THE ANGLOSPHERE: 
A GENEALOGY OF AN IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DISSERTATION

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By
Srdjan Vucetic, M.A.

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Dissertation Committee:

Professor Ted Hopf, Adviser

Professor Jennifer Mitzen

Professor Alexander Wendt

Approved by

______________________________
Adviser

Political Science Graduate Program
ABSTRACT

The Anglosphere refers to a grouping of English-speaking states, whose core is said to consist of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. In international relations, the term is usually used to describe and/or prescribe civilization, empire, military coalitions, customs union or even a political association. The Anglosphere is a neologism, but one rooted and reflected in long-standing international phenomena such as the Anglo-American Special Relationship, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the Australia-New Zealand-United States Pact (ANZUS) Pact and the Commonwealth of Nations. In addition, quantitative research on the sources of international security cooperation clearly shows a pattern of behavior particular to the Anglosphere.

While it offers no shortage of explanations of international conflict and cooperation across different groupings of states, the field of International Relations (IR) is silent on the subject of the Anglosphere. This dissertation seeks to open up the research agenda by investigating two basic questions: how did the Anglosphere become possible and what effects does it have on international politics? The dissertation considers these questions in parallel, via two complementary analytical tasks. The first task is to provide a genealogy of the Anglosphere as a grouping of states characterized by shared identity. To second is to develop and evaluate a theoretical framework which links state/national identity to foreign policies generative of the Anglosphere.
The genealogical account shows how the relations between and among the states of the Anglosphere came to be seen as exempt from the standard rules that govern international conflict and cooperation, such as those on the use of force, appeasement, reciprocity, face-saving, institution-building, defection or punishment. While the identities constitutive of the Anglosphere varied in their content and contestation, the five states at the putative core of this community have managed to continually sustain it for more than a century. Far from being natural or inevitable, this genealogy concludes, the Anglosphere is contingent on the past interactions and is likely to be subject to contestation and re-construction in the future.

In positing state/national identity as a cause, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation proposes that collective identity at the level of the state will have made one state action more likely over others, thus leading to differentiated outcomes in international conflict and cooperation. The empirically testable proposition is twofold: first, identity shapes state action by making some cooperative policies more likely than others. Second, foreign policy debates on the fit between identity and the perceived reality influence the continuity and change of state action. The test proceeds in four sets of case studies of security cooperation between and among the states of the Anglosphere core: the turn of the twentieth century Anglo-American “great rapprochement”; the negotiations over the Pacific Pact in 1950-1; alliance politics over the Suez crisis (1956) and the Vietnam escalation (1964-5); and the politics of the “coalition of the willing” in the run-up to the Iraq War (2002-3). The empirical findings support the first proposition; the empirical record is mixed with the second proposition. The contestability of
state/national identity seems to increase with the perceived misfit between identity at home and the perceived reality abroad.

The dissertation represents the first attempt to explain and understand the Anglosphere as a phenomenon of major significance in international relations. The dissertation also has the potential to achieve a broader impact on the research agenda on identity and international cooperation, particularly within the constructivist research program in IR. Last, the relatively new methodology in this project could be used across subfields in IR and in other disciplines.
To my family
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VITA

October 2, 1976..............................................Born, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

2000................................................................Hon. B.A., Int’l Relations and German,
University of Toronto
(Toronto, Canada)

2002................................................................M.A., Political Science,
York University
(Toronto, Canada)

2002-2005 ................................................ Graduate Research and Teaching Associate,
The Ohio State University

2007-2008 ..................................................Presidential Fellow
The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

1. Vucetic, Srdjan, “Democracies and International Human Rights: Why is There No
Place for Migrant Workers?” The International Journal of Human Rights, 11.4
(December 2007), 403 – 428.

2. Vucetic, Srdjan, “Why Did Canada Sit Out the Iraq War: One Constructivist
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Democratisation Theory?” Southeast European Politics, 5.2-3 (December 2004), 115-
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Community-building Institution?” Southeast European Politics, 2.2 (October 2001), 109-
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PREFACE

The Anglosphere. Genealogy. Identity. International Relations. These four concepts range anywhere from “essentially contested” (W.B. Gallie and William Connolly) to “impossible” (Ernesto Laclau), but I still wrote an entire dissertation about them. The Anglosphere is my research problem, genealogy is my methodology, identity is my theory and international relations is the object of study in my discipline. The dissertation is a story how the Anglosphere became possible and with what substantive effects on international relations. After asking the “what?” and “so what?” questions in the first chapter, I turn to “how?”, “why?” and “how-possible?” My main argument is the Anglosphere, as a grouping of states, emerged in interactions between and among English-speaking states and their societies. Through these interactions, select English-speaking states have learned to maintain peace among each other, cooperate, integrate and identify each others as best friends.

This dissertation makes a claim to interpretation—an account of social and political life that observes subjects and structures in the way they relate to each other—but not necessarily a claim to hermeneutics, which can be seen as “interpretation plus.” That one plus asks the researcher to include herself/himself in the account or, put otherwise, to investigate the subject as well as the investigator. Calls for the “personal dimension” are often made at conferences and workshops, yet rare is that scientific text which spends even a paragraph on self-evaluative thought. Let me buck the trend, then.
I was born and raised in the illiberal multiculturalism of Sarajevo, the capital of the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When a transition to free-market democracy and the growth of monistic nationalism caused war, I fled. In all that refugee randomness, I ended up in Canada, a state actor who offered me not just shelter and status, but also the opportunity of permanent resettlement. Thus began my intense relationship with the Anglo Other. Though I have acquired fairly Anglospheric symbols of identity—the English language, Canadian citizenship, American Ph.D.—I am rarely recognized as an Anglo, in most social contexts. I will spare the reader the predictable detail, save for this one. As I floated my dissertation project in the community of young scholars at Arizona State in January 2006, more than a few of them admitted to being drawn to my presentation only to find out how the personal name spelled with a minimum of vowels related to the noun Anglosphere. To them, the match between the two was somehow not the most intuitive and hence interesting.

In my study of international relations, within the academic discipline of known as upper-case International Relations (IR), the Anglo Other appears everywhere, at least to me. The IR canon, as I studied it, insisted on an ontology which emphasized territorial nation-states and their jealously guarded sovereignty. This did not help me understand how the world hung together, even with respect to the questions IR saw as central. My readings in history continued to puzzle, such as this 1939 document:

If you were to ask any Canadian, “Do you people have to go to war if England does?” he’d answer at once, “Oh, no.” If you then said, “Would you go to war if England does?” he’d answer, “Oh, yes.” And if you asked “Why?” he would say, reflectively, “Well, you see, we’d have to” (S. Leacock, cited in Granatastein, ed., 1993: 158; Nossal 1997: 149).
According to the ontology dominant in my field, Canada was a sovereign nation-state in 1939, yet the texts and behavior from the period suggested that its sovereignty was significantly circumscribed. History, I later learned, contained all kinds of anomalies for IR. Rather than being discrete units, states appeared linked—and broken—by all kinds of international and transnational identities and identifications. IR, I concluded, would do well to consider these factors. This dissertation is a result of one such consideration.

The Anglosphere, like many other terms beginning with the prefix Anglo, sometimes appear in the so-called scare quotes, which are meant to signal the author’s constant awareness of the problems the terms give rise to. I have decided to leave them out entirely because it is my belief that we can never claim any certainty over any essentially contested concepts (crisis, events, identity, race and so on). In this study, the quotation marks therefore usually indicate either quotations or my labels, but not contestations. Leaving out scare quotes may be a minority practice in constructivist writing, but I trust that the reader will always keep in mind that I a priori refuse the objectivize the subject and write it as if it had some concrete, authentic essence. Along the same lines, my use of the upper case Anglosphere should not be read as deference to the phenomenon’s quasi-sacrality, but as a grammatical standard.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE ANGLOSPHERE AND HOW IT MATTERS

If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security...If we are together, nothing is impossible.


Now Mr Churchill is starting his process of unleashing war (like Hitler) with a racial theory, declaring that only those people who speak English are full-bloodied nations, whose vocation it is to control the fate of the whole world...Mr Churchill and his friends in England and in America are presenting those nations who do not speak English with a kind of ultimatum – recognize our supremacy over you, voluntary, and all will be well – otherwise war is inevitable.


It used to be said that the sun never sets on the British Empire. I am afraid we were partly responsible for sending that adage out of fashion! But, if there is one phenomenon on which the sun cannot set, it is the world of the English-speaking peoples, in which the people of the Indian origin are the single largest component.

Manmohan Singh, India’s Prime Minister, Honorary degree acceptance speech, Oxford, 2005.

At the time of this writing, an Internet search of the term Anglosphere yields between thirty and fifty thousand distinct entries, depending on the search engine. The meanings of the term seem to vary, but in the mainstream the Anglosphere refers to a community of English-speaking states, nations or societies in international society – a phenomenon formerly known as “English-speaking peoples.” This dissertation is a story how the Anglosphere became possible and what effects it has on international relations.

My main argument is that the Anglosphere constitutes a “special” community in international society characterized primarily by a sense of shared identity. The Anglosphere identity varied in its content and contestation, but has been continually updated for more than a century. The net effect has been remarkable, relative to
comparable international relations: the members of the Anglosphere have learned not only how to maintain peace among each other but also how to cooperate even in the most sensitive areas of state sovereignty. Because of shared identity, I argue further, member states of the Anglosphere judge each other by standards different from those they use to judge non-members. The standards that govern international relations—the use of force, appeasement, reciprocity, face-saving, institution-building, defection and punishment—have an exceptional (or “exemptional”) quality within the Anglosphere.

In this chapter, I begin with two questions—what is the Anglosphere and why it is interesting theoretically. Next I discuss two ways to develop a research agenda on the Anglosphere. One is a genealogy and the other is a theory on why some identities come to the fore over others. Then, after delineating the scope and domain of my inquiry, I present my main findings. In the last section, I give a quick tour of the dissertation.

WHAT’S IN A NAME?

As a concept for making sense of international relations, the Anglosphere can be traced back to two conferences convened by the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, in 1999 and 2000. Attendees reportedly included former prime minister of Britain Margaret Thatcher and a host of public intellectuals, entrepreneurs, newspaper editors and scholars like James C. Bennett, Conrad Black, Robert Conquest, Francis Fukuyama, Owen Harries, John O’Sullivan and Kenneth Minogue. According to one written record, this was the “intellectual heart of British-American conservatism” (Lloyd 2000). Since this conference, the Anglosphere-talk has taken off, at least in the English-speaking world. In the mainstream media, *The Economist* described the idea of the Anglosphere
political association as “improbable,” but “arresting” (December 3, 2005) while Daily Telegraph listed the Anglosphere as one of the “core values of the British identity” (July, 27 2005). Among in-office state officials, U.S. President George W. Bush is considered to be a fan of the Anglosphere, as is Britain’s Prime Minister George Brown, who penned a Wall Street Journal op-ed on “Enlarging the Anglosphere” (April 16, 2008, A19).

The proceedings of the two Hudson conferences never appeared in print, but several attendees subsequently published chapters and books on the topic. The basic argument is prescriptive: for the sake of the progress of human civilization, English-speaking states should cooperate and integrate more.1 In these writings, the Anglosphere is conceptualized as an identity shared among individual states. Its first defining feature is language: all officially English-speaking states, from Antigua and Barbuda to Zimbabwe, are members as are those whose populations speak English in “sufficiently large numbers,” like Sweden or Switzerland. In this sense, the Anglosphere is defined not so much English-speaking, as “English-using” (Haglund 2005). Indicatively, the proponents of the Anglosphere treat language an additive feature of state identity.

In addition to language, the Anglosphere identity is further defined in terms of the “values and institutions” associated with the historical experience of England/Britain. These vary across writings, but a typical list includes individualism, limited government, representative democracy, judicial review, free market capitalism and the rule of law. In the Anglosphere argument, there is nothing peculiarly English or Anglo about each of

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these values and institutions, save for the fact that they have been successfully
“harnessed” in the English-speaking states who went on to make the modern world.²
And being good at modernity is what ultimately sets apart this community from
seemingly similar macro-historical structures and processes: “the English-speaking
nations have not only formed a distinct branch of Western civilization for most of history,
they are now becoming a distinct civilization in their own right” (Bennett 2002: 112). In
a civilization defined by its shared origins in the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian and
Enlightenment traditions, the Anglosphere therefore stands an exception.

The ambiguities over its definition go front and center of the theoretical
significance of the Anglosphere. In most discussions, this community is conceptualized
as a set of concentric or nested circles. The labels vary across the writings, but the basic
division is between the “core” (“densest nodes” or “inner circle”) and “periphery” (“outer
circle,” “frontiers”), with a variety of in between mid-circles. The geometry of the
concentric circles is meant to signal that membership in the Anglosphere can be acquired:
speak our language, adhere to our values and institutions and you are “it”—or at least
“in.” Ostensibly, membership can also be lost. The outer boundaries of the Anglosphere,
it seems, move from unique to near-universal (Conquest 2005: 281). Such variable and
elastic conceptualization is no doubt meant to be political, not scientific. As the
proponents of the Anglosphere argument are well-aware, the critics have long regarded
calls for cooperation and unity among English-speaking states as parochial, ethnocentric,

² Roberts (2006: 636). In culturalists terms, to the extent that these are possible in the first place, the
adjective Anglo is extremely hard to pin down due the multiple and overlapping constructions of England
in ordinary language definitions, such as English England, Anglo-British England, Little England,
Cosmopolitan England and so on (Bryant 2003; also see Wierzbicka 2006: 5, 299-301).
racist and imperialist. To the Soviet leader Stalin, whose thoughts can be found in the
second epigraph, the Anglosphere smacked of a racial theory of war. This criticism
echoes sixty years later in the contemporary descriptions of the Anglosphere as the
“imperial axis of whiteness” or the “Anglo-Saxon Ummah.”

Whether the proponents of the Anglosphere can succeed in deflecting such
criticisms is doubtful considering that the Anglosphere is exclusionary by default: not
every state, nation or society wishes to cultivate the language, values and institutions
associated with the historical experience of England/Britain. What is more, nearly all
available operationalizations of the Anglosphere core betray a desire to a fix it to no more
than five states: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (“Britain”) and
the United States (US or “America”). The vaunted variability and openness of the greater
Anglosphere is challenged by a highly consistent fixity and exclusivity of its core.

Without this tension, I posit, the Anglosphere is simply not possible. As social scientists
have argued since the era of Churchill and Stalin, social identities do not exist as
disconnected, unadulterated units but always emerge in the context of significant
“Others.” In the contemporary writings on the Anglosphere, the primary significant
Other is the continental Europe or, more specifically, the European Union (EU). The
problem with “Europe” is not language—English being one of the official languages of

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3 Citations are from Mythalal (2005: 1260) and Monbiot (2005). Also see, inter alia, Bellocchio (2006);

4 The operationalizations of the core do vary, sometimes within texts authored by the same person, but
rarely are its boundaries stretched beyond these five states (Gamble 2004, 2007, cf. Bennett 2007, Garton-
Ash 2004, Windschuttle 2005). Roberts, for example, promises to write a history of “the places where the
English language is spoken by the numerical majority as their first language today” (2006: xi), but later
changes his mind to focus on the said five states. Ireland, he concludes, “provided the exception to every
rule, disrupted every generalization from the rest of the English-speaking peoples so often that it must be
considered quite apart from the rest” (2006: 641, also see 196).
the EU—so much as its values and institutions, anything from collectivism to dirigisme
capitalism to the democratic deficit of supranationalism (Conquest 2000). The EU and
the Anglosphere are thus seen as separate, but mutually constitutive. In order for the
Anglosphere to exist, the EU must be egalitarian, statist, high tax and so on.

From the perspective of such large human collectives like civilizations, the
Europe/EU-Anglosphere distinction may be disregarded as the “narcissism of minor
difference,” peculiar to mainly British conservatives (Gamble 2003; Garton Ash 2004).
But note that the Anglosphere is meant to be simultaneously prescriptive and descriptive.
What is striking about the Europe/EU-Anglosphere distinction is its durability and
pervasiveness in substantive terms. Consider some examples. In the field of political
economy, the proponents of the Anglosphere hold that the Anglo-American “model” of
capitalism is not only different from its European counterpart, but far superior to it, as
evidenced in the standard measures of the economic lives of states and societies such
Behind this success, the argument goes, stand Anglo institutions. To use example of the
Americas, what distinguished the English-speaking settler colonies from, say, their
Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking counterparts in South America was the way in which
institutions were created and sustained. The English system of property rights, for one,
provided foundations for the more rapid institutional developments in democracy, such as

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5 A claim that English-speakers were somehow different from the continentals can probably be traced back
to the early days of England, but an argument that English-speaking states and nations differ from Europe
cannot be older than the 1770s. For Edmund Burke, the freedom-loving Britain and America were quite
distinct from the tyrannical Spain and Prussia. House of Commons, 22 March 1775. Available at
the secret ballot, manhood (and later universal) suffrage or the welfare state.\textsuperscript{6} As for the research on values, the World Values Survey and international public opinion polls – e.g., the Pew Global Attitudes Project—all suggest that English-speaking states, nations and/or societies tend to be similar and themselves different from comparable units in Europe and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{7}

Those who see it as synonymous with imperialism will not probably agree that the Anglosphere can be seen as a post-colonial “networks” or “family of nations” – groups of states held together by shared historical, cultural and/or linguistic identities (Shaw 2008: 24-7; Sandholtz, Brysk and Parsons 2002). There are at least half a dozen such groups, including the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth. Like the Anglosphere, the Commonwealth is defined by the English language, values and institutions; one major difference is the exclusion of the US (cf. Shaw 2008: 27, 107). What matters here is the fact that all these networks are mutually constituted. Arguably, la Francophonie is not bound so much by post-colonial as by opposition to the English-speaking Other, particularly as it manifests itself in “globalization” (Glasze 2007).

The Anglosphere also appears in the research on language and cultural imperialism. In a conceptualization variously known as romanticist, symbolic, relativist, expressive or discursive, language is seen as an integral part of culture, common knowledge and power. The debate on cultural imperialisms centers on whether and how


\textsuperscript{7} The World Values Survey finds that English-speaking societies cluster together on most value dimensions (Inglehart 1997). As for public opinion polls, for as long as such data existed, the respondents in the Anglosphere core states have tended to identity at least two other Anglosphere core states as “best friends” or as places they would like to visit or “go to lead a good life” (Kohut and Stokes 2006: 28, 43-6; Dumbrell 2006: 32-4).
the imposition, adaptation and use of English encompasses the spread of values with in-built hierarchies which favor genetic native speakers, as opposed to functional native speakers. One camp argues that Englishes spoken in historically non-Anglo cultures have become so altered that they are fully capable of expressing local values without falling victim to cultural imperialism (Kachru, Kachru and Nelson 2006).

Another camp holds that English terms such as right, wrong, fair or reasonable are seen not as cultural universals which can be freely altered to fit local conditions, but as part and parcel of a historically evolving “Anglo culture” (Wierzbicka 2006: 5). Cultural imperialism, so viewed, is not intentional, but unconscious and “internal” (Ibid.: 312-3). What matters for the purposes of my study is that both camps validate the conceptualization of the Anglosphere in terms of the concentric circles. From this perspective, usually associated with Humboldt, every language community has its “First Diaspora,” “inner/first circle,” “traditional bases,” “common cultural core” or “irreducible core” (Ibid. 2006: 4-6, 17, 300; Kachru, Kachru and Nelson 2006: 2-3). So just like Asian English or EU English have a cultural core, so does Anglo English, which one writer poetically described as the “magic circle of Anglo-Saxon thinking” (David Malouf, cited in Wierzbicka 2006: 9).9

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8 The debate is sparked by the global spread of English—from 250 million in 1952, English will be spoken, in one estimate, by three billion people in 2015, a third of the projected human population (Ives 2006: 122, cf. Phillips 1999: 602).

9 The term Anglo-Saxonism, like English-speaking peoples, can be seen as another conceptual antecedent of the Anglosphere. In the English language the term has largely been discontinued in the political writings, partly because of its association with British fascism in the 1930s or American racism in the 1960s. Elsewhere, the term persists. A simple keyword search through French or Spanish newspapers and newsmagazines in 2007 indicates that the word Anglo-Saxon describes anything from English-speaking states to multinationals and consulting firms to food, film and fashion. What some of these texts underscore is fear and fascination with the global dominance or hegemony of the Anglosphere, often of the conspiratorial kind. In Spanish (and Catalan), Anglo-Saxonism still carries memories of the Anglo-American collusion in the “catastrophe” of 1898 (Noyes 2005: 7, 47, fn. 78).
All these literatures seem to suggest that the Anglosphere carries enough political and practical significance that it can safely be regarded as an “objective” fact of world politics (rather than an idea dreamed up by a small number of conservative intellectuals). This approach, to be sure, is not without pitfalls. Constructivists have long argued that any attempt to capture the empirical substance of a social phenomenon like the Anglosphere leads to essentialism and reification. Their logics are similar: if any social phenomenon constitutes itself through self-evaluation, then any attempt to study it is directly implied in this process. So not only is the study of the essential nature of the Anglosphere a doomed mirage, but the very mention of this phenomenon may have unsavory political and normative consequences. For example, every time a state leader employs the term Anglosphere to inspire more Anglo-American cooperation in the areas of higher education and research and development (e.g., Brown 2008), he or she risks turning a “racial theory” into “objective reality.” Simply put, the very talk of the Anglosphere does violence to all those to whom it is applied.

I contend that identities like the Anglosphere should be studied precisely because political and social actors claim them to enable concrete human action. Indeed, no constructivist would deny the ubiquity of the discourses of the Anglosphere identity, whether at the individual, local, national, regional or global level. As thinking and acting with references to groups of individuals, nations and/or states is an inescapable social fact, it makes sense to try and show how identities are constructed and maintained, and with what political consequences. The main goal of this dissertation is to show how the

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10 In foregrounding the Anglosphere for the purpose of theoretical and empirical analysis, I am not pursuing reification of existing hierarchies, but “strategic essentialism” (Spivak 1993, Dean 1994). To term refers to
Anglosphere became possible. To do so, I set out to investigate how the Anglosphere identity relates to multiple and overlapping identities within the five states of the putative “core” and with what effects for international conflict and cooperation.

HOW TO STUDY THE ANGLOSPHERE

In international relations, the Anglosphere appears everywhere. First we have stories upon stories dealing with the Anglosphere themes, anything from the Anglo-American naval cooperation in the Opium Wars to the bronze bust of Winston Churchill with which President Bush decorated the Oval Office. Then we have practices and institutions like the famous Anglo-American “special relationship” or the UK-USA Security Agreement, which calls for the sharing of intelligence among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US. Then we have behaviors and outcomes, like the “imperialism of free trade”\(^\text{11}\) or the US-British-Australian military invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Times change, governments come and go, but the English-speaking fact in international society seems to persist.

Despite is prominence in international relations, the Anglosphere has no presence in International Relations (IR), an academic discipline which has lower-case international relations as an object of its analysis. One factor is the proponents of the Anglosphere tend to write outside the discipline, mostly with disregard to theoretical debates in IR. Another, more important, factor is the mismatch between the defining features of the

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\(^{11}\) The phrase “imperialism of free trade” was introduced by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson to describe an essentially Anglo-American pursuit of a global economic restructuring based on (neo)liberal principles. In one contemporary pun, this process is also known as “Anglobalization” (Ferguson 2003).
Anglosphere and the conceptual toolkit in IR theory. The Anglosphere is no doubt reflected in multiple interpretations of international relations, from civilizations and empire to international political economy and military interventions. For one, studies of groupings of states—alliances, blocs, regions, subsystems, zones of peace and security communities—have provided various explanations on why international relations tend to vary below the level of the international system. There is, however, no research agenda on the Anglosphere. What is puzzling for IR theory is the nature of the glue that supposedly holds the Anglosphere together—language, values and institutions. The Anglosphere’s defining features do not have a distinct theoretical status in IR.

One way to develop the research agenda on the Anglosphere in IR is to investigate how this grouping of states became possible. The “how-possible?” questions fall in the realm of constitutive analysis, the process of identifying the conditions of possibility for social phenomena (Wendt 1999: 77-89). A constitutive analysis of the Anglosphere tells us how this identity is constituted such that it has the features and effects that it does. Like in the natural sciences, where an analysis of how atoms constitute molecules contributes to explanations of various chemical and biological processes, an analysis of the constitutive practices of the Anglosphere can contribute to explanations of various international processes. One suitable methodology for dealing with the “how-possible?” questions is genealogy, a research tool of historical, interpretative inquiry aimed at analyzing the interplay between agents and structures which produce social phenomena (Appendix A). Like history, genealogy deals with the interpretation of text, but it keeps the analytical focus on the processes by which structures are used to render some courses of action more likely than others. One purpose
of genealogy, therefore, can be an investigation at the ways in which social and political actors engaged with their identities in different historical contexts. In this dissertation, my genealogy of the Anglosphere considers four historical contexts: the turn of the twentieth century America and Britain, Australia and New Zealand in 1950-1, Australia and Canada in 1955-6 and 1964-5 and Britain and Canada in 2002-3. In each of these contexts, I analyze how competing articulations of identity collided in the imagination of what it means to be a member state of the Anglosphere. I show how the Anglosphere is contingent on the past interactions and suggest that is likely to be subject to contestation and re-construction in the future.

Another way to develop the research agenda on the Anglosphere, I posit, is to ask what this identity does in international relations. There are many ways to deal with this question and constitutive analysis is one of them (Appendix A). But what also interests me is the causal link between the Anglosphere identity and cooperation between and among the five core states. My interest in this question is sparked by a statistical finding, which I present in the next chapter, that the Anglosphere identity, operationalized as language shared between states, is positively associated with the likelihood of participation in US-led military interventions. Statistical evidence also points out that these states carry similar military alliance portfolios as well as act like a voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly. So if English-speaking states indeed tend to cooperate more than states selected at random, then how can we explain this tendency? To answer this question, I develop a theoretical framework linking state/national identity to foreign policy and then I evaluate it using a set of case studies. In positing identity as a “cause,” I am making an argument that identity at the level of the state (“national” or
“state identity”) will have made one foreign policy outcome more likely over others, thus leading to differentiated outcomes in international conflict and cooperation.

In my theoretical framework, which builds on the constructivist research program in IR, I conceptualize state action in terms of the discourses and debates over foreign policy. My claim is twofold: first, the dominant discourse of identity shapes foreign policy by making some cooperative policies more likely than others. Second, foreign policy debates on the fit between identity and “reality” influence the continuity and change in foreign policy. Cooperation between English-speaking states, in my view, is a function of identity discourses and debates within a particular national context. I evaluate this argument in four sets of cases studies embedded in my genealogy: the turn of the twentieth century Anglo-American “great rapprochement; the negotiations over the Pacific Pact in 1950-1; alliance politics over the Suez crisis (1956) and the Vietnam escalation (1964-5); and the politics of the “coalition of the willing” in the run-up to the Iraq War (2002-3).

Because each set of case studies deals with a different historical context and it because it compares a different pair of states, the theoretical puzzles vary in each but each of them deal with security cooperation between and among the five states of the putative Anglosphere core. In the case of the Anglo-American rapprochement, I consider how and why the Anglo-American war became “unthinkable” while peace and cooperation became dependable. Central to this process, I argue, was the rise of Anglo-Saxonism, a racialized identity which established American and British empires as vanguards of civilization. In the case of the Pacific Pact, I look at the way in which the proposed pact came to be reduced to the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty, thus
excluding Britain and the so-called island states. I contend that the discourse and debates of identities in Australia and New Zealand contributed to a pact primarily based on racial, not strategic or even anti-communist considerations. I further contend that a shared identity among English-speaking states rendered British exclusion from ANZUS not only nominal, but also conducive to a stronger English-speaking alliance in the Cold War.

With respect to the Suez and Vietnam case studies, I offer a paired comparison of Australia and Canada and ask why foreign policies of these two seemingly similar states diverged in the two crises. In the Suez case, I argue, the dominance of British race patriotism at home compelled the Australian government to side with Britain, while the Canadian government essentially overrode the Canadian identity by going with the UN and the US, against Britain. In Vietnam, I explain the divergence in Australian and Canadian policies on America’s escalation of the war in terms of the status of the American Other in the discourse and debates of identity. I show that while Australia turned exceptionally pro-American, Canada came to see itself as a unique nation with a unique foreign role which emphasized peacekeeping over warmaking.

In the last case study, I consider the run-up to the Iraq War from the perspectives of Britain and Canada, two seemingly similar states with similar foreign policy records on America’s recent interventions. I posit that British participation in the war against Iraq followed a pro-American, anti-European orientation of the British identity, but not after considerable reframing of that identity by the British government. In Canada, the dominance of a nationalist and anti-American identity at home, I argue, compelled the government to sit out the war. In short, I find that state/national identity had consistently
significant effects on international security decisions which sustained cooperation between and among the core states of the Anglosphere.

My focus on security cooperation is deliberate as this domain constitutes the least likely case for international cooperation and thus the strongest sort of evidence possible for my theoretical perspective (Eckstein 1975). Also note that my case selection was guided by substantive, not statistical concerns. Critics of the Anglosphere often draw attention away from the every-day security cooperation – such as that in intelligence cooperation—to the main “failing-offs and faults,” such as the Suez crisis (Conquest 2000, Harries 2001). I selected my cases partly in response to this criticism. In each set of cases, foreign policy choice made by at least one core state contradicted the idea of the Anglosphere identity. The Anglo-American rapprochement followed a barely averted colonial war between the two empires. ANZUS came after Britain was shut out from the negotiations and Suez, Vietnam and Iraq all stand as bywords for dispute and disagreement in the history of security cooperation within the Anglosphere. In this sense, too, my case selection is “hard”: the greater the objective potential for discord within the Anglosphere, the more powerful the argument in favor of shared identity.12

Some readers may say that this research design violates my genealogical focus on the constitutive effects of identity. In my reading of it, however, genealogy encompasses multiple epistemological and analytical aims, including the standard “why?” questions

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12 In the theory of case studies, the status of my selections varies (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). My pair-wise comparison of Australia and Canada in Suez and Vietnam as well as of Britain and Canada in Iraq can be seen as “structured-focused” to the extant that the cases – two nations in two decisions – differ as little as possible from each other except on the dimensions to be explained. The cross-national, century-long sampling approximates what is known as “maximum variation.” Last, with respect to the writings on the Anglosphere and related phenomena, Suez case can be seen as “paradigmatic,” while Canada comes closest to an “outlier” or an “anomalous” case (Bially Mattern 2005; Haglund 2005).
(Appendix A). In positing identity as a cause, I am therefore making an analytical—not ontological—separation between identity and its effect for the purpose of adding value to my overall explanation. This move is necessary since genealogy, being a methodology, cannot make a theoretical contribution to the research agenda on the Anglosphere. At the same time, I fully acknowledge that my theoretical framework supplies but one analytical cut in the phenomenon under investigation; other cuts are both possible and desirable.

Also note that there is a seamless overlap between the contexts under genealogical investigation and the cases used to evaluate my theoretical framework. This means that there is a dual purpose to the empirical investigation undertaken in this dissertation. In my view, genealogy is contingent on, and symbiotic with, interpretative, qualitative case studies (Appendix A). Typically, genealogy is used to capture the variation of meanings attributed to social phenomena across different historical and geographical environments (i.e., what makes sense in one place or one period can appear absurd in another). At the same time, nothing in this methodology prevents the researcher from expanding its typical purposes, so long as this move is driven by the research question.

A broader conceptualization of genealogy is analytically more profitable, at least for the purposes of this study. Because they are embedded in a genealogy, my case studies are considerably richer than those typically performed in IR: each considers the politics of identity in at least two states over at least one full year. Also, in each case study, I use introduction and/or conclusion to reach further back and forth in time in order to cover the most interesting developments skipped by my analysis.

13 In IR, the relatively recent influx of scientific realism has significantly expanded the heretofore narrow boundaries of positivism such that qualitative case studies can now be seen as compatible with interpretivist or genealogical traditions. On scientific realism in IR, see Wendt (1999) and Wight (2006).
As for the genealogical argument, a research design based on pair-wise comparisons of nations and their foreign policies over time approaches the Anglosphere as a site in which multiple and multivalent political and social actors come into contact and interact to constitute an identity. I wish to underscore that that my case (or context) selections should be seen as commonsense signposts rather than as the set of critical junctures which locked in the Anglosphere to certain path-dependent routes. In terms of the exploratory and agenda-setting nature of this dissertation, I believe that these selections are justifiable.

MAP OF THE DISSERTATION

Before I give a tour of rest of this dissertation, let me recapitulate the introductory chapter. I have proposed to open a research agenda on the Anglosphere by subjecting it two kinds of analyses: one is a genealogy and the other is a causal logic linking identity to foreign policy. There are more than a few alternative approaches the Anglosphere, as I suggest in the last two chapters. A more comprehensive understanding and explanation of the Anglosphere, I believe, can be accomplished only by multiple analytical cuts.

In the next chapter, I present the findings of a preliminary large-N analysis, which correlates shared language, as an objectivist proxy for the Anglosphere, with data on international participation in US-led military interventions from 1950 to 2001. While I find robust evidence of the positive association between speaking English and fighting America’s wars in this period, I temporarily profess agnosticism on the causal link between the two sides of the equation. I conclude this chapter with an argument that interpretative, qualitative case studies should be seen as a methodological sine qua non in
the study of identity. In Chapter 3, I develop a theoretical framework which seeks to account for the role of state/national identity in the formation of the Anglosphere. After deriving a set of propositions on the causal link between identity and foreign policy, I turn to an extended methodological discussion.

In Chapters 4-7, I perform four sets of case studies, along the lines discussed above. The analytical format is the same in each of these chapter chapters. I begin with a theoretical puzzle, then I make three analytical steps. First, I identify the discourses of identity at the level of state-society relations; second, I analyze foreign policy debates on the fit between identity and the perceived reality; and last, I process-trace specific foreign policy decisions and their consequences for international security cooperation. In Chapter 8, I evaluate my arguments against alternative explanations drawn from IR theory, followed with a discussion of how my theoretical and empirical contributions add – or subtract – value to our knowledge on how the world hangs together. I do not cover the entire theoretical spectrum of IR, only the currently dominant “American” triad of realism, liberalism and constructivism. In Chapter 9, I consider both the policy-relevance and normative implications of my Anglosphere story. Appendix A is intended for philosophers of science and methodologists: what I provide is an extended discussion of genealogy as a research tool in IR, including my take on Foucault, coherence theory of knowledge and causation. A Bibliographic Essay (Appendix B) is intended to clarify my use of primary sources in Chapters 4-7.
CHAPTER 2


It is special. It just is and that is that.

The British and with them the rest of the Commonwealth, particularly the older dominions, are our most reliable and useful allies, with whom a special relationship should exist. U.S. State Department memo, FRUS 1950 III: 870-9 (cited in Burke 2007: 578)

Anglo-America is a kind of failed state.
The special relationship is not what it was, nor what its fervent believers would like it to be.
The party is over, but the guest linger, reluctant to separate, spellbound by the storied past.
Alex Danchev, historian (2006: 579)

The omnibus term “coalition of the willing” is a historical artifact from the run-up to the Iraq War. In the week of the invasion in March 2003, the White House website listed forty nine states as members of the coalition whose purpose was to disarm Iraq and remove its dictator Saddam Hussein from power. Strictly speaking, the U.S. was not going it alone against Iraq, but observers pointed out that the majority of the coalition members were third-rate powers, some with no military capability at all.14 Among the coalition members, only Australia and Britain helped the U.S. with significant combat

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14 Right off the bat critics questioned the “willingness” of coalition members to go to war. The Daily Mirror, for example, immediately relabeled the US-led effort as the “Coalition of the Bribed, Bullied, and Blind” (22 March 2003; cf. Newnham 2008). Former Vermont governor and former Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean, called the invasion “unilateral,” while scores of critics opted for the term “near-unilateral.” Within a month, the Bush administration dropped the bombastic coalition of the willing for a much simpler “US-led coalition” or “multinational coalition.” Without going into the review of literature, the US effort over Iraq became known as “ad hoc multilateralism,” “instrumental multilateralism,” “multilateralism à la carte” and “unilateralism in disguise.”
troops, leading pundits to describe the coalition as “Anglosphere-heavy” (Reynolds 2004, also see Garton-Ash 2004; Haglund 2005). Does the Anglosphere identity impact the likelihood of joining U.S.-led coalitions of the willing?

To answer this question, I begin by translating the Anglosphere into IR cooperation theory using a tripartite, American-style theoretical division of realism, liberalism and constructivism. From these perspectives, I distil a set of hypotheses on what makes membership in US-led coalitions likely, which I then evaluate using large-sample quantitative evidence. The findings support the Anglosphere argument: shared English language has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of participation in U.S.-led military interventions. After briefly relating this finding back to the literature examined in Chapter 1, I turn the problem of quantifying identity as an objectively-given variable. I suggest that a qualitative and interpretative research design is necessary for analyzing the effects of identity on behavior. With this conclusion in mind, in the subsequent chapters I develop and evaluate a causal logic linking the discourses of identity at home and international security policy.

THE ANGLOSPHERE IN IR THEORY

In IR, international cooperation can be approached from three main families of theory: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Realism is the most pessimistic: it assumes an international system marked by Hobbesian anarchy, defined as the absence of authority above the states, where security is scarce and self-help is the norm (Mearsheimer 2001).

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15 This tripartite division of contemporary IR theory is but one possible cut (Wendt 1999, cf. Dunne, Kurki and Smith, ed., 2007; Elman and Elman, eds., 2003).
The glue that binds states together comes in the form of alliances, against rising power and/or threat. Because the risk of violent conflict is constant, international cooperation is therefore always and only a function of security-seeking. According to realism, the Anglosphere should not exist. What realism probably can explain are the English-speaking military alliances formed to counter specific rising military threats, such as Prussianism, Nazism, Communism and Islamic terrorism (Roberts 2006). Realism can also claim an explanation of the Anglosphere based on American hegemony or empire.

Liberalism is the historical foil of realism: it sees the international system as a Lockean community composed of nominally sovereign equals that share certain institutions, norms and the rule of law. International cooperation is possible, even in security matters such as arms control or intelligence sharing. In the last two decades or so, liberalism has focused on what is known as the liberal or Kantian peace. Causes of the liberal peace continue to vary, but are generally “triangulated” among three factors — democratic institutions and norms, economic interdependence and international law and institutions (Russett and Oneal 2001). In the liberal worldview, the Anglosphere is a particular “zone of peace” characterized by high values on these three variables. Like peace, liberals see international security cooperation as caused by shared regime type: democracies tend to fight with, and for, each other (Farnham 2003; Lipson 2003; Risse-Kappen 1995).

Constructivism sees the world as neither exclusively Hobbesian nor exclusively Lockean, but argues that multiple worlds are possible, including a Kantian one, in which

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16 A strand of liberalism known as neoliberal institutionalism argues that security cooperation is possible even outside institutions, norms and law so long as relatively few actors share an expectation of continued interaction well into the future.
international relations are marked by trust and shared identity. International cooperation is a function of identity relationships among a set of states. For example, friends will automatically cooperate, rivals more judiciously and enemies will not cooperate, but fight. Constructivists reject realist and liberal assumptions on the existence of a presocial international system and thus subsumes that realist and liberal worlds are but two ideal types of international relations. From a constructivist perspective, the Anglosphere can be seen as what Karl Deutsch called a security community, which is a group of states characterized by the “unthinkability” of an intramural war (Deutsch et al 1957, Adler and Barnett 1998). Members of the Anglosphere are said to consciously and unconsciously rule out the use of force as a means of settling conflict and instead expect peaceful relations at all times. From this perspective, what is keeping English-speaking states at peace is not simply an alliance, economic interdependence, democratic institutions or some combination of these factors; rather, war is unthinkable because of a shared identity (Wendt 1999: 353-7). This identity also leads to greater cooperation in the domain of security.

In the ideal world, an empirical evaluation of different theoretical arguments should follow the identical metatheoretical grounding and the identical evidentiary base. IR is no such world: the diversity of positions on what constitutes truth-claims and/or evidence is one of the prominent features of the discipline. IR theories, suggests a recent textbook, are ridden with “incommensurabilities” (Dunne, Kurki and Smith, eds., 2007). The first incommensurability concerns the “what we know for sure?” question. Ontologically, realism and liberalism can be seen as objective-interest theories, which believe in the material determinants of international relations such as power or interest.
In contrast, constructivism is decidedly intersubjectivist, dealing with – in my theoretical framework at least – the ways power and interests are constructed from the discourses and debates on identity. In this view, material factors are meaningful insofar as they are constituted by intersubjectively-held ideas. Material factors therefore exist but are given meaning by human actors. The bean counts of a state’s military capability or references to bargaining among political parties and interest groups are based on ideas that these factors make a difference in international politics, not some exogenous, unchallenged realities. It follows that social inquiry is not an observation of objective material factors but an observation of meaning found in texts left behind by human beings. Related to ontology is the so-called levels of analysis problem, which says that theories developed to explain one level of social life are logically ill-equipped to explain other levels. Realist and liberal theories typically deal with the variables distributed at the level of the international system and/or domestic politics, while constructivist theories mainly look at the level of interaction—how states interact with other states as well as with their societies.

The second incommensurability concerns the “how do we know what we know?” question. Different answers to this question—that is, different epistemologies—generally differ over the definition of the research problems, as well as sources of data, and thus lead to very different accounts of politics. Realism and liberalism can be seen as upper case-P positivists, a philosophy of science which believes, among other things, in deductive theory, generalizable truth-claims and the Humean conception of causation. Constructivism stretches the boundaries of positivism into the realm of a post-positivist rejection of foundations. This is a polyvalent realm: most poststructuralists tend to
problematize nearly every aspect of positivism—prefab theory, truth-claims and the idea of causation. What they foreground—as the necessary object of study—is language (since there can be no meaning outside of it). In IR, many self-declared constructivists implicitly or explicitly agree with these positions, but certainly not all. Combining the two incommensurabilities together, we therefore have a major conundrum when it comes to comparing different arguments on the Anglosphere: if IR theories hold different ontological and epistemological positions, as well as deal with different levels of analysis, then no single source of theoretical or empirical criteria is fair game in adjudicating among them. In IR, it seems, metatheory is no ally of methodology.

I believe that research should primarily be driven by substantive concerns, not metatheoretical ones. One way to deal with incommensurabilities, I suggest, is to level the metatheoretical playing field so as to open up the space for substantive research. Leveling the epistemological playing field is easier. As the next chapter suggests—and Appendix A explains at length—my constructivism retains several elements of positivist epistemology, partly on the basis on my philosophical belief that ontology comes before epistemology. This position, associated with scientific and critical realism in the philosophy of science, yields beliefs in small-t truth claims, a broadened conception of causation and inference to the best explanation (Wendt 1999; Wight 2006). So in contrast to those who reject social science as an artifact of nineteenth century modernity, I am committed to it, at least in its Latin sense of the terminology of science as knowledge.

While we may more easily level the epistemological field, that of the ontological incommensurability is more challenging, for here we must privilege either the objectivist
ontoloht at the expense of realism and liberalism or the intersubjectivist ontology at the expense of constructivism. Because neither solution is ultimately fair to all three theories involved, I propose to perform my empirical analysis twice, once from each perspective. According to Table 2.1., three kinds of empirical contests are possible in IR. The first is a debate within each cell, as reflected in the decades-long contest between realism and liberalism or, for that matter, within realism itself (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001). The second possibility is a contest across the epistemological divide, which usually takes the form of a poststructuralist critique of mainstream IR (cf. Dunne, Kurki and Smith, eds., 2007). The third contest, a three way debate among realism, liberalism, and constructivism, is possible under two conditions. First, constructivism must be seen as broadly positivist. Second, the three theoretical perspectives must show flexibility—represented by the arrows—over the status of intersubjective meanings.

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Table 2.1 The ontological and epistemological incommensurabilities in IR

In light of the above discussion, this dissertation sets out to complete two different empirical tasks. Beginning in the next chapter with an intersubjectivist ontology, I construct a theoretical framework for linking discourses of identity to international
cooperation, and then the move on to evaluate that framework against both empirical
evidence (Chapters 4-7) as well as alternatives (Chapter 8). In this chapter, in contrast, I
brace the intersubjective nature of identity so that it can be treated as an objective,
material fact and measured like other concepts. This set-up allows me to conduct a
quantitative analysis of the relationship between the Anglosphere and security
cooperation. In what follows, I focus on the levels of the system as well as unit and/or
dyad, assuming that an equation with linear additive covariates can provide empirically
meaningful results across these levels.

HYPOTHESES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

Neither realism nor liberalism nor constructivism suggests a theory on what
makes states willing—or unwilling—to participate in U.S.-led military coalitions;
followership, in general, still remains woefully undertheorized in IR (Cooper, Higgott,
and Nossal 1991). Fortunately, because all three perspectives have sufficiently dealt with
related phenomena such as alliances and military interventions, we can easily distil a set
of hypotheses on why states follow the U.S. into wars.¹⁷ Let us begin with realist
perspectives. Systemic or structural realism famously brackets the characteristic of
individual states, save for military capability and geography. It follows that states with
greater military capabilities are more likely to join military interventions (H1) as are
states geographically close to the target of that intervention (H2). Part and parcel of most
realist theories, the predictions can be seen to follow the tenets of collective goods

¹⁷ Relevant studies include, inter alia, Bennett et al (1997); Finnemore (2003); Lake (1999); Lipson (2004);
Schroeder (1976); Starr (1972) and, especially, Tago (2007).
theory.\(^{18}\) States with limited military capability—no available troops, small air and naval bases and so on—have an incentive to free ride on the US because their absence will not critically affect the probability of success of the intervention; for the same reason, the US will not care about free riding. However, states most proximate to the source of threat will have no luxury of free riding and so will have the greatest incentive to participate.

Realist theories that stress attributes and/or interactions at the unit and dyad levels are usually known under the rubric of neoclassical realism. Within this literature, research on formal alliances is most directly related to the question of participation in multilateral military interventions (cf. Huth 1998). If the so-called reputation effects are incorporated into the collective goods theory, it follows (\(H3\)) that states already formally allied with—or in a defense pact, neutrality pact or entente—the US are more likely to join \textit{ad hoc} coalitions led by the US.\(^{19}\) Within this literature, an important debate concerns the link between regime type and alliances, particularly whether democracies are “reliable partners” (Lipson 2003). In short, it is theoretically unclear whether democracies are able to make more reliable allies than other regime types; empirically, it is unclear whether regularities among all jointly democratic, allied dyads are statistically driven by the three large regional defence pacts (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Gibler and Wolford 2006; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 2003, 2004). Assuming a fundamental similarity between the processes of alliance—and coalition—formation, mutual democracy

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\(^{19}\) Walt (1987: 43-44), cf. Morrow (2002). In general, the literature on formal alliances follows the autonomy/security trade-off model (Morrow 1991). Gibler and Rider (2004) criticize this model by suggesting that security and autonomy are complementary and that alliances should be seen as a function of one variable—interest similarity. I will entertain this variable further below.
should make participation in US-led multilateral military interventions more likely ($H4$).

Broadly related to the liberal paradigm is the perspective on symmetric interdependence. In this logic, the incentives and disincentives associated with economic side-payments and sanctions by the US – bribing and bullying – matter for the likelihood of participation. States that are dependent on US trade ($H5$) and/or economic assistance ($H5a$) can therefore be seen as more likely to join US-led military coalitions (Newnham 2008).

In an argument consonant with the predictions made by systemic constructivist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches, Tago (2007) argues that the key determinants of membership in US-led military interventions are collective legitimacy and the operation type. Simply put, followership is a function, ceteris paribus, of collective legitimacy and the expressed purpose of intervention. On the former, when it comes to multilateral military coalitions, the UN Security Council can be seen as the main body for granting collective legitimacy. On the latter, a military intervention into a state’s domestic affairs without the consent of its government – also known as hostile intervention – is less likely to make large coalitions because the sanctity of state sovereignty is a central norm in international law which most states respect most of the time ($H7a$). Conversely, an intervention to ward off foreign aggression is more likely to gain support ($H7b$). Other purposes can be specified, but these two values can approximate the philosophical justification of the very idea and practice of the coalitions.

20 I acknowledge that legitimacy can alternatively be conceptualized as a function of followership. For a seminal discussion on the effects of UN collective legitimacy, see Claude (1966). For different perspectives on why UN legitimization may be preferable to other forms of legitimization, see Hurd (2005), Ku and Jacobson (2003), Thompson (2006) and Voeten (2005). Generally, it is safe to expect the domestic audience cost to be lower in following the UN than the US.
of the willing; indeed, it was US State Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who proclaimed that
the mission should define the coalition, rather than the other way around. With respect
to Hussein’s Iraq, for example, legitimacy and the expressed purpose of intervention
could go a long way in accounting for the variance in US followership between the 1991
and 2003 invasions.

In IR, the standard bargaining model holds that war is a product of incompatible
interests and abortive or unsuccessful bargaining. As theoretical traditions that have
treated state interests as uniform and incompatible have been discredited, most scholars
have come (again) to recognize that “interests matter,” meaning that the range of issue
areas over which state interests may vary is vast. There has been far less consensus over
the ways of conceptualizing interest compatibility or similarity, mainly because interest
itself is unobservable. At the time of this writing, the concept of dyadic interest similarity
serves as the industry standard. This idea holds that states reveal their “preferences”
regarding specific issue-areas over time, which allows the observer to identify the
behavioral conditions that reflect that state’s interests. In the next section, I will
discuss the operationalization of this concept and then re-consider it theoretically in the
conclusion. For now, the corresponding proposition shall remain rather drab: states with

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21 See Baltimore Sun, December 27, 2001. For America’s allies who saw their alliances to be based on
shared identities, rather than shared interest, the statement appeared jarring.

22 In bargaining theory, war occurs as the result of a set of necessary conditions none of which is sufficient.
Incompatible interests cannot explain war, but can explain its absence (e.g., Fearon 1995).

23 Labels alternative to interest similarity include “interest affinity” or the compatibility of “satisfaction
and “utility” (Sweeney and Keshk 2005: 165, fn.1). In general, the lack of specification and measurement
of state interest has long been an “embarrassment” for IR (Kratochwil 1982). For one, the question
whether states are fundamentally egoistic or fundamentally social cannot be settled by looking at behavior
alone because behavioral outcomes may be compatible with a variety of preferences (cf. Wendt 1999).
interest similar to those of the US will follow the US lead into military interventions (H8).

Gibler and Rider (2004: 326) suggest that “changes in state interest can better explain the onset and termination of alliance relations because dyadic foreign policy similarity defines the set of possible alliance commitments.” The higher-order question is what variable can better explain state interest? For constructivists, the value of an identity variable lies precisely in its ability to explain an entire set of possible interests, including those regarding alliance choices. In this view, identity is both ontologically and logically prior to interest, but the proposition is similar: shared identity will positively impact the willingness of states to join US-led military coalitions.\(^{24}\)

Note that some non-constructivist theories in IR implicitly theorize identity, while some identity-based theories reject constructivism. The link between identity and cooperation can be seen as a function of a variety of causal mechanisms, none of which are exclusively or necessarily constructivist.\(^{25}\) For the purposes of this analysis, I will bracket the theoretical and meta-theoretical issues regarding identity as a variable discussed earlier and proceed to stabilize and homogenize two identities: the West and the Anglosphere. That relations among civilizations guide war and peace is an ancient

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\(^{24}\) For the implicit and explicit theorization on the positive association between shared identity (“culture” or “ideological solidarity”) and alliances formation and/or alliance durability, see, *inter alia*, Deutsch *et al* (1956); Aron (1968); Siverson and King (1980); Risse-Kappen (1995); Adler and Barnett (1998) and Walt (1987: 33-40). On identity (or “similarity”) and cooperation more specifically, see, *inter alia*, Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006); Herrmann *et al* (2008); Hopf (2002: Ch. 6); Rousseau (2006: Ch. 2); Russett and Oneal (2001: Ch. 7) and Wendt (1999: Ch. 7).

\(^{25}\) Social psychology has found that positive identification with the members of the “ingroup” has an immediate effect on the need to outdo the “outgroup” in one way or another: states cooperate with the ingroup and compete against the outgroup. Cognitive psychology has discovered that identification is a function of perceptions: the greater the perception of other states as friendly, the greater chances for cooperation. And from communications perspectives, by removing the wrongly interpreted “signals” and “indices” or the radically different readings of past, identity – as in speaking the same language – removes many potential sources of conflict.
claim, but it was Huntington (1996) who revived it by predicting the “clash of civilizations” in the post-Cold War period. In the logic of Huntington’s schema, Western states are more willing to join the US – as a fellow Western state and a leader of the Western civilization – in its interventions abroad \((H9)\) or that the willingness is higher in the post-Cold War period \((H9a)\) or among states in the same ideological bloc \((H9b)\).

Along the similar lines, the Anglosphere—operationalized both as the five state “core” \((H10)\) as well as the entire group of officially English-speaking states \((H11)\)—can be expected to have a positive effect on membership in US-led coalitions. These predictions are roughly in line with a constructivist view that the West or the Anglosphere represents a Kantian security community, in which self-regarding and other-regarding actions – balancing against threats vs. helping the (US) friend – tend to mix. Note that while the Anglosphere core can be regarded as a subset of Huntington’s West, the greater Anglosphere and the West partially overlap. A similarly partial overlap exists between the community of democracies and the Anglosphere.

I should like to stress that there are no self-declared constructivists among the authors cited in the preceding two paragraphs. My equation of their arguments and constructivism is organizational. I am aware that concepts like Western civilization or the Anglosphere are controversial, quintessentially contested categories. By quantifying these identities, I do not intend to write them into existence over other possible categories. (As I show in later chapters, the content of any social identity is not only by definition contestable, but also must be theorized as such). I do believe, however, that an argument’s lack of a “proper” conceptual and theoretical pedigree – or its excess political controversy, for that matter – does not preclude preliminary empirical evaluation (cf.
Chiozza 2002; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000). Arguably, when it comes to theory and politics (and the politics of theory), the aforementioned categories of identity are no worse than many other causal variables typically used in social science models, yet in no case are we stopped from measuring their occurrences or testing for their effects (e.g., democracy).

Another imperative is to recognize that factors exogenous to the model may have a great deal of relevance to the explanandum at hand. A Marxist could argue that the rich states of the North are more likely to join the US in attacking the poor states of the South. A liberal (or that Marxist again) could suggest that financial and/monetary integration with the U.S. should make states more willing to join U.S.-led coalitions. I do not pursue these and similar hypotheses because, first, not all data sources are easily tractable and analyzed in a single attempt and second, as I said earlier, because I am primarily interested in evaluating explanations associated with the three mainstream theoretical perspectives in IR.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT
To test these hypotheses, I adopt the models and data used by Tago (2007) but modify them in two ways: first, I introduce a number of new explanatory variables and, second, I update the dataset. As per the original operationalization, the unit of analysis is “partner state-US coalition,” whereby targeted and enemy states are excluded from the list of possible US coalition partners in each case (all other states in the system are game). A US-led coalition is defined as a military operation in which at least one other state joins the US effort but where the US provides the largest portion of the coalition’s forces.
and/or the US commands the forces in the theater of operations. From a sample of 200+ plus US military interventions abroad in the post World War II period, seventeen cases qualify as a US-led multilateral coalition: the Korean War (1950); Lebanon/Jordan (1959); Panama Naval Patrol (1959); the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962); Thai Border Protection (1962); Dominican Republic (1965); the Vietnam War (1965); Lebanon (1982); Suez (1983); Grenada (1983); the Gulf War (1990); the Iraq No-Fly Zone (1991); Somalia (1993); Haiti (1994); Kosovo (1999); and Afghanistan (2001).26

My dependent variable is dichotomous, coded 1 for a state’s participation in a US-led multilateral military operation and 0 for the missed – or passed – opportunity. A US partner – or a “willing” state – is defined as a state that, on the formal (and semi-formal) request of the US government, 1) deployed its official forces – at least a platoon-sized unit (minimum 20 soldiers) – in the theater zone; and/or 2) provided the logistics, naval and air bases which significantly facilitated the military operation. This definition is no doubt contentious but roughly follows one given by Secretary Rumsfeld on 20 March 2003, when he claimed that “around forty nations” joined the US assault on Iraq by offering anything “from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to the deployment of combat units.”27

26 For more on the construction of this dataset, see Tago (2007). This dataset was updated with help from Swarthmore (2004). A comparison of this dataset with alternative data sources on international conflicts (e.g., Kosimo, Uppsala Armed Conflict and so on) suggests that several other cases could make the list, especially if the operational definitions are slightly changed.

