such diverse make-up. The churches were unable to control 
the personnel and the expenditure of money.

Archer organized POAU to meet the threat posed by the 
Roman Catholic Church hierarchy and other non-separationists 
so that POAU could, as he put it, stand up like David and 
116 
triumph over Goliath, a phrase common among public interest 
groups. He worked to "develop a militant body" that would 
"put more rigid backbones into those who ought to be on 
117 
our side."
POAU's growth failed to reach Archer's goal but, nonetheless, was impressive, especially in appearance and especially if one considers Archer's lack of manpower. Archer's decision to rely on the development of roots in communities through chapters proved to be a wise one in many ways. He never changed his mind on his decision despite later criticism that they were not worth it and caused insoluble problems. Organizational and financial uncertainty and instability facilitated consideration of extreme courses of action. Instability constantly served to remind officers of the organization that POAU's health, like the health of most public interest groups, depended upon retaining visibility and associating itself with controversial issues supported by its constituency.

"STRUGGLE OF IDEAS": EDUCATION, PROPAGANDA, AND PUBLICITY

The "struggle of ideas" was another battlefield on which the leadership of POAU saw itself fighting the war against non-separation and especially Catholicism. Causing controversy, POAU leaders believed, aided in the performance of the task of awakening a somnolent nation to diminishing Americans freedoms and to the loss of religious liberty. Moreover, POAU leaders challenged Catholicism while most of Protestantism set back and did nothing. For example, Archer told his Board in 1949 that Protestantism had failed to meet "Catholic propaganda and argument" for its
"authoritarian culture" in such places as Life, Look, Time, and in the colleges.

Archer cited as one indictment of the success of this propaganda machine a Gallup poll in which four out of ten citizens did not object to public funds going to private schools. He did not indicate whether the number was an increase over previous polls; he meant that 40 percent was a large number of people to favor such an un-American policy. He could account for it only as the result of propaganda that hid the real aims of the Catholic hierarchy from the American people. He concluded that if "this propaganda goes unchallenged" America would be controlled and Catholic. And because small FOAU was on the front lines of this battle, it was the "principal target" of this vast machinery.

Speaking before the Associated Church Press in 1949, Archer further clarified why it was necessary to cause controversy, to publicize, and to carry on a steady educational campaign. He believed the secular press refused to criticize the political activities of the "Roman church" because it was "throttled by fear of boycotts and reprisals." He cited examples of the power and presence of that church that needed to be challenged:

In all parts of the nation Protestant ministers have been cut off the air or prevented from using the free pulpit or forum to discuss church-state relations. ...Congressional committees are deliberately stacked to prevent discussion of the important issues in open Congress. ...The Supreme Court decisions are held up to public ridicule
with bold announcements that such decisions must be overruled by 'persuasive, persistent, peaceable' efforts. Departments of Federal Government manned for layers deep go unchallenged despite the fact that ideologically in many cases these policy men subscribed to a dogma which is inimical to free institutions. The great contributions of Protestantism to American democracy go unheralded while the American public is conditioned by an efficient Catholic press, aided too often by a secular press, to believe that one who challenges the Catholic State politically is bigoted, communistic or both.\textsuperscript{122}

Archer aimed to mold public opinion to create a favorable climate of opinion for separation, an aim of all interest groups and used most successfully by the Anti-Saloon League of America. After two years on the job, he believed the time had come to "exert our full powers to establish leadership in the field of ideas." After building and organizing FOAU for two years, he felt more confident of "implanting our principle in the minds of the rising generation."\textsuperscript{124}

The reason for Archer's optimism at the time came partly from the fact that he now had two staff aides. Besides Mayne, he had hired Stanley Lichtenstein, a Jew, in September, 1949 as his editorial assistant for the newsletter. Lichtenstein became Director of Press Relations in May of 1951 and Managing Editor of \textit{Church and State} in September of the same year. Archer, however, remained as editor, determining policy for the paper.

In the hands of Archer and Lichtenstein, \textit{Church and State} changed from the inter-organizational newsletter it
had been under Dawson to POAU's premier public relations instrument. First as a newsletter and then as a review, Church and State was used by Archer and Lichtenstein to present the point of view of POAU exclusively, to promote and provide organizational news of POAU, and to mobilize and attempt to keep a constituency through dramatic stories that would sustain interest in separation. Archer believed a good journalist should be able to point out the potential mountain in the molehill. Stories appeared that were designed to expose a local violation, win support for POAU's side, and force a halt to the violation. Other stories were used to report community or state-wide controversies or violations, controversies that were sometimes instigated by POAU. Like the magazines of public interest groups, Church and State was highly stylized in the presentation of stories, and during the first five years it contained only nine editorials.

The writers of a majority of the stories concentrated violations of separation and Catholic influence and power when violations were committed by Catholics. The editors of Church and State, for instance, pointed out the excessive number of Roman Catholic chaplains in the Armed Forces and inferred their influence. They cited examples of Catholic doctrine on separation, on public schools, and on other religions as it was taught in Catholic school textbooks. In other words, Church and State reflected the editors'
professional interest in strict separation and their analysis of Roman Catholic aims, strategy, and methods.

From 1948 to 1953, the editors of Church and State focused in on certain areas, reflecting the priority interests and issues of the editors. The most frequent subjects of articles were those that dealt with education. Over forty-eight articles were on federal aid to education. Stories of bus transportation recurred in forty-one articles. Garbed nuns and priests teaching in public schools were given high visibility with over fifty-seven articles. Over half of these captive school stories portrayed situations in small towns and rural areas in Colorado, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wisconsin where POAU leaders were either organizing or negotiating or involved in lawsuits.

Approximately fifty-eight articles involved religion in the public schools. Almost half of the above articles discussed released time issues. Despite division within the Board and NAC over questions of whether the public schools should permit bible reading and prayers, stories in Church and State opposed these, and other, forms of religious exercise in the public schools.

The majority of the educational problems reported in Church and State concerned local and state problems, many of them in rural areas, which could be resolved only at those levels. The review ran stories on tax funds going to sectarian institutions like Catholic schools and hospitals.
The editors gave considerable space to legal rulings of state courts and state school superintendents.

In addition to sixty-four pieces on the Vatican, stories on foreign countries numbered ninety. This number put them second, behind only education. The emphasis on foreign countries puzzled observers of POAU and struck critics as irrelevant to POAU's task. Some of the reasons for the accentuation were as follows: statements supporting separation by the NCWC would be shown false; what priests and bishops really believed about religious liberty would be exposed by actions of Catholic authorities in countries where Catholics were in control; America would become like those countries if she became Catholic. Another reason for the stress was Archer's goal of challenging the right of the Roman Catholic Church to lead an anti-Communist crusade because of the church's "causal relation to Communism."

In Church and State, as well as in other POAU publications and writings, chief targets of overseas stories were the "Catholic States," especially Spain and Italy. When the Vatican supported Spanish bishops' curbing of Protestant minorities as "unexceptionable," Archer criticized Rome for putting liberal Catholics, like those in America who had objected to the curbing, "in the doghouse." The Vatican had upheld the "Spanish-Italian style of religious repression in contradistinction to the American system of religious freedom."
Archer explained where he thought the American liberal Catholics, whom he granted might favor religious liberty, really stood in the Catholic hierarchy in terms of influence. The "illiberal and opportunistic policy" upheld in the Spanish case was "soundly based on papal texts" rendering "hollow the protestations of 'liberal' American clerics that the Roman Catholic Church supports American freedom rather than the 'thought control' program which binds churches in Spain and Italy." Pronouncements by liberal Catholic clerics in America supporting religious freedom were dismissed by Archer as having little influence in the Catholic hierarchy.

The articles in Church and State made a number of specific points about these Catholic states and their relation to religious liberty in the United States. One point was that countries like Spain were under the sway of "clerical fascism." When President Truman's Attorney General, Howard McGrath, a Catholic, attacked separation and POAU, Archer retorted that McGrath, like civil officials in "clerical fascist states," overthrew government by consent in order to "appease" all-powerful clerics. A second point stressed how church-state union led to restriction and persecution of Protestants in the name of national and religious 'unity'. The stories showed, from POAU's point of view, modern day examples of the direct relationship between church-state union and persecution, a relationship which separation of church and state destroyed.
Another point emphasized the relationship between Communism and Catholicism. According to Archer, Communism flourished in "Catholic controlled" nations like Italy because Catholicism created conditions conducive to Communism. Relatedly, the church fostered the "anti-Communist myth" in the United States, accusing Protestants of being "soft to the Communist conspiracy" in order to prepare the people for its own domination. But, Archer contended, there were two conspiracies of power against liberty in the United States: "the Communist conspiracy and the Roman Catholic conspiracy," of which the latter, because of numbers, subtlety, and entrenched power, was by far the most dangerous.

One especially important larger goal of Archer was to prove that the United States did not need to join the "Holy War" of the Roman Catholic Church nor should it be led by Catholic anti-Communist spokesmen. Catholicism had no right to leadership in marshalling the spiritual forces in the Cold War. Rather, Protestants were the natural allies, as the main formulators of modern liberty. As a foe of freedom, Catholicism could not be a good ally of the United States in the Cold War. And that Cold War was part of a larger war, a war for freedom against totalitarianism in which Roman Catholicism, even more than Communism, was the main enemy.
In early 1953, Archer appointed a special committee on publications to review the program of educating and mobilizing the public. The report of the committee, chaired by Lowell and bearing his imprint, pointed out that "POAU is an educational organization" existing to "create sentiment among our people" for the American tradition of the wall of separation. The wall, the report writer said, was being "systematically undermined."

In POAU's first four years, POAU had distributed, excluding the manifesto and Lowell's best-selling pamphlet entitled, "A Summons to Protestants," three million pieces of literature and over thirty-four pamphlets, reprints, leaflets, and brochures. These pamphlets, usually of a speech or article of a member of POAU, were designed to reach more people than could Church and State. They served as organizing tools at mass rallies and helped to get POAU's message across to churches, conferences, and denominational bodies.

The authors of the report recommended a change of emphasis in the literature program. Usually a speech or sermon considered effective in delivery was reproduced in pamphlet form, but oral quality did not always come across in print. While such a piece might be read by "thoughtful people," it might be too abstract in discussing separation and religious liberty. In order to increase popular appeal and readability, the report writer advised concentrating on more eye appeal, catchy title headings, short and pungent
sentences in shorter, snappier pieces that could be read in a few minutes. The writer recommended the raising of specific issues addressed to "non-verbal kind of needs." Archer followed these recommendations.

While the rhetoric of POAU leaders came from a predisposed state of thought and was independent of the financial and organizational instabilities of POAU, not until some basic permanent foundation had been solidly erected could that rhetoric be changed, since it performed, in the eyes of Archer, the important functions of mobilizing, organizing, and fundraising.

**REMEDIAL ACTIVITIES**

The litigation or legal department existed only on paper in 1953, with proposed yearly budgets of $10,000 and a proposed reserve fund for lawsuits of $100,000. Archer was the only staff lawyer working in the legal area. Applying his means-manpower test, Archer gave low priority to legal and research work in these early years, giving priority to primarily to organizing and fundraising. In lieu of sufficient funds, he used lawsuits, which did not pay for themselves, to produce income by intimately intertwining them with organizing and fundraising, creating for that purpose legal committees or local units. POAU's legal work, which was supposed to be an action arm of equal importance to educational work, became subordinate to financial and
and organization goals because of Archer's decision to concentrate on gaining some independence. Until POAU attained some semblance of stability and permanence, lawsuits would function in this capacity.

In the meantime, POAU had to put out the fires lit by violations of separation. The firefighter imagery and function indicated how legal work was thought of: Roman Catholic intolerance of other religions caused violations of separation which, in turn, stoked the fires of intolerance in others. Halting those violations squelched the fires and prevented their spreading into religious warfare.

Archer used the lawsuit for several purposes. Besides correcting violations of the law, he employed the lawsuit to establish a chapter within a state or community to support and promote the lawsuit and the national organization. It also gave POAU legal standing within a state to apply or to challenge the ruling of a court; a challenge also created a climate against recurrence of the violation. Concentrating on the local and state levels where most of the violations occurred, he endeavored to establish a precedent for separation and a modern interpretation of the state and federal constitutions. The lawsuit, or the threat of a lawsuit, also served as a bargaining tool for settlement out of court.

Upon receipt of a complaint of a violation of separation, Archer proceeded in the following manner. Of the
fifteen hundred complaints of violations of the law POAU received in its first four years, one-third were surveyed to see if they were bonafide. After investigation and, if a correctable violation was found, negotiations followed the initial survey. Of the five hundred surveyed, Archer reported that twenty-seven were investigated and that five of the worst conditions were negotiated and resolved. Archer stated at another time that POAU had brought about corrective action in one hundred and fifty cases, or ten percent of all complaints received.

Archer did most of the investigating and negotiating by himself for the first ten or twelve years, having the "touch at negotiations" which other staff members did not have. At the request of or with permission of local people, usually Protestant ministers or Protestant members of school boards, he quietly and briefly entered a community in order to gather evidence. He set up a "Free Schools Committee," if necessary, in order to get standing and a legal agency through which to do business. In other words, he avoided the spotlight in order to first get "our people" together. Having done this, the local or state POAU made a vigorous protest against the particular violation, such as nuns and priests or Mormons teaching religion in the public schools. A local attorney was then hired, although at times one was hard to find, and when pressure was applied the lawyer was tempted to withdraw.
If the facts were favorable, money available, suitable plaintiff found, no similar case pending in nearby legal jurisdiction, and a local chapter formed for the purpose, Archer was ready to act. If the violation was in the schools, he went to the local, county or state superintendent of schools because he found the violation usually occurred with the permission of officials. He wrote to a Baptist in Louisiana, "You can tell the superintendent down there if he doesn't stop catechism teaching in the schools, I am coming down and they'll be faced with a lawsuit." In another case, the Executive Director reported to his Board in 1951 that a brazen 'raid' on the public treasury was stopped in St. Bernard, a suburb of Cincinnati, Ohio, where for fifteen years the Roman Church had been collecting some $55,000 annually from the public school board by packing it with four Catholics out of five members. POAU got in touch with Mr. Charle P. Taft (the brother of Senator Robert A. Taft and one-time President of the FCC) and prevailed upon him to see the Bishop about this illegal situation. The Bishop was informed that counsel had been employed, that POAU representatives were in Cincinnati, and that a suit would be brought if the contract favoring the Church were not cancelled. The bishop abrogated the contract with the public school.

Archer also recounted POAU's successful efforts with sectarian hospitals, citing the Sisters of Mercy Hospital in Jackson, Mississippi, as an example. There, Luther A. Smith, a NAC member, was involved in protesting governmental funds going to this institution. When it was learned that POAU was investigating, Archer insisted that church hospitals
either stop using government funds or get out of the hospital business. He enumerated similar successes in dealing with various violations in Montgomery and Birmingham, Alabama; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; two instances in Florida, one in Illinois, and one in California. He cited these as examples of POAU's "UNPUBLICIZED SUCCESSES."

He emphasized, first of all, the practical aspect of stopping the flow of funds to sectarian institutions rather than trying to get a court ruling. He did so because suits were often long and involved and meant expenditure of money, and, if a state's highest court upheld a state legislature's right to disburse the funds, the United States Supreme Court was reluctant to review it. Moreover, Archer did not want to initiate a lawsuit unless he could expect a favorable ruling.

If negotiations failed and there was a likelihood of a successful ruling, POAU prepared to go to court. Meanwhile, the local committee carried on a program of protest and complaints, while the national staff came into the area to enlist support from church leaders and editors and newspople for POAU's point of view so that they would be sympathetic and support the protests and litigation. Creating and consolidating public opinion and using public relations to the fullest, Archer aimed to create a climate of opinion that would indirectly affect the court decision since judges read the papers and were influenced by what people in the
community were thinking.

At the same time, POAU prepared the local counsel to go to court. Archer depended on attorneys who usually worked for fifty percent of their normal fee. From experience, he determined that the local attorney had gathered sufficient evidence and had carefully followed procedures and a detailed checklist Archer had devised. Archer did not leave POAU's cases entirely in the hands of local lawyers. He centrally controlled and closely supervised the attorney as much as he could, just as he did every other phase of the work of POAU.

Publicly at least, POAU leaders declared POAU did not desire to take "brothers" to a court of law. Rather, it filed its suits in the court of equity where the actual remedy was a declaratory judgment declaring the facts incompatible with the law. It filed a petition in the court of equity on two counts: for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of procedures and actions of the defendants and for an injunction enjoining defendants from continuing their practices. While the court deliberated, an appeal and a contempt of court action were prepared to convince the defendants that POAU leaders would follow through to ensure enforcement of the court order. This was necessary because Archer had learned that violations continued despite the court order, and POAU leaders had great difficulty in halting them.
Archer divided the country up into twelve geographic zones for legal purposes, bringing lawsuits in each zone to correct violations. In each zone, he brought a typical suit, usually filed in state courts, and, if the judgment was favorable, used it as a precedent to correct other situations not litigated in the area. For example, a lawsuit in Vermont was designed to set a legal pattern for the New England states, while a Missouri suit was to provide a legal precedent for action in Indiana and Illinois. Archer had under advisement on the average between eleven and fifteen lawsuits at any one time.

The lawsuits were utilized "as a tonic" and a "tool" and were also good sources for press releases and publicity. They were also proof of POAU's effectiveness as an action agency. Archer believed that a suit's value was inestimable because if POAU got its facts across in a friendly, logical way many people who had once felt it was proper to use state tax funds for church purposes would change their minds.

While claiming that it did not hesitate to take Protestants to court, POAU's suits were most often filed "against violations benefitting the Roman church." In explaining the discrepancy Archer stated, "The question comes down to this--Should the public's tax dollar be used to inculcate the idea that all other religions but this one are counterfeit". When Protestants were told that they violated
separation, they correct their mistakes after negotiations. Catholics, on the other hand, did not violate separation out of ignorance but for intentional and systematic reasons. The violations, moreover, from POAU point of view, were centrally directed. Consequently, POAU took Catholics to court more frequently than Protestants because Catholics violated separation more often. Most to the suits during these early years involved tax funds going for sectarian teaching in the public schools or "captive schools." According to Archer, funds for this purpose had been stopped in Missouri, Colorado, New Mexico, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota by 1954.

How Archer operated in specific situations can be shown from an example in Kentucky. In 1953, Archer gathered complaints and facts on nuns teaching in the Kentuck public schools in ten counties in the state. He subsequently mustered enough financial and personal interest and support to receive a $700 grant from the Board for Mayne to set up a Kentucky Free Public Schools Committee.

He then launched a campaign to raise money, making seventy speeches and travelling 2,000 miles in seven days. He worked to line up top church leaders and editors for finances and publicity, received front page coverage in the Louisville Courier Journal, hired a prominent Baptist lawyer, and investigated as he did in most cases Protestant violations. A suit was then filed in hopes that after winning,
POAU would be able to reach out and correct violations in other parts of the state. After only a few months of involvement, Archer believed that the overall results were sufficient to justify more money and time. He told the Board in terms they would agree with that re-evaluation of separation in Kentucky was already occurring and POAU was educating many people who had never before thought about separation. In situations similar to the above one, Archer stated that quick action acted as a deterrent to men who were more concerned with avoiding a contest than "standing for a principle." POAU was thus able to stiffen "weak backbones" and to use "our pressure...(as) an equalizer." 177

Two of POAU's most important litigations during these early years involved "garbed nuns" or "captive schools" situations. 178

The Dixon, New Mexico case provided POAU with its first important legal victory and its early legal reputation. The issue, from Archer's vantage point, did not concern nuns' wearing their uniforms while teaching in public schools, but rather the teaching of religion in the public schools, which was unconstitutional. An aspect of that teaching of religion involved the wearing of distinctive religious garb. It was this aspect that the Catholic press chose to focus upon, thereby arousing unified Catholic support.
The suit involved "30 schools, 11 New Mexico counties, 28 plaintiffs, 200 defendants, and $600,000.00 of public funds spent annually." The court found in the fall of 1948 that "we have many things in addition to sectarian dress," meaning nuns and priests in religious garb. These things were:

...the teaching of catechism; the teaching of prayers peculiar to one sect; literature of one sect; works of art depicting scenes found only in the stories or legend, or illustration of one sect, all these in our public schools. Buildings where playgrounds are dotted with sanctuaries and grottos peculiar to one sect; classrooms located in churches of that sect with that collection of influences and they could be nothing else but influences, even to the members of the orders themselves that they are influences constantly surrounding them, inspiring them to follow the tenets of that order; in the midst of these indoctrinating influences, to say that there is still a separation of church and state in our schools, we must say that they are separated only by the sound of a bell or sign marked 'private'. To any reasonable person that would be a mirage. There is no separation.

The judge issued an injunction barring 139 specified nuns from teaching in the public schools. He also prohibited free state-funded bus transportation for parochial school students.

Church and State, triumphantly reporting the ruling, said it broke the "grip of Catholic sectarianism on the public school system of the state." POAU expended $3,300 on the Dixon case and claimed to have stopped the spending of at least $375,000 in public funds. The case became for POAU leaders "our classic example of what can happen
here once we take church-state separation for granted." The case also illuminated "the pattern of a concerted, determined and widespread plan to force the public schools to teach dogmatic religion, and to tap tax-funds for the support of parochial schools."  

Implementation of the decision, however, proved difficult, illustrating the importance of chapters. POAU reported that the specified nuns were replaced by other nuns, while "pro-Catholic" state legal and school officials supported this and other violations of the court's rulings. Despite appeals for new remedies, state officials said they would "interpret" the decision of the state Supreme Court, which in essence upheld the lower court's ruling, and that meant to POAU the ruling would lose all meaning.

In such situations, local and state chapters were necessary to monitor, carry through, and agitate to insure the court's decision was followed. If the community or its officials thought that their practices were legitimate or if they were determined to avoid or nullify a court decision, POAU had a difficult, time-consuming, and money-expending situation on its hands. Local people familiar with the people and situation in the community could best put pressure on public officials.

In early 1949 Archer was looking for a good case to sponsor, one with facts similar to the Dixon case, and decided the situation in Missouri fitted the criteria.
After the withdrawal of two attorneys, the Missouri Association for Free Public Schools finally began in October, 1950 to file taxpayers' suits in various counties in Missouri on two separate issues: over one hundred garbed nuns teaching in the public schools; and busing of parochial students paid for out of public taxes.

The Missouri Supreme Court in June, 1953 ruled in POAU's favor on both of the above counts, and Archer claimed the court had stopped $960,000 a year from going to twenty-five parochial schools and ninety-four nuns. The court agreed with POAU that where officials of the Roman Catholic Church taught in the public schools there was a combination of religious and secular education and in such a situation there was no free public school.

Archer greatly regretted the lack of sufficient money and manpower to resolve all violations of separation as they should be resolved. POAU leaders usually supported lawsuits through financial help, selection of counsel, advice in preparation of briefs, and particularly in filing 'friend of the court' briefs. Archer announced in 1951 that, despite his best efforts, fifty situations still needed attention and were not getting it. In Boston and San Francisco, for example, public school property had been sold to Catholic parochial interests because, Archer alleged, "When the counsel, the purchaser, and the buyer are all of the same faith, the law is frequently overlooked." Archer tried again
and again to get a legal case to challenge federal aid to sectarian hospitals but continually was frustrated in his attempts. Protestants on school boards, he found, were unwilling to fight Catholic takeover of public schools and property. Moreover, once one dam was patched up another leak occurred in an endless series across the United States that were too much for POAU to act upon.

Archer's advice on how to solve the problems in these "trouble spots" made clear the relationship between his analysis of the Roman Catholic Church and his techniques. "You and I," he wrote a friend in 1951, "might not be so adamant in our demand for hewing strictly to the line of church-state separation were it not for the advantage that our friends on the other side take of every precedent established, however small. If we yield one iota, our yielding establishes a pattern for a secondary yielding and then a third." When asked his advice on letting the Catholic Youth Organization into the Community Chest in Sacramento, California, Archer warned, "If you let these folk in, it is the beginning of many entries." He suggested that "In some communities they introduce a small appropriation for the Planned Parenthood Movement. If our friends object to this, then you have some trading stock."

The founders envisioned POAU partly as a legal agency which would take violations of separation to court, thereby challenging the spread of Catholic influence and power.
POAU was to be a defensive organization. Under Archer's early direction, however, few lawsuits were filed. Of the ones that were filed, cases concerning nuns' teaching in the public schools were concentrated on, perhaps because the violations were obvious, money was being expended, and POAU could get more support for these cases than in other ones. One reason for the lack of suits was the intermeshing of legal goals with educational, organizational, and financial ones which gave legal work less than top priority.

ORGANIZING THE "BATTLE FOR FREEDOM"

Archer based his organizational actions on the principles of freedom, individual and institutional, and its corollary, equality—not on individualism, denominationalism, or the free church(or pietistic) tradition. The "separation of church and state, and the religious equality it implies" provided "equality in matters of conscience." POAU stood for "equality of creeds," an equality that was "thoroughly and uniquely American."

The Protestant churches had accepted religious pluralism. They believed in religious liberty and equality for all sects because they had denied any claim to civil power. They had accepted the sectarian compromise written into the First Amendment by the Founding Fathers, whereby the sects denied to themselves the right to make claims upon the government to support their faith. The idea behind the First Amendment,
according to Sidney Mead, was the "theory of equality." As Mead put it: "The idea of actually incarnating this theory of equality of all religious sects in relation to the civil authority is what was unique about the American experiment." And the compromise had been made necessary because the United States had been a religiously pluralistic society and because religious warfare had to be avoided.

The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, did not accept the First Amendment or religious pluralism. The church rejected individual and institutional freedom and their corollary of equality. Instead, the church demanded an "institutional loyalty" that used "the individual as a tool to achieve the purposes of the rulers...." Catholic leaders sought "a monopoly of freedom for themselves." They did so because they drew "political and cultural authoritarianism from their faith," which resulted in them seeking to "enforce Roman Catholic moral and political standards upon the whole community." Church leaders seldom practiced anywhere in the world "equality of worship and of creed before the law."

POAU officials viewed the Roman Catholic Church as a sectarian faith. Catholic leaders, like all sectarian leaders, made absolutistic and exclusivistic claims to the truth, salvation, and universalism. Church leaders, however, made claims on the state that other sects, churches, and denominations in the United States did not do. And, according
to Archer, equality could not exist where government had the "power to grant support or official 'recognition' to any sect or sects...." The church wanted the "establishment of its faith as the official faith of the American nation."

CONCLUSION

Archer created a professional and voluntary organization to represent what he regarded as predominately Protestant interests. He identified those interests with freedom and patriotism. Archer laid a solid foundation, much of it by himself or with little aid. The local and state units created under his centralized direction required constant attention, time, and money, and developed organizational interests that affected policy. Nevertheless, chapters proved their effectiveness on numerous occasions. In the process, however, the fundraising necessities, organizational fluidity, and rhetorical flamboyance made for a volatile combination.

Power for groups like POAU derived from the combination of public opinion and resources, especially financial. The degree of support evidenced by public opinion and resources determined a group's ability to survive and grow as well as its credibility. This support in turn affected the ability to influence governmental behavior in ways considered favorable.
The extent of the growth of POAU in resources can be discerned by comparison with ACLU during the same period. AU grew in income an average of 14 percent a year, going from $53,509 in income in 1948 to $108,017 in 1953, while the ACLU increased its yearly income by an average of 30 percent until income reached $182,839 in 1953. ACLU membership grew from 9,148 in 1948 to 24,000 in 1953, an annual yearly average of 25 percent. The growth from 1950 to 1953 in membership was 30 percent. The growth came at a time when ACLU began to emphasize membership growth. POAU grew from virtually no members in 1948 to 55,000 subscribers to Church and State in 1953, although the number of paid subscribers was a good deal lower. ACLU growth in comparison with that of POAU was impressive when one takes into account the fact that ACLU did not have tax exempt status while AU did. Contributions to AU, but not to ACLU, were tax deductible. By 1953, POAU had more chapters in more states than did ACLU, but ACLU had far more chapters staffed by paid employees in major cities. ACLU had a good many more staff employees and legal cases, but POAU was just beginning its work. ACLU tended to end the year with deficits, a practice Archer studiously avoided. Moreover, by 1953, POAU's reserve fund was twice that of ACLU, a fact which represented differing styles of operation.

In sum, ACLU did somewhat better that POAU in the years between 1948 and 1953. ACLU did better especially in terms
of income and given its tax status. POAU did appreciably better in membership growth. The fact that POAU grew to a size comparable to ACLU in so short a time was an impressive accomplishment for the leaders of POAU.

Other comparisons can be made to gauge the extent of POAU's growth. The American Communist Party at the height of its strength in May, 1945 had between 75,000 and 85,000 members. By the mid-50's the numbers had declined to approximately 10,000. The growth of Church and State in the first five years was comparable to the growth in subscription of American Issue, official paper of state anti-saloon leagues, in its first five years of existence, 1899-1904. Moreover, only a small percentage of public interest groups could afford to issue a monthly magazine.

Comparison between POAU and ACLU indicated several important differences in operation. The national POAU disbursed only a small portion of income to chapters, while ACLU gave its chapters a considerable portion of income received. ACLU chapters seem to have had much more freedom of action than did POAU chapters. ACLU was far more decentralized than POAU, with its policies and referendum votes made by the Board of Directors and National Committee carrying more weight than was the case for POAU.

POAU, like most public and private interest groups, was oligarchic in nature. POAU was virtually a one-man operation during these early years, and even after Archer
acquired staff talent to aid him he did not delegate responsibility to any great extent. His determination to maintain financial integrity and allow no corruption to mar POAU accentuated the need for centralization. Also, his desire to keep fanatics, which were common participants in public interest groups, and bigots out of important positions in POAU required close attention. This was doubly important because the image POAU had acquired. In contrast to ACLU, POAU required more unity of purpose and could not afford much leeway for dissent and disension. Centralized control facilitated effective and independent action. Nevertheless, Archer took his Board's opinions into account and was cognizant of how far he could go in adopting policy. He as well knew his constituency quite well because of his extensive travels and could determine what they wanted and the limits they imposed on policy. He knew his constituents and knew what needed to be done when POAU took an unpopular stance.

The legal approach of POAU differed from that of the ACLU. ACLU had at its command between 800 and 1,000 voluntary lawyers, expertise which POAU came no where near matching. POAU leaders gave less priority during these years to litigation; whereas ACLU's main strategy was legal action supplemented by lobbying. Both groups used the courts and legal decisions as mechanisms for lobbying and law enforcement, but POAU seemed to use suits more for their usefulness in mobilization, membership, and education.
All of techniques used by POAU were common among public interest groups. They emphasized that their opponents were bigger, more powerful, and better financed. Embarrassing, criticizing, and whistleblowing on government officials were common and effective practices. All used controversy to focus attention and increase awareness of issues they considered vital. The press and public relations were used to expand the scope of conflicts and increase leverage and to sensitize government officials to a group's view and power. Protest was the most common form POAU leaders used. POAU leaders gave especial attention to exposure of violations and to government and press being excessively influenced by Catholics.
CHAPTER IV: FOOTNOTES


3. Archer was Associate Director of Legislative and Federal Relations of NEA in 1942-1943. Also, he stated, at the time of his appointment as director of POAU, that his "political leanings" were "Republican, with apologies." "Glenn Leroy Archer," Current Biography, pp. 5-6; Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 29-30; Church and State (August, 1948), pp. 1-2; and author's interview with Archer, July 3, 1973.


7. In the lead story for Church and State (August, 1948),
p. 1, introducing Archer as the Executive Secretary, the point was made that Archer's grandfather and father "led among the Methodists in helping to Christianize the frontier. In carrying on the tradition, he is a man of faith and crusading spirit."


9. Archer's father was also a rancher, banker, and state legislator in Kansas. "Glenn Leroy Archer," Current Biography, pp. 4-5; Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 31; and author's interview with Archer, July 3, 1973.

10. Hetzell, Guardian of Liberty, p. 2. During his tenure as Executive Director of POAU, Archer obtained a license to preach as well as became a board member of the largest Methodist Church in Washington, D.C.


12. This building impulse can also be seen in Archer's buying old run down farms, restoring the soil, and rebuilding the farms. "Glenn Leroy Archer," Current Biography, p. 6 and Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 22.


17. Hetzell, Guardian of Liberty, p. 2; Dawson, The Birth of POAU, p. 4; Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 31; and for religious depression and the disintegration of the Protestant culture especially in its assurance of mission, see Marty, Righteous Empire, pp. 9 & 238.


20. Glenn L. Archer letter to Reverend A. Dudley Ward (General Secretary, Board of Social and Economic Relations,


23. Ibid., p. 6.

24. Ibid., pp. 10-12


27. Lowell, ibid., p. 32.


33. See any Church and State from October through December for the buildup and January and February for reporting what went on at the National Conference on Church and State.


35. Glenn L. Archer, "Report of Executive Director of POAU


42. Glenn L. Archer letter to Bertram T. Clark (St. Louis, Missouri), Washington, D.C., February 20, 1958, p. 1 in POAU files; Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 21, 34, and 139-141. The only debt Archer incurred was a $2,500 note in order to pay salaries in 1949. Archer, "Report of Executive Director...," September 16, 1949, p. 1 and Lowell Embattled Wall, p. 34. Also Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 69. Archer's personal contributions over his term as director was, according to his tax accountant, $250,000. Author's interview with Archer, July 3, 1973.
43. "Board of Trustees Report to National Advisory Council of POAU," Tenth Annual Board Meeting, in St. Louis, Missouri on February 12, 1959, p. 4 in POAU files.


46. Archer, "Executive Director's Report..." January 31, 1950, p. 3. For the problems caused by financial irregularities and charges of corruption, see Odegard, Pressure Politics, pp. 219-243.

47. Glenn L. Archer, "Director's Statement to Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council, Fifth Anniversary," mimeograph, Washington, D.C., January 19, 1953, p. 2 in POAU files. There is no indication in Odegard, Rourke, or Berry that the survival of interest groups like POAU depended on large contributors or institutional support to survive. In fact, those public interest groups started with Ford Foundation money had great difficulty when it came to depending on themselves and developing a membership base. See Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 69-75.


51. The figure is cited in Archer, "Executive Director, Seventh Annual Report to Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council," Washington, D.C., January 19, 1954, p. 3 in POAU files. However, according to the "Minutes of Joint Executive Session, Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council," held in Chicago, Illinois on February 7, 1962, in POAU files, POAU's stockholdings by 1953 had reached $400,000. See also Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 141. In the 1954 report only government bonds were reported. It seems likely that the $400,000 figure was correct. The amount of securities and property held by POAU were not quoted at their actual value in the budget because securities and properties were listed at a nominal value of $1.00 per gift until 1964. After 1963, the market value at the date of gift was listed in the financial statement. See, "Audit, 1971," n.p., n.d., in POAU files.


57. Archer, "Report of Executive Director...," September 16, 1949, pp. 6-7 and "Report of the Board of Trustees...,"
January 31, 1950, p. 4.


59. Dana, Remarks on the History of POAU, p. 5 and Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 37-38. The Religious Liberty Department of the NCC was founded in the 1940's by, among others, Oxnam and Mackay.

60. Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 139-140.


See also Christian Century, February 1, 1951. See also James DeForest Murch, Managing Editor, United Evangelical Action: Voice of Evangelical Christianity in America, Letter to Glenn L. Archer, Washington, D.C., December 14, 1949, in POAU files.


65. Archer, "Executive Director's Report..., January 31, 1951, p. 4 and Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 44.


67. "Proposed Budget for POAU, 1953," p. 1; Archer, "Executive Director's Seventh Annual Report...," January 19, 1955, p. 2; and Archer, "Director's Statement...," January 14, 1953, p. 2. Morgan, in Backs to the Wall," concentrated on the published material of POAU, especially the Church and State, finding the board meetings self-congratulatory and morale-building exercises and divisions within those meetings of little consequence. While the meetings were used by Archer for morale-building and the minutes of the meetings were not very thorough, the divisions over certain issues are mentioned and the position of board members on those issues can be discerned through other sources if not mentioned in the meetings. Issues were aired at the meetings. The Board meetings cannot be ignored.

68. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 177. Also Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, p. 7.


70. Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 141-14.

"Backs to the Wall," pp. 133, 140, 143, and 177.


73. Ibid.


82. Morgan interviewed John Mayne, who stated that when he took over his job in September, 1950 no more than six chapters were active. Given the natural tendency to emphasize one's own contributions, the fluid nature of chapters, and the lack of evidence from local chapters whose files were not kept at central headquarters of POAU, there were
probably about ten active chapters.

83. A local Chicago chapter had only been formed in May, 1950, Church and State (May, 1950), p. 4 and (November, 1950), p. 3 and Mayne, "Report of the Director of Organization...," October 17, 1951, p. 1


89. Archer, "Statement by Executive Director at Semi-Annual Meeting...," October 17, 1951, pp. 1 & 4.


For Catholic protests that Blanshard was not just attacking the political and social policies of the Catholic Church, as he alleged, but was attacking their religious beliefs, and he was, thus, a bigot, and an example of the "New


97. See Berry, *Lobbying for the People*, for the differences between the attentive and the mobilizable public.

The active chapter figures are based on the following. The directory of POAU chapters in *Church and State* (June, 1953), p. 5 was actually, according to the fine print, a list of chapters, committees (which were not full time chapters but temporary, legal, educational, or public school committees set up for specific purposes), chapters in the process of forming, and places where recent meetings had taken place. It is impossible to determine through the list which chapters were active and which ones were not.

Secondly, when Mayne joined the organization in September, 1950, POAU claimed seventy units with 21 self-supporting chapters, or approximately a 30 percent ratio of units to active chapters. Applying this ratio to the 115 figure, the top figure for active chapters would be 35. Mayne, however, found when he came on board that only 6 of those 21 chapters viable, or approximately 30 percent. Based on the same ratio, the low figure for viable chapters would be approximately 11. Assuming a greater organizing ability with the hiring and assuming the accuracy of Mayne's 1958 report that POAU had sixty active chapters five years after the 115 figure, it seems reasonable to estimate that 40 to 50 percent, or between 25 and 30 chapters, were formed during the 1948-1953 period.

The assumptions are further reinforced by two other factors. The Vatican controversy had a great impact on POAU's bringing alive chapters and stimulating the formation of new ones, although by 1953 without a new national controversy to stir them some of those chapters may have been moribund. Also, Archer wrote in 1958, approximately five years after the list appear in 1953, of the difficulties he was having with chapters. He stated that national headquarters put $1,000-1,500 into a local unit with a list of names to support it and then the "list dwindles and in five years we wind up with practically dead local and little support." Glenn L. Archer letter to Bertram T. Clark (St. Louis, Missouri), Washington, D.C., February 20, 1958, p. 2 in POAU files; John C. Mayne, "Department of Organization Report, POAU Board of Trustees, Semi-Annual Meeting," Washington, D.C., June 5, 1958, p. 1, in POAU files; and *Church and State*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (June, 1952), p. 4.

The range of active membership is based on the fact that at least twelve members were needed to form a chapter. Also, Mayne, in his 1958 report, when he stated that POAU had 60 active chapters, he stated also that those chapters were staffed by over 720 officers and directors, for an average of 12 per chapter. Based on the fact that some chapters would have more than 12 active members, for instance the Georgia chapter was reported to have 70, in 115 units and that some units might have less in the twenty-five chapters,

The membership figures are based on the 55,000 subscribers on the mailing list. Fifteen thousand of those 55,000 had not paid their dues and thus received *Church and State* quarterly. While carried on the membership roles, they could not be considered paid up members, leaving 40,000. Ten thousand copies of the *Church and State* were sent as a matter of course to Masons and a number of copies, impossible to estimate, were as a matter of policy given away to be distributed in chapter meetings, religious liberty rallies, in bulk to churches and church organizations for distribution. The actual membership, consequently, was perhaps closer to the 20,000 figure than to the 40,000 one. It is impossible to check these figures because membership lists, demographic breakdowns, and reports from local units could not be found in POAU files. Lowell, "Report on Preparation and Distribution of Literature," January 14, 1954, pp. 1 & 2.

98. Except in Louisiana, legal suits were being pursued. For instance, the state chapter in Kentucky was centered in a small farming community of Bradsfordville where a law suit was in the initial phases. See remedial activities section in this chapter.


100. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 177 and *Church and State* (June, 1950), pp. 4-5.


102. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 177.


105. *Church and State*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (June, 1952), pp. 4-5 and (June, 1949), p. 4 and (October, 1950), p. 3 and

106. **Church and State** (July, 1949), p. 4.

107. Ibid., p. 3.


114. Ibid., (February, 1952), p. 3.

115. See **Church and State** in footnote 112.


120. **Church and State** (May, 1951). See for example Glenn L. Archer, *Religious Liberty: Reality or Illusion?* an address


126. Ibid., Vol. 4, No. 7 (September, 1951), p. 2 and (May, 1951), p. 2 A Fred Somkin was an assistant editor of the Church and State for two months, but no trace of who he was or why he stayed so shorty remains. Church and State, Vol. 5, No. 10 (November, 1952), p. 2 and Vol. 6, No. 1 (January, 1953), p. 2.


128. See remedial activities section of this chapter.

129. This behind the scenes work seems to have been especially prominent in the midwest.

130. See for example Church and State (June, 1950), p. 2 and Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 180.


132. See Church and State (March, 1949), p. 4 and (November,

133. See remedial activities section of this chapter.


135. Archer, ibid., p. 18.


142. Ibid., Vol. 6, No. 9 (October, 1953), pp. 1 & 5 and (October, 1950), p. 3. See also New York Times, September 19, 1953, p. 28.

143. Archer, "Awake, America!" n.d., pp. 2 & 4-5; Archer, n.t., speech, n.d., pp. 3-5, the subject of the speech is the Protestant Reformation; Archer, Out of Bounds, January 27, 1954, pp. 9-10; and Church and State (September, 1949), p. 3 and (September, 1951), p. 5 and (January, 1949), p. 1;


146. See Chapter V.

147. Archer, n.t., speech, n.d., pp. 3-5.

148. Archer, "Director's Statement...," January 14, 1953, pp. 4-5.

149. For a list of the books and literature see Church and State (July, 1951), pp. 5 & 7 and "Report of the Board of Trustees...," January 31, 1950, p. 2.


151. Once, President Edwin Poteat questioned the message that was coming across in late 1948. He complained that the title page of Frank S. Mead's pamphlet, Shadows Over Our Schools, with its mitre and keys, the traditional symbols of the Roman Catholic Church, over a public school had too often been used by fanatical groups, from which POAU must protect itself. POAU needed publicity showing its broad base instead of a pamphlet which would lead people to open it "expecting RCC lambasted" and led them to conclude POAU was sponsoring "an anti-Romanist revival under somewhat more respectable auspices." He felt such an impression would "lose us friends and confirm our adversaries and make new enemies." Archer did not cancel the pamphlet as Poteat suggested, but he did change the cover. Poteat to Archer, November 20, 1948, pp. 1-4; Archer to Poteat, November 29, 1948; and Glenn L. Archer letter to Edwin M. Poteat, Washington, D.C., December 1, 1948, in POAU files.

152. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 146.

153. It is impossible to determine how many local units were created from above or below.

154. For one example of this imagery, see A Manifesto, Appendix A.

155. Archer, Executive Director's Sixth Annual Report, 1954,"

157. Ibid. He also stated that of fifteen hundred complaints 90 percent were given legal guidance which probably meant in most cases legal advice given to the complainant through a return letter, some copies of which are in POAU files. The ten percent corrective actions may have included other areas besides the legal one. Glenn L. Archer letter to Dr. Edgar L. Morphet (Professor of Education, School of Education, University of California, Berkeley, California), Washington, D.C., March 26, 1952, in POAU files.


161. Reverend Dr. Dwight C. Jarvis letter to Glenn L. Archer, Methodist West Wisconsin Conference, Southern District, Bloomington, Wisconsin, December 4, 1951 and Glenn L. Archer letter to Reverend Dr. Dwight C. Jarvis, Washington, D.C.,
December 14, 1951; Mr. and Mrs. Welbert Smith letter to Glenn L. Archer, Bonnotts Mill, Missouri, November 10, 1949 and Glenn L. Archer letter to Mr. and Mrs. Welbert Smith, Washington, D.C., November 18, 1949; Archer letter to Luther A. Smith, November 25, 1952; and Archer, "Remedial Activities of POAU," April 23, 1952, p. 1 All are in POAU files. POAU hired local lawyers at a reduced fee in contrast to ACLU and American Jewish Congress which depended on volunteer lawyers. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 305.

162. He had already written the school superintendent and a New Orleans attorney. Dr. Clyde E. Clark letter to Glenn L. Archer, White Castle Baptist Church, White Castle, Louisiana, February 20, 1952 and Glenn L. Archer letter to Dr. Clyde E. Clark, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1952.

163. Archer, "Statement of Executive Director at Semi-Annual Meeting, Board of Trustees, POAU," October 17, 1951, pp. 1-2. Archer went on to state that the problem was now whether the bishop would permit his people to vote for construction of a new public school building to replace the church owned building rented to the public schools whose teachers were all supplied by the church. For tensions between Catholics and Protestants at this local school level and what Catholic views and requests were, see Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, pp. 135-136.


For a number of reasons, POAU had difficulty bringing a lawsuit to challenge federal funds going to church schools and medical colleges, especially through the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act which was Title VI of the Public Health Service Act of 1947. (Other interest groups had no greater success.) "Minutes of Board of Trustees," October 17, 1951, p. 3; Archer letter to Huber, March 10, 1953; Glenn L. Archer letter to Mr. S. J. Ezell (Birmingham, Alabama), Washington, D.C., September 3, 1952; Archer letter to Reverend Homer G. Benton (Calvary Baptist Church, Brawley, California), Washington, D.C., February 14, 1952; Church and State (September, 1951), pp. 1 & 4 and (April, 1952), p. 4 and (November, 1951), pp. 3-4 and (October, 1951), p. 1 and (December, 1950), p. 2 and (June, 1950), p. 2 and (February, 1950), p. 3 and (November, 1949), p. 2 and (October, 1950), p. 4. See also Bernard J. Couglin, Church and State in Social Welfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), especially, pp. 47-48 and Appendix IV.


172. "...maybe we ought not to be doing this. I don't want Uncle Sam to come down here and tell me how to run this school. If we want a Methodist school, we don't want an atheist teaching our kids, probably don't even want a Baptist teaching our kids." Author's interview with Archer, July 3, 1973.


174. See Puchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, p. 130.


178. While publicity and lawsuits concentrated on "garbed nuns" and captive school situations, other less obvious

179. See Chapter IV.


181. Ibid., p. 1.

182. Ibid., pp. 2-3. See Lydia C. Zellers and Reverend Porfirio Remeo letter from Free Schools Committee to Friends, Box 45, Dixon, New Mexico, October 9, 1948 in POAU files; Church and State (October, 1948), p. 4; and Christian Century, October 13, 1948, pp. 1067-1068; American Civil Liberties Union, "we hold these truths..." Freedom, Justice, Equality, pp. 70-71, for different view of case from POAU.


186. Archer, n.t., speech before General Conference, Seventh Day Adventists, April 9, 1953, p. 5. See Dawson, Separate Church and State Now, pp. 43-48.


188. Church and State (December, 1951), p. 2. POAU filed a contempt of court proceeding and a contempt of court suit on use of public school busses and free textbooks. Archer letter to Ottinger, April 9, 1952.


194. Ibid.

195. See footnote 164.

196. Archer to Jarvis, December 15, 1951.


198. Glenn L. Archer letter to Dr. Bruce F. Blunt (Broadway Baptist Church, Kansas City, Missouri), Washington, D.C., October, 1951, in POAU files.


is in the original.

202. Mead, The Nation with the Soul of A Church, pp. 48-49.


205. Ibid.

206. See Mead, The Nation with the Soul of A Church, pp. 42-43 for definition of sectarianism.


209. Rourke, "End of An Era," pp. 4-6, 36, 41, and 86.


216. Odegard, ibid. and Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 186.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION, 1948-1953

Like the officials of the overwhelming majority of church organizations which lobbied in Washington and elsewhere, the leaders of POAU avowed the educational nature of the organization’s task with a disavowal of the organization’s political nature. POAU leaders acted in ways similar to religious lobbies, especially those with tax-exempt status, in not acknowledging the fact that they operated as an interest group. Archer in 1950 stated that some Board members warned that if POAU became a lobbying organization, they and their organizations would withdraw their financial support from POAU.

As the manifesto made clear, however, POAU was to be an "action" agency, operating where church and religious bodies could not or would not become involved. Moreover, many of the immediate objectives set forth in the manifesto could have been accomplished only through political action, influence, and pressure at the various levels of government. Consequently, Archer aimed to build an institution which had power and influence and would be perceived as having power and wide support and would thus be taken into account by church and government officials. In pursuit of this aim,
POAU became involved in controversies relating to federal aid to education, the public schools, Vatican ambassadorship, and Communism. The positions and actions of POAU leaders caused some internal problems and divisions within the organization. The positions and support of POAU brought the institution an identity as a fundamentalist organization engaged in a fundamentalist crusade against Catholicism. POAU leaders, however, were not fundamentalists.

**LOBBYING AND TAX-EXEMPTION**

Two relatively insignificant problems relating to lobbying consumed Archer's time and attention from early 1949 until late 1950, to the detriment of effective fundraising and organizational activities. POAU's application for tax-exempt status and a zoning problem relating to POAU's national headquarters, according to the Executive Director, impaired the work of POAU.

While framing an amendment to stop federal funds from going to parochial schools, Archer worked long hours on the problems relating to getting POAU approved as a tax-exempt organization. A tax-exempt status meant that POAU would be classified as an educational, non-profit institution and all contributions, including gifts, legacies, bequests, and investments, would be tax deductible. Archer and his Board set up scholarships and carried on various activities that could be classified as educational in order to qualify, and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approved POAU's application on July 3, 1950, after a lengthy investigation.

This tax-exempt classification meant several things. Lobbying could not be a "substantial" part of POAU's activities. The IRS determined what was substantial. In attempting to influence legislation, POAU could not take sides on specific bills, although the leaders could aide Congressmen through "educational" assistance. Nor could POAU urge its membership to contact members of Congress for purposes of advocating a position on particular bills. POAU officials needed written requests before appearing at congressional hearings. Nor could they participate in any political campaigns. POAU officials could however take positions before administrative agencies as well as bring lawsuits. While Lowell stated that POAU did more or less what it wanted during the '50s without any problems with its tax-exempt status, Archer believed the exemption was essential for the survival of POAU. Thus, the exemption subtly shaped the course of actions the leadership could pursue in the same manner that Protestant disapproval of specific forms of lobbying influenced the behavior of POAU leaders.

POAU credited a formal complaint of the anti-Catholicism of POAU and Catholic pressure, and not the lobbying activities of POAU, as the real cause of POAU's zoning problems. When Archer took over September, 1949, he had to move POAU from the Baptist building, where DeGroot had lent part of
of his law office for use by POAU, to a larger suite in the Harwell Building in northwest Washington. Even there the facilities were too cramped. Also, Archer wanted a more appropriate symbol for a national religious liberty head-
quarters, one that would rival in status the seven-story NCWC building in the 1300 block of Washington. A three-
story building at 1633 Massachusetts Avenue was found, and, with money provided by the Scottish Rite Masons, was pur-
chased at a cost of $27,500 on February 25, 1949. Before POAU could move in, in fact three days after POAU's purchase of the building, the zoning regulations were changed by the Zoning Adjustment Board to prohibit certain activities which before had not been restricted. While it owned the build-
ing, POAU was barred from entering or using the building.

The main reason for the denial, according to the Zoning Adjustment Board, was that POAU, in order to carry out the objectives of the manifesto, did "engage in propaganda to influence legislation," which was prohibited by the new regu-
lations. Because the NCWC and other organizations Archer considered lobbies were in the same area classification as POAU's new building, Archer argued that the zoning board's ruling was discriminatory. Before the zoning board Archer claimed that POAU met all of the requirements. DeGroot had never engaged in lobbying and had withdrawn as a lobbyist. The director had not been on the hill or appeared before congressional hearings and fifty percent of his time was
spent lecturing or traveling in lecture tours and ten percent of his time was spent in preparing study materials and research. Also, POAU appropriated no money for lobbying nor could it because of attitudes of certain members of the Board. The zoning board voted in POAU's favor on its third appeal in August 1950, a month after the approval of POAU's tax-exempt status. POAU moved into its building in September. Under the circumstances, the leaders of POAU felt that they were victims of a Catholic power play.

LOBBYING AND FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION BILLS, 1949-1950

POAU personnel were active in the renewed federal aid-to-education controversy that began in early 1949 in the Eighty-First Congress. A three hundred million dollar Senate bill would have allowed, POAU calculated, seven and a half million dollars to go in direct grants to elementary and secondary parochial schools. The Thomas bill(S.246) was the successor of the Taft bill and raised the same issues as had the earlier bill, with the FCC and NEA approving it as they had the Taft bill. Despite their support, the NAC adopted a resolution in January, 1949, claiming to speak in the name of Protestants, Jews, and other Americans, demanding "public" be inserted before elementary and secondary education in the bill. POAU also objected to the "device of welfare services" being used as the "back door" to shift the increasing costs of parochial schools to states through school lunches, free textbook, and bus transportation. After the Senate
passed the bill in May of 1949, Church and State writers urged their readers to write Congress opposing the bill.

The House then became the center of controversy when Congressman Graham A. Barden (D., N.D.), head of the House subcommittee on education, introduced an education bill on May 11, 1949. The bill would have prohibited federal funds from being used for bus transportation and from going to parochial schools. Spellman condemned Barden and his "disciples of discrimination" for loosening their "venom upon children" and for their "irrational, un-American, discriminatory thesis that the public school is the only true American school." Following this June 19th statement Catholic churches, presses, and organizations across the country took up the cardinal's argument and rhetoric, followed by an impressive letter writing campaign by Catholics to Congress against the Barden bill.

Archer responded to the cardinal the following day in the name of thirty million Protestants for a cause that had the endorsement of seventy-five million Protestants, Jews, liberal Catholics, and "non-churched." He stated that only the type of bill represented by the Barden measure "fully accords with the concept of religious freedom bequeathed to this nation by Thomas Jefferson." "Does the Cardinal wish to fasten upon this nation," Archer exclaimed, "a pattern of public-supported and church-controlled education from which our forefathers fled, and from which millions of
Europeans, including Roman Catholics, demanded to be freed?" Moreover, Archer continued the Cardinal should not be allowed to turn this dispute into an anti-Catholic issue since a majority of Roman Catholic children now attended public schools. Archer finally pointed out once again what he perceived to be the real reason behind the Catholic hierarchy's drive for public funds. It desired religiously segregated education in order to keep Catholics apart in order, as they said, to inculcate them with Catholic ideas in pursuit of its aims of power and influence that would make the country Catholic.

The cardinal immediately responded to Archer through his secretary, Monsignor John S. Middleton. The monsignor told of the cardinal's agreement with Jefferson that there should be no forced faith, without addressing the specific point of paying for a faith one did not believe in. While supporting Jefferson in the abstract, the implication was that the cardinal did not consider such payment a matter of faith or "sinful and tyrannical." Nor was it a matter of force since society was obligated to support religion for its own well being and the well being of its people, who were overwhelmingly religious. Middleton claimed that it was false to say the cardinal advocated public support for Catholic schools or church control of the public school system. Rather, he went on, the cardinal "is opposed to a public-supported and exclusively state-controlled school system."
The secretary was injecting issues extraneous to the bill. This issue was raised, not by the bill, but by Catholic views of distributive justice, derived from papal pronouncements, and of public service performed by the parochial schools. The Catholic argument was concisely summed up later in the controversy by Father McManus of the NCWC, clearly showing that he and his colleagues were advocating a government subsidy for religious schooling:

Are we tending toward a government monopoly of education? Must all educational, health and charitable institutions submit to a process of secularization before they dare ask for a state subsidy? If under a democratic government parochial schools have no rights to public funds, what legal rights have they even to exist. If parochial schools do not serve the public good, do they deserve tax exemption?

Cardinal Spellman's longtime antagonist, Bishop Oxnam, a member of the President's Commission on Higher Education, joined Archer in defending Barden against the cardinal's charge that he was a "new apostle of bigotry." Oxnam called it a lie to describe the bill as part of "a craven crusade of religious prejudice," as pitting "class vs class," or as a "vote against constitutional right." The bill upheld the distribution of public funds to public schools only, the "American principle," and protected public education "from a prelate with a prehensile hand."

Cardinal Spellman has used the term 'bigot' freely of late. Now we know what he means by it. Anyone who disagrees with the Cardinal or who objects to the hierarchy putting its hands in the public treasury is a bigot.
Archer answered the Monsignor's charges by stating that "the founders of this republic were not bigots." He also observed how the Catholic hierarchy fell into line to shout bigotry following Spellman's attacks. There was a reason for this, he stated, explaining how POAU viewed what was happening.

It is a subject of legitimate inquiry whether the hierarchy's timetable for 'making American Catholic' is not coordinated with a larger, world-wide timetable of the Vatican for making the world Catholic, along the same lines of clerical fascism which distinguishes the government of Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Costa Rica and other Catholic countries where dictatorship as rigorous as that of Soviet Russia prevail.28

At this point, as a result of an attack by Spellman on Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the essentially Catholic-Protestant conflict became a national controversy. In her syndicated column "My Day" on June 23rd and July 8th and 15th, she wrote about the controversy caused by the cardinal's request for federal funds for Catholic schools and opined:

Those of us who believe in the right of any human being to belong to whatever church he sees fit, and to worship God in his own way, cannot be accused of prejudice, when we do not want to see public education connected with religious control of the schools, which are paid for by taxpayers' money.

She said that while private schools have made a great contribution to the public schools, this did not entitle them to any tax funds. She stated her belief:

The separation of church and state is extremely important to any of us who hold to the original traditions of our nation. To change these traditions by changing the traditional attitude toward public education would be harmful, I think, to our whole
attitude of tolerance in the religious area. She stressed that she did not oppose the aid because of any bias against the Catholic Church, although she received numerous letters to that effect, nor because she was anti-Negro, the other often repeated complaint against the Bar-30 den bill.

In a July 22nd letter, Spellman took her reference to his starting the controversy as a "personal attack" and her column as part of an "anti-Catholic campaign." She has "condemned me," Spellman claimed, "for defending Catholic children against those who could deny them their constitutional rights of equality with other American children...." He bitterly remarked that her "record of anti-Catholicism" con-sisted of "documents of discrimination unworthy of an Ameri-can mother!" and that "I shall never again publicly acknowl-edge you."

Spellman had for many years used strong language about a number of Protestant leaders with impunity. His bitter words this time were directed against a prominent and power-ful figure within the Democratic Party, the widow of a Demo-cratic President, and an American heroine. The non-Catholic public and press reactions to the tone and accusations of Spellman's letter widely condemned him and led him to issue an August 6th statement after submitting it to Eleanor Roosevelt for her approval.
While not retracting his statements about her, the Cardinal's statement was temperate and clarified his position. In what was regarded as a retraction, he noted that the Catholic Church was not requesting general support for its religious schools, which state and federal constitutions prohibited. Certain "auxiliary services," however, could be provided parochial school students on a "non-discriminatory," equal basis with public school pupils through direct federal funding instead of through federal grants to states as provided for in the Thomas bill. The bill was discriminatory because states differed in their constitutional abilities to grant such aid. What the cardinal failed to mention was that such granting of federal money to the states would have prevented distribution of the money to parochial school students in an overwhelming majority of the states because the state constitutions prohibited such an outlay of public funds.

POAU officials had jumped into the midst of the controversy, believing that their call to action on Spellman's initial address had led to his attack on Mrs. Roosevelt. Archer was glad that he could cite evidence showing that POAU had succeeded in annoying the church. Archer proclaimed that for the first time a prominent Catholic spokesman had stated that direct aid to parochial schools was prohibited by federal and state constitutions and Supreme Court decisions, although he was dissatisfied with the disclaimers.
He (Cardinal Spellman) now finds that public opinion is so pronounced in favor of the American principle of separation of church and state that he concedes that it would be unconstitutional for either Federal or state governments to underwrite the major costs of maintaining parochial schools. He reaffirms, however, that the Roman Catholic Church is out to get all it can from the government at the taxpayer’s expense. 33

POAU leaders issued thirteen press releases to thirty Washington agencies and to twenty leading church periodicals. Also, they were able to place or to encourage the writing of articles in Missions, Alabama Index, Liberty, Christian Index, Signs of the Times, The Churchman, Lutheran Witness, Watchman-Examiner, New York Daily Compass, Christian Science Monitor, New York Times, and the New York Herald-Tribune. 34

Early in August, after the Spellman-Roosevelt bout had ended, Oxnam in a radio interview sharply criticized the cardinal, arguing that his attacks were part of a "coldly calculated plan" announced in papal and hierarchy statements to kill federal aid. "The blunt fact is," Oxnam stated, "that the Roman Catholic Church does not believe in our public school system." The press was highly critical of Oxnam for his remarks, but Archer was delighted because Oxnam made front page news. POAU had for the first time received television coverage and had organized a series of religious liberty rallies on the plight of the public school system "besieged by (the) Roman Catholic political machine." The recent educational furor was made the theme of the second national conference on church and state. Congressman Barden
spoke to the conference on "Federal Aid to Public Schools."\(^{37}\)

The Roosevelt-Spellman controversy benefitted POAU. Public interest in its work increased as indicated by a temporary spurt in income and membership. Archer remarked that by clarifying the goals of the Roman Catholic Church the controversy illuminated the issue implicit in federal aid to education better than ten years of publicity by POAU could ever have done. The leadership was quite pleased over the incident. The members of POAU thought that the Cardinal had been humiliated, and they kept the episode alive by continuing to refer to it. Until the NEA changed its position, Archer argued that it had been POAU's "lonely protest" that stood against the inevitable passage of the House of the Thomas bill. Moreover, Archer stated that POAU's position and the leaders' willingness to criticize Catholics had shown others the way. POAU had stiffened backbones. "I have it on good authority," Archer told his Board, "that POAU's stand turned the tide."

Although the national press over Spellman's remarks quickly died down, the controversy over federal aid-to-education continued in Congress until the spring of 1950. POAU writers concentrated their rhetorical guns upon Representative John Lesinski, Chairman of the House Labor and Education Committee, who had called the Barden bill, "anti-Catholic and anti-Negro."\(^{43}\) When he dissolved Barden's subcommittee after it voted 10 to 3 to let the Barden bill come to
the floor of the House for debate, Archer observed that Lesinski, like the other Catholics in Congress, jumped through the hoop whenever the hierarchy cracked the whip.

Is not this state of affairs shameful, and as dangerous to the American way of life, as the existence of Communist lackeys who follow the Soviet 'party line'? 44

When Congress reconvened in January, 1950, a movement toward compromise was reported. POAU leaders reiterated their strong stand for aid to public schools only, while Archer attacked the New York Archdioceses for "carrying on an unholy war against the American public schools." "The truth is," Archer insisted, "that Cardinal Spellman himself misrepresented the hierarchy's position last summer when he made a deliberately false public statement." Archer was referring to Spellman's statement that his church was not seeking governmental financing of its schools. The Senate passed a compromise version of the Thomas bill, which had the support of the NEA, but it was killed in committee in the House. Archer wrote of its death, "We were able to defeat (a) federal aid bill that would have opened the door to parochial interests by 13 to 12." Archer did not specify, nor was it clear from the context, whether he was referring to PAOU's role or that of opponents of parochial aid.

POAU's Board proudly claimed credit for defeat of the bill, citing the statement of McManus of NCWC that POAU had a "(f)lashy success" and "great influence" in defeating the
Thomas bill as proof. There was a lack of evidence to indicate how decisive a role POAU played in the bill's defeat. POAU, however, was part of larger process and paled in influence beside other large institutions involved in the educational fight. As before, Catholics were able to prevent legislation which did not include parochial schools in its funding provisions and Protestants halted any federal aid to education bill that included such aid. In addition, federal aid to education involved the questions of race and segregation, Southern and ideological conservatives opposition to federal control and spending, and President Truman's lack of assertiveness in supporting the bill for a number of reasons despite his support for passage of federal to education. POAU's most important role in the defeat probably involved constituency mobilization and agitation. Acknowledgement of POAU's impact by the NCWC was gratifying for the leaders of POAU since they tended in part to measure the influence and success of POAU by the acknowledgement of opponents.

Pressure techniques used by POAU varied. The leaders of POAU lobbied occasionally in Congress, where it had some support, without worry that its tax-exempt status would be revoked. This talking with friends was not construed by those in POAU as lobbying. Archer did not set up within POAU the means to lobby systematically and directly with members of Congress. Instead, he sought influence through
personal mailings, mass mailing campaigns, editorial comment, media releases, and enticing ministers and church members to contact their representatives in government.

POAU leaders also sought to influence state legislatures. Archer claimed in 1952 that POAU had played an important role in eleven state legislatures in preventing money from going to sectarian institutions, particularly in the state of Washington where he had direct contacts with the State Superintendent, Dr. Pearl Wanamaker about legislative matters. He additionally sought to get POAU’s views across at the county and municipal levels and at public hearings.

"Hearings," a POAU pamphlet announced, "are also pleading before the bar of public opinion."

PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND SECTARIANISM-SECULARISM

POAU leaders staunchly defended the public schools in their publications against charges of godlessness, atheism, and secularism. At the same time, publications of POAU increased their condemnation of religious instruction in any form in the public schools, despite division within POAU’s Board. No policy statement could be produced on released time, the teaching of moral and spiritual values, and Bible reading and prayer. POAU officially emphasized the right of parochial schools to exist, but a clear distaste for them showed through. They were seen as a threat to the public schools and to the United States.
Delineating the nature of that threat, Archer put the Catholic parochial schools in a familiar context:

...why is there a Roman Catholic question in this country? My answer is for the same reason we oppose Communism. The Vatican Church-State is an ecclesiastical-political organization which has scrambled religion and politics in such a manner that it has succeeded in playing one off against the other to accomplish its ultimate purpose, namely world domination, just as truly as we accuse Moscow of trying to do, of the Kaiser of attempting in 1914-1920 and Hitler in the 1940's. Of course the 100 years of effort to make American Roman Catholic received tremendous impetus from the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 in 1925. The issue decided there was the right of parents to determine the kind of education their children should have as against an educational program that would make for national unity.

Had the Supreme Court upheld the Oregon School Law at that time, it is easy to see that by this time the Roman Catholic Church would be on the way out and there would no longer by any formidable political Roman Catholicism to menace the nation.

The particular menace in the public schools was "sectarian influence," especially in the form of the Roman Catholic Church. Leaders of POAU emphasized separation as the legal defense against such influence. They stressed the secularization of American common schools in the Nineteenth Century as the American and therefore the only solution to sectarianism.

An exchange between Monsignor Frederick G. Hochwalt, Secretary General of the National Catholic Educational Association, and POAU in 1952 well summarized many of the particular issues at conflict over public schools. Hochwalt,
who did not speak for all Catholics or the hierarchy, spoke to "clarify certain misconceptions, propagated by POAU."

He stated his belief in the following four points:

(1) Catholics believe in the public schools!
(2) Catholics believe that as citizens, like all other citizens, they have an obligation to pay taxes for the adequate support of the public schools in their community. (3) Catholics have not nor will not interfere with the justifiable expansion of the public schools in their community. (4) Catholics have a civic duty to take an active interest in the welfare of the public schools system.61

Leaders of POAU took issue with each of Hochwalt's points in an April 24th statement, defending public schools against "ecclesiastical intrusion."

POAU cited Canon Law 1374, which stated that Catholic parents should get permission from local church officials before sending their children to public schools, as proof that Catholics did not believe in and in fact boycotted the public schools. The canon law did not condemn public schools nor did the law prohibit Catholic children from attending public schools, in fact a considerable portion of Catholic children went to public school. The law did not prove that Catholics or members of the Catholic hierarchy did not believe in and boycotted the public schools. Nevertheless, members of the Catholic hierarchy, for which the Canon Laws were written, had made a number of disparaging statements about public schools that justified concern on the part of the leaders of POAU as ardent believers in the public school system.
The essence of POAU's point about the canon law was that it was a church law, dictated from Rome to clergy in the United States. A corollary to this point was that the hierarchy in the United States did not differ in their aims from the aims of Roman Catholic hierarchies in other countries and that the Pope and the hierarchy had the authority to dictate such terms to its followers and could expect to be obeyed. Such centralized authority operating from the top down with such power over the minds of men was not conducive to freedom or democracy. Moreover, laws to Archer existed to be enforced and obeyed; otherwise, they were meaningless. He assumed the hierarchy carried out the letter of the law and that Catholics going to public schools were acting in defiance of the spirit of the canon law.

On the point of taxation, POAU, as an example, quoted from a 1937 pamphlet by Father Paul L. Blakely, May an American Oppose the Public Schools?. "Our first duty to the public school," the quoted sentence stated, "is not to pay taxes for its maintenance." The pamphlet was issued under the Imprimatur of the late Patrick Cardinal Hayes which, POAU asserted, had "never been repudiated by the hierarchy." An Imprimatur and Nihil Obstat, however, only meant that a work was free of doctrinal or moral error without implying that those who put their signature on it agreed with the contents, opinions, or statements in it. The statement did not need to be repudiated by the hierarchy
because it was not a statement of the hierarchy or its policy but that of one individual within the hierarchy.

