MARK HANNA
AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
VOLUME I
DISSERTATION

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To My Parents
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Mark Hanna was one of the most controversial figures in American politics. Admirers considered him as a brilliant party chieftain, who during the 1896 presidential campaign had successfully brought the business methods of efficient organization and advertising into national politics, and saved the country from the threat of "Bryanism." Detractors viewed him as a corrupt politician, one who used the party system to reward his big business allies to perpetuate the trusts. Hanna appeared a contradictory figure to many of his contemporaries. As a successful businessman within the Great Lakes business world of coal, iron ore, and shipping, in mid-life Hanna gradually disengaged from business to enter the challenging and exciting world of Ohio Gilded Age politics. Hanna was a great believer and advocate of having the Republican party act as the primary policymaking instrument within the political economy.
By the end of his life Hanna had added another dimension to his public career because he advocated settling labor disputes outside of the party system. Hanna was falsely accused by numerous Democratic and Populist opponents as being a "labor crusher" and destroyer of organized labor. Actually, Hanna counted union leaders Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, and John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers among his close personal friends. At Hanna's funeral in February 1904, wreaths were sent by numerous labor organizations. A day of rest and mourning was authorized in the anthracite coal fields by the unions.

Like many of his contemporaries who attempted to understand the major socioeconomic changes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Hanna's own "search for order" led him down many divergent policy paths. To better understand Hanna's motives, ambitions, and impact, he must be studied within the context of the changing American political economy of the second half of the nineteenth century.

_Hanna's Historical Image_

For the past fifty years Hanna's reputation has been influenced by current trends in the literature. During the 1930s Matthew Josephson's _The Politicos_, a
progressive liberal interpretation of the Gilded Age, viewed Hanna as a business plutocrat and kingmaker of William McKinley. Until the late fifties the majority of writers, following the lead of William Randolph Hearst's cartoonist Homer Davenport who had brutally caricatured Hanna during his national political career, considered Hanna as the controlling force behind McKinley. However, since the early sixties, a revisionist interpretation led by H. Wayne Morgan, Margaret Leach, and Lewis Gould has conclusively shown that far from controlling McKinley, Hanna was his loyal lieutenant. Instead of being Hanna's lapdog, McKinley is now portrayed as having initiated the modern American presidency.1

Throughout the past fifty years, many historians have naturally gravitated to focusing upon the role that brought Hanna the most fame: his role as national G.O.P. chairman during the 1896 presidential campaign. Writers who worked within the Presidential synthesis considered Hanna as the first major "businessman in politics." They focused primarily upon his "revolutionary" campaign leadership of the Republican party. Historians such as Clarence Stern considered Hanna's elevation as party chairman as symbolic of the triumph of big business in capturing the Republican party. According to Stern, this action led to a "resurgent Republicanism." Historians focused upon Hanna's "revolutionary" use of organiza-
tional business methods in conducting the 1896 national campaign. This scholarship has helped to shed valuable light upon Hanna's management of the national campaign. However, Robert Marcus has pointed out that most of Hanna's "revolutionary" organizational campaign methods had been used or advocated by previous Republican or Democratic campaign chairmen. With greater financial resources at his disposal than previous party chairmen, in 1896 Hanna effectively ran the best organized and efficient national campaign that contemporaries had ever viewed. Its scope, level of efficiency, and relative size (as compared with Bryan's campaign) astonished onlookers. It was this that led many contemporary writers, and later many historians, to consider Hanna as primarily a revolutionary campaign manager. The "businessman in politics" interpretation, though valuable, basically neglects previous businessmen-politicians who truly initiated "business methods" into state and national campaigns. This interpretation also over-emphasizes Hanna's 1896 campaign managerial role, at the expense of overlooking the significance of his entire public career.

In 1961 Thomas Felt became the only historian to produce a biography of Hanna. Felt's unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," focused upon Hanna's career until 1897. Felt used the traditional Presidential synthesis frame work for interpreting Hanna.
Felt emphasized Hanna's relationship with such national Republican leaders as McKinley, Sherman, and Foraker. Felt stressed that Hanna's "exchange of loyalties and services with each of these men that brought" him into national political life. Felt's insight was correct. Also Felt summarized Hanna within the traditional "businessman in politics" framework. To Felt, the "symbolic significance of the rise of Mark Hanna lay in the dramatization of the approaching merger of the new urban industrial America with the machinery of democratic government." 2

Journalist Herbert Croly's *Marcus Alonzo Hanna* is the single major published biography of Hanna's life. Though the conditions under which Croly agreed to write Hanna's biography led him to be overly sympathetic to his subject (Croly was paid a large sum by the Hanna family and was the only writer given permission to use Hanna's private papers, which were afterwards immediately destroyed by the family), Croly succeeded in sketching a full portrait of Hanna's public and private life. Due to the destruction of Hanna's papers, Croly's biography has been the single best authority of Hanna's private life, including many of his private and political arrangements.

Unlike the vast majority of his contemporaries, Croly realized that Hanna's historical importance was not confined to his role as McKinley's campaign manager or
whether he was McKinley's superior or lieutenant. Though published in 1912, Croly's biography is the one major work on Hanna which focused attention on Hanna's impact upon government-business relations. To Croly, Hanna was the perfect metaphor for the philosophy of "Pioneer American-ism," which Croly defined as the rapid allocation of the country's "inexhaustible" natural resources. Croly reported that Hanna was part of a nineteenth century tradition which advocated using the government as an active and positive force in developing the national economy and fit thereby into an important strand of the American political tradition. According to Croly, Hanna was not a transitional political figure between the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries, but simply represented the "culmination" of nineteenth century life. Surprisingly Croly did not view Hanna's labor conciliation work with the National Civic Federation as an innovative extra-party administrative attempt to move beyond the traditional nineteenth century framework of government-business policy.  

**Conceptual Framework and Recent Revisionist Historical Scholarship**

There is another approach to evaluating Hanna that expands upon Croly's important insights with a focus on Hanna's public career, first within the business world and
afterwards in the political world. This interpretation emerges from tracing Hanna's progress from the local level of Cleveland politics, to his entry into Ohio factional politics, and finally to his appearance the national political stage. Through use of the recent historical literature dealing with government-business relations from approximately 1820 to 1900, I intend to provide a fresh look at Hanna's important historical role as a transi- tional figure between the nineteenth century party period and the emerging twentieth century administrative state. By focusing primarily upon Hanna's role as a policymaker on various government-business issues, one can better reveal Hanna’s long-term historical significance than by over-emphasizing Hanna's role as Republican party chairman during the 1896 and 1900 presidential elections.

The work of a generation of scholars exploring the meaning of the American tradition years after Croly's death provides the context for clarifying Hanna's careers. It was especially important in the changing nature of government-business relations within the American political economy. In particular, historians have reexamined and highlighted the political significance of economic issues in deciding elections, redefining party ideological positions, and determining many key policy-making issues of the postwar nineteenth century American polity. 4
The "organizational synthesis" school has shed new light on interpreting the changes in government-business relations from the Gilded Age to the Progressive Era. Historians, such as Alfred Chandler, Samuel Hays, and Robert Wiebe, have promoted the organizational synthesis thereby revising the earlier progressive-liberal interpretation that differentiated between the governmental policies of the Gilded Age and those of the Progressive era. Historians from the organizational synthesis school found not a sharp break, but instead a gradual evolution between the government-business policies from the Gilded Age to the Progressive Era.5

Building upon the insights gained from the organizational synthesis school, "new" political historians such as Richard L. McCormick, Austin Kerr, and Thomas McCraw have focused upon the declining role of the political party as a primary instrument in determining economic policy at the turn of the century. These "new" political historians emphasized the parties' gradual displacement, in their former policymaking roles, by special interest groups and state regulatory agencies. Particularly illuminating is McCormick's conceptual framework for analyzing the long-term transformation of government-business relations from 1820 to 1900. McCormick focuses upon the long-term shift in the form of government policymaking from the nineteenth century party period
era of distribution toward the emerging regulatory
Administrative State of the twentieth century. Through
the revisionist work of McCormick and others, political
historians are moving beyond the framework of studying
mainly the political impact of ethno-cultural issues and
to focus more attention upon the impact that national and
sectional government distribution policy issues had upon
the electorate. According to McCormick, by focusing more
attention upon nineteenth century economic issues,
historians will clearly recognize the "ideological and
economic divisions between Americans" over such vital
national issues as government promotion, distribution,
protection, and regulation of resources.6

With attempts by organizational historians and
practitioners of the "new" political history to refocus
attention upon the importance of government-business
policy in changing the state, several historians have
detected a significant postwar ideological policy shift
within the Republican party. Eric Foner and Morton Keller
have observed that by the mid-1870s to mid-1880s, certain
party leaders, along with their constituencies, began to
shift the G.O.P. away from emphasizing Civil War issues
and ethno-cultural social reform issues towards focusing
primarily upon economic issues. The societal impact of
the Second Industrial Revolution in the North influenced
this party shift toward economic issues. Foner has
particularly begun to focus upon this key party policy shift. By use of class analysis, Foner sketches an emerging monolithic (mainly Eastern) business community, in accordance with an emerging second generation of G.O.P. leaders more concerned with economic issues than most of their predecessors, shifting the party away from its earlier reform base of free labor, Reconstruction, and social reform. According to Foner, by the end of Reconstruction, the G.O.P. was becoming the main political spokesman and protector for the emerging large financial and industrial institutions, which were the hallmark of the American Second Industrial Revolution.  

The insight of Foner and others created new possibilities for reinterpreting the political history of the latter half of the nineteenth century. My own research indicates that Hanna was a key leader within the second generation of the post Civil War Republican leaders. He helped shift the party away from emphasizing Civil War issues and social reform. Unlike Foner, I believe that by the mid-1870s, the key impetus for initiating this key policy shift emerged not from a monolithic Eastern business establishment, but from politicians and businessmen located in the most rapidly industrializing areas of the north, such as the Great Lakes region.  

Among the political and business forces that desired a greater emphasis upon economic issues there was
no overall agreement on what role the state should play in dealing with the socioeconomic effects of the Second Industrial Revolution. The issue of government involvement in the economy exceeded specific economic issues. It determined the entire framework of government-business relations. Like the vast majority of Midwestern businessmen who were involved with the coal and iron business, Hanna favored a broad program of government promotion of the economy, ranging from high tariffs to direct subsidies to private business.

The key theme central to Hanna's political career was the philosophy that shaped his viewpoint of government-business relations: the Commonwealth Idea of equal rights. Advocates of the Commonwealth Idea of equal rights believed in an activist government that vigorously promoted private interests, not for the benefit of the few, but for the common interest. A discussion of the evolution of the Commonwealth Idea, from its origin during the National Era to its decline during the Gilded Age, will properly show how the intertwining philosophies of government-business relations impacted upon the state. A discussion of the Commonwealth Idea's evolution is also necessary to reveal how socioeconomic factors determined which philosophy was most appropriate during a particular time. Throughout much of the nineteenth century the advocates of the Commonwealth Idea of equal rights
competed against supporters of the *laissez faire* doctrine of equal rights for philosophical supremacy in determining the scope of government-business relations. In fact, the commonwealth ideology of equal rights was created during the National Era as a reaction to the economic policies enacted by governments operating under the *laissez faire* equal rights philosophy.

**The Evolution of the Commonwealth Idea**

The egalitarian doctrine of *laissez faire* equal rights was fully developed and implemented by both the national and state governments during the Jacksonian Era as a protest against the class legislation of the early National Era. Under the doctrine of *laissez faire*, court-created special incorporation laws were revised by state legislatures and made general incorporation laws. According to historian Leonard Levy, the followers of *laissez faire* equal rights believed the nation's economy should be left to its natural devices. The people individually, rather than their government, were the best judges of their interests.

The problems and challenges of developing a vast unsettled continent would not be accelerated by withdrawing the tentacles of state power from development. The Commonwealth Idea was completely contrary to the equal
rights philosophy. Unlike *laissez faire*, it was the best system for a continent with vast national resources, limitless land, and little capital.

To fully develop the new nation and allow it to reach its potential vast state expenditures and private sector investments would be required. Contrary to the doctrine of vested rights, government promotion would not only benefit a favored few, but also the general or public interest. Leonard Levy described the Commonwealth Idea as equal rights in the general interest. According to Levy, "The people were the state; the state was their Commonwealth." They identified themselves with it and felt that they should rightfully share in the advantages that it could bring to them as a community. The state was their means of promoting the general interest.⁹

The Commonwealth Idea was implemented during the First American Industrial Revolution with the development policy of building canals. Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, in his "Report on Roads and Canals" issued on 6 April 1808 produced the best summary. It explained and justified the need for certain governmental promotional and distributional policies. Gallatin believed that owing or because of, the recent large extension of territory and population, only public authorities could command sufficient credit at a reasonable interest rate to fund canal works.
Gallatin believed the role of the government was not only confined to promotion but also supervision of the government projects. For the next sixty years following Gallatin's "Report," there would be inherent tension between the state's dual functions of promotion and supervision of government projects. Such projects included turnpikes, canals, railroads, industries, river and harbor projects and the sale of the public domain. In the North the Civil War's impact strengthened the commonwealth philosophy by promoting an activist state, while permitting the G.O.P. to become the primary spokesman and defender of government intervention into the private sphere for the benefit of the general interest. Historian James Huston observed that the Civil War allowed the Republicans to become the first political party "to wield consciously the power of the federal government in order to smooth over some of the social dislocations generated by the industrial revolution." Until the mid-1870s, the state focused almost entirely on its promotional and distributional functions.

As recent historians have pointed out, by the 1870s a key shift had taken place in the government and the private sector. The Civil War had strengthened the commonwealth bonds among a majority of the Northern electorate. However, the effects of the 1870s Depression changed many of these connected bonds. A strong belief
developed that the distribution of government aid to private interests were not in the public interest. By the 1870s socioeconomic dislocation that accompanied three decades of rapid economic growth eroded the unifying antebellum conception of the Commonwealth Idea. Various socioeconomic groups started to perceive that their interests were no longer analogous with those of the corporations that the state had created and subsidized. Arthur Hadley, a railroad authority from Yale University, described the situation: "We thus have a separation of the community into more and more rigidly defined groups, different in industrial condition, distinct in ideals, and oftentimes antagonistic in their ambitions and sympathies. This separation of laborers and capitalists into distinct classes involved serious dangers to society as a whole.... It involves a contradiction between our political theories and the facts of industrial life."

Three key groups led the postwar doctrinal assault against the prevailing distributive policies that were initiated and justified under the auspices of the Commonwealth Idea. Their key tactic was the use of the state regulatory power against any enterprise "clothed with a public interest." This approach breathed new life into the doctrine of laissez faire equal rights. The three key groups were: agrarian shipping interests located in the Interior (especially the Upper Northwest and Great Plains); the growing urban middle class; and the courts.
The fierce reaction of agrarian shipping interests against railroad shipping policies and price structures led many agrarians to desire to cut off all state aid to the subsidized railroads and to begin to use the state's regulatory power. Midwestern state legislatures and local governments had previously legislated public aid, public land, and tax breaks to railroad lines. They expected their island communities would gain connections to a larger market and aid them to develop and prosper. Instead, as a result of the 1873 Depression, poor railroad management (which had led to overbuilding), and inexorable expectations of small shippers, many small farming communities were plummeted into a depressed economic condition. All of their previous convictions that state subsidy of industry actually benefited the common interest now changed.

Several Midwestern state legislatures passed regulatory Granger laws. They created regulatory railroad commissions to review railroad rates, and established special farm organizations, (such as the Grange and Farmers Alliance), to lobby for farm interests. To many within the interior, the concept of a Commonwealth for the general interest appeared unrealistic. By the early 1890s it was probable the vast majority of citizens within the interior would reject any large government subsidy to any
enterprise that did not directly benefit them. They would classify it as either class legislation or private business.13

Not only interior agrarian interests, but large elements of the urban middle class also believed the American System (which they supported through their taxes) no longer benefited their interest. As historian C.K. Yearley, the acceptance of the idea of laissez faire by the urban middle class was a reaction to the high property taxation needed to implement the American System. Agrarian interests directed their rage at the railroads to erect a regulatory structure to combat the previous state distributive system.

The urban middle class directed their resentment against the corrupt urban party machines. The political parties had controlled and distributed tax funds for the expansion of their party organizations. The urban middle classes' key program of civil service testing for government jobs was their response. It was an effort to eradicate government corruption and mismanagement of basic government services. Their goal was a professionally run administrative state bureaucracy separate from political party control. The urban middle classes wanted this professional administrative state to help lower property taxes; create a more efficient government; and gain more political power. The urban middle class would ensure that
their particular qualities of frugality, efficiency, education, and xenophobia toward immigrants would be the measure of good government in the emerging administrative states. Together with interior’s regulatory Granger laws the urban middle classes goal of a non-party administrative state eroded the previous unifying concept of a Commonwealth. ¹⁴

By the late 1880s, the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, resurrected and modified the previous doctrine of laissez faire. The courts espoused not only a legal principle but also particular laissez faire rhetoric to attack any enterprise which obtained aid from the state. The 1873 Munn decision allowed the federal courts to decide the legality of state regulation. To decide the constitutionality of state regulation laws, the courts created the doctrine which historians have labeled as conservative laissez faire.

Similar to the earlier doctrine of laissez faire equal rights, conservative laissez faire’s main goal was to weaken the power of the state. In the early nineteenth century laissez faire was an egalitarian doctrine to keep the state, particularly the courts, from promoting certain privileged interests. By the late nineteenth century the doctrine of conservative laissez faire had the dual purpose of stopping per-
ceived unfair state promotion business and unfair state regulation of business. The goal of many members of the Court, was a "weakened spring" of government. By stripping away the Commonwealth idea's dual powers of promotion and regulation, the Court hoped to create a market economy, functioning not through governmental intervention, but through natural laws.\textsuperscript{15}

By the 1890s many groups along the spectrum of the American polity, from farmers to the urban middle class, agreed with many of the Court's reasoning that enactments designed to "promote ... the general good," were devices used by powerful socioeconomic interests to subvert the people's "just rights." Proponents of conservative laissez faire intended to purify the American political economy of its previous distributive policies. Many people believed these policies were maintained through high taxation, party corruption, and class favoritism toward powerful special interests.\textsuperscript{16}

By the mid-1880s the rhetoric of equal rights by conservative laissez fairism adherents proved an effective instrument against the decreasing number of strong commonwealth advocates. The massive socioeconomic upheavals that had affected the country since the 1870s led many people to view the previous antebellum policies and rhetoric of the Commonwealth Idea as being anachronistic.
Hanna had been an integral part of a successful Ohio G.O.P. political–business coalition that had achieved by the late 1880s ascendancy over the social reformist wing of the party. However, Hanna's later national efforts to resuscitate the antebellum Commonwealth Idea of government promotion for the common interest failed. The antebellum belief in a commonwealth of all interests had been disintegrated by the various socioeconomic forces that had been unleashed since the 1870s upon American society.

However, the Commonwealth Idea proved a broad enough concept that it could be used not only for economic policy but also for cultural purposes. Working in tandem with McKinley, from 1896 to 1901, both men promoted the idea of a commonwealth to attract immigrant voters into the G.O.P. The efforts of McKinley, Hanna, and others broadened the ethno-cultural basis of the party and began its evolution toward becoming a more heterogeneous party.

Hanna's efforts for more than thirty years within the Republic party helped produce a party that was more conducive to the socioeconomic changes that had transformed late nineteenth century society. Building upon the work of previous party leaders, such as James G. Blaine, Hanna made the G.O.P. a more modern governing party than it had previously been before his political entrance from the auspices of M.A. Hanna & Co.
FOOTNOTES

1 Matthew Josephson, The Politicos, 1865–1896 (New York, 1938); H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, 1963); Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, 1959); Lewis Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980).

2 Clarence Stern, Resurgent Republicanism: The Handiwork of Hanna (Ann Arbor, 1963); Much of the literature of the twenties and thirties interpreted Hanna within the "businessman in politics" operating upon "strict business principles" framework. "He is rightly to be regarded less as an individual than as a very accurate exemplification of new and powerful forces which for many years had been acquiring strength, but which now first emerged from a half-obscenity, and revealed themselves to the nation as laying claim to an almost despotic dominance." Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic, 1885–1905 (New York, 1907); Henry Stoddard, As I Knew Them: Presidents and Politics From Grant to Coolidge (New York, 1927), 262; For an excellent addition to the historiographical literature of the 1896 campaign see Michael McGeer, The Decline of Popular Politics, The American North, 1865–1928 (New York, 1986). McGeer analyzes the innovative advertising techniques that Hanna developed during the 1895–96 campaign period; Thomas E. Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna" (Unpublished dissertation, Michigan State University, 1961), 372.

3 Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna (New York, 1912); Croly described the disappearance of the Hanna papers to fellow journalist William Allen White. "... the Hanna papers are now destroyed. After the work was done, I had them packed in a box and sent to the late Dan Hanna," (Mark Hanna's son) "accompanied by a letter. Apparently they reached Ravenna, Ohio, during one of his many non-lucid intervals. At all events, I never heard from him about them and the box containing the papers disappeared." David Levy, Herbert Croly of the New Republic: The Life and Thought of an American Progressive (Princeton, 1985), 148.

history as "the history of the American state ... an analysis of the role of the state in our society," 589.


8 The doctrine of equal rights was developed by jurists as a reaction to the early nineteenth century abstract doctrine of vested rights. The Marshall Court used vested rights as a barrier against the rising instrumentalism of the Jeffersonian period when the goal was to protect privileged corporate interests against state legislatures. The marshall Court accomplished this through judicial review of state charters granted to individuals or corporations. The Marshall Court cloaked these public charters with the constitutional protection of the obligation of contracts' clause. Constitutional historian Edward S. Corwin termed vested rights, "the basic doctrine of American constitutional law." By the early 1900s it had become superceded by the more purely philosophical American doctrine of equal rights. Many Americans had become distrustful of the powers arbitrarily used by their governments to protect privileged individ-

9 Leonard Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 305; One of the strongest advocates of the Laissez faire equal rights doctrine was Thomas Cooley, a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and the first chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cooley had written, "The State can have no favorite ... discrimination by the State ... is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim in ... government...." Peter Walker, Moral Choices: Memory, Desire, and Imagination in Nineteenth Century American Abolition (Baton Rouge, La., 1978), 345.


15 According to constitutional historians Stephen McCurdy and Alan Jones, conservative federal justices such as Stephen Field and Thomas Cooley eroded the power of the state. They created an abstract concept to change the former concept of public interest. In the courts, an abstract and inviolable line was drawn which separated a private business, and a private business with a public interest. Only the latter, incorporated or granted special privileges by the state, fell within the state's regulatory tripartite powers: taxation, police, and eminent domain powers. With the federal courts' narrowing of the state's regulatory powers, federal justices, such as Field, who sincerely believed in the doctrine of conservative laissez faire, concurrently limited the number of opportunities the state could aid certain economic interests. Under the *Munn* decision, federal courts, and not state legislatures would be the final constitutional arbiters in deciding which private enterprises were "clothed with a public interest." Alan Jones, "Thomas M. Cooley and 'Laissez Faire and Business Relations,'" *Journal of American History*, 53 (1967), 751-71; Charles McCurdy, "Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897," *JAH*, 61 (1975), 970-1005; M. Les Benedict, "Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism," *Law and History Review*, 3 (Fall 1985), 293-331.

16 Benedict emphasizes that the overriding principles of individual liberty, guided the followers of conservative laissez faireism. Liberty was best achieved, not by the work of government, but through the operation of the natural laws of the economy. Benedict, "Laissez Faire and Liberty," 301.
CHAPTER II

MARK HANNA AND THE RISE OF
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND

To understand Mark Hanna as a successful businessman and national politician, it is important to consider his family and business background. Hanna was reared in Cleveland, Ohio, and was actively involved in the political economy of the Second Industrial Revolution. He was one of a select group of businessmen who transformed Cleveland from a grain and shipping port into the dominant Great Lakes receiving and transshipment port for coal and iron ore. These experiences helped shape Hanna's later conduct as a public figure.

The major business achievement of Hanna was his transformation of Rhodes & Co. (formerly his father-in-law's successful bituminous coal selling agency) into one of the leading iron ore and transshipment agents on the Great Lakes. Rhodes & Co. later became Hanna & Co. Hanna's business strategy successfully linked the crucial coal, iron ore, and steel industries to Cleveland, thereby making it a great transshipment port and industrial center.
The 1870s Depression served as the backdrop for the one major setback Hanna suffered during his business career: his failure to settle a wage dispute between management and labor through arbitration. The collapse of the arbitration proceedings between business and labor, which Hanna had brokered, led to a strike which resulted in destruction of Rhodes & Co. coal property, with violence against both strikers and strikebreakers. This single incident of failed arbitration had a major impact upon Hanna's future dealings with organized labor.

The active role the government played in the development of the economy on both the state and national level was essential to the business success of Cleveland and Rhodes & Co. The successful role the state played in supporting promotion of the region, through development of local industries, made a deep and lasting impression upon Hanna and his fellow businessmen of the Great Lakes region. The previous lack of state economic aid was the primary reason the Hanna family moved from their New Lisbon, Ohio, home, to the growing Great Lakes port of Cleveland.

Mark Hanna was born on 24 September 1837 in the eastern Ohio town of New Lisbon. He was the second of seven children and the eldest son born to Leonard and Samantha Hanna. He came from a family background of
merchants who maintained strong Whig political sympathies. Hanna's grandfather, Benjamin Hanna, and his sons, which included Hanna's father Leonard, were recognized as operating one of the leading wholesale and commission merchant firms in what was then one of the busiest trading towns in eastern Ohio. Located approximately twenty miles from the Ohio river, with a branch river directly connecting the community with the Ohio River, New Lisbon had a prime location to benefit from the emerging river transportation network of eastern Ohio. The Hanna family's business primarily consisted of being commission brokers for the incoming commerce, carried along the river transportation network, from the east coast to the Ohio frontier.

According to Hanna biographer Herbert Croly, the Hanna family's pro-Whig sympathies "flowed naturally from their mercantile interests."\(^1\) A key economic policy difference between Democrats and Whigs was the Whig's policy of releasing state aid for promotion and development of the economy of the country for the common interest. This Whig Commonwealth promotion policy appealed to numerous mercantile interests in developing areas of the country, such as eastern Ohio. Unlike the Whigs' Commonwealth policy, the Democrats usually favored a strict _laissez faire_ policy. Most Jacksonian Democrats believed government aid to private interests
reeked of special privilege, and Democrats believed this inevitably led to party corruption and damaged the political process.

From the mid-1820s to the 1840s, canal construction was the primary means of state development in Ohio. Ohio, with a policy similar to that of many states in the Northwest, granted liberal amounts of state aid to finance many public projects, particularly canals. Whig administrations and Whig legislatures usually issued the largest amounts of state aid for such public projects. Between 1825 and 1842, Ohio finished its canal system. By 1845, the state had built some six hundred and fifty-eight miles of canals at a total cost of nearly $15,000,000.

Canal construction could create a settlement out of a previous wilderness or change a small village into a leading commercial town. The failure to locate a canal near a previous central hamlet could doom a town to virtual economic extinction. Such was the fate of New Lisbon. The town was not properly situated to benefit from the state canal system.

This misfortune led to the Hanna family's unfortunate involvement in construction of the Sandy and Beaver Canal. The canal investors' goal was to link New Lisbon with the Ohio Canal. The 308 mile Ohio canal ran from Portsmouth on the Ohio River northward to the village of Cleveland located at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River on
Lake Erie. The proposed Sandy and Beaver canal would link up with the Ohio Canal in the adjoining western county.

The Hanna family was prominently represented among the officers of the canal company. Benjamin Hanna was the President and Leonard Hanna was a Director. The Hanna family invested liberally in the company stock. One family member later alleged that out of a total investment of two million dollars in the company, the Hanna family had supplied no less than $200,000.

The canal's construction began on 24 November 1834. Then investors in the Sandy and Beaver Canal were adversely affected by the Panic of 1837, which resulted in suspension of canal construction. The Panic resulted in massive state bank failures and led to a withdrawal of state funds from various Ohio canal projects. As a direct result of the Panic, *laissez faire* Jacksonian Democrats gained control of the state government.

As a result of the Panic, Ohio had amassed debt, and its government leaders were faced with the necessity of taxing its citizens to meet the interest on the debt incurred through the previous Commonwealth promotion of state banks and public works. To cut the immense expenses of the state, the Democratic leadership drastically reduced state aid to canal projects.²

Under the new *laissez faire* program, state aid to the Sandy and Beaver Canal was eliminated. Without
state aid, private investors, such as the Hanna family, had to invest more of their private earnings into canal construction to complete the projects. When the canal was actually finished on 26 October 1846, canals were gradually being replaced as means of transportation by the speedier, all-season railroad system. Few boats used the canal to transport goods from New Lisbon to the Ohio Canal. Shortly afterwards, the canal company went into bankruptcy. The company's bankruptcy plunged with it the fortunes of the Hanna family (along with many other investors), and the former vibrant commercial town of New Lisbon. A contemporary observed the declining situation of New Lisbon after the failure of the canal.

Business forsook the town. Its 'boom had burst!' Houses and stores went unrented, and many fell into decay. So it was during our boyhood; and this condition cause the removal of many of the young men and more enterprising citizens.

As a result of the failure of the canal, the Hanna family fortune was lost.

Since New Lisbon was no longer deemed a major commercial center, Benjamin Hanna's sons, Leonard and Robert decided to start a new business in Cleveland, which was a small but thriving lake port city of approximately 20,000. It was a town that had benefited - rather than been hurt - by the state's developmental plans. During
the early 1820s, state officials selected the village, to be the northern terminus of the projected 308 mile Ohio Canal. Cleveland became the premier lake port and the chief city on the southern shores of Lake Erie.

In the spring of 1851, Leonard and Robert Hanna, together with a neighbor Hiram Garretson, moved to Cleveland and began the wholesale grocery company of Hanna, Garretson & Co. Like all other business establishments in Cleveland during that period, Hanna, Garretson & Co. was established on the waterfront. A waterfront location was essential for a successful business. All freight which arrived at the mouth of the Cuyahoga, whether by canal or lake, had to be unloaded, stored, and either processed or transferred to another vessel. During the fall of 1852, the families of Leonard and Robert Hanna permanently joined them in Cleveland. Fifteen-year-old Mark Hanna would begin his career in the Cleveland and Great Lakes business world.5

Before 1855, many Clevelanders, in association with other Great Lakes ports, were frustrated by the lack of federal aid for Great Lakes development. The only federal appropriations to improve Cleveland’s harbor was an insignificant amount of five thousand dollars received on 3 March 1825. This funding was exhausted in the construction of a single pier from the east shore of the Cuyahoga River. In 1827, an additional sum of ten
thousand dollars was appropriated by the federal government to Cleveland. This amount was primarily used to dredge a new straight harbor channel.  

As historians have emphasized, this frustration during the 1840s and 1850s with the lack of federal aid, usually resulted from national Democratic administrations. This was a major reason the entire Great Lakes region overwhelmingly supported the Whig and later Republican parties.

To Great Lakes advocates, who desperately needed federal aid to construct and improve their harbors, it appeared that the Democrats focused their energies on expansionism of southern interests, thereby neglecting the Great Lakes' interests. Historian John MacNaugton has pointed out that Great Lake's editors, politicians, and businessmen emphasized the contrast between what Democratic Administrations (particularly Polk's) did to gain new southern territory and what little it did to improve existing northern territory. According to MacNaugton, to many a Great Lakes editor "the glories of Montezuma's halls paled before the spectacle of a steamer wrecked on a sand bar near the local harbor entrance." Finally, in 1852, with the prodding of the Whig Administration of Millard Fillmore (himself a resident of Buffalo, N.Y., a key Great Lakes port), Congress passed the General Harbor Bill of 1852, which
gave more than two million dollars for rivers and harbors. The Great Lakes region and the southern river systems thereafter shared in all future federal appropriations.

The federal government's most significant action for Clevelanders in transforming it from a small port into the major shipping center for the entire Great Lakes was the construction of a canal to bypass the impassable St. Mary's rapids at Sault St. Marie, Michigan. Before construction of the Sault Canal, passage of vessels to Lake Superior was impossible. A one mile rapid, with a seventeen foot drop, lay in the St. Mary's River, and acted as a barrier between Lakes Huron and Superior. When the Sault Canal was completed on 19 April 1855, it created an all-water transportation system running from the upper reaches of Lake Superior to the southern shores of Lake Erie at Cleveland. It then continued by canal and river to the railroad terminals of Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York. The Sault Canal made Cleveland a key Great Lakes transshipment point between the iron ore regions of Lake Superior and the developing steel industry of Ohio and Pennsylvania's Mahoning and Allegheny Valleys. The increased annual shipments of iron ore into Cleveland's harbor helped fuel the city's rapidly growing iron and steel industry from 1855 to 1873.8
Through a combination of good fortune and their own foresight, the proprietors of Hanna, Garretson & Co., arrived in Cleveland at a crucial turning point in its economic development. The new business opportunities resulted from the development of the Lake Superior iron ore trade. It gave the young Mark Hanna an excellent business environment for him to acquire knowledge of the Great Lakes shipping trade.

By the mid-1850s, Hanna, Garretson & Co. was one of the first Cleveland firms to anticipate the possibilities of the Lake Superior iron ore trade. Through the establishment of a steamboat line, the firm extended its business ventures into the Lake Superior iron ore region. This strategy allowed them to act as forwarding commission merchants. The extended commission duties of Hanna, Garretson & Co. included the northward shipment of various supplies to the copper and iron mines of the Marquette mining region. Afterwards, the commission took the mass copper and iron ore onto the steamboats, where it was then shipped to Cleveland. Railroads then shipped the ores eastward for smelting.

To gain experience, Mark and his younger brother Melville traveled as pursers for a season through the upper Great Lakes country. Through his travels, Mark soon gained knowledge of the activities of the new Lake Superior iron ore industry. Additionally, as Hanna's work
focused on the increased iron ore shipments arriving from the Lake Superior region to the Cleveland docks, the young man soon obtained crucial business contacts in the Lake Superior iron ore industry.

Along with a prescient few, Hanna perceived that the mining and shipment of Lake Superior iron ore was the crucial aspect of the Great Lakes trade for Cleveland's future as both a transshipment point and industrial center. Throughout the rest of his business career, Hanna made the iron ore trade the anchor for all the rest of his various enterprises. What was true of many prominent Clevelanders is of particular importance in discussing Hanna: Without the Lake Superior iron ore trade's transformation of Cleveland from a commercial center into a major industrial center, Hanna would never have accumulated the massive economic power that, by the early 1880s, he would successfully begin to transfer into political power within the Ohio Republican party.9

Since 1860, the decline in Leonard Hanna's health, due to a fall from a horse, left him largely incapacitated and prevented him from doing any business for the firm. During his father's two year absence until his death, Mark Hanna, the eldest son, assumed his father's place in the business and additionally became the "guardian and head of the family."
Upon the death of his father Leonard Hanna on 15 December 1862, the twenty-five year old Mark Hanna officially assumed his father's place in the firm of Robert Hanna & Co. The previous firm of Hanna, Garretson & Co. dissolved in late 1862 over the issue of whether to add a liquor department to the commission's business. Garretson viewed the liquor trade as a large profit maker, but Robert and Leonard Hanna refused because of their strong temperance convictions.10

The key change in both Hanna's private and public life was his marriage, at twenty-seven years of age, to Augusta Rhodes on 27 Sept. 1864. Mark Hanna and Augusta Rhodes had planned their wedding through numerous letters sent to each other during the summer of 1864 while Hanna was serving a ninety day enlistment in the One Hundred and Fiftieth Ohio Regiment. Hanna's regiment was stationed at Fort Bunker Hill outside Washington D.C. The regiment had been shipped from Cleveland to protect the U.S. Capitol from any further excursions from the Shenadoah Valley by Confederate General Jubah Early. The regiment saw no action, and by the late summer of 1864, Hanna's brief military service during the Civil War ended. Augusta Rhodes was the daughter of Daniel J. Rhodes, an avid Democrat, and one of the pioneers who developed the Ohio bituminous coal fields. The elder Rhodes intensely disliked Hanna's strong Republican views but recognized
his son-in-law's business expertise. Rhodes desired to disengage from the frenetic daily duties of business, so he wanted Hanna, along with two other individuals, to manage his profitable coal business. Soon, thereafter, its name was changed to Rhodes & Co. The obstinate Rhodes expected the young couple to live in the Rhodes mansion on Franklin Avenue so the elderly man could manage the young couples' private life. Hanna refused Rhodes' offer of patriarchal support. After residing in the Rhodes mansion for a year, Mr. and Mrs. Hanna moved into a small house on Prospect Street.

In 1866, instead of joining Rhodes & Co., Hanna, together with his brother Melville and another individual, started a petroleum refinery: Hanna, Doherty and Company. The partners invested $100,000 in the business. Rhodes was horrified that his son-in-law would risk his future in such a dangerous and uncertain business. He wasn't unhappy when the refinery soon burned down. The morning after the fire, Mr. Rhodes appeared at the Hanna house on Prospect Street. He gleefully offered the destitute young couple his mansion in which to live and, for Mark, employment in his business. While the young couple prepared to move, Rhodes consoled the defeated young man with the reiterated remark, "Your money is all gone, Mark, and I am damned glad of it." However, Hanna's independent business streak would not be quelled
but asserted itself within the contours of Rhodes & Co., for the betterment of both Hanna and Daniel J. Rhodes.

The opportunity to manage Rhodes & Co. gave Hanna a crucial foothold within the vital Ohio bituminous mining industry. Unlike the Lake Superior iron ore trade, this was an area of the mining industry in which Hanna had little actual experience or business contacts.

Rhodes & Co. was a well established coal commission business when Hanna joined it in 1867. Rhodes & Co.'s primary function was acting as coal commission agents for various businesses. Its duties were to obtain the desired quantity of coal (sometimes received from the company's numerous mines) and then to deliver the coal to the customer.

By the mid-1850s, Rhodes & Co.'s major customers were the growing area enterprises dependent upon the power generated from fossil fuel. From 1845 to 1860, Rhodes had been a leader in the discovery of bituminous coal mines in the Massillon, Mahoning, and Tuscarawas Valley coal regions of eastern Ohio. Rhodes' efforts in developing much of the isolated coal regions was of great importance to Cleveland. The coal could be mined and shipped to Cleveland via small rail lines, where it would be trans-shipped on a major railroad line to the east.

Thus, by the early 1880s Rhodes' development of rail transportation lines into the Ohio coal country made
Cleveland the largest bituminous coal market on the Great Lakes. By the mid-eighties, rail transportation of coal was recognized as being very efficient. In 1864, the price of transporting a ton of coal from the Tuscarawas Valley had cost ten dollars; in 1884 the cost per ton had dropped to one dollar and eighty cents.  

From the time Hanna entered Rhodes & Co. management in 1867, until 1885, when it was renamed M.A. Hanna & Co., Hanna's diversification strategy kept Rhodes & Co. financially intact despite the 1870s depression. Hanna's goal was to combine the previous Ohio valley bituminous coal assets of Rhodes & Co. with the crucial Lake Superior iron ore shipping trade. This placed Rhodes & Co. at the hub of Cleveland's booming coal, iron, and shipping industries.

The Civil War's impact upon Cleveland had accelerated the growth of its coal and iron industries and helped to transform the city from being primarily a commercial center toward becoming a manufacturing center. Additionally, between 1860 and 1870, Cleveland's population more than doubled, from 43,417 to 92,829. When scientific discoveries during the late 1860s revealed that the Lake Superior ores were perfect for smelting in the first U.S. Bessemer steel plants Eastern capital provided the necessary funds to improve the railroad facilities to the iron fields and also to enlarge the port facilities of
the Upper Peninsula. Soon, large flows of iron ore were shipped from the upper Great Lakes to the southern end of the lower Great Lakes. Through its geographic location, Cleveland became the leading Great Lakes receiving port for the incoming iron ore of the upper Great Lakes. A contemporary remarked "that Cleveland had been chosen as the most natural place where the iron ore of the Lake Superior region and the coal from the vast fields of the Ohio and Pennsylvania should meet for the manufacture of iron...." By the early 1870s, Cleveland was connected by railroad of the southern Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania coal fields and, additionally, by water to the iron ore regions of the upper Great Lakes. With significant financial resources at his disposal because of Rhodes & Co.'s successful coal selling trade, Hanna could therefore expand the firm's activities into the Great Lakes iron ore and shipping industries.\textsuperscript{13}

It was personally important for Hanna to prove to his father-in-law that he had sound business judgment and managerial talent. When Daniel J. Rhodes died in August 1875, despite the economic downturn from 1873 to 1879, Hanna's managerial judgment in diversifying the company's interests, had kept Rhodes & Co. financially intact, while many similar companies, which had failed to diversify, had serious financial difficulty or were forced into bankruptcy. After the depression, Rhodes & Co., through
diversification, and cost cutting, was in a strong financial position and able to take advantage of the new business climate when general prosperity returned in late 1879.

Under Hanna's management, Rhodes & Co. remained both a coal seller and also broadened its activities. His linkage of the firm's activities with the Lake Superior trade, enabled the company to have a financial role in the lake transportation business, in addition to the sale of coal and iron ore. The previous lessons Hanna learned at Hanna, Garretson & Co. enabled him, together with Melville Hanna (a member of Rhodes & Co.), to organize in 1874 the Cleveland Transportation company. It established a fleet of black wooden vessels known as the "Black Line." Hanna's transportation company entered into a multi-year contract with the leading Cleveland mining company on the Marquette iron ore range, the Cleveland Mining Company. The "Black Line" carried the company's ore from Marquette to Cleveland at $3 and $3.50 per ton and linked Rhodes & Co. to the Lake Superior trade.

With the profits from the "Black Line's" transportation of coal from the rapidly expanding iron ore areas of the Great Lakes, Hanna purchased, for Rhodes & Co., several iron ore mines on the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. The Upper Peninsula iron ore mines were added to the bituminous mines Rhodes had previously purchased in
southeastern Ohio. Through continual purchases of mines, Hanna added to the Rhodes & Co. coal and iron empire.

By the mid-1880s, under Hanna's management, Rhodes & Co.'s diversification strategy was nearly completed. The company continued to transport other companies' coal to Cleveland, but it was also able to mine and transport its own coal, in its own boats, unload the coal on its own docks, and sometimes even smelt the ore in its own furnaces. Pig iron was its largest finished product. When this process was completed, Rhodes & Co. reverted to its traditional function and sold the products.

In July 1886 M.A. Hanna & Co. purchased the Globe Iron Works located in Cleveland. As a result of the purchase, the company went beyond its traditional sales and transportation agent role, toward a measure of control over the industrial production process of shipbuilding. At the time the Globe Iron Works was one of the leading builders of the most technologically advanced steel vessels on the Great Lakes. Under Hanna's management, the Globe Iron Works was incorporated as the Globe Iron Works Company with a capital stock of $500,000. Hanna's purchase of the Globe Iron Works placed M.A. Hanna & Co. at the center of the Great Lakes shipping industry, at a time when steel vessels were replacing the earlier wooden hull vessels as carriers of coal and iron ore. The smaller wooden vessels, which were the previous popular
choice for the grain carrying trade, proved inefficient for the bulk transportation of iron ore from the upper Great Lakes to Cleveland. Hanna, through integration of the production facilities of the Globe Iron Works with the firm's previous upper Great Lakes iron ore mines and lake transportation vessels, had vertically pushed M.A. Hanna & Co. toward control of an additional stage of the business process, one central to the Great Lakes iron ore and shipping trade.\textsuperscript{14}

A major component of Hanna’s Great Lakes strategy for Rhodes & Co. was to gain control of the docks of a single port. Hanna's intention was for the company to find an appropriate port suited for receiving, unloading, and then transporting iron ore to the Pittsburgh steel mines.

By 1874, Hanna accomplished his goal when he gained control of the small, decayed shipping port of Ashtabula, Ohio, located ninety miles northeast of Cleveland. Previously, the Pennsylvania Railroad had leased the small, failing, Ashtabula branch railroad for ninety-nine years, for the purpose of having it linked with its national system. As a result of the Pennsylvania Railroad lease, Ashtabula became a major iron ore shipping port. In comparison with Cleveland, Ashtabula was a much shorter distance to the Pittsburgh steel mills and, therefore, more important because it involved less railroad time and
fewer stops and transfer points. The Pennsylvania Railroad immediately built two hundred feet of docks on the west side of Ashtabula harbor.

Under Hanna's direction, Rhodes & Co., which were known in the Ohio bituminous coal region as being Pennsylvania Railroad shippers, obtained the vital lease on the Pennsylvania docks at Ashtabula. The lease granted Rhodes & Co. the legal right to be the sole company to operate the western Ashtabula docks. Under the lease, Rhodes & Co. furnished the Pennsylvania Railroad with iron ore to transport back to the western Pennsylvania steel mills.

With the knowledge that much of the Lake Superior iron ore shipped to western Pennsylvania would be handled by these docks, Hanna sought to make the Ashtabula port a type of "crown jewel" in the expanding Rhodes & Co./M.A. Hanna Co. industrial empire. The most expensive and technologically innovative coal and iron ore handling and unloading machinery was installed by Hanna at Ashtabula. By the early 1890s, M.A. Hanna & Co. completed the laborious process of continual improvement of the Ashtabula dock facilities. In 1891, when the federal government completed construction of a vital shipping breakwater, the company's Ashtabula docks had the facilities to handle 11,000 tons of coal and iron ore per day.
In 1901, primarily due to the M.A. Hanna & Co.'s controlled docks, Ashtabula replaced Cleveland as the leading iron ore receiving port on the Great Lakes. For the next several years, during this crucial "Age of Steel," Ashtabula finished no lower than second among the other eleven Great Lakes ports which received iron ore.

By the mid-1880s the success of Ashtabula, as a shipping and receiving port, had become feared and resented by many Clevelanders. When Hanna later embarked upon his political career in the early 1890s, a business associate emphasized that much of Hanna's political unpopularity in Cuyahoga County was due to the astounding business success of his leased Ashtabula docks.¹⁵

Hanna's Great Lakes diversification of Rhodes & Co. enabled it to survive the 1870s Depression. The Depression had a devastating affect upon Ohio bituminous coal mines, thereby, introducing Hanna to the contentious labor issue.

Hanna became the first coal operator in the Ohio bituminous coal region to deal with representatives of organized labor for the joint purpose of bringing stability to the slumping coal industry. The National Association of Miners, formed in 1873, realized that for the miners to survive the recent economic downturn, they had to organize a union, and then attempt to arrive at a joint agreement with the bituminous coal operators. The
union established its general office in Cleveland. By 1874 the Association had gained twenty thousand members.16

With much of the coal industry in depression, officers of the Association visited the various coal company offices in Cleveland. The union officials hoped that if they promised to use their power to prevent costly strikes, certain coal companies would recognize them through joint agreements. With one exception, the company presidents declined to recognize the union. They stated to the union officials that they felt competent to manage their own affairs without meddling outsiders. Mark Hanna was the lone exception. According to Andrew Roy, who became the first inspector of coal mines in Ohio, Hanna:

received the general officers courteously, requested to see the constitution of the association, which he read over very carefully. He then asked Messrs. Siney and James, whether, in case the award of the umpire should go against the miners, would they abide by it; and whether in case they did not feel disposed to keep faith with the decision, had the general officers sufficient influence to prevent them from going out on strike? Messrs. Siney and James would order them to continue work, and use every means in their power to prevent a strike. 'Then,' replied Mr. Hanna, 'I am heartily with you, and will do all I can to have the operators submit all questions that may arise in future, to the decision of a board of arbitration.'17
Because of a series of unfortunate circumstances, for the only time in Hanna's personal dealings with organized labor, the joint agreement failed.

In the fall of 1874, when the demand for coal dropped fifty percent, coal companies operating in Ohio's Tuscarawas Valley informed the miners that their wages would be cut from ninety to seventy cents per ton. Unlike most of Ohio's coal country, the miners of that district were relatively well paid and well organized. Most union miners decided to strike rather than accept the wage reduction. However, President John Siney of the National Association convinced the Tuscarawas Valley miners to accept arbitration of the issue.

The arbitration hearing took place within the Akron office of Rhodes & Co. Hanna, through his establishment of an operators' association, had many district operators favorable to acceptance of any award from the arbitration hearing. A seven member arbitration board was chosen with both business and labor having three representatives on the board. Hanna was chosen one of the operators representatives and Judge Andrews of Cleveland acted as the umpire. Both sides presented their cases to the umpire on what constituted a fair wage during a time of economic depression. With a twenty cent margin between operators' offer of seventy cents per ton and labors' demand of ninety cents per ton, Andrews' decision of
awarding labor seventy-one cents per ton, shocked and bitterly disappointed the labor officials. As a result of the award, the humiliated labor officials, and particularly the angry rank and file, soon disregarded previous promises given to Hanna stating labor would accept any arbitration award—even one that went against them. To the National Association, if all arbitration meant was labor's capitulation in a different form, the workers would revert to the traditional strike method to gain their goals.

Shortly thereafter, during the spring of 1875, a single coal company, not a member of the operator's association, offered the miners a nine cent wage increase provided they dropped their demand for a checkweighman at the scales. Association President Hanna and other alarmed members of the operators' association, who had granted the Miners' Association scale demand, demanded the union control its rank and file and stand by the arbitration award. When non-union miners accepted the company's eight cent per ton offer, the Association released the union miners from the arbitration award.

Despite direct appeals from Hanna and other association members to the union officers at a meeting on 12 April 1875, in the Rhodes & Co. Akron office, the union officials refused to rescind their executive order. During the meeting, Hanna emphasized the importance of
upholding the contractual principle of never abrogating a joint agreement. He also stressed that the effect of the establishment of new railroad lines in the southeastern Ohio Hocking Valley coal district would cause cheaper Hocking Valley coal to be brought into competition with the more expensive Tuscarawas coal (primarily because of higher labor costs) in the crucial Cleveland market. With the failure of the meeting, though, the operators' association, with its business pool a failure, yielded to the union demand of eighty cents per ton.\textsuperscript{19}

During the spring of 1876, business conditions in the coal region began to stabilize. The coal operators slashed the union miners wages to sixty-five cents per ton, causing the Association's leaders to send the miners out on strike.

When Rhodes & Co., in conjunction with the other coal companies, sent in replacement workers for the striking miners, several hundred strikers rioted. The striking miners attacked the replacement miners and burnt several mines. The damage caused to Rhodes & Co. was four burnt mines. Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes sent the state militia to protect the mine owners' private property and to preserve public order. As a result of the militia's actions, the strikers were defeated by the summer of 1876, and forced to return to work at the proscribed wage of sixty-five cents per ton. In the fall
of 1876, as a result of the labor defeat, the Miners' National Association collapsed.  

For the next ten years, in the Ohio bituminous coal region, the principle of arbitration between capital and labor was effectively smashed. Hanna, the president of the operators' association and the chief business advocate of arbitration, sustained not only a business defeat, but also a stinging personal defeat. For the rest of his active business career, Hanna refused to involve himself in labor disputes or negotiations in the Ohio bituminous coal region.

In later years, as the spokesman for the national Civic Federation, Hanna would use the 1876 strike as an example of the tragedy that occurred when trust and conciliation between capital and labor collapsed. To his credit, Hanna always included himself amongst those responsible for the mutual breakdown of trust between the operators and the union officials. However, not until twenty-four years later, when he had gained sufficient national political and economic power, did he lead another labor conciliation movement involving the coal mining regions of the country.

By the mid-1870s, leading Cleveland businessmen realized that the poor condition of Cleveland's outer harbor threatened its future status as a major iron ore shipping port for the upper Great Lakes. Cleveland,
through its excellent location on the south shore of Lake Erie and the growth of its iron and steel industrial base, appeared destined to become the leading shipping port on the Great Lakes. However, the Cleveland business community realized that if the city was to develop into a major shipping port on the Great Lakes, improvements of the harbor area would be necessary. The fierce storms that blew up suddenly off Lake Erie not only wrecked havoc upon the city's Lake Superior coal and iron ore trade, but also caused constant repair of the city's docks and unloading facilities.

The shipping problem could only be corrected with the construction of a breakwater, situated off the west side of the Cuyahoga River. Only the federal government had the financial capability to support the construction of a west breakwater. In 1874, a writer for the Cleveland Leader emphasized the importance of the breakwater for Cleveland's future.

No improvement that Cleveland has contemplated for many years was as necessary to the future of our city as this.... The building of the Harbor of Refuge will add fifty thousand people to the population of Cleveland within ten years. It will add more than any other improvement ever adopted here to make the city growing and prosperous.22

In June 1875, the federal government agreed to fund the construction of a west breakwater in Cleveland's outer
harbor. The effect of the breakwater construction on Cleveland's shipping trade was first realized in 1880, when the Cleveland docks received over 750,000 tons of iron ore, an increase of twenty percent over the previous year. In 1883, the west breakwater was finally completed. Cleveland's future position as the leading Great Lakes receiving port for coal and iron ore and its emergence as a leading industrial center was insured.

Hanna, through his diversification of the interests of Rhodes & Co., had a vested interest in the federal government's construction of a breakwater. Hanna's business strategy had focused a great amount of the company's interests on the Lake Superior iron ore trade, which could have been seriously threatened if Cleveland's outer harbor was not improved. In fact, it was the issue of the breakwater which initially propelled Hanna's formal entry during the mid-1870s into Ohio Republican politics.*

By 1876, the crucial role which the federal government had assumed in the survival of an enterprise, city, or region, greatly influenced Hanna's emerging

* The crucial role which the breakwater issue played in transformation of the local Republican party, and Hanna's key role in bringing about the transformation, will be discussed in Chapter 2.
political ideas. During Hanna's youth in New Lisbon, the state's failure to include the town within the state canal network had led to the commercial collapse of the town and the loss of the Hanna family fortune. Unlike New Lisbon, Cleveland was a city the very existence of which was practically created by the state's decision to make the village the northern terminus of the Ohio Canal. Additionally, Cleveland's emergence as a leading shipping port and industrial center on the Great Lakes, was largely owed to the federal government's construction of the Sault Canal in 1852 and the west breakwater in 1875. The federal government's continued maintenance of a high tariff against competing foreign coal, iron and steel, also positively affected Rhodes & Co.'s extensive coal and iron trade. With this experience, Hanna had a strong conviction that government should assume an active promotional role in the private economic sphere.

The effects of the 1870s Depression began to end by early 1880. With the increased activity within the coal, iron, and steel industries, Hanna began the slow process of disengagement from the daily activities of running Rhodes & Co. Herbert Croly correctly observed, that from 1867 until 1880, Hanna appeared to devote practically his entire time to the coal and iron business of Rhodes & Co.

By 1881, with the Depression ending, Hanna began to shift some of his attention and energies away from the
coal and iron business and toward politics and other business enterprises. During the 1880s, Hanna's various local business enterprises included owning an Opera House, a major banking institution, and a west side street railway company. At one time Hanna employed approximately six thousand people in his various enterprises. By the late 1880s and early 1890s, Hanna's business stature in the Great Lakes coal and iron industry was recognized through the various regional companies he was associated with as an officer: He was President of the Pacific Coal and Iron Company of St. Paul, Minnesota; President of the West Republic Mining Company of Marquette, Michigan; and Vice-President of the Hubbell Stove Company of Buffalo, New York. Additionally, Hanna's knowledge that his two younger brothers, Melville and Leonard Hanna, would be the leading daily managers of Rhodes & Co. and later M.A. Hanna & Co., allowed him to leave much of the daily toil of running the company in his brothers' capable hands.\(^{25}\) The final say on any major business deal (such as the purchase of the Globe Iron Works) however, was always left to Hanna, the senior member of the firm. Only he had accumulated the business stature and contacts to conclude major business transactions, not only in Cuyahoga County but throughout the country. By the late 1880s Hanna's business duties included his spending increased amounts of time in Pittsburgh and Chicago, and later in
New York City. Throughout the rest of his life, within the business community, Hanna was always considered to be the key national representative of M.A. Hanna & Co. 26

Much of the technological and managerial innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution in America weakened the role of the "middleman" or selling agency. Hanna's actions, from 1867 to 1885, in transforming the coal selling agency of Rhodes & Co. should be interpreted as an attempt to extend more of the "visible hand" of control over the company's product. As Herbert Croly commented, it was crucial for Hanna to obtain for Rhodes & Co. an early interest in the mining, transport, handling, and sale of the basic materials necessary to the iron and steel industries as possible. Hanna's successful diversification and consolidation strategy, particularly his purchase of the Globe Iron Works and his transformation of it into the Globe Shipbuilding Company, which became the leading builder of steel vessels on the lower Great Lakes, allowed Rhodes & Co., and particularly M.A. Hanna & Co., to survive and prosper in the new business environment of mass production. Leonard Hanna, the youngest brother and business associate of Mark Hanna, stated that under Hanna's active management, Rhodes & Co., and later M.A. Hanna & Co., "came to be not only sales agents but" also "miners of coal and iron ore, owners of ships, operators of docks and makers of pig iron." Under his active
management he had established Rhodes & Co., and later in a more surrogate role M.A. Hanna & Co., near the center of Cleveland's industrial growth and prosperity.27

In 1890 a writer for the leading Great Lakes shipping journal, *The Marine Review* commented upon the recognition of Hanna's achievements:

coal interests extend from the producing districts of Pennsylvania to terminal property at the head of Lake Superior, and the ore business of the firm of which he is senior member probably shows a larger increase within the past five years than any other concern on the Lakes.28

Hanna succeeded in constructing a major industrial empire out of the Rhodes & Co. coal commission business, a process virtually completed in 1895 when Hanna left the company. Hanna's successful diversification and transformation of the company was illustrated by the continued phenomenal success the M.A. Hanna Co. maintained, even decades after its founder's death.
FOOTNOTES

1. Herber Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work* (New York, 1912), 11, 12; Columbiana County, where New Lisbon was located, was strongly Democratic in the pre-Civil War era. Additionally, it was a seedbed for Copperheads, as New Lisbon's native son, Clement L. Vallandigham, the leading northern Copperhead, twice represented the county in the State House of Representatives during the forties. Thomas Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1961), 12.


7. The split between the Democrats and the Whigs over the question of the necessity and constitutionality of governmental promotional policies was exacerbated by President Polk's veto of the General Harbor Bill of 1846. During his presidency, Polk opposed all improvement bills as nonessential and helped to turn the Democratic party against any federal aid to the Great Lakes. It was particularly Polk's policies that turned the majority of voters in the Great Lakes region against the Democratic party. John Gordon MacNaughton, "Democratic Hostility to the Navigation and Commerce of the Great Lakes as a Neglected Factor in the Rise of the Republican Party" (Ph.D. diss., University of Buffalo, 1961), 34; Edward
pross, "a history of rivers and harbors appropriation bills, 1866-1933" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1942), 32.


10 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna 42-43; Leonard Hanna Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (Library of Congress).

11 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 48-50; Annals of Cleveland, 49 (1866), 411. Under pressure from Rhodes, Hanna reluctantly sold his interest in the company to his younger brother Melville. Soon young businessman George W. Chapin, who had recently married Salome Hanna, joined Mel and the oil refinery became Hanna & Chapin. The firm was about the last to sell out to the Standard Oil Company. Through his connections to the oil refining business, H. Melville Hanna became a wealthy man. In later years, among friends, Hanna would refer to Melville as "my rich brother." Leonard Hanna I, box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Mark Hanna to Augusta Rhodes, June 22, 1864, Box 1, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

12 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 56; Cleveland Leader, August 7, 1875, p. 4; James Ford Rhodes, "The Coal and Iron Industry of Cleveland," 337-40; Van Tassel and Grabowski, eds., The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, 817.