27 The operational rule is biased in favor of operational (policy coordination and execution) over procedural (political endorsement) dimensions of multilateralism. For one, cash infusions (e.g., Germany and Japan in the Gulf War) are not coded as participation. Also, it is unclear exactly which naval and air bases and what kinds of logistics are critical for the US to use force abroad (e.g., did Colombia’s or Eritrea’s participation in the Iraq War make a significant difference to the US effort? What about France’s non-participation?). I coded non-combat participation conservatively. To ensure that my results do not depend on a particular participation measure, I varied the thresholds for troop contributions (increasing the minimum to 100) as well as the state size (dropping those below 250,000 inhabitants) with no statistically discernible change in
In terms of the key causal variables, eight are dummies and are equal to 1 for every possible US coalition partner who shares the same home region with the target state ($H2$); who is a US ally ($H3$); a democracy ($H4$); Western ($H9$); one of the four non-US members of the Anglosphere “core” ($H10$); English-speaking ($H11$). To classify regions and US allies, I relied on the various Correlates of War (CoW) datasets. Democracy was measured using the Polity IV democracy score, whereby the US partner has a monadic score of at least seven. Huntington’s Western civilization was operationalized following Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000: 603-8). A state was coded as an Anglosphere member if English is its official language and/or more than seventy percent of its population consists of native English speakers. Note that this coding satisfies only one condition for membership in the Anglosphere; the values and institutions clause is absent. Also note that two typical proxies for the identity variable in IR—religion and ethnicity—are absent from this model because they highly correlate with civilization and language (bivariate regressions yield high $R^2$).28

Coded as 1 are the cases of intervention with UN approval, which means that the Security Council gave a fiat for the use of force against the target state before the formation of a coalition ($H6$). The same code goes for the interventions whose stated objective is interference with the domestic affairs of the target state ($H7a$) or to thwart foreign aggression by the target state ($H7b$). Three cases are coded as US-led

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28 In IR, objectivist coding of identity in IR usually relies on a standardized CoW dataset known as the Cultural Composition of Interstate System Members. This dataset contains national census information on ethnicity, language and religion, much of it is marred by various measurement and specification issues (Henderson 1998: 470; Lai and Reiter 2000: 214). I will return to this point below.
interventions to counter foreign aggression (Korea, Vietnam, Gulf) and four are regarded as interventions in domestic affairs (Grenada, Iraq No-Fly Zone, Somalia and Haiti, Afghanistan). Data for the military expenditure ($H1$) was taken from the (CoW) national capability dataset for the year of the coalition-formation. To reduce the effects of outliers, the information was transformed into a natural logarithm equivalent.$^{29}$ For trade dependence on the US ($H5$), I adopt the Oneal-Russett operationalization which uses a score of a state’s total trade with the US over a state’s GDP.$^{30}$

To test for the effect of dyadic interest similarity with the US, I turned to the “$S$” score – an index of a state’s “revealed preferences” (Signorino and Ritter 1999; Sweeney and Keshk 2005). The interest similarity score is constructed by comparing state behavior over certain issues areas such as militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), alliances, trade, joint intergovernmental organization (IGOs) memberships and so on by way of annual summaries. For my spatial measure of interest similarity, I rely on the similarity of dyadic UN voting data (Gartzke and Jo 2002). This indicator taps the similarity of the so-called revealed preferences by assuming that similar voting records indicate states with more compatible views on key world issues. Values range between 1, “most similar,” and –1, “least similar”; in turn, interest similarity with the US should be positively associated with participation in US-led coalitions ($H8$). To minimize the risks of tautology – looking at UN voting data to explain the formation of multilateral

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29 This is the approach undertaken by Tago (2007). Again, I considered alternative specifications. Analysis was replicated using two alternative indicators for state military capability – number of troops and military expenditures per soldier – with no critical changes in the statistical performance. All supplemental and alternative estimates as well as standard diagnostics are available upon request.

30 The measure was downloaded from the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene, Version 3.2) developed by Bennett and Stam (2001).
coalitions discussed in the UN – I took S scores on the year before a coalition was made. I will return to this measure later.

Three control variables that are likely to be correlated with the main explanatory variables are included. The first is the presence of other major powers in the US-led coalition, coded as 1 if present, 0 if absent. By definition, major powers are different from other states and are found to be positively associated with coalition participation (Tago 2007; Corbetta and Dixon 2004). What is unclear is why; as Corbetta and Dixon admit: “our results alone cannot tell us if this is due to their policy preferences, or to available opportunities, or to some combination of the two” (2004: 13). For this reason, I refrain from the a priori association of this variable with one theoretical perspective over others. Cold War is a dummy variable coded as 1 for the period before 1990. Different bloc is a dummy variable that is coded as 0 for all the states which were members of the communist and non-aligned blocs during the Cold War because of their negative association with participation in US-led multilateral interventions. In the post-Cold War period, 0 can be assigned to the states some US officials designated, at one point or another, as the so-called rogue states (e.g., North Korea).

For pooled data with a binary dependent variable, panel logit analysis is the obvious choice for estimation. Because I am interested in inferences for independent

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31 Strictly speaking, UN voting indices measure association, not similarity. Using Scompute, a Stata program to calculate S (Sweeney and Khesk 2005), I examined the similarity in IGO membership as well as the records of diplomatic recognition. The results do not substantively change across the three models. MIDs and alliance portfolios, typically standard input data of interest in the security realm, must be rejected on both theoretical and statistical grounds, namely multicollinearity and endogeneity. For an alternative measure of interest similarity via revealed preferences, see Voeten (2004: 735-7).

32 I considered four additional controls: development (measured as GDP/population), distance (the natural log of the mileage between capitals), nuclear weapons (dummy) and US partner’s involvement in a militarized dispute (dummy). All failed to change the substantive interpretation of the models.
variables that do not change across cases, I opt for a random-effects (or a between-group estimator) model. A fixed-effects model is inappropriate since it excludes key variables with no within-group variance (e.g., English), as well as more than forty percent of observations. Using a random-effects logit and random-effect panel probit models, I recorded no meaningful change in other variables, however. Note that the panel data are incomplete, which means that there is an uneven number of observations (states) over cross-sectional units (coalitions). Analysis using two random samples of the subset of data with an even number of observations across all cross-sectional units did not change the substantive results, suggesting no statistical bias in estimation.

The analysis will also evaluate the interaction effects or the differential impact that relevant explanatory variables have had on coalition participation. As I explained above, I have reasons to expect the Cold War or different Cold War bloc to dampen coalition participation among states who share identity with the US (H9a, H9b). The functional form of non-linear models, such as logit and probit, assume that the effect of each causal variable on the probability of an event is contingent on the values of the right side of the equation. With the introduction of interaction terms, however, the coefficients no longer represent the general impact (ceteris paribus) of one explanatory variable on the dependent variable, but yield estimates that are conditional on the values of the interacting variable. Therefore, I will compare the changes in the regression coefficients of the baseline model in a model with controls and a model with select interaction terms.

Before I move on to the results, let me briefly consider three obvious sources of bias, some of which have already been discussed by Tago (2007). First, standard statistical techniques, such as logit or probit, generate biased coefficients when applied to
finite samples of rare events by underestimating the likelihood of the phenomena under investigation. In my view, the multilateralism of US intervention—around ten percent of all US uses of force in the period under scrutiny—does not qualify as a rare event.

Second, there is the issue of the proverbial non-events—cases of failed coalition-making in which the US had to go it alone. A complete model of the participation in US-led coalitions should ideally specify not only the basic reasons for participation but also the reasons why the US could not meet its intervention objectives multilaterally. However, even a sample of failed coalition cases would be insufficient because a two-stage selection model would have to control for the process by which coalition formation is linked to coalition membership. Control for this source of bias must await further data collection and more advanced statistical modeling.33 Third, since diffusion, timing and sequencing are important in politics, an argument can be made that participation in a US-led coalition at time t will make participation in the same at t+1 more likely or that participation of one state will render participation of another more likely. Again, these arguments cannot be settled without additional data collection and more advanced statistical models.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the estimates of two models: Model 1 is the baseline panel logit analysis; Model 2 presents the specification with controls and Model 3 encompasses Model 2 and adds a set of interaction effects. Positive coefficients signify greater

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33 If we use the strict operational definition of multilateralism, the 1959 Anglo-American military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan must be dropped from the sample. Yet this case offers precisely those kinds of observations that are needed to minimize the said selection bias.
participation and thus a greater multilateralism of US-led coalitions; negative ones, lower participation and thus lower multilateralism. The second column contains information on standard errors and statistical significance. So what do these numbers tell us about the expectations about states’ willingness to participate in US-led military coalitions?

Realism fares well overall. Hypotheses on military capability, the presence of threat in home region and the existing alliance with the US obtain statistical significance in all three models. The first two hypotheses vindicate a systemic realist perspective; the last hypothesis validates the classical realist argument on alliances as key tools for international organization, but simultaneously chips away at a systemic realist view of alliances as temporary marriages of convenience.\(^{34}\) The results generally undermine the predictions associated with liberalism, at least at the dyad- and unit-level. For one, higher democracy does not seem to foster greater participation in US-led military coalitions. There is some evidence across all models that the dependence on US trade accounts for US followership, but no evidence of the similar influence exerted by total US aid. Taken together, these findings support the arguments, one, on the independence of security from economics and, two, on the unreliability of democratic partners (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004).

\(^{34}\) This can be seen as a confirmation of institutional theory and its path-dependence arguments: alliances institutionalized over time may be difficult to destroy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 basic</th>
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<th>Model 2 w/ controls</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3 w/ interactions</th>
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<td>0.031</td>
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<td>0.530*</td>
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*** Significant at .01 level; ** Significant at .05 level; * Significant at .10 level (all two-tailed)

Table 2.2 Logit Analysis Predicting Involvement in US-led military coalitions 1950-2001

_Interest similarity_, a variable of choice to many liberals as well as classical realists, fails
to explain US followership. The coefficient on the variable is negative – using a two-
tailed test – which may suggest that a similarity of foreign policy records in some issue
areas (i.e., UN voting) does not predict the likelihood of going to war itself. I will return
to interest similarity in a moment.
The findings partially confirm the argument on the importance of global legitimacy and the purposes of intervention (Tago 2007, cf. Finnemore 2003). In all models, UN approval increases the number of participants in US-led coalitions. Also like in Tago’s study, a null result was found for the impact of missions designed to counter foreign aggression. The other specified purpose of military intervention—sorting the target state’s domestic affairs—obtains in the hypothesized direction, but only in Model 1 and at a .1 level of statistical significance. States, ceteris paribus, are likely to follow the US if the target state has been condemned by the UN Security Council and/or if the target state had attacked another state. These finding resonate with the expectations made by systemic constructivism and, to a lesser extent, neoliberal institutionalism.

Turning to constructivism, which is the central preoccupation of this paper, the record is decidedly mixed. There is some evidence for arguments associated with shared identity effects, but much against. Like military capability, geography, and collective legitimacy, the Anglosphere turns out to be a robust predictor of US-led military multilateralism across the board. Western identity and English language are also significant, but while shared language stays significant across all models at at 0.5 level, the statistical significance of shared civilizational identity drops with the introduction of additional variables. In Model 3, which is meant to more fully capture the implications of Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis by modeling for the differential propensity of states to join US-led coalitions when interacted with cold war and different ideological blocks, Western identity has no discernible statistical impact on coalition participation.

The substantive impact of these variables changes very little with the addition of controls and two interaction terms. One important exception – Western identity – was
discussed earlier. Another exception is foreign aggression, which drops in statistical significance in Models 2 and 3. The Different Blocs and Cold War dummy failed the test of statistical significance, which means, all else equal, that the likelihood of participation in US-led military coalitions did not change since the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideological blocs.\footnote{To double-check, I analyzed the data broken into two temporal domains: 1950-1983 (ten cases) and 1990-2001 (six cases), but again found no statistically discernible changes. These findings are consistent with Tago’s (2007).} As for the statistical significance of major power, this finding can be associated with an ancient realist claim that military interventions—including those led by the US—are business for big states, not also-rans.\footnote{Coupled with the finding on the positive association between military capability and coalition participation, the positive impact of the major power status can be said to validate a classical realist argument that non-balancing behavior is more frequent than balancing (cf. Schweller 2004, 2006).} But while a realist can claim that it is their preponderant military capability which makes major powers more active in military international interventions, a constructivist can counter that major powers hold special beliefs about privileges and responsibilities.

Evaluating the odd ratios of the statistically significant variables, increases in the probable odds of participation in US-led coalitions seems to be associated with collective legitimacy, geography, identity, alliances, and the major power status.\footnote{The coefficients produced by logit (i.e., log base $e$ (log) of the odds) and the odds ratios produced by logistic regression are in direct relationship since the latter is nothing but an ordinary regression using the logit as the response variable (i.e., the coefficients are in fact in terms of the log odds). The odds ratios are therefore computed by raising $e$ to the power of the logistic coefficient.} In terms of the predicted odds, the most important factor seems to be the UN, whereby states are eight to nine times more likely to join if a US-led coalition carries the authorization from East River. The variable with the next greatest impact is geography, which suggests that US
military intervention within home region induces states to participate roughly six times more than a similar operation elsewhere.

A factor that increased the odds of participation by a factor of roughly 3.7 is the Anglosphere. Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand are almost four times more likely to join military interventions led by the US than other states (A random English-speaking state is eighty percent more likely to do the same than a state where English is not a primary language). These findings give credence to a claim that “in the times of crisis, the Anglosphere falls back into the habit of working together” (Ponnuru 2003). In comparison, all formal allies are roughly three times more willing to help the US than non-US allies as are, to a lesser extent (∼2.8 times), major powers: China, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union/Russia and, after 1991, Germany and Japan.

Last, to clarify the interactive effects of identity, I estimate the predicted or conditional probabilities of participation in US-led coalitions under different configurations of the same set of statistically significant coefficients. The scales are obviously different across variables and the following results should all be taken with a grain of salt. Moving from 0 to 1, on the US ally variable increases the likelihood of participation by 7% and the Anglosphere variable by 12%. The same operation yields between 2% and 4% increase in probability on the variables home region, US trade, UN approval, English and major power. Moving from the mean of military capability to its minimum reduces the likelihood of participation by 8%.38 Taken together with the information on the levels of statistical significance and the odds ratios, the predicted

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38 To generate predicted values, I ran Model 2 through Gary King’s Clarify for Stata program. All percentages should be read as “give or take few percentage points.” Exact calculations are available upon request.
probabilities tend to validate realist and constructivist predictions over those made by liberalism. Table 2.2 gives a comparison of all theoretical expectations to empirical results overall.

Earlier I noted that S-scores, the industry standard for measuring shared interests, failed to predict coalition participation, at least compared to the identity variables. Table 2.3 revisits this measure, this time averaging it out over the Cold War and post-Cold War period. Once again, the two unit interval scale has a range of values between 1, “most similar,” and –1, “least similar”; the greater similarity is meant to indicate the greater compatibility of the views between the U.S. and an actual or potential ally. The first column ranks the states most similar to America using the computed averages of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables Influencing Participation in US-led Military Coalitions</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Capability</td>
<td>+++ System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Region</td>
<td>+++ System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Trade</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Aid</td>
<td>+ System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>+ System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Approval</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Affairs</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aggression</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Similarity</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglophone</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>- System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power status</td>
<td>+++ System</td>
<td>Dyd/Unt</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes 1) Each theoretical perspective is represented with two columns; first representing systemic perspective, second referring to dyad and/or unit perspective. Signs plus (+) and minus (-) indicate the strength of relationship between theoretical predictions and results, with multiple signs indicating stronger relationship. Results are taken from Table 1.

2) Blank cells indicate no specified relationship between theories and variables (but do not deny that a relationship may exist). The specified predictions refer to the general logics of main theoretical perspectives in IR, not specific theories associated with these labels.

Table 2.3: Summary Comparing Theoretical Predictions to Empirical Results
weighted $S$ scores of alliance portfolios in U.S. dyads from 1946 to 2000 (Signorino and Ritter 1999). The second column does the same with the data I used in the preceding analysis – the UN voting data (Gartzke and Jo 2002). The first indicator can be said to reflect a realist dictum that alliances are the primary form of international cooperation, while the second – one which sees the values of UN votes as “symbolic” – is more in line with liberal and constructivist teachings.\(^{39}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input data</th>
<th>1. Alliance Portfolios</th>
<th>2. UN Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO (average)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (average)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>Belgium, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, New Zealand</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>Japan, Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>Spain, Norway, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: $S$ scores of select US dyads in the post-WWII period

The numbers support the Anglosphere to some extent. On the plus side, the top ranking U.S. friend and ally in both columns is an Anglosphere member—Canada and Britain, respectively. On the minus side, NATO allies like the Netherlands—and, in UN voting, Israel—reveal more similar preferences with America than most other Anglosphere states. Notably, Australia and New Zealand, who have identical average scores on both measurements, fall somewhere in the middle of the pack in terms of the interest affinity with the U.S. and Ireland, a possible sixth member of the Anglosphere core, is anchoring the lower end. Comparison of these results with those in the preceding analysis suggest

\(^{39}\) Input data on alliances came from CoW, version 3.0, and was accessed through the EUgene program.
one important finding – while formal alliances like NATO are a strong indicator of the willingness to help the US so are the informal groupings like the Anglosphere. Interpreted in yet another way, there may be truth to claims that NATO always has an “Anglosphere option” (Stuart 2004-5). It may be that the US does not only multilaterally govern its behavior on the use of force with a small group of states, but that it also draws legitimacy from this group.

Combing all these findings – the levels and direction of statistical significance, odds ratios, predicted probabilities and S-score averages – I come up with the following substantive interpretations. All being equal, a state will be most willing to join a US-led military intervention when the intervention is 1) targeting a proximate state, 2) has a UN fiat and the state is 3) big, 4) well-armed, 5) allied and 6) English-speaking. Since geography is non-manipulable, the first determinant of coalition participation is also the least interesting theoretically. The second factor is the UN Security Council vote on the intervention. But no less than four factors which make or break participation concern some aspect of state identity. In a blunt interpretation, when push comes to shove, America’s best buddy – or mate – is Britain, the other English-speaking major power.

The latter conclusion is au courant with the enormous literature on the Anglo-American “special relationship” (AASR). The vast scholarship on the AASR begins with a simple observation that the Anglo-American relationship differs in significant ways from that of any other two countries. The extant explanations of the AASR differ over its

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40 The UN effect, note, is independent from the prior participation of the veto-holding major powers who sit on the Security Council. This conclusion can be said to validate both constructivist and neoliberal institutionalist arguments on the impact of collective legitimacy on outcomes in world politics. The importance of the UN fiat may be even more important in the post-intervention phase, to the extent that it involves help with the governance of target territory (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 30-6).
causes: some stress shared interests, others underscore shared identities and still others believe in both. My analysis suggests that the last group is probably right. Since the Iraq War, the AASR-talk has become political costly in both London and Washington, but the party is not over – contrary to a claim from an epigraph to this chapter. At a minimum, my findings emphatically support calls for a “return to a historiography that emphasizes the surprising enduring quality of the Anglo-American relationship” (Ashton 2004: 125). I will return to the AASR in Chapter 4. And as I will show in Chapters 5-7, the three remaining U.S.-dyads within the Anglosphere – Australian-American, Canadian-American and New Zealander-American – can also be seen as special, as per the wishes of a US State Department memo quoted in the last epigraph. The idea of specialness, I posit, is a defining feature of the Anglosphere.

WHY CASE STUDIES ARE NECESSARY

In the preceding analysis, I treated identity as an objective phenomenon, which can be operationalized and measured using the states’ demographic break-downs. The quantitative approach, I submit, should be seen as both first-cut and second-best. In most conceptualizations, identity is not objective, given or fixed, but intersubjective, contextual and malleable; as such, it violates the main assumptions which make statistical analysis possible in the first place. As quantitative researchers have themselves observed, an analysis of modal trends in the relationship between identity categories at state or sub-

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41 The concept of “specialness” never quite took off as a theoretical building block (Danchev 2005; Dumbrell 2006: Ch. 1; Kimball 2005; Pallade 2006: Ch.1, Reynolds 2006: 309-313; Supplement to Journal of Transatlantic Studies 3:1, Spring 2005). In Britain, a survey in 2005 found that a majority of respondents who think favorably of the US cited the AASR as a reason (New Statesman, 27 June 2005, 9).

42 Since 2005, diplomats at both US embassy in London and British embassy in Washington have been reportedly asked not employ the term (New Statesman, 27 June 2005, 9; The Economist, 27 March 2008).
state actors and types of state behaviour is a useful preliminary exercise, but one that leads neither to the understanding of how identity is constituted nor what it does (e.g., Henderson 1998: 480, 481).

Two most heroic assumptions on which any statistical analysis rests are unit homogeneity, an idea that the independent variables operate independently of the temporal and spatial context and direct causation, an idea that the independent variables are uninfluenced by the dependent variable. As for direct causation, identities may indeed have effects in the Humean sense of cause and effect, but they are also constituted in the Aristotelian sense of X (e.g., Indochina, East, Pakeha, poor etc), being impossible without Y, e.g., (India/China, West, Maori, rich etc). What constitutes the Anglosphere is a high rate of participation in the U.S.-led coalitions of the willing among English-speaking states. But even if we narrow and harden the conceptualization of identity so that statistical treatment can proceed, we are likely to face insurmountable problems of operationalization and measurement. Instructive in the IR context is a comparison between the conceptualizations of interest and identity. As said earlier in this chapter, typical working definition of state interest in large-$N$ studies assumes that interests are manifested by the previous commitments made by each state. $S$ scores, the measure discussed above, consider multiple commitments, ranging from security to economic relations to global governance, assuming that the pattern of the foreign policy choices of one state will have meaning when compared to the foreign policy choices of other states. Scholars are advised to experiment with new input measures for $S$ scores so long as they
follow two specific theoretical criteria when constructing their measures: 1) the objective observation of behavior and 2) preference for costly behavior over “cheap talk.”

When it comes to measuring state identity, both criteria are problematic. First, conceptually speaking, state identity can not be reduced to international behavior, or even to texts about international behavior. True, the constructivist mantra “we are – or become – what we do” refers to an effect of social interaction on state identity, but identity-producing interaction is not solely a matter of interstate relations. State-society interactions matters as well because the national Self is constituted in relations with its significant Others both at home and abroad (Hopf 2002: Ch.1 and 6; Wendt 1999: 342; Mitzen 2006: 343). Among the proposed types of input data for computing S scores, those rejected on theoretical grounds are “regime type” or the “distribution of politically-active communal groups” – precisely the kinds of occurrences which speak to this bottom-up conceptualization of state/national identity. Second, from the identity perspective, there can be no such thing as cheap talk because communication is part and parcel of a social process which sustains and changes identities. Even when they communicate over theoretically non-essential matters such as human rights, states change their properties and preferences. Dimensions of identity such as ethnicity, religion and language are unlikely to capture such changes.

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43 Empirical criteria, such as data tractability or variation, are no doubt important as well as it is the research question itself (Sweeney and Keshk 2005: 182).

44 I will discuss this point at length in the next chapter. To be sure, few rationalists still defend the idea that talk is cheap. Theories built around the concepts such as audience and reputation costs, for example, suggest that bluffing can have political consequences similar to those incurred by behavioral choices (e.g., Sartori 2005).
The conceptual issues involving comparisons of different types and contents of identity, as well as those related to operationalizing and measuring identity as a variable are extremely challenging, but are compounded with the assumptions required by statistical models. Little wonder that a review of the last generation of identity scholarship in social science found that “nearly all studies of identity included some sort of rich case study” (Abdelal et al 2005: 13). Even if the identity datasets significantly improve in the future, the necessary methodological procedures for studying this concept are likely to remain qualitative and interpretative. “Rich” case studies have a host of comparative and special advantages. Some scholars still wrongly perceive case studies as a sidekick to quantitative methods, even if they accept the unique ability of case studies to identify and evaluate the so-called causal mechanisms – social or political processes by which variables exert influence on outcomes.45 The logic of identifying a causal process in given cases, one which requires consistency of all specified intervening variables, is radically different from that of establishing statistical correlations, which requires only probabilistic associations. The central question emanating from my statistical analysis is why are (some) English-speaking states more willing to help the U.S. wage its wars than states selected at random? To deal with this question, I turn to a theoretical framework linking state/national identity to international security cooperation which I then evaluate in a set of rich case studies. As the next chapter will demonstrate, rich case studies provide greater freedom in operationalizing the concept of identity, much to the benefit of its internal validity.

45 A number of other basic social science tasks – from typologization to the identification of new variables or new relations among old variables (including complex interaction effects and reciprocal causation) – are virtually impossible without case studies (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007).
CHAPTER 3

TOWARD A THEORY OF THE ANGLOSPHERE: A UNIT-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE

All the people like us are We/And every one else is They.
Rudyard Kipling, “We and They,” 1919

As history constantly teaches us, discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which there is a struggle; discourse is the power to be seized.
Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, 1966/1981

In the previous chapter, I treated the Anglosphere as an objectively given fact. In a brush-clearing statistical analysis of the determinants on participation in U.S.-led “coalitions of the willing” between 1950 and 2001, I found that, all else equal, the Anglosphere identity correlates with the states’ propensity to help America fight its wars. To get from this correlation to an explanation of the tendency of English-speaking states to cooperate in international security, I need to a causal logic or a causal mechanism. What I suggest in this chapter is a theoretical framework on how states come to cooperate, pitched at the unit level of analysis. I argue that foreign policy choices which lead to cooperation follow the discourses and debates over the meanings of state/national identity. I apply this framework in the subsequent chapters to explain how Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the U.S. made choices which led to the practices and expectations of dependable security cooperation which have come to define the Anglosphere in international relations.
My theoretical framework, I underscore, is but one approach to the Anglosphere. Ontologically speaking, identities are constructed on, and across, all levels of analysis, but it is impossible to give the same analytical depth to all of them simultaneously. In Chapter 1, I considered the construction of the Anglosphere identity at what can be seen as the local level – by looking at claims made by various intellectual communities on the existence of the English-speaking singularity in the world. In Chapter 2, my statistical analysis imparted the Anglosphere from the dyadic or interaction level. In the rest of the study, I suggest a unit level – or “second image” – perspective in which the Anglosphere is regarded as a constitutive element of state and/or national identity. Unit-level perspectives assume that the observable behavior of states is the product of choice or a pattern of human choices made on the basis of some dimensions, such as regime type, interest or, in my case, identity. Individuals and groups within states, it is further assumed, act on these dimensions, as per more or less direct correlation between ideas and action.46 Once I account for the constructions of ideas at the domestic level, I then move to explain how unit characteristics of this actor influence behavior in the international sphere. I make no claims about international outcomes before making claims about the empirical setting at the foreign-policy level first.

In IR theory, much of the traditional unit-level work stops at analyzing choices or patterns of choices made by one state, usually a great power. In this study, I move beyond traditions and analyze the strategic interaction of two or more states of variable

46 Like most unit-level analysis, mine will on occasion consider the construction of ideas within individuals. I am aware of the theoretical slippage from the state to political elites, decision-makers and individual leaders. Also, I am aware of a basic philosophical and theoretical conundrum over whether states are as “real” as human beings (Wendt 2004).
capabilities and/or status. In Chapter 4, I look at the direct interaction within the Anglo-American great power/empire dyad. In Chapters 5-7, I consider both direct and indirect interactions among at least three states of the Anglosphere core, two of which are always less-than-great powers. Various feedback loops between the Anglosphere and actors who invoke it obviously constitute one of the most interesting aspects of my genealogical argument. My theoretical and empirical focus, however, remains at the unit level: I do not provide a theory of interstate interaction, only a proposition about the likely outcome resulting from the interactions of two actors should each actor hold a particular perception of the other’s identity. A more systematic combination of bottom-up and top-down perspectives on the Anglosphere is no doubt desirable, but cannot be undertaken in this study.47

This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part I present my theoretical framework: I begin with a conceptualization of state/national identity as discourse, with minimal review of the main literatures and typologies of identity at the unit level in IR. Then I move to consider the role of argumentation and framing in foreign policy debates. I complete the framework by using the concept of fit to connect discourses and debates. In the second part, I present discourse analysis (DA) as my main methodology. I first discuss the break of my DA in three levels of analysis and then I introduce the role of keywords and new events as methodological tools for the analysis of argumentation and framing in foreign policy debates.

47 A move toward interaction is consistent with an ontology which believes in the relationality of agents and structures (Wendt 1999). In this view, neither policy-makers nor communities of states are in principle reducible to the sum of heretofore separately analyzed structural and agential variables.
IDENTITY AS DISCOURSE

In the constructivist ontology, actors and structures are mutually constituted, which means that the interaction among actors constitutes a social structure and that this structure constitutes the actors. The structure of reality and knowledge are regarded as social constructions, whereby the said structure is primarily cultural or ideational, rather than primarily material. The actors have an identity and seek to have it secured – what is known as “ontological security.” Without an identity, there would be no sense of continuity over time and thus no cognitive and affective stability necessary for agency in a social environment. Based on these assumptions, constructivism can be seen as a framework for analyzing social interactions which give rise to social phenomena.48 One such social phenomenon is the state, a social actor defined by of a bounded territory, a state structure (“government”) and a collective identity. From the constructivist perspective, identity is the key, because without a collective identity the state’s territory and structure would have no meaning (Wendt 1999: Ch. 5).

Like all identities, the collective identity of the state – which can be called state or national identity – is constituted by a set of meanings which a state attributes to itself while relating to significant or relevant Others across time and space. To paraphrase Kipling’s verse from the epigraph, the “We” is impossible without a “They.” Following a recent conceptual schema, the meanings that constitute a state’s collective identity fall into four basic, mutually non-exclusive forms: constitutive norms (the representations and practices on “who we are”), social purposes (“what do we do”), relational

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comparisons (“who and what we are not”) and cognitive models (“what we see/know”). These meanings are always contested, even if only at the margins of politics. Put otherwise, the state’s collective identity varies in terms of content, i.e., the meaning of a collective identity, contestation, i.e., the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared category.⁴⁹ In my application of this schema, the state/national “we” is constituted in the state’s interaction with its society as well as other states.⁵⁰ State/national identity is thus spatially constructed not only externally, against the territorially bounded external entities such as Ireland or the East, but also internally, vis-à-vis the less bounded subjects such as Irish constituency or Eastern provinces. Temporal or historical identities play an equally important role in the construction of the Self. Here, too, the significant Others are both internal, such as the glorious or shameful past, or external, such as modernity or development.

Note I refuse to specify collective identity as either “state” or “national.” Rather than reviewing various theories on the relationship between state and nation,⁵¹ I adopt a simple continuum: on the one end, the state and nation are commensurate; on the other, they are separate. The meanings that constitute state/national identity are obviously

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⁴⁹ Abdelal et al (2005). Contestation is not to be confused with salience, which usually refers to the political consequences of the degree to which individuals identify with a group.

⁵⁰ See, inter alia, Hopf (2002: 288-91); Mitzen (2006: 343), Ruggie (1998: 870-4) and Wendt (1999: 201). Empirical work on the constitution of state/national identity varies in focus: some accounts privilege interactions with significant Others internal to the state, i.e., in society, while other focus on those external to it, i.e., in international society (Hopf 2002: Ch. 6; Wæver 1993).

⁵¹ General theoretical consensus holds that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that most nations claim a bounded territory for themselves. On the one end of the theoretical continuum are primordialists who believe that nations have ancient ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious or geographic foundations. On the other end are instrumentalists who see national identities as an object of strategic manipulation by elites. From my perspective it is important to note that nearly all theories on this continuum hold is that nations are always think and act in relation to at least one other nation or human group (Hechter 2000: 14).
complex and hard to measure, but this continuum is arguably broad enough to include anything from beliefs on biological inheritance and specific forms of speech to beliefs on territoriality and multiculturalism (Wæver 2005). As with all explanatory typologies, this one can be refined into subtypologies by simple property space techniques but each re-classification calls for an explicitly stated prefab theory on the constitutive essence of the state and/or nation (cf. Elman 2004). I propose a different approach. As I said earlier, my theoretical framework on begins at the unit-level, with the interaction between the state and its society. Rather than deductively specifying and linking certain contents (values, institutions, race/ethnicity or religion) to state/national identity (constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and cognitive models), I begin with a fairly inductive analysis of which aspects of collective identity are relevant in a given context. The aspect of identity on which political and social actors condition their identity is an empirical question so that the point at which my unit becomes an international subject comes only after I account for the political processes which define it. The meanings of state or national identity are multiple, but not infinite and can be empirically recovered. From this point of view, the question of how the Anglosphere become possible cannot be answered without an explanation of how the core states chose policies that led to dependable cooperation in the domain of international security.

In my conceptualization, identities are constituted by discourses – structured practices of communication which produce meaning and shape social relations. Theories of discourse differ on many issues, but all tend to agree on three basic claims. First, discourses are intersubjective, which means that meanings are voluntarily shared by all

52 There is no such thing as pure induction. My approach is more similar to what Charles Pierce termed abduction, a dialectical combination of barefoot empiricism and deductive theory (Finnemore 2003: 13).
social actors who relevantly participate in social interactions, as opposed to being somehow aggregated as individual, subjective beliefs. Discourses of identity within a state or nation, for example, provide answers on the “we” questions: who we are; where we stand in time and space; where we have been and where we are going; how we should position ourselves with respect to significant Others; what we possess and what are our rights and responsibilities; what role should we seek to play in the world and so on.

Second, discourses are power: they make the boundaries of social identity by rewarding/punishing actions that are congruent/deviant with those identities as well as by enabling/constraining what is possible (imaginable, thinkable, permissible, desirable) in the first place. The rules determining what “makes sense” are not simply grammatical or institutional but social and political. Any given discourse will thus consist of an ontology or a worldview – a set of ideas of what entities exist, who or what runs them, why and how. Different discourses may have different answers to these questions: what entities exist in time and space: individuals, classes, states, nations, markets, extraterrestrials? What sort of agents run these entities: monarchs, business interests, political parties, people, gods? What do these agents want: territory, money, prestige, immortality? How they go about getting what they want: conflict, cooperation, talking, prayer? Ontologies may vary across contexts, but their effects are similar in that some entities, agents and relationships will be privileged, others will be temporized and marginalized and still will be ignored or even erased. The point is that all social items – subjects, objects, concepts – are never independent of discourse.53

53 My understanding of discourse and its relationship to the subject is derived from Michel Foucault. Appendix A reveals that my Foucault – I strongly believe in multiple Foucaults – comes off as a lapsed
Ole Wæver captures the relationship between the discourses of identity and foreign policy thus:

*overall* policy must hold a definite relationship to discursive structures, because it is always necessary for policy makers to be able to argue “where this takes us.” (Who they have to argue this to depends on the political system, but they are never free of this obligation) [2005: 35].

Embedded in Wæver’s claim are two assumptions. The first holds that any public policy must be a part of identity discourses, as discourses are always intersubjectively shared. The assumption implies that foreign policy is embodied in the discourses of identity: identity shapes foreign policy, but is, ostensibly in a feedback loop, shaped by it as well. The implication is consistent with constructivist ontology, which sees identity and foreign policy as co-constituted: the main problem of foreign policy concerns not threats and opportunities but identity.

Note that Wæver refers to discourses – or “discursive structures” – in the plural. In discourse theory generally, the multiplicity is implicit as some discourses are understood as dominant, hegemonic or governing, while others are described as challenging, counterhegemonic or subaltern. Allowing for the empirical character of multiplicity and dominance, the relationship between discourse and policy can be expressed as a testable proposition: all things equal, foreign policy is likely to follow the dominant discourse of identity. Note that the italicized word overall is meant to remind the reader that all things are usually not equal. The proposition therefore relates to the patterns of policy, rather than a specific outcome. Also note that this proposition

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becomes a falsifiable causal claim only if we temporarily “stabilize” one side of this relationship (identity) to explain the other (foreign policy).  

Wæver’s second assumption holds that discourses are contestable by human agents. The simplicity of this assumption can be deceiving: most discourse-based theoretical approaches in fact accord no necessary role to humans, whether they are seen as the authors of text or policy makers. Indeed, while constructivist ontology in IR has agents and structures as co-constituted, constructivist theory usually dislocates human agency in favor of structures (cf. Sending 2002). In Wæver’s view, human actors play as important a theoretical role as discourses: “policy makers” are “obliged” to “argue” in front of an audience in a bid to explain why their actions should be seen as legitimate – i.e., acceptable in terms of what is intersubjectively held as “true” and/or “valid.”

I agree with Wæver that contestation of discourse is a privilege of the select few. But whereas he reduces contestation to “policy makers,” I see it as occurring among political elites, a broader category of individuals who speak and act in the name of the state. Political elites can be defined as individuals with privileged institutional positions and reputations which provide them comparatively greater authority in social interactions. Authority is the source of their power: while they are as much discursive creatures as anyone else, political elites are hitherto “authorized” to speak and act before

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54 Some discourse theorists reject such stabilizations and argues that foreign policy – more generally, practice – is inexplicable outside of the intersubjective meanings they carry within a discourse community. The separation is meant to be analytical, not ontological (Appendix A).

55 Terms related to political elites include, for the Victorian era, “public moralists,” or, in the more contemporary sense, “public intellectuals,” “opinion leaders,” “entrepreneurs of ideas,” or, as the British still call them, “chattering classes.” In this study, this group of people has historically been dominated by middle-aged men and associated with professional identities in the academia, organized religion, business, law, politics and/or journalism (Stapleton 2001).
an audience or audiences in the society. Political elites speak and act not only in order to make the world intelligible to themselves and others, but also because the societal hierarchies compel them to do so.

ARGUMENTATION AND FRAMING

In this theoretical account, human agency is manifested through *arguing*, as a particular form of communication aimed at winning an audience or audiences. To say that political elites are “obliged” to argue is to make a major theoretical claim on how foreign policy works. At the same time, there is no doubt that argumentation – also known as deliberation, communicative action, rhetoric, or, most simply, “talk” – is pervasive in the social world. Within the constructivist research program in IR, the question of “what actors say, in what contexts and to what audiences” has become a major area of inquiry, if not a movement which can be called “active-voice” constructivism. This work has extensively dealt with the social-theoretic and social-scientific underpinnings of the independent role of talk, topics that I therefore need not to engage here. What I derive from this growing literature a claim that the construction of social facts such as identity or foreign policy is always contested and never complete in

56 Parallel to the overarching Foucauldian understanding of power, this framework recognizes the positional power of political elites who are comparatively more capable of defining meaning within the dominant discourse. I will return to this point below, but note that no conceptualization of power is likely to be sufficiently complex to capture the concept (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

57 Obligation can be understood from a theory of action known as the “logics of appropriateness.” According to James March and Johan Olsen, political actors “follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations” or “act[] in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed and publicly known, anticipated, and accepted” (1998: 949). While a useful heuristic, this formulation has generally frustrated the empirically inclined, at least in IR: what is missing from the logic of appropriateness is an independent and indirect specification of what constitutes appropriateness (Hopf 2002: 12-6; Wendt and Fearon 2002: 60-2). I will return to this point in the methodological discussion.
the sense that all political actors accept this construction or accept it to the same degree. By making arguments, political actors make situations, rather than simply thinking and acting within situational constraints.\textsuperscript{58}

From the perspective of argumentation, the key situational constraint is the audience or public – a fact that argumentation has more than two participants. Political actors may express or articulate reasons to justify policy positions, plans or actions, but it the public who judges what is legitimate or what is meaningful, true and/or valid in a given context and, consequently, what can be done.\textsuperscript{59} In my conceptualization, the scope of “public” is historically variable and therefore should be treated as an empirical question, though like Wæver I believe that some “selectorate” obliges political elites to argue over “where this takes us.”\textsuperscript{60} Publicity is assumed to involve a public record – the media for which is variable from simple minutes of meetings to press conferences televised live – which serves to stabilize expressed identities across time and space.

\textsuperscript{58} Note that not all IR theories incorporating talk are constructivist and that not all constructivists theorize talk. In my reading, representatives of active-voice constructivism in IR are, \textit{inter alia}, Hayward Alker, Michael Barnett, Sheri Berman, Mark Blyth, Jeffrey Checkel, Neta Crawford, Martha Finnemore, Colin Hay, Ian Hurd, Alastair Ian Johnson, Ronald Krebs, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Marc Lynch, Janice Bially Mattern, Jennifer Mitzen, Craig Parsons, Rodger Payne, Thomas Risse, Richard Price, Frank Schimmelfenig, Vivien Schmidt, Kathryn Sikkink, Maja Zehfuss and Wesley Widermeyer. Outside IR and political science, talk constitutes a major area of study in anthropology, business, communication, economics, history, sociology and psychology. After all, rhetorical theorists have studied the effects of talks for over two millennia. For literature reviews in, or relevant to, IR, see Bruner (2002), Crawford (2002), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Kornprobst (2007), Krebs and Jackson (2007), Mandler (2006), Müller (2001) and Tilly (2002).

\textsuperscript{59} A legitimacy crisis occurs when the claims of what is valid cannot keep pace with shifts in the operation or location of political authority. For extended discussions of this “sociological” and/or “empirical” conceptualization of legitimacy from IR perspectives, see Clark (2005: Ch. 1); Crawford (2002: 80-1, 122-3); Hurd (2007: Ch. 2) and Jackson (2006: 16-21).

\textsuperscript{60} The term “selectorate” is IR jargon. On the role of public in political debates, see Elster (2002). For IR perspectives, see Krebs and Jackson (2006), Mitzen (2005), Wæver (2005). The Wæver passage quoted earlier in this chapter offers that policy debates are present in all political systems, but one can logically expect arguing to be more entrenched under comparatively liberal, open or tolerant conditions (Crawford 2002: 22-3; also see Jackson 2006: ix, Mead 2002: 61-5; Karawan 2001: 168, cf. Lynch 1999).
Even in secret and secretive deliberations, a small audience – say, an inner cabinet – passes judgments over policy positions. (The secrecy may imply that an argumentation before a wider public is “postponed”). Because it constrains the kinds of statements that actors can legitimately make in a given context, the public can be seen as productive of foreign policy as well. The key causal mechanism through which argumentation influences the social and political world is known as persuasion – arguing directed at changing the beliefs and preferred course of action of one’s interlocutor. From this perspective, because the assessment of “where this takes us” and other “we” questions is open to debate, identity and policy must be seen as shaped by particular and partial arguments and attempts to persuade opponents and audiences. In advancing an argument in favor of the causal value of arguing, I am not suggesting that agents exist independently of structures that surround them; rather, I am referring to an ontology in which agents and structures are mutually constituted through a dialectical relationship which varies in time and space. By arguing, I posit, individuals and groups can impact the environment within which they operate, and sometimes radically so (Bleiker 2003).

One way to theorize the effect of arguing in the identity-cooperation link is to account for the role of foreign policy debates. The difference between discourses and debates lies in flexibility and variability. Discourses represent deeper layers of meaning which are slow to change. In contrast, debates are more bounded episodes of contestation in which human agency comes to the fore. While elites – and especially policy makers –

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61 Within the aforementioned group of scholars, the conceptualizations of persuasion range from Habermasian truth-seeking to Weberian coercion, but they could conceptually broadened to include Foucauldian resistance or the discursive repertoires of the Bakhtin circle (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007; cf. Craig 1999, Steinberg 1999).

62 Publicity and persuasion have a definitive relationship: actors tend to generalize and impartialize interests claims, they tend to reciprocate and foster a sense of obligation and mutuality (Mitzen 2005).
cannot say just about anything (not without a risk of losing their job or status for being incomprehensible to their audience), they need not say the same thing in all contexts. In fact, political elites who offer legitimate arguments in debates look to solidify or improve their social standing. In this sense, too, the answers to the questions such as “where this takes us” are structured by the stable (or “sticky”) meanings derived from the wider and deeper understandings of “we” but are not necessarily determined by them.63 As per Figure 3.1., foreign policy debates are nested in the wider discourses, but policy is always mediated by some form of the public expression of “where this takes us.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISCOURSES OF IDENTITY</th>
<th>FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figure 3.1 From discourse to foreign policy (a unit-level perspective)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

It is important to underscore that my account of contestations brackets the actors’ motives, preferences, intentions or sincerity.64 What analytically matters for me are the rhetorical moves the actors make to justify or legitimize their positions, so long as they can be seen as a product of conscious reflection. Actors rhetorically frame their action for many reasons, but mostly because they believe others may disagree or misunderstand the action.65 Framing, defined as the social construction of events by political actors, can

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63 See McAdam et al (2001: 29-30). For many social theorists, argumentation always takes place within dominant discourse. One reason is practical: the creation of entirely new meanings is less likely because it requires extraordinary material and ideational resources (Ibid.: 47-59).

64 On the role of individual intentionality in constructivism in IR, see Crawford (2002: 124-8), Hopf (2002: Ch. 1), Jackson (2006: 21-4), Mitzen (forthcoming), Sending (2002), and Wendt (1999: Ch. 3).
be said to come in three ideal–typical forms: abstraction, comparison and appropriateness.\textsuperscript{66} Abstraction, as a form of deductive reasoning, is equivalent to a syllogism in which a claim about a cause-effect relationship consists of two premises and a conclusion. Without going into the philosophy of syllogism in logic, in the practical use abstraction operates as follows: one premise (major) specifies a goal Y, while the other (minor) posits the causal relationship between X and Y; the conclusion, then, is the claim that X must be fulfilled to achieve Y.\textsuperscript{67}

Comparisons refer to communications devices such as historical analogies, similes and metaphors. Again without delving into the definitions and differences among these, it can be said that comparisons rely on the old and familiar (source domain) to interpret – meaning find systematic correspondences with – the new and uncertain (target domain). Comparisons are effective because they can communicate both abstract and tangible meanings as in comparing the signature of a peace treaty to “drinking poison” or in describing regional cooperation as “building a common home.” Comparisons, in short, serve to make complex, novel or controversial ideas sound simple, familiar and palatable. Appropriateness, earlier defined as rule-following, can be seen as a specific form of logical reasoning that relates an idea to extant identities. For example, political actors

\textsuperscript{65} The concept of framing comes from Erving Goffman and possibly Kenneth Boulding. My conceptualization comes from the literature on social movements (Benford and Snow 2000).

\textsuperscript{66} In the multidisciplinary study of political communication, there is no shortage of conceptual discussions of such “forms of reasoning,” all of which can be said to go back to Aristotle. For a well-known treatment in IR, see Crawford (2002). These forms of reasoning are often seen as micro-structural discursive forms, as opposed to the larger scope of identifications, genres or schemata (cf. Angenot 1989).

\textsuperscript{67} Consider the use of syllogism to choose between two policy alternatives: either diplomacy will settle the dispute, or there will be war (major); diplomacy failed to settle the dispute (minor); therefore, there must be war (conclusion). Or consider the use of syllogism to resolve uncertainty in the premise: if we send the troops across the border, then we will be at war (major); we sent the troops across the border (minor); therefore, we are at war (conclusion).
speaking on behalf of a state with an official multicultural identity are unlikely to find an openly racist immigration policy appropriate, just like those acting on behalf of a self-perceived neutral state are likely to refuse offensive and defensive alliances.

Abstraction, comparison, and appropriateness are three ways of linking an argument to existing ideas and thus making some policy options more likely than others. In general, arguments that make these moves are likely to be more persuasive than arguments which are specific and non-generalizable claims and/or are cynical about rules. But what ultimately makes arguments competitive in a political arena is their “fit” with the underlying discourses of identity. Let us consider this concept in more detail.

FIT AND MISFIT
As I said earlier, the meanings of “we” are multiple but not infinite. To succeed in debating the “where this takes us” question of foreign policy, political elites must control the dominant interpretation of possible answers in the sense that their truth- or validity-claims cannot refer to fantasy or unlikely meanings. Ideas must be grafted to other ideas in a way that makes sense to an audience. Successful argumentation, I posit, can be seen as a function of the fit – also known as accessibility, click, goodness of fit, congruence, match or resonance – between the speaker’s framing of the meanings of “we” and the dominant interpretation of reality.\(^{68}\) The proposed mechanism is simple: the public demands that the speaker adhere to the hitherto made commitments. In the case of

\(^{68}\) The concept of (discursive) fit is theorized in multiple bodies of knowledge (Mandler 2006: 277-8). In IR, the constructivist work on norm compliance, order and interest, broadly understood, has dealt with this concept at some length (e.g., Börzel and Risse 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Hansen 2006; Weldes 1999). Once again, the separation between discourse and fact is meant to be analytical, not ontological.
foreign policy debates, the society – or one of its segments – holds the government to the
agreed-upon principles and asks justification for deviations.

The concept of fit is theoretically significant for two reasons. First, in the
constructivist ontology, a causal mechanism behind the foreign policy process lies in the
interaction of actor choices and the possibilities enabled or constrained by the underlying
discursive structures. The interaction dynamic can be easily conceptualized thus: if the
policy stakeholders deem the fit to be appropriate, they will rebuff or deflect calls for
change and the extant policy position is likely to hold. Conversely, if the dominant
readings are invalidated by the observations of the misfit, calls for change will intensify
and so will the likelihood for policy shifts. Second, from a perspective centered on
legitimation, the theoretical step from calls for change and change is short: a victory in a
debate over the fit between identity and the putative reality makes one’s preferred
outcome more likely as the opponent will have limited ground from which to legitimately
oppose the policy. So if the representatives of the status quo position in foreign policy
succeed in consistently interpreting the actions of a rival state as harmful, the government
is likely to reject the opposition calls for more cooperation with the rival. Conversely, if
the opposition is able to show that the rival state has turned into a friend, then the
government is likely to be forced to open up space for more international cooperation.69

Analytically, fit can be approached from the perspective of debates over the
interpretation of environmental demands, often expressed in phrases such as “reality
constraints” or events and facts “on the ground.” Foreign policy, in this view, is not a

69 There are many theories of audience reception. For example, Althusser’s concept of interpellation (also
known as uptake or hailing) holds that structures (e.g., discourse) constitute the Self forcing it to perform
some tasks over others (Weldes 1999). The audience is more likely to escape interpellation if there are
misfits between discourse and situations.
closed system: any argument on the “where this takes us” logically generates a set of expectations about future, which can be challenged by what goes on in the world. Discursively speaking, as new facts and events emerge and reality constraints change, political actors move to reappraise extant discourses anew, which opens the door for change in foreign policy orientations. Depending on the outcome of contestations, the dominant readings of reality can be strengthened or challenged. If a chain of future events validates expectations, an argument – and the identities, policies, and institutions that the argument supports – are likely to be consolidated. Conversely, if there is a misfit between the argument and the perceived reality, a policy will be destabilized. Fit and misfit are themselves a function of perceptions and misperceptions, but what matters analytically are their frames and counterframes.

One way to analyze the making of mis(fit) is to focus on the claims of consistency and coherence, which, lumped together, can be seen as the logical connection to prior acts and/or statements. Political authority, in this view, depends on legitimacy and legitimacy depends on consistency and coherence. So if consistency and coherence bode well for the actor’s political future, hypocrisy – a blatant violation of the terms of one’s own discourse – leads to costly “rhetorical entrapments” and “blowbacks” and nearly immediate political troubles. Though one could certainly imagine a world in which hypocrisy is seen as inconsequential, in liberal democracies the gap between the word and the deed usually bears costs. A related source of political trouble is fantasy – an imagined situation which does not correspond with the prevailing intersubjective consensus on what constitutes reality. Though not as intentional as hypocrisy, policy positions interpreted as fantasy also lead to rhetorical entrapments and the loss of
political capital. In each case, political actors can change foreign policy by pointing out the inconsistency and incoherence in a particular understanding of objective realities.

To express my argument in the form of a proposition: the greater the perceived fit between the dominant discourse and international realities (as interpreted by the political actors), the greater the continuity in foreign policy choices. The continuity and change in international conflict and cooperation, all things equal, will depend thus on the continuity and change in foreign policy understandings as supplied by relevant human agents. Continuity in this study refers to regularities in foreign policy understandings over time; change refers to departures from the dominant views of a state place in the international society. The continuity of a belief in the cooperative nature of the state is likely to lead to more cooperation; conversely, a shift in the same belief is likely to lead to more conflict.

To sum up the chapter so far, my theoretical framework approaches international cooperation from the perspective of the content and contestation of identity with individual states. The analysis begins with an inductive recovery of the discourses of identity at home and then moves to analyze foreign policy debates on the fit between the discourse of identity and the perceived reality. Two testable propositions are as follows: a) foreign policy will be shaped by the dominant discourse of identity and b) foreign policy will be shaped by the debates on the perceived fit between identity and reality. Using causal arrows, this theoretical framework can be presented thus: Discourses of identity → Foreign policy debates on the fit between identity and reality → Foreign policy choices → International conflict/cooperation.

As I said in this chapter’s introductory qualification, I do not explicitly theorize the last link in the causal chain – the connection between foreign policy choices and
international conflict/cooperation. The theoretical step between foreign policy and international outcomes is long and requires a different level of analysis altogether. Rather than being caused by foreign policy choices in one national context, international conflict/cooperation is sustained and transformed through interaction. Simply put, when it comes to cooperation, it always takes two to tango. The interaction level underscores the role of recognition in identity-formation. Recognition lies at the core of the constitution of identities because subjectivity always depends on intersubjectivity. An identity claimed by the Self may be pure fantasy unless it is recognized – that is, acknowledged as legitimate – by the significant Other or Others (Wendt 1999: 224-33, 2004). The main rub with recognition is that it can be asymmetric: the Others may not recognize the Self as equal and vice versa. The fit between identity and reality at home is therefore at least partly shaped by the types of recognition coming from abroad. In this view, precisely because the meanings of state/national identity are constantly contested at home, interstate interaction can be said to encompass learning and change.

The conditions under which interaction will give rise to learning is outside the scope of my theoretical framework, but it logically follows that as “positive feedback” entrenches extant interpretations emanating from the dominant discourse, “negative feedback” destabilizes them. States can therefore be seen as reflexive entities, they adjust their identities in response to the actions of other states. Discourses and policy positions can be seen as self-reinforcing: as their interpretive frameworks make sense of more and more new events, they come to seem exceptionally true and valid and become harder to disprove by different interpretations of patterns of meaning. As per the ontological security assumption, the dominant discourses and policy positions are not easily
dislodged because both speakers and audiences come to find comfort in routines, which reduce uncertainty and enable action. In each empirical chapter, I will revisit this question as it directly pertains to my genealogical argument overall. At this point it is useful to provide a stylized map of ideal-typical identities in international politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value/Recognition</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Close [←]</th>
<th>[→] Distant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive [+</td>
<td>Full Recognition</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Metropolis/Imperial Centre/Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ally/Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Settlement colony/Periphery/Offspring</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Junior Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative [–]</td>
<td>Partial recognition</td>
<td>Imperial possession/trusteeship</td>
<td>Degenerate enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Barbarian/Backward State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Savage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slave/Slave colony</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Labels were mostly borrowed from extant IR taxonomies (Holsti 1970; Gong 1984: Ch. 1; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Wendt 1999: Ch.7).