In not recognizing the diversity of opinion within the Catholic Church, POAU officials presented a more simplistic view of a church position than they might have. Protestants' experiences in foreign countries was one reason for their view. Moreover, POAU leaders dismissed liberal Catholic statements in favor of religious freedom, democracy, and the public schools as having little influence in the church.

The crux of the NCWC's position, as noted above, was that Catholics paid a double tax and this was discriminatory and unjust. The argument rested on narrow self-interest, being applied only to Catholic taxpayers and not to other taxpayers who supported religious schools through private donations. The position, however, did not imply, as POAU suggested, that the NCWC was advocating the violation of the law by refusing to pay the income tax. Rather, the NCWC used the argument to justify public aid to Catholic schools. Moreover, there could be broad disagreement over what constituted "adequate support" of the public schools, even among Catholics since many of their children attended them.

On Catholic involvement in the expansion of the public schools, POAU cited the case of Henry A. Gau of Pierz, Minnesota. Gau had been excommunicated in 1951, according to POAU, because he supported very openly a proposal to build a public instead of a parochial high school. POAU
cited this instance as proof that the hierarchy did not support expansion of the public schools. The operative word in the monsignor's statement was "justifiable" expansion. Catholics in a number of communities during these years helped vote down school bond issues because aid to parochial schools was excluded. To POAU, such actions were more examples of the extensive nature of the power politics used by the Catholic hierarchy to impose its religious views on its adherents.

Lastly, POAU cited captive school situations and Catholic-dominated school boards as examples of the church's "active interest" in the public schools. This interest, POAU leaders pointed out, "often takes the form of infiltration resulting in changing the character of the public school system." POAU interpreted this in a public versus Catholic light. The leaders of POAU sought to boast Protestant expressions of pride, faith, and unity in order to combat Catholic power and solidarity on issues involving schools and school interests.

The question of secularism and religious exercises in the public schools continued to cause problems for POAU leaders. Released time remained one of the main bones of contention. POAU increasingly condemned violations of released time programs insofar as such practices were related to McCollum, without condemning all released time programs. Archer viewed released time programs as a threat to religion
and to the public schools, but despite his continual prod-
dings the Board could not agree on a policy statement on re-
leased time. His basic contention was that "We can't do
that which we challenge." Probably a majority on the Board
favored a policy pronouncement condemning released time.
The numerous Protestant violations and the fears of secular-
ism in the public schools, however, prevented the Board
from reaching an agreement on policy.

Many evangelicals and fundamentalists within POAU feared
that secularism had become too aggressive. For example,
Harold J. Ockenga, minister of Park Street Congregational
Church, Boston and a founder of the NAE, expressed his con-
cern over secularism in the following statement, with which
Dawson disagreed, before a POAU audience:

We have overemphasized the sectarian danger to the
exclusion of the secular danger. Both perils need to
be faced. Both are equally dangerous, and the pendu-
lum has been swinging too far in the direction of a secular state. We have been meeting sectarianism by
a frontal defense of debate, controversy, and legal
action, but we have allowed secularism to infiltrate
our defenses.73

Archer had to maintain good relationships too with
liberal members of the organization. He therefore empha-
sized the threat of released time programs to minorities,
dissenters, non-conformists, and the non-churched as major-
74

ities in a community tried to coerce recruits for religion.

The POAU leader argued that Roman Catholics were the
leading proponents of released time. Many public schools
had started out supporting released time, Archer maintained,
and ended up as Roman Catholic parochial school supported by public funds. He did not however offer proof or examples.

Archer appointed a committee consisting of Dr. Lowell, as chairman, Williams, and Yost in November, 1951 to define what the policy of PFAU should be relative to religion in the public schools. The committee's report paralleled the position found in PFAU's official publications. The public schools could not teach religion in any form in the classroom without using the state to propagate religious beliefs. Yet, the schools were not godless or hostile to religion because they should teach about religion, about the moral and spiritual values and ideas of the Judeo-Christian tradition that played a role in building the United States. Teachers could "inculcate" these values inherent in the faith and practices of the great religions.

The real threat to the public schools were Catholic arguments aimed to change the First Amendment for "what cannot be changed by word must be changed by interpretation."

The writer of the report expressed the following fear:

...if religion is taught in the public schools on a legal basis, ...our Constitution will have been changed at a vital point, and separation of church and state will no longer be a tenet of political faith in the United States. It means furthermore that any sect which, by the default of others or through the pressure of its own members can influence or control the resources and functions of the State can become in practice the established religion in our country.

According to Yost, the Board and the NAC thought it wise at the time not formally to accept the report.
In early 1953, the director prodded his Board once again to state a policy on religious exercises in the public schools. He pointed out that while the major religious groups had made recent statements on religion in the public schools POAU, in response to numerous inquiries, had to answer incom- 80 completely and inadequately for lack of a firm stance.

The renewed interest in the subject resulted from the April 28, 1952 Supreme Court ruling in Zorach v Clauson, in which six justices declared constitutional a New York City released time variant known as "dismissed time." As compared to McCollum, no state coercion was involved since students were dismissed to attend religious classes outside the public school classroom and no public funds were expended. Justice William Douglas, speaking for the majority, reaffirmed absolute separation of church and state as the constitutional philosophy of the First Amendment. He then went on to state, however, that common sense and the American tradition of cooperation between government and religion made the determination of where the line of separation should properly be drawn one of judgment. Alongside of the strict separation ruling set down in the Court's reasoning, there was to be accommodation between religion and government because, as Douglas put it, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.

The Supreme Court had given a boost to Protestant and Catholic cooperationists or accommodationists who favored
public religion in the schools and in American life. Strict separationists were thus confronted for the second time within five years, despite ringing endorsements of absolute separation by the court, with decisions which to their mind undermined strict separation while invoking its name.

Despite the renewed public interest in this area, POAU adopted no policy on released time, limiting itself to condemning Protestant use of public school authority to promote their faiths and religion in violation of McCollum. Leaders condemned these violations as the "shame of Protestantism." POAU continued to publish material opposing the teaching of religion in the public schools. Its position followed the general rejection of such teaching laid out in the rejected 1951 report on religion in the public schools.

**AMBASSADORSHIP TO THE VATICAN CONTROVERSY**

In building POAU into institution with a national name and power, the renewed controversy over Vatican-United States relations provided Archer and POAU officials a golden opportunity for doing so. The controversy gave POAU a tremendous boost, the biggest in its short history.

In midst of the controversy over federal aid-to-education, another controversy flared anew. In January 1950, Myron C. Taylor resigned from his post as the personal representative of President Truman to the Holy See. After a number of leaks and trial balloons hinting that the President was going to appoint an official ambassador to the Vatican,
Truman submitted to Congress on October 20, 1951, a few hours before its adjournment, the name of General Mark Clark, an Episcopalian and chief of Army Field Forces. The President asked the Senate to confirm him on the basis of "diplomacy and humanitarianism." A bill was submitted along with the nomination to exempt Clark from the law prohibiting active duty officers of the armed forces from holding a civil post in government. The exemption bill did not have time to pass before Congress adjourned and Clark, consequently, could not serve as a recess appointee.

Meantime, Protestant reaction was immediate, intense, and virtually unanimous in opposition to the appointment. Mail to the White House ran six to one against the appointment and Protestants put much pressure on Congress. After two months of these steady and high powered protests and pressure, Clark requested in December than the President withdraw his name from nomination, which Truman "reluctantly" did. He indicated however that he would make another nomination, but he never did.

POAU, whose NAC had in February 1951 warned of a "great storm" if diplomatic relations with the Vatican were resumed, filled the pages of Church and State with the issue. POAU leaders wanted to make politicians aware of Protestant resentment and resistance on the issue. POAU leaders insisted that the Catholic hierarchy was "whipping up" support for replacement of Taylor through a "tremendous barrage" of mail,
which non-Catholic should match. Soon after Taylor's re-
signation, POAU leaders raised a question to which they re-
turned again and again, especially in relation to the Vati-
can issue because

...of the import of the oaths which Roman Catholic
cardinals and lesser ecclesiastics in this country
take to the Pope. If they are oaths to a foreign
monarch that would, under existing law, seem to
cancel their American citizenship or at least to
require them to register as agents of an alien
government. Perhaps both. 88

During the summer of 1951 when rumors flew that there
was going to be some movement on the Vatican issue, POAU
issued the special flyer entitled, WHO WILL BE THE NEXT TO
KNEEL. The cover pictured Taylor supposedly kneeling before
89
the Pope. The flyer asked the reader to help in "this
crusade" by writing the White House, State Department, and
his Senator in order to stop the "unconstitutional foreign
intrigue" and the $400,000 of taxpayer's money going to the
"glorification of an international church-state dictator-
ship." "Subservience to the Vatican," must halt, the flyer
said, and "no American official must ever again be allowed
to bend the knee before a foreign potentate." 90

POAU leaders gave several other reasons for their op-
position. They rejected outright Truman's contention that
the ambassador was needed in "coordinating the effort to
combat the Communist menace." Oxnam, then co-President of
the WCC, called the Clark nomination "unwise, unnecessary,
and un-American." Blanshard, expressing one of his major
arguments against the church, remarked that "the Vatican cannot have it both ways; it is either a church or a state. If it is a state, it must assume the responsibilities of a state and register its leaders as foreign agents." Along the same lines, Archer on October 22nd called attention to the need for "registration of members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy as 'foreign agents'" if Clark was confirmed by the Senate. "If going to recognize the Vatican as a foreign power for the purpose of sending an Ambassador," he continued, "we should recognize it as a foreign power all the way." Was the Vatican a church or a state; it cannot be both just to suit the hierarchy, was the essence of POAU leaders argument.

In a NAC statement, Reverend George A. Crapoluo stated POAU's belief that the Clark nomination would "start a tidal wave of Protestantism such as this country has not seen in years." Dawson, who had one day before Truman sent Clark's name to Capitol Hill, requested a conference with the President on federal aid going to D.C. church hospitals. He was denied a meeting with Truman because, according to the White House, Dawson had attributed "a base and despicable motive to his (Truman's) action in nominating an Ambassador to the State of Vatican City." Dawson was quoted as accusing his fellow Southern Baptist, Truman, of "a frantic bid for holding machine-ridden big cities in the approaching Presidential race." As Archer put it later, Clark's nomination was
"an offering to the great god Politics."

Nationwide protest by Protestantism from the pulpit on Reformation Day, eight days after Clark's nomination, called for radio time, petition drives, and organization against the Clark nomination. While the NCC took the lead in organizing the opposition, POAU had already begun to arouse public opinion and to carry on a publicity campaign. It organized protests from local communities and Protestant clergy and laymen through direct mailings and contacts with Senators. A "Declaration" was written in Archer's Washington office opposing the Vatican ambassadorship and signed by nine prominent D.C. clergymen. POAU organized a series of approximately one hundred rallies throughout the United States, and the two months of rallies involved most of the leaders and membership of POAU. POAU distributed over 50,000 pieces of literature, especially of WHO WILL BE THE NEXT TO KNEEL? at the rallies.

Paul Blanshard, who was on a successful lecture tour for POAU through the South when the Vatican issue broke open, was the main attraction. He toured thirty cities, mostly in the midwest and far west, from November 7th to December 7th and spoke to crowds which many times reached from 3,000 to 6,000 and averaged 1,500. He told the crowds that the issue was not a religious one, as Catholics claimed, but one of dual citizenship or dual loyalty. Blanshard met, as Archer, Oxnam, and he had previously encountered, attempts to
prevent his speaking before local audiences. Although
the pressure was usually subtle, Blanshard met attacks from
Roman Catholic spokesmen, especially those from the Knights
of Columbus and the Catholic War Veterans. In many communi-
ties, according to POAU spokespersons, the censorship and
suppression originated with the Roman Catholic Church and
its organizations.

Grassroots lobbying by Protestants and POAU was success-
ful and resulted in a significant increase for POAU in mem-
bers, income, and, especially as a result of Blanshard's
tour, formation of new chapters and study groups.

After Clark withdrew his name, POAU tried to keep the
issue in the limelight. It vigorously warned throughout the
spring of 1952 that the State Department's budget had allot-
ted $70,000 for a "small mission" to the Vatican as a part
of a devious maneuver by the administration and certain Sena-
tors to set up a Vatican mission. When a House of Represen-
tatives vote eliminated the allotment, Archer viewed it as
a significant victory.

At the same time, Presidential candidates in the elec-
tion campaign of 1952 gave what POAU leaders considered vague,
contradictory, and opportunistic statements on the issue of
an ambassador to the Vatican. Church and State called on
its readers to be vigilant continually and to write their
Senators and Congressmen, party leaders, and the presiden-
tial candidates. When it became clear that Dwight D.
Eisenhower would most likely be President, Archer pressed him to avoid the "Vatican Lure" that would inject religion into politics by appealing to Catholic or the religious vote. Integrity and the interest and welfare of the United States, not political effect, Archer said, should guide his actions. Once Eisenhower was elected, Archer wrote to Oxnard stating that he knew a few of his advisers from his days in Kansas politics and that he had been told that if strength could be shown on the ambassador issue, it would enable the President to say no.

When Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, a convert to Catholicism, was appointed ambassador to Italy in early 1953, POAU, now speaking in the name of thirty-three denominations, objected to her appointment. Did not "A RELIGIOUS TEST FOR OFFICE" exist, asked POAU, since it was generally known that Luce had been appointed because she was a Catholic as well as an Eisenhower supporter. POAU thought that Mrs. Luce should be scrutinized on "her belief in American principles—the separation of church and state...."

Behind all of this attention to Mrs. Luce was the recent scrutiny given Dr. James B. Conant upon his nomination as United States High Commissioner to Germany. Congressional Catholic opposition, especially by Senator Joseph McCarthy, and a Catholic letter writing campaign had made Conant's nomination a controversial one. It had been a smear campaign, POAU leaders quoted Dawson as saying in his
appearance before the Senate subcommittee hearing on Conant's confirmation. Dawson also stated that, "if this divisive issue (of public aid to parochial schools) is now permitted to decide action on Dr. Conant's confirmation, it will be peculiarly unfortunate since it would mean sectarian interest would control appointment to public office." The Vatican issue had however receded as a prominent concern, with Clark's withdrawal, and POAU workers were unable to revive it.

The leaders of POAU added a few new wrinkles to Protestant objections expressed in the '40s over diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Archer summarized some of POAU's objections as follows:

In studying the advisibility of a 'regular diplomatic minister to the Vatican', the President will, of course, consider whether the temporal claims of the Roman Catholic Church have any causal relation to Communism; whether the Vatican did, in fact, tip off Hitler concerning the allied plans of invasion of North Africa, as reported in the New York Times on June 21, 1946; whether the United States needs two official ministers in Italy; whether Americans are willing to recognize the Vatican as a sovereign power and thus require all agents of the Roman Catholic Church in this country to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act; and whether it is diplomatically wise in a predominately non-Catholic country to single out one church for this special privilege; whether or not such relation would be legal under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and whether the diplomatic recognition of the Vatican will promote unity at home.112

The leaders of POAU contended that an ambassador would be accredited to the Pope as head of a church and not as a ruler of a sovereign city-state.
POAU received support from the editor of *The Christian Century*, who seldom disagreed with POA on any separation issue during the 1950's. The editorial writer stated that "The Vatican Lesson" was a lesson that taught that there were people who would "subvert underlying Protestant principles."

The editorialist discussed coverage by the secular press, outside of the South, as an example of the difficulties Protestants faced in getting their views across to the American people.

On the whole...the daily press has reflected the urban power of the papal church by a news treatment which has frequently seemed intent on allotting to the Protestant side only the absolute minimum of presentation and an editorial treatment which has either favored the establishment of religion with the Vatican or tried to persuade the American people that the issue was without importance. Where, for instance, the press has given full and impartial coverage to one of the crowded mass meetings which Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State held across the country, this has usually caused surprise and public comment.114

The editor of the magazine went on to declare that the Roman Catholic Church now thought of itself as the majority church in the United States.115

I ideological fears for the core of American values, and for Protestants ability to compete with the Roman Catholic Church for the soul and soil of America were being expressed by POAU leaders far more than status anxieties. These anxieties in the first instance derived from the ideology of institutional equality in the case of the Clark nomination for the appointment would have placed "all non-Roman churches
in a subordinate status in American society." 116 POAU leaders believed that "(e)quality of all churches before the law" required "militant patriotic action" in order to meet not only the "peril to Protestantism but to sound Americanism" 117

Rooting their views of America in the ideals of liberty and equality which were carried forth through love of those ideals, POAU leaders defined America and its institutions and government in ideological terms. Because society was rooted in ideals, the main threat to America was ideological and enemies were mainly ideological ones who supposedly believed in different ideals. It should be observed that although POAU supported the concept of an open forum, they believed un-American those who brought ideas into the forum that challenged their own position. The true and changeless American ideals had been established almost two hundred years ago and they had been endangered by ideological foes throughout American history, the leaders of POAU believed. The Clark nomination was the latest such threat to American ideals and values.

POAU leaders observed that there was a "widespread feeling that a change in our long tradition of church-state separation such as the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican represents, will cause conspicuous legal and political alterations in the structure of our government and in our American way of life." 119 Archer wrote that "Our government
was founded on the theory that a state should not be a church, and a church should not be a state." He called for a return to first principles, "principles according to which the United States used to be governed." Those original principles, which gave meaning to America, were the result of colonial Americans search for a solution to religious persecution and bigotry.

Because of the actions of the Catholic Church and what it threatened to destroy, Archer could account for the few "anti-Catholic fanatics" who were given their opportunity to "go to town" when Truman nominated Clark. The major opposition to the nomination, however, was not "just another resurgence of old-fashioned 'anti-papist bigotry' which used to disgrace our country." The men and women who led the opposition were against every kind of racial and religious discrimination that granted special favors and privileges, according to POAU. The Protestant upsurge was the "natural result of his (Truman's) proposal to single out one church for an extraordinary and altogether un-American bestowal of government favor."

The Vatican issue, along with the Spellman-Roosevelt exchange, gave POAU national exposure during these early years, accounting for sizeable increases in POAU's growth. During these early years, POAU perhaps reached maximum influence and audiences as a result of the controversy over the Clark nomination. Only sixty percent of the American
people, however, at the height of the struggle knew about the controversy. The issue paled into insignificance in comparison with the Korean War. Also, like much of McCarthyism, the Vatican nomination dispute involved disagreements among elites. Elites on each side of the issue sought to tip the scales of argument and pressure by adding the power of public opinion to their side.

Opposition to Clark's nomination among Protestants was broadly based. Opposition came from fundamentalists, like the American Council of Christian Churches; evangelicals, like the NAE and Southern Baptists; and mainline and liberal Protestants represented by the NCC. The constituency of POAU and the NCC overlapped considerably, and gave POAU leaders an important voice within NCC's leadership. Through actions, organization, local roots, mobilization of supporters, and publicity, POAU leaders played an important role in defeating Clark's nomination.

POAU's position and influence appeared significant among millions of Protestants. The independent base, resources, and voice as well as grassroots organizing and willingness to act and to shout loudly gave POAU leaders influence within Protestant organizations. POAU, as Philip Wogaman observed in 1967, was becoming the dominant voice of American Protestantism on the issues of church and state. The role of POAU in the Clark nomination fight was a significant step toward its becoming the dominant voice.
The Vatican controversy has been viewed as an insignificant and isolated event with no relevance to the Cold War in the United States. When commented upon at all, it has been seen as a purely symbolic issue. The controversy was, however, part and parcel of the issues raised in the context of domestic anti-Communism. Truman, and many Catholics, justified Clark's appointment primarily on the basis of increasing America's ability to fight Communism. Leaders of POAU viewed the Vatican issue as part of a battle for leadership in the Cold War. POAU leaders questioned the priority given to domestic anti-Communism, especially since there were few Communists in the United States or in the government. First priority should be given to fighting political Catholicism in the form of clericalism which had numbers, power, and fellow travellers.

Archer repeatedly challenged the right of the Roman Catholic Church to lead a crusade against Communism. The church lacked the qualification, was conducive to Communism, and had compromised with Communism in other countries. Moreover, he said, the church used the communist, as it did the secularist, issue to promote its own fervid brand of anti-Communism, which was a cover to gain power and dominance in the United States. Protestantism, he continued, should rightfully provide the leadership in fighting Communism. The Vatican issue, like the issue of McCarthyism, was part of the power struggle for leadership in that fight.
Right wing Catholics and right wing fundamentalist Protestants, with whom POAU has usually been identified, were supposed to have made common cause against communists, socialists, and liberals during the early 1950's. If common cause was made by others, POAU did not take part in it. Rather, the leadership of POAU, especially Archer, challenged any such undertaking. Nor was it true that POAU in its leadership, policies, and pronouncements was right wing or fundamentalist. POAU would join no anti-Communist crusade, whether led by Catholic or non-Catholic, for such movements were aimed at the wrong enemy and used against Protestants.

Since no money or power was involved in the Vatican issue, the issue has been viewed as symbolic of deeper tensions between Catholics and Protestants. This view presumed that economics and power alone defined reality, and that what did not concern these two interests was unreal or symbolic. The Clark nomination was as symbolic or non-symbolic as federal aid to private education. Both of them involved principles which prevented money and power from flowing to the Roman Catholic Church and both of them portended a disadvantageous position for Protestants, in the view of the leaders of POAU, vis-a-vis the Roman Catholic Church. They also portended a larger change in the basic structure of America if the previous consensus on where the line of separation was drawn was changed by such official government actions.
How the leaders of POAU related the Vatican issue to the larger structural changes exemplified how their political analyses and conclusions followed from cultural premises. For these men, importance of the Vatican issue derived from the fact that an ambassadorship violated the equality of all churches before the law, in relation to the state, and in their relation to each other. This civil equality was written into the First Amendment through separation, according to the leaders of POAU, in order to prevent cultural control of America by any church or groups of churches. Special privileges violated this civil equality. Non-Catholic churches, as a result of an ambassadorship, were put at more than a relative disadvantage to the Roman Catholic Church in terms of status, power, and money. Because of the nature and religious liberty theory of the Roman Catholic Church, non-Catholic churches, the leaders believed, would be placed at a permanent disadvantage, one that could only be overcome by injecting, perhaps violently, the religious issue into politics.

ANTI-CATHOLICISM AND ANTI-COMMUNISM

In the atmosphere heated by domestic anti-Communism and McCarthyism as well as the strong war of words between POAU leaders and various Catholic officials following POAU's founding, leaders of POAU had to defend POAU's leadership from criticism from right wing Catholics and right wing Protestants. On the defensive, Archer tried to turn such
criticism to his advantage in order to lessen its effect within POAU. Criticism of POAU's supposed anti-Catholicism became intermeshed with POAU's supposed pro-Communist stance, especially among POAU's right wing critics.

Catholic officials continued their attacks on POAU leaders motives as hate-filled and their statements as evidence of bigotry. Archbishop Cushing contended that "thanks to the extremely hard, though evil, work which contemporary anti-Catholics had done" his church was in a "very precarious position."  

J. Howard McGrath, Truman's Attorney General, before a Catholic audience in 1951, attacked Blanshard and POAU leaders for arousing bitterness.

Our Sunday Visitor, a Catholic diocesan weekly head-quartered in Huntington, Indiana, published a number of attacks on POAU's founders, especially the more liberal ones. The weekly also published a fifty-eight page booklet in 1949 written by F. A. Fink, Whose Friends Are They--America's or Russia's?; a 128 page booklet, Who's Who in POAU?, which culled much of its information from Fink's work; and a sixteen page pamphlet, "Blanshard and His Sponsors-How People Are Being Deceived By An 'Organized' Minority."

Fink, responding in part to criticism by POAU, was short on evidence and long on emotion, calling POAU leaders life-long anti-Catholic bigots and friends of the Soviet Union. Pointed out for special attack were Blanshard and Oxnam because they appeared especially socialist and pink.
The booklet more generally attacked Protestantism and defended Catholicism in church-state matters. Fink found in opposition to Catholicism evidence of atheism and secularism.

Other works chimed in with the same name calling, adding radical Jeffersonianism and "liberal majoritarianism" to the list of viewpoints criticized. Fink had made the indictment against POAU a broad one, but the others concentrated more on the liberals Oxnam, Shipler, and Blanshard as especially tinged with red hues and un-Americanism. Accusing POAU leaders of pro-Communism and secularism, Who's Who in the POAU? claimed that "Today the POAU is following the Freethinkers."

To support their criticisms of Oxnam and Blanshard as atheists and supporters of world Communism, anti-Catholic individuals and anti-Catholic literature was cited by Our Sunday Visitor. Use was found for charges made against POAU by Carl McIntire, President of the fundamentalist International Council of Christian Churches and American Council of Christian Churches and editor of the Christian Beacon. Howard Kiroack, founder of the Laymen's National Committee, Inc. School Week, the sponsor of Sunday School Week, was quoted as saying that "these spokesmen for the Protestant Church are playing right into the hands of those who would replace our American way of life with godless communism."

The Protestant works cited were used as additional proof that POAU was led by atheists and that "Bible
Christians and Patriots the founders of POAU certainly are not." Our Sunday Visitor used McIntire's accusation that POAU was associated with various organization having a record as Communist fronts, being on the HUAC subversive list and that, moreover, POAU had some of the same leadership as the liberal NCC. These writings were permeated with a pervasive anti-Communism that eschewed any standard of evidence, rationality, coherence, and meaning (except to the persons expressing them). Using guilt by association, they aimed to discredit liberal Protestantism as much as POAU.

Choosing not to see differences among Catholics or within the Catholic Church as significant, PCAU regarded such works and their distribution as the evidence of a smear campaign by the hierarchy to shut them up. These works appeared in local communities and in mailing campaigns when Catholics protested Blanshard's presence or speaking in a community. Leaders of POAU viewed the distribution of the works as an attempt by the Catholic hierarchy to destroy POAU's influence and to sow disunity and doubt among its supporters. The effect of such works, while hard to measure, required POAU to respond (especially Blanshard and Oxnam) against such charges. Richard E. Morgan, in his work on POAU, has argued that these Roman Catholic "gutter attacks" contributed to POAU's style of striking the pose of martyr in the face of persecution.
Archer used the attacks on POAU for his own purposes. He used them to build morale among the staff and in the Board. The reactions of Roman Catholic Church organs was an important standard by which Archer judged the influence and effectiveness of POAU. The louder and more often the Catholic officials decried POAU, Archer claimed more effectiveness for his organization. For example, in the fall of 1949, he stated that no better proof of POAU's significance existed than the attacks on it by Our Sunday Visitor. It had even published a "red" book on POAU.

In early 1950, he returned to this theme of measuring POAU's national influence by the attention accorded POAU by Catholic publications. Making headline and front page news was important irrespective of the play given to POAU. In January, 1951, Archer argued that the Roman Catholic Church wanted a church-dominated government in the United States, citing as proof the church's publications devoted to meeting POAU's challenge. In early 1952, shortly after the Vatican controversy ended, he insisted that the list of organizations friendly to POAU increased almost in proportion to the rising number of hysterical attacks and "vituperations constantly hurled at POAU by the organs of the Roman Catholic hierarchy."

While some Jews and humanists avoided POAU because they thought they it represented only Protestants, they were not openly critical of POAU, as were some fundamentalist and
anti-Catholic Protestants. The fundamentalist Christ's Mission, an extreme anti-Catholic group which published the Converted Catholic Magazine, while not opposed to POAU felt the best way to defeat Catholicism was "to combat its false doctrines and superstitions," a position, as noted above, specifically rejected by POAU. One fundamentalist accused POAU of raising a "red herring" because it raised the "pseudo issue of the union of Church and State, in order to throw the American people off the track, in their thinking as to the menace of Russia and of Communism...." A fundamentalist Bible Baptist accused Newton of being "cheek-by-jowl with Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, who is one of the main fifth columnists of Joe Stalin in America."

Carl McIntire and ACCC leaders were critical of POAU, especially of Oxnam. McIntire was stridently anti-Communist, anti-Papist and anti-Romanist, and anti-ecumenicalist. He opposed the NCC and the WCC as modernist and pro-Communist. Since Oxnam and Mackay were leading proponents of Protestant ecumenism and were leading members of the NCC, their association with POAU made it a refuge for "modernists" and "pro-communists." When Mackay stated that Catholicism was a "sister Christian communion," McIntire fired back that "The historic Christian faith will never admit for a moment that the Roman Catholic testimony is Christian." And when Oxnam observed the two faiths worshipped the same God, he retorted, "The truth is that we do not have the same
faith." He explained that the "difference between Romanism and Protestantism is life and death." He charged "leftish" Oxnam with "pro-Catholicism." In 1953, McIntire published a pamphlet called *Bishop Oxnam—Prophet of Marx* in which he described the bishop as the leader of the most "popular, radical, pro-communistic element in religious circles in America."

McIntire received support from anti-Communists in Congress. J. B. Matthews, a staff member of McCarthy's Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, condemned the Protestant clergy as the leading supporters of Communism in the United States. McCarthy approved of McIntire's work and the ACCC "as a militant anti-Communist Protestant group." He also approved of fundamentalist clergy as "usefully serving the interests of America and God." On March 9th, 1953, it was announced that HUAC was going to investigate the churches and individual clergy, to which POAU objected that such an investigation threatened American religious liberty. On March 17th, Congressman Donald Jackson, California member of HUAC, charged on the floor of the House that Oxnam served God on Sunday and Communist fronts the rest of the week.

Oxnam, a frequent critic of McCarthy and HUAC and their methods, demanded to appear before HUAC to defend himself against such charges and other charges that had begun seven years before. Now Methodist Bishop of the influential Washington area, he appeared before the committee for ten hours
on July 21st. Before the hearing opened to a large, generally pro-Oxnam crowd, leaders of the ACCC were escorted to seats reserved for them in the front row of the hearing room, which, because of Jackson's relations with the ACCC, was called "Jackson's Pew." Oxnam did well in vindicating himself, but many of his critics did not think him so successful.

Archer sought to turn the tables on the Catholic Church hierarchy, whom he blamed for the proposed investigation of the Protestant churches as well as for Oxnam's difficulties. Firstly, despite the leaders knowledge that HUAC based its charges against Oxnam on unverified material supplied by the ACCC, POAU leaders charged the Roman Catholic Church leaders for the bishop's predicament. McCarthyism was accused, by the writers of Church and State, of being part of a Catholic scheme to increase its power within the federal government, by making anti-Communism the criteria of employment. The aim was to get Protestants dismissed from the government. The Roman Catholic Church, moreover, propagated the "myth" that it was the best foe against Communism, and it should, therefore, determine whom the government ought to employ.

Secondly, Archer sought to raise questions as to the reliability of the Catholic clergy. Archer had Church and State give page one coverage during the spring of 1953 to challenge the American citizenship of a Catholic prelate.
Blanshard filed a petition with the American Embassy in Dublin, Ireland that Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, the Papal Nuncio to Ireland, should lose his citizenship because he violated Section 349 of the McCarran Immigration and Nationality Act. The act stated that an American citizen shall lose his citizenship if he worked for a foreign government and had taken an oath of allegiance to that foreign government. Archer contended that if the United States Government rejected Blanshard's petition, it would "be confessing that its policy is to dance to the Vatican's tune." The State Department rejected Blanshard's petition.

Thirdly, Archer asked HUAC and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to inquire into the teaching of "un-American doctrines" in the Roman Catholic schools. He cited as one example the Catholic textbook, Living Our Faith. The book, Archer stated, attacked separation and "religious beliefs of non-Catholic Americans." Moreover, Archer showed that in some places public school textbooks were "'doctored' to conform to Roman Catholic theology" and then given at no cost by public school officials to parochial school students. Such teachings were more dangerous to America than Oxnam could ever be.

POAU's support of Oxnam caused some grumblings within the organization. One opponent of that support was the extremely active and often intemperate Dr. Reverend Frederick Curtis Fowler, a founder of POAU, President of the Pittsburgh
POAU chapter, and pastor of the Knoxville Presbyterian Church, which was associated with the NAE. He complained to Archer that the defense of Oxnam divided and defeated the purpose of POAU. Archer replied that "we" think Roman Catholics were drumming up these attacks and asked of Fowler, "certainly you don't agree with Jackson." Archer argued that he might not agree with Oxnam in theology but theology was not the issue. Separation was the issue and Oxnam was strong for separation and separation was all he, Archer, was charged with defending. POAU perhaps lost some supporters as a result of its cautious support of Oxnam in his appearance before HUAC and because of its opposition to the premises, methods, and ends of McCarthyism. Nonetheless, defection from the ranks of POAU did not seem to be large.

Archer later assessed the role of Catholicism in the anti-Communist thrust of the times. He believed that Senator McCarthy, with his "Roman Catholic brain trusters" like Father Walsh, had been correctly perceived by Oxnam as flying "under false colors." The senator was not after Communists but working for his church in his assaults on Protestants. He was a "front" to push Catholicism into power but the "big prize faded when Protestantism was challenged."

The effects of the congressional investigations, however, had not been good for POAU's fight against Catholic political influence, according to Archer. They provided "fertile ground for propaganda of (the) Roman Catholic
Church," and the entire atmosphere created by the investiga-
tions gave "subtle approval of Roman Catholics and subtle
disapproval of Protestantism."

Roman Catholic leaders have cleverly used the men-
tal climate of the 50's to advance their cause.
They have used fear of the Communist conspiracy to
advance their own conspiracy. The impression created
and fostered by many of the so-called Communist in-
vestigations was that only Roman Catholics were bona-
fide patriots, that only Roman Catholics could be
trusted with the task of exposing and weeding out
the Communists. In the hiring of J.B. Matthews, a
man who had publicly smeared the Protestant clergy
with the dirty paint of Communism, this hand was
overplayed. But this general point of view was
diligently advanced in all the peripheral publicity
surrounding the various Communist investigations.
Such an event as the appearance of Bishop Oxnam be-
fore the Velde Committee was widely used in this way.
Bishop's Oxnam's public confounding of the Committee
and his resounding triumph over its hierlings won
instant acclaim. Yet over the long haul the hearing
has been subtly used against the Bishop. The innuendo
has been cleverly passed in ever-widening circles
that there is some mysterious 'redness' about Bis-
hop Oxnam.168

The fact that the Roman Catholic Church had its agents in
vast numbers in the United States should make everyone
doubly alert to the "tyranny of clericalism and Communism."

**INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND DIVISIONS**

In developing POAU into a non-sectarian, independent,
mostly Protestant defense agency, Archer faced a number of
divisions and constraints. These problems required him to
be a diplomat as well as a manager in order to present a
united front on the politics of separation. Board members,
members of the NAC, and other adherents of POAU brought with
them different views of separation and pressured Archer and
his staff one way and then another way. But Archer quickly
got control over POAU and became its spokesmen and contin-
ually greased and oiled the organization. He worked to
maintain separation apart from promotion of theological or
religious doctrines. He attempted as well to keep POAU free
of the religious fanatic. And although Archer seldom acted
where there was not a consensus, the divisions within POAU
did have an effect on the ability of POAU to act on certain
issues.

One of the problems Archer confronted was one that
should have been solved at the founding, the name of the in-
stitution. This seemingly trivial matter went to the heart
of the identity of the institution. Whose interests did
POAU represent? Was it a largely Protestant organization or
was it even more broadly based, as the founders envisioned?
Archer observed that there were strong sentiments on both
sides. One side favored retaining Protestants in the title,
POAU; the other side advocated a name change to Americans
United or AU. Both positions wove arguments in great detail,
taking much time and energy.

Lowell and Blanshard were representative of the two ex-
tremes. Lowell argued for retention of POAU because only
Protestants took up the cause and any change in the name
would not make a bit of difference to Jews, non-Catholics,
or atheists. Blanshard, on the other hand, believed that
POAU made non-Protestants feel second class, and he desired
to attract the "non-churched." Archer advised Blanshard that if he wanted to change the name he must lead the way, but opinion within POAU was sharply divided over Blanshard himself, negating any such role.

Archer, who at first favored a name change, reversed his position by late 1949 but decided to stay out of the discussion. At first, when he went into communities, many people requested the name change, and Archer thought that he might have had more success in raising money if there had been a different name. He also realized that the name POAU discouraged Jewish support that he was desirous of attracting and slighted the "other Americans" who favored separation. Nevertheless, he felt that after one and half years POAU had acquired a recognition value with the press and that it was Protestants in the main who needed to be alerted to the threats to religious liberty.

The contention between those who wanted to emphasize Protestantism as the first priority and those who emphasized the alliance nature of POAU continued with the former predominating. In 1955, however, the alliance forces were strong enough that a committee to consider changing the corporation's name was appointed. In addition to the above arguments, the alliance forces believed that the length of the name was cumbersome. Furthermore, the word "Protestant" invited antagonism and discouraged liberal Roman Catholics from joining and, as well, implied that POAU, which was
definitely not the case.

With the word "Protestant" the bone of dispute, the forces for retention argued that that name protected some people from the "assaults of enemies," goodwill was attached to the name, and Protestants were principally to blame for the present drift toward church-state union. They should be singled out for blame and for action. Finally, other Americans were not and never would be substantial supporters. POAU was retained but, nevertheless, many POAU leaders at rallies referred to their institution as "Americans United."

As a result of internal difference, a lack of clear policy guidelines affected Archer's ability to accomplish his tasks. In early 1953, Archer gave a brief overview of the problems POAU faced in developing procedures and policies. Board members and advisors, Archer complained, had not declared themselves on certain troublesome, complex issues, leaving legislative intent unclear and vague. "As a general rule," he observed, "we favor separation, but we differ with respect to the application of principle on many specific problems." If the conflict within POAU could be resolved, Archer pointed out, there "may be large reservoirs of untapped mass support for POAU...."

"There are those," he declared, "who believe that POAU has not taken a clear stand on certain issues alleged to be within our province."
These people believe POAU's failure to declare itself on these matters lends credence to the charge that we are a sectarian Protestant organization engaged in a bitter struggle with the Roman Catholic Church for the soul of America, with the general welfare and the needs of our democratic secular state largely forgotten. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to search our own souls and see whether we have been to any extent guilty of the charge. 177

Archer also pointed to the lack of official policy on questions of Protestant use of public funds for Protestant hospitals, Sunday laws, and "permits for students to attend Protestant religious services in the public schools." 178

The director gave a few recent examples of the lack of policy direction in specific areas. In California, POAU members were confused and deeply divided on a proposition on the California ballot over whether to exempt parochial schools from property taxes. Religion in the public schools had again returned to the limelight, but POAU's response, because of internal division, was incomplete and unsatisfactory. Questions concerning why Church and State concentrated so much of its space on stories of persecutions in foreign countries arose, but no guidance had been given on how to make them more relevant to church-state separation in the United States. Indeed, should POAU continue to publish such stories?

These and other practical matters Archer had to deal with in holding POAU together, but he was unable, he stated, to resolve these conflicts while at the same time solidifying the organization. Archer himself concentrated so much
of his attention and energies on organizational and financial problems that had to neglect systematic development of policy and issues. He suggested to the Board that if the members found some general area of agreement they should stand up for "right principle," even though it would alienate some supporters. Everyone could not be satisfied, Archer said, especially since POAU's actions always seemed to leave a number of people dissatisfied.

Divergent left-right theological and political support further complicated the Executive Director's task. He reported that a number of ministers, while enthusiastically for POAU's broad objectives, were fearful "that POAU's Manifesto promotes irreligion" and "godlessness." From humanists came the complaint that the manifesto needed to go farther, for it did not draw the line sharply enough. "It fails," Archer stated, "in their opinion, to comprehend the full meaning of the Jeffersonian concept of church-state separation.

He performed a delicate balancing act to keep both ends of the spectrum with their different interests and views within POAU. He played officially neutral before his Board, asking the members how the division should be resolved. While increasing the credibility of POAU, such diverse support limited its freedom of action. A common ground of unity could not come from a stance derived just from a free church tradition that made separation a theological
prescription or a theology of separation such as taught by Southern Baptists.

The intrusion of theology also hampered Archer.

In addition to the conflicts in policy and procedure, POAU is constantly confronted by problems raised by theological differences. It is difficult to understand why our individual theological beliefs should impede our organizational progress since the primary purpose of POAU is to protect the law that gives us the right to differ. Yet as a practical matter our people keep injecting theological differences which impair cooperative organization and action.

Additionally, the difference between the theological and political right and left cause some difficulties. An exchange of letters between Robert McElhose, acting treasurer of the Los Angeles chapter, and Archer exemplified part of this problem. McElhose wrote that while he was fighting Roman Catholic persecutions of others, he had qualms about associating himself with POAU since he had read a pamphlet naming Poteat, Oxnam, and Mackay as associated with many Communist fronts. While he was against the Roman Catholic Church, he was not willing to line up with the Communist Party and "Others" to injure the Christian church. "I wouldn't be caught with these men in the same church," he stated, explaining religious freedom did not go so far left as to include Communists. Obviously knowing very little about POAU, he sought advice from a man whom he admired, Clyde Taylor of the NAE, whose name he saw was on the Board of Trustees list.
Archer replied that by all means he should contact Taylor but that he took POAU's organization too seriously, since members were not required to be associated with any particular body or to be bound by anything except the conviction of the worth of separation. We are not concerned, he went on, with theology or the interior form of worship of anyone or any body. Instead, POAU aimed "to protect our liberties" through law and to "keep the highways of freedom open before all churches." Moreover, the ugly name-calling McElhose was experiencing was a "Trick of the enemy" used against all who stood up to "clerical totalitarianism."

Archer confronted two other important problems during the early years of his tutelage. POAU had been unable to enlist the cooperation of leaders in many communities so that in many local and state units POAU did not command the leadership and support POAU's principles deserved, according to Archer. He suggested conferences between the Board and the NAC and denominational leaders as one way to resolve the problem. Secondly, he noted that "(t)imidity and fear continue to be twin enemies to our progress." He was referring to his frequent experiences with persons who boldly stated for separation and privately told him that POAU was doing more for separation than anyone else but who refused to let POAU use their churches. "I am one-hundred percent for what POAU is doing," Archer reported about what he had been told, "but I dare not personally become affiliated because my
ministry has been to all of the groups."

Archer and his staff had accomplished a good deal with only minimal guidance from the Board. They continued to receive only minimal guidance. Archer continued to be the main policymaker and the main fundraiser who raised the money to carry out policies. Archer's authority in and control over the organization enabled him to limit the effect or skirt the internal divisions and problems. These divisions and problems did not seriously impair the work of POAU, but they did somewhat limit Archer's ability to act forcefully in some areas.

CONCLUSION

Despite the problems, Archer had accomplished much by 1954. Morgan's observation that POAU in these early years was "more phrases than deeds" was inaccurate. In fact, a solid foundation had been created. Relationships with individuals and groups were developed that were broad if not always deep. There were signs that POAU could impress and influence, as witnessed in the cases of federal aid to education and the Vatican Ambassadorship. An independent organization had been created that gave Archer the leeway to exert influence without being excessively dependent on official church organizations and personnel. He had in fact successfully negotiated resolutions to a number of local violations of separation, had helped to win a number of legal suits, and had participated with other Protestants in
mobilizing opinion at the state and national levels. POAU had a voice among humanists and liberals; in the NEA, NAE, and NCC; and in conservative, evangelical, and fundamentalist circles. Archer had been successful in translating the support and resources POAU received into a "name" and influence as well as an adequate degree of effectiveness.

The techniques used by the leaders of POAU to influence Congress were common among public interest groups. The technique considered most effective by a majority of public, as well as by private, interest groups was personally speaking with public officials. POAU leaders seemed to use this approach only occasionally, although they did contact friendly members of Congress. POAU leaders did not at this time testify before congressional hearings, a technique public interest groups did not consider to be effective. POAU leaders most commonly used indirect methods of lobbying through constituents such as letter writing and contacts by influential constituents. After personal presentation, letter writing was considered the most effective technique for influencing congressional behavior. Perhaps the most often used technique on the part of POAU officials was public relations, a technique considered effective by groups that used it although it was not a widely used method.

In his first five years, Archer developed POAU along lines that followed the interests, logic, and law of separation. POAU might have received its "greatest support by
fundamentalists" who at POAU rallies shouted "'Amen'" following denunciations of Catholicism by the religiously liberal Paul Blanshard. But POAU was not representative of right wing Protestant fundamentalism. The position of POAU was not the position of fundamentalism in regard to such things as released time, secularism, modernism, and anti-Communism or McCarthyism. McCarthy never had much support among the executive staff. Archer did not consider Christianity to be a part of the common law, and POAU officially opposed the Christian Amendment. Under Archer's auspices, POAU was not primarily a religious organization expressing theological doctrines nor did it intend to recall America to the older cultural traditions cherished by such organizations as the KKK.

Whatever his personal preferences, Archer worked to nourish the broadest possible support. He worked with anyone, and would willingly have worked with Catholics who believed in strict separation. During these early years, Archer had sufficient support within his staff and Board to keep POAU on the course of strict separation without becoming a representative or spokesmen for a particular political, religious, or theological position.

Archer was also a man of principle who staffed and built POAU to exemplify principles. POAU's cultural and educational tasks and its politics of separation were expressions of principles. Compromise on separation was not
perceived as a wise move, because POAU could resolve a particular battle but lose the war through eroding what one knew to be right principle. And through the prophetic role of awakening America to the significance of separation of church and state to American liberty and the threat posed to it by Catholic power and ideas, POAU would perform a major task in perpetuating American freedoms.
CHAPTER V: FOOTNOTES

1. Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, p. 103.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
9. Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 43-59. Of the 83 public interest groups studied by Berry, forty-nine percent or forty-one of them had tax-exempt, tax deductible status. They also did not pay income taxes. The major target of these groups was Congress, and even among those with tax-exempt, tax deductible status forty-four percent risked their status by making their prime target Congress. Public opinion was a low priority items in terms of primary targets. Author's taped interview with C. Stanley Lowell, July 2, 1973.


15. Another requirement was that over one half of the total annual operating expenses of the firm had to go for educational purposes, such as instructions, lecturing, research, and financing scholarships. R. O. Clauser, Director of Planning, Board of Zoning Adjustment letter to James C. Wilkes (POAU's attorney), Washington, D.C., April 27, 1949; R. O. Clauser letter to James C. Wilkes, Washington, D.C., July 12, 1949; POAU, "Minutes of Meeting at 1633 Massachusetts Avenue," Washington, D.C., April 11, 1949; and "Zoning Board Abuses Power to Bar POAU from Headquarters Building," Church and State (July, 1949), p. 1. All are in POAU files.


sectarian education because aid could go only to states which constitutionally permitted such aid. There were few such states. To FOAU, it was an opening wedge the Catholic hierarchy would use to justify more aid and changes in state constitutions to permit such funding. See Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Federal Aid to Sectarian Education, pamphlet (New York: FCC, April, 1947), p. 4. In FOAU files and Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, p. 588.


27. New York Times, June 22, 1949, p. 25; "Issue of the Day," The Daily Compass, New York, June 30, 1949, p. 1, FOAU re-print in FOAU files. See editorials "Churches Undermine Public Schools" and "Federal Aid Minus Jokers," Christian Century, June 29, 1949, pp. 782 & 784, respectively. Hartnett, Federal Aid to Education, p. 23, stated "The Christian Century, liberal Protestant weekly, is forever harping on the Blanshard-Oxnam theme." along with the Scottish Rite Masons, Southern Jurisdiction. The theme is the un-American and undemocratic nature of Catholic parochial schools which "prove that this hostility to the existence of the Catholic school system is very widespread." Emphasis is in the original.


30. Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 590-591 and Stokes, Church and State in the United States, Vol. I, pp. 746-749, where the column and the exchange of letters are printed in full.
31. More was involved in the Cardinal's sentiments against Mrs. Roosevelt than this particular bill and controversy. He stated later that she "unveils the secret intolerance of a very notable character who has, for many years, unjustly enjoyed the reputation for toleration" and that "when we have a long clear record, year after year, of sly, carefully worded, covered utterances which were always against us then we know what kind of a mind and heart they come from." He went on to state what had been apparent for a number of years, that the Cardinal and the Catholic hierarchy had been annoyed by her statements which they took to be tolerant of Reds and Communists and fellow travellers, and her support of the loyalists in the Spanish Civil War and her opposition to official recognition of General Franco's Spanish Government. Stokes, Church and State in the United States, Vol. I, p. 750 and New York Times, July 25, 1949, p. 13, which also includes Blanshard's criticism of the Cardinal. See also Crosby, "The Politics of Religion: American Catholics and the Anti-Communist Impulse," The Specter, pp. 21-24.

32. The auxiliary services included in addition to free bus transportation and textbooks, health services for parochial school students. The division over public funds for parochial aid was along Protestant-Catholic or religious lines, but the division over the granting of funds for auxiliary services did not follow religious lines, indicating in part the effects of the Everson decision and the welfare services and child benefit argument. Stokes, Church and State in the United States, Vol. I, pp. 750-758; New York Times, September 17, 1949, p. 8; and Church and State (October, 1949), p. 1. See also editorial, "Cardinal Spellman Overreaches," Christian Century, August 3, 1949, p. 907.


37. "POAU FAVORED 9-3 by T.V. Jury--'Should Federal Funds for Education be Used for Public Schools Only?'" Church and


39. Ibid.


42. Archer, "Report of Executive Director of POAU to Board of Trustees, Biennial Meeting," September 16, 1949, pp. 1-2.


45. New York Times, March 10, 1950, p. 19, and February 1, 1950, p. 20. The key issue to most committee members in the House Labor and Education Committee was bus transportation, according to the New York Times, January 8, 1950, pp. 8E & 38. For one important Catholic position at this time see action pamphlet of Robert C. Hartnett, S.J., editor-in-chief of America and The Catholic Mind since November, 1948,


47. The Barden bill (H.R. 9643), 1st Session; H.R. 7160, 2nd Session) received in the 2nd session of Congress nine favorable and nineteen adverse votes in committee to bring it to the floor of the House. Alongside of these figures to show Catholic power in Congress, the magazine mentioned an amendment by John F. Kennedy (D., Mass.) that would have permitted aid for auxiliary service even in state where prohibited had had twenty-nine favorable and only sixteen adverse votes in committee.

48. Glenn L. Archer letter to Dr. Luther Warren (Dean, McPherson College, McPherson, Kansas), Washington, D.C., March 27, 1950 in POAU files.


51. Perhaps POAU was following the Law of Adverse Noise as set forth by Paul Blanshard, God and Man in Washington (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 94. He stated that congressional etiquette spoke of gentle noises of approval coming from voters as best measured according to their intensity not their total volume. And adverse noises should be multiplied by two. Moreover, if it was a religious matter, aggrieved sectarians had the longest political memory.

52. Author's interview with Lowell, July 2, 1973. For that support, mostly from a few southern congressmen and senators, see Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, pp. 77-78.


Drop Free School Bus Demand," Church and State (June, 1951), and "Free Rides' Sought by Parochial Schools," Church and State (June, 1951), pp. 2 & 8 where the question of bus transportation in legal rulings and introduced into state legislatures in New Mexico, Montana, Indiana, California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey is discussed.


In the magazine and at the conferences, as elsewhere, Archer had to include various angles and subjects in order on the one hand to appeal to and support fundamentalists within POAU and on the other to appeal to and support Unitarians within POAU, without excessively alienating either one.


58. Ibid.


60. In Church and State and before mixed audiences such as at the national conferences, Archer emphasized the meaning to religious liberty of the Jeffersonian-Madisonian position on religious liberty, free conscience, and separation. He emphasized the rights of minorities to religious freedom and dissent to Unitarians; the rights of free exercise and conscience to Seventh Day Adventists. This position covered a wide range. In addition to this position he as well before Baptists emphasized the religious tradition of separation derived from Roger Williams and the free church tradition or he stressed the religious heritage of liberty derived from Protestantism and its experiences in the new world. See for


63. Quote is from Archer, "Let's Keep Our Public Schools Free," in POAU files, p. 1. See Creedon and Falcon, United for Separation, pp. 156-157. John Cogley stated that the Blakely quote was a not altogether groundless expression of Catholic dissatisfaction with public schools. It gave the impression to non-Catholics that Catholics merely tolerated and would have abolished the public schools if they could have. The opinion expressed by Blakely, however, was not accepted, to any appreciable degree, by American Catholics. John Cogley, Catholic America, pp. 212-213.

64. See Hartnett, Federal Aid to Education, p. 2.

65. Ibid.


70. Glenn L. Archer letter to Professor Alfred McClurcy Lee (Wayne University, Detroit, Michigan), Washington, D.C., January 17, 1949 in POAU files.
71. Archer to Wilson, April 10, 1951.

72. See Joseph M. Dawson, for his opposition to secularism and to religious education in public schools, Sanctifying the Secular, A Baccalaureate Sermon delivered at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky, May 3, 1950, pamphlet (Washington, D.C.: POAU, (1950?)). For a much less hostile attitude toward secularism and its being made a whipping boy of churchmen through a false definition of secularism, "The Fading Illusion About Secularism" n.p., January, 1955, both in POAU files. See Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools, pp. 245-247 for "Letter to the Christian People of America" of the NCC dated December 13, 1953 and drafted by John A. Mackay. It called for more religion in education and a halt to the growth of the secular state and was considered by many church leaders similar to a statement made a month earlier by the Catholic hierarchy. For the NAE's strong opposition to secularism and support of religious instruction in the public schools, see Gasper, The Fundamentalist Movement, pp. 109-113. Many fundamentalists, however, recognized the dangers of continued released time programs because of the justification it could provide the Roman Catholic Church in its demands for textbooks and bus transportation, although they remained staunchly opposed to McCollum.


75. Archer, ibid., p. 30.


files. See also "Memorandum for P.O.A.U. Committee on Released Time," February 15, 1952, pp. 1 & 2.


80. Archer, "Director's Statement to Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council," January 14, 1953, p. 3.

81. The ruling was announced just five days after the report on released time had been submitted. Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306 (1952), in Tussman, ed., The Supreme Court on Church and State, pp. 264-274.

82. Douglas seemed to be agreeing with Justice Reed's lonely dissent in McCollum. Ibid., pp. 264-268. For the accommodationists or cooperationists interpretation as opposed to the no-aid, strict separation theory of the religious establishment clause, see Kauper, Religion and the Constitution, pp. 67-73 and Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, pp. 129-131 and Strout, The New Heavens and New Earth, pp. 295, 301, and 307. Douglas later changed his mind and opted for Rutledge's Madisonian separationism, government neutrality between believers and non-believers, which was not acknowledged in the majority opinion of Zorach, as well as neutrality between competing sects. He talked less of the need to insure that the Constitution was not read as containing a philosophy hostile to religion. See Tussman, pp. 264-268, Engel v Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437, 443-4 (1962), Strout, The New Heavens and New Earth, pp. 306-307. Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissent, sometimes bitterly, to Douglas' opinion, and they made clear that the majority opinion reflected the impact of a four year verbal barge on the Court following McCollum and Everson. It as well reflected the state of society at the time. For criticism of Zorach, see Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 135, 174-176, and 412-435.


84. "POAU's 5 Years Reviewed by Trustees, National Advisors," Church and State (February, 1955), p. 5. Church and State merely reported the various reactions to Zorach without comment. See Church and State (June, 1952), p. 6 and (May, 1952), p. 2. For favorable Catholic reaction to Zorach, see Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools, pp. 226 & 363.

85. POAU, How the Freedom of Religion and the Separation of Church and State Guaranteed Under the First Amendment to the

86. White House Press Release, January 18, 1950, pp. 1-3 in POAU files; for Truman and Taylor correspondence, see Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 302-307; for discussion of history of Vatican appointment, see New York Times, October, 1950, pp. 1 & 26-27. President Truman, according to the memoirs of Reverend W. A. Visser't Hooft, then general secretary of the WCC, made a "discreet inquiry" concerning sending a U.S. ambassador to the General Secretariat of the WCC about the time of the Clark appointment. The WCC told him they would not know what to do with an ambassador. Washington Post, June 1, 1973, p. B18. Truman had offered the job to Charles P. Taft, a member of the board of the NCC, but he declined the offer and helped to lead the opposition to the Clark nomination. Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 307-308.


88. Church and State (March, 1950), p. 4. For the lack of significant pressure from Catholics to Protestant opposition to the Clark nomination, see Cogley, Catholic America, p. 263.


90. Ibid., and POAU, WHO WILL BE THE NEXT TO KNEEL, flyer (Washington, D.C.: POAU, (1951?)).


94. Ibid., p. 10 and October 25, 1951, p. 22.

95. The exchange is printed in "Truman's Door Closed to Dr. J. M. Dawson," Church and State (June, 1952), p. 6. Dawson wanted to discuss a bill passed by Congress (H.R. 2094) allowing federal money to be used by sectarian hospitals.


99. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 75-76 and DECLARATION ON THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN (mimeograph), Washington, D.C., November 26, 1951 in POAU files. The signers were Edward B. Willingham, National Baptist Memorial Church; Estel E. Perry, National Memorial Church of God; J. Warren Hastings, National City Christian Church; Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Washington Cathedral (Episcopal); Edward G. Latch, Metropolitan Memorial, the National Methodist Church; Edward L. R. Elson, the National Presbyterian Church; A. Powell Davies, All Souls' Church, Unitarian; Seth R. Brooks, Universalist National Memorial Church; Robert L. Boothley, Capitol Memorial Church, Seventh Day Adventist. Hastings, Powell, and Willingham were members of the NAC; the latter two, especially Willingham, were active members.

100. Church and State (December, 1951), p. 7.

101. Ibid., pp. 1-2 and Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 45. So successful was Blanshard's tour that it was extended after
the immediate crisis over the Clark nomination had passed. Church and State (February, 1952), p. 6.


America Press, 1952), in POAU files; Francis J. Curran, S.J., Why Not An Ambassador to the Vatican?, (St. Louis, Missouri: A Queen's Work Pamphlet, January 1952), in POAU files; Cogley, Catholic America, pp. 261-264. The NCWC and most Catholics argued that an ambassador to the Vatican would be to a sovereign state. Robert A. Graham, S.J., Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 344-346, criticizes the above view and argues that the Catholic argument should have justified sending an ambassador to the Vatican on the fact that the Pope was the head of the Roman Catholic Church because that was where the Pope derived his powers. For arguments pro and con on the Vatican ambassador issue see Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 302-320 and Stokes, Church and State in the United States, Vol. II, pp. 97-112.


116. POAU advertisement in Christian Century, November 14, 1951, p. 1328.

117. Ibid. See also DECLARATION ON THE PROPOSED APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN, November 26, 1951.

118. See Appendix A.


121. Church and State (July, 1951), p. 1. The emphasis is in the original. See also Archer, "The Vatican Issue," n.d., p. 5.

122. See, among others, Archer, "Remarks on Separation of Church and State," December 6, 1953, pp. 1-2 and n.t., speech before General Conference, Seventh Day Adventists, April 9, 1953, p. 21.

124. One Gallup poll taken in December, 1951 found that of the sixty percent questioned who knew about the controversy raised by the Clark nomination 19% favored it, 29% were against it, and 12% had no opinions. Among Catholics, forty-three percent favored it, 12% were against, and 10% had no opinion; among Protestants, twelve percent favored it, 35% opposed it, and 11% had no opinion. Church and State (January, 1952), pp. 1 & 5.


126. Oxnam, Mackay, and Dana were the most important. Philip Wogaman, Protestant Faith and Religious Liberty (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 49.

127. Fuchs claims, without citing evidence, that POAU organized the opposition and blocked Clark's appointment. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, p. 135 and Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 76.

128. Wogaman, Protestant Faith and Religious Liberty, p. 42. Wogaman understood POAU better than Sanders in his Protestant Concepts of Church and State or Morgan in his "Backs to the Wall" when he stated that POAU's views reflected absolute conception of separation and religious liberty which was based more "on American tradition than upon theological reflection."

129. Wogaman, Protestant Faith and Religious Liberty, p. 49. That voice was challenged in the latter 1950's and 1960's with the Religious Liberty Department of the NCC becoming very active under the leadership of Dean Kelley.

130. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 75-77.


132. Archer, n.t., speech before General Conference, Seventh Day Adventists, April 9, 1953, p. 20. Also Morgan, "Backs
to the Wall," pp. 74-77.

133. Church and State (January, 1950), p. 1. Because Louie D. Newton, a member of the Board of Trustees, had opposed the KKK and been sued for $150,000 by them in 1921 for an article critical of the KKK, he was chosen to reply to Cushing.


135. F. A. Fink, Whose Friends Are They,"; Our Sunday Visitor, Who's Who in the POAU?; and Our Sunday Visitor, Blanshard and His Sponsors—How People Are Being Deceived by An "Organized" Minority (Anonymous) (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, June 16th, 1953), pamphlet No. 53, 6th edition, in POAU files. See also Christopher Roche, "Oxnam, Blanshard, and Co.," The Sign, December, 1950, pp. 27-30, which was the first part of a series entitled "Bigotry in the U.S.A." See also The Leader-Republican, Gloversville and Johnstown, New York, February 7, 1952, p. 7. Our Sunday Visitor, according to its masthead, was the largest Catholic weekly in circulation in the world with a readership of 700,000. According to Roy, the paper was a source of embarrassment to many Catholics for its open attacks on Protestantism and Protestant leadership. Roy, Apostles of Discord, pp. 387-388. Blanshard stated that it was in the Catholic presses rather than in the NCWC Bishops statements, which were always discrete, where the complete Catholic program could be found. Blanshard, God and Man in Washington, pp. 40-41. See Church and State (February, 1952), pp. 5 & 7 and "Statement in Defense of POAU Leaders Against Charges of Communism," n.p., n.d. (1966), in POAU files.


138. Roy, Apostles of Discord, pp. 186-202, especially pp. 196-197 and 223-226 for clash between McIntire and NAE, and,
also, pp. 155-156 & 387-388.

139. Ibid., p. 156.


141. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 73.


145. Church and State (February, 1952), p. 3.

146. Roy, Apostles of Discord, pp. 154-155. The militantly atheistic National Liberal League found POAU "a bit too pious."

147. Ibid., pp. 146-165, 183-185, and 236-237 for following NAC members: Dr. Charles Fama of The American Protestant Defense League; John W. Bradbury, editor of Watchman-Examiner; James DeForest Murch, ed. of United Evangelical Action, bi-weekly of NAE; and Harold J. Ockenga, member of the NAE.

148. Ibid., p. 155.

149. Ibid., pp. 35-357.

150. Ibid., pp. 154 & 165-168 and Communism and the Churches, pp. 228-230.


152. Ibid., p. 155.

153. Roy, Communism and the Churches, p. 234. The material was first published in The Christian Beacon, on April 9th, 1953. Another target of McIntire was the Methodist Federation of Social Action, as especially infiltrated with Communists. Clyde R. Miller, a liberal NAC members, was head of the Federation's Commission for Propaganda Analysis. Roy, ibid., p. 301 and Roy, Apostles of Discord, pp. 150, 311, 314-315. See also Gasper, The Fundamentalist Movement, pp.


155. Goodman, ibid., pp. 332-345; Gasper, The Fundamentalist Movement, pp. 64-67; and for the clash between J.B. Matthews of McCarthy's Senate Permanent Subcommittee and John Mackay in 1953-1954, after Matthews charged him with being a "top collaborator" with the Communists, see Roy, Communism and the Churches, pp. 260-263. See especially Mackay's "Letter to Presbyterians," in Roy above. In 1953, Mackay was moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.


160. POAU cited as an added example Mrs. Luce's nomination because she was a Catholic. "Agency Heads Accused of Favoring Catholics," Church and State (December, 1953), p. 2.

161. Ibid., (April, 1953), pp. 1, 3, 6, and 7.


163. Blanshard was in Ireland writing a book on the Irish and Catholic power. See New York Times, February 18, 1953,
p. 9; Christian Century, July 8, 1953, p. 789 and March 18, 1953, pp. 307-308; "Vatican Press Office rejects Blanshard Argument," RNS (Foreign Service), February 18, 1953, p. 4, copy in POAU files; Paul Blanshard letter to John Cogley, editor of Commonwealth, Washington, D.C., n.d., in POAU files; Paul Blanshard, Petitioner, "Supplementary Statement and Petition in the Matter of the Revocation of the American Citizenship of Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, Papal Nuncio to the Irish Republic," February 23, 1953, in POAU files; Press release from Office of Senator Pat McCarran (D., Nev.), Washington, D.C., February 19, 1953, in POAU files; Stanley Lichtenstein letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1953 and March 11, 1953 and reply by John W. Hanes, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1953 and Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, Washington, D.C. to Paul Blanshard, May 8, 1953, all are in POAU files. The State Department rejected Blanshard's contentions on two counts. The expatriation statute, was never intended to apply to bishop's oaths and to a bishop subsequently taking up foreign residence. Also in the meaning of the statutes, the bishop did not take an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, the State of Vatican City, but to the head of the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, the bishop was not under the government of a foreign state.


165. See Reply to Pope's Plea, Dr. Frederick Curtis Fowler letter to Glenn L. Archer, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 5, 1953 and Glenn L. Archer letter to Dr. Frederick Curtis Fowler, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1953, in POAU files.

166. Fowler stayed in the organization. In his work on POAU, Morgan contends that it was the liberal membership of POAU that prevented POAU from supporting McCarthy. He categorized POAU as a part of the phenomenon known as the Protestant fundamentalist crusade, of which McIntire and the ACCC were a part. Morgan misinterpreted POAU's position on McCarthyism. Whether conservative or liberal, the leaders of POAU, as spokesmen for POAU, concentrated on Catholicism and saw the anti-Communist issue as harmful to their cause because it was used to help the Catholic Church. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 95-97 & 254. Archer, "Executive Director, Sixth Annual Report, 1954," p. 7.

167. Archer, ibid.

168. Archer, "Eighth Annual Report of Executive Director..."


171. Paul Blanshard letter to Glenn L. Archer, Thetford Center, Vermont, December 3, 1949, in POAU files.


175. Committee on Change of Corporation's Name, "Committee Meeting Minutes for the Board of Trustees," POAU, Washington, D.C., June 28, 1955, in POAU files.


177. Archer, "Director's Statement to Board of Trustees..." January 14, 1953, pp. 2-3.

178. Ibid., p. 3.

179. Ibid.

180. Ibid.

181. See Morgan, "Back to the Wall," pp. 1-12 and Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and State, pp. 221-222 and 230-231, for their different views of this matter.

182. Archer, "Director's Statement to the Board of Trustees ...," January 14, 1953, p. 5.

183. Mr. Robert R. McElhose letter to Glenn L. Archer, Inglewood, California, December 29, 1952 in POAU files.


186. Archer, "Director's Statement to the Board of Trustees . . .," January 14, 1953, p. 6.


188. Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 214-252.


191. This is not to argue that Archer and the leaders of POAU did not want to keep the United States religious. To these men, freedom and religion are inextricably bound together.


194. See, for example, bibliography in back of this work for indication of the variety of pamphlets published by POAU.
CHAPTER VI
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS: 1954-1960

In 1958, Archer stated that other Protestant groups, and by implication Protestantism in general, furnished a "weak united Protestant voice" for separation and stood "strangely immobilized" before the "menacing" threat of "clerical oppression." Archer found that there was not the degree of unity among Protestants on separation as the founders had believed, although clearly a majority did support some form of separation. Archer found a unity of action on separation virtually impossible among Protestants. Moreover, POAU leaders and their stance had increasingly come in for criticism from certain Protestants, and this criticism partly accounted for Archer's critical remarks. The efforts of the leaders to acquire resources, influence, and support were impeded by several elements, elements which were part of a larger cultural context that made more difficult the winning of hearts and minds.

Protestantism lacked theological as well as political unity. The lack of unity evolved from the erosion of theological commitment and the subsequent secularization of religion, especially among mainline denominations. There was, consequently, a lack of common Protestant action based
on commonly held convictions. No one could speak for Protestantism on virtually any subject, including separation, even if strict separation had held the loyalty of a majority of Protestants.

Relatedly, a successful conservative propaganda campaign in the 1950's changed the context within which POAU leaders operated. Within the framework of an apparent religious revival, conservatives argued that all religions were essentially homogeneous. They argued that one religion was as good as another religion, because what was important was that one believed and that one went to church, any church. This belief in religion in general had a corollary when conservatives argued that divisive issues, like separation, should not be raised in the public arena.

Moreover, denominations, especially mainline ones, and interdenominational agencies, like the NCC, had developed bureaucracies and interests of their own. Clerical bureaucrats or institutionalists in the denominational agencies and boards acquired interests independent from the lay people in the local congregations. These denominations consequently had agencies through which areas like separation could be handled, and these agencies were moreover under the control of denominational leaders. They could study and get money to study what the denomination's position in reference to separation should be. In doing so, public controversy would be avoided.
Nevertheless, POAU continued along its well-established pattern of growth during the latter-fifties. The growth of POAU was especially marked during 1959 and 1960. In order to acquire the support of the General Conference of the Methodist Church, POAU leaders changed institutional policy in regard to official denominational representation within POAU. Also, POAU began to acquire a legal reputation among the two other important separationist organizations, American Civil Liberties Union and American Jewish Congress.

POAU expanded activities especially at the local and state levels. Most of POAU's actions at the state and local levels dealt with bills relating to separation in state legislatures, protests and organization, and lawsuits and the threat of lawsuits. POAU's legal activities were especially prominent in the areas of captive schools, bus transportation, hospitals receiving federal funds, and the sale of public property to churches or church-related institutions.