15 Mansfield, ed., History of the Great Lakes, I, 296-97; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 60; Marine Review, 12 (Sept. 12, 1895), 7; ibid., (Nov. 14, 1895), 11; Cleveland Leader, Dec. 8, 1888, p. 4; J.B. Morrow I, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); James O. Curwood, The Great Lakes: The Vessels that Plough Them; Their Owners, Their Sailors, and Their Cargoes (New York, 1909), 44. In the immediate post-Civil War decades, some Clevelanders complained that their port's unloading facilities were horse-and labor-intensive and were manifestly inadequate to meet the needs of a growing port. In the 1870s Cleveland's Board of Trade agonized over the loss of cargoes to immediate lake cities such as Ashtabula and Lorain, which had newer technology at their docks and could thus unload ships more expeditiously than Cleveland. Van Tassel and Grabowski, eds., The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, xxx; "Several causes have combined to bring about the dethronement of this city as the greatest receiving port for iron ore in the United States, ... Year after year old and slow-going machinery was kept in use on the ore docks, while Ashtabula, Fairport, and Lorain were putting into operation the best and latest devices for handling ore cheaply and rapidly .... The remarkable volume of the lake ore traffic this year affords abundant evidence that the Lake Superior iron mines will supply a vast and rapidly increasing business to the Lake Erie ports which bid for it, and in such a competition this city cannot afford to be beaten. Cleveland Leader, Dec. 8, 1888, p. 4.

16 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 90-91.

17 Andrew Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States (Columbus, n.d.), 163; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 91.

18 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 91; Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States, 168.

19 Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States, 169-70; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna,
92; Cleveland Leader, April 13, 1875, p. 8; ibid., Aug. 5, 1875, pp. 4, 8.

20 On 20 April 1876, the first Rhodes & Co. mine to be attacked and burnt was the Warmington mine located in the Tuscarawas Valley, just south of Massillon, Ohio. Andrew Roy described what happened: "The militia were placed at the Warmington mine. The Rhodes Coal Company, which had an interest in the Warmington mine, owned four other mines in the Tuscarawas Valley. The strikers, who blamed the Rhodes Company for causing the troops to be brought into the valley, determined to revenge themselves on this company. The night following the appearance of the troops, bodies of the strikers, with blackened faces and dressed in fantastic garments, appeared at each of the Rhodes mines, captured the engineers and night watchmen, placed them under cars and set all the mines of this company on fire." Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States, 170–73, 175; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 92–93; Stark County Democrat, May 4, 1876, p. 1; Canton Repository, May 3, 1876, p. 3; ibid., June 9, 1876, p. 1; Cleveland Leader, April 21, 1876, p. 1; Roy, 248–49, 255–57.

21 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 89;
Simultaneously with the labor trouble in the coal mines, Rhodes & Co. had an angry labor strike by dock workers at the Company's Ashtabula iron ore receiving docks. Attempting to lower costs as a result of the Depression, Rhodes & Co. had lowered the workers' wages from eleven to ten cents per ton. A confrontation resulted when fifty replacement workers were turned back at the docks by one hundred angry strikers. The next day the sheriff of Ashtabula County, in league with the posse of armed men, marched to the docks and drove the strikers off, making seventeen arrests in the process. Despite this show of force, the strikers prevented the unloading of iron ore at the Ashtabula docks. Several days later, Hanna arrived at the Ashtabula docks and personally met with many of the strikers. Hanna convinced the vast majority of the strikers to accept the wage cut and return to work. Immediately the unloading of iron ore at Ashtabula docks again commenced. At that moment, a long strike at the Company's recently acquired Ashtabula docks, could have seriously crippled the Company. As Hanna was the driving force behind acquiring the dilapidated Ashtabula docks, it was imperative for Hanna to quickly settle the strike. Cleveland Leader, April 22, 1876, p. 1; ibid., April 24, 1876, p. 4; ibid., April 28, 1876, p. 1; Ashtabula Telegraph, April 28, 1876, p. 3.
22 Cleveland Leader, May 4, 1874, p. 1; ibid., Oct. 13, 1874, p. 4.

23 Van Tassel and Grabowski, ed. The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, 609.

24 The west breakwater measured a total length of 7,130 feet, and formed a harbor of refuge with an area of a hundred acres for anchorage in depths varying from seventeen to twenty-nine feet. Orth, A History of Cleveland, Ohio, I, 725, 762.

25 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 65; Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States, 243; Cleveland Leader, May 28, 1880, p. 9; After 1881, both Melville and Leonard Hanna became Hanna's agents in key Great Lakes business associations, such as the Cleveland Vessel Owners' Association and later the Lake Carriers' Association. These business organizational were key lobbying groups for gaining increased government aid from Washington for Great Lakes shipping interests; Orth, History of Cleveland, Ohio, I, 718; Cleveland Herald, Sept. 20, 1880, p. 6; Mansfield, ed., History of the Great Lakes, I, 467-68; William G. Rose, Cleveland: The Making of a City (Cleveland, 1950), 535; Orth, I, 141-42.

26 In 1890 the Globe Iron Works was reorganized when several of the original holders disposed of their holdings. The resulting reorganization had H. Melville Hanna as the president of the company. Richard Wright, "A History of Shipbuilding in Cleveland, Ohio, Part III," Inland Seas, 13 (1957), 110-11; Orth, A History of Cleveland, Ohio, I, 720-21; Cleveland Leader, July 13, 1888, p. 4; Mansfield, ed., History of the Great Lakes, I, 450; Marine Review, 3 (Feb. 19, 1881), 8; Hanna certainly played a crucial role in the key business consolidation on the Great Lakes when the American Shipbuilding Co. was consolidated on 16 March 1899. Among the majority Great Lakes companies purchased by the American Shipbuilding Co. was the Globe Iron Works. Both of Hanna's brothers, Melville Hanna and Leonard Hanna, were on the company's executive committee. Richard Wright, Freshwater Whales, 140; In 1901 the Pittsburgh Steamship Company was organized through a massive combination of Great Lakes fleets which included the M.A. Hanna fleet. Orth, A History of Cleveland, Ohio, I, 715.

27 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 59; Hanna's "firm for a long series of years occupied the position of
middlemen. Because of the rapidity with which combinations have been made in the last few years the position of middleman has been seriously interfered with.... This evolution compelled firms like M.A. Hanna and Company to adjust themselves as rapidly as they could to modern methods." Andrew Squire I, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Leonard Hanna I, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

28 Marine Review, 1 (March 27, 1890), 1.
CHAPTER III

OHIO REPUBLICAN FACTIONALISM
DURING THE GILDED AGE

When Mark Hanna entered the Gilded Age political world of the Ohio Republican party, it was one torn by factionalism over both issues and personalities. Being a product of Northern society, the party had to adjust to the emerging industrial society. The policy choices facing the state during these changing times placed the Republican party, the professed party of positive government, at the center of major policy debates. The decision for party leaders was to determine whether the party should emphasize its past heritage of Protestant social reform, or its Whig heritage of focusing upon promotion of the economy. As a businessman, whose success was greatly attributed to government subsidies, Hanna was one of a new generation of Republican leaders who emerged during the 1870s and 1880s. These new Republican leaders helped to make the Republican party the party of business and economic development. They stressed the "new" economic
issues of distribution and organization over the "old" Civil War issues of Reconstruction and social reform.

Hanna's initial entry into Ohio Republican politics was at the local level in Cleveland. He entered Cuyahoga politics to assist like-minded businessmen who wanted to refocus the local party to emphasize local business issues. They wanted to shift the radical reformist political agenda of the local Western Reserve Republican party from social reform issues toward economic issues. The Republican business community's key issue was to obtain government funding for the construction the breakwater.

Hanna thrust himself into the local political sphere by his purchase of the Cleveland Herald newspaper. Hanna had subsequent personal battles in the newspaper business with John B. Cowles, the owner and editor of the Cleveland Leader, the city's leading Republican newspaper. The Cleveland Leader strongly supported social reform. It characterized Hanna as being a corrupt party boss. This negative image was later magnified on both the state and national levels.

By 1885, Hanna entered into state politics with his support for Republican Governor Joseph Foraker. By 1888, after various personal and political disputes with Foraker, Hanna fought to destroy the political career of the charismatic Foraker.
As a result of his split with Foraker, Hanna later joined the opposing camp of Foraker's main Republican rival in Ohio, Senator John Sherman. This decision was based upon personal grounds and party policy. Foraker's personality and personal emphasis upon traditional social reform issues threatened Senator Sherman's position within the state and national parties. Since the close of the Civil War, Sherman, through his work as Secretary of the Treasury and in the Senate, had played a key role in recasting the Republican party, by emphasizing economic over reform issues.

Hanna was a very emotional person, prone to hero worship and unselfish personal allegiance to people he admired. However, as shown with Foraker and others, he was a fierce antagonist and held personal hatreds. He used any means at his disposal, subtle or clumsy, to defeat those whom he believed had publicly crossed him. A contemporary succinctly described Hanna's indomitable trusting personality toward others:

One of the most marked of Hanna's attractively human qualities was the warmth of his personal friendships. When he hated, he hated with all the strength of his masculinity; but he also set no bounds to the ardour of his likings. This coarse-fibered man had something of the gentleness of a woman where friendship was concerned, and also something of the unrestraint of a child. When his confidence had been fully won, his cynicism and the
hardness of his character seemed to disappear. Singularly lacking in complexity, his emotions in private life were as little controlled as were his appetites in public matters.

Hanna's previous biographers have stressed the ironic fact that Hanna first entered Cuyahoga politics to strip power away from the local party political machine. During the early 1870s, Hanna went to the businessmen on the west side (particularly in his own ninth ward) and persuaded them that the taxpayers, and not the ward heelers, should run the city government. Hanna then wanted to maximize efficiency in government to lower taxes. Hanna's action is best shown as an early attempt at *laissez faire* reform of the party system.\(^1\) The success the reformers achieved was based upon their ability to encourage businessmen to participate in local politics.

The business elite won a temporary victory against the local machine in the 1873 mayoral race. Hanna and like-minded businessmen bolted the party's mayoral nominee to support the successful Democratic nominee, Charles A. Otis, an apolitical steel magnate.\(^2\)

Between 1876 and 1880, Hanna, as a Republican businessman from the West Side, campaigned vigorously in the traditional spectacular manner for his political party. As recent historians have emphasized, in the
1870s and early to mid-1880s, Northern politicians engaged in "spectacular campaigning" to reinforce partisan identification. Uniformed companies and bands supported emotional oratory especially stressing Civil War and social reform issues. For Republicans, the entire electoral process became a community ritual. In both 1876 and 1878, Hanna presided as chairman at several West Side campaign meetings. He simply introduced the speaker to his West Side neighbors. Afterwards he would go back to his seat on the platform and, like the rest of the audience, listen to the speaker pontificate upon sacred Republican principles.

In an era when political campaigns stressed marches and hot oratory, Hanna was an obscure figure in local electoral politics. At that time, much of his energy was devoted to developing efficient organizational and management structures in his shipping and coal mining businesses. To local party leaders, his focus upon economic issues was not considered appropriate within the local spectacular campaign culture.

During the 1870s and early 1880s, tensions within Cleveland's Twentieth Congressional District developed between those who favored a focus upon the "old" social issues relating to the South and Reconstruction and those who emphasized the "new" economic issues dealing with mass industrialism. The Twentieth was situated within "the
most radical region of the Western Reserve" and had previously been represented in Congress by the social reformer Joshua Giddings. Reformers willing to use the powers of the national government, not only to revolution-ize the South, but to enforce "protestant morality" upon the general Northern populace, maintained power within the local Republican party. However, Cleveland was becoming the major shipping center of the Great Lakes, for both incoming raw materials and outgoing goods. At this time, many Republicans, particularly businessmen, began to urge the party to shift its focus from idealistic social issues to economic issues affecting Cleveland's position as a shipping and industrial center within the Midwest.

A major concern of local businessmen was the poor condition of Cleveland's harbor. If Cleveland was to develop as a major shipping center, construction of a breakwater was essential. Only the federal government had the financial resources to begin construction of a breakwater for Cleveland. Many Republicans believed the party needed someone in Congress who would focus his attention upon obtaining federal funds for Cleveland. Therefore, many business oriented Republicans insisted on addressing local economic issues, rather than national social issues.
By the 1870s, the question in the Twentieth District was whether the two party factions would cooperate in a congressional campaign against the Democrats. From 1873 to 1875, the single term Republican incumbent, Dick Parsons, a businessman and newspaper proprietor, had been the first congressman to gain congressional funding for the building of the breakwater. However, due to his focus and advocacy upon economic issues, Parsons ignored such social issues as temperance. It was an issue that was important to many of his constituents. Republicans usually won by about three thousand votes. However, in 1874 Parsons was defeated by the Democratic nominee Henry B. Payne. In a backlash against Parsons, many temperance Republicans refused to support the ticket. One newspaper editor later complained, "Payne's victory was accomplished by the foolishness of the Republicans in making the temperance crusade a party issue." 7

In 1876 the Republican chose Amos Townsend to contest Payne's seat. Townsend represented the Republican faction that wanted the party to stress economic issues (the breakwater) over social reform and Reconstruction. Townsend defeated Payne. He was also reelected in 1878. Townsend's success strengthened the business faction of the local Republican party.
While historians have focused on Hanna's relationship with Foraker and McKinley, Hanna first supported and worked to secure a leadership role in the local Republican party. Townsend's personal qualities and political goals were quite similar to those of the thirty-nine year old Hanna. They both were businessmen with the same type of business and social relationships.

Townsend was a partner in the leading Cleveland wholesale grocery house of Edwards, Townsend & Co. Townsend believed the party should emphasize the new economic issues resulting from the societal impact from mass industrialization, transportation, and urbanization. Townsend was not an advocate of ideological Civil War issues. He opposed temperance even though it was considered the most important social reform issue in his district. In fact, his wholesale grocery was a leading dealer of liquor to the community. Townsend's main goal was to help the shipping and manufacturing interests of the city by obtaining federal aid for the building of the Cleveland breakwater. In an age when campaign style relied on oratory to stir the party faithful, usually upon social reform issues, Townsend was "outside the pale." His personal style was not conducive to inspirational oratory. The economic issues he espoused did not easily lend themselves to waving flags, balloons, or patriotic regimental marches. Instead, Townsend was a businessman
who devoted much of his congressional activity to quietly obtaining federal aid for the Cleveland breakwater.

As a result of the breakwater, the Cuyahoga Republican party united behind Townsend in both 1876 and 1878. The economic issues that Townsend stressed were emerging as a major part of the Republican party agenda. After listening to an 1878 Townsend speech, a reporter wrote:

He favored a tariff for protection, a fair compensation for labor, the advancing of the interests of the merchant marine, liberal government appropriations for erecting government buildings and harbor and river improvements, pensions for disabled soldiers and soldiers' widows and homes for soldiers' orphans. He said those are not propositions which charm the eye, but doze the brain ... but are living propositions.

From 1876 to 1880, Townsend had obtained $479,000 of federal aid to his district from a Democratic Congress. Over two thirds of the aid went to the construction of the Cleveland breakwater.

For Townsend, and such supporters as Hanna, the main standard of a congressman's success was not leadership or oratory upon reform issues such as treatment of Southern blacks or temperance, but the amount of federal aid a congressman obtained for his district. Townsend represented a type of politician who focused upon the new issue of economic promotion.
For Hanna, 1880 was a politically crucial year. First, Townsend faced a serious challenge for the Republican congressional nomination in the Twentieth District. Second, Hanna bought the Cleveland Herald, a Republican newspaper losing influence and readership to the Republican daily, the Cleveland Leader. Hanna thereby gained a certain amount of local fame and infamy. During this time, the local media's attacks on Hanna permanently tarnished his image.

On 8 May 1880, Hanna assumed sole proprietorship of the Herald from former congressman Dick Parsons.10 Hanna did not take an active role in the management of the Herald for the five years he was owner. Despite this fact, Cowles, the editor of the Leader, became his instant enemy.

Between 1880 and 1885 an intense journalistic war raged between Hanna's Herald and Cowles's Leader. Cowles was a firm believer in the ideological social reform mission of the Republican party. He had begun his newspaper career as an ardent supporter of abolitionism and had continued as a Radical Republican, intent on revolutionizing Southern society. The "bloody shirt" always had a prominent place in the Leader's editorial pages. By 1880, Cowles was supporting the Protestant social reform of temperance. During the 1880s, the
temperance crusade was reinforced in the Leader's pages by Cowles's anti-Catholicism.

A newspaperman all his life, Cowles was known for producing a lively and vigorous paper. When Hanna enticed some of his staff to the Herald with a fifty percent increase in salary, Cowles's editorial counterattacks grew hotter.¹¹ The 1880 fight over the Republican congressional nomination provided Cowles with ample ammunition to attack Mark Hanna as Townsend's political manager.

Townsend's renomination to Congress was challenged by the former Mayor of Cleveland, William Rose. According to Rose, Townsend had broken an informal understanding they had when Rose had stepped aside for Townsend in 1878. Under the supposed agreement in 1880 Townsend was to have reciprocated.¹² Unlike Townsend, Rose was a great orator, and was more sympathetic to social reform issues such as temperance. Rose had the support of the reformist wing of the party, because it wanted more focus on social issues. Cowles's Leader supported Rose. The Herald naturally supported Townsend.

In the party primary vote for delegates to the district convention, Townsend secured a two to one margin in delegates over Rose.¹³ Hanna was elected as a Townsend delegate from the ninth ward. Through his efforts, Hanna delivered a united delegation from his ninth ward for Townsend.
Any hope to end the factional tensions were scuttled by the battle at the district convention. The Rose forces claimed foul play by the Townsend camp on two key issues: ward representation and the manner of voting. Hanna was appointed chairman of the Committee on Credentials by the temporary chairman of the Committee on Credentials, S.O. Griswold. Griswold was also a Townsend supporter. The committee had to decide on the charges by the Rose forces. They alleged that Townsend delegations in several wards had been improperly chosen. The committee decided in favor of Townsend and seated the delegates chosen in the primary. The Rose forces next produced an amendment which would allow each individual delegate to cast his ballot separately from the delegation. Again the Townsend supporters defeated the proposed amendment. As a result, the Rose forces walked out of the convention. They refused to return to the convention unless a compromise candidate was chosen. The Townsend leaders, particularly Hanna, vociferously rejected the Rose proposal and their stalling tactics. Since Townsend controlled the majority of the delegates, he was quickly renominated. The Rose adherents then nominated an Independent Republican candidate of their own, C.B. Lockwood, a known temperance supporter, to oppose Townsend.14
The Cleveland press reported extensively upon the fractious activity at the district convention, and much of the press, following the example of the Leader, laid blame for the split upon both Griswold and Hanna. Cowles wrote in the Leader that from a Townsend standpoint "there seems to be but one opinion, and that is that ... Griswold and Mark Hanna are to blame for the split."\(^{15}\)

Cowles, however, declared that the Leader would support Townsend in the campaign (thus ending any Democratic hope that Lockwood's candidacy would endanger Townsend). Cowles added a parting shot at his newspaper rival Hanna: "The party is not to blame for the indiscreet conduct of Mr. Griswold and Mr. Hanna, and it should not be permitted to suffer for it."\(^{16}\)

The editor of the Herald, A.B. Hough, angrily replied to Cowles's attack.

A spasm of sense taught the old man that it would not do to lend editorial support to a bolt, so he compromised by endorsing Townsend while applying the knife to the throats of Townsend's friends and supporters. Mr. Mark Hanna happens to be one of these, and is guilty of the further offense of being President of the Herald Publishing Company. Therefore, Mr. Hanna is singled out as a mark for special misrepresentation and abuse.\(^{17}\)

The party regrouped in 1880 and reelected Townsend. However, the factional struggle had adversely
effected Townsend's reelection. His victory was by a substantially smaller margin.

Townsend did not enjoy active campaigning and decided not to seek another term. Another reelection bid would have initiated an even greater factional battle. Cowles wrote in the Leader that Townsend's greatest achievement "in behalf of this city may be seen in the work now in progress on our breakwater...." 18

Because of the Cleveland area's expanding population, it gained an additional congressional seat in 1882. The Republican nominee for the new Twenty-First District, businessman Sylvester T. Everett, was acceptable to the businesswing of the local Republican party. With Everett's nomination, the evolution of the local party was completed. The Republican party was now primarily an advocate for Cleveland business interests. Party leaders now expected the federal government to promote the economy, at the expense of social reform issues. However, Everett lost to the Democratic nominee, Martin A. Foran, who was a lawyer and labor advocate. For only the second time since 1855, Cleveland was now represented by a Democratic Congressman.

Most observers concluded that many reform Republicans simply refused to vote for Everett and stayed home on election day. Everett's defeat proved there was still a significant number of local Republicans who
believed temperance was as important as the acquisition of federal funds for the breakwater. A small minority of temperance Republicans abandoned the party and formed a separate Temperance Party devoted exclusively to social reform. They launched attacks upon both Democratic and Republican businessmen who participated, or acquiesced in the liquor trade. However the vast majority of social reform Republicans remained within their ancestral party.

During the 1880 Presidential election, Hanna and other key Cleveland businessmen, formed a business men's club to support Garfield. Hanna had a prominent role in the organization as a member of the executive committee. This was a new political role for Hanna, who had not previously engaged in such activities.\(^{19}\) As a result of his political work for Townsend, Hanna played a more prominent leadership role within the business community and the Cuyahoga Republican party. The business men's club was to be a permanent organization for future campaigns, and not simply an ad-hoc organization to be disbanded after the election.\(^ {20}\) The club stressed only economic issues. The club's constitution emphasized that the "vital issues of the pending election contest ... (is) the existing tariff and financial policy of the government...."\(^ {21}\)

Hanna became increasingly influential in the Cleveland business community and the Cuyahoga Republican
party. This was illustrated when he was chosen one of the few Clevelanders' selected to ride on a special train, on 28 September 1880, with Senators Conkling and Logan and ex-President Grant. The train was scheduled to journey from Cleveland to Warren, Ohio, where the three national leaders were to address a mass meeting.\textsuperscript{22} Afterwards the train, upon returning to Cleveland, made a special stop at Mentor, the home of Republican Presidential candidate James A. Garfield.\textsuperscript{23} Contemporaries believed the symbolic importance of the visit to Garfield's home would help heal G.O.P. factional wounds previously caused by Garfield's unexpected nomination.\textsuperscript{24}

Between 1881 and 1884, Hanna became more involved with the political community primarily because of the growing newspaper feud between the \textit{Herald} and the \textit{Leader}. During the 1883 Cleveland mayoral election, Cowles accused Hanna of aspiring to become a local political boss. Cowles alleged that George W. Gardner, a businessman and the Republican nominee, had used his public office to help his own private business interests. Cowles charged that "Marcus Aurelius" had arranged Gardner's nomination, and, for the first time, withdrew the \textit{Leader}'s support of a Republican mayoral nominee.\textsuperscript{25} As a result of the dispute, the Democrats swept every Cleveland municipal office. The Democratic mayoral nominee, George Farley, led his party's ticket to
victory. Cowles placed the blame for the Republican 
defeat squarely upon the shoulders of Hanna and the 
*Herald*. He wrote:

Mr. Gardner's defeat was a foregone 
conclusion the moment he was 
nominated, and the blame for the 
humiliating predicament ... rests 
firstly upon the shoulders of the 
*Herald* gang, headed by Mark Hanna, 
who were willing to encourage the 
party to defeat if that unprincipled 
sheet could profit by a few straggling 
subscribers from the *Leader*.26

The *Leader-Herald* subscriber battle aggravated 
the tensions between the two different wings of the local 
Republican party. The *Leader* was the spokesperson for 
those Republicans who stressed social reform, while the 
*Herald* emphasized the protectionist views of the 
business community. The loss of the municipal offices, 
together with the previous loss of the congressional 
seat, were indications that the Republicans would be in 
trouble in the forthcoming 1884 elections.

In both 1880 and 1884, the *Herald* and the 
*Leader* had supported different candidates for the 
Republican presidential nomination. In both years the 
*Leader* had supported James G. Blaine of Maine, while 
the *Herald* staff had supported Ohio's favorite son, 
Senator John Sherman. The question of the makeup of the 
Ohio delegation's makeup to the National Convention in
Chicago, could prove crucial in determining the nominee. If Sherman was to have a chance to defeat Blaine at the Convention, he needed a solid Ohio delegation. The selection of two delegates in each of Ohio's twenty-one congressional districts developed into a state factional battle between the Sherman and Blaine forces.

At the Twenty-First District Convention, A. C. Hord was the first delegate chosen. He was the chairman of the city central committee, and the choice of the "young Republicans." He was a confirmed Blaine supporter. To enhance their personal prestige and to strengthen their candidates, both Hanna and Cowles attempted to gain the second delegate slot to the National Convention. Hanna, who now resided in the new Twenty-First District was placed in nomination by William Bayne, a local Republican and Hanna friend. Much of Hanna's support came from his West Side political base. On the second ballot Cowles defeated Hanna for the second delegate slot by a margin of 196 to 107. Cowles's selection demonstrated that Cuyahoga Republicans favored Blaine as the next Republican nominee, and, also, that thirty-year party veteran, Cowles, had more prestige and support among Cleveland Republicans than Hanna.

The Ohio Republican party had forty-six delegates to the National Convention. The twenty-one Republican district conventions chose forty-two delegates. The State
Republican convention would choose an additional four at-large delegates to the National Convention. The at-large delegates chosen were usually the best known Ohio Republican politicians. It was common political practice that the two largest municipal areas in the state, Hamilton County and Cuyahoga County, would each have one delegate at-large. The district delegation itself would decide whom to support, and the state convention would then ratify that district's choice.

After the district convention, and before the state convention (to be held in Cleveland), speculation in Cleveland centered upon Cuyahoga's choice for delegate at-large. Particular attention focused upon former congressman Richard C. Parsons. Before his single term in Congress, Parsons held a succession of government posts: President of the City Council, Speaker of the State House, Cleveland Internal Revenue Collector, and Marshal of the U.S. Supreme Court. Cowles wrote in the Leader that "'Mr. Parsons' name will in all probability be presented by the Cuyahoga delegation and he will receive a most generous support from the Western Reserve and the entire state." 28

The question of the candidate Cowles would favor at the National Convention had great importance within the thirty-five man Cuyahoga County delegation. Cowles was not one to ease tension between the local Blaine and
Sherman forces by maganeously supporting any delegate who favored Sherman. In politics, as in newspaper battles, Cowles always played to win.

While Parsons was favorable toward Sherman, it is probable that his first choice for Republican presidential nominee would be Blaine. Blaine had been Speaker when Parsons had served his single term in the House. Since Parsons was regarded as the delegate Cuyahoga would probably choose, the Blaine forces, who had already gained both delegates at the district convention, had no problem in supporting him.

The Sherman forces in Cuyahoga County considered it crucial that Sherman be selected as the delegate-at-large. The local Sherman leaders included businessman Sylvester Everett, former mayoralty candidate George Gardner, and former Congressman Amos Townsend. Everett was an influential figure in Cleveland. From 1869 to 1883, Everett had occupied the office of city treasurer of Cleveland. In 1881 Everett was appointed by President Garfield to be a government director of the Union Pacific Railroad. In 1882 he was the unsuccessful Republican congressional nominee for the Twenty-first District. Additionally, in 1884, he was chosen Vice President and General Manager of the New Union National Bank (Mark Hanna was the bank president). Townsend did not forget his former political manager and remembered Parsons had placed
himself as a compromise candidate at the 1880 congressional district convention should Townsend fail to obtain the nomination. Therefore, Townsend, together with Gardner and Hanna's new business partner, Everett, began to push Hanna as the Sherman choice for state delegate-at-large.

On 25 April 1884, through the combined efforts of Everett and Townsend, Hanna defeated Parsons for the delegate-at-large post by a margin of twenty votes to fifteen votes within the Cuyahoga delegation. As a result, Hanna became the Cuyahoga candidate for state delegate-at-large. Through Hanna's support of Sherman, he gained the support of the Sherman forces at the convention.

The factional political fight, between the Blaine and Sherman forces at the state convention, ended in an uneasy truce between the two camps. This stalemate worked to Hanna's advantage. Each side could now claim two delegates-at-large to the National Convention. The Blaine forces had the support of Congressman William McKinley and Judge William West. The Sherman advocates were Judge Joseph Foraker and Hanna. All the delegates-at-large, except Hanna, had established state political reputations.

Parsons' supporters alleged Everett used corrupt methods to win the Cuyahoga delegation for Hanna. Parsons alleged that Everett had pressured him to use unethical business practices in order to switch federal funds from
an older established bank, to the Union National Bank, if Parsons desired a delegate-at-large slot. A writer for the *Plain Dealer* alleged that a "crucial injustice" was done to Parsons by the majority of the Cuyahoga delegation. Parsons' friends insisted "that unfair means were used amongst the delegates to secure a majority for M.A. Hanna, who was beaten as a candidate for district delegate." The editor of the Dayton *Democrat* wrote on April 26, "the sensation of the day was the action of the Cuyahoga delegation in throwing overboard ex-Congressman Parsons and declaring their preference for Hanna.... Vest Everett who aspires to be a local boss, is said to be at the bottom of Parsons' overthrow."  

Hanna's defenders, which included much of the Cleveland business community and the *Herald* staff, insisted that Hanna deserved the honor of being a delegate-at-large. Hanna was qualified, his defenders insisted, not because he had been a party leader or a reformer or even a professional politician, but because he was an influential Cleveland businessman who had contributed time and funds to help the local party. A writer for the *Herald* defended Hanna's qualifications.

Mr. M.A. Hanna of this city is a true representative of the businessmen of the country, having extensive and diversified interests, giving
employment to large number of men. He also represents that important and influential class of republicans who give generously of their time, their labor and their money to the furtherance of republican principles, and who ask nothing of the party in return except faithful adherence to those principles.\textsuperscript{33}

The controversy over Hanna's selection as delegate-at-large affected Hanna's later public career.\textsuperscript{34} At the 1884 National Convention, Hanna displayed his organizational skills in the presence of national and Ohio party leaders. They were awed by the "unknown" Hanna's managerial ability.

Hanna's political activities increasingly involved both the state and national political spheres. However, in the eyes of many Clevelanders and Ohioans, he would be forever tainted by the allegation that his managers illicitly obtained his delegate-at-large spot. The state press reported Hanna as another corrupt businessman-politician.

At the convention, Hanna impressed Senator John Sherman and Joseph Foraker. Sherman had compiled an impressive record throughout service in various government posts in the House, Senate, and particularly, as Hayes's Secretary of the Treasury. Sherman was acknowledged by his political peers as the foremost economic policy-maker in Washington. While Sherman had been a national figure
since the 1850s, Foraker, before he was nominated in 1883 as the Republican gubernatorial nominee, had been an obscure circuit judge and local politician in Hamilton County.

The 1883 Republican gubernatorial nomination appeared to be a dubious honor for Foraker. In 1882 the Democrats had swept fifteen of the twenty-one congressional districts (including the twenty-first), with a statewide plurality of 20,000 votes. This result was in stark contrast with 1880, when Ohio Republicans had given Garfield a plurality of 34,000 votes. Much of the 1882 electoral change resulted from the loss of the German vote, after Republicans had submitted a prohibition amendment to the voters.35 However, in 1883, Foraker proved to be a brilliant orator and campaigner. He delivered 105 speeches throughout the state. Though he lost the election by 12,529 votes (an improvement of 7,500 votes over 1882), Foraker established himself as a political personality who could appeal beyond the traditional G.O.P. base.

Foraker's dynamic style was new to the Ohio political world of the Gilded Age. Only the magnetic personality of James G. Blaine inspired such personal devotion. William D. Bickham, editor of the Dayton Journal, wrote in 1883 "no man in Ohio had ever moved to the front with a firmer step. Foraker was really a
surprise to those who presented him to the convention ... and what is better, he has sustained the reputation he gained in that campaign and increased it."36

Sherman entered the national convention with only a slim chance of achieving the nomination. The favorite was James G. Blaine, who had come so close to the nomination in the previous national conventions of 1876 and 1880. Sherman's managers hoped for a deadlock between Blaine and the next prominent candidate, President Chester A. Arthur. They hoped the convention would turn to Sherman as a compromise choice. The Sherman strategy was based on Blaine's initial strength within the convention, and also Sherman's strength within the Ohio delegation.

The anti-Blaine forces, particularly the Independent Republicans, sought to determine the overall strength of Blaine by forcing a test vote upon the Blaine forces' choice of temporary chairman of the convention. The convention vote was close. The anti-Blaine candidate edged the Blaine forces candidate for temporary chairman. The vote revealed the split in the Ohio delegation and ended any realistic chance for the Sherman forces. The Ohio delegation split twenty-three to twenty-two for Blaine's candidate.

McKinley's vote against the anti-Blaine candidate was a major disappointment to the Sherman forces. Many Sherman supporters had hoped McKinley would forego his
district's enthusiasm for Blaine and vote for Sherman, who was his own personal choice. A Sherman follower wrote to the Senator, "The outward effect of his position was to impress outside friends and those from other states predisposed to you of an unalterable division in your own state ranks." 37 Foraker succinctly stated, "We knew after this vote had been taken that it was not possible for Mr. Blaine to be nominated on the first ballot; we also knew that on account of the division of the Ohio delegation there was less chance than we had supposed for the success of Senator Sherman." 38

The split in the Ohio Delegation was confirmed in the actual vote for President. On the first ballot, Sherman received twenty-five votes, while Blaine got twenty-one. On the fourth ballot, Blaine received the necessary number of votes needed to gain the nomination. He was then nominated by acclamation.

Though Sherman was defeated, Hanna's reputation as a master politician strategist was enhanced. Charles Kurtz, a young lawyer from Athens County, and one of the Sherman managers, wrote to Sherman that "Mr. Hanna is surprising me very much by doing most effective work and he is busy as a sailor." 39 J.C. Donaldson, a veteran state politician, also told Sherman that "Mr. Hanna has perhaps done more good aside from Judge Foraker than anyone else." 40 When the Convention was finished,
ex-Governor Foster exclaimed to Sherman that "Mr. Hanna of Cleveland was a surprise to us all. He is worth fifty (of his kind) ... active able and aggressive he surprised us by knowing men and measures—what to do and how to do it."  

Hanna had focused on the Northeastern Independent Republicans, whose candidate was Senator George F. Edmunds of Massachusetts. Hanna had earlier been rebuffed by the Arthur team. Working individually with Northern and Southern delegates, Hanna arranged a loose agreement with Henry Cabot Lodge and the young Theodore Roosevelt (two of Edmunds' managers). Under the agreement, Edmunds' delegates would switch to Sherman when their candidate had no chance and Blaine's nomination appeared imminent. Unfortunately, the Edmunds' forces failed to switch on either the third or fourth ballots.  

As a result of his campaign activities at the National Convention, Hanna was considered a very valuable person for the Ohio Republican party. His previous political activity of managing and fundraising on the local level was supplemented and later overshadowed by his work on the state and national level. On 12 June 1884 the Ohio Republican Central Committee appointed Hanna a member. He served on that Committee for the next eight years.
Apart from his new prestige as an innovative political tactician, the most important result of Hanna's convention activities was his developing friendship with Foraker. Foraker's and Hanna's political reputations were greatly enhanced. Foraker's reputation had primarily been strengthened by his fiery nominating speech for Sherman at the convention. Foraker had not heard of Hanna until the Clevelander's surprise election as a delegate-at-large to the national convention.\textsuperscript{44} During the convention, Hanna wrote to Foraker, "Among the few pleasures I found at the convention was meeting and working with you. And I hope soon to have the pleasure of insuring the acquaintance under more peaceful and comfortable circumstances."\textsuperscript{45}

Hanna's main activity during the 1884 election was to solicit funds from his fellow businessmen, particularly those who benefited from the Republican policy of protection and promotion of the home market. The tariff had first become a major national campaign issue in 1880. In 1884 the tariff was the cornerstone of Blaine's presidential campaign. According to Robert Marcus, Blaine expected to promote the tariff to hinder the mugwump revolt and economically appeal to the workers. Blaine also intended to emphasize to the Irish that the tariff was part of the economic anti-British policy. Finally, Blaine would use the tariff to appeal to the "New South." Instead it became a one-man argument, with Cleveland
remaining silent upon the issue. Even some of the protected industries, which underwrote much of the Republican campaign, did not seem to feel the urgency of the Republican protectionist appeal. Hanna, in a letter to Foraker toward the end of the campaign, wrote with disgust of the lack of funds given to the party by local Republican businessmen:

If it were not for the common calamity that would fall upon all of us, nothing would rejoice me more than to see our people get a little Democratic free-trade, enough to make manufacturing interests and banking interests and other such industries understand the difference between Democracy and Republicanism....

Toward the end of 1884, Hanna reported local collections of $3,000. This small amount, though, was more than the total sum Foraker could report from Cincinnati for the 1884 election.

In 1885 Hanna ended his brief career as a newspaper publisher. On March 14, 1885, Hanna admitted financial defeat and sold the Herald to Cowles. As a result of the transaction, the Herald ceased to exist, and Cowles's Leader ended all personal attacks upon Hanna. However, the consistent pounding that Cowles had heaped upon Hanna during the past five years had promoted the image of Hanna as a corrupt local political boss. The editors of the Democratic Plain Dealer, and
the Independent Press, continued to picture the increasingly prominent Hanna as a greedy, corrupt boss.

In 1885, Hanna's reputation as a prominent local Republican leader was enhanced by the municipal election results. In a turn-around from 1883, Hanna's close friend George W. Gardner was elected mayor of Cleveland and the entire Republican municipal ticket also was elected. Hanna's political triumph was short-lived. However, Hanna's most important goal that year was to see his good friend Foraker win the Republican gubernatorial nomination and be elected in the fall.

Hanna was determined to bring a united Foraker delegation from Cuyahoga County to the Republican state convention in June. This would help Foraker gain the nomination and justify Hanna's reputation as the most important Republican leader in Cuyahoga County. To Hanna's severe embarrassment, his county's delegation entered former Mayor William Rose in the race. This occurred despite a total lack of support for Rose from the entire state. Rose's quixotic candidacy proved that within the Cuyahoga delegation there were still factional scars from the 1880 district convention fight between former Rose and Townsend supporters. Rose's candidacy also illustrated that Foraker was not (and never would be) as personally popular among Cleveland Republicans as he was throughout the rest of the state. During the
convention, Hanna had to watch the proceedings of his
delegation from "a good hard-bottomed chair on the
platform among the functionaries." Hanna realized that
not only did his delegation fail to help Foraker obtain
the nomination, but many Cleveland politicians still
viewed him "as a businessman in the back seat." 49

Despite the state convention proceedings, Hanna
played a prominent role in the 1885 state and municipal
elections. Foraker, the Republican nominee for governor,
appointed Hanna to serve on the Republican State Executive
Committee. Foraker did not know of anyone from Cleveland
besides Hanna "suitable for the committee." 50 In the
Cleveland municipal election, Hanna took an active part in
the race for county treasurer. A former bank clerk at
Hanna's Union National Bank, David Kimberly, was the
Republican nominee for county treasurer. The opposition,
led by the Plain Dealer, charged that Kimberly was the
tool of Hanna and Sylvester Everett, and alleged that
should he be elected, he would place all of the county
funds in the vaults of the Union National Bank. 51 The
Plain Dealer designated Hanna as the "West Side Boss,"
who together with Everett "rounds the Republican party in
this county" and were "scheming to get control of the
county treasury." 52 However, Hanna's lack of control
over the local party had been demonstrated at the state
convention.
To the opposition press, Hanna had become a negative symbol representing business corruption of the Cuyahoga Republican party. Hanna's features were exaggerated to a neanderthal likeness, lending themselves to easy caricature as a symbol of corrupt bossism. Opposition cartoons of the bowlerhatted Hanna soon resembled an anti-British caricature of John Bull. A writer for the Plain Dealer alleged that at the ninth precinct on election day, he saw Hanna "through a plate glass window" giving money to Republican ticket peddlers. "Marcus put his hand to his trouser's pockets, took it out again and slipped something into the hand of the peddler. The latter held to all the boss gave him and put it to his vest pocket, smiling to himself as he went out to make way for another." Whether this particular incident ever happened is unknown. Despite its questionable veracity, the reported incident fit nicely with the image of "Boss Hanna," and was publically accepted by many Clevelanders as a proven fact.

The Republican ticket triumphed in both the state and Cleveland municipal elections in November 1885. Foraker decisively defeated his opponent, Governor Hoadly, by 17,451 votes, while Kimberly was elected County Treasurer, running ahead of much of the Republican ticket.
During Foraker's campaign for the governorship, he identified himself with the traditional ideological reform issues and symbols of the Civil War. He stressed the Southern Question much more than economic issues. Foraker pledged support for "Protestant Morality" and championed the social reform of temperance. He was a new type of charismatic political personality who achieved broad voter support due to his oratorical skills. He stressed older social reform issues, instead of the newer economic issues many Republicans were emphasizing in their campaign rhetoric and government policy. Ironicaly, Foraker adapted the emerging twentieth century skills of fame and personality, in order to trumpet older social reform issues. This difference did not then become apparent to many Republicans, including Hanna, who intended to develop the Republican party as a vehicle for government promotion and protection of business interests.

The correspondence during 1885-1886 between the newly elected Governor Foraker and Hanna dealt primarily with the state political posts that the Governor controlled through his power of appointment. Foraker wanted to reward Hanna (and Cleveland) with the ceremonial post of State Chief of Engineers. Downplaying the demands of the post on Hanna's time, Foraker emphasized that the only expenses and duties Hanna would have to perform would be "only to buy a brigadier-general's uniform and appear once
or twice, possibly a year with the Governor and the rest of the staff, on state occasions.... It will require but little of you, and it helps me to recognize Cleveland in a way that it is very agreeable to me...."56 Hanna politely refused Foraker's offer, telling the Governor, "I don't like public office and one of that kind would not be to my taste."57 Hanna was more interested in securing the prize patronage plum the governor had to offer: the State Oil Inspectorship for his friend. The state oil inspector's duties were to inspect the products of the oil refineries. The inspector controlled and appointed numerous deputies throughout the state, and shared with them a fee for every barrel of oil inspected at the refineries.

Hanna's prestige as a major Cuyahoga party leader had diminished due to his failure to hold the Cuyahoga delegation for Foraker. Therefore, it was important that Foraker acquiesce in Hanna's personal selection of the State Oil Inspector. Such a demonstration of personal influence with Governor Foraker would improve Hanna's status as the leader of the Cleveland Republicans. If he gained this political plum, Hanna would no longer be considered as only a large contributor and collector of party funds. Within the state government, the State Oil Inspector's position was generally viewed as belonging to Cleveland. Northeastern Ohio was becoming a major
oil refining, shipping, and storage center, as John D. Rockefeller developed a growing oil refining business.

William Bayne was Hanna's personal selection for inspector. He was Hanna's close friend and fellow warder. The only possible reason for Hanna's selection of Bayne was either a personal friendship or a simple repayment for a past political debt. Bayne had no qualifications or previous experience in state government, and no influential political following in Cleveland.

Louis Smithnight was the most qualified and obvious person for Foraker to select from Cleveland for the State Oil Inspectorship. In 1882, Smithnight had previously been appointed by former Republican Governor Charles Foster to be State Oil Inspector. When a new Democratic administration and state legislature met in 1884, one of the first orders of party patronage business was removing Smithnight from office to be replaced by a Democrat. Smithnight then assumed the position of chairman of the Cuyahoga Republican Executive Committee, and subsequently received a great deal of credit for the Republican victories in Cleveland during the spring and fall elections of 1885.59

By early November 1885, Foraker was faced with three possible choices for the State Oil Inspectorship: Smithnight, Bayne, and a Professor Hartshorn of Alliance, who was recommended by McKinley. By late November, Hanna,
at the urging of McKinley, agreed to drop Bayne and shifted his support to Hartshorn. Hanna's reasoning for the switch was explained in a letter to Foraker: "The Major is never behind hand with his claims. I tell him he 'wants the earth' and it looks as if I was getting about where I generally do in politics -- left with only my reputation of being a good fellow, always accommodating,...." 60

By early 1886, Foraker after taking into consideration, experience, the support of ex-Governor Foster, and "almost everybody else in Northern Ohio then active in politics," made the obvious choice, Smithnight.61 Hanna, forgetting the slight, acquiesced in Foraker's decision and apologized for troubling the Governor, insisting that "I feel ashamed when I realize that those (appointments) in which I have been interested have given you the most trouble. That instead of being a help to you I have been a nuisance." 62

By 1886, it probably appeared that Hanna's standing as a party leader within the local Cuyahoga Republican party had not improved. However, his personal influence within the state party was rapidly developing due to his growing political relationships with Governor Foraker, Senator Sherman, Congressman Charles Grosvenor of Athens County, and Congressman William McKinley of Stark County. Hanna's prestige within the state and national Republican
parties grew because of his committee and political convention activity. A major irony of Hanna's political career was that he never had the same control and influence over the Cuyahoga Republican party, as he would later exert over the state and national Republican parties.63

Hanna had enough power within the local party in 1886, to influence the Twenty-first Republican District Convention and secure the nomination of his former political mentor, Amos Townsend. Working together with Everett and other influential businessmen, Townsend was nominated by the convention with a three vote majority. During his acceptance speech, Townsend again emphasized economic issues and organization over a "brass band campaign."64

In their campaign against two-term Democratic Congressman Martin Foran, the Townsend forces were soon faced with numerous party factional troubles. Cowles's refusal to accept a printer's union at the Leader led to a printers' strike against the Leader management and a subsequent labor boycott against the major Republican newspaper within the city. Cowles's antagonism against the growing labor movement and his paternalism toward his own employees, boded ill for Townsend among working men.65 Townsend also encountered problems from fellow Republicans, more
interested in social reform. They were not impressed with Townsend's six year congressional record of obtaining over $700,000 of federal appropriations for the Cleveland breakwater. A writer for the Plain Dealer gleefully noted:

anti-saloon Republicans ... do not like the idea of a liquor seller for candidate. They do not see, if it is sinful and criminal to sell it by the gallon or the barrel that it may be sold again by the glass. There are saloon and anti-saloon republicans. We wonder if they can all unite upon a wholesale liquor dealer for Congress."

Townsend lost to Congressman Foran by 1,448 votes.

Cowles and Hanna reached different conclusions about the reasons for his defeat. Cowles believed the party lost the support of the "temperance people." They voted against Townsend "because whisky is sold in his wholesale grocery store ... thus [ironically] aiding to elect the attorney of the Liquor League." In a letter to Foraker, Hanna wrote:

The Cleveland Leader is really responsible for our defeat here. They got up a fight with their union printers and turned them all out, thereby bringing the whole influence of the labor vote against us. There was a little disaffection towards Townsend, owing to the old fight ... but that Cowles ... Oh! It is an outrage to
have such a paper to represent our party.\(^6\)

It had to have been doubly hard for Hanna to have seen that his own ninth ward voted for Foran over Townsend.\(^7\)

During 1886 and 1887, the temperance issue continued to affect the local and state Republican parties. In the fall of 1886, party temperance reformers won their greatest state electoral triumph when the Dow Law was approved by a majority of voters statewide. The Dow Law provided for the taxation and regulation of the liquor traffic along with local option. Unlike previous temperance legislation, the Dow Law appealed to both the social reform and business promotion wings of the party. The law combined Protestant moral reform with the business goal of seeking a lower taxation burden on other businesses. In the spring municipal elections in Cleveland, the Republican mayoral nominee William Bayne, and the entire Republican city ticket, were decisively defeated by the Democrats for the first time in four years. A recent Sunday closing law, demanded by the Protestant-temperance reform wing of the local party, was blamed by many party professionals for the G.O.P.'s loss of the city government.\(^7\)

The political leadership of Governor Foraker was the primary reason for the electoral success of the temperance issue. Foraker's image within the state party
was that of a young party reformer who emphasized the social reform issues of the Civil War era. Foraker's publicity-minded refusal to follow President Cleveland's order that all captured Confederate battle flags be returned by all Northern governors as a magnanimous gesture to the South, reignited the "bloody shirt" issue for one last time. It reminded Ohio voters that the Democracy was the party of treason.

More importantly to Foraker and his growing personal following within the state party, the Governor boldly separated himself, upon his own set of issues, from his more cautious party elders. For many Republicans, fretful that their party was evolving toward becoming only the party of business, the young Governor was a hopeful return to the past moral fervor and reforming spirit of the party's founding fathers. By 1887, Foraker had become a national figure. He was challenging Senator Sherman for the allegiance of many of the party faithful throughout the state and the nation.

The factional rivalry between the two camps became public knowledge over the question of whether to endorse Sherman for President at the State Republican Convention. Congressman Grosvenor, a leader of the Sherman forces, on April 1, 1887, called for Sherman's endorsement at the 1887 State Republican Convention in Toledo. The Sherman strategy had two purposes. First, Sherman wanted to prove
to Republicans throughout the nation that contrary to 1880 or 1884, he had a solid delegation from his home state at the national convention. Second, by placing the question of Sherman's endorsement a year before the presidential election, the Sherman forces would steal the limelight from Foraker, who was to be renominated for governor by the convention. There were a significant number of Foraker supporters on the state level who supported Blaine on the national level. The Sherman strategy was to not only overshadow Foraker but also prevent Blaine from making imroads on the Ohio delegation. Sherman leaders realized that the dream national ticket of the Foraker camp was a Blaine-Foraker ticket in 1888.

By 1887, Hanna started to shift his allegiance from Foraker to Sherman. Soon after the Convention of 1884, Sherman told Foraker that he would gladly meet Hanna. In 1885, probably owing to the joint influence of Sherman and Board Director Sylvester Everett, Hanna was appointed by President Cleveland to be a member of the federal government Board of Directors of the Union Pacific Railroad. The duties of his new position brought Hanna to Washington frequently, where he came into contact with members of Congress and "others who made up the political official population of the capital."72 Sherman and his agents maintained close contact with Hanna. This process strengthened Hanna's political self esteem. Hanna desired
to be acknowledged as the key political powerbroker in Cleveland party politics. Soon Hanna's strong sense of friendship, personal loyalty, political acumen, and business contacts, were placed at Sherman's disposal. Not surprisingly, Hanna strongly supported the 1887 Republican endorsement of Sherman.

Foraker's position over the state party's presidential endorsement of Sherman was politically sensitive. Privately, Foraker was furious at Sherman and his supporters' selfish attempt to steal the political limelight from him at his convention. However, Foraker could not afford a bloody factional fight at the state convention, particularly since he would need the political and financial assistance of Sherman and his supporters in the upcoming fall election. Before the convention, in a letter to Hanna, Foraker showed his distress regarding the matter of the resolution.

I suggested in lieu of the resolution, that he (Sherman) attend the convention, be made its permanent chairman, and that we adopt a resolution commending and eulogizing him as our Senator, saying that in my opinion such action would not meet with any opposition.... Considering my prospective relation to the canvass.... I am keeping out of the fight rather because I do not want to fight Sherman and I cannot conscientiously or consistently fight for him in this respect.... I am 'neither for nor against.'
While Foraker acquiesced in the endorsement, he and his followers would not compromise over who controlled the state party apparatus. After becoming governor, Foraker built up a strong state factional organization by political appointments. Foraker and his allies maintained control over the state party executive committees. Foraker let it be known that on state patronage matters he would have "no fooling or nonsense of any kind with Mr. Sherman, or any of the gentlemen who represent him."  

Republicans of Northwestern Ohio had always given Sherman less support than any other area of the state. Since the convention was to be held in Toledo, this gave the staff of the Toledo Blade a good forum for criticism of Sherman's proposed endorsement by the convention. Immediately before the convention, the editor of the Blade, S.J. Knabenshue, printed a number of anti-Sherman editorials alleging that "the effort of the senator's managers to force an endorsement at the Toledo convention simply resolves itself into the construction of a machine." The Blade, the strongest Republican newspaper in Northwestern Ohio, was an advocate for many Northwestern Ohio Republicans who always supported Blaine over Sherman in presidential politics.

The Sherman managers' fear that a significant minority of Republicans in the state convention would refuse to either vote for Sherman's presidential
endorsement or prepare a general substitute amendment never materialized. According to reporter James Boyle of the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, the committee on resolutions voted 17 to 4 in favor of the Grosvenor resolution which endorsed Sherman for president. Supposedly one of the four negative votes came from Congressman McKinley. On the second day of the convention the delegates jointly adopted the Grosvenor resolution without a dissenting vote and also renominated Foraker for Governor. It appeared that the Sherman forces had gained a significant victory in pushing through the endorsement without a single negative vote, thereby publicly tying up the 1888 Ohio delegation for Sherman. However, the success of the Sherman endorsement strategy, over the Foraker-Blaine camp, became a pyrrhic victory.

The 1887 Republican State Convention split Republicans into two factions. The split continued until Hanna's death in 1904. The Foraker faction continued to use the past symbols of the Civil War in order to maintain the Republican party as a cultural instrument of social reform. They considered the Democrats the party of treason and reaction. The Sherman faction emphasized economic issues. They used the tariff as a symbol for prosperity, home industry, high wages, and broad government distribution of resources from which to attack the "laissez-faire" Democrats. The factional dispute went
beyond ideological symbols and policy issues. It also focused upon party patronage. As a recent historian has pointed out, the state government, along with the federal government, was a major source of patronage, leading to factional conflict between a state's senator and its governor. Such was the case by the late eighties between Governor Foraker and his legion of state political appointees, as opposed to Sherman's own army of federal officeholders.

The Ohio Republican party won a sweeping state victory over the Democrats in the 1887 fall elections. Foraker was easily reelected over his Democratic opponent. The Dow Law was again approved by the voters. The state legislature again contained a Republican majority.

For Hanna, the 1887 state and local elections reaffirmed his dual image as the major business fundraiser for the Ohio Republican party, and as the "corrupt boss" of Cuyahoga County. By 1887, the importance of local business contributions to the party became crucial, as new civil service laws made it more difficult to obtain numerous small sums from office holders. The recent switch in the month state elections were held, from October to November, cut back "substantial aid from the East." Even the best efforts of Hanna and Springfield manufacturer Asa Bushnell, could not raise the amount of
money they had previously obtained in past elections for the state executive committee. The relative decline in the amount of money going to the state party made personal fundraisers, such as Hanna, an even more valuable commodity to party officials. In local Cuyahoga politics, Hanna was continually branded by the Plain Dealer as one who "aspires to be the new boss of the Republican party in Cuyahoga County ... to the court house ring and the city hall ring has now been added the Mark Hanna ring."  

The factional rift between the Sherman and Foraker camps began to affect the personal relationship between Hanna and Foraker. Hanna had not been a delegate to the 1887 state convention, but he had certainly indicated his feelings, by letter to Foraker, on the Sherman endorsement question. Foraker had grown suspicious when he learned that Hanna, together with Foster, Sherman, McKinley, and Townsend, had attended a party leadership conference in Canton, shortly before the state convention, and he had not been invited. Newspaper stories circulated throughout the state that the purpose of the leadership conference was to create a party strategy to keep Foraker from being renominated. While the stories were never verified, Foraker took his exclusion as proof that his political enemies were attempting to destroy him politically.  

By 1886, with Hanna's active fraternization with the
opposing camp, Foraker remained suspicious of his one-time personal and political associate.

Hanna and Foraker again crossed patronage swords over the Governor's appointment of a new state oil inspector for his second administration. Hanna, for the second consecutive time, pushed for the appointment of William Bayne to be inspector. Again Bayne was rebuffed by Foraker. To save face, Hanna joined together with the Cleveland business community to support the incumbent, Louis Smithnight of Cleveland. However, for Foraker, political circumstances in the state were much different in 1887 than in 1885. By 1887, Foraker had accepted the harsh fact that should he one day oppose Sherman, the Cleveland area would probably be almost solidly against him.

Discarding political tradition, Foraker passed over Northeastern Ohio and handed the inspectorship to Hamilton County Republican boss George B. Cox. In 1887 Cox and his organization had proven their political worth to Foraker by helping the Governor carry Hamilton County, which he had previously lost in 1885. For Foraker, the allegiance of Cox and his Hamilton County political "ring" could prove crucial should Foraker attempt to extend his political career beyond his second term as Governor.

Hanna, along with the greater Cleveland political community, were shocked at both Foraker's blatant
political selection of Cox as state oil inspector and his bypassing of Cuyahoga County in favor of Hamilton County. In desperation, Hanna solicited the opinion of the "Standard people," whose officers, he reported to Foraker, felt that, unlike Smithnight, Cox lacked the necessary qualifications of the job.\textsuperscript{83} Foraker refused Hanna's appeal. He chastened his former ally for his comments against both Cox and Hamilton County.\textsuperscript{84} With the Governor's personal selection of Cox as oil inspector, over the protests of many influential Ohio Republican leaders and Republican businessmen who had contributed funds liberally to the party, the appearance of two factional organizations within the Ohio Republican party became a reality.

After Foraker's selection of Cox, Hanna requested the Governor to have Bayne appointed as Cox's Deputy State Oil Inspector for Cuyahoga County.\textsuperscript{85} In a final rebuff of Hanna, Foraker ignored Bayne, and made Smithnight Cox's Deputy State Oil Inspector for Cuyahoga County.\textsuperscript{86} While Foraker's decision was a politically wise one (particularly in view of Standard Oil's favorable opinion of Smithnight), he had politically humiliated for the last time Mark Hanna, his most valuable political ally in Cuyahoga County.

For the next eight years, Hanna was Foraker's most formidable Republican political enemy in Ohio politics.
It could be reasonably inferred that Hanna's frenetic political activity for Sherman in the upcoming three years was motivated as much to defeat and humiliate Foraker as to advance Sherman's political interests and personal policy agenda.

As the 1888 Republican National Convention approached, Hanna emerged as one of Sherman's key campaign managers in the Senator's quest for the nomination. During the spring, Hanna traveled East to meet with key Republican leaders in New York and Pennsylvania.\(^{87}\) Hanna's trip was a part of the Sherman campaign strategy to develop support from key Eastern Republican state leaders.

The main investment of time and money during the pre-convention phase was focused upon the South. According to Sherman campaign managers, such as Green B. Raum, if Sherman could produce a solid Ohio delegation, and then add a vast majority of the Southern delegations, the Senator would be so close to the nomination that Northern delegations would inevitably abandon their first choice and cast their votes for Sherman on a later ballot. This emerged as the overall Sherman convention strategy. Their strategy included two shaky propositions. First, that Blaine's recent message to his ardent followers, stating his desire to withdraw from the nomination would dampen his followers enthusiasm to such
an extent that they would end their campaign on his behalf. Second, the Sherman managers realized the Southern delegates reputation of being receptive to cash would not convince Northern delegations of their sincerity in supporting Sherman. Since the South was solidly Democratic in national elections, through the forces of culture and past history on one hand, and disenfranchise-ment of likely Republican voters on the other, their "bribed" convention support was meaningless to party professionals.