Table 3.1 Ideal-typical identity relations mapped on the dimensions of distance and value

In much of social theory, identity is usually binarized in terms of similarity/difference with significant Others. The friend-rival-enemy distinction, the staple of IR theory, follows this continuum. I break the similarity/difference continuum into two separate axes of meaning: distance, the placement of the significant Other as close/distant, and value, the assessment of the significant Other as positive/negative.70 This conceptualization provides a more complex and diverse identity map, yielding more than

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70 On the flatness of the term Other in much of empirical analysis, see Hopf (2002), Mandler (2004, 2006).
a dozen self-other identity relationships. In this table, the distance continuum is straightforward: from the perspective of the Self, the friend is the most proximate, the (degenerate) enemy is the most distant and the ally and partner are in between.

The value continuum is conceptualized as a hierarchy of recognition, which ranges from friendship on the top to slavery on the bottom. Historical practices such as the enslavement of defeated enemies and/or the establishment of slave colonies are the extreme examples of unequal or partial recognition, whereby the Self all but denies human subjectivity to the Other (typically, the slave is nothing but an appendage to the master). On the recognition ladder, one notch above slaves are savages, who are perceived to be in the “state of nature.” Greater value is granted to barbarians, but their full equality is denied for one reason or another. The terms savage and barbarian may be seen as retrospective, but the discourses constitutive of unequal international political orders persist to this day. From the perspective of the discourses centered on the North/West, the South/East are no longer barbarian, but are still regarded as historically behind or backward. The colonial-era categories such as the core and periphery have contemporary echoes not only in the North/South or advanced/developing distinctions, but also in the metaphors such as the “concentric circles” (e.g., Anglosphere), the exclusive “clubs” (e.g., OECD) or “waiting rooms” (e.g., EU or NATO enlargement).

71 The barbarian-savage distinction comes from the nineteenth century “publicists” like James Lorimer, who attempted to classify humanity according to a standard of civilization (Gong 1984: 6, 49). Civilizational analysis in IR often conflates the historical and semantic distinction between barbarians and savages (e.g., Hall and Jackson, ed., 2007). Note that the fact that the barbarian or savage may not seek – or even perceive the need for – full recognition does not invalidate the constitutive effect of recognition (Wendt 1999: 231-33).

72 For example, at the time of the Congress of Vienna in 1878, some international lawyers argued that accession of Balkan states to the “family of nations” be made conditional on their civilizational performance (Gong 1984: 84).
As I said earlier, identity relations may be distributed across time as well as space. Arguably, the present-day EU finds many of its negative and distant Others in Europe’s barbaric, savage and degenerate past. But these are only examples; as I said earlier, how the Self and the Other line up in a given context should be treated as an empirical question. In principle, self-other relations are dynamic and contextual so that a friend in one context may become a barbarian or a rival in another context. In the rest of this chapter, I discuss methodological tools designed to empirically evaluate the propositions concerning the combined effect of discourses and debates on foreign policy choices.

**DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

To evaluate my theoretical argument in the subsequent case studies, I rely on the observation of texts. My main methodology is discourse analysis (DA) – a “qualitative and interpretive recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena”\(^{73}\) In my study, the recovery of meanings focuses on the written word, as a dominant form of text. The task of my DA is to contextualize identities, i.e., interpret and code identities as they are present in an individual text; and then intertextualize them, i.e., to interpret and code identities across a sample of texts. Intertextuality refers to the ancient observation that the meaning of a text is contingent on

\(^{73}\) Abdelal et al (2004: 14). As the authors explain at length, DA is but one methodology for accessing the identity variable. For an extended discussion of DA from IR perspectives, see Hansen (2006), Hopf (2002), and Milliken (1999). Note that a more broadly understood DA may be seen as synonymous with or at least similar to qualitative content analysis in the social sciences or, in the discipline of history, the study of the “official mind” (Paul Kennedy) or “informational milieu” (John Darwin).
other texts.\textsuperscript{74} In the last step, intertextualized identities are grouped into discourses, identifiable with a provisional label, usually written with a suffix “ism” and placed in inverted quotation marks. The methodological objective of this exercise is to find which identities are present and which predominate, both in terms of their frequency and across sources, in a given context.

DA expects the researcher to “read an awful lot,” not the Foucauldian “everything” (Wæver: 2005: 35). Clearly, when it comes to phenomena like state/national identity even the most Herculean DA is bound to be frustrated; virtually any sample of texts left behind by a society or even a political elite can always be construed as biased and/or too narrow. I suggest that the inferential potential of the sample – what Foucault called the “archive” – can be increased by defining the scope of the study and by holding to a set of sampling rules. With respect to the scope, my DA focuses on relatively brief junctures of history and geography before an outcome of interest. In each empirical chapter, therefore, my inferences of state/national identity generally pertain only to one or two national contexts within the fourteen to twelve month-period preceding a specific foreign policy choice. The reader is free to take (or leave) my findings in her travels to other destinations. As for the sampling criteria, the central rule holds that a sample of texts must be sufficiently wide and diverse to pass as representative of the discourses of identity within a community of people under study in a

\textsuperscript{74} Intertextualization is meant to provide both a historically informed interpretation of the text as well as a thick description of the historical context in which the text was produced and consumed. In modern social theory, the concept is usually associated with Julia Kristeva (Hansen 2006: 55-9; Hopf 2002: 26-9, cf. Angenot 1989).

73
given period. A bibliographic essay (Appendix B) at the end of the dissertation contains
detailed lists of sources and sampling criteria for each individual empirical chapter.

My DA begins with a threefold categorization of the collected texts, following my
theoretical framework (Figure 3.1). Each category corresponds to the level or layer of
discourse: the discourses of identity in the society, foreign policy debates and specific
foreign policy decisions. To minimize the risk of tautology (common in the measurement
of unobservables such as discourse), I isolate these levels in advance of accessing data.
As a further constraint, I also analyze the texts left by the society first and specific
decision-maker texts last. These two criteria ensure that the data used to furnish the
explanans is always separate from that used to specify the explanandum.75

THREE ANALYTICAL STEPS

The first analytical step revolves around broad societal identity relations within
genres such as journalism and popular fiction, selecting on circulation, authorship,
ownership, region and politics. The objective of the first exercise is to “recover” the
discursive topography (or terrain) of a society in order to identify the dominant discourse
of identity and its challengers. The key theoretical point is that state-society relations
figure in the construction of state/national identity in the same manner as state-state
relations: any state may exclude significant Others interior to it just like it may exclude
significant Others beyond its boundaries. The most distant and negative significant
Others can sometimes be found among the groups of citizens and the meanings

75 On the importance of methodological discipline in this type of DA-based research design, see especially
constructed within state-society relations may have consequences for foreign policy decisions and understandings. Because it shows how the Anglosphere identity was made possible within the core states at different historical junctures, this analytical step can be said to most closely approximate the more traditional Foucauldian genealogy.

That an analysis of a wider social or societal discourse may a valuable source of data in explaining foreign policy is somewhat of a novelty in IR, but it is a time-honored methodological insight in many other disciplines. Even leading diplomatic historians – A.J.P. Taylor or Paul Kennedy come to mind – have often pointed out to the need to know the “spirit of the age” (*Zeitgeist*) or the “official mind” in which the subject matter is set. In this view, secret or secretive mutterings found and analyzed in the “official histories,” government-sponsored edited volumes and declassified archival records have the inherent capacity to mislead the researcher and becloud understanding of what a community X thought or wanted in a given historical context.76 For this reason, some diplomatic historians consciously move away from the narrow focus on texts of high politics.

My study follows the methodological model introduced to IR by Ted Hopf (2002) who argues that any foreign policy understanding must be related to a broader discursive context in the society or social sphere. (The relationship between text and context – or discourse and fact or language and society – is mutually constitutive and dialectical).

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I treat the society as historically variable, in awareness of the fact that each period has a particular societal group who evokes national identity in its own, exclusive terms. For example, in the late nineteenth century, laying a claim on British identity was infinitely easier for a societal minority consisting of educated, employed white males who formed the backbone of the government, business and media. By the early twenty first century, the construction of this identity was opened up, if ever so slightly. How being British varies across, and is mediated by, identities of gender, race/ethnicity, region, profession, class, education, travel and so on is an empirical question which directly informs the way in which I assemble the context and intertext.

Relatedly, ranging from popular verse of the nineteenth century to government-sponsored public relations campaigns in the age of the Internet, genres of texts vary across chapters to reflect the variation in production and consumption of text. As a general rule, I have selected not only widely-read texts, but also those accorded important cultural roles. History textbooks and popular histories are a case in point, as they are written and read as a way to evoke a nation’s past or traditions and thus conceptualize national identity (That history-as-identity is necessary for human agency is a separate point that goes back to Nietzsche.) In other words, history books serve as repositories of answers to the question “who we are” and thus constitute an important source of data about the period in which they were written. So while, say, Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-88), Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1989) or Ferguson’s *Empire* (2002) may not count as reliable secondary sources, they can nevertheless be read as valuable primary sources, as cultural artifacts which describe and inscribe the politics of their time. In fact, the very bombastic titles of those works, while
describing empires past, suggest that they are submitted to address anxieties, hopes and prescriptions for empires present. So while readers turned to Gibbon to apply the lessons of the rise and fall of the Roman Empire to the “decline” of the nineteenth century British Empire, their counterparts from the 1990s and 2000s approached Kennedy and Ferguson to see to what extent the lessons from the imperial London can fly in contemporary Washington, D.C.

Another case in point are popular novels, as they are often written, read and/or discussed with national identity in mind. For example, the publication of George Johnson’s *My Bother Jack*, analyzed in Chapter 6, coincided with the author’s return to Australia from abroad, creating a cultural event described as a search “for both national and personal identity” (*Southerly* 1964: 24, p. 246; also see *Meanjin* 1964: 23, p. 221). Popular fiction, much like history books and textbooks, are a canary in the mine of data on self-other relations.

In the second analytical step, I consider general foreign policy debates within texts authored by people whose job or interest is to explain how the world hangs together to an audience – usually the general public, but also to more exclusive audiences such as legislators and academics. Assuming that I can keep the asymmetries among audiences reasonably constant – as well the asymmetries emanating from the speakers’ unequal capacities, authorizations, ranks and credentials to articulate their explanations – what interests me is how elites wave the meanings of the Self within foreign policy debates. Once again, what interests me is not what the speaker means but “what the reader
understands.”  In this layer of DA, my primary sources are the foreign relations sections in respectable newspapers and newsmagazines as well as the parliamentary debates on international affairs. In some chapters, specialist publications on foreign affairs are also consulted. Presumably, some texts analyzed in this step will seek to justify the state’s place in the world and others will criticize it; what is important is that they ask the “we” questions.

While there is more than one way to analyze how discourses shape debates and vice versa, my framework centers on the concept of keywords – also known as topoi, commonplaces, markers, constitutive stories, phrases or key representations. Keywords can be defined as basic ideas which a discourse community links to wider bodies of intersubjective meaning. They do not come from any one source but are widely shared and serve to transmit the content of national identity from the past into the present and from one geographical area to another; they do so in a simplified and memorable manner, not through historical, scientific or any narrative that may require technical knowledge. The connection is typically causal, linking temporally asymmetrical sequence. In this view, history is invented but the invention is not instant; keywords that construct

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77 Barthes (1986: 52). Though I theoretically bracket intentionality, the empirical chapters may contain references to intentions for the reasons of exposition.

78 The term comes from Raymond Williams, though he never developed a theory of keywords (1976: 13; cf. Norris 1997: 26-8, 36-7; Skinner 1979, Rodgers 1998). In the field of history, my approach has antecedents in the so-called conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte), introduced by Reinhart Koselleck in the early 1970s and further developed by Quentin Skinner and others. In IR, the concept has been approached from a variety of traditions, from its Aristotelian roots to more contemporary theorizations by Ann Swidler and John Shotter and/or critical discourse theory (see, inter alia, Bially-Mattern 2005; Hansen 2006, Kornprobst 2007, Kratochwil 1989, Jackson 2006; Shenav 2006; Ringmar 1996). Other than keywords, a DA can focus basic analogies, ideal-typical characters, main phobias and the outliers such as censurships and taboos (Angenot 1989) or “discourse strategies” such as nomination, predication, argumentation and so on (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, and Vetter 2000).
historical narratives all come from wider intersubjective meanings, with themselves as products of the prior and confined exercise of agency.

Note that I treat keywords as ideal types, which means that they are meant to capture the minimal spanning set of meanings which command a substantial degree of intersubjective consensus. Keywords such as the arrival, birth, West/East, New World, revolution, frontier, neighborhood, golden age, renaissance, mission, justice, danger/threat, destiny, decline, disaster or victory serve to shape the present in light of lessons from the past in more than a few contemporary national discourses of identity. The significance of keywords lies in not what they are, but what they do; what matters is not a simple description of a physical act – e.g., arrival in the promised land – but the way this description relates to other facts within larger structures of meaning. Keywords can be said to come in a hierarchy of importance, which agents struggle to rearrange as they want and can. I will return to this point in a moment.

To grant keywords a “life of their own” would violate the constructivist ontology of mutual constitution of agents and structures. In my framework, keywords are seen as repositories of the answers to the “we” questions – including “where this takes us” – but these answers are hardly final, clear and uniform. It is the political actors who interpret or frame keywords of to an audience or audiences. As ideational resources necessary for

79 Ideal types are a classic Weberian tool of simplifying the complexity of information for the purpose of analysis and can be defined as tenuous categories which refer to some aspects of the phenomena in question better than others (cf. Jackson 2006). In specifying constructs like discourses of identity or keywords, the best I can hope is to approximate intersubjective meanings in very broad brushstrokes. In principle no ideal need be realizable, even approximately, in order to serve its purpose; like simplifying assumptions, ideal-types are only as good or as bad as the knowledge-claims they produce.

80 In a twist on the ontological security assumption, it can be argued that virtually all personal identities depend on keywords because individual memory – and thus human agency – is mediated in interaction with groups with collective memories.
political actions, keywords are always framed though particular and partial readings and are thus subject to the hierarchies of power: dominant interpretations are binding and have direct consequences for political outcomes.81 For example, in foreign policy debates, state/national identity acquires meaning only in the context of keywords, such as “free trade” or “democracy.” To frame these keywords as universal – and thus easily reproducible – values facilitates claims that policies and institutions that promote free trade and democracy abroad are in the national interests.

Once again, framings do not have to be “valid” and/or “true” in the sense of universal reason and ethicality or in the sense of correspondence to some objective reality. Commonplace binarizations such as good/evil, advantage/uselessness, threat/opportunity or facilitation/burdening usually suffice, but are obviously not the only mediators of meaning. If my framework is correct, both keywords and discourses on foreign policy will reflect the general discursive terrain, recovered at the societal level. To go back to an earlier example, if the audience already reads state/national identity through “free trade” and “democracy” than it makes little sense for speakers to claim – through abstraction, comparison, appropriateness or any other form of reasoning – that “communism” is part of that identity too. The analysis of different framings of each keyword should be able to reveal the main “discursive positions” at the level of foreign policy debates.82 For example, in the debate on what may be called the “ontology of national security” – the debate on key foreign policy questions “what are we trying to

81 That power accrues to political speakers who succeed in defining problems or solutions is an argument that goes back to Aristotle, but I have no space to develop it in this chapter. Because keywords link identities to action, the capacity to make or break these links is a source of power.

82 In this study, positions are discourses pitched at the level of foreign affairs. In IR and elsewhere, such analysis is sometimes known under the rubric of “schools of thought” (e.g., Mead 2002; Wight 1991).
secure?” and “what or who threatens us?” – I expect the majority of answers to follow the dominant discourse, but I also expect differences across political elites.83

Once I identify keywords and the main framings or positions, the next objective of this analytical step is to account for the debates over the fit between identity and the perceived reality. To capture the dynamism of these debates, I propose to focus on “new events,” “shocks” or new facts on the ground (novums), provisionally defined as moments of significant disjuncture between reality and discursive structures used to interpret it.84 In the “politics as usual” times, contestation arguably reflects the underlying discursive undercurrents. When new events or shock occur, however, contestation has a potential to turn into change. Whether this potentiality becomes actuality – especially a lasting one – depends on the structure and process of political contestation. In this conceptualization, a new event is therefore a property at least partially internal to human agency: it never just “happens” to political actors, but it is a political and deliberative outcome as it always needs to be incorporated into the discourses of identity. Discourses encounter new peoples and places as well as new relationships between the two and all of these can disrupt hitherto dominant representations. In short, new events can compromise the answers to the “we” questions. Faced with a new event, political actors may explain it using dominant discourse or

83 With the broadening of the concept of national security in the early 1990s, IR has become increasingly open to the temporal, spatial and even ethical variation in the ontology of security (e.g., Wæver 1993).

84 Disjuncture does not imply inconsistency or incoherence, but simply a “reality gap” in need of interpretation. In IR, Constructivist recognize – but do not always theorize – the fact that all environments are subject to shocks. In my account new events are an analytical device, meant to be recovered empirically as opposed to being treated as an objective historically fact. They themselves do not have an independent causal value. For a useful conceptualization of new events, see Hansen (2006), Legro (2005) and Kornprobst (2007). For a Habermasian distinction between the crisis mode vs. normal/routine mode of politics, see Krebs (2007).
provide a frame based on an alternative discourse. The interpretation of a new event, therefore, can be seen as a product of contestation among political actors speaking from different discursive perspectives.85

In a given political context, many occurrences can be seen as candidates for new events – from natural catastrophes to health or economic crises to sports events. As per the ontological security assumption, state/national identities are realized in interaction with both internal and external events or, more accurately, with significant Others who participate in new events both at home and abroad. In my account, I will bracket the debates over new events at home in favor of those abroad, because they are more likely to have a logic on its own (I make no claim that event X gained more headlines in a period than an event Y). For my purposes, the most useful new events are international security crises since they are likely to expose points of contention over foreign policy keywords.86 My selection of new international events will follow the patterns of discursive contestation in contemporary texts, but to minimize the risk of tautology further I will try to avoid obvious overlaps in terms of actors and readings. To evaluate the impact of the perceived fit between identity and reality I will trace the ways in which representatives of opposing foreign policy positions linked new events to extant keywords and with what effects. Because some arguments will be more persuasive than others, the dominant

85 The term “exogenous shocks” suggests that events are defined in terms of their material effects, but when shocks involve significant Others, they are clearly relational and therefore primarily ideational. The agency of the Other shapes the definitions of the Self. For this reason, new events are only partially internal, meaning that they are not open to any interpretation. While it is of course possible for political actors to ignore a new event, such an option is unlikely because the legitimacy of political actors partly depends on their ability to provide continuous and consistent identity narratives.

86 War, in particular, has the ability to mobilize the boundaries and practices that sustain or disrupt various political communities (Barkawi 2006: Ch. 4).
interpretation of the fit will therefore influence the likelihood of one policy option being taken over others.

The third and last analytical step consists of the process tracing of decisions leading to an international outcome of interest.\textsuperscript{87} As per my framework, if my DA has succeeded, the topography of identity relations reflected in the decision-process will be a fragment of a larger discourse of identity and will follow general foreign policy debates. In this step, therefore, temporal asymmetry is analytically critical because texts specifying a specific policy decision must be produced and consumed after texts left behind the general debates. If my argument is correct, we should expect that policy follows a) the dominant discourse of identity and b) the outcome of foreign policy debate on the fit between the discourse of identity and the perceived reality (the “facts on the ground”). My argument will be falsified if a policy – its continuation or change – has no relationship either with discourse and/or debates. With respect to the first proposition (a), my argument would be falsified if I find that foreign policy elites are able to create policy entirely as they wish (“out of thin air”), without going through the “we” questions.

The second proposition (b) can be broken into two testable claims: b1) the greater the fit, the more likely it is that a policy will continue; and b2) the greater the misfit, the more likely it is that a policy shift will take place. Two kinds of findings arise that would cast doubt on my argument here: first, if a policy shifts to an alternative option despite the presence of the rhetorically demonstrable fit between the dominant understanding of

\textsuperscript{87} As I said in the previous chapter, process tracing is a time-honored method for “causal interpretation” in qualitative case studies. This procedure is particularly well-suited for the analysis of how beliefs influence the actors’ evaluation of the situation and policy options. It also works well for nonlinear propositions involving inflection points such as those specified in my perspective on new events and misfit (George and Bennett 2005: Ch. 10; Gerring [w/ Thomas] 2007: Ch. 7).
state/national identity and the facts on the ground; and second, if a policy continues
despite the rhetorically demonstrable misfit between discourse and the facts.88

Perceived Fit  Perceived Misfit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continuity</th>
<th>Policy fits identity (proposition confirmed)</th>
<th>Policy stays the course despite misfit (proposition falsified)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Policy shifts for “no reason” (proposition falsified)</td>
<td>Policy shifts due to misfit (proposition confirmed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that in situations where there are no plausible alternatives, the likelihood of a policy shift will be reduced. I will carefully consider this possibility in each case study.

Table 3.2 Conditions for falsifying claim that debates shape foreign policy

Documents such as internal memos, private letters, diaries and memoirs are readily available for Chapters 4-6. Particular consideration goes to the declassified records of private policy deliberations which I dug out at various national archives and libraries in Australia, Britain, Canada and the US (see bibliography and the accompanying essay). The declassified documents provide evidence that discourses and debates indeed shaped the decision-making process because they reveal who said what and with what impact. In Chapter 7, I look at a recent event, for which government archives will be closed for the next three decades. In this case, my process tracing was reduced to what is sometimes denigrated as “Kremlinology” – reading of official texts, newspaper reports and books written by dissidents. While this chapter in principle

88 The so-called congruence method, as a corollary to process tracing, seeks congruence or consistency between the actors’ evaluation of the situation and options and actual policy choices. The more congruent this link, the greater potential for causal imputation (George and Bennett 2005: Ch. 10).
suffers from the bias of unbalanced sources, it nevertheless deals with the Iraq War, an event for which an avalanche of data already exists. Official bureaucratic and semi-judicial inquiries, leaked documents, published memoirs and diaries as well as numerous insider accounts – often written by the journalists who happen to be more on the inside of the political process than some elected representatives – provide a goldmine on information which I use to process-trace the decision processes under investigation.

Primary source research is an imperative for IR theory because of its promise to reveal patterns and thematic lines that had hitherto escaped attention or, indeed, theorization. My data set/archive of closely analyzed primary source texts in the entire study consists of nearly three thousand highly selective, but representative units of text, which is on average seven hundred fifty discrete units per chapter. To a professional historian, the number may appear illegitimate, despite – perhaps because of? – claims to legitimacy made by the deployment of sampling techniques. So to substantiate – as well as corroborate – my DA, I consulted the vast secondary literature on the subject. As a general rule, I relied on cultural, intellectual and social history in the first model and on diplomatic history on the second and third. As all histories are exercises in exclusion, bias, and implicit theorization, I attempted to select on the scope as well as political and theoretical variation.89 In practice, I tried to triangulate among interpretations of the same event or series of events given by different historical schools (e.g., orthodoxy, revisionism, post-revisionism). This secondary source cross-check helped me establish if my text selection was ideal-typical in terms of “what the past was like” or, more

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89 A broader foray into secondary literature is necessary to ameliorate a selection bias – or bias and selectivity – which arises when analysis follows on historical facts hitherto interpreted by similar theoretical perspectives (Thies 2002: 358-366).
accurately, in terms of structures of meaning we might attribute to historical documents or events. Where my reading of history disagrees with the dominant readings supplied by professional historians, a warning sign – usually in the form of footnote – is placed. Footnotes will also serve to enrich the illustrative vignettes as the primary vehicle in the exposition of findings.

The primary-secondary source balance is further explained in the bibliographic essay (Appendix B), but the basic idea behind my DA is decidedly not to redo the painstaking, in-depth primary source research conducted by armies of seasoned historians over many decades, but to, first, strategically sample from available texts and, second, corroborate the findings by a systematic foray in the secondary literature. In Chapters 4-6, the secondary literature cross-check follows the same general pattern: in the first analytical step, I read social and cultural history and diplomatic history for the second and third. The use of secondary sources is thus doubly helpful: not only does it serve to augment my primary source probes by adding a number of observations, but it also acts as a “null coding hypothesis” of sorts – a constraint used to minimize the risk of reading history backwards. Therefore, only after a combined primary-secondary source assessment of texts do I move to write them over with my theoretical framework.

Throughout the study, special place will be given to public opinion survey data, since claims by random individuals that they uphold certain ideas or rank them in certain ways are probably the most widely accepted way to cross-check the findings of any DA.90 Historical public opinion polls – e.g., standard Gallup data used in Chapters 5 and

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90 In a liberal model of democracy, the government is an empty vessel through which public preferences become policy. Public preferences therefore matter because the voters hold the government accountable: if politicians set a policy that is at odds with what the public wants, they risk losing their jobs. This model, to
6 – are usually criticized for being biased in favour of small samples of urban upper income men. More important, however, these surveys are of limited value to a recovery of “national identity” mainly because they are based on fixed menus of what constitutes opinion and/or value. Open-ended interviews, though historically rare, are theoretically more valuable. Not being prompted by the pollster, the answers to the open-ended questions may tap into people’s “true” beliefs and knowledge about the nation’s most important problems, themes and identities even if they lack good measures of the intensity with which respondents hold a particular opinion or value. Due to their limitations, survey data may complement, but never substitute text-based forays into the questions of national identity (Mandler 2006: 275). One compendium of Canadian post-war public opinion put it best: “The use of public-opinion polls for the study of national identity can give us the views of a cross-section of Canadians, but it cannot provide a comprehensive definition of national identity, nor of the forces which have shaped its development” (Schwartz 1967: 7).

In closing this section, let me consider the most typical objection to DA – the question of silences. In the words of one foreign policy theorist, “more often than not dominant ideas remain latent. Although we assume they exist, we cannot easily demonstrate their existence for the simple reason that they are not expressed; and they are infrequently expressed because they are rarely challenged” (Nossal 1997: 139). In most theories of arguing, silence is golden as it indicates the internalization of a validity-

\[\text{say the least, has had its share of critics and there is hardly any consensus whether public opinion matters for foreign policy, much less how, when and under what conditions.}\]

\[91\text{Early post-WWII Gallup pollsters in Australia, for example, decided to discontinue polling women on foreign policy because of too many “don’t know” answers (Edwards 1997: 15). For similar assessment of Canadian Gallup, see Igartua (2006: 10-2) and Schwartz (1967: 53-6, 128).}\]
In this account, where such internalization is not necessarily relevant, silences are evidence of the dominance of one discourse over others. The same goes for the no-debate policy issues – think of the 1950s “Cold War consensus” in the United States – in which arguments based on certain counterhegemonic discourses (i.e., socialism) were seen as proverbial political suicide. The theoretical status of the outer limits of intersubjective understandings and silences is therefore similar: they serve as markers for differentiation between plausible and implausible arguments in a given political context.

The question of silences can be seen as an aspect of a larger problem of measuring ideas. Because of the counterfactual validity, behavioral outcomes cannot be employed to measure the effects of discourses. Assuming that texts left behind are representative, one way to ensure the validity of the measurement of ideas – or, in this case, the matching of texts to identity – is to continually deal with counterfactuals, i.e., the “what ifs” and “might-have beens” of history. Counterfactuals are controversial. For some, counterfactuals are an inevitable tool for making causal judgments, particularly when it comes to evaluating explanations of historical outcomes. For others, any pondering on the possible alternative explanations for the empirical findings is next to useless. In this study, I believe in counterfactuals, with two strings attached. First, counterfactual reasoning should stay in the realm of the plausible, which means that it should not invent new agents and structures but should instead stay with the given

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92 Silences may not be as easily recoverable as debates, but what ameliorates their tractability is the empirical scope in the study: if silences, like arguments, are limited in time and space, than historical and comparative variation is a plus (Crawford 2002: 130; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895; cf. Hansen 2000; Hopf 2002).

93 An argument that a cause of an event may be determined by imaging the effect of the absence of conditions that lead to it in the first place goes back to Max Weber and Karl Popper. For major controversies and issues, see Fearon (1991) and Clark (2004: Ch. 5).
empirical material. Imagining a new dominant discourse or a new position in a foreign policy debate and then envisioning alternative historical outcomes is pointless. Second, counterfactuals should be made in historical proximity to the outcome in question. The relatively short period in which I analyze the discourses of the state Self, debates, new events and outcomes – usually twelve months – asks for a minimal number of speculations. Appendix A further discusses why I think history embodies theory and vice versa and why neither should be seen as logically prior to the other.

SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have provided the conceptual, theoretical and methodological foundations on which the subsequent empirical chapters are based. My theoretical framework regards state/national identity as discourse which in the foreign policy realm is contested by talking human agents. My testable claim is twofold: first, the dominant discourse molds foreign policy by making some decisions of the state vis-à-vis other states more likely than others. Second, foreign policy debates on the fit between identity and reality influence foreign policy choices. In the next four chapters, I turn to four case studies to examine the links between state/national identity and cooperation among core members of the Anglosphere: the Anglo-American “great rapprochement,” 1894-1903; the ANZUS Pact and the “Pacific settlement,” 1950-1; Suez and Vietnam, 1955-1965; and the Iraq War, 2002-3.
CHAPTER 4

THE “GREAT RAPPROCHEMENT” AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ANGLOSPHERE

All is race; there is no other truth.

The mental habits of the people [in England and America] are the same.
James Bryce (1895, II: 717)

We are a part, and a great part, of the Greater Britain which seems plainly destined to dominate this planet.
New York Times (1900), cited in Morris (1968: 28)

In a strict Foucauldian sense, social items like the Anglosphere have no single origin, but even the most strictly Foucauldian genealogy must begin (and end) somewhere in the recorded history. In asking how the Anglosphere became possible, I begin in the last decade of the nineteenth century, a time when Britain and the US were “almost destined to be enemies” (Rock 1989: 31, also see Roussel 2004). In this chapter, I will use my theoretical framework to explain this outcome and demonstrate its importance in the historical construction of the Anglosphere. Contra the conventional wisdom which sets its origins in WWII, I posit that the Anglo-American “special relationship” (AASR) emerged at the turn of the twentieth century.

The *fin-de-siècle* Anglo-American relations are usually described as the “great rapprochement” (Perkins 1968). Instead of the inevitable enmity, what therefore occurred between Britain and the US was a rise of cordiality.94 Thus defined, the “great rapprochement” hardly constitutes a major theoretical or historical puzzle. A cursory

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94 Rapprochement comes from the French (and diplomatic) verb *rapprocher*, meaning “to bring together.” The “great rapprochement” can be seen as a reestablishment of cordial relations, such as those that characterized the Anglo-American relationship at the turn of the eighteen century (Perkins 1955).
look at the contemporary institutions and practices such as alliances, pacts, condominiums or spheres of influence suggests that many imperial projects were simultaneously competitive and cooperative, depending on the context. But in comparison to similar international relations at the time, Anglo-American interaction consistently stood out. Consider a brief trans-hemispheric comparison of imperial behavior in the nineteenth century. As a leading protagonist of imperialistic “scrambles” and “carve-ups” in the eastern hemisphere, Britain pursued a conspicuously inactive policy in the Americas (Knight 1999: 139-142). Conversely, the US never moved to annex – either through force or purchase – a single part of British territory in Canada, Newfoundland or the British West Indies, in contrast to large parts of territories owned by Denmark, France, Spain or Russia (Bridge and Bullen 2003: 6). Much of the century saw no cordiality whatsoever, but there is no doubt that a curious tolerance prevailed. Why, then, did London acquiesce to US expansion in the Americas, but elsewhere vigorously fought off bids for expansion from other great powers/empires?95 Conversely, why did Washington tip-toe around British possessions in what its saw as its American hemisphere?

In Kenneth Bourne’s words, British foreign policy makers “consistently” identified Americans as friends, using “criteria which lay outside their professional terms of reference” (1967: 403). Friendly attitudes were reciprocated by American foreign policy makers as well as by wider British and American societies, particularly toward the

95 The label great power/empire is meant to indicate that empire was a dominant form of international political organization at the time, not the great power as IR theory would have it (retrospective and interchangeable terms include “first-rate power” and “major power”).

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end of the century.\textsuperscript{96} By the second half of the 1890s, the Anglo-American friendship became an established fact. A steadily growing number of elites on both sides of the Atlantic – from government and opposition officials to clergymen and businessmen to artists and soldiers – felt compelled to express a conviction of how Anglo-American war was “unthinkable.” Declarations of the unthinkable of war are logically evidence of its thinkability, but what is indicative is that no such declarations were made with respect to other states at the time, certainly not with such regularity and vigor.\textsuperscript{97} Furthermore, what many elites argued for was not simply peace, but a political union. Arguably, the scope of the rapprochement was seldom so expansive in prior history. In a climate shot through with such unusual attitudes, little wonder that Westminster and Washington would treat each other outside the “professional terms of reference.”

So viewed, the key puzzle behind the Anglo-American rapprochement is not why peace “broke out” (Rock 1989), but how did it become so dependable? In particular, why was the Anglo-American war so consistently delegitimized by the individuals who were both empowered and responsible to keep the possibility of such conflict real? I argue that the “great rapprochement” was caused by Anglo-Saxonism, a racialized identity which established Britain and the U.S. as vanguards of civilization. With the rise of Anglo-Saxonism at home, Britain and the US could no longer treat each other as imperial rivals,


but as the “two branches” of the common Anglo-Saxon race. This shared identity not only made war illegitimate, but it also enabled durable security cooperation that would later come to characterize the AASR and, in turn, the Anglosphere.

Earlier in my study I argued that international security constitutes a hard case for making the link between identity and cooperation. Considering that one actor in the Anglo-American dyad had been established in difference to the other less than two generations beforehand, case studies presented in this chapter can be regarded as doubly hard for my argument. My empirical focus falls on two cases: Venezuela I (Winter 1895-6) is a U.S. intervention in a boundary dispute between Venezuela and the British Empire and Venezuela II (Winter 1902-3) is a U.S. intervention over the Anglo-German naval blockade of Venezuela. Outside this primary focus, in this chapter I also consider the Spanish-American War (1898) and the South African War (1899-1902).

CIVILIZATION AND ANGLO-SAXONISM

The basic Anglo-American discourse of identity was “civilization.” In an ideal-typical reading, this discourse encompassed the identities of modernity, the state, and Protestantism. Modernity was mainly understood through education, science, technology and industry, including strong beliefs in competition and progress. The state combined rights and property for men, as well as race and nation. Protestantism invoked obedience,

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help, and family. The basic legitimacy of the sovereign ruler – the state over society and
man (adult male) over home – was respected as a fundamental axiom of human affairs.
“Manly activity” or “manliness” was measured through the capacities for “breeding” and
“fighting” (the latter included war as well as other forms of physical exertion, such as
sport; few texts in my archive ever mentioned sex). Class intersected gender: a
gentleman was expected not only to score high on both measures, but also to exhibit traits
such as nobility, chivalry, honesty, fair dealing, courage and “hardihood.” He was also
asked to be respectful of other men (“comradeship”), considerate of the “oppressed”, as
well as protective of women. The female ideal was epitomized in Queen Victoria. The
British monarch was revered on both sides of the Atlantic for her “duty, domesticity,
character and dignity.”

That it is possible to intertextualize a single dominant discourse for both Britain
and the US testifies to the existence of a common intersubjective space between the two
societies in the period. The shared language no doubt created this space, as did a
spectacular decrease in communication and transaction costs and with it a significant rise
in the flows of information, people, goods, and services. In the 1890s, English was
hardly an English language. But shared language alone did not produce the Anglo-
American intersubjectivity. Another pillar of the civilization discourse therefore was
race. For example, transatlantic marriages were something of an upper class fad in the
late-nineteenth century, but the dominant discourse of identity made it unlikely or even

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impossible for a British man and American woman to marry into the English-speaking upper class of, say, Calcutta or Cork (Burk 2007: Ch. 7).

In the English language of the 1890s, terms such as the state, people, nation and nationality were used largely interchangeably with race (my archive does not contain the word ethnicity). “Racialism” – a belief that the world is composed of races at different stages of civilization – probably originated in the natural sciences but it swiftly turned into something of an ontological axiom for the social sciences and humanities.100 Most theories posited a basic racial hierarchy consisting of units – anywhere from two to sixty-three, but usually three to five – coded by geography as well as physiognomy. Virtually every race-related text in my archive assumed the existence of a causal relationship between race and the relative success of individuals and groups, such that one’s racialized identity determined one’s social status. Race-talk, however, was confused and confusing.101 One of the typical points of contestation was whether race was “blood”/“biology” or “spirit”/“culture.” In my archive, neither nature-based nor culture-based theories of race prevailed; most texts in fact regarded race-as-blood and race-as-spirit as compatible – race was thought to be a product of environment and history as well as biology. To the extent that my reading is correct, racialism therefore did not automatically imply supremacist imperialism and colonialism (logically, an attempt to socialize biologically inferior communities would have been self-defeating).

100 Racialized identities served – and still serve – to categorize people on the basis of presumed difference. “Racialism” is a retrospective term which implied difference, but not necessarily supremacy.

101 Consider the variation in social Darwinism, Spencerism, Galtonism, Lamarckianism or the understandings of the terms such as “survival of the fittest,” “natural selection,” “struggle for existence” and “fitness” (Banton 1977, Burrow 1966, Crook 1994, Frederickson 1971).
As racial inequality was not necessarily biological and thus irremediable, the so-called white race(s) did not universally hold the cultural and/or biological primacy. In other words, while the concept of civilization was Eurocentric, not all Europeans or whites were equally superior to non-Europeans or non-whites. Many texts held that if the circumstances which led to a racial hierarchy changed, an “inferior” race could catch up and even “overtake.” In my archive, while the Australian Aborigines and Native Americans were universally seen as “dying nations,” China or “Latin nations” were frequently cited as example of races slipping downwards as Japan was moving upwards.

It is probably safe to assume that all national elites at the time cultivated myths of superiority and declared positive human attributes to be distinctively national. From this perspective, it is not at all surprising to discover that the contemporary Anglo-American elites believed that “their” race constituted the most mature stage of civilization. In the words of the British imperial tycoon Cecil Rhodes, “we are the first race in the world, and the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race” (cited in Ferguson 2003: 228). What may be surprising, however, is that the professed superiority was neither American nor English/British, but Anglo-Saxon. Thus Rhodes’ “we” was a transnational we. The popular sources of reference at the time trace the word Anglo-Saxon to its eight century Latin roots, when it was used as to describe the main language spoken in Britain. Synonyms, depending on the context, included English/British and Yankee (the term “WASP” arrived later); even today, as I suggested in Chapter 1, Anglo-Saxonism is sometimes conflated with “English-speaking.”

102 Notes & Queries, Sixth Series (III), May 14, 1881, p. 390-1; Eight Series (IX), February 1896, p. 163. In the OED, the ethnological meaning of the term was first recorded in 1858 (Frantzen and Niles 1997). On the migration of Anglo-Saxonism to America, see Kirk (1993) and Fischer (1989).
historian Edward A. Freeman, the leading expert on the subject of the time, the political usage of the term dates to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in the late nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxons were described as a nation, as in this description in the inaugural issue of the Canadian magazine *Anglo-Saxon* (September 1887):

> the nation formed by the union of the Angles, Saxons and other early Teutonic settlers in Britain, from whom the English, the Lowland Scotch, a great proportion of the present inhabitants of Ulster, and the mass of the population in the United States and the various Colonies have sprung (cited in Hastings 2006: 93-4).

In my 1894 archive, the popular books by Benjamin Kidd and Josiah Strong owed, in part, their immense popularity to their attempt to explain why the Anglo-Saxon race behaved so well, while other races did not. Kidd, a British bureaucrat turned public intellectual, gave a theory of international politics with race as the explanans and “social efficiency” as the explanandum (1894: 55-7, 300-5). The theory predicted the Anglo-Saxon rule of what he called the “Western civilisation” and hence the world. Strong, an Ohio pastor, found a way to marry Darwinism to theology arguing that evolution was God’s method of unifying humanity into the “Coming Kingdom” ruled by the Anglo-Saxons from their North American headquarter (1893: 79).

Darwinism, objectively speaking, complicated Anglo-Saxonism: if species evolved over thousands of years, who could claim the distinction of an English-speaking race? England, in this view, was a recent phenomenon; its offshoots even more so (Gossett 1999: 312). Historians supplied a persuasive answer: the so-called Teutonic

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103 According to Semmel (1968), Kidd’s book can be seen as one the first transatlantic social science bestsellers, going through three editions and thirteen reprints by January 1902 (three hundred thousands copies); in 1899 appeared a review of social sciences entitled *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd.*
origins theory or “germ theory,” popular on both sides of the Atlantic, posited that the Saxons invasion of the British Isles in the fifth and sixth century seeded an institutional “germ” of democracy there. It argued that the germ was successfully disseminated to the British colonies, which implied that the institutional antecedents of all English-speaking polities were the centuries-old constitutions and assemblies which the Saxons developed in the forests which later became Germany. The theory gave rise to Teutonism, an idea of racial identity that broadened the boundaries of the Anglo-Saxondom to include the Germans. But, as I discuss in a moment, the tenets of racial evolutionism also held that the past characterized by a Germanic identity did not necessarily imply a Germanic future.

Among many historians who preached Anglo-Saxonism, John Fiske is one of the most frequently dropped names in my archive and was best known for calling for the establishment of a world state, led by the peoples of English origins (1885). His much-read history textbook argued that the Anglo-American alliance was natural and that civilization arrived to the Americas with the English, but not the Spanish or the French (1894). Fiskean thought on the natural expansion of, and affinity among, the “English peoples” resonated among many historians, including those on the other side of the Atlantic. A British 1896 history textbook instructed pupils that the US is the “nation which no right-feeling Englishman will ever call foreign. It is peopled by men of our blood and faith, enjoys in a great measure the same laws as we do, reads the same Bible, and acknowledges like us the rule of King Shakespeare…They and we are one flesh (cited in Rock 1989: 50). That Anglo-Saxonism dominated the discipline of history was crucial since nineteenth century historians also served as futurologists, supplying people
with “lessons” on everything from personal finances to morality to statecraft. In this sense, Anglo-Saxonism was not simply a theory of history, but more importantly a theory of politics as well. From the present-day viewpoint, it is easy to see Anglo-Saxonism, like all racialized identities, as “an echoing cavern of banalities out of which even a well-lit historian might never emerge” (Kramer 2004: 1321). But in the period under study, Anglo-Saxonism was the dominant discourse of identity in virtually every domain of knowledge in the English language at the time. The rise of Anglo-Saxonism – like its decline and eventual fall – is outside the scope of my inquiry, but it had much to do with the popularity of evolutionism in arts and sciences and, as I will contend below, the rise in non-Anglo-Saxon immigration.

In my archive, a belief that Anglo-Saxon tradition was one of the greatest achievements of civilization was generally not contested. As a discourse which emphasized the distinctiveness and unity of white, Protestant, English-speaking men who governed themselves on the democratic and capitalist principles such as individual freedom, property and equality, Anglo-Saxonism served to justify certain domestic and international racial orders. But while a consensus existed on the outsider status of the frequently enlisted others such as “red men” or Latin and Slavic men, debate ensued with respect to the boundaries of the proverbial “we.” If a global community of Anglo-Saxons existed, what were its constituent territorial as well as temporally bounded entities? What were the boundaries and legitimate claimants of the Anglo-Saxondom? The baseline claim – that Americans and Britons shared a racial identity – came under fire from at

least two sides: national chauvinists restricted or denied Anglo-Saxonism, while Teutonists and Anglo-Teutonists tried to transnationalize it further. The way in which these debates were settled, I argue next, has had spectacular effects on international relations.

ANGLO-SAXONISM IN FOREIGN POLICY

In the period under study, British and American foreign policy elites debated a shared theme – expansionism or imperialism. Simply put, while the British were preoccupied with their decline, the Americans talked mostly about their rise. The US debate, employing three keywords, pitted “exceptionalism” against “expansionism.” The first two were the omnibus terms “Manifest Destiny” and “Monroe Doctrine.” They were coined in and/or associated with events in earlier periods, but experienced a major comeback in the 1890s. The third keyword was the “frontier.” Though not infrequent

105 In general American historians have traditionally preferred expansionism over imperialism. As retrospective terms, expansionism and imperialism were probably equally popular in the US, and imperialism was preferred in Britain. Note that many Anglo-American imperialists opted for terms such as expansion, civilization and modernity, while reserving imperialism to signify foreign policies of Napoleon III or Russia.

106 Studies in American foreign policy, especially textbooks, usually dichotomize American foreign policy positions, traditions, or schools of thought: isolationism vs. internationalism, unilateralism vs. multilateralism, exemplarism vs. vindicationism, exceptionalism vs. antiexceptionalism, expansionism vs. antiexpansionism, Large Policy vs. small policy etc. For me, the analytic vagueness of these terms is irrelevant, as is the fact that the distinction approximated, but was by no means identical to the Democratic and Republican Party positions at the time (Hofstadter 1965: 164, 173). The goal of my DA is not to produce an analytically rigorous terminology, but to take stock of the discursive terrain, the ideal-typical keywords and their ideal-typical readings and analyze their effects using my theoretical framework.

107 In the contemporary usage, the Manifest Destiny related to a belief in the “inevitability” of American territorial expansion and the Monroe Doctrine to the elimination of any non-American colonization of the New World. The terms simultaneously implied both the US’ distinction from the Old World and its expansive destiny in the New. Typically, however, American expansion was seen as necessary in preventing a European one – the Doctrine served the Destiny and vice versa (McDougall 1997 and Murphy 1999). On the Doctrine as a trope for politics, see Perkins (1963: 281-7; LaFeber 1986). Historians usually
in earlier texts, the frontier joined the fray with full force following the publication of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” in 1894.\textsuperscript{108} In 1890, the map published by the US Census Bureau showed no frontier line for the first time. The closing coincided with an extended economic depression, farmer and worker unrest and fears of alien immigration (the first anti-immigration league was formed in 1894). Many concluded that America needed more space; according to William A. Williams, Turner’s thesis “did much to Americanize and popularize the heretofore alien ideas of economic imperialism and the White Man’s Burden” (1992: 93). Williams famously reduced American foreign relations at the time to the Open Door and Manifest Destiny, but as I will suggest below, what enabled the two policy direction in the first place was Anglo-Saxonism.

In American foreign policy debates, Hawaii was arguably the first discursive battleground, as it introduced the central question on where white settlement ended and colonial administration began (and why and how this boundary mattered for the US). In 1894, Hawaii was occupied, but not annexed because it was unclear, legally, whether and how the constitution “follows the flag” and, politically, whether and how “national destiny” applies to the Pacific (Collin 1990: 53-4; May 1991: Ch. 2; McDougall 1997: 112-3). In the exceptionalist reading, which was preferred by Democrats, Populists and an odd Republican like Senator Hoare, the common argument was that American nationalism was legitimate only when applied within North America – a continent

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\textsuperscript{108} In terms of the dissemination of academic theories, Turner’s stood head and shoulders above the rest at the time – it “became the central, if not the only, thesis of Everyman’s History of the United States” (Williams 1992: 90). The frontier phenomenon had been studied before, notably by individuals like Crèvcoeur, Tocqueville, and Jefferson. For a historiography, see Cronon \textit{et al} (1992) and Wrobel (1993).
characterized as a seemingly “virgin” frontier. In 1898, the former President Cleveland articulated the exceptionalist position by describing the Hawaii annexation as a “perversion of our national mission. The mission of our nation is to build up and make a greater country out of what we have, instead of annexing islands” (cited in Shoultz 1998: 107; cf. May 1991: 37-8). The formation of the Anti-Imperialist League in 1899 was an institutionalization of this position.

The exceptionalist position eventually lost out because the expansion debate was ultimately cast in racialist terms. Robert Beisner notes that only one (George Hoar) of his “twelve anti-imperialists” actually argued for the irrelevance of race (1968: 219, 232; also see Hannigan 2006: 276-7). Because nearly everyone believed in racial evolution and racialized hierarchy, it was rhetorically extremely difficult to argue against the racialized rationales of various political projects, from national unity to imperial competition to the oppression of “lower”/“inferior” races.109 “Civilization was policy,” at home and abroad (Ninkovich 1986). The content of this racialized reading of the world was remarkably similar on both sides of the Atlantic: the vanguard of the civilization belonged to the Anglo-Saxon master race: Britain and the US, as the two Anglo-Saxon “branches,” were meant to lead humanity conjointly to modernity and peace, perhaps in a world federation founded on Anglo-Saxon political and other institutions. The British Empire might have been the US’s historical foil, but in the 1890s it became a very special model. Thus wrote a pundit in 1900, the year of acquisition of formerly Spanish colonies:

The entry of our country upon what appears to be a new policy of foreign conquest and colonization must evidently impart a doubled impetus to that active extension of Anglo-Saxon civilization for which the mother country alone has been in modern times so conspicuous (Chapman 1900: 683; cited in Kramer 2004: 1321, fn. 15; Martellone 1994: 88; Hofstadter 1965: 164).

In the same year, Anglo-Saxonism gained such major ground that it entered even the legal debate on whether the constitution follows the flag. A University of Pennsylvania law professor, argued against the constitutional restraint to expansion by deploying both Anglo-Saxonism and Manifest Destiny: “It may well be our destiny to carry on the work of subjecting the world to the sway of Anglo-Saxon civilization” (George Wharton Pepper, Quoted in Rystad 1991: 12). Academics like Herbert Baxter Adams, Franklin Giddins or Harry Powers saw the Anglo-Saxon expansion as “cosmic law” and/or “ethics of evolution (Gossett 1999: 313-4).

The growing dominance of this discourse had to do with the apparent fit between identity and reality. The rise of Anglo-Saxonism not only correlated with the rise of imperialism, enabling a neat self-fulfilling prophecy: “Anglo-Saxon superiority justified racial conquest, which in turn proved Anglo-Saxon superiority” (Kohn 2004: 4). Sarcastically, one colonial official in 1885 defined Anglo-Saxons as “the great exterminators of aborigines in the temperate zone” (Bell 2007: 249). In addition, as I will show below, the discourse justified Anglo-American cooperation, which too proved Anglo-Saxon superiority. In my archive, very few texts contested the implications of this discourse, even if they would protest the aesthetics of the term Anglo-Saxonism (the hyphen was unwieldy) or its underlying theoretical baggage (the hyphen logically contradicted the idea of racial essence [e.g., Fiske 1885: 103-5]).
In Britain, Anglo-Saxonism was hegemonic in the entire national narrative. The so-called Irish question – also known under the rubrics of “home rule” – provided not only fodder for long parliamentary and constitutional discussions (e.g., Dicey 1893), but also an impetus for the debates on the hierarchies internal to what had hitherto been seen as a single English/British race and was now divided into the Anglo-Saxondom and the “Celtic Fringe.”¹¹⁰ The main event for 1893 was the resignation of the Liberal leader Gladstone, which was widely interpreted as a result of yet another failure of the government to solve the so-called Irish problem – a problem of domestic racial order. For British elites, Anglo-Saxons everywhere in the world belonged to the same race centered on London. America, as the “eldest daughter” or the “daughter in her own” held as special place, but its Anglo-Saxon credentials were beyond dispute. In the summer of 1898, for example, all six contributors to a round table in *The Spectator* on the question: “Are Americans Anglo-Saxons?” gave an affirmative answer, save for a token Irishman (Orde 1996: 198, n. 47).

Americans were not so certain in their Anglo-Saxonism. Exceptionalists, for one, argued that, first, Americans were not Anglo-Saxons; second, that Anglo-Saxonism was a cheap British trick; and third, that it was inconsistent with America’s unique “creed.” All three arguments heavily built on Anglophobia, which was one identity relationship in the civilization discourse and which can be associated not only with exceptionalists in foreign policy but also with the so-called agrarian populism which was a major political

force at the time. While most Americans did not believe in the British Empire, few ever ventured to dispute their Anglo-Saxonness. In the racialized discourse on civilization, discursive alternatives were simply unavailable. For one, various ideas on a distinct “American race” never quite took off and the reasons have to do with the mass ethnic immigration. The coming of non-Protestant or even non-Christian Eastern and Southern Europeans forced the elites to reflect on national identity, whereby the sole anchor turned out to be the already established racial narratives of Anglo-Saxonism. Fears of an “alien” take-over thus rendered the exceptionalists’ objection to Anglo-Saxonism politically dangerous or even illogical: if full assimilation of immigrations was an imperative for the preservation of “national character,” so was the recognition of the Anglo-Saxonist content of this character.

Note that fears of alien immigrants far outweighed the potential effects of the so-called ethnic Anglophobia (Jacobson 1999: 46-7; Moser 2007: 10). For example, as a probable internal other, the Irish-Americans did not constitute a powerful political constituency. The Irish-born amounted to 2.13% and Irish-Catholics represented around 8% of the total population in the period (in 1894, there were 15 Irish-Americans in the House and 3 in the Senate). German-Americans – to whose Otherness in American identity politics I will return below – were similarly weak as a constituency. The third largest immigrant group were Canadians, generally perceived as fellow Anglo-Saxons.

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111 Crapol (1973: 112-3). Anglophobia and Anglo-Saxonism were not necessarily incompatible, even in the same text or the same person (e.g., Moser 2007: 5).

112 E.g., Drage (1895). Fiske was known for explicitly rejecting the idea of the American race. For a discussion, see Anderson (1981: 84-5); Horsman (1981: 302), Orde (1996: 28-30). More generally, see Gossett (1999); Jacobson (1999: Ch: 2; 2002: Ch: 5); Kohn (2004: Ch. 1) and Knuth (1958: Ch: 2).
In the words of one observer, the US needed not to annex Canada, as long as it kept annexing Canadians (Smith 1891; also see Douglas 1894, cf. Wallace 1954). Besides, there is no evidence of an ethnic voting block in Congress. For example, neither Irish-American nor German American members of the Senate tried to stop the Anglo-American arbitration treaty, a key Anglo-Saxonist institution, from being ratified (May 1991: 62-3; O’Day 2000: 174, 176; Ward 1969: 47, 5, 68-9).