Archer and the leaders of POAU believed that the hearts and minds of Protestants and Americans were with POAU on the questions of the separation of church and state. They believed that the reasons for the major problems of separation came from Catholic practices which either confused, pressured, or fooled the American people on the nature of separation and on the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, the leaders aimed to educate the American public about Catholic propaganda and its centrally coordinated institutional
system of power and about Catholic clericalism. In doing so, the leaders used the tools of power at its disposal in order to persuade, influence, and pressure. They understood how power was exercised in the "broker state" society as they pursued their interests. They also understood the growing importance of mass communications in its ability to reach and influence the American people.

FINANCES, ORGANIZATION, AND SUPPORT

Archer labored to create an organization with as low overhead as possible, but the questions of the wealth and health of POAU were never far from the center of his attention. POAU raised $800,000 in eight years, but Archer felt that in comparison to what was needed the sum was meager. So much times was spent "stoking organizational and financial fires" that the remedial and other programs suffered. Continuing to live from "hand to mouth," Archer and his staff spent much of their time in the field running after money. Hence, no systematic plan for implementing policies could be carried out. POAU leaders continued their opportunistic strategy to church-state problems, taking advantage of controversy in order to augment funds and visibility.

The close connection between fundraising and vigorous organizational promotion in order to induce support for POAU had come in for criticism from several Protestant scholars. The leaders of POAU believed that they could not afford to break the tie between organizational promotion and
fundraising nor could they increase the objectivity of the publications of POAU until a large portion of the budget of POAU was institutionally underwritten. Where and how to get money remained Archer's "heaviest burden."

POAU did, nonetheless, increase its financial security. Archer put more money into a contingency fund for emergencies, selling when needed securities and government bonds. POAU received approximately $10,000 to $15,000 a year from its securities and bonds. By 1960, with a proposed annual budget of $350,000, Archer's investment program had produced stocks and bonds worth $345,978, approximately double that of 1953. The money was earmarked as reserve funds for legal actions, expanding the regional offices, and protection of families of men who switched jobs to work for POAU.

In Archer's judgment, however, only institutional support would guarantee POAU's permanence. Only a minimum of 50% of its annual budget "underwritten in advance" would make POAU secure. When Archer appealed to foundations for funds, he had been turned down because, he explained, none of them were free of Catholic trustees and none "would dare appropriate money" to POAU.

Scottish Rite Masons and Southern Baptist Conventions continued to be the most important institutional donors, followed by Methodist conferences, Christian Scientist, Mother Church, and the Seventh Day Adventist General Conference. The Scottish Rite Masons usually contributed $20,000
a year to pay for the printing and mailing of Church and State to its members. Behind the scenes support of its members and aid by this organization were of incalculable value to POAU. Among the 24 Southern Baptist state conventions, only 3 had POAU written into their budget in 1956; in 1958, the total reached 11, an appreciable degree of support. The Christian Scientist Board of Directors usually allotted an annual $5,000 to POAU, while the Seventh Day Adventist General Conference normally gave between $3,000 and $5,000 annually. In 1957, thirty-five church conventions and conferences, state denominational bodies, local church bodies, councils of churches, and ministerial associations gave institutional "gifts" to POAU.

POAU sought inclusion in the annual budgets of individual churches. These "scroll churches," as POAU called them, contributed approximately 5% of POAU's yearly budget, a "pitifully small" sum, as Lowell noted. The number of scroll churches fluctuated yearly, from approximately 200 in 1955 to 140 in 1956 to 400 in 1958. One hundred and four such churches from about 9 denominations gave a mere $6,600 out of a total income in 1957 of $234,806. Of the $6,600 contributed, seventy-seven Baptist churches gave over two-thirds. The rest of it was divided between five churches of the Christian Scientists, six Methodist, seven Presbyterian, three Evangelical and Reformed, and one Unitarian church. The above figures fell far below the estimate made by
Lowell in 1956 that POAU needed 50 dollars each from 1,000 churches.

POAU thus failed to receive the institutional sponsorship Archer so ardently desired. As a percentage of POAU's yearly budget, institutional funds remained constant at 15%. In 1960, when income rose appreciably, institutional gifts rose well above its normal yearly average to $49,000. The total income for the year rose proportionally higher, reaching $510,000. In addition to the 15% of its annual budget received from established church groups, conventions, and conferences and 5% from local churches, POAU received 12% of its income from local chapters and 3% from the sale of its literature. Generally, individual contributions accounted for 70% to 80% of annual revenue. So while Archer fell short in acquiring institutional support, he was successful in acquiring other means in order to increase POAU's income appreciably each year.

POAU aimed for the endorsement as well as the funds of the national denominational bodies of the churches. Endorsement could represent ideological, moral, and financial support that could overcome POAU's handicap in dealing with the national press.

POAU had the commendation of the Southern Baptist Convention and strove in 1956 to obtain the endorsement of the Methodist General Conference, asking that $10,000 be appropriated annually to aid POAU. C. Stanley Lowell, who had in
March, 1956 become associate director of POAU and in February, 1957, managing editor of *Church and State*, led POAU's campaign. He had the help from Herbert S. Southgate, District Superintendent of the Roanoke District of the Virginia Conference of the Methodist Church. W. Kenneth Haddock, District Superintendent of the Southeastern Jurisdiction of the Methodist Church and a member of the Commission on Temporal Economy of the Methodist General Conference, also aided Lowell. Although POAU suffered a narrow defeat in committee, a four year study of POAU was authorized.

POAU worked hard for the next four years to get Methodism's endorsement. It was aided by Dr. Edwin R. Garrison, a member of the NAC and in the mid-60's a POAU vice-president as well as a member of the study groups of the Coordinating Council of the Methodist Church investigating POAU. POAU faced one major obstacle to endorsement by the general conference when it met again in 1960. The conference, like the Southern Baptist Convention, had a constitutional provision that allotted direct grants of money only to those programs directly controlled and administered by the denomination itself. Consequently, the Southern Baptist Convention in 1952 had only commended POAU and asked Southern Baptists to cooperate with it. Both denominations had stated that full support was virtually impossible without official representation on the policy making bodies of the organization to which they gave funds.
POAU faced a dilemma. To allow denominations an official voice in POAU would require a basic change in policy. Denominational representation had always been opposed because, among other reasons, it might mean denominational control and limits being placed upon POAU's actions. Most of the founders, also, opposed any official relations between the institution and the churches. POAU, however, needed endorsements and the money and prestige such endorsement would bring to it.

Discussions on the question of POAU's relation to the denominations occurred among the leadership during 1958 and early 1959. Except for Taylor of the NAE, founders on the Board opposed official representation in the NAC or on the Board. Dawson and Morrison argued vigorously for the essential need to remain independent of the churches and independent in action. Dana believed that no official endorsements were needed, pointedly asking whether the goal of POAU was a broad-based coalition, Americans United, or a limited Protestant one, Protestants United. Newer Board members seemed more amenable to accredited support, although W. Stanley Rycroft, a member of the United Presbyterian Commission on Ecumenical Mission, found it hard to tell whether POAU was a creature of or a cooperator with the churches. Reflecting the reality of their field work, the staff favored representation. After all, they said, "POAU is a church-related group." That opinion, expressed by Colonel Edward
Felker, who became general counsel in 1959, reflected a marked change in attitude from the time of POAU's founding.

By mid-1959, POAU's constitution had been changed to allow the denominations officially to appoint representatives to the NAC and the Board. Why had the change occurred? Necessity, financial and otherwise, was one reason. Staff support had been another reason. A number of founders, like Morrison and Dawson, were retiring, although they retained emeritus status. (C. Emmanuel Carlson, the new Executive Secretary of the Baptist Joint Committee, in effect, replaced Dawson on the Board.) The newer Board members did not have the national prestige and reputation that the founders had had, and they had more of a local than a national orientation. POAU was becoming less representative of Protestantism during the last half of the 1950's as "liberal and neo-orthodox churches...either reduced their support of POAU or have dropped out of the organization." The change in POAU's policy may in fact have been made possible by this loss of support, as POAU became more conservatively and evangelically oriented.

With the representation issue cut of the way, Methodist members on the NAC was increased by Archer. Haddock had been added to the Board along with Pastor Theodore H. Palmquist of Foundry Methodist Church, Washington, D.C. In late 1959, Southgate became a member of the Board and became Recording Secretary in the spring of 1960 after Yost's
retirement. In 1960, the Board and staff consisted of 7 Methodists, 4 Southern Baptists, 2 Presbyterians, 2 Congregationalists, 2 Seventh-Day Adventists, 1 Christian Scientist, 1 Episcopalian, 1 NAE member, and 1 Unitarian.

Opposition to POAU from within the Methodist General Conference came in 1960 from the same sources and for the same reasons as in 1956. One of the most consistent opponents of financial aid to POAU was Reverend A. Dudley Ward, General Secretary of Board of Social and Economic Relations. He vigorously opposed financial support to any non-Methodist organizations and churches. He denied that his opposition came from bureaucratic jealousy or that he was opposed to POAU. Church and state relations were the most ambiguous and difficult issue facing the Protestant church, Ward wrote. He would be more than willing to consult with POAU as he would with other denominations and the NCC to study the problem. POAU's viewpoint was only one among many.

Despite Oxnam's assurance that Ward was sincere in the reasons for his opposition, Archer and Southgate maintained that he was basically opposed to POAU. They associated Ward with the growing ecumenical dialogue between Protestants and Catholics and the do-nothing approach of the NCC. A marginal note on a letter written to Southgate stated, "Where will the NCC lead us? Has NCC courage?" Southgate appealed to Ward by painting POAU as an ecumenically Protestant organization where Methodists could work with other
denominations instead of competing with them. He asked him to join "the Protestant cause" that aimed "to thwart the plans of the hierarchy to make Roman Catholicism the state Church of the U.S." Archer pointed out that the Methodist Church would, in effect, be paying for services of a lawyer to enforce the law for it.

The Secretary and Associate Secretary of the Council on World Service and Finance, from whose budget the money for FOAU would come, opposed aid to FOAU. The associate secretary found FOAU "divisive in its purpose and...a pressure group in its methods." The secretary, George B. McKibben, an influential lawyer in the Republican Party, who previously had had differences of opinion over FOAU with Oxnam, the President of the World Service and Finance in 1959, had voted against supporting FOAU in 1956.

FOAU, in McKibben's opinion, was biased and irresponsible, hardly worthy of support from a "responsible" organization. McKibben, writing to Oxnam, cited as an example of his objection the statement "the time honored tradition that no Protestant can be nominated for Mayor of Chicago in the review. He found that observation inaccurate. He pointed out that in the last 20 years 5 of the 6 Republican nominees for the post were Protestants. He could not understand how anyone could take seriously these events in Chicago as a symbol for "not America First but Vatican First."
Lowell, who had written the articles, defended the statement. Protestants were systematically discriminated against in the nomination and election of mayor of Chicago since no Protestant for many years had been elected mayor. To point out this fact was on the same level as Catholics pointing out that no Catholic had been nominated for President in many years. Moreover, bigotry came from "intent" of pressure groups like "Catholic Action" and no from "small-minded prejudice" within POAU.

They opposed financial aid to POAU, according to Archer, because they "actually opposed POAU." These "timid souls" among Methodists, he said, feared Catholicism because, as POAU grew more powerful, the opposition to its success increased in severity as well. In a long letter to Southgate, Archer wrote:

Some of the timid Protestant leaders reason like this: 'There is no doubt that the Catholics present a problem. POAU has done some good but is too extreme. Those of us who represent the wiser heads of Protestantism must get together and not let POAU run away with the ball. Since the Religious Liberty Department can't do very much because there are so many different points of view, each church must set up an agency to discuss church-state separation. This book is to be guide to the denomination that pronounced it.

Now the sum total of the work so far in these different areas amounts to nothing but talk.\textsuperscript{52}

The denominations deluded themselves into thinking they had done something great while "Roman Catholics must shout with joy at this turn of events."\textsuperscript{53}
Despite prominent opposition, the general conference in May of 1960 accepted the recommendations of the Coordinating Council, of which Garrison was secretary. It called upon Methodists to give moral and financial support to POAU, nationally and locally. POAU's well organized campaign at every level of Methodism and its use of letters, resolves, and petitions had paid off. Of course, well placed and influential POAU supporters helped as well. POAU's report was fully accepted by the conference. The report had emphasized the legal work POAU had done to stop tax money from going to the churches thus preserving the "free church in a free society" and the principles of equality of churches before the law. The general conference noted that along with financial support Methodists now had an effective voice within POAU which should be continued to keep the delicate balance required to avoid "fanaticism and appeals to bigotry." The major difference between 1956 and 1960 was organization and renewed national interest in church-state issues, especially as a result of John F. Kennedy's candidacy for the Presidency. After Methodism's endorsement, Ward and others immediately attempted to get the report reconsidered on grounds that POAU was not Methodist or wholly Protestant.

The response of the editors of America to the endorsement was perhaps typical of Catholic reactions. The editors made three points in "Methodists Bless P.O.A.U." on May 28, 1960, a month and a half before the Democratic convention.
In clear reference to the election of 1928, they stated that "Politicians" had not forgotten the power of Methodism during the era of prohibition. But the issues in 1960 were not those of 1928. Neither the Methodists nor the POAU were trying to use the law to impose their private or Protestant morality on Catholics. Separation raised issues that had less to do with concrete moral differences between Protestant and Catholic than with more abstract differences over the nature of authority and the best relation of religion to the society and to the state. The other two points made reference to POAU's reputation for anti-Catholicism and regarded the endorsement as a setback to Catholic-Protestant dialogue.

Within a month of the Methodist endorsement, the Southern and American Baptist conventions likewise commended POAU. By 1960, POAU had endorsements from institutions representing the majority of Protestants.

POAU chapters, providing between 10% and 15% of yearly income, were also vital to the health and financial security of POAU. They were vital because they were a primary source through which individual contributions came. By 1958, POAU had sponsored over 5,000 public rallies. Archer used locals as a means of access to churches to galvanize them over community, state, and, at times, national issues. Reflecting his orientation and where the problems of separation most frequently arose, he organized and pressured at the local
and state levels far more than at the national level. At the community and state levels power was differently organized, making a stand and mobilizing opinion had more immediate impact, organized pressure was more effective, and access to policy-makers was easier than at the national level. Locals also helped to provide, when needed, grassroots pressure upon officials in Washington, D.C.

Chapters had little freedom of action, however. All news releases had to be approved by national headquarters prior to issuance. Money collected had to be sent to headquarters for accountability and distribution. Archer set up regional staffed by paid employees partly because of the inefficiency and unreliability of some volunteers.

Archer obviously believed the ends of the institution could be met effectively only through decisions made from the top with little delegation of authority. Archer's face-to-face diplomacy and the staff's concentration on field work at Archer's insistence, however, closed the gap that tends to develop in organizations between leaders and the led. The very word "field" connotated a farm to be cultivated, nurtured, closely watched, and harvested. While the financial problems accentuated centralization, they also had the effect of requiring persons in authority to be in touch continually with and frequent visitors to locals and churches.

The health of the organization was maintained in three ways. One way was through continual attention to chapters.
To increase their dependability, Mayne went into the field with manuals, study guides, and ways of spreading knowledge and garnering membership. The study guides, for example, spelled out how public meetings should be conducted, the precise order a rally should follow, the best time to ask for money, and what to say and how to say it. Inside the chapters, small internal units like the James Madison League and The Minutemen were set up and gave to those who belonged to them distinctions and a sense of belonging to a unique, face to face organization. Regional offices staffed by semi-professionals dotted the country watching over and coordinating locals, churches, and other activities.

Members of POAU were of like-minded motivation but morale had to be built continually and maintained. A common goal provided the motivation and the means for morale-building. That goal provided a common foe and an explanation for the fight. Unity against something provided commonality against the outside world. Unity for a higher purpose provided a communality that kept theological and political and sectarian differences within bounds. The rhetoric of war and battle helped to motivate, also, and required a general, like Archer, to lead the troops into battle.

The most prominent feature of local chapters continued to be a state of flux, although a minimum of approximately 60 chapters seems to have been reached by 1960. By the beginning of 1956, POAU listed 50 local chapters, a
substantially lower figure than the 115 cited in 1953. Despite holding 56 meetings and organizing 12 new chapters in 1956, only 43 chapters were functioning in that year. POAU held 75 public meetings in 1957 and ended the year with 18 new chapters for a total of 55 chapters in 22 states. California had the largest number of chapters with 10; New Mexico had 8, seven of which were new; and New York had 5. By early 1959, California had only 4 chapters. By June, 1958, Mayne reported 60 active chapters staffed by over 720 active officers and directors with 8,000 informed members standing "guard." Those figures indicated that POAU had a large amount of manpower resources that Archer could tap. In February of 1961, POAU once again listed 60 active chapters. Chapters contributed $36,000 in 1958, up from $12,000 in 1956 and $26,000 in 1957.

Urban areas retained prominence in Archer's plans. He set up regional offices in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York beginning in the mid-50s and expanded them as income allowed. Wherever a Catholic cardinal resided or wherever there was a large concentration of Catholics, Archer tried to build a strong chapter. As the director of the Chicago regional office, who like his counterpart in Los Angeles was a Southern Baptist, stated in 1960, these offices overcame the overpowering and "over-confident giant, Roman clericalism" in the fight for "equal liberty for all!" The aim was to have a chapter in every capital of the country in order
to "keep (an) eye on proposed legislation and administrative decisions" and to meet the "adversary on their (sic) home ground." In 1957, POAU had 13 such chapters. In addition, it had chapters in the largest cities of ten other states. Neither of the above figures constituted a significant increase over earlier years. Nevertheless, according to Mayne, who believed chapters were "laboratories for shaping the missiles of propaganda" in a "national crusade," these chapters thwarted the smooth running of Catholic plans better than the NCC or research materials coming from Washington, D.C.

Concern arose over the rapid growth of the Catholic Church in places and sections of the country previously considered "safe." Mayne mentioned as previously safe areas those places where the public schools had a "monopoly of education and where the American cultural pattern is undisturbed," and those places where farmers, the last wholly "American cultural bodies," lived. Moreover, Mayne feared for small cities where the "rose-colored glasses of brotherhood" were shattered by Catholic political and educational power. Mayne cited the spread of Catholicism to the South and its growth in such places as Tulsa, Oklahoma; Atlanta, Georgia; and North Carolina. He mentioned the need for chapters where there were few Catholics because eventually, as a result of "the operations of Jesuits and Franciscans," local citizens would have their hands full "handling Catholics."
He believed POAU must go in before any crises erupted and organize in order to save "a vanishing American way of life...." 72

Archer faced a number of problems with the locals. Regionals and locals competed with one another for funds. Regionals developed interests of their own and wanted less emphasis on organizing the churches and more on organizing other groups in their area. Locals complained about the detailed control Archer exercised over their activities, leaving them with too little of the locally raised money. Archer had continual trouble with inadequate reporting of income and expenses as well as lack of attention to careful business methods. Also, local leaders often lost interest and let the local's membership and activities dwindle after a considerable initial investment of time and money. 75 74 76

Archer perceived the major problem to be local leadership. Local leaders acted on their own, in his opinion, jeopardizing the whole movement and tax status by using POAU's name. Some local leaders were very sectarian and emphasized theology, a tactic Archer opposed. Many of the local leaders lacked prestige, stature, and broad influence in their community. Archer attributed part of their failures to "unwise business methods" but most of the blame he attributed to the fact that the local leaders were "unworthy." Archer's solution to the problems of "occasional betrayal and subversion by local leaders, amid
malediction and perfidy” was to get new leaders, as he did in Chicago in 1959. Archer stressed personal integrity and qualities as the best way to make an impact in communities.

How Archer sought to maintain unity was clearly spelled out in a memo to the area offices in July, 1960, a time when POAU was beginning to get into high gear for the presidential election campaign. POAU's role in the election campaign had come under increasing criticism and problems at local levels had occurred. Area offices were to insure locals followed national policy, not to act independently, and not be a "harping critic." Archer indicated in the memo that POAU rested first of all on local chapters, not on the churches, but as "workers for the cause" local leaders needed to tap churches and lodges, meaning Masons who helped in time of need. As "missionaries for 'enlarging (the) movement'," the area men must "Guard carefully statements which may hurt cause." The men were to follow a regimen of "self improvement" as well as study Catholic pronouncements for "they tell best story for us." The men and women were to study hearings before Congress and propaganda techniques and "Balance blast at Catholics with Protestant violation."

Archer then became more personal in the memo. POAU was not a job but a crusade and "Crusaders must be in deadly earnest" for their work was influential and significant. He would not tolerate easy living or loafers since POAU was
under fire and its every move watched. The cheapest transportation and rooms should be taken. No shows of luxuries were permitted and personal habits must be above reproach. A "religious outlook" was required because "We are not here to hurt religion, but to save its freedoms." Total dedication and nothing less, and desire for unity and nothing less, must be personal qualities. "It simply is not ethical," Archer wrote, "to run down our associates in public. The facts are we have no one in the movement unworthy, and I do not expect to allow the unworthy to enter." The unworthy must be excluded because, he concluded, "Many a good cause goes down because of rascals inside. We must be lily white in money matters."

POAU's growth in income and membership were two more indicators of its growing health and wealth. Between 1954 and 1961, yearly income grew at an average rate of over 20%, a 6% increase over the earlier period. The rate was higher for the 1958-1960 period than for the 1954-1957 period. From 1954 to 1957, yearly income approximately doubled from $113,686 to $234,806; it almost doubled again between 1958 and 1960 going from $289,589 to $534,140. Archer's proposed budget for 1958 was $175,000, up only $75,000 from 1954. By 1960, however, the proposed budget had doubled, to $350,000, and by 1961 had reached $450,000. The spurt of income in 1960 came from POAU's involvement in the church-state issue raised by a Catholic running for President.
Church and State remained POAU's principle organ in "disseminating the truth" for the "crusade for freedom". Lowell stated that in 1957 over 100,000 issues were sent out monthly, the same number of members he though POAU should have after 10 years of recruitment. Actual membership stood at 32,000 in 1957, the same number who joined through getting the review between September, 1959 and September, 1960. After two years of annual growth of approximately 20%, the circulation of the review spurted 53% to 90,000 paid subscribers between September, 1959 and September, 1960, but the growth, in Lowell's opinion, was not spectacular. By the end of 1960, the review had 105,000 regular subscribers and a total circulation of 150,000. Again, POAU's involvement in the church-state issues raised by a Catholic running for President was mostly responsible for the growth of POAU and the increased circulation of Church and State.

The distribution of the review was geographically even in terms of regions, although subscribers were concentrated in certain states. In December, 1957, the center of gravity of the review's distribution was the Midwest, with about 20% of readers in each of the five major regions of the country. Over one-half of the subscribers, nevertheless, lived in 10 states, with California having the most subscribers, followed by Illinois, Missouri, and Pennsylvania. From the early days of POAU, California seemed to have been responsible for a significant portion of membership and funds.
POAU may have gotten its staunchest support from the South and from Southern Baptists, but the organization was not a southern or regional or Baptist movement. The organization functioned in selected spots across the nation, with Archer directing aid he received from the smaller cities and towns to the larger ones or to where violations of separation occurred and to activities which challenged Catholics. This redistribution of funds took into account the metropolitan and urban nature of America in the 1950's.

Overall, POAU did somewhat better than ACLU in the later fifties. While ACLU grew at a yearly annual rate of 17% from 1953 to 1960, POAU grew at a rate of approximately 23%. POAU surpassed ACLU in income by 1960, with ACLU taking in $486,694 and POAU receiving $534,140. Moreover, in four or more of these years, ACLU ended with a deficit and, in 1960, had a reserve fund of $44,000. POAU had no deficit and had a reserve fund almost eight times as large as ACLU. ACLU had a membership of 33,000 in 1954 and of 49,000 in 1960, whereas POAU had an active paid membership of 32,000 in 1957 and by September, 1960 had reached 90,000. ACLU grew in membership between 1954 and 1960 at an annual rate of 12%. POAU grew an average of 20% a year between 1957 and 1959 and from September, 1959 to September, 1960 subscriptions to Church and State grew 53%. ACLU had 14 affiliates with paid employees in major cities, while POAU had 3 regionals with a paid staff, although 23 chapters were located in major cities.
ACLU had 60 staff personnel in its affiliates and national headquarters in New York, with 6 executive staff and 16 clerical help at headquarters in 1954. In 1959, POAU had 6 staff employees at the regional office, with 12 executive staff and 6 clerical aides at headquarters. The differences reflected the more decentralized nature of ACLU. Both organizations, like public interest groups in general, maintained low overhead costs. Clearly, by 1960, POAU was in a number of ways the larger of the two organization and both institutions had comparable resources at the command of the leaders to translate into political and other forms of influence and power.

The growth was far from sufficient, however, to make POAU permanent, according to Archer's criteria. The ties between organization, finance, and promotion were not broken. No fundamental internal problems, however, threatened the organization. The growing band of critics within Protestantism was not perceived by the leadership of POAU as a major threat to POAU. By 1960, Archer was far closer to achieving his dream of building a national "shrine" for religious liberty in the nation's capital.

**LEGAL ESTABLISHMENT, LAW, LOCALS, AND LEGISLATURES**

POAU began to acquire an unfortunate legal reputation among separationists, especially in the two other principal organizations in this field of litigation, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and American Jewish Congress (AJC). Morgan, in 1967, summed up the origins of that reputation stating that POAU has never been careful about the technical development of its cases; one has the sense that it cares more about having cases on particular issues in particular places than about quality of craftsmanship or even chances of success. This casual and haphazard style is a continuing scandal to lawyers for more precedent-conscious groups (notably the AJ Congress), and there is a strong feeling within the separationist community that POAU wastes much of the money it spends on litigation. 91

Morgan concluded that POAU was an "impact-conscientious group." 92

POAU used the courts, constitutions, and the laws for educational purposes among Protestants and for political purposes against Catholics. Archer's policy was to pursue only those cases which had a chance of success, but he would organize a case or go into a community with the threat of a case in order to stiffen backbones. 93

Frank J. Sorauf has written of these three principal separationist groups and their significant relationship with 67 of the most important church-state cases between 1951-1971. He specifically agreed with Morgan's judgment, but noted that other factors were operating:

One fact governs and colors virtually all of the intergroup contacts: the relatively low esteem in which other groups hold AU. It is not new, and it is not limited to the ACLU and AJC. State councils of churches have, for instance, dissociated themselves from AU in at least two of these cases. The suspicion of AU is grounded in part in an unhappiness with AU's anti-Catholicism (or perhaps, one might say, with its commitment to a Protestant hegemony in American life and culture)—unhappiness both with the fact of the
obsession and with the public relations problems it creates. The low regard reflects also what other groups believe to be AU's reckless litigation and substandard legal work. It may also reflect an awareness elsewhere of AU's socio-political conservatism; AU simply is not a part of the generally 'liberal' style, rhetoric, and fraternalism that characterize the other separationist groups.  

Legal cases, under Archer's guidance, however, were seen merely as one more educational avenue and not the primary area of attack, as in the case of AJC and ACLU.

The program improved with Archer's hiring of Paul Blanshard as a part time, special counsel in April, 1956 and retired Army Colonel Edward Felker in 1959 as general counsel. With the coming of Blanshard, POAU's legal activity, according to Morgan, increased significantly beyond what it had been before his arrival.

Despite the differences among the three institutions, they viewed separation as protecting their interests. POAU, like ACLU and AJC, was a defense agency for a particular community of interests and its techniques, style and goals reflected its Protestantism and conservatism. POAU sought to protect Protestant interests, as it interpreted those interests, in the same way as the ACLU and AJC sought to protect their respective constituencies.

POAU leaders, however, did not seek to keep Protestantism culturally established through imposing its particular version of separation by use of the law. Most POAU leaders, and especially Archer, did not seek retention of a Protestant
hegemony, a hegemony that had not existed for quite some time. One must not associate opposition to Catholic demands and politics as necessarily anti-Catholicism. Nor must one assume that the relationship between anti-Catholicism and commitment to Protestant hegemony that existed in 19th Century and early 20th Century Protestant groups was operative among POAU leaders. The American Catholic Church was a powerful institution in the 1950's, with unity and influence to shape events and pressure individuals and organizations. It made demands upon the state that only a very powerful institution in American society could achieve. POAU leaders feared Catholic hegemony, and they at times expressed their fear in terms reminiscent of when America was a Protestant society. More frequently, they worried about keeping Protestant equal with Catholicism in the changed American society. They assumed Protestant and American interests were the same, an association similar to the association ACLU leaders made between secular and American interests. In other words, they realized that they lived in a broker state society and that they must fight for Protestant interests if those interests were to be taken into account by the important decision makers in the United States.

Moreover, in only one instance, Sunday closing laws, during the 1950's did POAU leaders interpret separation so that it would promote the interests of religion through the use of the law. In the late '50s, POAU adopted the policy
favoring the closing of businesses one day in the week, instead of forcing businesses to close on Sunday. The policy was similar to the position taken by Seventh Day Adventists, Seventh Day Baptists, and Jews. Catholic and many Protestant bodies favored Sunday closing laws. In 1967, POAU, however, came out against Sunday closing laws, even in the case of closing one day in seven, because the use of the law in these cases were confusing and inappropriate support to religious convictions.

One of Archer's major problems was finding expert counsel to represent POAU. Why so? The legal profession, he said, faced "the kind of pressure...that keeps them from being free to practice their profession." Archer stated that, "Anyone who takes a case against a Catholic Agency is a marked man in his community and state, and the church follows that man as long as he is in practice." He cited public school officials who took positions against the Catholic Church and were "dogged through their life--they're marked, and lawyers know this to be true." He told of his and Blanshard's visiting 18 law firms in Vermont before a former Governor took a case, because the attorney had fulfilled all of his political ambitions and was well enough off that his business could survive a boycott.

POAU leaders aimed through the legal program to hold the "money line" because "Money provides the acid test of intent." Appropriation of public money to sectarian groups
was unconstitutional, no matter how small, and POAU leaders sought to prove at every chance they could get the sectarianism of the American Catholic Church, and especially the distinctive nature of that sectarianism. Establishment of religion, defined as government aid to sectarian groups, was, moreover, the issue that generated the widest concern among Protestants. In addition, Archer believed that aid to the Catholic Church was but the first step in order "to capture our educational program and this means the culture of the country."

Bus bills introduced into state legislatures to provide public aid for transporting of parochial school students became the leading story in Church and State. POAU interpreted bus transportation permissible but not mandated by the Everson decision. Though technically legal, POAU leaders felt such provisions were unconstitutional. The concern with the bus issue may seem a small thing but resistance to transportation was mandated by the manifesto. Moreover, Everson allowed the aid while affirming separation. A couple of more ringing endorsements like Everson while permitting aid would completely change the meaning of separation, as POAU interpreted it. Better to stop such transportation from becoming a habit, POAU leaders reasoned, for it would be the "opening wedge" for the "camel's nose" to stick in and demand more aid.
In 1961, twenty-one states permitted busing in one form or another. Bus battles occurred in well over a dozen states after the mid-fifties, and the states of Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, and Maryland passed bus legislation. Other states as well passed laws permitting busing and POAU sought to challenge them after first fighting in the state legislatures to prevent their passage. Morgan stated that POAU had contributed to 3 of the 9 successful suits challenging the busing practices, on state constitutional grounds. POAU contributed small amounts to challenges in, at least, Wisconsin, Alaska, and Maine, but the challenges in the latter two states were, for various reasons, unsuccessful.

POAU's involvement in these state bus battles were far more than legal ones, although the depth and effectiveness of involvement was unclear. POAU seemed especially active in New Mexico, Maine, Missouri, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. Each and every battle in these areas, as in other areas, POAU perceived an organized pressure campaign by the Catholic hierarchy for political favor. Such views justified POAU's political involvement "to equalize the pressures leveled against governmental officials." Money and power and not just status were at stake. Local chapters organized, held public meetings to rally local Protestants and spotlight the issue, and brought pressure to bear on the state legislatures. Local leaders appeared before committee hearings on bus bills and flooded the legislatures with
with letters. National headquarters sent in speakers and organizers, and when legal challenges failed, it called for state-wide referendums on the issue. POAU, also, made its resources available to other groups and worked in a number of instances with and through Masons, but found the local council of churches and educational groups inadequately organized and ineffective.

The Connecticut bus law controversy of 1957 was especially bitter. Extreme recriminations were exchanged between Democrats and Republicans, with POAU defending Republican opposition to the bill and arguing that no bigotry was involved in opposing such a law. POAU's "Operation Connecticut" set up a free schools committee, held meetings, and carried out its usual activities in such cases. When the law passed, POAU dared anyone to implement the law so it could go to court to challenge it. POAU charged that bill had been "bludgeoned" through by a "ruthless pressure campaign." They tagged it the hierarchy's bill with legislators jumping under the "Clerical Whip," and threatened with political reprisals that amounted to "political blackmail."

When the President of the Connecticut Council of Churches criticized POAU, Church and State charged him with being unrepresentative of Protestants. It claimed he was typical of POAU's critics who unwittingly became part of the Catholic Church's counterstrategy in "pitting Protestant against Protestant." POAU maintained that the "Connecticut Council
of Churches offers a classic example of a Protestant organization being used by the Roman Catholic Church for denominational ends."

In referring to such bus bill battles like that in Connecticut, Archer stated the following:

Can we not see in a thousand instances and communities what is desired? Are we about to pay taxes to support teaching that refers to our converts as 'half-saved'; our religion as a 'counterfeit'; our great American safeguard of separation 'a compromise'. There is the issue. Are we 'bigots "who love freedom for all creeds, and special privilege for none"'.

The emotional tenor of Archer's remarks accurately reflected the atmosphere surrounding the bus bill fights. Theodore Powell wrote of the Connecticut bus transportation controversy:

Religious groups in a dispute over public policy tend to behave as crusaders seeking victory for a righteous cause. Political bodies search for compromise. A political crusade between strongly polarized, uncompromising belligerents imposes severe strains on the legislative process....

The distinctive feature of the 1957 legislative battle over the school bus bill was a great irony. The qualities esteemed by religious standards--persuasion, moderation, patience, respect for the demands of another's conscience, forgiveness, a spirit of brotherhood that persists despite strong differences of opinion--these qualities were displayed by the politicians. The same, alas, could not be said for the clergy themselves.

Citing Powell, Morgan concluded from the Connecticut bus fight that:

...the political argument holds that the justification of strict separation is the continued health of the political process and that to settle for anything less takes the risk of introducing toxins of uncivility into the system.
When Oregon passed laws in the late '50s permitting busing and purchase of textbooks by the state for use by parochial schools, Oregonians United, one of POAU's strongest state chapters, wanted to challenge both laws in one suit. Archer favored this tactic and contributed $1,000 for getting the suit off the ground, with the Scottish Rite and Grand Lodge Masons contributing $3,000 each. Henry Clauson, an official of the California Scottish Rite Masons and a friend of Archer's, became one of the attorneys for the case.

The Oregon ACLU cooperated with the parties but wanted to test only the textbook law. Leo Pfeffer of AJC concurred in this judgment because he reasoned that textbooks were an unjustifiable educational benefit. Bus transportation, he believed, was a justifiable aid to children by protecting them from the dangers of the highway. He argued, according to Morgan, that Everson stood little chance of being reversed, but there was a chance of reversal of Cochran. When the Masonic groups and POAU persisted in combining the two and continually delayed filling suit, ACLU withdrew, "disgusted," from the case amid mutual recriminations. ACLU filed its own suit which was successful in overturning the Oregon textbook law.

POAU won at least partial victories in its "captive school" cases in New Mexico and Missouri and attempted to do the same in Kentucky.
POAU stepped into a bitter Protestant-Catholic tug of war that had been going on at least since 1941 when it became involved in the Bradfordsville, Kentucky case. The small, conservative, Republican community of Bradfordsville, populated mostly by Methodists and Baptists, had had its high school closed by the Marion County Board of Education. The people of the town thought Catholics, who lived in the western part of the county and who were in the majority on the school board, sought to destroy the high school through denying adequate funding to the school. They refused to send their children to St. Charles or St. Francis high school, which they believed were Catholic and favored by the board. The schools, moreover, were in Lebanon, which in the townspeople's mind was a "wide open" town where the young "ran wild" subject to the influences of beer, liquor, and pool halls that did not exist in Bradfordsville. In the 1954-1955 school year, parents in the town struck and kept their children out of the Lebanon high school after the Bradfordsville high school was closed down by the Marion County School Board as substandard. A similar strike had occurred ten years before when Catholic parents refused to send their children to Bradfordsville high school.

At this point, POAU entered the fray and filed a suit to bar nuns from teaching in the public schools in their garb and another suit to reopen Bradfordsville high school. Eugene Siler, U.S. Congressman and one-time moderator of the
General Association of Baptists, represented the Kentucky Free Public Schools Committee. Jesse K. Lewis, a crusader against vice, gambling, and himself an independent candidate for governor of Kentucky in the mid-fifties on the Free Citizen's Party, took the other case.

POAU's legal cases were muddled and confused, and they were lost, although it won a partial victory on the facts on appeal when the Kentucky Court of Appeals ordered a new high school to be built because of the school board's actions were arbitrary. The bond issue for the school, however, failed at the polls. Court rulings eliminated part of the sectarian teaching in the schools, but the court upheld the right of nuns to teach in the public schools. POAU could not get cooperation from the state school board to eliminate the practices it opposed. POAU filed suit to remove the four Catholic members of the Marion County School Board because of discrimination against Protestants, but the suit also failed. POAU leaders continued involvement and aid for well over five years despite the difficult time in mustering public opinion to their side in Kentucky. During the long, inconclusive court battles, Bradfordsville declined and the new high school was built. Sorauf wrote of the outcome of the battle:

Eventually, the morale of the plaintiffs and their supporters broken, the high school at Bradfordsville was closed and the town's youngsters sent to Lebanon. Bradfordsville's life and population dwindled, and by the 1970's its one short main street was pocked with empty and fire gutted stores.
As with bus cases, POAU could not get a federal test case on the "takeover" of public schools. POAU concentrated on state and local courts. POAU representatives entered communities and organized and began publicity to create sentiment for their point of view on the local school board in order to provide a counterweight to Catholic pressure. "Since the Catholic clergy," Lowell argued, "are unable to take over and operate all public schools, they take over and operate those they are able to pre-empt." In those schools, Lowell objected, nuns taught that the United States was a Catholic nation.

In 1959, 2,055 nuns and priests taught in 281 public schools in 21 states, according to a POAU investigator. In that year, Archer had a film called "Captured" made to give publicity to the situation. Most of these captive schools were in small towns and rural backwaters where strong ethnic and religious ties governed, according to Gaylord Briley. Either outsiders from another faith from the original settlers came in or new industries entered the area and upset the political balance in these communities. These changes in many cases resulted in Protestants becoming a minority group, at which point the situation was usually brought to the attention of POAU. Leaders of POAU complained that while the Justice Department stepped in to protect the civil rights of blacks it did not do so to protect the minority rights of Protestants. In many communities, however, as Archer
pointed out, Protestants were in the majority but farmers and businessmen were convinced that nuns teaching in the public schools would save the taxpayer's money.

POAU encountered a number of difficulties in working to resolve these captive school situations. Legally, POAU ran into the problem of finding a suitable plaintiff with standing, of mootness, and of needing to exhaust local and administrative remedies before giving a case legal standing. When action took too long, supporters tended to lose interest. The publicity of POAU at times worked against it. On a number of occasions when POAU went into a community to investigate a captive schools situation, the evidence of such a situation reported to POAU had disappeared by the time Archer or Lowell investigated. Occasionally, POAU could not keep a "united front on (the) case" with local community leaders. Attorneys proved difficult to retain. At times, Protestant criticism of POAU's anti-Catholicism made action difficult in a community. POAU, however, maintained that the chief problem came from Catholicism. "Non-Catholic parents of school children," a POAU editorial writer reported, "have frequently been driven out of the community by bigots or intimidated by threats of boycott or ostracism."

In 1960, POAU won its first court case on federal constitutional grounds in Vermont, Blanshard's home state. The Vermont Supreme Court in a unanimous decision ruled that it was a violation of the constitutions of Vermont and the
United States to use local tax funds for tuition payments to parents sending their children to parochial school. The case had been a long time in the making, because of lack of interest, a common problem for POAU with legal cases. This particular case ultimately cost POAU over $10,000.

The case eventually became part of a bitter Republican-Democratic partisan battle, much in the manner of Connecticut bus issue and somewhat similar to the Bradfordsville situation. POAU finally had been able to retain the firm of former Vermont Governor and Supreme Court Justice Stanley C. Wilson and his junior partner, F. Ray Keyser, Jr., Vermont Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1958, and Republican Governor in 1960. The case required confidentiality so Archer worked discreetly through the Vermont Council of Churches. POAU leaders did not announce their involvement. Blanshard, who did much of the work on POAU's end, though from a practical attorney's viewpoint that the case looked good because "All of the five judges are Republicans." In a memorandum to Archer, he wrote:

Unfortunately, in this state the fight over Catholic policy has degenerated into a straight party fight. The Attorney who will oppose Keyser in the Supreme Court in November is Fayette, who is both the chief attorney for the Diocese of Burlington, a leading Catholic layman, and the State Chairman of the Democratic Committee of Vermont. Very confidentially Keyser has already been subject to bitter charges of bigotry by Vermont labor Democrats merely because he has consented to become the lawyer in this case. He has told me confidentially that he has heard of a letter sent out by the head of the Teamsters Union in Vermont calling for all members of the Union to oppose him as anti-Catholic because he accepted a
retainer in the Swart case. He tells me that the Democratic Party in Vermont is owned body and soul by the Catholic Church, and I can confirm this opinion from long residence here. 128

Archer, serving as a plaintiff in one case himself, tried unsuccessfully to est the constitutionality of the 1947 Hill-Burton Act that authorized federal funds to go to sectarian hospitals. The same legal problems plagued the organization in this case as in others. Compensating for lack of success in lawsuits, POAU leaders stiffened resistance to use of federal funds.

The threat of a lawsuit seemed to have in the hospital area, as in the areas of bus transportation and captured schools, occasional success. Most of the successes of POAU were in the South and involved halting disbursement of Hill-Burton funds to the American Catholic Church. POAU also was able on occasion to change the minds of local Baptists and Methodists in metropolitan areas of the South.

POAU frequently found itself "burned" on the hospital issue in much of the same manner and for many of the same reasons as in the disputes over bus transportation. Catholics and more than a few Protestants argued that the health, safety, and welfare of children, the sick, and the dying were the primary considerations in such aid. These considerations far outweighed in importance the abstract principle of separation of church and state.

POAU justified concentration on the American Catholic Church in this area, as it did in other areas, by pointing
to the singular sectarian nature of that church and the unique claims it made for itself in relationship to the state. POAU leaders cited Catholic canon law in regard to hospitals, as they cited canon law in reference to education, censorship, marriage, divorce, and Catholic lawyers and judges. POAU leaders objected to the Catholic teachings on birth control, freedom of the doctors, and on childbirth and the rights of the mother in relation to therapeutic abortions.

POAU spokespersons also objected to the consequences of this application of the medical code to American society. Lowell maintained that Catholic hospitals, like Catholic schools, were under clerical control and that to give aid to such institutions spread that clerical control into the public realm. Public officials aided clerical encroachment on areas formerly within the province of individual conscience or the state. "Are certain areas in which the American people have traditionally reserved control to themselves," he wrote, "now to be turned over to the control of clerics?" If so, Lowell feared the rule by clerics, a clerical state, and destruction of representative government. The code, Archer state, gave preferential treatment to Catholics and discriminated against non-Catholics.

"It's my opinion," Archer related to a meeting of the local ministerial association of Skokie Valley, near
Chicago, Illinois,

from wide experience that Roman Catholics will say and do most anything to obtain control of a hospital that can be built by public funds. In order to obtain that hospital they will say that it's non-sectarian. They will advertise the charitable character of the hospital. They will indicate that they will be fair to every minister, but when control is obtained and when there is sufficient strength within the community among the Catholic population, there is wide discrimination against the calling of ministers to patients for last rites. There is wide discrimination in the charges.137

Citing a number of instances of discrimination, Archer concluded that, "Rome is conciliatory when it has to be. They are arrogant and discriminatory when they have the controls to be." 138

POAU leaders showed particular concern in this area for Protestant interests. When a public hospital came to be run by a Catholic order, it had become a "public sectarian hospital" or "taken over." Federal and community tax dollars were, in effect, being used to enhance Roman Catholicism. Public property was being "given away" without much cost to that church. Because of these events, Hill-Burton became the "principal means of missionary penetration of the Protestant south by Roman Catholic forces." 139 Archer feared "that the great tradition of a Protestant Southland died when their leaders signed the Hill-Burton hospital aid bill." He concluded that "religious liberty is being stifled under a mass of defective social welfare bills."
If Archer could not stop the flow of Hill-Burton funds, he sought to stiffen Protestant backbones to guard Protestant interests in competition for funds. In Skokie Valley, for example, each of the major faiths were in the minority and a community, a Catholic, and a Lutheran hospital were competing for federal funds. Archer urged the local ministerial association to adopt a policy that would have opposed funds for the Catholic hospital unless it agreed, in effect, to follow Protestant guidelines and end objectionable medical practices.  

Unlike the other areas, Protestant institutions received federal subsidies through Hill-Burton. POAU leaders argued that in this competition with the Catholic Church for funds Protestants could not win. Of the government subsidies going to sectarian hospitals, the church, POAU leaders argued, received 70% to 80% of them. POAU leaders paid particular attention to, and was perhaps most successful in preventing, aid going to Baptist and Methodist hospitals.  

Nevertheless, by 1960, two hundred and thirty-six Protestant hospitals had crossed the money line to the tune of $112.5 million compared to 370 Catholic hospitals receiving $203 million. Controlling 55.3% of all sectarian hospitals, Catholic hospitals received between 1947 and 1960 58.4% of Hill-Burton funds. Twelve Southern Baptist hospitals received $6 million and 46 Methodist hospitals received $32 million. Because of the differences in the
the funds received the denominations, POAU leaders felt Protestants were being penalized for holding to principles that prohibited the taking of governmental aid.  

**GIVEAWAYS-TAKEOVERS**

The line between church and state, between what was private and what was public seemed to be blurring to POAU leaders. The takeover of public property like schools and hospitals by private sectarian interests represented a pattern of sectarian preemption. An editorial writer in *Church and State* thought the transfer of hospitals, built with public funds, to Catholic orders "represents a nation-wide conspiracy to preempt community, public hospitals as properties and agencies of the Roman Catholic Church."

Another facet of the views of the POAU leaders was that the sale or transfer of public facilities and property such as those built with Hill-Burton funds represented not only takeovers but giveaways of public property. Public officials gave away public property in collusion with or because of pressure from Catholic Church officials. Archer explained other ways property was given away:

One of our problems grows out of the fact that when certain groups get control of government agencies, they are prone to transfer public property, which all of the people paid for in the first instance, to the Catholic Church. In Boston 12 ertswhile public school buildings have been transferred for as little as $2000.00 each. Cardinal Spellman bought a building from Mayor O'Dwyer for $250,000, and sold it back to the same Mayor for $1,350,000 fifteen months later. This is a way of taking public tax funds for
sectarian purposes. It's a legal way, a clever way. .... In westerly Rhode Island a group of buildings was turned over to the church for the nominal fee of $1.00, and here is another way of taking public monies for church establishment.149

At a Lincoln Square, New York rally to oppose the sale of public property to Fordham University, Archer summarized the results of these takeovers-giveaways when he stated that the "Line and law (of separation are) becoming blurred today." 150

Similar to the giveaways involving public hospitals were the giveaways resulting from federal, state, and local urban renewal or "slum clearance" programs. From 1957 through 1960, land made available through urban renewal projects in Lincoln Square in New York City to Fordham University and in Mill Creek in St. Louis to St. Louis University received most of the attention in POAU publicity. In the case of Fordham, in which POAU filed no suit but gave much publicity to, POAU entered the fray "more in endorsement of fighting spirit of New York leadership than in hope of victory." 153 Archer argued that the Society of Jesus was under alien control and that many Jesuits were not citizens of the United States. These facts along to Archer should have disqualified the universities from receiving a public subsidy. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that Fordham's participation in the project violated the Constitution. The lawsuit of the St. Louis Chapter, which received far less publicity than the activities in New York, involved very narrow legal grounds in which separation did not figure prominently
but related to the giveaway technique.

The men of POAU considered the land acquired by both Fordham and St. Louis universities to have cost both of them so little in comparison with the fair market price of the property that they were, in effect, given away by public officials. Also, POAU leaders believed such sales by public officials constituted governmental subsidies that promoted the proselytizing and propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church.

POAU leaders concern for appropriation of public property by the American Catholic Church was indicative of an underlying fear that, despite all of the work of POAU, POAU was losing the battle for America. Subtly the transformation of the United States continued. Wherever the Catholic Church was POAU leaders saw signs of fundamental reorientation toward Catholic ideas and practices. Significant victories seemed small in comparison with the feverish activities of POAU and the enormous job that always needed to be done but that could not be done for lack of money.

By the latter '50s, the control of urban areas by Catholics had advanced to the point that the American Catholic Church now was taking over what had been private interests. The interests of the church merged with the public interests in these areas. "One by one," an editorial writer in 1957 argued, "the names of American cities are being quietly captured by Roman Catholic educational institutions while
non-Catholic citizens permit the genteel larceny without protest." The editorialist cited 13 Catholic universities which had taken over "historic American locality names" in order to "create the impression that the Catholic institutions bearing the public labels are American in nature and control...." The writer concluded, "Hands off! American names belong to America!"

Something new had permanently entered the United States, POAU leaders believed, and this new element was spreading and causing the line to blur between private and public interests. Clericalism was that new element and increasingly became POAU leaders main focus. Roman Catholic clericalism, according to Archer in 1958, destroyed religion, for religion flourished only "like business, under free enterprise, free competition, and not under political favors or state support." POAU leaders, especially Lowell, emphasized that the lessons of history taught that certain things followed clericalism. By acquiring land through "coddling favoritism" of government, the Catholic Church grew wealthy. This land was tax-exempt and, Lowell observed, a big church with a great deal of tax-exempt land was "the root of anti-clericalism." Separation of church and state was POAU leaders solution to these problems, problems which increasingly preoccupied that leadership during the 1960's and 1970's.
POAU leaders successfully prevented a "giveaway" involving Presbyterian College of St. Petersburg, Florida. When the college had accepted a gift of public land in 1959, POAU leaders conferred with the college officials while giving local publicity to the possibility of a lawsuit and to the gift of public property to a sectarian institution. After negotiations, the college agreed to pay $500,000 for the property, which POAU leaders believed to be a fair price. The American Jewish Committee praised POAU's work in this case for the "minimum damage to community relations." Presbyterian College involved separation and sectarianism; whereas, the two Catholic universities were also part of the battle for the culture of America.

The disposal of surplus federal property was a "giveaway" that did not bring protests from POAU leaders despite the $47,840,265 worth of real estate going to the churches between 1946 and 1963. Sixty-eight percent of the property went to the Roman Catholic Church, Seventh Day Adventists, and Southern Baptists. Catholics received through 222 transfers almost $16 million, while the Adventists and Baptists received over $14 million through 166 transfers of federal property. Methodists received $758,753 through 24 transfers. In the early sixties, POAU leaders became concerned with such giveaways as the above denominations began to change their policy in regard to accepting federal surplus property.
EDUCATING THE PUBLIC AND PRESSURE POLITICS

Archer designed POAU to be its own public relations firm and he thought of problems in terms of public relations. The original intent of public relations was a means of fund-raising, educating, and creating an image for POAU of power and prestige. Public relations was also part of an ongoing propaganda war with the Roman Catholic Church and a means of influencing behavior.

POAU leaders used every means at their disposal "to reach the heart and mind of American people." Archer aimed for "an impact upon the American mind." He believed that, "an impact we must make, for the mind of America is ours if we can but reach it." POAU spoke from "the house-tops of the nation" to the "silent longing of the American people" in their "inherent aversion to all tyranny." POAU stood between the Roman Catholic Church, "organized to seize the citadels of cultural influence and manipulate them in their own interests," and its domination of the American mind. If POAU kept "our fathers" heritage of freedom that was "integral to the America we love," the following generations will rise up and "call us blessed."

The POAU leaders emphasized propaganda because they believed that Catholic propaganda had swayed the minds away from the American view of liberty. Lowell, in 1957, observed that despite the success of POAU and ten years of work a number of Protestants still had little idea of what
POAU was doing, and they were even publicly criticizing POAU. "We are in danger," Lowell said,

of establishing a mentality in this land which insists that opposition to sectarian subsidy is evil and dirty, or that this is church-state separation in an 'extreme' form. Opposition to the church subsidy is being slickly branded as 'secularism'. We are being told that anyone friendly to religion is also friendly to state financing of religion. It is such cleverly designed propaganda that we have to overcome and also, at times, the indifferent and lost of our own people who have halfway succumbed to it.

The battle is for the mind of America. The issue is whether we shall succumb here to a clerical encroachment upon our free institutions or whether these institutions shall remain free, the guerdon and pride of all people of all creeds. The battle is sternly joined.172

The mind could be brought back, according to Archer.

In order to build morale and stiffen backbones, Archer, in time honored fashion, turned his opponent's epithet for him into fighting words to be proud of. "To be brave requires courage," he stated, "Courageously to stand for principle often means a loss of business through reprisals and boycotts." He believed that "A false tolerance and spurious brotherhood softens the touch of many Americans."

These people fear to be called a 'bigot', a smear term I am pleased and proud to wear, if wearing it may help to preserve our religious liberty.174

POAU thus developed a studied policy of turning the source of intolerance around. The author of an early 1954 Church and State editorial defined bigotry as the denial of liberty to others.

A bigot, then, is a lover of liberty—for himself alone, He is one who is so convinced of his own
infallibility, or the infallibility of his church or party, that he believes himself called upon to separate the sheep from the goats among his neighbors and to 'put the fear of God' (meaning himself) into the latter.

It is an error to assume that every person who at any time fights for his own liberty is by that token a true believer in the principle of liberty. The acid test is: Will the person fight for his own liberty also fight for the liberty of others—even those with whom he disagrees.

The editorialist then applied this view to the Roman Catholic Church.

To believe that one's own religion is 'true' and that other religions are 'false' does not necessarily make one a bigot—but to go further and conclude that the poor benighted followers of 'false' religions have no 'right' to freedom of worship is, indeed, to succumb to the disease of bigotry. The claim by the Roman Catholic Church to an exclusive 'right' to propagate religious 'truth'—and, in Catholic countries, to suppress religious 'untruth'—is in irreconcilable conflict with American democracy's insistence that all citizens are equal before the law. ...

POAU differs with no church groups except where such groups seek to use the power and wealth of government in order to secure a place of privilege in the life of our country. So long as the traditional 'wall of separation between church and state' is firmly maintained, no 'tyger' of religious warfare will be unchained in the United States. 175

As stated previously, POAU leaders understood how to wield influence in the "broker state" society of mid-20th century America. They used public relations to gain impact because recognition was vital. Lowell noted in 1957 that in state legislatures where concessions to parochial schools arose POAU had become "a recognized factor in all such contests." 176 Archer believed that POAU had become a recognized factor in the nation because when Roman Catholic leaders made
a statement, the news media called for POAU's reaction. Recognition by an increasingly powerful mass media was important in itself irrespective of the image that came across.

POAU leaders also were caught up in another aspect of mid-century public relations, the creation of appearances, the seeming reality of constant activity and importance. A good example of these frequently used devices was the Christian Brothers case. Appearing before a 1956 congressional tax hearing, Blanshard brought to light the tax-exempt status for wine-making by the Christian Brothers, a Roman Catholic religious order, whose corporate name was DeSalle Institute of California. Tax-exemption had been granted on the basis that wine marketing was a church-related activity. Blanshard contended that the Christian Brothers was not a church and therefore should not receive such tax-exemption. Moreover, a religious order, according to Blanshard, should not receive tax-exemption based on unrelated business income derived from "unchurchly" activity. This order also competed unfairly with other wine-makers who had to pay corporate taxes.

POAU got part of what it wanted. The new tax ruling stated that such religious orders as the Christian Brothers were not churches for purposes of tax-exemption on its income. POAU leaders were still not satisfied. They found the ruling unsatisfactory because it excluded Jesuits, who ran a radio station and who were at that time under challenge by POAU. The Justice Department, who refused POAU's urgings
to include it in the Christian Brothers case, did however initiate a successful suit against the Christian Brothers for back taxes, which according to POAU cost the order $4 million.

Meanwhile, POAU leaders went about creating a "favorable climate of opinion" for their views. A spate of stories appeared on tax favoritism, special privileges, giveaways, and handouts involved in the case. The initial story in Church and State on the case appeared with a photograph of Blanshard holding up two bottles of wine with the caption, "Tax Exemption For These?" A number of stories followed on the Catholic lotteries, bingo, and such items as "church liquor and gambling operation." POAU had exposed the Christian Brothers and gave extraordinary publicity to the case. POAU stories and literature gave the distinct impression that the lawsuit and all the surrounding activity were POAU's doing. When the Christian Brothers lost the case, POAU trumpeted that "bad publicity" had "forced" it to refund its taxes. And when the order filed a suit appealing the ruling, POAU stories hinted that there was something underhanded in its doing so.

Educating the public to the threat of clericalism led POAU leaders into pressure politics. In December, 1956, the film Martin Luther, which had been occasionally banned, was cancelled by WGN-TV in Chicago. POAU charged the cancellation resulted from the actions of the Legion of Decency and
and the National Organization for Decent Literature. Local Catholics organized a boycott and pressure campaign and a "bigot blitz" in aid of "clerical blockade" of the film. Lowell, who did a "slow burn" over the cancellation, wrote to Reverend John W. Harms of the Chicago Church Federation, which led a massive protest and petition drive to get the film shown, that "We dare not let it die." Lowell wanted pressure on the station until out of desperation it showed the film. Otherwise, Lowell believed that "they have us across the barrel and that will be it." He was certain gigantic rallies to mobilize Protestant forces could be attained for "This is one to arouse everybody." Unanimity could be gotten on this issue because Protestants believed that "Freedom must be mutual or it is non-existent."

At the same time, POAU leaders worked behind the scenes with other Protestant leaders who had formed the Action Committee for Freedom of Religious Expression. One member of the committee was Harold Fey, editor of the *Christian Century* and board member of the Executive Committee, Illinois Division, ACLU.

While Lowell stiffened Chicagoan backbones, Archer tried to organize pressure from Washington. He fired off salvos to HUAC and the FCC calling for investigations of this suppression "subversive of American freedom" and this "un-American activity...." Lacking "faith in the courage and independence" of the FCC, Archer called on Senator Warren G.
Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to investigate the violation of the station's license through suppression of free expression of ideas. Subsequently Blanshard went on a series of mass meetings in the midwest and west to get letters of protest sent to Magnuson calling for an investigation. POAU leaders approached a senator on Magnuson's committee and some southern congressmen to call for an investigation. POAU leaders, through a meeting with an official of the FCC, found out that the speaker of the house, who made much of his Southern Baptist membership, had a relative on the FCC and that such contact might prove helpful. The FCC official as well indicated that when the time for renewal of WGN-TV's license came up a demand for a hearing could not be ignored if there was a file bulging with complaints from individual churches. Most television stations broadcasted the film and the controversy soon died down.

POAU leaders, as "part of a counterattack against the sectarian pressure" involved in the cancellation of the Martin Luther film in Chicago, questioned granting of television channel licenses to Loyola University, New Orleans and St. Louis University, St. Louis. POAU argued that these Jesuit institutions were "alien" controlled, were "fanatically devoted to the authoritarian system of control of the Roman Catholic Church," and were partisan. The result, according to POAU, was that one could anticipate discriminatory
practices, favoritism, and no freedom for other religious
faiths on their airwaves.

When the FCC granted Loyola University a license, POAU
leaders called on the House commerce committee to investi-
gate the FCC for "deliberately and openly practic(ing) re-
ligious favoritism." POAU subsequently filed a friend of
the court brief in an unsuccessful appeal of the grant to
Loyola University. Despite the defeat, Archer spoke of
the slowing down of the drive for acquisition of radio and
television stations by Catholic orders.

CONCLUSION

Clearly Archer, through soft spoken diplomacy, had be-
come the originator of policy. Management determined policy.
He had the instruments of power and of organization in his
hands. He had the list of members, the files, the magazine,
the recognition as Mr. POAU; he selected personnel, raised
the money and prepared the budget and kept the books; and
he was the morale builder.

POAU had accomplished a good deal by 1960 under the lead-
ership of Archer. This accomplishment came despite the ad-
verse affect on the discussion of issues relating to separa-
tion by the conservative propaganda campaign. POAU was not
silenced, and the leaders were able to raise separationist
issues and obtain a goodly number of victories, especially
at the local and community level. POAU grew appreciably in
finances, organization, and membership, especially during
1959 and 1960. The most important accomplishment was endorsement of POAU by the Methodist Church in 1960. POAU leaders had the influence and support to overcome powerful opposition among bureaucratic leaders in the church. Grassroots support was no small part of the reason for the support of POAU. In order to achieve the backing by denominations representing a majority of Protestants, POAU leaders changed policy to allow official denominational representation. Independence of action seemed not to have been affected to any great degree nor did POAU become an official arm of the Protestant churches, as the Anti-Saloon League of America had been. POAU leaders were able to translate their resources into power, promoting Protestant interests and becoming a recognized force in American society in regard to separation.

Archer's aim in building up POAU was not so much the exercise of power as to win hearts and minds. He sought to win hearts and minds through education, pressure, politics, and lawsuits. In a number of instances, chapters had impact in local communities and state legislatures, although the extent of that impact was not clear. Chapters organized and protested in areas like giveaways and takeovers and at times were able to create sentiment and pressure for resolution of church-state violations. At times, however, chapters did not seem to have been efficiently run, well managed, appropriately staffed, or effective. The most effective
technique used by POAU leaders was the threat of a lawsuit. POAU successes seemed to have been greatest in the use of this device.

Despite the legal reputation of POAU among fellow separationist experts, the legal approach of POAU officials fitted into their overall aim. The aim was to win hearts and minds to separation as well as to awake those indifferent to the concept to its importance for the American people. Nonetheless, the approach meant that a number of suits were initiated for other than legal and constitutional reasons and were thus not legally successful. Overall, legal victories were substantial in some areas, like bus transportation, while in areas such as hospitals taking Hill-Burton funds legal successes were nil. POAU, however, was able on a number of occasions to negotiate Protestant churches out of taking funds. Like public interest groups, POAU leaders seldom achieved all they wished for or solved particular problems of separation immediately or larger violations of separation once and for all.

In the latter-fifties, the growth of Protestant critics and ecumenism, which was partly the outgrowth of the promotion of religion, were major problems faced by POAU leaders. POAU officials met these challenges head on and saw at this stage little fundamental problem to the effective functioning and influence of POAU. They, however, saw the Protestant critics and ecumenists as dangerous to separation
of church and state and reacted accordingly. The conflict between these two groups and POAU leaders became involved in the issues raised by the election campaign of 1960.
CHAPTER VI: FOOTNOTES

1. Glenn L. Archer, n.t., speech, Board of Directors, St. Louis Chapter, POAU, March 28, 1958, p. 1 in POAU files.


5. Glenn L. Archer, "8th Annual Report of Executive Director to Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council," POAU at Washington, D.C. on January 25, 1956, p. 15 in POAU files and "Minutes of Board of Trustees Meeting, 2nd Executive Session," POAU at Washington, D.C., on September 17, 1959, p. 4 in POAU files. Public interest groups, according to Berry, generally keep their overhead costs low, especially in regard to offices, office space, furnishings, and clerical aid. Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 63-64.


9. "Minutes of Board of Trustees Meeting, 2nd Executive Session," September 17, 1959, p. 4 and Glenn L. Archer speech to Board of Directors, St. Louis, Missouri on March 28, 1958, p. 3 in POAU files.


12. Archer, "Executive Director's 7th Annual Report...," January 19, 1955, pp. 3-4. Private foundations, like Ford, because of their tax-exempt status were prohibited from giving money to political and propagandistic groups. Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 47-48.


See Chapter VIII.

22. POAU's proposed budgets for 1955-1961, in POAU files, and Table 1.


33. "Minutes of Board Meeting," POAU, Washington, D.C., on September 17, 1959, pp. 4-5 in POAU files.


36. Church and State (December, 1953), p. 2. One representative was appointed for every one million members of the church that endorsed POAU.

37. Archer to Board of Trustees, August 21, 1959, p. 2.


46. The letter is Ward to Southgate, September 18, 1959, p. 1.


50. George B. McKibben letter to Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, May 23, 1959, p. 1, copy in POAU files is without an address. Also, G. Bromley Oxnam letter to Mr. George B. McKibben, June 1, 1959, copy without letter head in POAU files.


53. Ibid., p. 2. See also Herbert S. Southgate letter to J. Homer Magee, Annandale, Virginia, September 15, 1959, pp. 1-2 in POAU files.


58. Church and State, Vol. 13, No. 8 (September, 1960), p. 2. For other endorsements of its work by various denominations see Research Department, POAU, memo, dated 2/16/60, in POAU files; Church and State, Vol. 8, No. 11 (December, 1955), p. 1 and Vol. 11, No. 8 (September, 1958), p. 6; and The Church Herald, Vol. XVI, September 4, 1959, No. 34, pp. 6-7 in POAU files. The Church Herald is the official weekly organ of the Reformed Church in America.

Also Church and State, Vol. 13, No. 9 (October, 1960), p. 2.

60. See, for example, Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler,
The Irony of Democracy (California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc., 1972), especially, pp. 213-218, 236, 287-290,
and 294-298.

to Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council," POAU,
Washington, D.C., on December 3, 1957, p. 3 in POAU files.

62. Archer, "8th Annual Report of Executive Director...,"
January 25, 1956, p. 15.

63. "Joint Executive Session, Board of Trustees, and National
Advisory Council, Minutes," POAU at Washington, D.C., on
December 4, 1956, p. 2 in POAU files.

64. Mayne, "Report of the Director of Organization...,"
December 3, 1957, p. 2.

65. "Minutes of Joint Executive Session, Board of Trustees
and National Advisory Council," POAU at Boston, Massachu-
setts on February 11, 1959, p. 6, in POAU files.

December 3, 1957, p. 3 and "Report of Organization Depart-
ment...," June 5, 1958, p. 1.

67. "Minutes of Joint Executive Session, Board of Trustees
and National Advisory Council," POAU, n.p., February 15,

68. "Report of Organization Department...," June 5, 1958,
p. 1.

69. Glenn L. Archer, "Memo to Members, Board of Trustees,"
n.p., December 30, 1960, p. 1 in POAU files and Lowell,
"Annual Report of Associate Director...," December 3, 1957,
p. 5.

70. James M. Windham, Director, Midwestern Regional Office
Report to Board of Trustees, POAU," Washington, D.C. on
September 6, 1960, p. 2, mimeograph in POAU files.

71. Mayne, "Report of the Director of Organization...,"
De-
cember 3, 1957, p. 3.

72. Ibid., pp. 1-4.


76. Glenn L. Archer letter to Bertram T. Clark (St. Louis, Missouri), Washington, D.C., February 20, 1958, p. 2 in POAU files.


78. POAU, Blueprint for Action and Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 144-145.


84. See Table 1 and proposed budgets for 1958-1961, mimeographed copies in POAU files.


92. Ibid., pp. 195-196.


94. Ibid., p. 81. National ACLU leaders were quite leery of Protestant promotion of what they called "non-sectarian religious morality" in the public schools. American Civil Liberties Union, Constitutional Liberty, 1958, p. 7.

95. See Mayne interview with Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 145. Blanshard was also made contributing editor, while Lichtenstein was made Director of Research in July, 1956. Archer remained editor. Church and State Vol. 9, No. 4 (April, 1956), p. 2 and Vol. 9, No. 7 (July, 1956), p. 2.

96. The issue of Sunday closing laws continually divided POAU's leadership. Believing that prescribed closing on Sunday impinged on the religious liberty of those who did not observe Sunday as the Sabbath or a day of rest, POAU opted for closing one day a week by a business. The choice of the day was to be left to the business and supposedly did not involve the law. POAU, however, believed that business
should be made to close one day a week, although it did not specify whether the closing should be required for religious or general welfare reasons. Such a requirement would involve the use of the law in order to promote religion if based upon original religious intent of the Sunday closing laws. Blanshard argued in 1959 that Sunday closing laws should be retained by the Supreme Court, which was soon to rule on their constitutionality, on the basis that they were measures for the benefit of the general welfare, which was the basis upon which the Supreme Court ruled the laws constitutional. Blanshard feared that if the Court ruled them unconstitutional on the basis of their general welfare function the whole social welfare laws passed since the New Deal would be endangered. See Church and State (July-August, 1959), p. 2 and (September, 1961), p. 5 and (April, 1965), p. 5 and Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 83-85.

For the reversal of the above position by POAU see Church and State (February, 1967), p. 14.


100. See Indexes to Church and State, Vol. 7 (1954) and Vols. 8-10 (1955-1957) and Vols. 11-13 (1958-1960. In 1954, there were 3 stories on bus transportation; in 1955-1957, 52 stories appeared; and between 1958 and 1950, 64 stories.