Unlike the 1884 District Convention, at the 1888 Twenty-First District convention, Hanna was chosen, along with businessman Myron T. Herrick, as the two district delegates to the National Convention in Chicago. According to associates of both men, the two had started out as rivals at the district convention, but after their mutual selection, they began a close personal and political friendship for the rest of their lives. 88

The problem for the Sherman forces at the state convention in April was the lack of sincerity and supposed loyalty of Governor Foraker and his supporters. Though Sherman had been unanimously endorsed by the convention for the second consecutive year, there was anxiety among Sherman supporters that should opportunity arise, the Foraker faction would abandon Sherman for Blaine. Even the selection of three of the four Sherman state delegates-
at-large did not ease the tensions of the Sherman managers. Congressman Butterworth's defeat of Foraker ally, Springfield businessman Asa Bushnell, damaged the facade of unanimity that Sherman managers, such as Hanna, had tried to create at the convention. Hanna, in an effort to placate Foraker and his forces, told the Governor of his disappointment when the Cuyahoga delegation failed to support Bushnell. 89

After the state convention, Foraker, along with members of his inner circle, expressed doubts about Sherman's candidacy. Foraker expressed himself to Governor Russell Alger of Michigan concerning the weakness of Sherman's candidacy: "We cannot understand why he appears to have no following outside of his own state." Louis W. King, a Foraker operative, expertly analyzed the weakness of the Sherman strategy of concentrating upon Southern delegates. In a letter to Foraker's secretary and political manager Charles Kurtz, King stated, "You have no doubt observed with great regret that not a single delegate to the convention from North of Mason's and Dixon's line has been instructed for him since the adjournment of the Ohio Convention.... In my judgment, it is conclusive proof of disastrous defeat at Chicago." 90

Both faction leaders should have communicated and worked together to plan effective strategy for Sherman at the convention. However, prior to the convention, both
factions remained separate. The Sherman managers were responsible for this joint isolation. It was their candidate and state patronage protector whose candidacy was at stake. Hanna, who was chosen by Sherman to be his personal manager at the convention (since the Senator would be in Washington), and "Quarter-master for the party," attempted no real reconciliation with the Foraker faction in the crucial months before the convention. As a result, Foraker, who was the official head of the Ohio delegation, arrived in Chicago, "ignorant of many matters about which I naturally felt I should have been advised," and felt "at a corresponding disadvantage, on account of such lack of information." Hanna, who had always prided himself throughout his business career as being a conciliator between management and labor, refused to ignore or forgive the personal political slights the Governor and his supporters had dealt him over the past three years.

By the time of the convention, Ohio newspaper publishers were working closely with the Foraker inner circle in order to "boom" Foraker as a dark horse candidate. Foraker's supporters purchased nine hundred copies of a Toledo Blade editorial booming Foraker and mailed a copy to every convention delegate. The Blade's editor, Knabenshue, exclaimed to Foraker that, "I will meet you at Chicago, with sanguine hopes that,
when the dark steed is unblanketed, he may prove to be from the Ohio stud...."93

The Ohio delegation arrived in Chicago on June 17 and went straight to its rooms at the Grant Pacific hotel, selected by "Quarter-master" Hanna. On the first floor were the general headquarters of the delegation. This floor was occupied by delegates whose primary allegiance was considered to be for Blaine and Foraker. They were denied admittance to the second floor. The Sherman inner circle communicated directly with the Senator in Washington over a telegraph wire. Hanna's deliberate arrangement of the rooms helped to intensify the mistrust between the two factions. A reporter for the Plain Dealer stated that Hanna "took complete control of everything," allowing only the Sherman inner circle, which included Congressman A. C. Thompson, Charles Butterworth, William McKinley, Charles Grosvenor and ex-Governor Charles Foster, to enter the strategic second floor room. The reporter added that, "two sturdy colored porters stood guard at the door and only the chosen were admitted to the holy of holies where Mr. Hanna held the ropes to the Sherman balloon."94

A factional battle erupted the next day when it was revealed that Hanna intended to nominate his former political mentor, Amos Townsend, for Ohio National Committeeman. Hanna's goal was to replace the incumbent A. L. Conger of Akron. Conger was a key leader of the
Foraker faction and had always been a strong supporter of Blaine. Foraker quickly informed Hanna that he would oppose any attempt to replace his close political ally. Foraker regarded Townsend as a political enemy. At the meeting of the full delegation, a preliminary poll indicated that there were 31 votes for Conger and only 15 for Townsend. Hanna decided not to have an official count thereby permitting Conger to be chosen without opposition. Immediately afterward, Congressman McKinley presented a motion which advised the delegation not to choose a delegate yet. McKinley's reasoning was if Sherman were nominated, he should select his own committeeman. This last gasp measure by the Sherman forces was defeated in the Ohio delegation by a vote of 32 to 14. The votes demonstrated that the Foraker faction still had significant power within the delegation. It became apparent that most delegates approved of Conger's tenure and opposed Hanna's iron-fisted attempt to gain control of the entire delegation. If Sherman gained the nomination, his official state campaign would be run by Conger, an ally of Foraker.\textsuperscript{95}

As balloting began, the ghost of Blaine hung over the convention. Sherman led on the opening ballot with a total of 292 votes. However, the entire convention and national press recognized that except for Ohio and Pennsylvania. (where he received 53 of 60 votes), plus a
third of the Massachusetts delegation, all of Sherman's support came from the South. The hope of the Sherman managers for a breakthrough in the North centered upon the leader of the New York delegation, Senator Warner Miller. On the opening ballots, Miller and his delegation supported their fellow New Yorker, New York Central Railroad president Chauncey Depew, a last minute entry into the Presidential field. Miller promised the Sherman managers that when Depew had ended his brief candidacy, he would try to switch New York's 52 votes to Sherman. Hopefully, this would create a boom for the Ohio Senator. Sherman led for the first three ballots, but he could not move beyond his first ballot total votes. If there was no breakthrough, it was believed by many observers that the weary delegates would turn to their sentimental choice and nominate Blaine by acclamation.

The Sherman forces received their response from the New York delegation on June 23, after Depew withdrew from the race. On the fourth ballot, the New York delegation shifted its 52 votes, not to Sherman, but to the Governor of Indiana, Benjamin Harrison. The Sherman forces were shocked. Harrison was regarded by many as a simple stand-in for the Blaine forces, to be cast aside at the appropriate moment, when Blaine's name would be unveiled to the delegates. The Sherman forces, together with other anti-Blaine elements, fearing the beginning of a
Blain stampede, voted a postponement of the convention until Monday, June 25.

From June 20 to the 24th, Hanna, in his second floor room, remained in close contact with Sherman over the telegraph wire. During this time, Hanna was the most frequent messenger to Sherman. To Hanna, Sherman was the figure "to save the party from expediency or Blaine lunatics." Many delegates, such as Green B. Raum, had relayed only optimistic reports to the Senator. However, Hanna feared that Sherman's high profile within the convention would create combinations of various Northern delegations to stop the Senator from obtaining an early ballot victory. By June 25, Hanna's prediction had been proven correct. Still, on the evening of June 25, Hanna, together with most political operatives, regarded the New York vote for Harrison as a simple cover for Blaine.

Some anti-Blaine forces had begun to coalesce around Congressman McKinley as the best candidate to oppose the anticipated Blaine movement. McKinley had already received eight votes from delegates in the New Jersey and Wisconsin delegations. Inquiries from various delegations came to Hanna, wondering if it was time for the Ohio delegation to switch from Sherman to McKinley. Contrary to McKinley's strong protestations against abandoning his personal pledge to support Sherman, Hanna telegraphed Sherman explaining the urgent situation and
the need for the Sherman forces to stop Blaine at any cost. Hanna emphasized that "the Blaine move is to be made on the next ballot. We think McKinley the only man who can defeat him.... Can Ohio afford to lose the opportunity. I regret the situation but fear I am right." Sherman, who could not bear having another junior Ohio politician gain the nomination Sherman had sought since 1880, quashed any hope of a McKinley candidacy. Any movement toward McKinley, Sherman informed Hanna, would be viewed as "a breach of ... faith. Mutual fidelity demands that we stand to our position and fall if need be with honor.... Let my name stand. I prefer defeat to retreat." 

The Blaine threat finally evaporated on June 25, when Blaine informed his agents, by cablegram, that he again declined to be a candidate for the nomination. With Blaine out of the race, the urgency which had produced the brief unity of the anti-Blaine groups vanished. While there was still some hope within the Sherman camp that Senator Miller could swing the New York delegation to Sherman, that hope evaporated with the first ballot on the 25th. New York stayed with Harrison. New York's action led to a swing toward the Indiana Governor which resulted in his taking the lead for the first time in the balloting. On the next ballot Harrison was nominated by acclamation.
Sherman had failed in his best opportunity to gain the nomination. As a result of his defeat, Sherman was increasingly viewed as a politician with decreased personal power and standing within the Republican party. To many political operatives, Sherman was perceived as being potentially vulnerable to a challenge within Ohio.

The Sherman forces focused their anger and blame for the Senator's defeat upon Foraker and his henchmen. To them, Foraker's most unforgiveable position was his utterance to the press on Sunday, June 24, that as Sherman's candidacy was now hopeless, he, Foraker would now support Blaine, and encourage his followers to do also. As one correspondent informed Sherman, at the convention there "has been an influence at work against you, an unseen hand ... is at work—Foraker and his sycophant followers." Foraker, angry at being denied entry into Sherman's inner circle, decided to pursue his own political agenda at the convention. Before being talked out of it by Hanna, Foraker was ready to publicly split the Ohio delegation over whether to seat the Mahone-Readjuster delegates in the Virginia delegation. Foraker's spell-binding nominating speech for Sherman caused some anxiety among the Sherman leaders because the Governor made several derogatory personal remarks about several of Sherman's fellow nominees. The "unity" of the Ohio delegation was also threatened by
Foraker's public and private meetings with various Blaine political agents. It was no secret among many delegates that the dream ticket for the Blaine forces was a Blaine-Foraker ticket.\textsuperscript{104}

Foraker and his supporters made a spirited defense of the Governor's actions at the convention. As an example of his loyalty to Sherman, it was pointed out that as head of the Ohio delegation, Foraker had helped to keep it solid for Sherman until the end. Foraker achieved this goal despite pressure on him from fellow delegates anxious to vote for Blaine. Everyone agreed that Governor Foraker's nominating speech was the most memorable and exciting one delivered at the convention. To Foraker, his actions, not his own personal preferences, proved his loyalty to Sherman.

According to Foraker, it was the Sherman managers (particularly Hanna) who had deliberately cut off the Foraker camp, through physical separation of floors and rooms, from the Sherman forces. To Foraker, Hanna's rigid room and floor assignments indicated hierarchical levels of planning responsibility. It was not surprising when immediately after the convention, Hanna had trouble in getting delegates loyal to Foraker to pay their share of expenses for the hotel rooms which Hanna had arbitrarily selected and arranged for the delegation.\textsuperscript{105} For Foraker, the rooms served as an apt metaphor for the
physical separation between the Sherman insiders and the Foraker outsiders.

The Sherman camp's assignment of prime culpability for Sherman's defeat to Foraker led the Governor and his friends to believe that the real intention of Sherman and his friends was to end Foraker's political career at the conclusion of his second gubernatorial term in 1889. Several weeks after the convention, Foraker, in a self-righteous defense of his actions at the convention, stated to Sherman:

... I am of the opinion that for more than a year you have had things poured into your ears that never ought to have been uttered, and that some things have been said, and will be said, relative to the proceedings at Chicago, that might lead you, if you were disposed to listen to them, to a different conclusion. I desire here and now to turn my back upon all such talk.106

Hanna's experience as Sherman's main campaign manager at the 1888 Convention disillusioned him briefly with the Ohio political situation. Unlike the 1884 Convention, when he was "discovered" as an innovative political manager for a secondary candidate (Sherman), in 1888 Hanna was the manager of the favorite to gain the nomination. While his reputation as a master campaign strategist had not been enhanced at the convention, Hanna became a lightning rod for the discontented Foraker
faction. A controversial figure in local Cuyahoga politics, Hanna now also became a controversial figure in state politics. Sensitive to personal attacks by the Foraker faction, Hanna, for the first time since 1884, began to withdraw from his intense involvement in politics. He declined a spot upon the 1888 State Executive Committee. He refused to serve again under key Foraker henchmen, Mansfield newspaperman William S. Cappeller. Hanna exclaimed to Sherman that "I will decline to serve as I know they only want me to raise money for them to spend which I will not do."\(^{107}\)

Hanna's only major activity during the 1888 presidential campaign was stressing the benefits of the Republican policy of tariff protection and government promotion to all classes. Hanna spent a great deal of time in helping the Western Reserve Protective League send its educational message to the Cleveland area. In October he arranged to have his political friend Senator Sherman make one of his rare campaign appearances in a speech before the League. Sherman's address was a success and achieved favorable publicity with the press. Sherman's speech also emphasized the political influence which Hanna, one of the League's board of Managers still enjoyed within state G.O.P. circles.\(^{108}\)

Hanna's main political activity was to raise funds for the National Committee from "protected" Midwestern
businessmen in the great tariff campaign of 1888 between Cleveland and Harrison. It was reported that Hanna's efforts netted the national party $100,000.\textsuperscript{109} Hanna again focused upon the key policy questions of promotion and protection, which had been the primary impetus for his formal entry into the world of electoral politics.

In 1889, Hanna reemerged as the best business fundraiser for the local and state Republican parties. In the Cleveland Municipal Elections, Hanna was still attacked as the party fundraiser for protected industries. He was also criticized by editors of the \textit{Plain Dealer} for attempting to gain control of the city funds since a former cashier at the Union National Bank was the Republican nominee for city treasurer.\textsuperscript{110} For the state gubernatorial campaign, Hanna withdrew completely. In spite of the best efforts of Hanna, McKinley, Grosvenor, Butterworth, and J. Warren Keifer, for the fourth consecutive time, Foraker was nominated for Governor on the first ballot by the Republican State Convention. The Sherman forces had unsuccessfully promoted the candidacy of Robert Kennedy to stop Foraker. A correspondent from the \textit{Plain Dealer} correctly reported that "Mark Hanna of Cleveland is quoted as saying that he will not give $1.00 to the campaign fund if Foraker is the nominee." Another source reported Hanna as saying: "Now that you have nominated him, let us see you
Hanna did not raise one cent for the state committee, and through his inertia let it be known that he was hoping for Foraker's defeat.

For various reasons, Foraker failed in his bid to win a third consecutive term as Governor. He lost the election by 10,812 votes to his Democratic challenger, Congressman James Campbell. Not only did Foraker suffer defeat, but the Republicans lost both houses of the State Legislature. This allowed the Democratic majority to redistrict state legislative and congressional boundaries in Ohio for the upcoming census year. Congressman Grosvenor, whose district was redrawn, observed that "The head of the ticket dragged down the rest of it, and for the first time in the history of politics in Ohio." As compared with 1885, an unpopular Sunday observance law in Hamilton County resulted in a switch of 14,000 votes to the Democratic ticket. The "Ballot Box Forgery" resulted from Foraker's unknowing use of a forged signature to wrongly charge Campbell for attempting to use congressional influence to gain a ballot-box monopoly for a company in which Campbell had an interest. Also the non-support from the Sherman wing, whose leaders were hoping to end Foraker's political career with his defeat, had a major impact on his defeat.

As M. Les Benedict had observed, state factions would sometimes sabotage their party's gubernatorial
candidates rather than allow executive patronage and influence to come under the control of an intraparty rival. Foraker's state patronage machine nearly equalled Sherman's federal patronage machine. If reelected, Foraker would have solidified himself as the leader of the Ohio Republican party, considering Sherman's recent convention defeat, and Foraker's magnetic personality and youthful vigor.

The Foraker faction blamed the Governor's defeat upon the Sherman forces. A leading Republican from Southeastern Ohio, George Fallon stated that:

The Governor's defeat will (initiate) an internal war in our party for many years to come and none will suffer more severely than these men who would compel a great party to make only such selection of candidates as they dictate. They mean to rule or ruin, but they will reap nothing but ruin.

S. R. House, a Cleveland businessman and intraparty foe of Hanna, emphasized to Foraker that he would "not pretend to forecast the future, but I am sure that the memory of a large number of Republicans, your friends, will prove to be long," and that the Sherman faction's "turn will come and the example that they have set may be followed when their friends come up for office to such an extent as to 'snow' them under most thoroughly."
Hanna, after the 1888 election, refocused his energies upon his business career. He heightened factional tension with a blistering anti-Foraker interview published in the Washington Star on March 24, 1890. The interview was an excellent example of Hanna's political nature. It was a personal attack upon the former Governor. Hanna particularly emphasized that Foraker's excessive ambition and charisma did not represent stable leadership sensitive to the conservative business elements of the party. According to Hanna:

Foraker has been a heavy load to carry for some time. Elected by the very best element of the Republican party in our state, he allowed his ambition to get the better of him. Capitalized with power as governor, the youngest and in many instances the worst elements of his party were put in places of trust. In almost every community he had created new political managers, and with them undertook to dominate all of the old and respectable element of the Republican organization. At the onset of this endeavor he naturally antagonized the friends of John Sherman, who represent with us the solid and substantial power of the Republican party.... The barnacles have now been scraped off; Foraker is dead as a factor in our politics, and Ohio is again as reliable a Republican state as it ever was.... Of course the results of last fall's voting hit us very hard, but in the end it will do us good. It will teach any ambitious and magnetic man in the future as Foraker is, that he cannot insult the business and conservative elements of his party
and then demand their support.... personally, I am not unfriendly to him; he has many bright and important gifts, but they are of the enthusiastic order which appeal to the mob, and such powers cannot last long in the crucible of action. Therefore, politically, I am done with him as I was before the last campaign.117

While Hanna had publicly politically buried Foraker, the leaders of the Sherman faction still regarded Foraker as a potent threat to Sherman.

In the spring of 1890, a Washington dinner between leaders of the two factions, with Ohio Secretary of State Thomas Ryan acting as middleman, was proposed to patch up factional differences. Ex-Governor Foster, a leader of the Sherman faction, stressed that the Foraker faction "are at present the disgruntled element." However, the Washington Dinner was never realized as both Sherman and McKinley advised against it.118 Possibly the two leaders felt they were in a strong enough position to not bargain with the Foraker faction. The Sherman forces were soon to learn that Foraker still had great influence within the Ohio Republican party.

Two key political events in 1890 illustrated how Foraker would be a real threat to Sherman in 1891. First, Congressman Grosvenor failed to win the Republican nomination in his newly redistricted Congressional District. The nomination went to a Foraker ally, William
Enochs of Ironton, Ohio. Grosvenor had been one of Foraker's most bitter political enemies, and his defeat was a great shock to the Sherman forces. The pro-Foraker editor of the Athens *Messenger* reported that Foraker's "influence was chiefly instrumental in bringing about" Enoch's nomination. Secondly, Foraker gave a highly emotionally charged speech to the Ohio Republican State Convention, again demonstrating his continued charismatic personality and oratorical powers. In reflecting upon the 1889 political debacle, Foraker stressed Republican unity for the future.

It was a slaughter, not only for the head of the ticket, but all along the line ... but if there be those who must have a victim, those whose minds are so constituted that they cannot be satisfied without definitely fixing fault, to all such I have an appeal to make. My appeal is that you place the blame upon me ... are we ready to meet the issue and answer the demands that rest upon us? The man who does not say 'yes' is not a republican; the man who said 'yes' and then sulks in his tent because he don't like a candidate, or don't like a committee, or don't like some other thing of the kind, is false to his party, false to his country, and false to his conscience. Let us then close up the ranks and go forward with courage and confidence.121

Sherman's quest to be renominated as Senator in 1891 was shaping up to be the decisive political battle between the two factions. It was assumed that Foraker
would challenge the aging statesman. The Sherman-Foraker factional battle soon attracted national attention. A writer for the Chicago *Inter-Ocean* reported that the "chasm" between the Sherman and Foraker adherents would be "gradually widened" due to the upcoming Senatorial contest. As a result, the reporter stressed that "Ohio Republicans will find themselves with the incubus of a factional quarrel upon them as heavy as that of the Platts and the anti-Platts in New York."

Hanna would reemerge in state politics as Sherman's key campaign manager in the upcoming Senatorial battle with Foraker. His experience in the bitter factional fight would decisively reorient Hanna's future goals.
FOOTNOTES

1 Herbert Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work* (New York, 1923), 115-116. An excellent study of how, beginning in the 1870s, Northern upper and middle class property owners successfully revolted against the high general property tax, unfairly imposed upon them by their local governments to replenish party coffers, and how this taxpayer revolt soon coalesced into a laissez faire reform of the high cost of local government, see Clifton Yearley, *The Money Machines: The Breakdown and Reform of Governmental and Party Finance in the North* (Albany, N.Y., 1970).


5 Cleveland *Leader*, October 3, 1876, Page 7; ibid., September 30, 1878, p. 12.

6 Ibid., April 14, 1880, Page 3. Eric Foner has recently maintained that the Postwar G.O.P. gradually switched from being primarily an instrument of national social reform to one concerned mainly with the promotion and protection of capitalist interests. Eric Foner, *Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War* (Oxford, 1980), 125.

7 Ibid., September 19, 1886, p. 8; ibid., April 14, 1880, p. 3.

8 Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 7, 1878, p. 4.

9 Morton Keller noted that from approximately 1860 to 1880 the focus of Northern federal and state activity were on ideological issues from the Civil War; but from 1881 to 1900 the government's emphasis was upon methods of federal or state organization in coming to grips and dealing successfully with the twin forces of

10 Cleveland Leader, May 8, 1880, p. 4.


12 Cleveland Leader, April 14, 1880, p. 3.


14 Ibid., July 30, 1880, p. 8; Plain Dealer, August 2, 1880, p. 4.


16 Ibid., p. 4.

17 Cleveland Herald, July 29, 1880, p. 4.

18 Cleveland Leader, August 21, 1882, p. 4.

19 Ibid., October 3, 1876, p. 7.

20 Ibid., September 29, 1880, p. 4.

21 Ibid., September 25, 1880, p. 8.

22 As Townsend was also one of the select party on the train, it is possible that his influence played a role in obtaining Hanna a spot upon the train as a reward for the support Hanna had given him.

23 The Croly myth of Hanna's role in arbitrarily changing the train's schedule to stop at Mentor, and Hanna's waltzing into the special carriage to present his fait accompli to Grant and Conkling, has already been demolished by Hanna's most recent biographer, Thomas Felt. Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 76.

24 While Croly had inflated Hanna's political importance in 1880, Felt's analysis of where Hanna stood within the Cleveland political community in 1880, though more accurate, seems somewhat too harsh: "He got out the vote in his ward on election day, collected contributions locally, and occasionally played host to speakers at his Opera House. As a merchant he was a man of some substance; as a politician he was nobody in particular." Ibid., 75.
25 Cleveland Leader, March 31, 1883, p. 4.; ibid., April 2, 1883, p. 8.
26 Ibid., April 3, 1883, p. 4.
27 Ibid., April 20, 1884, pp. 2, 4; Cleveland Herald, April 20, 1884, p. 8; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 18, 1884, p. 8.
28 Ibid., April 23, 1884, p. 4.
31 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 24, 1884, p. 2.
32 Ibid., April 26, 1884, p. 2.
33 Cleveland Herald, April 25, 1884, p. 4.
34 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 75.
35 Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 117–18.
36 Ibid., 185.
37 Charles Kurtz to John Sherman, June 8, 1884, volume 325, John Sherman Papers (Library of Congress).
38 Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life 160; Croly Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 123.
39 Kurtz to Sherman, June 1, 1884, v. 325, John Sherman Papers (L.C.).
40 J.C. Donaldson to Sherman, June 6, 1884, v. 325, John Sherman Papers (L.C.).
41 Charles Foster to Sherman, June 6, 1884, v. 325, Sherman Papers (L.C.).
42 Marcus, Grand Old Party, 83; Hanna to Sherman, June 10, 1884, v. 325, Sherman Papers (L.C.).
43 Cleveland Leader, June 13, 1884, p. 1.
44 Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 150.
45 Hanna to Foraker, June 11, 1884, Box 1, Joseph Foraker Papers (Cincinnati Historical Society).


47 Hanna to Foraker, Nov. 3, 1884, Box 1, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).


49 Ibid., 139; Cleveland *Leader*, June 12, 1885, p. 1.

50 Foraker to Kurtz, June 20, 1885, Box 15, Charles Kurtz Papers (Ohio Historical Society).

51 *Plain Dealer*, Oct. 3, 1885, p. 4.

52 Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, Oct. 6, 1885, p. 4; ibid., Oct. 8, 1885, p. 1; Oct. 9, 1885, p. 4.

53 The first known caricatures of Hanna appeared in the *Plain Dealer* during the 1885 November elections. An effective cartoon showed a small bowler-hatted Hanna embracing a taller, bearded Everett, both celebrating their success in getting Kimberly nominated. The caricature was entitled "Two Bosses," *Plain Dealer*, Oct. 11, 1885, p. 4.


56 Foraker to Hanna, Nov. 23, 1885, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

57 Hanna to Foraker, Nov. 24, 1885, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).


59 *Leader*, April 4, 1884, p. 4; ibid., Oct. 15, 1885, p. 8.

60 Hanna to Foraker, Nov. 28, 1885, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.)
Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 321.

Hanna to Foraker, April 24, 1886, Box 1, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).


Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 19, 1886, p. 5; Hanna and Everett had to counter a well organized "boom" for Townsend's main opponent, C.C. Burnett, at the district convention. Hanna to Foraker, Sept. 22, 1886, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

"The Leader shows itself to be the workingman's true friend by paying better wages than any other paper, by telling him what is for his own good and that of the public, instead of demagogically encouraging him when he is wrong, and by discountenancing boycotting and other revolutionary methods which bring labor into contempt," Cleveland Leader, Sept. 14, 1886, p. 4; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 19, 1886, p. 4.

Cleveland Leader, Sept. 19, 1886, p. 8.

Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 19, 1886, p. 4.

Cleveland Leader, Nov. 4, 1886, p. 4.

Hanna to Foraker, Nov. 8, 1886, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 140.

By Oct. of 1887, the Dow Law had brought $2,000,000 annually into Ohio county treasuries. This, according to advocates of the law, would lead to lower property taxes for other businesses, as they would no longer have to shoulder the taxation burden all alone. Cleveland Leader, Oct. 11, 1887, p. 4.

Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 313-14.

Foraker to Hanna, July 20, 1887, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

Before the endorsement strategy had become a cutting issue in state politics, Foraker had appointed Hanna on the state executive committee. Even with the endorsement controversy, Foraker would still probably have appointed Hanna to the committee, as Hanna was indispens-
able to the party as a business fundraiser. Foraker to Hanna, June 22, 1887, Box 3, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).


76 Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 267-8.

77 M. Les Benedict has developed a useful definition of factionalism applicable for late nineteenth century politics. To Benedict, factions are primarily alliances among party leaders seeking "support from broader segments of the party by identifying with attractive positions, symbols, promises, and electoral strategies." Michael Les Benedict, "Factionalism and Representation: Some Insight from the Nineteenth-Century United States," Social Science History, 9 (Fall 1985), 369.

78 Ibid., 374-5.


80 "Messrs. Foster, Bushnell and Hanna undertook to raise a certain amount for campaign purposes, but have not met with the success it was expected would attend their efforts,—indeed, they have been very much disappointed in their undertakings," Kurtz to Isaac Smead, Oct. 13, 1887, Letterbook #4, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

81 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 21, 1887, p. 4; ibid., Sept. 22, 1887, p. 4.

82 Foraker, Notes of A Busy Life, 315-7.

83 Hanna to Foraker, Jan. 20, 1888, Box 1, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).

84 "... No one will make any headway for himself by talking about Hamilton county having more than her share.... The consequence is that Hamilton County ... has not as yet received a state appointment of any kind whatever, with a salary attached.... People who talk about Cox in the way you say they are doing, do themselves a great injustice. Cox is not a Sunday-school superintendent, neither is he a man of as much culture as some others, but he is a man of ability, always reliable, not a bummer or a politician for revenue ...." Foraker to Hanna, Jan. 19, 1888, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).
85 Hanna to Foraker, May 2, 1888, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

86 Foraker is mistaken when he stated in a 1906 interview that he had appointed Bayne as deputy oil inspector for Cuyahoga County. Foraker Interview, Feb. - April 1906, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Smithnight to Caine, May 1, 1888, Box 26, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

87 Felt, "Rise of Mark Hanna," 161.


89 Hanna to Foraker, May 2, 1888, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

90 Louis W. King to Kurtz, May 25, 1888, Box 26, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

91 Foraker, Notes of A Busy Life, 339.

92 Isaac Smead to Kurtz, June 12, 1888, Box 30, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).

93 S.J. Knabenshue to Kurtz, June 14, 1888, Box 30, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).

94 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 18, 1888, p. 1.

95 Hanna to Kurtz, April 24, 1888, Box 30, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 18, 1888, p. 1; ibid., June 19, 1888, p. 1; ibid., June 20, 1888, p. 4; Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 346; Walters, Joseph Benson Foraker, 67.

96 Hanna to Sherman, June 18, 1888, v. 449, Sherman Papers (L.C.).


100 Hanna to Sherman, June 23, 1888, v. 450, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Leader, June 25, 1888, p. 1; Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 181.


104 Cleveland *Leader*, June 24, 1888, p. 3; Foraker to William Day, June 27, 1888, Box 30, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).

105 Hanna to Kurtz, June 29, 1888, Box 30, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Clarence Brown to Kurtz, July 3, 1888, Box 33, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Monaghan to Kurtz, July 5, 1888, Box 33, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Hanna to Sherman, July 14, 1888, v. 453, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Foraker, *Notes of A Busy Life*, 394-5.


109 Croly, 149.

110 Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, April 1, 1889, p. 2.


112 M.B. Gary to Kurtz, June 29, 1889, Box 35, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Z.B. Campbell to Kurtz, July 23, 1889, "... Next man I propose to make peace with is Mark Hanna. He is too good a man to have an enemy to the Gov. I propose to see him on my own individual responsibility, but if you have a need to say I may use if opportunity opens.... Hanna we must win to us--bury the past & come together in this fight." Box 35, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Z.B. Campbell to Kurtz, July 27, 1889, Box 35, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Robert F. Pairee to Kurtz, Octo 29, 1889,
Box 41, "I have traced down all (reasons) of Mark Hanna's opposition to you. He talks but he does not work." Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 21, 1889, p. 4, "Mr. M.A. Hanna isn't saying a word or giving a dollar."

113 Grosvenor Statement, Nov. 8, 1889, Box 41, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

114 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 12, 1889, p. 1; Foraker to Halstead, Nov. 10, 1889, Box 29, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.); Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 153.

115 Benedict, "Factionalism and Representation,"

116 George Fallon to Kurtz, Nov. 1, 1889, Box 41, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); S.R. House to Foraker, Nov. 7, 1889, Box 35, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).

117 "What Ails Hanna," March 25, 1890, Box 45, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

118 Charles Foster to Daniel J. Ryan, April 12, 1890, Box 1, Daniel J. Ryan Papers (O.H.S.); Foster to Ryan, May 5, 1890, Box 1, Ryan Papers (O.H.S.).

119 As a result of the Republican loss of the state legislature in 1889 to the Democrats, the Democrats redistricted the state in 1890 to their political advantage. A prime example of this redistricting was the merging of A.C. Republican congressmen Grosvenor's 11th District and Thompson's 12th District into a new single district, the 12th District. A district convention was held in Ironton, Ohio on June 26, 1890 to determine who would be the Republican nominee for the new 12th District. There were three candidates: Charles Grosvenor of Athens, Ohio, A.C. Thompson of Portsmouth, Ohio, and William Enochs, of Ironton, Ohio. Enochs was Foraker's choice. Even before the convention started, Foraker was taking an active role in helping Enoch's slim chances against both congressmen. Foraker to Kurtz, June 18, 1890, Box 45, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.), "... I want to say that in my judgment Enochs is the man to nominate and he should have help in every way that it can be given him. As between Grosvenor and Thompson, I prefer Thompson, but I do not think that there is any chance for him, and that means that either Grosvenor or Enochs will be nominated.... P.S. If there are any delegates from Athens County who are disposed to drop out of the Grosvenor column, they should not be long about it." After 229 ballots,
Grosvenor had 77 votes (Athens and Meigs County delegations), Thompson had 71 votes (Scioto and Gallia County delegations), and Enochs had 40 votes (Lawrence County delegation). The convention delegates voted to adjourn the convention to Gallopedia, Ohio on August 26, 1890. At the Gallopedia Convention it was not until the 447th ballot that William Enochs received a majority of the delegate votes. Enochs profited by the resulting tension and broken promises of support between the Grosvenor and Thompson camps, which finally resulted with Thompson ordering his delegates to vote for Enochs over Grosvenor. Athens Messenger, Sept. 4, 1890, p. 1. Grosvenor's surprising defeat was a blow to the Sherman faction and a great triumph for Foraker, who had helped to propel a virtual political unknown, Enochs, to victory over two Republican Congressmen and leaders of the Sherman faction.

120 Athens Messenger, Sept. 4, 1890, p. 1.

121 Foraker Speech to Republican State Convention, July 16, 1890, Box 45, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

122 Chicago Inter-Ocean, Box 47, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).
CHAPTER IV
"FORAKER CAN WAIT":
THE 1891 OHIO REPUBLICAN FACTIONAL STRUGGLE

During the 1880s, as the Republican party shifted towards emphasizing economic issues over social reform issues, the change coalesced with transformation of the campaign style, from one featuring spectacular campaigning toward one of education. Previously the spectacular style fit perfectly with Civil War issues and those of "Protestant Morality." The more sedate educational appeal was appropriate for discussions of tariff schedules and issues dealing with the effects of industrialization upon the American polity.

A key Republican, Iowa editor and businessman James S. Clarkson, led the Republicans' conversion to the educational style. He understood that voters absorbed in new technical issues, such as the tariff, could not be swayed with spectacular appeals. In 1887, Clarkson created a new political bureaucracy to handle the newer educational function: the National League of Republican
Clubs. The League replaced temporary clubs and marching companies of previous spectacular campaigns with permanent organizations whose function was to educate voters during and after elections.¹ Most importantly, unlike many previous social reform associations (primarily temperance) which operated outside of the formal G.O.P. party structure, Clarkson designed the network of clubs to function as an adjunct, and not a rival power base, to the Party's national, state, and local committees.² Proliferating businessmen's associations and education clubs formed a key part of the party's formal power structure. Through these structural changes, party leaders redesigned the Republican party as primarily an instrument of business development.

The changes in the campaign style, from spectacular to educational, and the creation of a new party pressure group to propagandize economic issues, aided the Sherman forces in their 1891 Senatorial battle with Foraker. An editor in 1891 wrote on the main function of the Ohio Republican League stating that "Republican League clubs are for work, not parade ... the old issues are passing away and the new issues between the parties are those of economies, commercial relations, finance and the like." Another Ohio writer in 1891 added, "A political campaign is a stern reality. The brass band, the torch-light
procession, the buncombe speech will not win this year.... The day of carrying elections by superficial things has gone by."³

Foraker was the active challenger to the incumbent Sherman. The flow of the factional battle would revolve around Foraker's peculiar political strengths and weaknesses. His qualities included personal ambition, a different political agenda (apart from Sherman's) to attract supporters, and a unique charismatic personality that appealed beyond the traditional confines of party.

As M. Les Benedict, a recent historian, has stated, a key element of factionalism is personal ambition, particularly when a young aspiring leader, such as Foraker, finds the route to higher position of authority blocked by the old guard.⁴ Michel's "iron law of oligarchy" is a useful rule as it posits that leaders of an institutionalized party, upon achieving power, will concentrate much of their energies on retaining that power. The only way that aspiring leaders could oust the old guard, was often only under the banner of "reform."⁵ Foraker, attempted to present himself to Republicans as a youthful, energetic reformer, untainted by the corruption of the federal government, and ready to take the place of the elderly incumbent. A writer for the pro-Foraker Toledo Blade exclaimed, "Foraker deserves the honor. He is worthy of it. It is demanded for him in
the name of the young, the progressive, the aggressive, Republicans of Ohio.... 'The old order changeth; ' new times require new men.'

Foraker's use of the "old" ideological issues of social reform allowed the ex-Governor to carve out his own special niche among Ohio Republicans. By emphasizing Civil War and "Protestant Morality" issues, Foraker summoned voters back to the idealized past and glory of their party during a time when many were confused and dismayed at the vast changes their country and party were undergoing as a result of industrialization and urbanization. Foraker made issues of social reform and "Southern treachery" more vital and real to many Republicans, than issues which dealt with the "current" problems of change within the political economy.

However, by dwelling almost entirely on issues from the Republican past, Foraker, to the consternation of many of his previous supporters, did not give enough attention to current economic issues. One supporter wrote to his secretary, Charles Kurtz, "I want to say that I think Gov. Foraker, should give us a little more tariff in speeches he may make, and eschew for time the 'bloody shirt.'" S.S. Knabenshue, a Toledo Republican, had stated in 1887 to Kurtz the potential demographic problem in relying only upon Civil War issues.
The trouble with the war issue is this: First, people are inclined to look upon the matter as the same old 'waiving of the bloody shirt' ... and, 3d, the young generation—men under 30—who were too young during the years of war and reconstruction to (understand) the deviltry of those Southern scoundrels, and who are slow to respond to a revival of the issue.  

Foraker's most valuable political asset was his charismatic personality. The upcoming factional struggle would basically pit Foraker's newer unique political presence against Sherman and most of the Ohio Republican political establishment (particularly the influential business community). Except for James G. Blaine and Civil War heroes, most Gilded Age politicians had to build a personal following through service to their party. Unlike a politician like Sherman, Foraker was able to instill strong personal loyalties, not only in those within the official party bureaucracy who depended upon him for their patronage jobs, but in those ordinary voters who usually placed greater loyalty to party principles than to individual candidates. With Foraker, the messenger was as important as his anachronistic message. As a writer for the Cleveland Leader stated, "Foraker is a host within himself."  

In order to offset Foraker's personal appeal, the Sherman camp favorably contrasted the dull Sherman with the magnetic Foraker by stressing that their man empha-
sized Republican principles over personality. A writer for the pro-Sherman *Ohio State Journal* added that Sherman,

... never would have, what is called a *personal following*. Rarely if ever does a crowd grow wild and throw up their hats at the mere mention of his name.... This absence of personal enthusiasm in his behalf has led some persons *** to believe that he is not popular. Well, in the sense of a popularity which clings simply to the *person* of a man and is mixed up with all sorts of considerations from those that are honest enough to those that are exceedingly questionable, he cannot exactly be regarded as a popular man.10

To contrast Senator Sherman with Foraker's public persona, the Sherman faction emphasized the differing segments of the party to whom each appealed. According to the Sherman camp, Foraker attracted the excitable segment of the party, whereas Sherman appealed to the sober, conservative element of the party. A Sherman supporter, John Poe of Findlay, Ohio, wrote contemptuously of the emotionalism of Foraker supporters, exclaiming that the people in Hancock County who preferred Foraker "are of that class who are always ready to clap their hands and throw their hats about nothing."11 In contrast to Foraker supporters, the editor of the pro-Sherman *Leader* added that:

the men who are urging the reelection of John Sherman are, as a class, the best,
most conservative, and safest counselors in the party ... the majority of businessmen of the state, men with whom politics are a secondary matter and an able and pure public service the first consideration, are urging the election of Sherman with an earnestness and unanimity that cannot be mistaken, and that it would be dangerous to overlook.\(^{12}\)

Foraker risked future permanent political harm to himself by his decision to run against such an established powerful public figure as Sherman. He realized it would reopen the party's factional wounds. However, such possibilities paled due to Foraker's strong conviction that he could defeat Sherman under the current senatorial electoral structure.

Since senators were not directly elected by the people, but through a vote in the state legislature, the key for both Foraker and Sherman was to repair the damage their factional split had caused in 1889 by regaining control of the state legislature in the upcoming 1891 elections. If the Republicans regained the Ohio legislature, each candidate had to persuade individual legislators (particularly freshmen) that it was their particular faction that had provided the needed funds and services crucial to their election. By convincing individual legislators of their faction's timely aid, factional leaders would win the member's votes in the party caucus for their candidate.
A key advantage for Foraker was that Sherman would be occupied with official duties in Washington during part of the campaign. Sherman's distaste for active campaigning was well known.

After his electoral defeat in 1889, Foraker had resumed his law practice in Cincinnati. The ex-Governor believed he would have a crucial edge against Sherman in personal loyalty among many Republican candidates, for whom he would write, meet, and actively campaign. Foraker, through his championing of Civil War issues, had in addition strong support among veterans' groups. Foraker also had support among his old state appointees; some farmer, social reform, and labor groups; and the entire Hamilton County delegation under the control of George Cox.\textsuperscript{13} Foraker hoped that his image and his active participation on the Ohio political scene would militate enough against Sherman's massive campaign funds, his army of federal officeholders who would comb the state in the senator's interest, his strong support among the crucial business community, and Republicans who personally disliked Foraker, to produce a Foraker victory in the Republican caucus.\textsuperscript{14}

The actions of the Republican state convention, meeting in Columbus in mid-June 1891 gave hope to the Foraker forces. They were still keeping publicly silent on Foraker's possible senatorial candidacy. In the
eyes of the Foraker faction and Democrats around the state, Sherman suffered a twin political defeat at the convention: First, he was defeated for permanent chairman of the convention by Springfield manufacturer and Foraker ally Asa Bushnell. Second, Sherman did not receive a strong, specific endorsement for reelection to the Senate. The convention resolution instead praised Sherman for his distinguished past service and record in Congress. The actions of the convention received a great deal of attention in the press, with many Foraker and Democratic organs gleefully eulogizing Sherman's apparent political death, despite protestations to the contrary from Sherman organs.  

The leaders of the Sherman faction, shocked at the actions of the convention and uncertain as to Foraker's intentions, gained an audience with the ex-Governor in July to attempt to ferret out his real plans. Their efforts proved disastrous. According to a letter Foraker wrote to a close friend afterwards, the Sherman men had come to him with a request that he publicly state he would not run against Senator Sherman. Taking exception to their manner, and what he considered past mistreatment by them (going back to the 1887 endorsement controversy), Foraker rebuffed them and concluded that "since they attacked as they did, I decided to run."
standing Foraker's stated intentions, it is highly unlikely that this single incident provoked Foraker to run against Sherman.

Foraker and his close political associates had already months before been carefully laying plans for a race against Sherman. In a previous letter written to Cincinnati editor Murat Halstead in late June, while playing coy with the idea of running, Foraker stated flatly that Sherman could not be reelected. Even granting Foraker the benefit of the doubt on the effect the July meeting had on his decision to run, Thomas Felt's analysis of the meeting is still apt: "The itch for office was revived with the slightest irritation." On Sept. 6, 1891, Foraker officially declared himself a Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate.

In the months leading up to the November legislative elections, Mark Hanna was the key political agent for Sherman in the Cleveland area. Hanna's responsibility was to make certain that a sizable majority of the eleven Republicans nominated at the Cuyahoga County convention were pledged to Sherman, and then help them get elected. It was important that Hanna obtain election of a solid Cleveland delegation for Sherman to offset the solid thirteen man Hamilton County delegation (the largest in the state) which Foraker could count on from Cox. Hanna took the Foraker threat very seriously. The importance
Hanna assigned to Sherman's reelection was obvious. Hanna devoted most of his campaign efforts to Sherman's reelection, rather than to his good friend William McKinley's gubernatorial campaign. Unlike Sherman, McKinley had a united Republican party behind him, with ample funds from the state committee in his bid to unseat the Democratic incumbent, James Campbell.19

For Foraker, Cuyahoga County was an area of the state in which his factional organization was politically weak. Cleveland had never been a Foraker stronghold. Foraker's strategy was to simply hold down the overall damage in Cuyahoga County. The Foraker side hoped to steal several of the eleven Republican nominations from Sherman. The weakness of Foraker's effort in the Cleveland area contrasted sharply with Sherman's support. Sherman had the solid support from the acknowledged leaders of the Cleveland Republican party (particularly the city central committee under John Smithnight), and the local business community. The two main advocates for Foraker in Cleveland were two obscure city officials: former sheriff and saloon keeper Hugh Buckley, Jr. and City Clerk H.H. Burgess.20 In early August, one of the leaders of the Sherman faction in Cuyahoga County, former congressman Amos Townsend, reported to Sherman that he had failed to discover "that Foraker has any foothold here ... or is making any effort."21
The major concern for the Sherman forces in the Cuyahoga area, before the county convention in late September, was the position of Congressman V.A. Taylor. Taylor had never been a Sherman ally, and the main concern for the Sherman leaders, particularly Hanna, was how much effort Taylor would expend at the convention to deny the Sherman forces a significant majority of the nominees. Hanna had several meetings with Taylor, sometimes in the company of Cleveland banker and financier Myron Herrick. Hanna later reported to Sherman that Taylor "is not tied up to Foraker and I think Herrick and I can bring him." The success of the meeting, and the various methods used by Hanna to persuade Taylor to drop his opposition to Sherman were disputed by the Foraker camp. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the Cuyahoga County convention in late September, Burgess had to report to Kurtz that through the combined efforts of the "machine" and Hanna's "grievance" Sherman had "at least" nine of the eleven Republican nominees for the state legislature. At the same time, Hanna triumphantly reported to Sherman that the entire Cuyahoga delegation was pledged to the Senator.

The Ohio State Republican Executive Committee, the main party funding agency, was low on campaign funds to distribute to individual needy candidates. The two factions attempted to procure the necessary money for underfunded Republican candidates. If such a candidate
was elected, the faction expected the candidate to show his appreciation by supporting that faction's candidate for U.S. Senator in the caucus.

An excellent example of the two factions attempt to "buy" a candidate was shown by their actions in Paulding County, a poor, rural county located in northwest Ohio. Paulding County needed, and expected to receive, large amounts of outside funds from the state party at campaign time. Its candidate for state representative, Francis B. DeWitt, a first-time candidate, was promised $500 in campaign funds from the state executive committee. DeWitt had earlier received the nomination by pledging himself to Sherman. When Sherman made his first speech of the campaign on August 27 in Paulding (since Sherman kept his campaign appearances to a minimum, this illustrated the importance of Paulding County), he promised DeWitt an additional $300 for his campaign. DeWitt had already spent $1,000 on his campaign. A disgruntled DeWitt let it be known that he believed that the current political market for his potential senatorial vote would meet his price. DeWitt was proven correct. The Foraker forces in northwest Ohio had already warned Foraker's campaign manager, Charles Kurtz, "that Sherman will put men under personal obligation to himself by furnishing money to them in tight places." Seeing an opening with DeWitt, the Foraker faction supplied him with the necessary
funds. As a result, DeWitt broke his earlier pledge to Sherman, and after he was elected, cast his vote for Senator in the party caucus for Foraker. The Sherman faction's efforts failed in Paulding County but, in exchange for necessary campaign funds, in other rural parts of the state, legislative candidates pledged themselves to Sherman. This was particularly true in southeastern Ohio, which was former congressman Grosvenor's political bailiwick. With his power in the state party, and his political contacts and agents throughout southeastern Ohio, Grosvenor was able to supply his particular candidates with the needed funds, and most importantly, got most elected to the state legislature. Afterwards they would be under personal obligation to Grosvenor to vote for Sherman in the caucus.

The Sherman forces had serious concerns about the ineffectiveness of the state party executive committee in acquiring needed funds and managing the Republican campaign. The fear was that the executive committee's alleged mismanagement would cost the G.O.P. any chance of regaining the state legislature and moot any chance for either Sherman or Foraker to become Senator. Grosvenor, in particular, indicated dissatisfaction with chairman William Hahn. At one point in early October, there had been serious consideration given to establishing a separate Sherman campaign organization, autonomous of the
executive committee. Its function would be to solicit funds for and distribute them directly to individual candidates and also to manage the overall legislative campaign effort.\textsuperscript{28} At a meeting with party leaders in mid-October, Sherman expressed his confidence in Hahn and ended any thoughts of a separate committee.\textsuperscript{29} Despite the vote of confidence from Sherman, Hahn and the state executive committee still had trouble obtaining needed campaign funds from sources in the East.\textsuperscript{30} The Ohio Republican party would have been in major trouble if their leading business fundraiser, Mark Hanna, had not reentered the political fundraising arena in 1891.

As noted above, as a result of his feud with Foraker, in the 1888 Presidential election, Hanna had virtually removed himself from electoral politics. However, in 1891, with the joint opportunity of defeating Foraker, reelecting John Sherman as Senator, and electing William McKinley as Governor, Hanna again became particularly active in both Sherman and McKinley campaigns. Both candidates strongly appealed to Hanna as both were leading advocates of transforming the national and state Republican party into becoming a policy instrument for economic development and resource distribution.

The importance of Hanna's fundraising abilities amongst fellow Midwestern businessmen engaged in the coal, iron and steel trade, was deeply appreciated leaders of
the Ohio Republican Party, especially in a time of party financial crises. In September Hahn had written to Hanna that

we believe that you can do more good then any other man in the state. From extensive acquaintances among the leading businessmen in the country, and the confidence they have in you, leads us to believe that if you simply ask them to contribute they will promptly respond to your request. 31

Hanna's strong personal efforts to secure a large campaign fund for the executive committee were successful. The funds Hanna procurred were then distributed to both the McKinley campaign and the legislative campaign.

By late October, Hanna's frequent travels to Pittsburgh's iron and steel manufacturers for the purpose of raising campaign funds for the state executive committee to help primarily in crucial legislative races was reported by writers for the Plain Dealer. Beginning on October 23, the newspaper reported that Hanna had received $23,900 from twenty-six Pittsburgh iron manufacturing firms. The money, reported the Plain Dealer writer, was to go to the "Republican corruption fund with a view of perpetuating McKinley" and had primarily come from "infant industries" who were the main benefactors of the Republican policy of protection. 32
With headlines proclaiming "MARK IS THE MAN" and "A BAR'L OF BOODLE," the Cleveland Democratic press cleverly attempted to resurrect the corrupt boss image of Hanna in order to affect possible Republican voters in the upcoming election. 33 Arguably, probably much of the money Hanna raised during the latter stages of the campaign did not go to McKinley, (who by all accounts had a large campaign chest and was felt to have a comfortable lead over Governor Campbell) but went instead to crucial legislative races. These crucial races would affect the makeup of the legislature and have a direct bearing on Sherman’s political future. However, Democratic editors generated more publicity in late October by charging that McKinley was the main beneficiary of Hanna’s business funds — not numerous party candidates scattered throughout the state.

Before the election, the Foraker faction planned a strategy for "scooping" Sherman, if the Republicans recaptured the legislature. According to the plan, immediately after the returns were in, Foraker newspaper organs, led by the editors of the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette and the Toledo Blade, were to proclaim Foraker as the next U.S. Senator. They would proclaim that Foraker was the clear-cut choice of a majority of the members of the recently elected Republican legislature. On October 3, Blade editor Knabenshue had informed Kurtz of the need to raise $100,000 in order to "boom"
Foraker "the month between the election and when the legislature meets." On Oct. 31, Foraker informed Kurtz that certain editors wanted to "publish senatorial preferences Wednesday morning in connection with the returns, and at once open the ball. I guess they are right to do so ... they must do so in order to prevent being scooped, and in the second place, they want to do so in order to lead the fight." 35

The 1891 Ohio elections produced a Republican sweep of all state offices and a solid recapturing of the state legislature. McKinley's margin of victory over Gov. Campbell was 21,511 votes. Most importantly, the composition of the new legislature, due to meet in Columbus in early January 1892, was overwhelmingly Republican. The Senate had twenty-one Republicans to ten Democrats and the House had a healthy margin of seventy-two Republicans to thirty-five Democrats. In most close races, particularly in rural areas, the Republicans swept aside their Democratic challengers.

As planned, the Foraker strategy of claiming victory for the ex-Governor began the morning after the election. Led by the editors of the two key Foraker organs in the state, the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette and the Toledo Blade, the Foraker camps' strategy was to force their legislative supporters (or those believed to be) to publicly declare themselves for Foraker. Knabenshue, the
key architect of the plan, exclaimed in the *Blade* that "it is now settled beyond a doubt that the ex-governor will be the choice of the caucus.... At this time it is an equally hard matter to place before the public eye facts and figures to substantiate these claims. More than fifty of the elected members are avowed Foraker men."^36

The Sherman camp was annoyed, but not surprised, by the Foraker camp's plan of attempting to both bluff and stampede a majority of the Republican legislators (forty-seven members) to their side. They were determined to stop the Foraker "boom" in its tracks. As with the Foraker crowd, the Sherman men, in order to end the factional battle, needed their supporters to declare themselves in public to expose the Foraker bluff. In a letter to Ohio Secretary of State Thomas Ryan, Sherman wrote:

> I wish to call your attention to the plan of campaign of Governor Foraker and his friends who are boasting and bloviating as if we were playing brag or bluff. Would it not be well now to call upon the members, all who are willing, to openly declare their opinion and avow it publicly so as to correct the impression that is sought to be made.

In an angry letter to Hanna, Sherman exclaimed that "Foraker has developed his plan of campaign to boast largely and claim everything, as you see being done in
the Cincinnati Commercial and in an interview of Foraker in the Post. He is especially claiming the Northwest."37

Observing several of Foraker's claims trumpeted in various Foraker organs, Hanna quickly went to the editorial office of the Cleveland Leader, and, using his influence, had the staff write a strong editorial supporting Sherman, while simultaneously dismissing Foraker's claims. Hanna told Sherman that he had "seen Foraker's game and anticipated what you suggest. I immediately went to the Leader and you will probably see the result in the morning's issue. I will also try to see each member of the (Cleveland) delegation and try and have them come out for you...." The success of the Leader editorial can be measured by Grosvenor's enthusiastic response to it and his suggestion that the editorial be sent to "all the press known to be in your favor."38

Within a week after the election, the Foraker strategy of attempting to stampede or pressure undecided or wavering delegates to publicly declare themselves for Foraker had failed. Four days after the election, Foraker gloomingly wrote to Kurtz:

I do not understand why people who are reliably on our side should hesitate to say so. Wobbling around only invites uncertainty and controversy, and creates
encouragement for the other side. To sum it all up, the situation does not look so well as it did a few days ago.... I have also written a note of congratulation to almost every one of the senators and representatives elect, and have introduced the senatorial question to each....39

The following day a despondent Foraker wrote to Kurtz that "in the absence of reliable information from Cuyahoga County, and with most of the doubtful counties turning out for Sherman the outlook does not look very encouraging to me."40

It is apparent why the Foraker faction urgently pressed for a quick, swift decision of the Senatorial question. They were now faced with a fifty day battle with the Sherman faction to see which candidate could get the necessary majority of Republican legislators to vote for their candidate. Sherman had the incumbency, national prestige, access to money from the influential Republican business community, the almost entire support of the state and national party establishment, a more than two-to-one lead in the crucial area of newspaper editorial support, and a virtual army, numbering in the thousands, of federal officeholders whose political existence directly depended upon Sherman's survival. The longer it took for the Republican members to reach a decision, the more of an edge the Sherman forces had over the outmanned Foraker camp.41
The structure of Gilded Age senatorial factional battles militated against a quick resolution of the conflict between the Sherman and Foraker forces. Most preferences for Senator were arrived at in private, usually away from the public limelight after the election. Neither faction could be sure who held the upper hand in the legislature until the actual caucus vote. Because of this uncertainty, for the next fifty days both faction's attempted to trump the other side with grandiose claims through their particular supporting newspapers.

The Sherman faction developed their own strategy for blunting the Foraker factions' challenge. Believing that the caucus was theirs to win if they made "no mistakes" (always a dubious prospect for any campaign organization), the Sherman leaders began to centralize their organization with a headquarters in Columbus and assigned political agents to visit key members in areas throughout the state.

The three main political agents for the Sherman faction were Capt. Jacob Donaldson, J.K. Pollard, and George P. Waldorf. Both Donaldson and Pollard's services were paid for by the pro-Sherman state Republican executive committee.42 Waldorf currently held a federal position with the U.S. Internal Revenue, in the Collectors office for the Toledo district. Waldorf was the primary Sherman agent for northwest Ohio. This was a key position, as outside of his Cincinnati home base, Toledo and
the Northwest Ohio area were the second strongest area of support in the state for Foraker. Donaldson previously held a federal position as an officer in the U.S. Senate. He resigned his position in the spring of 1891 to come home to Columbus to work for the state executive committee and Sherman's reelection. Until November, Donaldson concentrated the vast majority of his time traveling throughout southeastern Ohio, soliciting support for Sherman from Republican legislative nominees. Through Donaldson's efforts and those of ex-congressman Grosvenor, the overwhelming majority of Republican nominees in southeastern Ohio were elected to the state legislature, with most being in either Grosvenor's debt or that of the state executive committee (in the person of Donaldson) for their election. As a result, southeastern Ohio was a Sherman stronghold. Ironically, Foraker's own campaign manager, Charles Kurtz, was a native of the area. J.K. Pollard, a former member of the state senate in the early eighties, had responsibility for the entire State of Ohio. Pollard journeyed throughout Ohio, inquiring the preferences of party nominees as to their choice for Senator. Pollard talked and worked with many of the local party officials in many of the eighty-eight Republican county executive committees.

After the election, the three campaign agents were constantly on the campaign trial. They sought private
audiences with recently elected Republican members, either individually, or in groups with other prominent local party officials, to press Sherman's reelection. This strategy of private persuasion had been stressed by Grosvenor immediately after the election. According to Grosvenor, "... we should avoid writing to any one to demand how he stands, and should avoid letting anyone know that we had written to anyone. To that end we must select confidential persons known absolutely to be your friends, such as Waldorf ... and through them cultivate a systematic organization."\(^4\) Sherman's agents were well funded and usually had the support of the Ohio Republican party to help them in keeping certain members in their column, or converting wavering ones. The strong individual presence of Joseph Foraker was the major advantage of the other faction.

Sherman seldom met individually with state legislators to advocate his candidacy. He delegated that function to his agents. However, Foraker jumped at the opportunity. Foraker used his charisma and charm, together with his strong persuasive powers he had developed throughout his legal career, to make a positive personal impression upon many state legislators, particularly if they were incoming members. Unlike the icy Sherman, Foraker went out of his way to make state
legislators feel important, asking them not to vote for him out of rigid party duty, but as a personal favor to a friend.\textsuperscript{44}

Fearing Foraker's persuasive charm at converting legislators, plus his supporters claim of his being the representative of the "young, the progressive, the valuable element of the Republican party," while Sherman was portrayed as the choice of "worn-out party hacks," the Sherman leaders emphasized a parliamentary device to hold wavering delegates. As a majority of Republican legislative nominees, in order to receive their party nominations, had pledged themselves to Sherman at their county conventions, the Sherman faction insisted, not unreasonably, that they stand by their personal pledges.\textsuperscript{45} Sherman leaders conveniently ignored the fact that many county conventions, particularly in rural areas, had taken place before Foraker had officially become a candidate.

Each faction, during the approximately sixty days until the caucus vote, floated various issues through their particular newspapers to entice undecided members, usually through aroused constituent pressure, to declare themselves. Various schemes manufactured by the Foraker camp during this period included an offer to the Sherman leaders to allow the choice of a Senator to Republican voters through a popular party referendum.\textsuperscript{46} They also
attacked Sherman's "poor" record on soldiers' pensions (a smart strategy to bring a still relevant Civil War issue into the campaign).\(^{47}\) Another scheme, this one from editor Knabenshue, attempted to pressure Sherman to lead a bid in the Senate to unseat his fellow Ohioan Senator, Democrat Calvin Brice, as Brice was allegedly not an Ohio citizen, but one of New York.\(^ {48}\) In this way, the onus was upon Sherman to insure that Ohio would be represented by two Republican Senators: Sherman and Foraker. From the Sherman faction came the charge that the Senator's defeat for reelection was being planned and advocated by the "long haired men and short haired women" of the radical Peoples' party.\(^ {49}\)

The question of the role of Sherman's federal patronage employees in the closing stages of the campaign became a key factor in determining the final outcome. As stated by a recent historian, by the 1870s U.S. Senators had become the dominant figures in the process of controlling federal patronage for the purpose of keeping themselves in power.\(^ {50}\) Sherman's main degree of patronage support came from the hordes of postmasters, he, either by himself or with the help of the district's Republican congressman, had helped to appoint to federal positions in Ohio over the past twenty-five years. Ironically, Sherman now profited from the Republican debacle in the 1890 congressional elections because only six Republican
congressmen remained in Ohio's twenty-one Congressional districts. Under the current patronage structure between House and Senate members, the state's U.S. Senator controlled all appointments in districts represented by members of the opposing party. As the Republicans controlled federal appointments due to their party's control of the Presidency, Sherman currently had immense power due to the current political situation in Ohio. Ohio's six congressmen supported Sherman in his factional battle. Therefore, virtually the entire federal patronage "army" in Ohio was at Sherman's disposal.