The second counterargument was deflected by an insistence that it was Americans who had supplanted the British as the Anglo-Saxon leaders. If Anglo-Saxonism was a trick, Anglo-Saxonists argued, it was entirely an American trick (e.g., Sherwood 1896). The third counterargument, however, proved to be much a tougher nut. It sprung from the core of the exceptionalist position. For example, on the frontier keyword, exceptionalists argued that because British Anglo-Saxons had no frontier, American Anglo-Saxons had to be different. Turner’s thesis was that “colonization” of the frontier – interchangeable with the West (or the “Great West” in Turner’s words) – was the theoretical key to understanding “American History.” For exceptionalists, the West was a space bounded by the Rio Grande, the Pacific and either the forty-ninth parallel or the North Pole/Arctic Ocean. Further afield, America’s mission mandated leadership by example, rather than by conquest and/or settlement.113

The third counterargument failed because it was pointed out that exceptionalists did not read Turner carefully. In his original paper, Turner observed that America’s contemporary problems, not least of the so-called “panic” of 1893, were related to the

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113 The nature of the hemispheric expansion was ambiguous. Senator Lodge believed in the “citadel” North America but argued that Hawaii was “essential to the defence of that citadel” (cited in Kohn 2004: 16-7). Historiography deals with these ambiguities under the rubric “salt water fallacy” (Louis 1977: 570).
official “closing” of the frontier. The solution, as he later clarified, was in the opening of new frontiers, ideally in “outlying islands and adjoining countries” (1896: 296). In the expansionists reading of the frontier thesis, the boundaries of the “Great West” were no doubt rather elastic: if the old West was now closed, America simply needed more West. Anglo-Saxonism provided the necessary justification for enabling the claim that American exceptionalism was not national or geographical, but racial and historical, and thus “inevitable” and “a deep and irresistible inner necessity (Hofstadter 1965: 174, 177). Textual evidence shows that presidents McKinley and Roosevelt and senators Beveridge, Cabot Lodge, La Follette, and Platt strongly believed in the teleology (and tautology) of the racialized national destiny. Secretary of the Navy John Long thus explained this belief: “I cannot shut my eyes to the march of events – a march which seems to be beyond human control” (Ibid.: 179).

Prefacing the 1900 edition of the first volume of *The Winning of the West*, a series written with a nod to Fiskean theory of history, Roosevelt suggested that the opposition to American “expansion” had been “fundamentally the same, whether these wars were campaigns in the old West against the Shawnees and the Miamis, in the new West against the Sioux and the Apaches, or [in] Luzon against the Tagals” (cited in Kramer 2004: 1331; also see Jacobson 1999: 218). Turner, who favourably reviewed Roosevelt’s book, in all likelihood agreed (Colin 1990: 51). In this metageography, the Far East emerged as really the “Far West” (Hannigan 2006: 90). Arguments like these proved decisive for many exceptionalists: if you conceded to evolutionist theories on why the “red man” was “pushed out,” then it was unclear why you should believe that the national mission should stop at the “water’s edge.” A claim which held that the Pacific islands like
Hawaii did not belong to the pristine “West” was a logical non-sequitur. In this reading, Americans were no different than other “English-speaking peoples.” The American destiny, in a sense, pre-dated America.

Anglo-Saxonism strengthened over the course of the last decade of the nineteenth century, but even in 1894, it was becoming clear that arguments against expansion rested on shaky ground. By 1900, Anglo-Saxonist readings of the three ideal-typical keywords – the Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine, and the frontier – shifted the terms of the expansion debate. Arguably, the debate ended in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, in the form of the Teller resolutions and the annexation of Puerto Rico. The question whether territories could be administrated without being settled was answered affirmatively. In State Secretary Elihu Root wry words: “Constitution follows the flag, but does not quite catch up with it.”

Thus, colonial administration became a legitimate form of the American republican mission.

Support for American expansionism peaked during the war. In July 1898, Literary Digest noted that even traditionally anti-imperialist publications supported expansion and a Public Opinion survey of 65 newspapers found that only 24.6% opposed the American “retention” of the Philippines. In December of the same year, a Herald survey of 498 newspapers discovered a majority (61.3%) to be in favour of expansion, with clear margins everywhere except in the South (Hofstadter 1965: 169, also see 171). As a counterdiscourse, however, American exceptionalism proved resilient and it never ceased to stymie the enlistment of other potentially transnationalizing keywords in American

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114 Cited in Rystad (1991: 18) and Beisner (1968: 210). For a glimpse of the end of the debate, see Caroll 1899; Curtis 1899; Foraker 1900.
foreign policy such as freedom and democracy, collective security, anticommunism, the new world order and so one. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 7.

The British expansion debate was similar, but it had a much longer pedigree. According to Kennedy, since the time of the Tudors, Britain had one basic foreign policy dilemma: how to achieve balance in Europe while expanding and/or deepening an empire (1979: 10; also see Ibid.: 1981). In the 1890s, this dilemma was still central. Empire, no doubt a key element of British identity, faced unending “complications” or “Questions.” In 1894, the majority of the British elite – but certainly not all – worried about “decline” (or “overexpansion,” “deterioration,” and “decay”); in 1900, the “lessons” of the ongoing South African War opened the way for pessimistic and defeatist talk that lasted throughout the period.115 Lord Seeley’s *Expansion of England*, doubtless the most contemporary popular reading on the empire, framed Britain’s positions, in rather stark terms: Britain must either strengthen the empire or become a “second rate” power.116

Decline was addressed from three discursive positions – the “traditionalist,” “constructive imperialist,” and “European.”117 In 1894, few imperialists called for more

115 Compare the jingoism of the “Mafeking Night” (May 18, 1900) to the pessimism following the inability to fight the guerilla war in the winter (Krebs 1999, Porter 1982). Jingoism and pessimism went hand in hand, even in the agreement – by 1902 – that Britain was, in a popular idiom, “the weary Titan” (Chamberlain, Matthew Arnold) asking its “children” for burden-sharing (e.g., Friedberg 1988; also see Hyam 2002, Deudney 2001).

116 Cited in Green (1999: 349). The book, first published in 1883 (in print until 1956), went through several editions and sold several hundreds thousands copies in the 1890s (Ibid.: 346). Seeley was to constructive imperialists in Britain what Mahan was to expansionist in the US. On relevant readings of Seeley, see Deudney (2001: 193-4) and Bell (2005: 564).

117 Like the exceptionalist-expansionist positions in the US sample, these positions do not correlate with party identification, or even generation and class (Adams 2005: 14, 224; Gooch 1994; Neale 1966: xiii-xxii; Orde 1996: 11; Perkins 1968: Ch. 3). The term “constructive imperialists” is retrospective and can be seen as interchangeable with “new imperialists” (Eddy and Schreuder 1988: 30; Green 1999: 347; Haym 1999: 51; on historian calls them “zealots.” Porter 2004: 228). On the British decline debate in late-
expansion ("wider still and wider"), but the vast majority argued for reduction of Britain’s spectacular commitments, though typically with respect to finances (e.g., defence expenditures) rather than territory. The traditionalists formed the mainstream: most old Conservatives like Salisbury and his chancellor of the exchequer Hicks Beach as well as some senior Gladstonian Liberals like Kimberley, preferred the variations on the old tropes of “splendid isolation” or “masterly inactivity” and called for staying the basic imperial course. Europeanism, a polyvalent discourse incorporating Radicals, socialist and “Little England” ideas, argued for giving up overseas territories.¹¹⁸

Constructive imperialists agreed with traditionalists that there was no alternative to empire, but called for a “new imperialism.” Conservative and Liberal Unionists leaders Chamberlain, Lansdowne, and Balfour; Liberal leaders Rosebery, Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, Dilke, Playfair, Morley, Harcourt, Grey, Haldane and Churchill; navalists Beresford and Selborne; writers Kipling, J.A. Henty and Buchan; editors Milner, Amery, Garvin and St. Loe Stratchey; commentators Curtis and Jebb; scientists and historians Pearson, Egerton, W.A.S. Hewins, Pollock, Milner, Curzon, Stubbs and Acton and businessmen like Rhodes all vigorously argued for reform. Many tropes circulated in these debates ("imperial motherhood," “tariff reform,” “national efficiency”) but one stood as the ultimate keyword: “imperial defence.” Empire, after all, was the link between economy and security: the pound and free-trade Empire depended on the British

¹¹⁸ Note that very few text called for abandoning the empire altogether, not even those left behind by J.A. Hobson, the father of anti-imperialism (Porter 2004: 243; more generally, Claeys 2007).
Imperial defence implied two mutually inclusive policies: regional peacetime alliances and imperial consolidation. In 1894, Britain’s diplomats were in the midst of secret and public “conversations” on the topic of alliances. Thus the Anglo-German conversation lasted until London went ahead as signatory of a limited alliance with Tokyo in 1902. The move somewhat pleased nationalists as it added security to the empire without openly compromising Britain’s splendid isolationism in Europe, though some saw it as a “Faustian pact” (Hyam 1999: 55). Imperial consolidation was a more complex idea and included efforts to strengthen the empire on the basis of both material (devolution, tariff reform) and ideational (“moral unity,” empire with a “strong heart”) elements. 1894 saw the second of six colonial/imperial conferences convened to discuss the issue. In the period under scrutiny, over two hundred proposals circulated. Typically, “self-government” was suggested for places of the predominant “white [or Anglo-Saxon] settlement” and “enlightened despotism” for the rest (Mackenzie 1986: Ch. 6).

Implicitly or explicitly, the US was central to both policies – it could play the role of an ally or a model of governance. Politicians liked the idea of alliance: Balfour had advocated a “race alliance” for years (the term was endorsed by many); Dilke and Colonial Secretary Chamberlain talked about a formal alliance, and Foreign Secretaries Lansdowne or Salisbury privately expressed succour in an unspoken understanding. For

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119 Offer 1999: 704-7. Note that “imperial defence” came in two broad interpretations. One held that the security and prosperity of Britain dependent on the “coherence” and “efficiency” of the empire. The other argued that the referent object was in fact empire, not Britain (Green 1999: 348- 54; Eddy and Schreuder 1988: 21-32). The need for an outside security contribution was recognized in both readings.

The talk on imperial defence logically led to the consideration of “a grand Imperial federation,” “Greater Britain,” or the “United States of Empire” (Bell 2007; Darwin 1999: 66; Eddy and Schreuder 1988: 44). The US was invariably accorded a role. For most, the US stood as a model, but for some, it was much more – a possible (con)federal partner or unit. Consider some variations: the philosopher J.H. Muirhead, in an essay entitled “What Imperialism Means” (1900), argued that “America is no longer an argument for separation, but for retention” (Bell 2007: 235); Seeley advocated a world-wide federation of all the English race based on the American model (Seeley 1883: 11-6); Balfour, and probably for Chamberlain, agreed, hoping that a “race alliance” would end up as an Anglo-American “federation of race.” Against them, Dilke set out against the federation, though he called for the unity of race,120 while James Bryce, known as a harsh critic of American democracy, settled only for a common Anglo-Saxon “kinship” (1888: 3). Further, there were obvious disagreements as to which Anglo-Saxon branch would lead the way forward in institutionalizing the common racial identity. In general, British “race unionists” called the “daughter” to move back in with the “mother,” into the so-called “Greater Britain.” Rhodes saw the US as “an integral part of the British Empire” and called for its “recovery” (Ferguson 2003: 228). But many others preferred the metaphors of equality (“branches”). Rhodes’ friend William Stead, an influential

120 Lord Dilke’s Greater Britain (1868) called for an incorporation of all “English-speaking, white-inhabited, and self-governing lands” in a single polity (cited in Bell 2007: 8). For the proponents of Greater Britain, places like India and Ireland were insiders, but not in the polity’s inner core (Ibid.: 9, 171-8, 202-6). Echoes of this thinking resonate in the present-day Anglosphere discourse (Chapter 1).
newspaper editor, called for a “re-union,” under American leadership. Anglo-Saxonism legitimized positive identification with the US over imperial defence. To sum the chapter so far, in both American and British foreign debates, Anglo-Saxonism overwhelmed perspectives offered by nationally exclusivist and/or chauvinist discursive positions. Let us now consider the implication of these readings in the two Venezuela crises.

VEnezuela I: making allies

In June 1895, the US intervened in the long-standing British-Venezuelan border dispute over what appeared to be a gold-rich piece of land. In a communiqué sent to London, State Secretary Olney invoked the Monroe Doctrine and demanded submission of the dispute to US arbitration, because the US was “practically sovereign” in the hemisphere. An initial British dismissal was followed by another invocation of the Doctrine, in December of the same year, this time by President Cleveland before Congress. The issue gained headlines in the US press, which generally rallied behind the government (“War if Necessary” ran one title page). War-talk spread, while some officials, called for “resolute action.” For reasons related to the crisis, stock exchanges


122 E.g., Public Opinion Dec 26, 837-43; Nation Nov 14, Dec, 12, 26 (In the opinion of the latter magazine, Senator Henry Cabot Lode “substantially declared war” in October; October 31, Nov 21, 358 as did former president Benjamin Harrison, as other newspapers reported). Support came from Republicans, including Theodore Roosevelt. NY Times, January 31, 1896. At first, the government wanted to “repudiate” the Americans, but it quickly rethought the position after hearing about the “hysterical” US public opinion (FO 80/362 and 367; FO 80/364.). One Cabinet minister thus expressed his bafflement: “The hatred of England by Americans is unaccountable – we expect the French to hate us and are quite prepared to reciprocate the compliment if necessary; but the Americans, no!” (Bourne 1970: 171).
in Wall Street and Capel Court briefly collapsed (Rock 2000: 46). Britain was stunned. The US press moved from ambiguity to schizophrenia.\textsuperscript{123}

That winter saw a great deal of public and private diplomacy: from artists to church leaders to representatives of labour and business leaders, elites on both sides of the Atlantic lobbied both governments to resolve the crisis. Petitions, like the “Anglo-American Memorial,” were signed by thousands.\textsuperscript{124} By January, the entire American press called for peace. In the same month, Britain’s strategic position apparently worsened, following the failure of the Jameson Raid in South Africa – an imperial agent’s attempt to expand the British Cape Colony into Transvaal. The British government accepted arbitration in February, causing a transatlantic sigh of relief. In November, an arbitration agreement was signed, which both sides read as the British endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine (\textit{Times}, 10 Nov 1896; \textit{The Economist}, 14 Nov 1896).

Venezuela I shows how crises are spoken into existence. Most historians describe it with qualifiers such as “synthetic” (e.g., Grenville 1964: 55, cf. Bourne 1967: 319, 330; Allen 1969: 531). For one, the US reaction over Venezuela is puzzling given the non-reaction to a contemporaneous border dispute between France and Brazil, over the boundary of French Guiana or the British intervention in Nicaragua in the same


\textsuperscript{124} \textit{The Times}, Feb 18 and 21, 1896; \textit{Nation} 63, Feb 27, 1896, 186. Some letters, petitions and newspaper reports are contained or mentioned in FO 80/364 and 367, 96/200 and \textit{FRUS} 1895 1: 75-6. Also see Campbell 1970: 183; May 1991: 49-61; Pletcher 1997: 318.
In other words, there was no objective reason for Britain and the US to come “within measurable distance of war.” I would argue that the last move in the distance to war – a government decision – was impossible.

In Britain, not a single person openly advocated a “colonial war” with the US. Considering that jingoism was the order of the day in dealing with similar crises abroad probably until the Suez crisis (Chapter 6), the absence is odd. Jingoism was not absent after the British press learned about the infamous Kruger telegram, a congratulatory note by Germany’s Kaiser to the president of the Transvaal for repelling the Jameson Raid. The two events were coincidental, but virtually identical: each involved a foreign government’s message on what was publicly described as an act of British aggression. But the reception could not have been more different: resentment toward Germany was contrasted by conciliation towards the US.

What matters is that the British government and press were equally conciliatory towards the US before the news of the Kruger telegram reached Britain. Chamberlain, for example, declared the Anglo-American war as “horror” even in December (Orde 1996: 11; also see May 1991: 48-51). The anti-American Saturday Review revealed the limits of a more nationalist position: it sided with Venezuela, but did not go as far to call for

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war with the US. For Anne Orde, “the tone of British discourse reveals a peculiar perception of Anglo-American relations” (1996: 12). For Kennedy, who typically minimizes the significance of such peculiarities, notes that Britain’s “real foe” was the Franco-Russian dual alliance (1981: 109). In this sense, there is another striking comparison. Venezuela I and the Franco-British crisis over Fashoda in 1898 can be seen as similar colonial boundary clashes. But Whitehall mobilized the Royal Navy only against the French. In contrast, against the Americans, the government tabled a range of proposals for “swift resolution” which included anything from a one-time concession to permanent arbitration to a “race alliance” against “semi-civilized” nations such as Venezuela.\(^{127}\) Balfour, who is usually known as the father of theories on “race patriotism”\(^{128}\) and “race alliance,” warned of “the unnatural horror of a civil war” and announced that “[t]he time will come, must come, when…between English-speaking peoples war [becomes] impossible” (Times, 16 January 1896). His Cabinet colleague Chamberlain also described the war as “fratricidal” as well as an “absurdity” and “horror” for all of “humanity and justice… a crime against the laws of God and man.”\(^{129}\) Rosebery, from the opposition, called it “the greatest crime on record” and submitted that peace among “might nations of the Anglo-Saxon race” serves “best interests of

\(^{127}\) E.g., *The Spectator*, October 26, 1895. Due to its traditionally pro-American editorial position, Spectator is not representative. But the racialized rationale for peace widely recognized in indirect ways even by decision-makers. See Salisbury to Pauncefote, Nov 26, 1895, *FRUS* 1895, Pt 1, 563-67. Also see, Bryce 1896; *Economist*, Dec 21, 1895.

\(^{128}\) Alfred Lord Milner is also associated with the term.

\(^{129}\) London *Times* Jan 28, 1896. *The Economist* of January 26 contains the verse by William Watson urging the “towering Daughter, Titan of the West” not to threaten “thy mother’s breast” (quoted in Orde 1996: 11). Roosevelt would later call such war a “nightmare.” Roosevelt to Lee, June 6, 1905 (Morison 1954; volume IV: 1207 – unless otherwise noted, all subsequent Roosevelt quotes will come from the Morison volumes, marked by a volume and page numer).
Christianity and civilization.” Another Liberal, Harcourt, wrote that “[a] war with America must be avoided at all costs and irrespective of all Party considerations.”

The interpretation of the crisis was in fact remarkably similar on both sides. The Anglo-American friendship was treated as a scarce value, scarcer than British or American national interests overseas. Put otherwise, something beyond Britain and the US *qua* states became the referent object of security. Public and private pronouncements made by leaders like the Prince of Wales, the Bishop of Manchester, the Archbishop of Armagh, Pulitzer, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Cushman K. Davis, all related to the idea of a threat to war, not to the other state, their government or their people. The family metaphors were reactivated even by Olney, whose protest note set off the crisis. Faced with the overwhelming peace-talk on the part of businessmen, clergy, and scholars, the Cleveland administration abandoned its belligerent policy. In Ernst May’s words, “In the past, Anglophobia had always seemed profitable and relatively safe. It was so no longer” (1991: 58; also see Fischer 1989). What was fare more profitable was racial evolutionism. Former State Secretary Francis Bayard captured an ideal-typical reading, by calling a fight “between the two Trustees of Civilization [over] the mongrel state of Venezuela [was] madness” (cited in Shoultz 1998: 118-9, 124).

It was racial evolutionism which implied the ideas of “race alliance” or “race patriotism.” During the crisis, the steel baron Andrew Carnegie, published a piece in defense of British colonialism, recycling his earlier writings on a British-American “(re)union.” The argument was vintage Anglo-Saxonism: what mattered for the author

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was not the territorial division in Venezuela, but the establishment of the “English-speaking race [a]s the ‘boss’ race of the world” (1896). The identical rationale was employed by contributors to Political Science Quarterly, in effect advocating a switch to racial, not parochial politics (cited in Kohn 2004: 39). Calls like these easily grafted onto the extant whiggish interpretations of history and politics which regarded the Americans and British as “two branches” of the “imperial race” (Chamberlain) or “ruling race” (Balfour). All had an identical ontology of security, with race as a primary referent, not the nation state. In this reading, the full complexity of Anglo-Saxonism came to the fore. Peace-talk and family-talk turned out to be interchangeable: the Anglo-American racial solidarity became legitimate on scientific, familial, moral and even theological grounds. The “great Anglo-Saxon peace” was securitized.

From the perspective of a security community, a groups of states where no war is possible, the aftermath of Venezuela I constitutes the beginning of a very long North American peace (Russett 1963: 214). The “we-feeling” or “mutual identification,” such as that provided by Anglo-Saxonism, can be regarded as a necessary condition for the creation of such exclusive clubs (Deutsch et al 1957: 40-1, 66-7; Roussell 2004: 121, 138; Russett 1963: 27, 96, 128-9, 143, 217; Shore 1998). Anglo-Saxonism is similarly regarded by the students of the “great rapprochement,” as one among a “multiplicity of causes” (Kennedy 1984: 19-20; also see Anderson 1981: 12-3, 111, 177; Campbell 1974: 204; Kohn 2004: 4, Rock 1989: 49, 55, 59; cf. Layne 1994: 27, fn. 71). I will return to this reading in the concluding section.

131 For Chamberlain, all English-speaking peoples were part of one “Imperial race.” See speeches on Feb 23 and 23, 1903 (Boyd 1970: 110, 119). For Balfour and his supporters, see Hilton (2006).
Venezuela can also be seen as a crisis over equal recognition. Ernst May argues that before 1895, the British understood America as a “metaphysical conception,” rather than a state or especially a great power/empire. In this sense, the American threat of war was not credible, at least as compared to a similar speech act made by France or Germany (1991: 46-7). But the materiality of the Venezuela crisis – as reflected in the rapidly falling values of the American real estate market – materialized the US as a great power/empire. The rising British interest in the US in the 1890s is evidenced in the gradual increase in the number of mentions of the US in parliamentary debates, news coverage of the US (including the increase in regular American contributions) as well as by travel and marriage patterns (Gerlach 2001: 258; Rock 1989: 49). Not only was full equality between the US and Britain established, but also a degree of specialness. The recognition of the Anglo specificity became a commonplace ritual after 1896. Illustrative is the legalistic call for permanent (or “general”) arbitration.

The “Arbitrate Before You Fight” idea ultimately aimed to outlaw war. In English, it dates back to the Alabama Claims of 1871-2. In the period under study, the texts on the subject typically introduced arbitration as a matter of global and civilization importance, an imperative for any pair of states. But then it would conclude that the arbitration is most likely to succeed “especially when [states], as in the case of the UK and the US, they are allied by blood and knit together by love [.]. We are both the common inheritors of the traditions and glories of the Anglo-Saxon race from which we have obtained the spirit of conciliation, a spirit that has so aided the national development.
of both countries.”132 A survey of the press found that ninety percent of newspapers editors in the US supported the Anglo-American arbitration (Rock 1989: 27; Kohn 2004: 27).

Arbitration treaties eventually failed, though the arbitration movement had a major spill-over effect. Following the crisis, several civil society institutions with the mission of promoting the “Anglo-Saxon unity” sprung up – such as the multi-partisan (British) Anglo-American Committee, the transatlantic Anglo-American League and journals such as The Anglo-American Magazine and (the Churchill family-owned) The Anglo-Saxon Review: A Quarterly Miscellany. Scores of intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic approached the idea in common racial identity in other programmatic expressions, such as the “Anglo-Saxon Olympiad,” the “Pan-Anglican Festival” or a “common Anglo-American citizenship.” In terms of international institutions, the signifying of the 1901 Hay-Pauncefoote treaty, which renegotiated the terms of the building of the isthmian canal, as well as the 1903 Alaska panhandle boundary treaty, which settled the most important border dispute between the US and Canada, can be seen as the beginning of the extraordinarily durable AASR. I will return to this point later.

I have no space to consider its role in the Anglo-American rapprochement, but it the “puzzle” of a separate Canadian state is no doubt a critical aspect of the Anglosphere story.133 Canadian historian J.M.S. Careless once quipped that “There could not be a

132 Cited in Gerlach (2001: 214). Also see Public Opinion 22, Jan 21, 1897, 68-70; Literary Digest 24, Jan 23, 1897, 356-58. Arbitration to outlaw war was a popular idea in much of Europe at the turn of the century, save for Germany (May 1991: 35; Collin 1990: 104).

133 The Canadian international subject was a “tertium quid” of Anglo-American relations long before independence (Allen 1954: 181; also see Kohn 2004: 11). For an excellent recent account of the Canada puzzle, see Roussel (2004).
Canada without the United States and may not be a Canada with one” (1986: 135).

Translated into identity theory, what the author meant is that while the US Other is constitutive of Canada, the Other could one day come to assimilate the Self. Indeed, from the perspective of racialized discourses that dominated the 1890s America, the Canadians were regarded as fellow Anglo-Saxons, even though their state was known to be an essentially anti-American project. For some nineteenth century expansionists, the winning of the north was important as the winning of the west, but US Congress came to hear such calls less and less and none since 1911. The annexation question fell from the political agenda for various reasons, but arguably central was a belief that the Canadians themselves should decide whether to join the Union. Such respect, suffice it to say, was never granted to comparable targets of US expansionism. To sum up the chapter so far, Anglo-Saxonism not only defused the war-talk over Venezuela, but it also rendered any future threat of war less likely. The effect of the Anglo-Saxonist reading of the crisis was doubly positive for Anglo-American cooperation: it established Britain and the US as equals – as states and empires – and it reinforced the perception of the congruence between a dominant discourse of identity and international behaviour. Peace and cooperation between two Anglo great powers/empires was exactly what Anglo-Saxonism predicted.

134 Anti-expansionist typically turned this argument on its head by asking why formal annexation was needed, in terms of the Manifest Destiny, given that the Canadian political process already resembled the American one. To be sure, what also stopped the annexation-fact in its tracks was the simply fact that Canadian voters leaned to the left of the US centre. Indeed, in America’s contemporary two-party system, the addition of liberal votes from Canadian provinces in an election would never be acceptable to the Republican Party as the more conservative of the two parties (e.g., Clarkson 2002: 11). So even if some future Canadian government somehow succeeded in convincing Canadians on the desirability of a political union with the US—known as the “big idea” in some Canadian circles at the moment—the US would probably turn the Canadian application down.
All identities are relational and depend on others. For Anglo-American elites, Venezuela was clearly an oppositional other, but only partially recognized as an equal – that role was likely reserved for races/nations placed higher on the civilizational hierarchy. A similarity with significant Others – like the one implied by Anglo-Saxonism – is likely to more salient when there is a simultaneous relationship with additional significant Others. In this section, I will evaluate this proposition against four significant Others, selecting on their placement on the similarity and distance axes in the civilization discourse. These are Spain, France, the Boers, and Germany.\footnote{The retrospective term Boer referred to a race/nation/people/tribe of a European descent (self-declared as Boerevolk) living in the Transvaal (ZAR) and the Orange Free State (OFS) in South Africa. The term Afrikaner began to gain currency later. Afrikaner is not be confused with Afrikaans, which is the name of a language then generally considered to be a Dutch dialect (but not to be equated with Cape Dutch).}

The Spanish-American War is generally seen as a breakthrough for the “great rapprochement.” Among great powers, Britain turned out to be the sole supporter of the US. Its support was near-unanimous: resolutions, declarations and poems encouraging the US; Star and Stripes went on display everywhere; and hundreds of British subjects attempted to enlist in the US navy. Constructive imperialists all rallied behind the US and even major Ameroskeptics among nationalists voiced their support (e.g., Salisbury). What matters again is the articulation of this support in racialist terms: the US victory was declared a victory for all Anglo-Saxons. In September 1898, Edward Dicey, a widely-read commentator, submitted that he “should find cause for congratulation in the fact that the American Republic has now reverted to the hereditary policy of the Anglo-Saxon race” (quoted in Orde 1996: 27-8). A tabloid explained the American success by
reminding readers that the word “Yankee” originally referred to a man of “Puritan, Anglo-Saxon stock” (Berridge 1986: 196; also see Smith 1999).

The news from Britain, which included rumors of tacit cooperation between the US and Royal navies against the Spanish – reassured many Americans that there indeed was a common Anglo-Saxon bond. Roosevelt wrote thus: “The attitude of England in 1898 worked a complete revolution in my feelings and the attitude of the consentient at the time opened my eyes of the other side of the question.” Olney, who was ready to go to war over Venezuela, declared in a March 1898 speech that Britain was America’s “best friend” (Rock 1989: 28) – probably the first such statement about the foreign power since the revolution. Even Senator Lodge, who built his career on Anglophobia, declared satisfaction over the identity of beliefs, race, blood language and aspirations (Ibid.: 53. Two decades later, Lodge would call for a formal Anglo-American alliance; Moser 2007: 11). In terms of concrete action, a special Joint High Commission was formed in 1898 to resolve issues in Anglo-(Canadian-)American relations. In historiography, this commission is seen as a premier agent for the “cleaning of the slate” – a term used to describe an effort to remove various border disputes and thus solidify the peace on the continent (Roussel 2004: 121, 138; Campbell 1957: 88-119; Monger 1963: 66).

The “revolution” in American attitudes toward Britain can be related to the vitality of Anglo-Saxonism. In the dominant discourse of identity, Spain was a significant other opposite of Anglo-Saxonism in terms of race, religion, modernity and democracy.

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More important, this discourse was seen as highly consistent with the outcome: Anglo-Saxonism seemed to have correctly predicted the British response in 1898. The outcome induced the critics of Anglo-Saxonism to rethink their positions: Roosevelt, Olney and Lodge came to learn that the talk of Anglo-Saxonism – and hence Anglo-American specialness – was no cheap talk. Importantly, Spain supplied ample outside recognition of Anglo-Saxonism by blaming the outcome of the war, among other things, on Anglo-American collusion (Hilton and Ickringill 1996). Similar signals came from France, whose elites regarded the US and Britain as a special Anglo-Saxon duet of international relations since at least Talleyrand (May 1991: 299, n.2; Pitt 2000; Sears 1927). In the period under study, among the contemporary non-fiction translated into English, Edmond Demolins’ *Anglo-Saxon Superiority* (1897) was one of the most popular reads. In this book, a French outsider clearly confirmed the theses by Seeley, Fiske and Roosevelt – much to the delight of its Anglo-American readers (Anderson 1981: 66-7).

One could argue that the Venezuelan and Spanish Others can be regarded as the usual suspects; the same can be said of France, Russia or Japan, whose alterity was directly implied in Anglo-Saxonism. To examine a comparatively harder case of the effect of an Anglo-American racial identity, I now turn to the social construction of oppositional otherness in Anglo-American relations with two discursively positive and close others – the Boers and Germany. Considering that Teutonism dominated some areas of the Anglo-American discourses (the discipline of history, but also the nascent political science [Oren 1995: 286, 293; 2003: Ch. 1]), claims for racial identity in international politics could possibly have been conceivably lodged in the name of these two putatively Germanic races. Put otherwise, ideas of racial solidarity in international
relations could have plausibly been extended to American-Boer, American-German or Anglo-German pairs or their three-way combinations.

In contrast to the Spanish-American War, where Anglo-Saxonism triumphed, the South African War showed many of its tensions, at least in the US. Over South Africa, American elite opinion was split and greatly fluctuated without significant reference to the expansionist-exceptionalist divide. Support for the Boers was expressed by many important public figures and not just the Anglophobic populists like William Jennings Bryan, but also by bona fide Anglo-Saxonists, like Andrew Carnegie, Henry Adams or ex-President Benjamin Harrison. Support was also expressed in numerous declarations, petitions, cartoons, resolutions of sympathy (including those by the Boston and New York city councils as well as the Democratic Party platform of 1900) and, last but not least, by three hundred American volunteers who joined the Boer war effort. This entire camp read the war as the new American Revolution (e.g., Montbard 1896). The racial identification no doubt helped: while few Americans could sympathize with similar rebellions in the British and other empires, the majority had no trouble siding with the Boers (Kramer 2002: 1340-4). It is important to note that pro-Boer Americans voiced their anti-British protest in the same way like some anti-war Liberals in Britain (Koss, ed., 1973).

The pro-British camp consisted of most Republicans and big business leaders. Their support was expressed by a stream of much-needed supplies to the British government – from food, ammunition and transport animals to cash loans. The official policy of “benevolent neutrality” was defended in terms of inter-imperial solidarity. On the surface, solidarity was a function of “repayment” – benevolent neutrality was a mirror
image of British policy during the Spanish-American War. But the ultimate rationale was race (Campbell 1970: 173). State Secretary Hay wrote in 1900: “the fight of England is the fight of civilization and progress and all our interests are bound up in her success” (Mulanax 1994: 83). Roosevelt defended the policy on both grounds. First, he expressed gratitude for the British support against Spain and, second, he overruled his “Dutch blood” and supported Britain’s overall civilizing mission. Roosevelt’s belief that “English should be the tongue South of the Zambesi” was reflected in the official policy.

The pro-British camp generally avoided the trap of supporting the empire against rebels by reading the South African War through the American Civil War, with the Boers playing the role of the Southern slave-holding landowners (Farwell 1976: 145).

Ironically, the racialist discourse on civilization saw the Boers as inferior for maintaining a racialist socio-economic system. In this reading, the Boers came as inferior to Anglo-Saxons and because of their comparative inferiority, the Boers deserved to be annexed.

Historians disagree over which reading of the war dominated the American public sphere overall, but agree that identification with the Boers eventually loosened (Anderson

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138 The Roosevelt administration welcomed the war as an opportunity to extract concessions from the British Empire over the Alaskan boundary and the isthmian canal, but never in such way as to alienate the British (Mulanax 1994: 208; Campbell 1960: 4-5).

139 Roosevelt to John Strachey, January 27, 1900 (Morison III, 9); to Spring Rice, July 3, 1901 (Ibid., 109); to Frederick C. Selous, 7 February 1900 (Ibid.: II: 1152); to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 17 Dec 1899 (Ibid.: 1112-13); to A.D. White, 30 March 1896, (Ibid. I: 523) December 18, 1901 and January 16, 1902 (Ibid.: III: 208, 218). On Roosevelt’s preference of the British Empire over others, see Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, 30 Jan 1900 (Ibid. II: 1152), and Elihu Root 29 Jan 1900 (Ibid.: 1151).

140 Allen 1969: 586, 592; Campbell 1970: 182; Noer 1978: 135-6; Tilchin 1997: 9. It is another irony that no American text surveyed makes a comparison of the Boer War with the contemporaneous Philippine revolt. London Times carried a comparison in October 1899; Admiral Mahan’s essay in The Independent (February 1900) was a follow-up (Kramer 2002). New York Times saw the Boers fighting out of “religious fanaticism,” not liberty (Sep 14, 1900).
The Anglo-Saxon tautology worked and arguably vindicated the pro-British reading of the war. Practice seemed virtually entirely congruent with discourse again. What is remarkable is that for the first time in history, the US sided with the Empire – the British Empire at that – and against the rebels (Perkins 1968: 89). The policy of supporting Britain in the South African War is all the more remarkable considering that it constituted a liability of the Republican administration in the November 1900 elections.

In the Anglo-American discourse of identity, the Boer republics were regarded as racially close and positive, but not as insignificant as Venezuela in terms of statehood. In contrast, virtually every text in my archive recognized Germany as a great power/empire. Once again, Germany – understood as the source and continuity of the Teutonic or Germanic race to which Anglo-Saxons were closely related – was the least likely candidate for an oppositional Other (Ferguson 2003: 285, 288; Oren 2003: Ch. 1).

As I said earlier, for many in British and American societies, Teutonic racialized identity (less frequently: Aryan) complemented or subsumed Anglo-Saxonism into an alliance of all Germanic states. For example, one purpose of the Rhodes Scholarships – ran by the trust established in 1902 under Rhodes’ will – was to prevent war among the three great powers/empires (the main goal was to help build the future Anglo-American federation). The phrase “Anglo-Teutons” was sometimes used to supplant or complement the phrase “Anglo-Saxons” and “Germanic” was sometimes coterminous with “Anglo-Saxon” (e.g., Carnegie 1898: 9). But while is true that Anglo-Saxonism was often implicitly or explicitly read as a subset of Teutonism, no text in my archive explicitly expressed a desire for wider Germanic/Teutonic ties in international and
imperial politics. For many authors, it was perfectly legitimate to hold a view about the Teutonic origins of liberty and be anti-German. In this sense, Teutonism was seen as but one variation on the general Whiggish celebration of post-1688 British – or post-1776 American – progress, without necessarily implying a Germanic future.

Because it enunciates a three-way identity relationship, Venezuela II stands as a very useful case study. Claims for racialized identity in international politics could possibly have been conceivably lodged in the name of Anglo-German, American-German or Anglo-American-German combinations. Yet, these alternatives failed and Venezuela II turned out to be a point of no return. Prior to the crisis, Germany hovered between a potential friend and an actual rival; after Venezuela II, Germany turned into a threat.

Britain and Germany entered the crisis as tactical allies. In December 1902, the two European empires (later joined by Italy) deployed their fleet in the Venezuelan waters with the objective of forcibly collecting debts. At that time, naval blockades were standard policy, even within the domain of Monroe’s hemispheric claim. Indeed, US leaders wholeheartedly agreed that countries like Venezuela needed “spanking” from time to time.141 Also standard was the reaction of the American press to such blockades, which would normally express irritation to European attempts to forcibly collect “American” debts. During this particular blockade, the press strongly condemned the action, especially after some heavy-handed bombardment of Venezuelan ports. Domestic politics again induced the American government to react. President Roosevelt explained that action to collect “claims due” was entirely appropriate, but that possibility of a long-

141 One British official thus justified the blockade (Mitchell 1999: 86; Kneer 1975: 8-11). But Roosevelt also thought that European “spanking” was necessary in the case of South American misbehaviour. Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternburg, July 12, 1901 (Morison III: 115-6); Oct 11, 1901 (Ibid.: 172).
term territorial occupation of Venezuelan territory (i.e., its customs houses) was entirely not.  

Like in Venezuela I, the state secretary demanded arbitration and the president backed him up. Unlike in Venezuela I (when it possessed no such capability), the government also dispatched a battleship squadron to the crisis area. Less than two weeks into the blockade, European allies agreed to arbitration, “in principle.” But the agreement collapsed in January 1903, when German warships destroyed another Venezuelan fort. Washington confronted Berlin with an ultimatum and succeeded: the arbitration agreements were signed and the Europeans withdrew. The enforcement of the vast hemispheric claim that was the Monroe Doctrine never came under a European test again.

In terms of the Anglo-American interaction, both Venezuela crises were similar in establishing the Anglo-American peace as a value to be defended. In December 1902, that the Anglo-American peace was an imperative for humanity was rather old news. What was new was the identification of an entity that not only did not belong, but also posed a threat to the great Anglo-Saxon peace – Germany. In the Anglo-American reading of the crisis, Anglo-Saxons had a predilection for “compromise” and “arbitration,” but Germans did not. Kipling, known as the “Voice of Empire in English

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Literature,” expressed the view of the many in verse, casting the German as the
“shameless Hun.” The Hun Germany was thus constructed as an enemy.

In Britain, the foreign policy makers again had trouble extending full recognition
to the US. What was glaringly obvious in the blockade-planning phase was the utter lack
of discussion on the possible US reaction. Another similarity with Venezuela II was
the absence of jingoism (also known as “rowdyism”) favouring further confrontation with
the US. In the British press, not a single report attempted to even contemplate the
possibility of a war with the US. The press at first gave the government the benefit of
doubt, but once the news of the US reaction was received, it turned sour. All newspapers
surveyed came to protest the nature of the diplomatic and, increasingly, naval face-off in
the Caribbean. The problem, as British editorials as well as opposition leaders noted, was
that Britain was on the “wrong side.”

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144 The London Times, Dec 22, 1902. According to the OED, this was the first English usage of the word
Hun, meaning a savage and/or barbarian, with respect to Germans. This designation implied that the
Germans forfeited their right to pursue colonialism.

145 Lord Lansdowne, “Proposed Coercion of Venezuela,” Memorandum 144, Oct 17, 1902. CAB 37, vol. 63, roll 18. Parts of this memo (“White Paper on Venezuela”) were released to the public on Dec 15 and
subsequently taken apart by the critics. The public and the opposition was upset that the paper contained no
discussion of the Monroe Doctrine or the appropriateness of a secret alliance, especially with Germany. For
the key parliamentary debate, see Hansard’s, Ser. 4 (1908), p. 1224-87. The government was either
confident that the US would not allow the action, as per the Anglo-American understanding, or it foolishly
miscalculated (Americans elites concluded that it was the latter; historians believe it was both [Campbell
1970: 274; Mitchell 1999: 80-2]).

146 Two Guardian editorials thus carefully explained that the war is with Venezuela, not the US; the Anglo-
American peace was the “cardinal principle of foreign policy” (Dec 9, 12). Times (Dec 5) informed the
reader of the presence – but not the meaning – of the move of Admiral Dewey’s fleet to Venezuelan waters.
Other newspapers made no references to the fleet whatsoever.

147 “Venezuela and President Roosevelt,” The London Times, Dec 25, 1902. The Times supported the
government at the first (Dec 10, 12, 16), but turned around in the second week of the crisis (Dec 22, 25,
27). The same can be said about The Morning Post. Newspapers that expressed support at first, like Times
or The Morning Post, argued that there was no crisis as long as Washington singled out the Germans
(Mitchell 1999: 122). Liberal newspapers, such as the Guardian (Dec 5, 9) or Westminster Gazette (Dec 8),
were critical of the government from the week one. For detailed overviews of the press, see Boston (1989);
The fit between discourse and the facts on the ground was perceived as incongruent. One way of minimizing the contradiction was to blame Germany for the crisis and the government for being foolish. Whether this reading made the misfit less worrisome is unclear; what is clear is that the public protest almost toppled the government (Allen 1969: 606; Campbell 1970: 182; Mitchell 1999: 96-7). In consideration to both British and American public opinion, the Cabinet essentially admitted to being “roped” by Germany and moved to break off the tactical alliance.\(^{148}\) The policy change was comprehensive: Balfour and Salisbury were so eager to make it up to the US that they publicly endorsed the Monroe Doctrine.\(^{149}\)

The American press read the crisis almost identically: Germany was the ringleader of the European “conspiracy” or “concert” against the Monroe Doctrine. Once again, German actions were attributed to the militarism and aggressiveness of the German people; British actions, in contrasts, were explained away as a product of German manipulation, that is, a matter of misjudgment and foolishness in their government.\(^{150}\) Consider the following interpretation of the blockade in the American press. In December, the press commented how the German navy sought to sink

\(^{148}\) See, e.g., Lansdowne to George Buchanan, Dec 7 and Dec 11, 1902, FO 420/206 and Herbert to Lansdowne, Dec 18, 1902, Feb 8, 1903 (cited in Kneer 1975: 40, 52). In general, more than other diplomas, the British seemed to “know” what Americans liked to hear (Adams 2006: 61-2).

\(^{149}\) A newspaper remarked that Balfour’s Liverpool speech constituted a departure from the traditional position of the British government (and Conservative party) on the Monroe Doctrine. The London Times, Feb 14, 1903. (In this speech, Balfour rediscovered the British co-ownership of the Doctrine, a thesis that would become a standard reading of history in the 1940s). Even Salisbury’s concluded, in the same month, that the Monroe Doctrine should be seen as a “rule of policy” (Herwig 1986: 193-4, also see, Gerlach 2001: 213-224).

\(^{150}\) Adams 2005: 61-2; Collin 1990: 101, 116, Herwig 1986: 240. The Anglo-German agreement was secret and, according to a newspaper, “iron-clad” (The NY Times, Jan 26, 1903; Also see Nation 75, Dec 18, 474-5; Dec 25, 494-5). As for who led, Herwig concludes that it was London, Kennedy that it was Berlin and Mitchell argues that it was neither.
Venezuelan gunboats, while the British aimed for capture. But in January, when German cruisers – in response to the small weapon fire from the coast – flattened the fort of San Carlos on the Venezuelan coast, the differentiation between the two allies acquired a meaning. For Americans, the German action was “impulsive,” “disproportionate” and “uncivilized.” In fact, the “neo-Teutonic principles” of revenge and destruction apparently “disgusted” the entire “English-speaking civilization.”151 The point lost in the coverage was that, in January, a British warship had joined one of the German cruisers in an almost identical destruction of the fort of Puerto Cabello.

The perception of the crisis was identical in Britain and the US, which is puzzling considering that the crisis – in the objectivist ontology of security – can be regarded as a clash of interests between Britain and the US. These perceptions were no doubt influenced by the interaction with Germany. The content and contestation of identity discourses in Germany were outside the scope of my analysis, but what is clear is the lack of conciliation coming from the German government. If the Kruger telegram was a major blunder, so was the attempt to delegitimize the US hemispheric claim by a reference to the United States of North America. A German Foreign Office memo thus saw the situation: “The Monroe Doctrine has not become an international law, to which

151 Nation 76, Jan 8, 25; 78, 29 Jan; Harper’s 27 Jan, 181; NY Times, Jan 29. The distrust of the Germans was shared on both sides of the Atlantic (Adams 2005: 55; Guthrie 1983: 205-9; Kneer 1975: 44. Mitchell 1999: 105). This time the British ambassador remarked that “The outburst in this country against he Germans has been truly remarkable, and suspicion of the German Emperor’s designs in the Caribbean Sea is shared by the Administration, the press and the public alike” (cited in Collin 1990: 111; also see Herwig 1986: 202).
the European nations are tied. It remains largely a question of power for the United States of North America to gain general acceptance.”

To the extent that such texts are representative, Germany positioned itself very much in opposition to British and American international roles (Kennedy 1984: 17). The effect of such outside recognition was thus similar to the one coming from the Latin nations, though it is unclear if German elites specifically acknowledged the Anglo-American specialness the way French and Spanish elites did. Had Germany lowered its aspirations to build an overseas empire and accepted to play a junior role with the US and/or Britain, perhaps a wider Teutonic rapprochement would have been more likely.

What is also clear is that Anglo-Saxonism became the only game in town after 1903. In terms of the discourse of identity, Teutonism lost ground and never recovered. Instead of the fellow Teutons, Anglo-Saxon predecessors, the Anglo-Americans came to see the Germans much like Kipling did, as the Huns. The Hun Germany obviously had a different place in the dominant political ontology from the one occupied by the Teutonic cousins. Table 4.1. summarizes the ebb and flow of the Anglo-Saxon worldview in the US and Britain, from 1894 to 1903.

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152 Kennedy 1980: 196; Also see Ibid: 178-9; Mitchell 1999: 82; Rinke 1992: xv. The “N” in the “USNA” was finally dropped in 1903. Note that German leaders also believed in a common European front as a counterweight to the US (Herwig 1986: 215-216).

153 This counterfactual would have to satisfy several conditions in at least three national contexts. In Germany, Teutonism was much weaker than German nationalism (the dominant interest group in Germany at the time called itself a pan-German League, not a pan-Teutonic League). In Britain, Teutonism had its major supporters (Chamberlain, Rhodes, and Karl Pearson), though it lost much of its appeal after the Kruger telegram (Kennedy 1980). In the US, the weakness of Teutonism can also be seen as a reflection of the aforementioned weakness of the German-American constituency or its co-option by the Anglo-Saxonist discourses and institutions. When faced with a choice, one-time proponents of Teutonist policies like Carl Shurtz and John W. Burgess, would opt for Anglo-Saxonism (Anderson 1981: 42; Beisner 1968: 219; Jacobson 1998: 45; Oren 2003: Ch. 1; May 1991: 49.).
To be sure, the outcome of identity politics at play during Venezuela II can be seen as both cause and effect of Teutonism’s lack of discursive footing in British and American societies. In this sense, there was nothing revolutionary about Venezuela II as far as the making of the German other is concerned. In the preceding section, I compared the Kruger Telegram to the American protest notes in 1896: one anti-British communiqué caused jingoism, another did not. Also compare the reception of two addresses by Colonial Secretary Chamberlain in the British case. In May 1898 at Birmingham, a month into the Spanish-American war, Chamberlain invoked Anglo-Saxonism to call for a racial alliance with the US, a “powerful and generous nation, speaking our language, bred of our race…their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and peaceful development of the world are identical with ours…the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Ango-Saxon alliance.” The speech was well-received in the media, especially in the US, where the rationale for alliance, if not the alliance
itself, was justified in similar Anglo-Saxonist terms. But when in November 1899 at Leicester, Chamberlain called for a “New Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race,” he was met with criticism and ridicule. A newspaper editorial reminded him that “[o]ur friendly relations are with the American people but not with the German government” (Times, 2 Dec 1899). In this passage, the construction of German alterity was obvious in the differentiated interpretation of the signifier for the foreign state: Germany stood for the government, while the US meant the people. From a slightly different perspective, even as a great power and empire, Germany was also different from the US. Kipling’s famous 1899 poem, “The White Man’s Burden,” singularly addresses the US (Colin 1990: 156).

Dual readings were pervasive in the US as well. In the period of the so-called carve-up of China, American newspapers often expressed worries about German imperialism, but almost never about the British equivalent. The German occupation of Kiachow in November 1897 was reported as potentially threatening to the US, but a similar British action in the Yanghtzee a month later was not. Therefore, Venezuela II should not be seen as a revolutionary event, but as a representative or even cumulative point in the long path of the Anglo-American othering of Germany. For the purpose of my argument, what is significant is not so much that Germany failed to gain the status of a racialized alliance partner, but that it became established as a racialized enemy. In this

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155 New York Times, Nov 27, 28 1897, vs. 8, 16, 18 Dec. 1897, 7, 25, Jan. 1898; Roosevelt allegedly saw Venezuela as Kiachow, a Chinese port earlier occupied by Germany (Collin 1990: 101). Indicatively, he made no similar analogies between objectively similar British encroachments in China or the Caribbean.
sense, one could argue that in the post-1903 Anglo-American discourse of identity, Germany became established as the battleground of the future.

The end of the Teutonic tension in the Anglo-American discourse meant that any racial identity in international politics was an English-speaking singularity. The boundaries of the Anglo-Saxondom were rounded. In the words of one British diplomat:

> Germany is now taking Great Britain’s place in the American mind as the “natural foe” and the more general this feeling becomes, the more will the American people be instinctively drawn toward the pole of Great Britain with whom they have so much in common.156

Venezuela II rendered Germany alien and threatening. To generalize within the case on the basis of secondary sources, these perceptions played a role in the alliance politics in the subsequent decade. The British government never again tried to sell a German alliance, certainly not against the US. A “German war,” in contrast, appeared rather likely, which eventually led to the conclusion of alliances with former arch-enemies Russia and France (Ferguson 2003: 285; Hyam 1999: 55; Orde 1996: 36; Rinke 1992: xviii; Rock 1989: 38; Taylor 1982: 10-2).

> For one, a key effect of the great rapprochement between the US and Britain is neither peaceful resolution of disputes nor tacit cooperation against Spain and the Boers, but of the lasting alienation of Germany after 1903 (Mitchell 1999: 105; also see Rinke 1992: xviii). In 1903, many more officials concluded – echoing Admiral Dewey in 1898 – that the “next war” would be with Germany. For Germany, Venezuela II signaled the end of cooperation between Germany and either one of the English-speaking powers

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156 Herbert to Landsowne, Feb 25, 1903, cited in Tilchin 1997: 60-1. Herbert was right. By 1903, the American war schemes began to consider a “general war” pitting an Anglo-American-led coalition against another led by Germany (Kennedy 1974: 292). I will return to the question of war plans below.
(Herwig 1986: 234-5; Kennedy 1984: 18-20). In Kennedy’s words, “[t]he consequences of this shift in political attitudes with the triangular relationship of Britain, Germany, and the US for the half-century following 1890 can scarcely be exaggerated” (1984: 22). Britain and the US fought two major wars against the Hun Germany, first possibly as Anglo-Saxons, second certainly as democracies fighting Nazism (Oren 2003: Ch. 2). WWI shattered ideas on racial identity among Germanic nations; WWII began to shatter many ideas on race as a legitimate principle for politics. In 1918, John Moser observes, American Anglophobia “died down…because Germany seemed so much worse than Great Britain”; by WWII, it virtually died off (Moser 2007: 11). Discursively speaking, the Hun Germany morphed more easily in the Nazi Germany than, say, the Weimer Germany. Also, when he spoke of the racial affinity between Britain and Germany, Hitler was exceedingly behind or against the times (Hannigan 2006: Ch. 6; Herwig 1986: 215; Martellone 1994: 90). As for the cooperation between the Anglo great powers/empires and Germany, this became possible only in the late 1940s, but on strikingly different set of identity relations (Jackson 2006).

Venezuela II followed the international trends set in the Spanish-American and the South African War. When Britain and the US found themselves on the opposite sides of an international conflict, the incongruence between discourse and behaviour was interpreted as an anomaly – nothing more than a folly on the part of the (British) government. Overall, policy turned out to be in tune with the dominant discourse. After Venezuela II, the specialness of the Anglo-American relationship was supported by another significant and different other – the Hun Germany. Britain and the US never
signed an alliance, but there is ample evidence to suggest that their elites continue to regard each other as friends, partner and allies (Allen 1969: 619; May 1991: 53).

CONCLUSION

Cases studies examined in this chapter are generally supportive of my theoretical argument. Between the two states and across the four international security situations, foreign policy choices were virtually always fit with Anglo-Saxonism, as the dominant discourse of identity in Britain and the US. In terms of the debates over the fit between identity and the perceived reality, the sole confounding case concerns the misfit in the American reading of the South African War. The US policy did not shift away from benevolent neutrality despite a stronger support for the Boer cause.

Critical in my Anglosphere story is the finding that a racialized identity constituted Britain and the US. Because states were racially differentiated, international relations were simultaneously interracial relations which, at a minimum, increased the likelihood of cooperation between racially similar states. As I said earlier, due to an Anglo-Saxonist grip on identity and reality in Britain and the US, the Anglo-American cooperation was widely perceived as a logical foreign policy choice. But note that this cooperation occurred partly because Anglo-Saxonism received extremely positive reinforcement both within the context of Anglo-American interaction over places like Venezuela and South Africa and in the interactions of the two English-speaking states with their significant Others like Spain and Germany. From the genealogical perspective, Anglo-Saxonism jump-started the Anglosphere. The contest over the boundaries and claimants of Anglo-Saxondom influenced relationships of partnership and enmity among
at least three great powers/empires, leading first to claims on the distinctiveness of the English-speaking fact in international politics.

The most remarkable of such claims were those advocating political union. According to Daniel Deudney, that such an idea can be debated by national elites suggests that that *everything* was up for debate – “polity ontology as well as statecraft instrumentality” (2001: 190). In this author’s estimation, the talk of the Anglo-American union lasted until the late 1940s. Echoing the proponents of the Anglosphere, Deudney asks whether the “most important and successful inter-state alliance of the twentieth century [is] actually a type of a non-state national unification”? (2001: 189). In his view, Britain, Canada and the US “look suspiciously like one nation divided into three states” (Ibid.: 207). On the one hand, Deudney’s case is overstated. Based on the findings I present in Chapters 6 and 7, British and Canadian discourses of identity do not support an idea of unifying the “North Atlantic Triangle” into a single superstate. The same goes for the US, even in the first three decades of the twentieth century which Deudney mentions (McKercher 1991). With these doubts in mind, I suspect that Deudney argued his case tongue-in-cheek, aiming to provoke those IR theorists who believe in the fundamentally competitive nature of the international society. I will return to this point in Chapter 8.

On the other hand, Deudney is certainly right to stress the extraordinary durability of what can be called the “English-speaking alliance” (Ovendale 1985). One of the more predictable events in international politics is a speech by an American president or a British prime minister on the specialness of the Anglo-American relationship. Other relationships around the world are regularly declared as special, but no declaration has such a long and consistent history as the AASR – the “mother of all special relationships”
(Krotz forthcoming). In this chapter, I argued that the putative origins of the AASR are
deepener than the conventional wisdom suggests, in the 1890s rather than 1940s. With this
argument, I do not deny that WWII represents a major turning point in the history of
English-speaking international relations. For example, though the Anglo-American
cooperation in intelligence matters goes back to the Napoleonic Wars, most scholars like
to stress how all intramural spying was (allegedly? temporarily?) discontinued during the
war against the Nazi-Fascist axis. After this war and with the beginning of a war against
communism, intelligence-sharing was institutionalized across the Anglosphere core, first
with the establishment of the UKUSA agreement (1947-8) and then with the
Echelon/ABCA agreement.\textsuperscript{157} The 1958 Anglo-American agreement on mutual defence
opened US nuclear know-how to Britain and deepened the AASR across all kinds of
defence policies (the agreement was renewed in 2004).

Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech of March 5, 1946 is universally regarded as the
first public invocation of the idea of specialness among English-speaking peoples. What
is significant from the Anglosphere perspective is that it came \textit{after} Washington
terminated lend-lease and nuclear cooperation a year earlier, much to the displeasure of
London. Indeed, the cooling-off of the wartime partnership – as well as the attempt of
the US State Department to distance itself from a call for the creation of the Anglosphere
(as an entity based on a common citizenship) – must read against the fact that the Iron
Curtain/AASR speech was a collective affair. British foreign minister Bevin and US
President Truman, who Churchill met in February, were given a say in the drafting of the
speech. The AASR idea resonated with more than a few Anglo-American elites, even

\textsuperscript{157} I cannot possibly due justice to this literature. On intelligence cooperation, see Burke (2007: 213-509-14) and Raynolds (2006: 320-1).
though it is no doubt true that American public opinion did not care about it at the time (Gilbert 1988: 159-220; Harbutt 1986: 152, 159-82, 182-208).

Arguably, America’s engagement of the Soviets followed the turn of the twentieth century blueprint on the imperial alliance between the US and Britain. While US behavior in the early years of the Cold War can be explained as a reaction to Soviet expansion – and talk of expansion – in Europe and Asia, there is no question that this reaction had a strong Anglospheric flavour to it, at least as far as Europe is concerned. In Southeastern Europe, in early 1947, Washington bombastically “took over” from London in the task of making sure Greece and Turkey remained non-communist (the Truman Doctrine). The next year, elsewhere on the continent, Washington endorsed a Canadian proposal for a North Atlantic defence treaty and, with together with London, moved to airlift supplies to the besieged West Berlin. If the Cold War turned hot at the time, counterfactually submits one historian, “Britain would not have to wait for Pearl Harbor” (Ovendale 1985: 84). Why the cooperation among the Anglosphere states in Asia lagged behind that in Europe is the question I explore in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5

ANZUS, BRITAIN, AND THE “PACIFIC PACT”

I did not like the ANZUS Pact at all.
Winston Churchill (House of Commons, June 17, 1953)

New Zealanders belong to a branch of New World civilization,
the main centres of which are Sydney, San Francisco, and Auckland – the Pacific Triangle.
Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (1959: 276)

We are a European, Western civilisation with strong links with North America, but here we are in Asia.

The foremost security institution of the Anglosphere in Asia-Pacific is ANZUS
(Australia-New Zealand-United States), a military pact created in 1951. In the genealogy of the Anglosphere, ANZUS is important because it symbolizes a failure of the core states to act in unison. Despite being present at the creation and despite official requests for membership, Britain nevertheless came to be excluded from the one multilateral security pact in the region with claims to collective defence. This outcome is puzzling from the perspective of Australia’s and New Zealand’s (NZ) self-other relations: how was it possible for the Self to say no to the “motherland”? True, Australia and NZ entered a security treaty without Britain once before, only that this was an arrangement between Australia and NZ, signed in 1944. The process by which English-speaking states cooperate with each other through security institutions is central to the understanding of what makes the Anglosphere possible. In this chapter, I examined the Anglosphere within the context of the drafting of ANZUS. What interests me is how how both Australian and NZ decision-makers justified British exclusion in front of their
audiences. In other wordst, how did Canberra and Wellington legitimize membership in a security institution from which Britain was deliberately excluded?

In the historiography, this question can be seen as an aspect of the so-called Anzac dilemma, a term that superbly captures the identity politics behind the putative shift of NZ and Australian alliance portfolios from Britain to the US. Extant accounts of the origins of ANZUS are based on a basic bargaining model, which sees the pact as a half-way point between America’s desire to enlist support in containing communism and Australia’s craving for a superpower’s long-term guarantee against any future invasion from Asia (McIntyre 1995). A larger regional pact – what the contemporaries called the “Pacific Pact” and what IR theorists counterfactually call “NATO in Asia” – was never fully actualized, primarily because of racialized identities. Using a crude and retrospective language, the white man’s states did not trust their Asian allies and vice versa (Acharya 2005; Capie 2003; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).

As for British exclusion from ANZUS, the explanation has not changed over the last fifty years. The exclusion, in a nutshell, was only nominal. Though ANZUS never became ANZUSUK, London was granted an informal membership or, as its diplomats called it, a “silent partnership” in the pact (Williams 1987: 253). Indeed, historians found that the very acronym ANZUS was in fact coined in Foreign Office, in October 1950 (McIntyre 1995: 286-7; Lowe 1999: 78). And the former colonies knew how to show

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158 Anzac stands for the combination for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps who fought in World War I. The historian F.L.W. Wood introduced the term Anzac dilemma in 1953 to describe Australian and NZ alliance politics (McIntyre 1995: 396-402; McKinnon 1993: 117; Millar 1991: 175-6; Waite 2006: 899). The argument that ANZUS represents a “switch” or “shift” in allegiances from Britain to the US makes sense only if one superficially specifies national identity and/or national interest and then heroically asserts that it is possible to identify a pristine point in the resolution of the Anzac dilemma in favor of the US. On these issues, see, inter alia, Bell (1988: 45), Bridge (1991: 2), and Day (1996: 47).
their respect to the motherland – by sending a carbon copy of every single diplomatic
one NZ official observed: “nothing could be done in ANZUS which the United Kingdom
did not know about” (McKinnon 1993: 122, n. 42).

Having weakened neither Commonwealth ties nor the functioning of the Anglo-
American “special relationship,” “British exclusion” from ANZUS cannot possibly
invalidate the Anglosphere. Further, negotiations within the Pacific Pact were both
historically compounded as to provide no valuable explanatory insight to the question of
what makes or breaks the Anglosphere in the realm of security cooperation. For one,
Britain almost made it to the club in April 1946, when an American-Commonwealth
Pacific Pact was briefly discussed by all four governments (McIntyre 1995: Ch. 1, 172-
4). And even if such Pact had come into existence, it would have probably served as
“something of an interim measure along the road to a more comprehensive regional
security arrangement” (Ibid.: 400; also see Lowe 1999: 77-9; Meaney 2007: 409; O’Neill
1981: 200, Waite 2006: 903). Indeed, in 1953 the four Anglosphere states joined France
in a strategic planning forum blandly named the Five Power Staff Agency. In 1954 came
the more famous South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a NATO-like pact
which linked ANZUS members to Britain as well as France, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Thailand.

Though we now see it as overdetermined, short-lived, and by all means nominal,
in the mindset of the decision-makers who talked about it in 1950, British exclusion from
ANZUS was a gravely serious matter. Under the Attlee government, London never

159 This is another long-standing historiographic consensus (McHenry and Rosecrance 1958: 328, also see
Meaney 2007; Trotter 2007).
interpreted exclusion as a loss for Britain. But the Churchill government, however, went to considerable lengths to gain formal membership in the pact, all of which were politely rebuffed (McIntyre 1995: 362-3; Williams 1987: 255-9). When he failed to obtain full membership in September 1952, Churchill loudly protested and the British press approvingly noticed (See clippings in NA, FO 371/101240-1). Such was the unease in Churchill’s cabinet about exclusion from the pact that foreign secretary Eden reportedly welcomed SEATO partly because it “remove[d] the anomaly of our exclusion from ANZUS” (cited in Williams 1987: 260, also see McIntyre 1995: 383-4). In Australia and NZ, many voices, both in the government and opposition, anticipated and echoed Churchill’s dissatisfaction. So how did ANZUS go ahead? My argument is that the Korean War destabilized what had been the Britishness of Australia and such that it enabled an independent foreign policy decision and direction away from Britain in the Pacific Pact negotiations. The Anzac dilemma was resolved by what was basically the Anglosphere argument par excellence. In the global alliance of English-speaking states, the frame held, there could be no trade-off between the historical ties of the British Empire and the US-led future. Any security gain achieved by Australia and NZ through ANZUS was simultaneously a gain for Britain as well.

Before I move on, let me clarify the designations: first, my label for the region is Asia-Pacific, which I believe is more historically accurate than the term Asia. Second, ANZUS retains the original name, but no longer includes New Zealand, here referred to by its acronym rather than by the historically more exotic but presently equally valid

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160 American decision-makers, whose texts Hemmer and Katzenstein examined, referred to the region as the “Pacific Area” (McIntyre 1995: Ch. 9; McMahon 1999: Ch. 3). On the elasticity of the Asia-Pacific region, see Edwards (2003) and Evans and Capie, eds., (2007).
Aotearoa (cf. Reeves 1924/1950). Third, retrospectively, I will use the term Commonwealth interchangeably with the British Commonwealth and the Commonwealth of Nations.\textsuperscript{161}

MODERN DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

In 1950, Australia and NZ shared a dominant master discourse of identity, which can be labeled as “modern democracy.” The Self was deeply committed to a form of liberal democracy in which the autonomy of the individual was best served by a state where the power to rule is checked by the rule of law. No text in my archive questioned the desirability of growth, progress and civilization, defined as a movement towards ever-greater security and prosperity in which material needs were ranked ahead of other needs. Restrictions on reading, drinking, dining and shopping were meant to protect the nuclear family, an institution ideally governed by a male individual with a stable job and fixed in a stand-alone home in something called a suburb.

National identity was significantly grounded in ethnicity/race, language and religion. These three axes of meaning were compounded such that frequently used signifiers referred to two or even all three simultaneously: English, British, Anglo-Saxon, Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian. Australian texts also integrated Anglo-Celtic and Catholic, while NZ texts talked of Aryanism.\textsuperscript{162} Anglo-Saxon, the word examined in the

\textsuperscript{161} A declaration made by eight “Commonwealth Prime Ministers” in April 1949 (Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, NZ, South Africa, Pakistan and United Kingdom) begins with the term “British Commonwealth” but ends with the “Commonwealth of Nations,” which heretofore became official. Empire was the unofficial synonym (e.g., English 1992: 27-8).

\textsuperscript{162} That Aryanism incorporated the Māori was a belief unique to NZ and can be seen as one aspect of a discourse that saw NZ as the mix of the crème de la crème of Europe and South Pacific, of the northern and southern Vikings respectively (cf. Belich 2001: Ch. 6).
previous chapter, was a much-used category for understanding the world of 1950 Australia and NZ. For example, New Caledonia was a “French island in an Anglo-Saxon Ocean” (*Age*, April 22) and “Anglo-Saxon traditions” existed in literature (*Meanjin* 9: 1, p. 47). The cultural heterogeneity within the British Isles was glossed over, as in Clune’s *Hiroshima*, where Irishness fit perfectly with British nationalism. (In NZ, texts also glossed over the presence of the specifically Māori Ratana, as the third largest church in terms of membership in 1950, behind Anglicans and Catholics.) Few texts questioned the relevance of racialized identities in politics and society and many argued that modern democracy served white racial progress.

One important finding is that nearly all texts in my archive located Australian and NZ subjects firmly within the British Empire or the global community of the so-called British peoples, Anglo-Saxons or “‘white nations’ of the British Commonwealth and the US,’ (*Australian Quarterly* 22: 2 [June], p. 32). In the reporting on the British Empire Games (February) as well as the Royal Visit 1952 (September), “we” and “they” shifted seamlessly back and forth, demonstrating an inordinate degree of interoperability between the metropolitan and colonial identities.\(^{163}\) If one word can describe the content of Australian and NZ selves in 1950, it would be the adjective British. The effect of Britishness was felt in immigration policy, where the official “White Australia” policy was only slowly taking over the unofficial *British* Australia policy. The situation in NZ was similar, except that the non-British intake concentrated on the Dutch who were regarded as closest to the British (*NZ Herald*, July 8). The expectations for non-British

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\(^{163}\) British colonies were close and positive. Canada, for instance, came out as slightly more modern, as in social and economic rights or environmental protection (*Argus*, November 4; *Walkabout*, June 1).
newcomers were high: not only did one have to speak English, but he or she had to be English-like. In a photo caption entitled “Ernst, Hank, Oleg, and Jurij,” one newspaper explained that all immigrant boys were supposed to learn the “national code” by learning to play football (Advertiser, April 1; also see Age, April 22, Man, June 1950). Identical assimilation was expected in the case of the Aboriginals and Pacific islanders.164

On the distance axis, the US trailed after Britain, more so in Australia than in NZ. The second closest Other for NZ was Australia, though it was understood as less positive and less close than Britain, followed by the US (Belich 2001: 251-4, 318; Trotter 2007: 416). In every-day theories of history, Australia and NZ were Britain’s “daughters” as well as America’s “sisters” or at least “cousins.”165 On the value axis, the US overtook Britain in areas such as the steel industry or cheap entertainment, though clearly not in, say, higher education or sports and recreation. For many Australians and New Zealanders, who regarded London as their capital, America and Americans looked immature and sometimes primitive.166 What is indicative for the Anglosphere story overall is a general lack of nuance over the differences between, on the one hand, the Australian/NZ Self and the British and US Others, on the other hand. A sufficiently high degree of mutuality and certainty in these identity triangles was typically assumed, but


165 American-authored books on Australia reciprocated these beliefs: Australians and Americans shared the “same mentality” and that what brought them together were both “rational and irrational” elements (e.g., Levi 1947: 48, 84; also see Grattan, ed., 1947).

166 See, e.g., a text on Hollywood in Argus (November 4) or NZ Herald (July 8). For a columnist in Man (May), the US was a “boy suddenly called upon to assume a man-size responsibility.”
not explained. Consider a *Walkabout* passage on the opening of the trans-Australian railway in 1912 (March 1):

As a part of the ceremony three rockets were fired – one releasing an Australian flag, one a Union Jack, and one of the Stars and Stripes. Thus in an atmosphere of international amity which in the light of subsequent events was almost prophetic.

Examples are indeed plentiful: *Meanjin* (9:1, Autumn, p. 47) never justified why Australian literature should be situated between English and American; *Sydney Morning Herald* (January 9) never explained why Miss Australia was modeled after Miss America, why Australian knowledge on the history of electricity depended on what Americans and British already knew or why, ultimately, should Australians raise the Australian American Memorial in Canberra. As one historian observes, the belief in the US as a “bastion of civilisation” was on the rise in the postwar years, but this rise did not necessarily imply a decline of belief in Britain, which was accorded a similar role (Lowe 1999: 108). Next after the US in proximity and distance came the West and, during the Korean War, the UN. The same observation applies to the NZ archive.

In a direct comparison of Australian versus NZ discourses, it is important to note two observations. First, Australia was a more important partner to NZ than vice versa. The terms used to pair the two states such as trans-Tasman neighbors, Antipodeans or Anzac were far more frequent in NZ. In NZ, the Australian Other signified greater economic and intellectual opportunity (though certainly not as great as that available in Britain), but ironically NZ saw itself as *more* modern. A latent sense of superiority was
reflected in writings on social security, gender and indigeneity. In one example, the abolition of the Legislative Council, the upper chamber of the parliament in August (with the intention to re-create it at some future date) was explained in terms of democratization (the Council had been populated by appointment, not election), but also with respect to size – in contrast to Australia, NZ saw itself as small and, curiously, “homogeneous” (*Dominion*, August 19).

Second, in NZ, Britain was understood as overwhelmingly positive and close. In Australia, the identification with Britain was more circumscribed. That Britain was by far the most positive and closest significant Other in the period under study is evidenced in the debates on anything from national health care reform (*Age*, May 29) to primary education (e.g., Tierney’s *Spencer Button*) to theatre (*Meanjin* 9: 1, Autumn) and skirt lengths (*Argus*, August 11). High public approval of the idea and practice of British citizenship or “loyalty” to Britain was evident when the word “British” was restored on Australian passports (*Age*, February 20) or in the way the Melbournians demanded that a German-owned theatre must play “God Save the King” before shows (*Argus*, November 4). But in contrast to the NZ archive, more texts questioned Australian ties to the mother country and debated the word independence. In reflections on WWII, “Singapore” was a byword for British insolence. Japan’s “downward thrust” in Asia weighed British power and found it wanting. Nearly all Australian authors were irked by London’s failure to

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167 In 1950, in NZ a Māori woman could be appointed a minister, while Australia had had no female ministers, state or federal before 1951 and no political representation of the Aboriginals and/or Torres Straits Islanders until the late 1960s. The comparative success of race relations in NZ was also reflected in rugby, where indigenous men could play with whites. In my reading of popular books, the treatment of the Māori was comparatively sympathetic and informed.
defend its main naval base in the Pacific in February 1942.\textsuperscript{168} Recent war history furnished one rationale for independence, but this was an independence of a shareholder, always invoked with respect to a wider community of British peoples or race. Independence outside imperial and post-colonial ties was utterly meaningless. The same holds for NZ, but note that “Singapore” barely surfaced in NZ texts. In the same vein, note that while these two Anglosphere states waited a half century to legally declare Britain a “foreign country,” Wellington was always slower to ratify the independence-granting Statute of Westminster from 1931 (in fact, at the time of writing, the British Privy Council is still the court of last resort for NZ).

Anchoring the opposite ends of the distance and value continua was the East, ultimately seen as Asian and communist.\textsuperscript{169} On the one hand, Asia was a byword for Japanese militarism, as shown in Clune’s \textit{Hiroshima}, Shute’s \textit{Alice} and Reeves’ \textit{Cloud}. On the other hand, Asia was gendered or paternalized: “Asiatics” were poverty-stricken, helpless, and “youthful and still uneasy”; like immigrants at home, ready to be converted into “good neighbors” (\textit{Canberra Times}, July 15). More uniformly threatening was communism, and for two main reasons. First, nuclear weapons took away the safety of distance: Soviet submarines, argued one military man, would soon be able to nuke

\textsuperscript{168} The British, on their part, appreciated the validity of Australia’s disappointment (McIntyre 1995: 329). Debates over the Britishness of Australia and NZ have been consistent since the first day of settlement. For Australia, see surveys in Meaney (2001), Ward 2001: Ch. 2. For NZ, see Belich (2001) and McKinnon (1993)

\textsuperscript{169} Note here that while it was fashionable to question the meaning of obviously non-local signifiers Near, Middle, and Far East, it was decidedly not fashionable to accept the geographic logic and place of Australia and NZ in the East. Within the dominant discourse, the limits of resistance was a cheeky observation, usually attributed to Prime Minister Menzies in April 1939, that Britain’s Far East is Australia’s “Near North.” (On a closer reading, rather than undermining Australia’s Britishness, the frivolousness of the statement in fact sustains it).
Australia’s capital cities. Second, unlike the Asian Other, communism was simultaneously external and internal. Modern democracy allowed for variations of democracy – not only capitalist and liberal, but also social, Christian, fair, Keynesian, paternalist, welfare, confederate, egalitarian and so on – but a revolutionary form of democracy advocated by communists was never one of them. What matters here is that the radical changes in international politics appeared related to the radical changes in labour relations, just as Hardy’s *Glory* seemed related – even implicated – in the generally popular Communist Party dissolution bills. In the age of “total war,” it was reasoned, “home defence has a wider meaning” (*Sydney Morning Herald*, August 4).

That fall, the Menzies government securitized Australian communists as “enemies” and “traitorous minority” for whom there will be “no sanctuary.” A siege mentality followed: apart from communism – rather, as a part of a war on communism – Australia fought two more “enemies” at home: inflation (*Australian Quarterly* 22: 1, March 1950, p. 119) and rabbits, who one state agriculture minister promised to eradicate “paddock by paddock” (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 November). The debate on communism was less

170 The response to this threat was a defence spending spree, perceived as long overdue: Australian defence forces used to be the “flower of Australian manhood” but were now serviced by “second-rate men.” (*Canberra Times*, June 15). Best Australian men, in other words, belonged in the military. The Soviet Union or “Russia robed for the world stage” (*Man* 27: 6, May) was perceived more as European than “Asiatic,” as shown in a comparison of the Soviet and French revolutions (*Age*, April 22) or reflections on Russian literature (*Meanjin* 9: 1, Autumn).

intense in NZ, but its newspapers duly counted numbers of “man-days” lost to strikes and some editorials attributing “militancy” and the loss of “industrial peace” to “Commos” or “Communist wreckers.” (In 1951, the NZ government declared a state of emergency over a waterfront strike.) One espionage case also showed that “no communist can be trusted” (NZ Herald, March 3).

Table 5.1. schematizes the main self-other relations from the perspective of Australian and NZ discourse on modern democracy. In terms of foreign policy options, the discourse implied alliances with the English-speaking states, against communism, Soviet and otherwise. Russian and Chinese communists were usually – but not always – perceived as a “team” (Sydney Morning Herald, January 11; cf. Argus, August 11), but it was the international and transnational quality of communism that turned into a threat of the highest order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value/Recognition</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Close [←]</th>
<th>[→] Distant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive [+]</td>
<td>Full Recognition</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>U.S. and, for NZ, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(equality)</td>
<td>Old Commonwealth</td>
<td>U.N./Korean War (e.g., Canada, South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative [–]</td>
<td>Partial Recognition (inequality)</td>
<td>Soviet communism (&amp; China)</td>
<td>Asia/Japan, for NZ, - for Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Commonwealth (e.g., India)</td>
<td>Asia/New independents (e.g., Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asian communism</td>
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Table 5.1 International self-other relations in Australian and NZ discourse, 1950
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the government declared:

The danger to us goes deeper than when the Japanese almost reached Australia. If Japan had succeeded then, Britain or America might have rescued us. But from a world of tyranny there could be no rescue (Message from the Prime Minister, Advertiser, October 3).

What was comforting, however, was the fact that the US superpower saw communism as dangerous and “alien.” The opinion polls of the day suggest, in fact, that the idea of American alliance was directly related to the fear of international communism.\(^{172}\) As I will show below, once the Korean War broke out, the alterities of Asia and communism blended into a powerful brew which threw Australia and NZ into the arms of the US. But if ANZUS was enabled by Korea, what, then, enabled British exclusion from this treaty?

THE UNMAKING OF THE PACIFIC PACT

The traditional view of the ANZUS historiography submits the so-called *quid pro quo* explanation: with the Korean War in full swing, the US moved to enlist regional support in containing communism through a series of pacts, beginning with a “peace with reconciliation” with Japan (Umetsu 2004: 172; McLean 2006: 70. This view has been revised in light of declassified archival documents and it is now understood that “ANZUS motives” were far more complex (McIntyre 1995: 346-7). My look at these additional motives begins with Australian and NZ foreign policy debates over three ideal-typical keywords: the Anzac dilemma, communism, and Asian expansionism.

\(^{172}\) See Australian Public Opinion Polls (APOP), nos. 690-9 (June-July 1950). Communism was the top problem in Australian polls, until the late 1951 (Ibid., numbers 822-34, December 1951-January 1952). Polls were conducted by Morgan-Gallup and can be found at the National Archives of Australia (NAA). For an index, see Beed and Goot (1983).
Traditionally dominant in foreign policy debates was “Britishness” or “race patriotism,” a discourse which called for the primacy of the British Commonwealth/Empire. Consisting of Britain and its dominions and colonies (former and otherwise), the British Commonwealth by a hierarchy, depicted in the concentric circles. The nucleus consisted of Britain and “old” (i.e. white, “the real and original”) dominions, while the “New Commonwealth” (e.g., Ceylon, India, Pakistan) and the remaining imperial possessions belonged to the outer circles. In this geography, the Commonwealth’s “outposts,” “bastions,” or “custodians” in Asia-Pacific were Australia and NZ. To appreciate the grip of Britishness at the time, consider that some Anzac officials in Japan and the US who insisted at being introduced as “representatives of Britain” (Belich 2001: 319; McLean 2006: 72; McKenzie 2006: 566); that Menzies automatically accepted the British request for atomic bomb tests on Australian soil (Martin 1999: 166-8, for tacit NZ cooperation on the matter, see McKinnon 1993: 130-1); or that the NZ government demanded the continuation of wartime rationing so that a “protein bridge” – a constant supply of agricultural products to Britain – could continue even long after WWII ended (In fact, Prime Minister Holland once offered NZ meat to Britain for free [McKinnon 1993: 114; 99-101; Belich 2001]). The foreign policy implication of this discourse was simple: “where Britain goes we go” (Belich 2001: 320; McKinnon 1993: 113; Trotter 2007: 414). A foreign policy that fell outside the

173 The British Commonwealth was also preferable to the simple Commonwealth and the majority asked for British, not Australian citizenship. See APOP, nos. 47-9 (November-December 1947); 775-87 (July 1951); and 788-99 (August-September 1951). Empire, while officially anachronistic, was a much-preferred term in private documents.
Commonwealth framework, in this discourse, constituted a problem; in the case of the so-called “American alliance,” it constituted an “Anzac dilemma.”

The alternative discourse – “internationalism” – argued that a continuing adherence to the Commonwealth did not prevent the pursuit of new roles. In NZ, internationalism was marginal and mostly confined to the texts authored by the Labour Party, but in Australia it was ascendant, as reflected in the texts authored by politically diverse individuals such as External Affairs ministers Spender and Casey, opposition leader Evatt and academics like Peter Russo.174 The new roles varied, from the “middle power” in the brand new United Nations system (Evatt) to the “metropolitan power” and “good neighbor” in Asia-Pacific (Spender). This discourse implied a range of foreign policy choices, from the traditional emphasis on British race patriotism and the defence of a civilization of English-speaking, Christian states to the local-patriotic “de-dominionization” and de-colonization (though not with respect to the British Empire).

One common denominator in all of these choices was the American alliance, also known as the “American guarantee.” For example, Spender argued that any postwar Pacific settlement was all but “meaningless” without the US and that Australia needed “to have a relationship with the United States the same as it had with Britain” (McIntyre 1995: 259; FRUS 1951 VI Asia and the Pacific, p. 138, also see Lowe 2001: 190). The key internationalist argument was that the Anzac dilemma was a fantasy. Because a unity of purpose existed among the English-speaking nations in Asia-Pacific, Spender argued, the

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174 Paradigmatic to internationalism was the foreign policy review conducted under Percy Spender Australian Hansard’s, vol. 206 (1950), 621-4; Address to the Australian-American association, 20 March 1950, Current Notes on International Affairs 21: 30 (March), 226-7; cf. Spender (1972: 320). To be sure, there was a difference between the US and the UN. A 1949 book written by Richard Casey on the future of Australian foreign policies brackets everyone else but the Commonwealth and the US (Lowe 1999: 83).
American alliance could only “strengthen and not weaken the British Commonwealth in the Pacific.” I will return to the debate over the Anzac dilemma below.

The debate on how to interpret “communism” and “Asian expansionism” significantly blurred the line between Britishness and internationalism. That communism stood as a threat to national survival was a matter of fact and both discourses understood international politics – identified as the Cold War – as an uneasy truce between “Western civilization” and communist imperialism. More important, both discourses also agreed that communism was historically continuous with Asian expansionism, a racialized security threat to the survival of Australia and NZ. In fact, so important was this confluence of the Asian and communist Otherness in Australian and NZ debates over foreign policy that it caused the failure of the wider Pacific Pact.

Consider, first, the Australian reactions to proposals for an Asia-Pacific defence pact and economic and technical assistance to Southeast Asia, made at the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ conference in Colombo in January 1950. Australian’s new foreign minister Spender enthusiastically endorsed the latter proposal. On a premise that “peace is indivisible,” Spender argued the best way to combat communism in Australia’s neighborhood was to offer economic and technical aid

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176 Australian historiography is quick to chalk up the Colombo plan as “Spender’s Plan,” but the idea was equally shared by the British diplomats and was modeled on the US Marshall Plan for Europe (Oakman 2004). The authorship of the defence pact is disputed. Compare a history of ANZUS in the note by J.B. Hunt in Far East Department, Foreign Office, FE 36/37/2 (November 12, 1952), to Spender’s address to parliament on 20 March 1950, in Current Notes in International Affairs 20: 3 (March), pp. 226-9. A Pacific Plan was probably first imagined by/in Australia’s government in 1949, but ANZUS was first officially discussed in September 1950, when Spender met with US President Truman (O’Neill 1981: 111; cf. Spender 1969: 40-67).
to the newly established Asian governments (*Sydney Morning Herald*, January 16). At home, his argument fell flat. The press bought neither the idea of peace indivisibility nor that of a common neighborhood. *A Bulletin* (January 11) editorial suggested that

> Asia has been unstable ever since Australia has existed as a country…so long as the dominating air power and sea power remain in the hands of the English-speaking peoples and their Western European allies, as they do today, the centre of gravity of the world must lie in their centres of production and not with the seething masses of Asia, which are, at the present and will be for years, incapable of overseas aggression far beyond their borders (cited in Lowe 1999: 54-5).

Even the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which had earlier shown enthusiasm for Colombo (as well as Spender), felt the need to remind the government that “Our religious faith, our national philosophy, and our whole way of life, are alien to Asia” (January 22). Now consider the interaction of racialized identity and strategy in the making of the Pacific Pact. In December 1950, John Foster Dulles, then America’s official Asia-Pacific troubleshooter, submitted a proposal for a “Pacific Ocean Pact” encompassing Australia, NZ, the Philippines, Japan and “possibly” Indonesia. The pact was to concentrate on the island states in the region (hence the alternative label the “Island Chain” concept). Dulles insisted that Japan should be a member because he and his president believed that the so-called “peace with reconciliation” – also known as “soft” or “liberal” peace with Japan – was seen a *sine qua non* of a long-term “Pacific settlement.” The oft-cited precedent for this move was West Germany, a vanquished enemy turned into an ally for the purpose of defending Western civilization against communism.

> In public, Dulles and his team argued that the Pacific Pact, like all of America’s alliances, would be made up of states, not nations. This was supposed to a strong post-racist, post-colonial message. But what made the statement possible in public was a great
deal of nation-talk in private. The diplomatic travaux préparatoires show how Washington gave Westminster a cold shoulder over ANZUS precisely because of its national make-up. As Dulles explained to the British ambassador in March 1951, America could not accept “a closed club for Anglo-Saxons” in Asia-Pacific (McIntyre 1995: 334). Even the inclusion of the Philippines, Dulles reasoned, made no public relations gain because this island nation was widely perceived, in a selection of his own appellations, as America’s “ward,” “little friend,” “stooge” or “stepchild.” Conversely, Dulles liked Indonesia, which he described as “more truly representative of Asia” (McIntyre 1995: 297). Racialized identity, in my reading, appeared as important as strategy in international security cooperation: Britain was excluded from the American alliance not because of its colonial commitments to the Asian mainland (e.g., Malaya) but because it looked too Anglo-Saxon.

For Australia and NZ, racialized identity mattered a great deal as well. First, Dulles’ West Germany-Japan parallel made no sense to Canberra and Wellington. In Australia’s racialized discourse at home, the former Germany enemy was a much closer and more positive relative to the former Japanese enemy: while West Germany was “recovering,” Japan was itching for a future revanche (Sydney Morning Herald, August 4). One External Affairs advisor supplied the following understatement: “Our acceptance of this, which would turn Japan from an enemy into a firm ally overnight, would give rise to political complications in Australia” (cited in Umetsu 2004: 180). Indeed, there is no shortage of evidence that Australian decision-makers believed that Asian allies like Japan and Indonesia would probably turn against Western democracies if the Cold War turned
hot. Second, any British exclusion automatically implied any Asian exclusion. For one NZ diplomat, an alliance with the Philippines or Indonesia but not Britain – what was called a “limited Pacific Pact” – was simply “unthinkable” (McIntyre 1995: 263). For the NZ Cabinet, such a pact was thinkable, but “disastrous” (Trotter 2007: 420). So between the unthinkable and the disastrous, in the words of prime minister, “by far the best solution” was a tripartite alliance – ANZUS.

The negotiations which produced the first draft of ANZUS in February 1951 could therefore be read as a battle of two ontologies of security. Dulles and his team argued, in public at least, that all the island states of the Pacific could help contain communism. In other words, there was no reason to a priori exclude any Asian allies from membership in the security treaty. From the Anzac perspective, however, the “yellow peril” in 1950 looked far more dangerous than the “red peril.” The Americans simply failed to appreciate the ultimate source of threat: communism was no doubt as bad as Japanese militarism, but both were forms of “Asian expansionism,” a term which, the Anzac diplomats admitted “could not be said publicly.” In this ontology, neither Japan nor states like the Philippines were acceptable members of the alliance. In short, ANZUS’ “real objective was an American guarantee against Asian expansionism from

177 See Lowe (1999: 51, 56, n. 60) and Meaney (2007: 406). Menzies’ speech in parliament on 30 May 1950 indicatively argued that if Malaya turned communist, Indonesia would too, with the net effect being Asian dominance over Australia (reprinted in Current Notes on International Affairs 21:5, May, pp. 353-5).

178 NZ Prime Minister Holland in DNZER III: 573-4, 582-4, 586; Also see Spender to United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra, 12 February 1951, PRO DO35/2927.

179 This findings is easily supported in the secondary literature (Cheesman 1999: 278; McLean 2006: 68; Meaney 2007: 400; Lowe 1999: 67).

any quarter” (McIntyre 1995: 333; italics in the original). From the perspective of the Anglosphere, the swiftness by which the boundaries of the security pact were closed against its potential Asian members demonstrates the resonance of the oldfangled ideas on the superiority of the white/Anglo-Saxon race.

Australian and NZ officials were remarkably successful in making their case to Washington. Dulles and his team, initially instructed to lend the pact an “air of colour respectability,” eventually gave up on Asian membership (Williams 1987: 245, 248). Even the inclusion of the Philippines, America’s junior partner in Asia if there ever was any, had to be abandoned. Public documents suggest that Canberra and Wellington rebuffed Philippine demands for inclusion on the grounds of the shortage of time and money, but internal memos indicate deep doubts in the “stability” as well as “importance” of Asian governments (McIntyre 1995: 255, 259, 267-8, 302). For one NZ diplomat, in fact, the idea of a Philippine proposal was a “farce” (Ibid.: 1995: 250). The Anzac campaign to restrict the nature of the pact had direct consequences for the finale of the postwar Pacific settlement saga in San Francisco in August and September 1951. So instead of the single Pacific Pact it sought, Washington signed three separate treaties, nearly simultaneously: the US-Philippines mutual defence pact, the Japanese peace treaty and ANZUS, a pact “about Asia” but not ‘of Asia’” (Lowe 1999: 81). Later, during the

181 Perceptions of other Asian states were arguably even more distant and negative, considering that texts established the Philippines as “unique as the only Christian democracy in the Far East” (Advertiser, April 1). In Asia, race easily trumped religion.

182 British wishes also mattered. Officially, Britain insisted that the closeness of the US-Philippine relationship made any formalization of that relationship redundant. But from internal memos, it can be deduced that Britain worried about losing prestige if Manila was to be included over London in a Pacific Pact (McIntyre 1995: 327-31, 335; McLean 1990; McKinnon 1993: 121).
Eisenhower administration, the pact of Asia was revived, partly on the basis of America’s need for “colour respectability” in the eyes of the world.

But this is not where my story on the impact of identity in security cooperation ends. The discursive consensus that existed on communism-cum-Asian expansionism in Australian and NZ foreign policy debates correctly predicts the creation of ANZUS, but leaves out the issue of British exclusion. From the identity standpoint, the hard problem of foreign policy was not the relationship between Asia and communism but the aforementioned Anzac dilemma. In the next section, I consider how three new events shaped the resolution of this dilemma: the recognition of the People’s Republic of China, the Malayan emergency and the Korean War. Each of these events could be read as a debate on the fit between identity and the perceived reality and what they cumulatively achieved was to render the Anzac dilemma false. What Australia and NZ learned in these debates was that foreign policy independence and Britishness were not mutually exclusive options in international security cooperation.

NEW EVENTS, OLD PERILS

The recognition of China, a major Cold War issue, can be seen as the first new event of 1950. In January, Britain attempted to take advantage of the Colombo conference to have the entire Commonwealth recognize the communist government in Beijing. The only taker was India; among the rest, Australia and NZ adamantly rejected the policy. Internationalism trumped Britishness, but only after the non-recognition was framed as loyalty to British identity itself. Britain’s Foreign Office, in this view, was worried too much about British commercial interest in China and too little about British anti-
communist identity. One diplomat in Willington believed that “New Zealand alone had saved the Commonwealth from complete disgrace” (cited in Belich 2001: 319). Similar debate took place later in the year over the question of sanctions. In response to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the US demanded UN sanctions, but Britain disagreed, fearing an escalation. In Canberra and Wellington, judging by the text authored by government officials, internationalists prevailed once again, describing the British as too soft.\textsuperscript{183} Due to an overwhelming anti-communist, anti-Asia discourse at home, the non-recognition of China was a fitting policy choice, regardless of what the motherland’s Foreign Office wanted.

Next came the so-called Malayan emergency, a communist-led guerilla uprising against the British colonial rule in Australia’s neighborhood. As the British outpost in the region, as well as parties to a secret joint defence planning arrangement with Britain of 1949 known as ANZAM (Australia-NZ-Malaya), the Anzacs were obliged to help contain the communist uprising. Sending troops would have been an obvious Anzac response were it not for an additional request. In addition to ongoing contingencies (the Berlin blockade) and emergencies (Malaya), the British were asking for a “permanent” military commitment to the “vital” Middle East area.\textsuperscript{184}

Australian foreign policy elites decided to debate London’s request at some length. Should their limited military resources be concentrated in the geographically faraway Middle East or the nearby Southeast Asia? Britishness, epitomized in the figure

\textsuperscript{183} This Anzac dilemma was exogenously resolved when, in February 1951, the UN reached a compromise resolution calling for sanctions with optional enforcement, thus harmonizing the divergent policy positions at home.

\textsuperscript{184} The demand was historically continuous with imperial foreign policy, but was motivated by a more contemporary desire to keep oil fields out of the hands of communists and/or nationalists (Louis 1984).
of Prime Minister Menzies, implied loyalty to traditions: dual commitment was one such
tradition, despite sour memories of Singapore in 1942. Internationalism, represented in
the voice of Foreign Minister Spender, called for a policy shift, away from the British
interests in the Middle East and toward American “containment” in Asia (McIntyre 1995:
190; Lowe 1999: 59-62, 2001: 193). The main debate went on between April and June,
but the decision was made in December. Despite the objectively more proximate and
ongoing conflicts in Malaya and Korea – and despite the fact that the memories of
Singapore were refreshed by the tenth anniversary of Pearl Harbor - the Australian
government, by a Cabinet majority vote, committed its best troops to sit and wait in the
Middle East. Canberra contributed an air force contingent as well as military aid to
colonial authorities in Malaya, but greater resources in the end went to the Middle East.
The internationalist reading failed to frame the Middle East deployment as a misfit with
the Australian Self. What made this frame difficult, I submit, was the nebulousness of
the American commitment to the Asian mainland, as compared to the familiarity of the
Middle East option. I will return to this claim in a moment.

Across the Tasman Sea, there was no debate: the Middle East contribution was re-
affirmed in April 1950 (DNZER III: 536-7). The government promptly agreed to send
troops to the Middle East, at a cost of a referendum on conscription no less.185 In private,
a note left behind by one NZ diplomat quipped:

My mind still finds it difficult to reconcile the arrangements we are
making –An agreement for the Pacific, but commitment in reality in an
area of the M[iddle] E[ast] where we have no representation and no
intelligence of our Own…I have the feeling that we [are] getting into a

185 For the entire background, see Templeton (1994).

Wellington’s decision, though puzzling the objective-interest perspectives, was consistent and coherent with the NZ identity, which, as I said earlier, held no memories of Singapore. Prime Minister Holland explained it thus: “New Zealand very proudly, and after the greatest consideration, has assured Great Britain that where Britain goes we go, that where she stands we stand, and that we shall support her to the hilt in every way” (cited in McKenzie 2006: 567). Holland was right: only once Britain decided to go from the Middle East, starting in 1955, Australia and NZ ended their troop deployments there.186

If the Australian and NZ internationalists stood no chance in the discursive battle over the Malaya-Middle East dilemma, they come to win the war over Korea.187 The invasion of the “free” South Korea by the communist North Korea catapulted the American alliance to the forefront and rendered the earlier defence deployment debate moot. The first discursive consensus broke down over the nature of military contribution to Korea. The naval commitment was swift and nearly simultaneous with that made by Britain, but the decision to commit ground troops was not. London ruled out a ground war and, for a time, it looked as if the Anzacs would followed the motherland’s lead. As the earlier debate over deployments concluded, when it came to a ground war against communist imperialism, the Commonwealth’s fight should be in the Middle East.

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186 They moved them to the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, a security institution London designed to help its counterinsurgency in Malaya.

187 For a blow-by-blow diplomatic and political narrative of the war from the Anzac (and official) perspectives, see McGibbon 1993 and O’Neill 1981. On the centrality of this war in the context of East-West confrontation, see Stueck 1997.
However, the spectacular escalation of the US military commitment to South Korea shifted the terms of the debate. From a vague promise, the American containment of mainland Asia turned into the perceived reality. The subsequent call to arms from Washington invoked the Anzac dilemma again. With the wind in his sails, Spender asked the government to “scrape the bucket” and send troops to Korea right away (Meaney 2007: 402; McIntyre 1995: 277).

Ten days into the war, Whitehall changed its mind and moved to send British army regiments to Korea. This flip-flopping discredited the British discourse in Australia and NZ. The governments had hitherto complied with British wishes, even though the actual fight in Korea was objectively more threatening to Australia and NZ than a possible fight in the Middle East. Now the motherland was fickle once again, as at Singapore, when it had left the dominions to fend for themselves. This reading of the event emboldened internationalists to put independence-talk into practice. In a race to publicly announce land commitment to Korea before London, Wellington beat Canberra by a few hours. In terms of contribution per capita, the NZ contributions followed the American and South Korean deployments, with Australia coming fourth (O’Neill 1981: 75-6, McIntyre 1995: 274-8; Martin 1999: 156; Lowe 1999: 63).

The general proposition derived from my theoretical framework – that foreign policy will follow the dominant discourse of identity – holds in the case of Anzac participation in the American-led UN coalition in Korea. The North Korean invasion fit with everything Australians and New Zealanders knew about Asia and communism – that it was powerful, militaristic and aggressive. According to The Bulletin, the US-led intervention was an attempt to “hold back a wave of barbarism such as the world has
never seen since the invading hordes of Asia put out the lights of Rome and set the worlds’ civilisation back a thousand years” (June 7, cited in Lowe 1999: 67; cf. 114). As for the proposition on the role of the debate over the fit between identity and the perceived reality, Korea resonated with the internationalist discourse. The war showed that Australia and NZ could pursue ties with the US – or the UN – independently from Britain without jeopardizing their Britishness. The war strengthened the English-speaking alliance in Asia-Pacific, not as a two-way affair between the Old Commonwealth and America, but as an arrangement among four mature English-speaking states. To borrow from Prime Minister Menzies, Korea rendered the Anzac dilemma “false.”188

To be sure, the putative “switch” from Britain to America was impossible in terms of the Australian and NZ selves in 1950. What became possible, thanks to the decision dynamic at the outset of the Korean War, was to argue in favor of an independent foreign policy. If the Anzus dilemma was proven to be false, then it was legitimate for Australia and NZ to pursue the American alliance outside the traditional Commonwealth ties. Korea shifted the terms of the debate so that British exclusion from ANZUS no longer represented a stark misfit between identity and reality.

ANZUS AND “ANGLOBALIZED” SECURITY

British exclusion from ANZUS struck many Australians and New Zealanders as illegitimate. Consider the opposition’s reactions to the publications of the ANZUS draft,

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188 See Menzies’ Adelaide speech of 26 June 1950 (Menzies 1958: 3-20). He referred to a false dichotomy between “power politics” and the UN, but a footnote placed in the published text suggests his later belief that the Korea war rendered the dichotomy moot.

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in July 1951. The leader of Australia’s Labour, Evatt, an arch-internationalist in most other contexts, described the treaty as “un-British” and called for future extension of formal membership to Britain (McLean 2006: 70). In NZ, Labour opposition echoed these statement, calling ANZUS “disloyal.” In both countries, the governments countered with the frame developed to interpret the run-up to the Korean War: the traditional Commonwealth defence and the new American alliance were parts of a single project. The NZ government, for example, issued a set of public statements arguing, variously, that ANZUS was “not incompatible with devotion to the mother country,” that it was a “backup to Commonwealth defence, not a new association” and, ultimately, that it was not a case of “selling out to the Americans.” Indeed, Britishness was so strong to disallow a justification of British exclusion from ANZUS as simply being in the “national interest.” Private documents indicate that the government was well-aware of the situation. Though the American alliance was the “richest prize,” said NZ External Affairs Minister Doidge, “In embarking on any forward step in this direction, we must be certain that we are not appearing to be turning away from Britain” (DNZER III: 545-6). The NZ press gave the government the benefit of doubt, but not for too long (McLean 2006: 77-8; McKinnon 1993: 123, Trotter 2007: 421).

The governments’ argument on the basic indivisibility of Anglo-American defence can be seen as the vintage Anglosphere discourse: if the (Old) Commonwealth was a family of nations, then the US was its special member. A 26 June 1950 speech by Menzies (1958: 3-20) is typical of the genre. To take out the main highlights, the prime

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189 These statements have been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere (Belich 2001: 319; Trotter 2007: 420; McKinnon 1993: 120-1, also see 112, 117, 122, 125).
minister argued that the US constituted an “amazing country…the centre of gravity of
democracy,” but calls to “move” Australia closer to the US were “pessimistic, distorted,
and, therefore, unreal.” But a condominium between the US and the Commonwealth was
entirely sensible since the “British peoples of the world need the Americans [and t]he
Americans need us…. we are the same kind of people, with the same ideas, with the same
ideals, with the same high faith, with the same basic belief that governments exist for the
people, that they are the servants and not the masters.” Given all these identities,
American-Commonwealth cooperation was natural. “Enmity,” in contrast, “would indeed
be disastrous to the freedom of man.”

While different discourses can be present within the same text, authored by the
same author, this passage shows how context can flatten identity differences. Between
the US and Britain, Australian loyalty was with Britain. But with the simultaneous
existence of other significant Others, the Anglo-American difference was lost for
Australia. It was this cultural background which enabled ANZUS and justified British
exclusion because it was argued that a limited Pacific Pact was never to be about the
Pacific. The argument in the basic identity between the Commonwealth and the US
greatly soothed the potential discursive rupture over the Anzac dilemma. The success of
this argument had to do with its resonance in Australian and NZ societies. Widely-used
terms such as the “English-speaking cause” or Anglo-Saxonism situated Australian and
NZ Selves in world history in a way that invoked a sense of a shared identity or destiny
with the US and British Others. As I said earlier, sisterhood and other family metaphors
inclusive of the US Other were the every-day currency of communication. What helped
is that the recognition of this identity came from the Americans: when speaking to the Anzac audiences, Dulles and Gen. Douglas McArthur used those metaphors liberally.\textsuperscript{190}

Like in the wider societal discourse, foreign policy debates invoked the familiarity with America but never interrogated it. The fundamental taken-for-grantedness of the American friendship clearly shaped the likelihood both of ANZUS and the British exclusion from it. What helped the internationalist reading of ANZUS was the fact that the British discourse could not possibly reject an American alliance on the basis of the lack of identity with the US. The best one could do was to try to reject such alliance because of shared identity. Evatt believed that America would defend Australia even without a formal alliance (McLean 2006: 288). Along these lines, Menzies repeatedly tried to explain to Spender that an American guarantee was not an imperative since “They are already overwhelmingly friendly to us” (O’Neill 1981: 87) and because “We undoubtedly have their goodwill” (McIntyre 1995: 302). These counterarguments can be seen as evidence of the deep trust felt toward the US, but they ultimately dissolved in debates because the formality of ANZUS ultimately had to with Japanese enmity, not US friendship.

In the early Cold War, the policy of containment heavily relied on a global division of labor. Outside the Atlantic Rim, the US was responsible for the Pacific, while Britain – i.e., the Commonwealth – watched over the Middle East. ANZUS, the decision-makers recognized, was meant to be a part of a “regional defence system extending from the Pacific through South East Asia and South Asia to the Middle East”

\textsuperscript{190} Besides, the argument was hardly new. Most educated Australians and New Zealanders probably knew that their governments once asked America to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific Ocean (in 1908 and 1937). One NZ historian even talks about “double nationalism” – American and British (Sinclair 1959: 304).
(Menzies to Holland, March 16, 1951, A6768 EATS 77/3). Before the Korean War, the role accorded to Australia and NZ was the defence of the Middle East; after the war, it was the defence of the eastern Pacific Rim. ANZUS, after all, was but one alliance in the archipelago of anti-communist pacts within the global Anglo-American strategy of containment. Arguably what disarmed many of its critics was the preamble of the treaty, which clearly acknowledged Australian and NZ Commonwealth obligations. In this sense, it could be said that British exclusion from ANZUS was possible because national security was, to borrow from another context, “Anglobalized,” in the Australian and NZ minds at least.\(^{191}\)

During the tripartite Canberra talks of February 1951, Spender profusely used the phrase “bolting the back door,” to employ a metaphor, for Australia and NZ, wherein the American alliance served to bolt the back door in the Asia-Pacific so that contributions could be made elsewhere to the defence of the Commonwealth and, in extension, Western civilization and democracy.\(^{192}\) The phrase no doubt relied on a metageography in which Australia and NZ stood in the West, with merely one (back) door in Asia (e.g., *Man* 28: 5, October). This reasoning made sense across the Tasman too. For Doidge, the entire Asia-Pacific was one giant back door for the West. Having a NATO, but not a Pacific Pact, he told NZ Parliament, was “like locking the front door and leaving the backdoor open” (Trotter 2007: 418). The back door metaphor – and the logic behind it –

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\(^{191}\) As far as I am aware, the pun comes from Niall Ferguson.

\(^{192}\) See *DNZER* III: 593-613. Once again, Australian historiography, probably influenced by Spender’s own account of negotiations, has established Spender as the *spiritus movens* of ANZUS, a man who able to get his various interlocutors to think outside the box on the question of American alliance (e.g., Spender 1969: 174-7). This view is now outdated (Lowe 1999; Martin 1999; McIntyre 1995; Umetsu 2004, although see Penrose 2004).
was compelling for all parties involved since the majority audience was subconsciously familiar with the metageographies it involved. And for Australia and NZ, this is where all foreign policy debate ended because in Anglobalized security, the Anzac dilemma could not exist.

CONCLUSION

In the universe of anti-communist military pacts of the Cold War, ANZUS hardly makes for a first-tier institution. Notably, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which codifies collective defence, has no equivalent in ANZUS: an attack on Australia and NZ was declared as “dangerous” to America, not a *casus belli*.\(^{193}\) This final draft of the treaty was indeed a disappointment to Canberra and Wellington, who wanted to be consulted, not just guaranteed to (Schaller 1985: 169). In fact, America gave them neither. In a wry comment left by Menzies, ANZUS had a “foundation of jelly.”\(^{194}\)

From the perspective of Australian and NZ diplomats who helped draft the treaty, the depth of the American alliance was the easy problem; the hard problem was the breadth. But Canberra and Wellington dealt with it remarkably well. They first convinced Dulles and his team that British exclusion must be contingent on Asian exclusion; then they moved to convince the audiences at home that British exclusion was

\(^{193}\) Articles 4 and 7, which come close, are more similar to the Monroe Doctrine, which I examined in the previous chapter. To be sure, in 1950 NATO was only beginning to acquire elaborate and militarized institutional features that differentiate it from most other peacetime alliances in history.

\(^{194}\) The comment was reported by the wife of Australia’s ambassador in Washington (cited in McIntyre 1995: 21; Meaney 2001: 17, 2007: 403). The jelly-like foundation, as opposed to tripwire defence guarantee, was what the US wanted (e.g., *FRUS* 1951: VI Asia and the Pacific, p. 177). In the subsequent crises, like during the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute in 1963-4, ANZUS officials would spend months discussing the precise conditions and nature of the defence guarantee. For one, the jelly-like foundation never supported a NATO-style secretariat or central command.
an overall good thing. In short, the governments managed to successfully demonstrate that the Anzac dilemma was moot. In the Anglobalized view of international security cooperation, the American alliance could not possibly “trump” the Britishness of Australia and NZ – any national security gain was simultaneously a net gain for the English-speaking alliance. The ANZUS case, in this sense, was arguably typical of the Anglosphere as a whole: “Paradoxically, one consequence of American-dominion rapprochement was to enhance the value of the British connection to the dominions” (McKenzie 2006: 559).

The standard narrative holds that the tripartite ANZUS Pact unraveled in 1985 when NZ’s Labour government failed to reach an agreement with the US over keeping the South Pacific nuclear-free. What is usually missing from this account is that NZ’s anti-nuclear identity was originally constructed against France, not the US. It was the nuclear tests in the French possessions of Mururoa and Fangataufa which sparked protests as well as international court action against Paris in the 1970s. In fact, 1985 was marked with two objectively similar events. In February 1985, the so-called port access dispute saw the Labour government deny access to an ostensibly nuclear USS Buchanan. As a result, a year later, the US suspended ANZUS obligations to NZ (however jelly-like these were in the first place). Polls from that time showed no great changes in opinions of America: the vast majority of respondents backed what was left of ANZUS, even if they supported their government policy (Mein Smith 2005: 223).

Now compare this situation with that playing out after July 1985, when French secret service agents blew up the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour, killing one of its crew members. The ensuing Francophobia, already high from
the days of France’s atmospheric tests in the 1960s and 1970s, reach sky-high proportions such that French fries were temporarily renamed “Kiwi sticks,” much like American Congressmen called them “freedom fries” after France decided to stay away from the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. So like British exclusion in 1951, NZ defection in 1985 does not disprove the existence of the Anglosphere. Indeed, despite its withdrawal – or suspension – from ANZUS, the US and NZ officially designate each others as allies and, less typically, friends. Even with the NZ hiatus, ANZUS remains a remarkably strong and durable alliance and one of the main institutional backbones of the Anglosphere.
CHAPTER 6

SUEZ, VIETNAM AND THE “GREAT AND POWERFUL FRIENDS”

Britain is not always right and the United States is not always wrong. Canberra Times, March 18, 1955

The problem of separate and distinctive identity…has been with us from the beginning and, I suppose, will be with us in the foreseeable future. Canada’s Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin, Speech to Canadian and American Public Relations Societies, Montreal, November 9, 1964

In the history of the Anglosphere, there have been no greater bumps than Suez and Vietnam. If Britain’s fall-out with America over Suez is legendary, so is America’s failure to enlist British help in Vietnam. In this chapter, I consider the making and unmaking of the Anglosphere in these two cases from the hitherto unexamined pairing of Australia and Canada. In the Suez case, Canberra was Britain’s staunchest ally; Ottawa, a critic. The situation reversed itself in Vietnam. When the US decided to escalate and Americanize the war, Australia was the first ally to offer political support and military assistance. Canada not only failed to cheer on, but it moved to criticize the US campaign. Starting with remarkably similar structural backgrounds – identities, interests and information – the two states arrived at different policies toward their “great and powerful friends.” How do we explain this divergence?

