THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
UNDER SELIM I, 1512-1520

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts

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1969

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To Professor Sydney Nettleton Fisher of The Ohio State University this author is highly indebted. Professor Fisher's direction and encouragement made this study possible.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Selim I was the ninth ruler of the house of Osman. His accession to the throne followed a prevalent dynastic pattern which compelled one heir to eliminate all his competitors. Korkud, Ahmed, and Selim were the only three sons of Bayezid II who remained in 1511. For some time Bayezid's health had been failing him. In the spring of 1511, his health continued to keep him bedridden. His sons became anxious concerning who would succeed him on the throne. Selim, especially fearing his father's preference for Ahmed, began to implement a strategy that eventually gained him the throne. Selim's strategy came to fruition, when in 1512, supported by the janissaries, he induced Bayezid to abdicate the throne. He then spent the time between the spring of 1512 and the autumn of 1513 eliminating his contenders which included his two brothers and five of his young nephews.

At the age of forty-seven, Selim secured the throne to reign for an eight year period between 1512 and 1520. His driving ambition and military competency had served him well. Moreover, he early displayed his shrewdness as a ruler when he avoided subordination to janissary demands by entering the city of Constantinople from a route different from the one usually taken by a new Sultan.
The very qualities which won Selim the throne, have won him severe criticism from Western historians. Often the accusations made against Selim's aggressive nature have obscured the more refined qualities which he possessed. The early seventeenth century historian, Richard Knolles, headed his chapter concerning Selim with "The Life of Selymus, First of that Name, the Third and Most Warlike Emperor of the Turkes." Even the famous history of Joseph de Hammer is filled with references to Selim's "thirst for blood." Furthermore, de Hammer used Andrea Foscolo, the Venetian baylo at Constantinople, as a source for describing Selim as "sanguinary." Although de Hammer made admirable use of Ottoman historians, he dismissed them on the point of Selim's character by stating the following:

But nearly all Ottoman historians could only admire the virtues of Selim with the imperial historian, Seadeddin, whose judgment was of so much less value since he lived in the corrupt atmosphere of the Sultan's palace....

It is true that Selim's fierceness caused the Ottomans to entitle him the grim or inflexible, yavuz. The famous curse which arose from the short life-span of his vizirs was "May you become one of the vizirs of Sultan Selim." But despite this severity, Selim possessed a keen intellect capable of artistic appreciation. He may have possessed a fondness for the military hunt, but he also possessed a fondness for Persian poetry and even wrote poetry himself. Reading history was a favorite pastime that occupied many of his nights. He knew and respected men of learning and he used their talents in his government. Selim employed the historian, Idris, to administer Kurdistan in 1515 and the poet, Kemal Pashazade, as the historian on his Egyptian campaign.
Probably the most important feat of Selim was that in eight years he almost doubled the Ottoman Empire by conquest. This fact, added to the emphasis historians place on his "blood thirsty" nature, has obscured the foreign relations of his reign. Furthermore, the longer reigns of Bayezid II (1481-1512) and Suleiman I (1520-1566) have succeeded in eclipsing interest in foreign relations under Selim. Historians oversimplify his period by ignoring everything but his conquests.\(^\text{18}\) No one could deny that it was Selim's conquests of Persia and Egypt which allowed the Ottoman Empire to reach its pinnacle under his son, Suleiman I.\(^\text{19}\) However, these conquests depended not only on Selim's military skill but also on his ability to implement a shrewd foreign policy.

This study will attempt to examine the foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire between 1512 and 1520, placing the conquests of Selim within the context of his entire reign as well as placing this period of foreign relations into its proper perspective in Ottoman history.
CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 177. This practice seems to have begun with Bayezid I (1389–1402) who had his brother, Yakub, strangled with a bowstring. He succeeded in legalizing his action by referring to the Koran. This practice remained legal standard procedure for new sultans for 250 years afterward.

2Marino Sanuto, I Diarii di Marino Sanuto, edited by Nicolo Barozzi, Guglielmo Berchet, Rinaldo Fulin, and Federico Stefani (Venezia: Fratelli Visentini, 1886), XII, 507–508. In a letter dated June 18, 1511, the Venetian baylo at Constantinople, Andrea Foscolo, writes that Ahmed of Amasia had the support of Bayezid and the high officials of government. Korkud of Manisa was not a serious threat for the throne. Selim was favored as the successor of Bayezid because of the popular support he received from the janissaries; Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481–1512 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948), p. 103. Originally, Bayezid II had eight sons. The probable order of their births were Abdullah, Shehin, Alem, Ahmed, Mehmed, Korkud, Mahmud, and Selim.

3Sanuto, XII, 113. Nicolo Züstignan to the Venetian government, Adrianople, March 9, 1511.

4Ibid., XIV, 245–246. Bayezid became disillusioned with his son, Ahmed, when he discovered Ahmed’s affiliation with the Shii heretics. On April 19, 1512, persuaded by members of the court and the janissaries, Bayezid sent word to Selim that he was to ride against Ahmed. Selim met with Bayezid on April 23, 1512 and the old Sultan promised to abdicate if he could spend his last years in retirement at the city of his birth, Demotika; Joseph de Hamer, Histoire de L’Empire Ottoman, translated by J. J. Hellert (Paris: Belligard, Barthés, Dufour, et Lowell, 1836. First published
in 1815), IV, 143. On the third day after leaving Con-
stantinople, May 23, 1512, Bayezid died. An unproven
rumor claimed Selim had poisoned him.

5 Edward S. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks
Both Korkud and Ahmed were executed with a bowstring by
an officer named Sinan.

6 Sanuto, XV, 547. A letter written by Leonardo Zu-
stigman, dated December 27, 1513, reports the killing of
Selim's five young nephews: Richard Knolles, The Generall
HISTORIE of the Turkes, from the First Beginning of that
NATION to the Rising of the Othoman Famillie (London:
Adam Islip, 1603), p. 504. Two sons of Ahmed escaped the
fate of the bowstring. Alladin fled to Egypt while Murad
fled to Persia. Later Murad became an indirect reason for
war with Persia in 1514.

7 Creasy, p. 127.

8 Hammer, IV, 143-144. It was the custom for the new
Sultan to grant the presents that the janissaries demanded
as they blocked the gates to the Serai. Selim avoided this,
but still granted the largest donation given to the janis-
saries up to that time.

9 Knolles, p. 499. See Appendix I; For an excellent
account of how Western Christendom viewed the Turks be-
ginning with the fall of Constantinople see Robert Schwoebel,
The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the

10 Hammer, IV, 136.

11 Ibid., p. 137; Sanuto, XIV, 245-246. Actually Andrea
Foscolo did not write the quote that Hammer accredits to
him. The real author was Nicolo Zustigman, Venetian baylo at
Adrianople, who wrote on April 2, 1512, the following:
"...questo Signor e...piccolo, rasso in la faza mostra
crudelissimo, e per quest e amato da' ianizari... e piu
presto bruto che altamente."

- 5 -
Joseph de Hammer used certain Ottoman historians whose works are no longer in existence today. In this respect, his history attains the stature of a primary source from many modern historians.

13 Hammer, IV, 138.
14 Ibid., p. 137.
15 Ibid., p. 139.
16 Creasy, p. 128.
17 Ibid.

The only account that covers the foreign relations of Selim throughout his reign is that of the general history by Hammer. Some monographs have examined portions of his reign, especially events surrounding his conquest of Egypt. However, most of these deal specifically with the economic aspects of the shift of trade because of the Portuguese. One of the better monographs written that discusses this topic well is George W. F. Stripling, "The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574," University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (1940-1942), pp. 5-136.

CHAPTER II

A PERIOD OF DIPLOMACY
(FALL 1513 - SPRING 1514)

After having interred the last of his rivals for the
throne, Selim left Brusa for Gallipoli. He then journeyed
to Mt. Athos where he met his viziers who accompanied him
first to Constantinople and afterward to Adrianople. The
foreign powers were eager to recognize Selim since there
was no longer any doubt concerning his claim to the throne.
The new Sultan was to indulge the foreign powers in a
period of diplomacy in the city of Adrianople.

Selim had actually made his first diplomatic ventures
in 1512. Shortly after the abdication of his father, he
received the deputies from Ragusa who came to recognize
Selim and ask his protection. They received the Sultan's
support but in addition to their annual tribute, he added
a five percent tariff on all their merchandise entering
Constantinople. At the same time Selim renewed the treaty
with Moldavia concluded under Bayezid II which made Moldavia
a tributary kingdom of the Porte.

Following his return from Brusa to Adrianople in 1513,
Selim first received the deputies from Moldavia and Wal-
lachia. They had come to recognize the new Sultan and to
pay the tribute due the Porte. The next powers which Selim
received were the Venetian and Hungarian ambassadors. The
new Sultan was to handle these powers with a firm but
gentle hand in order to avoid any confrontation. For sometime Selim anticipated warfare on his Eastern borders with the Persian Empire. He wished to remain at peace with the West in order that he might give his deeper concentration to affairs in the East.\(^6\)

With this idea of placating the West, Selim had early upon his accession, written the Doge of Venice in June, 1512.\(^7\) The letter assured the Doge that Bayezid II had abdicated of his own accord. Furthermore, Selim took this opportunity to express his affection for the Doge and the Venetian nation. His ambassador, Rius Chiaus, in the company of ten patricians, visited the Venetian Senate. Apparently, he impressed the Venetians by his manner of dress.\(^8\) Shortly afterwards, Venice sent Nicolo Zustignan as the new baylo at Constantinople. He accompanied Selim to Brusa where he wrote the Venetian Council of the defeat and death of Selim's brothers, Korkud and Ahmed.\(^9\) Venice, which wanted to renew the treaty of 1503\(^10\) with a few modifications, sent a special ambassador by the name of Antonio Zustignan. Zustignan was the ambassador who met Selim in Adrianople in the fall of 1513.\(^11\) The Venetian ambassador asked certain concessions which included the right of Christian witnesses in legal affairs between Venetians and natives, the recognition of the validity of the testimony made by Venetian subjects in Turkey, and the prolongation of a four year tenure of the baylo at Constantinople.\(^12\) The Sultan wanted to renew the treaty but did not agree to any of the concessions stipulated by the Venetian ambassador. Nevertheless, a treaty similar to the old treaty of 1503, was signed on October 17, 1513.\(^13\)
Selim sent Ali Bey as the Turkish ambassador to accompany Antonio Zustigian on his return trip for ratification by the Senate. In February, 1514, Ali Bey arrived at Venice. The Turkish ambassador was given a festive welcome and as others before him, he highly impressed the Venetians with his luxurious dress and that of his cortège.\textsuperscript{14}

Arriving at the same time as the Venetian ambassador was Martin Czobor, the ambassador of Ladislas (1490–1516), the king of Hungary.\textsuperscript{15} Czobor had come to renew the truce with Selim which the Turks had supposedly broken.\textsuperscript{16} Since 1503, Hungary had extended an uneasy truce with the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{17} Preceding Martin Czobor, the Hungarian monarch had sent a certain Felixe Raguseo to negotiate with the Sultan. Raguseo saw Selim in Brusa and demanded the restoration of Moncastro and other territories to Hungary as the price for an extension of a truce. Angered at Raguseo’s insolence, Selim had him mutilated and returned to Hungary.\textsuperscript{18} Czobor’s mission was further complicated by a crusade against the Turks led by certain members of the Hungarian gentry. On his journey to Adrianople, Czobor met Pierro Berislo, the Bishop of Veszprém, leading 2,000 men against the Turks.\textsuperscript{19} In league with Berislo was John Zapolya who had advanced through Transylvania to Wallachia and even into Szoereny. Already Zapolya had taken a significant number of prisoners.\textsuperscript{20} Throughout this period of time rumors circulated which suggested that the Turks would go to war with Hungary.\textsuperscript{21} However, in the frenzied atmosphere of a crusade against the Turk erupted a peasant rebellion at home. The crusade was disbanded and the gentry, Zapolya as their leader, put down the rebellion.\textsuperscript{22} Meanwhile, Martin Czobor succeeded in negotiating a three year truce with the Sultan.\textsuperscript{23}
Following the truce with Hungary, the Sultan received the ambassador from Mameluke Egypt. The Egyptian Sultan, Kansu-al-Ghawri (1501-1516), had sent Selim rich presents along with his good will. Kansu-al-Ghawri at this time feared Ismail of Persia and sought friendship with Selim. The Ottoman Sultan received the Egyptian ambassador with an equal amount of friendship and good will which he displayed by sending rich presents in return.

The last ambassador received by Selim was that of the grand prince of Russia, Basil III (1505-1533). The Russian prince was eager to benefit from whatever advantages an alliance with the Turks could offer him. Following his father's example, Basil sent one of his officials to the Porte in 1514. The Russian ambassador, Alexeief, was to assure Selim of Basil's friendship but not to relinquish the dignity of the nation by prostrating himself before the Ottoman Sultan. He was further instructed to deliver a letter to the Sultan. Basil's letter asked a renewal of relations with the Sultan that would match relations between their fathers.

The Russian ambassador returned to Moscow in the company of Kemal, the prince of Menkoub. Basil received the Ottoman ambassador in the company of his boyars. Kemal relayed Selim's willingness to extend friendly relations.

Negotiations between the two countries extended into 1515, when Basil sent Korobov with Kemal on a return journey to Constantinople. The letter which Korobov carried to Selim complained of the aid given by the Crimean Tartar, Mrnghli-Ghirai, to the Lithuanians and asked that Selim order this Khan to break friendly relations with the Lithuanians.
Furthermore, the Russian ambassador was to negotiate an offensive and defensive treaty with the Porte. Selim avoided involving himself in such a treaty by delaying the issue and promising to send an ambassador to Moscow sometime in the future. However, the Sultan did agree to a commercial treaty that gave the Muscovites free commerce at the ports of Kaffa and Azov. Although the Russian prince sent another ambassador to the Porte to reopen the issue of a military alliance, Selim again delayed a decision. Apparently Selim never sent an envoy to Moscow as he had promised, possibly because of his preoccupation with the war with Persia.

The presence of the Venetian, Hungarian, Egyptian, and Russian ambassadors made even more conspicuous the absence of a Persian envoy at the court of the new Ottoman Sultan. Shah Ismail of Persia (1499-1524) was the founder of the Safavi Dynasty that ruled at this time. The Shah and his subjects were followers of the heretical Shi'ite sect of Islam. The Ottomans had always followed the Sunni orthodoxy. This was one definite source of contention between these two expanding empires. For some time, even before Selim's accession, Shi'ism rapidly gained adherents throughout the border and the southwestern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Fearing that Shi'a converts would ally with Ismail and despising the religious implications of heresy, Selim planned to exterminate the sect within his Empire. He organized a network of spies throughout the provinces to obtain a complete list of those suspected of heresy. The number of suspects numbered approximately 70,000. Selim sent his troops to arrest the Shiites and some 40,000 of them were killed.
In addition to the issue of religion, tension between these two powers further extended itself when Ismail championed Ahmed against Selim during the period of successional strife. Ismail was also harboring Ahmed's son, Murad, who had embraced Shiism and had married one of the daughters of the Shah. The animosity that these two monarchs felt for each other could not have had a deeper intensity. A confrontation between these two great Oriental rulers was imminent and the Venetian ambassadors had predicted the conflict for sometime.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1Sanuto, XV, 547. In a letter from Constantinople dated January 10, 1513, Lunardo Zustignan tells of the death of Ahmed; Creasy, p. 131. Ahmed was buried at Brusa along with Korkud and five young nephews.