Sherman not only had the support of federal officeholders but also help from the Harrison Administration in the person of ex-Governor Charles Foster, the current Secretary of the Treasury. While President Harrison declined to get publicly involved in the factional battle, Foster, a key member of the Sherman faction, who maintained a strong personal dislike of Foraker-placed his own political network of state and federal supporters at Sherman's disposal.

The Foraker press focused attention and condemnation upon Sherman's sources of federal patronage, which they alleged were his main base of support. The editor of the pro-Foraker Athens Messenger excoriated Sherman's federal patronage power.
Every United States Marshall, internal revenue collector, post office inspector and every other federal appointee all over the state, every politician through whom the distinguished Senator has distributed the federal patronage for a term more continuous in years than the Peloponnesian war, (are) working like beavers to secure Mr. Sherman's reelection by coaxing, begging and even threatening....53

The Toledo Blade alleged that over ninety-five percent of newspapers supporting Sherman were either subsidized, owned or edited by men under personal obligation to him.

There are today in the state more than four thousand people whom John Sherman advanced to office while in the Treasury department; there are hundreds of postmasters who today hold their offices directly through him, and in nearly every town and county-seat the post office is in charge of the editor of the Republican newspaper. All these newspapers are offensively partisan in their advocacy of Mr. Sherman's reelection.... There is probably not in the United States a more careful dispenser of patronage where it will do the most good than Mr. Sherman....54

In attempting to identify Foraker as the "reform" candidate in the factional battle with Sherman, editor Knabenshue wrote that professional office seekers were a threat to democracy. The campaign, Knabenshue stated, pitted "the aristocracy of the office-holders against the people."55

Not only federal officeholders and political agents employed by the state executive committee traveled around
the state in Sherman's political interests, but also Republican businessmen. Particularly involved were businessmen concerned with the possible effect on Republican economic policy if Sherman should lose his Senate seat to Foraker.

Mark Hanna was the most prominent and active businessman who visited particular Republican legislators in Sherman's behalf. Shortly after the November election, Hanna decided that the Foraker stronghold of Northwest Ohio needed his particular personal attention. In a letter to Sherman on November 10, Hanna stated that he was going to "Toledo today and will see Waldorf.... We are having a little trouble in smoking out some of our followers here. But I think that they are all right but two and I don't believe they can stand the pressure. Foraker is writing personal letters to them."56

Thereafter, the Sherman faction mounted a full scale pressure campaign on several wavering members in Northwest Ohio. Members of the Sherman group which visited Northwest Ohio were Hanna, Waldorf, Pollard, Toledo Postmaster James Brown, and Rev. Z.B. Campbell of Ada, Ohio. The two legislators Hanna visited in the company of Waldorf were representatives McConica and Carney of Hancock County. The visit was apparently unsuccessful, as in a series of letters to Sherman, Hanna reported "the situation in the northwest is not satisfactory.... McC. is greatly under
the pressure of the Foraker men at Findlay.\textsuperscript{57} Hanna also apparently visited members of the Lucas County delegation in Toledo to persuade them to support Sherman.

Why Hanna would leave his own Cuyahoga political bailiwick and travel in the company of federal office-holders to a part of the state where he had little or no political influence was puzzling. Probably it demonstrated Hanna's strong degree of personal loyalty to John Sherman and the importance Hanna placed upon Sherman's reelection. Also, if Hanna secretly harbored future illusions of political success, it was important to make personal contacts in parts of the state where he was not well known. Soon after Hanna's visit, the Foraker camp, with the assistance of the Cleveland Democratic press, charged that the reasons for Hanna's journey was to use money to help secure Sherman's reelection.

In a move to boost the morale of the Foraker camp, editors of the Cincinnati \textit{Commercial Gazette} published excerpts from a letter Hanna had written to chairman William Hahn on the situation in Northwest Ohio. The article reported that after having made a personal investigation of Sherman's strength in the Northwest, Hanna reported that "We have been thoroughly deceived; it is strong for Foraker."\textsuperscript{58}

The Foraker camp leveled charges of bribery and intimidation of individual members-elect against certain
members of the Sherman entourage. Hanna was allegedly involved in two instances. In one instance, while visiting members of the Lucas County delegation, Hanna was accused of pressuring members who had received financial aid from the state executive committee and intimating to them that the money they had received had come from Sherman. Thus, according to Hanna, they were under obligation to vote for Sherman. Hanna's alleged tactic showed the importance of which faction had control of the state executive committee, as it could control the funds distributed to individual candidates during an election and thus demand recompense later.59

A more serious charge, which was prominently featured in the pro-Foraker and Democratic press, was pressure placed upon state representative Charles H. Workman of Hardin County to vote for Sherman. There were two main allegations. First, that the five hundred dollars Workman had accepted from the state executive committee was Sherman's money and since that money had helped elect him, Workman owed his vote to Sherman. Second, it was alleged that Hanna had always furnished Governor-elect McKinley with money, therefore, Hanna "can get anything he wants of McKinley." As a political plum to rural Hardin County, should Workman vote for Sherman, Hanna would use his influence with McKinley to get the Governor-elect to appoint the Hardin County Republican
chairman as state adjutant general. Their efforts were futile. Workman declared himself for Foraker.

Despite the efforts, legal or otherwise, by the Sherman forces, Northwest Ohio remained a Foraker stronghold (the only one outside of Hamilton County). Several Northwest Ohio legislators, including the aforementioned Francis B. DeWitt of Paulding County, publicly announced they were changing their votes in the party caucus from Sherman to Foraker. Despite pressure from the Sherman camp, these members remained firm in their allegiance to Foraker. These actions of "betrayal" caused ripples of anger and panic to go through the Sherman camp, as concern mounted that other members could follow suit. If this happened, Sherman would face an unexpected and humiliating defeat to Foraker.

With the continual loss of support from Northwest Ohio, it was important to the Sherman faction that they solidify their political strongholds, such as Cuyahoga County. In Cuyahoga County, Hanna's prestige was on the line as he had to win a solid delegation for Sherman. Hanna needed at least nine of the eleven man Cuyahoga delegation for Sherman to offset the solid thirteen-man Foraker Hamilton County delegation. The situation became critical for the Sherman forces when it became apparent that four members of the Cuyahoga delegation were wavering in their pledge of support for Sherman. Hanna had to
bring the delegation back into line for Sherman. In a letter to Sherman, a disconsolate Hanna wrote to Sherman, "I am sorry now that I spent so much before (the) election on fellows who do not in least consider it any obligation." A significant loss of Sherman's Cuyahoga support would send shock waves throughout the Ohio political world, giving the Foraker faction the momentum they needed to possibly end Sherman's political career.

Two weeks before the caucus vote, to assure the nervous Sherman leaders in Columbus, a confident Hanna publicly predicted to a journalist of the pro-Sherman Ohio State Journal that at least ten of the eleven Cuyahoga delegation were for Sherman as "these men have given their personal pledge and it will not be broken." Hanna also predicted to the journalist that Sherman would gain sixty votes for Senator in the party caucus.

With the approach of the caucus vote, Foraker decided upon a strategy to capture the organization of the Ohio House by offering their faction's own candidate for speaker, Thomas McGrew of Clark County, to oppose Sherman's choice for speaker, J. Laylin of Huron County. The Foraker plan was to gain the allegiance of McGrew supporters. The House caucus vote for speaker was several days before the vote for Senator. The vote would determine the actual strength Foraker had in the
House before the entire Republican legislative caucus voted on their choice for U.S. Senator.

In late December, the worried Sherman forces began to meet at Columbus to plan their final strategy. Hahn, an apprehensive chairman, wrote to Sherman describing the apparent strength of the Foraker organization in Columbus. They allegedly had twenty rooms for their people at the Chittenden Hotel. However, unlike many panic-stricken messengers communicating with Sherman, Hahn told Sherman that he could count on at least forty-seven votes, the least required number for election in the caucus vote. According to Hahn,

"The Senatorial matter is assuming gigantic proportions.... Every Representative favorable to Foraker is invited to Columbus at this Hotel and his expenses are paid by the (Cox) gang. (Important for Sherman to elect Laylin over McGrew for the Speakership as).... Laylin's defeat would be very disastrous to us in the very opening of the fight...."66

Many of the Sherman leaders, including Hanna, wanted not only to defeat Foraker, but to humiliate him in the caucus vote (by a two-thirds or more majority) to end his public career. A reporter for the Plain Dealer reported Hanna as saying "We shall not stop with a bare majority, which we already claim to have, but propose to show Foraker that he is not 'in it' against John Sherman."67
Foraker and Sherman personally arrived in Columbus in late December. Foraker arrived on December 29 and immediately set up his personal campaign headquarters in rooms 32 and 33 of the Neil House. Sherman, who attended his daughter's wedding in Washington, arrived on December 31.68

On January 1, 1892, Hanna led the Cuyahoga delegation to Columbus. On the same day, Hugh Buckley, Jr., headed a Cuyahoga delegation, composed of Democrats and Republicans, with the mission to persuade members of the Cuyahoga delegation to support Foraker. Upon arrival, Hanna rented the entire second floor of the Chittenden Hotel to serve as the organizational center for the Sherman forces. The very next day Hanna had the entire Cuyahoga delegation personally meet with Sherman. Upon presenting the delegation, Hanna assured Sherman "that Cleveland would keep her promise to send him a delegation in favor of his return to the Senate."69

Hanna's main mission was to avoid a major split within the Cuyahoga delegation and keep at least nine of the eleven man delegation loyal to Sherman. In typical fashion, Hanna accomplished this major task. He used every means of persuasion, either subtly or clumsily, at his disposal. On January 2, Senator Spencer, one of the wavering Cuyahoga delegates, publicly announced at Sherman headquarters that he would cast his vote in the party
caucus for Sherman. A reporter for the pro-Foraker Toledo *Blade* was present at Sherman's headquarters and heard Spencer's statement. He wrote that it "was a dramatic scene. Spencer hung his head and the tears rolled down his cheeks as he said he was about to break his pledge to Foraker's friends. He surely looked like an intimidated man...."  


The Sherman faction's confidence was further boosted by the House caucus vote for speaker. J. Laylin defeated J.F. McGrew by a vote of 38 to 34. The Foraker managers needed a McGrew victory to have any realistic hope of possible victory in the caucus vote for senator.

To prevent the now inevitable reelection of Sherman, the Foraker faction requested a secret ballot in the party caucus, instead of the usual open ballot. The Foraker faction publicized the secret ballot notion as a necessary measure to checkmate the pressure of Sherman's federal officeholders who had invaded the state capital in swarms. The Sherman faction argued that an open caucus
ballot was necessary so that members would be compelled to keep and not break their previous pledges given at various county and district conventions, for Sherman. When the entire Republican caucus, as a preliminary to the actual voting for Senator, voted down the secret ballot proposal, Foraker's attempt to unseat the famed incumbent had failed.

On January 6, 1892, Senator Sherman triumphed in the Republican caucus over Foraker by a vote of 53 to 38. Each faction interpreted the final result differently. The Foraker faction claimed the vote revealed the deficiency in the present system of electing Senators. As a result of the outcome, many members of the Foraker group immediately pressed for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution favoring the direct election of U.S. Senators. Disillusioned with the vote, many Foraker leaders, conceded that the present political context favored Sherman. However, they were confident that the future favored their young and dynamic leader. Foraker, in a joint appearance with Sherman before the assembled Republican caucus immediately after the senatorial vote, signaled this belief to his followers. In a brief address, Foraker stated, "he had had an ambition to go down to Washington and see how they did things there, but 'I am young yet, and can wait.'" In a private letter
to a supporter, Foraker was much more blunt as to what forces conspired to defeat him.

I was defeated, but the defeat did not bring any discomforture. On the contrary, I would rather have my defeat coming as it did, than Sherman's victory secured as it was. I can afford what befell me. He cannot very well afford what has befallen him. Such an interference from an administration, which is the common property of all Republicans, in the settlement of a purely party matter, in a state, has never before been known in the history of American politics.\textsuperscript{74}

The Sherman forces were as jubilant in their celebration of Foraker's defeat, as they were in their own victory. A telegram sent to Sherman the day after his caucus victory stated it succinctly: "Foraker can wait."\textsuperscript{75}

Foraker's defeat did not cripple his future political chances. In fact, it could be argued that the reform banner under which he ran during his quixotic one-man factional struggle with Sherman helped his future political chances.

Sherman's political star was declining. Without the assistance of the Ohio Republican establishment, the powerful and newly assertive Republican business community, plus the thousands of federal officeholders who spent many days working on his behalf, Sherman would probably have been defeated by Foraker. Sherman remained a remote, elitist, intellectual figure, with an icy public person-
ality. Sherman was also a distant campaigner during an evolving political age which began to value the persona-
ble, advertisable, charismatic qualities of a Foraker. In a remarkable letter to Hanna, revealing qualities either of ignorance, fantasy, or senility, Sherman showed how removed he was from the changing political world of 1892. Congratulating Hanna upon their great victory, Sherman remarked:

It is a source of great satisfaction to me that our canvass was made without the expenditure of a single dollar for boodle, with no bitterness to our adversaries and with no appeals for our candidate to the interested cupidty or ambition of the Senators and members. 76

The 1891 factional battle between Foraker and Sherman was a collision of two opposing trends and political forces which, since the 1880s, had been attempting to define the main policy and ideology of the Ohio Republican party. The Foraker faction wanted to continue to emphasize the party's past ideological heritage as being primarily an agent of national social reform. To Foraker, the traditional idealism of the party should not be de-emphasized. The current economic trends were transforming the party's ideology into primarily being more pro-business. The Sherman faction wanted to continue the recent trends making the Ohio Republican party into an instrument for business development and expansion.
Of the key constituency groups within the Ohio Republican party, the growing influential Ohio Republican business community, gave almost its entire support to Sherman in the crucial factional battle with Foraker. For the first time, the state business community entered in full force into a bitter intraparty struggle for ideological and policy supremacy. The final result between Sherman and Foraker in the party caucus vote, illustrated to any previous doubters how powerful and indispensible the combined might of the business community, had become, within the Ohio Republican party.

For Hanna, the 1891 factional battle not only signaled his reemergence into the political sphere, but he was now acknowledged as a key Republican leader in Ohio politics. After Sherman's reelection, Hanna, transferred his loyalty and highly valuable political services to his good friend, the Ohio Governor-elect William McKinley. Unlike his previous relationship with Senator Sherman, Hanna and McKinley would have a close personal relationship based upon mutual trust and respect. Working together, these two men would transform the Republican party into a party dedicated to business promotion and ethno-cultural pluralism. Together they would help place the Republican party firmly within the modern American industrial state.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., 81.


5 Ibid., 380.

6 Toledo *Blade*, November 4, 1891, p. 4.

7 George W. English to Charles Kurtz, June 5, 1888, Box 30, Charles Kurtz Papers (Ohio Historical Society).

8 S.S. Knabenshue to Kurtz, November 1, 1887, box 27, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

9 *Cleveland Leader*, July 26, 1887, p. 1.

10 *Ohio State Journal*, November 18, 1891, p. 4.


12 *Cleveland Leader*, December 12, 1891, p. 4.


14 A critique of Sherman's aloofness from campaigning was a constant irritation to many Ohio Republicans and became a key reason why many decided to support the younger, more aggressive Foraker. "Sherman's star of life has passed its zenith and if elected he can say 'This is *all*, and now let the others hold the party together, I have had all I want, and will take no active part in the campaigns that may follow.' This is no
violent presumption, as evidenced by his inactivity during campaigns...." C.H. Strock to J.B. Burrows, November 12, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

15 Toledo Blade, June 17, 1891, p. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 17, 1891, p. 4; ibid., June 18, 1891. Editors from the pro-Sherman press downplayed Sherman's defeat by stating that Ohio Republicans never passed resolutions at conventions specifically endorsing Senators, unlike the Democrats at their conventions. Cleveland Leader, June 17, 1891, p. 1.


17 Foraker's legalistic hair-splitting and equivocating on whether he would challenge Sherman is fully shown in his letter to Halstead. "I do not propose to run after the Senatorship or anything else in politics. I am too busy and do not want anything. I stated the exact truth when I said in my reception speech at Columbus, 'Give me your good will, and give the offices to others.' At the same time, I do not think I should put up the bars in such a way as to keep me out, if, when the time comes, I should have occasion, for any reason, to change my mind." Foraker to Murat Halstead, June 22, 1891, Box 24, Joseph Foraker Papers (Cincinnati Historical Society).

18 Felt, 223.

19 Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work (New York, 1923), 159-60.

20 Buckley, had had limited success recently with the Cleveland electorate. Elected Sheriff of Cleveland in 1880, he was defeated for reelection in 1882, and again in 1888, when he lost to the Democratic incumbent, running behind the Republican municipal ticket in the process. Cleveland Leader, October 13, 1888, p. 4; Myron T. Herrick to Sherman, December 15, 1891, v. 561, Sherman Papers (L.C.). In Cleveland, Buckley was identified as being a saloon keeper. His failure at the polls in 1888, was linked by some to George B. Cox's defeat that year in Hamilton County for County Clerk. "The saloon element in politics seems to have had a black eye both in his (Cox's) defeat and in the defeat of Hugh Buckley for Sheriff in Cleveland, who was also identified with the Saloon and the Restaurant," William Cappeller to Murat Halstead, December 2, 1888, Box 27, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).
21 Amos Townsend to Sherman, August 4, 1891, v. 547, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

22 Hanna to Sherman, September 4, 1891, v. 549, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Buckley had a different interpretation of the success of Hanna's efforts. "Hanna got at Taylor and begged like a dog and said Sherman must have a delegation. Now I am afraid I may weaken but, I gave him hell last night, and he (Taylor) said he \textit{would} not quit me. Now that is why I have tried to fortify myself ... because I know Mark's way of doing things." Hugh Buckley, Jr., to Kurtz, September 5, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); "Myron Herrick got Taylor up to the club today to meet Mark and he begged Taylor to join in and help get a Sherman delegation but Taylor told him if he did not let up on that idea he would get licked like hell." Buckley, Jr., to Kurtz, September 10, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

23 H.H. Burgess to Kurtz, September 27, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

24 Knabenshue to Kurtz, October 3, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Waldorf to Sherman, October 16, 1891, v. 551, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

25 Knabenshue to Kurtz, October 3, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

26 L.W. Brown stated to Kurtz on the methods of financially helping legislative candidates, particularly in Paulding County. "Now there are expenses in Paulding such as few counties are blessed with, several newspapers to pay and I believe he (DeWitt) has two men, with their teams, constantly in his employ in making a hand to hand campaign." L.W. Brown to Kurtz, October 3, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 229-30.

27 Charles Grosvenor to Charles Foster, October 8, 1891, Box 2, Hanna–McCormick Papers (L.C.).

28 Grosvenor was concerned about directly helping a legislative candidate in Athens County, who had special needs." I would advise that the special assistance to be given to the members of the Legislature be given directly to trusty and careful agents, and I especially think that this is the case in the matter of Abbott. Abbott has got to operate upon the miner vote in Athens and Hocking, and the State Committee cannot do that." Grosvenor to Sherman, October 11, 1891, v. 551, Sherman Papers (L.C.);
At this point it must be emphasized that after his defeat in 1889 to be reelected Governor a third time, Foraker had lost control of the state party executive committee. Though Foraker still maintained strong support on the state party central committee, the executive committee was filled with Sherman partisans-like Hanna. However it could still be inferred that many within the Sherman faction would always have a degree of mistrust of the executive committee, because of its past Foraker affiliation. Hanna to Sherman, October 15, 1891, v. 551, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

29 Sherman to Hanna, October 6, 1891, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

30 William Hahn to Sherman, August 19, 1891, v. 548, Sherman Papers (L.C.); "We are unable to understand why our outside friends are leaving us to fight this battle alone. They write nasty letters to us, but letters do not pay bills." Hahn to Sherman, September 21, 1891, v. 450, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

31 Hahn to Hanna, September 13, 1891, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

32 Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 23, 1891, p. 1; ibid., October 28, 1891, p. 1.

33 Ibid., October 26, 1891, p. 8; ibid., October 27, 1891, p. 1.

34 Knabenshue to Kurtz, October 3, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

35 Foraker to Kurtz, October 31, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

36 Toledo Blade, November 5, 1891, p. 1.

37 Sherman to Thomas Ryan, November 5, 1891, Box 1, Thomas Ryan Papers (O.H.S.); Sherman to Hanna, November 5, 1891, Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

38 Hanna to Sherman, November 6, 1891, v. 553, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Grosvenor to Sherman, November 9, 1891, v. 553, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

39 Foraker to Kurtz, November 9, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).
Foraker to Kurtz, November 10, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

Ohio State Journal, November 27, 1891, p. 4; Cleveland Leader, November 24, 1891, p. 4. Writers of the Plain Dealer noted that Sherman had almost the entire support of the national Republican establishment in his factional battle with Foraker. "In the coming fight therefore, the Washington contingent, the outside press, and the money power of New York, which Mr. Sherman has so ably represented in the past, will throw the weight of their influence in favor of the senator's re-election.... Here Foraker isn't given credit for either the ability, the personal magnetism, nor the political shrewdness which he possesses, while Sherman's strength has been magnified out of all proportion." Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 11, 1891, p. 1.

On November 1, Donaldson reports that his total expenses for hotel room and "refreshments for ... room" came to $363.41. His expenses were to be paid by the state executive committee. Donaldson to Sherman, November 1, 1891, v. 552, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

Grosvenor to Sherman, November 9, 1891, v. 553, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

"It is not in the nature of captious criticism or unfriendliness to say that John Sherman is not popular with the masses, the rank and file of the party, that he does not possess as a leader the personal magnetism that attracts and wins the love and hearts of men...." Athens Messenger, Nov. 19, 1891, p. 4.

Knabenshue to Kurtz, April 14, 1888, Box 30, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Toledo Blade, November 10, 1891, p. 1.


Sherman was attacked for his support of a bill whose intentions, according to the editor of the Athens Messenger, was to cut off after September 1, 1878, "all claims for arrearages for pensions ....," Athens Messenger, November 19, 1891, p. 4; Cleveland Leader, December 27, 1891, p. 1.

Knabenshue believed that "in the month before Congress meets, we could create a terrifically large public sentiment, and put Sherman in a hole. If he
objects to Brice, well and good. If he *refuses*, then we have a month before the General Assembly meets. I would unhesitatingly attack Sherman as a traitor...." Knabenshue to Kurtz, October 13, 1891, Box 46, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Toledo *Blade*, November 6, 1891, p. 4; The pro-Sherman press stated that Republicans should reelect Sherman first, and after then, review the Brice matter, as the two were separate events and were "not to be confused or complicated in any way." Cleveland *Leader*, November 23, 1891, p.4.

49 Andrew Squire to Sherman, August 24, 1891, v. 548, Sherman Papers (L.C.); "It is already apparent that the People's party would jump in and claim a victory in the event that any other than Mr. Sherman was elected Senator.... This would in itself be a beautiful picture for a Republican legislature to contemplate in the event that the members allow themselves to be swerved from their proper and only honorable course in the present contest." Cleveland *Leader*, December 15, 1891, p. 4.

50 Benedict, "Factionalism and Representation,"
373.

51 Ibid., 373-4.

52 President Harrison, in a letter to Senator Sherman, stated his reasons for declining to get publicly involved in the Ohio factional dispute. "Of course, if I were to speak or were to show my preference in any way it would be resented as an impertinent interference with the affairs of a state of which I am not a citizen.... So many changes have taken place there that I quite regret to see any of the old staunch statesmen, who piloted the party and the country through times of peril, drop out. We are now in a state of financial transition and will very much need your wise counsel. Republicans outside of Ohio quite generally, I am sure, would take this view of the situation; but, of course, after having been so long in public life, you have in your state ambitious men, younger in years, who cannot be expected to take so broad a view of the question." Benjamin Harrison to Sherman, November 12, 1891, v. 554, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

56 Hanna to Sherman, November 10, 1891, v. 554, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

57 Hanna to Sherman, November 11, 1891, v. 554, Sherman Papers (L.C.); ibid., November 13, 1891.

58 Chicago Inter-Ocean, November 16, 1891, box 47, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

59 "This is the sort of argument Hanna uses. He goes to a man who may have received aid from a state committee to push his claim for the legislature and intimates to him that the money for that purpose came from Sherman. He has done that in one instance and I presume in others." J.K. Hamilton to Kurtz, November 16, 1891, box 47, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

60 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 9, 1891, p. 2.

61 Waldorf to Sherman, November 16, 1891, v. 555, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Waldorf's fury over DeWitt's breaking of his previous pledge to Sherman, left Waldorf incredulous. "He is one of the fellows Senator that I now hope you may win without. It shakes one's faith in human nature to come into contact with such samples of duplicity.... I have never in experience... seen such an aggregation of bad elements at work to destroy the very foundations of our party and of good government," Waldorf to Sherman, November 21, 1891, v. 56, Sherman Papers (L.C.); In the Defiance Express issue of November 26, 1891, it was reported that DeWitt had declared for Sherman on November 24, 1891, box 47, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); Another Northwest legislator who broke his pledge to Sherman, by publicly announcing for Foraker on December 22, 1891, was Senator O.P. Heller of Hancock County. Toledo Postmaster James M. Brown showed Senator Sherman the letter he had sent to Heller, imploring him not to break his previous pledge to Sherman. "There are some things which are of more value to a man than legislative honors, and the privilege of voting for a Senator of the United States. These are his individual honor, integrity and manhood.... for the sake of your own good name and dual honor, for the sake of the friends who trusted you and supported you, for the honorable soldier record you have born, for the sake of the children that you are to leave behind you, do not let it be truthfully said that you pledged your honor, and on the faith of that pledge obtained a position, but afterwards went back on your

62 S. J. Flickinger, the editor of the pro-Sherman *Ohio State Journal*, exclaimed that in Northwest Ohio the "Foraker stock" was "way up higher than I had ever expected to see it. Are they beating us in management or manipulation? That is the impression that is going out over the state...." S. J. Flickinger to Sherman, December 24, 1891, v. 563, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Chairman Hahn, fearing that the recent setbacks for the Sherman faction in Northwest Ohio would be blamed upon himself, stated his absolute loyalty to Sherman. "A great many jealous Republicans may write you and say a great many things about how I stand on this or that thing, but I want to say that I will not betray your confidence, and believe me when I say I am completely wrapped up in this contest. I must insist in this matter my intentions must in no way be questioned.... I also want to say that I am in no way responsible for the Northwest. Had I managed that matter I would guarantee a different state of affairs **than exist at this time." Hahn to Sherman, December 9, 1891, v. 559, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

63 Hanna to Sherman, December 4, 1891, v. 558, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

64 *Ohio State Journal*, December 12, 1891, p. 4.

65 Foraker to Kurtz, December 1, 1891, Feb 47 Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); A.C. Thompson to Sherman, December 6, 1891, v. 559, Sherman Papers (L.C.); Hanna to Sherman, December 4, 1891, v. 558, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

66 William Hahn to Sherman, December 17, 1891, v. 561, Sherman Papers (L.C.); A member of the Sherman faction from Columbus, Joseph Smith, gloomingly reported to Sherman on their faction's upcoming prospects. "The fight is going steadily and strongly against us. Hahn is away, Donaldson is without hope and sick, Judge Nash is confined to his room, Hanna has his hands full in Cleveland, and Ryan ... is too sick to take much part in the fight. At least $10,000 could be and should ... be used to break down the Foraker organization...." Joseph P. Smith to Sherman, December 24, 1891, v. 563, Sherman Papers (L.C.).

67 Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, December 14, 1891, p 1.
68 Toledo Blade, December 30, 1891, p. 1; Sherman felt that family obligation was greater than arriving in Columbus ahead of Foraker. "Rachel Sherman is to be married here on Wednesday at my house, and for me to go before the wedding would ... be ... evidence of weakness." Sherman to Thomas J. Ryan, December 28, 1891, Box 1, Ryan Papers (O.H.S.).

69 Cleveland Leader, January 1, 1892, p. 1; ibid., January 2, 1892, p. 1.

70 Toledo Blade, January 2, 1892, p. 7.

71 Cleveland Leader, January 3, 1892, p. 1, 9.

72 Cleveland Leader, January 4, 1892, p. 1; Ohio State Journal, January 6, 1892, p. 4; Toledo Blade, January 6, 1892, p. 1; ibid., January 7, 1892, p. 2.

73 "It will rouse the people to the fact that the present plan of electing United States Senators is defective, in that it makes it possible for a minority of voters, intrenched in power, to override a majority. It emphasizes the need of an amendment to the federal constitution which shall allow the people to choose their own Senators. Either the people are able to govern themselves, or they are not." Toledo Blade, January 7, 1892, p. 4, 1.

74 Foraker to D.M. Massie, January 11, 1892, Box 27, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).


76 Sherman to Hanna, January 9, 1892, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).
CHAPTER V

THE MCKINLEY – HANNA POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP: REDEFINING THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

In 1895, at the age of fifty-eight, Mark Hanna made the most crucial decision of his life: he decided to leave M.A. Hanna & Co. and become William McKinley's full time national campaign manager for the upcoming 1896 Presidential election. Hanna had compiled an outstanding forty year business career. He had established a major business empire in Great Lakes shipping and bituminous coal trades. Additionally, since the mid-1880s, Hanna had been a major political operator in Ohio Republican politics.

His gradual retirement from his business and public life was suddenly changed in 1894, when McKinley emerged as the leading contender for the Republican Presidential nomination. Hanna had the rare opportunity to become his friend's national campaign manager and key political confidant.
As a result of their successful campaign for the presidency in 1896, the McKinley-Hanna political relationship reinvigorated the G.O.P. and broke the Gilded Age political deadlock between the Republican and Democratic parties for national political supremacy. Both McKinley and Hanna intended to reemphasize the traditional Commonwealth policy of active governmental promotion of the economy. Their purpose was to help mitigate the effects of the nineties depression, which the Cleveland Administration's *laissez faire* policies had failed to correct. McKinley and Hanna had always wanted to broaden the traditional Republican constituency to include more immigrant elements of the electorate. Using the all-encompassing economic program of the Commonwealth Idea to appeal to different classes and ethnic groups, McKinley and Hanna successfully broadened the Republican constituency beyond the G.O.P.'s traditional xenophobic Protestant coalition. McKinley and Hanna successfully implemented the economic Commonwealth program to create an enlarged cultural constituency for the Republican party. Their efforts resulted in the G.O.P.'s becoming the dominant political party for the next thirty-five years.

From the political fame and power he had acquired by his successful generalship of the McKinley campaign, Hanna in 1897 was appointed to the U.S. Senate as John Sherman's replacement. In his initial years in the
Senate, Hanna faced myriad problems. Hanna particularly had problems upon the campaign stump, primarily during the 1897-98 senatorial battle. By late 1900, however, Hanna had improved his public image and had emerged as a leading Republican spokesman on industrial issues. Without his close friendship with William McKinley, Hanna's entry from the sphere of Ohio Republican politics, to become a national political power, would have been impossible.

By the early 1880s, William McKinley had ascended to national political power, primarily through his emphasis upon economic issues over social reform. By the mid-1880s, McKinley had become the leading Republican proponent of the tariff. The two parties educational discussion on the efficacy of governmental protection of the home market through a high tariff, from 1877 to 1896, was the key governmental-business relations issue in the national political sphere.

The roots of McKinley's protectionist beliefs emerged from his childhood. He heard his ironmaster father complain that foreign competition led honest working men to curtail their output, reduce wages, and close their smelters. As historian H. Wayne Morgan has emphasized, McKinley's whole political philosophy rested on twin assumptions that shaped the protectionist argument: first, the tariff produced higher wages by insuring an expanding home market; and, second, that the
growing American industrial system could not yet fairly compete with the industrial foreign competition that benefited from cheap labor. The low labor costs of foreign competitors resulted in their producing lower-priced industrial goods than their American counterparts.

The variety of economic interests in McKinley's Ohio congressional district revolved around Canton's emerging industrial base. They included steel, shipping, wool growing and processing, farming and mining. To McKinley, only through the tariff could these various local economic interests be harmonized. From McKinley's viewpoint, a high tariff insured the entire system's expansion.¹

McKinley's appreciation for the concerns of labor also developed from his residing in Canton, Ohio, the county seat and key city within Stark County. From the 1870s to the early 1890s, Canton and Stark County were strong bastions of Democratic voting strength, with a large segment of the voters sympathetic to the interests of organized labor. Any Republican candidate who desired to represent Stark county in Congress had to gain a substantial segment of the Democratic working class vote. While the three additional counties of the 17th Congressional District were more Republican than Stark, the labor vote was still crucial to any candidate's success.
Through his emphasis upon protection, tariff McKinley successfully welded together a business-labor coalition. Members of this coalition increasingly viewed the success of their economic interests as being dependent upon a high tariff policy.

McKinley received strong labor support during his first Congressional race in 1876. A key reason for McKinley's strong labor support resulted from his successful defense during the summer of 1876 of twelve striking coal miners who had been indicted for riot and destruction of coal mine property when replacements for their jobs appeared at the mines. The mine owners included Mark Hanna, who were represented at the trial by future U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Supreme Court Justice William R. Day. McKinley was able to win full acquittal for all but one of the striking miners. After the trial's conclusion, McKinley refused to accept a fee from the miners. McKinley biographer H. Wayne Morgan correctly concluded that although the case was relatively unimportant, much of the labor element in both parties became convinced that McKinley in Congress would be good for labor's interests.²

McKinley was consistently re-elected to Congress until 1890 when the Democratic landslide against the "Billion Dollar Congress" and the McKinley Tariff swept a majority of Republican members from office. Despite the
Democratic landslide, McKinley would have won re-election, except that the Democratic state legislature gerrymandered his district for a third time, producing a "safe" Democratic majority district of four thousand votes. However, running a vigorous campaign, a determined McKinley refused to disavow the tariff. During the campaign McKinley emphasized the beneficial aspects of the McKinley tariff for business and labor. He lost the election by only 303 votes. After receiving the news of his narrow election loss, McKinley began the opening lines of his editorial for the Republican Canton Repository with the sentence, "Protection was never stronger than it is at this hour."^3

Hanna became a leading contributor and advisor to McKinley during his successful 1891 run for the governorship. After Hanna's heroic efforts for John Sherman had produced the elder statesman's narrow Senatorial victory in early 1892 over Foraker, Hanna shifted his attention to the political fortunes of William McKinley. Unlike Hanna's previous close political relationships with Foraker and Sherman, Hanna shared with McKinley not only a common political vision, but also a personal chemistry. Soon the two gentlemen became as close as brothers. During his relationship with Hanna, McKinley neither patronized Hanna, as Foraker had, nor was he impersonal and distant, as Sherman was prone to be. In McKinley,
Hanna had found the close political patron and friend for whom he had been searching since the early 1880s.

As the 1892 Republican National Convention in Minneapolis approached, Hanna saw an opportunity to promote McKinley for the nomination. Because of the general dissatisfaction among the party faithful with the current incumbent, Benjamin Harrison, Hanna believed McKinley had a good chance of winning the nomination. As with his prior dealings with Foraker, Hanna was angered when every recommendation he made to the Harrison administration to obtain federal patronage positions for local Republicans was unsuccessful. At the two previous Republican National Conventions, Hanna had been one of Sherman's leading political agents. To most Ohio Republicans, though, Sherman, because of both his advancing age and the bitter legacy of the 1891 Senatorial fight with the powerful Foraker faction, was not a viable candidate.4

As the convention opened, many believed that the two strongest candidates against Harrison were his former Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, and Ohio's Governor William McKinley. Blaine's failure to issue a strong positive statement from his Maine residence stating that he was a candidate for the Republican nomination ended the general momentum for him with his party supporters (such as the Foraker faction).
The Harrison campaign managers, led by Louis T. Michener of Indiana, expected McKinley to abide by his previous public pledge to support Harrison. The Harrison forces believed that they had reached an arrangement for McKinley to give the nominating speech for Harrison. Upon learning of McKinley's arrival in Minneapolis, Michener went to McKinley's hotel room to confer with him on political strategy. According to Michener, upon entering McKinley's room, the Indiana politico treated the Governor as a Harrison supporter and told him that a solid majority of the delegates had declared for Harrison and Harrison was assured of the nomination. Michener next mentioned to McKinley that the Harrison forces "looked forward to the nominating speech he would make for Harrison. During my remarks he sat looking out of the window and giving no word that indicated any interest in what I was saying."

Michener learned several days later that a number of boxes arrived from Cleveland and were in the loft of a business building. A Harrison supporter secretly gained admission to the loft. He reported to Michener, that "he found the boxes open and that they contained portraits of McKinley, badges, pennants, transparencies, flags and all of the trappings of a McKinley parade." 5

With news of this discovery, together with information that since his arrival McKinley had been present at every anti-Harrison conference, Michener and
the other Harrison managers devised a strategy to weaken McKinley's appeal amongst the delegates. Michener's strategy was to elect McKinley convention chairman. According to Michener,

McKinley would be loudly greeted when escorted to the chair to make his speech; but that would be his last furor, for after the speech he would be the presiding officer only, making rulings and doing things that would cause discontent—always the lot of a presiding officer—and thus put him out of the hero class.  

Placed in the role of an "apolitical" permanent chairman, however, McKinley's "selfless" administering of the convention gained for himself a measure of positive publicity from the press and the delegates. McKinley's actions from the chair allowed Harrison to sweep to an easy renomination on the first ballot. Hanna feverishly worked the Ohio Delegation for McKinley, and through his efforts was able to present a unanimous forty-six member Ohio delegation for McKinley. The solid delegation was broken only when McKinley protested from the chair the actions of the Ohio delegation, supposedly done without his approval. Chairman McKinley then publicly cast his solitary vote for Harrison. While many party insiders were dubious about the sincerity of McKinley's "performance," afterwards the Ohio governor gained a large measure of favorable publicity for his actions at the
convention. With Harrison's defeat by Cleveland, in the autumn McKinley emerged as one of the leading contenders for the Republican nomination in 1896.

The actions of the Minneapolis Convention convinced Hanna that his primary duty for the next four years would be to do the necessary political groundwork to win the Presidency for McKinley. For Hanna, "the demonstration at Minneapolis convinced me that, although it was an impolitic thing for his interests to nominate him there, in the next national convention the popular demand for his candidacy would over-ride all opposition." Over the next four years, Hanna's principal activity and driving purpose was to sharpen and focus "public opinion" favorable to McKinley. Hanna established a superb political organization to give endurance and momentum to this favorable public opinion.

In February-March 1893, the so-called "Walker Affair" severely jeopardized McKinley's public image and presidential political momentum. Unfortunately for McKinley, he had co-signed notes totalling more than $100,000 for business debts of his friend Thomas Walker. The 1893 business collapse caused Walker to default on payment of these notes and McKinley was charged with the responsibility of meeting these obligations. McKinley's desire to help a friend now placed him in a most difficult financial position. He and his wife's assets together
were worth no more than $30,000. McKinley announced his retirement from public office for the purpose of making more money in order to meet his new indebtedness.

To help McKinley out of his financial morass, Hanna, together with editor H.H. Kohlsaat of the Chicago Inter-Ocean, Canton Attorney William R. Day, and Cleveland Financier Myron T. Herrick, assumed the role of trustees of the McKinley's property. The goal of these four individuals was to convince large segments of the business community to secretly fund McKinley's debts. Their purpose was to save the governor from political retirement and personal insolvency before the 1893 state fall elections. H. Wayne Morgan, in studying the Walker Fund Scandal, concluded that McKinley approved of the trustees' action. The Governor assumed that Hanna and the other trustees would buy up the outstanding notes, but that he would pay them at a later date.

Hanna, in seeking funds from his fellow businessman, was keenly aware of the danger of appearing to sell political favors and made it bluntly clear to all, "we are doing this in a semi-confidential way and will not receive any money from persons except those who give from proper motives." Morgan correctly stressed that Hanna, despite his negative image as being a corrupt political plutocrat, was "not one to wipe out financial liens by granting political mortgages."
By the fall, the success of the trustees' work was assured. Hanna and the other trustees had paid over $130,000 worth of notes and had left the McKinley property intact. The resolution of the debt crisis was made known to the Governor only after his successful reelection in the fall, when the whole affair had been successfully terminated.¹⁰

As a result of the Walker affair, McKinley received from the general public, not scorn or ridicule, but overwhelming sympathy and public support. Ironically, the Walker Affair contributed to his historic re-election landslide in 1893 and stamped him as the leading contender for the 1896 Republican Presidential nomination. Throughout Ohio and the entire nation over five thousand citizens of all classes contributed to the fund. Many political professionals expected McKinley, the tariff expert, would be revealed to the public as a negligent person who did not know how to manage his own affairs. Instead, the opposite happened. To the vast majority of voters, Governor McKinley appeared as an "Everyman," one who had to struggle with the same financial problems which the 1893 Depression had thrust upon the common people.¹¹ McKinley's gubernatorial re-election victory by 80,000 votes over an obscure Democratic free trader, was the greatest victory ever accorded any Ohio Governor and more than triple his previous 1891 gubernatorial election
plurality. In most Republican precincts in 1891, McKinley had run even or slightly behind the Republican legislative ticket. In 1893, even though the Republicans won twenty-seven out of thirty-one seats in the Ohio Senate and had increased their majority in the Ohio House to eighty-six Republicans to twenty-one Democrats, McKinley still ran thirty thousand votes ahead of the victorious Republican legislative candidates.12

In 1894, McKinley's political momentum increased because of the Governor's handling of a widespread coal mining strike in Ohio's bituminous coal fields and his national campaign tour for Republican congressional candidates during the fall campaign. During the spring of 1894, labor troubles in the coal fields developed because of a decrease in the miner's wages. In late June, violence erupted when trains carrying "scab" labor were sabotaged in the Massillon coal field. In responding to the labor crisis, McKinley followed Governor Hayes's previous actions in 1876 and called out the state militia to restore order in the Massillon coal field. However, unlike 1876, when Hayes's sending of the state militia provoked violence and led to casualties, the militia in 1894 restored order with little violence. Eighteen years before, Governor Hayes had been castigated by many in the labor movement as anti-labor. Hayes's anti-labor image resulted in his losing much of the Ohio labor vote to
Tilden in the 1876 Presidential election. However, McKinley emerged from the 1894 coal crisis with a strong image as the friend of labor. McKinley's strong labor image was further enhanced by his active support of arbitration procedures and backing of legislation friendly to labor in the state legislature.\textsuperscript{13}

In the November 1894 elections, McKinley was able to claim his share of credit for the unprecedented Republican Congressional landslide because of the 371 speeches he delivered in sixteen different states. Massive Republican gains particularly occurred at the expense of the Democratic party's laissez faire-gold wing. Contemporaries estimated that during the campaign McKinley addressed at least one million people.\textsuperscript{14}

The McKinley Governorship from 1892 to 1896 had significant political importance and was crucial to his successful Presidential bid. As H. Wayne Morgan has emphasized, while the gubernatorial office invested McKinley with little actual power beyond party patronage matters, the governorship was not an empty office for McKinley and gave him a key advantage in garnering all of Ohio's convention votes. The governorship gave McKinley executive experience and taught him how to deal with legislators. It also gave him a national platform from which to advocate his support for a high tariff. Most important for 1896, it allowed him to travel across the country in an "endless chain of publicity" for himself.
Mark Hanna (after the 1894 Republican landslide victory in the Congressional elections) withdrew from active management of M.A. Hanna & Co. so he could devote all of his energies to developing a McKinley national campaign organization. He was determined that such organization would function as efficiently as any business organization he had managed during his forty year business career. However, despite his formal retirement, Hanna continued to retain a substantial interest in the partnership.

Successful in his business career, and just about to enter the national political world of Republican politics, Hanna's family and home were a necessary respite to him from the pressure of the outside world. It was at home, surrounded by his loving family, where the weary Hanna could receive rest and emotional sustenance before journeying back outside to the thrilling, but physically draining world of business and politics. In September 1889, Mr. and Mrs. Hanna celebrated their silver anniversary by holding a large reception in their "new and magnificent mansion" on Lake Avenue called "Glenmere." There is little evidence that the "snow-haired" Augusta Hanna played a major role in either her husband's business or political career. Mrs. Hanna's activities were conducted within the separate female sphere of domestic activity (rearing a family and hosting receptions and
parties) and religious charitable work through her local Presbyterian church. While much of Mark Hanna's time was spent in the male-dominated world of business and politics, separate from his wife, it appeared the Hanna marriage was both a stable and loving one. After becoming a U.S. Senator, and faced with the necessity of spending nearly half of his time in Washington, Hanna insisted that Augusta Hanna come and live with him in Washington. At that time, the vast majority of congressmen did not bring their wives to reside with them in Washington D.C.

In 1895, Hanna's three children, Dan, Mabel, and Ruth, were reaching adulthood. Apparently Hanna did not play a major role in rearing his children. His business, and, later, political work usually kept him absent from home, except on Sundays or special occasions. When he was home, Mrs. Hanna found him "gruff and authoritarian with the children. He found her "overindulgent." Dan was twenty-nine years of age and the eldest child. He had been married for seven years and was currently a business executive in M.A. Hanna & co. A recent biographer stated that contemporaries remembered Dan as a "fun-loving boy of no outstanding talents that have been remembered." Mabel, the oldest girl, was apparently mildly mentally retarded. With little contemporary mention of her, it is probable that though she later married one of Hanna's personal clerks, Mabel was sheltered for much of her life by her
family. A contemporary observed that Mable "lacked the intelligence ever to grow into responsible adulthood." Ruth, was the youngest and her father's favorite. She had her father's boisterous personality and his uncanny ability to communicate with different groups of people. Her 1903 wedding to the grandson of Colonel Robert McCormick, founder of the Chicago Tribune, was attended by President Roosevelt and other significant dignitaries. It was easily the major social event of the year in Cleveland. Years later, Ruth would distinguish herself in Congress as an elected representative from Illinois.

By 1895, of increasing concern to Hanna's family, friends, and associates, was his recurrent health problems. Earlier in his life Hanna had been severely stricken with typhoid fever. The illness left him in a weakened condition, and easily susceptible to various colds and fevers. During the summer of 1890, Hanna suffered a serious accident, probably from a fall while riding a horse. According to Mrs. Hanna, Hanna suffered from "congestive attacks" which resulted in his temporarily losing consciousness throughout much of his life. It is possible that these attacks were the result of Hanna's previous battle with typhoid fever, plus his many years of intense overwork. He had only insignificant periods of rest and relaxation. As he reached middle age,
Hanna increasingly suffered through degrees of lameness in his legs. Hanna's legs experienced "rheumatic" symptoms, and he suffered intense pain as a result of the buildup of "chalky deposits" in his knees. In this condition he found it very painful to remain on his feet for long periods of time. Hanna's final years as a stump politician probably contributed to his problems with lameness. As his physical condition deteriorated, Hanna had increased difficulty in absorbing the cold, bitter Cleveland winters. In 1890 Hanna rented a large house in Thomasville, Georgia, for five years for the purpose of escaping the Cleveland winters. In the 1896 presidential campaign, Hanna's Thomasville residence would play a significant role.16

By 1895, Mark Hanna had become an overworked, overweight, increasingly lame, heavy cigar smoker, whose health was increasingly suspect. Fortunately for both Hanna and McKinley, for the next several years, Hanna's health held up under the strain, work, and pressure of a presidential campaign.

When Hanna resigned from active management of M.A. Hanna & Co., there was no evidence to suggest that he envisioned a future political career for himself. However, Hanna gained within the national Republican Party (national leaders outside of Ohio politics were not
familiar with Hanna). As McKinley's campaign manager and closest friend, he became a national figure with tremendous political power.

For Hanna the most important factor (even more than personal fame and power) was the promotion of the Commonwealth political vision he shared with McKinley. He was determined that the G.O.P. should change to take advantage of the national crisis and rapid political change characterizing the mid-1890s political world. By the mid-1890s, the Commonwealth policy of active government promotion of the economy for the common good was being superseded nationally, and in many state and local governments, by the Cleveland-Tilden political philosophy of laissez faire equal rights. At the same time, the Commonwealth policy was being vigorously assaulted by the Progressive-Populist coalition of reformers and professionals who were the primary agents for the emerging regulatory Administrative State.

McKinley and Hanna's pluralist strategy, of attracting non-W.A.S.P. ethno-cultural groups to the Republican banner became a key element to gain additional adherents to the Commonwealth standard. For years, Republicans such as McKinley and Hanna had attempted to merge the Republican party with the new ethno cultural realities of the emerging northern urban-industrial state. Their pluralist strategy de-emphasized the G.O.P's
traditional Protestant social reform wing. The social reform wing of the G.O.P. emphasized issues such as temperance reform, denial of state aid to parochial schools, and the newer issue of immigration restriction. McKinley and Hanna offered a new political home to non-W.A.S.P.'s who were favorable to the Republicans' Commonwealth economic program but had no actual political base except for the laissez faire Democratic party. They sought to obscure the Republican's divisive Protestant social reform policies while they emphasized the unifying economic Commonwealth policies designed to appeal to most ethno-cultural groups.

For the first time in Presidential campaigns, an actual professional campaign organization, complete with a full-time campaign manager and subordinates, was formed two years before the election. In late 1894 and early 1895, Hanna's two key political lieutenants were Charles Dick, current chairman of the State Republican Executive Committee, and Joseph Smith, ex-editor and current state librarian. Unlike previous Republican pre-convention campaigns, Hanna's organization conducted a national campaign in every state. These efforts were opposed by individual state Republican bosses and their favorite son candidates. In 1895 and early 1896, no opposing Republican nominee was safe from having his political fiefdom invaded by a well-organized group of local McKinley supporters.
Hanna's goal was to seal McKinley's nomination before the Republican national convention. In the absence of a Republican incumbent seeking renomination (and even with an incumbent), there was usually a strong party fight at the convention. An easy first ballot nomination had never occurred at a Republican National Convention.\textsuperscript{17}

The first goal of the McKinley forces was to seek a political truce in Ohio with the powerful Foraker faction. McKinley needed the unanimous support of Ohio at the State Convention to emerge nationally as a serious Presidential candidate. The McKinley organization had to negotiate with a reinvigorated Foraker faction in order to win solid support. John Sherman's previous failure to present a totally unified Ohio delegation at three separate national conventions had eliminated his hope of his being the nominee of the Republican party for the Presidency. McKinley and Hanna had to practically relinquish control of the state party to Foraker, if they wanted to obtain a unified McKinley delegation at the 1896 Republican National Convention.

The 1891 factional split between the Sherman and Foraker factions had never healed. After early 1892, with Sherman safely in his Senate seat, McKinley and Hanna assumed the leadership of Sherman's previous faction. The existence of continued bitter factional rumblings was obvious during the 1892 Presidential campaign. Foraker
refused to campaign in Charles Grosvenor's congressional district. Immediately after the election, Foraker suggested to his key political lieutenant, Charles Kurtz, that the ex-Governor's faction should select a gubernatorial candidate to oppose McKinley. 18

Foraker, after suffering twin defeats, (in 1889 for a third term as Governor, and in 1891, in his bid to capture Sherman's Senate seat), remained on the political sidelines. Foraker, seething with rage, continually plotted against his numerous political enemies. During the early 1890s Foraker was described by a commentator as a man lost in the "political wilderness." However, by 1895, Foraker, through a series of circumstances that ranged from McKinley's need to seek a political truce and the opportunity to be the leading Ohio Republican to oppose Democratic U.S. Senator Calvin Brice's bid for reelection, emerged from the political "wilderness." By May 1895, Foraker had become the leading power in Ohio Republican politics. For the next several years, Foraker and his organization controlled the Ohio Republican Party organization.

The Republican State Convention, held in Zanesville on May 28 and 29, 1895, was a complete victory for Foraker's faction. After the Zanesville convention, the Foraker faction dominated the state party organization, from late 1895 to 1898. At Zanesville Joseph Foraker was
unanimously endorsed for United States Senator. For the first time, prior to an election, a senatorial candidate was officially endorsed at a state party convention. Traditionally, a Senatorial candidate was chosen after the election through balloting at the legislative party caucus. Not only did the McKinley forces acquiesce in the Senatorial endorsement, but they also allowed Foraker to replace Charles Dick as chairman of the Republican Executive Committee with the ex-Governor's key political lieutenant, Charles Kurtz. To complete the Foraker sweep, their faction's gubernatorial candidate, Asa Bushnell, a Springfield, Ohio manufacturer surprisingly received the party's gubernatorial nomination on the sixth ballot.

In 1895, the G.O.P.'s political ascendancy in Ohio continued with another sweeping Republican landslide in the state legislative elections. It guaranteed Foraker's election in the Senate. Additionally, Bushnell's record 92,000 vote margin shattered McKinley's previous historic voting margin in the last state elections. The state election outcome confirmed Foraker and Kurtz in their control of the state party organization. Immediately after Bushnell assumed office, Joseph Smith's position as State Librarian was terminated, and the entire board of managers of the State Penitentiary (all McKinley appointees) were replaced.
At the 1896 Ohio Republican Convention, the McKinley organization, in order to receive the vital endorsement for McKinley, acquiesced in the Foraker faction’s tight control of the state party organization and party patronage. In exchange, the Foraker faction agreed to hold the state convention several months earlier, in order for Ohio’s endorsement to have a strong pro-McKinley influence upon other state conventions throughout the nation. Both factions divided the four state delegates-at-large to the national convention between them: Foraker and Bushnell represented their faction, while Grosvenor and Hanna represented the faction supporting McKinley’s presidential interests. To Hanna, no political compromise was too distasteful, if it helped to promote McKinley’s candidacy. Approximately two years later, Hanna, at the behest of his despairing political minions, would challenge Foraker and Kurtz for control of the state party organization.

As recent historians, particularly Robert Marcus, have emphasized, many of Hanna’s pre-convention tactics were not original, but had been borrowed from previous Republican “president makers” of the 1880s, such as Stephen Elkins and James Clarkson. According to Marcus, there was nothing innovative in any of Hanna’s methods: assiduously courting Southern delegations; working through
existing state party organizations; and systematically raising funds for McKinley from all sections of the country.

During this campaign phase, Hanna's effectiveness as a campaign manager was illustrated by his perfection of previous campaign methods. Hanna refined the usual noted tactics to work more efficiently and over a greater geographical area than previously. In the fall of 1895, Hanna, in an effort to assume greater control of the campaign, moved the headquarters of the McKinley organization from Columbus, Ohio, to his own Cleveland business office in the Perry Payne Building. Telephone connections were set up between McKinley's Canton home and Hanna's Cleveland campaign headquarters. Throughout the rest of the campaign, Hanna and McKinley used the telephone and messengers more often than written messages when they were unable to consult in person. In previous business matters, Hanna always preferred to use the new telephone technology over written messages or detailed business letters.

During the winter and early spring of 1895, Hanna, to effectively pursue the vital Southern delegations, arranged for numerous Southern delegations to meet McKinley at his rented Thomasville, Georgia, home. Through a combination of Hanna's political acumen and McKinley's personal charm, the overwhelming number of
Southern delegates who personally met McKinley voted for him and influenced other Southern delegates to vote for McKinley at the national convention. Since a quarter of the delegates at the national convention were from the South, Hanna and McKinley had successfully outflanked their rivals. During the winter of 1895-96, when presidential contenders such as House Speaker Thomas Reed of New Hampshire and Senator William B. Allison of Iowa sent their political agents to capture Southern delegates, they soon realized it was too late.21

In his dealings with hostile state party organizations, Hanna never attempted to create a competing state organization to contest the power of "the regular organizations." Whenever possible, Hanna recognized the leadership of a strong state party organization in return for that party's unqualified support for McKinley, either at the national convention (as with Ohio) or during the general election (as with Tom Platt's New York).22

Hanna's success in obtaining funds for McKinley during the pre-convention phase brought forth charges of "boodle" from hostile Republican leaders such as Senator William Chandler of New Hampshire. Chandler, a past national chairman of the G.O.P., viewed Hanna as a political upstart. Chandler's corruption charges were without merit. Hanna simply perfected the earlier collection system, which required dividing key states into sections with a key fund-raiser for each section.
While elements of Hanna's "revolutionary" campaign management style can be ascribed to earlier Republican politicos, Hanna was the clear innovator in developing the techniques of the advertising industry in a national political campaign. As historian Michael McGerr noted, Hanna was a prime factor in the shift away from the current educational style, (wherein the main thrust was a discussion of party issues), to an advertising style, which emphasized the packaging and selling of a candidate's personality over party issues. In March 1896, an early emphasis of this advertising style was demonstrated. Fifteen thousand campaign buttons, featuring McKinley's photograph, were sent from the Cleveland, Ohio campaign headquarters to all key sections of the country. This shift in the campaign style was noticed by Theodore Roosevelt who exclaimed that Hanna, "has advertised McKinley as if he were a patent medicine."\(^{23}\)

By April 1896, Hanna's successful southern strategy, together with his original plan of having the McKinley forces acquire delegates in virtually every state, (even states of geographical areas where competing Presidential candidates resided) had brought McKinley within reach of the nomination. At this time, McKinley believed he only needed a victory in a major state, besides Ohio, to end any realistic plans by the Eastern party bosses to subvert his nomination. The state chosen
was Illinois. McKinley's political gamble for Illinois was contrary to Hanna's previous avoidance of a direct political battle with state party bosses' Thomas Platt and Matthew Quay in the two most politically important states of New York and Pennsylvania (in terms of delegates). Despite Hanna's worries that aggressive measures in Illinois were not the best campaign tactic, McKinley sent instructions to his chief Illinois political operator, young attorney Charles Dawes, to secure the Illinois delegation for him.

It is probable that McKinley's political experience in national politics convinced him that, despite the risks involved, it was worthwhile to contest Illinois. An Illinois victory would give him a virtually uncontested first ballot triumph at the national convention. Following the orders of his chief, Hanna sent enough financial and organizational aid to Dawes to ensure that the young man could accomplish his important political task.

In order to stop McKinley's momentum, the national opposition to him coalesced around Illinois' favorite son candidate Senator Shelby Cullom. Their aim was to deny McKinley the crucial uncontested first ballot nomination. Anti-McKinley operators in Illinois included state politician John R. Tanner and industrialist G.W. Gates. They received funding and advice from Iowa Senator William
Allison and famed party chieftain James Clarkson. The major goal of the national anti-McKinley operatives was for Cullom to win enough delegates to secure an uninstructed delegation from Illinois. An uninstructed delegation was the best outcome the anti-McKinley forces could expect. They recognized McKinley's popularity among Illinois Republicans and the favorable press coverage his candidacy received in the state, particularly from Kohlsaat's *Inter-Ocean*.²⁶

During late March and April, as McKinley slowly gained a decided edge over Cullom in the balloting of the numerous district conventions (even defeating Cullom in his own Decatur district), the national anti-McKinley forces then launched an attack upon him through the American Protective Association. Many party operatives were convinced that McKinley's politically weakest position among party faithful was his advocacy of a more pluralistic Republican party. McKinley and Hanna were never advocates of strict temperance reform or xenophobic anti-immigration measures.²⁷

With prodding from anti-McKinley forces, particularly agents from Thomas Reed, the A.P.A. executive committee, located in Boston, issued a call for both parties to reaffirm their support of the previous 1876 party platforms. Both 1876 platforms contained bigoted attacks upon immigrants, particularly Catholics with their
allegiance to a "foreign" church. Fellow Republican contenders, such as Reed and Allison, quickly reaffirmed their support for the previous party platforms. Hanna, probably under instructions from McKinley, refused to acknowledge the A.P.A.'s declaration. No reply was sent from the McKinley camp. Furthermore, Hanna did not send a political agent to an A.P.A. sponsored Washington conference. Officials from the other Republican campaigns dutifully attended.