What makes this question worthwhile is the pivotal place reserved for Australia and Canada in my genealogy of the Anglosphere. The rankings and indices reviewed in the introductory chapter suggest that few states are as similar as Australia and Canada. In

195 The phrase was attributed to Prime Minister Menzies, who used it ironically to describe Australia’s alliance politics during the lash with Indonesia over West New Guinea in the early 1960s (Chauvel 1997).
the nineteenth century, when my genealogy begins, Australia and Canada saw themselves as members of the single British nation or at least two nationalities subsumed under a common British race (Green 1999: 356-357). As self-governing dominions, Australia and Canada were granted independence in 1931, but Britishness continued to define their national identities well after World War II. As independent actors on the world stage, Australia and Canada have demonstrated a great deal of like-mindedness (MacMillan and McKenzie, eds, 2003). One major similarity is their relationship with the US – the two states have gained and sustained platinum membership in US alliance portfolio, as evidenced by the unprecedented levels of intelligence sharing, military procurement, and privileged access to American policy makers. In short, Australia and Canada enjoy a “special relationship” with the US not unlike the more famous Anglo-American “special relationship” (AASR).196

In this chapter, I argue that in the Suez case, the dominance of British race patriotism implied Australia’s loyalty toward the “mother country.” Canada’s behaviour in Suez, in contrast, can be seen as a case of “liberal internationalism” in foreign policy going against “Britishness” in society. Ottawa succeed in justifying its diplomatic distance from Britain only by framing the disagreement as an intra-Commonwealth or even intra-British matter, rather than as an international spat. The divergence in Australian and Canadian foreign policy over Vietnam, I argue further, can be explained by the fact that Canada negotiated its nationhood primarily in anti-American and liberal

196 This chapter is not about Australian-Canadian relations, but they constitute the Anglosphere. For instance, according to Holmes, by mid-1950s, Australian-Canadian collaboration in international organizations – outside the Commonwealth – became “so habitual that it was taken for granted” (Holmes 1979: 44; also see Donaghy 1995; MacMillan and McKenzie, eds, 2003).
internationalist terms. Australia’s decision to go to war followed a long-standing drift toward the American orbit, advocated by a majority who believed in the US as the only available antidote to the threat of Asian communism. In Canada, the rise of Quebec at home induced new thinking in foreign policy which strengthened a liberal internationalist belief in Canada as a unique nation with unique foreign role such as peacekeeping and middle power mediation. In each case, foreign policy debates served only to confirm that identity resonated with the perceived reality.

Following the format established in the previous chapter, I begin this chapter by a DA of Australian and Canadian societies in the period under study and then comparatively zooms in on foreign policy debates in the years preceding the Suez and Vietnam decisions. In the concluding section, I use these case studies to consider the way in which long-term discursive structures make Australia one of the Anglosphere champions, while keeping Canada in a relationship of profound ambiguity with this club.

LUCKY AND UNLUCKY NATIONS

In my archive, combining Australian and Canadian texts from both periods, the baseline for all texts was “modern democracy.” This discourse held that the trade-offs between (mostly male) individual freedom and security were best managed by ballot-box and free market, as adjusted with some Christian egalitarianism and “moderate” social democratic ideas. Opposite of modern democracy was Soviet communism, which was associated with authoritarianism, collectivism or command economy.¹⁷⁷ This self-other

¹⁷⁷ In both states, national communist parties at the time were run by secret service agents (cf. Whitaker and Marcuse 1994). Few texts in my archive could affirm communism, but more than a few, like those published in Canadian Dimension, Meanjin or Overland freely challenged the anti-communist orthodoxy. My staccato readings cannot do justice to the complexity of such challenges, but they are duly documented
relationship, known as the Cold War, constituted the main feature of the daily life: athletes trained specifically to beat the Russians at the Olympics, new universities were built to help our science against their Sputniks in the space race and, most notably, unions and political parties vamped and re-vamped their images in search of the winning degree of anti-communism. In popular culture, lakes of ink were spilled on spy sagas, inspired by the defections by Soviet embassy officials, such as Petrov in Canberra and Gouzhenko in Ottawa. For example, one Australian men’s magazine opined how *The Manchurian Candidate* is “fiction, but could be fact” and proceeded to warn its target audience that some prostitutes could in fact be KGB agents (*Man*, February 1964, p. 6).

In the contest with communism, modern democracy saw itself as far more successful. Though some observers attributed this success to luck – Horne’s (1964) *Lucky Country* inspired my subtitle – most observers related the success to geography and history. On the former, because modern democracy originated in the West, Australia and Canada insisted at being Western. For Australia, this required discursive work, as objective geography set it in the East, in Asia (its territory in Papua New Guinea literally bordered on Asia). The Australian Self corrected this misfit by describing itself as Western, but “antipodean.” (In the same sense, Canada reinforced its Western identity with the adjective “northern,” whereby the North was another geographic signifier related to the success of modern democracy.) As for history, textbooks, historical novels and national holidays left no doubt that Australia and Canada “owed” their statehood – as

by social historians. Canadian magazine *Chateleine* published special reports from Russia and China, for example, attested to the universality of women’s concerns (Korinek 2000). Note that in 1955 one could find no explicit criticism of US foreign policy in either public or elite discourse; US policies against in Iran (1953) or Guatemala (1954) became controversial only in my 1964 texts.
well as nationhood – to Britain. Victoria Day, quipped Canada’s *Globe & Mail* in 1955, was primarily about history, not about long weekend leisure: “It is not good for a nation so to slight the truth of its historical beginnings” (May 23). Later in the year, the same newspaper so commented on the state visit of India’s Nehru: “We do not wish to be a British colony today; but we count ourselves fortunate to have been one yesterday” (December 18). At an extreme, the nation Australia and Canada were building was supposed to be a “neo-Britain” (Pocock 2005), “Better Britain” (Belich 2001) or “another Britain” (Frank Underhill, cited in Rutherford 2005: 198). In my reading of the historical evidence, I am agnostic over comparative Britishness, but what is notable that Australia’s negative memories of the British tactic of sacrificing of Empire/Commonwealth troops had no equivalent in Canada, despite some objective similarities (e.g., Vimy Ridge, the Dieppe Raid vs. Gallipoli, Tobruk).

Civilization was no doubt “Western” in the broader sense, but it was the British Empire who spread it. In 1955, the British Empire was reality: those who believed, with *Globe & Mail*, that India had deserved independence, also believed that Cyprus or the Gilbert Islands did not. By 1964, the British Empire had become the “great dream”; and for India in particular, it was “decent enough” (*The Australian*, July 15, 1964). The temporal dynamic of relations with the metropole was similar in both national contexts. In November 1955, *Argus* and *Age* covered Prince Phillip as religiously as the Melbourne Olympic Games (the prince came to open the event). But in October 1964, the visit of the Duchess of Kent to Sydney seemed like yesterday’s news. In 1955, “we” meant “British” or at least “British, too.” A decade later, Britishness greatly deflated. In Australia, a political magazine published a forum entitled “The British and Us”
(Quadrant, January-February 1965); in Canada, Globe & Mail argued that British immigration (the largest percentage of immigration in Australia and Canada at the time) did not pay. The British immigrant, the editors found, was the most likely to turn down citizenship, which constituted zero return on investment for Canada (October 12, 1964).

The cause lies in the changing nature in the metropolis-periphery relationship. The weakening of imperial loyalties in Australia and Canada began in the first half of the 1950s. First, Britain decided to transfer the bulk of its overseas forces to the Rhine. The transfer turned into an exodus following the Suez crisis, the event I analyze below. More important, the Suez crisis made it clear that the US, not Britain, called the shots in the Western alliance. Next, Britain made its first bid for membership in the European Common Market, the precursor of the European Union. This “turn to Europe” caused the crash of the traditional – and traditionally faltering – system of Commonwealth preferences in trade. By the early 1960s, it became clear that Britain would let the former dominions go without a severance package, i.e., without compensating Australia and Canada for its losses in trade.

Though it falls outside the scope of my inquiry, my DA finds that the Britain “turn” had a spectacular effect on both Australian and Canadian identities.198 The inaugural issue of The Australian put it best: because of the “shock” of Britain’s turn to Europe, a “young man’s country” had to “face life” (July 15, 1964). To be sure, while the Europeanization of Britain helped Australia and Canada mature as states and nations, it did not turn them into the “new” Commonwealth India. Being independent from a powerful English-speaking community, but derived from and integral to it, was seen as a

special resource. And this is where the main cross-national difference comes in and, with it, important insights for the genealogy of the Anglosphere. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are meant to capture the main similarities and differences between Australia and Canada.

In their textbooks, Australian and Canadian students could learn that the Americans and British were their “blood brothers” (Brown et al 1950: 57, also see Ibid.: 127, 146, 165; Greenwood 1955: Ch. 5 and 9; cf. Igartua 2006: 137). In Australia, the US Other followed Britain in terms of distance and value (perhaps discounting New Zealand). Britain led the Commonwealth, but it was the Americans who led the entire free world and civilization. Identities associated with nationhood were conflated with those associated with statehood or even economy, such that the US metaphorically emerged as a cousin, brother, another frontier society, fellow federation and Western democracy, in that order.

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Table 6.1 International Self-Other relations in Australian discourse, 1955-1964

In Canada, the international “we” also included the US, but not without considerable tension. For example, for the attendees of the first Canadian Writers’ Conference (Whalley, ed. 1956), Canadian literature could be found within the English-
speaking world of “Anglo-Saxon countries,” which included Britain (or “England”), the US and Australia.\textsuperscript{199} But while they could celebrate the transnational and international quality of their product – they also thanked the Rockefeller Foundation for footing the conference bill – Canadian writers, one by one, spoke against the “Americanization” of their profession. Similar ambiguity can be found in government-sponsored history textbooks. American invasions received a special place in the early chapters, but later chapter generally gave a positive view of the US not only as a good neighbor, but also as model of economic (e.g., Fordism) and even political progress (e.g., the press). Similar tensions, schematized in Table 6.2., persisted across advanced histories.\textsuperscript{200}

What matters is that nearly every text in my Canadian archive contained a degree of anti-Americanism. In fact, in my reading of the discourses on the Canadian Self, anti-Americanism was not a matter of conscious choice (“the Canadian way of being different”), but a necessary condition of identity.\textsuperscript{201} So while Australian texts generally regarded the US Other as an opportunity; Canadian texts regarded as an opportunity and a

\textsuperscript{199} The in-group predictably supplied benchmarks (e.g., Canada had no tradition of poetry readings like the US and Britain; more bookshops existed in Australia; in the US, a freelance journalist could “make a living” and so on). But it also meant security: the adverse influence of radio and television on Canadian literature was thus overblown because about ninety books a day are published in the US and Britain. In this text, the inscribed Other is the “Latin tradition” of literature, represented by France and Latin America, where the poet was a celebrity and no one liked to buy “paper-back.” Similar comparisons applied to many other art forms, from architecture to television, and were nearly identical in Australian texts (e.g., Overland, February 1955, p. 2; Meanjin, March 1955, p. 137). In the French-language texts in Canada, similarity is inscribed with respect to the French-speaking world, but also places like Louisiana and Latin America (e.g, La revue populaire, August 1955, p. 5; Châtelaine, July 1964, p. 10).

\textsuperscript{200} Compare Creighton 1955 vs. Maclean’s, February 9, p. 45 or Morton 1963 vs. Underhill 1964. Fears of Americanization were generally not reflected in public opinion polls (Schwartz 1967: 70).

threat, sometimes simultaneously. Comparative anti-Americanism, as I will show in a moment, can help explain the divergence in Australian and Canadian alliance behavior.

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<td>Partial recognition (inequality)</td>
<td>Soviet Union &amp; E Europe</td>
<td>Asia and Africa Communism</td>
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Table 6.2 International Self-Other relations in Canadian discourses, 1955-1964

Another cross-national difference germane for international behaviour concerns comparative nationhood. Unlike the self-confident Australian nation, the Canadian nation was deeply troubled. One Canadian traveller wrote about Australia with envy:

In Australia I was enormously impressed by the cultural and economic vitality of a people who have a jaunty confidence in themselves, isolated though they are from their traditional friends. They worry not at all about the preservation of their national identity. Who could ever mistake an Australian?²⁰²

Reflecting on the troubles with a nation, a University of Toronto student conference named “What is English Canadian?” gave an answer in a double (gendered) negative:

“He is not a French Canadian and he is not an American” (Globe & Mail, November 2, 202 Speech to Hamilton Canadian Club, April 29, 1964. In Arnold D. P. Heeney Papers, MG 30 E144, Vol. 10, NAC.
1964, p. 3). This was the main rub: everyone understood that national identity “must be about what we are, rather than about what we are not.” From the point of view of old-school British imperialists, Canada’s troubles were temporary. In Hugh MacLennan’s *Two Solitudes* – and the armies of texts that spoke to the novel in the period under study – Canada consisted of two races who speak different languages and live different lives. But the future invoked in MacLennan’s epilogue suggests the disappearance of the weaker solitude. French Canadians, the novel seemed to suggest, were slowly on the way of losing their hyphens, presumably the way the francophone Swiss had become Swiss like other linguistic communities in that country.

Most texts, in my reading, disagreed with MacLennan’s solution. For pessimists, Canada’s “tensions” or “dualisms” – mainly British-American and English-French, but also East-West, provincial-federal - sentenced Canada to permanent absurdity. For optimists, dualisms were Canada’s uniqueness and therefore national strength. Because of its dualisms, suggested one essay, Canada would never become a “melting pot” (*à la* the US), but would remain a modest – and ironic – “mosaic” (Ross 1954: xi; cf. Smith 1995: 128-31, 154). In 1955-6, Canada’s dualisms were generally under control. On one end of the identity continuum stood Britain, Anglo-American alliance, NATO, the

203 The quote is from John Conway, “What is Canada?”, *The Atlantic Monthly*, 214: 5, November 1964, p. 12. A dozen texts from my archive spoke to this article, including official speeches (e.g., Martin 1967: 71).

204 English-language history textbooks offered to their anglophone students a “story of the clash between the “races,” and that they belonged to the ‘race’ that had won” (Igartua 2006: 88). Race-talk was also readily reproduced in government publications, such as the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism spoke of “two founding races,” a designation seemingly adopted by the prime minister and critics alike (e.g., *Maclean’s*, December 14, 1964, p. 27). The terms French- and English Canadian made each other meaningful and labels greatly varied (e.g., the francophone Canada, Canadiens, and French-speaking Canadians and so on; cf Martel [2002]).

205 Australian also liked to speak of dualisms, namely “a deep indebtedness to our British inheritance… and a tendency to break away” (from a review of *The Sunburnt Country*, a collection of essays on Australia written as tribute to the 1954 Royal Visit in *Southerly* 55: 2, 1955, p. 99).
U.N., capitalist democracy and freedom; on the other, there was global communism.

This reading holds well against survey data. In 1964, the discursive space was much more complicated such that it seemed that Canada was living in a system that never existed or at least no longer existed. The nation was three years away from the national centennial, yet on its national holiday the national newspaper suggested that the country “may never become a nation” (Globe & Mail, July 1, cited in Igartua 2006: 166). What caused the erosion of national confidence was the Quiet Revolution in Quebec. The Quiet Revolution was hardly quiet – text upon text in my archive commented on the “unrest” or “changes” so much that the slogans “maîtres chez nous” (masters at home) and “indépendence ou égalité” briefly entered the everyday Canadian English. From the anglophone perspective, changes were welcome only to the extent that revolution was the social-democratization and secularization or of the hitherto conservative and suffocatingly god-loving province. What was not welcomed in the rest of Canada, however, were Quebec’s claims for full linguistic and economic equality.

Worse, concurrent with the quiet revolution emerged the novel spectre of secessionism, based on a claim that Quebec-based French Canadians (or francophone Quebeckers) are a

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206 The unstructured questions in Australian Gallup polls list items such as inflation, unemployment or the price of wool came out as top worries (e.g., Australian Public Opinion Polls [APOP], Nos. 1070-1080, February-March 1955 and Nos. 1581-1591, February-March 1962, National Archives of Australia [NAA]). Canadian Gallup polls found that Canadians overwhelmingly disliked communism and generally approved the symbols of monarchy (Schwartz 1967: Ch. 3 and Ch. 6). Polls with unstructured questions found that forty percent of Canadians regarded unemployment as the main problem. War came next at eight percent in 1957 and twenty-four percent in 1960. Russia, communism (in 1957) and defence (in 1960) received no more votes than problems such as cost of living or farm markets (Ibid: 228-9, cf. Bothwell 2007: 214). As for direct US-Canadian comparisons, contemporary research emphasized the heterogeneity of Canada and profound ambiguity of judging the degree of Canada’s difference from the US (Lipset 1964, Ibid. 1990: 138-42).

207 No general Canadian history ignores this event. A recent view holds that Quebec’s revolution plunged Anglophone Canada into a “decade of national soul-searching,” a quiet revolution of its own (Igartua 2005: 164). For Quebec-centered perspectives, see Létourneau (2004) and Rudin (1997).
separate nation, one with a pronounced minority syndrome – the Québécois.\textsuperscript{208} The emergence of an alternative to the national self within had many effects, but what concerns this account is how it reinforced anti-Americanism. Ralph Allen, Maclean’s editor, opined that Quebec secession could spark irredentist tendencies in Canada’s prairies; the entire “area between the Rockies and the Lakehead” could end up in the US (February 8, p. 20).

In sum, when it comes to the international society in 1955-6 and 1964-5, Australia and Canada were discursively anchored in what can be called the Anglosphere – a community of states consisting of the “Old” British Commonwealth plus the United States – as well as the West more broadly. This community was in the state of the Cold War against communism. But within the paired comparison itself, there were three sources of difference: relative to Australia, Canada was more anti-American, more Eurocentric, and less confident about its nationhood. If my DA is correct, all three differences are likely to be reflected in a comparison of Australian and Canadian foreign policy choices over Suez and Vietnam.

AMERICANISMS AND ANTI-AMERICANISMS

Australian foreign policy debate in 1955-6 and 1964-5 revolved around two keywords “Asian communism” and “forward defence.” With respect to the former, Japan turned

\textsuperscript{208} Though an odd text in my French language archive argued that cultural survival was at stake, the majority interpreted the Quebec issue as “politics.” A rare survey of francophone Quebeckers with post-secondary education found that roughly a quarter of respondents favoured Quebec’s separation from the rest of Canada in the period under study (Schwartz 1967: 49, n. 32). To achieve separation, few francophone Quebeckers resorted to terrorist acts, such as one raid on a gun shop which left two “Anglo-Saxon collaborators” dead (Gazette and Le Devoir, August 30). It was in this atmosphere that the Queen came to visit Quebec, with “appealing” results (Globe & Mail, October 13).
from an archenemy into an “important trading partner” and “Cold War ally,” while China became the main locus of Australia’s fear. In Indochina, communisms were Chinese-equipped and Chinese-led; in Malaya, they were also ethnic Chinese (simply, “Chinese Communists terrorists”). For Foreign Secretary Hasluck, the situation was simple: “Behind all that is happening or will happen in Asia looms the fact of China” (Foreign Affairs 1964: 61). That fears of Asian Communism were specifically racialized, not ideological fears as evidenced in the treatment of Indonesia. Nominally a destination of Australia’s anti-communist assistance, Indonesia was characterized as another China – as a populous, anti-Western dictatorship with a large communist party and a well-trained army bent on expansion.209

“Forward defence,” which came to foreign policy discourse from the military circles, defined Australia’s defence in terms of the Western/Anglo-American alliance and overseas expeditions.210 To Prime Minister Menzies, forward defence made a lot of sense since “the main object of any defence policy was to keep the enemy out of your country and as far as away as possible” (cited in Martin 1999: 500). The enemy, however, was assumed to exist and forward defence served to deny the safety of Australia’s relative isolation: the British-made Centurion tank was read as a “symbol for impotence” because it was too heavy for airlift from Australia (August 8, 1964).

There were three readings of Asian communism and forward defence: Britishness, Americanism-realism, and liberal internationalism. The first two discursive positions

209 See, for 1964, Australian Outlook, April; p. 8; Quadrant, August-September, p. 15; The Argus, October 31; The Australian, December 4; and Hasluck (1964: 58). On the paradoxes of Australia’s Cold War alliance with Indonesia in this period, see Edwards with Pemberton (1992: 285-92).

210 The forward defence thesis is one explanation of Australia’s intervention in Vietnam, but this literature theorizes the concept differently than the present analysis (Woodard 2004: Ch 13).
vied for dominance in foreign policy debates, while the last sat on its margins. Liberal internationalism, as I intertextualized it from the writings of the Labor opposition leaders Herbert Evatt and Arthur Calwell or the diplomat Arthur Tange, criticized the narrow definitions of Asian communism and forward defence in favour of diverse goals such as diplomacy, decolonization and collective security of the UN system. The weakness of this discourse can be explained by the fact that it downplayed the main self-other relations upon which Australia’s identity was constructed at the time.

Americanism-realism called for a closer alignment with the US, rationalized as Realpolitik. Contemporary texts representative of this discourse include those authored by Liberal ministers Paul Hasluck and John Howson, the Country Party leader and trade minister John McEwen, the ambassador to Washington, J.K. Waller, or the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Frederick Scherger.211 According to the minister of external affairs Paul Hasluck,

The War of 1939-45 taught two lessons. One was that geographical isolation was no defense. An Asian power could attack Australian territory and threaten it with invasion. That lesson has since been underlined by changes in the nature of offensive weapons. The other was that British power was not great enough at the time of a war in Europe to conduct an effective defensive war in the Far East. That lesson has since been underlined by the postwar changes in the old British Empire (1964: 53).

The Americanist-realist reading of past wars usually contrasted Gallipoli, Singapore and Tobruk – the defeats of the Australian expeditionary forces usually blamed on British

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211 The most comprehensive Americanist-realistic statement in my archive is Greenwood (1955: Ch. 9). Also see the foreign sections in Horne (1964: Ch. 5).
generals – by the toponym Coral Sea, which signified the success of US-Australian cooperation in combat.\textsuperscript{212}

The main challenge to this reading came from “Britishness,” once-dominant discourse which emphasized race patriotism, imperial ties and the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{213} Championed by Menzies and his minister of external affairs Casey, Britishness challenged the idea of “postwar changes in the old British Empire” and argued in favour of a defence in synch with London-based partnerships. The American alliance was therefore complementary, but not central:

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despite occasional allegation to the contrary, post-war emphasis upon geography has not involved neglect of historic association with the United Kingdom and other members of the Commonwealth. Post-war governments in Canberra have also tried to make good use, with some variety of emphasis, of opportunities to strengthen Australia’s more recent associations in contemporary history with the United States (Alexander 1956: 145).
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

The balance of power between these two foreign policy positions was more-or-less a temporal function, as predicted by the continuity and change in wider societal discourse (Table 6.1). Britishness was stronger in 1955-6 and Canberra acted accordingly: it followed London in anything from UN voting to overseas deployments to nuclear

\textsuperscript{212} The “Coral Sea Week” began in 1946, as a celebration of the “Battle for Australia” or the “Battle that Saved Australia” and usually takes place in September. It typically includes military marches and official functions for visiting American dignitaries. The less glorious US-Australian campaign in the New Guinea is not celebrated. Note that Canada’s unwillingness to fight in the Pacific War was sometimes resented in Australia, though a full account of Australian-Canadian relations is yet to see the light of the day (Donaghy 1995: 9; cf. MacMillan and McKenzie, eds., 2003).

\textsuperscript{213} Hindsight suggests otherwise, but no look at primary sources can dismiss the contemporary belief in the Commonwealth. What historiography now calls the ‘fourth empire’ was an all-Commonwealth attempt to reverse Britain’s postwar decline, perhaps comparable to the “new imperialism” of the turn of the twentieth century (Darwin 1999; McKenzie 2006).
weapons policy.214 The most-talked about foreign policy issue of the year was the “Malayan Emergency” and the nature of Australia’s military commitment to this British-led intervention against Asian communism. The re-deployment of Australian troops from the Middle East to the Commonwealth’s “strategic reserve” in Malaya was cited as evidence that London finally got it right (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 168, 173).

Also important was the “offshore crisis” – later dubbed the First Taiwan Straits Crisis – in which Australia came to agree with Britain that Formosa was “not worth a great war.”215 In a comparable situation, when U.S. State Secretary Dulles called for a military intervention against communists in Indochina in April-May 1954, Canberra sided with London in rejecting the use of force on the grounds that it would provoke China. To Washington, the Australia government explained that it could go to war but that going to war without Britain was “inconceivable.”216

By 1964, the inconceivable had become not just conceivable, but likely – as predicted by the changes in the wider societal discourse. Britain was withdrawing to Europe and Australia needed to fend for itself. An Australian editorial explained the situation best: because Australia faced the “very new” and “disturbingly unstable

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214 In the UN, Australia participated in the so-called Commonwealth rotary representation and generally followed British diplomacy (on the China recognition, see Chapter 5). Also, as a strong believer in the burden-sharing of the “empire bomb,” Canberra not only supplied uranium to the program, but it also let Britain conduct atomic tests and rocket firing experiments on its territory. On Australia as the wannabe nuclear power in the age of Asian Communism, see Reynolds (2000).

215 Menzies, cited in Current Notes on International Affairs 26: 2 (February 1955), p. 117. Also see Sydney Morning Herald, January 26 and 29. The Taiwan Straits crises refer to a clash over the Chinese Nationalist island possessions of Quemoy and Matsu.

communities” of Southeast Asia, as well as the “brooding power intelligence of the new China,” Canberra should solicit “American power” (July 15, 1964). Put otherwise, the shock of British withdrawal needed the therapy of the American alliance. As it turned out, the editors were preaching to the converted. Britishness by that time was so weak that the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis saw little debate over the fit between identity and policy: not a single text in my archive protested against Australia’s growing harmonization with US diplomacy, strategy and military technology.

The Americanist-realist position was bolstered with a new keyword – the “domino theory,” an American doctrine which assumed that communist revolution permanently expanded abroad. Non-communist states, especially the newly independent Asian states, were like a row of dominos: if one were to fall, the rest would too. While many versions of domino theory floated in Australian foreign policy debates in 1964, all led to the same conclusion: the first domino must be prevented from falling, lest Australia becomes a domino itself.

In Canada, a keyword that best illuminates the foreign policy debates from the period is the “North Atlantic triangle,” a concept describing an interdependent relationship among Canada, Britain and the US. While the Anglo-American side of the triangle is well-known as the special relationship (to use the acronym, the AASR), the Triangle must be seen as a Canadian invention.217 A tendency to lump Canada with some

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217 The authorship of the term is attributed to John Bartlet Berner in 1945 (cf. Burke 2007: 200). For a contemporary critique of the concept, see Underhill (1963) and also see Eldridge ed., (1997), Haglund (2000) and Holmes (1979: Part III). British and American sources make no use of the metaphor, preferring instead the language associated with the AASR or Atlanticism. Alternative and/or complementary labels for Canada’s unique position in Anglo-American relations included “bridge,” “hinge,” “interpreter,” “honest broker,” “linchpin,” or, more recently, “go-between.” Not surprisingly, Australian texts invoked similar metaphors (e.g., Casey in Millar 1972: 338 and in Donaghy 1995: 11; Walkabout April 1964, p. 43).
of the greatest powers in human history must be seen as a triumph of self-importance, but even from the objectivist perspective the Triangle had prima facie credibility. In 1955-6, in per capita income Canada was second only to the US; in 1964-5, its economy was ranked sixth or seventh in the world, one that could, among other things, pay for top-tier diplomatic corps and large armed forces (100,000, with half in the army). Intertextually speaking, the Triangle was a reflection of the broader discourse in which Canada was seen as a product of British-American dualism. Conceptually, however, the Triangle was a superset for the other two foreign policy keywords from the period – “independence” and “middle power.” Last but not least, the Triangle prescribed a seemingly simple foreign policy goal: harmonizing the Anglo-American relations so that neither British nor American side/angle dominated over Canada.

In the period under study, there were four ideal-typical readings of the Triangle. “Britishness” was based on a belief that the Canadian Self was both British and Canadian with no apparent contradiction and argued that the British past be revived in order to counterbalance to the postwar dominance of the US. One university professor suggested: “What is un-American about English Canada can be summed up in one word: British” (Canadian Dimension 1: 1-2, Spring 1964, p. 12). Historians W.L. Morton, Donald Creighton and MacLennan, defended Canada as a “British country.” Though without obvious partisan representation, Britishness usually emerged among the Conservatives or “Tories.” Challenging this position was “continentalism,” which regarded Americanization as modernity and therefore inevitable.218

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218 The term is retrospective. The historian Creighton and the finance minister Gordon often used it to label their opponents as pro-American. On theory, history and historiography of the term, see Smith (1994).
In the continentalist view, fears of being seen as America’s “lap dog” or a “banana republic,” were misplaced; the US and Canada were not mutually exclusive on the continent. The North Atlantic triangle might come to lose symmetry, but Canada would not lose its sovereignty or non-American identities such as the two-nation state or the northern state. For Frank Underhill, for example, Canada was a (North) American country in denial. His *Image of Confederation* can be read as a cursory genealogy of Canadian nationalism which underscores a tension between, to use later-day language, its ethnic and civic components, neither of which precluded identification with the US. For the diplomat John Holmes, Canada should never overstate its differences with the US because it, too, possessed “the temptation to sin.” Canadian foreign policy, argued Holmes, would have not been so “noble” had Canada possessed limited land and resources and “large communities of non-European peoples.” Continentalism, like Britishness, was institutionally promiscuous and had no obvious partisan representation.

The third discourse, “liberal internationalism,” emphasized neither the British past nor American future, but a right to be different, unique or, in a keyword, “independent.” Texts associated with the Department of External Affairs – those written by Louis St Laurent, Lester Pearson and Escott Reid – expressed a belief in a security policy based on distinctively Canadian values and institutions. For the aforementioned Holmes, a self-identified liberal internationalist, Canada’s “modest but unique” foreign policy goal was

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219 Some called for a hemispheric vision, particularly because a *Latin* America policy would too be in line with Canada’s bicultural identity (*Châtelaine*, July 1964, p. 10; *Le Devoir*, August 25, 1964; Martin 1967: 106).

twofold: first, to show that “people of different languages and culture can coexist within a single sovereignty” without melting away as in the US and, related, to “differ from the United States without opposing the interests of the United States as we saw them.”

Second, to demonstrate that a former colony does not have to be a “eunuch state,” but a middle power central to the “manifold activities of the United Nations” and international order in general (1964: 106-7; 1971: 190-1). This reading wedded a certain moralism to the practice of independence as well as argued that the source of Canada’s power – piggybacking on the US – did not matter as much as the use of this power. So the North Atlantic triangle, golden that it was, looked like a strait-jacket. For Pearson, Canada’s natural home was not the Triangle, but the Atlantic Community, which he defined as North America and (Western) Europe. More generally, the post-war international institutions spree seemed far more promising (e.g., Gazette, February 23, 1955). In 1955-6, this discourse established Canada as a NATO ally and a middle power; a decade later, it added the identities of a peacekeeper and a multilateralist.

Canada’s fourth foreign policy discourse – “anti-American” – held that there was no such thing as the North Atlantic triangle, only American hegemony and/or imperialism. In the latter half of the 1950s, Canada harmonized its defence with the US, following Cold War threats as well as WWII patterns. Among various initiatives, the

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221 E.g., 1970: 140-7. Roussel (1997) has shown this perspective implied a radical, Kantian belief in the formation of a supranational entity in the postwar North Atlantic. Residues of this approach can be found in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty (cf. Pearson 1970: 140-7; cf. Kitchen 2004: 17-9). Ideas about a more political Atlantic community were expressed by others, such as British foreign secretary Bevin in the late 1940s or US State Secretary Herter in the early 1960s. On Canada’s move from the Triangle to Atlanticism, see Haglund (2000: 46-9). On liberal internationalism in Canada, see Holmes (1979).

222 See, e.g., Pearson in Maclean’s, May 2, p. 12; Holmes in Globe & Mail, November 2, 1964, p. 4 or the selection of Paul Martin’s speeches (1967). In a typical view, Canadians were leaders in peacekeeping, while Scandinavians and others were “tourists” (Le magazine Maclean, October, p. 5).
establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1958 was subjected to a major parliamentary debate. For both Liberals and Conservatives, the agreement was the only way for Canada to preserve sovereignty in the nuclear age. In the minority view, held by the socialist CCF and the Quebec-based populist Créditistes, NORAD symbolized yet another American bid for ownership of Canada. In contrast to Britishness and liberal internationalism, anti-Americanism invoked no imperial ties or international institutions as solutions to the continentalist pull. So when Tommy Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party (the successor of CCF) criticized the government’s “deferential pose of supine subservience” to the US (H of C, May 28, 1964), he was making a case for more radical anti-dotes to American hegemony: neutralism, pacifism and/or isolationism. However, because Britishness implied anti-Americanism, the two discourses acted as obvious allies in foreign policy debates.

Before I weigh these four positions across contexts under study, a comparative digression is in order. First, the Canadian Self was a mix of confidence projected outward and insecurities looking inward. Troubles with nationhood at home, it appears, compelled Canadian decision-makers to experiment with foreign policy ideas such as middlepowermanship and peacekeeping. Also, there was no version of Tommy Douglas in Australia. The historical and/or historiographic tropes such as “fortress

223 The idea of middle powers was introduced by the Canadian UN delegation at the San Francisco conference in 1945 and has residues in Articles 23 and 44 of the UN charter. The idea always had its critics and was nearly abandoned after 1965 (Holmes 1971: 191; cf. Andrew 1993). In IR, Australia and Canada are often seen as the ideal-typical middle powers, though the form and scope of their middle power behaviour varied. The concept has fallen into disrepute in recent years (Chapnick 2000; Stairs 1998: 271-279; Welsh 2004: 585-7). As for peacekeeping, no Australian discourse enunciated it, though there was at least one call to place the Australian military on “permanent UN stand-by,” following the Canadian or Scandinavian example (The Australian, Nov 4, 1964).
Australia” or “splendid isolation” never made an appearance in Australian debates and no text in my Australian archive regarded demilitarization as a serious idea.

Second, like in the wider society, the Canadian Self was remarkably Eurocentric in foreign policy debates as well. Asian communism was a problem, but not the problem. For the foreign minister Martin: “The German problem is the centre of the European problem and…the relations of the west with communist countries” (H of C speech, May 22, 1964; also see Martin 1967: 104). Such statement would not be possible in the comparative Australian context at the time. Along the similar lines, the Canadian press usually argued that Canada could not be a “universal” peacekeeper, but never explained why Canadian peacekeepers should prefer Cyprus over, say, the Dominican Republic.224 The cross-over between Canada’s unique international roles and its Eurocentrism was productive of Canadian foreign policy: because Canada is a peacekeeper, Le Devoir argued, Ottawa should withhold military assistance to Southeast Asia.225

Dominant interpretation of Canadian foreign policy varied between the two periods. In 1955-6, the North Atlantic triangle was in perfect balance. On the outside, the US neighbor was a superpower, but Canada was still a predominantly Commonwealth nation. On the inside, few texts questioned the anti-community orthodoxy. All “official status” parties, for example, regarded the UN, NATO, the Commonwealth of Nations, and series of bilateral agreements constituting the defence of North America as mutually

224 Globe & Mail, May 6, 1964. Australia sent a police contingent to Cyprus.

225 February 2, 1964. Canada’s unwillingness to embrace its hemispheric identity – compared to its readiness to be European, Atlantic and even Pacific or Arctic – lasted until the 1980s (Nossal 1997: 161). Curiously for a state infatuated with international institutions, Canada stayed out of the Organization of American States until 1990.
inclusive. While integrated with the US in defence of its continent, Canada normally placed its overseas troops under British command (e.g., Korea). And when it came to Anglo-American diplomatic disagreements (e.g., offshore crisis), Canada, like Australia, generally sided with Britain (cf. Beechcroft 1991). As distinct discourses of identity, Britishness, continentalism and liberal internationalism nearly always implied the same foreign policy; anti-Americanism hardly surfaced in texts.\footnote{Nuclear weapons policy was a notable exception. Unlike Australia, Canada never claimed it could make its own bomb or expressed an interest in the “Empire bomb.” Presumably, one bomb on the continent was seen as sufficient.} The Suez crisis, as I will show in a moment, created the first major misfit between identity and the perceived reality in Canada’s post-war foreign policy debate.

In 1964-5, the North Atlantic Triangle looked broken, much like Canada’s nationhood. At home, the national unity crisis diminished Canada’s ontological security. “A weak and divided Canada, anxious about its present can play no worthy part in international affairs,” declared Pearson in February 1965.\footnote{Speech to the Canadian Club in Ottawa, February 10, 1965. *Statements & Speeches 1965/6* (LAC).} The internal debate resulted in a blow to the British discourse in foreign policy. A discourse which established Canada as a British country in North America with a French-speaking minority and/or province was no longer secure. One effect of the Quiet Revolution was the signing of a cultural “entente” between Quebec and France in February 1965, which later facilitated the creation of the Francophonie, an international community of francophone nations comparable to the Commonwealth and the Anglosphere.

Abroad, the Cold War détente – symbolized in the signing of the Moscow nuclear test-ban treaty in 1963 – had uneven effects across the West: while America re-engaged
its Asian enemies, Britain turned to its European allies. The latter event had an adverse effect for Canada’s Britishness, comparable to that felt after London dismantled its imperial trade system. If Britain could not keep its market open – let alone defend its transoceanic strategic interests overseas – then Empire/Commonwealth had no meaning. From that point onwards, in Canada’s understanding of the North Atlantic Triangle, “Europe” became a complement to Britain and “Atlanticism” gradually trumped the Commonwealth both in terms of value and distance (Haglund 2000: 46-9).

The demise of Britishness in Canada had different effects across foreign policy issue-areas. Continentalism gained in the economic sphere, liberal internationalism in all others (cf. Nossal 1997: 158). In defence, a white paper published in March promised leadership in UN peacekeeping and foreign aid and positioned the Canadian-US cooperation as “an aspect of Canada’s conviction that security lay in collective arrangements.” This was a rather weak description of an alliance which at that time controlled Canadian airspace, defence production, and strategic defence planning. A plausible interpretation holds that the American alliance was not seen as the “harnessing by the United States of our resources to its war machine but rather as Canada demanding its rightful share in the alliance armaments business” (Holmes 1971: 192). And in the issues of global governance, in anything from Cyprus to the Malaysia-Indonesia

228 Britain’s anti-Commonwealth policies hardly looked like a foregone conclusion at the time. In 1963, the French government under President De Gaulle vetoed British application to the Common Market and began to systematically denounce NATO. “It should be remembered,” offered the Gazette, “that a Franco-Russian combination has always been of one those natural alliances” (October 31, 1964, p. 8). Britain’s response was to propose a joint Anglo-American nuclear force (Colman 2004: Ch. 2). Had it succeeded, this policy would have probably reinvigorated Britishness and weakened centrism which relied on the wider definition of the Atlantic partnership.
confrontation, ideas of multilateralism or international law had more relevance for Canada than beliefs in, say, alliances or deterrence.

Note that my DA of foreign policy elite texts disagrees with the public survey data on the decline of Britishness. According to Gallup, post-war Canada had three mutually exclusive options: to continue as a member of the Commonwealth, join the US or become independent. In the period under study, Commonwealth was favoured by either a plurality or a majority. Around ten percent believed in a union with the US. And twentyeight percent supported independence, both in 1956 and in 1964 (Schwartz 1967: 73-7). NATO, an institution implied in all three discourses, was usually supported by two-thirds of respondents in this period (Ibid. 82). To the extent that the UN can be used as a proxy, my reading of liberal internationalism fares much better. In July 1955, forty-five percent of respondents agreed with a belief in the UN control of armed forces and, a year later, a similar plurality expressed an agreement in the UN control of foreign policies (Ibid: 78-9). Comparable data in other countries suggest that only the US held a more favourable view of the UN (Ibid.: 77). I will probe these evidentiary disagreements further in my analysis of Canadian decisions on Suez and Vietnam.

SUEZ

In July 1956, Egypt’s military-led government nationalized an international company charged with operating the Suez Canal. As diplomacy failed to find a way to resolve the crisis, fighting ensued. On 29 October, Israel invaded Egypt first, followed by Britain and France, who acted in collusion with the Israelis. Britain provided minimal and/or misleading information about its plans to its allies and systematically vetoed all calls for
cease-fire, including an American resolution in the UN General Assembly on November 1-2. The Anglo-American alliance ruptured for a week, placing junior allies like Australia and Canada on the diplomatic fence. Australia opposed the resolution; Canada, abstained from the vote.

Australia’s support for an illegitimate and illegal intervention against Egypt has been explained as “blind loyalty.” In light of the perceived fit between discourse and practice, however, blindness was relative: Britain, a global empire, was an extension of the Self, Egypt, an Eastern start-up, was a partially recognized Other. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of texts read the event as a blatant “confiscation” or “appropriation” of what was regarded as Britain’s most valuable piece of real estate. Once it became clear that London asked for political and diplomatic support, not troops, the debate was virtually closed. Cabinet ministers who privately opposed the British use of force – the external affairs minister Casey and the defence minister Philip McBride – abstained from defecting from the official line. The opposition kept quiet until the invasion itself, when it condemned the use of force, but failed to make a case for a cease-fire resolution. Liberal internationalism aired dissent but was simply overruled by the widely perceived necessity to support what was still the mother country.

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229 Hudson (1989). Australia, like all Britain’s allies, was kept in the dark about British Suez policy, from the planning stage to the decision to collude with Israel (Ibid.: 65-7, Ch. 3; Martin 1999: 331, 347). Within the Commonwealth, NZ was probably the most staunchly pro-British over Suez (Templeton 1994: 179-80).

230 See, e.g., Cabinet conclusions on August 7, National Archives of Australia (NAA), A5462/118/2/4, Menzies’ Menzies’ internal correspondence shows that pro-British policy was a foregone conclusion (NAA MS 4936, Series 1-16-Suez). In September, Casey wrote in his diary that the use of force would be make Britain “lose face,” not least because “America and Russia are likely to be strongly against,” but also because “Israel would want to horn in” (Millar 1972: 244-6). Casey and Menzies disagreed only this one time (Hudson 1989: Ch. 2; Martin 1999: 333-4).
An alternative policy was rendered even less likely once it became clear that the Soviets moved to quell the Hungarian revolt with much force. In the key parliamentary debate between Menzies and Evatt over Suez, the prime minister described the Anglo-French intervention as “proper” and declared that any criticism of Britain “when Russia was on the march” in Hungary was “lunacy” (H of R, November 1). The Soviets, in other words, would exploit any Western disunity, which included the failure of the UN to act. This framing proved enormously resonant with the intended audience. An obvious missed opportunity was a failure to point to Australia’s diplomatic isolation during the crisis. In my reading of the press, editorials summarily failed to comment on the fact that virtually the entire UN condemned the invasion. American opposition to invasion was attributed to the momentary confusion of its government and, in particular, State Secretary Dulles (Advertiser, November 9; Argus November 2). Across five Australian dailies in November, not a single editorial suggested that Britain might have facilitated Soviet oppression in Eastern Europe by weakening the Western alliance, a suggestion made very clearly by Evatt in parliamentary debates (H of R, November 8). The press also rejected rumours of the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. “Such shabby and dishonourable plot would be so repugnant to any friend of Britain that it is difficult to believe the story has any basis” said Sydney Morning Herald (November 1). In this sense, Menzies was being representative of the modal opinion when he wrote to the British prime minister, upon hearing the news of invasion: “You must never entertain any doubts about the British quality of this country”231

231 Cited in Martin (1999: 347). Menzies’ agency, though it predicts the same outcome as the outcome of foreign policy debates, cannot be understated. In this event, Menzies arguably saw himself primarily as a British leader, not as Australian prime minister. During his visit to London in August, he participated in
Unlike Australia’s blind loyalty, Canada’s role in Suez is regarded as a success story of international diplomacy. Pearson’s proposal to introduce an emergency UN police force to secure the cease-fire was approved in the emergency session of the General Assembly of November 3-4. The proposal in fact came from the American UN team, but it was Pearson who sold it, first, to the UN secretariat and then, critically, to Britain’s Foreign Office (Bothwell 2007: 127-130; O’Reilly 1997: 90-1). It led to the peaceful resolution of the crisis, a Nobel Peace Prize for Pearson and the institutionalization of blue helmet (then blue hat) peacekeepers. But in terms of national identity, Suez must be regarded as a harrowing experience for Canada. For the Canadian correspondent of The Economist, the nation’s reaction to Suez “was almost tearful… like finding a beloved uncle arrested for rape” (quoted in Eayrs 1957: 107; Reford 1982: 67). Family metaphors were indeed a popular way to describe the Canadian predicament. The crisis split a group of Canada’s historical friends and allies into two. Britain and France were mother countries (or a “mother” and a “stepmother”) and the US was a sibling (“blood brother,” more mockingly: “uncle”) and never in recent memory had they disagreed so intensely and so openly.232 Canada’s diplomatic decision against “mother” countries was unprecedented in the history of Canadian foreign relations.

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232 In the English-language texts, Suez signified a disagreement between the US and Britain; France was nearly absent, apart from glib references to the “Anglo-French” invasion. Prior to invasion, though, Pearson suspected a French-Israeli secret deal (Bothwell 2007: 126). French-language texts considered France’s motivations, but these were regarded as identical to those of Britain (Igaratua 2006: 124, 129). No text suggested that Israel’s invasion was anything but a separate matter.
Being inconsistent with the baseline discourse which idolized the West, democracy, and free markets (with binding contracts), the nationalization of the Suez canal was simply indefensible. Similarly, there was no contestation of the coverage of a series of crises in Eastern Europe which culminated in the Hungarian uprising in October, followed by the Soviet invasion in November. Soviet “brutality” in Hungary, the *Globe & Mail* argued, could never be compared with the Anglo-British “protection” of the canal (November 9). Where the opinions diverged was over the “wisdom” of the Anglo-French invasion. The liberal internationalist reading, supplied by the ruling Liberals, commissioned a policy which rendered the Anglo-French invasion an overreaction with a potential to destroy an entire decade of international law and/or international anti-communism. But this reading contained a major wrinkle in its logic. Democratic states were not expected to use force without the UN’s approval any longer, much less two mother countries who had in fact founded the system of collective security or, for that matter, the anti-communist alliance.

The Britishness perspective, articulated by the opposition Conservatives, offered a reading similar to that which dominated the Australian debate. Suez was understood as a situation in which a petty generalissimo rebelled against the Western world order. Britain had put such adventurers in their place long before the UN existed and much to everyone’s satisfaction. As for the US, its government – especially State Secretary Dulles – resented that London was finally asserting international leadership. Events in

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233 Typical exchanges with the British government express Canada’s overarching concern about the Anglo-American “divergence,” not the UN (e.g., St Laurent to Eden, October 31, 1956, DCER, p. 187). With an exception of Finance Minister Walter Harris, the Cabinet generally endorsed what they saw as the wait-and-see policy.
Hungary vindicated earlier predictions on how American “weakness” over Suez would embolden Western enemies elsewhere. Continentalism, as the third intertextually available discourse, was predictably silent during the crisis. In my reading, not a single letter to the editor – much less an official statement – called for Canada to vote for the American resolution or otherwise followed the American lead in further pressing Britain and France for a diplomatic settlement.234

Earlier I promised to give another look at public opinion data, as it earlier disagreed with my DA. The evidentiary base on Suez is spotty, but shows a major split. In November, forty three percent of Toronto respondents to a Gallup poll agreed with the Anglo-French invasion, but forty per cent opposed it with seventeen percent offering no opinion.235 A similar finding comes from a content analysis of the editorials (and letters to the editor) of twenty six English-language dailies and three French-language dailies over the three months of the Suez crisis, all showing an event split between support and criticism of the government’s position (Adams 1988; cf. Eayrs 1957; Igartua 2006: 119-124). The Globe & Mail was unwaveringly supportive of Britain. Even after the British government submitted to a UN order to halt the fighting, Canada’s national newspaper said: “Future historians will, we believe, applaud rather than condemn the British and

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234 Consider an alternative dependent variable. In May and June 1956, Canadian parliamentarians debated the government proposal to build a trans-Canada gas pipeline, particularly whether the building concession should be given to a private American consortium. Here too, the opposition criticized the Liberals as pro-American. However, no one asked why the proposal insisted that the gas pipeline should exclusively run through Canadian territory, given that a US route – already followed by the existing oil pipeline – was significantly cheaper.

235 Bothwell 1992: 144; Eayrs 1957: 103; Hilliker and Donaghy 2005: 31. Another Gallup poll, taken in October, indicated that a slight plurality of anglophone Canadians preferred British foreign policy over American foreign policy, though it was unclear from the wording whether the questions referred to Suez or not (Schwartz 1967: 64-5; 70; cf. Igartua 2006: 118-9).
French action.” In contrast, *Le Devoir*, reportedly like other French-language newspapers, condemned the invasion, describing it as “inexplicable and unpardonable” (November 3). The Montreal *Gazette*, nominally supportive of the Conservatives in this period, gave the government the benefit of the doubt, but not support. But once Pearson’s UN proposal was adopted, it endorsed the government policy, calling peacekeeping “historic” (November 12).

The Britishness discourse benefited from the zero-sum logic of the isosceles triangle metaphor: the enlargement of one angle caused the reduction of the other two. Consider the special-session debate in the House of Commons on November 26-9, which convened to vote on the funding of the peacekeeping contingent. The Conservatives used the opportunity to criticize the government for abandoning Canada’s traditional allies in their times of need. The Liberals fell into the trap. To one criticism, Prime Minister St Laurent retorted: “The era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world is coming pretty close to an end.” To another, which accused Ottawa of acting like “the United States chore boy,” Pearson fired back: “It is bad to be a chore boy of the United States. It is equally bad to be a colonial chore boy running around shouting ‘ready, aye, ready.’”

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236 November 12. For this newspaper, American policy in Suez was “erratic” (October 3) and mysterious (October 16). Britain invaded to “make peace” (November 2). The letters to the editor overwhelmingly supported this line, accusing Ottawa for “kowtowing” to the US and describing the Liberals as “sell-outs” and “American lapdogs” (November 9 and 20). Even when Pearson’s peacekeeping proposal was met with near-universal welcome, the newspaper continued to deride it, calling their own Canadian peacekeepers “a typewriter army” and an “international farce” (November 20 and 21). A few of published letters positively treated the UN (November 5). In February 1957, the *Globe & Mail* came to endorse the government policy on the Middle East (Eayrs 1957: 106).
Both responses drew a great deal of ire, even from within the cabinet.\textsuperscript{237} When Suez was read as an Anglo-American dispute, Ottawa’s policy looked like an illegitimate denial of Canada’s imperial/Commonwealth commitments. Canadians, not just defenders of a British discourse definition of the country, clearly felt uncomfortable with the direct move from their imperial past to the allegiance to the American superpower. The government did far better when it framed its policy as an attempt to rescue the mother country from the Suez imbroglio.\textsuperscript{238} In this argument, Canada’s peacekeeping proposal was not counterdiscursive to Britishness, which believed in the restoration of the broken North Atlantic triangle as well as the Commonwealth. The trick was to frame the Suez crisis as Anglo-Egyptian, Anglo-Commonwealth or even a crisis internal to the London government, but never let it be seen as an Anglo-American spat. That Britain’s Prime Minister Eden commanded no confidence of the parliament or the public – or even his cabinet – was not disputed, but not immediately obvious. So to control pro-British hawks at home, the Liberals resorted to the very language of Britishness which emphasized fair play, consultation, deliberation and arbitration over the use of force and the humiliation of the enemy. Put otherwise, Canadians were ready to hear criticism of Britain, only if it sounded like it had just come from Trafalgar Square.\textsuperscript{239} The move worked. Publicly, one


\textsuperscript{238} London did in fact expect Ottawa to help and even sent a message that it was ready to entertain the Canadian idea of a peacekeeping force right before the fateful UN vote (Telegram 1501, November 1, \textit{DCER} 22: 191-2).

\textsuperscript{239} Canada’s permanent representative to the UN noted that Britain did not want to solve the crisis, but humiliate the enemy (Telegram 755, September 25, \textit{DCER} 22, 167-9). Australia’s Menzies believed in regime change in Egypt, not a diplomatic solution (Martin 1989: 164).
former British government official noted that it was Canada, not Britain, who was playing by the rules in Suez (Globe & Mail, November 12, p. 4).

Canada’s Suez decision contradicted the dominant discourse of identity and went down as a politically treacherous move, despite the positive fall-out of the international acclaim accorded to Pearson’s diplomacy. It is unclear whether Suez had anything to do with the defeat of the Liberals in the 1957 elections by the Conservative Party under Diefenbaker, but the new government did attempt to stop the geometric changes in the North Atlantic Triangle. Diefenbaker’s proposal to divert fifteen percent of its US imports to Britain was a bold idea, but ultimately came to be perceived as unrealistic (Roth 2005; cf. Hilliker and Donaghy 2005: 37-8). In this sense, Suez can be seen as a major point in the collapse of Britishness and, with it, the Triangle metaphor in Canadian foreign policy debates.240 By 1964, Canadian policy became a contest between continentalism, on the one hand, and a coalition of liberal internationalism and anti-Americanism on the other.

VIETNAM

Compared to the Suez crisis, the Vietnam escalation of 1964-5 was a protracted affair. In 1964, both Australia and Canada already had soldiers in Vietnam, a country temporarily divided into the communist North and non-communist South. The purpose of Australia’s

240 The onward flow of integration was marked by occasional bumps in the alliance, none greater than those during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The Diefenbaker government first questioned the veracity of claims that the Soviets had secret missiles deployed in Cuba, then, once the crisis erupted, refused to commit Canadian forces to nuclear weapons, as per earlier agreements. Major disagreements occurred during the First and Second Taiwan Straits Crises. Australia’s prime minister noticed these bumps in 1953: “Pre-war, the Canadians touched their hats to the Americans and would never have thought of criticising. Now they seem to go out of their way to criticise” (Millar 1972: 106).
contingent – a platoon of military advisors (since 1962) and an air transport squadron (since August 1964) – was to help the US improve the security of South Vietnam. Canada’s contingent, committed a decade prior, was part of an international commission – consisting of Canada, India and Poland – whose task was to oversee the implementation of an agreement which ended a colonial war against France in the three Indochina countries. Two hundred Canadian diplomats and soldiers were representatives of the Western bloc, but de facto peacekeepers.

Logically, prior commitments could be seen as determinative of the subsequent policies: belligerent for Australia and neutral for Canada. But even within set roles, the type and degree of political support offered to the US ally were open for debate. When US President Lyndon Johnson decided to escalate and Americanize the war in winter 1964-5, Australia was among the first allies to extend support (and the last to withdraw it). In December 1964, for example, only Australia encouraged bombing over negotiation and signalled a willingness to share the burden of a ground war in Vietnam. In April 1965, the Australian government put an infantry battalion under US command in South Vietnam and, a month later, amended its recent and controversial military conscription bill, which enabled Australian conscripts to serve overseas. By 1967, Australia had a light combat division on the ground. In terms of alliance obligations (i.e., not in military contribution per capita), Australia over-committed. Neither ANZUS nor SEATO demanded a military intervention in Vietnam, but the Commonwealth ties did

241 Arguably, Australia would have been content with the greater escalation of the war. Documentary evidence shows that both Canadian and Australian decision-makers were familiar with other US options, namely the “nuclear castration” and “maximum air war” (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 335-40; Ross 1984: Ch. 1).
call for help in the defence of Malaya against Indonesia. Australia’s plausible alternatives in Vietnam, each considered by the Cabinet at one point or another, were the non-combat status quo or a commitment of air and naval combat forces in lieu of infantry.²⁴²

From the US perspective, Canada was a poor ally in Vietnam. The Canadian government periodically discussed their withdrawal from the increasingly moribund international commission, even with White House officials, but never made the move. One of the reasons, cited in an internal memo in June 1965, held that participation in the commission “enables us to resist pressure for direct Canadian involvement in the Vietnam situation” (cited in Bothwell 2000-1: 109). The memo suggests that direct involvement – anything from logistical help to the Australian-style combat mission – was within the realm of the plausible. Washington indeed asked for Canadian troops, more than once (English 1992: 138-140). But in lieu of help, the Canadian government became one of the first allies to criticize the air assault on North Vietnam.