2Sanuto, XVI, 375; Hammer, IV, 155.

3Hammer, IV, 144.

4Ibid.

5Sanuto, XIV, 491; Hammer, IV, 155.

6Hammer, IV, 155.

7Sanuto, XIV, 414-415, 462. See Appendix II and III.

8Ibid., p. 478. A letter from Rome, anonymous, dated July 14, 1514 states "Vene l'orator dil Signor turcho vestito di restegno d'oro fodra di raso verde con la vesta di veludo ..., et accompagnata da zercha 10 patricii...."

9Ibid., XV, 347. In a letter written by Nicolo Zustignan on October 10, 1512, he reports "il Signor era venuto in Bursa e tien vera in Andernopoli, per cazar etiam l'altro fratello Guret."; Ibid., XVI, 312. In a letter dated April 23, 1513, Zustignan states "Verifica la morte di Achmat bassa...."


11Sanuto, XVI, 348.
M. Belin, "Relations Diplomatiques de la Republique de Venise avec la Turquie (fragment)," Journal Asiatique, Vol. VIII (November-December, 1876), p. 390. Up to then, according to the terms of the 1503 treaty, the Venetian baylo had not remained in Constantinople for more than three years. The baylo originated under the Byzantines and continued under the Ottomans in the Venetian treaty with Mehmed II. Some of the baylo's duties involved audiences with the Porte, the presentation of gifts to the Sultan, and the arbitration of disputes between Turks and Venetians. He further regulated Venetian commerce, took care of restitution for attacks by corsairs while keeping watch on the growth of the Turkish navy.

Sanuto, XVII, 539-540. See Appendix IV.

Ibid., pp. 521-522.


Ibid.; Sanuto, XV, 408. The Venetian orator from Hungary wrote on November 20, 1514 concerning a contingent of Hungarians who had infiltrated into seventeen miles of Turkish territory in retaliation for a previous attack by the Turks. Skirmishes on the Hungarian border fill the reports of the Venetian ambassadors. To blame explicitly the Turks for breaking the truce is to assume that the Hungarians were never guilty of aggression, an assumption which is difficult to prove.

Parry, p. 404. On August 20, 1503, a truce was signed between Hungary and the Porte. The truce was to last seven years. It included other nations directly or indirectly implicated, namely Poland, France and Spain. The truce, renewed by Bayezid for three years, again received a renewal under Selim in 1514.

Sanuto, XVII, 12. Paulo Gradenigo, the governor of Cyprus, wrote the following in May, 1513: "... donde el Signor ordoro che li fosse taia, le rechie el naso et mandato via..."; Ibid., XVI, 425. In a letter by Antonio Zustignan on his way to Adrianople, he reports the following concerning Raguseo's mission: "... ne havia voluto confirmar la pace, e la colpa e stato di l'hongaro...."

Ibid., XVI, 409; Hammer, IV, 157.

21 Sanuto, XVI, 312. In a letter dated April 23, 1513, from Constantinople, Nicolo Zustignan writes "...Turco voleva omnino far guerra al re di Hongaria..."


24 Sanuto, XVIII, 393-394. Marco Andrea Belunese to the Venetian government, Damascus, March 10, 1514.

25 Stripling, p. 39.

26 Sanuto, XVIII, 394. Selim was more interested in Persia at this time and wished to remain friendly with Egypt. Marco Andrea Belunese states in his letter: "...al qual el dito Signor turcho ha ditto non voler altro dal Soldan se non ch'el defenda el suo paexe, perche lo ditto Turcho dise esser sufficiente a ruinar Soffi senza tuo subsidio de altri."

27 Hammer, IV, 157. Joseph de Hammer is the only source this author could find for the narrative of diplomatic exchange between Basil III and Selim.

28 Ibid., p. 158.

29 Ibid.

30 Kemal, the prince of Menkoub, had previously visited Moscow as Selim's ambassador after the abdication of Bayezid II.

31 Hammer, IV, 158.

32 Karamsin, Geschichte des Russischen Reichs (Riga, 1825), VII, 47, 58, 78 stated in Hammer, IV, 159.

33 Ibid.

34 The Shiites believe in only the first four Caliphs.
They thereafter believe that the Caliphate or Imamate was transferred to the descendents of the fourth Caliph, Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad. On this basis the Shiites separated from the orthodox Sunnites and developed their own theology and tradition. However, they did incorporate many of the tenets of orthodox Islam.

35 The Sunnites are the orthodox members of Islam who recognize all the Caliphs, but not the right of the descendents of the house of Ali. They have claimed the majority of the peoples of Islam in the past as well as in the present.

36 Creaey, p. 132.

37 Ibid.

38 Sanuto, XIV, 246. "...sultan Achmat di l'Amasia, dice fa pratica de intelligitita con li Sofi e uniti venir a' danni di questo Signor."

39 Ibid., p. 287; Hammer, IV, 160. Alladin, Ahmed's other son who managed to escape to Egypt, reportedly died of the plague in Cairo.

40 Furthermore, in speaking of the animosity between these two rulers, one must also mention another source of contention between them. There were many petty rulers of autonomous Muslim states that existed on both sides of the Taurus Mountains. Both Persians and Turks were trying to incorporate these as client states and religion was one vehicle for this move.

41 Sanuto, XV, 358. Andrea da Cividal to the Venetian government, Damascus, September, 1512. The Venetian ambassador predicted "...onde persuade el Turcho debia far buona guera dal canto suo al predicti Suffi. Per tanto lo Signor Turco ha deliberato con potentissimo exercito cavalleria in persona contro lo signor Suffi et star de li longamente per conseguir vitoria del Suffi suo inimico...."
CHAPTER III
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SHAH ISMAIL
(SPRING 1514—WINTER 1515)

His relations in the West settled, and his problem concerning the Shiites solved, Selim now turned his attention to matters of warfare with Persia.

Provocation for war on both the Persian and Turkish side went deeper than just petty causes. A contest between these two powers was inevitable. Persia had expanded its territories at the expense of its neighbors since Shah Ismail came to power in 1499. The Persian monarch had conquered most of Kurdistan located north of Mesopotamia and Iraq\(^1\) which bordered dangerously upon the territories of both the Egyptians and the Turks. He had even warred upon Ala-ed-Devlet, the prince of the buffer state of Dhu-l-Kadr. This state, located north of Syria and southeast of Turkey, was claimed by both the Ottomans and the Mamelukes. The defeat of the Usbeks under Sheibani Khan in 1510 had made Persia an awesome power which faced a weak India to the east and the Indian Ocean to the south.\(^2\) Furthermore, the growth of Shiism, especially on the border provinces of the Ottoman Empire, cannot be underestimated. The subversive nature of the Shiite heresy to the Turkish Empire was well realized by both Shah Ismail and Selim. Its chief reason for enticing followers is that the Shah belonged to the Bektashi Order of Dervishes as did the janissaries and the rulers and leaders.
of the border provinces. Finally, the very harboring of
a contender for the Ottoman throne by Ismail was a sure
indication of his ambitious schemes toward Selim's Empire.
It is certain that Ismail would not have championed Murad
if he did not have plans for overthrowing Selim and placing
Murad on the throne, possibly as a vassal of the Persian
Empire.

Both monarchs knew that there would be no hegemony in
the East unless the two met on the battlefield. The Nas-
subiqes of Egypt were waning in power for sometime as both
the Ottomans and Persians were growing. The contest for
the chief power in the East lay in the hands of the two
ambitious rulers, Ismail and Selim.

There is some question as to who was the aggressor in
the campaign which blossomed in the spring of 1514 between
the Ottomans and the Persians. The aggression of Shah Ismail
against Selim graced the pages of the reports of the Ve-
netian ambassadors. Nicolo Zustignan, the Venetian baylo
at Constantinople, wrote of the aggression of Ismail who
had marched toward the Ottoman territories with Selim's
nephew, Murad. Zustignan later reported that Ismail had
penetrated Ottoman lands to a depth of some five to six days'
march. Another source, Giovan Maria Angiolello, who was a
Venetian in the service of the Turks, wrote in his account
of the Persian campaign that Selim was invited to attack
Persia. This invitation was forthcoming supposedly from
the tributary chiefs of territory that bordered the Turks,
principally the Kurds who were enemies of Ismail.

Whoever actually started the hostilities may remain
uncertain; nevertheless, the preparation for war by Selim
is recorded to have begun with his journey from Adrianople.
on March 19, 1514 and his arrival at Constantinople on March 29th.9 The decision to go to war was made before he left Adrianople. Selim planned to lead his forces in person as was the Ottoman custom. He left the government in the hands of his son, Suleiman.10 His march against the Shah began on April 20, 1514, a Thursday, an auspicious day in Ottoman tradition.11

Selim’s declaration of war reached the Shah by means of a Persian spy found in the Ottoman camp on April 23.12 The letter containing the war declaration is an interesting example of the style employed by rulers of the time. The following is an excerpt of the last paragraph of the document:

...if, drunk with the thoughts of thy power and foolish bravery, thou wilt pursue the course of thy iniquities, thou shalt in a few days see thy plains covered with our tents and flooded with our battalions. Then shall be performed prodigies of valour; and then shall the world witness the decrees of the Most High, who is the God of battles and the Sovereign Judge of the deeds of men....

Selim and his army proceeded to march toward Kaysari where the troops rested and Selim attempted negotiations with Ala-ed-Devlet, the prince of Dhu-l-Kadr. The Turkish Sultán asked the prince for cavalry reinforcements. Ala-ed-Devlet excused himself, claiming his advanced age as a liability in an attempt to remain neutral.14 Because of this unsuccessful venture with the prince of Dhu-l-Kadr, Selim had to reroute his army’s march. The Ottoman army continued marching to the Sivas River which was approximately halfway between Constantinople and the Persian capital of Tabriz.15 Here in a general review of troops, Selim counted 140,000 men. An additional 5,000 men were employed in a commissariat
which included 60,000 camels. Furthermore, Selim had collected 40,000 men between Kaysari and Sivas.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{16}

The Shah on his part had not remained idle. He had sent two generals, Stugiali Mametbey and Carbec Sampira, with a force of men to meet the Ottoman troops.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{17} Apparently the Shah decided to test the endurance of the Ottomans by initiating a retreat strategy with a scorched-earth policy.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{18} Ottoman supplies were conveyed by fleet to Trebizond where they were carried to the troops by mule.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{19} Such a supply line was difficult to maintain and the Ottoman Sultan hoped to provoke Ismail into war before his troops faced starvation. In a plan to force the Shah into a contest, Selim wrote him two insulting letters in Persian and a third in Turkish which insinuated that Ismail was a coward.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{20}

In his third letter to the Shah, Selim declared:

\begin{quote}
They, who by perjuries seize sceptres ought not to skulk from danger, but their breast ought, like the shield, to be held out to encounter peril; they ought, like the helm, to affront the foeman's blow.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

The Ottoman Sultan's third letter evoked a response from the Shah of Persia. A Persian envoy delivered a letter from Ismail which was accompanied by a box of opium. The letter feigned the willingness to resume peaceful negotiations while insulting the Sultan by insinuating that the letter he sent must have resulted from the work of an unqualified writer who was under the influence of opium. Since Selim was known to use opium on occasion, this insult of his literary talents and the box of opium were extremely degrading to the Sultan.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{22} Selim ordered the Persian envoy to be torn to pieces, as had been the fate of an earlier Turkish envoy sent to the Shah by Selim to ask for the custody of Murad.\textendash{}\textsuperscript{23}
Shah Ismail's strategy was very effective. Selim's troops were disgruntled by meagre provisions and difficult terrain and contemplated insurrection.\textsuperscript{24} The news of the Persian encampment at Khoi on the plains of Chalderan came just in time to avoid a rebellion by the janissaries. The encampment of the Persians meant that they would finally meet the Ottomans in battle. The Ottomans could not have continued much further than Chalderan without suffering from the increase in the lack of supplies.\textsuperscript{25} On his part, Ismail must have decided that he could no longer devastate his own country and that he could not risk the Ottomans storming his capital at Tabriz.

There on the plains of Chalderan, the Ottoman and Persian forces met each other on August 23, 1514.\textsuperscript{26} In numbers both armies were almost equally matched. The Ottomans numbered 140,000 men\textsuperscript{27} and the Persians, approximately 120,000.\textsuperscript{28} Apparently, the Persian cavalry was extremely successful against the Turkish forces at the beginning of the battle. However, through the efforts of Sinan Pasha, skillful use of the Turkish artillery won the battle from the Persians.\textsuperscript{29} The Persian horses were unable to endure the noise of the Ottoman cannons.\textsuperscript{30} The victory went to the Turks, but both sides sustained heavy losses of men.\textsuperscript{31}

The presence of Selim at the scene of the battle is certain but there are conflicting reports as to the presence of Ismail.\textsuperscript{32} Whether present or not, Ismail's loss at the Battle of Chalderan was a definite turning point in Ottoman and Persian history. Persia had received a crushing defeat from her Turkish neighbor. Selim's victory over Ismail had prevented the Sophi from becoming the "absolute lord of the East."\textsuperscript{33}
Shortly after the Battle of Chalderan, the inhabitants of Tabriz sent two ambassadors welcoming Selim to enter the city. The envoys were dispatched to Selim after witnessing Ismail's swift retreat from the capital to Casveen.³⁴ After a brief rest at Khoi, Selim led his forces to Tabriz, and he entered the city on September 5, 1514.³⁵ The second day of his entrance, the Sultan attended the Khutbah service that was held in his name.³⁶ During his brief stay in the Persian capital, Selim sent a message to Suleiman to send out notices of his victory to the Crimean Khan, the Sultan of Egypt, and the Doge of Venice.³⁷ Before leaving Tabriz, Selim exported a large number of the finest artisans of that city to his capital at Constantinople.³⁸ The Ottoman Sultan departed from Tabriz only after a stay of eight days.³⁹ He then proceeded to march to Amasia where he intended to set up his winter quarters. This march was extremely arduous because of scarcity of supplies and harassment by the Georgians at the rear of the Turkish army. Finally, Selim reached Amasia in the middle of November, 1514.⁴⁰

Soon after Selim's departure from Tabriz, Ismail returned to the Persian capital. In the month of October, 1514, he sent out ambassadors to the Mameluke Sultan, the prince of Dhu-l-Kadr, and the prince of the Georgians.⁴¹ His embassy to the Egyptian Sultan arrived in December, 1514.⁴² Ismail was successful in negotiating a treaty with the Mameluke Sultan, Kansu-al-Chawri. The treaty entailed that the Egyptian monarch would give aid to Ismail in a combined effort against the Turk with the condition that Kansu would not have diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. The Shah's ambassadors to both the prince of Dhu-l-Kadr, Ala-ed-Devlet, and the prince of the Georgians, Djanik, met with the same degree of success.⁴³
By this alliance, the Shah had succeeded in isolating the 
Ottoman Sultan with hostile powers on the east and the 
southeast of his empire.