As expected, members of the A.P.A.'s national advisory board accused McKinley, while as Governor, of appointing a Catholic to a state patronage position over a "qualified" A.P.A. nominee. Particular members, in order to weaken McKinley, attacked Hanna as being a "papist." The shrillness and the absurdity of the attacks against McKinley and members of his campaign organization brought a negative response, not only from Republicans, but from local A.P.A. branches throughout the country. 28

On April 31 the McKinley forces won a smashing victory over Cullom's forces at the state convention. After McKinley controlled the Illinois delegation, the A.P.A. presidential board retracted its previous attacks against McKinley. According to members of the presidential board, the A.P.A. would revert to its traditional "non-partisan" role and officially support no candidate. 29
The Illinois triumph for McKinley and Hanna, which Hanna's second-in-command, Charles Dick, stated was the "Gettysburg of the fight," was significant for both political and pluralistic reasons. The McKinley campaign organization, by competing and winning Illinois, a major "hostile" state for McKinley against significant local and national opposition, virtually guaranteed McKinley an easy first ballot nomination. Of even more importance to the G.O.P.'s future, McKinley and Hanna's challenge to the A.P.A., on the issue of xenophobia toward non-W.A.S.P.'s, set a key precedent. Later national Republican Presidential contenders, such as Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, would follow his pluralistic example in the future as they also attempted to broaden the G.O.P.'s traditional Protestant boundaries.  

In mid-June 1896, at the Republican National Convention in St. Louis, McKinley was in fact easily nominated on the first ballot. Despite the desertion of a number of western silver delegates over the money question, McKinley and his managers intended to make the tariff the main issue of their campaign. In early February, McKinley declared that in 1896 the Republicans would, "make the campaign upon their own ground and not be carried away by side issues."

While McKinley and Hanna realized that the money question would become a serious issue in the upcoming
campaign, particularly in the Northeast, they remained confident that the tariff was the key solution to correcting the economically depressed conditions of the country. The McKinley managers selected of a high tariff supporter Garret Hobart of New Jersey for Vice President over the New York banker Thurston Morton, favorite of the eastern gold financial interests, reemphasizing the ascendancy of the tariff over the money issue at the national party convention. The McKinley campaign primarily represented the Midwestern industrial interests, rather than the Eastern financial interests and in mid-June 1896 was set to engage the Democrats over the tariff issue.31

The charismatic William Jennings Bryan's emergence, with his silver message based upon a combination of unique personal appeal, agrarian class politics, and pietistic reform, completely shifted the Gilded Age political landscape. Throughout the rest of the general election, Hanna's direction of the national Republican campaign, in his role as the chairman of the Republican National Committee, reacted to Bryan's revolutionary techniques and message. Hanna's success in blunting Bryan's message brought national political fame and infamy to the Ohioan.

According to historian Robert Marcus, the "key revolution of 1896" was business's desertion of the Democracy as a result of Bryan's message. With Bryan's
"Cross of Gold" speech, the Eastern financial wing of the Republican party, with Hanna's acquiescence, shifted the Republican campaign message from the tariff to the money question.\textsuperscript{32} Previous sound money Eastern bankers, such as Wall Street banker August Belmont (who had previously supported the Cleveland-Tilden \textit{laissez faire} gold wing of the Democratic party), deserted en masse to the Republican candidate. It was an easy choice for Wall Street to support McKinley's tariff position over Bryan's class-warfare silver message.

At the beginning of the Presidential campaign, Hanna was generally unknown to many Wall Street bankers. Business friends, like the railroad magnate and sound money Democrat, James J. Hill, introduced and recommended him to major bank directors. The Republican National Committee's campaign coffers were relatively low in recent national campaigns due primarily to recent civil service reforms banning donations from political appointees. Now the RNC campaign fund was soon filled with contributions from the financial community. Hanna was able to use the perceived threat to capitalism from Bryan for the purpose of wedding the financial resources of big business almost entirely to the Republican party.\textsuperscript{33} Due to Hanna's strategic response to Bryan's message, the party chairman was able to bequeath to the G.O.P. a strong corporate financial base primarily from the emerging industrial center firms and the major Eastern financial institutions.
While Bryan's silver message blunted the Republican strategy of emphasizing the tariff during the campaign, the Nebraskan's stress upon class interests and his evangelical appeal to Protestant reform groups, allowed McKinley to portray himself as the candidate of the Commonwealth idea of equal rights and ethno-cultural pluralism. As a result of Bryan's campaign, McKinley and Hanna were able to implement their long term strategy of strengthening the Commonwealth message through attraction of new ethno-cultural groups to the G.O.P. The Commonwealth Idea appealed to immigrants, labor, established farmers, businessmen, and the growing urban middle class. While Bryan attracted pietistic Republicans to "his" Democratic party, McKinley made up for the loss with his positive message of economic nationalism for all groups. He also attracted large numbers of Catholics and German Lutherans to the G.O.P.\textsuperscript{34}

During the campaign, McKinley's speeches emphasized the home market aspect of the tariff in order to unite the common economic interests of industry and agriculture. McKinley's ingenuous weaving of the protective aspects of the Commonwealth Idea attracted both farmers and workers. McKinley charged that when industry suffered from a lack of protection, the industrial purchasing power of businessmen and workers for agricultural products was reduced.\textsuperscript{35}
During the "Battle of the Standards," it was the candidate's position on the desirability and morality of the new industrial-urban society that best defined their differences. Bryan's analysis of the problems of the advancing American urban-industrial society, seen through the disapproving cultural lens of the evangelical Protestant reformist countryside, was a powerful message that attracted many rural pietistic Republicans to his cause. While Bryan concentrated upon the problems of the urban-industrial society, McKinley focused upon the opportunity this historic societal transformation brought to all citizens.

Because of Bryan's unprecedented personal campaign, the Republican National Committee was forced to make an intelligent and quick response. Bryan visited twenty-seven states, traveled 18,009 miles, and gave six hundred speeches to approximately 3,000,000 voters. Borrowing an idea from the 1888 Harrison campaign, McKinley and Hanna designed their own "Front Porch Campaign." The goal was to bring delegations of voters, from throughout the country to Canton for the purpose of hearing McKinley "personally" address them on major campaign issues. In order to combat the dramatic impact of Bryan's "swing" around the country, the McKinley campaign organization countered it by continuously bringing thousands of voters to Canton every day. In
order to achieve such daily massive numbers of voters, the McKinley forces reached an agreement with the railroads. The railroads offered special low fares for delegations wishing to journey to Canton. Additionally, the railroads, through careful scheduling and a temporary expansion of Cantons railroad facilities, kept a continuous flow of delegations moving through Canton daily between June 19 and November 2. By the end of the campaign McKinley had spoken to 750,000 people from thirty states in over three hundred delegations. With the indispensable help of the railroads, McKinley's "Front Porch Campaign" competed as a major news story with Bryan's national whistle-stop campaign. By the end of the campaign, the picture of a well-rested, dignified McKinley was an excellent counterpoise to the picture of an exhausted, hoarse, and often erratic Bryan.

By mid-August, a long distance telephone connection between New York, Canton, and Chicago was installed. The telephone network served not only for private conversations, but primarily for the transmission of proposed news releases that required approval elsewhere than from the point where they had originated. Besides using the telephone, when Hanna was in Cleveland during the campaign, virtually every day he took the one hour train ride from Cleveland to Canton. At McKinley's Canton home, McKinley and Hanna would plan the following day's scheduled events and overall campaign strategy.
Hanna organizationally responded to Bryan's threat by establishment of an Eastern Campaign Headquarters in New York City and a Western Campaign Headquarters in Chicago. He simplified the systematic role of each national campaign headquarters. The New York headquarters was the campaign's fund raising center. Many of the funds from New York were transferred to Chicago for the purchase, production, and distribution of millions of campaign literature materials to targeted individuals and voting groups.

Hanna's establishment of a large literary bureau operated upon center firm techniques emphasizing economies of scale, mass production and mass distribution. Although not original, this approach was very effective. Hanna first observed the efficient operation of a literary bureau during Asa Bushnell's 1895 Ohio gubernatorial campaign. Ideas that Ohio party chairman Charles Kurtz had initiated in Ohio during 1895 Hanna used and perfected throughout the nation in 1896, particularly in the crucial Midwest area. In early 1892, former RNC chairman James S. Clarkson had planned for an extensive national distribution of party literature, under the executive management of the RNC, for the 1892 campaign. Clarkson's illness in 1892 prevented the RNC, from attempting such an organizational effort. What Clarkson had envisioned for 1892, Hanna would bring to fruition in 1896.36
The Republican literary campaign was strengthened by the lack of press support for Bryan among the usual major Democratic editors and publishers. Since the conclusion of the Civil War, the major Northeastern Democratic newspapers (excepting Horace Greeley in 1872) had always been the major propaganda organs for any Democratic Presidential campaign. In 1896, there was an overwhelming shift of newspaper support, (excepting the populistic Hearst Press), to the Republicans or to the independent "gold bug" Democratic candidate.

Former editor Perry Heath was officially the head of the Chicago Literary Bureau. However, the financial and organizational genius behind its functioning was the previous head of McKinley's forces in Illinois, Charles Dawes. As the official leader of its financial department (which was the key department in that it had oversight over the other twenty-two departments or bureaus at the Chicago headquarters), Dawes borrowed the railroads duplicate voucher system to ensure that the various departments operated upon the same efficiency principles as the center firms. During the entire campaign, Dawes distributed almost $2,600,000 of the approximately $3,500,000 the Republicans raised for the campaign. By comparison, Bryan, whose campaign funds were primarily raised through the Western silver mining interests, had only approximately $500,000 for his entire campaign.
Under Dawes's direction, the western headquarters distributed approximately 250,000,000 documents throughout the country. By mid-September, through the Speakers' Bureau, he supported two hundred and fifty speakers in twenty-seven states. For the first time, the National Committee even sent speakers to the Pacific coast. Each week Dawes's Bureau of Publication and Printing distributed boiler plate material to small newspapers. They reached approximately five million families. Dawes also had a key role in targeting specific voting groups, and then assigning the best economic spokesman or particular ethno-cultural agent to work with each group. 37

Except for McKinley and Hanna, Dawes played the most crucial role in electing McKinley President. It was an example of Hanna's political genius in recognizing the organizational and financial abilities of the young unknown Dawes and then having the confidence to place him in the most important and sensitive position in the entire campaign organization. 38

In the press, the public image of Hanna fluctuated between the extremes of being a brilliant political novice (who brought business efficiency to national political campaigns) to being a corrupt plutocrat. Next to Bryan, Hanna was the most controversial and caricatured individual in the entire campaign. Preceding the national
convention, Hanna had generally received a positive press image. The majority of the political press portrayed the former unknown businessman as a natural political genius, one who had bested the vastly more experienced party bosses at their own game. After the convention, the Democratic press, along with much of the independent press, criticized the large campaign war chest the RNC had acquired from Wall Street and big business.

In previous campaigns, the presidential nominee, not the campaign manager, had been the chief target for opposition criticism. However, in 1896 it was Hanna, not McKinley, who became the opposition’s chief target. For Democratic editorialists and caricaturists, the wealthy bloated Hanna was a better symbol than McKinley to place opposite William Jennings Bryan, the young idealistic champion of the laboring classes. Since Hanna was unknown nationally before 1896, it was easier for the Democratic press to tarnish Hanna with the harshest negative stereotypes. No competing positive image of Hanna then nationally existed.

During the 1896 campaign, the most unfair attack upon Hanna was the opposition’s depiction of him as a “labor crusher.” The image of Hanna as a crusher of labor was first circulated by Max Hayes, secretary of the Cleveland branch of the Central Labor Union, a socialist labor organization. The Central Labor Union had always
attacked Hanna's politics and his various Cleveland business interests. Alfred H. Lewis's additional negative writings about him in Hearst's New York Journal were circulated nationally through much of the Democratic press and were editorialized in much of the Independent press. Additionally, Homer Davenport's powerful but brutal caricatures of Hanna as a neanderthal-like monster, created a powerful negative image of Hanna.\textsuperscript{39} For the rest of his life, Hanna's primary ambition was to change this negative image of himself.

Hanna's stewardship of McKinley's campaign contributed to McKinley's significant electoral victory over Bryan. One week before election day, an anxious Hanna exclaimed to fellow national committee members:

Boys I am afraid we made a little mistake in our calculations. We are ready for the election and it is a week off. We have nothing to do now except to wait and hope that our work will stick and that nothing will happen to undo what has been done.

Hanna's fears were unjustified. Dawes's outstanding leadership at the Western headquarters in Chicago helped McKinley sweep the crucial area between the Ohio and Missouri rivers, and guaranteed his victory at the polls. McKinley's electoral margin over Bryan was the largest electoral mandate since Grant's landslide election over Greeley.
After the election, the press acknowledged RNC chairman Hanna's successful "revolutionary" generalship of the McKinley campaign. The editors of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, whose staff had unmercilessly attacked Hanna throughout the campaign (though not the pre-convention phase), now praised the efforts of their nationally famous fellow townsman.

Mr. Hanna says he 'will be pleased to receive the congratulations of the Plain Dealer. With our most graceful bow we tender them to him. Mr. Hanna has achieved a success as a political leader which puts into the shade all other leaders of his party. When Mr. Hanna entered the field of national politics the recognized Republican leaders looked at him with scornful amusement. They did not know him. Some of them had never heard of him except perhaps as a 'mere businessman.' Mr. Hanna taught them, one after another, how to carry business methods into politics and they have learned more about political management than they ever knew before.40

To Hanna, the most important letter of congratulation came from President-elect McKinley.

We are through with the election, and before turning to the future I want to express to you my great debt of gratitude for your generous life-long and devoted services to me. Was there ever such unselfish devotion before? Your unflagging and increased friendship through more than twenty years has been to me an encouragement and a source of strength which I am sure you have never realized, but which I have constantly felt and for which I thank you from the bottom of my heart.41
In early January 1897, President-elect McKinley, appointed Senator John Sherman to the post of Secretary of State. Sherman's acceptance created a vacancy in the U.S. Senate. Speculation focused upon which appointive office McKinley would offer the RNC chairman. He offered Hanna the plum patronage position of Postmaster General but Hanna politely declined any offer of a cabinet post. He desired to replace Sherman in the U.S. Senate. It is probable that McKinley's cabinet offer to Hanna, concurrent with the Senate vacancy, was a ploy by the politically savvy McKinley to protect his politically inexperienced friend from negative national publicity.

The Foraker faction, which since the 1895 Zanesville Convention had controlled the state party organization, was not favorable to the appointment of Hanna, their chief political antagonist, to a Senate seat alongside Foraker. Therefore, in February 1897, Governor Bushnell secretly offered the Senate position to Cleveland Congressman Theodore Burton. Burton refused. Only after public pronouncements of support for Hanna's selection from Sherman and McKinley, in addition to the nearly united outcry from the Ohio Republican press, and Foraker's refusal to oppose Hanna, did Bushnell cave into the political pressure. On 21 February 1897, Governor Bushnell appointed Hanna to the U.S. Senate to finish out the unfilled portion of Sherman's term.42
The key political objective for Hanna was to overcome the many political obstacles in his path and win election to his own Senate term. Sherman's term expired on 4 March 1899. Since the Ohio legislature would not convene in January 1899, Hanna would be forced to campaign for election in the same year as his appointment. With Charles Kurtz as Ohio party chairman, the state party organization was still controlled by the Foraker faction. In the upcoming 1897 Ohio elections, three-quarters of the state legislature (who selected the nominee for the Senate through a vote of the majority party's caucus) and Governor Bushnell would be up for election. With Hanna expected to be endorsed for the Senate at the upcoming state party convention to be held in Toledo (following the Zanesville Convention precedent when it endorsed Foraker), it was crucial for Hanna's political reputation that the Republican state legislative candidates not run substantially behind Bushnell's expected large plurality. If this occurred, Hanna could be accused of "dragging down the ticket" and costing Republican legislative candidates votes. If the Republican legislative majority was significantly reduced, Hanna's chances in the party caucus would be seriously weakened.

As the endorsed Republican Senatorial candidate, Hanna for the first time in his life would be expected to campaign throughout the state. Hanna's only previous
experiences upon the stump consisted of two short
impromptu speeches he delivered during the 1896 Presidential campaign (one before a Polish club and the other at
the Chicago auditorium). Saddled with a "high and weak"
voice, Hanna had to overcome a terror of public speaking.
President McKinley emphasized to Hanna that he, as the
party's endorsed Senatorial candidate, must deliver
speeches during the campaign. Hanna replied, "If I must
go on the stump, I'll never be elected. I can't stand up
before a crowd and talk."43 However, due to his new
political responsibilities at campaign rallies Hanna could
no longer simply introduce the main speaker and then slip
back to his chair on the platform. Due to his fame from
the 1896 campaign, Hanna became the main attraction for
the Ohio electorate during the 1897 state campaign.

At the 1897 Ohio Republican Convention, held in
Toledo in late June, Hanna reasserted his faction's power
in the state party at the expense of Foraker's faction.
Resolutions from eighty-four of Ohio's eighty-eight
counties endorsed Hanna for the Senate. The state
convention nearly unanimously endorsed him for the
Senate. Through Hanna's pre-convention planning and
organization, he had secured control of all committees and
chosen his key ally Charles Grosvenor to preside as
chairman of the convention. Hanna replaced his key
political enemy, Charles Kurtz, as chairman of the
Republican state committee with Columbus attorney George K. Nash. Except for the renomination of Bushnell, the Foraker forces (absent Foraker, who wisely remained in Washington) were virtually swept from power in the Ohio Republican party by Hanna and his supporters. One historian correctly remarked that if the 1895 state convention was Foraker's, then the 1897 convention was Hanna's.44

Though brusquely swept aside by Hanna, the Foraker factional leaders still had enough political expertise and power to strike back and possibly remove Hanna from his Senatorial seat. They had nearly toppled the five term incumbent John Sherman from his Senate seat in 1891-92. In 1897-1898 the Foraker factional leaders faced Mark Hanna, an appointed Senator with less than a year in the Senate.

During the 1897 fall campaign, Hanna had to dispel the "corrupt boss image." He made speeches daily from September 21 to November 1. After an initial unsuccessful attempt to compose a formal speech, Hanna decided upon a natural, informal, colloquial speaking style. Hanna's goal was not to transform himself into a polished orator, but to simply convince his curious audiences that he was not a corrupt money-monster. During his first speaking campaign, Hanna's utterances were only memorable when he energetically defended himself against the false charge
that he was a "labor crusher."45 A reporter for the
Cleveland Leader described the tiring effect which the
constant traveling and speechmaking had upon the
sixty-year-old Hanna's constitution.

... campaigning has proved a hard strain on
the Senator. It has meant constant travel,
over oftentimes poor roads, hotel fare, not
always the best in the world, one speech
every day and often two, and the attendant
strain of continually meeting new people,
listening always courteously to what they
had to say of the political situation,
genernally accompanied by glowing accounts of
what they individually have done for the
Republican party and concluded often with an
application for an office.... The Senator
is thoroughly tired out. The strain of the
past month and a half has been tremendous,
harder, in some respects, than the strain
which, as chairman of the national Repub-
lican committee, Mr. Hanna stood during the
summer and early fall of 1896.46

Unfortunately, Hanna was unable to change his
negative public image despite his six difficult and
draining weeks on the stump. The only gains he
accomplished in his campaigning was personally meeting
voters and various local party officials. When he was
paired with an accomplished campaign orator, such as
Joseph Frye of Maine, his simplistic, unprepared
utterances, plus his inability to develop a strong
speaking style, merited little attention from his
audiences or the press. Frye later remembered that the
response which Hanna received from his Republican
audiences was not enthusiastic. As a speaker he was an unprepared amateur.\(^47\)

The results of the 1897 fall elections justified the anti-Hanna forces proclaiming that Hanna's presence had negatively affected the total G.O.P. vote for the state legislature. Though Bushnell's own plurality had been severely reduced from 92,000 to 28,000 votes, the total plurality for the Republican legislative candidates was less than one-third of Bushnell's shrunken total. In 1895 the G.O.P. had an approximate eighty-seat majority in the Ohio legislature. After the 1897 election, the Republican majority in the new state legislature had been sliced to approximately fifteen seats.

Three electoral trends caused the severe decline in the total Ohio Republican vote in 1897. Since 1865, in every Ohio off-year election following a Republican presidential victory, there occurred a comparative decline in the total Republican vote. Also, the two historic landslide victories the Ohio G.O.P. had accomplished in consecutive state elections in 1893 and 1895 established a level of political dominance that was impossible to maintain. Additionally, in 1897, the key Republican stronghold of Cincinnati was splintered by a group of independent silver Republicans led by Edward O. Eshelby, editor of the *Commercial Tribune*. They joined a fusion ticket with the Democrats and defeated Boss Cox's
local party machine. Five "silver fusionist" Republicans were elected from Cincinnati. Optimistic pro-Hanna officials included those five amongst the eighty Republican votes in the legislature. However, no one knew how the five "silver fusionists" would vote upon the senatorial question in the party caucus. The anti-Hanna forces needed only to switch the votes of eight Republicans to defeat Hanna. The actions of the five Cincinnati fusionists would have a vital impact upon the final caucus vote.48

Immediately after the election results were announced, deposed state chairman Charles Kurtz in association with Cleveland Mayor Robert McKisson, developed a complicated strategy to defeat Hanna. The anti-Hanna faction would first gain eight anti-Hanna Republicans. The sixty-five Democratic members of the state legislature, plus the eight Republican members, would then be able to defeat Hanna.

During Hanna's entire political career his strongest political opposition came from his home town of Cleveland. In 1895, the young McKisson, an underdog mayoralty candidate, personally went to Hanna's business office to seek his support. Hanna in a brusque and blunt manner told McKisson he was too young and inexperienced to be the mayor of a major city. Without Hanna's help, McKisson was elected and then reelected in 1897. McKisson
developed the reputation as a local reformer. He built much of his reformist image by opposition to Hanna's streetcar railway interests in Cleveland. By 1897, McKisson, a charismatic speaker and personality, developed a personal faction within the local Cuyahoga Republican party. It opposed Hanna's powerful local clique. By late 1897, McKisson had become a local, though lesser version of Joseph Foraker, Hanna's most formidable political enemy.

Three legislative members associated with McKisson's faction, namely, state Senator Vernon Burke, and state Representatives Harry C. Mason and M.F. Bramley were elected in 1897 to the state legislature from Cuyahoga County. During the election, in association with the entire Cuyahoga Republican ticket, they pledged to vote for Hanna in the party caucus. However, when the final results of the state legislative election created an opportunity to unseat Hanna, the three Cleveland members under the able tutelage of Kurtz led the Republican opposition to Hanna in the state legislature.49

On 3 January 1898 the seriousness of the opposition to Hanna became evident. In an unprecedented arrangement, the anti-Hanna Republicans joined forces with the Democrats and successfully organized both the House and Senate. To the chagrin and fury of the Hanna forces, the two leading Cleveland opponents of Hanna: (Harry Mason and
Vernon Burke), were elected (primarily by Democratic votes) House Speaker and Senate President. Mason was elected by three votes in the house, and Burke by one vote in the state senate.

Just one week before the Ohio legislature was to formally vote upon the U.S. Senatorship, the Hanna forces, representing the regular Republican organization, found themselves at least three votes shy of the necessary seventy-three votes needed for Senate election. The opposition to Hanna had the seventy-three votes needed to elect their Senate candidate. The impossible seemed about to occur: Mark Hanna, the brilliant political manager of McKinley's presidential campaign of the previous year was about to be denied a full term in the U.S. Senate. This would be accomplished through a combination of Democrats and eight Republicans, with most of the Republican leaders coming from Hanna's own political backyard of Cleveland.50

On January 3rd, the same day the opposition organized both houses of the state legislature, Hanna arrived in Columbus to manage his Senatorial campaign. Soon the edge the Hanna forces had over the opposition in terms of strategy, organization, money, and organized Republican public opinion, began to be applied upon the wavering Republican legislators.
Charles Kurtz, the brilliant leader of the opposition forces, committed a strategic mistake. He learned that Hanna had come to the state capital to conduct his campaign. Afraid of the vast influence and loose money which the Hanna forces had available in Columbus, Kurtz ordered the newly elected anti-Hanna legislative leadership to order a recess. Kurtz's purpose was to allow wavering members to escape to their districts to avoid the vast Hanna influence in Columbus. However, when various members returned to the intended peace and quiet of their districts they came into personal contact with many outraged constituents. Most of these groups had been organized by the Hanna forces into mass meetings. Their purpose was to demand that their representatives honor their pledges and cast their votes for Hanna.

In these meetings and throughout the Republican press, it was emphasized that Hanna's defeat, engineered through the votes of "traitorous" Republicans, would damage the prestige and honor of the G.O.P. and be a personal embarrassment to President McKinley. The joint pressure of the organized mass meetings, together with the incessant rumblings of the party press, brought two wavering Republican representatives into Hanna's column. However, two days before the election the Hanna forces were still at least one vote short of victory.
In the joint house vote, conducted on January 12, the votes of four of the five silver Republican fusionists from Cincinnati made the difference for Hanna. Two of the silver fusionists, Representatives Droste and Lane, during the campaign pledged their votes for Col. Jephtha Garrard, the silver Republican leader in Cincinnati. They felt no pressure from the regular Republican organization since their constituency was mainly anti-Hanna. On the day of the vote it was learned that the anti-Hanna coalition's choice for Senator was Republican Robert McKisson instead of a committed silverite. This caused Garrard to release Droste and Lane from their personal pledges to him to support a silverite candidate in the party caucus. They cast their votes for Hanna thereby giving him the bare majority of seventy-three needed for election. The final joint house vote for Senator was a seventy-three to seventy vote margin for Hanna over McKisson.

If Kurtz and the other bipartisan leaders of the anti-Hanna coalition had settled upon a committed silverite to oppose Hanna, instead of McKisson, it is probable that Hanna would have lost. The anti-Hanna coalition's delay until the final hours to choose McKisson as their candidate probably cost them a victory that, a week before, they had skillfully brought within their grasp.52
Hanna's political reprieve was short lived. Before the final vote on the senatorial question, serious allegations involving bribery against one of his political agents was alleged by Representative Charles Otis, one of the Republican fusionists from Cincinnati. He charged that Hanna had used, or attempted to use, unsavory methods to gain his Senate election. This charge added to Hanna's image as a corrupt boss.

Shortly after the Senate vote, the state legislative leadership (under the control of the anti-Hanna coalition), launched an immediate public investigation of Otis's bribery charges against Hanna and his agents. Under the auspices of Senate President Vernon Burke, a five member Senate investigating committee, (packed four to one against Hanna), began an investigation into the matter. Under the rules of procedure designed by the legislative leadership to govern the hearings, no attorney was allowed to represent any of the accused before the investigating committee. Following the advice of his counsel Andrew Squire, Hanna declined to testify before the Senate Investigating Committee. The committee's rules of procedure guaranteed the fact that the vast majority of witnesses testifying would be hostile to Hanna. Not surprisingly, the final report of the Senate Investigating Committee, by a four to one vote, found sufficient evidence that Hanna was aware that his agent had attempted to bribe Otis.
The investigating committee sent its report to the U.S. Senate Committee of Privileges and Elections to decide if the charges of bribery against Hanna were justified. If the committee, under the chairmanship of William Chandler, a pro-silver New Hampshire Republican, voted in favor of the report, Hanna would then face a full Senate vote on whether to expel him from his Senate seat. Fortunately for Hanna, the biased procedures which the Ohio Senate Investigating Committee used to prove Hanna's guilt convinced a majority of the Committee on Privileges and Elections (all Republicans) to file a majority report against the acceptance of the Ohio Senate report, thereby avoiding a vote on the Senate floor on whether to expel Hanna from the U.S. Senate. However, the authors of the majority report did not dismiss all the testimony given to the investigating committee: "It raises suspicions," they stated, "that Mr. Hanna's representatives in Columbus knew what the alleged agent was doing." 53

It is unknown whether Hanna actually knew that a political agent of his had been sent during the legislative recess to Cincinnati for the purpose of offering Otis a bribe of $10,000 for his vote. However, many citizens throughout the nation (including many of his fellow Senators) who had first become acquainted with Hanna through the cruel caricatures and misleading statements created during the 1896 Presidential campaign
believed the bribery charges. The extreme political circumstances and chaos in Columbus during the final days before the Ohio Legislature was to cast its Senatorial vote contributed to the strong belief that Hanna's agents did attempt bribery. The Hanna organization was awash with money and this contributed to the plausibility of Otis's story.

In Hanna's defense, should he have attempted to bribe a legislator, Otis would have not been a promising target. Amongst his five fellow silver-fusionists only Otis was never considered as a possible vote for Hanna among the Hanna forces. Additionally, Henry Boyce, the key agent who attempted to bribe Otis, was an outsider from New York. He had no actual knowledge of the inner workings of Ohio politics. Boyce's alleged bribery took place within the auspices of a hotel which was known to any local politico as the headquarters for Cincinnati Democrats. It is improbable that Hanna had any knowledge of such an amateurish bribery attempt.

Whether or not Hanna was actually guilty of the bribery charge, his public image was further damaged. For the next several years Hanna followed the same obscure pattern he had chosen when he first entered the Senate in March 1897. Hanna was alienated and patronized by many of his fellow Senators. Many of his Senate colleagues believed him unqualified for the Senate. He had gained
entry into this august chamber only because of his close personal and political relationship with President McKinley.

For approximately his first three years in the Senate Hanna did not give a single formal speech upon any major topic. The only time Hanna distinguished himself upon the Senate floor was in June 1900 when he used his vast business experience in industrial matters to effectively defend the price that private companies had charged the government for armor plate. At that time armor plate was used in the construction of steel battleships.

Hanna's main activities during his early Senate career took place off the Senate floor and basically involved Republican patronage matters in Ohio and the South. Since 1896, the Southern shadow party organizations relied on RNC chairman Hanna to influence President McKinley on their behalf.

Through his position on the Senate Naval Committee, Hanna had various petty patronage battles with Naval Secretary John L. Long over the awarding of ship contracts, and whether or not enough Republican workers were being employed at the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard. The Brooklyn Naval Shipyard matter occurred at the beginning of the 1900 Presidential campaign and brought forth a strong McKinley letter to Hanna. In the letter the President reminded his friend that he was pursuing
questionable ethics in regard to his complaints about the shipyard's hiring policies. Hanna angrily believed that McKinley's lecture to him on campaign ethics had been written with the President's biographer in mind.54

Hanna, as chairman of the RNC, again conducted McKinley's 1900 Presidential reelection campaign. The same fund-raising techniques, together with basically the same campaign organizational structure based upon the workings of the literary bureau, resulted in an even more resounding electoral defeat of Bryan. With the country's economy successfully emerging from the depression, the Republican prosperity issue easily blunted Bryan's appeals to free silver, anti-imperialism, and trusts.55

Ironically, a great deal of Hanna's time as RNC chairman was spent attempting to hold the solid Ohio 20th Congressional district for the G.O.P. (the northern part of Cuyahoga County was included in the district). The factional split in the local Republican ranks found Hanna supporting the pro-Mckisson congressional nominee Jacob Beidler. Beidler's opponent was the incumbent Congressman Judge Phillips. He was as an independent Republican candidate and was supported by a large segment of Hanna's former political allies (including James R. Garfield who had cast the solitary pro-Hanna vote on the Ohio Senate Bribery Investigating Committee). Hanna saw this vote as an opportunity to finally quell the bitter
factional rivalry between his forces and McKisson's machine. Hanna probably hoped to avoid another bitter local party factional struggle when he sought Senate reelection in three years. As party chairman he was also concerned about the slim thirteen-seat Republican majority in the House. Hanna threw the full support of the RNC, the Republican Congressional Committee, and his own local party organization, behind Beidler's candidacy. Hanna and his faction's support proved crucial to Beidler's election. In a congressional district that usually gave the Republican candidate a solid five thousand vote plurality, Beidler won by less than seven hundred votes.

For Hanna, his strong support of Beidler reduced the factional tension in Cuyahoga County. By holding the Twentieth district, the Republicans gained two additional seats in the Ohio congressional delegation giving the G.O.P. a seventeen-to-four edge in congressional seats over the Democrats. With his support of Beidler in 1903, Hanna did not have to fear a party revolt on his usually vulnerable Cleveland flank. However, by abandoning many of his more progressive supporters such as James R. Garfield, Hanna severed communication lines with many future leaders of the emerging Progressive wing of the Cuyahoga Republican party. 56

The 1900 Presidential election marked the first instance of Hanna's emerging from McKinley's shadow and
development of his own separate political identity. Hanna's long process of rejuvenation finally resulted in his recognition as the leading national spokesman on government-business relations and the labor question.

Hanna, in response to a personal attack upon his integrity by South Dakota Senator Richard Pettigrew, who was an 1896 silver "bolter" from the Republican ranks, ignored the advice of McKinley and others and began a "Northwest Tour" of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the populist strongholds of South Dakota and Nebraska. On 5 June 1900 Pettigrew personally attacked Hanna on the Senate floor. The South Dakota Senator accused Hanna of protecting the trusts for the purpose of gaining immense political contributions from them to the G.O.P. national campaign fund. Pettigrew then dredged up the report from the Ohio Senate which had accused Hanna of bribery. Hanna angrily responded to Pettigrew's attacks, and soon thereafter, Hanna with his close friend and former campaign traveling companion Senator Frye, organized the Northwest tour.

McKinley strongly advised Hanna against the Northwest tour. The President emphasized to Hanna that nowhere in the country had Hanna been more abused than by the "Populist" orators of the Northwest. Based upon Hanna's previous Ohio political campaigning, McKinley no doubt feared that Hanna's public appearances, would confirm, rather than change, the diabolical image Hanna's
political enemies had created. In reflecting upon Hanna's crucial decision on whether to follow McKinley's usually sage political advice, Hanna biographer Herbert Croly stated why Hanna decided to reject it.

... Mr. Hanna could not submit to such a limitation of the range of his political action without implicitly circumscribing his own subsequent political career. The question fundamentally was whether his appearance so conspicuously on the stump would weaken the ticket or contribute to its election. He believed that he could both set himself right with the people of the Northwest and make votes. It hurt and angered him that so many leading Republicans, including his old friend the President, held to the opposite opinion. He determined to vindicate by the results his own judgment, and thereby to increase his own personal political prestige.57

In mid-October Hanna and Frye embarked upon their Northwest tour. They confounded all contemporary expectations. Hanna made a strong positive impact upon the large congregations of listeners who gathered in small isolated rural hamlets to hear him speak upon Republican principles from the train's platform. He also had a positive impact upon the state elections in populist South Dakota.

Hanna's informal colloquial speeches were well suited to the thousands of isolated agrarians who came to see for themselves the "monster" Mark Hanna. Hanna's lack of polish upon the stump, together with his non-
threatening personal appearance (many agrarians only had knowledge of Hanna's physical appearance from the gross caricatures of him contained in the Populist-Democratic press), and his quick sense of humor, in evidence when Hanna parleyed questions shouted to him from members in the audience, impressed these rural citizens who had previously considered him a corrupt businessman-politician from the East. Herbert Croly detailed the overwhelming South Dakota crowds that came to see the "famous" Mark Hanna.

Two years before President McKinley had visited South Dakota, in order to welcome some soldiers returning from the Philippines. He had drawn the biggest crowds in the history of the state. Mr. Hanna's crowds were anywhere from about one and one-half times to twice as large as Mr. McKinley's. They were larger also than those which had greeted Mr. Roosevelt in the same district a few weeks earlier. At seven o'clock in the morning the train would stop at a station where one could see no more than half a dozen houses, yet there would be a congregation of three hundred people to hear Mr. Hanna speak. Farmers in the neighborhood had started at midnight and had driven many miles, in order to be at the station when the train arrived. At Sioux Falls, as well as at the larger places, a crowd three times as large as the population of the town gathered at the meeting.58

By contemporary accounts, during his Northwest tour, Hanna made eighty-two speeches at seventy-three locations and had personally spoken to approximately 129,000 people, including fifty thousand in South Dakota and forty-five thousand in Nebraska.
On the night of McKinley's landslide victory, apart from McKinley's reelection, probably the most pleasing personal news that Hanna heard that evening was that the South Dakota state legislature had swung back in the Republican column. Pettigrew's national political career was finished. The widespread theory that Mark Hanna was a huge electoral hindrance upon the future prospects of the G.O.P. was about to change.59

The successful outcome of the Northwest tour marked the key point in Hanna's personal odyssey from being identified as a successful national campaign manager who masqueraded as a Senator, to becoming a leading figure in the U.S. Senate. Afterwards Hanna became a leading national spokesman in the political arena on the role that government should play in facing the challenges and opportunities posed by the Second Industrial Revolution.

In his advocacy for the necessity of granting ship subsidies to the merchant marine (in order to improve America's trading position in the world), and advocating the creation of extra-party bureaucracies, such as the National Civic Federation to fairly arbitrate labor disputes, Hanna was able to establish his own independent political persona. A contemporary of Hanna's, the journalist Charles Thompson, later remarked upon the change in Hanna's political persona that emerged after Pettigrew's defeat.
With that slaughter of Pettigrew, Hanna had found himself. His inferiority complex in the presence of the Senate had fled. He stepped at once, easily, into a position of leadership. Having found that he could talk, he went on talking; and as he did so his style immediately improved.... He also became, at a bound, a leader in affairs of state. Hitherto he had been a businessman grown into a party boss; now he ceased to be either and became instantly a statesman. He had only three years and a half to live, and in that time he made the enduring part of his fame. If he had died in 1900 he would have been remembered, if at all, only as a good political manager who ... successfully managed one campaign.60

McKinley's assassination in Buffalo on 6 September 1901 ended one of the most successful political partnerships in American political history. On the day McKinley was shot in Buffalo, Hanna was in Cleveland attending an encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic. When news of the President's shooting reached him, Hanna hurried to Buffalo to be at McKinley's bedside. When McKinley died, six days after being shot, a grief-stricken Hanna was one of the last individuals to say good-bye to his dear friend. According to Mrs. Hanna, for a period of several months after McKinley's death, his name was never mentioned in the Hanna home. "He never grieved outwardly, yet I have seen his eyes fill with tears when making a speech he referred to McKinley."

For the final two-and-a-half years of his life, Hanna personally worked diligently to insure that not only
were McKinley's tariff and commonwealth distributional policies adhered to within the G.O.P., but that McKinley's personal memory was kept alive through Hanna's speeches on special public occasions. On 15 May 1902 Hanna was the main speaker at the laying of the cornerstone of the McKinley Memorial at American University in Washington D.C. A reporter described Hanna's attempt to control his emotions while delivering the speech memorializing the late President.

During his brief address there was an occasional hiatus, caused by his inability to control himself. At certain references to McKinley the Senator's voice trembled and failed for the moment, and his eyes filled with tears. He was so moved at one time that he leaned against one of the rough uprights of the temporary platform for support. The Senator's emotion touched a responsive chord in the hearts of his audience.

On the second anniversary of McKinley's death, Hanna was the main speaker at a formal ceremony in Toledo, Ohio, where a monument of McKinley was unveiled. Hanna movingly described several personal qualities of the late President.

Friends of Toledo and Lucas County, my heart goes out to you for your generous tribute to our friend. Well as I knew him, you knew him just as well.... That great heart knew no sentiment during its whole public life that did
not find its response in the hearts of the people. He was, Father O'Brien said, 'a dutiful son to an aged mother, who glorified in her son's ambitions; he was a lovable husband to an invalid wife, comforting her in her days of trial, granting her remotest wish with the lovable spirit that was his.'

By September 1901, Hanna, through his successful Northwest tour, his advocacy of ship subsidies, and the beginning of his labor conciliation work with the National Civic Federation, had already established his own independent political persona. If McKinley had been assassinated in 1898 or 1899, it is entirely possible that Hanna would have remained an obscure Senator, with little future in the national political world. Hanna probably would have only been remembered for his successful political generalship of the Republican party during the "Battle of the Standards," when he strengthened the party structure and broadened the constituency of the Republican party. Hanna's achievements as Republican National Chairman had helped to make the G.O.P. the dominant party for the next thirty-five years, and briefly enabled the G.O.P. to again become a strong instrument for the dissemination of the Commonwealth Idea. Herbert Croly emphasized this basic Hanna portrait as his being the "culmination of nineteenth-century life." By 1901, though, Hanna was ready to confront the new political and
economic challenges of the new century. According to Hanna, this upcoming work would become the most important achievement of his public life.
FOOTNOTES


2 Stark County *Democrat*, June 29, 1876, p. 5; H. Wayne Morgan, *William McKinley and His America* (Syracuse, 1963), 50-1, 52-3; Francis Weisenburger, "The Time of Mark Hanna's First Acquaintance with McKinley," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 21 (1934), 78-80; Canton *Repository*, August 4, 1876, p. 4; ibid., August 18, 1876, p. 4.


4 Joseph Foraker to Russell Alger, May 2, 1892, Box 27, Joseph Foraker Papers (Cincinnati Historical Society); Foraker to Charles Kurtz, May 14, 1892, Box 49, Charles Kurtz Papers (Ohio Historical Society); Morgan, *William McKinley and His America*, 116; Charles Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (Library of Congress).


6 Ibid.

7 Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, June 9, 1892, p. 1; ibid., June 10, 1892, p. 1; Cleveland *Leader*, June 9, 1892, p. 1; ibid., June 16, 1892, p. 4.

8 Morgan, *William McKinley and His America*, 167.


Papers (L.C.); "... neither the property of Governor McKinley nor that of his estimable wife will be used in relieving him from the financial embarrassment.... A number of wealthy men, including several here, have agreed upon a plan to furnish all the money necessary to pay the entire indebtedness of the governor and it is expected that within a week every claim against him will have been paid in full. When this is done the property placed in trust for creditors will all be transferred to the Governor and Mrs. McKinley free from any lien, debt or incumbrance. One of the gentlemen engaged in carrying out the plan said: 'security will not be asked, and none taken from Governor McKinley by those who advance the money.'" Cleveland Leader, March 9, 1893, p. 4.

11 Morgan, "Governor McKinley's Misfortune," 108, 120; Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 176.


13 Thomas Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna" (Ph.D. Diss., Michigan State University, 1961), 278; Cleveland Leader, April 22, 1894, p. 4; ibid., June 14, 1894, p. 2; ibid., June 18, 1894, p. 1.

14 Cleveland Leader, June 19, 1896, p. 10.

15 Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 152, 183.

16 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 173; Cleveland Leader, Sept. 29, 1889, p. 7; Felt "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 63-65, 282; Elmer Dover Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (Library of Congress); Mrs. Hanna Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Leonard Hanna Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

17 Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 279, 294; During this time period, before the official campaign headquarters were opened, Hanna bore a great part of the preliminary expense. It was later reimbursed to him by the 1896 campaign fund. Elmer Dover Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

18 Charles Grosvenor to Sherman, Oct. 3, 1892, Volume 588, John Sherman Papers (L.C.); "The results of Tuesday's election are such that I incline to the opinion that we should select a candidate for Governor, and at one put him to the front in opposition to McKinley, and all
others who may seek the favor of the convention ... I think of King, Morey and Enochs in this connection, but for reasons I will explain when I see you, I incline to Enochs." Foraker to Kurtz, Nov. 11, 1892, Box 50, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.); "You will say, that the party cannot afford to lose the next election-state officers, legislature, etc., but if McKinley insists upon a 'vindication,' I can't well see how you or your friends can afford to lead an opposition movement against his renomination. The advantage of position and the courtesy of a second term favor McKinley, and you would be charged as being a disturber, always making trouble, and so could you afford that?" Kurtz to Foraker, Nov. 17, 892, Box 50, Kurtz Papers (O.H.S.).

19 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 30, 1895, p. 6; Philip Warken, "The First Election of Marcus A. Hanna to the United States Senate" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ohio State, 1960), 8; Everett Walters, Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican (Columbus, 1948), 107, 109; Cleveland Leader, Nov. 10, 1895, p. 20; Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 302; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 182.


21 Charles Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 175-76, 177-80; Cleveland Leader, Dec 8, 1895, p. 1; Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 282, 284; "The Gov. is here having a pleasant time and a much needed rest. The newspapers are trying to make it out that there is any amount of political significance in his visit to the South. It certainly is successful in developing the fact that he is a very popular 'American Citizen' and welcomed by every one regardless of political affiliations." Hanna to Dan Ryan, March 17, 1895, Box 1, Dan Ryan Papers (O.H.S.).


23 Cleveland Leader, March 19, 1896, p. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 22, 1896, p. 8; Michael McGerr, The Decline of Popular Politics, The American North, 1865-1928 (New York, 1986), 159-60; Cleveland Leader, March 1, 1896, p. 8; "McKinley never declined an invitation to speak that it was possible to accept.
More drops of ink to make millions think ... advertise, advertise, do anything to get advertisement, has been the motto of the McKinley propagandists." Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 11, 1896, p. 2; "When McKinley's campaign for the nomination opened in earnest, with Mr. Hanna in charge, some seventeen hundred copies of the Leader were sent out each day under Mr. Hanna's orders to all parts of the country.... Mr. Hanna had obtained the names of leading citizens in several hundred congressional districts throughout the west and that he had ordered the Leader sent to each of these men for a period of three months." James Morrow Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Marcus, Grand Old Party, 228-29.

24 Cleveland Leader, March 6, 1896, p. 7; In Nebraska there was a similar fight to that in Illinois, and Dawes, during the early stages was in charge. Then another young man, Frederick Collins, took over from Dawes and succeeded in winning instructions for McKinley against the desires of such powers as the railroad's attorney and senatorial candidate John M. Thurston. Thomas Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 293.


26 John R. Tanner to James S. Clarkson, Feb. 16, 1896, Box 2, James S. Clarkson Papers (L.C.); "The McKinley sentiment is growing rapidly in our state. The Times-Herald is pounding away for McKinley all the time, while the Tribune is printing Presidential preferences from the Editors' all over the country, which shows McKinley largely in the lead...." Tanner to Clarkson, Feb. 17, 1896, Box 2, Clarkson Papers (L.C.); G.W. Gates to William B. Allison, Feb. 17, 1896, v. 304, William B. Allison Papers (State Historical Society of Iowa); "I feel that we will succeed in most of the districts in getting uninstructed delegates and in having our men on their delegations." M.B. Madden to Clarkson, March 3, 1896, Box 2, Clarkson Papers (L.C.).

27 Cleveland Leader, April 2, 1896, p. 7; Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 570.

28 Cleveland Leader, March 22, 1896, p. 2; ibid., April 8, 1896, p. 6; ibid., April 9, 1896, p. 6; ibid., April 14, 1896, p. 6; ibid., April 16, 1896, p. 6; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 16, 1896, p. 3; Cleveland Leader, April 29, 1896, p. 9; According to Gates, "The A.P.A. is certainly hurting McKinley very much, and I think I can truthfully state that I believe
William McKinley will not be the nominee at St. Louis." G.W. Gates to Allison, April 18, 1896, v. 304, Allison Papers (State Historical Society of Iowa); Hanna intended to use the A.P.A.'s attacks upon McKinley to help stir up the large Catholic constituencies in Chicago. Hanna stated to Dawes that "We are given the tip that there are a large number of the Cook Co. delegates to the state convention who are Catholics. If that is so this will fix them as I understand they are going to help McKinley...." Hanna to Charles Dawes, April 18, 1896, Box 277, Charles Dawes Papers (Northwestern University); "My direct information from friendly A.P.A. Sources that the A.P.A. conspirators" (Illinois Congressman) "-Aldrich included- are using poor old Cullom only as a stalking horse for Reed." Jas. Boyle (McKinley's private secretary) to Dawes, April 21, 1896, Box 13, Dawes Papers (Northwestern University); Cleveland Leader, April 29, 1896, p. 1; ibid., May 14, 1896, p. 1.

29 Cleveland Leader, April 28, 1896, p. 1; ibid., May 1, 1896, p. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 17, 1896, p. 2; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 183.

30 Charles Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 182-83.


34 R. Hal Williams, Years of Decision: American Politics in the 1890s, (New York, 1978), 119, 121; See Richard L. McCormick, "Ethno-Cultural Interpretations of Nineteenth-Century American Voting Behavior," Political Science Quarterly, 89 (1974), 351-77; Republicans attempted to publicize Bryan's purported links to the A.P.A. among immigrants. For Michener, "... relations sustained by Mr. Bryan to the A.P.A. and making valuable
suggestions as to the means to be employed in winning to the support of the Republican ticket many thousands of Roman Catholics...." Container 1, Michener Papers (L.C.); Marcus, _Grand Old Party_, 249.

35 Williams, _Years of Decision_, 101, 122; Gerald C. Fite, "Republican Strategy and the Farm Vote in the Presidential Campaign of 1896," _American Historical Review_, 65 (1959–60), 802.

36 Williams, _Years of Decision_, 119; Clarkson's aborted blueprint for the 1892 campaign provided a prescient view of the tactics of the 1896 Republican campaign. (Hanna's familiarity with Clarkson's plan are unknown). "... I have been satisfied for years that our Republican policy of making a campaign only in the few weeks before election, which is always in the busy time of year when people read but little, and after every voter has practically made up his mind as to the party he will support, was unwise and wrong. All voters and converts must now be gained in their homes before they go to the polls, and most of them can be gained in the leisure of winter when everybody is reading papers and ready to read any article of interest to them.... As you know, the organization effected at Washington, with Captain McKee in charge, for the preparation and printing and circulating of literature excelled anything ever organized before in this country. For, in addition to the local agencies of clubs and committees, debating societies, newspapers & etc., which I have mentioned, I had with two years of hard work secured a list of the names of more states, and lists which gave the age, occupation, nativity, residence and all the other facts in each voter's life, and had them arranged alphabetically, so that literature could be sent constantly to every voter directly, dealing with every public question and issue from the standpoint of his personal interest." Clarkson to Given, Aug. 18, 1894, Box 2, Clarkson Papers (L.C.); Cleveland _Leader_, Nov. 10, 1895, p. 20; Morgan, _William McKinley and His America_, 232–33; Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 333; A Cleveland _Leader_ reporter described Hanna's usual daily routine during the 1896 campaign. "Every day or so Hanna would get on the train, taking a lot of papers with him, and go down to Canton.... During the journey he would have two seats to himself and would sort over these papers, so that he had them just in the shape in which McKinley would understand them most quickly. He would proceed at once to business, and together the two in a couple of hours would go over the whole field, and by evening Hanna would be back in Cleveland with a new set of directions for his subordinates."
37 Cleveland Leader, July 16, 1896, p. 3; Paul Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Philadelphia, 1964), 170, 172; McGeer, the Decline of Popular Politics, 140-41; Cleveland Leader, May 28, 1896, p. 1; at Chicago headquarters, among the approximately 22 departments was a women's bureau. Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Leader, Oct. 4, 1896, p. 7; Williams, Years of Decision, 121; In an early report to Hanna, Dawes explained his business system. "Will use the railroad system of duplicate vouchers. I am very anxious that we get started in such a way as to show those who are associated with us and dealing with us, that we are running this thing on a strict business basis." Felt, "The Rise of Mark Hanna," 331: Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 228-29; Cornelius Bliss Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

38 Even as astute a politician as Clarkson underestimated Dawes. "But I judge from some recent indications that Hanna is having the sense not to ride over the state organization, although he has put young Dawes, an untrained and unknown man, on the executive committee in place of Jamieson, the Illinois member, who is a trained and experienced politician and really the head of the Republican organization in the state." Clarkson to Fessenden, July 21, 1896, Box 2, Clarkson Papers (L.C.). In mid-August Hanna made his only trip to Chicago, to inspect the western headquarters. Hanna remained approximately a week. Cleveland Leader, Aug. 11, 1896, p. 1; ibid., Aug. 17, 1896, p. 10.

39 Cleveland Leader, June 19, 1896, p. 1; ibid., July 31, 1896, p. 7; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 25, 1896, p. 8; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 224-25; Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 229-30; Cleveland Leader, Nov. 8, 1896, p. 6.

40 Fite, "Republican Strategy and the Farm Vote," 805; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 4, 1896, p. 1.

41 Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 246.

42 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 1, 1896, p. 1; Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 253, 255; Sherman urged Gov. Bushnell to appoint Hanna to the Senate. "I respectfully ask, after I vacate my seat, that you appoint Mark A. Hanna... As I surrender it I naturally feel that I should be consulted in filling the vacancy until the Legislature meets... I am at liberty
to say that the President elect will be much gratified for
the complement to Hanna to whom he largely attributes his
great success in the Presidential election. I hope you
will give to this request your serious and favorable
consideration. We ought to avoid even the appearance of
factional discord and in a friendly way cooperate with
each other for the good of the common cause." Sherman to
Bushnell, Jan. 16, 1897, v. 596a, Sherman Papers (L.C.);
Foraker, no doubt to his amusement, refused Hanna's
request to pressure his ally, Bushnell, to appoint Hanna
to the Senate. "... making the appointment without
consultation, or understanding, with anybody, have
precipitated a situation that prevents Governor Bushnell,
as nearly as I can make out his opinion of it, from
considering you, except upon the theory that he does not
'dare,' to use the flashing headlines of the Canton
Correspondent, to do anything else. His self-respect
rebels against such an idea, and all his friends are made
to feel like resenting it. In consequence we have condi-
tions that were unforeseen, and with respect to which I
cannot make any promises, or take any responsibility."
Foraker to Hanna, Jan. 29, 1897, Box 27, Foraker Papers
(C.H.S.); Finally Bushnell appointed Hanna. "When Senator
Sherman announced his intention to President McKinley, I
deemed it best to make no announcement as to my action in
the matter of appointing his successor until the vacancy
actually existed. However, the interest of the people and
their anxiety to know what will be done has become so
evident that it now seems proper to make the definite
statement of my intentions. I, therefore, wish to
communicate to you my conclusion to appoint you as the
successor of Senator Sherman when his resignation shall
have been received." Bushnell to Hanna, Feb. 21, 1897,
Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

43 Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers
(L.C.); Mrs. Hanna Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick
Papers (L.C.).

44 Cleveland Leader, June 22, 1897, p. 1;
Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.);
Cleveland Leader, June 23, 1897, p. 1; ibid., June 24,
1897, p. 1; Walters, Joseph Benson Foraker, 138.

45 Cleveland Leader, Sept. 16, 1897, p. 1;
ibid., Oct. 3, 1897, p. 1; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna,
245, 247-8.

46 Cleveland Leader, Oct. 17, 1897, p. 14;
ibid., Nov. 1, 1897, p. 1.
Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 247-48.

Cleveland Leader, Nov. 4, 1897, p. 1; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 250-51; "The feeling everywhere got abroad and could not be overcome, that Mr. Hanna belonged to the boss species. That was enough. The people are against bosses, both big and little, State and National. They will not tolerate them.... It was this feeling that kept thousands of Republicans in Ohio away from the polls, and it was this feeling that was responsible for the fact, that while the Governor had a plurality of more than twenty-eight thousand, our legislative ticket barely got through, -the aggregate vote for it being a minority.... It was sixteen thousand more than Bushnell's vote two years ago." Foraker to Whitelaw Reid, Nov. 26, 1897, Box 27, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.); William Cappeller to Foraker, Nov. 10, 1897, Box 27, Foraker Papers (C.H.S.).

At the time of the senatorship fight, Kurtz, through the patronage of Gov. Bushnell, was oil inspector for Ohio. Cleveland Leader, Dec. 30, 1897, p. 4; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 3, 1898, p. 4; James B. Morrow Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Leader, June 20, 1897, p. 2; ibid., Nov. 17, 1897,p. 2; "It was Hanna, as symbol and candidate, around whom the contest whirled. As symbol, his election would be a ringing endorsement of the administration, his defeat a repudiation that would lessen its prestige and endanger its policies. So at least the Republicans tried to convince the faithful." Warken, "The First Election of Marcus A. Hanna," 23; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 12, 1898, p. 1.

Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 2, 1898, p. 1; ibid., Jan. 4, 1898, p. 2; Warken, "The First Election of Marcus A. Hanna," 89.

Cleveland Leader, Jan. 2, 1898, p. 15; ibid., Jan. 10, 1898, p. 3; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 256-58; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 5 1898, p. 4; ibid., Jan. 10, 1898, p. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 5, 1898, p. 4; Warken, "The First Election of Marcus A. Hanna," 89; As during the 1891 senatorial battle, both campaign headquarters were maintained at different hotels. The Hanna organization resided at the Neil House, while the Kurtz group stayed at the Southern Hotel, Cleveland Leader, Jan. 12, 1898, p. 1. A reporter for the Leader commented upon Hanna's method of organizing a campaign. "I spent some time at his headquarters in Cleveland and looked over the books
showing how he ran this last senatorial campaign. The whole state was divided up into sections. Every man of importance was known. Every vote was counted. Every newspaper editor had been lined up, and the wires reaching from the Perry-Payne building extended to every hamlet of Ohio. Scores of clerks were kept constantly busy. Two hundred and fourteen daily papers and all of the weeklies published in Ohio came to the headquarters. A corps of readers clipped these, summarized their matter, and presented it to Hanna's lieutenant. A close touch was kept with every county, and the correspondence was such that it amounted to hundreds of letters a day." Cleveland Leader, Jan. 2, 1898, p. 15.

52 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 252-53, 255-56; Box 110, Garfield Papers (L.C.); Estes Rathbone Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 12, 1898, pp. 1-2; The method through which Hanna received the news of his election was interesting. "A white handkerchief, waved violently by a man on the steps of the State House, gave notice to Mr. Hanna, who was watching at a window, that he had been elected. His face turned white, and paraphrasing the historic words of Garfield, he exclaimed: "God reigns, and the Republican party of Ohio still lives." Cleveland Leader, Jan. 12, 1898, p. 4.

53 Cleveland Leader, Jan. 11, 1898, p. 1; "Legal Statement of Henry Boyce," Box 2, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 12, 1898, p. 1; Dick Interviews, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Leader, Jan. 18, 1898, p. 1; ibid., Jan. 19, 1898, p. 1; Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 260, 262; James R. Garfield Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Box 130, James R. Garfield Papers (L.C.); William Chandler to George Hoar, July 6, 1898, v. 122, William Chandler Papers (L.C.); Congressional Record, 55th Con., 1st Sess., Feb. 28, 1899, p. 2558.

54 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 285-87; Cleveland Leader, Jan 30, 1898, p. 2; Cong. Rec., 55th Con., 2nd Sess., June 1, 1900, p. 6360, 6363; Morgan, William McKinley and His America, 51, 298; White, Masks In A Pageant, 168; Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980), 51-2, 234; Chandler to John Long, Oct. 7, 1898, v. 123, Chandler Papers (L.C.); Hanna to McKinley, Aug. 3, 1900, Box 59, Cortelyou Papers (L.C.); Hanna to McKinley, Aug. 10, 1900, Box 59, Cortelyou Papers (L.C.).