103. Archer speech, n.t., to Board of Directors, St. Louis, Missouri, March 28, 1958, p. 4; "POAU Achievements,
1959-61," n.d., p. 4 in POAU files; and Church and State (July-August, 1960), p. 5. ACLU stated that literally hundreds of local school boards were faced with this bus transportation issue. See American Civil Liberties Union, Justice For All, 1957, pp. 56-57 and 62.


106. Without the files of the various chapters, it is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy the detailed actions and effects of those chapters.


111. Glenn L. Archer, The Ramparts We Watch, pamphlet of


114. Ibid., pp. 230-236. See also "Board of Trustees Report ...11th Annual Meeting, February 12, 1959, pp. 14 & 16; "Statement to the Coordinating Council of the Methodist Church..." pp. 6-8; and Church and State, Vol. 13, No. 4 (April, 1960), p. 5.

115. See Chapter V.


123. Ibid, p. 2; Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 223; Archer,


128. Morgan, ibid., p. 216.


135. POAU, *ibid.*, pp. 3 & 6; Felker, *The Silver Spring Hospital Story*, pp. 4-6.


137. Archer, address, n.t., and Questions and Answers, Skokie Valley Ministerial Association, May 22, 1957, p. 3.


139. "Statement to the Coordinating Council of the Methodist Church...," p. 12.


149. Archer, address, n.t., Questions and Answers, Skokie Valley Ministerial Association, May 22, 1957, pp. 16-17.


152. See Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 99-100.


154. See for example C. Stanley Lowell, "Testimony Offered at a Public Hearing of the City Planning Commission of New York City, on the Lincoln Square Project, Wednesday, September 11, 1957, at City Hall," pp. 1-6, in POAU files.


156. American Civil Liberties Union, Constitutional Liberty, 1958, p. 33.


163. "Confidential Report of the Legal Department..."


183. Ibid., (November, 1958), p. 3.


191. Ibid. (January, 1957), pp. 1 & 8; Glenn L. Archer telegram to Francis E. Walter, Chairman, House Committee on


197. Archer, n.t., speech to Board of Directors, St. Louis Chapters, March 23, 1958, p. 4.


199. For Anti-Saloon League of America as an arm of the Protestant churches and the leaders dependence on those churches, see Odegard, Pressure Politics, pp. 34-35.


201. No one had success in challenging Hill-Burton funds through litigation.

CULTURE OF LIBERTY:
HISTORY OF AMERICANS UNITED
FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1947-1973
VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Ronald James Boggs, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1978

Reading Committee: Approved By
Marvin Zahniser
John C. Burnham
Bradley Chapin

Adviser
Department of History
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter | Page
--- | ---
POAU and its Critics | 403
POAU and the Election of 1960: Kennedy, Brotherhood, Religion, and A Changing America | 418
Conclusion | 467

VIII. CHANGING CLIMATE OF OPINION AND YEARS OF CRISIS: 1961-1973 | 487
Ecumenism | 488
Secularism and Amending the First Amendment | 509
Internal Problems | 516
Conclusion | 552

IX. REDEFINITION OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE FROM FEDERAL AID TO PAROCHIAID: 1961-1973 | 577
Federal Aid to Education in the Kennedy and Johnson Years: 1961-1965 | 579
Parochiaid in the States: Referenda, Constitutional Conventions, and Amendments and Politics, Legislatures, and the Courts | 592
Parochiaid: Pro and Con | 646
Other Areas | 656
Conclusion | 666
X. CULTURE OF LIBERTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term Trends: Voluntarists and Institutionalists</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietists and Liturgicals</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate of Opinion and Education</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and Tactics: Capabilities, Effects, and Changes</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIXES

A. Protestants and Other Americans
United for Separation of Church and State - A Manifesto.................. | 733  |

B. Tables 1-12

C. Figure 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

xix
CHAPTER VII
ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE, POLITICAL CATHOLICISM,

In the years from the mid-50's through 1960, POAU came under increasingly critical scrutiny from a number of Protestants. The two critical issues dividing POAU leaders from their Protestant opponents involved whether absolute separation best served Protestant interests and whether separation and anti-Catholicism were compatible. Appropriate Protestant relations with Catholicism and the nature of the Catholic religion and its relation to politics underlay opposition between the two groups. The dispute also revolved around whether or not Catholicism was changing and whether it could change. Another area of dispute centered upon the nature of pluralism, on whether religious or cultural pluralism best defined the nature of the American society. Each group claimed to be more representative of Protestantism, with POAU's opponents arguing that POAU did as much harm as good and POAU leaders asserting that their critics had lost their Protestant(evangelical) convictions.

The presidential candidacy of Senator John F. Kennedy (D., Mass.) provided a focal point for intra-Protestant debate. Kennedy's candidacy exacerbated tensions and
divisions within Protestantism as well as between Protestants and Catholics. The actions of POAU leaders in relation to Kennedy and the election campaign of 1960 dramatically increased identification of POAU as a controversial institution and as a representative of conservative, evangelical Protestantism.

POAU AND ITS CRITICS

By late 1955 and 1956, POAU had begun to encounter some difficulties with important Protestant representatives, mostly liberals. The NCC had publicly distanced itself from POAU, and on at least three occasions in late 1955 POAU's opponents within NCC had voiced their criticism of POAU through the *Christian Century*. While defending POAU as an ecumenical alliance of divergent Protestant groups and the nonchurched, a magazine editorial called for an end to Protestant "paranoia" and Catholic "claustrophobia." Protestant should stop regarding every American Catholic action as threatening Protestantism, said the editorial writer. Also, Catholics should stop feeling shut out by Protestant society and should cease their aggressive fighting for increased status. The *Christian Century* simultaneously supported POAU and strict separation and a change in Protestant-Catholic relations. More significantly, opposition to POAU, by men like Ward and McKibbon, had been strong enough in 1956 to prevent the Methodist General Conference from endorsing it.
Also, liberal churches, which had previously aligned themselves with POAU and strict separation, began to withdraw their support from POAU. This trend became especially prominent by the latter fifties.  

In each of the above cases, POAU leaders perceived a common source of opposition to POAU. Their opponents were "brotherhooders" who favored or were members of interfaith groups such as commissions on human relations and the National Conference of Christian and Jews (NCCJ), which was founded in 1928 as a result of the religious conflict in that year. POAU leaders found their critics guilty of close association with Catholics, making them unworthy representatives of Protestant interests. 

POAU leaders had publicly clashed at least twice with local chapters of the NCCJ by the mid-50's, once in New Orleans in 1953 and once in Kansas City in 1956. In each case, the local NCCJ charged POAU officials with disrupting community harmony and with using separation as a cover to attack the American Catholic Church and the loyalty of Catholics to America. In both instances, POAU retorted that the local NCCJ acted under the influence of Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. When policemen showed up at one POAU rally in a Kansas City Presbyterian Church, where Archer spoke, POAU blamed "Roman Catholic Action." POAU reported that fears of police action, harassment, and intimidation were voiced at the meeting, quoting one minister's response
that "Spain is much closer than we thought."

Brotherhood under such circumstances, argued POAU, was impossible, and Protestant believers in brotherhood on these terms aided in the destruction of American liberty and Protestantism. The "appeasing" brotherhoods ignored "the hostility of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to any real 'brotherhood' effort under which the equality of all groups would be recognized." On numerous occasions, POAU leaders cited canon law and Catholic writings on interfaith relations dealing with worship, marriage, divorce, and the prohibition of Catholics from reading books on other faiths as examples of this denial of equality and liberty.

The intolerance of this "uni-lateral type of liberty" derived from the "inherent philosophy" of the Roman Catholic Church and led to clerical control destroying free minds and free souls. Catholic officials hid this deeper intolerance by giving lip service to surface tolerance in order to better "mask...their designs" so that they could use organizations like the NCCJ as a "Roman front" to gain influence among Protestants. The "'nice fellowship' diabetes" permitted Catholics to insinuate themselves through their business and marital ties into political power and majority status in a community where they changed "the law and structure of our free country."

The major threat of the brotherhood syndrome came from its effect upon Protestant convictions. Morrison
expressed the opinion "that NCCJ (was) doing more to weaken the vigor of Protestants in their struggle for religious liberty than any other group." Convictions had softened and courage sapped to the point that some Protestants allowed themselves to be used as tools and willing dupes. They acquiesced to their own persecution and yet when the dangers were pointed out to them, they tried to silence the messenger of the "reality of the dangers." These sentimentalists feared public controversy, although controversy provided "a kind of safety valve against violence."

Protestantism needed unity on church-state issues, and brotherhooders divided it by criticizing POAU. Catholics depended upon divisions and rivalries among Protestants, and Protestants failed to comprehend the peril facing it. "It's (the Catholic) maneuver," Lowell stated

is to get Protestant leaders to criticize POAU(,) then widely publicize the statements. It uses the NCCJ and councils on human relations for these purposes.... It tries to portray P.O.A.U. to the public as being'anti-Catholic' and a disturber of community relations because it opposes subsidies to the Roman Church."

Criticisms of the leadership, position, and methods of POAU came also from the Christianity and Crisis. The writers in the magazine who wrote the articles critical of POAU were at one time or another associated with the Union Theological Seminary in New York and with its leader, Reinhold Niebuhr, the leading neo-orthodox or neo-conservative thinker in the United States. In 1957, after nine years of silence on POAU,
the public criticisms of POAU appeared in the magazine.

On April 1, 1957, an editorial entitled "A Lamentable 'Protestant' Strategy" and written by Robert McAfee Brown, Professor at the Union Theological Seminary, appeared in Christianity and Crisis. The origin of Brown's objection was POAU's challenge, in response to the Chicago television cancellation of the Martin Luther film, to the airwave rights of the Jesuit-run universities of St. Louis and Loyola. Brown interpreted POAU's tactic as aimed at keeping "a Catholic point of view from getting a hearing," and he believed that such a strategy was lamentable because it defined Protestantism as anti-Catholicism. He called on Protestants "to disassociate themselves in large numbers from an organization so ill-equipped to speak in their name." 17

POAU officials immediately defended themselves. Lowell thought Brown was disqualified to speak for Protestants because he had "also been a paid writer for Commonweal...." 18 POAU leaders argued that Jesuits believed in "ecclesiastical authoritarianism," had a "long record of discrimination against non-Catholic programs," and were aliens as aliens were defined by existing statute. "We are not using," Archer wrote in a letter to all members of the Union Theological Seminary,

the concept of 'Americanism' or the word 'alien' in this case blindly or vindictively. We hold no brief for narrow nationalism. But we are realists and not sentimentalists. It would be a serious blow to religious as well as cultural freedom in the
United States if the Jesuits secured their projected chain of television stations. 19

Lowell believed Brown especially naive in thinking that no official pressure had been applied in Chicago and that the Roman Catholic Church favored tolerance. "Dr. Brown," he wrote, "seems to take strongest exception to the P.O.A.U. protest because it was in 'retaliation' for Roman Catholic pressure in Chicago."

This is amazing naivete. Many Americans feel that the Roman Church's drive for public funds and state sponsorship must definitely be resisted. If resistance, what kind of resistance? Our answer is that the same kind of force must be used in resistance that the Roman Church uses in its aggression. What does 'Catholic action' mean? It means simply socio-political pressure. This kind of pressure must be met with counter-pressure—that is all. We cannot hope to meet the challenge of Roman Catholic action by passing around saccharine-coated opiates and gently murmuring 'God bless us everyone.' We must, rather, speak the language that will be understood. We must offer not only parry but riposte.

...The alternative is to let the pressure mount until it becomes oppression, as it has in other lands—let it mount until only ugly and direct action will avail the people for relief. This kind of action—and Americans are not altogether strangers to it—is as abhorrent to us as it would be to Dr. Brown. 20

An exchange between Reinhold Niebuhr and a conciliatory Lowell followed. Niebuhr was well aware of the problems posed by the American Catholic Church and its power structure. He, however, believed it could change and accommodation with it could be reached. While opposed to general aid, Niebuhr favored fringe benefit aid to private schools in the form of school lunches and bus rides. He acknowledged that Lowell was not a fanatic in defense of absolute
separation since he took into account other equally valid views. Nor did Niebuhr think that Lowell was an anti-Catholic, for Lowell had stood on principle and argued for Protestant renunciation of tax exemptions. Niebuhr, nonetheless, remained adamant in his objections to the general aims of POAU. He viewed it as advocating "pure principle," which he found dangerous, and as following the same line of thought as economic conservatives in defense of laissez-faire economics.

Lowell had argued from the premise of pluralism, a deeply held value on the part of Niebuhr as well as on the part of POAU leaders. Lowell, however, did not argue from the basis of cultural pluralism, a position the advocates of which acknowledged the equality and validity of the major faiths. He argued from the basis of a religious pluralism that found all religions equally sectarian. Lowell stated that just because he did take into consideration "'the principle of community in a pluralistic society'" he opposed subsidies to 258 denominations. He opposed sectarian indoctrination in the public schools as impossible in a pluralistic society. Public schools created for all creeds a sense of community out of the diverse religious life in communities throughout the nation. Cultural pluralism, on the other hand, created enclaves and segregated schools and communities isolated from the mainstream of American life and to aid such schools was to further divide and segregate
life in the United States.

The exchange did not prevent criticism of POAU by writers in Christianity and Crisis, for on September 16, 1957, an article appeared with the title of "Protestantism, Catholicism, and POAU." The writer of the article was Tom G. Sanders, who the previous year had been an assistant to Niebuhr and who was a member of the religious department of Sweet Briar College in Virginia. Sanders' article was the most thorough critique that had yet appeared of POAU. The critique raised the same issues that Niebuhr had given voice to. These issues were pluralism, absolute separation aiding the secularistic threat to Protestantism, and the charge that POAU supported secularist public schools through favoring the teaching of a religion of democracy instead of the Judeo-Christian heritage.

Because Sanders perceived Blanshard as combining secularism and anti-Catholicism, Blanshard bore the brunt of Sanders' criticisms. Sanders asserted the POAU was not representative of Protestantism and that not many Protestants considered POAU a legitimate "instrument of Protestant opinion on the church-state issue." He offered no proof for his assertions however. Nor, in fact, was Blanshard, a part-time employee, representative of POAU.

POAU leaders did not understand the internal workings of the Roman Catholic Church, Sanders maintained. They quoted the most disagreeable statements of the church out of
context as if the statements were universal positions of the church, while ignoring more "tolerable" views. POAU leaders failed to grasp the lack of authority and hierarchy within the church, which left much room for individual interpretations, leeway on politics, and even some on morals. POAU officials incorrectly thought Catholics regarded the Pope as infallible on every issue. Especially displeasing to Sanders was POAU's unwillingness to give any credit to the church for its religious mission. Instead, POAU viewed it as a "power organization working for the enslavement of the minds and pocketbooks of mankind" and a pressure group driven by "clerical machinations."

Moreover, POAU leaders failed to comprehend the relationship of Catholicism to America. Catholic concepts of freedom and conscience were theological and not political, Sanders pointed out to POAU, and those concepts, which had been endorsed by every American Catholic prelate, supported the First Amendment. For a Catholic not to support the existing constitutional structure would be a sin. Anxiety about a Catholic majority was so strong within POAU leadership that they refused to see that religious freedom and various church-state relations existed where Catholics were in a majority as in Eire, Belgium and West Germany. He found "inexcusable" POAU's "deliberate attempt" to make the Catholic position "look as incompatible with democracy as possible." The Catholic Church in America was neither a
"monolithic monster" nor an "espionage agency directed by the Pope to subvert American democracy."

Taking note that POAU had some members who were nativists, Sanders found the old argument that Catholics could not be loyal Americans because they were subject to a foreign power to be "inadmissible." He was referring to the Jesuit television episode, which he believed to be "a direct attack on the Catholic religion, for a basic tenet of Catholic faith is the spiritual and moral, but not political leadership of the Pope." POAU had reduced Protestantism to anti-Catholicism in order to feed "underlying prejudice and paranoia," and lacked the self-criticism "to see the distortions taking place in the home camp." He concluded with the following statement:

To label as 'Protestant' a notion of separation incompatible with an Protestant ethic and to pervert the canons of objectivity by the use of unfair tactics are a more serious threat to the integrity of Protestantism than present Catholic actions.  

If Protestants were to develop a new policy toward Catholicism, the distorted views of Catholicism and questionable tactics of POAU, according to Sanders, would have to be overcome.

POAU leaders rejected each of Sanders' points and were especially disturbed that the attack had been a public one. Archer denied Sanders' "amazing claim" that American priests believed in freedom of religion and conscience and he argued that the church was monolithic "whenever the Pope wants it
to be. A writer in *Church and State* charged the Union Theological Seminary had become the "soft spot" in Protestantism by preparing to surrender to Catholic financial demands and ignoring the challenge to American democracy in Catholic teachings on a whole host of matters. Also, secularism paled before "the larger menace of the Roman Catholic drive...." And of course Sanders laid himself open by trying to deny political implications in religious and spiritual positions.

Privately, POAU was not conciliatory toward Sanders as it had been toward Niebuhr. Comparing the temperance of *Church and State* to the intemperance of the Catholic press, Archer wrote him that "You would rate higher with me if you did an expose on Roman Catholic exaggerations and distortions." Then, he became personal:

You haven't been heckled by Roman Catholics in every state of the Union. I have. You have not had your business boycotted by a priest for seven years. I have. You haven't been viciously attacked by so-called Christian editors. I have. You haven't been denounced as a fellow-traveller for your convictions. I have. Really, I am quite mild when you consider all I have been through. Never have I known a priest to apologise when caught in an absolute falsehood.

If Sanders' philosophy and lack of courage prevailed in the United States, the corruption of Spain and Italy and of the Irish Catholic political machines in American cities that Archer had seen would prevail. Sweet Briar would no longer be sweet but "priest ridden."
POAU was such a "distinct liability" to Protestantism, in Sanders' opinion, that opposition to it was the only viable course of action. POAU leaders exaggerated the Catholic threat to the United States through uncritical polemics and emotionally charged labels to the point of "irresponsibility". Moreover, POAU, Sanders retorted, improperly inferred that because one agreed with American Catholics on certain issues that he had deserted to the Catholic side. For these reasons as well as an "unbearable self-righteousness" and lack of self-criticism on the part of POAU, the Union Theological Seminary found it prudent to stand clear of POAU.

The conflicts between POAU and its Protestant opponents broadened in the years from late 1957 through 1960 as a result of two developments. The thaw in Protestant-Catholic relations, which had been one major reason for a growing distance between POAU and at least some Protestant elites, grew into Protestant-Catholic (and Jewish) "dialogue". With increasing tempo, interfaith seminars, meetings, and discussions took place in order to come to terms with and better understand the tension-filled and often volatile relations between the branches of Christianity. A "new breed" of Protestant separationist began to emerge and to challenge POAU. The second development was the candidacy for the Presidency by Catholic John F. Kennedy. These two developments tended to merge, especially in the minds of the leaders
of POAU, and further accentuated the differences between POAU leaders and their Protestant opposition.

The question of representation grew in importance as a result of these two developments. Whether or not belief in strict separation should be the major criterion for judging the fitness of a Catholic candidate for the Presidency became a divisive issue. The ramification of this issue revolved around the best Protestant approach to Catholicism, and which approach represented a truer expression of Protestantism.

POAU leaders tied separationism with two leading anti-Catholic themes, both of which their opponents thought had nothing to do with separation. One theme was doubt concerning the loyalty of the American Catholic Church and its clergy to concepts and practices of democracy, freedom, and America. Archer, in discussing the parochial schools as "agents" of the church, stated his belief in the following terms:

There's where the indoctrination takes place, there's where those children are conditioned so that when they become governors and mayors and lawyers, etc., they react automatically. They don't have to think; they just react automatically against Church-State separation, and they have 600 periodicals reaching 22,000,000 people monthly that are indoctrinating agencies in this very philosophy.36

Unless a Catholic politician could show that he was independent of clerical control by favoring separation and religious freedom he should not be elected to public office. He also must reject the application of the canon law to other
religions and to the United States. The second theme involved the image of the church as a centrally controlled and organized institutional system of power, whereby the church through its clerics influenced Catholic candidates and politicians.

Besides representation and a proper separationism for Protestants, cultural pluralism also increased in importance as an issue. Cultural pluralism became the popular term, especially among Catholics, to describe the changing relationships between the faiths. But, as Strout has pointed out, the idea of pluralism varied with each faith. The men of POAU believed that the United States was primarily a religiously pluralistic society in which each sect and denomination voluntarily disciplined its own claims on universal truth in relation to civil authority and other religions for the sake of religious freedom.

Upon this premise of religious pluralism, POAU leaders held firmly to the theory of the melting pot, in which a common American culture provided the unity and uniformity. America had one culture but many faiths. The connection between religious plurality and cultural uniformity derived from the idea that the United States was "a nation whose genius has been Protestant, and whose watchword has been liberty." Protestants had founded a culture in the New World based on the precepts of the Reformation; and the common bond between religion and culture was independence of
mind and soul, liberty, and democratic organization. America was liberty's culture.

Catholicism challenged Americanism because Catholicism and Americanism were culture religions, each one claiming for itself civil monopoly of power and civil universality for its religious ideals, which in the case of Americanism was liberty. As American culture had emerged out of the Protestant religious heritage, out of the Roman Catholic religion emerged a Roman Catholic old world culture devoid of independence, liberty, or democracy. Acculturation to American ideas had to occur in order for that church to become Americanized and to accept the First Amendment compromise on religious pluralism. A cultural pluralism promoted a dual culture with two competing ways of life. Catholicism aimed to break the previously forged bonds between religion and culture in America and make it a country with a Catholic identity and Catholic ideals. And Protestants in a Catholic America would be in much the same situation as Protestants in Spain or Italy or Colombia.

Survival of Protestantism in America was at stake. The collapse of their Protestant opponents' religious convictions explained why they did not see the threat, and publicly attacked FOAU. Protestants could become a permanent minority, like Protestants in Catholic countries, not only in status but in every way, especially in terms of power, Catholicism increasingly overshadowed the Protestant
evangelical mission through the use of special advantages and privileges that discriminated against Protestant interests.

These Protestant interests in the face of the Catholic threat required Protestant unity on church-state issues. Thus, the establishment of Catholic hegemony increased apace with the help of Protestants. POAU leaders had neither the power to prevent they regarded as a collapse of conviction nor to provide unity around evangelical ideals. The closer Kennedy came to the Presidency, however, the more worried POAU leaders became about the Protestant failure of nerve.

POAU AND THE ELECTION OF 1960: KENNEDY, BROTHERHOOD, RELIGION, AND A CHANGING AMERICA

Four specific points regarding a Catholic candidate for public office went into POAU's official policy toward a Catholic for President. When Kennedy narrowly lost the vice-presidential nomination in 1956, POAU leaders in their first comment on the possibility that he might be a presidential candidate in 1960 emphasized the non-political and non-partisan nature of their organization. They asserted that POAU's policy was one of neutrality toward the nomination of Kennedy. Besides a stance of public neutrality, POAU leaders claimed to be appalled at the lack of public discussion on the religious questions raised by Kennedy's candidacy. Fear of religious controversy permeated the
country, showing a lack of courage. POAU leaders argued that these questions should be raised and that it was not bigotry to raise them. Thus, educating the American public to be "sufficiently aware of the dictatorial-clerical threat to the American way of life" justified POAU's participation in an electoral campaign.

The third and fourth points dealt with more religious matters. The third point involved clerical control through canon law. Through canon law, POAU officials believed, "the hierarchy of Senator Kennedy's church has a policy which every Catholic office holder is supposed to follow." POAU, thus, would test every Catholic candidate as to whether he followed his church's teachings on separation or whether he exercised independence and favored separation. Lastly, POAU leaders believed that religion played or should play the determining role in voting but that voting from religious preference involved no "'anti-Catholic bias'" on the part of the American voters.

When POAU leaders officially announced their policy on Catholic candidates, especially for the Presidency, in February of 1958, they issued a number of disclaimers as to their intent. Catholic candidates raised social and civic issues that could legitimately be raised and resolved in the non-theological realm. The reason that the issues came up at all was due to the fact that only the American Catholic Church actively pursued ends in the political field.
A candidate should be "scrutinized" closely. Promoting religious tolerance should not be permitted to be "used as a shield to conceal his opinions." POAU spoke out in opposition to a "blanket boycott" of Catholic candidates and to the formation of a Catholic or anti-Catholic political party, referring to the KKK and Know-Nothing movement as regretful chapters in American history.

In February, 1958, POAU issued "An American Challenge to Catholic Candidates," consisting of three "Questions For a Catholic Candidate." Blanshard had suggested, written, and submitted in December, 1957, four questions for consideration to the NAC and the Board. Except for the question on birth control, the Board approved the remaining ones "in principle."

POAU leaders asked in its first question whether a candidate personally favored or opposed the "boycott rule" on public schools set forth in Canon Law 1374. Secondly, did the candidate personally support the interpretation of the First Amendment as set forth in the 1948 Roman Catholic Bishop's annual statement and the "new plan" for financing parochial schools? The new plan referred to a proposal of grants of monies to parents for tuition to parochial schools or tuition grants. These grants were pushed by the conservative Cardinal of Los Angeles, James F. McIntyre, and Father Virgil Blum, Jesuit Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, who had written an article in 1956 in the
Homelitec and Pastoral Review entitled "Should POAU be Unopposed."

The third question involved appointing an American ambassador or personal representative to the Vatican. In each case, POAU leaders wanted to know whether the candidate would "resist control" and exercise private judgment as other Americans or follow orders of the hierarchy.

The publication of the questions resulted in the resignation of Stanley Lichtenstein. After Blanshard and Lowell came to the staff, Lichtenstein had been, in effect, demoted to Director of Research and had been dissatisfied with POAU for some time. The origin of the disaffection was policy, according to Lichtenstein. He contended that policy had been changed so that POAU no longer supported separation as it had in the early years. He cited the questions as one example of this reversal of policy, stating they constituted a religious test for public office based on sectarian labeling. POAU had opposed such labeling in the 1953 ambassadorial nomination of Clare Booth Luce, and Poteat had objected to it when he supported the right of an atheist neither to read nor teach the Bible in the public schools. Lichtenstein believed a Catholic could approve of Canon Law 1374 and serve faithfully as President. The other questions were loaded because Protestants themselves, especially on McCol- lum, were divided over these issues. Lichtenstein wrote later in the Boston Pilot, a Catholic diocesan paper, that POAU had clearly become a sectarian organization. Instead
of questioning all candidates on church-state relations, POAU had separated Americans into "hypenated Catholic-American, Protestant-American, Jewish-American, Free-Thinking Americans."  

Kennedy initially rejected the questions as "somewhat insulting" and a religious test for public office. He could conceive of no situation in which his personal beliefs, or those of any Catholic, would be in conflict with his public responsibilities under the constitution. He stated that the spiritual authority of the Roman Catholic Church did not extend into secular affairs and that his own conscience was free from any obligation to any authority or private institution. Moreover, what was true of previous times and in other countries did not apply to a pluralistic society where the norm was diversity of opinion.

While acknowledging on a number of occasions that Kennedy indicated "loyalty to the U.S. Constitution rather than loyalty to papal commands," POAU leaders judged Kennedy's response insufficiently explicit on his adherence to American rather than Catholic ideas. POAU leaders organized a letter writing campaign to pin him down. According to the 1958 July *Church and State*, Kennedy had adequately replied to one part of the joint questions by coming out against public aid to non-public schools. He, however, denied that Catholics boycotted public schools, pointing to the many Catholic children attending them, and while he saw no
constitutional difficulty in appointing an ambassador to the Vatican, he did not plan to appoint one.

The questions at least briefly turned the national spotlight on FOAU, after seven years of relative obscurity. On June 1, 1958, Archer and Mackay appeared with Dean Francis B. Sayre, Jr. of the Episcopalian Washington Cathedral and Congressman Eugene J. McCarthy(D.,Minn.) before 20 million viewers on NBC's Meet the Press. The subject of the show was religion and the Presidency. Archer raised the point of independence of any Catholic public official to follow America's basic civil law and his own conscience and whether he would promote his church and discriminate against other religions. "In short, are you a free man?" he asked McCarthy, a Catholic.

Can you make your decisions, impartially(sic). Can you attend any church that you may wish to attend, and can you enforce any civil law, even when that law conflicts with ecclesiastical law, dogma of the church, or other medieval disciplines(sic). He had never experienced any conflict, McCarthy replied, nor did he see any problem between Catholicism and American democracy, nor was he an instrument of the church nor was there one Catholic position.

In other words, FOAU officials feared that sectarianism might come before nationalism and put religious before civil authority and loyalty, destroying thereby the essential authority of the "civil power as an 'arbiter among the sects'...." The three questions posed by FOAU sought to
clarify the nature of the conflict. During the year POAU leaders developed a total of fifteen questions on clerical diction through canon law. They dealt with such areas as divorce, marriage and family relations, medicine, censorship, attending other churches, and promoting the interests of the church.

During the election campaign of 1958, the Fair Campaign Practices Committee (FCPC) became concerned with expressions of anti-Catholicism. The FCPC originated in 1954 in response to congressional and public concern over the excesses of McCarthyism, and it promoted a "code of fair practices" to be subscribed to voluntarily by all major candidates. The committee had in 1954 condemned misrepresentation, falsification of facts, and malicious and unfounded accusations designed to create or exploit doubts without justification as to a candidate's loyalty and patriotism. In 1956, the FCPC added to its list of unethical activities appeals to prejudice based on race, creed, and national origins. In September, 1958, the FCPC announced its intent to consider the "integrity" of questions that could be put to a Roman Catholic candidate. On October 22nd, it warned of "'Sly' Election Appeals Based on Prejudice" that raised doubt that a Catholic "can be trusted to be free of influence of foreign powers and that Catholic citizens adhere to doctrines not only alien but hostile to the United States."
POAU's relationship with the FCPC developed along lines similar to its relations with the NCCJ. POAU officials though the makeup of the FCPC with one Catholic, one Jew, and one Episcopalian resembled the NCCJ and for much the same reason: it was pro-Catholic. Archer wrote to Charles P. Taft, president and director of the committee and vice-president of NCC, appealing to their common Republicanism and their both having been for a time speech writers for Alf Landon. He wanted to get POAU personnel involved with the committee's work so that militant Protestantism would be represented.

Fearful that the FCPC was going to hold a secret interfaith meeting the outcome of which would be condemnation of their questions, POAU leaders charged the FCPC with giving in to Catholic and being intimidated by the false accusations of bigotry. An editorial in *Church and State* wondered whether "a wall of silence" would be erected around Catholic candidates to suppress questions about "conflict of loyalties" through "allegiance to a religious power structure." Did not the FCPC see that the Roman Catholic Church was controlled from abroad and was gaining cultural domination to suppress freedom and did it close its eyes to what was emerging as a result of this growing domination, "incipient anticlericalism?"

Beginning around October of 1958, POAU raised anew the question of dual loyalty by questioning the citizenship of
American Cardinals who voted in the 1958 election for a new Pope. Like earlier questioning of the citizenship of Archbishop O'Hara and Jesuits, the "strategic gambit" of POAU proved controversial. So controversial did it become that by December POAU carried lengthy stories filled with a number of rationales to justify the maneuver. Lowell later admitted that the ploy had been lost on the public, an opinion shared by Oxnam. Oxnam thought it was bound to be "misunderstood," was in poor taste because Catholics were still in mourning over the death of Pope Pius, and involved a purely religious matter. POAU received many angry letters from Catholics and an equal number from "sentimental Protestants" who thought POAU leaders had launched a "home to Rome" move for American Catholic Cardinals. Nevertheless, Lowell, who was responsible for the maneuver still felt it was a wise move.

POAU officials seemed to be satisfied with the impact the dual loyalty questions had made. The objections to the questions raised no self-criticism within POAU. The leadership was delighted to get into the national news and to have discussed the relation of separation to a Catholic candidate for President. By acting so early, POAU leaders helped to shape and define the specific role separation would play in the election of 1960. At the same time, the election campaign was a good opportunity to get POAU's views about the political nature of Catholicism across to
the American people.

A majority of Protestant leaders shared POAU leaders view of the American Catholic Church as a powerful threat, although many of them would have disagreed with these men and women over the changeability of that church. For instance, in one of the first major ecumenical encounters Protestant, Catholics, and Jews participated from May 5th through the 9th in the Fund for the Republic seminar, "Religion in a Free Society." The many Protestant ecumenical moderates there, Martin E. Marty argued, aimed to break with the chauvinism of their forebears who had identified the "kingdom of God with evangelical empire," with the American way of life, a single economic scheme, and a crusading spirit. Despite Morrison's and Taylor's fear that such discussions were "brainwashing" in nature--Archer, Mackay, and Blanshard attended the seminar.

Irrespective of the differences among Protestants in attendance, they shared enough of a common image of the Catholic Church to disturb Catholics. Dr. Norman St. John-Stevas of Yale University state that in his view:

The last four days have been largely a critique of the Roman Catholic Church. I think this is most welcome.... The Catholic problem...exists in the people's mind. This conference gives to American Catholics a solemn warning that whoever is responsible, the image of the Catholic Church which has been created in the American mind is not an image of the Church of Christ. It is largely an image of a power structure. Bricks are not made without straw and a part of this responsibility, a heavy part, rests with Catholics themselves.\(^74\)
James O. Garrick, editor of The Commonweal, agreed with him that the image, although distorted, was of "a huge monolithic structure, a kind of vast pressure groups, intent on restricting here, banning there, and picketing everywhere."  

POAU leaders perception of the Roman Catholic Church as a totalitarian and all-pervasive power structure has been previously described. The view functioned, as Sanders observed, to deny the validity of that church's religious mission and teachings. For example, the October Church and State editorialized about "Babies, Votes, Subsidies," stating the church's views on birth control rested on "tortured biblical exegesis" and did not make sense theologically. Only when "viewed in totality of design" from the "standpoint of cultural domination" did the policy make sense in terms of purpose and direction. The church was said to seek through "births unlimited" the "suffocation with human beings" or "'Chinification'" of the United States. "Catholic Action" had been unable to acquire control through immigration but now sought to do so in this fashion. The editorial writer cited the statement of the Archbishop of Hartford, Connecticut that a majority of children born in that state were Catholic as pressure for a bus bill.

Here was political pressure being applied with the weight of numbers to intimidate legislators in voting a church subsidy. Well, there it is--babies, votes, subsidies, and eventually--revolution!  

With such pressure of an omnipotent and omnipresent church, a President from the Catholic faith presented
unique problems for POAU leaders. These leaders thought such a President would be seen by his church as its President, and the canon law and clerical control would be invoked to get subsidies and special privileges. Even a Catholic President who proclaimed his independence from clerical control could not be trusted because he would be subjected to enormous pressure that would not be the case if the President were non-Catholic. POAU's stance, in effect, denied, as Sanders had feared it would, the religious freedom of individual Catholic candidates to exercise their own consciences as they saw fit unless they could somehow show their independence.

Ecumenism indicated the changing climate of opinion in 1958, using with increasing frequency the concept of cultural pluralism to describe what was emerging. A POAU editorial writer replied in "Pluralism Vs. The Melting Pot," arguing the hierarchy used the "pseudo-scientific name of 'cultural pluralism!'" to further "segregate our children on religious lines...." The editorialist continued,

But 'pluralism' is still the anti-thesis of the Melting Pot, the shining ideal upon which our nation's unity is based. Let us not be fooled by the new label. 78

Instead of "foreign enclaves" and "Balkanization of America," POAU opted for unity provided by the common school system that had been responsible for "our progress toward the American Dream" of free and independent minds and souls.

A Catholic President would further encourage division and
and symbolize the triumph of this idea of cultural pluralism.

One example of the resistance to any idea of change within the American Catholic Church and to Protestant ecumenists was POAU's dispute with Reverend John McG. Krumm, Episcopalian and chaplain of Columbia University campus. Shortly after the 1958 November elections, he gave a sermon in which he took a hopeful look at the new voices within Catholicism on religious liberty and tolerance. He felt "deeply humiliated" by those Protestants who refused to recognize such changes. He, therefore, called on Protestants to repudiate the tiny minority among them who were outdoing themselves in "plain bigotry and prejudice..." Krumm did not mention POAU by name but had it in mind.

Through letters and pressure, POAU worked to convince Krumm of the validity of its views and to get him to recant publicly. Believed "Some RC triggered him," Lowell insisted absolute separation was not a recent invention of the Supreme Court and was necessary in a pluralistic culture. Lowell further defended its tactics of attacking the Roman Catholic Church as a power structure and questioning Catholic candidates and Catholic officials rights of citizenship. He urged Krumm to view public criticism of POAU as irresponsible because "the Catholic press will gloatingly parade (it) in its pages and which will merely bewilder hosts of our people."
Krumm remained adamant in his belief that POAU represented only a minority of Protestants and that POAU's tactics exacerbated Protestant-Catholic relations. "Somehow these smart boys can see the handwriting on the wall," Archer noted, in a moment of pessimism, "Perhaps they'd just join Rome in a showdown any way and with ease."

Nevertheless, POAU received some satisfaction from Krumm. George K. Hunter of the Catholic Interracial Council, on a program called "Climate of Prejudice," broadcast on This Is New York on February 16, 1959, referred to Krumm's sermon and compared POAU's literature to virulent anti-semitic literature. Prompted by POAU, Krumm publicly denied that he was referring to POAU in his sermon. He explained that such a comparison did an injustice to POAU's methods and approach because it used reasoned arguments and not appeals to hatred or anti-Catholic "diatribes." Without changing his essential opinion of POAU, Krumm stated that POAU's opposition to the Roman Catholic Church was based on "a special concept of the meaning of the doctrine of separation...."

In 1959, POAU leaders developed the theme of Kennedy's conflict with his church. They considered Kennedy in a March Look magazine interview to have adequately answered the three questions. In fact, they took credit for this support of the principle of separation. They praised him for "courageously asserting that his oath of office would
take precedence over directives from the officials of his church." The Vatican, however, POAU predicted, would do what it had done in the case of Al Smith's declaration of independence in 1928 and openly contradict the "heresy." What subsequently came out of the Vatican was read by POAU leaders as part of its strategy to deny Kennedy his independence and freedom of conscience. POAU had blamed Catholic propaganda and a bigot ban for the silence over the conflict of interest issues. It happily reported the end to silence and the criticism of Kennedy's position among the Catholic press.

In an editorial "Whose Conscience," POAU accused the Catholic press of being "fundamentally dishonest" in its criticisms of Kennedy. Kennedy, the editorial writer said, had put the constitution above conscience. Defining conscience as emerging from inner compulsion and standing at the "very citadel of the self," the writer denied that devout Catholics had this "moral weathervane."

But for the Catholic, conscience means simply the teaching and directives of his church. The Catholic who accepts his church's dogma all the way has, properly speaking, no conscience of his own at all. In a letter to Krumm, Lowell made clear his view that the precedence of canon law over civil law spelled "bondage of conscience to a power structure." The aim of that power structure was to "subvert the civil tradition of democratic peoples..." The less a person was Catholic, the more qualified and trusted he became for public office, according
to the above line of reasoning.

POAU's attacks, which were especially numerous throughout 1959 and early 1960, on patron saints in the Armed Forces related to the concern over a Catholic President. Protests by POAU and other Protestants curtailed the patron saints program and POAU helped to halt the practice at a few army bases. POAU leaders charged involved favoritism, special privileges, and sectarian promotion to the detriment and discrimination of other religions.

In an interview with Time magazine in early 1959, Lowell stated, in reference to the patron saints programs, "If we had a Catholic President, would we have this kind of thing rubbed in our faces all the time." In a March editorial entitled "Sectarian Malfeasance," the writer wondered "If a Roman Catholic were elected president would he approach the job" with the idea of promoting the Catholic religion as Catholic public officials promoted the patron saints program.

And would he, in order to get publicity for his church, treat us to the spectacle of endless nuns and clerics streaming in and out of the White House to the accompaniment of countless photos on the front pages, the back pages and the middle pages of the press? 93

Relatedly, Church and State included a number of stories on political Catholicism. The new Pope, John the 23rd, proved to be, according to POAU writers, to be what POAU predicted he would be, a "political Pope" who issued voting orders. Because of concordats with the Vatican,
Protestants could not become heads of governments in a number of Catholic countries. Because of the large number of Catholics elected on the Democratic ticket in November of 1958 to governorships and congress, POAU warned that the Democratic Party might "become another party of Catholic action" similar to Catholic Action parties in Europe.

Political Catholicism aimed, according to Lowell, to cap off with a Catholic President its conquest of America that it had begun in the 1930's. Through "a sensational increase" in numbers, the church had become the largest faith and the "country once overwhelmingly Protestant in numbers and thoroughly Protestant in its genius had turned in another direction." Now, the Catholic "genius for politics" that had made it the "kingmaker" of the Democratic Party had decided itself to become king. "The nexus of many a municipal political machine," Lowell maintained, "has been a close liaison between parish priests and diocesan bishops, on the one hand, and the boss, on the other." Catholics worked "to achieve in the nation what it has already achieved in New York, Boston, and Chicago." They attempted to create an "aura of invincibility about a Catholic candidate" and played upon the "slobbering sentimentality" of Protestants. These Protestants would vote for a Catholic for President simply to prove they were not bigoted. The "consuming" Catholic ambition, Lowell stated,

to attain to the Presidency represents an emotional drive. Many Roman Catholics have suffered from
inferiority feelings because of immigrant backgrounds and traditionally lower educational and economic statuses. For many Catholics the idea of a fellow member as President undoubtedly represents a 'compensation' feeling. Such a distinction would help 'prove' to themselves that they really belong. It has been estimated that as high as 85 per cent of Catholic votes might support any Catholic candidate.

Archer believed the church had stepped up its efforts to destroy P.O.A.U. during 1959 by assigning four "skillful" Catholic writers "to shake the confidence of Protestants in P.O.A.U." This "campaign to distort and disgrace" P.O.A.U.'s program by these writers for the diocesan press, especially for the Boston Pilot and Our Sunday Visitor, was responsible for P.O.A.U.'s failures "to reach the public with our side."

The executive director explained why Protestant confidence was shaken and its program viewed by many as a disgrace by stating that "Our opponents seem to have all the communication tools on their side."

The "campaign against P.O.A.U." culminated in a book written by Lawrence P. Creedon and William A. Falcon with the assistance of Monsignor Francis J. Lally, editor of the Boston Pilot, called United For Separation. Morgan compared the book to the previous "libel" Who's Who in the P.O.A.U.; the book however was of a different order. The authors did not charge P.O.A.U. with Communism, although they obviously thought the stance of P.O.A.U. aided this enemy of Catholicism. They had done research and went to great lengths to answer P.O.A.U.'s arguments and criticisms against their church. Overall,
the book was a much more reasoned defense of the conservative Catholic position in America than previous attacks on POAU. Nonetheless, the authors took only the worst aspects of POAU, using them to show Catholics that Protestants were out to destroy the church. By propagandizing, quoting out of context, and caricaturizing, they did what they accused POAU of doing.

The Protestant opposition, too, had obviously broadened in 1959. POAU lost some rank and file supporters, and many Protestant leaders, who privately supported it, would not do so publicly because of the bigoted, nativist, and anti-Catholic image. Moreover, Archer complained that various church study groups, ecumenical groups, and the Religious Liberty Department of the NCC were "shooting at POAU from the flank and from the rear and from the inside." He then commented: "It makes my financial load heavy, it presents a staggering problem in public relations. Unwittingly some of our Protestant leaders are being used as tools against us and against their own interests." Archer saw the problem, as he usually did, as a matter of image to be solved by public relations, keeping those opposed to POAU from taking public potshots at it. However successful this action had been in the past, POAU's actions and the changing climate of opinion had weakened its power to be successful in so doing.
Archer classified those opposed to POAU into various categories. One category was the "Ivory Tower Theologian," who faulted POAU's "methodology" but did not understand the abstract and practical problems presented by the Catholic Church. The Pope-hater, on the other hand, believed POAU was too gentle, too "wishy-washy, weasel worded." In 1959, "splinter" groups appeared criticizing POAU for not being aggressive enough and for being too soft on Catholics. There was also the rabid anti-Communists, who "only sees Red" and sees Catholics as helping them in their fight instead of seeing the affinity between Communism and clerical "totalitarian." Another category included those who considered POAU anti-religious and pro-secularist.

A new source of criticism came from the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. In the commission's February-March, 1959, review, an editorial writer accused POAU of changing its original goal of separation to one of anti-Catholicism, especially with regard to the questions for Catholic candidates. Also, the editorial writer found POAU intemperately, irresponsibly, and dangerously anti-Catholic and condescending toward Jews. In reply, Lowell used the same intemperate language he used against POAU's Protestant opponents, further alienating the editors of the review. He accused them, as he accused other opponents, of trying to suppress the religious issue and of being an unrepresentative, "small,
splinter" group. The accusation brought the retort of dishonesty and near libelous statements from one of the editors.

POAU found itself in a dilemma. Ecumenists classified POAU as unrepresentative of Protestants and tied to fringe groups working to defeat Kennedy, importuning it to change its ways. At the same time, the "phony purveyors of 'brotherhood'," POAU leaders believed, were indifferent to the Catholic threat. A more active political role to overcome this indifference would, however, impugn the tax-exempt status and classify POAU with those groups seeking to defeat Kennedy, a classification POAU leaders wished publicly to avoid. POAU leaders' policy was to take the middle course between those who were apathetic and indifferent to the Catholic threat and those who were rabid "fanatics." In this way, the leaders hoped to avoid identification with hate groups, while warning America of the dangers posed by Catholicism. Conflicting impulses and forces within POAU, however, made the issue of political intervention one of great tension within the organization.

Three phases of development can be discerned in POAU's relation to the election of 1960 and the controversies surrounding the election and POAU's stance during 1960. The first phase went from January until July 15th, when Kennedy accepted the Democratic Party's nomination for President. From July until the second week of September constituted
the second phase, and the third phase went through the November election and POAU leaders interpretation of the election results.

As a result of the United States Bishop's statement of November, 1959 against the distribution of birth control information, POAU in January added birth control to the three major questions. Considering the statement "a political bombshell" and "binding on Catholic candidates," POAU maintained that Kennedy did not adequately clarify whether or not he felt bound by the statement. POAU later admitted that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had "capitulated" to the bishops on this issue, but he had done so out of "political expediency, whereas Senator Kennedy is suspect as subservient to the bishops." Archer used the opportunity in January to point out once again the suppressive nature of the "'brotherhood boys!' who might try to hide the birth control question.

POAU leaders increasingly questioned Kennedy's independence and capability, if elected, to exercise his own private judgment. Stories appeared in Church and State in which the writers stated that Kennedy had once followed an order not to attend an interfaith meeting. Most stories dwelt on the political nature of the church, how it worked, and how the church got its way.

By July, POAU began to hedge even on its previous stance toward Kennedy's positions on separation. Conceding
Kennedy's statements in general on separation put him in POAU's camp, Archer brought up Kennedy's amendment to the federal aid to education bill ten years before. More importantly, Archer insisted that he had never condemned the principle of federal aid to parochial schools. Also, Archer asserted that POAU leaders would not do "anything to enhance the hierarchial power of the Roman Catholic Church by voting for an altogether good man such as Kennedy if that vote would in any way enhance that power." And POAU leaders in their statements made more and more explicit that such 118 would be the result of a vote for Kennedy. The closer Kennedy came to nomination the more the clerical power of the hierarchy to exact obedience on civil issues through spiritual and moral punishments hung like the sword of Damocles over the individual conscience of the young man from Boston.

POAU had all along worked to make the religious issue the dominant one of the 1960 election, and it received some aid from an unexpected source in legitimatizing the issue. POAU leaders had defined the religious issue as the nature of Catholicism and, more specifically, the relationship of the idea of separation to Catholicism. They denied the religious issue was Protestant bigotry. Rather, Protestant "anxiety" came naturally from the nature of political Catholicism. A month or so before the convention however, a spokesman for Kennedy stated that it was not bigotry to
ask questions on matters involving public policy. Public education, a Vatican ambassadorship, relations with Spain or Colombia, religious liberty, and use of foreign aid to promote birth control were legitimate sources of concern.

POAU leaders declared that if Kennedy were nominated and won the election the reason would be the strategically located Catholic voting blocs that assured him of victory. Earlier when Kennedy won the primary in Wisconsin, POAU attributed the victory to three Catholic congressional districts. Two of these districts were Republican, but they provided the Kennedy "bulge" because of "Republican, McCar-thyite 'cross-over'...." POAU leaders vigorously defended those Protestants who had decided to vote against a Catholic for President from charges of hatred and bigotry. Voting for separation was not a matter of prejudice but one of principle.

Meanwhile, in February, for the second time in as many months, a Catholic attacked POAU in a national magazine. The criticisms came in a Look magazine interview of Reverend John A. O'Brien, Professor of Theology at Notre Dame and co-chairman of a commission in NCCJ. He denied that his church sought political ends or domination and that Catholics desired to become a majority in the population in order to destroy separation of church and state. He saw no possibility of a conflict of interest for a member of the Catholic faith in the performance of his duties as President.
He believed that "such groups as the POAU stir up antagonism and create tensions between citizens on matters of faith." He ascribed the fear that, if a Catholic were elected President, separation would be broken down, to the power of POAU.

I believe this fear is chiefly the result of a 12-year propaganda campaign by an organization called Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which follows the same line of attack on Catholics the Know-Nothings followed in the 1850's. The campaign has been intensified because a Catholic may be a candidate for President this year. Of course, the current attacks have no more basis in fact than those of a century ago.\(^\text{125}\)

Calling O'Brien's attack a "semi-hysterical smear" by a "notorious and irresponsible proselytizer," POAU used the attack to demand access to the magazine to present its side. Archer mounted one of his letter writing campaigns and instructed his "colleagues" to be sure to make the point in their letters that the editors had "unwittingly allowed themselves to be used as the tool of RC propaganda." The editors of Look in fact did, on May 8, publish an article by Oxnam and Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, former president of NCC and executive head of the United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., on Protestant "uneasiness" over a Catholic candidate for President. They wrote:

This uneasiness arises from a feeling widespread among American Protestants that the election of a Roman Catholic to the Presidency would both symbolize and strengthen the growing and direct political influence that the Roman Catholic Church exerts on our government and our society.\(^\text{126}\)
Commenting on this statement, Berton Dulce and Edward J. Richter, who had studied the history of religion and the Presidency, observed:

"Here, the new terms of the issue which had appeared quietly amid the 1920 protestations and warnings about 'conspiracy' and 'allegiance' took root in 1960. It was the broad social force of the church moving openly, unconcealed in American society, that constituted the danger. By comparison, the seeming diminution of Protestantism as an influence gave profound cause for concern. It was no longer a question of conspiracy. It was a question of philosophy, of doctrinal influence on personality. Nor was 'bigotry' a fair label to give to the expression of such a concern." 129

One could add in reference to POAU's position that it was also a question of the power to impose culture.

"We believe that certain Catholic strategists," a March Church and State editorial observed, "will attempt to pin upon us in the coming campaign every crackpot utterance from the lunatic fringe of the underworld of politics." The editorial writer continued that O'Brien's attack was the "ugly foretaste of his church's strategy." 130 Attempting to insulate itself from the "underworld of gossip, bigotry, and scandal," POAU emphasized the rational nature of its criticisms. When condemning anti-Catholic extremism on the part of Protestants, POAU coupled it with condemnation of similar distortions in Catholic diocesan newspapers. 131 It published, once again, warnings about the circulation of false stories on Maria Monk, the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, and the oath taken by the Knights of Columbus. Simultaneously, it criticized the press and politicians who took such items
as typical of all literature critical of Catholicism.

In March, the FCPC initiated its 1960 campaign effort with a two-day conclave in Washington, D.C. Members of the NCC and NCCJ, which co-sponsored the conference; Monsignor Francis J. Lally, editor of the Catholic Boston Pilot; Catholic priests and laymen; Carl Henry, editor of Christianity Today; and C. Emanuel Carlson, executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee and a member of POAU's Board of Trustees, were in attendance. The purpose of the meetings was to discuss the religious issue in the upcoming election campaign. Ecumenists were fearful of what the issue would do the burgeoning interfaith dialogue.

POAU, inaccurately, viewed the meeting as primarily an anti-POAU meeting. Ever since January when they had learned of the long list of objections to it within NCCJ and that the NCCJ might hold a meeting to discuss POAU, leaders of POAU sought to head it off for fear of a public condemnation. POAU leaders interpreted the FCPC meeting within this context. Lowell believed that POAU staff had been excluded from the meeting upon the demand of Lally. Lowell indicated that POAU leaders did not consider Carlson, who had been invited partly because he state on POAU's Board, a representative of POAU. Catholic "apologists," according to Lowell, had set up the meeting to use the FCPC in order to take revenge upon POAU for the four questions and because of its general effectiveness.
According to Carl Henry, criticism of POAU involved at least three specific points. Henry, although he disliked the tendency toward secularism in POAU's statements, had been POAU's main defender at the meeting. Roman Catholic representatives intensely disliked the identification of American Catholicism with Italian, Colombian, and especially "Spanish Christianity," which they regarded as "deviant and irresponsible." Lowell's pamphlet, Catholics, Protestants and Politics, which originally had appeared as an article in Christianity Today, came in for the most criticism. Catholics considered it "inflammatory," especially the sentence, quoted above, "They fear, too, a daily circus of priests and nuns parading in full regalia in and out of the White House to the accompaniment of endless photos on the front pages, the back pages, and the middle pages." Lowell elsewhere defended this statement as representing a "legitimate Protestant apprehension in connection with Catholic candidates and gives a timely word of warning."  

Lally also objected to the statement in the pamphlet, "In Massachusetts, from Boss Curley's time, the dominant political power has been Roman Catholic." Henry suggested more objectivity in POAU's literature and he proposed that the pamphlet be taken out of circulation. Lowell, however, retorted, "I can document that from the 1948 referendum on birth control right up to Cardinal Cushing's relations with JFK." Lowell petulantly concluded that the FCPC ought to
change its name. Bruce Felknor, Executive Director of FCPC, who stated that his detailed research backed up Lally's objection, confessed "to alarm" at Lowell's irresponsibility and inflammatory statements. He saw in them the "same sort of oversimplification and conclusion-jumping that gives rise to apprehension about some of POAU's literature."

POAU leaders increased their public attacks on interfaith dialogue. In a March editorial entitled "Angels on a Needle Point," a writer described such dialogue as interminable talking that led to "Paralysis by analysis" and compared Protestant dialogists to Nero's fiddling and musing while Rome burned. When Robert McAfee Brown suggested rules for dialogue, POAU suggested its own "Rules for the Dialogue" that did not involve shaming oneself with confessions of sin about responsibility for the divisions of Christendom. POAU feared such a "concession...gives away case of free churches to the concept of an authoritarian, monolithic church" and would eventually lead to "a monolithic, all-embracing church...." POAU leaders favored acknowledgement of the fundamental differences between Protestants and Catholics as a basis for a pluralistic culture.

In a June editorial entitled "Dialogue or Monologue?" POAU opined that Claud Nelson, then director of the Department of Religious Liberty of the NCC, was disqualified to be a participant in dialogue because he was also a consultant with NCCJ. People like Nelson held the same views as
Catholics so that meetings between Protestants and Catholics did not involve confrontation between differing points of view. The editorial writer concluded that "he does not represent militant Protestantism, and he is not likely to defend the separation of church and state against militant Catholicism."

Nelson, along with A. Dudley Ward and Carlson, objected to the editorial. Especially critical of the editorial was Dean M. Kelley. Kelley was a member of the Board of Christian Social Relations of the New York East Conference of the Methodist Church and would soon become head of the religious liberty department of the NCC.

POAU's activities were disruptive to the more important overall reconciliation of the faiths, Kelley believed. Quite critical of the overall approach of POAU, Kelley took exception to POAU as an education organization because the POAU viewpoint excluded the Roman Catholic Church from a common Christian witness. He found POAU's concentration on local church-state violations and on the use of coercion by taking another church to court disruptive of good relations between Protestants and Catholics. He, also, resented POAU's attempt to discredit the work of the Methodist Consultation on Church and State when he instructed the Committee to investigate all angles of separation instead of accepting POAU's black and white formula of separation. Because he believed POAU harmful to the needed reconciliation,
Kelley, along with Ward and others, successfully sponsored a resolution at the March 15th meeting of the Methodist General Board recommending the Coordinating Council disapprove any contribution of money to POAU.

Moreover, Kelley warned POAU leaders that their "anti-Catholic crusade" and their repudiation of dialogue would "cut itself off from sympathy and support of major part of Protestantism." He concluded, in what Lowell and Archer regarded as a threat:

Protestant leaders have not yet realized the direction POAU is heading, and I hope that direction can be corrected before they do, for a public mass repudiation of POAU by responsible Protestant leaders might become necessary in order to preserve what little 'dialogue' has been begun. 147

Lowell's response to Kelley did not do anything to convince Kelley that POAU was appeasable or would compromise in light of the changing climate of opinion. Dialogue, he said, was unrealistic and sentimental for it started "from the stance of friendliness to the state-financing of religion" and because of Protestants "who take a 'loyalty oath' to Courtney-Murray-John Cogley-William Clancy interpretation of Catholic doctrine." 148 "The CC now has," Lowell stated, "a blanket order on its priests not to engage in dialogue with POAU officials because we insist on quoting canon law and papal encyclicals to their embarrassment." Catholic opposition to POAU, moreover, came from "deathly fear" of POAU. Lowell defended POAU's speaking loudly "even if our voice is shrill" because of what was at stake. After the
May 4th endorsement of POAU by Methodism, Lowell confidently explained that Kelley illustrated "the weakness and atrophy of Protestantism."

In June, POAU leaders found a chance to strike back at the FCPC when Paul M. Butler, retiring Democratic Party chairman, reportedly told the press that a Catholic "voting bloc" would be created against the Democratic Party if Kennedy were denied nomination because of his religion. Archer immediately urged the FCPC to condemn as unfair practice and as religious bigotry this threat to form a Catholic voting bloc. Charles P. Taft responded that Butler's remarks were "a political and sociological observation" and not a call to action. Lowell shot back that if a POAU leader had observed that a Protestant bloc would form if Kennedy were nominated the FCPC would have loudly come forth with charges of prejudice and bigotry.

After Kennedy's nomination in mid-July, POAU returned to the Butler incident to defend Protestantism from charges of bigotry. When POAU published Taft's letter through the Christian Century, Felknor, FCPC's Executive Director, wrote a letter to the editor of the magazine objecting to POAU's publication of the letter. He stated that the publication was unauthorized and that the letter appeared in a distorted and exaggerated manner. Felknor once again expressed alarm "At what appears to be an effort on the part of POAU at troubleshooting out of an incident which does not seem to
contain seeds of trouble."

In a September editorial entitled "Is Fair Play One Way?" the writer characterized Butler's statement as de-
signed to "panic Catholics and to give Kennedy the nomina-
tion through exploitation of his faith." The editorialist
continued in this manner:

Is it the purpose of the Fair Campaign Practices
Committee to defend the injection of religion into
the 1960 campaign so long as it favors the candi-
date of Roman Catholic faith, but to oppose the
injection of religion when it might work to his
disadvantage?  

Later in September Archer wrote to Felknor in language
reflecting strong feelings. Why, Archer asked, did FCPC ig-
nore Roman Catholic "malpractice" that had great consequences
for America and harp on Protestant "indiscretions" that
meant little? Archer further asserted FCPC picked out un-
influential and unrepresentative Protestant bigots in order
to "smear whole community of concern over clericalism with
the brush of bigotry." The concern was not bigotry in it-
self but reaction to statements and actions "which are the
original bigotry."

After Kennedy's nomination, FOAU's position toward Ken-
nedy remained unchanged. FOAU leaders reiterated their
stance of neutrality and emphasized the questions, while at
the same time political Catholicism and its clericalism re-
mained the main target. The impression created by FOAU's
literature was that Kennedy, despite his independence, was
the candidate of the Roman Catholic Church for the
Presidency because Catholic officials and press regarded him as their candidate.

The best example of the relation between the nature of the Roman Catholic Church and Kennedy's election in the minds of the leaders of POAU was expressed in Lowell's, The Religious Issue in the 1960 Campaign, first published in September. As if revealing some deep secret, Lowell told a "grim story" of what the Roman Catholic Church actually taught. He delved extensively into Roman Catholic worship practices, an area POAU founders in the manifesto stated was irrelevant to the issue of separation. Lowell also elaborated on church control over education and the state, the right to use force, and the right to disobey the civil law if it conflicted with church law. Lowell asserted that it was not bigotry to quote from the Pope to document Catholic "desperately bigoted teaching." People must not remain ignorant of this teaching he continued:

The teaching of the church is so bad, in fact, that people just can't believe it. It's like MEIN KAMPF in which Hitler put his whole program. It was so bad nobody could believe that either. They just laughed.158

Upon this basis, Lowell went on to Kennedy's "predicament" created by his repudiation of his church in announcing his independence in response to POAU's three questions. Lowell, who prided himself on his logic, asked "What does all this mean?":

It means that if the Senator is sincere and if he faithfully maintains his position, he is bound to
be under constant pressure and attention in his relation with his church. He will not be excom-unicated, he will not be formally disciplined. His church is far too astute for that. But a steady, relentless, grinding pressure mounted with all the emotional overtones of church loyalty will be constantly operative on him to get him to modify these positions. 159

Only he would have this pressure, and he would have this pressure by the very fact that he was an independent-minded Catholic. In the final analysis, it came down to the question, "But COULD HE WITHSTAND ECCLESIASTICAL PRESSURE?" and the answer to which all of the publications of POAU pointed was negative.

Once Kennedy had been nominated, POAU leaders saw the upcoming election campaign as "our greatest opportunity to reach the mind and heart of the nation." The leaders geared up to make the religious issue (Catholicism) the dominant issue of the election of 1960. Although still feeling discriminated against in the press, POAU leaders also felt that for the first time POAU had broken the "sound barrier" against discussions of the religious issue and received adequate coverage by the mass media in 1960. They based their appeals for money not on a fight for principles as they had earlier done but on attacks by "our enemies" who "try desperately to smear us with their" 'bigot' tar brush" in response to POAU's increasing potency.

POAU leaders enormously increased the number of pieces of literature distributed by POAU. Between April and December, approximately twenty-nine articles, pamphlets, and
foldouts were issued by POAU. POAU increased distribution of literature from 689,000 pieces in June to over a million and a half in August. Lowell's *Protestants, Catholics and Politics, If the U.S. Becomes 51% Catholic*, and A *Summons to Americans* circulated well; the latter two had each passed the two million mark by the end of the year. *How the Roman Catholic Church Would Change the Constitution* reached over a million copies. *Church and State* advertised a pamphlet called *A Roman Catholic For President?* that was actually a sermon delivered by Dr. Harold A. Bosley entitled *Why I Cannot Now Vote For a Roman Catholic For President.* According to the records of POAU, this pamphlet was the only one of its type to be distributed during the campaign and the only one that did not use POAU's name or identify POAU. During 1960, POAU distributed over twelve million pieces of literature which equalled in number all the literature it had published in the previous eleven years.

POAU leaders used other methods to make an impact on the election campaign. POAU representatives gave over 500 addresses during the year. Beginning in September and perhaps earlier, publication of Church-State DIGEST and Church-State NEWS began. The NEWS was a four page reprint, consisting of a "flood of facts" on Roman Catholic church-state violations, "actual" statements by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and Dr. Harold Bosley's answer, "Should I Vote For a Catholic?" The DIGEST and NEWS had a combined circulation
of over a million.

Movies as well figured in POAU’s campaign. POAU had produced a movie "Captured" in 1959 dealing with how public schools became captive schools. The New York office of B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League in January, 1960 accused the movie of "fomenting bigotry" because it suggested that the Roman Catholic Church was "engaged in a conspiracy to 'capture' as many public schools in the nation as possible." Attendance rose per showing from 124 in 1959 to an average of 170 in 1960, reaching a total audience of 168,000. From the profits of "Captured," POAU produced "Boycott," which was released October 1st, 1960 and dealt with the "tabooed subject of sectarian reprisal against political opponents."

Pressure from members within POAU had been building throughout the year to force the organization to take a more active part in the election campaign, and the pressure increased after Kennedy’s nomination. According to Lowell, POAU found itself accused of helping the "Catholic conspiracy" with its praise of Kennedy and his independence. POAU continually had problems with members who campaigned against Kennedy using POAU’s name and literature. The national headquarters had on a number of occasions to warn its members and chapters against using POAU’s name or labels for campaign use. The San Diego chapter, according to Lowell, because of its repeated public attacks on Kennedy and for
openly organizing against Kennedy, had the chapter's charter at least temporarily revoked. Pressure from within and below, however, was not alone responsible for movement toward a more active political role in the campaign.

After a number of discussions between Archer and his staff and Board members over possible strategies to follow in the coming months, the Board of Trustees met on September 6th to discuss a course of action, summarized in "Memorandum on Strategy of POAU, During the Current Political Campaign." The memorandum reiterated that POAU's traditional strategy was sound in utilizing the current church-state interest to dramatize the religious liberty problem. The memorandum's authors also indicated that POAU had been constantly "impertuned from many quarters to lead a political campaign" against the election of Kennedy. This action was impossible because it would endanger POAU's tax status, which disqualified POAU from influencing legislation and participating in political campaigns, and upon which rested POAU's continued existence.

What followed, however, was a rationalization that justified a more active political role in the campaign under the name of seeking educational goals and through the use of other groups. The memorandum writers stated that the public was prevented from received vital knowledge about the religious issue. This knowledge about the religious issue could be increased through "a more frankly political group of an
ad hoc nature."

Such a group called Citizens for Religious Freedom had recently formed with which POAU leaders had been in touch and to whom it had opened its research files. The origin and full membership of this committee was obscure. An executive of the NAE subsequently stated that this citizens' group originated with a proposal by an NAE official to POAU leaders that they sponsor a church-state conference on the religious issue in the campaign. Officials of POAU responded with the suggestion for a citizens' committee, the head of which became Reverend Donald Gill, associate director of the NAE.

The Citizens for Religious Freedom, according to the memorandum writers, had a number of aims. Primarily, the group aimed to insure that the religious issue was not ignored in the election campaign either by the political parties or through the efforts of "professional brotherhood groups" which remained "darkly ignorant" of the implications of the issue. One issue which the group would address was the stance of the Roman Catholic Church toward other faiths, on religious freedom, and on the control of the church over its members. The group would present evidence of clerical encroachments on "our free culture." Additionally, the group wanted to stress the importance of registration and voting of Protestants. The group, however, did not want to make a formal recommendation as to who they should vote for.
The group also desired to provide literature, buttons, slogans, signs, and ads on religious freedom and to make recommendations or suggestions for action by voluntary local community groups.

The hope of the founders of the citizens' group was to give "responsible" leadership for the many local groups springing up over the country who wished to emphasize the religious issue. The committee's objective, in other words, looked toward being a national coordinator of these groups and giving them national direction. Finally, giving voice to the most important implication of the religious issue, the memorandum writers gave as the group's basic rationale for these actions the "elementary act of self-preservation by Protestant people." Basicall, the group aimed at a national political effort to defeat Kennedy.

A lengthy discussion among POAU Board members followed on what to do and on whether POAU should join with the Citizens for Religious Freedom. Lowell commented that POAU should not be silent out of fear of being accused of establishing a religious test with the questions for a Catholic candidate or because Kennedy had made a few good statements. Dr. Clyde Taylor of the NAE favored POAU's cooperating with the group, because the group could coordinate POAU leaders with the leaders of other organizations. The group would also correlate literature of these organizations as well as hold rallies. As an independent corporation, the committee,
most importantly, could become active politically. When an objection was raised to sending an official representative to the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom scheduled for the next day because it was an "anti-Kennedy meeting," Taylor replied that he was not asking for official representatives.

The Board decided to stand by the manifesto and continue the present policy and strategy in order not to endanger its tax-free status. POAU would continue to take "full advantage of the current paroxysm to secure nationwide publicity for continuing church-state problems" and to present "facts of the Roman Catholic problem in American." While agreeing with the resolution, Carlson wondered whether this strategy was really helpful to the churches. He seemed to think a less aggressive posture would have been better. Although the Board was aware of the risks involved, the members agreed to support Archer if he decided to speak before the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom the next day, September 7th. The next day POAU leaders issued a statement reiterating their stance and worrying about Kennedy's silence on the "official boycott" of the public schools. "For us," the leaders stated, "this is a matter of self-preservation."

The National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom met at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., and was more or less representative, according to a writer in the
New York Times, of "evangelical, conservative" Protestantism. One hundred and fifty people, whose names were withheld from the press, attended the conference, which lasted all day behind closed doors. Since Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, noted pastor, lecturer, and author, and who had been one of the chairmen of the meeting, led the news conference after the meeting, Citizens for Religious Freedom became known as the Peale group or conference. Also speaking at the news conference was Dr. Daniel A. Poling, editor of the Christian Herald; Harold J. Ockenga, former president of the NAE and pastor of the Park Street Congregational Church; and Dr. L. Nelson Bell, a prominent Presbyterian layman and father-in-law of Billy Graham. Bell warned of a "pseudo-tolerance" abetting the "Romish" tide to "conquer as an ecclesiastical organization." He worried that "Our American culture is at stake.... I don't say it won't survive, but it won't be what it was." The conference's statement, which had been previously written and submitted to the meeting, and POAU's statement issued earlier in the day, if put side by side (as they were in the New York Times and their authorship hidden) seemed initially indistinguishable. Peale and Poling, however, were questionable spokesmen for the new group because both were open supporters of Vice-President Richard M. Nixon for President.