Having secured his alliance, Shah Ismail now sent an 
embassy to Selim in Amasia during the winter of 1514. The 
Ottomans had captured Ismail's harem and treasures after 
the Battle of Chalderan. The Persian envoys, four of the 
most educated men in Persia, were laden with exquisite gifts. 
The Persian ambassadors asked for the return of the Shah's 
favorite wife. Selim refused this request and had the noses 
of the envoys cut off, sending them back to Ismail in this 
condition. He then married the wife of the Persian Shah 
to his secretary of state.

In the spring of 1515, Selim resumed his campaign against 
the Shah. He took Koumak in May. Later, in June, 1515, 
he set his forces against the Shah's ally, Ala-ed-Devlet, who 
Sinan Pasha defeated on the battlefield. The province 
of Diarbeker had surrendered to Ottoman sovereignty after the 
Battle of Chalderan. Also, most of Kurdistan had submitted 
and Selim received the sovereignty of the entire province in 
the winter of 1515 through the skillful negotiations of Idris, 
the historian. Idris was well-qualified to administer the 
province since he was a native of Kurdistan and knew the 
people, language, and customs of the country.

The conquering of Ala-ed-Devlet's territory helped to 
destroy Ismail's alliance. Furthermore, Kansu-al-Chawri 
had himself broken the alliance by sending Selim envoys in 
April, 1515. The Turkish Sultan informed the Doge of Venice 
of his new successes in June, 1515. Selim had taken a sub-
stantial amount of territory from the Shah, mainly including 
Diarbeker and Kurdistan. This territory was enough to serve 
as a buffer to future Persian invasions.
On his return to Constantinople, Selim was forced to deal with the pillaging by janissaries which had taken place in Amasia during his absence. In an effort to discontinue the constant revolts of the janissaries which had plagued his father as well, Selim decided to initiate a reform. In essence, the heart of the Sultan's reform rested upon changing the source of power of the seghbanbashi or head commander of the janissary corps. The position of the seghbanbashi rested upon a process of a meritorious rise through the ranks. Selim replaced the seghbanbashi with an aga whom the Sultan would choose from a small number of trusted friends. In this manner, Selim hoped to destroy the independent authority of the janissaries by placing them under a leader chosen by the Sultan.

The Sultan's spirit for reform went even further than the army. More important to the area of foreign affairs was Selim's interest in developing a more advanced navy. The fleet, which had served as a transporter of supplies to Trebizond in his war against Persia, was badly in need of expansion and repair. Selim hoped to build a fleet the equal of the Christian fleets. Furthermore, Constantinople possessed no arsenal since the time the Turks had taken the city from the Byzantines in 1453. The old Byzantine yard had become a cemetery. Selim gave the order that the old arsenal should be rebuilt under the name of "grave of graves." Piri Pasha, the new vizir chosen at the Battle of Chalderan, had predicted that the European powers would be caught by surprise in learning of the new arsenal and the enlargement of the fleet. The news of the Sultan's latest schemes certainly encouraged Hungary to conclude a one year extension of the truce. In this treaty, the Poles were also admitted.
Both Hungary and Poland did not wish to be attacked by the Turks, having been involved in many skirmishes on their border territories. The Prince of Wallachia, possibly also fearing the Ottoman Sultan's new strength, offered an increase of his annual tribute.

During the winter of 1515, Selim spent his time at Adrianople knowing well that his new territories were being consolidated and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire by the work of the historian Idris and others. He was now the master of Asia Minor. Nevertheless, Selim was not content with only this conquest. He knew his Empire would not be secure without consolidating his frontier to the south and southeast. It would be the Mamelukes who were the most natural contenders now against the strength of the Ottomans. Selim next focused his attention on the possibility of war with Egypt.
CHAPTER III
FOOTNOTES


3 Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512, pp. 91-92. Apparently the border tribes were known for a ghazi spirit which made little theological distinctions. The ideas put forth by Ismail's heretical Shiism were easily accepted. The danger of the janissaries' sympathies with Ismail always existed since they, like the border tribes, belonged to the Bektashi Order of Dervishes; John Kingsley Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (London: Luzac & Co., 1937), p. 67. According to Bektashi tradition both Ismail and Selim were members of the order. Birge relates a story taken from Selman Gemali Baba of Elbasan that tells of Selim's youthful association with Ismail in which they pledged to proselytize Shiism among their subjects if they came to power. When later they were both in power, Selim's ministers were Sunnites and he gave this as an excuse for not making his country Shiite. Ismail considered him a liar.
4 Stripling, p. 38.
5 Sanuto, XVIII, 115.
6 Ibid., p. 328.
7 Angiolello, p. 118; Sanuto, XIX, 56-57. A letter written by Sier Donado da Leze to Sier Priamo from Padoa dated September, 1514 mentions the following concerning Angiolello: "... da domino Zuan Maria Anzolello citadino vicentino, qual stete con l'zvo di qisteto Signor anni 20 e se ritravo quando el dito Signor ando contra Ussum Cassan, stete sempre nel campo, sicche screvera cosa che li piacera."
8 Angiolello, p. 119.
9 Sanuto, XVIII, 170; Hammer, IV, 176.
10 Sanuto, XVIII, 203; Ibid., p. 421; Hammer, IV, 177.
11 Sanuto, XVIII, 205; Creasy, p. 133.
12 Hammer, IV, 177.
13 Ibid., p. 182; Creasy, p. 136.
14 Sanuto, XIX, 86.
15 Zeno, p. 58.
16 Hammer, IV, 184.
17 Angiolello, p. 120.
18 Ibid.; Sanuto, XIX, 84-85; Sykes, II, 245.
19 Sanuto, XVII, 421; Creasy, p. 136.
20 Hammer, IV, 183.
21 Ibid., pp. 185-186; Creasy, p. 136. It was the practice, oddly enough, for the Turkish court to use Persian as its official language and the Persian court to use Turkish.
In a report of the Venetian consul at Cyprus in August, 1514 is recorded the supposed portion of Ismail's response to Selim which follows: "Et il signor Sophi rispose: 'Se vui non manzate li vostri cavalli, et si li vostri schiavi janizari nonsi fara suole a le io non passaro la fiumara; ma se vui volete venirmi ad trovar passate vui la fiumara et venite ad trovarmi.'"

Sanuto, XIX, 85-86.

Hammer, IV, 188.

Sanuto, XIX, 57. Apparently, provisions were very low at this time. At one point, Selim received supplies from a Georgian embassy that came to his camp located some miles east of Kaysari.

Angiolello, p. 120.

Supra, p. 17, Footnote 16.

Sanuto, XVIII, 328. Nicolo Zustinian to the Venetian government, Constantinople, March 14, 1514.


Zeno, p. 61.

Ibid.; Sanuto, XIX, 304. In a letter from Maffio di Prioli to the governor of Cyprus, dated October, 1514, there were estimates of the losses encountered by the Turks and the Persian at Chalderan. "...et che quelli del Suffi a morto de quelli del Turco do 40 mila persone et di le sue 12 mila...."; Ibid., pp. 186-187. A letter by Jacomo di Zubon to Andrea Griti, written in Ragusa and dated October 17, 1514 reports the loss of twelve Turkish sanjaks, listing their names and regions. Eight sanjaks were from Rumelia and four from the Anatolia.

Zeno, p. 61; Angiolello, p. 120; Sanuto, XIX, 287. Nicolo Zustinian to the Venetian government, Constantinople,
October 2, 1514. In this letter, Zustignan cites Ali Bey, the former ambassador to Venice, as his source of information concerning Chaldoran. Among other things, he states the following concerning Ismail: "...e come il Sophi era fuzito con tre ferida...."

33 Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512, p. 91. Sophi, Sufi, or Sofi is the Persian word meaning mystic. Ismail was often known as the "Signor Sophi" by the Venetians; Zeno, p. 61.

34 Angiolello, p. 121.


36 Ibid.; Khutbah services were held on Fridays at the mosques. Here was a public ceremony in which the ruler's name was mentioned. On this particular day, Selim's name was mentioned at the service.

37 Ibid., p. 203; Sanuto, XIX, 307, 314, 317. A simple sipahi by the name of Mehanets delivered the letter in person to the Doge of Venice. See Appendix V.

38 Angiolello, p. 121; Hammer, IV, 203.

39 Hammer, IV, 203; Angiolello, p. 121. Angiolello reports that Selim remained in Tabriz three days; Birge, p. 67. Selim was forced to leave Persia before he was able to consolidate his gains. The janissaries were the main reason Selim left Tabriz only after a brief stay. Birge claims that besides their distance from home and lack of booty, janissary restlessness resulted from their secret sympathy with the religious doctrines of the Persians.

40 Sanuto, XIX, 326; Angiolello, p. 121; Hammer, IV, 206.

41 Sanuto, XX, 40; Angiolello, p. 122.

42 Angiolello, p. 122.


44 Sanuto, CC, 40. Nicolo Zustignan to the Venetian government, Constantinople, January 16, 1515.
45 Hammer, IV, 200.
46 Ibid., p. 208; Sanuto, XX, 244-245.
47 Hammer, IV 212.
49 Sanuto, XX, 472; Hammer, IV, 213.
50 Hammer, IV, 222-223.
51 Sanuto, XX, 109; Stripling, p. 40.
52 Sanuto, XX, 472; Ibid., p. 566-567. See Appendix VI; Ibid., XXI, 7. For the Doge’s response to Selim see Appendix VII.
53 Ibid., XX, 225; Hammer, IV, 214.
54 Hammer, IV, 215-218. Not only did Selim change the method of appointing the seghbanbashi but also he created a supplementary position of a Kul-kiaaya who was to deal directly with the matters between the janissaries and the Porte. Furthermore, he ruled that the head of the janissaries, the seghbanbashi, was not to march at the head of his corps at the opening of a campaign. Finally, the defense of the seraglio and the capital in the absence of the Sultan was to be in the hands of the seghbanbashi.
55 Sanuto, XXI, 505; Hammer, IV, 218.
56 Supra, p. 18, Footnote 19; Hammer, IV, 218.
57 Hammer, IV, 219-220.
58 Ibid., p. 220; Fisher, The Middle East: A History, p. 206. Piri Pasha was well-acquainted with the navy since he himself was an admiral in the Turkish navy; Sanuto, XXI, 521. Surian to the Venetian government, Buda, January 30, 1516. According to Surian, the treaty also named the Pope and Venice among others.
59 Ibid., XXI, 53. In a letter dated September 25 and 26, 1515, Antonio Surian writes from Buda that it is certain that the Turks would invade Hungary and that the King of Hungary was sending ambassadors to the Pope, France, and Venice to renew peace and to ask aid against the Turks.

60 Hammer, IV, 220. The Prince of Wallachia was increasing the tribute not only monetarily but also promising an annual tribute of 600 young men to the Sultan for recruits to his janissary corps.

61 Ibid., p. 259.

62 Sanuto, XIX, 456. Lunardo Zustignan to the Venetian government, Adrianople, November 18 and 22, 1515. Lunardo Zustignan related that the Egyptian Sultan had sent an ambassador to Selim and wished to make a treaty but that the Turkish Sultan had refused. He continued "...ditto Signor preparava exercito contra il Soldan, e vol sia in hordine per tutto Fevrrr proximo; fa far assa artelarie picole da campo."
CHAPTER IV.
THE CONQUEST OF THE MAMELUKE EMPIRE
(SPRING 1516 - SUMMER 1518)

Unlike the relatively new Safavi Dynasty of Persia, the Mameluke Empire had existed since the third quarter of the thirteenth century. From that time until the time of Selim I, it remained a leading power in the East. Its territories included Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Hejaz area of Arabia, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Much of the Empire's prestige rested upon the fact that it served as the middleman in the East-West trade. Also, despite the Caliphate's decline in influence in the Muslim world, the Mamelukes still enjoyed the honor of the Caliphate abiding in Egypt and the duty of protecting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

In the first decade of the sixteenth century, the Mameluke Empire began to suffer from an increasing loss of the lucrative East-West trade. The Egyptians were especially losing a substantial portion of the important Indian spice trade to the Portuguese who had discovered and were utilizing a route around Africa rather than the Mameluke route of the Red Sea. This fact was one reason for the rapid decline of this magnificent empire in the early sixteenth century. Such was the state of the Mameluke Empire when Selim I came to the throne in 1512.

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Since the time of Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-1481), discord between the Mameluke and Ottoman Empires had not occurred infrequently. Under Bayezid II, from 1482-1491, a period of warfare existed between the two empires in which the Mamelukes remained undefeated. In 1511 and 1512, hostilities having disappeared, Bayezid II donated supplies toward a Mameluke campaign against the Portuguese. Selim also extended aid to the Mamelukes in 1514, although pre-occupation with the Persian war limited the amount of aid.

In the fall of 1513, the Mameluke Sultan sent an embassy recognizing Selim as the new Ottoman Sultan. At that time, Kansu-al-Ghawri feared the Persian Empire more than that of the Ottoman. However, on witnessing the exploits of Selim in Persia, the Mameluke Sultan soon discovered his potential enemy. Alarmed by the Ottoman victory over Shah Ismail at Chalderan in 1514, Kansu decided to enter into an alliance with Persia, Georgia, and Dhu'1-Kadr against Selim. The members were to aid one another and promised not to send envoys to the Ottomans. This alliance ended when Kansu sent an embassy to the Ottoman Sultan in April, 1515.

Later, it was completely destroyed when in June, 1515, Ala-ed-Devlet's life and territory fell to Selim.

Kansu-al-Ghawri had already sent an army to line the borders of Syria in the fall of 1514 as a safeguard against some future attack from either the Turks or the Persians. The events of 1515 were to prove to Kansu-al-Ghawri that his reinforcements were justified and that Egypt might next feel the sharp edge of Selim's ambitions.

Meanwhile Selim spent the fall of 1515 and the winter of 1516 occupied with reorganizing his fleet and incorporating his new territories while renewing a truce with Hungary.
The reports of the Venetian ambassadors throughout this period predicted a renewal of the war with Persia or even a war with the Mameluke Sultan. Nicolo Zustignan, Venetian baylo at Constantinople, wrote that Selim was reinforcing his navy, not against Venice, but to make war with the Sultan of Egypt.