Ottawa’s criticism came in the midst of the campaign phase codenamed Rolling Thunder, when Prime Minister Pearson used his April 2 speech at Temple University to call for “a measured and announced pause.” Rare was a foreign leader who dared question American foreign policy on American soil while America was at war. The next image is iconic in Canada’s Cold War lore: the following day at Camp David, the enraged US president verbally and physically violated the hapless Canadian prime minister.

²⁴² In 1964, the US government asked its allies for help in securing South Vietnam airbases or technical assistance, but never called for combat troops. US President Johnson introduced the “more flags” program in February 1965. In July 1965, he wrote to several allied leaders asking for help in Vietnam, but found no new takers. Allies pursued at least a dozen of different assistance programs to South Vietnam and Washington itself envisaged multiple roles for allied ground forces, from “technical advising”/“logistics” to “deterrence” to “combat”/“operational.” Australia’s alternatives are explained in Woodard (2004: Ch. 15).
minister for, in the president words, “pissing on the neighbor’s rug.” Pearson’s speech was an outlier among Canadian official speeches on Vietnam in 1965, but it captured Canada’s policy of judicious distance from the American war. In one account, Washington saw Ottawa “as a tiresome and self-righteous nag,” for its continuing calls for negotiation and diplomacy (Holmes 1971: 185). What is worse, in the capacity of peacekeeping in Vietnam, Canada seemed to seek objectivity, balance and fairness, as opposed to looking after the interests of its ally and neighbor. A switch from neutrality to belligerence in Vietnam was probably not a plausible alternative for Canada, but a warmer US policy certainly was. Let us now consider the dynamics of foreign policy debates.

In 1964-5, the menu for Australian forward defence was basic: “two allies and two conflicts” (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 280). The allies matched the conflicts: the Vietnam conflict was associated with the US; the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation with Britain and the Commonwealth. Each conflict demanded a strong military commitment from Australia’s resources. Given that these were limited to three infantry battalions available for overseas service, Australian decision makers faced yet another Anzac dilemma (Chapter 5). Given that a decade of diplomacy and peacekeeping had failed to reach a durable settlement for Vietnam, Australia’s liberal internationalists had a

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243 Historiography sees the incident as overblown. For an eyewitness account, see Richie (1983: 79-80). Pearson had publicly implied disagreement with US policies earlier that year, but was well-aware that the Temple University speech would constitute a risky “political act” (Bothwell 1998: 72, 2007: 225-7; Donaghy 2002” 128-31; English 1992: 362-9; Ross 1984: 262-3; cf. Pearson 1975: Vol.3 137-43; *Globe & Mail*, April 3; *Gazette*, April 5). Publicly expressed opinion of other allied leaders ranged from lukewarm support, as in the case of Britain’s Wilson, to heavy criticism, in the case of France’s De Gaulle (Logevall 1999; Daum *et al* eds., 2003; Gardener and Gittinger, eds., 2000).

244 This greatly puzzled the Poles, who never once contradicted communist interests, the Indians, who saw the commission as moribund, as well as Canada’s own military staff at the commission, “for whom co-operation with the Americans was a way of life and thought” (Bothwell 2000-1: 110).
weak case. Britishness was in a favourable position because a Commonwealth-based forward defence centered on Malaysia made double sense. First, an Australian battalion group, which had successfully fought communist guerrillas in Malaya from 1955 to 1960, now formed part of the Commonwealth strategic reserve in that strategically important region (as an international shipping lane, the Strait of Malacca was comparable to the Suez Canal). While no “NATO in Asia,” the reserve was far more developed than a comparable force under the American command.

Second, Indonesia’s President Sukarno was as unpredictable and as aggressive as communists in Hanoi and Beijing. In 1962, he pressed against the Australian territory of Papua-New Guinea – a place run by “the world’s most enlightened colonial service” *(Walkabout, January 1964, p. 15)* – by taking Dutch New Guinea. In 1963, Sukarno then declared a policy of “confrontation” against the newly formed federation of Malaysia, which, in October 1964, resulted in a clash between Australian troops and Indonesian cross-border saboteurs. Next, in November 1964, Sukarno approached China, in a move which became dubbed as the “Jakarta-Peking axis.” Objectively speaking, the entire “corridor” or “arc” to Australia’s immediate north looked as shaky as the seventeenth parallel in Vietnam. Besides, Indonesia was far wealthier, larger, and more strategically important to Australia and its allies than Vietnam. In this sense, the September 1965 military coup against the increasingly anti-Western Sukarno was a more decisive victory for the West than any degree of success in Vietnam.

The Americanist-realist discourse argued against the status quo because it regarded British power as insufficient to the long-term forward defence of Australia. That American power was “massive” had been obvious since at least 1942, but with the
deployment of thousands of American military advisers to Vietnam, that power came close to home. In April 1964, Man described the conflict in Vietnam as “wildest” and “whacky”; “guerrilla warfare with touches of a Hollywood production,” where “lovely girls and wild parties are mixed with danger.” The last word in the reportage is given to a Yankee officer: “This, man, is the way to fight a war. Nobody’s ever had it so good” (pp. 40, 80). This event proved to be a trump card for Americanism-realism. With the American commitment to Vietnam, Australia was given a new go-to ally in the region. The terms of Australia’s forward defence could now be re-defined.

The Vietnam-American alliance link was implied in the discursive structures, but it was the government and media who made it into a priority. Even Menzies, by then Australia’s longest-serving prime minister, had come to accept the value of the American alliance. Equally critical roles can be accorded to the other members of the cabinet’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (FAD), particularly the external affairs minister Paul Hasluck and the defence minister Shane Paltridge as well as the Air Chief Marshall Scherger.245 In November, the scheduled defence review asked for conscripts and additional monies but never claimed that they should be sent to Vietnam. Instead, Indonesia was identified as the main threat and Papua New Guinea was listed as Australia’s most probable danger zone.246 The conscription bill passed on the grounds of

245 Scherger became known to history as a “politician in uniform” (Edward with Pemberton 1992: 375). Hasluck and Paltridge were Menzies appointments during the Cabinet reshuffle in April 1964. The FAD usually consisted of five to six ministers plus the representatives of the defence establishment.

246 It also supported the UN-French proposal for neutralization of Indochina and also envisaged support for Thailand if the entire Indochina fell to communists. In this sense, the review was closet to liberal internationalism than to nationalism (Cabinet document 493, October 22, 1964, CS file 1473, A4940/1, NAA). The hypothetical location for the military exercise in September 1964 was Thailand (Edwards 1992: 11).
a “continuing requirement to make our forces available for cold war and counterinsurgency tasks” (Menzies, “Defence Review Debate,” H of R, November 10).

*Sydney Morning Herald* concluded that Australia was “preparing against war with Indonesia” (November 11). So for Australia to go to war in Vietnam, the threat perceptions had to be shifted.

The official to commence the shift was Hasluck. Upon returning from a trip to Southeast Asia in June 1964, Hasluck suggested that Hanoi, not Jakarta, was the ultimate enemy for Australia (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 300). Judging by the press reactions, the shift appeared too sudden for the Australian audience: the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation looked far more threatening than South Vietnam (*Canberra Times, Age*, June 22). In the government discussions, Hasluck’s assessment received support from the prime minister and the military staff led by Scherger, but it is unclear how other cabinet/FAD ministers came to accept that Hanoi, not Jakarta constituted the main source of insecurity for Australia. The records of key cabinet/FAD meetings show no discussion of the trade-offs between the two conflicts or the possible difficulty or duration of the Vietnam deployment. This silence may indicate two things: professional incompetence or confidence that America would win. The recommendation to send combat troops to Vietnam also came from the defence community, from Scherger, but it was the ministers who made a decision. McEwen, the trade minister and Menzies’ deputy, justified the policy as “an act of faith.”

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So justified, Australia’s intervention in Vietnam became inevitable. Menzies later wrote: “from the outset of American military operations against aggressors in Vietnam I found it impossible to contemplate that Australia could allow the United States to “stand alone” in that enterprise” (1968: 8). Exchange Vietnam for Suez and the US for Britain, and the statement can be chalked up as evidence of Australia’s blind loyalty. In my reading, Australian Vietnam War language is a testament to the peculiar evolution of the British discourse which simply added – or exchanged – the self-identification with Britain to that with America. In this transition, the American alliance became established as an end in itself, the role normally played by Empire/Commonwealth. Speaking at a party rally in Sydney in April 1965, probably without notes, Menzies described the US intervention in Vietnam as “the greatest act of real courage since Britain stood alone in the Second World War.”

For the official historians, the proximate cause of Australia’s shift to a US-based forward defence in 1964-5 was the Gulf of Tonkin incidents. The event – in which the US bombed North Vietnam in response to an alleged naval attack – electrified _The Australian_, which was the first to endorse the punitive bombing. In the extended parliamentary debate, Hasluck argued that the use of force had “no current alternative...to check the downward thrust of militant Asian communism” and Menzies argued that the bombing was evidence of America’s irreversible commitment to the region (H of R, August 11, 13). Labor, which argued from a liberal internationalist platform, failed to

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248 Quoted in _Australian_, April 6, 1965. The Australian audience no doubt appreciated the analogy, but several newspapers noted that some British ministers – as opposed to the British government or British people – doubted the wisdom of escalation in Vietnam (_Age, Sydney Morning Herald_, May 1).

249 Edwards with Pemberton (1992: 307-314). Note that “Tonkin Gulf incidents” usually refers to the second incident, which was later found to be an American fabrication.
offer a unified and/or alternative reading of the event. While MP Gough Whitlam endorsed the US retaliation, his colleague John Cairns suggested that Washington could have fabricated the incident (Ibid.). In the eyes of the press, the government was right; the opposition, confused (e.g., Age, Advertiser, Sydney Morning Herald, August 14; also see Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 347-9). Labor divisions were entirely discursive, but the end product was hegemony of the government-supported Americanist-realist position.

Tonkin Gulf was only the beginning; the government framing of Australia’s security situation carried over to subsequent events. In September, Indonesia escalated its policy of confrontation with Malaysia by landing its paratroopers on the Malaysian peninsula. A UN Security Council resolution, vetoed by the Soviets, deplored Indonesia’s action; Western states protested, with Britain threatening a punitive counterattack. To test Indonesia, a Royal Navy squadron announced a passage though the waters claimed by Jakarta. The event – dubbed the Sunda Straits Crisis – was resolved when Indonesia allowed the squadron to pass, though not via the desired route.

That the Sunda Straits and Tonkin incidents had a lot in common was not lost on contemporary observers (Australian, September 16; Sydney Morning Herald, September 14). Both events involved a provocative presence of allied navy in enemy-claimed territorial waters, so like in Vietnam, the Australian government offered support in Sunda as well, this time to Britain. The big difference was that only in Sunda did Canberra urge the Anglo-American policy cooperation (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 320-1). For Australian decision-makers, American power was sufficient to deal with North Vietnam; British power against Indonesia was not. This difference signals a major change similar to a situation a decade prior, when British sabre-rattling against a non-Western
dictatorship (e.g., Suez) generated unequivocal and automatic support, in contrast to similar American policies, in which Canberra called for more “consultations (e.g., Indochina intervention).

In 1965, the Australian government committed to both conflicts, announcing a commitment of an infantry battalion to each danger zone, to Malaysia in January and to Vietnam in April. In the objective ontology of security, two conflicts were similar: one Asian state fought another with insurgent proxies with regime change as the goal. Also, in both conflicts, Australia’s policies were similarly justified in terms of forward defence and the fears of Asian Communisms, as well as logical extensions of earlier commitments to friendly governments threatened by aggressive dictatorships. In this sense, the government was right to see the two conflicts as “part of a common pattern and a common threat” (McEwen to British Prime Minister Wilson, January 19, 1965, cited in Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 341). Each threat was associated with a different ally. The US protected Indochina against communism; Britain did the same in Malaysia, against Indonesia. The primacy of Vietnam and the American alliance was achieved through careful framing. Consider Menzies’ justification of Australia’s military commitment:

The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all countries of South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans...We have decided – and this has been in close consultation with the Government of the United States – to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam...alliances, as well as providing guarantees and assurances for our security, make demands upon us (H of R, April 29, 1965).
Two features made Vietnam the more important war. The first was the aforementioned domino theory; presumably unlike the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation, the Vietnam conflict “directly” involved Australia, the main target for the interoceanic communist thrust. Second, Vietnam was America’s war. Menzies concluded his speech with the reading of a letter from US President Johnson, which said that Australia’s commitment of infantry battalion to Vietnam “proves again the deep ties between our two countries in the cause of world peace and security.” The expressed rationale for intervention was consistent with internal government documents. Vietnam was Australia’s long-term project of containing communism and building the American alliance.250

On the news of Australia’s decision to go to Vietnam, the editorials supported the decision, with the exception of The Australian, which did not like the timing of the war. Nearly all commented on the link between the intervention and the American alliance, in a sense that the benefits of the latter outweighed the pitfalls of the former.251 The desire to deepen the American alliance was an ongoing theme of Australian foreign policy and helps explain why Australia chose to intervene in Vietnam over other options. In the discourse of Australian identity, alliance obligations were a familiar rationale for going to war, but not a single text noticed that Australia would fight its first war without Britain. What was inconceivable, to paraphrase Casey, in 1954 was irrelevant in 1965. Applying

250 Key NAA sources are A1838 Department of External Affairs (DEA) files 3014/2 and 30140/10, and A4950 Cabinet discussions (CS), file C4643.

251 E.g., Age, April 30. In the parliament, the Labor leader Calwell disputed the justification to send troops on multiple grounds – that the conflict was primarily a civil war, that communism was a political, not military problem and that the US could easily end up a loser like France. He also invoked the official positions of Britain and Canada as evidence that alternative policies were possible (H of R, May 4). Menzies responded by essentially calling Calwell anti-American for proposing that “American soldiers from the Middle West can go and fight and die in South Vietnam, but that is not for us” (Ibid.). According to the press, he was right (Sydney Morning Herald, May 5).
the Korean War analogy to the situation in Vietnam was thus misleading: Australia jumped to join the American-led coalition in Korea primarily to encourage American endorsement of ANZUS, but Korea was also a British/Commonwealth war. What is also ironic within this logic – but what drew no attention at the time – is that Australia was ready to forgo the defence of proximate (i.e., Borneo, New Guinea) and strategically far more consequential territories (i.e., the Strait of Malacca) in order to defend South Vietnam so that it could deepen the American alliance, lest it be tested against Indonesian aggression in those same territories. The *Canberra Times* came close by commenting that “We’ve got what even Hitler feared, a war on two fronts. It is a desperate gamble” (May 1; cf. April 30). In general, however, neither the policy makers nor the press considered the defence trade-offs or mentioned that the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation tied down twice as many allied troops than the one in Vietnam.

Standard counterfactual analysis holds that if one of Hasluck’s predecessors had been at the helm of the ministry of external affairs, Australia would have sent its extra infantry battalion(s) to Malaysia, not Vietnam. Arguably, because he believed in the Sino-Vietnamese rivalry, Richard Casey (minister from 1951-1960) would have let the communists fight it out among themselves (Hudson 1986: 252-3). His successor, Garfield Barwick (resigned in April 1964) strongly believed in the continuity of a division of labour in which Vietnam was associated with the US and Malaysia with the Commonwealth.252 To the extent that opinion polls can be compared over time, Barwick’s argument would have had considerable traction in the wider Australian

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252 This case is developed by Woodard (2004: Ch. 16). Barwick resigned in April 1964 upon upsetting the Americans and the opposition with a suggestion that ANZUS would apply should Australians soldiers be attacked in Borneo by Indonesia (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 281-2).
In my view, the dominant discourse of identity disempowered these agents – as well as Labor opposition – partly because they failed to offer an alternative reading of the new events which would contradict the view that Asian Communism was up and/or that America could keep it down. The domino theory, for one, could have been destabilized by describing North Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh as the “new Tito,” who was a Communist state leader but not a Soviet proxy. Had the Americanist-realist discourse failed to achieve dominance in foreign policy debates, Australia’s forward defence would have probably continued to be based on the Commonwealth and the American alliance would have remained as mercurial as the text of the ANZUS and SEATO treaties. The US-Australian division of labour between Vietnam and Malaysia would have obtained, just like it did within the AASR (Busch 2003: 188-196; Ellis 2004: 17, 155-60).

Canadian historical writing on Canada’s Vietnam policy has been marked by a debate on the so-called complicity thesis which holds that Ottawa actively facilitated the tragedy in Indochina. Charges of complicity were perhaps inevitable in a situation which enunciated two key clashing identities: a US ally, an identity implied in the conservative discourse, and a middle power diplomat, put forward by liberal

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253 Fifty nine percent supported and twenty three percent opposed the intervention in Borneo/Malaysia in May 1964; in February 1965, the relation was sixty five to twenty six percent (APOP nos. 1745-62, April-July 1964; nos. 1804-19, February-March 1965). Hawkish opinion against Indonesia also obtained in October and December, following the face-off with the Royal navy in the Sunda Straits (Edwards with Pemberton 1992: 322). In comparison, the Vietnam intervention in May 1965 was supported by fifty two percent and opposed by thirty seven percent of respondents (Advertiser, May 15).

254 Consider the discussion in Quadrant, January-February 1965, p. 3. Hasluck specifically argued against this interpretation (Edward with Pemberton 1992: 353-4).

255 As evidence of complicity cited are various forms of information, intelligence and military hardware procured by Canadians to the US during the war, including Canadian volunteers who fought in US armed forces in Vietnam. For an overview of the literature, see Preston (2003: 74-6). For a month-to-month account of Canadian foreign policy in the period under study, see Eayrs (1983) and Preston (2003).
internationalism. In my reading, liberal internationalism dominated the formulation process and public expression, continentalism shaped implementation. The result was the perceived ambiguity in which Ottawa supported the American goals in Vietnam but occasionally criticized the means, as did Pearson at Temple University. The prime minister usually spoke from the liberal internationalist perspective which stressed Canada’s middle power efforts – and experience – at conflict resolution. In this view, the American alliance was as important as Canada’s membership in a peacekeeping commission in Vietnam. Internal government documents show that officials believed that “it was important to distinguish Canadian attitudes from American, and not to seem to be just a mouthpiece for the United States” (Bothwell 2007: 225).

At the same time, no official statement in the period described the Vietnam conflict as a civil war and no Canadian policy maker opposed the US intervention itself, only escalations and the talk of escalations.²⁵⁶ For liberal internationalists, the conflict in Vietnam could not be resolved by the show of US (air) force, but by a new conference and/or a Suez-era emergency international police force to stop the violence. The continentalist position saw the conflict primarily in terms of the US-Canadian relations. The harmonization of policy with the US, even as it slid into a major war, was an imperative for the sake of American credibility and therefore Western unity or solidarity.

²⁵⁶ Rumours of a nuclear option in Vietnam horrified the Canadians (Ross 1984). Cabinet discussions from the period do not indicate debates over Vietnam, but records can be found in the documents in Pearson Papers, MG 26 N 6, Vols 9-10 and in Department of External Affairs (DEA), LAC, RG 25/10122/20-22-VIET.S.
While no text advocated a complete switch of roles in Vietnam – from peacekeeping to combat – most texts within this discourse saw Canada as a poor servant of Western interests, far more similar in the style of official rhetoric to India, the non-aligned member of the tripartite international commission, than to Poland, the Eastern Bloc member. Staunch anti-communists, for example, wanted Ottawa to support the US resolve in Vietnam the way the socialist bloc supported Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia or Hungary.257

Outside the Cabinet, the liberal internationalist discourse dominated the parliament, though the NDP pushed its left-of-centre limits by calling Ottawa to break publicly with Washington over Vietnam. Continentalism had its proponents in both Liberal and Conservative parties as well as in the diplomatic and defence establishment, but it failed to mount a challenge to the dominant readings of the war. Public opinion data suggests that Vietnam was equally popular in both Australia and Canada (as was US President Johnson, for that matter).258 But my DA reveals important differences between two nations in the ways the war was understood. The Canadian press dealt with the American conduct of the war critically, regardless of the general editorial line. The respectable Globe & Mail regularly placed the term military advisors under inverted

257 Ross 1984: 267. Ross’ quasi-discursive perspective on Canada’s Vietnam decision agrees with my findings in the period under study (Ibid.: 32-3). In the commission, India had the largest contingent and held the swing vote. For Indo-Canadian relations in Vietnam, see Bothwell (2000-1: 106-9).

258 The first Canadian poll on Vietnam, from July 1965, found a 44-33 ratio in favor of American intervention. A year later, the ratio changed to 35-34, with subsequent polls showing around a third in support of US withdrawal from Vietnam and around forty percent calling for either escalation or the status quo. According to Gallup numbers, the balance between critics and supporters was more-or-less equal until 1968, possibly even 1970 (Holmes 1971: 199, Bothwell 2007: 216, 230; Ross 1984: 450). President Johnson was popular with a majority of Canadians and was probably more popular in April 1965 than in April 1964 (English 1992: 144; cf. Maclean’s, January 23, 1965, p. 18). A Gallup poll of August 1965 found that fifty seven percent of polled Canadians judged the US as Canada’s best friend (Bothwell et al 1992: 261).
commas and gave pessimistic assessment of US military operations (e.g., December 25, p. 7). More alternative outlets, like the *Canadian Dimension* (self-defined as “the product of the post-nuclear generation of leftist thinkers”) freely spoke of napalm and torture and argued, as early as April–March 1965, that “[b]y concentrating on winning the war first and the people last [the US] has lost both” (p. 4). And in March 1965, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation mistakenly reported on the US shipment of poison gas to South Vietnamese Army, making an analogy with WWI, in which Canadian troops were target of German mustard gas.259

As articulated by politicians and the media, Canada’s liberal internationalisms was hardly anti-American over Vietnam in the period under study, certainly less so than Australia’s liberal internationalism. For example, in contrast to the Australian counterpart, the Canadian parliament uniformly endorsed the news of the second Gulf of Tonkin incident (H of C, August 5). The cabinet expressed support for the US by a renewed promise to supply the US with information collected by Canadians serving in the international commission in Vietnam (Donaghy 2002: 126-7; Preston 2003: 104).

At the policy implementation level, continentalism was dominant. In a social context of a divided Vietnam, where the division of the country was supervised by a commission made up by the Canadians, the Poles and the Indians, continentalism easily carried the day: “the Americans were nearby, they spoke the same language, they had basically the same point of view…and they were usually friendly (Bothwell 2000-1: 110). Texts written by Canadian diplomats and soldiers in Vietnam are hard to come by, but traces left behind overwhelmingly indicate sympathy with the American cause. As I

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259 The gas in question turned out to be a tear gas, but not before many commentators called the US militarist and racist (Bothwell 2007: 224).
said earlier, most soldiers and some diplomats (e.g., Gordon Cox) were openly pro-American, but the fact is that very few wondered why Canadian field intelligence should be sent to the US embassy in Saigon (or, in at least one case, to the US Central Intelligence Agency). Even fewer asked why Canada’s commission staff should use American facilities in Vietnam – anything from air-conditioned GI bars to the free transoceanic transportation (Eayrs 1983: 242-50). In the predominant view on the ground, the Canadians were loyal allies, not impartial international referees. One peacekeeper thus described the situation:

I was bloody ashamed of the things I was required to do because of the External Affairs Department policy in Vietnam…. There are men, Canadians, there trying to build a career. To antagonize the Americans would have restricted their futures. I don’t recall any occasion when I saw anything in print that we should cover for the Americans, but at the same time, if you did not, you’d be in a very difficult position (officer Hugh Campbell in Globe & Mail, February 16, 1966, quoted in Levant 1986: 174).

Arguably, that continentalism dominated the armed force was a fact since the 1950s, despite the wide-spread use of British symbols: “If there were a segment of the Canadian population immune to anti-Americanism, this was it” (Bothwell 2007: 131, fn. 42). But during Vietnam, this fact gave rise to an “inherent contradiction” between the views of the Department of External Affairs and those in the Department of Defence (Ibid. 2000-1: 110). This observation is entirely consistent with my analysis of the clash of competing discourses of identity. In my reading, therefore, the contradiction in policy was more fundamental than simple “cultural” disagreement between bureaucratic units. To be sure, the peacekeeper and loyal ally identities were thus not always at loggerheads, especially in practices that appeared consistent with both liberal internationalist and continentalist
discourses. And in one sense, the situation was reminiscent of the Suez crisis: the
Canadian government desperately wanted its premier ally to seek peace when the ally
was impetuously going for war. But unlike in Suez, few described the government policy
as fatally wrong; in fact, ambiguity was seen as inevitable.

Canadian ambiguities over Vietnam continued throughout 1965. The five
missions (June 1964 to June 1965) of the Canadian commissioner Blair Seaborne were
the sole communication channel between Washington and Hanoi. Judging by the internal
documents, Canadian foreign policy makers saw nothing odd in placing its Indochina
diplomat at the US disposal, even when it became clear that the US was not interested in
diplomacy, but in information-gathering (Logevall 1999: 156-63; Preston 2003: 96-99;
Ross 1984: 275-80). Also ambiguous were actions of the minister of foreign affairs
Martin. On the one hand, Martin acted as a spokesperson for the American alliance -
witness his threat to resign upon reading a copy of Pearson’s Temple University speech
or, later, his dismissals of the criticisms of Canada’s complicity in war. On the other
hand, he ceaselessly continued to seek a negotiated settlement in Vietnam even after
American and military intervention escalated in May 1965.

While my DA ends in 1965, there is evidence to suggest that the Vietnam War
shifted the Canadian foreign policy debate away from continentalism, though without
has been no change of government policy but a change in the climate in which
government policy was formulated” (1971: 195). In a subsequent section on society and
culture, Holmes revealed a possible explanation for why a discourse shift produced no
policy shift:
The Canadians do not know whether to respond by rejecting the United States and finding their own way or by wallowing in sin with the Americans. This dilemma is attributable to one virtue, fairmindedness – the realization that we share the horrid bourgeois civilization and the Cold War and its not decent to attribute the wickedness to the United States and virtue to Canada (Ibid.: 196).

Canada discursively never abrogated its American alliance, but what Vietnam did was to greatly diminish Canada’s inferiority complex viz. the US -“that paralysing conviction that Canada’s national purpose is catching up with the US” (Ibid. 198). The Vietnam effect on Canadian identity was profound. At the time, “[fo]r Canadians, relations between the two countries were not a means of expressing similarities but of defining and even amplifying differences” (Bothwell 2007: 215). Arguably, the Vietnam War was an event that supplied evidence for the British and liberal internationalist predictions that the Canadian Self did in fact significantly differ from the American Other. Coupled with the quiet revolution in Quebec, Vietnam induced a deeper search of the ways in which Canada could be distinct, and foreign policy – as the “hard case” for such distinctiveness – became established the main turbine of Canadian identity in the years to come.

CONCLUSION
Given a similarity in the baseline discourse of identity in Australia and Canada, it is no surprise that their foreign policy elites shared beliefs in the alliances with Britain and the US and the corollary international defence and promotion of universalistic goals such as individual freedom and democracy. Surprising from this perspective are their divergences in cases like Suez and Vietnam. In this chapter, I have argued that Australian and Canadian alliance choices followed the contents and contestations of
identity at home. During the Suez crisis, the dominance of British race patriotism implied Australia’s loyalty towards Britain. This loyalty is historiographically seen as “blind,” but at the time it resonated with the discourses and debates on the Australian Self. In Canada, loyalty was overruled by the liberal internationalist discourse, which emphasized an independent and possible unique role for Canada in world affairs. The policy was a clear misfit with Canada’s dominant Britishness at home, but the success of the government’s framing had much too do with the circumstances beyond the control of its advocates. Indeed, the opportunity to dominate diplomacy within the North Atlantic Triangle never presented itself for Canada again (O’Reilly 1997: 93). Be that as it may, Canada’s choice over Suez clearly falsifies my argument regarding the productive role of the fit between identity and the perceived reality in foreign policy.

During the escalation of the Vietnam War, Australian policy was driven by an Americanist-realist discourse which saw the defence of Australia as contingent on the American alliance or, more specifically, American military presence in Southeast Asia. With reality so defined, following America into Vietnam made for a coherent and consistent policy. In Canada, anti-Americanism, Eurocentrism and peacekeeping all militated against fighting – as opposed to doing diplomacy – in Vietnam. Moreover, a coalition of foreign policy discourses critical of the US successfully argued for that Canada’s “benevolent neutrality” was the most fitting policy toward the US in Vietnam. Note that like in Suez, Ottawa never condemned the foreign policy goals of its ally; it merely – and not more than once – called for a change in means.

Since the Vietnam War, it was Australia and not Canada who has become the most dependable ally (Australia has fought every major “American war” in the twentieth
century in a still unbroken sequence, though Australia’s contributions have always been more political than military; when it comes sending troops, Australia generally lagged behind other American allies in both absolute and per capita terms.) In recent years, this divergence has arguably become more pronounced than ever, as evidenced in the Australian-Canadian divergence over the Iraq War, the Ballistic Missile Defence and the Kyoto and Ottawa protocols. The divergence, I posit, has to do with two main factors: geography and Canada’s dualistic nationhood. On the first, if it is true that Canada sees itself as a “regional power without a region,” then it is probably safe to say that Australia perceives itself as a regional power with too big of a region. For Canberra, the Vietnam War, like the Korean War then or the Iraq War now, was an opportunity to deepen its ties with the familiar America, primarily against the threatening Asia.

Geography is obviously not destiny – Australia defied geography in the 1950s by deploying its overseas army contingent to the Middle East. But geography also means that Canada never had to buy an insurance policy from the US. To Ottawa, the American guarantee largely comes free, thanks to the way the political map of North America developed in history. Once the US gave up on the idea of annexing it sometime in the latter half of the nineteenth century, geography was no longer something to be feared; in fact, Canada became one of the more secure states – not nations! – in the world. Formal institutionalization of the recognition that the US cannot defend the continent without also automatically defending Canada began in 1940, with the signing of the Ogdensburg

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260 Neither is history destiny: in the 1980s and 1990s, Australia decided to “push into Asia,” leading some commentators to question its Western credentials (Huntington 1996). The last two decades have shown the persistence of “America first” policy, but a future shift in Australian foreign policy is possible. Asia may one day come to appear as close and positive to Canberra as, say, Europe has become close and positive to London since the 1960s.
agreement and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Canada has since closely cooperated with the US but, as the cases of Vietnam and Iraq show, cooperation is not compliance. I will return to this point later in my study.

The second cause of the divergence in Canadian-Australian alliance behaviour lies in Canada’s French fact, namely the one in Quebec. Save for Ontario, no province in the Canadian federation has been as powerful politically as Quebec, a claim readily evidenced in the geographic and linguistic identities of Canadian prime ministers since 1896, particularly in the decades since the Quiet Revolution. Public opinion data, since they were introduced to Canada in the 1940s, show that Quebec skews the national average to the left, with some help coming from Toronto and Vancouver. On foreign policy, the push to the left has arguably been even more pronounced. Because the (francophone) Quebeckers disliked overseas interventions and what that usually entailed – above all, the draft – every time Ottawa decided to go to war, the question of national unity would spring to the top of Canadian politics. In sum, unless there comes a radically new interpretation of geography and culture – say, Australia “goes East“ and/or Canadian politics changes its bilingual, bicultural matrix – the discourses of identity based on these two structures are likely to determine Australian and Canadian foreign policy in general and security practices constitutive of the Anglosphere in particular.
CHAPTER 7

EMPIRE, IRAQ AND THE “COALITION OF THE WILLING”

We do think the same, we do feel the same, and we have the same – I think – sense of belief that if there is a problem you’ve got to act on it. Tony Blair in a BBC documentary, 8 September 2002, cited in Naughtie (2004: 129-30).

We’re not the same. Jean Chrétien, interview in Maclean’s, December 30, 2002.

In Chapter 2, I provided a large-N analysis of the determinants of participation in US-led military interventions between 1950 and 2001. I discovered that the Anglosphere identity, operationalized as shared language, has a significant positive effect on the states’ likelihood of responding to a US call to arms. The finding, I concluded, was a correlation in need of a causal mechanism: why do English-speaking states make good US allies? In the subsequent chapters, I developed a framework linking identity and foreign policy cooperation and then applied it to a set of case studies drawn from my genealogy. With this chapter, my genealogy comes to its last case study – the run-up to the Iraq War, as seen from the perspectives of Britain and Canada. Though sharing identities constitutive of the Anglosphere core, these two states showed different levels of willingness to participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq.

The invasion began on March 19, 2003. On March 18, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced to the House of Commons that Britain was going to war against Iraq, a rogue state in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties to international terrorism. Blair said: “Iraq is not the only part of this threat. But it is the test of whether we treat the threat seriously…It will determine the pattern of international politics for the
next generation.” The purpose of the intervention, the prime minister underlined, was not only disarmament but also the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s dangerous and odious long-time dictator. A day earlier, Canada’s Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced in his House of Commons that his country would not join the US-led coalition. His justification related not to the principled opposition to the war, but to the fact that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) failed to pass a resolution authorizing military intervention against Iraq. In Parliamentary question period, Chrétien also intimated that he was against the idea of regime change: “If we change every government we don’t like in the world where do we start? Who is next?”

Their divergence over Iraq is puzzling considering that Britain and Canada faced nearly identical structural conditions. First, there was the alliance with America. Both states were long-standing US allies, whose governments at the time – Blair’s Labour and Chrétien’s Liberals – had an impeccable record of supporting US interventions abroad, including the punitive bombing of Hussein’s Iraq in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox). Second, there was the strong anti-war sentiment at home. In Britain, public opinion surveys throughout the period suggested that a majority – including a majority of Labour voters – did not believe in the invasion of Iraq, even with UN backing (cf. The Guardian, 28 August 2002; 18 February 2003). And on February 15, a month before the war, hundreds of thousands of Britons – possibly as many as two million – hit the streets to show their anti-war sentiments. As for the politicians, in September 2002, Labour essentially split over a parliamentary motion considering a possible Iraq war, and Britain’s potential involvement in it. And when the actual Iraq War came to the table, the government faced resignations from three ministers. One of them was the Leader of the
House of Commons Robin Cook, an ex-Foreign Secretary, whose theatrical resignation in the parliament on March 17, the day before the historic votes on the war, prompted a standing ovation. The next day more than a third of Labour MPs defied their party leadership and voted in favor of an anti-war amendment, an event that constituted the “largest rebellion in the history of the Labour party” (Gamble 2003: 230). For the subsequent and main pro-war motion, a large portion of rebellious backbenchers abstained from the vote and the government received overwhelming support from the Conservatives. Britain thus went to war over the objections of a quarter of its elected representatives and, judging by public opinion, over the objections of the majority of its citizens. The anti-war sentiment in Canada was just as strong.261

Third, there was a similar policy menu. Calling for the status quo in Iraq – the continuation of containment – was unlikely, but there was an option of backing the US-led coalition without sending troops or with a non-combat contribution. That a “support minus” policy was a plausible alternative was evident in the case of Spain, whose prime minister hosted Blair and Bush at the “war summit” in the Azores in March 2003, but managed to keep Spanish soldiers out of the invasion. Besides, as shown in the previous chapter, “support minus” had its precedents in both British and Canadian foreign policy. Also note that Canada’s non-participation was hardly a foregone conclusion at the time. Less than a month before the invasion, the government was still dithering (Maclean’s, February 24, 2003). And a week into the invasion, when asked if Ottawa was with or against the US invasion, Chrétien answered with a resounding “maybe” (Globe and Mail, February 24, 2003).

261 Anti-war demonstrations in Canada, while significant – between 100,000 and 250,000 in Montreal and around 30,000 in Toronto – were lower than those in other countries allied to the US (AP 2003, Jedwab 2003, Schuster and Meier 2006).
What made Canada’s “no” even more startling – and ironic – was the fact that Canadian troops were actually sent to the theatre of operations in Iraq, unlike the troops of some gung-ho coalition members, such as Italy or South Korea.

In this chapter, I argue that British and Canadian choices in the Iraq War followed respective discourses and debates over state/national identity in each country. In Britain, the Iraq decision ran *against* the hegemonic discourse of the British identity. What made British participation possible was the creative and persuasive framing given by Blair and his foreign policy team. By merging “Atlanticism,” and “liberal internationalism,” the government argued that international law and institutions should be seen as flexible so long as the US constituted a “force for good” in the world. In Canada, “nationalism” in society and “liberal internationalism” in foreign policy debates emphasized the need for Canada to be different from the US. As a result, Ottawa defined its independence in terms of multilateralism and the UN and thus against participation in the Iraq invasion. Ostensibly, the government could have framed the Iraq decision in terms other than independence and multilateralism – say, neutrality, isolationism or pacifism – but doing so would not have been as resonant with the dominant discourse on Canadian identity at the time.

This chapter proceeds as follows the familiar format: first I compare the relevant self-other relations in British and Canadians societies in 2002-3. Then I review of the foreign policy debates over three new events of the period. Then I analyze the decision to join the US-led coalition from and, last, I evaluate the implications for the Anglosphere.
THE BEST OF THE WEST

In 2002-3, Britain and Canada self-identified as “liberal democracies,” a system in which humans act as individual citizens when they vote to delegate authority to a governing body. As such, contract and consent are seen as the ultimate baseline: the will of the majority, like the freedom of minority, is sustained by law, and lawbreaking is punishable by the agents established by a governing body. Liberal democracy is in many ways synonymous with capitalist democracy, in which the universality of political and civil rights sharply are contrasted with the variability of economic rights. For example, despite the relatively sophisticated nationalized health care and education systems in both states, most texts in my archive treat health and education primarily as the responsibility of the individual.

In an ideal world, the dominant reading went, a variation in social and economic rights is supposed to be a function of work or merit; for one, time and money are evaluated as precious commodities precisely because they are largely mutually exclusive (e.g., Pearson 2002). In this context, variations in socio-economic rights are frequently couched in terms of gender and “household” which most texts related to (nuclear) family or middle class.262

In addition to security and prosperity being associated with the middle class, another frequently cited measure of liberal, capitalist success was order. One Canadian historian observed: “In nationalist myths about Canada, we are supposed to be polite and civil, but look at hockey. Hockey is essentially one long rant where Canadians vent the

262 In my DA, most signifiers of the class status – anything from newspaper advertisements to the musings on aesthetic lifestyle tastes offered by fictional characters – inscribed a middle class identity (synonymous with “class-free”) as both dominant and ideal (e.g., The Guardian, February 19, 2002, 18).
emotions they are supposed to repress.” The norm, as in “supposed to,” is to repress
“long vitriolic complaints” (National Post, February 20, 2002). While the real Canadian
likes to rant, the ideal Canadian puts the “civil” in civil society – she or he is composed,
civil, tolerant, and respectful of others. The same observation was made in British texts,
with respect to the 2002 World Cup in football.

At home, challenges to liberalism and capitalism were marginal and usually came
in the form of discourse provisionally labeled as “Marxist-feminist.” This challenge
took the form of a double critique. Without equalizing the two, this discourse questioned
both the dominant liberal-capitalist template and its alternatives – usually various forms
of authoritarianisms – because they saw them as overlapping in several gender-biased or
class-biased areas: asymmetrically distributed material wealth, consumerism, militarism
and misogyny. At a minimum, Marxism-feminism questioned the apolitical view of
the economy. One target was globalization or the concomitant belief that “productivity”
and “efficiency” were panaceas against the cold logic of global supply and demand
chains, even though such therapy called for soak-the-poor, fiscal tightening at home.

Another target was corporate behavior, often seen as socially irresponsible or
even outright corrupt. In one fictional text, puzzled about her company’s mission
statement, a manager of a hedge fund wonders: “By what logic did the hardcore

263 Testament to the weakness of the counter-hegemonic discourse was a propensity to cynicism bordering
on self-censorship: “Now…Marxism is as respectable as marquetry (and about as relevant)” (Sinclair 2002: 431).

264 Note that no text in my archive regarded the two centuries-long march to democracy as misdirected. For
examples of Marxism-feminism, consider reflections on a lecture by Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of
Canterbury (The Guardian, 20 December 2002) or feminist critiques in Shields’ Unless. A corollary to this
counterdiscourse was popular belief in human agency as a function of luck, as opposed to the usual
suspects such as personal wealth or representative democracy (cf. Elton 2002).
capitalists of the 20th century end up parroting slogans first chanted by Maoist peasants, who were not even permitted to own their own bicycle” (Pearson 2002: 27). In this reading, corporate service and production – the main source of the material benefits bestowed by capitalism – had become as antithetical to the human interest as in the darkest days of communism, a negative as well as geographically and temporally distant Other.

So while British and Canadian texts recognized that the Self had been “doing best” in historical and cross-national terms, the future looked bleak, even within the dominant discourse. For one, “government” or the “state” was seen as rapidly losing power to “globalization” on the outside and to the private sector and the media on the inside. Texts on public service reform, for example, argued that the time had come to recast the “1945 welfare state” (Britain) and “medicare” (Canada). Public authority also clashed with an ever-greater demand for individual freedom, as reflected in the debates over drug legalization (e.g., Elton 2002).

A redeeming and highly valued feature of liberal-capitalist democracy was multiculturalism, a constitutive element of British and Canadian nations in the period under study. In British texts, London emerged a multiethnic, multiracial and multiconfessional haven, comparable to no other city in the word, with possible exception of America’s New York. In this city of cities, being “second-generation” or “mixed” was not simply a right but “cool” and thus a distinct plus. 265 A similar sense of superiority

265 “Chicken Tikka Masala,” argued one observer, was London’s “most popular dish for the moment (Sinclar 2002: 437). In 2001, a senior cabinet minister cited this Westernized Indian dish as a primer of how “Britain absorbs and adapts.” Another semi-official slogan for multiculturalism was “Cool Britannia,” itself a Newsweek label from 1997.
emerges in Canadian texts, which tended to treat multiculturalism as a national invention. In a textbook historical narrative, Canada was born in the symbiotic co-existence of the First Nations and European settlers and lived to become home to “diverse groups of people” or a “place where immigrants of different cultures or races form an integrated society” (Newman 2000: 8; Fielding and Evans 2000: 465, also see Hacker 2002). In both context the multicultural Self is directly related against the racist Other, which in the past believed in the purity and superiority of white, imperialist Anglo-Saxons.266

In the cornucopia of identities that constituted the multicultural, ethnicity appeared as the center of gravity, though not without the usual ambiguities of a multicultural city. In one rich passage:

Exclusive province of childhood: a time when genetic/cultural inheritance feels like this weird but cool thing you just got landed with, like an extra shoe. Hey, check this out, Tom! I’m Eurasian! Whoa, I’m a Maori! Look, no hands! (Smith 2002: 27).

The passage contains two wide-spread beliefs about ethnicity: that it is relevant for most human beings most of the time and that it is hereditary and/or environmental.267 (As for the implied Eurasian-Maori distinction, from the perspective of the racialized Self, Britain and Canada were clearly Eurasian, as reflected in the inability to differentiate Chinese and Japanese men [Ibid.: 91]). Ethnicity often stood in for religion, which was

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266 To be sure, the Self also opposed the unruly immigrant Other, as in texts on the 2001 riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. On the contemporary Britishness debate, see a think tank report by Leonard and Griffith, eds. (2002). A comparable text for Canada is Parkin and Mendelsohn (2003).

267 On the latter, the primordialist view of ethnicity predominated, at least in my DA. For example, Canadian textbooks tried to differentiate ethnicity, which was defined as an exclusive feature of immigrant peoples (or “non-British and non-French settlers”) from race, by historicizing the latter in terms of WWII-era practices such as the Holocaust and the internment of Japanese Canadians (e.g., Fielding and Evans 2000: 4-10, 188-9).
generally present in the form of an intense binarization between Christianity and Islam and, in the British texts, also between Hinduism and Islam.

The interpretation of what caused the diversity of the Self varied between two national contexts. Canadian texts believed that the Canadian society, at various stages of history, consciously decided to embrace ethnic and regional diversity, immigration and globalization. Very few sources questioned the distinctiveness and value of Canada’s diversity, even if they raised questions about Canada’s ability to manage it, particularly in the case of the separatist francophone Quebeckers. In comparison, many British texts openly agonized over diversity, especially as it related to the quasi-federalization of Britain known under the rubric of “devolution.”

Taken together, all of the aforementioned axes of meaning firmly moored Britain and Canada in the West, a community of like-minded liberal-capitalist democracies. In this context, the Eastern Others appeared under various rubrics, from the institutionally shaky “developing world and…former Communist regimes” (Globe and Mail, March 20, 2002) to South American military juntas (Shields 2002: 75) to the perennially tumultuous Middle East or Balkans (Elton 2002: 204; McMillan 2002: 493–4). By far the most significant of Eastern Others was Islam. In my archive, Islam was primarily understood in terms of terrorism, but also in terms of corruption, superstition, extreme misogyny, fatalism and other features of illiberal and, ultimately, barbarian society and economy.

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268 That devolution would not be easy was obvious from national history textbooks, where the emphasis stood firmly on English history. With respect to Scotland and Wales, devolution was regarded as a response to a decline of Britishness (hence not to a rise of Scottishness and Welshness); in Northern Ireland, devolution was replaced by peacebuilding; and in England, by far the largest constituent in the union, the meaning of devolution swung back to diversity, albeit of the regional, center-periphery kind. The rise of the city of London relative to the British state was cited as a major change in the understanding of the British Self.
In this reading, the West and Islamic terrorism were engaged in a Manichean struggle between liberty and tyranny. Given that the West was also seen as an agent of civilization, the British and Canadian Selves were therefore fighting not only for survival, but also – quite selflessly – for all humankind, for all significant and insignificant Others. Implied in this identity was a notion that the Self should not only support ever-freer markets, poverty reduction and enlarged skill bases, but fight fire with fire. From the perspective of state/national identity, the most obvious foreign policy direction for Britain and Canada was an alignment with the putative West, understood as liberal, capitalist as well as middle class- and diversity-friendly, coupled with a respect for international diversity, so long as it conformed to international law and order. The most salient significant Other – and hence the most likely and/or least contested threat – was Islamic terrorism or Islam more generally, which anchored the far end of otherness. Fighting a war in Afghanistan, in this reading, was entirely consistent with the dominant discourses on British and Canadian identities. But what matters for this chapter are the significant differences within the umbrella identity known as the West. In a nutshell: Britain was relating its state/national identity primarily against Europe; Canada, primarily against the US. This identity difference, I posit, does much of the causal work behind British and Canadian policy divergence over Iraq.

NEIGHBORS AS OTHERS

In my archive, Britain’s most significant Other in 2002-3 was Europe, typically with the European Union (EU). To understand this self-other relationship, consider two main events of the period: British entry into the single currency and “Eastern”
enlargement.\textsuperscript{269} The first evinced fascination, but mostly fear. Though many were pleased – or at least pleasantly surprised – by the EU’s smooth turn to the euro, the vast majority cried for “keeping the pound.” Control over currency obviously implied the continuation of British sovereignty, as in a popular motto: “one currency, one government.” At the same time, it signified the superiority of home-made laissez-faire capitalism over the continental Europe’s dirigiste, “red tape” capitalism. Thus, far from seeing a European monetary future as inevitable, the dominant discourse of identity rejected it.\textsuperscript{270} In a typical reading, European integration did not stand apart from global developments such as globalization and/or American leadership in global economy. So viewed, the EU was in fact comparatively weak and therefore undesirable. In a classic Anglosphere argument, the Stability Pact and Growth Pact, an agreement to limit inflationary pressures on the Eurozone, was described as the” Mick Jagger of economics, long past its sell-by date but still cavorting about the stage as a ghoulish remnant of the golden age of monetarism” (\textit{The Guardian}, November 1, 2002, 22).

As for enlargement, the EU was understood as an agent for the assimilation of the Eastern Other, but more than a few voices warned that Britain should worry about British factories moving east while an Eastern European workforce “floods” westward. Also, it

\textsuperscript{269} Publications like \textit{The Economist} and \textit{The Guardian} discussed other EU issues, namely the “constitutional reform,” but generally outside the British context – i.e., as though the EU constitution mattered in Paris or Berlin, but not in London. Within the national context, the term constitutional reform (or settlement) referred to the ongoing process of “modernizing” British democracy, which ranged from changing the House of Lords to the Bank of England to the establishment of the new Supreme Court. Importantly, one of the central yardsticks for these changes was the US (e.g., “has Blair made the UK system of government more like the US?”).

\textsuperscript{270} A point of great contestation in 2002, for example, was Prime Minister Blair’s speech in Birmingham in November 2001, in which he allegedly eschewed economics for politics and came dangerously close to promising a Eurozone near-future for Britain. Note that my intertextualization differs from Bache and Jordan (2006), who saw a significant EU-turn in British politics in the period under study. Objectively speaking, the Deutschian measures such as trade, travel or telephony show a striking EU effect on Britain.
was clear that the enlargement was not limitless. Britain decided how much Europe it wanted, but it was Europe – including Britain – who decided if it wanted Russia and Turkey. All of these frames, incoherent as they were, were consistent with a Churchillian belief in soft British participation in a hard, united Europe (Jenkins 2002: 816). Europe, as Churchill saw it, was a nexus of “freedom, culture, civilization and Christian ethics,” but was not the only such nexus in the world. A far more important nexus, I find, was the US-led Anglosphere. But while in both societies America played the constitutive role, the British Self seemed far more secure against the US Other than the Canadian Self, which seemed overwhelmed if not on the verge of being absorbed. On the distance-value matrix, Canada regarded the US as a closer, but more negative Other (Tables 7.1 and 7.2.). Canada’s comparatively greater anti-Americanism in 2002-3, I posit, was one source of British-Canadian divergence over Iraq.

In my intertextualization of Canadian texts, the contestation over the US Other pitted “nationalists” against “continentalists.” The nationalist discourse framed Canada as “different” and/or “unique,” whereby the proximity of, as well as the similarity with the US was the main concern. Writing in the Globe and Mail, one Canadian traveller on a Vegas-style cruise ship in the Gulf of Mexico described the Americans as “brash”, “excessive,” “very frazzled,” and a “bit much right now.” Apparently, they are “no[]longer just public-spirited and patriotic, but also supporting Bush…sporting America-the-Beautiful lapel pins and highschool marching bands belting out God Bless

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271 There is no space to discuss the content and contestation of identity relations between Britain and a plethora national signifiers located between the Gulf of Finland and the Levant, but British texts generally failed to differentiate within the term Eastern Europe – an obvious indicator of a rather distant Other.
America.” The twin sources of the threat were spelled out for the audience: the Bush administration and the “mindlessness of it all” (February 20, 2002, R1).

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Table 7.1 International Self-Other relations in Canadian discourse, 2002-3

American culture, usually interpreted in terms of the monotony and simple-mindedness of Hollywood and American television, was the most immediate threat, followed by American politics and economy. For one, across my sample of textbooks, Canadian history was narrated as a response to American expansionism. As for the economy, though a “de facto common market” generally benefited Canada, “Wal-Martization” did not (Globe and Mail, February 20, 2002, A17). The modal response to these forms of Americanization was an argument that bigger, richer or flashier did not mean better. The new chief of the Canadian Football League summed it up: “We’re not the NFL…that has

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272 Compared to similar texts published in the 1950s and 1960s (Chapter 6), the framing was starkly more anti-American. Consider the story in Hacker (2002: 31-67): The war of 1812, while “sparked” by the British, what “many” Americans, including Thomas Jefferson, wanted was more land and more furs. British North American colonies confederated in 1863 to help “resist” a takeover by the US; the Mounties were created to prevent the Canadian West from becoming “as wild and lawless as the American West.” A coast-to-coast railroad (1886) and national radio (1936) had a similar purpose - “Bigger meant stronger – and not only against the U.S.” The Free Trade Agreement of 1989 was an issue because many worried that “Canada would become like the United States and lose its unique culture, along with other Canadian things such as medicare.”
a billion-dollar TV contract, so it’s important to focus on what we are and not on what we aren’t” (Maclean’s, January 1, 2003, p. 35). Arguably, the daily constitution of the Canadian Self began and ended with the US.

In a longitudinal perspective, nationalist anti-Americanism appears to be a persistent feature of the Canadian Self. But compared to the 1960s, Canadian anti-Americanism of 2002-3 was on the rise, possibly erasing many of the historical areas of positive identification. In my reading, the past celebrations of American productivity and free press gave way to critiques of, say, ceaseless and swelling consumerism or its gated affluence and depressing inequalities (seen as endemic in the US, but not in Canada). But like in the past, what the Canadian Self needed to keep the US Other at bay was the identification with Britain and, to a lesser extent, Europe. Consider culture again: Canadians, argued one TV watcher, would gladly substitute some of “the money, the music, the flash, the hot bodies” for a “British soap” with some “character-led grit” (Globe and Mail, March 20, 2002). Similarly, Canadian entries at a Dutch film festival reportedly showed a “passion European audiences appreciated,” a quality Hollywood normally ignored (Maclean’s, December 22, 2003).

Challenge to nationalism came from continentalism, a discourse which positively regarded the US Other. For continentalists, the emphasis was on similarities, not differences:

We are rich North American nations, developed mostly by immigrants, with democratic styles of government and intertwined economies and continental defence. In this sense, we are like the Americans as the Swiss are like the Germans and the Belgians are like the French (Maclean’s, December 30, 2002, p. 39).
That Canada is located in the West is evident from the last sentence, but so is the fact that Canada is primarily American, not European. In this author’s view, Canadian fears of being swallowed up were irrational: Hollywood “did not change Kentucky, Arkansas or Massachusetts.” More important for Canada were delusions of uniqueness or, grandeur: “how does a nation that is one-tenth the size of another in population, with a vanishing military, an economy smaller than a couple of large U.S. states, and a dramatically different political system imagine it is like its much more powerful neighbor? (Ibid.). Rather than feeling so threatened, this discourse suggested, Canadians might as well find succor in the security and prosperity provided by the proximity to the US. What guaranteed Canada’s distinction was its political system, ostensibly defined by the Westminster-style parliament and English-French dualism. In short, the contestation of the status over the US Other in the construction of the Canadian Self, continentalism made two points: first, the differences are overstated and, second, the differences can co-exist. And even if the second point was wrong, continentalism held, Canadians could do much worse than “becoming like the Americans.”

In contrast to Canada, the contestation over America was far less salient in British texts. On the one hand, like in Canada, no British text positively evaluated Hollywood or American food. On the other hand, no text agonized about the Americanization of Britain. One response to the US threat was irony, another was professed equality. In talent and popularity, for example, British celebrities were on a par with their American counterparts (while Canadian celebrities “must wear name tags”). But yet another typically British response to Americanization was silence. One important finding of my DA is that not a single text in my archive raised questions about the presence of the US
military in Britain. The newborn euro was a major threat to British sovereignty, the decades-long presence of thousands of armed Americans on British soil was not.

In the next section, I analyze how this differentiated status of the US Other played a role in the way British and Canadian elites debated the meanings of the international security context surrounding the run-up to the Iraq War.