The association of Nixon supporters with the group brought cascades of criticism. Father Murray, the leading
American Catholic theologian reorienting American Catholicism's stance toward American society and religious liberty, used the opportunity to state that the "'oldest American prejudice' is as poisonously alive today as it was in 1928, or in the 1890's, or even in the 1840's." The only difference he saw was that religious prejudice was clothed in rational phrases and footnotes. Criticism came as well from the American Jewish Congress and even from Harold Fey, who stated that the conference misrepresented Protestant concern and charity.

The most forceful disapproval came from Reinhold Niebuhr and John Bennett, who were vice-chairmen of the Liberal Party in New York. They accused both Peale and Poling of opposing Kennedy because they were Republicans and for economic and not religious reasons. The statements by the two groups, the two men said, opened the "floodgates of bigotry" although "clothed in the respectability of apparently rational argument." The statements caricatured the Roman Catholic Church as having an "unshakeable" position and as imposing a uniformity of opinion upon its members in civil affairs. They did "show prejudice" when they ignored the vast numbers of interpretations within the church and its powerful theological support for religious liberty and democracy and for freedom of Catholic laymen in civil affairs. They violated Protestant belief in individual freedom of conscience and judgment and opposed Kennedy simply because he
was Catholic. The two men then stated that these two groups "certainly do not represent American Protestantism as a whole." Rather, they represented social conservatism's opposition to liberal policies and candidates and were using the religious issue to thwart civil rights and economic policies with which Kennedy was associated.

While seeking to disassociate itself publicly from the Citizens for Religious Freedom, POAU defended it. Archer stated that POAU had not "concurred in" the statement issued by the Peale group, and his Board had never considered it. Although the two statements were taken as part of the same document, Archer emphasized that they were two separate documents and POAU remained strictly an educational organization. He defended Peale, who had been invited because of his reputation and who subsequently severed his connection with the group, and decried newspapers who dropped Peale's column because of the incident as an example "of (the) kind of coercive tactics we have found typical of Roman Catholic action." He observed that Niebuhr and Bennett "who have gone into orbit" needed to "take cognizance of these tactics and of their threats to our American freedoms." To "throw oil on troubled waters," Archer sent a copy of the Board's statement to FCPC and a special bulletin to POAU members to show how fair POAU was and how lacking it was in anti-Catholic prejudice.
Shortly after the Peale controversy, Kennedy accepted an invitation to address an interdenominational groups of Protestant clergyment on September 12th in Houston, Texas. E. S. James, editor of the Texas Baptist Standard and ardent supporter of POAU, arranged the meeting. Prominent members of POAU had already "urged opposition to any Roman Catholic presidential candidate until that church is willing to change its policy in regard to church-state separation." Nevertheless, POAU leaders claimed to be pleased with Kennedy's position set forth in his Houston appearance on two of the questions. They claimed to be disturbed by his position on persecution of Protestants in Roman Catholic countries and his support of separation as explained in the 1948 Bishops statement.

POAU concluded that Kennedy had placed himself in opposition to the views of the Roman Catholic Church and thus was a "bad Catholic" and could make a "good president." Throughout the rest of the campaign POAU leaders continued to counter that generally favorable assessment by emphasizing the clerical pressure and control Kennedy would be subject to. In the long run, POAU leaders thought he would be unable to resist. POAU leaders sought simultaneously to appease supporters of the FCPC and ecumenists and those within POAU who wanted a neutral policy on Kennedy as well as its members among the NAE and Southern Baptist Convention who wanted greater opposition to Kennedy's election on POAU's part.
Both the Peale controversy and Kennedy's Houston appearance brought much criticism from Catholics, liberals, liberal and neo-orthodox Protestants of conservative Protestants. Opponents shifted the religious issue away from the nature of Catholicism and toward Protestantism and the fairness of Protestants.

The sensitivity to Protestants' being unfairly treated and being discriminated against as a minority group grew appreciably among POAU leaders during the election campaign. An editorial "Unfair to Protestants" indicated how the leaders of POAU felt during the election:

It is an American axiom that white Protestants are the only group that can be slurred and unfairly treated in every mass media today. Try it with any other group and the cry is heard: 'Discrimination against minorities.' Try it with white Protestants and nothing happens. So it is tried frequently.

POAU protested often and loudly to the charge of "Protestant religious prejudices" saying that Protestants had justifiable reasons for "anxiety." For example, an editorial writer in Church and State condemned election night coverage on television:

The immense and incredible majorities for Kennedy in certain Catholic dominated cities were accepted as a matter of course. The moment Kentucky, Oklahoma and Tennessee started to show strength for Nixon, however, the commentators pointed out that this was the area in which religious prejudice was a fact. For the commentators religious prejudice was a one-way street.

While Protestantism was associated with bigotry, Archer charged that the "bigotry of non-Protestant leaders was
passed off as tolerance and Americanism." This situation made the Presidential campaign "pure torture," Archer stated, as "American Protestantism was malignand and slurred in countless ways." Truth was turned on its head:

We who have helped to establish American liberty and tolerance were made to look as if we were the enemies of liberty and tolerance, and advocates of clerical dictatorship were made to appear as apostles of freedom.194

POAU leaders censured Protestant leadership for this situation, claiming that leadership had suffered a "loss of nerve." In a speech, "Protestant Unashamed," which Lowell stated Archer had given many times since 1958, Archer declared that the "sinews of its conviction have been cut." Protestant leaders were no longer capable of defending their heritage of freedom. He put it this way:

Instead of glorying in the Reformation which liberated the soul of man from the intolerable bondage--instead of glorying in the freedom wherewith Christianity has set men free--it now stumbles about mumbling apologies for its existence. Actually Protestantism stands for self-government; Protestantism stands for democracy. And the United States stands for self-government and democracy. Protestantism belongs in America because its principles are American. But you would never know that if you heard the apologetic tones of many American Protestants.195

The leadership, with its tolerant attitudes, had plainly sold out Protestant convictions.

These brotherhoods such as Brown and brotherhood groups like the FCPC and NCCJ ought to be repudiated by Protestants, Archer believed. They did not understand that Rome never changed. They aided the development of a "super church"
and ignored Catholic concentration of power and what the church was doing to the United States. Archer explained that these "brotherhood boys must not beguile us with evasive words" but rather "may be more dangerous than the bigots." He called for a public awakening, a new Reformation that would end "ecclesiastical imperialism" and insure against "spiritual tyranny". Inveigling against the brotherhood boys, Archer warned:

This kind of leadership is sterile and bankrupt. We must publicly disavow the oft-repeated cliche of these men that they, and they alone, speak for Protestants. Those who betray Protestants are not entitled to speak for them. What these leaders deserve is not brotherly solicitude but resounding repudiation. 197

The election campaign provided the catalyst for an open break between the now conservatively and evangelically oriented POAU and the liberals in the Protestant leadership.

POAU tried to avoid public classification with religious groups seeking to defeat Kennedy and with "so-called 'hate groups.'" But, according to leading newspapers, Morgan, and Lowell, the leaders were not really successful in preventing POAU's association with an anti-Kennedy movement. 198 At the same time, POAU leaders sent out bulk order of Church and State to anti-Kennedy people for distribution; the staff knew they were anti-Kennedy and that the magazine was going to be used as propaganda against Kennedy. 199 They used the Committee for Religious Freedom as a clearinghouse for their literature and possibly had a hand in directing the committee's activities. 200 POAU leaders developed an informal
working alliance for the distribution of literature and campaign work with two main anti-Kennedy Protestant organizations in 1960, the NAE and the Southern Baptist Convention.

Two elements determined the outcome of the election, according to an editorial writer for Church and State. One element was "Protestant anxieties," although the writer did not explain how such anxieties specifically affected the outcome. Anxiety was a word of common usage in the 1950's to describe a number of things; POAU leaders used the word almost with pride. The word was used to describe a justified general fear of Catholicism and more accurately reflected Protestant concern than did the ascription as religious prejudice or bigotry. Secondly, Catholic bloc voting had elected Kennedy.

POAU leaders stress on the "religious issue" as the primary factor in the election of 1960 reflected their outlook that religion was the most important factor in American life. Religion, far more than class or socio-economic status, was reflected in voting. There were Protestant religious and political issues, and, as in the past, Protestants should vote along lines that would support Protestants. Separation of church and state was one of the most important religious and political issues.
CONCLUSION

POAU clearly benefitted from the 1960 election campaign. Income spurted up by at least $100,000 during 1960, to a total of $500,000 (although $50,000 of that amount came from the closing of three wills.) Church and State added 37,000 new members to the subscription list during the year. Circulation of Church and State reached 125,000 members and had a total circulation of 250,000 people by the end of the year. More importantly, a temporary spurt in numbers of chapters occurred. In late September, POAU leaders reported 60 active chapters, not a significant increase over previously published reports, but 20 chapters were in the process of formation. In the October issue of Church and State, POAU leaders stated that the organization had grown to 150 chapters. At the end of the year, POAU leaders reported 96 active chapters and 9 litigation committees.

POAU also benefitted from the election campaign of 1960 in terms of influence and national recognition. POAU had more national exposure than at any previous time, despite the adverse coverage by the secular press and by those who did not wish to discuss the religious issue because it was divisive. The opponents of POAU obviously believed that the organization represented a significant portion of Protestantism and had an appreciable degree of power. The issues raised by the campaign aided POAU leaders to obtain endorsement from the Methodist General Conference and seemed to
have increased their influence among Southern and Northern Baptists. Through educational and organizational activities and work with the Committee for Religious Freedom and the Southern Baptist Convention, POAU leaders provided leadership and coordination to the campaign. In turn this work increased their contacts within conservative Protestant circles. Although the POAU leaders occasionally lapsed into emotional anti-Catholicism as described above, POAU leaders for the most part developed rational arguments and questions that others could use. The leaders spoke to a number of Protestant fears and anxieties about the power and influence of Catholics in public life, ultimately symbolized by Kennedy's presidential bid. POAU leaders played a role in defining the religious issue, and although their questions and involvement with the Peale group were controversial, they helped to shape the religious issue in the campaign.

The role of POAU in the election campaign was mainly an educational one. Its policy in regard to the questions was the main anchor throughout the campaign, although the leaders took advantage of every opportunity to point out the dangers posed by Kennedy if he were elected. The Board seems to have been the main restraint in preventing a more active political role by POAU's staff and the organization. At the same time, during the later days of the campaign, POAU staff leaders became actively involved in activities that were directly aimed to defeat Kennedy.
With some notable lapses, POAU leaders granted that Kennedy was independent of his church, although they doubted he could remain so because the power of his church over him would eventually prove to be too great. A subtle change of emphasis among POAU leaders occurred during the election. They fluctuated between granting Kennedy his independence and denying the significance of that independence, and between avowals that Kennedy was admirable enough to vote for and that he left too many questions unanswered to vote for. The leaders increasingly saw Kennedy as the candidate of the Roman Catholic Church officials and church press. Despite Catholic criticism of a number of Kennedy stands, the press and officials of the church, in the leaders of POAU's eyes, came to more and more support Kennedy as their candidate for President because he was a Catholic and because of what his election would mean for the church.

The election campaign of 1960 was the occasion for the open break between POAU leaders and leaders of ecumenism among the Protestant leadership. POAU became identified as conservative and evangelical, and the leaders perceived themselves battling for the leadership of Protestants on questions of church-state relations. They were representative of militant Protestantism opposed to a militant Catholicism and faced with a liberal Protestant leadership that not only attacked POAU publicly but who had lost the courage of their convictions. Interfaith dialogue and the concept
of cultural pluralism seemed especially dangerous to POAU leaders because they believed both of them gave away the case for opposition to aid to church institutions. The militant stance of POAU leaders against Catholic demands for aid and ecumenical compromise to those demands and with a changing Catholicism brought heightened conflict, a multitude of problems, and crises for those leaders in the 1960's.
CHAPTER VII: FOOTNOTES


7. Ibid.


16. See Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict, p. 66 and Curry, Protestant-Catholic Relations in America, pp. 61-62. For discussion of Niebuhr's thought, see Stout,
The New Heavens and New Earth, pp. 268-284.


21. Reinhold Niebuhr letter to C. Stanley Lowell, New York City, New York, August 27, 1957, p. 1; C. Stanley Lowell letter to Reinhold Niebuhr, Washington, D.C., August 21, 1957, p. 1 and September 6, 1957, p. 1, all in POAU files. Archer's note on the Niebuhr letter: "In our cases buses become legal precedents for additional support, even as hospitals are now used for school buildings. If he had to deal with practical problems, he might be more practical."


24. S. E. Sanders letter to Glenn L. Archer, Ashville, North Carolina, September 30, 1957, in POAU files. Tom's father was a supporter of POAU and a believer that the Roman Catholic Church was "doing everything can do to take control."


27. Ibid., pp. 115-118.

28. Ibid., p. 118.


32. Ibid., p. 2.


42. Church and State (December, 1956), pp. 2-3.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., Vol. 10, No. 7 (July, 1957), p. 3. See also editorial, "Better Forget It," ibid., Vol. 9, No. 7 (July, 1956), p. 3.


55. Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 58.


57. Ibid., Vol. 11, No. 3 (March, 1958), pp. 2-3.

58. Kinescope script of "Lawrence Spivak's The Big Issue," June 1, 1958, pp. 3-4 in POAU files; POAU, The Big Question--

59. For some reactions see New York Times, June 2, 1958, p. 46; "Must Presidents Be Protestant?" Presbyterian Life, July 15, 1958, pp. 7-8 & 30; and "Rome and the Presidency," The Church Herald, August 22, 1958, pp. 6-7 for strong support of POAU. POAU leaders viewed the broadcast a "major triumph" because for the first time POAU had gotten on nationwide television. See "Memo RE: Board Meeting," POAU, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1958, p. 8 in POAU files.


62. Religious News Service (Domestic Service), Wednesday, October 22, 1958, in POAU files.


67. Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 47 & 51.


70. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, pp. 228-229.


79. Ibid.


88. Ibid.


94. "Vatican Dictates New Voting Orders," ibid., (June,


100. Glenn L. Archer form letter to Board of Trustees, Washington, D.C., August 21, 1959, p. 5 in POAU files.


104. Ibid.

105. Archer to Board of Trustees, Aug 21, 1959, p. 2.


107. Ibid. and Church and State, Vol. 12, No. 9 (October, 1959), p. 2.


117. POAU, Catholicism, The White House, and POAU, p. 3.


120. Ibid., (June, 1960), pp. 1 & 5-6 and (September, 1960), pp. 1 & 5.


123. Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 54.


131. Ibid., (May, 1960, p. 2.


134. Dulce and Richter, Religion and the Presidency, p. 133.

135. Ibid., p. 146.

136. n.n, "Reported Attitudes of NCCJ to POAU," n.p., January, 1960, p. 1; "Minutes of Joint Executive Session of Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council," POAU at Boston, Massachusetts on February 10, 1960, p. 7; and Glenn L. Archer NIGHT LETTER to Mr. Webster Jones (President, NCCJ), Washington, D.C., February 2, 1960, all in POAU files.


149. Ibid.


159. Ibid., p. 3.

160. Ibid., pp. 1-6.


165. "Minutes of Board of Trustees Meeting," POAU at Washington, D.C., on September 6, 1960, p. 1 in POAU files.


News Release in POAU files.


171. See The Register, January 17, 1960 and Catholic Transcript, January 14, 1960, both in POAU files.


181. Ibid. and Richter and Dulce, Religion and the Presidency, pp. 165-166.


185. Richter and Dulce, Religion and the Presidency, p. 171.


188. Church and State (September, 1960), pp. 1 & 5-7 and (October, 1960), p. 5.


193. Ibid.


195. Ibid.

196. Ibid., pp. 6-7.


200. Lawrence P. Creedon, The Boston Pilot, February 17, 1962 maintained four of the ten directors of the Citizens for Religious Freedom were officials of POA, copy in POA files.


Morgan in "Backs to the Wall," p. 117 observed that when Church and State analyzed a study of the 1960 election, which indicated that Kennedy was almost defeated by anti-Catholic votes, the editorial writer interpreted the study as concluding Kennedy had been barely elected by Catholic votes, although Protestant votes for Kennedy also played a key role in his success.

Recent research has found that religion is a more basic factor in political preference than socio-economic status. Political values are derived more frequently from basic religious beliefs, theological orientation, moral percepts, and modes of worship than from status in the American class structure. This finding is consistent with findings of American political behavior throughout American history. Phillip E. Hammond and Benton Johnson, American Mosaic: Social Patterns of Religion in the United States (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 225. And see Kleppner and Jensen above.


205. Ibid., p. 1.


CHAPTER VIII

CHANGING CLIMATE OF OPINION AND YEARS OF CRISIS: 1961-1973

For a dozen years after 1960, changing attitudes toward separation, or at least toward strict separation, transformed the context in which the leaders of Americans United (AU) strove to achieve their goals. One major change related to ecumenists who objected to the association of separation with anti-Catholicism. Another change, which affected relations with AU's more fundamentalist supporters, occurred because of major decisions by the United States Supreme Court in 1962 and 1963 in regard to religious exercise in the public schools. Also, willingness by Protestants to accept some form of public aid for church institutions and church work perceptibly increased as a result of the passage of federal programs in the mid-sixties and passage of state programs in the latter part of the decade and early seventies.

These changes brought about an internal crisis within AU and a crisis in its relations with major Protestant

*During the 1960's, Americans United(AU) replaced Protestants and Other Americans United(POAU) as the basic identification used by the leaders of the organization. In 1971, the name was officially changed to Americans United. In this and subsequent chapters, Americans United(AU) will be used.
institutions. AU's image as anti-Catholic became increasingly disadvantageous. Archer had great difficulty in coping with the problems the image created. By 1963, Archer and AU's leadership realized that the changes in public opinion were adversely affecting AU. The greatest years of internal turmoil were 1963 through 1965. Beginning in 1966 and continuing through 1972, AU's membership perceptibly fell, growth slowed down, and income grew at a slower rate. Politically at least, the separationist position of AU in the latter sixties provoked serious problems and criticisms, although election victories and Supreme Court decisions brought some counterbalancing support for separationism.

**ECUMENISM**

"The age of historic distrust and antipathy," stated the retired but still active Mackay in 1969, "has come to an end." He was referring to the change in relations between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism wrought by ecumenism during the sixties. Similarly, Lowell noted in 1968 the "dramatically changed" times as compared with the more favorable climate in the forties and fifties. "Much of the boardsman leadership of old line Protestantism now," Lowell wrote, "actively opposes Americans United and seeks to cut off its Protestant support." He proudly announced, "We have not changed, but they have."

AU's leadership realized in the early sixties that the anti-Catholic image was adversely affecting relations with
old line Protestants as well as a number of other Protestants. Discussions ensued on how to avoid the image while still opposing Catholic financial demands as well as on the proper tone of AU literature toward Protestant and Catholic opponents. Although three pamphlets that had been criticized were taken off the market in 1963, caustic criticism in *Church and State* continued, and little or no change in approach or method occurred. Instead, the resistance of Archer to the "ecumenical boys" stiffened because, as he put it in the fall of 1963, they were leading "us astray from our original basic tenets of liberty." Consequently, the rift between AU and liberal Protestantism and ecumenists grew.

The rift between AU and the NCCJ widened until Archer appeared before a Washington, D.C. meeting of the NCCJ in 1963 to defend AU. The leading charge against AU was bigotry, or at least that was how AU leaders interpreted the charge, because they denied the saliency of other, more specific criticisms against them. According to Morgan whose work on AU reflected the changed milieu of the 60's and who was representative of liberal reaction to AU at the time, Archer's feud with the NCCJ was a "source of scandal" among liberal and ecumenical Protestant separationists.

*Christianity and Crisis* continued opposition to AU, reiterating many of the criticism of AU by Thomas G. Sanders. Sanders' later work, *Protestant Concepts of Church and*
State, was, like Morgan's work, a reflection of the changed times. Sanders, however, reflected the neo-conservative approach to ecumenism. He denied the existence of any ideological and absolute principle of separation in Protestant tradition. The separationist position of AU, according to Sanders, reflected a secularist instead of the original religious interpretation of the First Amendment. Bennett, like Sanders, favored across-the-board aid to church schools for non-religious instruction, believing "that what is good for the Roman Catholic Church is good for us."

In the midst of the renewed controversy over federal aid to education in 1961, the editors of Christianity and Crisis wrote against AU's "'holy war' mentality" and self-righteousness. The editorial writer charged Lowell with using "inflammatory language" and distorting evidence. They also charged him with inaccuracy when he claimed that the American Catholic Church was responsible for Senator Joseph McCarthy's pro-Community charge against Protestant clergy. The writer objected to AU's use of separation as part of a "propaganda machine that evokes membership application and financial contributions," and to its absolutizing of "its own sectarian position as the 'American position'." The editorial writer called on the leaders of AU to change and end its association of separationism with anti-Catholicism.

We ask the leaders of P.O.A.U. to cease and desist from their blatant anti-Catholicism and to move beyond the entrenched position of the holy war from which they impugn the patriotism of their adversaries.
and attack any understanding of the American tradition and Protestant Christianity that differs from their own.\textsuperscript{12}

Quoting William Clancy, the editorial writer remarked that "The \textit{Brooklyn Tablet} and POAU seem made for each other because if it were not for the one, what would the other find to talk about?"\textsuperscript{13}

AU's response could only confirm the editorialist's fear that the leadership of AU perceived itself in a war of good versus evil, of God versus the devil. Lowell claimed that criticism of AU should be suspended while it fought a "life and death struggle" for the "American way of lie." In battle the style of a man's haircut was irrelevant, Lowell proclaimed. AU did not have the time to reply to criticism because it was fighting the Catholic drive for federal funds. In a letter to Dean Kelley, Lowell stated that behind the criticism by \textit{Christianity and Crisis} was the publicity given by AU to the fact that some theological students attending Union Theological Seminary received federal fellowships.\textsuperscript{14}

In other words, AU's effectiveness once again was responsible for criticism and one could discount the content of that criticism. Privately, Archer believed, in a variation on a theme, "If we ran POAU in a manner to satisfy some of these intellectuals who lean over backwards to pacify the Catholics we would not have enough financial support to run a peanut stand."\textsuperscript{15}
Lowell's reply to Christianity and Crisis produced the first major public criticism of AU by the Christian Century. The magazine objected that AU had not stuck to the issue of separation, lacked objectivity, and was unfair and inflammatory in its reply. Besides raising questions about AU's techniques, the major point of the story warned AU about "fanaticism" and, as Sanders before, called for self-scrutiny.

The editorial writer of Christian Century had wondered about AU's lack of fair play and "awareness of the rules of the game." But the rules of the game were in question, for they were changing. Ecumenists' increased sensitivity to AU's language, techniques, and assessment of American Catholicism were consequences of changes within Protestantism that POAU opposed. AU questioned these new rules because of what they represented, as, for example, when Lowell stated:

\[\text{It is my conviction...that the ecumenical movement endangers the integrity of Protestant Christianity. I believe, further, that it may jeopardize the freedom of smaller groups apart from the so-called mainstream of Protestantism. Ecumenism constitutes a trend that must be quickly reversed if Protestant convictions and Protestant freedom are not to be undermined.}\]

More forcefully, the associate director believed that "Much of the old-line Protestant leadership is ready to return to Rome on almost any terms."

As a matter of fact, the Christian Century, too, was changing with the times, becoming "An Ecumenical Weekly."
A number of articles appeared in the magazine during 1964 and 1965 critical of AU, especially of AU's reporting of the Vatican Council. Lowell attributed the change in the liberal magazine to the coming to the staff of the ecumenically-minded Martin E. Marty, a Lutheran. Marty joined the Christian Century in 1957; the criticism began a good deal later.

Fey, who retired as editor in 1964 and who remained a supporter and friendly critic of AU found AU's style no longer as acceptable as it once was. He stated in 1964 that AU "has a function to perform—if it sticks to its original purpose. But there's a certain strain of Know-Nothingism in their writings, regardless of what the Roman Catholic Church does or does not do."

The relations between Dean Kelley of the Religious Liberty Department of the NCC and representatives of AU had become "seriously strained" by the mid-60's. Kelley, who viewed AU with mounting hopelessness, contended AU's image was so bad that it destroyed its effectiveness. He believed AU's method of operation could not solve the problems of separation, writing to Archer that grassroots support manifested in an audience of 10,000 applauding loudly would not made the crucial decisions in church-state separation. Archer agreed with him that elites would make the important decisions.

Archer dismissed Kelley's criticism because, as he
wrote, "Kelley likes to hear things against POAU and has a
good memory for what most of use would consider mere scuffs
of battle." Moreover, Archer reminded him that in some
places the image of NCC was one of Communism, naivete,
bureaucracy, and of being "hoodwinked by Jesuits." Kelley,
however, was only one of a number of people within NCC who
objected to AU on grounds of bigotry, for claiming to speak
for the whole of Protestantism, for "irresponsible" public
relations, and for using "the Catholic issue to raise
money." Archer and Lowell dismissed these objections, as
it did Kelley's, as manifestations of professional jealousy
of AU's success.

Kelley's objections involved far more than professional
jealousy, however. Kelley did not favor direct federal aid
to parochial education. Protestant opposition to aid to
parochial schools he, however, found invalid given Protes-
tant acceptance of public funds for higher education, hospit-
tals, and overseas relief programs. Unless Protestants gave
up this aid he believed that no real reason existed for oppo-
sing aid to parochial education. Attending a NAE church-
state conference in 1963 as a representative of the NCC,
Kelley referred to this "ambiguity" he found in much of Pro-
testant separationism:

Grants from federal funds to church-related colleges
and hospitals were described as a form of 'coopera-
tion' which does not in any way 'jeopardize religious
liberty.' Concern was expressed that evangelical in-
stitutions should not be 'frozen out' of any programs
of government largesse but should enjoy their 'fair
share'—without, of course, compromising principle or submitting to government control. There was no indication of why this policy should not be applied also to parochial schools.32

From the beginning of Protestant-Catholic dialogue, AU's association with conservative Protestantism led liberal ecumenists to assume AU's separationism was merely the expression of out-worn cultural Protestantism. Kelley expressed what he regarded as the major problem of evangelicals in the evangelical-ecumenist controversy over separation when he stated in his conclusion about the NAE meeting, at which both Archer and Lowell spoke:

Throughout the conference there was a note of petulant complaint that Protestant dominance in national life is waning. One might expect that the older, larger churches of European background would be yearning for the fleshpots of establishment and privilege, whereas the younger, more evangelical churches would have confidence in the power of the Word to find its own way. But such is not the case; apparently the evangelicals are less weaned from culture-Protestantism than are some of the major denominations. They are not evangelical enough! Instead, one finds them looking back to the "Christian commonwealth" of colonial days— the American version of medieval Christendom.33

In other words, Kelley believed that evangelicals sought aid from the state for their interests and Protestants but opposed aid for Catholicism.

AU leaders had always opposed aid to church-related colleges and hospitals as a threat to religious liberty and spoke out against competing for funds. AU leaders also spoke out for a consistent Protestant position that rejected all forms of governmental aid to Protestant institutions in order
to present a more convincing opposition to Catholic demands for aid. From the viewpoint of AU leaders, moreover, old-line Protestant denominational leaders, in their attitude toward public aid to parochial schools, were the ones desirous of establishment and privilege. The result of such aid would be a multiple establishment of the three major religions, which in fact would mean the establishment of culture-religion with the Roman Catholic Church using its power to destroy the other two religions.

One consequence of the alienation between NCC and AU leaders was the exclusion of the staff of AU from the church-state "Consortium" begun in 1964 and later institutionalized under the leadership of the NCC. The aim of the consortium was to exchange views and provide cooperation among various separationist groups in the context of the renewed controversy over federal aid to education that had begun in the Kennedy Presidency. During Lyndon B. Johnson's term of office, the consortium was one of the major conduits which worked out the difficult church-state compromises that permitted passage of the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 (ESEA). The major compromise was between the NEA and NCWC. Baptist, Methodist, Episcopalian, Lutheran Council, United Church of Christ, and NCC members of the consortium favored the compromise involving dual enrollment or shared time programs (a favorite of Kelley's and variant of released time) and indirect aid to parochial schools. Jewish organizations,
NAE, Seventh Day Adventists, and ACLU opposed the compromise. W. Melvin Adams, a Seventh Day Adventist member of AU's Board, complained that AU's exclusion from the consortium was "inefficient and silly." 36

Also in 1964, the NCC held a National Study Conference on Church and State in Columbus, Ohio, that lasted for three days and was attended by almost 400 delegates, including fourteen NCWC observers. The conference and its findings reflected the general change occurring within major Protestant leadership circles that opened the way toward compromise among the majority in the consortium. As with the consortium, board members of AU, as representatives of their denominations, participated in the conference but not AU staffers.

According to Philip Wogaman, anti-Catholicism had little appeal to the delegates; some delegates however worried over the power of its appeal among certain Protestants. One such delegate was Franklin H. Littel, a Methodist and Professor of Church History at Chicago Theological Seminary and former member of the Religious Liberty Department of the NCC. In 1963 and 1964, Littel and AU leaders engaged in a number of extremely vitriolic exchanges, one of which in September, 1964 was recorded in the Congressional Record. Littel believed Protestants unfairly manipulated the wall to their own advantage, especially to keep the public schools a Protestant preserve. He stated in an article, "Toward Religious
Liberty,"

Organizations such as Protestants and Other Americans United (POAU) build up their staffs and budgets by appealing to Protestant anxiety at the rise and increasing acceptance of the Catholic community, and flood our churches with the most vicious and scurrilous attacks on American Catholicism, its leadership, and on such Protestant or Jews as seek solutions to specific issues by reasoned discussion rather than blind prejudice. 39

In his paper for the conference, "Christian Witness and Religious Liberty," he stated that "Although anti-Catholicism is waning as a political force, professional anti-Catholicism has a support in some Protestant church circles which it has not enjoyed for many years." Ecumenists increasingly used the charge of bigotry against those persons and organizations opposing aid to church institutions.

The general findings of the conference confirmed what AU leaders had been saying about the movement of Protestant leadership toward the Roman Catholic position on aid and on the effect of the concept of cultural pluralism. The authors of the general findings emphasized both separation and interaction, rejecting absolute, strict, and universal separation in a "voluntaristic and pluralistic culture." The authors' ignored questions of religious establishment and concentrated on the state's responsibility to promote religious liberty. They acknowledged the right to freedom of choice for parents and gave attention to the serious financial problems of parochial schools. They made much of the need for redefinition by Protestant churches in the
the "transition of this nation from a Protestant to a religiously pluralistic society." They sought to wean Protestants away from identifying their churches with the existing political and social order, which reduced their faith to the folk religion of culture religion. The delegates looked at this change, according to authors, as bringing to fruition the past goals of a free church in a free state within a free society. Defining secularism as a religion and a threat, the authors of the report of the conference provided a common enemy against which to unite and a common goal behind the pluralism.

Somewhat later, in a rather mild criticism Archer merely noted some sentiment at the conference for "softening up" of separationists. Making a virtue of necessity, he emphasized AU's independence from the conference and from institutional involvement that would make a strong stand for separation difficult. He denied the delegates represented either the mainstream or the majority of Protestantism; rather, AU represented the majority. He called upon the rank and file of mainline Protestant denominations to reject their liberal leadership, which no longer believed in strict separation. This distinction between the institutional bureaucrats who sat on the denominational social boards and who were usually clerics and the laymen permeated AU's writings as one major explanation for the changes and defections from "the" Protestant position on church and state. Archer
observed that the conference had a "high proportion of executives of church institutions and agencies as compared with relatively small proportion of pastors and laymen." These executives, he went on, represented institutions which were recipients of public funds and "appeared to be out of touch with grassroot sentiment of churches."

Criticism by Church and State writers was not so mild. They charged that the extreme liberal wing of ecumenists at the conference wanted to breakdown the wall of separation in order to break the impasse over federal aid to education, the responsibility for which AU stated belonged to the Catholic Church. Despite the ecumenists' minority status at the conference, the writers believed that they were responsible for the less than absolute separationist position in the position paper of the conference. The other delegates had been hoodwinked and out-maneuvered by the extreme ecumenists. In reality, the delegates still believed in strict separation. The metaphor of the wall of separation remained valid in AU leaders opinion. Moreover, the editorialist took Marty to task for stating that AU no longer could be taken as the voice for Protestantism on church-state matters, as Protestants sought a new flexible, middle ground, presumably provided by the Religious Liberty Department of the NCC.

Although the Southern Baptist Convention gave the usual commendation of AU, AU's working relationship with the Baptist Joint Committee had broken down, too, by 1964.
C. Emanuel Carlson, the executive director of the most important organization in AU's founding, was a member of AU's Board until 1963, when he left quietly. Carlson's views on separation had evolved over the years into a modified position on separation, rejecting absolutism. He similarly sought to reorient fellow Baptists toward a more flexible form of separation, one not premised on anti-Catholicism. Kelley considered Carlson to be his most competent adviser in the consortium. Carlson was to play a key role in the church-state compromise that enabled passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. By 1965, no discussion or liaison existed between AU and Carlson.

The division within AU over the proper response to ecumenism briefly surfaced in 1964 as a result of the resignation of Ellis H. Dana, one of the founders, from the Board of Trustees. AU's movement "AGAINST THE TRENDS" was one, but not the only, major reason for Dana's resignation, for he had expressed dissatisfaction with the direction of AU for quite some time. He found AU too negative, unfair, unobjective and "Antiminded," and he believed that the leadership had failed to face up to the new ecumenical trends in all faiths and that AU had lost confidence of Protestants who had originally supported it. He believed further that the need now was to work with the American Catholic Church on mutual problems developing from the ecumenical movement and two sessions of the Vatican Council. The American
Catholic Church was changing, and the AU leadership refused to acknowledge it. "In the eyes of most fair minded Americans (churchmen as well as non-churchmen)," Dana asserted, "P.O.A.U. appears weak and uninformed when it continues to speak and write as though the Roman Catholic Church in America is a conspiracy, monolithic and incapable of change."

The official AU policy toward ecumenism remained unchanged during the mid and latter sixties, but was a bone of contention within the Board. W. Stanley Rycroft, Presbyterian representative on the Board, in a 1969 paper entitled "DO WE UNDERSTAND THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT," stated the following:

It is evident to me that the Ecumenical Movement has hurt our movement in two ways. The 'official' attitude toward it has tended to alienate us from the mainstream of Protestantism, something which I feel we could have avoided. Secondly, it has been divisive within our own ranks. It is undoubtedly true, on the other hand, that the false concept which many Protestants have of the Ecumenical Movement has led them to mute their convictions about separation of church and state.

Rycroft and Mackay, who like Rycroft was mildly critical of the anti-ecumenical policy, were in a minority on the Board, but these two in addition to Carlson and Dana should have been able to make some impact on Archer and Lowell or at least get the language toned down. That they were not able to do so reflected the fact of Archer's power, with the Board reflecting the policies Archer wished to carry out. Also, the majority the Board agreed with the policy.
Moreover, the staff, hand-picked by Archer, reflected his views of the "False brotherhood" of ecumenism:

False brotherhood, cleverly advanced in these days, will prove to be a blinding blunder. Appeasing Protestants of our day will become the Neville Chamberlains of tomorrow. Today's prisoners of intimidation will lie in unknown graves where the timid and fearful of all ages have lain.\(^49\)

In the background of the growing power of ecumenism and AU's alienation from the liberal Protestant leadership were the changes coming out of the Vatican Council. AU leaders denied that any fundamental change did or could take place within the Roman Catholic Church. No such changes could take place because, although Pope John XXXIII had rejected the idea that "error has not the same rights as truth," the church would never renounce that it was the one true church. As Lowell pointed out, the church held to a dogma of truth and faith that could never give credence to an adequate concept of freedom, and Protestants at the "point of freedom" must not be guilty of the "sin of compromise." To have an adequate concept of freedom, as Lowell defined the concept, the Roman Catholic Church would have had to renounce its history and become Protestant.

Since the church was unchangeable, AU leaders described the Vatican Council in terms of language they had always used. One effect of the ecumenical movement among the Protestant followers was the rejection of certain terms and tones of language that had been previously acceptable, the
change in acceptable language reflecting more deep-seated changes. For example, a writer in the *Christian Century* quoted the "Nativist lingo" in the January 1965 issue of *Church and State* on the report of Vatican Council II, session III as follows:

...totalitarian rule...the same old feudal operation...the same old dictator...firm 16th century mentality, but more tyrannical...his bachelor theologians at Rome...his hackers (i.e., the bishops)...his Italian cronies...the man in the saddle at the Vatican...his perquisites and promotions (used to explain the only reason why anyone anywhere is a Catholic bishop and does not join Luther's Reformation)...these machinations...out of obsequious deference to a medieval theology of the kind which damned Galileo...the Roman Church attempts everywhere to fence off its people from the world about them.  

Robert McAfee Brown in his 1967 work on the ecumenical revolution cited the above quote as one example of "diatribe" using "loaded and emotionally charged words" that was "typical of a certain Protestant mind set." He claimed that such statements of "things Roman" were now unrepresentative, despite the fact that they were still found "in the outlying precincts." When he asked, "Who speaks for Protestants on the church-state issue--P.O.A.U. or *Christianity and Crisis*?", he, however, wisely did not answer his own question. He believed that there was no Protestant position because Protestants were too diverse, although he incorrectly implied that AU's position was parallel to that of Carl McIntire and the American Council of Christian Churches.
Of those Protestants who still believed the Roman Catholic Church to be a power structure seeking to "take-over" the United States, Brown believed them to be in an untenable position. The position was untenable because they could hold their position "only by accusing the Roman Catholic Church of living and acting in bad faith and deliberately propagating falsehoods for public consumption while cannily planning contrary strategy in private." AU leaders found no reason or change in the Roman Catholic Church to change their minds on the church as a system of power.

One of the most important changes to come out of Vatican Council II was the declaration on religious liberty, a declaration open to various interpretations. The declaration writers affirmed the right of interior belief and public expression of religious belief free from coercion even where there was an established church. Like minority groups in the Roman Catholic Church, AU leaders denied that any change toward religious liberty or other faiths occurred, stressing that the declaration reaffirmed the church's traditional position, was a "set back" for religious liberty, or, as expressed in typical Lowellian hyperbole, represented "a death-bed repentance." Gaston D. Cogdell, director of organization for AU following Mayne's departure, stated AU's view when he wrote:

Actually, the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Liberty was in some respects a victory for the reactionary forces within the Roman Catholic Church.
There is no hint within it of the freedom to preach, to evangelize, and to propagate one's faith. Freedom of religion is taken to mean merely freedom of conscience, which actually cannot be denied anyhow—and even this type of religious freedom is carefully conditioned by the stipulation 'within due limits.'

The leadership of AU went to great lengths to point out that the ideas of the "one true Church," established church partial union of church and state, and tax support for churches had not been rejected. Moreover, Vatican II reaffirmed the principle that the Catholic religion should permeate throughout the Catholic schools.

AU leaders believed that under the ecumenical banner Catholics and Protestants, bereft of Protestant convictions, were joining together into one "Super Church." Archer stated his belief that ecumenism rested "on the assumption that a union of all churches into a single, organic structure, in which the primacy of the Pope would be universally recognized is the most desirable form of Christianity to assume." Protestant clericalism was forming with Catholic clericalism to create one vast monolithic ecclesastical structure that would become the established church.

The key shift in the climate of opinion came in the mid-sixties. Ecumenism changed how AU and separation were viewed and was a major part of the trends of the times which, according to Archer in 1965, had so eroded the principle of separation that support for the principle was becoming a minority view (at least among liberal Protestant leaders.)
Archer, of course, meant strict separation. AU's isolation from former friends and executives of denominational agencies and the NCC, Morgan contended, denied it a forum for cooperation and a place to explain its cause. While the influence AU leaders had among liberals and ecumenists may have been destroyed, Morgan's characterization of AU as an "organizational pariah" was extreme. Private meetings and contacts continued to occur but AU's influence in mainstream Protestantism was low and remained so throughout the decade. At the same time, AU's anti-ecumenism probably helped it with its more fundamentalist supporters at a time when AU was having some problems with them.

Simultaneously, the transformation of AU begun in the late fifties, as a representative of conservative Protestantism, hardened by the mid-sixties into an even more extreme image. According to a Newsweek story in October, 1964 on "POAU in Crisis," liberal theologians had withdrawn their support of AU as a result of ecumenism. "POAU's constituency," the writer of the story concluded, "more and more represents a small-town, latter day fundamentalism in the eyes of its critics."

Fey, while worried about the "danger of a fundamentalist take-over," was more hopeful. He noted the "ambiguous" nature of AU's attitude toward ecumenism, with some in the organization anti-ecumenical and others "horrified" at the "anti-ecumenical trend." The problem derived, he believed,
from the fact that certain Southern Baptists, Christian
Scientists, Seventh Day Adventists, and other more or less
isolated from mainstream Protestantism lacked an understand-
ing of ecumenism. Without mentioning names, he tried to re-
assure his Christian Century readers that a majority of the
Southern Baptists were younger men who did not see the Roman
Catholic Church as monolithic or immune from the influences
of democracy.

By the mid-sixties, ecumenism was clearly at its peak of
influence. By 1966, leaders of the NCC and Catholic Bishops
had developed continuous working relationships and a priest
had been added to the staff of NCC. Working groups on im-
portant theological matters existed between the Catholic
Bishops and the Presbyterian, Lutheran, Episcopalian, and
Methodist churches, especially during 1965-1967. There oc-
curred interfaith conferences on family life and marriage,
and interdenominational cooperation and coordinated action
grew enormously in areas of mutual interest. By 1967, Roman
Catholic parishes in thirty cities had become full members
of local councils of churches. Reformation Day, which AU
leaders had so often used to boost Protestant pride and re-
sistance, became in a number of churches festivals of faith
and unity. Climaxing a long term trend, Catholics in the
89th Congress in 1965 for the first time surpassed Methodists
as the largest religious group in Congress.
At the same time, despite the changes and the wavering support for strict separation among Protestant leaders, strict separation held the loyalty of a majority of non-Catholics in 1966. According to a 1966 Catholic Digest poll, most non-Catholics still opposed even fringe benefits like textbook and bus transportation aid to church schools.

**SECULARISM AND AMENDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT**

Meanwhile, AU leaders were having problems as a result of two Supreme Court decisions. In 1962, the Court ruled in *Engel v. Vitale* that the New York Board of Regents' non-denominational prayer used in the public schools was an unconstitutional use of state power. The 1963 *Murray v. Curlett* and *Abington School District v. Schempp* ruled unconstitutional the formal reciting of the Lord's Prayer and Bible-reading in the public schools. The Court stressed once again the "strict neutrality" of the state in matters of religion as well as the uselessness of questioning the *Ewing* and *McCollum* decisions. While forbidding official prayers whether denominationally neutral or voluntary, the Court did not forbid the teaching about religion in the public schools.

Although both decisions were controversial, the *Engel* prayer decision came in for the greatest amount of criticism, which reached a level that surpassed the volume of criticism over *McCollum*. Even so, the preponderance of Protestant
leaders supported the Murray and Schempp decisions. Conservative Protestants, members of small fundamentalist bodies, and minority groups of large denominations, however, vigorously challenged the rulings.

The Engel decision divided AU leadership, but those opposed to the decision were in the minority so that in the end Archer prevailed. Louie Newton, Clyde Taylor, W. Kenneth Haddock, and Dick H. Hall, Vice-President of AU, opposed the decision. In fact, the day following the announcement of the decision, while Archer prepared a statement in support of the Court, Newton publicly criticized Engel in Atlanta. A phone call to him from Archer on its relation to AU's position on separation ended Newton's public faultfinding.

The position AU leaders took on Engel was consistent with AU's general position on religious exercises in public schools involving money expenditures, officials, and sectarianism. With a view toward its supporters among the fundamentalists who did not understand separation to mean prohibition of prayer, AU emphasized the prayer in New York was so innocuous Jesus Christ was not even mentioned and offended nobody because it was so vapid. The non-denominational prayer exemplified "public school religion," a "religion of the least common denominator." In other words, the prayer was "not religious enough." Of course, if it had been religious enough, it would then have been denounced as sectarian and thus unconstitutional. AU noted the Engel decision held
the money line. In AU's later literature on *Engel* as well as on the other court ruling, the stress was on the positive side, clarifying the points that private prayer and use of the Bible was not prohibited.

A movement began to change the First Amendment to permit prayer and Bible-reading in the public schools shortly after the Supreme Court decisions. While AU opposed any such changes, the impetus from the amendment came primarily from evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants. The NAE, with 2 to 3 million members and claiming to represent 15 million evangelicals, backed such an amendment. Lowell wrote that AU's relationship with NAE, like its relations with the Seventh Day Adventists, was uniformly one of friendship and cooperation in spite of some disagreements.

The divergence of the separationism of AU from that of the NAE at the point of this amendment, AU's official opposition to an NAE sponsored Christian Amendment, and on the Christian day school movement, to name just three points of difference, was bound to cause some strain in relationships.

Moreover, the forces pushing for an amendment came from a grassroots movement, one which the overwhelming majority of official Protestantism (and a "very cautious" Catholicism) opposed. Catholic initial reaction had been extremely critical and divided over the decisions. The American Catholic Church was one of the most sharpest critics of *Engel*. Church officials, after reversing their position following
McCollum by coming out for Bible-reading and prayer in the public schools, seemed to have subsequently neither attacked or defended Schempp. AU leaders feared that the church would use the emotional secularization issue among Protestants at the grassroots level to get public aid.

One hundred and fifty resolutions appeared in Congress in 1964 proposing First Amendment changes and, more seriously, Senator Everett Dirksen (R., Ill.) had 47 co-sponsors for his 1966 "Voluntary Prayer" amendment. AU leaders apparently worked separately to defeat the 1964 amendment forces because of their exclusion from the loose "consortium" of other anti-amendment forces. In 1966, Ed Doerr, then Director of AU Field Services and a Director of the National Capital Humanist Association, wrote, without going into detail, that he and others had "pulled the strings to strengthen Dirksen's opponents and succeeded."

The secularism-sectarianism problem once again faced AU leaders. To the Senate, Lowell denied that there was "a plot to 'drive God out of the schools!'" and asserted that sectarian religion could not be promoted in a compulsory situation. The United States was no longer overwhelmingly Protestant, Lowell observed, and this situation required respect for the rights of the religious minority. "Where would the few Protestants be in Boston," he asked, "if we had religion by majority rule there? Where would the few Roman Catholics in North Carolina be?"

Archer pointed out
that a "prayer that is legislated is not a prayer at all." At the same time, he realized that there were many people who feared that the country was becoming so secular that anything should be done to stop it. He warned, however, that "the surest way to impose secularism on a country is to have a secular body like Congress or a legislature legislate religion."  

In 1971, the alert once again went out from AU headquarters on the possible passage of a voluntary "non-denominational" prayer known as the Wylie Amendment, after Representative Chalmers P. Wylie (R., Ohio). AU activated chapters and alerted the churches, lodges, and clubs for a letter writing campaign to counter the strong mail campaign by amendment supporters to Congress. AU emphasized the letters need not be long or scholarly, just numerous. After visiting Capitol Hill, Archer found that of the 15 elected officials he talked to, four seemed to support AU's position and three others needed help because they were afraid to vote against the amendment due to grassroots support. The difficulty in voting against it, as Lowell remarked, was that it was like voting against God. In one instance, at least, the use of Church and State articles and AU leaders efforts in generating support at home helped a congressman vote against the amendment. AU leaders did make a concerted lobbying effort to defeat the measure in the House, where though a majority voted for the measure it did not receive
the needed two-thirds majority.

AU's stance on the Supreme Court decisions and constitutional amendments cost AU support among AU's most stable supporters. E. Mallory Binns, a Southern Baptist minister and in 1973 AU's Public Relations Director, continually maintained that AU lost a significant portion of membership because of the stance, more so than on any other issue. The perceptible decline in the percentage of annual increases in income beginning in 1962 confirmed Binns' observation. The adverse climate of opinion, the passage of federal aid programs to church institutions, and the substantial amount of income to begin with must also be taken into account as causes for the decline. In other words, the key to AU's decline in support was not directly due so much to ecumenism but to the loss of more fundamentalist supporters. The loss of that support opened the way to a broader base, a more flexible policy, and the inclusion of other, formerly absent forces within AU's leadership structure.

In 1971, the NAE drew away from AU partly over the Prayer Amendment, although the other differences of opinion mentioned above were operative in this distancing. Clyde Taylor, who had become Director of NAE, however, remained on the Board. The NAE believed the Court's prayer ruling, especially as interpreted by lower courts, denied religious liberty that was exercised through voluntary prayers.
Possibly to firm up sagging evangelical support and because of their own concerns about the lack of teaching about religion in the public schools, AU leaders joined in 1971 in forming the National Council on Religion and Public Education. The Court's decision in *Scheffpp* gave impetus to courses about religion in the public secondary and junior high schools. Also, ever since the rejected 1952 study on released time, AU's position in *Church and State* had always been that teaching about the moral and spiritual values of the Judeo-Christian religion was permissible in the public schools. AU, however, did not actively promote such teaching for fear of the implications of such promotion. AU leaders were joined by the leaders of the Baptist Joint Committee in forming the Council. AU's relations improved after E.S. James, who had sat on AU's Board, became the committee's executive director. The United States Catholic Conference (USCCB), the new name for the NCWC after 1966, and the National Conference of Christian and Jews (NCCJ) were also important founders of the National Council. The chairman of the council was a formerly favorite target of AU, Neil J. McCluskey, S.J. Three hundred educators attended the November, 1972 national convention and discussed the educational necessity of teaching about religion in the public schools.

Although the council never really got off the ground, AU leaders' participation in founding the organization signified several things. The atmosphere had changed
considerably to allow the cooperation of AU and the USCC and NCCJ. AU leaders had changed their tactical policies and AU's image had undergone a degree of transmutation. The fact that AU could cooperate with the USCC indicated that the larger societal changes in America in the 1960's had eventually found their way into AU.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS

By 1963, AU stood at a turning point in its history, one which brought AU into crisis and brought the leaders face to face with a decision about the future direction of AU. Their relations with Protestant denominational agencies and NCC were deteriorating while criticism of AU increased from these sources. The sources of most of this criticism were AU leaders' methods and, particularly, AU's anti-Catholicism, which was a subject of increasing discussion among Protestant leaders. AU's anti-Catholic image caused the greatest difficulties for AU's leadership. Moreover, the stance of AU on the Supreme Court's school prayer decision caused internal problems. The scramble for finances still dominated AU leaders daily work for they had not yet attained the degree of financial permanence Archer had continually sought.

By 1963, of the original founders only Dana, Taylor, and Newton remained active participants on the Board. When Mackay and Oxnam retired in the early '60s, AU leaders
had difficulty in obtaining a top Presbyterian and Methodist with recognizable names to replace them. Eventually, Methodist Bishop Caradine R. Hooten, a lawyer and then Executive Director of the National Temperance League, replaced Oxnam briefly. Dick Houston Hall, Jr., whose Decatur, Georgia Baptist Church gave more money a year to AU than any other church, became a Vice-President of AU. In 1970, AU had only one vice-president, Edwin R. Garrison, a Methodist. The Presidents of AU continued to be Southern Baptist. While AU continued to have many denominational representatives on the Board, Methodists and Southern Baptists remained predominant, with Southern Baptists increasing in number.

Archer experienced some difficulties with staff turnover. Mayne left his position as Organization and Promotion Director in May, 1962. Drawing from within AU, Archer appointed Gaylord Briley, the office manager, head of the Circulation and Promotion Division. (Briley left in 1965 to take a position at Christ's Mission, Inc. of New York City, a fundamentalist group which published the Converted Catholic magazine.) Not until April, 1963, did Archer find a Director of Organization. He was Edward Terry, a Methodist minister, who had been an administrator at Rose Viela Senior Citizens, Inc., in Portland, Oregon. Most importantly, Paul Blanshard resigned in January, 1962, because of age and the desire to devote his time to writing. Although only the
part-time special counsel, he had done a considerable portion of the legal work.

Meanwhile, some problems at the local level also pointed to a need for a re-evaluation of AU's program. Fights in the churches and local organizations for funds and support between AU and ecumenists, who tried to prevent support of AU, had proved the value of a body of support independent of the churches. Nevertheless, local chapters, which continued to be a financial drain, had problems with "firebrands" as well as those relating to a "bad image." When Morgan attended a Queens, New York chapter meeting, for example, he found it inadequately organized, lacking in promotional material, and in financial difficulty. Also, the group proved ineffective because the hot church-state issue at the time required a political, not an educational solution. Furthermore, the regional offices were costing more than they were taking in, leading Archer to contemplate discontinuance of some of them.

Archer set up a survey committee in 1963 to review the work of the organization. He also asked John M. Swomley, a member of the Saint Paul School of Theology (Methodist) in Kansas City, Missouri, to do an overall survey of AU's program in order to make suggestions for increasing its effectiveness. Mr. Archer has kept Swomley's report confidential, but his findings can be garnered from the Board's response to the highly critical report. While Swomley
reiterated a number of the criticism that had dogged AU for years, his critique took on importance because he was the first outsider to investigate AU, and he confirmed from the inside some of what outside critics had pointed to.

Swomley thought that AU had an unfortunate public image and had failed to face squarely some criticisms made of it. AU's anti-Catholic image had tended to attract the more fanatical fringe and appealed to more conservative religious groups. The most serious problem was AU leaders failure to take into account or adjust to the new climate in Protestant-Catholic relations. A third major problem AU leaders had been unwilling to face was the welfare state and all of the ramifications emerging from it. Fourthly, he recommended the development of a consistent philosophy or rationalization of religious liberty and separation. This recommendation reflected the widely held perception that AU acted less from separationist motives than on the need to keep Protestantism culturally established. Swomley's opinion also reflected the widely held perception that AU leaders selectively applied their separationist principles to Catholicism.

To top off the changes he recommended in the above areas, Swomley suggested that the manifesto of 1948 be rewritten in current language dealing with current problems in order to appeal to the new generation.

He advised three other changes related to AU's public image. Since AU did not represent a majority of American
Protestants, the name of POAU should be dropped in favor of Americans United(AU) so as not to presume to be speaking for Protestants. The new name, he suggested, would reflect a more inclusive movement that would develop as a result of the correction of the denominational imbalance in AU in favor of Southern Baptists. Besides wider representation on the Board, the lack of NCC representation should be rectified in order to improve AU's bad relations with that organization. Thirdly, he argued that AU's literature and films were poor in quality. Church and State, which had come in for so much criticism, especially since Lowell began to write stories for it, Swomley judged to be unfair, unobjective, caustic, lacking in documentation, and unnecessarily polemical. Moreover, he believed Lowell to be severely anti-Catholic and "intemperate" in dealing with AU's Protestant opponents. His recommendation that the review be discontinued was unrealistic but was part of his critique to recommend ending any activity that had come in for criticism as being anti-Catholic.

He called for a reorganization of the institution and a change in priorities, policy, and strategy along with more specific recommendations. He suggested the development of research and educational departments, the expansion of legislative services and lobbying efforts and ending mass meetings, the Department of Church Relations, and regional offices. Referring to one of the most frequent sources of
of criticism, Swomley recommended that AU stop creating issues and making emotional appeals to bring in money for the opportunism created a bad impression. Judging the staff on the basis of money raising had led the staff to be too much preoccupied to do their staff work. Moreover, in keeping AU organizationally alive, the staff had all too frequently become involved in peripheral issues that sapped strength and diverted attention from the separation issues. Besides finding AU too heavily weighted with older people, he believed several personnel on the staff were not fit by training, experience, or knowledge for their jobs. Legally, AU should hire one or more first class full time lawyers, cooperate more with other agencies such as the ACLU and NEA, expand legal work, and divorce legal work from propaganda. Since outside groups hesitated to associate with AU, a concentrated effort must be made to change interagency relationships. An understudy to Archer should be found, since he had expressed since the mid-fifties a desire to retire but had always seemed to be needed. If Swomley's recommendations were followed, AU would be a Washington lobbying group, without much membership, and be primarily a legal, and not an educational, group on the order of the ACLU.

Opinions of the report among the Board members were diverse and some members were strongly critical. In spite of the criticism, there was among the Board members general agreement on a number of items. Although admitting to some
problems and need for a few changes in policy, AU, they felt, had done sufficiently well with its present structure, personnel, and program that there was no need for fundamental change. AU had survived, moreover, because Archer went out and raised money through speeches and mass meetings. Foy Valentine, Executive Secretary of the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, best expressed the majority's view of ecumenism when he stated, "let it pass."

Generally, the Board members rejected Swomley's observation on anti-Catholicism and related matters. Most of them did not see anti-Catholicism as hurtful to AU and saw AU's image as impossible to reshape since it was not AU's fault. Moreover, they denied that AU challenged Catholics because they were anti-Catholic or that they did not go after Protestant violations. They gave a full vote of confidence to Lowell, and they agreed that AU was effective, of great value, and had popular appeal. AU had no great need for "objectivity." Some members doubted that there was any such thing as objectivity in the church-state field and where the Roman Catholic Church was involved. AU should not lose its passion, enthusiasm, or crusading spirit, they contended, for popular, grassroots support remained essential. As Valentine observed, AU had no more extremists in it than did the American Medical Association or the National Association of Manufactures.
The Board agreed with many of Swomley's specific recommendations. POAU remained the official name, but AU became standard in every other way. Dawson, who held emeritus status, alone remained adamant in his objection to any change in the name; even Morrison, who also held emeritus status, changed his mind on the name. The question was that even if AU's position represented the majority opinion of Protestants, did AU in fact have the support of those Protestants so that it could claim to speak for them? Furthermore, because of the changing climate of opinion, the more inclusive name of AU had broader appeal than the more exclusive POAU.

Swomley also recommended the hiring of a trained journalist. The Board recalled that one had been sought for a long time but, as in other positions, good men refused to join AU for fear of jeopardizing their professional standing.

While the Board seemed not to have discussed problems dealing with the welfare state, the problem with the denominations did consume some attention. The denominational imbalance in AU's leadership structure had occurred because AU sought to gain status by drawing from the two or three large denominations in order to assure them of their right to expect AU's support and sympathy. Dana, Rycroft, and Carlson pleaded with the Board to work for wider denominational representation. While there was general sentiment for wider representation, the Board generally felt that members of the NCC could not be appointed because they
would not support AU's position. In other words, the Board did not desire AU to surrender to the cultural pluralists.

The most vigorous dissent from the consensus came from Dana, who had been dissatisfied with AU's direction at least since the late '50s. In 1961, he desired a "basic reinterpretation" of the manifesto in order to deal with the criticisms of AU. What had kept in the organization despite AU's "anti-Catholic animus" was the need for a militant counterpoise to narrow and self-seeking Catholic actions. In 1963, Dana disagreed with AU's growing anti-clerical emphasis, stating that "if it continues to accent the anti-Catholic motif it will inevitably tend to become an anti-clerical organization." The result of such a development would be destruction of AU, which had happened to all previous anti-clerical organizations in the United States. His sharpest criticism, however, dealt with AU leaders' failure to fact the changing climate of opinion and criticisms. "POAU," Dana stated, echoing Swomley, "stands at the crossroads."

The Board indicated that AU would continue to take the same road. The road taken reflected AU's basic philosophy, which Harold G. Basden, a member of the Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board, reiterated when he stated, "Our struggle is with hearts and minds of the people and has to do with abiding values." The determining voice in AU's direction was to be Archer's. The Board had met at least four times to discuss the Swomley report and its disruptive
effect, especially on the staff. In a speech to his staff to build up morale and reverse what he saw as a developing "defeatist" attitude caused by doubt, confusion, and anxiety, Archer expressed his reaction to the report and the direction AU would take in the future.

He reiterated his often expressed belief about criticism of AU's anti-Catholicism and methods. "It is quite easy to say POAU shall not be anti-Catholic," he state, "but no one has ever told us how we can avoid this appellation without failing in our duty." He went on to state what duty made necessary:

In a sense we must accept the criticism and devise ways and means of doing all we can to avoid being anti-Catholic in heart and spirit, but we can never entirely be removed from the name and do a good job resisting Roman Catholic designs. If we were as pure as morning dew and resisted successfully the Catholic claim, the Catholics would still dub us anti-Catholic, and some Protestants would be gullable enough to swallow this propaganda.123

Drawing from his own experience, Archer advised his staff to rise above the criticism and develop a sense of remoteness from it.

These criticism, according to Archer, came in part from "self-styled" denominational leaders who desired to hold on to their bureaucratic positions, sought popularity, and had lost courage. These leaders feared AU's certainty because these men lived in the "gray areas of life" and were "neutrals, the indecisive." They were shaken by AU leaders who "dealt with black and white," and who entered a battlefield
where courage was central, faith in one's cause a certainty, and compromise was not countenanced until victory was achieved. AU leaders, Archer stated, would "never trim our sails to fit a particular climate lest we go down when that climate changes...." AU leaders provided leadership where these denominational leaders did not for AU leaders had a special ministry and message that must make an impact on the "thought-life of the nation." In doing this work of religious liberty, AU leaders did God's work. Archer concluded:

If POAU has a place in our national life it is to stiffen the weak backbones of some of our people and to offset the enormous propaganda that would entirely wipe out the values of the Protestant movement and the fruits of our American democracy.

Archer did make some changes without doing any fundamental restructuring. He maintained somewhat tighter control over what Lowell wrote and soon had seven editorial associates helping with Church and State, which became a magazine. He, also, changed personnel. Terry and Briley left AU. Gaston D. Cogdell, a member of the Church of Christ, became Director of Organization in October, 1964 and J. Eugene White of the Texas Baptist Standard joined the editorial staff in December of 1964. Also joining the staff in early 1966 was Edd Doerr, an Indiana public school teacher who had organized and acted as President of the first Indianapolis chapter of AU in 1964, Doerr, a former editor of The American Rationalist, worked as Associate Director of Organization before becoming head of the
Educational Relations Department in late 1969. In 1964, Archer also hired two lawyers, Franklin C. Salisbury, an Episcopalian, and John J. Adams, a Baptist. Adams was also made Associate Director for Administration and assistant to Lowell and Archer. He apparently was being groomed as Archer's successor, but he left in June, 1966.

Archer tinkered with AU's literature in order to improve AU's image. He tried to upgrade the literature by retiring such "extreme" items as "If the U.S. Becomes 51% Catholic," "Urban Take-Over," and "The Hidden Wealth of the Catholic Church." Beginning in 1965, Church and State became somewhat more informative and fair, less polemical, and more sophisticated, although AU's critics never noticed.

In 1963, two changes occurred in the manifesto. AU stopped aiming for a reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decisions on bus transportation and textbooks. Also, AU henceforth opposed changes in the federal and state constitutions that would weaken separation. Mirroring the effect of the two Supreme Court decisions and the secularism issue, AU added to the claim that it was not anti-Catholic the points that it was not anti-Protestant or anti-religious. The manifesto no longer made the point that AU was anti-Catholic only in the sense that Roman Catholics were anti-Protestants.
These changes in the manifesto were not sufficient for Dana, who first resigned as chairman of the manifesto committee and then in May of 1964 from AU. The reasons he gave for his public resignation reitered his comments on the Swomley report. In the last several years, he maintained, AU had moved from its sole purpose of separation to attacks on the American Catholic Church, causing those in the major denominations and NCC to pull away from AU. The "extremist anti-Catholic emphasis" and anti-clericalism of AU had made it ineffective and given separation a bad name. He blamed an unrepresentative Board of Trustees and Archer for these problems and policies as well as for the lack of any major changes to confront a "pluralistic American society." "Executive readiness and will," he wrote, "were not there." Dana concluded that the intent, motives, programs, and support desired by AU's founders had changed and AU had become sidetracked into less desirable avenues of behavior.

The same month that Dana resigned, the Methodist General Conference refused to renew its endorsement of AU. As in 1960, the infighting between AU and its opponents was fierce, but in the end the closing session of the conference rejected by a margin of two to one a minority report calling for specific commendation of AU. Money from the conference was not really AU's concern, for the conference had at most given AU $3,000 in one year. Prestige and access to
Methodists explained why AU was anxious to secure Methodist endorsement.

The endorsement of AU had always encountered vigorous objections within Methodism, and those objections increased during the early '60s. Objections came, once again, from within the Methodist bureaucracy, especially from the General Board of Christian Social Concerns which concerned itself with church-state matters. Dr. Astor Kirk, the church-state man for the Methodists in 1964 spoke against AU at the 1964 meeting. He observed that Methodists had their own agency and the NCC, that AU was only one of several civil liberty groups in this field, and that AU was anti-Catholic. Robert W. Moon, speaking for the General Board, charged that AU simply wanted the endorsement for financial reasons. Another source of disaffection at the conference was the AU attack on Robert B. Pease, a Methodist laymen from Pittsburgh, in regard to an urban renewal program in Pittsburgh where Pease was director of the redevelopment authority. In the pamphlet "Urban Take-Over," an AU writer had criticized the project. Pease stated on the conference floor that "By implication, by innuendo, by half-truths and twisted facts, this pamphlet attacks the urban renewal program and, with a picture and words, it attacks me personally."

AU, of course, vigorously defended itself. Dealing with the giveaway of the "heartland" of American cities to
the American Catholic Church, the pamphlet accused Pease of a "long period of fraternizing" with Father Henry McAnulty, President of Duquesne University. It claimed the government bought property for $9.2 million and sold it without competitive bidding to the university for $954,000. Archer wrote to his fellow Methodists admitting some local leaders had "more zeal than judgment" but only because some of the "folks with judgment have not enough zeal."

The continual criticism, despite its adverse effect on AU, had a positive side. AU still had sufficient strength, appearance of power and support, or a loud enough voice to command attention and to call forth from its opponents equally loud and vigorous complaints and dismissals.

In the fall of 1965, Dawson thought the crest of adverse criticism had been reached in 1964 with only a slight increased in 1965, particularly from religious bodies and press. Typically, he recommended, as Archer had so frequently done, a redoubling of educational efforts to provide others with a better understanding of AU's position.

Another trend adversely affecting the climate of opinion, from AU's viewpoint, involved the passage of programs for federal aid to education that climaxed in 1963-1965. In addition to the aid provided through hospitals, surplus property, urban renewal programs, and the 1958 National Defense Education Act, the federal government gave aid in various forms to sectarian or church-related colleges.
Most importantly, the Higher Education Facilities Construction Act of 1963 allowed specific grants for construction of facilities to be used for teaching secular subjects at church-related colleges. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as interpreted by the Office of Economic Opportunity, authorized church-related agencies to participate in programs and to receive federal funds. The proverbial dam burst when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 on the rationale that the act primarily benefitted the individual or child while providing only indirect aid to church institutions. AU, of course, opposed these programs before committees, in *Church and State*, and other forums, but to little or no effect.

AU's relations with the NEA, the NCC, and the consortium had reached a nadir by 1965. One more reason for this drawing away from AU by Protestant denominational leaders was their increasing willingness to take funds for their church institutions and AU leaders uncompromising attacks on that position. AU's influence, effectiveness, and capabilities at the national level were now greatly diminished. The magnitude of the forces working for change was too great for an institution with the size and limited resources of AU. Any lobbying by AU may have been hindered in 1965 as well by the fact that the IRS was investigating its lobbying activities. Nevertheless, from AU's perspective, these were disastrous years, ones that revealed the
capitulation of many denominations on the separation issue and AU's ineffectiveness to stem the defection or the flood of federal legislation.

The effect of the federal aid brought a further deterioration of the fortunes of strict separation and AU. "Many church school administrators," the AU staff proclaimed in 1966, "have openly advocated government assistance to their institutions, insisting that it presented no church-state problem." The staff continued that "Others, while originally in opposition, now give serious consideration to participating in the benefits of government aid." 152 For example, the Baltimore Methodist Conference, which had contributed $500 annually to AU since the early fifties, began to accept federal funds, and when it did so, it voted in 1966 by a margin of 291 to 211 to drop AU from its budget. The momentum for public aid and against strict separation at the national level perhaps reached its apogee in 1965, but the rippling effects brought new problems and an even graver crisis for AU clear into the 1970's.

The crisis can be measured in a number of ways, one of which involved Church and State. The readership of the magazine had temporarily reached 200,000 a month during the height of the 1960 election campaign. During the early sixties, readership averaged 150,000 to 175,000 a month. It rose again to 200,000 a month during 1965 probably as a
result of the controversy surrounding the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. In 1966, readership dipped to 150,000 a month, which AU attributed to death and retirement. For the rest of the decade and through 1971, the average distribution a month was 100,000, climbing to 130,000 in 1972. Actual subscription rates probably stood closer to 60,000 in 1970. Because AU claimed its *Church and State* readership as supporters, it seemed obvious to conclude that its support was definitely declining among old support groups.