In the spring of 1516, Selim decided to mobilize his troops and sent Sinan Pasha at the head of 40,000 men toward Albustan since hostilities still existed between the Ottomans and the Persians. Shah Ismail, aware of Selim's intentions, informed Kansu-al-Ghawri of Egypt. The two rulers made peace between themselves and decided to make an alliance in which the Mameluke Sultan would send troops to the rear of the Ottomans and hopefully surround Sinan Pasha between them.

Kansu-al-Ghawri, determined to protect himself from Ottoman aggression and in keeping with his alliance with Ismail, began immediately to prepare the mobilization of his troops and supplies. Ibn Iyas, in his account of the Ottoman conquest, suggested that the period of preparation "showed a bad state of affairs." The Sultan had unexpectedly announced on the first month of spring that the Mamelukes were to go on an expedition in one month. Confusion reigned throughout Cairo and among the troops. Because of a lack of horses and mules, the Mamelukes raided the livestock of the mills and consequently forced them to shut down. In fear of compulsory contributions, merchants hid from the Mamelukes and so did artisans and tailors. In order to collect money, heavy taxes were levied on the small villages, and this caused the fellahin to flee and leave their crops unattended. The Mameluke treasury was so low in funds that
Kansu could not pay the soldiers he left behind in Egypt. Furthermore, the soldiers did not favor the expedition; they asserted that the Ottomans had not violated Egyptian territory and that the Egyptian Sultan's mobilization of forces would only increase Ottoman wrath and multiply the chances for war. Despite the numerous adverse conditions, Kans-al-Ghawri left Cairo to make the long march to Aleppo on May 17, 1516. He drafted every possible candidate into his army and left only a small contingent to guard Cairo with Tuman Bay as regent. 17

The Mameluke Sultan proceeded to march through Palestine and Syria until he reached Aleppo on July 10, 1516. 18 Kansu had received recognition throughout all the cities of Syria into which he marched. Most impressive was the welcome which he received in Damascus. The European merchants showered him with gold and silver coins. Unfortunately, because of the excessive greed of his soldiers, the old Sultan almost got knocked off his horse as the soldiers rushed to pick up the coins. 19

Selim had heard from Sinan Pasha himself that the Mamelukes had gathered a disturbingly large army of observation on the Syrian border. The Ottoman Sultan wasted no time in calling together his diwan. As Selim had hoped, his ministers voted in favor of a war with Egypt. 20 Selim immediately sent out an embassy which was to make known his intentions to the Egyptian Sultan. 21 At the head of the embassy he placed Karaja Pasha and Mavlana-Rukneddin, the judge of the army of Rumelia. 22 Then the Ottoman Sultan secured his government at home by leaving the cities of Adrianople, Constantinople, and Brusa respectively in the

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hands of Suleiman, Piri Pasha, and Hersekoglu-Ahmed Pasha. Selim himself left Constantinople to join Sinan Pasha on June 5, 1516. 23

Shortly after his arrival in Aleppo, Kansu-al-Ghawri received Selim's envoys. 24 The purpose of Selim's embassy and the contents of his message to Kansu have opposing interpretations in various accounts. 25 However, the fact that Kansu treated Selim's ambassadors poorly is reported by all the accounts. He had the Ottoman ambassadors thrown into prison. Apparently, whatever Selim had actually proposed to Kansu must have highly angered the Mameluke Sultan. Ibn Iyas reports that Selim's ambassadors tried to convince Kansu that their ruler wished peace with the Mamelukes and really wanted war with Shah Ismail. 26 This interpretation is credible since Selim would have hoped to delay Kansu as much as possible.

In the meantime, the Ottoman Sultan traveled through Karamania, and stopped at Konya on June 26th. In Konya, Selim wrote a letter to the Venetian government dated July 2nd which related his victory over the Persian governor of Diarbekir which completed the submission of the entire province. 27 From Konya, Selim continued to travel until he reached Sinan Pasha's camp at Albustan on July 23, 1516. Having come this far, Selim knew the seriousness of his position. He prepared a careful strategy to avoid entrance into Mameluke territory. Instead, he marched his troops eastward to Malatia. Here, he was in a position to face either the Persians in Diarbekir or the Mamelukes in Aleppo. In this way Selim insured that he would not be caught by the Persians from the rear. 28

The news of the Mameluke march northward out of Aleppo reached Selim on July 30th. On August 5th, Selim began his march toward Aleppo. 29 He encountered the governor of Aintab,
Yunus Bey, who had deserted the Egyptians and offered Selim the lead from Aintab all the way to the city of Aleppo. Shortly after the Ottomans began their march, Selim received Kansu-al-Ghawri's final embassy under a military man by the name of Mughalbay. Mughalbay, who was accompanied by a military retinue, offered new terms for peace. Selim, angered that a military man be sent to negotiate peace, remembered the treatment of his own ambassadors and ordered that the entire embassy be slain. All ten of Mughalbay's retinue died, but he was spared only because of the pleas of Yunus Bey. The Ottoman Sultan had Mughalbay's hair and beard shaved and his head was covered with a black hat. In this condition, he was sent back to Kansu on a lame donkey.

With the return of Mughalbay to the Mameluke camp, Kansu-al-Ghawri realized that a confrontation in the very near future was imminent. Conditions in Syria were becoming unfavorable to the Mamelukes. Already the governor of Aintab, Yunus Bey, had deserted to join the Turkish side. Also, the population within and surrounding Aleppo was hostile to the Mamelukes because of their disregard for the rights of the inhabitants. At this point, Kansu decided to call a war council to discuss strategy in the forthcoming contest with the Ottomans. At the meeting, Sibay, the governor of Damascus, questioned Khair Bey's loyalty who was the governor of Aleppo. Janbirdi-al-Ghazali defended Khair Bey, keeping him from losing his command. To the misfortune of the Mamelukes, the council accepted the strategy of Khair Bey who indeed was a traitor. He represented the Mameluke soldiery in the hope for immediate war. Khair Bey's
strategy won over the caustious retreat strategy of al-Ghazali which would have exhausted the Ottoman supplies and possibly won the war for the Mamelukes.35

On August 20, 1516, Kansu-al-Ghawri and his army marched northward to the plains of Marj Dabik, located one day's march from the city of Aleppo.36 Here the Mamelukes set up their camp, awaiting the approach of the Turks.

On his part, Selim had left Malatia, traveling to the southwest. He knew that in the past the Ottomans had never won a battle against the Mamelukes. His men also knew the fate of the Ottomans in past pursuits. In order to encourage his soldiers, Selim spoke to them and distributed presents throughout the ranks. The Turkish army continued to march until it reached the plains of Marj Dabik on August 23, 1516.37

The following day, August 24th, the two armies met one another on the plain of Marj Dabik, the Muslim traditional burial place of David.38 The Mameluke forces numbered approximately 40,000 men.39 Though no definite number can approximate the strength of the Ottoman forces, the possibility exists that they had a number close to the Mamelukes, and probably a few thousand stronger.40 The first attack occurred when both Khair Bey and Janbirdi-al-Ghazali met the Turkish cavalry and repulsed them. As the Turkish cavalry retreated, Selim sent forth his two best generals, Sinan Pasha on the right wing and Yunus Pasha on the left, while Selim himself lead the center wing at the head of the janissaries. Similar to the events of the Battle of Chalderan, the Ottoman artillery created chaos in the ranks of the Mameluke cavalry. This gave the Ottoman horsemen time to realign. At this point, the Mamelukes tired from the encounter, began to
retreat, while the Ottoman, spurred by success, pressed forward. Seeing his chance to turn the tide of battle, Khair Bey began implementing his strategy. He informed Kansu-al-Ghawri that the Mamelukes, surrounded by Ottomans, were losing. Khair Bey then withdrew his troops and marched toward Aleppo. Panic overcame the Mameluke soldiers as the news of Khair Bey's retreat reached the ranks. The Mamelukes began deserting the battlefield en masse. Kansu-al-Ghawri tried to rally his troops but his efforts became useless.41 The eighty year old Sultan fell from his horse while stricken most likely by a heart attack or stroke.42 His body, trampled by both Mamelukes and Ottomans, was never recovered.43 The Battle of Marj Dabik was lost to the Ottomans and Syria fell to them as a result.

The battle, which lasted from sunrise to late afternoon, claimed many Ottoman lives and estimates ranged from 1,000 to 15,000 men dead.44 As for the casualties in the Mameluke army, estimates are not reported. However, in a victory letter of Selim to the Venetian government, the Ottoman Sultan states that besides the Sultan, Kansu-al-Ghawri, thirteen Mameluke governors died in the battle.45

The Mamelukes who had fled attempted to re-enter Aleppo where all their supplies remained. However, the hostile inhabitants attacked them and would not give them refuge. These soldiers, realizing it impossible to enter Aleppo, turned in the direction of Damascus. There they arrived in pitiful condition, many without clothes or horses and riding on camels and donkeys.46 Selim had sent Yunus Pasha to pursue the retreating Mamelukes. Having chased the defeated troops to Hama, Yunus Pasha met Khair Bey here and accepted the traitor's offer to join the Ottoman forces.47

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The victory of Marj Dabik had opened Syria to the Ottomans but the task of formally subduing the province was still to be implemented. On August 28, 1516, Selim began this task by entering Aleppo. The Turkish Sultan received a favorable reception. Selim was happy to find that Kansu had left a vast amount of treasure in Aleppo, including 800,000 gold ashrafis. Khair Bey pleased Selim by presenting him with 150 slaves and 3,000 ducats. For these presents, Selim promised that Khair Bey would be the governor of Cairo. While in Aleppo, Selim met with the Caliph and three judges who had made the journey from Cairo with Kansu. Selim received the Caliph with honor and respect, but showed the judges his anger because they had supposedly taken bribes for their administration of the Law.

With the fall of the city of Aleppo, the Syrian border cities of Malatia, Divrigi, Behesni, Aintab, and Kalaat-er-Rum recognized Selim's sovereignty. Cautious to placate the population and to keep their loyalty, the Turkish Sultan left indigenous rulers in charge of the governments of his newly acquired towns. Before leaving Aleppo, Selim took part in the Friday Khutbah service in which he received recognition as the ruler of the country.

Selim left Aleppo on September 15, 1516, marching in the direction of Damascus. On his way, he took both Hama and Homs. However, Tripoli surrendered peacefully to the Ottoman Sultan. On October 9, 1516, Selim formally entered the city of Damascus. The Arab sheikh whom the Mamelukes had left as governor, Kasir Bey, gave the city up to Selim peacefully. According to Muslim law, Damascus could not be plundered because it had surrendered peacefully.
soon as news traveled of the surrender of Damascus, the rest of Syria fell easily to Selim. Officials came to Damascus from Beirut, Saida, Antioch, and Ptolemais, all coming to recognize the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan. Selim stayed in Damascus during the winter of 1516 until the month of December. During this time, he concerned himself with administrative reforms. Some days after having entered Damascus, he convened a council for the express purpose of reforming many of the old Mameluke laws and customs. He also received the emirs of Lebanon, both Druzes and Maronites. Aware of the capacity of the Lebanese for resistance, Selim decided to confirm the fiefs of the emirs and to impose a very small tribute. The petty princes of Lebanon became nominal vassals of the Porte, and retained the rights over life and death, taxation, treaties with foreign powers, and maintenance of an army. In this way, Selim avoided a minor war which would have hampered his more immediate goal of conquering Egypt.

While Selim attended to his newly acquired province of Syria, the Mamelukes had regrouped their forces in Egypt. On September 22, 1516, Tuman Bay, who had remained in Cairo as regent, became the new Mameluke Sultan. Conditions in Egypt had not improved since Kansu-al-Ghawri had left on campaign. The Mameluke treasury was empty, the Caliph remained with Selim, the troops were in disorder, Syria was in Ottoman hands, and the Turks were about to invade Egypt.

Selim had sent Tuman Bay an embassy to offer peace. The Mameluke Sultan received the two Ottoman ambassadors in a manner befitting their rank. However, when hearing
that the terms for peace were that Selim's sovereignty
be recognized and that his name be mentioned at the Khutbah
with money coined in his name, an officer named Alanbay
cut off the heads of the Ottoman envoys.° This incident
only made Tuman Bay more determined to meet the Ottomans.
He attempted every effort to provide his army with supplies.
He even raised mercenary troops from the surrounding ter-
ritories in North Africa. Tuman Bay also sent envoys to
Shah Ismail in the fall of 1516. He asked that the Shah
attack Aleppo, thereby diverting Selim's attention from an
attack on Cairo. Furthermore, he hoped to cut off Turkish
supplies with this plan.° In an effort to stop the Ottomans,
Tuman Bay sent Janbirdi-al-Ghazali at the head of ten
divisions to march toward the frontiers of Syria on October
28, 1516.° Not far from Gaza, in the vicinity of the Kara-
vanserai of Yunus Khan, al-Ghazali encountered an advance
army sent by Selim under Sinan Pasha. The Ottomans were
victorious in the skirmish, forcing the Mamelukes to retreat
into the desert. The next day the Turks re-entered Gaza,
where they had camped before their encounter with the
Mamelukes.°

Meanwhile, Selim had left Damascus on December 15,
1516.° He was in Ramala when the news of Sinan Pasha's
victory reached him. Shortly after this, the Ottomans
began to cross the desert in early January. After a thirteen
day march, they reached Egypt. The trek across the desert
was strenuous for the Ottomans and furthermore, they were
constantly harrassed by bands of Bedouins.°

The news of the Ottoman march toward Egypt took Tuman
Bay by surprise. He had expected the Ottomans to begin their

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march in the spring rather than in the winter of 1517. The Mamelukes immediately began to fortify against the Ottoman advance. Tuman Bay established a camp at Raidaniyyeh, a small village near Cairo. Some of the preparations made at Raidaniyyeh included the posting of artillery and the digging of ditches that were supposed to eliminate much of the Ottoman cavalry when they attacked. 66

Selim approached the Mameluke camp on January 22, 1517. 67 Previously informed of the enemy's plans by traitors, Selim did not make a frontal attack on the village of Raidaniyyeh. The Turkish artillery was superior in the battle. 68 The Mamelukes, after hours of fighting, finally retreated to Cairo.