56 Cleveland *Leader*, May 13, 1900, p. 1; Sept. 16, 1900, p. 3; "The Twentieth Ohio district, by Mr. Phillips' action is converted from an absolutely safe Republican district to a doubtful one.... The campaign this fall is a most important one, and it would be exceedingly unfortunate to sacrifice a single district for any such reason as has actuated Congressman Phillips in adopting the cause he has." Cleveland *World*, Sept. 26, 1900, p. 4; "I have your letter regarding the Congressional situation in our district, and regret that I cannot agree with you that I should support Mr. Beidler. I feel so strongly that he is utterly unworthy of support that I cannot vote for him, and hence cannot urge my friends to do so.... He and his friends have been so well known as bitter opponents of the administration and its friends that the real friends of President McKinley will not believe that their loyalty to him forces them to support such a man. I very much regret that the burden of this contest is being thrown on your shoulders as I know how much you have to contend with in this campaign. It is disgusting to see Beidler and his friends hanging on you for aid." James R. Garfield to Hanna, Sept. 27, 1900, Box 85, James R. Garfield papers (L.C.); "At the request of some of the strongest Hanna people in Cuyahoga County and the Twentieth District I will now state that the movement against Mr. Beidler has not the support of Senator Hanna, General Dick, or of any of the so-called Hanna leaders. We have tried to wipe out factionalism in the party here in Cuyahoga County, and we have about succeeded in doing so." Cleveland *Leader*, Oct. 25, 1900, p. 5; Dick Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); James R. Garfield Scrapbook, Box 194, James R. Garfield Papers (L.C.); Cleveland *Leader*, Nov. 7, 1900, p. 10; "There is less of factional feeling, and better spirit and more complete harmony than we have had in Ohio in many years." Dick to Hanna, May 1, 1901, Box 26, Charles Dick Papers (O.H.S.); Dick to Garfield, Nov. 9, 1900, Box 85, James R. Garfield Papers (L.C.).

57 Cleveland *Leader*, June 6, 1900, p. 1; Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*, 334.

59 "1900 Campaign," Box 3, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Minneapolis Journal in Box 3, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

60 Charles Thompson, President's I've Known and Two Near Presidents (Indianapolis, 1929), 32.

61 Elmer Dover Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Leader, May 15, 1902, p. 5; ibid., Sept. 15, 1903, p. 1.
CHAPTER VI

THE FINAL DEFEAT OF THE COMMONWEALTH IDEA:
HANNA AND THE POLITICAL BATTLE
OVER SHIP SUBSIDIES, 1900–1902

The previous Whig-Republican policy of distribution of government aid to promote the nation's industries and transportation lines for the purpose of improving the national general interest had been, at least in the North, usually a winning issue for Republicans at the polls (as long as the party concentrated on economic issues and not ethno-cultural ones). However, by the 1880s, the Republican governmental distributinal policy was under vigorous attack from Interior Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. They labeled it class legislation. By 1900, though, with the twin Presidential victories of William McKinley, the most famous national protectionist spokesman, many Republicans were ready to move forward to renew an energetic, positive government distributional policy. As noted in the previous chapter, by 1900, Hanna
emerged as a leading national Republican spokesman on the evolving state of national government-business relations.

The American merchant marine was the American industry Hanna and other Republican leaders now decided to promote. The merchant marine had been the one major industry which the Republicans, despite numerous attempts over the past thirty years, had failed to protect or promote. If Hanna and other Republicans could finally achieve a breakthrough and provide a sufficient subsidy for the merchant marine, the result could mean a decisive renewal of the previous Republican commonwealth doctrine of aiding individual major enterprises to benefit the common interest. Hanna and many of his fellow Republican legislators appealed to American public opinion to justify granting public aid to support various shipowners and shipbuilders. Strengthening the merchant marine, was a particular form of the nineteenth century American doctrine of equal rights: the Commonwealth Idea.

On the national policymaking level, throughout the mid-1880s and mid-1890s, supporters of the traditional antebellum Commonwealth Idea were being eclipsed on one side by adherents of conservative laissez faire and, on the other, by advocates of a special interest group approach in determining the scope of government-business

* A detailed discussion of the emergence of the Commonwealth Idea during the antebellum Era, and the reasons behind its weakening during the Postwar Era, is to be found in the Introduction.
relations. During the 1896 Presidential campaign, McKinley and Hanna, as already noted, had succeeded in strengthening the Commonwealth Idea. This was accomplished through appeals to the unifying aspects of the tariff, and also through redefining of the G.O.P. as a broader pluralistic social institution. Bryan's class-based appeal had proven a perfect foil for McKinley and Hanna's resurrection of the Commonwealth Idea, and pluralistic restructuring of the G.O.P. After the election, adherents wanted to resurrect the Common-wealth Idea as a prime policy-making philosophy, coterminous with the other differing national strategies of government-business relations. However, whether the Commonwealth Idea could again unite the country behind an appeal for aiding a single industry for the benefit of the common interest, as it had nationally during the antebellum and Civil War Eras, and locally during the Postwar Era in certain industrializing areas of the country, like the Great Lakes area of the Midwest, would soon be tested. The true efficacy of the Commonwealth Idea, both as a justifying philosophy for government aid to private interests, and as a national policy strategy, would be determined in the upcoming national political fight over granting public subsidies to the merchant marine.
By 1900, however, the chances of obtaining public aid to the merchant marine, through a sole appeal to the Commonwealth Idea, appeared politically risky. However, the proponents of both the Hanna-Payne and Frye ship subsidy bills, particularly Hanna, refused to discard the Commonwealth system of government distribution and development. At the turn of the century it was increasingly difficult to justify, in Commonwealth terms, a multi-year public appropriation to develop the merchant marine. Several domestic and foreign factors led many subsidy proponents, particularly Hanna, to believe they could achieve their goal of a subsidized merchant marine and also resuscitate the Commonwealth Idea of equal rights in a changing America.

By 1900, the success of the Second Industrial Revolution in America created an economic situation where production exceeded consumption by fifteen percent. A large quantity of American goods had to be sold abroad. There emerged a nationalist belief that the surplus goods should be delivered abroad in American vessels and no longer in foreign (mainly British) vessels. By 1900, trade figures revealed that foreign vessels transported more than ninety percent of American exports. The effect of foreign events, such as the Spanish-American War and the initial acquisition of an American Caribbean and Pacific empire, convinced many politicians, businessmen,
writers, and economists that the American mission toward a formal or informal empire could not be achieved without a new navy and an improved merchant marine.¹ For Hanna and others, America's changed position with the world, through its economic strength, offered a unique opportunity to resurrect the Commonwealth Idea.

Proponents of the Commonwealth Idea insisted that America's new global challenge had to be met by moving beyond the straitlaced philosophy of conservative *laissez faire*ism.

In previous marine matters, Hanna personally attested that the Commonwealth Idea had proven successful, through the grant of public subsidies and government protection in building up the lakewise and coastal trade. It was only natural to believe this policy should be extended to the ailing merchant marine. The pitiful condition of the American merchant marine in 1900 gave Hanna and his allies an opportunity to resurrect the merchant marine through an appeal to the Commonwealth Idea. In 1850, American ships carried seventy-five percent of American goods. In 1898, they carried only ten percent.² However, the reasons for its decline tempered any initial enthusiasm.

Compared with Great Britain, American shipmakers were slow in adjusting to the technological evolution from wooden hulls to iron hulls; from replacing iron with
steel; and from switching from sail power to steam powered, propeller-driven vessels.³ In domestic manufacturing, American businessmen had become the world's innovators in creating new industrial strategies and structures to increase industrial efficiency. However, this was not true for shipping.

Great Britain developed the new international shipping lines. These lines were run as a large scale corporate business. This required not only technical and institutional changes, but also close cooperation with the government in aspects of planning and public subsidies.⁴

The most disputed factor of the decline of the marine was the impact the Civil War had upon American shipping. Subsidy opponents insisted that trade statistics proved that the decline of the marine began in the mid-1850s. The impact of the Civil War only accelerated the decline of American shipping. However, ship subsidy advocates insisted it was the Civil War crisis which disorganized American shipping and led to its rapid decline. They emphasized that during the war, over 150,000 tons of shipping were destroyed. As a result, a large portion of American tonnage, 751,000 tons, were sold abroad, mainly to Great Britain.⁵ Because the government disrupted the natural business environment,
subsidy advocates insisted the government should make some kind of subsidy restitution. This would help the merchant marine regain its former strong pre-war position.

One of the major factors in the decline of the merchant marine was the protective system which Commonwealth advocates had vigorously developed for eighty years. This protective system, while shielding the coastwise trade, had encouraged American internal development at the expense of foreign commerce. As a contemporary writer pointed out, in the early nineteenth century, the emerging protectionist system drove American capital to turn from the sea, where it operated at a disadvantage, to a more promising domestic market. American capital profitably remained within the domestic market for the rest of the century.⁶

The only significant American investment in shipping was in the coastwise and inland seas trade. Both were protected from foreign ships under the Act of 1817. Emory Johnson, a contemporary writer on Great Lakes shipping, pointed out that at the turn of the century, nearly six-sevenths of the American merchant marine's total tonnage was engaged in the protected coastwise trade and sea fisheries.⁷ The final one-seventh of American shipping was split equally between American investment in foreign trade under the American flag, and investment under a foreign flag. By 1901, the American-controlled foreign flag fleet totaled 672,000 gross tons.⁸
From 1850 to 1882, efforts of the federal government to help the merchant marine ranged from attempting to subsidize shipping lines, to submitting several governmental reports focusing upon several causes for the decline of the merchant marine. However, they failed to stem the relative rapid deterioration of the merchant marine.

Two previous governmental attempts at subsidizing a shipping line, first with the Collins Line from 1850 to 1859, and finally from 1867 to 1875 with the Pacific Mail Line, failed. In the case of the Pacific Mail Line, it also ended in scandal. As a recent historian commented, the Pacific Mail Line scandal created a longlasting distrust of any governmental activities in the maritime field. Two special committees issued governmental reports on the problem: the 1870 Lynch Report and the 1880 Nimmo report. They focused upon the causes of the decline of the merchant marine. The 1870 Lynch Report offered a specific remedy to improve the condition of the merchant marine: general bounties were to be given to all vessels engaged in both the foreign and the protected coastwise trades. However, despite the support of President Grant, free trade congressmen from the interior defeated the proposal in Congress. These free trade congressmen from the Interior rejected any American shipping subsidy. They preferred free ships as the solution to the American shipping problem.
The most important report released from the government was Naval Secretary Chandler's 1883 report on the state of the merchant marine. Chandler ironically tied the problem of the decline of the merchant marine (due to no protection or subsidy) with the country's rising domestic economic power (a direct result of governmental protection and promotion). Chandler emphasized the effect this would have on the United States as it gradually evolved into a world power resulting from the Second Industrial Revolution. According to historian Thomas Reeves, Chandler stressed that an effective merchant marine was indispensable on economic grounds. According to Chandler, with a growing surplus of goods to export (the nation's exports had increased more than two hundred percent between 1870 and 1880), a weak merchant marine had allowed foreign competition to hurt the balance of trade, deprived businessmen of profit, and seamen of employment. Chandler pointed out that shipping stood alone among the major industries unprotected by the federal government. Chandler advocated that subsidies be given to help build it up. For Chandler, only this action would bring U.S. shipping into balance symmetrically with other U.S. industries.  

From 1872 to 1884, the federal government gave limited aid to businessmen employed in the international shipping trade. It gradually placed raw materials
required for ship building on the free list, and allowed American vessel owners to engage foreign crews in foreign ports. The employment of foreign crews allowed American shipowners to neutralize high American wage rates. The free trade policy was easy to attain in a Congress where *laissez faire* anti-protectionist Democrats were delighted to erode the Commonwealth inspired protective system.

In 1891, Maine Senator, Joseph Frye, attempted to obtain from Congress, an adequate subsidy to the merchant marine. However, in the changed political climate of the 1890s, subsidies failed by three votes in the House. Instead, the inadequate Postal Subsidy Act of 1891 was adopted by Congress. This act extended a system of subsidizing the movement of mail on American ships. The twin deficiencies in the bill were its inadequate subsidy payments system and the development of few new shipping routes. The subject of ship subsidies continued to receive powerful opposition from the interior of the South and West.

The proponents of the 1891 Postal Subsidy Act, however, helped focus American determination to achieve a fair share of the Latin American trade. Secretary of State James G. Blaine initiated reciprocity agreements with several Latin American countries in 1891, and called for construction of an Isthmus Canal to help American trade.
By the late 1890s, because of the Cleveland Administration's inadequate response to the 1893 Depression, the political situation had immeasurably changed from the early 1880s. This political situation strengthened the Republican Party of McKinley and Hanna which advocated aid to the merchant marine.

After assuming office in March 1897, the McKinley Administration and its congressional allies determined to extend the protective system to the merchant marine. President McKinley, in his December 1899 address to Congress, called for Congress to grant aid to the merchant marine. But first, in March 1897, the McKinley Administration focused upon strengthening the internal protective system by passage of the 1897 Dingley-Hawley Tariff Bill. Between 1890 and 1897, McKinley became converted to trade reciprocity. He believed American prosperity was linked with world reciprocity. McKinley saw the revival of the merchant marine as an important part of his overall reciprocity program.15

Before the Administration could develop a reciprocal trade policy, its energy and attention was consumed with foreign affairs. American attention was focused on its conflict with Spain. With its victory over Spain, the U.S. became an imperial power.
With measures in Congress already proposed to aid the merchant marine, McKinley in his December 1899 address, placed himself firmly behind the congressional forces advocating ship subsidies to resuscitate the merchant marine.

Our national development will be one-sided and unsatisfactory so long as the remarkable growth of our inland industries remain, unaccompanied by progress on the seas. Our coast trade, under regulations wisely framed at the beginning of the Government and since, shows results for the past fiscal year unequaled in our records or those of any other power. We shall fail to realize our opportunities, however, if we complacently regard only matters at home and blind ourselves to the necessity of securing our share of the valuable carrying trade of the world.... I am satisfied the judgment of the country favors the policy of aid to our merchant marine.17

By 1898, all sides agreed the merchant marine was in serious decline. The U.S. must continue the necessary work to become a major economic power. Besides subsidizing the marine, two other political positions emerged: free ships (non-interference from government), or allowing the course of natural economic development to eventually strengthen the marine.18

The laissez faire-free trade solution of free ships, while popular in many university economic
departments and among many Southern Democrats, (such as Senator Vest of Missouri), had lost support in Congress. In the emerging administrative state, free ships had few supporting organized interest groups compared with advocates of the subsidy scheme.

The idea of natural economic development saving the merchant marine, was a popular idea, and had general support within the press, Congress, and the country. It attacked the central thesis of the subsidy approach which claimed that the U.S. could not produce or operate vessels as cheaply as Great Britain and therefore, the federal government must give subsidies to the merchant marine to offset the British advantage.

The supporters of the natural development approach emphasized that the greater efficiency American industry had achieved, as a result of the second Industrial Revolution, would accomplish the same result for the merchant marine. The U.S. produced the iron and steel, necessary for the building of modern ships, more cheaply than anywhere in the world. Therefore natural development advocates insisted Americans were constructing ships more cheaply, for the protected coastwise and inland seas trade, than the British. These writers insisted that when America's industrial efficiency was fully realized in the shipping industry, American vessels would successfully compete against British and German shipping lines in
carrying goods throughout the world. However, the degree of credit the protective system received for this development varied with the individual writer. Advocates of natural development had broad support from sympathizers in both *laissez faire* and Commonwealth equal rights camps. 20

The ship subsidy propaganda machinery started with an 1897 article, "Plea For Home Ships," written by Alexander McDougall and published in the *Chicago Tribune*. According to McDougall, the problem was that Americans paid more than $200,000,000 to foreigners to ship American goods around the world. "If we could do only one-half" of our own shipping, Americans could then plow the savings back into their own country, which would bring "the greatness which this country will some day reach." The solution to the problem, McDougall emphasized, was a subsidy; but only one to "home ships," not foreign vessels owned by Americans abroad. The problem of "foreign vessels" would be a major one for the framers of the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill. 21

Supporters claimed there were two key reasons for subsidizing the merchant marine. First was the question of fairness. The merchant marine was the one major U.S. industry not protected or promoted by the federal government. Secondly, advocates emphasized that promotion of the merchant marine was not class legislation but would
benefit the general Commonwealth interest. Richard P. Joy, in the Great Lakes shipping journal, *The Marine Review*, scolded both political parties for failing to subsidize the merchant marine while aiding every other project. Joy exclaimed,

> Our Congress thinks nothing of granting millions of dollars in land grants to railroads and spending vast sums on improving our rivers and harbors, but the moment a bill praying for subsidy to keep our struggling oversea shipping alive comes before them, they fail to see that the country will receive any benefit from it.  

Ship subsidy advocates, knowing opposition from the interior had killed previous subsidy efforts, stressed that the Hanna-Payne subsidy bill would benefit the nation's producers through lower shipping rates for their goods. A writer in the pro-subsidy *Scientific American* asserted that as American domestic industries had flourished due to the government assistance, "we have yet to find any substantial reason advanced to show why government assistance will not prove as great a stimulus to our shipping interests." McDougall, in his 1897 article, wrote, "there is not much, if any, part of the United States that would not get a direct or indirect benefit from our owning many ships at sea." During Senate debate on the subsidy bill, Senator Perkins of California
asked, "Who says that it is not a benefit to the farmers or producers of this country? This whole bill is conceived in the interest of the American people and you cannot benefit one industry without all being correspondingly benefited, directly or indirectly."\(^{25}\) Another problem for subsidy advocates, then, was that by 1900, if many economic interest groups did not immediately benefit from the subsidy, Commonwealth promises of later "indirect benefits" would be disregarded and disbelieved.

David Rothman, historian of the Gilded Age Senate, points out that the fractured party discipline of the 1870s was not comparable to the current strong Republican Senate leadership, which demanded party discipline. Senate Republicans had a solid Senate majority by 1895. As a consequence, it strengthened the party caucus's power and importance. According to Rothman, the Senate party caucus dictated voting decisions, and "senators disregarded personal and sectional interests to respect its decisions...."

However, not every party measure supported by the caucus would assure party unity over sectional economic interests. The problem of granting subsidies to the merchant marine was a particular example.\(^{26}\) By 1900, the antebellum Commonwealth rhetoric of equal rights could not smother the socioeconomic dislocation in the American polity. Consequently, neither could the party caucus
completely keep its party membership intact on a contro-
versial issue involving competing socioeconomic divisions 
emanating outside the Senate chamber.

By 1897, under the direction of Senator Frye of 
Maine, work was begun on the Hanna-Payne ship Subsidy 
Bill. It began with a special committee called the 
Committee of 25. Frye was criticized for his selection of 
committee members. This criticism encouraged opponents to 
brand the Hanna-Payne bill as class legislation for 
wealthy shipowners. Critics stressed that Congressmen 
made up only one-fifth of the committee (Hanna was also 
selected), while the rest were businessmen who had 
interests in the shipping trade. The chairman of the 
Committee was C.A. Griscom, the president of the Inter-
national Navigation Company. The company controlled a 
significant number of foreign vessels owned by Americans. 
A key fault of the Committee, as a recent historian 
alleged, was its failure to hear and coopt the basic 
producing public. Instead it confined input almost 
exclusively to the carriers of goods and constructors of 
ships.27

During 1898 and 1899, Hanna started to play an 
active public role as Frye's co-manager of the subsidy 
bill. The subsidy bill was the first significant national 
legislation which Hanna publicly championed.
Hanna's power and influence within the Senate emanated from two sources: his close association and supposed influence over President McKinley; and his place upon the powerful Republican Steering Committee. On the Steering Committee, Hanna sat with the leader of the Republican caucus, William Allison of Iowa, and other Republican Senate titans such as Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, Orville Platt of Connecticut, and John Spooner of Wisconsin. Historian Horace Merrill labels Allison, Aldrich, Platt, and Spooner, the "Big Four." They controlled the Republican Senate at the turn of the century.²⁸

The recommendations from the Committee of 25 underwent numerous revisions and amendments within the Senate Commerce Committee, and, particularly, the Commerce sub-committee, chaired by Hanna. By early December 1899, the first significant subsidy legislation in eight years was ready to be reported to the Senate.²⁹ In the absence of Senator Frye, who was serving as a Peace Commissioner in Paris, the ship subsidy bill was introduced on 6 December 1899 by Hanna in the Senate, and Sereno Payne of Wisconsin in the House. The legislation became known as the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill.

The Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill was a Republican attempt to transfer upwards of $9,000,000 of subsidies a year, for the next fifteen to twenty years, to American
shipping companies. Advocates stressed that with subsidy payments, the greater cost of operating an American shipping line would be partially offset by the payment of the government subsidy. As a result, American shipping would engage more in international trade and competition with foreign shipping lines. The assumption of the bill's supporters was that when the scheduled payments ceased, American shipping would be strong enough to compete with the international shipping lines of Great Britain and Germany.

The bill's preamble attempted to include all interest groups. It linked the country's continued successful internal development with an invigorated merchant marine. The merchant marine was needed to dispose of the country's surplus: "The profitable employment of the surplus productive power of the farms, factories, mines, forests, and fisheries of the United States imperatively demands the expansion of the foreign commerce."30

The bill's two key provisions which provoked the most antagonism dealt with foreign vessels and the use of a speed requirement to determine the amount of subsidy a ship could receive. For foreign vessels being built under American ownership prior to 1 January 1899, the bill provided for payment of a half-subsidy to the owner, provided that the subsidy recipient built the equivalent
number of vessels in the United States as he had built overseas. On the issue of speed, the bill provided greater subsidies for ships that traveled faster. This brought opposition from producer interests within the Interior and South. They emphasized that slower vessels carried the bulk of their farm products. They believed it to be inconceivable that these slower vessels would not receive as much bounty as the fast passenger ships, whose primary function was to carry the rich elite to Europe. Opponents strenuously claimed that farmers' shipping charges would not decrease as much as the price of a ticket on one of the luxury passenger lines commuting to Europe.

Advocates of the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill had an edge over their opponents because they had the support of the core constituency of the emerging Administrative State: the special interest group. Rothman, in his study of the Gilded Age Senate, emphasized that during the 1870s, lobbying for the first time became a vital element in shaping government policy. The tariff issue led to the creation of numerous special interest groups (particularly businesses associations which wanted their own economic interests protected in any tariff bill). It also strengthened existing special interest groups with new members. From the 1870s to the 1890s, probably the most important national special interest group was the American
Iron and Steel Association. James W. Swank was its
general secretary and was widely considered to be the most
effective lobbyist in Washington. Protectionist Senators
cooperated with the Association in sending out its
"educational" tracts and pamphlets. According to Rothman,
Congressmen gladly supplied long mailing lists, including
the names of friendly local postmasters, to see to a
proper distribution of Association literature. Any tariff
bill produced by Congress over the last thirty years of
the nineteenth century had been practically written by
Swank and his Association.32

Excepting many agricultural interest groups, the
overwhelming number of business interest groups lobbied in
support of the ship subsidy bill. While not every
interest groups would directly benefit from its passage,
the principle of government aid to business was involved,
and most business interest groups felt compelled to
support it.33

With McKinley's reelection, Hanna began to assemble
the ship subsidy forces for the upcoming short session
of the 56th Congress. In a press interview with the
Cleveland Leader in November, Hanna declared that he
intended to take a more active interest in Congressional
affairs. He arrived in Washington on 1 December and
remained until Congress adjourned for Christmas break.
Upon learning that Hanna intended to renew his lease on
the Cameron Mansion, formerly occupied by the late Vice President Garrett Hobart, the Leader reporter inquired whether Hanna planned on either holding or going to many Washington social functions. Hanna replied, "No. I will have to forego that pleasure. I am not participating in any social functions, loving cup affairs, jollifications, or anything of the kind." 34

On November 10th, Hanna sent telegrams to various Republican Senators. The telegrams requested them to be in their seats on 3 December for the purpose of placing the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill on the Senate calendar as unfinished business. Hanna and Frye had already arranged the order of business for the Committee. The legislative procedure of unfinished business was necessary for immediately bringing the bill to the floor for debate and possibly final action. A New York Times journalist reported that Hanna "had been so anxious to have the bill considered ahead of all other legislation that he had taken the precaution to telegraph every Republican Senator in advance, to please be in his seat on the first day of the session to attend to important business, meaning this business." 35

In an interview with a reporter from the Marine Review in November, Hanna stated he was confident of the final passage of the ship subsidy bill, and emphasized how important it was that the bill be the first order of
business when Congress opened, "in order to insure a speedy passage and to prevent its being lost in the crush of legislation that invariably marks the close of Congress." 36 Hanna's prescience, in realizing the key factor of legislative timing in determining whether the bill would be passed in the short session, was soon justified.

It was crucial to the bill's success, that Great Lakes economic and protected shipping interests support the bill. Protected since 1817 from foreign shipping, the Great Lakes over the past fifty years had received government appropriations for lighthouses, harbors, deepening waters or canals, and erecting breakwaters. 37 Supporters of the bill continuously pointed out the "indirect" benefits the Great Lakes region would receive because the enormous iron and coal deposits located in the region would be stimulated by shipbuilding. Proponents stressed that a subsidized merchant marine would lead to increased export of the region's iron and steel throughout the world. 38 Many Great Lakes interests supported the ship subsidy bill, but many refused, and this caused serious concern for the final prospects for the bill's passage. 39 Hanna's own political bailiwick of Cleveland, Ohio, failed to support the ship subsidy bill.

Once again, Hanna, the master political strategist, had problems controlling factional disputes within the
local Cuyahoga Republican party. A large minority of Cleveland Republicans were fiercely anti-Hanna. On his political home turf he was still regarded by many as a local political boss who looked after his own petty provincial business and political interests. The curious situation that Hanna's hometown opposed his pet measure was due to two key factors: the federal government's promised eastward extension of the Cleveland breakwater, and Cleveland Congressman Theodore Burton.

In the upcoming House River and Harbors Bill, (a prime example of national government promotion and distribution) Cleveland was due to receive its largest government appropriation ever. The city received $2,925,000, of which $600,000 was for immediate work on extending the breakwater and improving the harbor entrance. The needed improvements were partly due to engineering planning failures during construction in 1875 on the original breakwater. The major credit given for gaining Cleveland the needed federal funds did not go to Hanna, who was preoccupied with preparing the ship subsidy bill, but instead, to Theodore Burton, Chairman of the House River and Harbors Committee.

Since assuming his role as chairman in 1898, Burton became one of the key dispensers of federal aid. Burton's primary responsibility was to referee among the hundreds of localities throughout the country that desired
government appropriations for their local projects.\textsuperscript{42} In assuring that his district was well funded in the upcoming appropriation bill, Burton simply followed the precedent set by previous chairmen. With both key government distribution bills, the shipping bill and the river and harbors bill, up for passage in the upcoming short session, it was vitally important that the two key Cleveland Republicans, Burton and Hanna, (both key advocates of the responsibility of government to promote the economy in the general interest) be united in support of both bills. For various reasons it did not happen.\textsuperscript{43}

Since 1890, there had been a great deal of political and personal tension between Hanna and Burton. Historian Wilbur Devereaux Jones places much of the blame for the personal friction on Hanna's mismanagement of local politics. Jones claimed Hanna was never willing to make concessions to Burton or others in the matter of political patronage. Hanna would even refuse appointments to minor offices. However, Charles Leach, one of Hanna's key local political agents, blamed Burton for the personal enmity. Leach claimed that during Burton's first congressional campaign in 1890, when he received less than half of the amount he had requested from Hanna for his campaign, (Hanna was the collector and distributor of party funds in 1890) Burton angrily threw the check back on Hanna's desk. During the early phase of the 1896 campaign, while
Hanna managed McKinley's campaign for the nomination, Burton supported McKinley's main challenger, House Speaker Thomas Reed.

Even without the political tension, personalities divided Hanna and Burton. Burton was reserved, hard-working, scholarly, cold, and at times displayed little loyalty to political allies, whom he would discard whenever the political situation dictated. Burton had many of the personal qualities of Hanna's former political mentor, John Sherman. Whereas in his relationship with Sherman, Hanna had played the role of the loyal subordinate, he had no reason to play that same role to the younger, arrogant Burton. Hanna probably believed Congressman Burton should show some of the same fealty to the older, more politically experienced Hanna. Burton refused. According to a reporter of the Cleveland Press, the political tension between Hanna and Burton was caused by the two men being, "a trifle too large to swim in the same tank without splashing water in each other's face." The underlying political tension between the two exploded into open political conflict when Hanna learned that Burton, acting upon principle, would publicly oppose the ship subsidy bill at the exact time the bill was scheduled for Senate debate.

Burton's opposition to the subsidy bill dramatized the factional divisions of Cleveland Republicans. It also
threatened federal appropriations for Cleveland if Hanna decided to retaliate against Burton. Cleveland Postmaster C.C. Dewstoe, a local Burton political lieutenant, warned Burton that it was the wrong time to awaken factional differences as "it is the feeling of a good many that the old factional differences have been largely wiped out and that any new disturbances would be deplorable." Dewstoe also reminded Burton that the Congressman had always been a staunch supporter of the Republican doctrine of government aid to economic interests. According to Dewstoe, now was not the appropriate time to begin to have qualms over the appropriateness of certain projects chosen to be promoted by the government. "I have said," Dewstoe continued, "that I did not believe you would be opposed to any proper and just method of developing our maritime interests anymore than you would be to the operation of a Protective Tariff for the development of our internal industries." Despite similar appeals, on 23 November 1900 the Cleveland Leader reported that Burton was opposed to the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill. The significance of Burton's opposition, continued the Leader reporter, was that Burton was "the first influential Republican member of Congress ... who has announced his opposition to the shipping bill." Burton based his opposition to the bill on an economic and political basis. Burton believed a subsidy
to the merchant marine was not needed. If passed, Burton thought it would hurt Republicans at the polls at the next election and erode the possibility, "of party supremacy in the future." The fact that Vernon Brown, a shipping agent for the foreign Cunard shipping line, secretly provided Burton with information against the shipping bill, caused doubt about Burton's professed motives for opposing the bill.48

When Burton stood against the bill, he assured political allies Hanna would not dare to delay the River and Harbors Bill in the Senate or attempt to trim the appropriation for the breakwater extension. However, in a private letter to ally Harvey Goulder, chief maritime attorney in Cleveland and legal advisor to the Lake Carriers Association, Burton was not so optimistic.

Your note in regard to the breakwater and the attitude of Senator Hanna, is at hand. I sincerely hope that the Senator will cordially cooperate in the Senate. A word of unfriendliness, or even of doubt, from his would cause the appropriation to be stricken out. It will be impossible to secure the full amount.49

Hanna not only had to worry about Burton's announced to vote against the ship subsidy bill in the Cleveland press. He was also concerned about the low level of general support the bill received from several key Cleveland institutions. Hanna was furious at Burton
for publicly expressing himself on a subject which Hanna felt the Congressman had not given careful study. While Burton had stated that his opposition to the bill was on principle, and not personal spite, Hanna reacted differently. Upon hearing on 23 November from a reporter of Burton's announcement against the bill, Hanna angrily exclaimed, "If it is true, then the Republican papers here should lambast Congressman Burton." 50

J.B. Morrow, the editor of the key Cleveland Republican newspaper, the Cleveland Leader, the strongest local press defender of Hanna and of the Republican doctrine of protection and promotion, however deserted Hanna. The Leader's editors came out against the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill. Morrow and the Leader had always responded favorably to Hanna against Democratic attacks upon Hanna's character. They always defended his motives in promoting the bill as sincere and patriotic, and even ran several positive articles on the bill. However, these actions could not obscure the fact that practically for the first time since 1890, the Leader would not support Hanna on a major issue. 51 Also, when Hanna proclaimed the ship subsidy bill had been, "approved and endorsed by practically every board of trade and commercial organization in the country," a reporter for the Democratic Plain Dealer pointed out
that the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce had not publicly supported it but had "maintained a significant silence regarding Hanna-Payne....".52

Moreover, the arrival of the ship subsidy bill on the Senate calendar for debate in December 1900 came at a time when Congress was attempting to cut back on federal expenditures. During the upcoming short session, Congress was in the process of reducing by $70,000,000 the war taxation, previously needed for prosecuting the war with Spain. At the last moment it shrank from allocating vast appropriations to initiate a new program of shipbuilding, as it was deemed too expensive. A common theme used against the subsidy bill, by several opponents, was that it would extend the war taxation burden.53

In late 1900, however, subsidy supporters noted a federal surplus of close to $80,000,000. A writer for a key newspaper, whose editorial policy was strongly laissez faire, the New York Times, cautioned against a distribution program.

As the hungry member looks at these he sees something like $150,000,000 available to be used for various public purposes, and the possession of so large a surplus will be referred to as justifying the donation of part of it to shipbuilders who wish to increase the merchant marine fleet.54
The embroiling political tension between the dual forms of equal rights, whether the Commonwealth or \textit{laissez faire} viewpoint, was placed in historical context by a Commonwealth proponent of the ship subsidy bill in the \textit{Marine Review}:

There will not probably be a single argument brought against this bill during the entire discussion in or out of congress that has not been used against every government appropriation of money to further the interests of commerce since the government was established. The broader view, however, has prevailed and our country has progressed. The narrow view always made strict economy the 'paramount issue,' and, like a steamboat manager who allowed economy in the line of fuel to absorb his entire attention, stopped his steamer and saved the entire fuel expense. Of course the earnings stopped, but economy in fuel was maintained.\textsuperscript{55}

As the Senate was preparing to open proceedings of the short session on 3 December, Hanna and Frye agreed on their legislative strategy. In a Washington conference on December 1, Hanna and Frye reaffirmed that the ship subsidy bill would be the first bill presented during the short session to the Senate. Allowing for Christmas adjournment, the Senate would be in session from 3 December 1900 to 4 March 1901, the date of McKinley's inauguration. Since the death of Vice President Hobart, Sen. Frye, as President Pro Tem of the Senate, had acted 299
as the presiding officer of the Senate. Frye would step down from his chair to begin the debate on the bill with an opening speech to the Senate on Dec 4. Thereafter, he would return to the chair and conduct the Senate proceedings until the March 4th adjournment. Hanna would be the floor manager.

If the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill did not reach a vote by mid-to-late February, it would be taken off the Senate calendar as "unfinished business." It would then be replaced with appropriation bills or various pet projects of individual Senators. If the Hanna-Payne bill did not obtain a vote before the adjournment of the 56th Congress, it would have to wait an additional year to be proposed again. An additional year would allow the laissez faire anti-ship subsidy forces to organize opposition in Congress, the press, and the public. It would also give them additional time to catch up with the ship subsidy forces in organization and propaganda.

Frye's opening speech on the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill focused upon the changing economic position of America within the world. Where America was once an importing nation, Frye stated, it had now become an exporting nation. "In 1897," Frye stressed, "we exported $151,000,000 and imported twice more than what we exported. Last year (1899) we exported $200,000,00 more than we imported." Frye continued that the sudden upsurge
in American exports and overall trade did not disguise the fact that of all the enormous exports and imports of the United States, only nine percent were carried in American bottoms. The U.S. paid foreign nations $500,000 a day for the carrying trade. For Frye, the key device needed to help alleviate the sorry situation of the merchant marine was the federally funded subsidy, given over a period of years.56

Throughout Frye's speech, Hanna occasionally prompted the Maine Senator and this was widely commented upon by the press. A New York Times correspondent reported on Hanna's movements throughout the speech: "He moved up to the front row, taking a seat there for the first time in many months, and sat by Mr. Frye while the latter was speaking, prompting him and giving him hints."57

Hanna gave the next major speech as an advocate of the shipping bill on 13 December. Since his successful speaking excursion into the "enemy" territory of the Great Plains during the 1900 election, Hanna had developed confidence in his oratorical ability, particularly in speaking upon industrial issues. Before, Hanna had spoken at length on the issue of the cost of ship armor for naval vessels. However, the opinion of contemporary writers and historians that this was Hanna's first formal Senate speech is correct. As reported in the press, Hanna spoke
for nearly three hours, without a manuscript, and in a "delivery at all times ... forcible and intense." 58

In his speech, Hanna summarized myriad issues concerning the necessity of supporting a public subsidy to the merchant marine. Hanna gave his interpretation of the decline of the marine. He stated it was caused by the Civil War, and not by problems with the industrial structure of the merchant marine. Hanna emphasized that during the War with Spain, there was inadequate naval protection of the American coastline. He also pointed out how the "subsidized" American line had successfully protected the American eastern coastline. He illustrated the example of American naval inadequacy in transporting American soldiers, stricken with malaria, from Cuba to Point Montauk on Long Island. Hanna employed the ideas of Mahan and his cohorts for the need of maintaining a respectable merchant marine to act as an auxiliary for the American Navy in times of foreign crisis. He said it was ironic that when America was ready to build an Isthmian Canal to help hemispheric and international trade, the American providers of the canal would not be able to economically take advantage of the new artificial shipping route. Instead, nation's with stronger international shipping routes would be the main beneficiaries.

In focusing upon the crucial issue of producer interests, Hanna agreed that a strong merchant marine
would dispose of the growing American surplus of agricultural and industrial goods. Failure to do so, he warned, could lead to another general depression. "We must either find foreign markets for our surplus products," Hanna declared, "or we must curtail our productions of agriculture and manufacturing by one-third.... It would mean the throwing out of employment of thousands and tens of thousands of men and the consequent increased competition for employment." Hanna emphasized that since production was one-third greater than consumption, the ship subsidy bill would supply the connecting link between the producer and the consumer.

I want to put it upon the broad ground of a connecting link between the producer and the consumer, as an adjunct to our further growth and prosperity, which it is written must continue in the nature of things because of the conditions which control us and our future.59

Not surprisingly, Hanna stressed the example of Great Lakes shipping, in espousing how governmental aid had laid the "foundation" for not only its success, but the prosperity of the entire Great Lakes region. In emphasizing his connection with Great Lakes shipping, Hanna declared that for over forty years he had seen that industry grow from a comparatively insignificant
beginning, to its present condition of unparalleled greatness. The success of Great Lakes shipping, Hanna expounded, had been fostered through government protection and liberal congressional appropriations for the improvement of Great Lakes harbors.\textsuperscript{60}

In couching his advocacy of the ship subsidy bill in Commonwealth language, Hanna attempted to deflect the oncoming \textit{laissez faire} attacks. He also stated his deep and abiding conviction of the beneficial role government played in development of the economy. Hanna sincerely believed the subsidy bill would benefit, not only the merchant marine and its owners, but also the farmers' who could ship their goods more cheaply overseas, and laborers who would find work in the depressed shipbuilding industry. Hanna's perception of the political situation can be criticized as being overly subjective and viewed through "rose-colored glasses." However, his experience and business success on the Great Lakes gave him tangible reasons to do so.

In his address, Hanna declared the subsidy bill was not a form of class legislation, but would benefit the general interest.

\textit{This question is broader than the lines of the bill can write it. It will be widespread in its benefits. It is not aimed at any class or particular industry. It is one of those measures the influence of which}
will permeate every industry and every class in the length and breadth of the United States. 62

He then concluded his speech with an appeal to the Commonwealth Idea.

I am standing here as the exponent of the principle and I claim for every line in the bill that it is in the interest of the whole people of the United States, and particularly of those who must look to higher and more experienced authority to conduct the public affairs of our Government in their interest. 63

Commentators split on whether or not Hanna's speech had any positive effect on helping subsidy forces promote passage of the bill. A writer for the pro-development Marine Review was lyrical in his praise for Hanna's address.

There has been in many a day no speech to equal the one he had just made in the senate. It has been known all along that some of the best speeches made during the late campaign were made by Mr. Hanna. They were naturally hurried efforts, but there was meat to them. He embraced at once the center and circumference of his subject. One could feel the brain throbbing in his words. But it remained for his speech upon the shipping bill to reveal the depth and strength of his statesmanship. Its keynote was earnestness — that sincerity which carries conviction and is the parent of eloquence. It was a truly splendid bit of work. Spoken
with ease and without notes, lucidly
and logically arranged, it distinguished
ed him as an orator.64

Other commentators also praised the speech.65

Detractors of the subsidy scheme, found flaws in Hanna's
subsidy argument. A writer for the Cleveland Plain
Dealer rejected Hanna's example of the successful Great
Lakes shipping trade to advocate "a scheme of subsidies
for vessels in the ocean foreign trade." The writer
declared there was no possible connection between the
two. Hanna's attempt at a statesmanlike image in his 13
December speech was belittled by a New York Times
reporter. The writer stated:

naturally his temper, his manner of
thought, and his methods of persuasion are
rather those of the trader than of the
statesman or the student of large
politics. He ignores or belittles the
facts that are against him, and where his
case is weak he makes up for the weakness
by the force and emphasis of his
assertion.66

Subsidy opponents used Hanna's high profile in
advocating the subsidy bill as a basis to tie Hanna's
corrupt, boss image to the subsidy bill, in order to
weaken its chances of passage. Hanna and his political
allies protested such tactics. A writer for the Marine
Review defended Hanna's business character, and
attributed his successful Cleveland business career to
nothing but hard work.
The Review has had little to say about Senator M.A. Hanna. During the four years in which he has been identified with national life it has been fairly silent about him. It has seen him vilified and abused, misrepresented and maligned more than any other man in public life. What reason there may be for all this calumny is not known. It is certainly not the opinion of those who know him well at home. There is no man who has lived a more open and honorable life.... He has known nothing but hard work all his life and, indeed his chief advantage over his fellow men is in his ability to work hard.... Mr. Hanna is regarded by his men as a model employer. But the caricaturists have preconceived him and have fashioned all his doings to meet their preconception. The general opinion of Mr. Hanna is that he is so saturated with commercialism that the dollar mark clings to his clothes. So universal is this view that the connection of Mr. Hanna's name with the shipping bill has been the source of its greatest weakness. But nothing could be further from the truth.67

During Senate debate upon the bill, Hanna finally lashed out at insinuations that his support of the ship subsidy bill was a quid pro quo to the large business corporations who had recently contributed liberally to the national Republican party coffer. Shaking his finger at Senator Teller of Colorado, the silver Republican now turned silver Democrat, Hanna exclaimed:

I know something about economic measures. I think I am entitled to the same consideration in connection
with such measures as it is accorded to any other Senator. I do not propose to be considered as advocating any measure to loot the Treasury when I am working for the interests of the United States.... For my part I have tried to be fair and even liberal to the other side; and I am met with the taunt, almost descending to personality, that the purpose of those who are advocating this measure is to pay back subscriptions to political campaign funds, to pay political debts, and that the Republican party is the only party that descends to such political measures, an insinuation that, by virtue of my position as chairman of the national Republican committee, I am responsible for this legislation ... in order to make recompense to those who you say have contributed to the campaign fund of the Republican party. Is that a part of an economic question to be discussed in this body? Is that what you call fair treatment in legislation?

Insinuations were also made by Hanna's supposed relationship with the American Shipbuilding Company of Cleveland and how the 'shipping trust' would benefit if the bill was passed by Congress. 68

The Congressional adjournment for Christmas on 22 December 1900, brought a new development which thrust more responsibility of the bill's management upon Hanna's shoulders. On 21 December, Senator Frye's wife died suddenly of an apparent heart attack. It could be assumed, at least for the opening days in January, Frye's grief from his personal loss affected whatever leadership on the bill he could provide from his presiding role as President Pro Tem. 69
When the 56th Congress reopened on 3 January, the ship subsidy bill was displaced from its privileged position as "unfinished business" on the Senate calendar, and substituted for by the Army Reorganization Bill. The plethora of important bills that needed to be passed before Congress adjourned for the year on 4 March, as suggested above, would have as decisive an influence on the ship subsidy bill's passage as the actions of the bill's opponents. A writer for the *Review of Reviews* gave a summary of the important legislation that the Republican leadership of the 56th Congress hoped to pass before adjournment: a ship subsidy bill; reduced war taxation; an enlarged and reorganized professional army; resolution of the Hay-Paunceforte treaty; and perhaps a Nicaraguan canal bill. Added to this were key appropriation bills that needed to be dealt with (including Burton's River and Harbors bill), and an oleomargarine bill, strongly favored by Upper Midwest producer interests. 70

It required an affirmative vote of a majority of the Senate for the ship subsidy bill to be placed back on the Senate calendar. The Republicans had a solid Senate majority, and through a near unanimous party caucus vote, placed the ship subsidy bill back on the Senate calendar for debate. In mid-January, after completion of the Army Reorganization bill, the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill
reached the Senate floor on 23 January. The fifteen legislative days lost would become crucial, making it much easier for the bill's opponents to filibuster the bill to death. 71

The ship subsidy bill became the focus of Senate debate from 25 January to 18 February 1901. A key advocate, Senator Chauncey Depew of New York, the former President of the New York Central Railroad, led off debate with a very effective speech. Depew dealt with the consequences of America's changed position in the world and the new responsibilities it had assumed in the new century. According to Depew, American businessmen's emphasis upon the production side of the industrial process had resulted in American production far exceeding internal demand. What was needed, Depew continued, was to concentrate upon the important distribution side of the industrial process in order to dispose of the surplus. Depew linked the changing conditions of American business with its new international responsibilities.

Almost at the hour which marked the exit of the nineteenth and the entrance of the twentieth century, the United States found its position changed, both in its relation to the rest of the world and in its internal conditions. We suddenly discovered, by the unexpected results of an unexpected war, that we had a place and had responsibilities second to none among nations.

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Several contemporary commentators agreed with Depew's analysis. 72

Congressional opponents of the ship subsidy bill were not inclined to engage the bill's advocates in a dialogue upon America's changed position in the world, and its new responsibilities. Opponents focused their rhetoric upon attacking the ship subsidy as class legislation, and being contrary to the American doctrine of equal rights. Sincere laissez faire conservatives and spokespeople for economic interests not directly benefiting from the bill reaffirmed the equal rights doctrine of laissez faire. Senator Clay, of Georgia, spoke for many when he declared, "Equal rights and equal opportunities to engage in any business or enterprise and to receive equal or corresponding benefits from public expenditures are among the fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution." Senator Vest of Missouri asked a key question of the subsidy bill, which thirty years before would have been quite unusual, but now was most appropriate.

If the shipbuilders and the shipowners are entitled to a bounty, why not give a bounty in the years of distress in the agricultural districts to the farmer and cattle raiser? If we enter upon this broad domain of opening the treasury and dispensing the tax money of the people at the discretion or the will of Congress, where is the end and what is the limitation? 73
In the early nineteenth century, under the American System, bounties or public aid were given to promote private enterprise. The difference, between the early to mid-nineteenth century and 1900 was that, previously, public aid given to private enterprise was considered as being for the general interest and not for the benefit of specific "classes" or special interests.

Because of the bill's advocates' pressing need for time, from 6 February to 8 February 1901, the Republican Senate leadership instituted Senate night sessions to provide additional time to debate the bill. The Democratic minority threatened to retaliate against Republican actions by stalling or filibustering against the ship subsidy bill until it was removed from the Senate calendar and replaced by appropriation bills. Every evening at 8 p.m., when a night session was due to commence, Democratic Senators would demand a roll call to see if the necessary quorum of 46 senators, the number needed for senate debate, were present. After two consecutive evenings of hurriedly corralling individual Republican Senators to their seats, the Republican leadership changed their strategy. On the third evening, the Republican Senate leadership ended their gambit of night sessions. However, the Republican strategy of night sessions produced a bitter counter-reaction from many within the Democratic minority. Any hope of Democratic cooperation
in bringing the ship subsidy bill to a vote, before adjournment, had virtually vanished. Democratic members (and no doubt also many Republicans), wanted the Senate to concentrate its dwindling time on the numerous appropriation bills, which unlike the ship subsidy bill, would *directly* benefit projects in most members states. 75

Republican advocates of the ship subsidy bill were not only weakened by their failed strategy of night sessions but by the vacancy, due to gout, of the bill's floor manager, Mark Hanna. During Hanna's later years, the stability of his health fluctuated. Hanna's declining health was a major reason he and his wife in 1899 had taken a trip to Europe. Hanna had spent a great deal of time in a French spa at Aix, where he took the local mineral water cure. During his final years in the Senate, flareups of gout occasionally sidelined Hanna. Hanna's particular absence was most debilitating, though the able Senator Aldrich assumed floor management of the bill. However, his knowledge of American shipping was not as complete or thorough. Even though stricken with gout, Hanna was among those Republican Senators who rushed to the floor during the night sessions to help insure a quorum, though as a New York *Times* correspondent observed, he "had risen from a sick bed in order to be present." 76
The key sectional opposition to the ship subsidy bill emanated from interior and Southern Senators, both Republican and Democratic. Representing agricultural interests, they rejected the bill as "class" legislation, because of the speed requirement in the bill for deciding the amount of subsidy. House members on the Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, who opposed the ship subsidy bill, issued a House Minority report which objected strongly to the "unfair" speed requirement contained in the bill. An exchange on the Senate floor between Senators' Frye and Clay, illuminated the concern of many Senators over the unfairness of the speed provision.

Clay: 'I understand that most of our farm products are carried by ships of about 12 knots.'

Frye: 'Certainly they are.'

Clay: 'I understand that to be true, and I understand that the ships that are to convey our farm products under the provisions of this bill will not draw more than a third of the amount of subsidy that the fast passenger ships will get.'

The actions of Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin, one of the Republican "Big Four," was influenced by the strong pull that sectional organized special interests had over party ties or appeals to the Commonwealth Idea. Organized state dairy groups, such as the Wisconsin Butter & Cheese Company, pressured Spooner to use his power to
displace the ship subsidy bill with the Grout Oleomargarine Bill. This legislation was strongly favored by national dairy farm associations. Spooner, a former corporate lawyer for the state's railroads, was politically threatened by the emerging La Follette progressive movement in Wisconsin. He dared not antagonize the powerful state dairy farm interest groups, which along with the railroads, were Spooner's main base of support in Wisconsin.

Spooners, at a key moment, jumped into action against the ship subsidy bill. On 16 February, Senator Spooner, with the approval of a majority in the Senate, substituted as unfinished business the Grout Oleomargarine bill in place of the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill. Defending his actions against businessmen who were unyielding defenders of the Republican policy of protection and promotion, such as steel magnate E.H. Gary, Spooner asserted that "it was not a good bill in the popular interest." Spooner's action revealed the gradual splintering of the previously united Whig-Republican business community. They had previously stood for government promotion of the economy in the general interest. Now, over the ship subsidy bill they were split into competing economic special interest groups.

The Democratic strategy of stalling action on the ship subsidy bill, with long speeches, which subsidy
proponents labeled as filibustering, (under current Senate rules, no vote could be taken as long as any member cared to discuss the bill) had, with the timely help of Spooner, derailed Senate passage during the short session of the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill.81

Due to the limited time left in the session, many bills, such as the Army and Sundry appropriation bills, were passed before adjournment. Others bills, such as the River and Harbors bill, failed to come to a vote.

The curious circumstances surrounding Senator Carter of Montana's personal filibuster against the River and Harbors bill, which had already passed the House on 16 January 1901, led to fresh accusations in Cleveland that Hanna precipitated Carter's action to rebuke Congressman Burton. Senator Carter was due to leave the Senate upon its 4 March 1901 adjournment. He had been under an ethical cloud since early January 1901. At the time, the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections had issued a unanimous report that concluded that Carter was not entitled to his Senate seat because of the "briberies and corrupt practices by his agents," which violated the laws of Montana for the "protection of purity of elections."82 For some reason, this departing, ethically-tainted Republican Senator took the Senate floor on the evening on 3 March, and taking advantage of the Senate
rules on unlimited debate, occupied it for nearly thirteen consecutive hours, until adjournment the following morning at 9:45 a.m.

Carter's effort ended any hope of reaching a vote on a Senate compromise version of the House River and Harbors bill. Carter's method of filibuster was to read from the report of the River and Harbors bill and then comment upon relevant portions. During one part of his discussion, Carter veered away from describing the inadequacies of the Rivers and Harbors bill, and began criticizing the persistent efforts of certain Democratic Senators in causing defeat of the ship subsidy bill. What explained Senator Carter's behavior?  

A recent historian alleged that Carter's action was at the joint request of Hanna and the McKinley Administration. McKinley and Hanna wanted to delay Burton's River and Harbors bill from Senate passage before adjournment. McKinley thought the current sixty-million-dollar appropriation in the bill was ten million too high. Hanna, in a familiar pique of anger over the failure of the ship subsidy bill to reach a vote in the Senate, wanted to punish the opponents of the ship subsidy bill. In a pair of editorials in the Cleveland Plain Dealer entitled, "Why the Rivers and Harbors Bill Failed," and, "Mark Hanna is to Blame," a writer charged Hanna with responsibility for stalling the River and Harbors bill. The writer

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claimed Hanna betrayed the interests of Cleveland through his fractious relationship with Congressman Burton over the ship subsidy bill.

The responsibility for the failure of the river and harbor bill rest with those who persisted in blocking the way with the ship subsidy bill and who sacrificed the interests of Cleveland, of the commerce of the Lakes, and of the waterways and harbors of the United States generally for the sake of 'lambasting' Mr. Burton, who would not bow down and worship the ship subsidy fetish.... From that time on Mr. Hanna was not particularly favorable to the River and Harbor bill, and in more ways than one he showed that he did not feel particularly friendly toward Mr. Burton. There is no doubt that if Senator Carter opposed the bill at the request of President McKinley, that opposition came primarily at the suggestion of Mr. Hanna.84

The irony of Hanna's actions in opposing the government's three-mile-Eastward extension of the breakwater, even in a pique of anger at Burton, demonstrated a serious split within the ranks of the Republican protectionist forces as to what projects should be funded by the federal government. In a letter written to Hanna in 1898, the railroad magnate and personal friend of Hanna, James J. Hill, originated an idea to take money out of the rivers-and-harbors projects and place it in ship subsidies. This action would be more appropriate, noted 318
Hill, than "to lathe and plaster the bottoms of rivers called navigable, on which there had not been a steamboat floated in ten years." In response Hanna replied, "You are dead right."85

By late January 1901, when the ship subsidy bill was being debated in the Senate, Hanna publicly announced that it was his contention that the federal government's function in Cleveland had ended with the establishment of a safe harbor of refuge. According to Hanna, it did not include additional appropriations for the recent extension of the breakwater or the improvement of the mouth of the harbor. According to Burton, in a private interview he had later with Hanna, the Senator supposedly, "modified his statement later to say that he would be willing to see it extended as far as Willson Avenue."86

Cleveland Republicans could not believe that Hanna, who had earlier used the construction of the original breakwater in the 1870s to help transform the local Republican party into an instrument of economic development for Cleveland, would actually use his power in the Senate Commerce Committee to block the government's grant of 2.2 million dollars to Cleveland. A reporter for the Plain Dealer stated that Hanna's implied threats of opposing the breakwater appropriation were nothing but a threat against Burton in order to force him to end his opposition to the ship subsidy bill. According to the
reporter, Clevelanders', "cannot believe that so adroit a politician as Mr. Hanna has shown himself to be, would make so fatal a blunder ... that he would maliciously deal an ugly blow at the commerce and navigation of the lakes in fighting for the special advantage of a coterie of ocean going shipowners...."  

Others believed that if Hanna blocked Cleveland's breakwater appropriation, it was not because of hostility towards Burton but to protect Hanna's economic interests at the Great Lakes port of Ashtabula, Ohio. A writer for the independent Cleveland Press accused Hanna of "trying to cut Cleveland's appropriation in the rivers and harbors bill and add to Ashtabula's slice of the pie."  

Though excoriated for his actions in delaying passage of the River and Harbors bill by the local Cleveland press, the business community, and a large part of the local Republican party, Hanna refused to remain silent. Together with several of his political allies, he launched an attack on Burton's criticism of the ship subsidy bill as being unprincipled and devious. According to Hanna, Burton's opposition was selective, since Burton, through his role as chairman of the House River and Harbors Committee, had strengthened and profited by the Republican promotional system of subsidies to various industries. During debate in the Senate Hanna exclaimed that the River and Harbors bill was as much of a subsidy
to economic interests as the criticized Ship Subsidy bill: "If it is the object of measures pending before Congress merely to get money out of the Treasury, what about the River and Harbor bill? I say here that there are propositions in that bill that would make the ship subsidy bill look pale." Senator Frye also complained that the ship subsidy bill did not present a "very serious proposition" to the Senate, "which would authorize in five minutes the construction of a battleship costing $5,000,000 and pass a River and Harbor bill carrying $60,000,000 in a few hours or days."\(^8\)

Hanna's fellow Ohioan and ally, Congressman Charles Grosvenor, served as chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Grosvenor's committee had charge of any House ship subsidy legislation. Grosvenor released a public letter to Burton, wherein he praised the efficacy of the traditional Republican policy of government protection and promotion of industry. According to Grosvenor, there was no difference in subsidies given to the merchant marine or given to projects contained in the River and Harbors bill.

... the greatest scheme of subsidy every entered upon in the United States is the river and harbor appropriations, to which Mr. Burton is devoted.... The river and harbor appropriations are subsidies, just as truly as the ship subsidy would be. In the one case as in the other the
fund is a public fund, collected from all the people and expended for the very few... The congressmen who goes in for appropriations, should pattern after Grosvenor and Hanna. He should leave his squeamishness between the leaves of the family Bible.90

Unlike Burton's advocacy for the River and Harbor bill, Hanna's and other ship subsidy advocates' problem was that traditional Commonwealth rhetoric for government promotion of a single major industry had become anachronistic. Growing numbers of legislators and voters realized that the vast quantity of legislation benefited certain socioeconomic interest groups. In seeking passage of certain appropriation bills, it was usually best to appeal directly to each of them.

By 1900, there had occurred a historic shift in government-business relations and the rhetoric used to justify it. The earlier appeal to the antebellum Commonwealth policy of government promotion of a single major industry, to benefiting, either directly or indirectly, done for the benefit of the general interest, was being replaced by a slightly different government distribution policy. Unlike the Commonwealth policy, the new policy simultaneously promoted different national projects or industries in a single bill. In policy terms, there was no single Commonwealth, but instead, dozens of sectional economic interests. Outside of the armed
forces, no single industry or interest could now justify massive amounts of government subsidy, by simply stating that aid to their particular interest would directly benefit the entire American people. Now Congress simultaneously spread protection and subsidies to various sectional economic interests in one bill, thereby benefitting many industries in all parts of the country.

The failure of the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill to reach a Senate vote in 1902 caused Senator Frye to introduce in the 57th Congress a substantially weaker Frye ship subsidy bill. To appease the producing interests of the Interior and the South, Frye completely changed the provisions of the bill. He eliminated the speed requirements, which had so infuriated the producer interests. In fact, the entire long-term industrial strategy, present in the Hanna-Payne bill, for building up the merchant marine through a series of $9,000,000 payments over a period of twenty years, was completely removed from the Frye bill. It was hard to fathom the limited yearly outlay of payments contained in the bill. The benefits were spread over many different interest groups, over an unlimited period of years, instead of one industry for a set time period.

By breaking the Commonwealth mold of the Hanna-Payne bill, and replacing it with the popular special interest mold, Frye created a harmless bill that would not
even strengthen the merchant marine. The Frye bill simply amended the innocuous 1891 Mail Subsidy Act.\textsuperscript{91} Probably the Frye bill was a simple face-saving device for the Senate Republican leadership. They wanted to show they could pass a ship subsidy bill, even a weakened and ineffective one.

While Hanna judiciously voiced his displeasure at the weakened Frye bill on the Senate floor, he still advocated its passage.\textsuperscript{92} By helping to push the Frye bill through the Senate and House, Hanna desired to regain some of his political prestige and honor in his Cleveland political base. He had been undoubtedly damaged by his feud with Burton over the Rivers and Harbors bill.