In the middle and later '60s as well, AU began to have more than the usual money trouble. After a 22% dip in income to $419,000 in 1961, AU's annual income amounted to a little over $636,000 in 1962. AU's earnings for 1967 were approximately the same as in 1964, although revenue increased to almost $900,000 in 1968 due in large part to the special building fund drive for a national religious center. By 1971, AU received an income of $842,792, a figure which must be adjusted in order to take the inflation rate into account. Moreover, AU's income growth per year for 1960-1971 averaged only one-fourth of what it was for the 1950's, 4% as compared to 17%. Also, AU incurred its first long-term debt in 1969, following the loss of its tax-deductible status, and in 1971, according to Treasurer Southgate, AU ended the year with a deficit of over $59,000, the first such deficiency in AU's history.
The source of income remained basically the same, mostly from non-recurring sources. Institutional budgetary support was lacking in sufficient quantity to provide a permanent and stable source of revenue. In fact, institutional support at times seemed to have declined as a percentage of the budget below ten percent. In other words, support from individuals and the grassroots remained AU's mainstay and impressive. Wills grew in importance in undergirding AU's financial health, with AU receiving up to $60,000 in one year from wills. In 1967, AU had bequested to it in wills over $500,000, but when AU received that income was unpredictable. Because it was unpredictable, AU had to continue to rely on increasing membership. In 1972, wills and special solicitation accounted for one-third of AU operating expenses.

Reflective of these money problems and also worsening them was AU's project for a new headquarters, symbolizing the formal institutionalization and permanence of AU. The project was a product of Archer's long-held dream of building a memorial to the founders of AU and a "shrine" to religious liberty. Advertised as "America's Religious Liberty Center," Archer perceived it as a "Protestant Religious Liberty Center." "Protestant" and "American" were interchangeable where religious liberty was concerned since the Roman Catholic Church was not credited with making any contributions.
Archer had committed about $1.2 million to the project by 1966. Some Board members worried about such a large commitment of money at a time when AU was experiencing difficulties and federal programs needed to be challenged. Besides some concern about Archer's timing, a few Board members feared that institutionalization of the movement as represented by a new headquarters might diminish AU's militancy. The original headquarters, as envisioned by Archer, was to be built in Washington, D.C., close to Capitol Hill. AU, however, purchased a building and land worth over $550,000 in 1969 that was far smaller than originally planned and located in Silver Spring, Maryland, a suburb of Washington, D.C. The locations was a far cry from the symbolic location of Capitol Hill.

A real blow, at least at the time, was the loss of tax-deductibility status in 1968, after a three year investigation by the IRS. The loss put AU in the same tax category as the ACLU: tax-exempt and able to lobby but contributions to institution were not tax-deductible. No guidelines had been issued by the IRS as to what constituted "substantial" lobbying, being left to the discretion of the IRS. In his study of public interest groups, Berry found that the IRS applied the rule against substantial lobbying selectively. Moreover, the IRS had on a number of occasions been accused of denying tax deductibility to groups for purposes of political reprisal.
AU attributed this tax problem to its Roman Catholic opponents who on a number of occasions called for an investigation of AU's political activities, and to certain Protestant leaders in the NCC who called AU "a shrill Protestant voice." While under investigation, AU leaders assiduously avoided "legislatively oriented activity" and, as they had usually done, set up separate organizations and let them do the lobbying.

Having been cut off from large donors because of the loss of tax deduction for gifts, AU leaders worked slowly to rebuild financial resources and to find other means of support. One of the most productive solutions came through the formation of the Americans United Research Foundation in 1969, established as a tax-free educational foundation. Contributions to the Foundation were tax-deductible, so AU leaders hoped to keep the large donors. The Foundation could and did do educational and legal work and participated in campaigns coordinated with AU, although the funding of the two institutions had to be clearly distinct. AU used the Foundation to finance research projects and to finance legal suits. AU, according to Archer, was now free of limits imposed by its tax-deductible status and could pursue real "action" or lobbying programs.

AU neither collapse nor seemed to have a great deal of difficulty as a result of the loss of the tax status as Archer had earlier feared. The transition seems to have
gone smoothly. AU now had sufficient stability and financial resources. Equally important, AU had, unlike most public interest groups, a substantial membership base to provide AU with non-tax-deductible funds and enough large donors to make it worthwhile to set up an affiliated but legally independent public foundation.

Archer seemed of two minds on whether he wanted AU reinstated to its tax-deductible status. Citing AU’s activities in 1961 and 1962, the IRS ruled that AU leaders had gone beyond their educational role of providing information and had become "an active advocate of a political doctrine," apparently meaning separation. AU leaders contended that they advocated a position and did a small amount of lobbying in a particular cause, but these activities were not prohibited by the educational status and were required if AU was to be effective in its work. As early as 1965, Mackay had argued that as a crusading group urging certain lines of action AU was not entitled to tax exemption and should take a more activist role. AU leaders felt persecuted because their major competitors, the American Catholic Church and the USCC, extensively lobbied while their tax-exempt status was never questioned.

AU leaders desired their previous tax status back because raising money was more difficult without it, yet they wanted also to lobby. Consequently, the 1969 AU lawsuit against the IRS argued that the government had no right to
deprive it of the right to political and legislative activity as a price of tax exemption. If AU won the suit, AU would get back its tax exemption, according to Lowell, and would also be able to do all the lobbying it wanted.

The strict separationist position (one that opposed indirect as well as direct aid) continued to deteriorate. William M. Pinson, a member of the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas, and a member of the NAC, summarized in 1969 the changed perspective and breakdown. He believed the most effective argument against strict separation was that there had never been absolute separation and it would be difficult to maintain it if there now was complete separation. The separationist was now denounced as a "relic of the dinosaur age" and an "obscurantist, a bigot, and a secularist," living in a world of theology not facts. Separation stood in the way of progress, bringing "disagreement, disgust, and distrust." As he noted:

Government officials see the separationist as a hindrance to the progress of certain government activities. Administrators of church institutions see him as an obstacle in the way of gaining public funds. Political progressives see him as a member of the conservative anti-government camp. Concerned citizens see him as an obstruction standing in the way of improved education and welfare programs.177

Pinson made the point that these attitudes toward separation were not without foundation. He stated:

Too often the separationist is more of a slogan shouter than a careful analyzer of the
church-state situation. He is guilty of prejudice—usually toward the Roman Catholic Church and the Federal government. His motive for favoring separation may be more fear of big government and Catholicism than love of freedom. He may stoop to extremist tactics—the use of half-truths, twisted facts, emotionally charged words, innuendoes, and arguments by label rather than logic. He often is more negative than positive—being against church-state involvement but not struggling realistically with the issue of what the relation of church and state should be. Opposed to government funds going to church anti-poverty programs but refusing to see what the role of government and church should be in the war on poverty. His plea for separation may be no more than a conditioned response built in by years of denominational brainwashing; he may not be able to give an account of why he holds the separationist position.178

Whether knowingly or not, Pinson had pinpointed many of the problems with AU practices as such "modernists" as Pinson perceived them.

The erosion of strict separation ate into AU’s support. The late sixties saw, according to AU’s legal division, the rapid deterioration of separation because of the distortion of the mass media on the "spurious" child benefit theory and the acceptance of "Jesuitical legal reasoning." Nonetheless, higher education seemed to be one of the most prominent areas where an important sector of Protestantism had come to favor aid. The result of this adverse climate and "softened" Protestant support was, according to Archer, that even Baptists who had formerly supported AU were now among its opponents and taking aid.

About the same time that AU’s problems with the NAE occurred, Taylor wrote to Archer in 1970 complaining that AU
"shows considerable bias in favor of the public schools, and tends to look upon church schools as an insidious enemy." Archer in response asked, "What sort of blindness afflicted the Christian school people" that they would even think if seeking aid when the "Colossus of Rome" would virtually be the only beneficiary. Surely, Archer implored, you do not go along with the "Jesuitical fallacies of CEF being swallowed by Nixon." He cited Holland as an example of how, because of dividing public funds between public and parochial schools, the country was transformed from a predominately Protestant to a predominantly Catholic one. Already, "the enemy, with the help of friends from inside" had made too much progress. Separation alone was the answer, standing like the "Maginot Line, or the ancient Wall of China...." He appealed to Taylor: "Separation of church and state is the only hope for the spread and expansion of the Protestant religion."

Serious inroads in AU's support among Protestant leaders and the grassroots, which had been its staunchest bases, confirmed the observations of Philip Wogaman. He perceived in 1967 a change occurring within Protestantism. Until recently, AU had been the dominant voice of Protestants on separation, advocating a strict form of separationism and absolute religious liberty. While AU's influence and support remained considerable, the NCC had become the preeminent voice on separation, one favoring indirect aid. At the
same time, he remarked that the constituency of NCC and AU overlapped. While Wogaman had a liberal bias and may have been exaggerating the real situation, few could deny that AU had become the voice of an ever-shrinking minority by 1973.

"Religious liberty" was the new standard of judgment used by the majority. As Wilbur G. Katz of the University of Chicago Law School and a trustee of the Seabury Theological Seminary put it:

In determining the limits of constitutional separation, it is the concept of religious freedom which provides the criterion. The principle of church-state separation is an instrumental principle. Separation ordinarily promotes religious freedom; it is defensible so long as it does so, and only so long. This standard did not mean a necessary favoring of aid or establishment, as Katz made clear when he stated:

The basic American principle of church-state relations is not separation but religious liberty. This liberty includes freedom from government aid as well as freedom from restraint. Religious freedom has its limits, but they are not limits set by a principle of separation of church and state. This religious liberty position contributed, according to AU, toward the growth of a religious establishment in the 1960's.

Not all developments were bleak ones for AU. During the years between 1961 and 1973, favorable internal changes were occurring. One accomplishment took place in 1971 when AU finally became the official name for the institution. AU doubled its yearly income from 1961 to 1971, although one
must discount part of the later income increase as due to inflation. Nevertheless, the financial achievements of Archer and his staff were doubly impressive given the changing climate of opinion, but the increase also reflected the activity of AU and rising concern with separation at the local and state levels. The structure Archer had set up also accounted for the financial advancement. The departments had been shaped to gather support and money and the staff's continually going out into the field, which had been much criticized, kept AU in touch with its financial taproots. Archer avoided a top heavy bureaucratic structure, although a solid administrative system existed at the headquarters building in Silver Spring, Maryland. By the late '60s and early '70s, AU between $500,000 and $1,000,000 in reserve as a result of two millions worth of investments. Moreover, by 1970, AU had a net worth of $1.8 million and total assets exceeding $2 million.

Chapters stabilized between 75 and 115 through these years, although the numbers of chapters continued to fluctuate yearly. Following Swomley's report, Archer eliminated marginal chapters and concentrated more on state and large city chapters in order to increase AU's visibility and the effectiveness of its direct political action. Chapters' direct and obvious financial worth did not increase, however. For example, chapters brought in over $45,000 in 1962 but only approximately $39,000 in 1970.
Very few chapters, moreover, were for long viable, self-supporting, or stable.

Nonetheless, chapters had proven their value in generating local support and money from interested individual donors. More significantly, their independence from the churches enabled AU leaders to maintain their position and yet to have men and women of the local church power structure (outside the direct authority of the churches) on its side when the crunch in the churches came in the middle and late sixties. If AU had relied solely or primarily on the graces of the formal church authorities, it might have been in real difficulties in terms of survival, effectiveness, and freedom of action.

The most viable chapters indicated the sources of most active support. In 1967, thirty-two states had chapters, located mostly in large cities. Missouri in 1967 had seventeen chapters, but in 1971 had only eight. California had only eight chapters in 1967, but by 1971 had thirteen. In 1967, New York and Ohio had ten chapters each and Kentucky had twelve. In 1971, Michigan had eight chapters and Pennsylvania had seven.

A significant change in the relative location of chapters had occurred since the 1950's. While the Midwest seemed to have remained the predominant center, chapters were much more evenly distributed between the four major regions than was the case in the '50s. In other words, AU had
developed considerable support in the Far West and, especially, in the Northeast, where in the 1950's little chapter support had occurred. In fact, at one time in 1970, chapters in the Northeast surpassed the number of chapters in the South and almost equalled the number in the Midwest. The growth in chapters in the Northeast reflected where many of the major battles in the '60s occurred. Moreover, California, whose chapters seemed to have been especially turbulent, had been the leading membership state since sometime in the fifties. Furthermore, AU received more money from California in the '60s and '70s than from all the southern states combined.

AU techniques were often sophisticated. Chapters were used to share knowledge and inform new members as well. Following public meetings, a home party was held for the new members in order to get to know them and develop friendships with them that would solidify their membership. At the party, a "Madison League" would be formed. Similar in purpose to the communist cell technique that a number of right-wing organizations in the United States had emulated, the league was a study group in which the new members came to understand the issues as did the AU leadership. The members became part of a grassroots alert system who as "Minute men" would be able to act when the alert sounded. These members were also to be on the lookout for behavior of fellow AU members who might be "carpetbaggers" seeking
to attach themselves to the movement or "infiltrators" seeking to destroy cooperative efforts. Despite the guidelines on chapter behavior, leadership continued to be problem in terms of "impulsive and ill-advised action," fundraising, and locals getting into discussions of theological, political, and economic views irrelevant to separation.

The religious freedom rally had been the major means to recruit new members and to stir up enthusiasm. Procedures for an effective public rally had been thoroughly worked out, ones that would guarantee control so that the rally would not get out of hand and would "avoid speeches, sometimes harmful, from the floor." For example, the major requirement for the public meetings was large attendance in order for it to perform its functions of fundraising, informing, acquiring new members, and a showing of strength. Success depended less on the quality and content of the program than on effective promotion work. If this thorough promotion and advance work had not been done to ensure a big audience, the meeting should not be held.

In the latter '60s and early '70s AU no longer held so many large public rallies, that had come in for so much criticism. AU, nonetheless, did hold 234 public rallies in 1967. According to Lowell, the reason for the decline was due to the changing mores of the American people who were no longer as issue-oriented as they were before, who were afraid to go out at night because of crime in the streets,
and who did few things more adventuresome than watch television. The increasing sophistication of the American people also played a role.

As stated previously, regional offices had been established because of the instability and fluidity of local chapters, the unreliable nature of volunteers, and the need for some expertise. Archer realized that the separationist movement was "not (the) type which can command an overriding loyalty" and thus required a "salaried stabilizer in (the) community if (AU was) to be represented there." Nevertheless, Swomley, who was by no means alone in his opinion, recommended closing the offices. The main problem was one of financial drain. For example, in 1965, the regional office in Los Angeles spent $32,000 but took in only $19,000; in Chicago, the office expended $29,000 but earned only $17,000; and in New York, the regional center had income of $4,000 but spent $18,000. The balance of income and expenditures had not changed much by 1971 when the three regional offices spent almost $90,000 while returning only $29,000.

The regionals had other problems besides the financial ones. With small budgets and little staff, regional directors spent so much time fundraising that viable programs and effective public relations greatly suffered. In the early '60s, the regional office in troublesome California, which had the most success in fundraising through public meetings, instead of creating viable chapters dissolved all of them,
much to Archer's chagrin. All in all, Morgan believed that they cost more than they were worth, a costly prestige item.

They were far more than this to Archer. He had set up a committee to survey the value of regionals and had been willing to consider eliminating them if necessary. He found them too valuable to dismantle. Regionals quietly handled pre-existing local problems and provided a stable resource in the area for public relations, news releases, radio, and television. These factors outweighed the economic disadvantages. Moreover, they brought more local leadership into AU and spread AU's influence over a wider area. Furthermore, regionals paid their way if one counted the income received from the area as a result of their actions. For example, the New York regional office, which was the most monetarily inefficient, increased AU's mailing lists and gave New York papers local news. It provided AU with personal contacts with Protestant businessmen and organizations such as the Protestant Church Council, Religion in American Life, Protestant Men's Federation, and the New York Bible Society. Archer also developed metropolitan offices or "clearing houses" with part time officers, usually retired clergy or lawyers, to do what regionals did, only on a smaller scale. The offices rose or fell as the situation warranted. Consequently, AU had during these years anywhere from six to ten major offices in
large cities.

Swomley had called for the elimination of the Department of Church Relations also, but it, too, proved its value. The department had been set up in 1961 under Southgate's direction, and later became the Department of Church and Youth Relations under the direction of Giole Settembrini, a Southern Baptist. The functions of the department was to work for institutional support from the Protestant superstructure in the form of endorsements and contributions.

One of the most important programs within the Church Relations Department concerned the scroll church program begun in the 1950's. By 1961, 436 churches had AU included in their budget, thereby becoming a scroll church. Those churches had given $27,146 to AU in 1961, with 277 Baptist churches giving $19,298 of that amount, 71 Methodist churches giving $3,481, and 27 Presbyterian churches giving $1,88.

Indicating how AU managed in part to maintain its financial health in years of difficulty, scroll churches by 1974 reached 4,173 members from 31 denominations. All gifts from churches amounted to approximately $100,000 a year.

The increased emphasis in AU's writings on the virtues of the small, independent, locally-oriented churches was consequently not an accident.

Contributions from traditional bodies and official denominational bodies changed somewhat. The Baptist state conventions had given to AU over $10,000 in 1962.
Although the figure had climbed to approximately $23,000 in 1971, the income was about the same received from the state conventions in 1963. The Mother Church, Christian Scientists had endorsed AU in 1966 and asked followers to contribute to AU if they wished but not as representatives of the faith. The Christian Scientist Board of Directors had increased its giving to AU from $5,000 in 1963 to over $23,000 in 1971. Seventh Day Adventists, however, which had given $5,000 in 1962 and 1963, gave only $250 to AU in 1971. Similarly, Scottish Rite bodies, which had given over $22,000 in 1963, contributed only $3,500 in 1971. These bodies may also have contributed funds to the AU Research Foundation.

AU did change, especially in the '70s, and, although that change was not fundamental, the change reoriented the organization and did somewhat aid AU's fortunes. AU had at least taken a first step, a movement back toward establishing a broader alliance. According to Lowell in 1973, the change began around 1967-1968 when Protestant leadership, especially board members, actively sought public aid. Increasingly, non-church people, Jews, and humanists were joining AU's readership and chapters. Jews and "even secular" representatives appeared on the Board and the NAC, and Archer hired a humanist and a few liberals to work on the staff. Church people and fundamentalists, according to Lowell, were still the basic AU supporters. As a result of a poll conducted
by AU of its Church and State readers, AU found to its surprise that 1 to 2 percent of its membership, that is its subscribers, were Catholics.

In fact, one of the best indicators of the change was Church and State. As late as 1969, Mackay had criticized it for unnecessarily "acid" comments and sarcasm instead of statements of facts. Church and State became increasingly sophisticated and the florid prose, adjectives, and name calling somewhat declined. More analytical articles appeared using evidence gathered from outside traditional sources. And solicited articles not necessarily reflecting AU's views, although most did, began to appear. All in all, more reporting and less shouting were manifest with the exhortation to action confined to the editorials. More news of religious exercise problems gained ground, while news of AU's organizational needs receded.

Basically, however, most traits that had characterized Church and State for so long continued, although at times muted form. The importance of avoiding precedents for aid and the potential these precedents carried for the destruction of separation continued to receive a great amount of coverage. Pressure was still mounting and the Constitution was still being subverted. "Powerful clericalist lobby machine," a magazine writer reported in 1973, was "inducing ignorant innocents" to abandon government neutrality toward religion. Retrograde Spanish Catholicism continued to be
seen by *Church and State* writers as having a substantial relationship with American Catholicism. Pictures of Catholics kissing the hands and kneeling before a Catholic official or the Pope still occasionally fascinated the editors of *Church and State*. AU leaders had not given up their search for dramatic and attention-getting devices to dramatize AU's message.

In AU's twenty-fifth year (1972), Archer drew upon these changes, putting together a new self-image. AU had built a "broad base for a narrow objective," he stated, bringing together for that purpose a "curious amalgam of fundamentalist and libertarian, Baptist and Unitarian, devout theist and ardent atheist." He sought increasing support among minority religious groups like the Seventh Day Adventists and Christian Scientists and other small groups whose "religious exercise" problems AU could help resolve.

Besides cultivating the poles of militant humanists and fundamentalists, he thought AU "should renew our mission to mainline Protestants" such as Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, and United Church of Christ (formed in 1961 as a result of the union of the Congregational Christian Churches with the Evangelical and Reformed Church.) After all, they had created AU, Archer stated, and, moreover, ecumenism, which had twisted priorities, seemed to be waning in these quarters.
He no longer found the American Catholic Church "an anti-separation monolith" nor Catholics a manipulable "sectarian voting bloc." Following Vatican Council II, criticism of the church among Catholics mushroomed. The chief aim of those criticism was the triumphalism, legalism, and clericalism of the church, and these Catholic critics were even more critical of the church than Blanshard had been in his works on the church in the 1950's. The divisions within the church reflected Catholic laity's desire for independence, according to Archer, and this sentiment was exploitable by AU. As far back as 1965, Mackay and Rycroft had urged Archer to appeal to the Catholic laity, who in their view increasingly believed in church-state separation. After a decade and a half, Archer was returning to his and the founders original conception of AU.

CONCLUSION

During the 1960's, the separationist viewpoint held by AU leaders was transformed from the majority to the minority view held by Protestant denominational leaders and board members. Ecumenists had won the day by the mid-60's with the passage of federal programs that gave aid to church institutions. In fact, ecumenically-minded clergy had become so much a part of the political and governmental structure that even Dean Kelley became concerned enough by 1966 to speak out on the "Ecumenical Establishment." The success
of the ecumenists represented a triumph for cultural pluralism, a concept especially advocated by liberal intellectuals, including Reinhold Niebuhr, beginning in the 1930's and designed to promote "cosmopolitanism" and to recognize ethnic diversity. Also, many ecumenists seemed to feel a great need for a more unified Christian response to the threat of secularism. By the later '60s, the ecumenical atmosphere and the aid programs led some supporters of AU among Baptists, Methodists, and evangelicals to change their position in regard to aid.

The conflict between AU and its opponents was an intense one. They competed, sometimes bitterly, for funds in the denominational organizations and churches. Intellectuals, like Niebuhr and Sanders, and bureaucrats, like Kelley, Ward, and Kirk, clearly found the techniques, methods and language of AU, common among voluntary and interest groups, distasteful, excessive, and unnecessary. For their part, AU leaders could not abide bureaucratic compromise. Both groups represented different constituencies. AU leaders had great difficulty in defending its position against the argument often made by ecumenists that there was no Protestant position on separation. AU leaders squarely and loudly stood in the way of aid, because they obviously had grassroots support, power, and money. AU leaders, on occasion, were intemperate, unfair in their criticism, and impugned motives, and the image of anti-Catholicism seemed to have done its greatest damage in
the middle years of the sixties. Ecumenists exaggerated that image into one of fanaticism for their own advantage, while they opportunistically associated AU leaders with far more fundamentalist Protestants who wanted to keep Protestantism culturally established. AU leaders, moreover, stressed the threat of institutionalism to the Protestant churches in ecumenism and the acceptance of public aid.

By the '70s, AU had broadened its base. AU's stance on the Supreme Court decisions in 1962 and 1963, Sunday closing laws, opposition to all forms of public aid, and changing the First Amendment alienated fundamentalists and attracted humanists and secularists. AU was less conservatively and evangelically oriented by 1970 than had been the case in 1960. AU's support still was strong among Protestants, even though it had quite obviously shrunken base within Protestantism. AU still had impressive grassroots support as evidenced by membership, chapters, and finances. Unlike earlier years, by 1970, AU less frequently had to defend itself against charges of bigotry and anti-Catholic. The disclaimers as to intent and the need to prove the political and social nature of the criticisms of the American Catholic Church appeared less and less frequently as the '60s merged into the '70s.

How well did AU do in terms of growth during the '60s and early '70s. In the early years of the '60s, ACLU did better than AU in developing chapters, number of employees,
and income, while AU did far better in terms of membership, reserve funds, and net worth. ACLU continued to spend money as it came in, ending the year with deficits, having a reserve fund in 1962-1963 of only $9,700, and a net worth of $112,700 in 1962-1963. In comparison to the 83 public interest groups operating in 1972-1973 in Washington, D.C., AU was one of the largest institutions in membership, chapters, total assets, employees, and full time professional staff.

For a fuller measure of AU's overall successes and failures and a fuller understanding of the extent of support for separation, AU's battles in the major controversies of the period, parochial aid, need to be examined.
CHAPTER XIII: FOOTNOTES


13. Ibid.


15. C. Stanley Lowell letter to Reverend Dean M. Kelley, Washington, D.C., July 7, 1961, p. 1 in AU files. See also G. Weir Hartman letter to Reverend Dean Kelley, Columbus, Ohio, April 4, 1961, pp. 1-2, in AU files. Hartman was executive director of the Columbus Area Council of Churches and later president of AU's Columbus chapter and member of the Board of Trustees.


18. Ibid.


27. "Minutes of the Executive Committee of Board of Trustees," POAU at Washington, D.C., on September 2, 1966 in AU files.


33. Ibid.


41. "General Finds of the First National Conference on Church and State," held at Columbus, Ohio on February 8, 1964, pp. 1-6, mimeograph copy in AU files.


43. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 320.

44. Archer Memo, August 2, 1962, p. 1 and Mielke, Ecumenism and Church-State Separation, pp. 6-7 and Adams, The Growing Church Lobby in Washington, pp. 107-110 & 170-180. When the Elementary and Secondary Act passed in 1965, AU blamed its passage on "Protestant defections." It believed it saw the beginnings of a decline in the historically strong Protestant position on separation in the 1964 NCC Study Conference. It also blamed the passage on the Christianity and Crisis; the Protestant Episcopal Church, which came out in 1964 for aid through textbooks and equal bus transportation; the NCC; Carlson; and Christian Century. Church and State (May, 1965) p. 7. For AU's criticism of the approval of across the board school aid by National Education Association, see ibid., p. 4.

For AU's suggestion on how to break the impasse on federal aid to education, see ibid., (May, 1964), pp. 3-4 & 11.

For an interesting discussion of "Separationist Revisionism" of Carlson, Dean Kelley, Winthrop Hudson, and Franklin Littell, see Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and State pp. 242-249.


48. Mackay, ibid. See also Mielke, Ecumenism and Church-State Separation.


50. See Cogley, Catholic America, pp. 120-123 and Brown, The Ecumenical Revolution, pp. 6-8.

51. Brown, ibid., p. 249.


54. Ibid.


56. Ibid., p. 312.

57. Ibid., p. 310.

58. See Chapter I.

59. Brown, The Ecumenical Revolution, pp. 244-266.


63. Marty, Righteous Empire, pp. 277-278.


68. Ibid., p. 318 and Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 81.


70. In 1973, one source within AU stated that although AU had an anti-ecumenical image, especially as a result of Church and State, the men out in the field did not make their appeals to anti-ecumenical sentiment.

71. Fey, "Separationists Confer," The Christian Century, February 5, 1964, p. 167. The reason for Fey's emphasis on Southern Baptists was because POAU was generally perceived to be predomnately as Southern Baptist organization.


73. Ellis, ibid.

74. Church and State (May, 1967), pp. 4-5.


77. Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 207-209.

78. Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict, p. 76; Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, pp. 466-476; and George R. LaNoue, "A Review of Church-State LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS


85. Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 133-134.

86. Author's interview with Lowell, July 3, 1973; National Council of Churches, Why Do Religious Bodies Oppose "Prayer" Amendments? A selection of statements by some of the major religious bodies in the United States, pamphlet (Washington,


92. Ibid.


94. Glenn L. Archer Memo to Staff, n.p., November 1, 1971,
p. 1 in AU files.

95. Author's interview with Lowell.

96. Fred Schwengel, Congressman, Iowa, 1st District, letter to Ed Doerr, n.p., October 28, 1971, copy in AU files. Schwengel was a devout Baptist.


98. Author's interview with Lowell and Table 2.


101. Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 219-220 & 224-227. E.S. James left the Board when he became Executive Director of the Baptist Joint Committee.


Church and State (November, 1965), p. 15. Hooten's place was taken by Edwin R. Garrison in December, 1965, ibid., (December, 1965), p. 15. Louie Newton, who had been Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees and a former President of the Southern Baptist Convention, became President of POAU in the middle 1950's. He served in that capacity until Jimmy Allen of Dallas, Texas was elected in 1969. Later, Allen was a President of the Southern Baptist Convention, ibid., (December, 1969), p. 5.


110. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 153-154; Glenn L. Archer letter to Member of Board of Trustees, n.p., January 22, 1963, p. 3 and Dr. Dick H. Hall, Jr., Chairman, Survey Committee letter to All POAU Board, n. p., January 8, 1963, p. 1 in AU files. Also Church and State (April, 1963), p. 2. For importance of staff experience and years on the job, see Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 82-90.


112. Lowell, Embattled Wall, pp. 133-134.


123. Glenn L. Archer Memo by Executive Director and Read to Key Staff Members, September 19, 1963, p. 1 in AU files.

124. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

125. Ibid., pp. 3-4.


a Methodist who worked, as had Salisbury, with the Baptist Joint Committee, replaced Salisbury as the general counsel of AU in 1972. *Church and State* (May, 1972), p. 17.

129. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," pp. 141-144.

130. Ibid., pp. 190-191. See *Church and State* in 1965 as compared to 1963-1964.


(October, 1964), pp. 7 & 15.

141. POAU, Urban Take-Over, pp. 5-6 & 10; Southgate to "Dear Member...," March 11, 1970, pp. 1-3; and "STATEMENT REGARDING PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE TO THE DELEGATES OF THE 1964 METHODIST GENERAL CONFERENCE," n.p., n.d., pp. 2-4 & 6, in AU files.


145. *Ibid.* AU leaders had continually stated that educational efforts needed to be renewed because AU's position was not understood.


155. Ibid.


162. Ibid.


166. Berry found that the important distinction was not between those groups who had tax-exempt, tax-deductibility status and those who did not or between groups who lobbied Congress and those who did not. All of the groups lobbied Congress. The crucial difference he found to be between those groups who lobbied Congress openly and those who did so more discretely. Berry, Lobbying for the People, pp. 48-55, also for loss of tax-deductible status by Sierra Club.


The foundation had tax-exempt, tax-deductible status. The affiliated, but legally independent public foundation was a legitimate method for about a dozen public interest groups in tax-exempt, non-tax-deductible status in order to circumvent restrictions in the Internal Revenue Code. For example,
ACLU had set up an ACLU Foundation and the League of Women Voters had established a League of Women Voters Education Fund. The non-tax-deductible organization is used to attract money for lobbying while the money received by the foundation can permissably be used for educational and legal campaigns. The foundation and the group may coordinate efforts but funds must not be intermixed. Consequently, foundation money from large contributors is used for purposes of litigation.

Most groups, however, had neither sufficient number of small contributors to lobby effectively, a substantial membership base, or large enough donations to warrant setting up a foundation. They would have had a difficult time surviving loss of tax-exempt, tax-deductible status. Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 50.

171. Ibid.


175. Church and State (March, 1973), p. 11

176. Author's interview with Lowell. In 1971, lower court ruled in AU's suit that non-profit organization does not have a right to question the loss of its tax exempt status in federal court. AU appealed to the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia. "Audit for 1971," in AU files.


178. Ibid., p. 2.


Washington, D.C., December 1, 1961, pp. 1-5 in AU files; C. Stanley Lowell letter to John J. Hurt (Christian Index, editor, Atlanta, Georgia), Washington, D.C., July 28, 1965, p.1 in AU files (Hurt was a member of the Board of Trustees); and Dick H. Hall, Jr., Southern Regional Director, "Report to Trustees," POAU, n.p., September 14, 1971, pp. 1-2, in AU files.


186. See Chapter IX.


193. Church and State (April, 1970), appendix and (October, 1971), appendix.


201. Church and State (December, 1967), pp. 3-4.

202. Author's interview with Lowell, July 2, 1973. Since 1964, partisan identification with the two major political parties has dropped dramatically, and those that do identify themselves as Democrat or Republican are less likely to be strongly partisan. By the latter '60s, issue-oriented voting had increased dramatically. Berry, Lobbying for the People, p. 288.

204. "Minutes of Semiannual Meeting of Board of Trustees," Washington, D.C., September 7, 1961, p. 6 in AU files; "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees...," February 23, 1966, p. 2; "Minutes, Regional Office Survey Committee," April 7, 1964, p. 4; Audit Report 1971; and Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 149.


207. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 149.


210. Ibid.

211. Lowell, Embattled Wall, p. 144.


220. "Minutes of the Meeting of National Advisory Council," at Boston, Massachusetts, on February 9, 1972, p. 3 in AU files and author's interview with Lowell.


222. See for example Church and State (December, 1972).


225. Glenn L. Archer, n.t., statement to 25th Semiannual Meeting, Board of Trustees, AU, n.p., September 14, 1972, pp. 1-3 in AU files; "Report of Editor, Associate Director to Board of Trustees," n.p., September 14, 1972, p. 4 in AU files.


228. Kelley worried about strings attached to federal aid programs, however insulated the church was from federal involvement in church affairs, and religious establishment through continual, regular, and accepted association of government and the churches. Dean M. Kelley, "Subsidiarity and the Ecumenical Establishment," ed. by Elwyn A. Smith, Church-State Relations in Ecumenical Perspective (Louvains: Duquesne University Press, 1966), pp. 228-242.


CHAPTER IX
REDEFINITION OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
FROM FEDERAL AID TO PAROCHIAID*: 1961-1973

"If separation of church and state does not apply at the money line," an AU pamphlet writer stated, "then it applies nowhere." From AU's viewpoint, the perceptible increase in the public flow of funds to church schools and institutions in the '60s and '70s argued that separation had broken down, especially in its absolute form. In terms of direct aid, there occurred in these years only a partial breakdown in separation or rather a partial redefinition of the meaning of separation. Looking at lower court decisions instead of legislative ones, rulings divided approximately equally between pro-separationist and pro-accomodationist positions. The higher appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court took, with some significant exceptions, decidedly strict separationist stands. Public opinion polls, popular votes on separation, and increasing numbers of major organizations actively working for separation indicated strong, majority support for separation at the money line. The above

*Parochiaid means the use of public funds for parochial schools.
mixture of results pointed in several directions at once, reflecting the competing and counterbalancing interests, power, and forces at work in American society. An accommodated separation had been reached by 1973, one that found churches and states associated but not aligned, working together while formally insulated from one another, interdependent but not permanently intermeshed.

AU moved with the changing battlefields over governmental aid. Most, but not all, of the battles in the first half of the sixties took place at the federal level. By the mid-sixties, the fight over federal aid to education had become so predominant that AU's policy priorities and legal actions in areas such as captive schools and urban takeovers virtually disappeared. AU however had very little influence at this federal level. AU leaders had much more influence and were much more active at the state level where the main battles were fought in the late '60s and early '70s. Their activity in legislative politics increased enormously after the loss of the tax-deductibility status. Their judicial politics increased as court decisions at the various levels of government were required because of the increased amount of legislation in the church-state field. Parochiaid battles had become so numerous and involved so many forces by the late sixties that AU paled in importance and joined in separationist alliances to carry out objectives.
FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS: 1961-1965

Many routes exist to affect a legislator's actions: direct lobbying, testimony, telephone calls, mail from important people in the home district, press releases, and public announcements. Another avenue is the expression of public opinion. As George R. LaNoue, a church-state expert from Columbia University who worked with the NCC, stated of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA):

Public opinion...informed by the mass media rather than the actual language of the Bill or the testimony before the Congressional committees, knew only of the Bill's noble intent, and from the very beginning the Bill had overwhelming popular support. One of the reasons there was so little discussion of the problems in the Bill was the default of so many responsible organizations that usually can be depended upon to inform and alert the public.2

The "responsible" institutions to whom LaNoue was referring to is the NEA and major Protestant organizations like the NCC. Elites determine the structure of public debate by the knowledge and access to communication they command and the public generally follows the lead and opinions formulated by elites. AU, in comparison with the above organizations, was a small elite institution. In that capacity, what actions did AU leaders take, what role if any did they play, and what arguments did they use in the federal aid to education battles between 1961 and 1965?

President Kennedy's federal education bill in 1961 led to bitterness and controversy that had not been seen since the 1948-1949 fight over educational aid.
Kennedy's educational bill called for no aid to parochial schools, a fact that brought sharp criticism from Catholic authorities, especially Cardinal Spellman. A legal study by the NCWC (USCC) argued the constitutional right of aid to church-related schools for their public and secular function as well as the right of freedom of choice and of educational pluralism. AU leaders replied that the American Catholic hierarchy was "controlled by a single dictator in Rome" and that Spellman had issued a "declaration of war" against separation. And Congressman John McCormack (D., Mass.), the Speaker of the House, would as usual carry out the orders of the hierarchy in the Congress.

AU, usually in the person of Paul Blanshard, had four meetings with the White House, usually with Ted Sorenson, an aide to Kennedy, over the educational bills. As a result, Blanshard played a role in writing the legal memorandum of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which argued for no aid to elementary and secondary schools. Contacts, however, soon evaporated as Kennedy came to see that it was impossible to satisfy AU, a characteristic of groups like AU.

AU continuously tried to bolster public support for Kennedy's position. AU leaders testified before congressional committees on the educational bills, as they had done previously and as they were to frequently do on subsequent education bills in the Kennedy and Johnson years. Billing AU
as the only Protestant organization with the courage to act and resist Catholic aggression instead of just talk, AU leaders supplied information to public officials and members of Congress and provided a long legal analysis on the church-state issue in federal aid to both Houses of Congress. And they sent thousands of publicity statements to friends so that they could "make their protest to Congress effective." The interests involved were so enormous and organizational pressure so intense that it seems unlikely that AU played anything but a very minor part in the overall controversy. The bills, testimony before hearing committees, and crises of various kinds developed so rapidly that AU seemed at a loss about how to effectively maximize its resources and power.

Once a bill was enacted into law, AU leaders resorted if possible to the courts, which was the case after the passage of the Higher Education Facilities Construction Act of 1963. The College Aid Act enabled church-related colleges and universities to obtain federal funds for the construction or improvement of academic facilities other than those used for sectarian or religious purposes. The constitutionality of this aid rested on the distinction Congress made between the less prevasive nature of sectarianism and religious indoctrination in church-related colleges in comparison to church-related elementary and secondary schools. Ironically, HEW's legal memorandum, in whose writing Blanshard participated,
made just this distinction. Interestingly, the phrase "sectarian college" gradually lost currency in the 1960's, even among AU, and the phrase "church-related college" came to be used most frequently.

AU joined the Horace Mann League and other groups to challenge Maryland's legislative appropriations for buildings to four religious colleges. The League organized the successful challenge with Leo Pfeffer of the AJC as the attorney. The leader of the League, in whose founding Archer participated, was Edgar Fuller, executive secretary of the Council of Chief State School Officers. It claimed a membership of 500 public school educators and the former officers of the NEA and American Association of School Administrators. During the case, Fuller complained that AU took unfair advantage of the case in its publicity, a charge Archer dismissed as evidence of professional jealousy. AU filed a "friend of the court" brief and spent $11,000 on the case.

The Maryland Court of Appeals in a 4 to 3 ruling in 1966 found appropriations to three of the colleges unconstitutional. Two of the colleges were Catholic and the other one was Methodist in affiliation; aid to Hood College, which was loosely tied to the United Church of Christ, was declared constitutional because it was not regarded as excessively religious. The object of the suit, according to AU, was to challenge the 1963 College Aid Act, which was the model
for the Maryland legislation permitting aid to the colleges, by getting a favorable case before the United States Supreme Court. Much to AU's dismay, the Court decided not to take the case. Nevertheless, AU used the ruling to argue that the Maryland decision cast "grave doubt" on the constitutionality of all federal grants to sectarian institutions.

The doubts eventually proved not to be grave after all. With Pfeffer once again in charge, separationists brought a case in 1968 against four Catholic colleges in Connecticut received federal funds under the 1963 act. By a 5 to 4 margin, the Supreme Court ruled in Tilton v Richardson(1971) that the 1963 College Aid Act was constitutional.

Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the plurality, elaborated on the criteria by which to judge church-state involvements. Burger pointed out that these criteria were to be taken as guidelines and not tests since there were no absolutes in constitutional adjudication. The guidelines were to make more specific what was meant by church-state alliance. In doing so, the Court went beyond the question of financial assistance. Aid itself was no longer the sole criterion; in other words, no absolute, abstract money line existed. In the abstract and unlike Everson and McCollum, the criteria were not based on the premise of absolute separation. Rather, the criteria measured the degree and effect of governmental aid. The Court was to be guided by the degree of involvement between churches and governments and not
whether aid violated pre-existing strictures of absolute separation.

In Tilton, the Chief Justice drew upon two earlier church-state cases. The Court's Schempp decision stated that in order for a law "to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." In Walz v Tax Commission (1970), a case involving tax exemption for places of worship, Burger, speaking for the majority, sought to prevent "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." He decided on the basis of "no-entanglement": "We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is not an excessive government entanglement with religion... the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." To the purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement set forth as guidelines in Tilton, Burger added a fourth one on whether the law inhibited the free exercise of religion.

Tilton rejected the strict financial grounds put forth by separationist attorneys. Burger spurned as "simplistic" the argument that every form of financial aid to church-sponsored activities violated the religious clause. He distinguished between parochial schools where the young
were impressionable and institutions of higher learning where they were less so and the schools were less religious even when tied to religious institutions. Also, he argued the aid in building facilities was not likely to involve close and continuing governmental monitoring and thus did not involve excessive entanglement.

Justice William O. Douglas, with Justice Black concurring, dissented. Douglas denied the existence of differences between church-related colleges and parochial schools because both were equally permeated by religion and religious aims. He argued the decision evaded financial guidelines. Moreover, he believed that the government would become entangled excessively with the colleges aided because it would have to conduct surveillance of the federally assisted building to insure that they were not being used for religious purposes. In sum, he concluded, *Tilton* constituted a "radical departure from Madison's Remonstrance memorialized in today's decision."

At the end of his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas cited his dissent in *Walz*, where he used AU's studies of church wealth to indicate churches did not need the aid provided by tax exemption. AU had filed a "friend of the court" brief in *Walz* in support of tax exemption for places of worship. Douglas' position in that case argued for an end even to that tax exemption. Douglas and AU, which filed a "friend of the court" brief and provided financial support for
the Tilton case, however, agreed with each other in the Tilton case.

AU leaders, of course, criticized Tilton for a number of reasons, trying to play it down in order to limit its effect. They interpreted the decision in such a way that it supported AU's position. Lowell stated the decision followed a long line of Supreme Court decisions that declared the government cannot do indirectly what it was not allowed to do directly. He meant that grants to church-related colleges were permissible but the government could not aid authentically sectarian colleges with a religious mission. Moreover, he declared the decision was indecisive because of the divisiveness of the Court and the majority opinion's lack of clarity.

The college aid law was hardly the only aid program affecting church schools. According to Lowell, over 150 federal programs existed by 1973 to aid colleges and universities, with the churches participating in most of them. The main action AU leaders took in this area was persuasion. They argued and pleaded with church colleges and administrators, and in denominational conventions and conferences, that they not take funds, or if funds had been taken, to change policy. In this regard, AU leaders seemed especially active in stiffening the backbones of Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists, and Southern Baptists. Methodist institutions, it might be added, seemed to be deeply involved in
taking government funds. Southern Baptist conventions remained strong opponents of such aid. AU leaders urged successive conventions to pressure Southern Baptist colleges not to take aid that the administrators of the colleges had either taken or desired to take.

Srauf observed that the separationist challenges in the Horace Mann League and Tilton cases gave impetus to secularization or "de-religionizing" in governance and teaching at religious colleges. Laymen sat on boards of trustees and the colleges became defacto independent from the religious order. For example, the lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, for the four Connecticut colleges in Tilton had the colleges secularize so that he could argue that they were not religiously controlled institutions. Even Fordham University became nonsectarian enough to qualify for state aid. 31 AU's object had hardly been such secularization, and it continuously and strenously objected to this development. In the case of Catholic colleges, AU leaders argued that even with such "secularization" measures they were still Catholic-controlled and that such measures were taken for the sole purpose of receiving aid.

Protestant colleges were especially troublesome to AU leaders. By accepting aid and going through the process of de-emphasizing the religious nature of the institutions, the colleges became non-sectarian and in effect as public as any public college or university, the leaders argued.
The institutions were thus subject to federal control and surveillance, under the thumb of "Big Brother." AU leaders warned those considering taking government funds that because no religious test could be applied once they accepted funds the colleges could no longer limit enrollment to one denomination and might have to hire faculty members who were atheists.

AU formulated a policy for the denominations to follow. Before a Methodist college, for instance, took federal subsidies, the college should "go public." The denomination should sever its ties with the school because with the acceptance of funds it would lose its Methodist identification and no longer serve its Methodist constituency. AU observed that severance from the churches by the colleges was taking place rapidly by 1970 through voluntary means because of increasing costs or federal intrusion. AU recommended to Methodists they surrender denominational ownership and management of all or most of its institutions of higher learning. It asked the church to concentrate on its seminaries and used the released funds for use in distinctly religious programs on the campuses of the schools. In this manner, the direct or indirect aid to the colleges could not be cited as precedent for further aid or, because the college took such public subsidy, the denomination did not need to support a similar subsidy to parochial schools.
AU leaders seemed to have little effect on the passage of the ESEA of 1965. The rationale for the programs of the ESEA was that the child and not the churches would benefit from federal aid. Money would go only indirectly to the churches. The ESEA authorized shared time programs and funds for textbooks for parochial school students and permitted church officials to administer programs. Among separationists AU was in the minority along with the AJC, ACLU, NAE, and the Seventh Day Adventists. AU opposed the child benefit theory, citing the HEW legal memorandum mentioned above where the benefits to the child were not considered ipso facto constitutional. While AU's initial reaction to the compromise on shared time was one of "watchful waiting," AU leaders subsequently came out against shared time programs.

AU leaders major objection to ESEA was of course what they thought its effects would be upon separation. Lowell made this clear in his testimony before the House:

All of this talk about aiding children, justice to parents, helping to cure poverty, and all the rest should not obscure that basic fact. This is a tax for religion, however, miniscule, and once on the books it will be steadily increased as sectarian pressures mount.... This legislation does move toward a partial union of state and church with some contribution of government funds for church support. It is not just the facts that concern us; it is their direction. They point to the wrong way. We believe that the increasing involvement of government with church envisaged in these legislative proposals is socially destructive, filled with the promise of inter-creedal strife and mutually bad for both church and state.
In AU publicity, Lowell went beyond these points to complain that the ESEA "opened the door to achieve, step-by-step, full public subsidy to religious schools" and legitimated the concept of federal aid to religious schools.

Regarding the ESEA as "otherwise commendable," AU leaders objected to it on more specific church-state grounds. Since federal funds were to go to local school board through state educational boards, AU leaders asserted states that prohibited such public aid to church schools in their constitutions would be circumvented. The act permitted too much administrative discretion to suit AU leaders, who feared lack of public educational control over parochial school officials who would be involved in administering the act. They objected to the various special categories permitting material aid to church schools. They opposed shared time or dual enrollment programs because they set up, apart from the public schools, a federal school system that would be dominated by the parochial interests of a church in the local communities. The absence of means to test the act through judicial review also drew their fire.

Once passed, AU leaders raised other objections in addition to the ones above. AU writers exposed what they considered the numerous abuses in the various programs of the act, abuses without any recourse to legal or administrative solutions. Most of these abuses involve Catholic officials, according to AU leaders. For example, the Catholic hierarchy
had preempted the ESEA, as well as the Office of Educational Opportunity, programs for its own benefit and discriminated against children attending public schools. **AU leaders found Protestant objection in the programs also objectionable.** They criticized, for instance, church officer's salaries being paid by the federal government and ministers working in the various programs to cure poverty, while they ignored their basic mission of saving souls. The result of these and other actions was to make the "church's welfare administration...a part of the government bureaucracy...." The churches, according to Lowell, had changed roles from "bold innovator to government chore boy."

One major problem with the ESEA entailed the lack of any provision for judicial review that would allow constitutional tests of the programs. The Senate passed a Judicial Review bill in 1966 following hearings chaired by Senator Sam Ervin(D.,N.Car.), a member of the NAC of AU, but the House refused to go along. The problem was overcome through Pfeffer's successful challenge to **Frothingham v Mellon**(1923). **Frothingham** prohibited taxpayer suits in federal courts unless the plaintiff could prove sufficient standing. In **Flast v Cohen**(1968), the United States Supreme Court modified this lack of standing rule and permitted taxpayer suits in some establishment cases. **AU's lack of standing had always been a major problem and, while it continued to cause some difficulties, AU's legal activities in the federal**
courts and its sponsorship of cases increased following the ruling.

AU brought at least three suits against programs of the ESEA, in addition to twice bringing suit against the Economic Opportunity Act. In January of 1971, AU had two of the seven cases then currently challenging the ESEA. Also, AU filed "friend of the court" briefs in suits brought in Missouri and Illinois challenging dual enrollment programs in those states. Only the Missouri challenge succeeded. Overall, these cases had little or no lasting impact.

**PAROCHIAL AID IN THE STATES: REFERENDA, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, AND AMENDMENTS AND POLITICS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE COURTS**

Constitutional Amendments and Conventions and Referenda. Edd Doerr, reflecting on the parochial aid campaigns going on in 40 states in 1970, enumerated some of the methods used to publicly aid parochial schools:

...various forms of transportation aid; textbook and equipment loans; auxiliary and remedial instructional services; income and property tax credits or rebates; tuition grants, tuition vouchers, 'educational entitlements'; payment of teacher salaries; assigning public school teachers to non-public schools; 'purchase of secular education service' contracts; shared-time and dual enrollment plans; so-called 'performance contracts'.

Fights in the state legislatures over these various forms of aid carried over into the courts once they passed, as separationists challenged their constitutionality. One way state funds could be obtained was by changing the state constitution's prohibition on public funds going to church
institutions. Forty-eight of the fifty states had prohibitions equally strong as or specifically stronger than the Federal Constitution.

AU first became involved in fighting these constitutional changes in New York State in 1961. The IRS cited this involvement when it abrogated AU's tax-deductibility. New York's Governor, Nelson Rockefeller, a Baptist, advanced an amendment to the state constitution permitting private institutions of higher learning, including church-related one, to receive state aid for construction of facilities.

In March of 1961, Archer made a statewide speaking tour opening AU's campaign. While accusing Rockefeller of yielding to the power of Catholic pressure in order to get re-elected in 1962, Archer took chief aim not at lawmakers but at the invasion of the state by clericalism especially in the person of Cardinal Spellman. He asked rhetorically of the cardinal, "if you are a loyal citizen of this country you will accept the Constitution. Your selfish interests are not supreme over American law." He warned against soft Protestants, pressure, and propaganda. The proposed aid endangered the American public school system because it would set up a "great competing, dogmatic school system" that practiced religious segregation. He referred to the fragmentation and weakening of the public school systems in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands after public aid to parochial schools was enacted in those countries.
To fight Amendment or Proposal 6 on the ballot in the November, 1961 election a loose working coalition formed in late September and early October consisting of 12, and later 18, civic and religious groups. The groups included Jewish organizations (AJC, American Jewish Committee, Metropolitan Council of B'nai B'rith); liberal organizations like the Americans for Democratic Action and New York chapters of League for Industrial Democracy and American Humanist Association; New York Society for Ethical Culture; New York Civil Liberties Union; New York State Congress of Parents and Teachers, Metropolitan District; and the Protestant Council of the City of New York. AU participated in this liberal coalition. On October 9th, these groups set up an ad hoc committee entitled "The Committee to Save the New York Constitution," and the Public Education Association agreed to coordinate the efforts of the groups.

The New York regional office of AU did much of the basic work for national headquarters. Most of the work was done by Paul Duling, head of the regional office, and Leo D. Adolph, a member of the regional Board of Trustees and of the committee on Church and State of the American Humanist Association (AHA). Adolph coordinated the two organizations. Both of these men went around lighting fires and arousing dormant Protestant groups, lobbied ministers and newspaper editorialists, and wrote a flyer and distributed it by the thousands.
The campaign of the coalition stressed the violation of the principle of separation, but the key to its common strategy, according to Adolph, was to break what was regarded as the "curtain of silence" on the issue. Publicity required money. At an October 26 strategy meeting the AHA pledged $200 and Duling offered $1,500 in AU's name, although Lowell had earlier told him that national AU was unable to send any funds because it was in the red at the time. Also, the press releases of the various organizations did not receive publicity despite the fact that four of New York City's five newspapers editorialized against Proposal 6. Adolph, however, believed the editorials came as a result of pressure form letter writing campaigns and press releases.

National AU aided in other ways. Archer, Lowell, Mayne, and Felker spent most of the month of October campaigning in the state. Besides the work of Rycroft, Clark Foreman, Duling, and Adolph, Southgate along with others met with the Governor, Speaker of the House, and church leaders. AU paid for an advertisement in the New York Times, of which it reprinted 110,000 copies for distribution.

Separationists won in November, but the victory settled nothing. Voting was a one time affair, while politics was an everyday activity where issues were not so clear cut, separationists lacked continuity and unity, and education was the prime concern. Proposal 6 went down to defeat by a margin of approximately 133,000 votes. New York City approved
it by only 3,000 votes while upstate New York defeated the measure by 130,000. Adolph concluded that the key to victory had been the effort of the coalition in New York City to cancel out the campaign of colleges and universities, State Board of Regents, Rockefeller, and pressure and pulpit campaign of the Catholic hierarchy. Subsequently, Rockefeller created an "independent authority" to issue bonds and loans and got through the legislature his "scholar incentive program" that provided grants to students at colleges and universities, including church-related ones. Separationists had no recourse because, although New York City allowed taxpayer suits, the state of New York did not permit such suits.

AU leaders felt quite satisfied with the role of AU in the campaign and with the vote, declaring that the vote was a mandate for the appointment of public officials who supported separation. The leaders were gratified that the Brooklyn Tablet attributed the defeat of the amendment to "professional bigots," referring to AU and its usual friends. They were also happy to have enlightened the established Protestant leadership, such as the New York State Council of Churches, who believed the amendment could not be defeated at the polls. Duling felt buoyant at AU's acceptance into "good society." He wanted maximum promotion given to the role of the other groups in the fight in order to dispell the accusation that AU took too much credit for
its fights. He also hoped it would encourage AU to be more professionally and people-oriented by getting it off the "Protestant-church related hook and into broader field of civic groups." The broadening to which Duling referred had to await the full effects of the changing times and loss of support.

The next major fight over constitutional changes came once again in New York. The 1967 New York Constitutional Convention proposed to eliminate Article XI, Section 3 in its revised constitution. The section, sometimes called the "Blaine Amendment," strictly prohibited indirect and direct aid to church schools. The 1961 fight had been intense but had at no time reached the bitterness and acrimony over church-state issues that occurred in 1967. The new constitution lost at the polls by a 3 to 1 margin in November, 1967, in no small measure due to the church-state controversy.

AU played a relatively insignificant role in the 1967 fight over the constitution. In contrast to 1961, when only one constitutional amendment was involved, the controversy encompassed a revised constitution and a greater number of organizations. Secondly, AU was under investigation by the IRS and avoided lobbying and directly influencing legislation while actively pursuing traditional educational goals, although those goals also aimed toward political and lobbying ends.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, AU's reputation had declined significantly between 1961 and 1967, leading other organizations to publicly keep AU at arms length. In contrast to 1961, when a common separationist strategy was being worked out with Pfeffer and AJC taking the lead, AU found itself excluded. Morgan, an AU critic, stated, without citing proof: "AU had been excluded from these councils because of its recklessness and its perceived anti-Catholicism. It was not felt that the united separationist front in New York should be quite that united." The separationists set up the Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PEARL) to act as a clearinghouse and stir up activity. PEARL consisted of 24 member groups, including most of those who were active in 1961 as well as the Anti-Defamation League, United Federation of Teachers, and Unitarian-Universalist Ministers Association of Metropolitan New York. PEARL represented a constituency of about ten million.

Despite the rebuffs, AU leaders participated in the controversy. AU's general counsel as well as Arthur W. Mielke, minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Buffalo, New York and member of the AU Board of Trustees, testified at the Constitutional Convention. Doerr most likely worked with the AHA. AU leaders set up a front organization, "Committee to Preserve Church-State Separation in New York," headed by Rycroft, a Presbyterian and AU Board member. The staff went to New York where it pursued its usual methods
of public meetings and distribution of short pamphlets.\textsuperscript{73} In addition, the "most passionate opponent of repeal" of the Blaine Amendment at the Constitutional Convention debates was Reverend Donald S. Harrington, state chairman of the Liberal Party of New York and a member of the NAC. He was the lone member of the Bill of Rights and Suffrage Subcommittee on Church and State at the convention to oppose repeal.

In what light AU viewed the New York battle can be discerned through Edd Doerr's book on it. Regarding the fight as part of the continuing struggle between "The Old World Versus the New," Doerr, who called himself a religious libertarian, entitled his work The Conspiracy That Failed. Why a conspiracy existed and had to exist in New York he explained this way:

\textit{...the only way clericalists can get public aid for parochial schools or remove constitutional provisions prohibiting such aid is through a conspiracy to obscure their real aims and the true nature of what they want tax support for, to attract sympathy for their cause through deception, to smear and defame constitutional provisions and persons standing in their way, and to control the political processes through which constitutions are changed and laws enacted.}\textsuperscript{75}

The existence of the conspiracy could not be disproved since it was not subject to proof. Its existence was a matter of belief that the actions and statements of the conspirators were for consumption only and designed to keep the truth hidden. The believer knew the truth because he supposed he knew what the conspirators knew: their aims and ideas were
unpopular, undemocratic, and designed to destroy American freedoms.

How did the conspirators work in New York? The Citizens for Educational Freedom (CEF) had "knocked off" most of the opposition delegates to the convention before it began. The convention had favored repeal because of duress and subterfuge. During the campaign the Catholic hierarchy used "Machiavellian cunning, Madison Avenue public relations know-how, a little Jesuitry...and a level of usable financial and personnel resources available to very few organizations anywhere." According to Doerr, the Catholic hierarchy spent two million dollars, one million of which CEF spent, on its campaign drive. The hierarchy used spies, a pulpits campaign, parochial school children, and priests who drew checks from parish petty cash for the campaign. The propaganda campaign was underhanded and cynical and used scare tactics and the big lie technique.

The main villain in Doerr's view was less the Catholic hierarchy itself than CEF, an organization with which AU leaders, with increasing frequency, did battle over parochial aid in the states. Founded in 1959 by Judge Anthony D. Daly in St. Louis and organized to represent parents with children in religious schools, CEF was 90% Catholic. Other accommodationists such as Lutherans, Dutch Reformed, Orthodox Jews, and others participated in CEF, sometimes in positions of power. The Protestant Episcopal Church, which had
church schools, came out in 1964 for aid in the form of textbooks and bus transportation only. That same year, Orthodox Judaism reversed its position and favored aid from government to religious schools. Enrollment in Jewish schools increased significantly during this period. Lutheranism had the second largest parochial school system in the United States, with almost 200,000 students in over 1,500 schools in 1969. Of the four major and seven minor Lutheran bodies in the country four favored parochial aid, although the largest body, the Lutheran Church in America, opposed aid. The Missouri Lutheran Synod between 1965 and 1967 shifted its position toward taking of federal funds. Thus, CEF and Catholics were joined on the battlelines by an increasing number of allies. Although the largest church advocating aid, the American Catholic Church was hardly the only major church body doing so. It, however, was the most powerful.

CEF's program advocated a number of aid formulas, of which its major advocacy involved the tuition grant or tuition voucher program that, according to AU, had been formulated by its spiritual mentor, Father Virgil C. Blum, S.J. In this program, the state would grant or issue vouchers to parents with children attending church schools and the parents would give it to the school for tuition. It also espoused parental freedom of choice in education, a fair share of tax monies (tax credits), and a "God-centered" education. "Today the secularists--the opponents of religious
education—the doctrinaire subscribers to the slogan of separation of church and state," a CEF spokesman testified, "rely upon the Blaine Amendment to deny and subvert our constitutionally-guaranteed liberties."

CEF found its chief opponents in AU, AJC, and ACLU. It accused them of attacking the rights and liberties of children, especially black, poor, helpless, and deprived children. It accused these civil libertarians of affinity with White Citizens Councils and segregationists in denying these children equality of creed and race. The absolutistic and ideological approach to separation of these three groups destroyed the free exercise of religion, according to CEF. CEF focused primarily upon guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity and of religions. Commenting on the distortions of the positions of the three separationist organizations by Blum and CEF, the Christian Century editorialized over how "Faithfulness to principle always has unhappy consequences."

CEF developed into one of the principal lobbyist for parochial aid. It began to organize politically in 1963 as a result of growing support among Catholics for a tuition grants program and because of Kennedy's negative stand on federal aid to education. Having no tax-deductibility status, CEF had more maneuverability in lobbying than AU. By 1964, AU saw the need to meet the increasingly effective and spreading challenge from CEF. By the late '60s, CEF
claimed a grassroots membership between 100,000 and 150,000 with the number of chapters reaching 1,000. Between 1965-1970, it claimed to have been active in 23 states and had success in getting various forms of parochial aid passed in approximately 11 of those states. It also campaigned to amend the constitutions of Wisconsin, Washington, Oregon, New York, and New Mexico.

AU leaders strove to counter the "deceptive cunning" of CEF. Much of AU's parochial aid literature in the latter '60s and early '70s seems designed to counter the main thrusts of the arguments of the CEF. "Parent's rights," according to AU, actually meant cleric rights and public schools were not state or government schools. These schools were "people's schools" run as a public service through duly elected local officials and like all public services everyone was rightfully taxed for their maintenance. At the same time, parochial school served a private, sectarian, and ideological, and not any public, functions.

AU viewed CEF as a militant "clericalist-front pressure group." At another time, Doerr stated that CEF was "a church political party" because it supported candidates for election. CEF had only a modest national organization in Washington. Power resided in the states where the chapters operated virtually independent of the national organization.
Moreover, although CEF leaders had good informal relations with the USCC, the Conference leaders objected to CEF's advocacy of freedom of choice and "parent's power." The Conference did not desire parental control over the schools or separate power groups having a strong say in their programs. Also, lawyers for Catholic officials believed the CEF's legal program, which was virtually non-existent in comparison with AU's, careless and given to legal "recklessness." Established church leaders, bureaucrats, and legal experts thus kept CEF at a distance and saw it as a threat to their power and freedom in much the same way as their Protestant counterparts did AU.

AU and CEF sparred in Wisconsin in 1967, and the separationists ultimately lost. In 1962, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the granting of free bus transportation to parochial school students was unconstitutional. CEF was the prime mover in getting the state legislature to pass a constitutional amendment permitting such action. C. Stanley Lowell led the opposition to the amendment for AU in 1967. The referendum campaign between AU and CEF was, according to Sorauf, "a somewhat desultory battle." The separationists lost the April referendum garnering only 43.5% of the votes, a decline from the 1946 referendum on a constitutional amendment on the same issue when separationists got 55.5% of the vote.
A constitutional proposal for state tuition grants to pay up to one third of a parochial schools budget reached Nebraskan voters in 1970. The leading proponents of the constitutional revision were CEF, which spent $36,000 on its campaign, and the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church. Archer worked with the Nebraska State Education Association as well as other educational and church organizations, especially Methodist and Baptist state organizations, through an ad hoc committee. Separationists lacked funds for a large publicity campaign depending instead on personal appearances and pamphlets. AU distributed well over 200,000 pieces of literature, which were the most numerous items issued by any of the separationists. Separationists won the referendum with 58% of the votes, defeating the constitutional amendment by a vote of 241,211 to 176,656. Most rural and small town areas voted against the measure as did the capital city of Lincoln, which voted heavily against it. Omaha, which was 40% Catholic barely favored the proposal, while the measure carried in small German and Czech Catholic farm counties.

A more important referendum battle took place at the same time in Michigan. The state legislature had passed a purchase of services act for non-public schools, which the state supreme court in a 4 to 3 advisory opinion ruled constitutional. Separationists in the state responded by successfully circulating a petition to place a constitutional
amendment on the November 1970 ballot declaring unconstitutional all forms of parochial aid except bus transportation. Although rulings by the Attorney General of the state and the Board of Canvassers took the proposal off the ballot, the Michigan Supreme Court put it back on.

Ad hoc groups dominated the campaign. Stuart Hubbell, a national leader of CEF, headed up Michigan Citizens Against Proposal C. As a result of the petition drive a state-wide organizational network had developed enabling the formation of a PEARL-like coalition called Michigan Council Against Parochial Aid (CAP). The head of it was Erwin Ellmann, president of the state ACLU affiliate and drafter of Proposal C. The umbrella organization represented 28 religious, educational, and civic groups including AU, Michigan Education Association, Methodist conference and Baptist state convention, Seventh Day Adventists, state PTA, and the Jewish Community Council. Clearly, more separationist groups were becoming involved in battles.

CAP had to fight two "scare tactics" of its opponents. CAP ran up against the charge of anti-Catholicism and bigotry, with a probable connection with the KKK. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) took some part on the side of CAP, and it was hardly an organization to associate itself with the KKK. More difficult to answer was the charge, made mostly by state educators, that the amendment was so broad it would eliminate the tax
exemption of church property and scrap most of the Michigan constitution, shared time, and participation in federal aid programs. These charges carried weight. For example, the Detroit News reported in mid-September that 50% of those questioned were against parochiaid while only 41% favored it. But by mid-October the figures had reversed with 58% opposed to Proposal C and only 39% in favor of it.

CAP's campaign however proved successful. Faced with an expenditure of $83,000 by Citizens Against Proposal C, CAP, after early money troubles, found enough financial means to run full page ads in papers and a seven day media blitz involving almost hourly radio and TV spots just before the election. AU provided literature and manpower as well as money. It distributed one million pieces of literature, a figure that stands out when compared with the 190,000 distributed by CAP and with Citizens Against Proposal C's 600,000 mailing figure. AU people served on committees, went around collecting signatures, distributed literature, and helped to get out the vote. AU's whole national staff spent most of the month before the election in Michigan making over 80 appearances and speeches. Joining CAP in support of the amendment was the Lutheran Church of America, while joining Catholic officials and the CEF were the Christian Reformed Schools and Missouri Synod, Lutheran Church. Proposal C passed by over 340,000 votes or by 57%, halting the expenditure under the act of 21 million dollars
according to *Church and State*, separationists spent $200,000, whereas their opponents spent a total of one million dollars. A "few little Davids," according to Archer, had defeated the "colossus" with its wealth, huge organization, official political support, and "all the heavy handed tools of persuasion...."

In at least three instances in 1972, AU worked to prevent the passage of constitutional amendments. In Idaho, a constitutional amendment that would have permitted free bus transportation lost by a vote of 144,866 to 107,390, a percentage victory of 57.4%. AU worked chiefly with the Idaho Educational Association. Separationists won all but three counties and apparently the majority of the Mormon vote as well as getting an even split in four Catholic dominated counties. A revision of the Oregon Constitution would have substituted a specific ban on public aid for the "permissive" language of the First Amendment, a substitution separationists, as in New Mexico and New York, invariably opposed. Separationists won the referendum by a margin of 509,602 to 330,718, or by 61%.

The story was different in South Carolina where indirect state aid for church-related and private schools received voter approval in a referendum by a vote of 247,001 to 187,757, or by 57%. Unconvincingly, AU attributed the defeat to voters being "flim-flammed" by believing they were voting against the measure when in fact they were voting
for it. The South Carolina measure involved the avoidance of integration. AU, despite the belief that such a vote created a dual school system and weakened the public schools, had usually avoided the questions since the '50s of how separation was adversely affected by proliferation of private schools in the South. Despite the lack of much activity on either side in these three referendums, the voting generally indicated that the trend was still favorable to AU's separationist position at the grassroots level.

The referenda's results gave AU leaders hope, while the fact that there were such referenda in the first place was a source of deep worry. Archer, nevertheless, claimed to see in these votes an awakening of grassroots support for separation. The organizations involved on both sides of the parochialaid issue increased as the stakes increased. AU staff leaders by that latter '60s no longer found themselves excluded from the strategy sessions as it had been earlier. Breaches in the wall of separation, however, came with increasing ease, especially in the state legislatures. Although the courts generally repaired the breaches, the ideology of AU signified the dire meaning of these breaches for the future of the wall.

In the Legislatures and in the Courts. "Parochialaid legislation," Cogdell declared, "is pressure group legislation usually passed by questionable means...." States became the primary focus of controversy with the proliferation of
parochiaid legislation in the late '60s. While AU leaders could not see this legislation as a valid expression of the politics within the particular states, Doerr clarified what was involved in the legislation for both sides. "Both advocates and opponents of parochiaid," he stated, "regard the issue as being of crucial importance involving, as it does, religion, politics, personal and public finance, race, educational theory, and conflicting views of society."

Parochiaid legislation began to proliferate around 1968, seemed to have reached a peak in 1971, and slightly increased through 1973. Between 1968 and October 1, 1970, forty-one states had had a total of 58 parochiaid proposals or programs, of which 22 had been passed by the state legislatures. As of March 12, 1973, thirteen states gave substantial aid to non-public schools, mostly as a result of programs passed during the 1970-1972 period.