On his return to the capital, Tuman had the gates of the city fortified. The Mameluke Sultan appealed to the population to defend themselves. The inhabitants of the city were well aware that if their city were taken, it would be open to plunder by the Turks as was the custom of Muslim law for those who resisted invasion. 69

Selim began his attack on Cairo on January 27, 1516. Heavy fighting in the city continued for three days and nights. 70 On January 30th, the wearied inhabitants finally surrendered. In accordance with Muslim law, the city was left open to plunder. During this period, the homes of the city were pillaged by the Turks and large numbers of Mamelukes were massacred by the banks of the Nile. After three days of pillaging, it is said that Selim entered the city to take up residence in the palace of the defeated Mameluke Sultan. 71

Tuman Bay had escaped from Cairo by assuming a disguise. He fled to the region of Segesta where a band of Mamelukes
from Alexandria joined him. While there, he managed to acquire the allegiance of some Arabs in northwestern Egypt by promising them tax exemption for three years.72 Also, certain families from Cairo who had suffered humiliations from the Turks, promised to assist Tuman Bay in an attack on Cairo. However, Selim became informed of these plans and decided to send a final embassy of peace to Tuman. Unfortunately, the Turkish ambassadors never reached the Mameluke Sultan because they were all slain by a band of Mamelukes before reaching their destination.73 The news of the massacre of his embassy hardened Selim's convictions to destroy completely Sultan Tuman Bay. Selim made preparations to march up the Nile and attack the Mamelukes. In the confrontation that resulted, the Mamelukes at first were successful, catching the Ottomans by surprise. However, the Ottoman forces rallied and many of the Mamelukes fled or died at the hands of the Turks.74 Tuman Bay was captured and taken to Cairo. In order to convince the populace that the Turks were their masters, Selim dressed Tuman in old clothes with chains around his neck and paraded him on a donkey throughout the principal squares of Cairo. Finally, on April 13, 1517, Tuman Bay died after being hanged at the gate of Bab-ez-Zuwailla as were his remaining Mameluke officers and soldiers.75

Having crushed Mameluke resistance and eliminated the last Mameluke Sultan, Selim now was the inheritor of all the former Mameluke territories, as well as the Mameluke trading rights. Included in this booty was the prestige and responsibility of protecting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Even the Caliphate had now fallen under Ottoman
rule. Furthermore, Selim inherited the island of Cyprus among his other territories. The Venetians had leased the island from the Mamelukes for a certain amount of tribute. On investigating this, Selim discovered that the Venetians owed five years of tribute payments. He demanded on June 14, 1517, that the tribute, amounting to 40,000 ducats, be paid.  

The first Friday after the conquest, Selim attended the Khutbah service. The Ottoman Sultan was officially mentioned as the ruler. It is reported that he impressively displayed a great example of humility to those who assembled at the service. Before leaving Cairo, Selim exported many of the prominent rich families to his capital in Constantinople, along with many of the most priceless Egyptian works of art.  

On May 28, 1517, Selim, interested in reviewing his fleet, traveled to Alexandria where the Ottoman fleet had sailed from Constantinople. He returned to Cairo on June 3rd and stayed in the capital until the early days of September, 1517, when he began his return into Syria. Before leaving Cairo, he made Khair Bey the governor of Egypt.  

The Ottoman Sultan reached Damascus on October 9, 1517 with an army of 25,000 men. Here Selim learned of Ismail's difficulties with the provinces of Khorasan and Tartary. It is most probable that these difficulties had kept Ismail from attacking the Turks from the rear in Syria. During his stay in Damascus, Selim found himself constantly busy with both internal and external affairs. There was a Bedouin uprising and Selim's troops were forced to put it down. Many Bedouin sheikhs from Syria such as the Beni Ibrahim came to pay the Ottoman Sultan their homage.
Also, Selim worked on plans for the organization of a public tax. As for external affairs, Selim had already met in Cairo with the two Venetian ambassadors, Bartolomeo Contarini and Alvise Mocenigo, concerning the tribute for Cyprus. He was so pleased by them that he had Mocenigo sail with his fleet to Constantinople while Contarini traveled with the Sultan's cortege all the way to Damascus. Selim also renewed a one year truce with the Hungarians, which unfortunately was broken shortly afterward. Furthermore, he received at Damascus the ambassadors of Ismail who sent their monarch's proposals for peace along with rich presents. His work in Damascus over, Selim appointed Janbirdi-al-Ghazali as governor before he left for Aleppo on March 5, 1518.

Selim reached Aleppo on March 12, 1518. He spent two months in the city and while there, learned of the work of Pope Leo X in attempting to stir the European princes into a crusade against the Turk. The Ottoman Sultan left Aleppo after selecting governors for Tripoli, Maledin, and Amman. Selim was anxious to return to Constantinople partly because of this new Christian conspiracy and partly because he had not been in his own capital for almost two years. After a trip of two months' duration, Selim reached Constantinople in July, 1518.
CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1Muir, p. 13. Beibar Badakdar, the first of the Bahrite Mameluke Sultans came to the throne in 1260.

2Stripling, p. 16. Stripling's excellent article, "The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574," was a helpful source of reference for this chapter; Albert Howe Lybyer, "The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade," The English Historical Review, Vol. XXX, No. 120 (October, 1915), p. 579.


4Donald Weinstein, Ambassador from Venice: Pietro Pascualigo in Lisbon, 1501 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 23. Venice as well as the Mamelukes suffered from the change to the Portugesse trade route; Stripling, pp. 28-29.

5Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512, pp. 35-42.

6Ibid., pp. 101-102.

7Sanuto, XIX, 40. Sier Tomaso Venier to the Venetian government, Alexandria, July 8, 1514.

8Supra, p. 9, Footnote 24.

9Supra, p. 20, Footnote 43.

10Sanuto, XX, 109.

11Supra, p. 21, Footnote 49.
Sanuto, XIX, 304. Mafia di Prioli to Sier Michiel, Damascus, October 7, 1514, summarized; Muhammed Ibn Ahmed Ibn Iyas, An Account of the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt, translated by W. H. Salmon (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1921), p. 1. Ibn Iyas's account of the Ottoman conquest was written contemporaneously to the events that transpired. It is believed that he was an Arab who was probably in the employe of the Mameluke government.

Sanuto, XXII, 204; Ibid., XXI, 456.

Ibid., p. 505. Nicolo Zustignan to the Venetian government, Adrianople, January 8, 1516.

Ibid., XXII, 276; Hammer, IV, 261; Angiolello, p. 124.

Sanuto, XXII, 348; Angiolello, p. 124.

Ibn Iyas, pp. 1-10; Stripling, p. 41; Sanuto, XXII, 485.

Ibn Iyas, p. 32; Stripling, p. 41.

Sanuto, XXII, 567. Thomas Venier to the Venetian government, Alexandria, July 17, 1516. The Venetian consul, Venier, reported that Kansu arrived in Damascus on June 8th and that he stayed for seven days; Ibn Iyas, pp. 24-25.

Hammer, IV, 262.

Apparently Selim's intentions have never been clearly discerned. Angiolello, Hammer, and Ibn Iyas all give different purposes for this embassy.

Ibn Iyas, p. 32.

Hammer, IV, 263; Sanuto, XXII, 472.

Ibn Iyas, p. 32; Sanuto, XXII, 567.

Angiolello, p. 124; Hammer, IV, 263; Ibn Iyas, pp. 32-33. Angiolello records that Selim's embassy came to inquire as to the reasons for Kansu's mobilization of troops to Aleppo. Hammer simply states that the embassy was to deliver a declaration of war as was the Law of the Koran which bound a
hostile power to declare itself. Ibn Iyas states that the
Ottoman embassy feigned a mission of peace and that Selim
declared only an interest in defeating and destroying
Shah Isma'il.

26 Ibn Iyas, pp. 32-33.
27 Hammer, IV, 263; Sanuto, XXII, 462. See Appendix VIII.
28 Stripling, p. 43; Angioletto, p. 124.
29 Stripling, p. 43; Hammer, IV, 263.
30 Hammer, IV, 263.
31 Sanuto, XXII, 659; Apparently the custom was to send
ambassadors who were not connected with the military. Es-
pecially preferred as envoys were the very learned and
respected.

32 Hammer, IV, 264-265; Ibn Iyas, p. 36. In the account
of Ibn Iyas, Mughalbay was imprisoned and put in irons.
33 Hammer, IV, 263; Muir, p. 198.
34 Muir, pp. 198-199; Stripling, p. 44; Hammer, IV, 275-
276. Kansa had poisoned Khair Bey's brother. This was the
reason that Khair Bey became a traitor.
35 Stripling, p. 44.
36 Muir, p. 199.
37 Stripling, pp. 45-46.
38 Hammer, IV, 276; Sanuto, XXIII, 107.
39 Sanuto, XXII, 529. An anonymous letter dated May 18,
1516.
40 Ibid., XXI, 276; Hammer, IV, 261. When Sinan Pasha
began his march to Albustan, he reportedly took 40,000 men
with him. One must reason that Selim's forces at Marj
Dabik equalled this amount and possibly a few thousand more
that might have joined them later.
Angiolello, pp. 125-126; Hammer, IV, 276-278; Stripling, p. 47; Ibn Iyas, p. 42. Discrepancies occur on some of the details of the battle in all four of these accounts. Stripling's article here has most closely been followed for any detail.

Sanuto, XXIII, 108. In an anonymous letter dated October 6, 1516, the following is reported concerning Kansu: "...et il Soldan, volendo montar a cavallo cascoe... iterum caschoe et spiro. Era di anni 80, nome Campesn El Gruri...."; Stripling, p. 47. On the basis of a statement by Paolo Giovio, Bishop of Nocera, and also John Leo's History and Description of Africa, Stripling's diagnosis of Kansu's death was hernia; Ibn Iyas, p. 43. Ibn Iyas reports that "the Sultan's heart became as a red hot coal, which could not be extinguished...a kind of paralysis fell upon him, which affected one side...." This author bases her belief that Kansu died of a heart attack or a stroke because of the account in Ibn Iyas; Knolles, p. 531. See Appendix IX.

Sanuto, XXIII, 109; Ibid., p. 108.

Ibid., pp. 397-398. Selim to the Venetian government, Aleppo, August, 1516. See Appendix X.

Ibn Iyas, p. 46.

Stripling, pp. 48-49; Knolles, p. 558. See Appendix XI.

Stripling, p. 49.

Sanuto, XXIII, 328-329. An anonymous letter written from Famagusta in December, 1516, reports the events of Selim's entrance into Aleppo.

Ibn Iyas, p. 47; Muir, p. 200.

Hammer, IV, 279-280; Stripling, p. 49.

Ibn Iyas, p. 49; Hammer, IV, 280.

Sanuto, XXIII, 325. Donado Marzelo to the Venetian government, Cyprus, September 27, 1516.
54 Hammer, IV, 284-285; Sanuto, XXIII, 201.

55 Stripling, p. 50; Sanuto, XXIII, 286; Ben Meir, pp. 421-422.

56 Hammer, IV, 287; Sanuto, XXIV, 15.

57 Ben Meir, p. 422; Hammer, IV, 286.

58 Hammer, IV, 286; Sanuto, XXIII, 247. Tomaso Venier to the Venetian government, Alexandria, September 29, 1516. In this report, Tuman Bay is referred to as the "great Diodar," which is his first name, while Tuman Bay is his surname.

59 Ibn Iyas, pp. 71, 76; Muir, p. 203.

60 Hammer, IV, 301.

61 Stripling, p. 52.

62 Hammer, IV, 302; Sanuto, XXIV, 19; Angioletto, p. 128.

63 Sanuto, XXIV, 19; Hammer, IV, 302-303; Angioletto, p. 130.

64 Sanuto, XXIV, 17, 19.

65 Hammer, IV, 303-304; Sanuto, XXIV, 126; Stripling, p. 52.

66 Stripling, p. 53; Angioletto, p. 131.


68 Sanuto, XXIV, 306: Stripling, p. 53. The Turks had highly skilled mercenaries from Italy and their gunpowder was prepared by Jewish experts in powder manufacture. The Jews received refuge from the Sultan when formerly they had been expelled from Spain.

69 Stripling, pp. 53-54.

70 Ibid., p. 54; Sanuto, XXIV, 224.
When Selim's janissaries pillaged the city of Cairo, they
found in a sepulchre 500,000 ashrufis, silver lamps, chains,
and carpets. Selim himself claimed most of the treasure.

Hammer, IV, 311; Sanuto, XXIV, 204; Angiolello, p. 135.

Hammer, IV, 315-318; Stripling, p. 55.

Angiolello, p. 137; Hammer, IV, 321-322; Knolles,
p. 551. See Appendix XII.

For a few months after the death of Tuman Bay, the Caliph
Mutawakkil was allowed to exercise his authority. In June,
1518, Selim had him brought to Constantinople. He returned
to Cairo after Selim's death and began to exercise his old
powers until his death in 1543. Mutawakkil was the last of
his line. Ibn Iyas at no time mentions that Selim ever
took the powers of the Caliphate from Mutawakkil.

Sanuto, XXIV, 650; Stripling, p. 56.

Ibn Iyas, p. 115; Hammer, IV, 327; Sanuto, XXIV, 506;
Stripling, p. 57.

Hammer, IV, 335, 341; Sanuto, XXIV, 506.

Stripling, p. 57; Sanuto, XXV, 118.

Stripling, p. 58; Hammer, IV, 344.

Hammer, IV, 345; Sanuto, XXV, 144; Ibid., p. 132.

Hammer, IV, 345.

Sanuto, XXV, 404. An anonymous letter from Cyprus,
March 28, 1518; Ibid., pp. 485-486.

Hammer, IV, 346.
86 Stripling, p. 58; Sanuto, XXV, 269.
87 Sanuto, XXVI, 18; Ibid., p. 133; Hammer, IV, 347.
CHAPTER V
THE FINAL YEARS
(FALL 1518 – FALL 1520)

Selim had left Constantinople in the spring of 1516 as one of the three most important Muslim powers. He returned in the summer of 1518 as the most important Muslim power. He had eliminated the Mamelukes through conquest and Persia no longer remained a threat. The combination of territory taken from the Persians and the Mamelukes had almost doubled Selim's original empire. With this change in physical dimensions came the corresponding change in world power. The Turks were now the leading power in the East. As could be expected, this shift in status for the Ottomans effected their relations with other nations, especially with the European countries.¹ The final two years of Selim's reign saw the initiation of a new direction in the Empire's pattern of foreign relations.