The Frye bill reached a Senate vote, on 17 March 1902, in the Republican dominated Senate. It passed by a 42 to 31 margin. However, despite being substantially weakened it still did not satisfy the producer interests of the South and Interior. Their representatives still castigated any subsidy to the merchant marine as "class" legislation. Six Republicans deserted the party on the vote on the Frye bill, including two of the "Big Four," Iowa's William Allison and Wisconsin's John Spooner. Their example of placing sectional economic interest over national party unity gave Midwestern Republican congressmen an excuse for opposing the Frye bill. To many
Interior Republican House members, Allison and Spooner opposed it, the bill could not be considered an "official" caucus party measure. 93

Upon reaching the House, the Frye bill was buried for the entire duration of the first session of the 57th Congress. Grosvenor failed in his attempt to bring the bill from his Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to the floor. Many House Republican members saw no valid reason to push for the unpopular concept of providing public subsidies to a single private interest. Due to the intransigence of several Republican members, the Frye bill never reached a vote in the House. 94

With the opening of the 57th Congress in 1902, the political battle between Hanna and Burton over the River and Harbors bill finally ended with its passage on 6 June 1902. Burton's pressure in the joint Senate-House Committee not only gained passage of the 60 million River and Harbors Act but also kept intact Cleveland's entire 2.2 million appropriation for improvement of the harbor and three mile extension of the breakwater. Continued pressure on Hanna, from former political allies such as the current Civil Service Commissioner, James R. Garfield, continued while the bill was in joint conference. Garfield emphasized to Hanna that, "I am confident you should give assurance that the harbor improvement appropriation as provided by the House will be concurred
in by the Senate. The large business interests will vigorously oppose any reduction. I personally urge that you give this assurance." Hanna replied, "I have given this matter my attention, and expect to see it arranged to the satisfaction of our friends."95 Hanna emphasized that since Cleveland received its full appropriation in the bill, this was proof he was not opposed to helping improve the city's harbor. However, not surprisingly, it was Burton who received the major credit within Cleveland for gaining federal funds for the harbor and breakwater.

After the River and Harbors Act of 1902 was passed by Congress, the continued political feud between Hanna and Burton erupted into a bitter factional dispute within the Cuyahoga Republican party. The split was over which faction would control the Cuyahoga Republican Central Committee during the upcoming local fall elections. The factional dispute occurred when Burton's candidate for committee chairman, Paul Howland, lost to the Hanna faction's candidate, Abel. Burton, who at the time was relaxing in Hot Springs, Virginia due to "nervous exhaustion," immediately charged three of Hanna's local political lieutenants, Charles Leach, Frank Chandler, and W.R. Hopkins, of using surreptitious means to engineer Howland's defeat. Burton threatened that if Abel did not quit the chairmanship he would resign from the ticket in
the upcoming fall election. Burton claimed it was customary for the congressional candidate to select the individual who would manage his campaign.

The question of local political custom aside, it was noteworthy that Burton attempted to make a power move against the local Hanna machine in June 1902. At this time Burton had received all the local accolades for pushing the River and Harbors bill through Congress. Unlike Hanna, Burton was at the peak of congressional power and local popularity. The local party could not permit the loss of its strongest candidate in the upcoming election. A face-saving compromise had to be hammered out between the two factions. Hanna realized Burton's strong position. Hanna held a conversation on the factional matter with a Burton ally, attorney Harvey Boulder. According to Boulder, in a letter sent to Burton summarizing the meeting, Hanna stated that "he ... personally and as a Republican, would stand behind the best efforts that could be made to elect you this fall." President Roosevelt was soon advised of the seriousness of Burton's threat to the Republican party in a 10 June 1902 conference with Hanna.

In late July, a "memorandum" agreement was agreed to by the two local factional organizations. As Burton's 21st Congressional District encompassed only half of the county committee's jurisdiction, it was agreed that a
special advisory committee of fifteen men, headed by Howland, would run Burton's congressional campaign. The central committee would function outside of Burton's 21st District. While the "Burton-Abel Agreement" was supposedly a compromise between the two factions to ensure a successful fall campaign, to most local and national observers it was another political defeat for Hanna and his allies at the hands of Burton and his friends. Wilbur D. Jones, a historian who studied the local political tension between Burton and Hanna during these years, correctly interprets the agreement as another example of Hanna's failure to control local factional disputes within the area of Cleveland Republican politics: "Perhaps nothing can better illustrate the sorry state of Cleveland politics during the Hanna era than this unusual agreement itself." 97

Not content with disrupting the Hanna faction with threats to resign from the ticket, Burton concurrently brought charges against several of Hanna's political agents: U.S. Federal Marshal Frank Chandler, District Customs Collector Charles Leach, and Burton's own former political agent, Postmaster C.C. Dewstoe. Burton charged them with violations of the federal rule which banned civil service employees from engaging in political activity. Burton claimed the three violated the federal rule through their actions at the county convention which
caused Howland's defeat as chairman. Burton's charges of "pernicious political activity" was heard by a three-man Civil Service Commission, headed by James R. Garfield, a former close political associate and friend of both Hanna and Burton. Burton hoped that his public pressure would deny Leach, along with Chandler Hanna's most effective local political agent, reappointment by the President as collector of customs. The customs post was a prime political patronage job.98

However, Burton's second attack against Hanna was not successful. Hanna vigorously defended his two chief lieutenants. Hanna had a general conference with the President. The conference also included Civil Service Commissioner Garfield and Postmaster Henry Payne. Garfield and the Civil Service Commission made an investigation of the charges brought against the men. Soon they issued a report to the President clearing all three men. President Roosevelt, probably tiring of the ceaseless party factional disputes emanating from Cleveland, and not wishing to be further bogged down in the quagmire of Cleveland Republican politics, decided it would not be politically prudent to upset the local status quo. He immediately reappointed Leach as collector of customs.99 Hanna had blunted Burton's plan to gain ascendency of the local party machine. However, on
Hanna's part, it had been a purely defensive action to prevent further erosion of his local political power base.

The wide coverage, in many national newspapers, of Hanna's recent failure to control the factionalism of Cleveland Republican politics, together with his twin political defeats on the Hanna-Payne ship subsidy bill and the 1902 River and Harbors Act, damaged Hanna's national prestige and reduced his power within the Republican Party. The final indignity came in early 1903, when in a conference with Republican House members of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Hanna made a direct personal appeal for them to favorably report the Frye bill to the full House. He appealed to them as the Republican National Chairman and demanded that the bill be brought to a vote in order to redeem party pledges. Burton, although not a member of the Merchant Marine Committee, convinced enough Republicans on the Committee to vote with the Democrats against the Ship Subsidy bill. This final defeat on the ship subsidy bill was an additional blow to Hanna's party prestige. 99

The long campaign begun after the Civil War to grant a public subsidy to rebuild the merchant marine for the benefit of the entire commonwealth, had ended in total failure. The twin forces of a resurgent belief in the equal rights doctrine of conservative laissez faire, coupled with the multiplication and growing power of
economic special interest groups, led to the dissolution of the Commonwealth Idea of public promotion for the general interest. No longer would it be considered a viable public governing policy.

Despite some serious political setbacks for Hanna, from December 1900 to July 1902 (and even after), Hanna was not finished as a power within the national Republican party or as a leading spokesman on issues affecting the American political economy at the turn of the century.

Hanna, at the closing of the 1st session of the 57th Congress on 2 July 1902, was not a beaten public figure. This, despite his earlier failure to pass a ship subsidy measure, or witness an upstart Congressman defeat him on several economic and party issues. Instead, as portrayed by a New York Times congressional correspondent, "Hanna kept walking briskly about the Chamber shaking hands with everybody and without his cane. There was not a trace of gout; he did not limp, and he seemed as happy as a boy over the recovery of his health."

Hanna's effectiveness as a public figure did not end with his failed crusade for the Commonwealth Idea during the ship subsidy battle. While Hanna trumpeted the Commonwealth Idea of equal rights in the Senate, at the same time he helped to form one of the first national special interest groups of the twentieth century: the National Civic Federation. Hanna's work during the final
two years of his life therefore made him a key transi-
tional figure within the evolving government-business
relationship of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.

Hanna, through his conciliatory work on the
National Civic Federation, in which he attempted to create
new bureaucratic structures to better adjudicate capital-
labor disputes, was advancing toward the Twentieth Century
Administrative State.
FOOTNOTES


2 Review of Reviews 21 (1899), 322.

3 Edward Dickison, "The United States Merchant Marine as an Arm of National Policy" (Ph.D. diss., St. Louis University, 1968), 33.

4 Ibid.


6 Watson and Runke, "Should Our Marine be Subsidized," 611.

7 Marine Review, 8 (Oct. 26, 1893), 7; Scientific American, 84 (Jan. 12, 1901), 18; Emory Johnson, Ocean and Inland Water Transportation (New York, 1906), 258; George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York, 1951), 128-9.

8 Dickison, "The United State Merchant Marine as an Arm of National Policy," 34.


12 Arena, 25 (Feb. 1901), 150; Marine Review, 21 (April 19, 1900), 18.


14 Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kan., 1980), 34; Safford, 15.


16 H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, New York, 1963), 28.

17 S.C. Wheeler to Theodore Burton, December 5, 1900, Container 42, Theodore Burton Papers (Western Reserve Historical Society).

18 Review of Reviews, 23 (Jan. 1901), 5.

19 Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 31, 1901, p. 1733.

20 Nation, 70 (Jan. 4, 1900), 4-5.


23 Scientific America, 82 (May 5, 1900), 274.

24 Marine Review, 7; McDougall, "Plea for Home Ships."


26 Rothman focused upon the organizational trends of control and efficiency, which characterized many late nineteenth century institutions and applied it to the late 1890s Republican party caucus. David Rothman, Politics and Power: the U.S. Senate, 1869-1901 (New York, 1966), 4, 5.
27 Various congressional representatives on the Committee, besides Frye and Hanna, were Sen. Elkins of West Virginia, Sen. Perkins of California (who was a rare political commodity, a western congressional member who supported the ship subsidy bill), and Congressman Sereno Payne of Wisconsin, who was then chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Business representatives from the shipping community included: Charles H. Cramp, shipbuilder from Philadelphia; C.P. Huntington, who was regarded by contemporaries as having, at Newport News, R.I., one of the finest shipyards in the world; and Samuel Sewall of Maine, who had the largest shipbuilding company of sailing ships in the U.S. Representatives from the Great Lakes shipping community on the Committee were: Harvey D. Goulder, attorney for the Lake Carriers' Association; Frank J. Firth, pres. of the Lake Carriers' Assoc. Cong. Rec., 56th Con., 2nd Sess., Dec. 4, 1900, p. 31; Safford, 29; Criticism of the composition was quite prevalent in the press. "Under the guise of patriotism, and feigning a deep solicitude for the marine, a coterie of shipbuilders and shipowners framed the bill solely in their own interests, and aided by a powerful lobby have been endeavoring to secure its passage through Congress." John C. Watson and Richard Runke, "Should Our Marine Be Subsidized?" Arena, 23 (June, 1900).

28 Samuel Horace Merrill, The Republican Command, 1897-1913. (Lex., Ky.: 1971); Rothman, Power and Politics, 50.


30 Marine Review, 21 (Jan. 18, 1900), 20.

31 Eugene Chamberlain, "The Shipping Subsidy Bill," Forum, 29 (July, 1900), 539. Chamberlain was the current Commissioner of Navigation. He formerly had been Commissioner under Cleveland, and had then supported the Cleveland Administration's position against the 1891 Ship Subsidy Bill. Chamberlain was criticized by subsidy opponents for shifting his position on the subsidy question, thus bringing himself into line with the McKinley Administration's position.

32 Rothman, Politics and Power, 192, 206; The example of former Cleveland Congressman (1873-75) Richard Parsons, revealed the new careers former legislators could
have as lobbyists for special interests. Parsons, who was credited by many for initiating the pressure in Congress for the need of a breakwater for Cleveland, immediately upon his defeat for reelection, became a Washington lobbyist for the Pacific Mail Steamship Co. Parsons personally testified before a Cong. Comm. of his former colleagues, on the pressing needed for the Company to receive a subsidy, in order to build up its fledgling international shipping lines. Parson was reportedly paid $10,000 for his services as a lobbyist for the Company. *Annals of Cleveland*, 58 (Jan. 9, 1875), 4.

33 The strategy of the subsidy forces, in regards to the actions of the special interest groups which supported Hanna-Payne, encompassed having as many business associations pass resolutions at their conventions during the winter-spring of 1900. This was when the bill was being introduced in Congress, and it was important to create a groundswell of support for the bill. It was hoped this strategy would gain momentum for the subsidy forces by late 1900, when the bill would hopefully be debated in the Senate. Ship subsidy advocates claimed that the bill had "been endorsed by over two hundred of the leading commercial and agriculture associations who ... petitioned Congress for its passage." Hugh Gordon Miller, "What Government Subsidy Means to American Merchant Marine,"; Important business or industrial associations which publicly advocated for passage of the subsidy bill were: National Association of Manufacturers; Southern Cotton Spinners' Association; and the Allied National Agricultural Societies. *Marine Review*, (March 22, 1900), 18; *Cong. Rec.*, 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 8, 1901; J.C. Hanley to Spooner, Oct. 2, 1900, box 40, Spooner Papers (L.C.); A leading national special interest groups which opposed the provisions of the Hanna-Payne bill was the Merchants Assoc. of New York; Merchant Assoc. of New York to Nelson Aldrich, Container 32, Aldrich Papers (L.C.); The failure of the efforts of the powerful organized interests supporting the ship subsidy legislation in getting a bill passed by both houses of congress, was gleefully noted. "The promoters of the subsidy bill have for years tried to advance their cause by newspaper propaganda, by working conventions and business organizations, by hearings before committees of Congress, and by the splendid advocacy of their friends in Congress. The net result has been utter failure." *New York Times*, April 22, 1902.

34 Cleveland *Leader*, Nov. 19, 1900, p. 10.
35 A typical telegram Hanna sent out to individual Senators, was the one written to Sen. Aldrich: "You will recall the agreement reached at the last meeting of the committee on order of business with reference to the shipping bill at the opening of the session next month. Senator Frye has asked me to communicate with you, to request your prompt attendance in the Senate at the opening of the next session, in order that the bill may be placed in the proper position for immediate consideration," Hanna to Aldrich, Nov. 10, 1900, Container 33, Aldrich Papers (L.C.); Hanna to Spooner, Nov. 10, 1900, Box 40, Spooner Papers (L.C.).

36 22 (Nov. 15, 1900), 20; ibid., 22 (Dec. 6, 1900), 21.


39 The Iron Age, Dec. 27, 1900, pp. 18-19.

40 Cleveland Leader, Nov. 23, 1900, p. 1; Marine Review, 22 (Dec. 6, 1900), 13; ibid., 22 (Dec. 27, 1900), 20; Review of Reviews, 23 (Feb., 1901).

41 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 20, 1900, p. 1; Marine Review, 23 (March 14, 1901), 18.

42 Marine Review, 23 (Dec. 27, 1900), 20.

43 Ibid., 22 (Dec. 6, 1900), 13.

44 Jones is an excellent advocate in defending Burton's actions against Hanna and the local machine. Jones though fails to understand the position Hanna was working from in his numerous disputes with Burton. A possible reason for this is that Jones's article is based almost entirely on the Burton papers, with no input from any of Hanna's primary materials. Still, though Jones always took Burton's position in every political dispute the Congressman had with Hanna, he produced of the best articles dealing with the factionalism within the Cleveland Republican party. Wilbur Devereux Jones, "Marcus A. Hanna and Theodore E. Burton," Ohio State Archeological and Historical Quarterly, 60 (Jan. 1951), 12-13; Charles Leach Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).
45 Cleveland Press, April 12, 1902, volume 4, Burton Papers (Western Reserve Historical Society).

46 C.C. Dewstoe to Theodore Burton, Nov. 27, 1900, Container 1, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.).

47 Cleveland Leader, Nov. 23, 1900, p. 1.

48 Theodore Burton to Andrew Squire, Nov. 27, 1900, Con. 42, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.); Burton to J.B. Morrow, Dec. 1, 1900, Con. 42, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.); Burton to Vernon Brown, Dec. 3, 1900, Con. 42, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.).


50 Cleveland Leader, Nov. 24, 1900, p. 1; Dover Interview, Box 4, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).

51 J.B. Morrow Interview, Box 3, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Cleveland Leader, Dec. 12, 1900, p. 7; ibid., Dec., 15, 1900, p. 4; ibid., March 17, 1902, p. 4.

52 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 26, 1900, p. 4.

53 New York Times, Dec. 16, 1900, p. 4; Sen. Rawlins of Utah criticized the subsidy as an unjust attempt to subvert the previous patriotic just war taxation of the American people: "The tax-reduction bill naturally waits upon the pleasure of the ship-subsidy bill. We passed a law, in a spirit of patriotism and love of country, putting a tax upon almost all conceivable things to raise money to prosecute a war for the sake of liberty and humanity. Those taxes would naturally be taken off when the ends which they were to subserve had been accomplished. All the ends ... have been achieved. Nothing remains to be done. But the moneys imposed for the sake of war, for the sake of maintaining the honor of our country ... are no longer to be consecrated to the ends to which they were originally designed. They are now to be perverted and turned into an entirely different channel. They are to go to concerns that cannot be said to need them. Cong. Rec., 56th Con., 2nd Sess., Jan. 31, 1901, p. 1620; Review of Reviews, 23 (April, 1901).


Cong. Rec., 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., Dec. 4, 1900, p. 4; Ship subsidy opponents criticized the efforts of the literary bureau of the ship subsidy forces. "Therefore, a campaign of education on this important question had been inaugurated.... Soon the country at large will be getting literature bearing upon the subject in their mail. At least 60,000 copies of Mr. Frye's speech in the Senate ... last week, are being printed at private cost, and their general distribution will begin in a few days." Cleveland *Leader*, Dec. 12, 1900, p. 7.


Hanna's chief biographer, Herbert Croly, stated in 1912, the philosophic reasons behind Hanna's advocacy of a subsidy to the merchant marine: "He saw that every branch of American industry, agriculture and domestic commerce rested more or less on encouragement by the government, and that such encouragement was granted on the assumption that the public economic interest was most effectively promoted by the stimulation of private enterprise. On this basis a national economic system had been created, the several parts of which were closely connected, and which with one exception included every essential economic activity."


Ibid., p. 275.

Ibid.


72 Cong. Rec., 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 25, 1901, p. 1446; "Until now Americans scarcely can be said to have taken any part in the competition for overseas commerce.... The energies of the United States have been directed mainly to building up of home industries and to the exclusion by high tariffs of foreign manufacturers from the American market. That work has been accomplished. American manufacturers can now do more than supply their home market. With them commercial expansion has become a necessity, and they therefore are turning their attention to the overseas trade as they never have done before." Mr. Wetherell, Fortnightly Review in Iron Age, April 23, 1902.

73 Literary Digest, 21 (Dec. 15, 1900), p. 728; Outlook, 67 (Feb., 1901), 336.


75 Sen. Money of Mississippi excoriated the Republican Senate leadership for its using the device of night sessions to help push the ship subsidy bill through the Senate, and for its also using the threat of an extra session to break the Democratic opposition. "So far as an extra session is concerned, if that side of the Senate are willing to accept an extra session, we can stand it over here. There is no responsibility upon us. The responsibility for legislation or the lack of it rests there. You can get all your appropriation bill through if you take this bill out of the way. If you persist in blocking the way, you, not we, take the responsibility of an extra session. It will be your fault, not ours. We
can go fishing, so far as that is concerned." Cong. Rec., 56th Cong. Sess., Feb. 8, 1901, p. 2120.


77 The House Minority Report particularly criticized the speed requirement of the subsidy bill. "1. Because subsidies are graded according to the speed and capacity of ships, and are more than twice as high per ton of capacity for the swift passenger steamers, which carry but little cargo, as for ordinary freight steamers, which carry 80 or 90 percent of our exports. The subsidy, therefore, if it affects rates at all, will affect passenger rather than freight rates." Marine Review, 21 (May 17, 1900), 21; Iron Age, Dec. 13, 1900, p. 9.


79 "Many Republicans have expressed to me the idea that if you would energetically oppose the Ship-subsidy Bill, it would add materially to your strength. There appears to be a well fixed opinion in all quarters that the bill is an infamous one, and it is believed that no man in the Northwest who does not oppose it will receive approval on the part of his consti-
tuents." George W. Bird to Spooner, Feb. 1, 1901, Box 42, John Spooner Papers (L.C.); "Protect the farming interests rather than the corporations' millions. Push the Grout bill at the expense of the subsidy bill and Wisconsin farmers are with you." C.J. Pearsall, Vice President of the Wisconsin Butter & Cheese Co. to Spooner, Feb. 6, 1901, Box 42, Spooner Papers (L.C.).


82 New York Times, Jan. 2, 1901, p. 6; Cleveland Leader, March 4, 1901, p. 1; Stay, 40, 42.
83 New York Times, March 5, 1901, p. 5; Review of Reviews, 23 (April 1901), 400-01.

84 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 5, 1901, v. 3, v. 12, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.); "Senator Hanna is believed to have encouraged, if he did not direct, the assault upon the bill. In part it is believed he desired to administer a crushing defeat to Mr. Burton, who has shown an ambitious and insurgent disposition in Ohio politics ... by his opposition to the Subsidy bill...." Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 5, 1901, v. 3, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.).


86 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 20, 1901, v. 12, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.); ibid., Jan. 28, 1901, v. 12, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.); Marine Review, 23 (Feb. 21, 1901), 20.

87 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 10, 1901, v. 3, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.).

88 Cleveland Press, April 12, 1902, v. 4, Burton Papers (W.R.H.S.).


91 Nation, 74 (Feb. 27, 1902), 166; New York Times, March 18, 1902, p. 1; ibid., April 7, 1902, p. 8.


93 Colliers Weekly quoted in the Cong. Rec., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., March 14, 1902, p. 2788; Literary Digest, 24 (March 29, 1902), 498; New York Times, April 7, 1902, p. 8; James Parker, "Senator


100 To Hanna biographer Herbert Croly, Hanna was pictured as the perfect metaphor for Croly's concept of "Pioneer Americanism." According to Croly, Hanna represented the culmination of nineteenth century life. The Ohioan had failed to anticipate the changes and consequences brought by the new century. For Croly, Hanna had taken the traditional nineteenth century system of government and promoted economic development to its limits. According to Croly, Hanna did not become one of the public figures who would implement the new techniques of special interest groups, but instead, was the last of the old public figures. Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*, 349.

MARK HANNA
AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
VOLUME II
DISSERTATION

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By

Fred C. Shoemaker, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

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CHAPTER VII

THE END OF AN ERA:
HANNA AT THE CROSSROAD OF THE CENTURIES

During the final three years of Hanna's life, he sought to preserve the party period Commonwealth policy of development and protection. Simultaneously, Hanna worked to inaugurate a broad national policy for conciliation of labor-management disputes. The conciliation took place under the auspices of the National Civic Federation. Ironically, those efforts served to initiate the emergence of the Administrative State. At the same time, Hanna's intra-party feud with President Theodore Roosevelt was an attempt to convince Roosevelt to preserve the 19th Century Commonwealth principles which Hanna and his former political allies had made the ideological centerpiece of the Republican party. Hanna's conflicting actions of ushering in the future with the Administrative state, while attempting to preserve the past with his continued
support of the Commonwealth policy made him a major transitional figure between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

By 1890, many public figures realized the many grave social problems of an emerging industrial, urban America could not be solved with an antiquated party structure, which was more appropriate for development and distribution.¹ Whether the problem was long-haul versus short-haul railroad rate discrimination in Illinois, or coal mine safety in Ohio, the proper structure to resolve the problems was increasingly a commission of experts and not a party organization.² According to McCormick and other historians, by the twentieth century the key function for government was no longer distribution and development, but regulation and redistribution. Private special interest groups and governmental bureaucratic agencies and commissioners became the primary instruments for creating policy within the emerging Administrative State. For McCormick and the legal historian James Willard Hurst, by the end of the 19th century the loyalty and advocacy of the rising plethora of administrative client interest groups went naturally to the functional economic organizations, whether public or private, than to the increasingly outmoded party organizations.³

Hanna played a very important role in the transformation of economic and social governance from the party
period to the administrative state. Hanna's role as a critical figure in U.S. history exceeded his crusade for the Commonwealth Idea. Hanna was concerned by the tensions that affected the American polity, as it moved beyond the allocation of resources through the nineteenth-century traditional party period to the twentieth century administrative state. While Hanna was trumpeting the Commonwealth Idea in the Senate (in connection with his advocacy for the ship subsidy bill), he was elected chairman of the first major twentieth century national special interest group: the National Civic Federation.

To understand Hanna's strong influence within the emerging administrative state, it is necessary to examine Hanna's role in using the NCF as a policy tool outside the traditional party system. Hanna, during his tenure as chairman of the NCF, had the organization focus upon arbitration and conciliation of labor disputes. However, he did not discard his previous allegiance to the Republican party, or his continued interest in preserving the party as a viable policy making instrument in the new century. He was chairman of the RNC during his entire tenure as chairman of the NCF.

Hanna increasingly realized that his highly publicized labor conciliation work, beginning with the 1900 anthracite coal strike, and after 1901 as chairman of
the NCF, gave him the opportunity to transform the Republican party. During the late nineteenth century, Hanna, together with McKinley, were key agents in moving the Republican party toward becoming an instrument of economic development and cultural pluralism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Hanna also attempted to transform the Republican party into an influential instrument for labor peace. If achieved, the party could then become a working partner with the NCF.

Hanna's previous business record as a labor employer who recognized organized labor, unlike other politicians or businessmen, made him well qualified to testify to the wisdom of trade agreements. From Hanna's perspective, a key reason for the efficacy of labor conciliation was the events that transpired from 1898 to 1900 in the interstate bituminous coal region.

In 1897, M.A. Hanna & Co. helped create the first major interstate trade agreement between a major industry and a national union: the 1898 joint Interstate Trade Agreement for the bituminous coal region. Because of the severe 1890s depression, by 1897, the UMW barely existed as a labor organization. That year President Michael Ratchford called a desperation strike in the bituminous coal region. Many bituminous operators, (such as M.A. Hanna & Co.), instead of attempting to break the strike and crush the union, accepted the strike as an opportunity
to legitimize the union. Labor peace was important to all parties since the operators saw an opportunity finally to regulate an anarchic industry.

The joint interstate agreements were an innovative cooperative instrument created by certain coal interests (including Hanna's) to end the bitter competition between the soft coal operators. The competition had resulted in overproduction and lower prices in the Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Western Pennsylvania bituminous region. The series of joint interstate agreements were advantageous to both capital and labor. For the operators, the agreements helped to stabilize their competitive costs and led to a more overall rationalization of the bituminous coal region located north of the Ohio river. The UMW benefited from the agreements because for the first time in an interstate region it promised recognition and regular benefits for the national union. As a recent historian has stated, the Interstate agreement established the UMW as a "powerful industrial union."  

Thereafter, the operators and UMW met in an annual conference to sign the joint agreement. The Interstate agreement set the annual goals for the soft coal industry and wages to be paid for the miners. To stabilize the soft coal industry, the UMW became the prime enforcer of the agreement. To uphold the trade agreement, the UMW prevented strikes by its members in the bituminous region.
covered by the agreement. For the first time a national union had accepted the responsibility of upholding an interstate trade agreement. The UMW soon proved itself as capable as any other industrial organization of upholding its responsibilities under a trade agreement.

The UMW proved its good faith in the bituminous coal region. By 1900, its new president, John Mitchell, wanted to negotiate the same type of agreements with the anthracite operators for the unorganized anthracite coal fields of eastern Pennsylvania. However, the anthracite coal operators refused to raise wages of the anthracite coal miners and refused to negotiate any form of joint trade agreements that would have implicitly recognized the UMW as the bargaining agent for the miners. Mitchell, under pressure from the rank and file and union officials in the anthracite districts, called out all UMW miners in the anthracite region on 17 Sept. 1900.

The anthracite coal operators refusal to submit the question of the miners' wages to arbitration, was a personal rebuke to Mitchell and to the union. Mitchell believed the method of arbitration in the bituminous regions had proved successful for the unions, which had rejected class warfare and had chosen instead the path of business unionism. According to Mitchell, when "employers and miners' delegates meet in joint Inter-State convention and like prudent, sensible businessmen agree upon a scale
of wages which remains in force for one year," the causes of strikes and lockouts were removed. ⑦

It soon became evident that the workers' meager resources, and the UMW's small treasury, could not sustain the anthracite miners' throughout the winter of 1900. Mitchell, in a pattern of behavior he would repeat whenever embroiled in a tough labor dispute, went outside the organized labor community and cajoled his business and political allies to save him and his union from disaster. Senator Mark Hanna was the primary individual from whom Mitchell sought help in the current crisis. Mitchell knew that Hanna had proved he was a friend of organized labor.

Hanna considered Mitchell's appeal as a significant political opportunity for the G.O.P. in a Presidential election year. As the head of the Republican National Committee in the fall of 1900, Hanna's primary purpose was to guide William McKinley to a smashing reelection victory over William Jennings Bryan. A landslide victory for President McKinley would validate the Republican commonwealth principles of protection, development, and pluralism. A serious labor dispute in the anthracite area would conjure up ugly class divisions lying underneath the Republican commonwealth. Hanna realized Bryan could exploit a major labor dispute more effectively than his current anti-imperialist theme.
Daniel J. Keefe, head of the International Longshoremen's Association, had been a close personal and political friend of Hanna's. It was Hanna who had first helped Keefe's union organize the dock workers and sailors throughout the Great Lakes. By 1900, the International Longshoreman's Association claimed 100,000 members, of whom one-half were employed on the Great Lakes. As with Mitchell, Keefe was a great believer in the business unionist philosophy of respecting contracts and refraining from any sympathetic strikes. In following this strategy labor leaders would prove their personal integrity and their union's accountability to business leaders.8

Acting through Keefe, Hanna replied that if Mitchell requested, Hanna would use his influence to end the strike favorably for the mine workers. According to Keefe, the "Captain" was confident that Mitchell would not prolong the strike in order to benefit the Democratic party in the upcoming fall campaign. Keefe believed that Hanna "felt confident and satisfied that there was one man connected with the miners who could not be juggled with in any manner and that man was John Mitchell...." Hanna had received "a very lengthy letter from the Labor Commissioner of Ohio, in which he referred to you as being a first class fellow...."9

After several discussions with J.P. Morgan's men on Wall Street, Hanna, together with important members of the
business community (most of whom were terrified by the thought that a possible strike could elect Bryan President), pressured the recalcitrant anthracite operators to offer a one year ten percent wage increase to the UMW. Mitchell quickly accepted the offer. Mitchell trumpeted the short term increase in UMW wages as a major victory for his union stewardship and the principles of business unionism. As a result of the settlement, Mitchell believed he could always depend on Mark Hanna's strong support and influence within the business and political communities to sway recalcitrant businessmen.

Hanna enjoyed the adulation from the press for his actions in settling the strike. He envisioned this as a beginning of his personal endeavor to change his previous image of "Dollar Mark," the labor crusher. However, as Robert Wiebe emphasized, the anthracite settlement of 1900 left the anthracite operators with "a legacy of hate." They bitterly resented the "politically dictated defeat" delivered by Hanna and the House of Morgan. The next time the anthracite operators would remain firm. They would not be bullied by outsiders, more interested in the outcome of an election, than natural law principles of private property, which emanated from a divine being.

The following spring, Mitchell asked Hanna to help him achieve UMW recognition for 1901 in the anthracite fields. If that was impossible, Mitchell wanted
Hanna to at least induce the coal presidents to meet with Mitchell and his union lieutenants to plan for a joint conference for negotiating issues pertaining to the anthracite region. Mitchell emphasized to Hanna that the Republican party, through the actions of its leaders in the previous fall, had become the union's political protectors. Thus, they had an obligation, particularly in a nonelection year, to protect the union from being destroyed by the anthracite operators.\(^\text{12}\)

Hanna's key goal was still to have his Republican party recognized as the party of economic development, the party of labor conciliation. He quickly arranged a meeting with Mitchell and himself with President Elbert Thomas, of the Erie Railroad. Mitchell was the only coal railroad president who agreed to meet with Mitchell. At the meeting Thomas emphasized that he was opposed to giving recognition to the UMW; but speaking only for his company and only for the upcoming year he would receive committees from the union "to adjust any grievance the men might have." Using this "informal" commitment, gained from a single coal railroad president, on 1 April 1901, Mitchell used his Presidential power to thwart any anthracite strike against the coal companies. Mitchell used this informal agreement with the Erie Railroad, as an example to the other four anthracite coal railroad presidents, that the UMW could be trusted to act in an
efficient business manner. For 1902, Mitchell confidentially proposed, to the five coal railroad presidents, to join with the UMW in a joint conference for the anthracite coal fields—one analogous to the current agreement in the interstate bituminous coal region.¹³

As a result of his work in helping to mediate the 1901 anthracite dispute, Hanna was requested by Secretary Ralph Easley to be a member of the executive board of the National Civic Federation. Hanna accepted. Easley, a former teacher and editor of the Hutchinson (Kansas) News, had, with others, founded the NCF in Chicago during the late 1890s. The NCF's initial function was to conduct annual meetings for the purpose of discussing topics of national importance, including imperialism and the labor question. By 1900, under Easley's influence, the NCF shifted its headquarters from Chicago to New York. It began to focus upon arbitrating disputes between industry and labor.

Almost immediately after Hanna was placed on the executive board, the NCF was asked to mediate the 1901 steel strike. Hanna's work during the 1901 steel strike convinced many members of the NCF executive committee, particularly Easley and Vice Chairman and President of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, that Hanna was the best public figure to lead the organization.
The skilled Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers Strike against U.S. Steel, the most innovative industry in America, resulted in a major disaster for the craft union movement. During the 1880s and early 1890s, the Amalgamated was the strongest trade union in America. The further mechanization of the steel industry by applying the principles of economies of scale weakened the bargaining position of the skilled worker in the steel industry. Management had available a vast pool of unskilled labor. To exploit this cheap source of labor, the steel industry built their plants closer to the expanding urban areas which supplied the vast pool of cheap unskilled labor. U.S. Steel's executive board believed that the company needed to cut labor costs in order to successfully complete its strategy of verticle integration.

President Shaffer called his union workers out of the U.S. Steel mills in the spring of 1901. It was evident that the only way the union could possibly win the strike from the powerful steel industry was if Shaffer's fellow labor leaders in the AFL, particularly Gompers and Mitchell, joining in a general strike to help the Amalgamated Association.

The National Civic Federation, which had recently begun to focus its resources on arbitrating labor disputes, was requested by the involved parties to attempt
to mediate the strike. In a July 27 conference, the Conciliation Committee of the NCF (which included Hanna, Mitchell, and Gompers), met with U.S. Steel president Charles Schwab, Judge Elbert Gary, and J.P. Morgan. With pressure from the NCF, the industrialists agreed to grant the wage scale demanded by the union, but specified the union was not to organize the non-union mills.¹⁴

Shaffer’s rejection of the compromise offer, and his call to make the steel strike the central fight for unionism, gave Hanna the opportunity to privately strengthen the non-strike position of Gompers and Mitchell. For all three men, a general strike would produce a class-driven labor-capital dispute possibly resulting in a repeat of the class antagonism in the previous U.S. labor conflicts from 1876 to 1895. Believing that conciliation along the lines of business unionism was the best method of solving labor disputes, each individual did his best to destroy Shaffer’s class warfare position. Mitchell, despite allegations from Shaffer that he had promised to support the Amalgamated union, refused to call out the mine workers. A miners’ strike would have cut off the fuel supply of steel. Gompers rejected Shaffers’ pleas to call a labor conference for the leaders of other appropriate international unions. Gompers even refused to call a meeting of the AFL Executive Council to consider strike tactics.
Shaffer and his union, unable to achieve a general strike, were doomed to defeat. Finally, Hanna, acting through the auspices of the NCF Conciliation Committee, held numerous conferences with labor leaders in many of the large eastern cities. He succeeded in checking the idea of a general strike.

The three men's actions against president Shaffer's plan resulted in the failure of the Amalgamated to organize the non-union mills. On 14 September 1901, Shaffer accepted the original offer of a small pay increase for the union mills.\textsuperscript{15} Shaffer's failed strategy of initiating a large, divisive, class, and general strike against a leading center firm, was indelibly imprinted upon the minds of Mitchell Gompers, and various other labor leaders. Mitchell's and Gompers's actions in preventing a general strike, reaffirmed for Hanna that responsible conservative labor leaders could be entrusted to uphold trade agreements and squelch rank-and-file class warfare tactics or strikes.

Hanna's indefatigable work in helping to conclude the steel strike was genuinely appreciated by the other members of the NCF. In December 1901, Mark Hanna, the alleged labor crusher, was selected chairman of the Industrial Department of the National Civic Federation. For NCF members, such as secretary Ralph Easley and Vice Chairman Gompers, the advantages of having Hanna as
chairman far outweighed his reputation as a supposedly exploiter of labor and a fierce Republican partisan politician. Conciliation committee members, who worked closely with Hanna during the recent steel strike negotiations, were impressed by his sincerity to the cause of conciliation and by his numerous friends and contacts in the financial, industrial, labor, and political spheres. Hanna's many contacts enabled him to garner unique positive results in labor disputes. Many members expected, by Hanna's selection as chairman, "a much larger and influential number of men in the industrial world" would become involved in the NCF. Hanna's selection as chairman brought the organization, whose executive council had only recently switched from focusing upon imperialism toward the labor question, the quality it most needed: publicity. Hanna, as a famous personality, anointed the NCF with part of the fame he had acquired during his past five years as a leading national politician.16

Since the NCF was a voluntary organization, it was imperative to NCF officers, particularly secretary Easley, that the NCF be accepted throughout the country as the leading private institution for labor arbitration. Hanna's appointment as chairman helped Easley validate the NCF as a serious arbiter of labor disputes. Opposing sides in a labor dispute would choose the NCF as the agency to settle their particular disputes. The cases
would be arbitrated by the conciliation committee of the Industrial Department. While Hanna would always be anathema to the socialistic elements in the American labor movement, and also to partisan Democrats, his selection as chairman of the Industrial Department was well received by most businessmen. Without Hanna, many businessmen would never have allowed their business operations to be adjudicated by a third party.

Hanna as NCF chairman believed he had finally found the powerful national organization, with the necessary resources and prestige he needed, to make a powerful impact in resolving the labor question. Despite rapidly declining health, and already overburdened by his duties as a United States Senator and Republican national chairman, Hanna, for the final two-and-one-half years of his life energetically threw himself into the role as the leading advocate for labor conciliation in the United States. After assuming the position as NCF chairman, Hanna called his NCF conciliation work the most rewarding of his life. In referring to the importance of his NCF work, Hanna quoted St. Paul: "This one thing I do." 17

The enthusiastic public reception the "new" NCF received, together with its reorganization under Hanna's chairmanship, were the outstanding achievements of the annual December 1901 meeting. The meeting's purpose was to introduce Hanna as the chairman and also to publicize
the NCF's recent concentration upon industrial conciliation. Easley heavily propagandized the press and public leaders in order to make it "the biggest industrial conference ever held in this country," featuring nothing except "top liners" from both the ranks of labor and capital. The positive reaction by the press and public to Easley's industrial conference "pseudo-event," proved to Easley that "it was the biggest thing of its kind in the history of our country, and its beneficial effect is sure to be felt everywhere." In a letter to Mitchell, Easley wrote that he was particularly "gratified to find that there was no political snarling at Senator Hanna; that he was given credit for meaning what he said, as you and I have known for some time was the case." The important organizational achievement of the meeting was the reorganization of the Industrial Department of the National Civic Federation, with substantially broader powers than the current Board of Conciliation and Arbitration.

The effect of Hanna's chairmanship of the newly organized department soon became apparent. The roster of membership was expanded to three hundred. From December 1901 to his death in February 1904, chairman Hanna's department dominated the entire work of the NCF. His emphasis upon conciliation work soon became the main policy of the organization. During his tenure, Hanna's
success in bringing large numbers of important men into the Industrial Department, led the organization to drop the Department designation from its name. The NCF was now presented to the country as devoted primarily to the labor question; Hanna's title was changed from Industrial Chairman to President of the entire body.20

Hanna's personal deep and abiding conviction that conciliation was the best method of preventing labor strikes was the cornerstone of his chairmanship. As a labor employer who dealt with unions and concluded trade agreements with them on issues relating to hours, wages, and conditions of employment for thirty years, Hanna believed he had the correct answers on how to address the labor question.21 Several specific beliefs formed the basis of Hanna's ideas about how to handle the labor question.

The first ideological belief Hanna shared with many contemporaries who had either studied or had personal experience in dealing with the labor question was that labor strikes were simply a business problem. As a business problem they could be eradicated through the proper application of business methods by both capital and labor. Since around 1895, the recent trend among organized labor leaders, such as Gompers and Mitchell, was contrary to "European" socialism, with its theories of inevitable historic class confrontation with capital.
The new type of labor leader accepted the business methods used by the large center firms. Historians have recently labeled this belief "business unionism." Many labor leaders used the methods of business unionism to keep their fledging organizations intact and their rank and file under control. The actions of conservative labor leaders, such as Gompers, were proof that individuals such as Hanna did not operate within a historical vacuum but instead within a context where they had powerful allies in the labor movement.

Hanna partially accepted the contemporary belief that the proper structure to ensure class harmony was not political parties, but an administrative arm operating outside the party system. Yet Hanna never completely accepted the expert progressive belief that it was important to keep social questions completely out of the public arena, as the parties had failed to resolve "technical" problems, such as the labor question. A strong believer and advocate of the Republican party, Hanna probably felt that through his actions as NCF chairman, he and his allies could begin to transform the G.O.P. into becoming an instrument for future labor conciliation.

For the present, Hanna believed the NCF should be the primary agency for bringing capital and labor closer together. The usual structure of NCF mediation was
the joint conference system. In this system, representa-
tives of labor, capital, and the public would properly
adjudicate the particular labor dispute, through the
application of business or scientific methods.22

Hanna differed from many of his contemporaries in
his belief that the rapid rise and success of organized
capital was linked with the slower, resultant advance of
organized labor. Hanna developed his viewpoint in the
1870s when he first dealt with organized labor. Hanna
concluded that as organized managerial capital had become
larger, more bureaucratically efficient, and technically
more sophisticated, labor must respond by adopting similar
managerial bureaucratic structures. Hanna shrewdly
perceived that a labor leader who asked an employer to
enter a trade agreement that recognized his union as the
single arbiter for the workers on issues within the
workplace was usually not a radical attempting to seize
control of the employer's business. Hanna believed that
through a combination of paternalistic moral persuasion
from the employer and annual trade agreements, the labor
leader could become virtually a co-partner, as interested
in the success of the company as the employer. Before the
vast majority of his business contemporaries, Hanna
comprehended that long-term trade agreements with labor
union, which practiced the principles of business
unionism, led to successful rationalization of the
company's business environment. This rationalization was crucial to any large industrial enterprise's success. Examples of Hanna's successful cooperation of organized labor interests in his own enterprises were sufficient to convince not only himself, but also other businessmen, of the efficacy of his labor strategy.23

Hanna's major speech on the labor question, given at Chautauqua, New York during the 1902 anthracite strike, was his major appeal for organized capital to accept organized labor as its proper partner in the successful evolution of capitalism.

In this twentieth century the evolution from individualism to organization is perfectly natural.... Organized capital is just as necessary to get the proper condition of industry as organized labor. This organization of capital has come to stay, just as organized labor has come to stay, and for the same reason—it is necessary. You cannot separate the interests of capital and labor. If it is good for one to be organized for any purpose, it is good for the other for the same reason. They are both good and necessary as applied to our conditions today and our development for the future.24

Hanna's ideas on the efficiency of using cooperating principles to address problems within the political economy, including his role as a facilitator in creating joint conferences between capital and labor, can be viewed
by historians as an early indicator of the associative state, which Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover perfected during the 1920s.25

The final element of Hanna's labor ideology was the familiar contemporary belief that American organized labor, properly "Americanized" by responsible businessmen to the efficient principles of capitalism, would proceed to "Americanize" foreign labor. This process would encourage immigrants to change their previous European socialistic beliefs of the necessity of class conflict. Hanna fully comprehended how crucial the role that organized labor played during the "Americanization" of foreign labor. It was feared by many that if "proper" labor unions failed to change the socialist beliefs of many immigrants, these immigrants would sway the American labor movement away from the capitalist principles of business unionism, toward the socialist class theories of Marx and Engels. Hanna believed if a majority of foreign labor were inoculated with capitalist values, then the "proper" evolution of the labor question away from class strikes and toward proper capitalist conciliation, would succeed.26

Hanna's years as President of the National Civic Federation, were probably the most enjoyable years of his life. Gradually, the earlier image of Hanna, as the labor
crusher, was slowly changed into a new image of Hanna as a labor statesman. Upon many public occasions, Hanna sincerely remarked that he would rather resign his seat in the Senate, or decline to be President, than to depart from his conciliation work for the NCF. According to Hanna, he wanted "no greater monument than to have the world remember that I did something to end the wars between American capital and American labor." 27 As NCF President, personal appeals to Hanna from public officials throughout the country (such as the mayor of Boston) for him to settle local labor disputes, were proof that a growing segment of the general public regarded Hanna as the indispensable person within the conciliation movement. 28

By 1902, fellow Republican politicians, who had little contact with the labor movement, such as Hanna's political friend and ally, Congressman Charles Grosvenor of Athens, Ohio, begged Hanna to come to their districts and campaign for them in strong organized labor areas. Grosvenor's Southeastern Ohio congressional district included the Hocking Valley bituminous coal region. During a 1902 campaign train swing with Grosvenor, through the bituminous coal mining areas of the congressman's district, Hanna was back among many of the coal miners and their descendants whose union he had been the first employer to recognize in the mid 1870s. At a particular
stop in the small mining town of Nelsonville, Hanna was introduced to the crowd from the train platform by Grosvenor. A reporter for the usually anti-Hanna Plain Dealer wrote that when Hanna appeared upon the platform, a stupendous roar of approval came from the crowd of 2,000 coal miners and "a tremendous shout went up: "Ah, there he is, that's Mark Hanna!" According to the reporter, Grosvenor retired to just within the door of the car, from which vantage point "he anxiously watched the grimy faces of the miners and eagerly" and noted "the effect" Hanna's words had upon the miners. During these stops with Grosvenor, in the mining regions, Hanna reminded the miners how his actual labor record differed with his previous labor crusher image.

I don't like to go into personal history, but I want to call to mind the fact that only a few years ago the people of Ohio were led to suppose that I wore horns. Democratic cowards, afraid to assail the integrity of President McKinley, made a mark out of me, and asserted that I was a labor crusher. The falsity of this, I am inclined to think, has since been proved, as a matter of fact I have been an employer of labor for the last thirty years, and for twenty years have not had a strike. My men know they are free at all times to present any grievances they may have; they know that I meet them more than half way. I am a friend to the workingman and am a friend to every man who does what he can for his home and country. Through the Civic Federation fifteen strikes have been settled and I am in hopes
that before we get through we will so closely cement the ties that bind employer and employee that strikes will cease to exist.

The enthusiastic reaction to him from labor audiences at official labor functions, whether they included past employees of his or not, had to have been some of the most rewarding moments of Hanna's final years.29

Hanna's role as President and official spokesperson for the NCF frequently thrust him into conflict with David Parry, President of the National Association of Manufacturers. The NAM was an employers association whose members refused to deal with organized labor. The majority of NAM members were heads of small businesses. These men believed that the rise of the organized labor movement, particularly Gompers' AFL, would cause financial ruin of their businesses and was a rebuke to their traditional business methods. The NAM was not as well organized as the NCF in the big cities, but the organization was very powerful on the local and regional level where the NCF was just beginning to organize branches during Hanna's tenure as President. Parry's assaults upon Hanna and the NCF, to which Hanna always vigorously responded, revealed that despite the many positive achievements Hanna and the NCF had accomplished in labor mediation and conciliation, there were still many leaders in the business community, particularly outside the center
firms, who refused to enter joint agreements with organized labor. Despite Hanna's appeals, many businessmen were unwilling to give up their own methods of labor mediation. These methods were invariably based upon the sacred laissez faire principle of freedom of contract. 30

Hanna's key ally from organized labor on the NCF Conciliation committee was AFL President Samuel Gompers. At the turn of the century, Gompers was the most important and successful exponent of business unionism within the labor movement. Gompers' key achievement, as head of the AFL, enabled his organization to survive the devastating depression of the 1890s and emerge from it as the strongest and most powerful trade union in the United States. From 1899 to 1903, the total membership of the AFL rose from 349,000 to 1,465,000. 31 By 1904 the AFL could claim ten percent of the nation's wage earners. 32 As a strong leader during the crisis, Gompers used the 1890s depression to perfect his bureaucratic organization. He centralized authority for himself as union president, and also for his loyal labor lieutenants, including John Mitchell.

With strong organizational control at the top, conservative labor leaders more easily developed business union policies without undue influence from the more radical rank and file. Gompers and his labor allies
followed the example of leading businessmen who managed center firms, where centralization of managerial authority has become standard. By the end of the nineteenth century, as labor historian Warren Van Tine concludes, there had occurred a crucial transformation, in not only the image, but also the functioning of the trade union official. National trade union officials, who had been low-paid officials with few official perks, became professional strike managers: with higher pay, and longer office tenure. They kept close contact with the rank and file union members. The creation of more efficient hierarchical bureaucratic structures permitted trade union officials to become more insulated from their membership's desires and demands. This new type of union official was a crucial component in the more structured nature of labor-management disputes after 1897. It was precisely this typically conservative labor leader who fully embraced the principles of business unionism and convinced more businessmen that they could conclude long-term trade agreements with unions. Businessmen, such as Hanna, realized these labor leaders had the means to control any shifts in rank and file sentiment that might disrupt a large business' long-term schedules. During the 1870s, Hanna first recognized this brand of conservative business-oriented labor leadership in the Ohio
bituminous coal mines. He spent the next thirty years of his life in actively cultivating and perfecting this type of responsible labor leadership.

From December 1901 to February 1904, Hanna and Gompers were the two most important representatives from the ranks of capital and labor to embrace and advocate arbitration and conciliation as the best method of avoiding costly labor strikes. Their positions as President and Vice Chairman of the NCF, gave both Hanna and Gompers the best public forum to advocate their views. The Hanna-Gompers relationship developed slowly because Gompers considered Hanna to be an opponent of organized labor's goals. Gompers' attitude toward Hanna changed as a result of Hanna's work in ending the 1901 Steel Strike along the terms which Gompers advocated.35 The key ideological reason supporting the Hanna-Gompers partnership on industrial conciliation, was the fact they both accepted and welcomed the recent evolution of capitalism toward larger, powerful, and more efficient industrial organizations.

Gompers considered it futile for labor to oppose the managerial and technological advances of the Second Industrial Revolution. He was restructuring his own labor organization along the previous lines of the leading center firms. He sincerely believed, however erroneously, that the greater industrial efficiency of the large
corporations would result in greater benefits for his union members. Gompers always remained skeptical about the anti-trust movement. He favored industrial concentration. He never questioned the value of technological change. With his belief in "volunteerism," Gompers joined with corporate executives in opposing state interference in the private sector. As labor historian Nick Salvatore observes, Gompers was the best labor representative that the NCF businessmen could have discovered.36 The goal for Gompers was the same as Hanna's namely, to substitute class collaboration for class struggle. "There is in our time," Gompers concluded, "if not a harmony of interests ... yet certainly a community of interests, to the end that industrial peace shall be maintained...."37 In many respects, Gompers' industrial commonwealth was similar to Hanna's.

By early 1902, under Hanna's leadership, the NCF was acknowledged as the most successful instrument for educating the public upon the merits of labor arbitration and mediation. Secretary Easley was gratified by the public acclaim given to the NCF for its role in successfully ending the 1901 Steel Strike. He also appreciated the positive boon of publicity which greeted Hanna's selection as chairman, and its avowed concentration upon labor arbitration. The publicity conscious
secretary yearned for a key test to solidify the NCF's reputation. According to Easley, "What we need now to clinch matters is a practical demonstration of the usefulness of the Committee; and I have no doubt that the time is not remote when their services may be called upon...." Easley's words proved prophetic as events ushered in the great 1902 Anthracite Coal Strike. This would be the greatest national labor upheaval since the 1894 Pullman Strike. How effectively Hanna and the NCF would respond to the coal crisis would affect their public reputation as the primary national agent of labor conciliation.

The labor strategy of John Mitchell and the United Mine Workers for the anthracite coal fields was the same as previously in 1900 and 1901. They wanted to attain a joint conference agreement for the anthracite coal region analogous to the current bituminous interstate agreement. Contrary to most contemporaries, Mitchell optimistically believed the anthracite coal operators would finally grant a joint agreement with the UMW. The pleasant ambiguities and informal arrangement for handling labor questions, arrived at the previous year with President Elbert B. Thomas of the Erie Railroad, revived Mitchell's faith in the reasonableness of the anthracite operators. Added to the optimism, as historian Robert Wiebe noted, Mitchell had the "invincible" Hanna on his side.
Mitchell, more than Gompers, slavishly embraced the principles of business unionism. As recent historians have noted, Mitchell, more than any contemporary labor leader, desired to use his business contacts, many attained through the NCF, to embark upon a successful business career. Whereas Gompers always maintained a certain class discomfort over socializing with businessmen at the opulent formal NCF dinners, Mitchell, in wide-eyed wonderment, reveled in the experience. Mitchell confided to Keefe that a 1902 NCF banquet given by businessman-diplomat Oscar Straus was "about the most elaborate affair in which it has been my good fortune to take part." 40

In league with his fellow "labor entrepreneur" Daniel J. Keefe, Mitchell embarked on a variety of speculative business ventures, most with a Mr. Dernell of Pennsylvania, hoping to "clean up a handsome little stake each year." 41 Mitchell's joint business ventures with Keefe never proved successful. When Mitchell and Keefe were not expending their time and energy on joint speculative business ventures, for an entire year they badgered Hanna, who they reverently referred to as "the Captain," to pressure his fellow political operative and good friend Postmaster General Henry Payne, to obtain a patronage position for Keefe within the growing federal postal bureaucracy. 42 Payne was never able to find a suitable federal position for Keefe.
Unlike Gompers, the class of individuals from whom Mitchell most desired to gain respect was not his rank and file, or even his fellow trade union leaders, but influential businessmen. To be able to sit down at a conference table with the opposing business side and to be treated as their equal, whether or not any suitable agreement was negotiated, meant more to the upwardly mobile Mitchell than to his fellow union leaders. For Mitchell, in that brief time at the conference table, he was considered equal to the businessman.

Mitchell hoped that the informal grievance committee President Thomas had created to settle labor disputes between the Erie and the UMW would prove that the union could now conclude a joint trade agreement with the other four coal railroad presidents. It did not. A key argument maintained by all five coal railroad presidents against unionizing the anthracite coal fields was, according to their records, that the efficiency of the company mines had suffered since the UMW surreptitiously entered the "peaceful" anthracite coal fields.  

Realizing his situation was hopeless, Mitchell again turned to Hanna and the NCF to arbitrate an agreement for the anthracite coal fields. However, to fully obtain the support of the NCF and its president, Mitchell was pressured by Hanna and the NCF to change his strike strategy. With Hanna's approval, NCF officers
pressed Mitchell to forego the crucial issue of union recognition in the anthracite coal region. The issues for arbitration would be the traditional ones of wages and hours. Having benefited from reforms Gompers enacted during the 1890s depression, Mitchell submitted to the NCF's demands. Most of his union lieutenants came from the bituminous coal districts, which made up eight of the eleven UMW districts. Mitchell's bituminous executive-board controlled rank and file discussions on the union's abrupt change of strategy.\textsuperscript{44}

Mitchell's pre-strike plans were to strike the anthracite fields of Northeastern Pennsylvania, dominated by non-union miners, rather than the non-union bituminous coal mines of West Virginia. The Pennsylvania anthracite coal fields involved 140,000 miners - compared to West Virginia's 40,000 bituminous coal field miners. However, West Virginia was the only significant northern bituminous region not covered in the yearly interstate agreements. As Robert Wiebe notes, "Logic favored West Virginia." The UMW's strength would always depend on bituminous coal; therefore, West Virginia's absence was more of a threat to destroy the joint conference - the backbone of the union's strength. Wiebe and others emphasized that anthracite, although appealing, "was peripheral."\textsuperscript{45}

There is no direct evidence that Hanna personally had any business interest in the West Virginia mines.
However, there certainly was an interest for two of his fellow Senators and political allies, Senator Elkins of West Virginia and Senator Kerens of Missouri. In early November 1901, Hanna arranged a private meeting for Mitchell with the two Senators "on the question at issue between your organization and their mines." While it is doubtful that a single meeting with three Senators forced Mitchell to change his union strategy of where to strike, it could have made it easier for Mitchell to abandon the West Virginia coal miners should they spontaneously strike.

When the West Virginia miners struck against Elkins's and Kerens's bituminous coal companies, Mitchell did virtually abandon the West Virginia coal miners to concentrate all resources upon the official anthracite strike. Not until the New Deal would the West Virginia bituminous coal mines be unionized.

From 26 March 1902 to 10 May, an NCF conciliation sub-committee, headed by Hanna, mediated the dispute between the miners and operators. Despite some partial success at the beginning, Hanna and the NCF failed to prevent the anthracite coal strike. It officially began on June 2, when Mitchell, pressured by his union membership, reluctantly called out the unionized anthracite miners. At the beginning of the NCF's mediation, Hanna, in an attempt to gain time, achieved a
partial success in convincing union leaders to select a new provisional date for the strike, from the original 1 April 1902 date to a later one in May. Remembering Hanna's past achievements in mediating labor disputes in the anthracite coal fields, a reporter for the Cleveland Leader stated, "people who remember his successes in mediating between the miners and the operators in the past feel confident now that his efforts to avert the impending strike will also be successful." At the beginning of the mediation period, Hanna also struck a similar confident pose. During negotiations, Mitchell singularly attempted to offer a resolution of the strike by dropping the issue of union recognition. However, his own UMW executive committee, operating under the strike guidelines set down by the previous Shamokin Convention, immediately rejected his proposal. The coal presidents, particularly their chief spokesman, George Baer, President of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, refused to consider a partial recognition of the union by May 10. As a result, the joint negotiations between the miners and the operators concluded permanently.

The NCF's efforts at the labor mediation generally received favorable press, even though Hanna and his conciliation committee failed to prevent the strike. Even Mitchell, in a letter written to his friend and protector Hanna, recognized that the image and effectiveness of the
Federation had been damaged. According to Mitchell, "I should be more than pleased, if a settlement is effected upon a fair basis, to have the Civic Federation receive credit for it, as it would restore whatever confidence has been lost owing to our failure to avert the strike altogether or settle it up to this time."50

The special UMW convention convened in July to consider a general sympathy strike of all coal districts to aid the striking anthracite miners. Such an action would violate the joint agreement in the bituminous fields. Hanna helped to finance Mitchell's mine-by-mine campaign against a general strike. The convention rejected the anthracite's districts appeal for a general strike. During this crucial period, Hanna, in his correspondence with Mitchell, appealed to the union leader to defeat the call for a general strike. Hanna wanted rejection, not only upon the principle of upholding the integrity of contracts, but also because a general strike in the bituminous coal fields would have a negative impact upon M.A. Hanna & Co.'s business.51

By the summer of 1902, when it became apparent the NCF had failed in its mediation efforts, Hanna's motives before, during, and after the NCF mediation conferences were criticized by the anthracite operators and NCF conservatives. They disagreed with Hanna's emphasis upon making conciliation the Federation's primary task. The
anthracite coal operators, primarily Baer and E.E. Loomis of the Lackawanna Company, charged that Hanna, through assurances of support to Mitchell, had helped to precipitate the strike. They charged that the anthracite strike would help Hanna's bituminous coal interests. As the strike progressed into the early fall, the price of soft coal did rapidly rise. Charles A. Moore, a conservative business member of the NCF executive committee, alleged the Federation had chosen sides in basically an interbusiness dispute between the hard coal operators and their soft coal counterparts. Moore spoke for many NCF conservative members who charged that the public viewed their organization's purpose as "to poke our nose into other people's business, and impress the public with the feeling that we are actuated by the spirit of conciliation and the 'brotherhood of man.'" A shift from conciliation, by dissatisfied conservative elements within the NCF, developed as a result of the experiences of the 1902 anthracite coal strike.