Most of these programs in both periods were challenged in or invalidated by the courts. The lawsuits were brought either by AU, AJC, ACLU, or PEARL(New York). Of the 78 legal cases dealing with either free exercise and religious establishment in January, 1971, sixty cases dealt with establishment of religion, twenty-four of which involved state aid to sectarian institutions. Ten of those cases found AU involved either as financial backer or sponsor. In January of 1973, AU was participating in fourteen of the thirty-four suits against state parochiaid. Clearly, AU was
playing a major role in challenging parochial legislation. "We," Lowell reported, "have put together winning anti-parochial combinations in a dozen states." How AU worked in the states can, ironically, be discerned from Lowell's analysis of Catholic strategy. Detailing the "strategy of deceit and circumvention" and the "ruses...being advanced by masters of deceit," Lowell described the pattern of the drive for public subsidy in the following manner:

The program calls for the hiring of professional lobbyists knowledgeable in the legislative techniques of each particular state. Also for the mounting of a statewide propaganda effort via the mass media. The propaganda stresses the difficult financial plight of the Catholic schools without, however, ever submitting an audited financial statement to prove the case. The publicity also threatens that Catholic schools may have to close up and dump their children on the public schools. Parochial schools and masses are used to mount massive letter-writing and telegram-sending campaigns centering on the governor and members of the legislature. Catholic Action groups like Citizens for Educational Freedom and Knights of Columbus are brought into the campaign. No possible angle of pressure and propaganda is overlooked. Lawyers hired by the Catholic Conference even draft the proposed church school aid legislation. Once the legislation is passed, the Catholic lawyers lead the defense of its constitutionality.

AU had its lobbyists in local chapters concentrate on propaganda and mass media, stress the financial difficulties and threats to the public schools, use its clerically-dominated organization to mount letter-writing campaigns, and employ its own lawyers for lawsuits.

Once AU lost tax-deductibility status, leaders were more willing to openly espouse lobbying and political action
against parochial aid. Church and State and AU's literature reflected the new mood. For example, AU's popular series of "Wake Up" pamphlets, after 1969, appealed more directly for political pressure and to voters. At AU's first National Conference on Church and State after the loss of tax-deductibility, the reorientation was apparent. The conference took place in Detroit, Michigan in early 1970, the year of the Michigan referendum. Harriet Phillips, chairman of Citizens to Advance Public Education and former vice chairwoman of the Michigan Democratic Party, gave an address to the conference to which AU gave publicity. She spoke of the need of those involved in a "cause crusade" to become aware "the conference rhetoric, propaganda sheets to their adherents, letters to so-called elected representatives of the people and all the acceptable pontificating is not enough to bring victory to our cause." If one lacked the economic power to "pull the legislative strings," one must venture out "as missionaries and create people power." She continued:

That means a combination of voter pressure prior to and during political campaigns and establishing a campaign group ready to battle for or against the particular elected official depending on his vote on this issue. Use the ballot and get political for this is where you will settle the issues as long as we remain a representative democracy.

AU got political but education remained the main vehicle for change. Archer's main desire was to reach the masses, continuing to conceive AU's task to "struggle for the mind
of the people. As this battle goes, so church-state arrangements will go." This emphasis led Morgan to call AU expression-oriented, working to satisfy emotional needs. AU aimed to arouse, awake, and revive Americans to an idea to which they believed most Americans had adhered. Such unification on the idea of separation would end the bargaining, compromising, and debating that was common to the politics of separation.

Bus transportation was a major source of controversy until overshadowed by other more substantial programs in the late '60s. Concern about busing increased enormously in the '60s when compared with the '50s, although the state permitting busing increased only slightly from 19 or 22 to 24 since most state courts ruled bus transportation laws violated state constitutions. Transporting of parochial school children remained an extremely emotional issue. Part of the reasons for increased activity in this area was the building of bigger, more centralized parochial schools and movement of Catholics to the suburbs. AU's files reflected this increased activity and expertise in this area when half of its ten lawsuits in 1966 challenged bus transportation laws. AU leaders apparently gave up any idea of reversing the Everson decision.

Morgan briefly detailed AU's campaign in Missouri in the spring of 1962. CEF had organized an ad hoc committee,
"Missouri Committee for Equal School Bus Transportation" to work for a bus law. In "Operation Missouri," AU mounted a hurried propaganda campaign to halt passage of any such law. Archer sent Mayne and Briley into the state where they contacted two local Protestant ministers who had said they would help, distributed literature, made speeches, and put men on the mass media. Morgan concluded the results of AU's efforts were only fair.

This campaign may have been the first time AU and CEF squared off against one another in a local dispute. Their militancy and degree of independence from the accepted norms of what was considered (by the prestigious leaders) appropriate behavior brought opposite Protestant and Catholic views into the political arena on a continuing basis. Of their clashes on the bus issue a Catholic education in 1969 pointed out in the Christian Century:

Come critics find C.E.F. hard to take. When C.E.F. works for the election to public office of candidates favorable to busing for nonpublic school pupils, its critics consider that action sinister, subversive of the democratic process. But when such an organization as Protestants and Other Americans United works for the defeat of those candidates, the same critics consider its action a defense of the nation and of the democratic process.

The bus fights in Pennsylvania attested to the emotionalism aroused by busing. When bus bills were before the legislature in 1961 and 1965, AU found itself the object of strong attacks as a "hate-mongering organization," one which published hate literature while cloaking itself in "alleged
loyalty to American ideals...." CEF was especially active in getting political mileage out of the nativist charge, which it applied to all who opposed the bus bill. Some Catholics could see opposition to a measure supported by their church or criticism of their church only as an expression of prejudice. When the Pennsylvania Council of Churches formed the "Friends of the Public Schools" to campaign against the bill, Council leaders rejected offers of help from AU because of its "anti-Catholic tinge."

The controversy grew more and more heated until the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission condemned both sides in the fight. It found AU's brochures and pamphlets appealing to "anti-Catholicism through content and provocative titles." On the other hand, the Commission discovered a "tendency by a few of the proponents of the bill to charge all opponents with prejudice, thus needlessly offending those whose opposition was based on honest conviction...." The Christian Century, commenting on the controversy, accurately observed, "it is not easy for either side to view the position of the other as honorable and just or the tactics of the other as legitimate and fair."

Doerr commented on why the Pennsylvania bus bill passed in 1965:

Legislators who opposed the bill were frightened into voting for it. One state senator from Pittsburgh said: 'If I vote against this thing I know that at the polls I'll be defeated. And no matter which way I vote, the non-Catholics won't do anything for me.'
The bill was passed and religious liberty and public education took a beating.\textsuperscript{130}

Virgil A. Kraft, Methodist minister and Midwest Regional Director, thought he knew why separationists lacked political clout in comparison with accomodationists, even though 65% of Americans opposed parochial aid. He state in 1971 that those against parochial aid, besides lacking in awareness, did not give top priority to their opposition. Whereas, he wrote, parochializers saw the issue as the sole one upon which they would decide who they would vote for. The legislators knew this political fact.\textsuperscript{131} AU hoped an anti-parochial bloc would develop which would vote and act solely on separation. Kraft received his chance to help develop such a bloc when in the spring of 1972 he became Director of Organization.

While the number of states permitting busing slightly increased, bus bills more often than not failed to be enacted. In 1965, AU participated in bus controversies in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and Delaware along with referenda in Baltimore and Anne Arundel counties in Maryland. Only in Pennsylvania and Ohio did bus laws pass. Support for passage of bus bills came from Catholics, CEF, Lutherans, and Episcopalians.\textsuperscript{135} In 1967, bus bills failed in Missouri, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota, where AU worked with a PEARL coalition, while passing in New Jersey.
AU leaders challenged what they regarded as breaches in the wall in the courts with mixed success. AU lost its challenge to the Pennsylvania bus law in the state supreme court and won its case in New Jersey against the bus law. In 1970, AU, in conjunction with the Minnesota ACLU, proved unsuccessful in getting declared unconstitutional Minnesota's bus law. In early 1971, AU participated either as sponsor, "friend of the court," or financial support in 3 of the 5 legal suits then challenging bus transportation laws.

These were "minor" breaches in separation but if such breaches occurred under strict state constitutional provisions against public aid to church institutions, other forms of parochial aid became an open question or at least gave hope and arguments to accommodationists. What occurred confirmed to AU leaders the accuracy of the line of reasoning made by Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, writing for the majority in Schempp:

It is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent; and in the words of Madison, 'It is proper to alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.'

In an absolute position, degrees were not possible. And while the opponents of AU might abhor the non-compromising position of AU, the very nature of the organization meant that it must be purist.
Instead of going to the courts separationists in Maryland, as in Michigan, collected the necessary petitions to require a referendum in 1972 on the 1971 tuition voucher law. The law provided an initial outlay of $12.1 million to non-public schools. A Maryland PEARL coalition with its usual complement of educational, religious, and civic groups organized as a coordinating committee. In addition to AU, AJC, and ACLU, PEARL(Md.) represented Americans for Democratic Action and New Democratic Coalition of Maryland; NAACP; Unitarian-Universalists; Prince George's Baptist Association, Inc.; and United Methodist Board of Christian Social Concerns.

AU leaders claimed to be "prime movers" in formation of the "anti-parochial coalition." The whole staff involved themselves in the referendum fight, with Doerr especially active with educational and humanist groups. AU leaders concentrated on the role played by the Catholic hierarchy and its use of public relations and on how the opposition outspent PEARL by 10 to 1. Against such odds, victory for separation was all the more significant; principles counted when Americans voted, overcoming propaganda and power. AU leaders believed voucher plans like Maryland's "would inevitably lead to the fragmenting and balkanizing of education into narrow sectarian, political, ideological, racial, sexist, academic level, class, and possibly ethnic enclaves." The result would not be "ecumenical or conducive
Maryland voters rejected the parochiaid statute 543,241 to 448,702, almost 95,000 votes. Church and State commented that while the 54.8% margin might not appear considerable, it did when one took into account that 17 other questions preceded the parochiaid measure on the ballot and all 17 of them were approved by an average of 70%. Parochiaid lost in 22 of the 24 counties of Maryland, with heavily Methodist counties providing the largest margin against it, at times reaching 76%-80%. Counties with a large Lutheran and Reformed Church population opposed the measure 62%-67%. Conservative Protestants in the rural and small town counties voted against it by a 60,000 majority. In the four urban-suburban counties, three were even while in Montgomery County, which had the state's highest income and was its best-educated county, rejected parochiaid by 37,000. In Montgomery County, precincts that went either strongly for Nixon or for McGovern voted against parochiaid. Anti-parochiaid sentiment was very strong among Jewish and liberal pro-McGovern precincts in Baltimore City, which went for parochiaid, and in Montgomery County. Although few blacks voted, a significant majority of inner city and, especially, middle-class blacks voted against the measure.

Opposition to parochiaid was broadly based spanning liberal and conservative political lines as well as urban-rural, class and wealth divisions. Importantly, a majority of
Lutherans who voted opposed the measure. The more liberal and the more conservative oriented voters strongly supported separation. These voters were strongly issue-oriented. Heavy Catholic areas like East Baltimore with Italian, Polish, and Bohemian populations and middle-class suburbs with strong Catholic makeup, of course, voted in substantial numbers for parochiaid. But as Albert Menendez, Associate Director of Field Services, stated, "Our traditional coalition held up beautifully."

AU played an important role in testing the constitutionality of state aid to sectarian institutions. The role changed with the changes in the nature of litigation, judicial politics, separationism, and AU's relations with other litigant groups, particularly AJC and ACLU. The value of the courts as the last bastion of defense, also, underwent some modification, in AU leader's opinion.

As pointed out earlier, AU's relatively poor legal reputation and the problems associated with the image of anti-Catholicism influenced the relationship between AU and the ACLU. AU's separationism differed in constituency, style, tone, and technique from the other two groups. In contrast to AU's conservative, religiously-oriented, and emotional separationism, the stance of the ACLU, which included a number of liberal Protestant clergy, was based upon liberal, secular, and humanistic values. ACLU leaders worked with
AU in specific cases but before 1966 did not share resources and intelligence. Even in the late '60s when the ties between the two groups were more formal, ACLU leaders, at times, did not want a case with AU and avoided association through various means. Local leaders of ACLU had a greater interest in church-state issues than the national organization, and affiliates of ACLU, particularly in states with relatively few Catholics, cooperated well with AU.

These local leaders also distanced themselves at times from the "shrillness of the POAU-Masonic separationism." Scottish Rite Masons, Southern Jurisdiction were exceedingly well represented in the national leadership and in local chapters, providing manpower and funds for AU. Masons kept their activities quietly behind the scenes. As Sorauf pointed out the Masons were the "eminence grise of church-state litigation," working through AU and its local groups.

AU's relations with AJC, especially with Pfeffer, who was the leading expert in church-state affairs among separationist lawyers, was and continued to be closer than with ACLU. During Blanshard's tenure as special counsel Morgan observed a close working relationship between the two groups. Pfeffer considered AU a "good friend" by keeping issues alive. AU, like ACLU, relied on Pfeffer's judgment in numerous instances, especially as AU moved from lower to the appellate court level, which in doing so AU shifted its emphasis from organizing, promotion, and fundraising to
constitutional goals. In sum, AU's relationship with AJC, as with ACLU, involved a complex mixture of overlapping and competing cases, joint ventures, disassociation from AU, financial aid from AU, frequent contacts, and giving AU the cold shoulder.

AU's relations with ACLU and AJC became considerably more cooperative as separationists sought to coordinate efforts in response to federal and state aid to church institutions. For example, in September, 1965, a Legal Conference on the Establishment Clause met in an "informal, unpublicized, and very much off-the-record" meeting. Fifty lawyers and representatives of organizations like ACLU, AJC, AU, NCC (Dean Kelley was one of the initiators), Baptist Joint Committee, and various educational ones involved with church-state litigation discussed litigation, aims, and "strategy." AU, ACLU, and AJC agreed to "coordinate and exchange information about their litigation." By 1966, a separationist litigation consortium had been set up.

Although several informal meetings followed, not until late 1967 or 1968 did the separationist consortium become truly active. One reason for the formalization and setting of strategy in 1968 was the Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v Allen. The Court handed it down the same 1968 spring day as separationist victory on standing to sue in Flast. Allen resulted from a New York ACLU suit challenging 1965 New York law requiring textbooks taken from
state-approved lists allotted to local school boards to be
distributed to the "non-profit private schools" within their
jurisdiction. The justification for the distribution rested
on the idea that the textbooks were on loan to students,
benefitting the student and parents, not church schools. 157
The Court held the law constitutional.

Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, based his
opinion on the "individual benefit theory" supposedly ad-
vanced in Everson by Black, who vigorously denied Allen fol-
lowed his reasoning in Everson. Picking up Justice Clark's
"purpose and primary effect" in Schempp, White argued that
to pass muster government funds must serve a public function
and the primary effect must not advance or hinder reli-
gion. Aid to the child and to secular educational func-
tions of church schools were constitutional if they did not
promote religious instruction and if the school was not per-
meated with religion. Allen was followed by a host of state
aid bills for private schools based on benefit to the
child. 160

AU, of course, agreed with the minority, which included
Black and Douglas, who supported Black's dissent and argued
the essentially sectarian nature of parochial schools.
Black wrote in his dissent:

It is true, of course, that the New York law does
not as yet formally adopt or establish a state reli-
gion. But it takes a great stride in that direction
and coming events cast their shadows before them.
The same powerful sectarian propagandists who have
succeeded in securing passage of the present law to help religious schools carry on their sectarian religious purposes can and doubtless will continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy of their particular brand of religion. And it nearly always is by insidious approaches that the citadels of liberty are most successfully attacked. 162

Lowell feared that White's Allen opinion was a harbinger of a new money line and "if pressed relentlessly, could mean the end of church-state separation." 163

A meeting of the consortium in the spring of 1968 produced a mimeographed memo dated July 20th setting forth "guiding principles" and elucidating courses of action to be pursued. The principles as well as the litigation strategy reflected, as did the consortium's decisions, Pfeffer's 164 judgment and his domination. The principles emphasized the need for legal victories at the lower and Supreme Court levels while avoiding pursuing borderline cases (perhaps a reference to AU). The memo concluded that the next case brought to the Supreme Court must involve sectarian schools with a higher degree of aid than buses or textbooks, as in Allen.

The memo pointed out that it should be made difficult for the Court "to move by a series of small steps all the way down the road to full aid." Consequently, the strategy was to "pose a case requiring a large step or none." Deciding not to challenge the poverty program out of fear of bad publicity, priority was given to challenging the Higher Education Facilities Act, which was accomplished in Tilton.
Another priority item entailed a challenge to the 1968 Pennsylvania parochiaid statute, which succeeded in *Lemon v. Kurtzman* that was handed down by the Court on June 28, 1971, the same day the *Tilton* decision was announced. As in *Tilton*, AU, ACLU, and AJC participated in *Lemon* (which is discussed below).

An October, 1968 meeting continued the consortium's discussion. After Pfeffer led a discussion on *Tilton*, members urged AU to pursue its tax-exemption suit in Maryland on "unrelated religious income." They hoped, however, that AU would hold off on its suit challenging Ohio's textbook and secondary services law because of *Allen*. Archer apparently ignored the request.

The consortium stopped meeting after May, 1969, although AJC, ACLU, and AU continued as they had always done to meet over specific suits. In fact, jointly sponsored cases were more frequent after the demise of the consortium than during its existence. The consortium could not have controlled the church-state legal field, especially with the proliferation of state parochiaid laws and the consequent increased litigation. According to Sorauf, one reason for the consortium's brief life involved AU's increased legal activities. The consortium had been brought together in part to limit AU's "recklessness" in litigation.

Following *Flast*, the courts showed an increasing disposition to allow standing to members of corporations and
corporations in individual taxpayer suits, although AU continued to have lack of standing problems. As a result of the decision and the loss of its tax-deductibility status, Archer decided to play a more active "leadership" role in the 1970's. Previously, AU's primary role at the appellate level had been through filing "friend of the court" briefs. Another reason AU gave for initiating suits in its own name was "that individual plaintiffs are thus saved from excessive publicity and harassment."

AU's increased activity can be seen in the 67 important church-state cases studied by Sorauf. He divided the level of involvement into three categories: "friend of court," intermediate (funds, legal advice, help drafting brief, argument in appellate court, encouragement and support, in a case after the trial began), and sponsorship of the case. Between 1951-1957, AU filed no "friend of the court" briefs and had 3 cases at each of the other 2 levels. AU played a role in 8 cases at the intermediate level and sponsored one suit during the 1958-1964 period. Between 1965-1971, there were 6 briefs, 6 intermediate cases, and 3 sponsorships. In each of the three periods, the case involvement of 6 to 9 to 15 represented the most cases in each period sponsored by any organization, except for the 1965-1971 period when ACLU significantly increased its sponsorship of cases to 10. Viewing the increase another way, AU was the plaintiff in two cases in August of 1967: a case challenging the United
State Post Office Department for issuing stamps with religious symbols celebrating Christmas as a religious holiday and the previously mentioned Ohio suit challenging the ESEA. By July 1, 1972, AU was sponsoring 12 cases, 9 as corporate plaintiff.

Between 1965-1971, AU participated substantially in at least 6 important challenges to parochiaid. Besides the generally successful Horace Mann League case in 1966-1966, AU sponsored, with the cooperation of ACLU and AJC, a 1966 challenge to the 1965 Michigan auxiliary services act.

AU had not taken the consortium's advice in regard to the 1968 Ohio $10 million auxiliary services statute permitting teachers and educational services to aid parochial schools, unfortunately. AU lost at the trial and at the Court of Appeals level. Following the Lemon parochiaid decision in 1971, the case was reargued before the Ohio Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the appeals court.

AU lost every argument. As members of the consortium feared, the act was found to have "negligible religious implication." The courts uncovered no purpose or primary effect of advance religion or excessive entanglement of government with religion, nor did they find that it violated the free exercise clause since the plaintiffs did not allege or show the act coerced them in the practice of their religion. Moreover, the act did not violate the Ohio Constitution since the AU had not proved religious schools had
an excessive right to or control of any part of state school funds.

One of the 6 cases challenging parochiaid took place in Connecticut in 1969. The organizational plaintiffs in the suit besides AU were the Connecticut branches of ACLU, Council of Churches, Jewish Community Relations Council, and NAACP. The suit challenged the state's 1969 $6 million purchase of secular educational services act. While the organizational plaintiffs were excluded for lack of standing, a three-judge court unanimously ruled the act violated the establishment clause through the advancing religion and administrative state control over secular parts of the schools operation while the schools remained religious. The court also denied that the repeal of the act would hinder the free exercise of religion.

The two remaining suits came in the 1970's and involved New Jersey and Vermont. AU's suit challenged the 1970 $9.5 million New Jersey purchase of educational services act. The suit competed with a similar suit brought by 15 organizational plaintiffs to challenge the same law. The 15 groups were the same ones involved in PEARL-like coalitions in other states. Although the ACLU, et. al., case was more thoroughly prepared and argued, both cases argued that parochial schools were religiously, racially, and socially segregated. Following the June 28, 1971 parochiaid decisions, the New Jersey legislature repealed the act,
eliminating grants for teacher's salaries, but then appropriated the same amount of money for textbook aid, shared facilities, and auxiliary personnel. Both cases became moot. More successfully, twelve years after AU's successful challenge to state "tuition grants" to parents of parochial school students, a three judge court held unconstitutional a Vermont statute permitting an educational lending and reimbursement program. The unanimous decision found excessive entanglement and potential for church involvement in the political process.

The key separationist challenge and ruling came in the June 28, 1971 decision by the Supreme Court. The Court declared unconstitutional the Pennsylvania purchase of educational services act of 1968 (Lemon v. Kurtzman) and a 1969 Rhode Island salary supplement program to teachers in private schools in certain specific situations (Earley v. DiCenso and Robinson v. DiCenso). At the same time the Court for the first time permitted direct public grants to church institutions in Tilton, it limited the scope of that decision by denying the above direct financial grants to elementary and secondary parochial schools. Furthermore, excessive entanglement guidelines applied to all aid programs, whether direct or indirect, which involved sectarian schools. Also, the ruling also stated that both the secular nature of the function involved in the aid and the nature of the institution to which aid went had to be considered. How these two
interacted had to be taken into account.

Originally, AU had no part in Lemon. AU, however, located a plaintiff and hired a counsel to challenge the Pennsylvania statute on its own. The threat of the suit pressured the groups bringing the case to include AU as one of six organizational plaintiffs. As in Tilton, AU claimed to be a "substantial if not the most substantial" financial contributor to Lemon; in fact, Salisbury at one point observed that AU was the largest financial contributor to the latter case.

As the case moved up through the courts the broad support for both sides crossed religious lines and indicated the extent of educational and monetary stakes at issue. A three-judge panel had ruled by a 2 to 1 margin that the Pennsylvania act's purpose and primary effect were secular and ruled the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing. The organizational sponsors were the Pennsylvania branches of the State Education Association, NAACP, Council of Churches, Jewish Community Relations Conference, and ACLU. The national AU was also a sponsor, indicative of the centralized nature of AU's legal program. Six Jewish organizations, including AJC, and eight educational association, including NEA, as well as the Horace Mann League filed "friend of the court" briefs. The following groups filed "friend of the court" briefs supporting the act: Pennsylvania Association of Independent Schools, CEF, National Catholic

Chief Justice Warren Burger based the Lemon decision on his entanglement guideline first enunciated in Walz as well as on the other guidelines mentioned previously in Tilton. The entanglement reasoning in Lemon was apparently, and was generally interpreted as, a strict separation position against programs directly aiding secondary and elementary church schools. "Excessive and enduring entanglement," Burger argued, caused an increase in political conflict, led to "political division along religious lines," "pressures for expanding aid" with accompanying campaigns by both sides of parochial, church involvement in politics, and state surveillance of church institutions. These baneful effects the First Amendment had been designed to prevent. These effects as well as the further restrictions of the other three guidelines by which to measure each specific case seemingly constituted a full blown justification for strict separation. How then did one explain Tilton?

Entanglement assumed a relationship between church and state existed. The question was whether the degree in a specific instance was excessive. While pointing toward strict separation, the underlying assumptions of Burger's argument rested on other than absolute separation principles.
Burger had already stated in Walz:

The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles.

In fact, absolutes and principles took a back seat to finding a workable way to judge church-state relations where public aid to church institutions was a fact of life. While claiming continuity with Everson, entanglement rested on a different basis of judgment. Instead of using the "wall" metaphor, Burger spoke of the "highways of church and state relationships...."

Burger cited the problems with the line of separation. He mentioned Black's opinion in Everson that bus transportation was on "the verge" of forbidden territory. He then cited the Court's decisions down to Allen permitting secular, neutral, and nonideological service by the government to religion. He reiterated the Court's difficulty in Allen and Walz in finding the line between religion and the state:

Candor compels acknowledgement, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.... The line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.

In contrast to other parts of the First Amendment, he found the religious clauses "At best opaque." The authors of the amendment, according to the chief justice, had
prohibited establishment of a state church and a state religion. What was meant by and how to determine what tended toward or was "respecting" an establishment, however, was far from clear. In the absence of the possibility of a precisely drawn constitutional line, he at this point proposed to substitute the avoidance of the three main evils, quoting Walz: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." The difficulties with separation as a constitutional rule, first made apparent in Everson, was to be avoided by abandoning it for other, presumably more pragmatic and testable, criteria.

Nevertheless, he stated that "lines must be drawn," although they would not be hard and fast ones. In determining the lines he did not depend on the traditional historical grounds as had been done in previous decisions, and on which the concurring opinion of Douglas, with Black in agreement, rested. Burger cited the conflicting interpretations surrounding separation and the long tradition of church-state cooperation. Excessive entanglement permitted the necessary leeway for the Court to take both traditions into account without abandoning separation or enlarging permissible areas of state involvement with religious institutions. At the same time, areas of church-state cooperation could be judged as excessive entanglement or not. Consequently, and following the Court's tendency, an
accommodationist position, Tilton, accompanied a separationist position, Lemon.

In general, Catholics saw Lemon as a blow to accommodation and to financially strapped parochial schools. They had hoped for some help from the Court and were extremely disappointed with little likelihood of a favorable decision in regard to parochial schools in the future. Moreover, the Court stated that political pressure and campaigns by institutions "whose interests have substantial political support" would not force it to go beyond that aid granted in Everson and Allen. Despite despair, parochial aid measures continued to be passed by state legislatures. CEF argued that Lemon and DiCenso had ruled out only one method of parochial aid.

AU heralded the decision, distributing thousands of the June 28th decisions. It argued that Lemon and DiCenso prohibited tuition grants and tuition vouchers. The decision also aided AU financially.

Following the June 28th parochial decisions, parochial aid laws and church-state litigation increased apace. The Court had ended aid through purchase of services, but tuition plans through grants, vouchers, and reimbursements and tax credits had not been tested before the Court. Tax credits allowed parents to deduct a specified amount of the tuition of religious schools from their income tax liability. These major forms of aid had been enacted into law in 11
states by February, 1973. The states were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Court challenges ended most of the programs while in Maryland, as discussed previously, a 1972 referendum threw out that state's tuition voucher plan.

These cases were part of the general increase in church-state cases. For instance, there were a total of 36 such cases in July 1968, and by January, 1971 they had reached 78 cases. By January, 1973, the church-state legal actions in process had reached 84. Of the cases to reach the high appellate court studied by Sorauf, eleven did so between 1951-1957 and twenty-two did so in the 1958-1964 period. Thirty-four cases reached the high appellate level in the six year period between 1965 and June 1971. At least thirty-four cases did so in the three year period between June 1971 and June 1974. From another angle, the Supreme Court had decided 9 church-state cases from 1962-1971, more than it had decided in all of its previous history. Between 1971-1974, the Court decided 9 cases, mostly involving parochial aid and in support of separationism.

AU played an important role in a number of these cases as well as lesser roles of financial aid, advice, and local support. AU and the Minnesota ACLU challenged the 1971 Minnesota Tax Credit Act, naming as defendants in the suit the heads of the Catholic dioceses and Jewish, Episcopal,
Evangelical, Seventh-Day Adventist, Lutheran, and Christian Reform Schools in Minnesota. The case was consolidated with a similar case brought by an organization of ten education groups, AJC, Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota, First Unitarian Society of Minneapolis, and, interestingly, the Minnesota Conference of Seventh Day Adventists. The plaintiffs lost at the trial level and the Minnesota Supreme Court, while not ruling on the constitutionality of the act, allowed payments under the act to continue.

Victory came twice in Ohio. AU, ACLU, and AJC successfully challenged Ohio's 1971 tuition reimbursement law. In October, 1972, the United States Supreme Court in an 8 to 1 decision summarily affirmed (without opinion) the Ohio court's ruling. The same three groups, plus the Ohio Free Schools Association, an AU affiliate, filed suit against the 1972 Ohio tax credit act. The suit argued the state legislators acted not only unconstitutionally but also in bad faith by subverting the opinion of the 3 judge District Court in the previous case. Once more a 3 judge panel ruled the act had primary effect of advancing religion and would generate political controversy along religious lines and, once more, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment.

The next important United States Supreme Court rulings came on June 25, 1973 primarily on two cases brought by PEARL(NY), PEARL v. Nyquist and Levitt v. PEARL.
The coalition in New York by this time represented 33 mostly liberal civic, religious, and educational organizations, including the New York State chapter of AU, which had been a member at least since 1971. According to Florance Flast, vice-chairwoman of PEARL and a member of the NAC, the relations between PEARL and AU were good. The Court struck down New York's education law that involved tax credits, tuition reimbursements, and maintenance and repair. The Court also struck down a 1970 $28 million New York law which required "mandated services." The Court as well affirmed a U.S. District Court's decision declaring Pennsylvania's tuition reimbursement act unconstitutional.

The Court applied its previously developed criteria. It found the aid programs advanced religion, fostered excessive entanglement, subsidized sectarian schools, and expanded political strife over aid to religion. On the tuition reimbursement and tax credit provisions, it ruled that the state did indirectly through the parents what could not be done directly. Moreover, it stated that the state in maintaining its neutrality "cannot by designing a program to promote the free exercise of religion erode the limitations of the Establishment Clause." This stance was the Court's answer to an increasingly frequent accommodationist argument that by not providing aid to parochial schools religious freedom, free exercise, and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment were being impaired by the state.
The Supreme Court had closed off various forms of parochial aid by 1973, except for auxiliary services and for limited services provided through the child benefit theory. Only the voucher plan had not been ruled on and, as Sorauf observed, "It was of all the options the one most threatening to the public school interests, and it was therefore the most vulnerable politically."

President Richard M. Nixon was one person who lent his voice to the cause of parochial aid. While doing so he also appointed Henry Cabot Lodge as his personal emissary to the Vatican in June 1970, after approximately a twenty year hiatus. AU, along with a number of Protestant organizations, protested, of course, but Nixon claimed the times had changed from the 1950's. Meanwhile, AU leaders excoriated Nixon for his meeting with members of the Catholic hierarchy without meeting with separationist leaders, as well as for his statement that the "non-public elementary and secondary schools...have long been an integral part of the nation's educational establishment."

Nixon made the above statement when he announced in April, 1970 the appointment of a four member President's Panel on Nonpublic Education to operate within the President's Commission on School Finance. As the November, 1972 Presidential election approached, the commission in March of that year recommended Congress consider tax credits and tuition
reimbursement. In April, 1973, after Nixon's election victory, Secretary of the Treasurer George Schultz proposed a tax credit plan as part of larger reform of the tax laws.

With Nixon's support, tax credit bills were introduced in Congress in 1972, in fact 139 separate bills for federal aid to non-public schools were presented in the House. The issue of parochial aid had reached a national forum when the House Ways and Means Committee began hearings on tax credit before the 1972 election. At a later hearing of the committee, Lowell, inaccurately, stated that only Catholic schools called for public aid. To support tax credit in Congress a coalition formed in late 1972 called CREDIT(Citizens Relief for Education by Income Tax). CREDIT, whose leadership overlapped with that of CEF, coordinated the campaign of the American Catholic bishops; Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod; Christian Reformed; Orthodox Jews; and secular private school interests.

Separationists forces organized their forces on Capitol Hill as well. Apparently since some time in 1971, an informal coalition of various national organizations had fought against parochial aid in Washington and Congress. Doerr had worked with the NEA, which had over one million members and opposed parochial aid, and the American Federation of Teachers against tax credit. Negotiations for a national coalition began in September, 1972, as the hearings of the House Ways and Means Committee began on tax credits.
At an all-day conference on March 12th, as the hearings of the above committee continued, the anti-tax credit national consortium was formally planned. Bishop John Walker, Suffragan Bishop of Washington Episcopal Diocese presided at the morning session, where Congressman James Corman (D., Cal.), a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, opened the meeting. The consortium comprised 41 religious, educational, and civic organizations and in essence was to be a national PEARL. Groups included, besides ACLU, AU, and AJC, American Humanist Association; Baptist Joint Committee; United Methodist, Board of Church and Society; Unitarian Universalist; PEARL organizations from New York, Maryland, Missouri, Florida, and Illinois as well as two PEARL-like coalitions from Michigan; and national and state public school organizations.

The PEARL consortium had other reasons for its formation besides an interest in tax credit legislation. Congress might be "stampeded" into passing such legislation. AU also viewed the consortium as an "anti-voucher coalition." CEF continued to champion a tuition voucher plan and the Office of Economic Opportunity in late 1969 and early 1970 had studied such a plan under guidance of Christopher Jencks of Harvard Graduate School of Education. Given a boost by Lemon, experiments in a number of areas were conducted. AU tried to prevent such experiments by threatening lawsuits wherever they involved parochial schools.
The program of the consortium did not involve policy making or setting up an organizational structure. Rather, the consortium was to coordinate programs of the groups and to organize general and special educational campaigns in order to stimulate support for separation, religious liberty, and public schools. In order to garner funds, the consortium planned to use such attention-getting devices as election issues, referenda, constitutional amendments, and passage of a law. Drawing from the experience of PEARL campaigns in the various states, awareness could be increased with a minimum of one-tenth to one-hundredth of what the opposition spent. Professional public relations and advertising firms would be hired in order to reach a mass national audience, particularly through television. The involvement of "grass roots membership organizations" gave the consortium volunteers and access to large membership roles.

In sum, the consortium was to be a watchdog, gather information, pursue membership building and public relations, and act politically and legally. The leading formulators of these plans were Florance Flast of PEARL(NY), representatives of NEA, ACLU, and AJC, and James E. Wood, new executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee and former 221 AU Board member.

The June, 1973 Supreme Court ruling against tax credits and tuition reimbursement halted the congressional legislation. Only tuition vouchers remained undecided but by
implication they too would be ruled unconstitutional.

"The Protestant churches," Archer wrote to Director Taylor of the NAE in 1970, "just cannot assume that they will receive anything like fair treatment in any arrangement where their activity or financing are dependent in any way on political processes. Archer was appealing to Taylor to remember the extensive power of the American Catholic Church. Ironically, the executive director made the statement at a time when AU, partly as a result of the loss of its tax-deductibility status, moved more actively into the political arena, in the late '60s and early '70s.

At this time AU began to have some doubts about the ability and willingness of the courts to hold the line of separation, a significant shift in attitude considering its formerly great faith in the courts. Allen was one reason Even Pfeffer, as a result of the decision, called it a mistake to rely so much on the courts. Before an AU audience, he called for legislative power so the "people's voice" would have power where decisions were made, usually by organized special interest groups.

In his study, Sorauf found of 58 adversary cases 29 were decided in favor of separationism and 28 for an accommodationist position, with one divided, at the appellate level. The separationist victories came almost exclusively in cases involving elementary and secondary schools. Moreover,
separationists won 6 of 10 cases before the United States Supreme Court. He concluded that between 1951-1971 separationism had substantial success in the appellate courts, considering the victories went against public policy. From AU's viewpoint, however, twenty-eight accommodationist victories and four Supreme Court losses were disastrous.

The legal climate along with the whole field of church-state relations deteriorated rapidly in the late '60s, according to AU. The courts gave currency to the "spurious" child benefit theory and accept "jesuitical legal reasoning." Salisbury, discussing in 1969 the difficulties of convincing a new generation that had never faced religious persecution of the relevance of religious liberty, stated:

It is a formidable task because the lower courts today have been deluged by a curious propaganda until it appears that judges are more concerned with church educational problems than in preserving religious liberty which they, too, have long taken for granted.

Getting compliance with court rulings continued to be a major problem. Judicial interpretation no longer was so reliable nor was the Supreme Court with its new personnel to be trusted.

More than ever separation seemed to rest on a mass awakening, with AU being "the voice of the people." In order to stir the masses in an effective way in the increasingly politicized and more nationwide field of separation, AU leaders worked increasingly through alliances. AU was a small
organization in the church-state field, although it had resources few among separationist groups could match. Coalitions were necessary to remain effective, but AU's potential allies required changes on the part of AU in terms of moderating its tone, playing down its anti-Catholicism, and developing more finesse at working with others. Moreover, as Lowell portrayed AU's condition, AU would work with anybody in its weakened condition.

Other reasons existed for the alliances. Archer elaborated on some of them in response to criticism of the policy from more conservative members within AU. These members objected to the goals of ACLU, AJC, NAACP, or PEARL. AU worked with anyone going its way "on a particular issue at a particular time," stated Archer. AU needed a strong base of support that could be translated into power at the right time. Denying a critics remark that "AU would join with the devil himself to beat the Catholic Church," Archer argued that AU will "form many an alliance at a particular juncture to help win a particular victory for church-state separation." In other words, the alliances were not permanent ones, involving the changing of AU's main goals, but merely tactical ones. Moreover, Archer pointed out that AU had been able to undertake and win many lawsuits that would have been impossible with its own resources. Archer at the same time realized the dangers of such alliances to AU's own frail internal alliance and the need for AU to keep its own
identity on the issue of separation.

Why was AU included in these coalitions? As many organizations as possible were needed to fight the better organized opponents and the proliferating parochial groups and programs. Two or three organizations could no longer dominate the separationist field. Whatever differences existed between the mostly liberal organizations that made up the alliances and AU paled before their common interests in stopping the flow of funds to non-public schools. Conservative groups had not organized on a similar scale. AU's identification as a conservative Protestant institution broadened the base of the liberal coalitions. AU's finances, manpower, and other resources could be tapped. Moreover, if AU was inside instead of outside an alliance in a particular situation, control, leverage, and persuasion could be exercised to keep it within bounds acceptable to the members. Otherwise, the militancy, emotional appeal, and anti-Catholicism of AU might backfire against their cause in a particular situation. Even where its help was not wanted, AU used threats of lawsuits or actual lawsuits to force itself into a particular alliance.

How far AU had come in politics can be discerned in a March, 1973 Church and State editorial entitled, "Politics As Usual." The editorial writer advocated what AU had earlier condemned the American Catholic Church for doing. The writer called for a strategy to develop greater voter
consciousness on "religious liberty issues." An opposition bloc to parochial aid that shifted its vote solely on the parochial issue would counter parochial aid and let politicians know that in a close election they need not go for "craven and obsequious assurance" to the "clerical bloc." The strategy rested on AU leader's perception of how a small militant minority within Catholic ranks were able to affect the votes of legislatures. Now, however, it was the people's turn to organize and be heard instead of the special interests organized to bombard the legislature.

PAROCHIAID: PRO AND CON

Parochial aid was an emotional issue for both sides and arguments were used to buttress these emotional feelings. The propagandizing done by both sides occurred as much to mobilize constituencies as to convince the opponents.

What were the most effective parochial aid arguments? Virgil Kraft stated that the most effective and principal arguments of the parochial aid lobby were that parochial schools saved money for the taxpayer and that there should be no monopoly in education. "The arguments," he wrote, "have enervated the patriots, and made paranoids of the parochials." Obviously, the arguments had had an effect on separationists as well. Menendez confirmed the importance of the cost argument, observing the effectiveness of the concomitant threat to close parochial schools and to "dump" the students on the public schools.
AU answered the monopoly argument in several ways. Public schools were people's schools owned by people in the local district. They were not government schools. Besides, public institutions should have a monopoly of government funds. Also, since there were over 20,000 private elementary and secondary schools in the United States, public schools could not be said to have a monopoly over education.

AU leaders most frequent refutation to the monopoly argument involved the consequences of parochial aid for the common school system. Such aid would set up a dual school system that would cost more money and be less efficient. A competing school system had crippled education in Western Europe, particularly in the Netherlands, in England, Quebec, and Newfoundland. The origins of the civil strife in Northern Ireland were in the government subsidies to the sectarian schools that segregated Catholic from Protestant. Once public funds went to church schools how could such aid be withheld from other private schools. Cogdell, citing extreme examples, asked:

How can public funds be denied to White Citizens Council schools, Black Muslim schools, John Birth Society schools, Communist schools and other privately owned, highly selective, ideology oriented schools, and granted to ecclesiastically owned special interest schools, which practice many kinds of bias, selectivity, and pupil isolation—religious, racial, academic and socioeconomic?
AU leaders turned the CEF-Catholic argument that government monopoly of schooling enforced religious conformity and homogeneity on its head. Religious schools, especially Roman Catholic, compelled religious conformity and homogeneity. The Roman Catholic Church leaders in their arguments against government monopoly were being disingenuous because they actively sought a church monopoly over education. Public schools on the other hand promoted pluralism and diversity and through their religious neutrality enabled those of every faith to associate and better understand other religions.

The pluralism and diversity promoted by the public schools only seemingly contradicted the following statement by Doerr:

Assimilation of people of many ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds has been recognized as a major national purpose. Government has no mandate from the people to use tax funds extracted from all people for the purpose of dividing citizens, as is the case in Ireland. The object has been to achieve national unity. Our universal and free public school system has been the great force toward that end.238

Assimilation into the civil tradition of America, which was not the secularism the American Catholic Church so often condemned, overcame parochialism, divisive and separatist traditions while permitting diversity and pluralism. The civil tradition was non-sectarian and national rather than ethnic and involved American ideals that were universally applicable, transcending other cultural traditions. The public
schools assimilated people to a common heritage of American principles. The assimilation was an ideological one; national unity came from belief and education in this Americanism. Part of that Americanism was a belief in diversity and pluralism, at least in theory, although in actual practice it aimed for homogeneity and conformity to the ideals. Also part of the ideology was that it was not an ideology; the public schools were not ideology oriented.

This public school ideology AU defended as an article of faith. The leaders of AU repeatedly referred to the integrative and unifying function of public schools and its being the bulwark of democracy. Such statements were made in a way that presumed agreement by most Americans. Even if the public schools had once performed these functions, which was not readily apparent, it was not clear they did in mid-century America. In these statements, AU leaders at times were answering illogical, uncomprehending, unwarranted, and purely selfish criticism of the public schools by officials of the American Catholic Church.

Arguments and anger expressed by Catholic agencies reflected widespread disenchantment with the public schools and the financial strains of keeping Catholic schools open. Menendez asserted that according to the polls 58% of Americans still supported public schools and that that percentage was the highest degree of support for any American institution. Nevertheless, a 1969 Gallup study found that if
non-public schools were free 40% of parents nationally and 59% in metropolitan areas would send their children to them. These latter figures undoubtedly reflected parental anxiety concerning integrated schools.

The financial crisis in the Catholic parochial schools was another powerful factor for the parochial drive in the latter 1960's. There seemed a possibility that many would close supposedly for lack of funds. Enrollment in non-public schools had doubled in the 25 years before 1965. Enrollment in these schools, however, fell from a peak of 7 million students in 1965 to 5.4 million in 1971, a drop of 23%. Inflation and the decline within religious vocations exacerbated the problems for Catholic schools. During the same period, the public schools increased their enrollment by 12.3%. Two-thirds of all Catholic school children were in public schools in this period. For these reasons as well as changes resulting from Vatican II, Catholic parochial schools found themselves in a "crisis of confidence." According to Andrew Greeley, the confidence crisis engulfed the whole American Catholic Church following Vatican II, a crisis that was the last phase of a long range adaptation by Catholic ethnic groups to American society and their acceptance into it. Public schools were no longer Protestant, and Catholics increasingly took a non-Catholic view of parochial schools, according to the Jesuit sociologist.
Not until the '70s did AU adequately counter the "closing down" possibility. AU leaders cited various studies such as Governor Rockefeller's 1972 Fleishmann Commission Report and AU's Research Foundation financed book written by Martin A. Larson entitled, *When Parochial Schools Close: A Study in Educational Financing*. AU leaders argued that the public schools, because of declining enrollment due to a decrease in the birth rate, could absorb non-public school students if they closed, even if all of them shut their doors. During 1971, Larson studied 16 communities across the United States where there had been transfers of private school students to public schools. Not surprisingly, he concluded that the transfers caused little problems, improved community harmony, and increased the likelihood of the passage of school bond issues. In the state campaigns, AU leaders used such information to counter the threat to "dump" students on the public schools. AU leaders always viewed the possibility of closure as a typical Catholic threat to get what it wanted. When the court in *PEARL v. Levitt* in New York in 1972 asked the defendants to show that any schools would have to close because of the withholding of public funds, they could not do so.

Drawing upon its own studies of American Catholicism, AU was quick to point out the implausibility of a financial plight for such a wealthy church. The church, Lowell estimated, received an annual income as of 1969 of $12
billion. Despite being the "wealthiest private organization in the United States," the church's financial resources were hidden under a "veil of secrecy," according to Lowell. Profits from unrelated commercial business income and investment programs went into the coffers of the tax-exempt church to be spent converting Protestants and working for parochial aid. Eighteen Catholic Action groups and about 207 Catholic associations and societies contributed to the church and had their own investment programs. Moreover, the church had an enormous number of programs specifically designed just to get funds from the government. According to Lowell, seven billion dollars went from various governmental units in the United States, mostly from the federal government, to the churches each year. Of this amount, the American Catholic Church received approximately $4.5 billion, almost equal to what it received in donations. AU leaders found the pleas of poverty and financial plight a subterfuge for other ends.

AU leaders denied Catholics were being doubly taxed because "Church donations are not a tax." Most people paid taxes for public schools had no children enrolled in them. They did not consider it an injustice to pay taxes for this public service. Also, attendance at public schools was a civil right while attendance at a parochial school was a special privilege. Moreover, AU leaders argued that to publicly subsidize parochial schools constituted double, even
triple taxation by forcing non-Catholics to finance a religion they did not believe in as well as their own denominational schools through voluntary support. At one point Archer wrote that nobody had a "right to demand that the public subsidize...private choice."

AU leaders disputed the oft-repeated contention of CEF that Catholic parents' "freedom of choice" to send their children to church schools to get a "God-centered" education was hindered by the absence of aid. AU leaders pointed out that they were asking for freedom for themselves, and especially for their church, and not for others. More tellingly, they found the contention hardly consistent with what the American Catholic Church taught and believed. Catholic officials espoused a very selective freedom and choice, for their church alone. Catholics or their church never countenanced freedom of choice in abortion, birth control, medical ethics, and other areas regulated by canon law.

The most effective anti-parochial arguments in garnering votes were separation was ingrained in American history, that this tradition kept religion out of politics, and that the church was too worldly, materialistic, and powerful to need or deserve government money.

AU leaders argued that parochial besides not being needed by the Church was not wanted, being opposed by a majority of Americans. To this end they cited a Gallup-Catholic Digest sponsored poll conducted in 1966: Americans opposed
parochiaid by a margin of 50% to 38%, virtually unchanged from a similar Gallup poll taken in 1952. In that fourteen year period, the Protestant percentages remained unchanged, 56% against and 32 for parochiaid. The most dramatic shift came among Jews who in 1952 opposed aid by a margin of 49% to 35% but by 1966 overwhelmingly rejected it, 74% to 17%. Catholic support for aid to religious schools also fell from 63% for to 25% against it in 1952 to 55% support as against 31% opposition. A 1969 poll conducted by American Independent Schools, Cambridge, Massachusetts found Americans opposed religious school aid by a wide margin, 59% to 37%.

AU began its own surveys in selected states in 1970. In a 1970 Maryland poll, AU reported finding that opposition to parochiaid had reached a margin of 62.5% to 35.3%; in Illinois in the same year the margin was 59% to 39.2%; and in Ohio in 1971 61.1% to 37%. All three states had parochiaid programs, but AU did not survey all the states with parochiaid programs. Americans United Surveys used the Gallup questions which were designed to get a pro-parochiaid response. When AU conducted another poll identifying the nonpublic schools as denominational and selective, Doerr maintained the margin of opposition to parochiaid increased to 5 to 1, with even a majority of Catholics opposed to such aid.

AU received some support from Catholic opponents of parochiaid for its position. Kraft found that the "Catholic
people can be changed...." The National Association of
(Catholic) Laymen (NAL) with 24 affiliates in major cities
and a total membership of 12,000 in 1969 aimed for more lay
control within the American Catholic Church. It favored
financial accountability and full public disclosure of
financial statements of the Catholic dioceses because secre-
cy was "contrary to the tradition of most every facet of
American civil society." Not only did NAL oppose parochi-
aid, it favored phasing out parochial elementary and secon-
dary education and was very critical of a number of conserva-
tive Catholics and their arguments in support of parochial
aid. The NAL leaders argued that "Contrary to the general impres-
sion, Catholics are not united on the issue of state aid to
parochial schools. Actually, there is a marked cleavage...."
The opposition however had difficulty in going public where
bishops strongly supported aid.

Before the 25th annual national conference on church and
state, Leo J. Jorden, who as counsel for the NAL had filed
a pro-separationist brief in Lemon v. Kurtzman, addressed him-
self partly to the changes within the American Catholic
Church. The changes he mentioned were the changes AU leaders
believed necessary in order for the church to be considered
American. The Americanization of the Catholic Church and
not any adjustment to the Roman Catholic Church by the Amer-
ican society had always been a major point of AU leaders.
Jordan stated that the "majority of American Catholics
support, in principle, the constitutional abridgement against an established church, and they cherish the doctrine of religious liberty." Nor did they like the church's ties with the Spanish Government. "I am convinced," he continued, "from an ideological basis that Catholics are no different from a majority of other Americans." Acceptance of the American civil tradition, as interpreted by AU leaders, was the only basis on which they would accept the Catholic Church. As AU stated: "Since Vatican II, the most forward-looking and progressive Roman Catholics have been trying to get their church to divest itself of its political superstructure, so reminiscent of a medieval monarchy, and to become a purely spiritual institution."

OTHER AREAS

In the early 1960's, AU continued to fight against government giveaways. AU leaders gave most publicity to such giveaways in urban renewal programs and federal surplus property in Mitchel Field, New York; Chicago, Illinois; Omaha, Nebraska; and Scranton, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Mitchel Field case in Hempstead, Long Island involved the transfer of a former Air Force base to the Diocese of Rockville Center for a parochial high school. AU leaders mounted protests amid cries of bigotry, received coverage by the New York Times, issued pamphlets, and spent $11,000 in the campaign against the transfer.
AU leaders attention to this area perhaps reflected the active and growing involvement of Protestants. Even where they challenged Protestants on giveaways, AU leaders took great pains to point out that Roman Catholic Church was the major beneficiary of giveaways. They made this very point when they were involved in the Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania controversy that had been one of the causes for rejection of AU at the 1964 Methodist General Conference. James Windham, head of the Chicago regional office in 1962, speaking from his experience with a similar controversy involving a Veteran's Administration hospital, stated:

The offering of government bargains to all churches can be a subtle trick to break down resistance while a prime recipient with ulterior motives moves in for the 'kill'. The bargains enjoyed by some Protestant churches for a season are now boomeranging to their embarrassment. If it is bad for one church to accept federal aid it is bad for all churches to accept it. Let Protestantism keep its hands clean.

More generally, an AU writer lamented in "Urban Takeover" that more often than not Protestants had approved of these transfers and "even fronted community committees" for them "all in a warm glow of brotherhood." These Protestants had not stopped to think what the implications of these programs meant for the cities, religious freedom, and American culture.

As indicated previously, birth control to the leaders of AU related not only to the sectarian medical code but also to the question of clerical control. Catholic clerics
through fighting birth control programs hoped to increase Catholics (since they could never become a majority through conversion). In this way, one day Catholics would be a majority of Americans and the church would then have full national public power.

But another way existed to increase Catholic population, through immigration. Lowell seemed to have been the most concerned with loopholes in immigration laws ever since he came onto the staff of AU, despite its minor importance. He worried about changes in the quota categories. He would not have allowed any immigration from countries without a birth control program. He saw Mexican immigration into the United States as a way for the American Catholic Church to deliberately increased its proportion of the American population. He stated, "It is as though they wanted to assure themselves a population problem for which they could find no solution except in immigration. Behind this reasoning was his fear that the church was making an "effort to break down immigration barriers and inundate our country with totalitarian-minded hordes." AU leaders found that American citizens from Southern Europe and Latin America possessed "foreign beliefs and mores" in regard to church-state questions that had weakened "patriotic" concern for separation. AU was America's instrument of liberty "stemming alien tides."
When Pope Paul VI restated his church's traditional stance on birth control in his encyclical, *Humanae Vitae*, AU leaders sought to get as much propaganda mileage out of it as possible because of the extreme adverse reaction to it among most Americans, including Catholics. They disseminated a translation of the Papal ban on birth control with their own comments that emphasized the challenge to Papal infallibility, the cleavage between Catholic laymen and clergy, and the disobedience of the ban by Catholics.

An earlier Church and State cartoon depicting Catholic policy on birth control epitomized AU's attitude. The Pope in full regalia held up an Eleventh Commandment, "No Birth Control," to six supplicants pleading for a reversal of the Papal ruling because of their poverty, starvation, and educational needs. Three of those pleaders came from Pakistan, Africa, and India, which were not Catholic countries or continents, but the Pope was nevertheless blamed for their problems. The caption to the cartoon read: "Please don't bother me with facts. My mind is made up." Birth control involved conscience and scriptural interpretation, and one would have thought AU would have shown some sympathy for the Roman Catholic position.

Tax-exemption in its various forms concerned AU in the 1960's. After the success of the Christian Brothers case, AU pursued a number of legal cases involving the church's "unrelated business income." The most important
tax-exemption lawsuit revolved around Walz v. Tax Commission (1970), in which the Supreme Court decided that places of worship should keep their tax-exempt status. Exemption did not amount to subsidy and did not constitute excessive entanglement and the purpose and effect did not promote religion. The tax-free exemption status, however, the Court said, was not a matter of right but a matter of Congressional discretion. Salisbury, as AU's general counsel, prepared a "friend of the court" brief supporting Walz in his suit to end tax exemptions for places of worship. Archer did not submit the brief. Later, he filed a brief against Walz and in favor of maintaining the tax-exemptions. At the same time, he took the opportunity to take a swipe at "secular and anti-church forces" bringing a "suit to tax the place of worship," a swipe aimed at pleasing part of AU's constituency.

Sorauft cited Walz as the only occasion on which AU found itself on the side of accommodationists in the courts. USCC filed a brief against Walz, favoring tax-exemption for houses of worship. The case was the most divisive one within and among AU, ACLU, and AJC, according to Sorauft. After long discussion and argument, AJC did not file a brief in the case, while the ACLU after much heated debate finally decided to favor Walz's position on ending the church's tax-exemption, with Pfeffer writing part of the brief. Within AU, quite a few representatives favored tax-exemption for houses
of worship. Despite this fact, AU had on a number of occasions challenged the churches of members of the Board and the NAC and favored the end of tax-exemption for income not directly related to primary mission of the church.

Sorauf also cited AU's position in *Walz* as one of the few examples he found of its less than absolutist position on separation. The tax-exemption issue, however, exemplified the difficulty of an absolute position on separation. Tax-exemption for church property used for religious purposes provided the churches with a special privilege, a governmental grant of aid, and a source of untaxed wealth. At the same time, to tax such property would intrude the state even further into church affairs. Either position tended toward establishment, as AU defined it.

AU's legal program grew along with the growth of the organization. Between 1948 and June 1966, AU had 39 major cases costing more than $2,000 or considerable time and activity; 128 minor cases; and about 1570 legal aid responses. From 1967 to January, 1973, AU either sponsored or contributed substantial financial aid in at least 32 major cases.

Sorauf compared the participation of AU, ACLU, and AJC in his 67 cases in three time periods. Between 1951-1957, AU participated in 6 of 11 cases or 54.5% of the total cases. Between 1958-1964, AU took part in 9 of 22 cases or 40.9%, while in the period 1965-1971 AU participated in 15 of 34
cases or 44.1%. Overall, AU had a share in 30 of the 67 cases or 44.8%, the same percentage as ACLU while, AJC participated in 22 cases or 32.8%. AU's cases tended, in comparison with the other two legal groups, to originate in other than the large urban centers.

The ability to win the cases AU participated in was of even more significance. The overall percentage of victories for all separationist plaintiffs at the appellate level was 48.2%, according to Sorauf. Separationist wins increased slightly when either AU, ACLU, and AJC were involved. The increase was due to the outstanding record of AJC, winning 65% of its cases at the appellate level. In comparison, ACLU won 51.9% while AU won only 44.4%, less than the average for all separationist plaintiffs.

The above figures indicated a number of things about AU. AU participated in an impressive portion of church-state cases, a portion that would increase considerably if only religious establishment cases were counted. While AU's legal program and cases never reached the size of ACLU, the activity of both institutions in the church-state field were comparable. In terms of quality, the relatively fewer number of successes tended to confirm the criticism of the poor quality of AU's legal work, although the quality was not as bad as criticism would lead one to believe. Also, Archer desired to have a number of cases underway at any one time for his own internal support and for propaganda.
He constantly strove to show others AU's value and indispensability, using the image of ubiquity created by public relations. Quite clearly, AU did not place as high value upon winning its legal cases as did the AJC or the ACLU. Archer's approach was a multi-dimensional one, emphasizing education, propaganda, political pressure, and court suits. If AJC or the ACLU were critical of AU's—and Archer's—legal tactics, it must be understood that the legal effectiveness of AU resulted quite directly from the organization and general approach that Mr. Archer deliberately developed.

AU's figures told a different story from Sorauf. As of May, 1964, AU had participated in 300 legal negotiations and actions, a figure which doubled by 1969. Settembrini claimed in 1972 that AU had won 137 court cases or 94% of its suits. He did not indicate how he arrived at these figures. Also, Archer claimed to have prevented over $100 million from going to church institutions by January, 1965. The figure reached $3 billion by 1972. Once again, AU leaders did not cite what actions stopped the flow of these funds.

AU continued its concern for Catholic propaganda. AU drew attention to what Catholic parochial schools taught despite objection from a number of Protestants that such concern was none of AU's business and, in fact, bigoted. AU was extremely sensitive to public school textbooks it
thought favored Catholicism and slighted Protestantism, especially in the interpretation of the Protestant Reformation.

On a larger scale, AU leaders found unconscionable the fact that the Vatican subsidiary Societa Generale Immobiliare of Rome had been permitted in the early '60s to participate in the building of Watergate Towne in Washington, D.C. AU cited the participation as part of a giveaway-takeover and as an "unsurpassed example of sectarian power and arrogance in D.C." Despite the fact that Watergate Towne had no identifiable Catholic markings, AU persisted in claiming foreign ownership and pressure to ease the building restrictions so it could rise to 130 feet. Why? On future picture postcards of the "free world's capital" the skyline will be "dominated by a monument to a clerical system which, unrestrained, has crushed freedom in other lands." The supposedly Catholic monument towered above the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials and was located along the approach to Arlington National Cemetery.

This perennial theme of the loss of the symbols of the nation to Catholicism surfaced as well in regard to postage stamps. To AU leaders nothing to the Catholic propagandist's mind was too innocuous or too insignificant to use to change the basic structure and values of the United States. Everything must be watched; everything was threatened. AU had long been concerned with the issuance of sectarian
postage stamps, at least since its protest of the 1954
stamp with "In God We Trust" upon it. Beginning with the
Kennedy Administration, Cogdell found a partial official
establishment of religion in the Post Office Department,
citing the Salvation Army stamp as the entering wedge for a
precedent to honor other churches meeting with governmental
favor. He said that the Post Office had no constitutional
right to issue religious stamps because the wall of separa-
tion had separated the private realm of religion from the
public realm of government.

AU's 1967 lawsuit against the Post Office sought to en-
join the issuance of stamps with religious symbols cele-
brating Christmas as a religious holiday. While the suit
was not successful, the Post Office stopped printing the
stamp. AU's propaganda accompanying the suit set forth
the threat represented by such postage stamps. Cogdell
wrote:

Postage stamps are a particularly subtle vehicle
for propaganda and unobtrusive indoctrination. By
words and pictures placed on stamps, ideas can be
conveyed on private mail received uncritically in-
to every home, on letters which are kept for gen-
erations. The little pictorial message upon an
envelope, seemingly so harmless, so innocent, can
plant a religious concept in the subconscious mind
and can help to create a tolerance for or an ad-
vocacy of a particular viewpoint in the beholder's
mind without his being aware of it. ....

A nation can be changed if its religious symbols
and if the ground rules governing its basic social
and spiritual relationships are changed. No better
way could be found to gradually, almost impercept-
ibly, alter these fundamentals than through postage
stamps, which are used in the intimacy and familiar-
ity of the private mail of every citizen.
America's religious symbols as well as her ground rules were changing, in AU leaders' opinion. AU's attention to symbolic changes in various areas reflected the leaders fear that the America they knew as symbolically reflecting Protestant values was subtly being transformed into a country governed by Catholic principles. A social and spiritual change was occurring in the way Americans lived and worshipped.

This juncture of change and ideology made the link between ancestors and the leaders of AU all the more necessary. The children must re-enact the heroism of the fathers through a return to values of the past. As Archer, who retired in 1973 after 25 years as head of AU but who continued to serve until a successor could be found, stated in 1974:

"The national whose forebears braved uncharted seas, offered and gave their lives for our heritage, will find among us, their children, the will, the determination, the sacrifice, the suffering necessary to stem the storm tides of our day. We have a heritage of keep." That heritage was the American culture of liberty.

CONCLUSION

In general, AU had played a significant and, at times, decisive role in keeping the money line of separation. The money line had been broken through indirect aid at the federal and state levels, and expansion of this form of aid in auxiliary services and church-related college the Supreme
Court approved. The Court, however, made clear that that was far as it would permit aid to go. AU leaders had relatively small influence on the legislatures of the countries, at least directly. The indirect influence may at times have been considerable. One must also remember that despite the number of parochial aid programs that passed most of them did not pass through the state legislatures. AU leaders and resources played vital roles in referenda and in court challenges. AU leaders halted a substantial number of programs to aid church institutions. Despite this prevention of funds going to churches, the amount of aid going to church institutions increased substantially during the 1960's. Nevertheless, most indicators pointed to the fact that beyond the indirect aid mentioned above the majority of Protestants and Americans supported the separationist money line position of AU leaders.

One of the most significant changes in the separationist field in these years was the increased entrance of organizations on the battlelines in support of separation. While continuing to depend on its access to the churches, AU allied themselves with these groups and came increasing to depend on them for the major work in particular campaigns. The allies were essential because of the growing number of allies among accommodationists, although the support for their position among Americans in general had not appreciably increased. Moreover, these allies, unlike AU's church support, were
mainly liberal and secular organizations, whose members were generally supporters of the Democratic Party. Clearly, parochial split supporters of the Democratic Party. AU leaders broadened their support among these groups as they took a consistently separationist position, one that challenged Protestant as well as Catholic violations of separation. AU's support seemed to be strongest among issue-oriented individuals and groups on the farther ends of the political and theological spectrum. Nevertheless, AU received considerable support from those more centrally located on the spectrum. At the same time, AU retained its identity as a conservative organization and remained a voice for the culture of liberty. Over the years, that culture of liberty had lost support among Protestants, while AU leaders moved to a more inclusive and consistent position that more fully conformed to the premises of that culture of liberty.
CHAPTER IX: FOOTNOTES


10. "Confidential Report of Legal Department...," February


16. Ibid. The Horace Mann League chose Annapolis and Anne Arundel County for its suit because there were no Roman Catholic judges, good reporting by newspapers and the reporters were good, and because it would be away from Baltimore where there had been a controversy over a suit filed by the atheist

17. Lowell, Church-State Fraud, pp. 94-95. See also C. Stanley Lowell, The Church College: Perils of Government Aid, pamphlet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, n.d.) in AU files.


22. Ibid.


26. Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, pp. 109-110. According to Pfeffer, each church-related college case must be decided individually because of the differences in degree of sectarianism. On the other hand, parochial schools were permeated by religious influence and thus differed little. Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 292-297.


28. Lowell, The Great Church-State Fraud, pp. 96-97 & 139-140; C. Stanley Lowell, "Analysis of the June 28,1971 Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court," to Board of Trustees, n.p., September 14, 1971, especially pp. 4-7, in AU files; and Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary,


39. Ibid., pp. 5-6.


48. Commission on Law and Social Action, American Jewish Congress, LITIGATION DOCKET OF PENDING CASES AFFECTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, No. 12, New York City, New York, January 1, 1971, pp. 1 & 11,


50. Edd Doerr, The Parochiaid Bomb, pamphlet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, 1970, p. 3 in AU files.


55. Adolph, Statement, November 15, 1961, p. 1 and Duling to Lowell, November 9, 1961, pp. 2-3; Paul Duling, Regional


57. Ibid., p. 5 and CSL Memo to GLA, JCM, JF October 12, 1961, p. 1 in AU files.


64. Duling to Lowell, November 9, 1961, pp. 1-3.


66. Ibid., and Duling to Lowell, November 9, 1961, pp. 1-3.


PLEASE NOTE:

This page not included in material received from the Graduate School. Filmed as received.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS


70. Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict, pp. 115-116
    Pfeffer, "Constitutional Confrontation in New York State."


    (June, 1967), p. 8, (July-August, 1967), pp. 21-23, (September,


74. Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict, p. 119 and

75. Doerr, ibid., pp. xvii and 75.

76. Ibid., p. 38.

77. Ibid., pp. xv, 32-33, and 148-169.


79. Church and State (October, 1970), pp. 14-16 and (December,
    1967), p. 24 and Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution,
    pp. 241-244.

80. Harold F. Hamilton, Director of New York State Federation
    of CEF, "Statement of Citizens for Educational Freedom to the
    Bill of Rights and Suffrage Committee of the New York State
    Constitutional Convention at the City Council Chamber, City
    Hall, New York City, on June 7, 1967," CEF, pp. 1-5 in AU
    files. See also Reverend Virgil C. Blum, S.J., "Church and
    State--The Wall of Separation is Crumbling," Our Sunday
    Visitor, October 2, 1966, pp. 4-5 and "JFK and Freedom in
    Education," Our Sunday Visitor (The National Catholic Ecumenical


88. AU, ibid., pp. 1-4 and Church and State (July-August, 1968), pp. 11-12.


91. Ibid.


93. Sorauer, The Wall of Separation, pp. 308-310; Lowell, The Great Church-State Fraud, pp. 64-65; and "Tax Aid to Parochial Schools," prepared by AU research staff, compiled
as of October 1, 1970, pp. 4-5, xerox copy in AU files. Church and State (June, 1967), pp. 4-5.


95. Lowell, ibid., pp. 2-3; VOTE AGAINST AMENDMENT 12 NOV. 3, leaflet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, (1970)) and VOTE 'NO' ON AMENDMENT 12***Here's Why (Silver Spring, Md.: AU (1970)), 2 pp. mimeographed sheets, both in AU files.


100. Ibid., pp. 1 & 10-11.

101. Ibid., pp. 1 & 8; Lowell, "A Report to the National Advisory Council," February 3, 1971, p. 3; VOTE YES ON 'C' NOV. 3, leaflet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, (1970)), in AU


organization, which spent $600 as against opponents’ $300,000. The amendment and parochial aid lost. AU leaders also worked in Illinois and Virginia Constitutional Conventions in 1970, both of which did not approve any constitutional changes. Other states where AU was active in 1970 was Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, California, and Louisiana. Church and State (September, 1970), p. 20 and (December, 1970), pp. 12-14.


106. Author's interview with Menendez, July 2, 1973.


111. Doerr, Parochial in the Court Today, p. 4.

112. AU, "Tax Aid to Parochial Schools," pp. 1-5.


118. AU, WAKE UP AMERICA! ALL ABOUT STATE AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS, leaflet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, n.d.); TAX SUPPORT for parochial schools? RAPID FIRE ANSWERS TO LOADED QUES- TIONS, leaflet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, n.d.); "PAROCHIAL AND WHY NOT PAROCHIAL?," AND "QUESTIONS FOR THOSE WHO ADVOW- CATE PAROCHIAL AND HOW PAROCHIAL WORKS," AU, mimeographed sheets in AU files; C. Stanley Lowell, The Perils of Tax Credits, pamphlet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU (1972?)), all of the above are in AU files.

119. Harriet Phillips, Chairman of Citizens to Advance Public Education (CAPE) and Former Vice Chairman of the Michigan Democratic Party, n.t., address at 22nd National Conference on Church and State, Detroit, Michigan, on February 9, 1970, Church/State News Service, in AU files.


121. Morgan, "Backs to the Wall," p. 310.


140. AU, MARYLAND'S 1972 PAROCHIAID REFERENDUM: WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT, leaflet (Silver Spring, Md: AU, (1972)), pp. 1-4 and VOTE AGAINST REFERENDUM QUESTION 18 on Nov. 7, leaflet (Silver Spring, Maryland: AU, (1972)), pp. 1-2; Vote Against Referendum Question 18 on November 7, leaflet (Hyattsville, Md: Maryland Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PEARL), (1972)), all in AU files.


142. Ibid., and author's interview with Menendez, July 2, 1973.

143. Gioele Settembrini, "Free Men in a Free Country (Draft)," address given in Maryland, November, 1972, pp. 9-10 in AU files. Author's interview with Menendez, July 2, 1973.