Before dealing in matters of foreign affairs, Selim, in the early months of his return, concerned himself with refurbishing his treasury. The financing of the Egyptian campaign had depleted the resources of the Ottomans. In an effort to restore his treasury, Selim gathered funds by collecting overdue tribute from vassals, customs revenues from merchants, and taxes annually collected from Christian and Jewish subjects of the Empire.²
While Selim concerned himself with monetary matters, he also decided to incorporate the Crimean Tartars into the Ottoman Empire. Under Mohammed-Ghirai's father, the Crimean Tartars were nominal vassals of the Porte and remained in fact autonomous. Selim distrusted such a relationship; he feared that the Tartars would eventually cause the Empire difficulties. With this in mind, Selim informed Mohammed-Ghirai that he was to become a legal vassal of the Ottomans. The Crimean Khan, unable to confront the Sultan at that time, subjected himself. From then on, he became one of the many vassals of the Porte and was forced to send his son to Constantinople as a hostage.³

For the first six years of his reign, Selim had followed a policy of pacifying Western powers. However, he no longer had any real contenders in the East and he now looked to the West in a far more aggressive manner. This change in foreign policy is clearly displayed by the foreign relations with Venice in his last two years. Instead of the rather calm relations which had existed, Selim became more forceful with the Venetians. In October, 1518, he sent an envoy by the name of Yunis to the Venetian government. Yunis delivered a letter which demanded compensation for the capture of several Turkish vessels and Turkish subjects and condemned this act as a danger to peace between the two countries.⁴ In June of the following year, Selim sent Mustafa Zaus to Venice to claim the tribute of 16,000 ducats owed to the Porte for the lease on Cyprus.⁵ The last payment took place in 1517 when the Venetians paid Selim for five years of tribute payments formerly owed to the Mameluke government. At that time, the cost of future tribute was
set at 8,000 ducats a year. Apparently, the Venetians had attempted to pay the Sultan in gold and silver but Selim had refused; he demanded the payment in Venetian ducats. When the Ottoman Sultan received the Venetian ambassador who brought the tribute, Selim warned that he would restore peace with the Republic only if it strictly observed the terms of its treaties with the Porte.\(^6\)

In the case of relations with Hungary, the Ottomans had last extended a one year truce in 1518. However, typical in the relations between these two countries, border skirmishes continued. Also, predictions of a planned Turkish campaign against Hungary filled the reports of Venetian ambassadors.\(^7\) Despite these predictions, the Turks again signed a truce for three years with the Hungarians. The projections of a Turkish campaign against Hungary reported by the Venetians remained for Suleiman I to fulfill.\(^8\)

While attending to affairs with Hungary and Venice, Selim also engaged himself in developing a larger and better equipped navy. The Venetian baylo at Constantinople reported that Selim had ordered approximately one-hundred ships of different sizes to be built.\(^9\) These preparations for a larger fleet were part of Selim's projected program of aggression against the West. His most immediate ambition seemed to include the invasion of Rhodes.\(^10\) He was not the first Ottoman Sultan to plan such an expedition. His grandfather, Mehmed II, had attempted to take Rhodes but failed to do so. From that time on, the island lived in fear of another Ottoman invasion. In 1511, Pope Julius II gave the Knights of Saint John the responsibility of protecting Rhodes with their lives.\(^11\) Under Selim's reign, relations with Rhodes had begun to become hostile in 1517.
During the Egyptian campaign, the Turkish fleet sailed passed the island of Rhodes on its way to Alexandria. At this time, the grand master of Rhodes and the Turkish admiral exchanged insulting letters. The corsairs from Rhodes thereafter began harrassing the Turkish ships sailing from Constantinople to Egypt. Animosities flared when Selim sent ambassadors to Rhodes in 1519 to demand tribute and slaves. The grand master of Rhodes replied he would not give Selim even polluted water. The forecast of war between Rhodes and Turkey was steadfastly predicted in Venetian correspondence. However, Selim must have reconsidered and peace was concluded between the two. It is believed that Selim wanted to postpone hostilities until he felt certain of his navy and supplies. Rumors of war between Turkey and Rhodes continued up until Selim's death. There is good reason to believe that he would have invaded Rhodes had he lived a few years longer. Instead, the task of taking Rhodes fell to Suleiman.

The West had not remained idle during Selim's conquest of Egypt and the last two years of his reign. The Papacy attempted to rally the Christian powers to a crusade against the Turk. As early as 1514, Pope Leo X (1513-1521) had attempted to create a crusade against the infidel. He had even sent money and supplies into Hungary to stir up a crusading spirit in this country where the threat of the Turks was always in evidence. Pope Leo had watched anxiously Selim's defeat of Persia, but when the Ottoman Sultan began the conquest of the Mamelukes, the Pope decided to act. Pope Leo feared that the Turkish Sultan would next turn on the Christian West, a fear not unfounded. In 1517,
Leo X began negotiating with France, England, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire. He issued a bull on March 6, 1517, which called for a five year truce of the Christian powers for the purpose of preparing a crusade against the Turk. Fortunately for Selim, the European powers never joined forces because of mutual jealousies and internal problems. Francis I (1515–1547) of France and Maximilian I (1493–1519) of the Holy Roman Empire engaged in a mutual jealousy over military power. Henry VIII (1509–1547) of England showed little enthusiasm for the plans for a crusade. His chancellor, Wolsey, who made proposals for a universal peace signed by the powers at the Treaty of London (1518), even superseded Leo X’s efforts for a crusade. Furthermore, aid forthcoming from the Holy Roman Empire collapsed under the stain of choosing a new emperor, Charles V (1519–1556) who was also King of Spain at the time. By 1519, the crusade was a near impossibility with cooperation among the powers at a low point. When Selim died in 1520, the Christian West falsely believed that their fears of aggression from Turkey were over and no longer pursued the issue of a crusade.

Two European countries with which the Turks became involved through the Mameluke conquest were Spain and Portugal. The acquisition of Egypt brought Selim closer to the Spanish Mauretanian lands. In the spring of 1518, the Spanish under the Marquis of Comares attacked the Moorish domain of Arudj Barbarossa, ruler of Dellys and Tenes. In the conflict that ensued, Arudj and his retainers died and the capital of Tlemcen was taken. The Spanish set up a local dynasty which paid tribute to the Spanish governor of Oran. Kaireddin, Arudj’s brother, took his place.
He was determined to regain Tlemcen from the Spaniards. Realizing his situation, he decided to appeal to the Ottoman Empire for vassalage. Successful in this endeavor, Kaireddin received the theoretical backing and prestige of the Ottomans. Even though Selim would have not been able to aid Kaireddin, this new vassalage linked the Ottomans to Spanish interests. In the following year, Selim received his first ambassador from Spain. His conquests had given him sovereignty over the Christian holy places in Jerusalem. The Spanish ambassador had come to confirm the franchise over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Christian pilgrims. This franchise had existed under the Mamelukes under the terms of an annual tribute. Selim received the Spanish ambassador graciously and even gave him a kaftan and 5,000 aspers. He promised the envoy that, if another ambassador came in the future, a special treaty would be concluded between Spain and the Porte.

Contacts with the Portuguese were more indirect than those with Spain. The Portuguese, who had menaced the Red Sea trade route under the Mamelukes, continued to do so under Ottoman hegemony of the trade route. Selim wanted to restore his new territories of Egypt and Syria to their former prosperity before the advent of the Portuguese. In order to accomplish this, he would have to deal with the Portuguese first, in the Red Sea and secondly, in India. In connection with his occupancy of western Arabia, the Mameluke conquest had resulted in the acquisition of the west coast known as the Hejaz which included the port of Jidda and all the towns north of it. Furthermore, the important area of Yemen to the south of Jidda became Ottoman.
when its Mameluke government recognized Selim in July, 1517. The Mamelukes had decided to take Yemen in 1516 as a retreat position in the advent of a Turkish conquest of Egypt. However, the Mameluke governor of Yemen, Iskander, decided that the best course would be to recognize Selim's sovereignty since the Ottoman victory in Egypt had been so thorough. Iskander remained as the governor of Yemen and he made his capital at Zebid. By 1517, Selim had accomplished his first step in destroying Portuguese power over the trade routes. However, the second step would never be accomplished. Selim's empire was now exceedingly vast and many other problems claimed his attention. Furthermore, his financial resources at this time made an expedition against the Portuguese in India prohibitive. Also, his fleet was in the process of becoming enlarged and better equipped both at Constantinople and Gallipoli. It was in no condition to confront the Portuguese fleet. Therefore, an expedition never materialized in his lifetime.

The Portuguese on their part continued to menace the trade route and even furnished Selim's enemies with artillery. Furthermore, the Portuguese took part in a siege of Tunis which was under Ottoman sovereignty. The Indian sultanates asked Selim for aid against the Portuguese as early as 1518. Although Selim never sent an expedition, he did manage to send a few ships in retaliation. An expedition to India against the Portuguese had to wait until 1538 during the reign of Suleiman.

In his last two years of life, Selim remained as vigorous as ever in his duties as Sultan. In an anonymous letter dated October, 1518, Selim is described as being totally
spirited, sleeping little, and taking the duties of governing entirely upon himself without the aid of numerous vizirs. In mid-September, 1520, Selim took the well-known journey from Constantinople to Adrianople. Apparently he had fallen ill before the planned trip. Against his doctors' wishes, he proceeded to continue his journey and refused to stop taking opium while insisting on riding on horseback. Intense pain overcame him on the third day and Selim stopped at the small village of Ogroshkoey. Here he died on September 22, 1520. Seven days after leaving Constantinople, Selim died at the age of fifty-four years. One report states that Selim died from the plague. However, the real cause of his death is uncertain. His body was interred on September 29th and Suleiman I became his successor. Selim left a well-ordered empire to his son, Suleiman. The Ottoman Empire on Selim's death was a richer and more powerful empire than when he inherited the throne. His deeds became recorded in an elegy written to him shortly after his death by the poet, Kemal Pashazade. This poet honored the achievements of this truly remarkable man during his short eight year reign. The following excerpt from the elegy expresses most eloquently the poet's praise:

His hand was a falchion; his tongue was a dirk;
His finger an arrow; his arm a spear bright.
In shortest of time many gests hath he wrought, --
Encompassed was earth of the shade of his might.
The Sun of his Day, but the sun at day's close,
Far-casting his shadows, soon sinking from sight.

In reviewing the accomplishments of Selim's reign, his conquests loom large in this category. However, his conquests were not the result of the haphazard whims of a ruthless and "blood thirsty" barbarian. Rather, they resulted from
a well-planned strategy of a man who used his talents as both a military general and a statesman. Selim carefully manipulated his relations in the West for the first six years of his reign so that his attention could be given to his activities against both the Persians and the Mamelukes. He had the foresight not to enter into an open war with Hungary or to involve himself in any situations that would weaken his strength against his Eastern foes. On the other hand, when his position became secure in Asia, he looked to the West with definite ideas of expanding into Europe. His naval preparations in the last years of his reign were to be utilized not by himself but by his illustrious son, Suleiman. It is certain that had Selim lived a few years longer, he would have led the same campaigns against Europe as did Suleiman after him.

Selim's new conquests brought the Ottoman Empire to its height of power to match the powerful European countries of France, England, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire. Even before his death, Selim began to initiate a pattern of foreign relations that Suleiman would inherit and later augment. It was Selim's foresight in the area of his foreign relations that made possible his conquests which shaped the destiny of his son, Suleiman, and the entire history of the Ottoman Empire that followed.
CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1Knolles, p. 564. This chart of Appendix XIII gives an idea of some of the contemporary European rulers of Selim's time. Those which are missing include the King of Spain, Charles I (1516-1556), the King of Portugal, Manuel (1495-1521), the Kings of Hungary, Ladislas (1490-1516) and Louis (1516-1526). Unfortunately, Knolles has inaccuracies in the dating and these have been corrected to the left of the original dates. See Appendix XIII.

2Stripling, p. 58.

3Hammer, IV, 348-349; Sanuto, XXVI, 355.

4Hammer, IV, 349-350; Sanuto, XXVI, 266-267. Selim I to the Venetian government, Adrianople, October 20, 1518.

5Sanuto, XXVII, 475. Selim to the Venetian government, Adrianople, June 1, 1519; Ibid., p. 466.

6Hammer, IV, 351.

7Sanuto, XXVI, 428. An anonymous letter from Buda, January 13, 1518. "...che l Signor turco aveva ordinato un assai bon exercito...et veniva lui in persona a quella impres." 8Ibid., p. 500. The Venetian orator to the Venetian government, Rome, June 9, 1519. "...certissimo il signor Re havia jurato la trieva per 3 anni...."; Hammer, IV, 351. Hammer reports the treaty as extending for only one year; Creasy, p. 165. Suleiman invaded Hungary in 1526.

9Sanuto, XXVIII, 568. Anonymous, summarized deposition, Constantinople, April 16, 1520. "...si trovavano in orden galie 100 tra grosse...et fuste 21, barge 3 di 700 botte bellissime, et da 6 in 7 brigantin...: et a Gallipoli, per quanto aveva intesa con certezza erano similiter galie 100 in ordene."
"Che publica voce era tra turchi che quest'armata si faceva per Rodi...."

Hammer, IV, 354.


Roger Bigelow Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 61; Sanuto, XXVII, 243. Deposition of Manoli Plagiati, Coro, April 11, 1519; Ibid., p. 620. Francesco Zacharia to Cyprus, Aleppo, May 12, 1519. According to this account, Selim demanded that the grand master of Rhodes give him seven years of tribute and slaves.

Sanuto, XXVII, 620. "Ha ditto el Signor esser partito di Andernopoli, va a Constantinopoli e tuol impresa contra Rodi...."


Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566, pp. 59, 61. During Selim's reign the knights had intercepted ships going from Constantinople to Egypt. In Suleiman's reign, the knights had supported the rebellion of al-Ghazali in Syria. In the year 1522, Suleiman succeeded in conquering Rhodes.

Supra, p. 43, Footnote 86.


Vaughan, p. 106.

Ibid. "... his heir was expected to be a meek lamb succeeding a fierce lion...."


24 Hammer, IV, 350; Sanuto, XXVII, 141, 280.

25 Supra, p. 29, Footnote 4; Vaughan, p. 3. For an idea of the trade routes used at this time and the new Portuguese route see Appendix XV.

26 Stripling, p. 88; Sanuto, XXV, 256.


29 Stripling, p. 88; Supra, p. 52, Footnote 9.

30 Stripling, p. 88; Sanuto, XXVI, 345; Ibid., XVII, 398. Vctor Lipomano to the Venetian government, Rome, December 13, 1513. The ruler of Tunis had asked to become a vassal of the Porte in 1513 when both Spain and Portugal threatened his sovereignty.

31 Sanuto, XXVI, 163. An anonymous letter dated August, 1518. The letter reports that the ruler of Calicut sent for aid against the Portuguese. The following is reported in the letter: "...Et che il signor di Colocut ha mandato al Signor turco un ambassador a domandarli 5,000 combatenti et 20 galie, offerendose cazar di quel porto el re di Portogalo: quel ambassador lui ha visto montar su uno galion turchesco per andar Sathalia, di grandissima valuta et 50 schiavi negri in dono...."

33 Sanuto, XXVI, 109. "Come il Gran Signor...e tutto spirito...dorme poco...si governa solo da sua testa; a solo uno bassa qui...."

34 Creasy, p. 152; Sanuto, XXVI, 264. Lomardo Bembo to the Venetian government, Adrianople, October 12, 1518. Bembo mentions that one of Selim's doctors was Ali Chelebi.