It is doubtful that under the peculiar circumstances which Hanna operated in 1902, particularly minus the power and publicity accorded a chief executive, he could have resolved the key issues which separated the disputants. Hanna's paternalistic approach toward the labor movement, which had proven successful in earlier dealings, failed. Like the overwhelming majority of his
business contemporaries, Hanna was not knowledgeable about the inner workings of labor unions. Instead of encouraging the embryonic labor organizations to strive toward some sense of independence, Hanna personally encouraged trade union leaders to depend on his paternalistic benevolence for their unions survival. According to Hanna, employers "provide the work, and are responsible for the conduct of the business, and upon them rests the responsibility for the conduct of the business, and upon them rests the responsibility of seeing that the men receive their share of the benefits." Robert Wiebe describes Hanna as a politician fitting a vague construct of organized labor into a peaceful vision of Republican rule. While more advanced in his views toward organized labor than many business and political contemporaries, Hanna never ideologically moved from his continuing vision of a classless Commonwealth encompassing all interests. For Hanna, this classless Commonwealth was to be kept in place through the paternalistic, beneficent developmental policies of the Republican party.

Through Hanna's thirty years of labor conciliation work, he had created a situation wherein if he failed Mitchell, it was logical that Mitchell would seek a new political protector, instead of embarking upon a new independent course. For some trade union leaders, such as Gompers, that protector would eventually become the
Democratic party. For someone like Mitchell, in 1902, that new protector would eventually become President Theodore Roosevelt.

With Hanna's failure to prevent the anthracite coal strike or help settle it through mediation, Mitchell sought other powerful public figures for help. Mitchell first requested for the help of Pennsylvania's two Republican Senators, Matthew Quay and Boises Penrose. However, when they failed to get negotiations resumed, Mitchell quickly accepted President Roosevelt's offer of help.54

President Roosevelt had two major reasons for overlooking all historical precedent governing the proper conduct of the chief executive in a national labor crisis. First was the near panic, engineered by the press, of a coal scare in the eastern cities, which were heated primarily by anthracite. Second, Roosevelt was competing with Hanna for control and dominance of the organization and agenda of the Republican party. Authorities have now concluded that the fear of a coal panic was not based on fact. However, in 1902, Roosevelt called the crisis "only less serious than that of the Civil War."55 During the early spring, while it appeared possible that Hanna could settle the strike, no one realized better than Roosevelt that a strike settlement would boost Hanna's prestige within the party
and further fuel Hanna's presidential boom. By the fall, Hanna's failure to mediate the strike through the NCF, together with his unsuccessful summer efforts to enlist the aid of J.P. Morgan to settle the strike, caused Hanna to issue a public statement that he would abandon any further personal efforts to end the strike. Roosevelt now had the perfect opportunity to not only end a "national crisis," but also simultaneously to strengthen himself within the Republican party.\(^{56}\)

Throughout Roosevelt's mediation process, from the unsuccessful October 3rd White House Conference, to the operators' agreement on October 13 to submit the dispute to a Presidential Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, the President was determined that Hanna have no input in settling the strike. Furthermore, Roosevelt was to receive the credit for the settlement. Shortly after the failed October 3rd White House meeting between business and labor, Roosevelt chose Secretary of War Elihu Root to be his agent to Wall Street financier Morgan. On the financier's yacht, Morgan and Root finally worked out a basis for arbitration of the strike.\(^{57}\) The arbitration format required the miners to end the strike, return to work, and submit all questions to an expert commission of presidential appointees.

When the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission made public its findings on 21 March 1903, most contemporaries,
and until 1961, the traditional historical interpretation, considered the commission's award as a great defeat for the anthracite coal operators and a great victory for Mitchell, the UMW, and President Roosevelt. The commission awarded the miners a nine-hour day, and a ten percent pay increase, and the commission established a joint mine worker-operator Board of Conciliation to settle grievances. Through his crisis management style, Roosevelt enlarged the power and prestige of the chief executive.

Wiebe's revisionist 1961 article on the strike concluded that the Commission's failure to recognize the UMW left Mitchell as big a historical loser as Hanna. Other historical works following in Wiebe's path, such as Joseph Gwowski's study of Mitchell's failure of leadership during the crucial three-year post-strike settlement period, have generally criticized Mitchell's conservative strategy as detrimental to the long-term interests of the UMW. From the evidence it is possible to conclude that while the anthracite coal operators relinquished some control of their mining interests to an expert commission, by 1905, the anachronistic ideological views of men like Baer attained more power within the legislatures, courts, and private organizations, such as the National Civic Federation, than the conciliatory principles of Hanna, Gompers, and Mitchell.
The personal influence that Hanna wielded as President of the NCF in shaping the policy of the NCF concentration almost exclusively on mediation and conciliation work was acknowledged and praised even by political opponents, and was fully recognized after his death in 1904. 60 Under Hanna's active leadership the NCF brought employers and unionists to the bargaining table in 118 disputes during 1902 and 1903. 61 In 1905, before the NCF had fully reorganized its policy of conciliation, it mediated 156 disputes. With the accession in 1905 of its new President, August Belmont, a conservative Wall Street banker, the NCF shifted its policy from industrial conciliation toward a welfare capitalism policy, which elements of the anti-labor National Association of Manufacturers began to advocate as an alternative to unionism. 62

By 1905, no single individual felt the immense loss of Hanna's influence upon the organized labor movement more than Samuel Gompers. Gompers agreed with the accepted business brief in the social benefits arising from capital's evolution toward larger and more efficient organizations. Gompers achieved from the NCF, particularly Hanna, protection from labor opponents within the business community, particularly the NAM. Hanna's death in 1904 couldn't have come at a less opportune time for Gompers. By 1905, the courts' and small businesses had
begun their successful antitrust assault against his organization. When Hanna died in February 1904, Gompers and organized labor had lost their most powerful ally within both the business and political communities. Missing a powerful protector like Hanna, by 1908 Gompers dropped his cherished principle of volunteerism and linked the AFL with the political fortunes of the Democratic party. 63

The robustness of the close-knit male political world of Washington suited Hanna's personality and needs. For six of the seven years the Hannas resided in Washington, they occupied rooms at the Arlington Hotel and the Cameron house. Three key Senate leaders, William Allison of Iowa, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, and Thomas Platt of Connecticut, also had rooms at the Arlington. Because of Hanna's famous "corned beef hash breakfasts," the Cameron House was a favorite morning stopping point for many Senators. During these years contemporaries remembered Hanna as a person who needed and appreciated company. It is possible that after McKinley's death, Hanna's need for constant companionship was reinforced. Later, a reporter reminisced about Hanna's constant need for companionship during his final years.

Without his friends close by his side he was a fish out of water. Without them he was miserable. And so he had them in for his famous breakfasts of
corned beef hash and corn pone baked in ashes; had them running to him by dozens and by scores all day; had groups about him in the lobbies, cafe and cloakrooms; had them as guests for luncheon; had them in droves for dinner; had them in his parlor or with him at the card table till bedtime. His life was with men. They were to him tonic and necessity.

Hanna used his skill as a whist player, previously acquired at the private Union Club in Cleveland, to insure many late night card games while in Washington. He did not allow the complicated rules of whist, which required quiet and immense concentration, to deter his jovial, talkative nature. A fellow whist player at the Union Club remembers Hanna "as a very good player for a man who talked as incessantly as he did."

Like McKinley, Hanna was a regular cigar smoker. Contemporaries remembered that Hanna smoked daily "around a dozen strong cigars a day." Hanna's favorite cigar brand was Cuban Hanna. Hanna abstained from alcohol throughout most of his life. Mrs. Hanna remembered that only later in life, when Hanna increasingly suffered from fevers, would he take a small dose of whiskey for medicinal purposes.

Like many contemporary, hard-working professionals, Hanna physically and psychologically needed several hours daily to unwind and relax among friends. Yet probably Hanna's work schedule as a Senator was less time consuming
and stressful (apart from elections) than his previous
twelve-to-fourteen hour-six day work week. Hanna finally
allowed himself a semblance of leisure time which he had
earlier always denied himself. By 1901, Hanna's declining
physical state demanded more periods of rest and
relaxation. While Hanna allowed himself more leisure
time, Hanna's friends and family members were convinced
that he never gave himself the amount of rest his
decaying physical constitution desperately needed.

From Roosevelt's sudden ascension to the presidency
in September 1901, to Hanna's death in February 1904,
these two political combatants, for different reasons,
vied for control of the Republican party. For Roosevelt,
his goal was to insure himself the Republican presidential
nomination. To achieve this goal, Roosevelt successfully
attacked parts of Hanna's geographical party power base.
The main goal for Hanna in the intra-party conflict was
neither to gain the presidential nomination for himself,
or deny it to Roosevelt. Hanna wanted to insure that
Roosevelt and his followers did not abandon the tradition-
al Commonwealth principles of the Republican party, which
Hanna and McKinley had previously labored to make
synonomous with the G.O.P. Contemporaries and future
writers, interpreted Hanna's campaign slogans of "Stand
Pat," and "Leave Well Enough Alone," as simply rigid
conservative party appeals to the electorate. However,
there was another dimension to Hanna's message. Hanna wanted to influence not only the electorate, but ensure that within the party, Roosevelt and his legion "stood pat" upon the previous protection and development policies of the G.O.P., and not abandon them for the allure of new issues, such as tariff reform, or publicity-seeking trust-busting expeditions.  

No persuasive evidence exists that Hanna ever seriously considered seeking the Republican presidential nomination. There were numerous reasons that he would not take such a decision. His health was rapidly declining. His previous image as "Dollar Mark" remained a grave political hindrance. Most crucial of all in comparison with the President, Hanna had neither patronage nor the prestige of the chief executive office. If Hanna needed any reminder of Roosevelt's advantages in any future party battle, he needed only remember the unfavorable outcome of the 1902 anthracite coal strike. As the political historian John Blum observed, "Mark Hanna never attempted the futile."  

Hanna did not contest Roosevelt's party nomination, but he never publicly endorsed Roosevelt for the 1904 nomination. Hanna knew that once he publicly endorsed Roosevelt, all speculation on whether he would run would be finished. He desired to keep all his options open. A public endorsement of Roosevelt would only erode Hanna's
strength within the national Republican party. More importantly for Hanna, it would seriously weaken his faction's support within the Ohio Republican party and benefit the Foraker faction.

Hanna's refusal to endorse Roosevelt for the nomination prompted the President by early 1902 to begin a strategy of dismantling Hanna's main sources of support within the national G.O.P. The President's policy was successful. Despite Roosevelt's favorable image as a reformer and trust-buster, he never allowed it to hinder his political strategy. To accomplish his purpose, he needed an able political lieutenant to solidify his support within the party.

Roosevelt as his campaign manager chose James Clarkson of Iowa, whose reputation was second only to Hanna's as a political tactician. Clarkson was the former spoilsman of the Harrison Administration. Since the 1888 Republican National Convention, Clarkson and Hanna had been political opponents within the Republican party. In 1896, Hanna's candidate, McKinley trampled, among others, Clarkson's candidate, Iowa Senator William Allison for the Republican nomination. Upon McKinley's electoral triumph, Hanna banished his longtime political foe into political oblivion. In April 1902, Roosevelt rescued Clarkson from the political wilderness and gave him the prime patronage position,
Surveyor of the Port of New York. Clarkson's main duties were not to check incoming cargo into New York harbor but to attack one of Hanna's primary party bastions, the South.

Clarkson's familiarity with Southern Republican politics, permitted him to maintain a "practiced guard" over the wavering Southern Republicans. A veteran of post-bellum Dixie politics and a longtime political friend and protector of Southern Black Republicans, Clarkson, from mid-1902 to mid-1903, converted party organizations, which Hanna supporters had made "lily white," to the "black and tan" of the Reconstruction Era. Revolts against Clarkson's policies erupted among white Republican organizations of North Carolina and Alabama. However, Hanna's failure to protest the treatment by the Administration resulted in the Souths becoming, by July 1903, practically solid for Roosevelt. Clarkson's capture of the Southern party organizations for Roosevelt was not the only political victory the Iowan presented to the President.

Clarkson also resuscitated his former creation, the National Republican League, into a key party agency. The League's members labored earnestly for Roosevelt's nomination. The membership of the various League state branches was made up of young male Republicans. Most of them viewed Roosevelt as the symbol of the "new generation
of young Republicans." These young Republicans were ready and eager to add a new voice within the party. Under Clarkson's leadership, the League's branches were particularly active in advocating Roosevelt's cause in the Midwest and West.67

Attacks by Roosevelt's political agents upon Midwestern party organizations of key Hanna allies, such as Cyrus Leland of Kansas, Richard C. Kerens of Kansas, and Senator Wolcott of Colorado had rendered their party organizations virtually impotent by mid-1903.68 Hanna's primary geographical bases of party power were thereafter under Administration control.

Roosevelt interpreted the game of politics as a series of personal challenges. He decided that if the tranquil Hanna failed to endorse him, he would politically embarrass the Senator in his native state. Fortunately for Roosevelt, he already had a key political ally in Ohio, namely, Senator Joseph Foraker.

Since 1900, the Hanna faction maintained complete control of both the Republican state central and state executive committees. With the sudden ascension of Roosevelt to the Presidency, the Foraker faction saw an opportunity to break Hanna's absolute control of the state party. Despite Hanna's silence, the Foraker faction attempted to gain Ohio's endorsement for Roosevelt's nomination.69 During the 1902 state Republican
convention, Roosevelt was "congratulated" for continuing to follow McKinley's policies. The state platform committee, under the control of the Hanna faction, wrote into the state party platform, "We cordially sustain President Roosevelt in his pledge to carry forward the great work which came to him as a sacred legacy."  

As the 1903 state convention approached, Roosevelt had let it be known that he had been pleased and heartened by the numerous state conventions that had previously endorsed him for the 1904 nomination. Foraker and his organization saw their opportunity and quickly sprang into action. In a brilliant political move, Foraker exclaimed that since Senator Hanna had publicly expressed no interest in the nomination, it would be viewed as a rank display of state Republican disloyalty to the President if Ohio did not follow the example of its sister states and publicly endorse the President at the upcoming 1903 state party convention.  

In contrast to his previous failure to respond to the work of Roosevelt's minions in the South and Midwest, in Ohio, with control of the state party apparatus at stake, Hanna struck back at Foraker's scheme. The 1903 state convention, Hanna exclaimed, was not the appropriate time or place for endorsement of a presidential candidate. The function of the upcoming convention, Hanna stated, was to nominate a state ticket for the upcoming
state elections. In a further attempt to keep the state party under his faction's control, Hanna appealed to Ohio Republicans:

On account of my position as Chairman of the Republican National Committee and the further fact that this year I am supposed to have a vital interest in the results in Ohio as bearing upon my reelection to the United States Senate, it would be presumed that I might have some influence as to the policy or action of the State Convention this year in National affairs.72

With Hanna vigorously holding the line, it appeared that the convention vote on an endorsement for Roosevelt would be a bitter, and closely fought vote.

Ten days before the Ohio State Convention, Roosevelt, who was on a western campaign, publicly issued from Walla Walla, Washington, his famous statement to the press. It gave his view on the recent dispute within the Ohio Republican party:

I have not asked any man for his support. I have had nothing whatever to do with raising the issue as to my endorsement. Sooner or later it was bound to arise, and, inasmuch as it has now arisen, of course, those who favor my Administration and nomination will endorse them, and those who do not will oppose them.

That evening Roosevelt also sent a telegram to Hanna. The President "intimated that he would be glad to receive the
endorsement of his candidacy at the hand of the Ohio Republican State convention this year." Placed in such an awkward political situation, Hanna replied, that due to Roosevelt's telegram, he would not oppose any action by the convention to endorse the President for the party presidential nomination.73

As previously with the 1902 anthracite coal strike settlement, Roosevelt publicly and politically strengthened his own position at the expense of Hanna, within the country and the Republican party. Hanna had previously hoped that he could use his personal endorsement of Roosevelt to put pressure upon him to uphold the principles of McKinley. Hanna believed Roosevelt had failed to do this in his anti-trust action against James J. Hill's Great Northern Railroad. With the convention's endorsement of Roosevelt, Hanna forfeited any type of effective check upon Roosevelt's future presidential actions. "Hanna men" publicly protested the endorsement was not a victory for Foraker, but "a Roosevelt victory, pure and simple." However, in the 1903 political milieu of Ohio Republican politics, any national "victory" for Roosevelt over Hanna was simultaneously a state triumph for the Foraker forces over the Hanna faction.74 As a result of Roosevelt's actions, during the final nine months of Hanna's life, instead of his publicly and privately vying with Roosevelt concerning the direction of the Republican
party, Hanna was forced to focus most of his attention upon protecting his own state political bailiwick from the assaults of the rejuvenated Foraker forces.

Roosevelt's aggressive strategy was to take total control of the Republican party from numerous party officials who maintained allegiance to Hanna and McKinley. In practically every instance, when these party men sought protection from Roosevelt's aggressive political agents, Hanna remained silent and inactive. As John Blum observes, Hanna could have thrown down the gauntlet of battle "a dozen different times." Instead, Hanna usually supported Roosevelt's policies. He seldom fought any of Roosevelt's political patronage appointments.

In only one instance did Hanna ever publicly oppose a presidential appointment: Roosevelt's nomination of Leonard Wood for major general. Hanna's reason for opposition to Wood was personal. Wood, in his previous position as Cuban Governor General, had accused and then jailed on charges of bribery a former Hanna political agent, namely, Estes Rathbone. There was little doubt as to Rathbone's guilt. However, Major Rathbone had been a key political agent for Hanna during his 1898 election to the Senate. In virtually every case, Hanna could be counted upon to support his friends, however unscrupulous their actions may have been. In the winter of 1903-04,
Hanna, along with his close political friend, Senator Nathan Scott of West Virginia, who sat upon the Military Affairs Committee, tried unsuccessfully to block Wood's promotion to major general. Not surprisingly Wood's key supporter on the Committee was Senator Foraker.  

By late 1902, Hanna realized the nomination of Roosevelt was inevitable. Hanna therefore worked to insure that the traditional principles that he and others had successfully made the Republican party's credo were not slowly abandoned or replaced.

Hanna keynote address to the 1903 Republican state convention was his best exposition and defense of those traditional Republican principles which, over the past twenty-five years, had benefited the country and Republican party so well. Unlike Hanna's other speeches, which were usually delivered extemporaneously, Hanna's key-note address was a polished effort. Ironically, Hanna gave the best speech of his career at the convention where Roosevelt triumphed. During his address, Hanna heralded the past principles and success of the Republican party as an instrument of economic progress during the previous party period.

Our government is a government of party. It is necessarily so and always will be so. The people, who are the final arbiters of all questions, study and consider from their own standpoint and form their
ideas and opinions as to the policies
by which these parties propose to
govern our country. Is it not the
best tribute that can be paid to the
people, not only of the State of Ohio,
but of our nation, to say how wisely
and how well they have weighed all
these great national questions, and
how truly and unerringly their
judgments has led them to the
conclusion that the policies and
principles of the Republican party are
best fitted to our form of government,
and have contributed more than any
other could to our development and
prosperity?

In closing, Hanna exclaimed to his fellow Ohio
Republicans: "never abandon these principles." They had
helped to unite American industry and American labor.
Those principles, said Hanna, were the "solid foundation"
of the party.

We have never failed when we have gone
before the country upon that solid
foundation, not of the theory, but of
fact, and have redeemed the prophecies
we made.... You must accept results
as proof, and if you consider not only
your own material interests of society
and of our common country you cannot
fail to find yourselves in the ranks
of the Republican party.... The
Republican party laid the foundation
stone. Human liberty and justice of
American industries and the American
workingman are placed in the sacred
archives of our country's history and
furnish its foundation stone, and as
it was raised year by year, tried by
experience, encouraged by success, let
me point to that magnificent struc-
ture, the monument to the principles
of the Republican party, and let that
party write the inscription upon its
base in letters that all who run may read, 'Hands off.' Time and patience have built that structure. The blood and sweat of our best husbandry has contributed to it. If we are to have a new era, or if the era of the twentieth century is to be a continuation of Republican prosperity, let those who were the workingmen upon that edifice 'stand guard.'

Hanna's defense of those principles, which some contemporaries called the "Ohio Idea," together with his defense of the cause of labor conciliation, would have remained his future primary activity, if he had lived. However, the final months of his life revolved around the parochial political duties of maintaining his factional control of the Ohio Republican party.

Despite the 1903 state convention's endorsement of Roosevelt and its nomination of a pro-Foraker Republican, state Senator Warren G. Harding for lieutenant governor, Hanna's faction maintained solid control over the state party apparatus. The Hanna faction's gubernatorial selection, Cleveland financier Myron Herrick, became the party's nominee. Hanna's former political foe, "Boss" George Cox of Cincinnati, had always been in the Foraker camp. However, by mid-1903, Cox had become disgruntled by what he considered Foraker's adverse treatment of himself and his local organization's patronage requests. Cox shifted course against his fellow Cincinnatian and now prepared to join forces with Hanna in the Senator's current factional battle with Foraker.
Hanna's triumphant reelection, over token opposition, together with Herrick's record victory of 115,000 votes over Hanna's bitter local foe, Cleveland Mayor Tom L. Johnson, proved that Hanna and his organization remained strong in Ohio. The one party government of Ohio, which Hanna and others had first achieved in 1891, had, in 1904, become solidified.79

In January 1904, Hanna was officially reelected as Senator. His margin of victory in the Ohio legislature was by a record margin of 93 votes. Only in Toledo and Cleveland was their any real semblance of Democratic strength within the state. The political universe of Ohio had previously been divided between the two parties during the 1870s and 1880s. However, because of Hanna, McKinley and others, the state Republican party was restructured and became an instrument for Ohio's economic development. In 1904, Ohio was as solidly Republican as it ever had been or ever would be in the future. On 13 Jan. 1904, Hanna was officially reelected as Senator by the Ohio legislature.

After the official vote, Hanna limped down the legislative aisle to the rostrum. With one hand he leaned upon the arm of a state senator and with the other hand he supported himself with his cane. To Hanna, how different the feeling must have been from Jan. 1898, when he was barely elected by a single vote. At the rostrum, the
cheers reverberated from the General Assembly floor for him from his fellow Republicans. Despite Hanna's recent losses upon the national level at the hands of Roosevelt, this particular moment had to be one of the great moments for the old and ailing party chieftain. With the deaths of McKinley and Sherman, Hanna stood as the last living embodiment of those state party leaders who during the 1870s started to transform the policy priorities of the state Republican party. On 13 January 1904, in the embodiment of Hanna, that process had triumphantly come to rest.80

As a result of his triumphant senatorial reelection, appeals for Hanna to reconsider running against Roosevelt, particularly from large eastern business interests, began to pour in upon the Ohio Senator. Hanna ignored all such appeals and informed his political agents to reaffirm his desire not to seek the nomination.81

Due to his increasingly poor health, further eroded through overwork and physical exhaustion, Hanna chose to lighten his political workload. He soon informed the President that he had no desire to continue as Chairman of the Republican National Committee in the upcoming Presidential election year. During his final months as chairman, Hanna's primary activity as RNC Chairman was to protect his old political friends on the Committee. Some, such as Committee Secretary Peary Heath were under attack due to the current postal frauds scandal. Hanna saved Heath from
expulsion from his Committee position. The President considered Heath, and others like him, political liabilities. Associates of the President charged that Hanna's "late" issue of the "call" for the place and time for the upcoming national convention had the ulterior motive of attempting to weaken Roosevelt. Hanna angrily denied the accusation. Hanna stated that he had grown tired of daily professing his loyalty to the President and his associates.

If he had lived, there is little chance that Hanna would have continued to remain as the national party chairman. Probably Roosevelt would have chosen a close ally, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, as chairman. Under current circumstances it is probable Hanna saw little chance for him to effectively function as chairman in such an unfriendly paranoid atmosphere. 

Besides, during the winter of 1903-04, Hanna's attention was riveted upon maintaining and keeping control of the vital Ohio Republican party apparatus from the clutches of the Foraker faction.

The final factional battle between the Hanna and Foraker forces, from early January 1904 to Hanna's death on 13 February 1904, was a petty political dispute over which faction was to control the state delegation to be sent to the national party convention. This was politically crucial, for whichever faction controlled the state
delegation would receive credit from Roosevelt for delivering the state's delegation to him.

Foraker and his forces believed that the honor should be conferred upon them, since they had been the main supporters of Roosevelt in Ohio. However, Hanna, fresh from his triumphal reelection, had no desire to see Foraker further strengthen himself with the state party. It was through the good graces of Hanna and his faction, not Foraker's, that Roosevelt would acquire his Ohio delegates. Even Roosevelt realized this would be an inopportune time for him to interfere in Ohio Republican politics. He was to receive the delegates anyway. From whose silver platter he would acquire them was not that important. Another reason behind Hanna's actions was that his rapid decline in health forced him to use everything within his power to strengthen his own factional organization. He was determined that his followers would continue to effectively function after his death. Hanna told his factional leaders that after his death, his key political lieutenant, Congressman Charles Dick, was to be his Senatorial successor and leader of "the organization." 83

In Ohio Republican politics, however, Hanna's death, left Foraker as the undisputed leader of the Ohio Republican party. Ironically, the very day Hanna died in Washington, the Foraker forces, at the annual meeting of
the Ohio League of Republican Clubs meeting in Cleveland, passed a resolution, over the isolated protests of the few pro-Hanna individuals present, endorsing Roosevelt for President.\textsuperscript{84}

The Hanna faction had enough power, in the absence of any real challenge from Foraker, to keep control of Hanna's Senate seat, through the state legislature's selection of Charles Dick as Hanna's successor. However, Foraker and his factional organization presented the state's delegates to Roosevelt and thereafter received the patronage plums dispensed from the executive office. Hanna's former political organization, at one time the greatest in the state's history, first shattered into personal political fiefdoms and then, soon after, disintegrated.\textsuperscript{85}

Restored to political power, James Clarkson, in a letter to his fellow Harrison Administration associate Louis Michener of Indiana, analyzed the impact McKinley and Hanna had had upon the national party, and what effect their deaths would have upon the party's future:

\begin{verbatim}
What times we have passed through!
What a part death has played,
especially in republican politics, in
the last few years. Three years ago
McKinley and Hanna were practically
the Republican party,-dominating,
powerful and asserting. The Repub-
lican party was their own. No one not
in their favor stood any chance.
Those who had not served them, because
they desired to serve older-time
\end{verbatim}
friends, were treated as enemies. It seemed to me and you and others at times as though the old homestead had become personal property, closer than a club made into a personal plan, and we kept out. How wide the gates have been opened since and how the party seems to be coming back to itself.86

Clarkson correctly observed the crucial shift within the Republican party. With the absence of McKinley and Hanna, the party was about to take a new direction. The party and country were moving toward a stronger state regulation of business and a reform of the party system. This shift would dismay Clarkson. If he had lived, it also would have disappointed his fellow party chieftain, Mark Hanna.

Through his major work at labor conciliation, Hanna was a key facilitator of the emerging administrative state. However, during his political lifetime, Hanna would never resolve the tension that existed between the former nineteenth century party period's commonwealth policies of development, and the emerging administrative state's regulation and redistribution policies. If Hanna had lived beyond 1904, the various reforms of the party system that emerged during the Progressive Era, would have, at first, bewildered, and then disappointed him. A new Republican party, led by leaders such as Roosevelt, Taft, and Hughes, were more intertwined with the twentieth century special interest state. These men assumed control
of the national Republican party from Hanna (by Hanna's death, Roosevelt had largely assumed command of the national party).
FOOTNOTES


2 George H. Miller, *Railroads and the Granger Laws* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1971); Albro Martin, "The Troubled Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age: A Reappraisal," *Journal of American History*, 61 (1974), 339-71; Kerr's main thesis was that the concern for coal mine safety in Ohio led to the creation of a framework for the emerging Administrative State. According to Kerr, "Clearly in the 1870s, however, the miners' agitation over unsafe and unhealthy working conditions was breaking ground for erecting what was to become in the next century an elaborate structure of government intervention into the affairs of private business firms." Kerr, "The Movement for Coal Mine Safety in Nineteenth-Century Ohio," 17.

3 McCormick, "The Party Period and Public Policy," 296; James Willard Hurst, *Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1956), 87; For McCormick, "the major parties seemed outmoded. Their historic ideologies were far less relevant to an urban-industrial society which demanded active governmental interventions than to a nineteenth-century notion where discrete policies of economic promotion constituted most of the government's work. Special-interest organizations found the major parties too diffuse to meet their needs." Arthur Link and Richard L. McCormick, *Progressivism* (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1983), 48; Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 129.


6 John Mitchell, "Circular Call for Convention of Districts One, Seven and Nine," July 17, 1900, Reel 2, John Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).


8 George A. Schilling to Mitchell, Sept. 1, 1900, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 14, 1900, p. 8; Henry Hoagland, Wage Bargaining on the Vessels of the Great Lakes (Urbana, Ill., 1917), 15, 16; By 1898, joint trade agreements were signed between the Association of Dock Managers at Lake Erie and the Longshoremen. The issues covered by the agreement were uniform scale charges for loading and unloading boats and uniform wage scales. John R. Commons, Labor and Administration (N.Y. 1913), 267, 285-86.

9 David J. Keefe to Mitchell, Sept. 19, 1900, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).

10 Henry George advised Mitchell to reject the ten percent wage raise offer in order to bring heat upon the Republican party. George stated that "one of our N.A. (North American) friends thought it might be the very best thing for the real interest of the mine workers if the convention should reject the ten percent offer unless the sliding scale is to be abolished. The way he reasoned was that they can say to the public that the railroads, helped by the Republican managers, are trying to trick the mine workers into accepting peace until the political campaign is over ... should the war continue, there would be ample time to make things terribly hot for the politicians, especially if immediately after the convention you should send up a yell that a hundred thousand men, women and children in the coal regions were starving. My friend is of opinion that 'Papa' would not long be 'out of it' under such circumstances." Henry George to Mitchell, Oct. 10, 1900, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902," 236; Cleveland Leader, March 26, 1902, p.2.


12 Mitchell appealed to Hanna to use his influence in order to avoid a strike in the anthracite region after 1 April 1901. Appeals such as Mitchell's, probably had an
impact upon Hanna's actions in attempting to mold the Republican party into becoming not only an instrument of economic development, but also one of industrial conciliation. Hanna hoped that both party functions, if acted upon simultaneously, would help insure labor peace. Mitchell observed to Hanna that "I desire to remind you that last fall when, through your valuable assistance, we were able to compromise the strike then on, it was heralded everywhere by the opponents of the Republican party that: the companies would take advantage of the first favorable opportunity, after the election was over, to destroy our organization...." Mitchell to Hanna, March 20, 1901, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).

13 Mitchell to W.R. Wilson (Sec. and Treasurer of U.M.W.), March 25, 1901, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Mitchell to Wilson, March 26, 1901, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Cleveland Leader, March 26, 1902, p.2.


16 Green, *The National Civic Federation, 40*; Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1934), 106; Lewis Gould, *The Presidency of William McKinley* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980). 134; A meeting on Imperialism in which Easley wanted to know if Senator Spooner would participate in the current meeting, which was to focus upon the Philippine question. Ralph Easley to Charles Dawes, August 27, 1900, Box 39, John Spooner Papers (Library of Congress); "The subject of this meeting has been laid before both Chairman Hanna and Chairman Jones, not that we expect to ask either national committee to officially pay any attention to us but to explain to them the scope and character of the meeting." Easley to Dawes, August 27, 1900, Box 39, Spooner Papers (L.C.).

18 Easley to Mitchell, Oct. 23, 1901, Reel 3, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Green, The National Civic Federation, 41-42; Mitchell to Easley, Dec. 26, 1901, Reel 3, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Easley to Mitchell, Jan. 2, 1902, Reel 4, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).

19 Green, The National Civic Federation, 42.

20 Ibid., 57-58.

21 John Commons, Myself ( ), 82-83; James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston, 1968), 13.


23 In 1897, when political attacks upon Hanna's labor record increased during his bid for the U.S. Senate, former employees of Hanna issued a pamphlet which praised Hanna's labor record, "A True Friend of the Workingmen: M.A. Hanna's Record," Fall 1897, Reel 54, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Cleveland Leader, August 5, 1902, p.1; New York Times, August 5, 1902, p.1.


26 Ibid., 233; Cleveland Leader, August 10, 1902, p.1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 23, 1904, p.10.

27 Green, The National Civic Federation, 27; Hanna publicly stated how important the work of the NCF had become in his life: "I would rather have the credit of making successful the movement to bring labor and capital into closer relations of confidence and reliance than to be President of the United States. If by resigning my seat in the United States Senate I could bring to fruition plans that are now fostering to make strikes, lockouts, and great labor disputes impossible, I would gladly do so ... I would want no great monument than to have the world remember that I did something to end the wars between American capital and American labor." New York Times, March 18, 1902, p.8.
28 Cleveland Leader, March 11, 1902, p. 2.

29 Cleveland Leader, Oct. 8, 1902, p. 1, p. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 10, 1902, p. 3; Cleveland Leader, April 20, 1903, p. 1.

30 Nick Salvatore, "Introduction," in Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography (Ithaca, New York, 1984), xxx-xxxii; New York Times, April 23, 1903, p. 1; As David Montgomery has pointed out, historians, such as James Weinstein, through use of the "new left" concept of corporate liberalism, have tended to overemphasize the influence and overall effectiveness which the NCF had within the business community. To Montgomery, "historians who have analyzed the Progressive Era in terms of the triumph of 'corporate liberalism' have tended to overestimate the significance and the success of the National Civic Federation. Neither the effort of the NCF to establish voluntary cooperation between organized business and organized labor, nor any subsequent effort of the sort, ever enjoyed the decisive support of the country's business leaders." David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America, 82; Green, The National Civic Federation, 96; Hanna to Cortelyou, April 24, 1903, Container 5, Daniel Cortelyou Papers (L.C.).


35 In late 1900, Gompers was wary of Keefe's close relationship with Hanna. In attempting to persuade Congress to enact an 8 hour bill, Gompers was aware of Hanna's opposition to the legislation. "I am of the opinion that the gentlemen to whom you refer will give no encouragement for either an early consideration of our eight-hour bill or its consideration at all by the present Congress, unless he is fully convinced, that organized labor and a large number of others are fully determined upon its passage, and the encouragement from him would be a result of the pressure brought upon him, rather than
from any voluntary act upon his part ... (come to
Washington to) pave the way for the removal from his mind
of the prejudice which both you and others have informed
me lurks in the Senator's mind, that either the A.F. of L.
or myself have any personal ill will towards him. I do
not desire to have any prejudgment on his part, stand in
the way of the maturity of our plans. Gompers to Keefe,
Dec. 27, 1900, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic
University): Mitchell, in an attempt to bring Gompers
closer to his political patron Hanna, revealed to Gompers
that it would be prudent, in developing a relationship
with the Ohio Senator, if the labor leader agreed to serve
on the newly created McKinley Memorial Committee.
Mitchell emphasized to Gompers that the "Senator and other
members of the committee are anxious to have you accept a
place on the memorial committee.... It seems to me, Sam,
that it would be a good move on your part to go on the
committee with Hanna. The Senator is feeling very
friendly toward you personally, and I believe that he will
be more responsive to our solicitations for his support on
labor measures in the future; and I am sanguine that it
would help to this and were you to accept a position on
the committee." Mitchell to Gompers, November 22, 1901,
Reel 3, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).

36 John Laslett, "Samuel Gompers and the Rise of
American Business Unionism," 76; Salvatore,
"Introduction," xxxi.

37 Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers

38 Green, The National Civic Federation,

39 Wiebe, "The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902,"
235, 237.

40 Ibid., 234; Salvatore, "Introduction,
xxx-xxxi; Mitchell to Keefe, March 13, 1902, Reel 4,
Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).

41 Van Tine, The Making of the Labor Bureau-
crat, 173; A recent study of Mitchell's financial
schemes which reflected negatively upon his personal
honesty and integrity is James O. Morris, "The Acquisitive
Spirit of John Mitchell UMW President (1899-1908), Labor
History, 20 (1979), 5-43; Letters which dealt with
Mitchell and Keefe's joint business ventures with Dernell
are, Keefe to Mitchell, Aug. 15, 1902, Keefe to Mitchell,
Sept. 10, 1902, Reel 4; Keefe to Mitchell, April 25, 1903,
Keefe to Mitchell, May 1, 1903, Mitchell to Keefe, July
30, 1903, Reel 6, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).
Van Tine, The Making of the Labor Bureaucrat, 173; Mitchell to Hanna, Dec. 27, 1900, Reel 2, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Mitchell to Keefe, Jan. 7, 1901, "Mr. Daniel Keefe ... will be an applicant for the position of Commissioner General of Emigration, now held by Mr. Powderly.... Mr. Keefe has been for many years a potent factor in the labor movement, and I am sure that no one man has rendered the Republican party greater service than Mr. Keefe, among the trade unionists." Mitchell to Payne, Sept. 3, 1901, Reel 3, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Hanna reflected upon the failure of himself and the labor movement to obtain a federal patronage position for Keefe. (I) "... am certainly distressed by your report of our friend's misfortune.... I will say, however, that I have already made an effort to secure something which might take the place of the position he recently gave up." Hanna to Mitchell, Aug. 19, 1903, Reel 6, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).


Easley to Mitchell, Nov. 13, 1901, Reel 3, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University); Easley to Gompers, Nov. 18, 1901, Box 2, Gompers Papers (Wisconsin State Historical Society).


New York Times, May 4, 1902, p.1; ibid., May 6, 1902, p.1; ibid., May 10, 1902, p.1; Baer's refusal to allow the NCF to continue further arbitration was
couched in the coal operator's usual philosophical language. "Anthracite mining is a business and not a religious, sentimental, or academic proposition. The laws organizing the companies I represent in express terms impose the business management on the President and Directors. I could not, if I would, delegate this business management to even so highly a respectable body as the Civic Federation." ibid., June 11, 1902, p.1; During his testimony before the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission hearings, as portrayed by a *Times* reporter, Baer sarcastically described the NCF's negotiations between the coal operators and the union. "The operators pocketed their pride, he said, and met in a church building where were present some distinguished men. 'Some were Bishops and some dressed like Bishops.' He pictured the members of the Federation sitting around 'puffing good cigars' and not saying a word, while he and Mr. Mitchell tried to get together." ibid., Feb. 13, 1903, p.1.

50 New York *Times*, May 10, 1902, p.8; Mitchell to Hanna, Aug 15, 1902, Reel 4, Mitchell Papers (Catholic University).


52 Cleveland *Leader*, August 11, 1902, p.10; Charles A. Moore to Oscar Straus, Oct. 6, 1902, Container 3, Oscar Straus Papers (L.C.).


54 Ibid., 230.


58 New York *Times*, March 22, 1903, pp.1-2; Several key historical works which interpreted the strike as a major victory for the miners are, Selig Perlman, A


61 Montgomery, Workers' Control in America, 65-67; Under NCF encouragement, between 1898 and 1905, some twenty-six national or district bargaining agreements were adapted as renewed. Tomline, The State and the Unions, 73.

62 Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 38; Salvatore, "Introduction," xxxi; for an excellent study of the forces which advocated welfare capitalism in America, see Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 (Chicago, 1970).


67 Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* 2nd ed., 43-44; New York Times, Oct. 21, 1902, p.8; ibid., July 5, 1902, p.1; "... Gen. Clarkson has a clear field so far as Mr. Hanna is concerned. If he wants to tie up the South no influence will be extended from Ohio that would tend to interfere with the operation." Ibid., July 7, 1902, p.1; ibid., Oct. 21, 1902, p.8; ibid., Nov. 17, 1902, p.1; Cleveland Leader, Nov. 19, 1902, p.1; ibid., Nov. 26, 1902, p.1; New York Times, Nov. 19, 1902, p.8; ibid., Nov. 20, 1902, p.8.


69 New York Times, May 28, 1902, p.1; Cleveland Leader, May 28, 1902, p.5; a writer for the Nashville *News* commented in late 1901 on the budding Hanna-Foraker battle in Ohio. "Stranger things have happened than Senator Hanna running for the presidency in 1904. The springing of the Hanna-Foraker feud again in Ohio in all its recrudescence is an indication that points that way. Senator Foraker had no sooner avowed himself a Roosevelt man than it was announced that the two Ohio senators had again fallen out over the distribution of patronage in their native State. The Republican national chairman was new in politics when he entered the arena a few years ago. But he was shrewd in methods and has been the most successful politician America has known for years." Nashville *News*, December 20, 1901 in container 28, Straus Papers (L.C.).

70 New York Times, May 28, 1902, p.1; Cleveland Leader, May 25, 1902, p.5.


73 New York Times, May 26, 1903, p.1; Everett Walters, *Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising*
Republican (Columbus, 1948), 201; Cleveland Leader, May 27, 1903, p.1; New York Times, June 5, 1903, p.3.


75 John Blum, The Republican Roosevelt 2nd ed., 50, William Allen White, Masks In a Pageant (New York, 1928), 177; Elmer Dover to Cortelyou, July 6, 1900, box 59, Cortelyou Papers (L.C.); Hanna to Cortelyou, Aug. 11, 1901, box 60, Cortelyou Papers (L.C.); New York Times, Oct. 8, 1900, p.1; ibid., March 25, 1902, p.1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 2, 1902, p.1; New York Times, May 7, 1902, p.3; ibid., June 24, 1902, p.8; ibid., March 15, 1903, p.9; ibid., June 29, 1903, p.3; Cleveland Leader, Nov. 19, 1903, p.1; New York Times, Nov. 13, 1903, p.5; ibid., Nov. 20, 1903, p.3; ibid., Nov. 28, 1903, p.1; ibid., Dec. 15, 1903, p.1; ibid., Jan. 6, 1904, p.8; ibid., Jan. 12, 1904, p.1; Cleveland Leader, Jan. 12, 1904, p.3; New York Times, Feb. 19, 1904, p.9.

76 Cleveland Leader, June 4, 1903, pp.1,7; New York Times, June 4, 1903, p.1.


78 New York Times, April 23, 1903, p.1; ibid., June 4, 1903, p.1; Harding had been considered a member of the Foraker faction, primarily due to his actions against Hanna during the 1898 Senatorial fight. As alleged by a reporter for the Cleveland Leader, Harding's papers, the Marion Star, was "the only Republican journal which came out flat-footed" for Hanna's opponent, Robert E. McKinson. Cleveland Leader, June 5, 1903, p.1; The Ohio Republican platform was imbued with the traditional principles of development and protection. According to a writer for the Leader, "The platform takes ground in favor of keeping, maintaining, and improving the canal system ... it opposes tinkering with the present tariff law, 'that changing conditions and the possible benefits of reciprocity may call for timely readjustment of schedules,' but 'that protection as a principle and as a policy must be administered by the friends of American prosperity and must not be sacrificed.'" Cleveland Leader, June 5, 1903, p.4; New York Times, June 5, 1903, p.8; Cleveland Leader, June 4, 1903, p.1; New York Times, June
19, 1903, p.1; Cleveland Leader, June 20, 1903, p.1; ibid., Jan. 20, 1904, p.1; ibid., Jan. 29, 1904, p.1; Foraker to Roosevelt, July 28, 1903, Box 24, Joseph Foraker Papers (Cincinnati Historical Society).

79 New York Times, November 5, 1903, p.6; Cleveland Leader, November 5, 1903, p.5; In response to a letter from an enthusiastic Kansan admirer who implored the Ohio Senator to now formally challenge Roosevelt for the Presidency, Hanna publicly refused to interpret his re-election as a rebuke to Roosevelt, but instead cast it as a triumph of traditional Republican principles. According to Hanna, on "... the result of the recent election in Ohio. I consider the great victory there an endorsement of the principles and policies of the Republican party." Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 20, 1903, p.1.


81 John Blum, The Republican Roosevelt 2nd ed., 53; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 12, 1903, p.6; Senator Nathan Scott, Wood's most vociferous opponent on the Senate Military Committee, vigorously attempted to persuade Hanna to challenge the "unsafe" Roosevelt for the nomination. "To my mind it is a foregone conclusion that if we renominate Roosevelt it means defeat. Now are you going to accept the responsibility of allowing the Republican party to go to defeat... You know if this man is reelected President that he will not and is not now carrying out the policy of William McKinley. In other words, you and I saw enough in the Military Committee to know that any blame that may be chargeable to Gen. Wood they are going to try to reflect upon McKinley's administration. When this man is reelected, I but ... want you to sit down and pray with yourself for an hour and a half as we used to do in the Quaker meetings and then" reflect upon the consequences of your failure to challenge him. N.B. Scott to Hanna, December 23, 1903, Box 3, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.).


84 Cleveland Leader, Feb. 2, 1904, p.1; ibid., Feb. 11, 1904, p.10; ibid., Feb. 13, 1904, p.1; After Hanna's death, Foraker summed up the final factional battle for convention delegates. "Before Senator Hanna became ill it seemed inevitable that there should be a contest over delegates to the National Convention, for I was satisfied then, and I am satisfied now, that neither he nor his friends intended to favor the nomination of President Roosevelt. With his death that feature of the situation passed away.... I was greatly surprised, therefore, when Governor Herrick published what he claimed was an extract from a last letter from Senator Hanna, enjoining him to see to it that delegates to the National Convention to support Roosevelt should be selected only from their good friends. That meant, of course, that no friend of mine should be allowed to go." No evidence suggests that Foraker was "surprised" at the Hanna faction's tactics, as Foraker's group were simultaneously employing the same delegate strategy for their side.


85 New York Times, February 19, 1904, p.9; S.S. Bassett to Charles Dick, Feb. 16, 1904, Box 5, Dick Papers (O.H.S.); Cleveland Leader, Feb. 19, 1904, p.3.

86 James Clarkson to Louis Michener, Feb. 24, 1904, Box 3, Clarkson Papers (L.C.).
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Hanna's death was a tremendous loss to the organized labor movement and to many ethnocultural groups, particularly the Catholics. The labor leaders personally lost a very good friend who was a stalwart fighter for labor conciliation and arbitration to eliminate unnecessary strikes. Catholics were especially grateful to Hanna for his strong advocacy of cultural pluralism. Both labor and the ethno-cultural groups considered Hanna a great statesman and true friend. They were relying on him to provide leadership in the emerging twentieth century on very important issues of deep concern to their constituencies.

For several years, associates of Hanna had commented upon his deteriorating physical condition. By 1900 the decline in Hanna's health had become obvious. During the 1902 congressional elections Hanna had to end a campaign swing and take a one-week respite from the campaign. Close political associates, such as Congressman
Grosvenor, were exasperated at Hanna's continuing over-exertion of himself, "and were afraid that if he continued with his present schedule his trouble may be permanent." ¹

Hanna's strenuous campaigning during his 1903 Senate reelection campaign probably contributed to his final illness and death. Hanna's Ohio campaign exasperated his friends and fellow politicians because they considered Hanna's reelection a vital certainty. ²

From January 11 to 13, 1904 Hanna was in Columbus to attend the official inauguration ceremonies for the incoming governor and to be officially notified of his Senate reelection by the Ohio legislature. The expected happy occasion for Hanna turned into one filled with shock and sorrow. Within twenty-four hours, both ex-Governors Foster and Bushnell were felled by strokes. Foster died immediately. Bushnell lingered in a coma for several days before he died. ³

The deaths of Foster, Bushnell, and Hanna marked the end of a very contentious factional era in Ohio Republican politics. These factional disputes over personality and policy had distinguished Ohio Republican politics since the mid-1870s. Ironically, when Foraker finally achieved his goal of undisputed control of the Ohio G.O.P., he then shifted away from emphasizing social reform issues. He rarely continued to identify himself as the representative of the "young, vigorous" Republicans.
In less than ten years Foraker's fame would rest with his being identified as the key defender of Standard Oil interests in the Senate. Foraker no longer trumpeted social reform issues.

Hanna spent the final fifteen days of his life, from February 1 to February 15, bedridden in his Arlington Hotel apartment in Washington, D.C. Hanna's death was caused by a typhoid virus he had contracted probably in Cleveland or during his three day stay in Columbus for the inaugural ceremonies. Hanna's continual refusal during the final four years of his life to rest and relax had permanently weakened him. Hanna's friend Solon Lauer stated: "Death will sometime stop his restless activity; but the fear of death will never do so." On February 15, at 6:40 p.m., Mark Hanna died of a virulent typhoid fever. 4

Hanna's funeral was held in Cleveland on February 19 at St. Paul's Episcopal Church. On the day preceding the funeral, from 1 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., approximately 35,000 people braved the "fierce blowing snow" of a winter storm for the brief opportunity to view Hanna's body as it lay in state.

On the day of the funeral, in an unprecedentated gesture, over 30,000 anthracite miners with official U.M.W. sanction ceased work as a show of respect to Hanna. Also the U.M.W. national headquarters and other
unions closed their headquarters at noon as an official sign of respect. Such organized labor action prompted one writer to observe that, "so far as is known there has never been a similar demonstration of respect shown upon the death of a U.S. Senator."  

Bishop Leonard in his eulogy emphasized Hanna's recent labor conciliation work: "Do you not recognize the reality of this man's great, generous efforts in the silent approbation those 30,000 miners are suffering while we worship here—the tribute that rebukes the noisy, shallow harangue which would inflame one class against another, and that tells the world of the reverence of the vast industrial army for a righteous man, a strong leader, a considerate employer? The miners of the coal pits have ceased their work to-day, that, joining with you and me, so they may honor this friend of the laborers."  

Hanna's strong defense of cultural pluralism was recognized by many immigrant groups. The Cleveland Catholic community was especially affected by Hanna's death. On Feb. 13, a letter was sent to the Hanna family from the Alexian Hospital in Cleveland: "There are 500 sisters in Ohio praying for Senator Hanna's recovery. He is one of our truest friends." After Hanna's death Monsignor T.P. Thorpe of the Church of the Immaculate Conception in Cleveland asked Mrs. Hanna for permission to put a memorial window, dedicated to Mr. Hanna, in the
church. Mrs. Hanna gave her permission. Later, she stated "it is unusual to make such a request of Protestants but Mr. Hanna always was generous with his money toward Catholics."

Hanna was not only an advocate of labor conciliation and cultural pluralism, but he also had an important impact upon creation of new twentieth century administrative organizations in addition to his work on the NCF. An example of Hanna's recognition of the need for innovative bureaucratic structures was his advocating in January 1902 formation of a Department of Commerce and Labor. Hanna believed such an institution should have the power to investigate corporate books and protect the rights of labor. Due to his Cleveland environment, Hanna was very cognizant of the various socio-economic forces transforming America into an urban-industrial society.  

If Hanna had lived beyond February 1904 he would certainly have fought against various Progressive reforms of the party system. Like many similar nineteenth century party chieftains such as James Clarkson, Hanna had little use for civil service reform. Hanna particularly detested anti-solicitation laws which prevented party solicitation of federal employees. Even in 1902 after such laws had been on the books for years, one of Hanna's political agents, Ohio party chairman W.F. Burdell, was banned by executive order from continued solicitation of money from
federal officeholders for the Ohio Republican party. Burdell's actions were a clear violation of the twelve sections of the Civil Service Act. Additionally, Hanna's refusal to oust Perry Heath as secretary to the Republican National Committee brought criticism from reform elements within the G.O.P. Previously Heath had served as Assistant Postmaster General during the Harrison Administration. In this position Heath was alleged to have been involved with or had knowledge of the postal frauds scandal. Hanna stood by his close friend and during a December 1903 meeting with President Roosevelt (their last personal meeting together) informed Roosevelt that as long as he remained party chairman, Heath would remain party secretary. Hanna's actions in protecting close political cohorts who were touched by scandal led many progressive reformers to constantly consider Hanna a corrupt party spoilsman. He undoubtedly would have been in the vanguard in opposition to Progressive reforms which politically or financially weakened the party system.  

Despite his yeoman work with the NCF, Hanna believed that the Republican party was the key instrument for necessary social and political changes. Hanna considered his involvement with the NCF as strengthening the G.O.P. During his presidency, Hanna succeeded in attracting to the NCF many individuals with ties to the Republican party. Hanna never viewed himself as the head
of an extra-party bureaucratic organization that would gradually replace political parties as the key initiators of many socio-economic policies.

Hanna's attitude toward the "trusts" was not Populist. Hanna accepted the institutional growth and legitimacy of labor organizations and also welcomed the massive number of corporate mergers. Hanna considered the growing number of large national center firms and labor organizations as a step toward a more harmonious society made up of all interests. Probably Hanna's new harmonious organizational society was a substitution for his previous belief in the antebellum Commonwealth Idea. Progressives fear that such organized political power would corrupt the political process had previously never troubled Hanna. It is doubtful it would have concerned him if he had lived.9

Upon Hanna's death many commentators mentioned the positive change since 1896 in his public image. A reporter for the Cleveland Leader wrote, "Now Mark Hanna will be mourned by multitudes who formerly disliked the personality they thought to be the man they did not know." The actions of Bishop Leonard, who dwelled at great length in his eulogy on Hanna's recent labor conciliation work, and the national unions unprecedented show of respect to the dead Senator, convinced many of his contemporaries that Hanna would be remembered, not as a corrupt party chieftain, but as a leading statesman on labor issues.10
Ironically, if Hanna had lived and remained on the national political stage as a Senator for the next six years his achievements may not have been as fondly remembered. Instead of being recognized as a "labor statesman," its probable his contemporaries would have remembered him as a defender of the "trusts" and a protector of a corrupt party system. Furthermore, many commentators probably would have agreed that the original harsh judgment of Hanna during the 1896 campaign was accurate.

As a transitional figure between the nineteenth century party period and the twentieth century administrative state, by 1904 Hanna had ideologically advanced as far upon policy issues as could be expected from his personal history and background. If Hanna lived another ten years, it is my best judgment he would have only played a secondary party and policy role to the more dynamic Roosevelt, and then cast as a reactionary foil opposed to Roosevelt's progressive executive leadership. Additionally, Foraker with Roosevelt's surreptitious help would have captured the state party apparatus from Hanna and his organization. As a national political figure, Hanna's death in 1904 came at the most propitious moment. As a result, the memory of Hanna's many positive and enlightened achievements will be emphasized and remembered.
FOOTNOTES

1 "Hanna seems to be ten years older than he was four years ago. The ruddy terracotta skin that glowed with health in 1896 has faded to an ashen pink. The mobile smile that was a conversation without words is hardening a little—but only a little. The lower parts of his legs are slightly uncertain, and his feet almost shuffle. The large, firm hand grips his cane with something like nervousness. The thin hair hangs more listlessly to the head than it used to hang...." William Allen White, "Hanna," McClure's Magazine, 16 (November 1900), 63; Augusta Hanna described Hanna's health problems during the 1900 Presidential campaign. "... I could see all the time that he was going beyond his strength. He had several nervous breakdowns. He dropped to the floor in his office at the Cameron house, in Washington. His heart almost stopped beating. I talked to him again but it did no good." Mrs. Hanna Interview, Box 3, Hanna-McCormick Papers (L.C.); Solon Lauer, Mark Hanna: A Sketch From Life and Other Essays (Cleveland, 1901), 11-12; Cleveland Leader, Oct. 12, 1902, p. 1; ibid., Oct. 13, 1902, p. 3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 12, 1902, p. 1; ibid., Oct. 13, 1902, p. 1; New York Times, Oct. 14, 1902, p. 7; Grosvenor to Dick, Oct. 14, 1902, Box 3, Charles Dick Papers (O.H.S.).

2 "... I have written General Dick that I will be able to give him a little time about the middle of October. I have been very much worried about your health, and hope that you will not wear yourself out with the labors and burdens incident to a hard speaking campaign. I think it would be a good idea for you to notify your friends that you cannot do this for yourself, and ask them to help out, although Providence has favored you by giving you the benefit of humbug and chaos for opposition." Jonathon Dolliver to Hanna, Sept. 9, 1903, Box 3, Hanna-McCormick papers (L.C.); Preceding the 1903 campaign, Hanna took a private summer cruise off the Atlantic coast for the purpose of reinvigorating himself for the upcoming campaign. An observer who saw Hanna several times during the summer believed the cruise did not allow Hanna the rest and relaxation he needed as the yacht "put in at different places along the north Atlantic coast and there were dinners and other social entertainments" to attend. After the conclusion of his cruising trip, Hanna
immediately journeyed to Sault Sainte Marie, Michigan to visit his eldest daughter Mabel Parson. Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 7, 1903, p. 6.

3 After being reelected, on January 13 Hanna journeyed by train back to Cleveland. A newspaperman who traveled with Hanna described his shock at the sudden deaths of the two men. "He talked of both men to me and several times repeated the story of Bushnell's seizure, describing his condition when the driver found him.... He met many friends on the train who congratulated him on his fine victory but the picture of Bushnell was with him throughout the journey home. He was ill himself at the time and perhaps, felt the uncertainty of his own life. Only those who knew him well could perceive any change in his manner or could guess at the thought that was in his mind." New York Times, Jan. 12, 1904, p. 1; ibid., Jan. 15, 1904, p. 9; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 15, 1904, p. 1.

4 Cleveland Leader, Dec. 11, 1903, p. 6; ibid., Feb. 5, 1904, p. 1; ibid., Feb. 16, 1904, p. 5; Representative William Alden Smith of Michigan talked of a recent conversation he had had with Hanna. Smith invited Hanna to attend the semi-centennial celebration of the founding of the Republican party, to be held on July 6, 1904 at Jackson, Michigan. According to Smith, Hanna replied, "I don't know where I will be then." Smith exclaimed, "Why you will be right here, of course." "No," replied Hanna, "I'm afraid I won't." Immediately Smith "walked to the rear of the Senate Chamber, and looking back at the Senator, wondered if he had a premonition that he might not live long. The impression made by his words never left me." New York Times, Feb. 18, 1904, p. 5; On February 5, five physicians were in attendance—Dr. Rixey, the regular family physician; Dr. Magruder; Dr. Brewer of New York; Dr. Behrond, the expert who examined the Senator's blood for typhoid indication; and Dr. Osler. New York Times, Feb. 6, 1904, p. 1; ibid., Feb. 8, 1904, p. 5; Feb. 13, 1904, p. 1; Feb. 14, 1904, p. 1; New York Times, Feb. 16, 1904, p. 1.


9 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 305, 307.

10 Cleveland Leader, Feb. 16, 1904, p. 4; An additional writer for Harpers' Weekly talked of the change in Hanna's public image upon his death. "The exceptional weight which he had acquired so quickly in Republican councils, was a source of less profound and fervent satisfaction to Senator Hanna than the knowledge that, in the minds of the great mass of fairminded citizens, he had, by personal contact, wholly dispelled the misconceptions of his character engendered by the libels and aspersions sent broadcast by the 'yellow' press during the campaign of 1900...." Henry McCook, The Senator; A Threnody (Philadelphia, 1905), 179-80.
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