144. Church and State (July-August, 1973), p. 11.


149. Ibid., pp. 82 & 223.

150. Ibid., pp. 53-55.


153. Ibid.

154. Ibid., 82-84; Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict, p. 115; and "Minutes of the Executive Committee of
Board of Trustees," at Washington, D.C., on September 2, 1966, pp. 2-3 in AU files.


163. Ibid., pp. 122 & 126.

164. Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 84.

165. Ibid., pp. 84-85 and see AU, The Supreme Court Decision on Parochial Aid, June 28, 1971.


171. Sorauf, ibid., pp. 68-70.

172. AJC, LITIGATION DOCKET..., No. 15, July 1, 1972, pp. 9, 19, 20, 24, 29, 51, 58, 71, and 93.


177. Ibid., No. 15, July 1, 1972, p. 24.


179. Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary, Department of HEW, Memorandum, Subject: Some Tentative Conclusions Concerning the Impact of the Church/State Cases Decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 1971, July 21, 1971, pp. 2-4.

180. Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, pp. 82-83.


182. AJC, LITIGATION DOCKET..., No. 12, January 1, 1971, pp. 34-37.


185. Ibid., p.18.

186. Ibid., p. 7.

187. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

188. Ibid., Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, pp. 1-17.


190. Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 24. Everson had enunciated a strong separationist position while permitting bus transportation; Zorach (1952) permitted accommodation on the matter of released time after the opposite opinion in McCollum in 1948; Flast was accompanied by Allen; and Lemon was accompanied by Tilton. Schempp, Murray, Walz, and 1973 decisions do not follow this pattern.

191. Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, pp. 327-328; Andrew M. Greeley, "Catholic Schools are Committing Suicide," New York Times, October 21, 1973, Section 6, pp. 40-65. According to Pfeffer, the American Catholic Church is not accepted by the American people as an open participant in the political process. Legislators, however, accept it as another self-interested interest group. Also, the Court accepts it as an ideological interest group but not as a self-interested interest group, i.e. aid to Catholic schools. Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 58 & 62 and see 281-282.


196. AJC, LITIGATION DOCKET..., No. 12, January 1, 1971,


198. Ibid., pp. 12 & 365.


200. AJC, Ibid., pp. 33-35.


204. Ibid.


Church and State (January, 1972, p. 7 mentioned the formation of Council of American Private Education(CAPE) in November, 1971 with the same organizations, plus National Catholic Education Association and National Association of Episcopal Schools, as made up CREDIT. It is not possible to say whether they were associated, although it seems likely, nor whether CREDIT is an outgrowth or a new name for CAPE.


of the constitutions and laws would "not permanently set themselves against the people." With this view, it was imperative to create public opinion in Congress, legislatures, and the courts for "above all, it is a battle for the mind of the people." How that battle went, so the battle in the courts would go and AU's legal tactics followed this type of assessment.

229. Lowell explained AU's weakened condition and need for allies in this way: A minister called on a very sick man and asked him, "Do you renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil." The man replied, "No, sir, in my condition I can't afford to antagonize anybody." Author's interview with Lowell, July 2, 1973.


233. Author's interview with Menendez, July 2, 1973.


235. See for example, Church and State (February, 1973), pp. 7-9; Doerr, "Public Funds and NonPublic Schools," April 2, 1973, p. 2; and AU, WAKE UP AMERICA!, pp. 1-2.


237. Doerr, "Public Funds and NonPublic Schools," April 2, 1973, p. 2; AU, WAKE UP AMERICA!, p. 2; AU, Tax Support for parochial schools?..., p. 1; and AU, TAX SUPPORT FOR PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: WHAT IT WILL COST YOU, leaflet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, n.d.), p. 6 in AU files.


239. See footnote 237.


246. See for example AU, VOTE AGAINST REFERENDUM QUESTION 18 on Nov. 7 pamphlet (Silver Spring, Md.: AU, (1972)), pp. 2-3, in AU files.


250. Ibid., pp. 1-9.

251. AU, TAX SUPPORT for parochial schools?..., p. 1; AU, Wake Up America!, p. 2.


255. Author's interview with Menendez, July 2, 1973.


262. Church and State (April, 1973), pp. 9-10. The Decree on Religious Liberty of Vatican II explicitly excluded freedom of Catholic conscience in relation to church authority. The right to freedom of conscience was limited to the church's right to freedom in society. Smith, Religious Liberty in the United States, p. 242.


268. POAU, Urban Take-Over, p. 6 and "Report of the National Study Commission on Urban Problems of Americans United for Separation of Church and State to Board of Trustees," AU, n.p., 1972, pp. 1, 6-8, in AU files.


271. POAU, Studies in Church-State Relations, p. 45.


274. AU, ibid., p. 27; Cogley, Catholic America, pp. 130-132; and Church and State (January 1961), p. 7.

275. Ibid.


285. Ibid., pp. 126-128.


288. Ibid., and Archer to Corson, January 6, 1965, p. 1. In 1963, AU claimed to have saved the American taxpayer at least $148 million. The calculation included the saving of $4 million through the case of the Christian Brothers; $3 million through the Missouri captive school cases; $6 million through the New Mexico-Dixon case; and $30 million a year through the defeat of the New York Amendment 6.


292. Gaston D. Cogdell, Politics, Religion and the Post


CHAPTER X
CULTURE OF LIBERTY

Profound changes in developing American values and lifestyles were mainly responsible for the formation in 1947 of Americans United. The history of AU over twenty-five years, until 1973, is again a story of further challenges to the "culture of liberty" as perceived by AU leaders. They vigorously defended the values of the culture in the legislatures, in the courts, and in the court of public opinion. They contended with long-term and more recent changes within Protestantism that in their opinion adversely affected the meaning of separation of church and state and religious liberty. They also struggled with the transition in status and power between Catholics and Protestants. Most importantly, AU leaders fought against public aid to church institutions, working "to break the accommodationists' grip on so much of public policy in the country."¹ Strategy and tactics changed as financial support patterns, climate of opinion, and influence changed.

LONG-TERM TRENDS: VOLUNTARISTS AND INSTITUTIONALISTS

In retrospect, long-term trends within Protestantism adversely affected the work of the leaders of AU.
These changes were bureaucratization, diversification, homogenization, and secularization. The combined results of these changes created a new situation beginning in the '50s within which AU leaders had to work. Protestants supporting those changes increasingly favored cultural pluralism and, in the latter '50s and early '60s, Protestant-Catholic ecumenism.

The growth of denominational and interdenominational bureaucracies, especially among mainline denominations such as Congregationalists and Presbyterians, was one such change. As a result of ecclesiastical mergers and other social and economic facts of bureaucratization, cartelization occurred among the above denominations. Competition between a small number of large denominations replaced competition between a larger number of smaller denominations. Moreover, competition characteristic of a free market situation received less emphasis among these denominational bureaucracies than did cooperation. Winthrop Hudson has called this aspect of Protestantism which emphasized denominational cooperation instead of denominational competition "cooperative Protestantism."

These denominational bureaucracies drew their funds from the swelling investment funds of the denominations. In this situation, the bureaucrats found themselves relatively free to pursue interests of their own. One result was division between the interests of local congregations, local
pastors, and laity and those of clerical bureaucrats who staffed the various agencies. These bureaucrats or institutionalists, instead, found it much easier to cooperate with their opposite number in other denominations, including those in the American Catholic Church, than with the lower echelons in their own denomination. One major consequence of the bureaucratic independence and the emphasis on cooperation was the development during the later '50s and '60s of "ecumenicity from above." Bureaucratic support for ecumenical activities between Protestants and Catholics increasingly brought conflict and division between the bureaucrats of the denominations and the denominational laity.

Another development was that mainline denominations increasingly relied on their bureaucracies and on interdenominational agencies like the NCC instead of on voluntary agencies. In the 19th century, the above denominations relied on voluntary agencies for cooperative endeavors. Unlike voluntary societies, denominational bureaucracies, official boards, and the NCC were under the control of the denominations. Denominations conducted their own studies and took positions on such issues as separation of church and state instead of relying on and working through voluntary societies like AU.

In four general areas, AU leaders, as voluntarists, disputed with the institutionalists. One area was how Protestant interests in separation could best be represented.
AU leaders argued denominational and interdenominational studies and positions did little to solve the problems of separation and lead to inaction. Even if denominations did not have direct control over AU, AU provided interdenominational cooperation, a semblance of unity on separation questions, and, most importantly, action.

Secondly, AU and the institutionalists contended with each other at the local and bureaucratic levels over money. Institutionalists on occasion intervened at the congregational level to try to prevent a church of their denomination from putting AU in its yearly budget. More frequently, institutionalists tried to prevent appropriation of funds from going to AU from agencies of national church bodies over which they had control. Bureaucratic jealousy and infighting in the denominations characterized the relations between the institutionalists and AU leaders.

Another area involved POAU's raising of what the institutionalists regarded as divisive issues, e.g., strict separation and the power of the American Roman Catholic Church. Institutionalists in general did not favor strict separation, believing much more than AU leaders in cooperation between church institutions and government. AU leaders shouted too loudly and were too sectarian to suit the institutionalists, who preferred cooperative solutions without much public fuss. Moreover, AU leaders, in raising these issues discussed them in terms of the virtues of a large number of
smaller churches close to the people. AU leaders frequently pointed to the problems of bigness, bureaucracies, institutional networks, and alienation from "people in the pews." In the division between the institutionalists and the laity in the denominations, AU leaders took the side of the grassroots.

Lastly, the voluntarists of AU opposed the tendency of institutionalists to support the idea of cultural pluralism that developed increasing support during the '50s. When these institutionalists later supported ecumenical activities between Catholics and Protestants, AU leaders' opposition increased and relations between AU leaders and the institutionalist deteriorated. Subsequently, when the institutionalists favored a degree of government aid for church institutions, AU leaders vociferously condemned them for their position. They became a prime Protestant target of AU leaders. Most of these institutionalists tended to be liberal or neo-orthodox (or neo-conservative) and to come from the mainline denominations. But institutionalists in denominations outside of cooperative Protestantism also leaned toward aid to church institutions and less than strict separation. This institutionalist position, also, grew in denominations from which AU drew much of its support.

The growth of diversity within Protestantism in the 20th century was a second important long-term change affecting AU's work. Denominations lacked internal agreement and
consequently denominational governing bodies carried little weight because of the sharp differences of opinion between the clergy and laity. The rapid growth of fundamentalism and evangelicism at the local levels also contributed to this diversity. Most importantly, according to Hudson, diversity resulted from the loss of theological or doctrinal content which led to a lack of a cohesive, normative tradition that had previously united Protestantism. This secularization of religion was especially prominent among the mainline denominations. The loss of a common Protestant consciousness and a uniting theological tradition brought in its train the ideas that no concerted action was needed or possible and that no organization could speak or act for Protestantism or apply Protestant beliefs. There were no beliefs, peculiar to Protestantism, to which a majority of Protestants adhered. Nor did the NCC represent such an instrument since it was weakest in areas where Protestants are strongest and since it did not think of itself as an instrument of ideological or theological unity. Ecumenism of the NCC had turned the institution into a non-Protestant body.

The consequence of this diversity for AU leaders in garnering support can be seen when this diversity is compared to the context in which the Anti-Saloon League of America operated in the early years of this century. The leaders of the League conceived of themselves as the arm
of the Protestant Church in the area of the destruction of saloons and the drinking problems in the United States. Their appeals and political action rested on common Protestant convictions and a degree of unity that was lacking in Protestantism in the 1950's. While separation of church and state did seem to have the support of most Protestants, AU could not depend on the degree of unity and cohesive support that the Anti-Saloon League enjoyed. The diversity within Protestantism produced a diversity of views on separation.

The two other long-term changes, secularization and homogenization, were interrelated. The growth of secularized religion without theological content tended to blur denominational differences. This secular religion was especially prominent in the mainline denominations resulting in what Peter Berger called "product standardization." Since these denominations became interchangeable, the importance of packaging and of marginal differentiation increased.

During the '50s, the homogenizers carried on a successful propaganda campaign which changed the context within which AU leaders had to operate. Part of the apparent religious revival among the general American population, what the homogenizers promoted, has been called a number of names: religion in general, faith in faith, utilitarian and sentimental piety, belief in belief. The homogenizers argued that one religion was as good as another because all were
leading to the same place, consequently it made little difference what one believed so long as one believed. To raise issues that divided Americans, such as AU leaders did with their advocacy of separation, seemed to homogenizers to be impudent. A billboard and newspaper slogan summarized this stance: "Go to the Church of Your Choice, but GO TO CHURCH," The result of the campaign was the de facto establishment of religion.

AU leaders had to contend with the effect on separation of the growing importance of belief in religion because it was religion. It was no longer enough that separation was generally favorable to religion and religious freedom. Separation must now support and aid religion in general. Since religion was good no matter what form it took, governmental financial aid to all churches equally could not be bad. The emphasis on conformity and the need to avoid controversial issues reinforced the problems AU leaders had with denominational bureaucratic leaders. A Protestant minister who believed his ministry was to all people of a community since his church was a "community church" would not wish to tackle issues that concerned AU leaders.

The relentless propaganda campaign to identify religion with the American way of life had a great impact. As Martin E. Marty put it, religion became the handmaiden of democracy. Democracy became the fourth American faith alongside of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism.
There was nothing new in the identification of the American way of life and religion. What was new, beside the national character of the identification, was the broadness and scope of the identification. The three major faiths were assimilated and molded by what has been called the American civil religion. Instead of Protestantism or Protestant values providing the basis of identification, religion in general provided the unity. In other words, the Protestant cultural establishment was being replaced by an amorphous religious establishment but in the process of course being secularized.

Also, Catholicism and Judaism began to share the national spotlight with Protestantism for guarding America's religious life. The idea of cultural pluralism whereby the three major faiths were ranked equal in status began to emerge at this time. The diversity promoted by the concept rested on the broad de facto establishment of religion.

Out of this milieu of cultural pluralism, establishment of religion, homogeneity, doctrinal de-emphasis and secularized religion, and bureaucratization grew the ecumenical movement. The ecumenical movement, begun in the latter '50s between Protestants and Catholics, worked to legitimize cultural pluralism, while promoting homogeneity of the three faiths, although their important differences were taken into account. Within this context, separation insofar as it meant no government funds to church institutions came under attack.
To its credit, AU leaders correctly assessed the reasons for the changing environment within which it had to work. AU leaders fought this milieu and its new values with increasing vociferousness and action. They also fought with a rising sense of despair, for the developments undermining their viewpoints were not merely institutional but cultural in nature. The absoluteness of AU's position on separation gave it little positional flexibility in confronting these changes. As its popular base of support eroded, AU turned increasingly to the courts for assistance. The courts, as Archer himself realized, could not be counted upon in the long run to support positions at variance with the popular will. The new constituencies of AU in the 1960's and 1970's, however, suggested that there was still much potential in America for separation of church and state.

PIETISTS AND LITURGICALS

Who were the supporters of Americans United and how shall we understand their value systems? One model seems to provide an explanation for the orientation. This model also helps to account for the political divisions within society over separation of church and state and governmental aid to church institutions, especially to church schools. Studies of voting behavior in the Midwest in the latter half of the 19th century by Paul Kleppner and Richard Jensen have found that religious identity more than class, ethnicity, or cultural background tended to determine political preferences
in particular circumstances. These scholars found two differing religious perspectives to be correlated with political divisions and conflict and, implicitly, life style. These religious perspectives cut across denominational lines and doctrine or theology. Each orientation provided a framework, a way of being, and values as a result of religious upbringing and affiliation.

The liturgical or ritualistic perspective emphasized the values of "right belief." Liturgicals stressed creed and doctrinal loyalty as well as rituals. The institutional formalities, traditions, and community held far more value for them than did the emotional quality of the religious experience or of revivalist activities, to which they were generally hostile. Ritualists believed that their denomination was the one true church and that the church, not the state, should determine public morality. Moreover, voluntary agencies for moral and social ends that were not part of church structure were opposed by officials of liturgical churches because such agencies were not under control of church officials.

Roman Catholics, Episcopalians, and German Lutherans were the major denominations in which this liturgical outlook predominated, although they were far from the only ones with such an outlook. Each of the above denominations developed parochial schools and seminaries, particular Roman Catholics, who were faced with hostile pietistic attitudes
toward Catholics. Catholic schools were constructed less to educate than to inculcate Catholic children in Catholic teaching and to propagate the Catholic faith. In the 19th century, disputes over these parochial schools were bitter.

The pietistic outlook viewed "right conduct" or behavior as being most important, rejecting ritualism. Pietists de-emphasized institutional experiences of faith, the importance of creeds, and denominational differences. Central to pietism was salvation through conversion, or change of heart, through direct contact with Christ. They stressed evangelism through revivals, proof of good works, individual salvation, and personal piety. Faith was a personal and ardent commitment that showed up in both conduct and social responsibility.

Pietists were, generally, but not solely, Methodists, Baptists, Scandinavian Lutherans, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians. Their staunch support of the common school system reflected their desire to inculcate children, especially foreign and Catholic, in Christian, meaning Protestant, and American values. Pietists sought moral and social aims through individual behavior and voluntary agencies. Pietists sought an end to parochial schools and an end to saloons, favored religion in the schools, and worked for the enactment of Sunday closing laws. When moral suasion failed, they, if possible, used the powers of government to enforce their values. Separation of church and state was
not defined to preclude such possibilities. Government, pietists believed, should sanction their values, thereby denying such sanction or public legitimacy to liturgical values.

The distinction between liturgicals and pietists provides an explanation for the conflicts over separation and religious liberty. As pietists, AU leaders emphasized the freedom of the state from the church and of education from church control. Liturgicals stressed the freedom of the church and therefore its communicants from the state and of state control over education, but they welcomed state support under their own control. AU leaders feared institutional religion and the church in politics, which threatened to ignite sectarian conflict in the civil arena. Liturgicals were apprehensive over the lack of religion in the form of the church in public life, especially in the public schools. Liturgicals tended to be members of churches which had a history of establishment. AU leaders came from churches which had not been established.

Whether the denomination had developed its own school system was an important variable in distinguishing the two outlooks. The correlation between having church schools and favoring parochial aid, however, was not one to one. The Episcopal Church, which was increasingly "Catholic" in its outlook, favored free bus transportation and textbook after 1964 but did not favor other forms of parochial aid.
Seventh Day Adventists, on the other hand, supported AU strongly and had its own schools but did not favor parochial aid. Evangelicals, who supported the Christian day school movement, moved somewhat closer in the early '70s toward parochial aid. Pietists gave a much stricter and more absolute interpretation to separation, one that emphasized the threat to society when the church as an institution entered politics for self-interested aid, than did the liturgicals.

Important changes had occurred between the latter 19th century and mid-20th century in the relationship between Pietists and Liturgicals. In some instances, these changes caused the two groups to modify their outlooks, or at least to modify the ways they accomplished their goals. Unlike earlier pietists, AU leaders did not seek to control the government to impose their value system on liturgicals. Instead, like liturgicals in the 19th and early 20th centuries, AU leaders used a "personal liberty ideology" to oppose governmental actions that would sanction the norms of the competing perspective, i.e. liturgical demands for parochial aid. AU leaders used separation to prevent government sanction for liturgical standards, believing such sanction was the first step toward complete domination of the country by ritualists. Earlier ritualists had cried out against pietistic domination. AU leaders, in turn, did not use separation in order to impose pietistic values through governmental actions, although separation favored those
pietistic virtues.

In other words, while the two outlooks persisted, they changed because the relative position of liturgicals and pietists changed in American society in religion and politics. The relative power between the two groups was an important variable tending to determine how those outlooks were carried out. Liturgicals tended to be Democrats, and the New Deal changed their conception of the role of government from a negative to a positive one. No longer fearful of state interference, they would use the government for their own ends. Pietists tended to be Republican and began to emphasize freedom from government. Catholics grew enormously in numbers, economic status, respectability, and their ability to influence and determine public policy. Lutheranism grew in influence within Protestantism and, between 1850 and 1958, grew 48 times to become the third largest Protestant denomination in America. Moreover, the Missouri Synod, Lutheran Church, which historically had been strongly anti-Catholic, joined Catholics in parochial coalitions. Dutch Reformed and Orthodox Judaism (in 1964), both of which were predominately liturgical religious groups, joined Catholics and German Lutherans in favoring government aid to religious schools.

Pietists by the 1940's had for a number of reasons lost the self-confidence and ability to reform the society in the way they had done in the 19th century. The power of
Protestantism over the public life of Americans had been greatly diminished by the mid-20th century. AU leaders did not call for continued cultural establishment of Protestantism but, much like the liturgicals in the 19th century, were defensive, believing that the aggressive opponents aimed to eliminate their value system. Pietists like the Seventh Day Adventists and Christian Scientists gave staunch support to AU. Evangelicals, who grew rapidly in the 20th century, provided AU's most loyal support.

Three important changes in the 1960's related to the liturgical-pietist distinction. Protestant ecumenists and denominational bureaucrats tended to favor public aid to church institutions more than those who were not in these two categories. As explained earlier, these ecumenists and bureaucrats were identified as institutionalists as opposed to voluntarists. At this point, one cannot say whether there was an association between institutionalists and liturgicals. That is, research needs to be done on whether ecumenists tended to come from the liturgical parts of Protestant denominations. And did denominational bureaucrats tend to favor aid because of their position in the bureaucracy or because they came from more liturgical backgrounds than those bureaucrats who did not favor aid? Or did denominational bureaucrats favor aid because of the secularization of outlook? Did bureaucratization reorient the pietistic outlook toward a liturgical or even a
secularist outlook or did it merely change the techniques by which pietism was carried out? Did the de-ritualization of the American Catholic Church, represented by Vatican II and subsequent changes, cause a fundamental change in liturgical outlook?

The second change occurred in the post-1968 period, with the passage of parochial aid laws. Jensen found that one quarter of the population of the Midwest he studied could not be categorized as liturgical or pietist. As a result of the secularization of American culture, the category in all likelihood grew considerably by the 1960's. As the flow of funds increased after 1968, individuals and groups from this category increasingly became involved in the political conflicts over separation. The ACLU, most of whose members were secularists, joined AU and AJC in the separation arena after 1968, where before the national ACLU leaders had only been intermittently concerned with separation questions. The NAACP, whose membership consisted of people with a pietistic background, joined with those opposed to parochial aid because of the NAACP's opposition to aid to schools who sought to avoid integration. AU relations with various educational groups seemed to have been very strong as public educators entered the battlefield against parochial. Unitarian-Universalists and Ethical Culturalists, which had its own schools, also increased their support of AU, even though both groups had participated in the founding of AU and some
of the earlier struggles of AU. Increasingly, secularists entered AU ranks and AU reflected this change in their rhetoric and in their alliances.

In one sense, the conflict between the separationist coalitions and the accommodationist coalitions in the late '60s and early '70s represented disputes between factions of the New Deal coalition. Liturgicals, like the Catholics, were joined by officials and associations of private schools who wished aid to avoid integration. This fact tended to water down southern support for strict separation. Pietists and secularists who were part of the Democratic Party were a substantial part of the separationist coalitions. While Republicans tend to be more strongly pietistic than Democrats and thus more separationist, the support for separation at the money line in regard to parochial schools among Democrats was strong.

One result of increased secularist support within AU was the cooling of some evangelicals toward AU, although evangelicals seemed to remain the backbone of AU supporters. AU lost much fundamentalist support for its opposition to amending the Constitution and support for the 1962 and 1963 Supreme Court decisions. Fear of secularism by evangelicals was the key to the growing distance between AU leaders and some evangelicals. A number of evangelicals also changed their position in regard to aid to church schools. In other words, the alliance, or mutual compatibility, between the
evangelical and the rationalist or Jeffersonian version of separation, which existed for 200 years, had begun to develop cracks.

Secularism was a third change and a key variable in the relation between pietists and ritualists. More fundamentalist evangelicals and liturgicals stood together in their fervent opposition to secularism, a fact that tended to mitigate other divisive factors. They wanted religion supported by government, stressing the cooperative tradition between church and state, accomodations to religion, acknowledgments of the spiritual committments of the American people in their institutions, especially in the public schools. For liturgicals, the diversity promoted by cultural pluralism did not include secularism.

AU leaders were far less theologically oriented than earlier pietists. Their appeals were less to theological commitment to the Protestant faith than to a more inclusive, civil and secular form of separation that was compatible with their pietistic outlook. How much secularism affected and changed pietism needs further study. Also needing further study is the affect of fundamentalism on pietism and the pietistic outlook and the important cleavages among pietists.

**CLIMATE OF OPINION AND EDUCATION**

The meaning of separation, whether strict or permissive of parochial aid, depended in large measure on public opinion,
which in turn was shaped by the mass media, propaganda, and the influence of interest groups. The importance of the climate of opinion for political influence can be discerned from an earlier example, national prohibition. Prohibition had in large part resulted from the work of the Anti-Saloon League of America, whose political power derived from public support the League leaders had shaped through propaganda and education. Indeed, Peter Odegard has stated that the influence of the League to command votes in the legislatures rested substantially on the quality and quantity of its literature, which was prodigious. When public opinion turned against prohibition, the League lost the basis of support, financial resources, and political power in the society at large. (The League's power mostly resided in the Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian (and Congregationalist) churches, the same sources of support for earlier pietists and for AU.) The press created an image of fanaticism and corruption of the League, and the League leaders in their success turned increasingly to political concerns. They abandoned their earlier educational and propaganda campaigns, and so could not prevent changes in cultural values, a change which led to decline in funds. The change in public opinion was in large part due to the efforts of the interest groups of the saloon owners, who used the techniques of the Anti-Saloon League. Moreover, League leaders ignored as insignificant referenda, which opponents of
prohibition used to express their dissatisfaction.

Over the first 25 years of AU's existence, the meaning of separation and climate of opinion surrounding separation changed. Until the early '60s or mid-60's, the climate of opinion on separation was favorable, although AU leaders began experiencing difficulties in 1960. From the mid-60's until the '70s, despite decisions of the Supreme Court against parochial aid, the climate of opinion was adverse, although public opinion still supported separation as evidenced by the referenda votes. The difference between the adverse climate of opinion and the favorable public opinion indicated that the two were not synonymous and that there existed a lack of consensus. The difference also reflected the power of Catholic interest groups in the legislatures, the national media, and the lower courts as well as the power of ecumenists and bureaucrats over communications and denominational school policy. The money line had been crossed with a number of health and welfare measures, federal programs, direct aid to colleges, and in 24 states bus transportation.

Separationist interest groups still had considerable power in state legislatures to prevent the passage of a number of parochial programs. Their power was obvious in the state referendums between 1967 and 1973. They were also able to achieve an separationist stance at the appellate court level that equalled the accommodationist stance. Separationists won in the two most important issues to reach the
Supreme Court: religious practices in the public schools and parochial. Unlike prohibition, cultural changes of values were limited to certain segments of the population. Public opinion did not accept the new cultural value system; in fact, support grew substantially as evidenced by the growing separationist alliance in the 1970's.

What role did AU leaders play in the above controversies? Over 25 years AU published over 50 million pieces of literature besides *Church and State*, which at the height of the influence of AU went to about 200,000 subscribers. The amount of literature hardly compared with the over 244 million pieces of literature distributed by the educational arm of the Anti-Saloon League between 1909 and 1923. Over 100 books and over 400 pamphlets and leaflets were issued by the League's educational arm. AU did issue approximately 300 pamphlets during its first twenty-five years. The amount of literature distributed, however, compared favorably to the amount distributed by the ACLU and the 83 public interest groups in existence in 1972-1973 studied by Berry. The importance of AU's literature and its quantity can be seen in the referendum fights and the evaluation by both sides of the controversies that quantity as much as quality was important in influencing the public. AU supplemented this literature, which in terms of quantity probably surpassed any group working for separation, with at least 20 phonograph and tape records and about 6 movies. Also, the literature
of AU and Church and State over the years improved, becoming specific and issue-oriented, and concentrating less on the Roman Catholic Church. Only about a dozen of the 83 public interest groups published a magazine which were highly stylized, factually and issue-oriented like Church and State. Providing subscribers with information that could not be found elsewhere or other media would not publish, Church and State was, however, not as research-oriented as the journals of some public interest groups, although the magazine placed increased emphasis on the growing original research done by AU members.

Like ACLU leaders, AU leaders did not have enough influence or resources to make a mass impact through the mass media, but they did help, as Pfeffer noted, to keep the issue of separation alive. Every program and policy of AU was infused with an educational purpose, and AU leaders did not abandon their emphasis on education with the loss of tax-deductibility. AU leaders kept in focus the prime importance of preservation of past norms. The result of AU leaders' continued educational concern was that despite the growth of anti-separationism, and financial and organizational problems, financial and organizational problems never became serious or really ever threatened the institution. AU leaders' broad educational program seemed to have not only increased in sophistication but increased in effectiveness as well. Publicizing issues could change minds as well as
convince wavering ones. Few criticisms of separation or of AU went unchallenged, and an organized educational campaign was carried out whenever AU leaders felt it was necessary. Such an approach helped keep public opinion on the side of separation and made opponents and government officials anticipate AU leaders reactions and criticisms before acting, which was a form of power. AU, in other words, made a sizable contribution in maintaining the generally pro-separationist stance that rejected aid to church schools among the American people.

Perhaps AU's greatest drawback was the anti-Catholic image, an image that did not conform to the actions of the leaders of AU. Like most members of interest groups, AU leaders were zealous and at times fanatical in their devotion to their cause, but this quality did not make AU leaders extremists. No image of corruption was ever affixed to AU leaders. AU leaders even mitigated their anti-Catholic image in the latter '60s and early '70s through changes and actions, garnering the fruits in increased tactical allies. Moreover, AU leaders turned the image of being a controversial institution to advantage. Archer shrewdly used this fact to influence violators of separation, knowing that most people wished to avoid controversy. AU leaders sought to gain publicity in a community in order to use the press to expand the scope of conflict and pressure politicians and the courts, just as did other private and public interest groups.
These groups, especially public interest groups, functioned as agitators in order to focus attention on controversial issues that would otherwise be ignored. By organizing Protestant protests against a public policy, separationists would be taken into account. Moreover, as Morgan pointed out, some community leaders who found AU's way of operation obnoxious and wanted to prevent AU from becoming active in a community nevertheless changed their ways.

In sum, AU's visibility, ubiquity, advertisements, and literature enabled AU leaders to make themselves heard and seen about the normal noise and activity of modern life, thereby increasing awareness and "stiffening backbones."

**STRATEGY AND TACTICS: CAPABILITIES, EFFECTS, AND CHANGES**

The capability of AU leaders to carry out the goals of the institution rested on financial and staff resources, tax status, membership, expertise of staff, and legal resources.

The magnitude of the growth of AU over twenty-five years can be seen through comparisons. Of course, neither AU nor any public interest group equalled the financial and membership resources of the Anti-Saloon League. In income, AU grew from $53,509 in 1948 to $842,792 in 1971, or 15 times. The average annual increase in income was 10%. Already by 1963, AU had increased its income almost 11 times to $517,483. In comparison, the income of ACLU increased almost 9 times from 1948, the 27th year of the existence of
ACLU, to 1962-1963, or from $72,430 to $630,832. Because of ACLU's lack of tax-deductible status, the growth of ACLU in comparison with AU was the more appreciable. However, frequently ended the year with a deficit, had relatively few investments, had a top reserve fund of $71,300 in 1955-1956 and frequently considerably less, and a net worth ranging from $39,536 in 1955-1956 to $142,375.17 in 1959-1960. Archer saved or invested 11% of the income AU received, and as a consequence AU had in 1969 a $1 million reserve fund and $2 million worth of investments.

In terms of membership, AU grew from virtually no members in 1948 to 175,000 in 1962-1963, while ACLU, which began a concerted membership campaign in 1950, increased membership from 9,148 to 66,450 in 1962-1963. While AU's growth was considerably more than the growth of ACLU, one must again take into account the lack of tax-deductiblity of ACLU. Although AU had 200,000 Church and State subscribers in the mid-60's, subscribers declined to 130,000 by 1972, in part due to loss of tax-deductible status. ACLU, according to Berry, had in 1972 a membership of 200,000.

The extent to which the growth of resources of AU has made the institution one with enormous capabilities can be discerned when compared with the 83 public interest groups studied by Berry. Only 19% of 16 institutions had total assets over one million dollars, institutions like the NCC with an annual income of $14 million and the National
Audabon Society with a yearly income of $7 million. Five percent or four of the public interest groups had a membership comparable to AU of between 100,000 and 200,000 members, one of which was ACLU. (Seven percent or 6 groups had over 200,000 members.) Thirty-three percent of the groups had over 100 chapters, while 30% had between 26-100 chapters.

Only 16% of the 83 groups had over 10 professionally employees and only 18% had over 20 workers at national headquarters. Although AU did not have many professional employees in the first dozen or so years, AU grew after the mid-60's in professional employees to over 10 and had in 1971 over 35 workers at Washington headquarters, the same number of workers as 1962. According to Berry, such numbers indicated a very high capability at least potentially. AU had a relatively experienced staff with expertise, especially Archer and Lowell, both of whom were extremely effective speakers. Like approximately 70% of public interest groups, the staff initiated policy, and AU was, like most of the groups, oligarchic in organization. The Board, however, helped to determine policy, set guidelines for Archer to follow, and through their committee work helped to shape policy. Moreover, the Board on a number of occasions, especially when the staff was divided or Archer was unsure how to proceed, determined policy. Also, Archer's diplomatic skill brought Board members into the activities of AU to a considerable degree. Decision-making at the top level, in
other words, was much more democratic than the centralized nature and Archer's authority would lead one to believe.

Relatively, the legal resources of AU were considerable, clearly beyond most of the 83 public interest groups, but less than the expertise of the 800 to 1,000 cooperating attorneys and some of the legal capabilities of the ACLU. The number of cases by AU was by the latter '60s impressive. AU and ACLU, however, were relatively less successful in the church-state field than the American Jewish Congress.

Grassroots support was a part of capability and was seen by the public interest groups as a prerequisite for effectiveness. The grassroots support of AU had always been strong, although the support declined in the latter '60s. AU still retained considerable support at the grassroots, but AU leaders were having problems.

These were the capabilities AU leaders had at their disposal to carry out the goals of the institution. The strategies and tactics the leadership used to accomplish those goals have been set forth in the body of this work. Changes of methods and in the priority of the issues have been delineated. In comparison with the 83 public interest groups previously mentioned, AU was distinctive in the amount of resources that were put into educational purposes, methods, strategies, and tactics. As the second strategy of influence, embarrassment and confrontation through tactics of political protests, controversy, putting officials on the
defensive, whistle blowing, and public relations campaigns were used extensively by AU leaders. AU leaders used the strategy of the law and used many more tactics than Berry defined. AU leaders also used the strategies of constituency through letter writing and other tactics not described by Berry and used information in personal lobbying and in congressional testimony.

Berry found great difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of the public interest groups, discovering no objective standard of judgment. He relied on the self-perception of the group leaders, insufficient though that technique was. Power can be defined as coercive sanctions, involving such areas as the law. One can extend this definition to include the threat of coercive sanctions, such as legal negotiations and threat of a lawsuit. Defined in this way, the power of AU leaders, especially Archer, was considerable. The quality of some lawsuits and the reasons for lack of success of some of the lawsuits of AU left much to be desired, but AU leaders did have a moderate rate of success in the legal area. The success of the threat of a lawsuit seemed to have been good to excellent.

If influence is defined as the ability to change behavior by making others do something they would not otherwise do, AU leaders had extensive influence on those individuals and groups who violated separation. AU leaders did not have broad influence on the culture or on Protestant leadership.
They could not prevent passage of parochial laws in many cases, but they could circumscribe and limit the scope of these programs as well as go to court. AU campaigns against parochial laws, where it made a concerted effort and worked mutually with allies, proved in a vast majority of cases to be successful.

In sum, despite the problems of image, and criticisms, and a dwindling Protestant base, AU played a major role in keeping the United States as separationist as it is and, in some ways, making America more separationist in 1973 than 1947.

CONCLUSION

The most wrenching moments for AU leaders have come in recent years when Protestant groups who were formerly supporters have themselves sought money at the public trough. This development has narrowed AU's numerical base, forced organizational adjustments, compelled AU to moderate its rhetoric, and impressed organizational leaders with a sense of abandonment. Too, the leadership was forced to seek active alliances outside church circles, alliances that must have been distasteful to those of an evangelical persuasion. Given the increasing move toward establishment of Protestant elementary and secondary schools with the resulting search for government money, and given the growing need of church-related colleges for public assistance, one may question
whether AU will long have a viable Protestant base. Without a supportive base in Protestantism, Americans United then will have to reexamine, in a major way, whether it dare defend the Protestant-inspired "culture of liberty."
CHAPTER X: FOOTNOTES


8. See Paul Harrison's *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959) for the consequences of the growth of bureaucracies in the American Baptist Convention. Also, for effect of bureaucracy in the Southern Baptist Convention, Lutheran Church (Missouri Synod), and in National Association of Evangelicals and on neo-Evangelicals that tended to make them similar to mainline denominations, see Berger, "A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity," pp. 185-186. See also Chapter VIII of this work.


Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity," p. 185.


19. Jensen rejects Kleppner's distinction between right belief and right conduct. According to Jensen, a majority of Pietists believed that what one believed was more important than conduct, since belief controlled what one did. See Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest*, p. 68.


26. Evangelicals are not necessarily fundamentalists, and though evangelicals are generally conservatives, a quarter to a third of the membership of the conciliar church are evangelicals. Even the NCC includes a number of evangelical congregations. Evangelicals can also be found among conciliar ecumenists. Fundamentalists tend to be separatists and differ with evangelicals over biblical inerrancy. See Shelley, _Evangelism in America_, pp. 9-15 & 128-132.


30. Strout, _The New Heavens and New Earth_, pp. 29, 96-100, 113, and 296 and Smith, _Religious Liberty in the United States_.


32. Odegard, _ibid._, p. 12.


34. _Ibid._, p. 76 and Odegard, _Pressure Politics_, p. 18


36. Odegard, _ibid._, pp. 244-266.


39. The argument does not mean the American public did not accept cultural pluralism; clearly, a majority of Americans did. But for the separationists ecumenism did not provide a good expression for cultural pluralism nor did cultural pluralism justify or prove the need for parochialism. Earlier pietists rejected pluralism. AU leaders rejected cultural pluralism, but they did not reject pluralism, favoring a religious pluralism. One must keep this important distinction in mind when discussing pluralism. Jensen, _The Winning of the Midwest_, pp. 138 & 189-190.

40. Odegard, _Pressure Politics_, pp. 74-75.
41. See Bibliography.

42. Berry, *Lobbying for the People*, pp. 179-180. Some of the groups studied by Berry were as follows: American Baptist Church, U.S.A., ACLU, American Conservative Union, Americans for Democratic Action, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Church of the Brethren, Common Cause, Consumers Union, Environmental Defense Fund, Liberty Lobby, National Wildlife Federation, United Church of Christ and United Methodist Church and United Presbyterian Church, Young Americans for Freedom, Zero Population Growth.


45. Ibid., pp. 9-10, 12. Leaders of ACLU, within their resources, tried to answer attacks on the institution.

AU wanted to make news, headlines, whether those headlines were good or bad. The assumptions behind this newsmaking were twofold. Firstly, it would get people to question the present way of doing things and bring separation to mind as relevant to the situation. Secondly, AU leaders assumed that separation was favored by the majority of Americans, and if AU brought this concept to the attention and showed an alternative course of action, the chosen path of a majority of Protestants and Americans would be separation.


47. Berry found fanatics and zealots to be the main participants in public interest groups. Berry, *Lobbying for the People*, p. 109.

48. Twenty-four percent of the 83 public interest groups used political protests as the principal techniques. Most of these were left-wing groups. Berry, *ibid.*, pp. 231-233.


54. See Chapter VIII and Table 5.


57. Ibid., pp. 160-161.

58. Ibid., pp. 28-31. The organizations with over 200,000 members were Common Cause (which reached 200,000 in its first year of existence), Liberty Lobby, Consumers Union, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, and Women's Christian Temperance Union.

59. Ibid., pp. 61-63.


62. Ibid., 186-197. In contrast to public interest groups, only 13% of private interest groups were dominated by the staff. Large business groups like Chambers of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers were, in consequence, immobilized by divisions in membership. Berry found that church supported lobbies were the least likely to be staff dominated, although the staff still played an important role in policy initiation.


64. Berry, *Lobbying for the People*, pp. 269-270.

65. Ibid., p. 263.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 274.
APPENDIX A

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED
FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

A MANIFESTO

The officers and the widely representative National Advisory Council of this organization desire to speak frankly and clearly to the American people concerning the purpose for which this undertaking has been launched. Its single and only purpose is to assure the maintenance of the American principle of separation of church and state upon which the Federal Constitution guarantees religious liberty to all the people and all churches of this Republic. PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED has been called into existence because this principle has been and is being violated, and threatened with further violation, in certain areas and by certain acts of both government and church. The plain meaning of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids Congress to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion" has been obscured by specious propaganda tending to confuse the public mind as to the clear-cut line of separation which this Amendment draws between church and state. We shall endeavor (1) to revive in the public mind a clear understanding of the constitutional basis upon which religious liberty has been guaranteed, (2) to redress the specific violations which have recently come into force, and (3) to resist further encroachments upon this constitutional principle.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED does not concern itself with the religious teaching, the forms of worship, or the ecclesiastical organization of the many churches in our country. It is no part of our purpose to propagandize the Protestant faith or any other, nor to criticize or oppose the teaching or internal practices of the Roman Catholic Church or any other. We have no connection or sympathy with any movement that is tinged with religious fanaticism. Our motivation arises solely from our patriotic and religious concern for the maintenance of the separation of church and state under the American form of government.
Nevertheless, the existing situation cannot be dealt with save by frankly taking account of the specific sources from which violations of the First Amendment originate. But our undertaking is not primarily directed toward these sources, but toward those agencies of government - local, State, and Federal - which weakly yield to their demands. Congress and all State legislatures, and all executive and judiciary agencies of government must be warned that they are playing with fire when they play into the hands of any church which seeks, at any point, however marginal, to breach the wall that sharply separates church and state in this country. The principle of their separation is firmly established in a long tradition as well as in the Constitution that any tampering with it will tend to light the fires of intolerance and fanaticism which our system of government is designed to prevent.

Our operations, therefore, are not inspired by any religious differences, but by a common conviction concerning the religious liberty of all faiths. The internal differences which distinguish one church from another have no place on the political level. Their consideration belongs in the open forum which the Constitution has provided for freedom of conscience and the free exchange of opinion. Here all the churches have liberty to worship as they desire, to propagate their own faith, and to maintain such organizations for this purpose as they deem expedient. In the open forum of religious liberty they may meet one another in cooperation or in controversy.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED has come into existence to defend this open forum of religious liberty against its vitiation by law or the administration of law. The state is forbidden to invade this area. It may not by law or the administration of law accord to any church a status which gives it a special advantage in the wide domain of religious freedom. This is the plain meaning of the First Amendment, which forbids Congress to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion" - that is, pertaining to, or leading toward, such an establishment.

The churches on whose behalf we speak ask nothing for themselves in the exercise of their constitutional freedom which they do not willingly grant to and demand for all other churches. They are content to take their place in the open forum of our free society and to flourish or perish by the inherent strength or weakness of their faith. This is cultural and spiritual democracy. For the state to connive with a church which seeks a position of advantage in the forum of religious liberty by creating any interlocking relation between that church and itself is to deny or
to curtail the religious liberty of all other churches and to vitiate democracy.

A powerful church, unaccustomed in its own history and tradition to the American ideal of separation of church and state, but flourishing under the religious liberty provided by our form of government, and emboldened by the wide diffusion of a false conception of tolerance, has committed itself in authoritative declarations and by positive acts to a policy plainly subversive of religious liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution. This church holds and maintains a theory of the relations of church and state which is incompatible with the American ideal. It makes no secret of its intention to secure for itself, if possible, a privileged position in the body politic. In pursuit of this policy, it has already made such gains that the principle of separation of church and state is in peril of nullification by legislatures and courts, and by Federal, State, and local administrations.

One of the long-range purposes of this church is to secure total support for its extensive system of parochial schools from the public treasury. Its strategy in furtherance of this purpose is to fracture the constitutional principle at one point after another where the action can be minimized as trivial or disguised as falling within some other category than that of its ultimate intent. It has begun by demanding that certain marginal services such as bus transportation, free lunches, free textbooks, and so forth, for its parochial school pupils be financed by public funds raised by taxation for the public schools.

Already the legislatures of certain States, yielding to the political pressure of this church, have enacted legislation empowering local school boards to grant their special privileges. The Federal Supreme Court in two decisions has confirmed State legislation which sanctions the use of public school funds to provide free textbooks for parochial schools (1930) and to transport pupils to such schools (1947). The four dissenting justices in the bus-transportation case solemnly warned the nation that these two breaches in the wall separating church and state are only the beginning. "That a third and a fourth breach, and still others, will be attempted, we may be sure," say the dissenting justices.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED is determined to assert its full strength to the end that there shall be no more breaches in this wall, that the breaches already made shall be repaired, and that the complete separation of church and state in an undivided state-supported educational
system shall be maintained.

On a bolder and more ambitious scale this same church now demands aid for its schools from the Federal Government. A proposed Federal grant of several hundred million dollars annually in aid of public education, especially in those States which economic resources are insufficient to provide adequate education for their children, has been before Congress for many years. Action on this proposal has been held up by the pressure of this church, which demands that its parochial schools shall share with the public schools in any such Federal appropriation in an amount proportional to the number of pupils in each school system.

Thus far Congress has withstood this demand. But two bills have been introduced in that body, one of which completely yields to the church's maximum demand, while the other provides that the funds may be distributed by each State in accordance with its own statutes. The latter, the so-called Taft Bill (S. 472), is a disguised evasion of the issue. It plays directly into the policy of the church which has already secured legislation in 18 States permitting financial aid to parochial schools in one form or another, and in effect invites the States to violate the mandate of the First Amendment. The effect of its passage by Congress would encourage and facilitate the church's campaign in these States to widen the initial legislation already enacted in its favor, and to secure similar and even more advanced legislation in all other States.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED respectfully demands that Congress shall not by such an evasion abdicate its responsibility to defend the Constitution, regardless of political pressure on the part of any sectarian interests which would thus subvert it. The effect of state-supported church schools would spell the end of our public school system as it has been established, fostered, and protected for more than a century. To divide state-supported education into sectarian school systems would divide American society itself into hostile sectarian camps, intensify sectarian intolerance, and thrust a religious issue permanently into the political arena from which our Constitution was designed to exclude it. Next to the Constitution itself, our public school system has been our strongest bulwark against the development of religious intolerance in our political life.

In the area of diplomacy, also, this same church has made ominous progress in its strategy of winning for itself a position of special privilege in relation to the state. An ambassadorship to the papal head of the church, represented at the time it was set up as a temporary measure, has
been in existence for seven years. President Truman in 1946 assured a Protestant delegation that it would be discontinued at an early date. But the powerful political pressure which the hierarchy is able to bring to bear against the fulfillment of this promise plainly makes it necessary that a strong and determined public opinion shall express itself in support of its fulfillment.

We are not deceived by the disguise under which the appointee to this ambassadorship was labeled as the President's personal ambassador. The Pope himself made it perfectly clear in the extraordinary ceremonial by which he received the incumbent that his presence at the Vatican marked a distinct departure from our Government's long-established policy. We hold that this ambassadorship constitutes an interlocking of the functions of church and state, which is contrary to the principle of their complete separation.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED, speaking on behalf of an aroused body of American citizens, demands that this un-American ambassadorship to the head of a church be abolished. We resent, on behalf of all non-Roman churches, the privileged access to the ear of the state which this relationship creates. As patriotic Americans, we call upon all our fellow citizens who cherish the principle of religious liberty which is implemented by the separation of church and state, to join us in condemning this un-constitutional entanglement of a particular church with the American state and in demanding its prompt abrogation.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED proposes to carry on a campaign of enlightenment and mobilization of public opinion throughout the nation until the vital issue which has been raised by these violations and the threat of further violations has been decided by the voice of the people.

The Americanism of the people's representatives in the various branches of government must be stiffened against the promptings of sentimentalism or the low dictates of political advantage to resist the aggressive activities of those who would subvert the Constitution to their own sectarian interest.

The issue has now become tense in many States and many local communities. In some communities a church-dominated school board has taken parochial schools into the public school system, with the result that bitter conflict and disorder have ensued, causing shame and disrepute to the whole community. Such spectacles afford a preview of the situation in which the entire nation will find itself if these encroachments upon the public school system spread. This is the kind of situation which the founders of the Republic
sought to preclude by clear constitutional provision for the separation of church and state.

The free churches of America have been slow in recognizing the gravity of the situation that was developing before their eyes. But they can no longer ignore the fact that their own religious liberty is in peril. Their disposition is such that they desire to have the most friendly and cooperative relations in the areas of social service and personal fellowship with all. They deplore every breach of the democratic amenities that should obtain among churches whose common right to be here is guaranteed by our Constitution. The enlightened leadership of Protestantism has repudiated, and mobilized public opinion to suppress, one after another of the weird manifestations of religious hatred that have emerged during the past generations.

Protestant churches and all free churches are, therefore, reluctant to engage in any overt movement which can be interpreted by hostile critics as a revival of religious intolerance. To impute any such animus to the organization for which we speak is to falsify its spirit and purposes. Its aim is absolutely the opposite. Its purpose is to preclude the resurgence of this evil spirit of intolerance in our body politic. It seems clearly that unless the actual violations of the principle of separation of church and state are redressed and the threat of further violations removed, the peaceful and friendly relations between the ecclesiastical beneficiary of these violations and the other churches of the land will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.

Our controversy is not with any church, Roman Catholic or any other. Our controversy is with those lawmakers and law administrators who would yield to the demand of any church for a relation to the state which the Constitution forbids. The effect of the First Amendment is to invest the makers and administrators of our laws with the ultimate guardianship of religious liberty and religious tolerance. If they maintain unimpaired the principle of separation of church and state, the churches can continue, as they have done since the founding of this Republic, to live together and face their differences with mutual respect and comity in the open forum of freedom, where the rules are tolerance, persuasion, argument, and example. But if the makers and administrators of our laws allow this principle to be nullified or undermined, upon them will rest the responsibility for lighting the fires of shameful religious resentment and conflict that will inevitably ensue.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED has emerged in recognition of the fact that all non-Roman churches, of all
faiths, are profoundly concerned over the present threat to religious liberty. Most, if not all of the free churches, have spoken out in official resolutions in condemnation of the current violations of the principle of separation of church and state. But this common concern has need of implementation through a common agency. Though this agency has not been officially created by the churches, we believe it will receive their moral support from its beginning and that their official support will be forthcoming when their conventions or judicatories are in position to take action. The representative character of those who have been prompted to form this organization will, we believe, commend it to all churches and synagogues as their own instrument for this purpose. Through it the patriotic and religious citizens throughout the nation, including those not commonly called Protestant, will be able to bring to bear their prompt and concerted resistance to the encroachments which they condemn with strong words in their resolutions.

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED by no means limits collaboration in this undertaking to Protestants, nor even to religious bodies. Quite the contrary. It bears the name "Protestant" only because the churches of that faith represent by far the largest body of citizens whose religious liberty is jeopardized by such aggressions as those cited above. Protestantism realistically accepts the responsibility of leadership inherent in its numerical preponderance, and offers itself as only the spearhead of a movement which embraces all Americans, whatever their faith may be. It desires and believes that it will receive the cooperation of churches and citizens of all faiths who cherish the religious liberty of others no less than their own.

We therefore call upon all patriotic citizens who profess the faith of Judaism and who sense the peril to the religious liberty they have uniquely enjoyed under the American Constitution, to join in the announced purposes and activities of this organization, and to accept representation in it. Similarly, all groups known as fraternal orders, and all citizens who, though professing no church allegiance, believed in the American system of separation of church and state, are invited to join with a united Protestantism which is sinking its own differences in a common effort to make sure that legislatures and executives and courts shall defend the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty against all attempts to subvert it. We have no doubt that there are many Roman Catholic citizens whose patriotic loyalty to American ideals is sound, intelligent, and sincere. These also are invited to join with their fellow Americans in maintaining this vital principle of American democracy.
In this endeavor we count especially upon the participation of the great body of educators throughout the nation, regardless of their religious affiliations, whose noble profession will be stultified by further encroachments upon the public school system or by the complacent acceptance of those already in force. The teaching profession perceives, perhaps more clearly than others, the evil social consequences in the permanent fissioning of American culture which will result from state support of church-controlled education.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

The immediate objectives of PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED may therefore be summarized as follows:

1. To enlighten and mobilize public opinion in support of religious liberty as this monumental principle of democracy has been embodied and implemented in the Constitution by the separation of church and state.

2. To resist every attempt by law or the administration of law further to widen the breach in the wall of separation of church and state.

3. To demand the immediate discontinuance of the ambassadorship to the papal head of the Roman Catholic Church. (Changed in 1963 to read: To prevent the special recognition of the Roman Catholic Church-State establishment by the government of the United States through the appointment of an ambassador or other envoy to the Vatican or recognition of diplomatic status for the present Papal delegate in Washington.)

4. To work for the repeal of any law now on the statute books of any State which sanctions the granting of aid to church schools from the public school treasury.

5. To invoke the aid of the courts in maintaining the integrity of the Constitution with respect to the separation of church and state, wherever and in whatever form the issue arises, and, specifically, to strive by appropriate constitutional means to secure a reconsideration of the two decisions of the Supreme Court upholding the use of tax funds (a) for providing the pupils of parochial schools with free textbooks and (b) for the transportation of pupils to parochial schools. (Changed in 1963 to read: To invoke the aid of the courts in maintain the integrity of the Constitution with respect to separation of church and state, wherever and in whatever form the issue arises, and specifically, to strive by appropriate Constitutional means to prevent
the use of tax funds to provide parochial schools with free
textbooks, bus transportation, or other subsidies.)

6. To call out and unite all patriotic citizens in a
concerted effort to prevent the passage of any law by Con-
gress which allots to church schools any portion of a Fed-
eral appropriation for education, or which explicitly or
implicitly permits the States to make such allotment of
Federal funds. This purpose in no wise prejudices pro or
con the propriety of a Federal grant in aid of public
education.

7. To give all possible aid to citizens of any community
or State who are seeking to protect their public schools
from sectarian domination, or resisting any other assault
upon the principle of separation of church and state.

8. In seeking these objectives we are determined to pur-
sue a course that cannot be justly characterized as anti-
Catholic, or as motivated by anti-Catholic animus. As Pro-
testants, we can be called anti-Catholic only in the sense
in which every Roman Catholic is anti-Protestant. Profound
differences separate us in the area of religious faith, but
these differences have no relevancy in the pursuit of our
objectives as clearly defined in this manifesto. The issue
of separation of church and state has arisen in the politi-
cal arena, and we propose to meet it there. (Changed in
1963 to read: In seeking these objectives POAU is determined
to pursue a course that cannot justly be characterized as
anti-religious, anti-Protestant or anti-Catholic. Its con-
cern lies in the political arena where the issue of Church-
State relations has arisen and it is in that frame of refer-
ence that the issue must be met. It is determined to sup-
port opportunity for all churches with official patronage
and privilege for none.)

(Added as an immediate objective in 1963: To oppose
changes in the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution
or in any state constitution which would weaken separation
of Church and State.)

PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE proposes to acquaint the representatives of
government, all the way up from the local community through
the States to Congress, the Supreme Court and the White
House, with the fact that an overwhelming body of public
opinion, led by the whole of Protestantism, is united in a
common purpose to achieve the above objectives, and thus to
assure the preservation of cultural and religious democracy
bequeathed by the fathers against any act of government
"respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."

On behalf of the officers and National Board of Advisors of PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, signed by the committee:

Washington, D.C.  JOHN A. MACKAY
President, Princeton Theological Seminary
EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAU
President, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School
G. BROMLEY OXNAM
Bishop of the Methodist Church, New York Area
LOUIE D. Newton
President, Southern Baptist Convention
CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON
Former Editor, The Christian Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PROPOSED BUDGET</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th>EXPENDITURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$53,509</td>
<td>$31,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>55,180</td>
<td>67,277</td>
<td>38,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>49,900</td>
<td>101,334</td>
<td>51,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>73,200</td>
<td>110,434</td>
<td>85,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>103,500</td>
<td>102,906</td>
<td>98,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>108,092</td>
<td>108,017</td>
<td>76,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>100,050</td>
<td>113,686</td>
<td>98,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>107,050</td>
<td>127,637</td>
<td>103,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>125,800</td>
<td>159,225</td>
<td>126,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>143,375</td>
<td>234,806</td>
<td>163,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>174,900</td>
<td>299,572</td>
<td>192,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>392,124</td>
<td>318,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>534,140</td>
<td>540,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>419,211</td>
<td>355,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>546,662</td>
<td>485,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>580,281</td>
<td>580,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>(579,137?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>636,230</td>
<td>581,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>665,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>637,964</td>
<td>620,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>889,774</td>
<td>682,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>(728,599?)</td>
<td>728,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>729,000</td>
<td>807,319</td>
<td>733,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>765,500</td>
<td>842,792</td>
<td>740,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a: of the $580,281, bond sales accounted for $50,000.

b: Figures could not be verified by other sources.

c: The rise in income is probably related to the building fund for the New AU National Headquarters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1949</td>
<td>+22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>+34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1956</td>
<td>+20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>+32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1959</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1960</td>
<td>+27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECTED AVERAGE</th>
<th>RATES OF INCOME GROWTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1952</td>
<td>+14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1960</td>
<td>+18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1966</td>
<td>+ 4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1971</td>
<td>+ 5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1960</td>
<td>+17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1971</td>
<td>+ 4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1971</td>
<td>+10.6 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AVERAGE RATE OF INCOME GROWTH AFTER LOSS OF TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECTED AVERAGE RATES OF EXPENDITURE GROWTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1948-1971                                | +11.7  |

### TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AVERAGE RATE OF EXPENDITURE GROWTH AFTER LOSS OF TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 9

INCOME SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1959</td>
<td>$415,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1971</td>
<td>$652,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1971</td>
<td>$1,067,991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 10

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF INCOME SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1959</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1971</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1971</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 11

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED

TOTAL INCOME: $9,773,499
DOLLARS SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED: $1,067,991

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED: 11%

TABLE 12

APPROXIMATE INCOME FROM DOLLARS SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED

TOTAL RESERVE FUND AND INVESTMENTS: $2,000,000
TOTAL DOLLARS SAVED, INVESTED, RESERVED: $1,067,991

$932,009
BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERVIEWS

Boggs, Ronald J. tape recorded interview with Glenn L. Archer on July 3rd, 1973 at Americans United for Separation of Church and State, National Headquarters, 8120 Fenton Street, Silver Spring, Maryland.

Boggs, Ronald J. tape recorded interview with C. Stanley Lowell on July 2nd, 1973 at Americans United for Separation of Church and State, National Headquarters, 8120 Fenton Street, Silver Spring, Maryland.

Boggs, Ronald J. tape recorded interview with Albert J. Menendez on July 2nd, 1973 at Americans United for Separation of Church and State, National Headquarters, 8120 Fenton Street, Silver Spring, Maryland.

NEWSPAPERS

The Christian Century, 1939-1973

Christianity and Crisis

Church and State Newsletter, Review, Magazine, 1948-1973


ANNUAL REPORTS

American Civil Liberties Union. Annual Reports, 1921-1964.

DISSERTATIONS


BOOKS


Howe, Mark DeWolfe. The Garden and the Wilderness:


Parsons, Wilfred, S.J. The First Freedom: Considerations


Smith, James Ward and Jamison, A. Leland, eds. The Shaping of American Religion. Religious Perspectives In


ARTICLES


PAMPHLETS

Archer, Glenn L. *The Tuition Voucher Plan of Government Aid to Parochial and Private Schools*. Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry, Orient of Nebraska, Bulletin No. 27. n.p.: Educational Welfare Association, the Scottish Rite, 1970.


Fink, F. A. Whose Friends Are They-America's or Russia's? n.p. (Our Sunday Visitor), n.d.


Hillis, Don. *If America Elects A Catholic President.* Kansas City, Missouri: Gospel Tract Society, n.d.


Our Protestant Heritage. *St. Louis, Missouri: Metropolitan Church Federation,* 1945.


LITIGATION DOCKETS


LITERATURE OF AMERICANS UNITED

Note: The literature, including files, tape recordings, and phonograph records, are in the central cabinet
files and the library files of Americans United.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Archer, Glenn L. Executive Director's Reports and Statements to the Board of Trustees and to the National Advisory Council of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1948-1972.

Dawson, Joseph M. Minutes of Conferences on Church and State, 1947.


Lowell, C. Stanley. Associate Director's Reports and Statements to the Board of Trustees and to the National Advisory Council of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1957-1972.


______. Committee Reports to Board of Trustees and to the National Advisory Council, 1948-1972.

______. Departmental Reports to Board of Trustees and to the National Advisory Council, 1951-1972.


______. Minutes of Board of Trustees Meetings, 1948-1972.

______. Minutes of Committee Meetings, 1947-1972.

______. Minutes of Executive Committee Meetings, Board of Trustees, 1948-1972.

______. Minutes of Joint Executive Committee Meetings, Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council, 1948-1972.

______. Minutes of Joint Meetings of Board of Trustees and National Advisory Council, 1948-1972.


... Reports of Board of Trustees to the National Advisory Council, 1948-1972.

... Treasurer's Reports to Board of Trustees and to the National Advisory Council, 1951-1972.

SELECTED UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES

Archer, Glenn L. "Awake, America!" n.p., n.d.

... "The Church Press and Separation of Church and State." Speech given before the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Associate Church Press, n.p., n.d.

... "Church, State, and Freedom." Address given at Southwide Conference on Church-State Relations, Baptist Assembly, Ridgecrest, North Carolina, August 17, 1951.


... "A Look At the Past." Speech given at the Americans United Retreat, Williamsburg, Virginia, September 29, 1969.

... "Priests, Protestants, and Persecutions." n.p., n.d.

... "Separation of Church and State." Speech given at the Grand Lodge of Texas, n.p., n.d.


... "The Vatican Issue." n.p., n.d.

... n.t. Speech given at General Conference, Seventh Day Adventists, n.p., April 9, 1953.

... n.t. Speech given at Lincoln Square, New York City, New York, April 15, 1958.

... n.t. Address, with questions and answers, given at Skokie Valley Ministerial Association, Chicago, Illinois, May 22, 1957.
n.t. (Subject was the Protestant Reformation).
    n.p., n.d.


Speeches given at the Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, National Conferences on Church and State, 1948-1973.

BOOKS


for Separation of Church and State, 1965.


BOOKLETS


Memorial and Remonstrance Against Parochial Aid. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1970.

The Press Speaks: Leading Newspapers of the Nation Editorialize Against Tax Support for Parochial Schools. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


PAMPHLETS, LEAFLETS, FOLDOUTS, AND SELECTED HANDOUTS AND REPRINTS

Note: Unless otherwise indicated the items below are pamphlets.

By Glenn L. Archer


By C. Stanley Lowell


. The Church College: Perils of Government Aid.
Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.

. The Churches' Stake in the Public Schools--Do Public Schools Have Any Value to Protestants? Washington, D.C.: Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


. The Perils of Tax Credits. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1972.


. A Summons to Americans. Washington, D.C.:
Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


By Staff Members of Americans United


Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


By Protestants and Other Americans United


_____. Americans United Answers the Parochial Lobby. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1972.


_____. Exploration II: Survival Depends on Knowledge and Action. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Leaflet.)

. Fallacies and Falsehoods of the Drive to Amend the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Mimeographed handout.)


. President Kennedy's Pledges. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Foldout.)


. Tax Support for Parochial Schools? - What It Will Cost You. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Leaflet.)


Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Are Protestants For Sale? Washington,
D.C.: Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


. Church-State Attitudes (or how to spot your neighbor's character at a quick glance...). Washington, D.C.: Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Foldout.)


A Quick Look At the Record! Washington, D.C.: Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Leaflet.)


"Who Will Be the Next to Kneel?" Washington,
D.C.: Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1951.


By Series: Organization Series published by Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. You Should Belong to POAU, No. 1.

You Plus Two for POAU, No. 2.

Planning and Conducting a POAU Home Party, No. 3.

The Madison League, No. 4.

The Purpose of a POAU Chapter, No. 5.

How to Organize and Direct a POAU Chapter, No. 6.

An Efficient POAU President, Secretary and Treasurer, No. 7.

An Efficient Program Committee, No. 8.

An Efficient Membership Committee, No. 9.

An Efficient Public Relations Committee, No. 10.

The Religious Freedom Meeting, No. 11.

How to Enlist Members and Take an Offering at a POAU Meeting, No. 12.


Financing the POAU Program, No. 15.
Truth Series published by Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Pocket leaflets.)

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. **POAU: Program-Purpose-Hope, No. 1.**

Lowell, C. Stanley. **Tolerance, No. 2.**

______. **Secularism, No. 3.**

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. **Communism, Protestantism, Catholicism, No. 4.**

Blanshard, Paul. **Do Catholics Owe Allegiance to a Foreign Power? No. 5.**

Lowell, C. Stanley. **NO I Won't Send My Child to a Roman Catholic Parochial School - Here's Why..., No. 6.**

Lichtenstein, Stanley. **Unity, No. 7.**

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. **The Truth About Protestant-Catholic Tensions, No. 8.**

Lowell, C. Stanley. **Is the Catholic Ante-Nuptial Agreement Binding?, No. 9.**

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. **Subsidized Religion, No. 10.**

Archer, Glenn L. **The Big Question: Religion and the Presidency, No. 11.**

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. **A Strategy of Action: The Story of P.O.A.U., No. 12.**

Lowell, C. Stanley. **Censorship, No. 13.**

Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. **Federal Aid to Church Schools: Questions and Answers, No. 14.**

______. **Clericalism: Roots and Fruits, No. 15.**

______. **What Can One Man Do?, No. 16.**
Vote Series published by Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d., or as indicated. (All are leaflets.)


_____ Vote Against Amendment 12 No. 3 (Nebraska). Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (1970).


_____ Vote No! on Ballot 6, Nov. 7 (South Carolina). Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d., (1972).


Wake Up Series

Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Wake Up America! All About State Aid to Parochial Schools. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.
Wake Up Delaware. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.

Wake Up, Florida! Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Leaflet.)

Wake Up Indiana. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Leaflet.)

Wake Up Kansas. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


Wake Up, Louisiana! Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d. (Leaflet.)

Wake Up Maryland. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


Wake Up New Jersey. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


Wake Up North Dakota. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


Wake Up South Dakota. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.

Wake Up, Tennessee! Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.
Wake Up Wisconsin. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


By Members of the Board of Trustees of Americans United


———. Down the Road to Rome. Washington, D.C.: Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1951 (Leaflet.)


———. Sauce for the Goose. Washington, D.C.:
Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1954.


By Others


Harris, Victor B. "Don't Knock the Door Off the Hinges!" Mill Creek Valley, St. Louis University, and 5,000,000 Tax Dollars. St. Louis, Missouri: St. Louis Chapter of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1958.


Holt, Bishop Ivan Lee. The Church and Public Education.
St. Louis, Missouri: St. Louis Chapter, Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1956.


Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, St. Louis Chapter. Little Children on the Highways: Archbishop Ritter and the Missouri Constitution. St. Louis, Missouri: St. Louis Chapter, Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


Robinson, J. Roy. Right or Wrong? The Supreme Court Decision in the New York School Prayer Case. Silver Spring, Maryland: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, n.d.


FILMS OF AMERICANS UNITED

Boycott - 30 minutes

Captured - 40 minutes

Milwaukee Reports - 30 minutes

The Runaway Bus - 30 minutes

The School-Aid Crisis - 40 minutes

The Vatican Council - 30 minutes

PHONOGRAPH RECORDS AND TAPE RECORDINGS OF AMERICANS UNITED

Archer, Glenn L. Can America Remain Free? (Tape.)

_______ The Emerging State Church. (Phonograph and Tape.)

_______ Our Hope for the Future. (Tape.)

_______ The President, Cardinal Spellman, and the School-Aid Crisis. (Phonograph and Tape.)

_______ The Ramparts We Watch. (Tape.)

_______ The Real Issue. (Tape.)

_______ The School-Aid Crisis. (Tape.)

_______ Separation and Spirituality. (Tape.)

_______ Will Baptists Barter Their Birthright? (Tape.)

_______ Winning the Battle for Separation of Church and State. (Phonograph and Tape.)

Bietz, R. R. Clericalism in Today's World. (Phonograph.)

Blanshard, Paul. The Challenge of Clerical Power. (Phonograph.)
______. Future of Catholic Power, Part I & II (Phonograph.)

James, E. S. The Challenge to Church-State Separation. (Phonograph and Tape.)

Kennedy, Gerald H. Separation of Freedom. (Phonograph and Tape.)

Lowell, C. Stanley. CEF vs. POAU. (Phonograph.)

______. Report from Rome: Eyewitness at the Vatican Council. (Phonograph.)

Ockenga, Harold J. The Perils We Face. (Tape.)

Southgate, Herbert S. Your Church and Freedom. (Tape.)