35 Hammer, IV, 356; Knolles, p. 498. See Appendix XVI.

36 Ibid., p. 357; Creasy, p. 153.

37 Sanuto, XXIX, 395-396. Sultan Suleiman to the Venetian government, Constantinople, October 10, 1520.


39 Sunra, p. 5, Footnote 10.

40 Sunra, p. 53, Footnote 16.
THE LIFE OF SELYMVS, FIRST OF THAT NAME, THE THIRD AND MOST WARLIKE EMPEROR OF THE TURKES.
APPENDIX II

Copia di la letera dil Signor turcho scrita a la Signoria nostra, portata per el suo ambasador Ruis (Chiaus) et translatada di grecho in latin per Marco Masuro cretense, leze publice in questa terra in grecho, di zugno 1512.

Soltan Selim Dei gratia rex maximus et imperator utriusque continentis Asiae et Europae etc. ad illustrissimum et colendissimum et per omnia honorandum ducem. Illustrissimi Dominii Venetorum dominum Leonardum Lauretanum dignam et condecentem salutationem, cum convenienti affectione mittimus Illustrissimae Dominationi Vestræ.

Sapiate come Dei gratia lo Signor mio padre de soa propria volunta et inclinatione de animo me ha mandato a domandare et ha conferito in nui et assignata la sua sedia et il suo imperio si de l'Occidente come de l'Oriente.

Per tanto la maiesta nostra, perche seti amici nostri progenitori gran tempo fa, vi manda el prezente nostro schiavo, Zanne Suis, qual vi certificara de l'affection nostra verso le signorie vostre, et questo havemo fatto per consolation et allegreza de le signorie vostre et azio intendiamo del vostro ben stare.

Scriptum in aula nostrae sultaniae potestatis Constantinopoli, moi die quarto, anno a prophetia Mohumeth 918, a Christi vero descensione MDXII.
APPENDIX III

Copia di la lettera fo scrita al Signor turcho in risposta di la soa mandata a la Signoria nostra.

Dal magnifico Zaus Symix messo de la excellentia vostra, ne sono sta presentate le letere di quella a noi gratissime, si per il nome di lei che ne scrive, il quale habiamo sempre de alta virtu et grandeza estimato, si etiam per la grata et iocanda nova in esse letere contenuta de la votiva exaltation sua a quel sublime imperio, cosa che ne a data grande alegreza et consolatione come a boni amici. Et pero rendemo abondantissime gratie a la sublimata vostra con ogni affection, rolegrandosi con lei et affirmandoli che per experientia l'e per cognoscer ne l'advenir l'optimo voler nostro verso lei, et in conservar la bona pace et amicitia per tanto tempo continuata con la excellentia del Signor suo patre, et in augmentarla sempre, sicome ne habiamo piu amplamente parlato con l'antedito nuncio. Et de la sua relatione lo intendera la illustrissima signoria vostra, li anni di la qual siano molti.
APPENDIX IV

Confirmatione di la pace tra la Signoria nostra e il signor Selim imperador de turchi, ne l'anno 1513, orator nostro sier Antonio Zustinian el dotor.

Mi Selim fiol dil qu sultan Baisiit, con el presente doxe de Venexia missier Lunardo Loredan, el qual mi a mandato el suo ambaxador che la pace et lo amor et la amicizia, secondo l'era con la bona memoria de mio padre, se renovi et confermi, nui lo aceptasemo et confirmasemo, et molto piu dal di che serano scripti i presenti capitoli per una parte et l'altra, per cose o poche o assai, non mescolando pero le diiferentie che sono passate; et cussi avemo facto pacto insieme dal presente zorno che e scripti li capitoli, et confirmasemo et avemo scripti questi capitoli et dati con sagramento grande per quello Dio che ha creato il cielo et la terra, con el Doxe di Veniexia et con tutta la Signoria, et con li soi homeni et con le tere et con li paesi et populi che appartien a lorco, et con le castelle et robe et con li homeni et con tutti che levano la bandiera di S. Marco, et con el Dominio che hanno in lo suo poter, et quelli che sono per terra, et con li paesi et teritori che hanno in la suo poter et quelli che sono al presente in suo poter, et con quelli chi averano ad conquistar della sui cristiani, che non siino della mei confini, ne della mei carazari, et con la insula de Nixia et con le insule che a quella apportien, intra nui amor et bona pace sara.
APPENDIX IV

Seguita li capitali soliti in l'altra pace col padre, et nella fine dicti e queste parole.

Et cussi nelli soprascriti capitali aceptamo l'amicitia et pace, per il sacramento grande che non si puol far magior prometto, per quello Dio che ha creato el cielo e la terra, sempre che la Signoria mantegnira questi sopra- diti capitali et li sacramenti soprascripti, da mia parte non sara nulla in contrario, et cussi ne siete certi.

Questi soprascripti capitoli sono scripti nelli anni del nostro Propheta grande 919, de Cristo 1513 a di 17 Octubrio, in la cita de Andernopoli; e quest e sta scripto per la bona amicitia nostra che sii ferma et stabile, et su in le mano loro.
Copia di la lettera dil Signor turco, mandata per el suo ambasador a la Signoria nostra, translata da di greco.

Sultan Selim Shah Dei gratia rex maximus utriusque continentis Asiae atque Europae ac totius Persiae dominus et Imperator, ad illustissimum et honorandum Ducem Illustissimi Dominii Venetiarum, dominum Leonardum Lauretanum salutem et dignam et condecentem salutationem, cum convenienti affectu mitissim splendori vestro.

Avivose, come molti anni fa, apparse ne le parte de Persia un certo perfido et impio homo fuera de ogni tribu et generation humana et non ha fede alguna et e nemico de tutti li ortodoxi et catholic de qualungque fede, over tribu et secta, il qual ha preso pur assai signori et li ha facti amazzare et hali ruinati cum la loro faculta, occupando et desolando li stati de ciascuno, et perseguitando li popoli deli signori amazati: per tano, vedendo la mia Maestà el mal et la iniquita che'l feva nel mondo, me missi in hordene cum gente innumerabile, et son andato contra de lui per far vendetta de li servi de Dio, et per liberarli del male et de la captivita che partivano, secondo che sete stati advisati. Et subito che passai el mar et intrai in Anatolia, li mandasemo uno nostro mandato in scripto de questa forma:

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si sete valenthomo veniteci incontra, descendite in campo che posiam fare fatti d'arme, et sara poi quello che piacera a Dio. Questo ho voluto fare a fin ch'el non potesse mai dire come io l'ho asaltato a l'improvisa. Pertanto, intras-simo dentro del so paese cum un innumero et terribel esercito, et caminaremos piu de uno mese de longo, ne mai li basto l'animo comparer a le frontiere. Da poi li manda-semo do altri nostri mandati, si ando pur dentro del suo paese, invitandolo cum le medeme parole: se sete valente homo venite in campo che combatiamo. Esso non volse mai comparer. Per tanto, vedendo lo imperio nostro che 'l non compareva, determinasemo et constituissemo de andar a la so sedia, iest a la citta chiamata Tempriz, qual citta e stata principio sedia et scanno de tutti li antiqui signori de Persia; et come nui fossemo longi da la sua sedia do giorniate, considerando lui che non poteva piu scamparla, compararse finalmente et vene in campo descosto da Tempriz do giorniate, qual pianura se chiamava Zalteram, et vene cum tute le so zente et cum tuta la so posanza ivi ne incontro. Tuttavia non li bastava l'animo venir a le frontiere et combatere cum l'imperio nostro, ma volse partire el suo exercito in do parte; de una parte de le gente fece capitaneo uno che era el mazior baron che 'l havesse, et era un chiamato Ustazal Machmeth et halo mandato su in Anatolia; epso tolse l'altra parte de l'exercito, et venendo in persona verso la Romania. Ambe iste partes ediderunt
magna praelia, tutavia el bilarbei idest el prefecto de Natholia nostro in un hora rompe quelle gente che anda- rono verso la Natolia, et taglio la testa a quel gran capitano che si chiamava Ustazal Machmet, fugavitque ac delevit eius milites. L'altra parte, nella qual era epso signor in persona cum la piu parte dì le gente, vene in Romania, et medesimamente li nostri lo cazorono et hanolo facto retornare; torno iterum et ha combatuto conflatumque est horribilem praelium. Sono stati feriti et amazati da una parte e da l'altra pur assa' baroni; vero e che hanno etiam ferito el bilarbei, idest el prefecto de Romania, de ferita mortale, per modo che non poteva piu star a cavallo. Per tanto, io comandai subito che do squadre de miei ser- vitori chiamati Alupiacides et Caripigitides, et parte de gianzari andaseno in adiuto dil bilarbei: le qual nostre sente immediate rompeteno l'inimico et lo hanno messo in fuga in so malhora. El qual scampando fo coacto de aban- donar tutto l'haver suo, cariagi et tutta la sua faculta; inter alia due so femine et pur assa' donne et ragazzi che'l se menava drio. Medessimamente havemo preso tutto lo so paese, et tutte le forteze se hanno reso a noi, et hannoci consignato le chiave de tutte le forteze. Per tanto, perché l'imperio mio sapeva certo che'l prefato era nemico di ogni generatione, et che ciascuno era per haver alegrezza de la de la calamita de epso, per questo mandamo el presente nostro schiavo Mechanet Is Pachmogam, afinche ve n'allegriate de questo, perché siete nostri amici cari et cordiali.
APPENDIX V

Scriptum in curia sultaniae nostrae potestatis in regione et sede imperiali Persiae, Tempriz. Septembris die tertio, anno Prophetae nostri 920.
Copia di la leta di Signor turco drizata a la Signoria nostra, portata per il suo orator, traduta di greco in latin.

Sultan Selym Sach Dei gratia rex maximus et imperator utriusque continentis Asiae atque Europae etc. ad illustrissimum et perquam honorabilem ducem Illustrissimi Domini Venetiarum dominum Leonardum Lauretanum salutem condignam et convenientem salutationem, cum condecenti affectus splendori mittimus.

Sapiati che, con la gratia del celeste Idio, et con la benediction dei nostri progenitori, se levassemo ai 10 del mese d’April de Amasia, et andasemo con lo exercito a la Syria, Arabia et de la Persia, nomine Chiemach, et era sotto lo imperio de quel impio et infidel, el qual havemo profligato et anichilato al tutto. Et perche era necessario che la ditta cita fosse sotto lo imperio de la nostra maesta, andasemo sopra de quella et arivasemo de li ai 18 de Mazo, et in quel medemo zorno che arivasemo, metesimo in ordine le artelarie, et gli dessemo una bataglia formidabile; et passato mezzodi, la tolessemo a fil de spada et amazasemo grandi et rizoli, et vene sotto lo dominio nostro tutto el suo teretorio et loci. Et deinde se levassemo de la dita cita et andasemo sopra uno Signor proximo a la dita cita, nomine Alodoulis, el qual se intendeva con quel infidio, et lo havemo fugato et omnino destrutto. Et per esser proximo quando andassem contra quello impio, vene el ditto
Alodoulis sopra lo paese de la nostra maesta et lo danizo, et pero andasemo contra de lui, et subito che arivasemo al suo paese, se messe a fuzer, et subito comando la nostra maesta che andasse el nostro vesiri Synam bassa drio le sue vestigie con 15 milia homeni electi, et lo azonse in loci asperi et strecti. Et subito che el ditto Alodouli vide esser azonto, se volto contra con 20 milia persone et fece fato d'arme a'll del mese de Zugno, et hanno roto et preso el ditto Alodouli con quatro suo'figlioli, et tainorno la testa a tutti, et similiter tutto el suo exercito tainorno a pezi, et lo anichilorno, et così tolseno tutti i loci et castelli soi, et havemo signoriza con tutto el suo circuito. La qual cosa, perche vui seti mei cordial amici et fra nui e bona pace et amicitia, mandemo el nostro presente zaus Suleman in congratulation de la vitoria et augmento de l'impero de la nostra maesta, azio ve consolate et alegrate ex toto corde, come boni et fidi amici che vui ne seti.

Scripta in Cregali nostrae majestatis aula, in civitate et sede Alodouli Ranenti, decimo quinto mensis Junii.
Copia di la letera di la Signoria nostra responsiva
al Signor turco.

Illustissimo et excellentissimo domino Selim magno
admirato et Sultano musulmanorum Leonardus Lauredanus Dei
gratia Dux Venetiarum etc. salutem et honoris ae gloriae
felicia incrementa.

Per mano de l'honorato nuncio de la Illustissima
Signoria Vostra, zicus Suleman, novamente ne sono sta presen-
tate letere di quella molto humane e amorevole, per le quale con grandissimo piacer habiamo intese li proximi
felici successi del potente exercito suo contro li soli
inimici; cossa ben preveduta da nui, che cognoscemo atro-
varsì ne la Excellentia Vostra, a presso la grande potentia
de l'imperio suo, grandissimo valor de anima et core a tutte
le sue imprese. Per tanto, ringratando quanto piu si pol
la Excellentia Vostra de cussi amorevole demonstratione,
come si conviene a la bona pace et amicitia che con lei
tenemo, ne ralegramo con quella summamente de ogni sua
prosperita et honore, riputandoli comuni et in beneficio
del Stato nostro per la mutua et perpetua benivolentia
nostra; dinotando equalmente all Excellentia Vostra, come,
per la benignita de Dio, le cose nostre de qui ne succedono
prospere, per atrovarsì gia passati di qua da monti in
Italia el serenissimo Re di Franza venuto con exercito
potentissimo et di major forze che gia molti et molti
anni sia mai sta veduto in queste parte, et di giorno in
giorno viene acquistando de molte gran cita; siche a con-
solazione di Vostra Excelentia, in breve speramo di aver
ancor noi insieme recuperato il restante del Stato nostro,
quale sempre sera promptissimo a far cosa honorevole et
grata a la Illustrissima Signoria Vostra, li anni di la
qual siano molti.

Data in nostro Ducali Palatio, die primo Septembris
1515, indictione quarta.
Copia di la letera dil Signor turoho scrita a la Signoria nostra, traduta di grecho in latin.

Sultam Selim Szach Dei gratia rex maximus et imperator utriusque continentis Asiae etque Europae etc. ad illustrissimum et maxime honorabilem Illustrissimi Venetiarum Dominii ducem dominum Leonardum Lauredanum salutatem dignam et convenientem salutationem cum convenienti affectu mittimus splendori suo.

Sapiate al presente come quantunque per lo passato havessimo superato quel perfido figliolo di Erdebil, quale e fora d'ogni fede, et havessimo dominato el suo paese; in protectione et custodia dil qual loco havevimo lassato per beglerbeg el nostro schiavo Machmeet bech, iterum quello figliolo de Erdebil mando el suo beglerbeg con i piu strenui et valorosi signori che havesse in la sua corte, con uno exercito de 15 milia persone, tutti homeni electi, i qual se scontrono con el nostro schiavo sopraditto beglarbeg dil ditto locho, et feceno uno horendo fato d'arme. Et con lo ajuto de Dio i nostri hanno superato quelli et hanno tajato la testa dil capitanio general suo, nomine Charachan, et di altri desdoto signori, et similiter tuto lo exercito spazono per fil di spada, che anima di loro non e scapula. Per tanto, per esser fra la mia Maesta et et vostra Illustriissima Signoria bona amicitia et pace,
mandamo el presente nostro schiavo chiaus Mustapha con la testa di uno primo signor de Bagdat, qual nomeva Gasbin, azio vi alegriate di nostri strenui fatti et bona fortuna, pero che la Maesta nostra e certa ne amate con cor sincero e seti amici cordial et fidi verso de nui.

Scripta in nostra regali curia, in Conia civitate Caramaniae, 2 Julii.
APPENDIX X

Copia di la leteta scrita per il Signor turcho in greco, a la Signoria nostra, portata per il suo orator, e traduta.

Selim Shach filius regis Bagesidi sit semper victor.

Sultan Selim Shach, Dei gratia rex maximus et imperator utriusque continentis Arabum, Persarum, Asiae et Europae etc. Ad Illustrissimum et maxime honorabilem Duce illustrissimae Venetiarum Dominationis dominum Leonardum Lauredanum, salutem condignam et convenientem salutationem, cum congruenti affectu splendori tuo mittimus.

Sapiati che, da poi havessemo per el passato quel infido et senza lexe superato, el quale haveva corroto et contamina la nostra fede, iterum andavamo con li eserciti nostri contra quello, acio totalmente lo destruzessemo. Et andando sopra quello infido et impio, par ch'el Soldan del Caiero se levasse da esso Caiero con tutto el suo exercito et venisse in aiuto de quello impio, et me expectasse in Alepo. Et vedando la mia Maesta tal operatione che el veniva in aiuto di quel impio, et haveva roto la paxe etiam fra noi, subito mandessemo da quello dui nostri ambassadori, i quali se scontrorno con el predito Soldan in Aleppo, et li dissemo non volesse per la bona pace et amicitia era fra noi dar aiuto a quelli infidi. El qual Soldano, non fazendo stima de tal parole, se levo da Alepo, et ne vene contra una zornata lontan da esso Aleppo, in
APPENDIX X

una campagna dove e el sepulcro del nostro profeta David. Et vedando la mia Maesta che se aveva facto aueto del mal, comandai se adunassero tutti i nostri philosophi, i quali resguardata la leze de Dio, trovorno quiumque fusse in aiuto de quelli impii era justo el fusse morto. Et vista la mia Maesta la leze e comandamento de Dio, subito missi in ordene li miei exerciti et andassero contra de lui, et se scontrasemo Domenega, a di 24 de Avosto, et combatessemo comenzaendo da 3 hole del zorno infina a l'occaso del sol orrende et formidabil bataie, per la qual cossa rompessimo et amazassem dito Sultano et altri signori, et cussi taliassimo a pezi et fracassassimo tutto il suo exercito, et avemo preso tutti i lochi e territori soi. Damasco, Alepo, Hantab, Malatia, Terende, Tripoli, Baruto, Siso, Tarso et tutte altre terre che erano sue ne presentorno le chiave et signorizemo tutto omno el suo regno. Quare, perche vui seti amici fidi de la nostra Maesta, mandamovi el nostro presente schiavo Muchemeto spachi oglan a cio vi alegrati per lo augumento, prodeze et victoria nostra, quale ne ha concesso el nostro optimo Idio. Scripte in curia nostrae regalis majestatis in civitate et regione Aleppo. Die 7 Augusti.
APPENDIX XIV

BULLE DE LEON X ORDONNANT LA TREVE DE CINQ ANS

Leo episcopus, servus servorum Dei, ad futuram rei memoriam: Considerantes ac animo revolventes generale concilium, permissione divina, a felicis recordationis Julio papa II., prædecessore nostro, in dictum fuisset ea potissimum causa ut depravati Christi fidelium mores in melius reformarentur, ac pax universalis ecclesiae daretur, neconon unio et concordia inter reges et principes christianos iniretur, ut tandem sancta ac pernecessaria contra catholice fidei hostes expeditio suscipi posset, ac tam ecclesiasticarum quam secularium personarum moribus, quantum expedire visum fuit per nos, qui eodem Julio prædecessori divina favente clementia successimus, reformatis, sublatoque scismate, qualis circa regum et principum eorumdem pacem et concordiam insundam mens nostra fuerit, quantumve circa illam componendam laboraverimus, eosque studiose hortati fuerimus, cunctis apertissime constare non dubitamus; cumque nunciorum nostrorum apud reges et principes ipsos, ipsorumque regum et principum litteris percepisseus exhortationes nostras tantum apud eos auctoritatis et efficaciae fuisset, illorumque corda et animos adeo flexisse et commovisse, ut inter omnes fere pax, tandem a nobis pro reipublice christiane universalis bono desiderata, conclusa foret, et, si quid superesset, propediem componendum, ipso Deo favente, speraretur; unde, fidei urgente
noscule, dictam contra infideles expeditionem, per nos et
dictum Julium predecessorem totiens in concilii hujusmodi
sessionibus propositam et promissam ad triennium tune
proxime futurum, dicto sacro approbante concilio, su-
mendam, faciendam et prosequendam per alias nostras litteras
decrèvimus, et ut felicem sortiretur effectum pias, humiles
et devotas ad omnipotentem Deum precem jugiter effundere
proposuimus, idemque omnibus utriusque sexus Christi fi-
delibus faciendum mandavimus, ac carissimos in Christos
filios nostros Maximilianum in imperatorem electum ac aliis
reges et principes, necnon potentatus christianos hortati
fuimus, ut, omnibus invicem posthabitis, odiisque, injuri-
isque, dissensionibus ac simultatibus oblivioni perpetue
demandatis, ad defensem christianae fidei, sicut proprio
et necessario eorum etiam tunc incumbebat officio, fortiter
et potenter exorgerent, et in tanto necessitatis articulo,
prout eorum forent facultates, prompta auxilia exhibere
studerent; eodem nichilominus paterno affectu monentes et
requintes ut, pro summi Dei et apostolice sedis reverentia,
pacem inter eos initiam aut trugas, saltem dicta expedi-
tione durante, inviolabiler observare curarent, ne tantum
bonum, quod dextra Domini assistente propitia secuturum
 sperabamus et optabamus, aliqua interveniente discordia seu
dissensione valeret impediri, prout in illis plenus con-
tinetur. Cum autem post expeditionis hujusmodi indictionem,
quantum creverint Turcarum tiranni vires difficile dictu
est, auditu miserum: novissime enim, post magnum Babilonie

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APPENDIX XIV

Egyptiace sultanum cum toto Mamelucchorum adversus eum comparato exercitu interfectum, tota Syria et Egipto ac alii omnibus provinciis dicto sultano quondam subjectis, potitus fuit: et nunc omni alia cura prope solutus et liber, nil aliud moliri quam christianorum cedibus et sanguini inhiare videtur. Et cum tot antea regna ab Evangelio esse aliena, eaque a Turcis et Sarracenis et aliis fedissimis gentibus comquinata cogitaremus, idque, culpa christianorum qui inter se miserabiliter potius pugnare quam Turcharum feritati obsistere, eosque adoriri retroactis temporibus voluerunt, accidisse, animo non poteramus esse quieto cum intelligeremus pastoralis nostri esse officii Dominici gregis curam gerere, qui ejus loco successimus, cui dictum est a Domino: Pasce oves meas. Oves enim, Christi fideles, sunt populi: hiis consulere, hos protegere, et totis co-natibus conservare deberemus ne perirent, donec eidem imperatori ac regibus et principibus christianis, tanquam christianae plebis custodibus, nixi fuerimus persuadere, ut contra Turochas pugnare ac susceptas injurias ulcisci vellent, pre oculiis ponentes bellum hujusmodi peropportunity geri certamque victoriam sperari posse, assistente Deo, sine quo nichil valet humana fragilitas, et, presidium afferente, cum nichil sit quod sue possit resistere voluntati. Si enim soli, licet, quantum nobis ecclesiam romanam et patrimonium beati Petri ministrae poterit, tantum pro fide catholica protegenda et dilatanda exponere et profundere

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APPENDIX XIV

ac etiam proprium sanguinem in hac expeditione effundere
parati simus, immanissimos lupos, hoo est Turchas aggredi,
et a dominico grege arcore possemus, id prompto ac liberali
animo faceremus. Sed cum tales non sint vires nostre, quae
tantam vim ferre possent, aucta presertim Turcharum po-
tentia, nec possit eorum imperium deleri aut comminui nisi
magnus christianorum conatu, magnisque classibus et exer-
citibus comparatis, sedes vero apostolica non habet unde
ista conquirere et parare valeat, nisi reges populique
christiani opem et auxilium ferant, et ob is ipsorum prin-
cipum auxilium implorare necesse fuit. Et aspirante Deo,
orundem principum animos ad hujusmodi sanctam expeditionem
sumendam ita promptos, ut par est, invenimus quales opta-
bamus et sperabamus, ut inter ipsos lites cessent, jurgia
eliminentur, unitis animis et viribus, gladium quem eis
divina majestas ad vindictam malorum tribuit, in Turchas,
qui Salvatorem Christum verum Deum esse abnegantes, legem
evangelicum conantur evertere, exercere velint prout ex
ipsorum litteris et nunciis intelleximus; eorumque concor-
diam et unionem, pro qua universalis ecclesia per dictum
concilium representata, Deum pie rogavit, firmam futuram
procul dubio credimus; et felicem hujus sancte expeditionis
successum speramus, a cogitamus eodem reges et principes
Turcharum forte numerum deterrere non debere, cum militum
et quidem electissimorum nostrorum multitudine illis valde
prestemus, virtute vero, animo, viribus, prudentia longe

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APPENDIX XIV

simus superiores, certamque pretera nobis de hostibus
fidei victoriarm, cum causa nostra justa, honesta ac ne-
cessaria sit, cum pro fide Christi proque salute omnium
christianorum expedito ipsa susciptatur, repromittere va-
leamus. Habita igitur super his, cum venerabilibus fra-
tribus nostris sancte romane ecclesiae cardinalibus, matura
deliberatione, et examinatis et perlectis in consistorio
nostro secreto, Maximiliani et aliorum regum et principum
predictorum litteris, auditisque corum oratoribus, ne ne-
gocium treugarum et induciarum hujusmodi faciendarum diu-
turniorem moram patiatur, et ut ipsi reges et principes in
conspectu Altissimi, cui eos ex nichilo creavit, et cujus
causa et de cujus honore agitur, quique genus humanum
a diabolic a servitute preciosissimo sanguine suo redimere
dignatus est, grati et fideles inveniantur in his etiam
aliorum predecessorum nostrorum, presertim pie memoria In-
nocentii papae III, vestigiis inherentes, eosdem Maximili-
anum ac alios reges, principes et potentatus christianos,
neconon respublicas, communitates ceterosque Christi fideles,
quinquennales treugas et inducias, quas, ne tam necessarium
ac salutiferum opus aliquo impedimento differatur, sed potius
debitum et optatum exitum consequatur, de eorumdem fratrum
consilio indicimus, et su excommunicationis late setentie
ac anathematis et interdicti in terris, dominiis eorum
penis, dicto durante quinquennio, inviolabiliter servare
debere discernimus; eos nichilominus in virtute sancte obe-
dientie monentes ac in Domino hortantes, et per viscera
misericordie Domini nostri Jesu Christi, per passionem ejus,
APPENDIX XIV

qua nos redemit, per judicium extremum quod unusquisque
secundum opera sua est accepturus, per spem vitae eternae
quam repromisit Deus diligentibus, se paterno affectu
rogantes ut hujusmodi treugis et induciis ad Dei honorem
et catholici fidei defensionem et exaltationem, neconon
communem et necessarium omnium Christi fidelium salutem,
per nos, ut prefertur, indiciis durantibus, in caritate
mutua et amoris ac benivolentiae unione persistentes, ab
omni prorsus abstinent offensione, ut, cum eorum salute
et gloria, tam sancte contra naphandissimos Turchas ex-
peditioni, cum benedictione nostra, omni prorsus metu et
suspinitione cessantibus, intendere; ac demum laudantes et
benedicentes Dominum, cum victoria et triumpho, leti et
jocundi, ad proria redire possint; reservantes nichilominus
nobis cognitionem et compositionem eorum que ad conser-
vationem treugarum et induciarum tempore hujusmodi durante,
quomodolibet pertinere videbuntur, illisque conditiones
adiicienti, declarandi et ampliandi, ac super eisdem treugis
et induciis providendi, mandandi et ordinandi, et omnia
circa ea quomodolibet necessaria et oportuna faciendi et
exequendi, prout nobis et eisdem fratribus nostris sancte
romane ecclesie cardinalibus visum fuerit expedire, facul-
tatem pariter et potestatem. Per hoc autem non intendimus
treugis et induciis predictis quominus, illo dicto tempore
durante, sub dictis penis inviolabiliter observantur, in
aliquo prejudicare. Volumus autem quod transumptis pre-
sentium manu alicujus notarii publici subscriptis, et sigilli

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alicujus prelati ecclesiastici appensionis munitis, fides adhibeatur ubique indubia et eisdem stetur firmiter, prout presentibus staretur, si forent exhibite vel ostense. Nulli ergo omnino hominum liceat hanc paginam nostre indictionis, decreti, monitionis, rotationis, reservationis, intentionis et voluntatis infringere, vel ei ausu temerario contaire. Si quis autem hoc attemptare presumat, indignationem omni-potentis Dei ac beatorum Petri et Pauli apostolorum ejus se noverit incursurum. ---Datum Rome, apud Sanctum Petrum, anno incarnationis dominice millesimo quingentesimo decimo septimo, sexto die martii, pontificatus nostri anno quinto.
APPENDIX XVII

The Last Strophe of the
ELEGY ON SULTAN SELIM I

by Kemal Pashazade

An elder in cautel, a stripling in spright;
Of glaive aye triumphant, of rede ever right.
An Asaph in wisdom, th'adorn of the host,
Him listed nor vezir nor mushir in fight.
His hand was a falchion; his tongue was a dirk;
His finger an arrow; his arm a spear bright.
In shortest of time many gests hath he wrought, —
Encompassed was earth of the shade of his might.
The sun of his Day, but the sun at day's close,
Far-casting his shadows, soon sinking from sight.
Of throne and of diadem soverans vaunt,
But vaunted of him throne and diadem bright.
His heart found delight in that festal carouse
Whereunto the sabre and trumpet invite.
The sphere never gazed on his equal or peer
In the mirth of the feast or the mirk of the fight.
Flashed he to the banquet — a Sun shedding light!
Dashed he to the battle — a Lion of might!
What time that the 'Seize! Hold!' resounds shall the
sword
Remember this Lion and weep blood forthright.
Alas! Sultan Selim: alas! woe is me!
Let reed and let falchion alike mourn for thee!

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