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Table 7.2 International Self-Other relations in British discourse, 2002-3

“A BRIDGE CANNOT MAKE CHOICES”

In British foreign policy debates in the period under study, most texts assumed Britain’s continuing importance to the world: “We are not a superpower today, but we can act as a pivotal partner” (Blair 2002a). The contemporary Britain defined itself against the historical British Empire, though more in distance rather than value: “The days of Empire are long gone…[but] Our past gives us huge, perhaps unparalleled connections with
many different regions of the world” (Ibid.). Foreign policy assumed Britain’s unique global ties and moved on to debate two keywords – the “bridge” and the “UN.” The first was a metaphor for Britain’s position between Europe and America and the second referred to British identity in the world’s main governing body and, in particular, the permanent British seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The metaphorical bridge implied that Britain stood half-way “between Europe and America” (Gamble 2003). Which side was closer was the matter of debate. Judging by a count of the pronoun “we” in the official speeches, Britain was inscribed in Europe far more frequently than in the AASR and/or the “Atlantic community.” In history textbooks, Europe was also resoundingly dominant, even controlling for the special attention devoted to the wartime alliance with America. Yet no politician or pundit readily identified with one side to the exclusion of the other. Blair or the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, to name the most prominent examples, were simultaneously “Europeanist” and “Atlanticist.”

273 Upon his election, Prime Minister Blair (1997) declared: “By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player.” On the words “pivot” and “empire” in British foreign policy discourse, see Fanis (2005) and Parmar (2005), respectively.

274 In the area of economic and business, the “bridge” can be intertextualized with the “third way” – a term referred to a policy, introduced by Blair’s Labour Party, of threading a middle road between monetarism and Keynesianism or, expressed in still more metaphoric terms, between the state-sponsored, “stakeholder” Europe and the free-market, “shareholder” America (Cook 2003: 133, cf. Gamble 2003; Garton-Ash 2004). Once again, across different texts on economics or business, the former was placed to the dustbin of history, while the latter was projected into the future.

275 Note about measuring the dominance of discourse: the inferences drawn from frequencies are insufficient or even misleading because they omit silences and the magnitude of identification.


277 Between the two, Atlanticism is a more commonly used term, but it varies across contexts (Dunne 2004: 895). For many pundits, the term pivotal partner was replaced with “junior partner” in discussions of British relationship with America.
As a discourse, “Europeanism” argued for the importance of geography over history, but usually conceded to the primacy of British sovereignty. For example, it positively evaluated the flexibility of national opt-outs from the EU. The EU, argued Europeanists, served Britain’s own particularistic national interests. And should there ever be an attempt to give more state-like attributes to the EU, Britain was big enough to stop federalism or supranationalism in its tracks. The audiences were overwhelmingly skeptical to the Europeanist argument. Consider a view of the ongoing Convention on the Future of Europe in Brussels supplied in the Daily Telegraph, a newspaper understood as the paragon of Atlanticism. The right to opt-out from EU conventions, submitted a columnist, was no consolation because “conventions can get out of hand,” as demonstrated in the case of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which created a superstate from a “loose grouping of 13 sovereign states” (31 August 2002, 22; cf. Tsatsas 2002: 7). Further because Britain did not belong to the EU’s “original Six,” it followed that the country should be at odds with at least some European institutions. In these circumstances, being a Euroskeptic was a “respectable” and “British” thing to do (Scotsman, 9 October 2002, 14).

That the British understood the EU Convention debate in reference to American

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278 See, e.g., the document “Why Britain Should Join the Euro” released in October 2002 by a group of economists called the “Britain in Europe” group (cf. Independent, 15 October 2002, 23). In this view, the Blair government shamelessly backpedaled on its long-term European policy out of short-term electoral consideration. In general, the media was far more welcoming to Euroskeptic groups and institutions such as “Business for Sterling,” “Bruges Group,” “New Europe” or the Institute of Directors.

279 The toponym St Malo referred to a 1998 agreement between the largest EU states to build a credible European Security and Defence Policy, buttressed by an exclusively European Rapid Reaction Force for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. In these arguments, British texts acknowledged the comparative greatness of France and Germany over other EU members.
history suggests an ease of transatlantic identification. The believers in the primacy of the AASR – summarily called Atlanticists – argued for the continued partnership with the US. This discourse held the power of the status quo, which held that the Europeanist/Atlanticist dichotomy is a false one. Blair (1997) argued that “There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other…Our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and Europe.” In this framing, which persisted throughout the Blair ministry, whether Britain identified more with America or more with Europe was irrelevant, what mattered is that Britain acted as a go-between (e.g., Blair 1998, 2002a, 2003c; Labour Party 2001: 38). The very persistence of the metaphor can be seen as a testament to Britain’s non-European identity because identifying oneself as a bridge denies – or at least qualifies – identifications with the “centre,” “axis” or “pillar” with an edifice at either end of the bridge (though no text claimed that Britain was American, too). Every deployment of the metaphor had an effect of solidifying Atlanticism over Europeanism. Consider Blair’s own take on the AASR, from January 2003:

I am not surprised by anti-Americanism, but it is a foolish indulgence. For all their faults, and all nations have them, the US are a force for good; they have liberal and democratic traditions of which any nation can be proud. Quite apart from that, it is massively in our self-interest to remain close allies. Bluntly there are not many countries who wouldn’t wish for the same relationship as we have with the US, and that includes most of the ones critical of it in public (Blair 2003a).

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280 In the Marxist-feminist discourse, The AASR was acknowledged with similar ease, like in describing the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet as “funded by the CIA, armed by Margaret Thatcher” (Sinclair 2002: 227).
As a nation, the US may have faults, but that’s hardly an argument against them in cross-
national terms. (This subtle contextualization often worked to prevent criticism of the 
British imperial past and/or moralizations of any kind, particularly since the Americans 
and British were seen as the “same,” as per the Atlanticist discourse). As for the US as a 
state, the AASR was nearly foolproof – it made sense from the perspective of regime 
similarity (liberal democracy) as well as some unspecified national interest. The alliance 
between Britain and the US as the two “forces for good” in the world was either implied 
or explicitly stated, as when Blair declared the AASR an “article of faith” and submitted 
that “our ability to partner America...is of fundamental importance, not just to this 
country but to the wider world.  

Blair’s claim that the Europeanist/Atlanticist dichotomy was false was itself false. 
For one, on the issue of defence, Brussels was always read as a paper tiger, while 
Washington always stood as an imposing giant. The Economist thus argued that an EU 
force would only make sense if “European soldiers would be groomed to fight alongside 
American ones at their most lethal and sophisticated” (2 November 2002, 18). So instead 
of being interpreted as a future replacement for NATO, an EU force was portrayed as an 
experimental complement – not unlike NATO – to US military, the best military ever 
fielded. Public opinion polls on defence matters, while supportive of these arguments, 

281 Blair (2002c). The phrase “forces of good” was introduced in the first term of Blair’s Labour.
suggest a gradual warming up to the idea of a European defence over the AASR. What they do not ask is about nuclear defence. From my DA, the question “Would you give up Britain’s US-made nuclear weapons system in favor of one made in the EU?” would not be answered in the affirmative. From a variety of perspectives, therefore, the metaphorization of Britain as the bridge between Europe and America was an Atlanticist frame which structured foreign policy options. As Robin Cook wrote in his diary, a “bridge cannot make choices” (2003: 133).

Outside of the Europe-America divide was a powerful discourse that partially intersected with the three interlocking circles metaphor – “liberal internationalism.” In Britain, this discourse implied a belief in international society, in particular Britain’s pivotal and time-honored role in major international organizations such as the UN, IMF, NATO, Group of Eight (G8) and the Commonwealth. From this perspective, the keyword *du jour* was the UN. Because Britain was a member of the permanent five on the UNSC, an exclusive club yielding veto powers over UN resolutions, liberal internationalism saw the UN as an extension of the British Self. Compared to the vast majority of states, Britain possessed a greater privilege – and greater responsibility – for helping maintain international order and governance of the world. In my sample, consisting of ninety five discrete texts, liberal internationalism dominated the foreign

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283 This discourse was particularly represented in the texts associated with the Foreign Policy Centre. For another take on (liberal) internationalism in British foreign policy discourse, see Dunne (2004: 905-6).

284 In a corollary argument, because of factors such as Britain’s multiculturalism and an excellent, internationalized educational system, British citizens – as well as British education or British-based individuals – were rightfully overrepresented in the UN and other international and transnational organizations.
policy debate. This discourse ruled supreme among the texts authored by Labour and Liberal Democrats, International Development, the Foreign Office and Defence as well as most foreign policy pundits.

What made British liberal internationalism distinctive was a profound belief in the betterment of the international society of states. That things were (or should have been) “different” was evident in most recounts of Labour foreign policy under Blair. Experience inscribed as central was the NATO air campaign in Kosovo and Blair’s speech to the Chicago Economic Council in April 1999, which justified that campaign in terms of a “new doctrine of the international community.” In this speech, which resonated in foreign policy debates in the study period, Blair effectively shifted the principle of non-interference rendering international military interventions for humanitarian reasons legitimate. The UN emerged as counterfactually valid: that the UN was rendered optional in Kosovo did not imply that the institution did not matter; what mattered was that action was morally and even legally defensible from the perspective of the new doctrine.285 This argument, during the second Blair ministry, had become a staple of British foreign policy (Blair 2001, 2002a, 2002b; cf. Boyce 2003).

In the majority of British foreign policy texts, most evidently in those left behind by the Labour Party, liberal internationalism was orthogonal to the

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285 Blair defended humanitarian military intervention as a just response to genocide, massive refugee flows and rogue states (Blair 1999). For a DA of this speech, see Fairclough (2000: 147-55). Notably, Blair’s Chicago speech attributed the cause of “many of our problems” to two dictators: Slobodan Milosevic, the enemy in the ongoing Kosovo war, and Iraq’s Hussein. Indeed, in the run-up the Iraq invasion, Kosovo served as a central analogy, but the first enunciation of moral “change” or “progress” in foreign policy was associated with Robin Cook, who, as Blair’s first foreign secretary, coined the phrase “ethical foreign policy” in 1997. Allegedly, Cook meant to say an "ethical dimension of foreign policy," but the press relations squad shortened it. The phrase, meant to relate to the issue of British arms sales abroad, never stopped drawing criticism (Chandler 2003). For a contemporary critique of British arms sales within the boundaries of liberal internationalism, see Mepham and Eavis (2002).
Europeanist/Atlanticist dichotomy. More specifically, many observers pointed to a number of contradictions between British and American behavior in the international community, particularly in the areas of trade and global governance. On issues such as global warming, steel tariffs, the International Criminal Court and even Israel/Palestine, the expressed British position was much closer to the EU than to the US. Yet the Atlanticists easily avoided the rhetorical entrapment by stressing that the AASR, “like democracy,” could not possibly imply a perfect harmony of interest. Distance – and, indeed, outright opposition – to the US were normalized on the issues of trade or climate control, these were inscribed as “low” politics. But with respect to the “high” politics of terrorism, weapons proliferation and/or regional stability, the US deserved the benefit of doubt because – “overall” – it constituted a force for good. What also mattered, obviously, was the social construction of international security as high-profile or at least more relevant than other issue-areas.

The view of the US as good on balance was resonant with the dominant discourse at the societal level which held the US Other as naturally close and friendly against a foreign and hostile world. In a typical reading of the history of Britain’s international security policy in the preceding century, the AASR stood as a default. Jenkins’ *Churchill* (2002) was thus labeled as “revisionist” simply because the author concluded that a *larger* part of the AASR was a partnership of necessity rather than a natural alliance.286 Note, however, that most such texts wrote security – and war in particular – as a matter of self-defense. But once security policy was interpreted as a tool for re-ordering the world

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286 In other words, Jenkins was read as a revisionist even though he hardly negated the effect of shared identity. In fact, the author explicitly acknowledged that Churchill’s belief in the inevitability of the Anglo-American alliance against Nazi Germany was based on sentiment and intuition, not reason and calculus.
in the liberal democratic image, the AASR would quickly become a subject of critical reflection. In one example, what failed spectacularly to fly in British foreign policy spheres was the claim – then typically associated with the historian Niall Ferguson, American journalist Max Boot or Tony Blair’s foreign policy advisor Robert Cooper – that the US should take a cue from the British imperial past to “save the world” (The Guardian, March 29, 2002). In parliamentary debates, the overly militaristic reading of the AASR was subject to much criticism from the Liberal Democrats, the party leader Charles Kennedy and foreign affairs spokesperson Michael Moore. The interventions shook up the Labour-Conservative duet by the argument that being “good at force” was not the same as being “a force for good.” As I will show in the next section, what disabled this critique was the framing of the terrorist threat. On this issue, the co-optation of liberal internationalism by the Atlanticist discourse had a profound effect on Britain’s stance in the Iraq crisis.

INDEPENDENCE AND MULTILATERALISM

Two keywords to understanding Canadian foreign policy debates from the period were “independence” (defined as sovereignty and autonomy vis-à-vis the US) and “multilateralism” (defined as acting in concert with states other than the US and, nearly always, under UN auspices). A discourse that stuck to these interpretations most religiously can be labeled “liberal internationalism,” as per a popular term in the academic study of Canadian foreign policy. At the societal level, liberal internationalism easily corresponded to the nationalist discourse, especially its liberal and multiculturalist components. Liberal internationalists – overrepresented in the government, media and
academia – believed in the direct relationship between free trade, peace and stability, on the one hand, and national and international prosperity, on the other. In looking to the past, they stressed a continuity with the golden age of Canadian diplomacy, symbolized in UN peacekeeping and epitomized by Lester Pearson, Canada’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate (e.g., Maclean’s, February 24, 2003).

In this reading, Canada’s independence was enabled and/or enhanced by multilateralism. In my DA, Canada’s international “we” seamlessly fit not only into well-known institutions like the UN, NATO and the G-8, but also the Free Trade of the Americas, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation or la Francophonie. Conversely, that same “we” experienced not only a considerable discomfort in the close bilateral embrace with the US, but also in a world defined by American unilateralism. Some of the international roles specified in liberal internationalism were discussed in the previous chapter: middle power, “relevant power,” “principal power,” “soft power,” “civilian power,” “peacekeeper,” “value-added nation,” “helpful fixer,” “honest broker,” “integrator,” “consensus-builder,” “mediator,” “do-gooder,” “good international citizen,” and “assertive globalist.” Note that nearly all stressed independence qua difference with the US – the “superpower,” “military powerhouse,” “interventionist,” “peacemaker,” or “world’s police.” That much of the inscribed difference hinged on the military component is evident in a Globe and Mail editorial on Canada’s Iraq decision, my explanandum: “[Ottawa] exercised independent judgment, and that independence has

287 See, e.g., comments by Janice Gross Stein in Globe and Mail, March 26, 2002 and Michael Ignatieff, National Post, February 14.

288 In Canadian history textbooks, the UN was more responsible for global security and prosperity than alliances like NATO (e.g., Fielding and Evans 2000: 277).
both supported and differed from the U.S. judgment of world events, especially military conflicts” (April 4, 2003).

Another discourse was a “radical” strand of liberal internationalism which rejected national security in favor of human security, a concept defined by the former Liberal foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy as “security for all people, everywhere” (2001: 2). This discourse implied a Kantian understanding of world affairs and called for the broadening and deepening of international law and institutions, increased development assistance, and coalitions with like-minded international actors, such as Norway or the International Committee for the Red Cross. This discourse thus appropriated as “Canadian” two recently forged institutions and practices: the anti-landmine treaty, underscored as the Ottawa Process, and the “responsibility to protect.”

In this sense, radicalism easily grafted onto the Marxist-feminist discourse at the societal level, while sharing many nationalist precepts, such as a belief in Canada’s uniqueness.

The relative weakness of the radical interpretation of liberal internationalism in Canadian foreign policy in 2002-3 debates can be explained by two factors: first, a major misfit between the expressed moral and humanitarian proclamations and Canada’s dwindling investment – material, human and/or gendered – in its foreign policy projects and programs. For many contemporary observers, Ottawa’s clear preference for trade policy (as in the government’s “Team Canada” sales campaigns) over foreign policy rendered liberal internationalism unpardonably passive (Molot and Hillmer 2002, Cohen 2003, Sjolander et al. 2003). In this view, rather than searching for a Pearsonian

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inspiration, the government resembled the 1930s Mackenzie King governments, known for their borderline isolationism.\(^{290}\) Second and related, the radicalism of the concepts such as the responsibility to protect sat rather uncomfortably with long-standing liberal internationalist expectations of gradualist and non-violent change in international society.

Note that in comparison to British liberal internationalism, the Canadian version differed in two respects: size and the use of force. In my DA, virtually all texts acknowledged Canada’s small size (\textit{ipso facto}, recognizing the importance of power in world politics) and argued that Canada cannot be everywhere or do everything (“niche diplomacy” or diplomacy of “comparative advantages”). In an ideal-typical reading, British texts contained no such arguments. Small size no doubt influenced the views of the military. From the Canadian perspective, on the issue of conflict resolution, military force was understood as second-best to politics and diplomacy. So while Blair’s Chicago speech in 1999 would generally fit with Canadian liberal internationalism, especially its radical strand, Blair’s emphasis on military interference in the affairs of rogue states would constitute a deal-breaking mismatch.

In the same archive, the continentalist discourse corresponded to its elite-level namesake – the “continentalist” tradition in Canadian foreign policy thought. This view – discursively associated with the business establishment and/or the province of Alberta – specified an alternative Canadian Self in which the US was possibly an extension of the Self, but one in which American dominance and Canadian independence were not mutually exclusive. As for multilateralism, continentalists regarded it as either naïve or

\(^{290}\) See Keating (2006: 127). For critics, that the government chose NATO over the UN or trade over human rights constituted a “contradiction” or a “gap” between rhetoric and practice (ibid.: 136-7).
hypocritical: had Canada been a “superpower,” it would have not “ignore[d] its national interest,” just like the US. A prudent and honest way to match the liberal internationalist rhetoric to the perceived reality, argued continentalists, would be to support the US, even at the price of abandonment of some of the multilateralist ideals. Like in the British Atlanticist discourse, continentalism conceived Canada’s foreign policy position as a trade-off: if Canada were to play a supportive role in the reproduction of American global preponderance, then there would be a chance – however small – of having an independent impact in global affairs. In other words, alliance and reliance, not independence and multilateralism, were the best guarantee of making a difference. In a cross-national reading, Canadian continentalism and British Atlanticism shared a great deal in common.

In Canada, the main discursive battle therefore took place between liberal internationalism and continentalism. The foreign policy implication of the former was clear: as a sovereign and independent state, bent on multilateralism, Canada needed to make its Iraq policy different from American foreign policy. In the continentalist view of Canada’s place in the world, the emphasis was on similarity with the US; on Iraq, Canada should have acted in unison with the southern neighbor. In my DA, liberal internationalism clearly won. Texts left behind by academics and most newspaper editors endorsed the definition of Canadian independence as the ability to say no to the

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291 Citation is from *Globe and Mail*, 16 January 2003, A13. And the perception of limited capabilities was widespread. In the words of one Canadian entertainer: “Canadians are observers, not doers. When Britain and America say, ‘We’re going to invade Iraq,’ people go, ‘Oh look out! There’s trouble brewing.’ In Canada, we don’t have the power, military or economic, to affect the world.” (Cullen 2003: 32). In addition to the limited power, there was a recognition that a series of spending cuts that began in the late 1980s resulted in the rise of what some have called the “Potemkin Canada”: a country with a vanishing military and diplomatic corps and ever-decreasing levels of international aid and development assistance (e.g., Cohen 2003).
superpower neighbor over Iraq, while multilateralism was equated, ideally, with a second UN resolution or, minimally, to an agreement among NATO allies, as in the Kosovo intervention. Among the examined sources, only the *National Post* consistently and unambiguously supported American foreign policy, in publishing anything from the scoffs at Michael Moore and French diplomacy to pointed critiques of Noam Chomsky and German diplomacy over Iraq to proposals for a “North American community of law”, based on the EU model, or the dismantling of the border.  

This dominance of liberal internationalism was resoundingly confirmed, first, in my survey of Canadian foreign policy scholarships and, second, in my analysis of eighty four discrete texts produced by Canada’s parliamentarians (press conference transcripts, press releases/briefings, speeches, and publicly available interviews).  

The outcome – Canada’s non-participation – was therefore consistent with liberal internationalism and/or, at the societal level, nationalism. In Britain, in contrast, participation followed the dominance of Atlanticism in British foreign policy debates.

Placed within my theoretical framework, this explanation makes for an overly structuralist and hence ontologically partial story of Canadian and British alliance behavior over Iraq. What rendered the alternative policies in each case unlikely or even moot, I argue, was the outcome of the rhetorical battle over two new and related events.

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292 The last idea – known as “grand bargain” or “big idea” was associated with individuals like Allan Gottlieb, former ambassador to Washington, or Wendy Dobson of the CD Howe Institute. Note that my DA of newspapers disagrees with Martin who suggests that Canadian media “was adamantly pro-war” (2003: 410).

293 My findings are consistent with the secondary literature: see Roussel (2004), for a comprehensive look at the work of “liberal internationalism” and “continentalism” in the recent episodes of Canadian foreign policy; Nossal (2000), for a telling overview of Canadian IR scholarship at the turn of the millennium and Michaud (2006), for a systematic content analysis of decisional statements by key government representatives in House of Commons during Question Period, from January 2002 to May 2003.
The first was the US conduct of the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The second was the appearance of two major security policy statements from Washington: the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), published in July 2002, and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), published two months later. The first document called for a greater securitization of the American homeland: tighter borders, expanded role for military forces, new secrecy laws, new special counterterrorist teams and citizens’ anti-terrorist surveillance. The second called for greater securitization – and more specifically, militarization – of US foreign policy interests.

AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR

In the period under study, Afghanistan hardly constituted a new event. It was in 2001, not long after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, that the US-led NATO intervention succeeded in ousting the fundamentalist Taliban regime. As members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the name for a NATO-led and UN-backed mission to the country, British and Canadian troops were responsible for keeping the order in Kabul, the Afghan capital. In 2002-3, the mission was proclaimed a “humanitarian success” and the debate centered on peacebuilding, including issues such as elections, warlords, heroin and the Taliban resistance. Within and across the texts on Afghanistan in the period, the counterinsurgency was understood as the most important, mainly because the rebels hosted Osama bin-Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader and the mastermind behind 9/11. Most British texts argued, typically on the 1950s Malaya analogy, that success depended on direct control of the government, ample troops and local and full control of borders.
Others disagreed. One reporter warned: “Britain did not do very well in its first three Afghan wars. It remains to be seen whether…it will fare better in its fourth” (Times, 12 May 2002).

What prompted a break in the discursive consensus was the information that “captives from the war” were being “processed” at the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The event received attention once it became known, early in 2002, that British citizens might be among the captives, which prompted questions about the legality of detention and treatment under international law (e.g., whether an “unlawful combatant” is the same as a PoW, as defined by the 1949 Geneva Convention), the power of special military tribunals set up to impose sentences (e.g., if the death penalty could apply outside civilian oversight) as well as the general status of Guantanamo in US territory, history and politics.

By January 2003, the questions turned to torture – or practices described as “pretty close to torture” or “violent interrogation” – and “rendition,” both of which further raised the level of discussion about the meaning of America. According to The Economist, Guantanamo associated the Bush administration – via the FBI and the CIA – with a series of failed homeland security projects like French counterinsurgency in Algiers, the Argentine military junta, Shin Bet’s (Israeli security service) attempt to thwart Palestinian suicide bombings or even the torture of Guy Fawkes, Britain’s famous seventeenth century terrorist. Conversely, Guantanamo did not sit well with “European governments…such as Britain and Spain [who] signed up to the many international prohibitions against torture even while facing determined domestic terrorists of their
own.” A similar reading was present in Canada, where the media treated the International Red Cross, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as authorities on US prisoner policy.

Guantanamo had the effect of qualifying similarities – and amplifying difference – between the US, on the one hand, and Britain and Canada, on the other. It logically raised questions about the prisoner policy of the British and Canadian military in Afghanistan. In Britain, the handing over of its captives to Afghan, rather than US authorities was interpreted as difference viz. the US, even if it was far from being in line with the ideal British Self (The Scotsman, 30 April 2002, p. 11). Canadian observers, too, worried about being implicated in a possible “conflict of interest” between international law and the US-led mission in Afghanistan (The Globe and Mail, 15 January 15, 2002, A1). But a more important event in the same context was as a friendly-fire incident of April 2002, when an American F-16 killed four and wounded eight Canadian soldiers during their training exercise in the north of the country.

For months, page after page framed the story – which centered on the question of an investigation of the incident – in the contexts of civil-military relations, peacebuilding and, in particular, Canada-US relations. The first-cut media reports, no doubt in search for poignant ironies, considered the semantics of the word “friendly fire”; the absence of Canadian casualties in combat since Korea (cf. National Post, 20 April, A23 and Ibid., 23 April 2002, A20) and, last but not least, President Bush’s slowness or incompetence –

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294 The Economist, January 11, p. 12. The same article argues that some borderline interrogation practices may be legal, if ambiguous, as in the case of the status of some suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoners in British detention in the 1970s. But rendition was identified as unambiguously illegal and illegitimate. For the Daily Telegraph, because of superior facilities and treatment in Guantanamo – forceful feeding, “clean and relatively comfortable” cages, free health care – Afghan captives were unlikely to “starve themselves to death in the manner of the 1980s IRA prisoners” (10 March, 2002, p. 13).
variously identified as “insensitivity” “reticence,” “spite,” and “indifference” – to publicly apologize and express condolences to Canadians. Follow-up reports continued to question the US military: why were they “part-timers”? Should they face a full military court martial? Why did they call one of them “Psycho”? Were the bombs “authorized”? (The analyses went as far as counterfactuals in which a Canadian fighter plane dropped a bomb on US troops: would Canadian pilots be extradited?) As the story continued to unfold, in which Canada’s status in the US probe was read as that of a supplicant, not a respected friend, the continentalist discourse was profoundly shaken. In contrast, liberal internationalism, which insisted on the need to defend Canadian sovereignty and enunciate the difference against the US, prospered.

What sparked much foreign policy debate in Britain and Canada, parallel to the new developments in Afghanistan, was a series of events in Washington: the NSHS and NSS, the approval of Homeland Security Bill in US Congress and the establishment of a wide-ranging Department of Homeland Security and the publication of the leaked draft of “Patriot Act II.” To the British and Canadian reader, the US security reform was intelligible given two assumptions: first, that the reader possessed a considerable understanding the workings of the post 9/11 American political system and, second, that

295 On April 18, the day of the incident, Bush had five public appearances but each time failed to communicate on the incident. The next day, the Globe and Mail’s banner headline read: “A Nation’s Grief Turns to Anger.” Bush apologized on April 19. A few days later, a columnist in the same newspaper concluded: “In one sense, it really wasn’t much of a story. Yet it ended up embarrassing the President of the United States” (April 22, 2002, A11). It also caused a spike in anti-Americanism, judging by boos for the American national anthem during games in the continental sports leagues (cf. Ipsos-Reid poll, Ibid. 7 May, 2002, A1).

296 In the story, the key implied difference was that the Canadian military pilots could not possibly be trigger-happy, psycho-cowboy part-timers. The attempt to blame the incident on the military interoperability was marginalized: “But suppose we were culpable, too…that we had no forward air controller on the ground, that he’d been bumped off the deployment” (National Post, 22 July, 2002, A16).
the goal of the reform was indisputable – the defence of the American “way of life” as identified with freedom, democracy and property and/or against authoritarian “rogue states” and terrorists.297 In a typical Atlanticist (Britain) or continentalist (Canada) reading, the security reforms were interpreted as “what matters to the American people” (the Republican victory in the mid-term elections being cited as proof; National Post, November 7, 2002, A23) or as a sensible bureaucratic reform. Canada’s Progressive Conservatives, for example, cited the US Homeland Security Department as a model for reforming the fragmented Canadian security system.298

Counter to this reading were all other discursive perspectives, which essentially argued that counterterrorism policy was a matter for politics and police, not military, as well as that the securitization of homeland via citizen surveillance and arrest was extremely risky for liberal democracy.299 Commenting on the NSHS, a contributor to The Scotsman argued:

The irony in the creation of a million or more state-registered informers is that the US could find itself being compared to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Nicolae Ceaucescu’s Romania, or the former East Germany, where millions of ordinary citizens were in the pay of its secret police, the Stasi (July 17, 2002, p. 10).

297 The intelligibility was a function of shared identity. The NSHS defined the Self as law and order, market capitalism and multiculturalism as well as identified the friends and enemies, at home and abroad, in no uncertain terms (2002: 7, 22-8).

298 Cited in National Post, February 13, 2003, A9. By March 2003, it became clear that the securitization of the US homeland caused the deepening of cooperation with the US. In Canada, for example, the talk on the so-called “smart border,” typically understood as the updating of the US-Canadian border control to the age of terrorism, was usually read as a reminder of the asymmetric interdependence on the continent (Roach 2003; cf. NSUSA 2002: 22-3).

299 To be sure, beyond the abstract discussion on the role of surveillance in democracy, there was also a critique of the Bush administration. “In defining a war that is unwinnable, certainly by 2004, Mr Bush will be able to ask Americans to allow him to continue the fight while giving warning that his ejection from office would mark a victory for the terrorists” (Times, 31 December, 2002, p. 15).
This discourse thus framed the US reform in terms of the freedom-security trade-off.

According to *The Times*, the securitization of British homeland on the US model “would demonstrate to the likes of al-Qaeda that they only have to talk about terrorism and they have the power to transform the conduct of life in Britain. The public should not want to offer them that pleasure” (February 13, 2003, p. 25). To push the logic of the argument, a reduction of civil rights and legal protections would not only constitute a short-term victory for the enemy, but would change the meaning of the Self beyond recognition. In the Marxist-feminist critique, for one, a dramatically securitized Self would not be worth defending.

Similar arguments applied in a critical reading the NSS, which famously called for unilateralism, preventive/pre-emptive war and the primacy of the US.\(^{300}\) For Canadian and British liberal internationalism (as well as, in Britain, Europeanism), the NSS caused a great deal of discomfort, particularly when reading the continuity with earlier pronouncements of the Bush administration. The doctrine of pre-emption, for example, was not only on “legally dubious” ground, but was stretching the limits of what is politically and morally defensible as “legitimate” (*Independent*, 9 November 2002, p. 4, cf. ICISS 2001). Expressed as a double shotgun question: first, why should “shoot first, talk later” be seen as a legitimate foreign policy? Second, on what grounds should the US government claim this type of legitimacy for itself, but deny it to others? The sympathetic critics downplayed the significance of the NSS, arguing that the new

\(^{300}\) Pre-emptive strike related to tactical or anticipatory self-defence, as in the idea of “first strike,” while preventive strike relates to strategic gain. The distinction was blurry in most usages. On the NSS and its reception, see Jervis (2003) and Peterson and Pollack, eds. (2003).
doctrine on US primacy was a temporary glitch in the American political system, which was never likely to be implemented as policy (i.e., with Al Gore things would have been different). Among less sympathetic critics some mocked the US for seeing itself as a special edition of humankind, while others, worryingly, drew attention to the link between the power of “neo-conservatives” in Washington and the attempt to institute special policing powers, in the US, North America and the world (e.g., Clarkson 2002). As for the supporters, in Canada no public figure came close to approximating Britain’s Blair, whose Fall 2002 and Winter 2003 speeches implied a direct link between the doctrine of pre-emption and his own “new doctrine of the international community” from 1999. As the next section will show, Blair’s main target was Iraq.

Like the events in Afghanistan, the overhaul of the US security system at home and abroad raised questions about US “leadership” over Iraq. The British were quick to resurrect the question of empire. The Guardian alone published a series of pieces by eminent historians, comparing the contemporary US with the historical (Western) empires: Roman, Spanish and, of course, British. The Canadians were typically less dramatic. Because the security-freedom trade-off had changed at the expense of freedom, a Globe and Mail book review suggested, the US export of democracy to Iraq should not be regarded as comparable to a similar process which occurred six decades earlier in Japan (February 22, 2002, D15). An analysis of the foreign policy debates that preceded

301 Blair’s biographers see 9/11 to be the genesis of this link (Seldon 2004: 498; Stothard 2003: 69-70, 87-8; Kampfner 2004: 173). For a sympathetic criticism of Blair’s adoption of the doctrine of pre-emption, see Daily Telegraph 17 October 2002 p. 27.

302 Consider, respectively, the articles by Jonathan Freedland (18 September 2002), Linda Colley (27 December 2002) and Paul Kennedy (16 January 2003). Some of this empire-talk arguably prompted US State Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to famously proclaim, in March 2003: “we don’t do empire.”
or ran in parallel to the Iraq debate suggests a growing weakness of the pro-American stance in Britain and Canada. The misfit between Atlanticist and continentalist discourses, on the one hand, and American behavior, on the other, was growing with each new event. Arguably, while the campaign against terror had the effect of making the US Other more proximate to the British and Canadian Self, it also caused America’s fall on the axis of value, at least relative to other relevant factors (Tables 7.1 and 7.2). The main division opened up over the role of the UN in a mission to topple the Iraqi dictator.

THE IRAQ DECISION

The war-drums on Iraq began in earnest in January 2002. In his State of the Union address, President Bush placed Iraq in the so-called Axis of Evil – together with rogues like Iran and North Korea. At first, most observers chalked it up as electoral pandering for mid-term Congressional elections. As the Bush administration continued and intensified its war-talk, bolstering it with major US troop movements in the Gulf, it became clear that the expressed objective of America’s Iraq policy was a moving object. The primary publicly expressed justification for the intervention, throughout the period under study, was self-defence – the need to disarm Iraq from WMDs, in order to pre-empt this “rogue state” from future military aggression and/or from proliferating these weapons to terrorists. The second rationale, which never stood in isolation from the first, was regime change – the replacement of the Hussein dictatorship with a Western-style democracy. By the fall of 2002, the Iraq debate came down to one issue: whether the

“international community” should concentrate on “weapons, not regime” (Times, 20 September 2002, p. 14) or on “regime change, too” (National Post, 4 October 2002, A16). The war, in other words, quickly became a question of when and how, not if.

In my DA of British and Canadian foreign policy debates, four cross-national similarities are central. The first – and most remarkable similarity – was that of public opinion. In the entire period under study, most surveys found no more than a third of respondents to be in favor of any form of military action against Iraq. Between forty and sixty percent was consistently against.\(^{304}\) The second similarity, shifting to the discursive sources of evidence, concerns a similar reading of the stated objectives of the invasion. Both Britain and Canada understood Hussein as a brutal tyrant, but many wondered about estimates of Hussein’s military capability and/or threat posed by this capability. As for regime change, most anti-war texts underscored that another “illegal, but illegitimate” intervention was hardly warranted. Among the unstated objectives, the control of Iraq’s oil was read as a dominant rationale behind the intervention.

Third, no text argued that either London or Ottawa should throw in its lot with Paris or Berlin, much less Mexico City or Santiago de Chile.\(^{305}\) On this note, the governments were particularly careful. In April 2002, fresh from taking a visit to Bush’s Texas ranch, Blair reportedly stated: “We’re not going to be with the other Europeans. Our policy on Iraq has always been different to them. We’ve always been with the

\(^{304}\) In the later stages, from January to March 2003, the majority rejected war without a second UN resolution. Public opinion data is on file with the author.

\(^{305}\) Haglund argues that Ottawa and Paris had identical positions on the war and submits that “if Paris decreed the war to be justified, Ottawa would have snapped to attention” (2005: 180, cf Macleans, February 24, 2003).
Americans on this one.*306 And in Canada, the government’s famous dithering on Iraq had to with the impossibility of publicly siding against Britain and the US. What was left was the insistence on Canadian uniqueness in the world, as per the nationalist discourse. In reflecting on the situation, one columnist alluded to Suez: “The last time the world faced a crisis like this, a Canadian found a way out” (Maclean’s, February 24, 2003).

The fourth and most important cross-national similarity was the dominance of the liberal internationalist frames. As I will show below, no text argued that the US (usually specified as the Bush administration, but often meaning all Americans) had the right to unilaterally impose its will abroad. Opposition to US unilateralism was present even within the Atlanticist Britain and the continentalist Canada – discourses which typically emphasized the need for US “leadership” over the nebulosity of multilateralism. In both Britain and Canada, in short, the “when” and “how” of the Iraq intervention had mainly to do with the UN authorization of the use of force.

In Britain, the pro-war camp was lead by the government. The public statements mirrored those coming from the Bush administration – “that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, that they were battle-ready, that he intended to use them and/or he was looking to sell them to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda” (Kampfner 2004: 161).

Between August 2002 and February 2003, Downing Street issued four much-publicized documents, each of which added to the case for war against Hussein.307 And among the

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306 Kampfner (2003: 168). According to journalist reports, some Labour party members asked Blair to join the ‘non-nein-nyet’ coalition (Stothard 2003: pp 207, also see 81-83). But the call was based not on a belief in the UN process, but in the diplomacy of France, Germany and Russia.

307 The most significant among these was the so-called “dodgy dossier” of September 2002 because, one, it stressed the presence and threat of Iraq’s WMDs to Britain and, two, because it served as “evidence” in the US and UN debates on Iraq. For the reasons of space, I cannot discuss the content and contestation of all
government voices, Blair’s was the loudest. After his Texas meeting with Bush, the prime minister spoke on Iraq frequently, stressing the threat of WMDs every time as well as regime change and terrorism on occasion (McLean and Patterson 2006: 362, cf. Bluth 2005: 600).

The government advocated the military confrontation from the position of liberal internationalism, namely as a response to Hussein’s history of violence, especially his use of WMDs against Iraq’s Kurdish citizens in the 1980s. While amplifying the WMD-related threats, this frame underscored the legitimacy of any policy aimed against Hussein. The prime minister was particularly adept at this formulation. when pressed about the inherent selectivity of the doctrine of pre-emption – as in the question “why Iraq and North Korea?” – Blair would give a response familiar from the time of the Kosovo intervention – “when you can, you should.” At the same time, however, the government officials added a specifically Atlanticist twist – the notion of shared responsibility.

In the liberal internationalist reading, shared responsibility was consistent with the role of a “pivotal partner” in the international society as whole. But in the Atlanticist reading, it meant “influence” in Washington. In the prime minister’s own words: “I will tell you that we must stand close to America. If we don’t, we will lose our influence to media-savvy dossiers on Iraq issued by the various agencies of the British government. On the dossiers and/or post-war inquiries who examined them, see Danchev (2007) and Jervis (2006). For a dataset of Blair’s political speeches in the study period, I drew on McLean and Patterson (2006), Dyson (2006) and Saraceni (2003). I also considered the texts authored by other Cabinet officials as well as government bodies such as Policy Planning Staff in Foreign Office.

308 Stothard (2003: 42). In this view, even Robin Cook’s resignation speech was hardly a disabling blow for liberal internationalism: “Ironically, it is only because Iraq’s military forces are so weak that we can even contemplate its invasion” (House of Commons, 17 March 2003).
shape what they do” (Seldon 2004: 574). This belief was shared by his team, as well as many observers. David Manning, Blair’s faithful and trusted national security adviser suggested that “By sharing Bush’s broad objective, the Prime Minister can help shape how it is defined” (cited in Mackay 2004: 16); and The Observer observed thus: “Blair knows that Bush is creating the New World Order. And Blair knows that, in order to be of it, you have to be in it” (February 2, 2003, p. 15; also see Times, 30 January 2003, p. 25). What was critical is that the two meanings of shared responsibility – liberal internationalist and Atlanticist – were blended, as if they were mutually inclusive.

Freshly written histories of Britain’s road to Iraq tend to give Blair a great deal of credit in persuading his Cabinet, parliament and the wider public that Britain “must be the No. 1 ally of the United States” (Cook 2004:102; cf. Naughtie 2004: 129; Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers 2007: 217-8; Stothard 2003: 70). Indeed, Blair’s speeches from the period are remarkably clear in stating the long-term benefits of the AASR for both Britain and the world. What is also clear, in some speeches more than in others, is that Blair believed in trading support for influence (e.g., Blair 2003a, 2003e). In my reading, the currency of this trade was set by the liberal internationalist discourse. While it is still too early to tell, it appears as though Blair had a single request with Washington and that was the UN process. In lieu of emphasizing future “insurance” – continuing nuclear defence or even post-invasion defence contracts for British firms – Blair asked for less US unilateralism. In his March 18 speech to the parliament, for example, Blair suggested a hope that the US would “recognise the fundamental overriding importance of restarting
Indeed, in the vast majority of British text on Iraq, the demand for the UN process was significant and consistent throughout the period under study, no doubt because legality was widely inscribed as a liberal internationalist value. The infamous Downing Street Memo, a leaked internal document containing information from a July 2002 cabinet meeting, suggests that the enforcement of UN resolutions over Iraq’s WMD was the seen as the “best” legal justification for the invasion. The more the government blended Atlanticism and liberal internationalism, the more it turned the Iraq debate into a question of “how much UN” was enough before the assault could begin.

To briefly shift the analytical focus, the entire UN process over Iraq between September 2002 and March 2003 was shaped by British foreign policy discourses. Arguably, that there was any UN process was thanks to the power of Atlanticism. According to a number of insider accounts, the Bush administration was so contemptuous of the UN and so gung-ho to go it alone against Hussein that only its British ally could make it change its mind and take its case to the UN. Without British support, Washington would have probably failed in getting a single resolution against Iraq.

In return for British support over Iraq, Blair also expected Bush to commit to an UN process in Iraq after Hussein’s defeat. Like the “road map” for Israel/Palestine, this support-for influence trades could be seen as implied in liberal internationalism as well. Historians differ as to when Blair presented this trade to Bush, either at the April 2002 meeting in Texas or at the September 2002 summit at Camp David (Kampfner 2004: 167-168; Meyer 2005: 207-13; Sharp 2005: 114; Woodward 2004: 119-20, 177-9 vs. Seldon 2004: 578).

Humanitarianism was dismissed outright, not cited as the second-best reason (Danner 2006: 91). During the decision-making process, Blair also claimed the Gulf War era resolutions against Hussein (i.e., UN 687) to be legally sufficient (Kampfner 2004: 30). As for the Kosovo-like emphasis of legitimacy over legality, this was treated only as a fall-back option, not least because legitimacy was seen as a function of the multilateralism of NATO.

The counterfactual is based on two assumptions: first, that the discourses underlying the AASR were sufficiently strong on both sides of the Atlantic and, second, that America’s own international
UNSC resolution 1441 of November 9, 2002 – the “first” or “initial” UN resolution – provided Hussein with one “final opportunity” to surrender WMD, namely by letting UN weapons inspectors in the country.312 But 1441 hardly constituted “full UN authorization” because of the difference of interpretations, namely over whether noncompliance, broadly defined, implied automatic war. To go back to the British debate, Atlanticism called for the “one and done” option, while liberal internationalism implied the continuation of the UN process. Judging by insider accounts, Blair strongly believed in the latter. In January 2003, he reportedly told one of his ministers: “We’ll get UN cover under all conceivable circumstances. Trust me, I know my way through this” (Kampfner 2004: 256, cf. Cook 2004: 308-9, 314, 324; Stothard 2004: 218).

The absence of a head-on debate between Atlanticists and liberal internationalists was affected by the unflinching Atlanticism of the Conservative opposition, whose party leader Iain Duncan Smith supported the war throughout the period under study.313 The pro-UN position, which at a minimum implied the postponement of the invasion, was articulated by the “rogue” elements in Labour and Conservative parties, the entire Liberal Democrats as well as the representatives of the Scottish and Welsh nationalists parties. Which discourse dominated the government’s decision-making process cannot be known institutionalism, typically personified in State Secretary Colin Powell, was effectively sidelined at home (cf. Woodward 2004).

312 For Robin Cook, 1441 was “the only point in the whole saga where it is possible to pinpoint a clear instance where British influence made any difference to U.S. policy on Iraq” (2004: 205, cf. Seldon 2004: 624). As far as foreign influence on the US policy on Iraq goes, Israel and Saudi Arabia were informed of the US attack on Baghdad before the fact, not Britain (Woodward 2004: 395-9).

313 For this reason, Blair consistently “enjoyed a buffer of about 20-25 per cent for his Iraq policy” (Keohane 2005: 68). Among the senior Conservatives, dissent was heard from MPs John Gummer, Kenneth Clarke, Malcolm Rifkin and Douglas Hurd (Ibid.: 2005: 68).
in the absence of access to government documents, but in public texts the need for “UN cover” was central and repeatedly discussed. Judging from the memoirs published by three of its members – Robin Cook, Claire Short and David Blunkett – probably one half of the cabinet harbored distrust over Blair’s ability to “get UN cover,” often publicly (e.g., Short 2005: 184). In mid-August, the British press reported of a “cabinet rift” over Iraq, identifying at least half-dozen cabinet ministers as “doves,” which in this context meant UN institutionalists, not pacifists.\footnote{Doves were Cook, Clare Short (International Development), Margaret Beckett (Environment), Alastair Darling (Transport), Andrew Smith (Work and Pensions) and possibly Jack Straw (e.g., \textit{Times}, 16 August, 2 September 2002; \textit{The Guardian} 16 August 2002).} In September, the cabinet came to an agreement that Hussein constituted a threat to the region and to the West, but also agreed that the UN route constituted the best way to deal with this threat.\footnote{See \textit{Times}, 24 September 2002. The agreement was a function of the norm of “collective responsibility,” not the result of a full-fledged debate (cf. Cook 2003: 212-4). At the annual Labour Party conference a week later, Blair endorsed a party resolution re-confirming the need for the UN route.}

Even in mid-January, when it was fast becoming obvious that a “second” UNSC resolution was beyond reach due to, an unnamed government minister told the press: “The government’s policy can be summed up in two words – United Nations. Stick to the United Nations and there will be less trouble, or even no trouble at all.”\footnote{\textit{Times}, 14 January. To the extent that the second resolution would mean the authorization of war, only two UNSC votes – Bulgaria and Spain – were seen as “guaranteed” to toe the Anglo-American line.} With a caveat that such reasoning comes close to circularity, the power of liberal internationalism in British foreign policy discourse can be gauged from the Foreign Office behavior. According to one historical account, the search for the second resolution was “one of the most sustained and exhaustive diplomatic campaigns by any
British government...[and] the worst diplomatic defeat...since Suez.”317 Though the campaign failed, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Blair and his foreign policy team believed in multilateralizing the US invasion by virtue of British membership in the US-led coalition.318 Paradoxically, London – or at least Blair – regarded multilateralism as both a cause and a consequence of British participation (Cook 2003: 311).

Many critics interpreted London’s position during and after the UN process over Iraq as servility to the US. In the summer 2002, many argued that the debate had already been settled, considering that the Anglo-American forces was already at war against Hussien under Operation Southern Focus, an air campaign aimed against selected targets in Iraq.

Blair was the critics’ primary target, as “US ambassador to the world,” “Bush’s Foreign Minister” (attributed to Nelson Mendela) to, least charitably, the “poodle.”319 The prime minister’s responses to his critics were vintage Atlantism. In reflecting on terrorism, he acknowledged the embarrassing poodle analogy (though for Britain, not for himself)” “Britain should be in there helping confront it not because we are America’s poodle, but because dealing with it will make Britain safer” (Woodward 2003: 107). And


318 E.g., Stothard 2003: 87. Thus in justifying the pro-war motion in the March 18 vote in the House of Commons, Blair argued that British “retreat” would not make the US rethink its unilateralism.

319 I cannot analyze these criticisms in detail, but note that no text objected to claims of shared identity between the US and Britain, both as states and as nations. What critics disliked was Blair’s implicit claim of identity of interest between the British nation-state and the Bush administration. As many critics pointed out, the link was illogical – would London support Bush even if Bush was opposed by the majority of the American people?
as for Iraq, Blair often quipped: “It’s worse than you think. I believe in it. I am truly committed to dealing with this irrespective of the position of America.”

In other words, he explained the Anglo-American common front on terrorism and Iraq as a function of an exceptional mix of interest and identity that gave rise to the AASR in the first place. On the day of the historic vote on the war on March 18, Blair submitted to his peers: “Partners are not servants, but neither are they rivals.”

Biographers of Blair – as well as a series of official inquiries – tend to believe Blair, pegging him as a watchdog, not lap dog. At a risk of circularity, a source of the evidence is the nature of the British commitment to Iraq. As I suggested earlier, Britain managed to introduce UN 1441 in the Iraq crisis and thus at least postpone the invasion. But even once the “when” of the invasion was set in March 2003, the “how” of British participation was arguably still open. Yet instead of committing, say, special forces and/or aircraft, Blair went all the way, authorizing the third largest deployment of British forces since WWII (Operation Telic encompassed 46,000 troops). Arguably, the full-on commitment to Atlanticism effectively disabled the aforementioned “support minus” option. For one, the idea of backing the US without sending troops to battle was presented to Blair “six or seven” times in the run-up to the war (Naughtie 2004: 79). In

320 Interview in The Guardian, 1 March 2003. Blair made the same point in a speech to his party in February (Riddell 2003: 1; Woodward 2004: 337). Those who rejected the servility hypothesis did not necessarily agree with the war. Realists, for example, argued that foreign policy should be driven by a sense for reality, not a sense of destiny (e.g., Rogers 2002). In another example, church leaders argued that the war would adversely affect Iraqi people, already under great strain after ten years of sanctions (e.g., The Guardian, 15 November 2002).

321 Such was Blair’s vigilance over Iraq that some officials in Washington mockingly called Blair “Winston,” in reference to Churchill (Kampfner 2004: 48). At the time of my writing, four inquires have found that Blair acted on false intelligence, but not a single one concluded that the prime minister lied to the public. In public opinion polls since the autumn of 2003, the majority believed that Blair – or, as some protesters called him, “B-liar” – lied to them. On the ongoing controversy on what constituted a lie over Iraq, see the debate between Hoggatt (2005) and Bluth (2005). Cf. Danchev (2007) and Jervis (2006).
March 2003, the option was offered to Blair at least three times: by Foreign Secretary Straw, a week before the invasion (Ibid.: 199); by Bush over the phone, sometime in mid-March 2003, and by US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld, who suggested, in a public, pre-invasion press statement, that moral and political support – in lieu of military support – might be of sufficient help to Washington. Blair rejected all proposals, explaining the decision as a matter of deep beliefs, not short-term politics. Indeed, the idea of “commitment,” to Blair, meant not political support, but being there “when the shooting starts.”

The extant literature usually cites Atlanticism as a necessary condition for British membership in the US-led coalition of the willing. For Dunne, the Iraq War reaffirmed the vice-like grip of Atlanticism on Britain’s identity…Had key ministers in the UK government believed in internationalism, then, at a minimum, it would have made its support for the United States conditional upon a consensus in the Security Council as well as upon indicators of significant support from other multilateral institutions (Dunne 2004: 908).

In my reading, Atlanticism was not the dominant discourse within and across texts in the British sample. My DA of British foreign policy, including the debates on new events

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322 The exact date is debated, but multiple sources suggest that Bush, out of concern that the Blair government could fall over Iraq, suggested that British troops could participate in “a second wave [as] peacekeepers or something.” Blair declined, stating: “I absolutely believe in this too” (Kampfner 2004:168, 203; Seldon 2004: 74; Naughtie 2004: 145; Woodward 2004: 338). One report suggests that as early as January Blair learned that Bush would not wait for a second UN resolution, even as a “favor” to Blair (Woodward 2004: 297, 337-8).


324 BBC News, 6 September 2002, cf. Dunne 2004. Blair’s “five wars in six years,” including Britain’s aggressive peacekeeping in Afghanistan, are cited as evidence of Blair’s belief that liberal internationalism must include some shooting (e.g., Kampfner 2004: 146).
such as Afghanistan, liberal internationalism emerged as far more salient. What mattered, however, was the relative position of these two discourses. While Atlanticism spoke generally against Europeanism – a discourse sidelined in the Iraq debate – liberal internationalism generally stood on its own. But even so, the British case can be said to confound a prediction that foreign policy should be implied in the dominant discourse. Given the downgrading of the UN and multilateralism in military action in Iraq, liberal internationalism strongly called for a support minus option.

The key to this puzzle lies in the terms of the Iraqi invasion itself. The necessary condition for British participation in Iraq was not the dominance of Atlanticism over liberal internationalism, but the successful blending of the two discourses. That this discourse was co-opted by Atlanticism was partly a result of Blair and his foreign policy team. In their justifications of the invasion, Downing Street kept the liberal internationalist language of the pre-9/11, Kosovo era, in which Britain stood as a pivotal partner in formulating and implementing an agenda for the entire international society. What Blair and his supporters added was the post-9/11 argument that the global threat of terrorism called for flexibility in the understanding of multilateralism and/or pre-emption. Other than discourse, therefore, the necessary condition was human agency. For one, there is little doubt that Britain’s prime minister saw Atlanticism as sacrosanct (so much that “any other option [on Iraq] was inconceivable” [Hoggett 2005b: 603]). Second, there is also little doubt that Blair and his team knew how to blend the two discourses in front of their audience, which had the effect of making British non-participation – or the support minus option – improbable. In Kampfner’s words, Blair’s
“attempt to re-invent and re-interpret Bush’s security doctrine of pre-emption and US primacy into something more palatable for the British centre-left was critical” (2004: 309). Conversely, equally critical was the unwillingness and/or inability of the British elite to appreciate the “fundamental incompatibility between Atlanticism and internationalism” (Dunne 2004: 895; cf. 904).

In Canada, the underlying discourse supported non-participation for two main reasons. First, Canadian continentalism lacked the power of British Atlanticism. Second, the blending of liberal internationalism and continentalism was impossible since the two were at loggerheads precisely over the status of the US. Without difference against the US, liberal internationalism did not make sense in Canada. In the latter sense, it is hardly a surprise that Canada saw no discursive tweaks comparable to those induced by Blair and his core supports.

In my DA, Canadian elite opinion was decidedly anti-war (cf. Martin 2003: 418). The case for war came from two directions, nationalist and radicalist. In the first, Canada was a free-rider. In contrast to Australia and Britain, argued a seemingly baffled Globe and Mail foreign affairs columnist, Canada pretended to live in a different civilization:

Jean Chrétien told an interviewer that Western arrogance helped to bring on the terrorist attacks. If only we stopped abusing the poor, he suggested, such attacks might abate. Contrast that position to Tony Blair’s; the British Prime Minister made it plain from the start that his country would be in the front lines against terror - not just because of its friendship with the United States, but because Britons themselves were at risk (15 November 2002, A21).
In the second, the Canadian government was seen as misdirected in its professed idealism. According to a *National Post* columnist, regime change, not just WMD, obviously justified the intervention: “Immanuel Kant, William Gladstone and Woodrow Wilson would have approved. So should we. So should progressives everywhere” (*National Post*, 4 October 2002, A16). Comments like this constituted a minority opinion. Against continentalist insistence on the Western (or here, Anglospheric) common front, liberal internationalism placed Canada as an independent state first, club member state second. Against radicalism, the liberal internationalist mainstream stressed the international law and order over the new and untested international doctrines.

According to one columnist, the idea and practice of regime change was fraught with risks: “Moral crusades are different. They’re vulnerable to charges of self-righteousness and suspicions about motives, whether their protagonists are tree-huggers, peaceniks or the leader of the free world” (*Globe and Mail*, 18 September 2002, A15). In scouring contemporary newspaper reports, I found a great deal of concern about both the threat posed by Hussein’s WMDs and the US plans to deal with it. The official position could not be deduced from the extant information.

One widely cited document stated: “Canada is very concerned about Iraq possessing such weapons. Immediate, unconditional and unfettered inspections are Iraq’s only means to prove that is has disarmed” (DFAIT 2002). Indeed, the government’s position on Iraq was inconsistent and ambiguous until days before the invasion and the dithering was justified as a function of the wider international debate on whether the UN resolutions against Iraq, including UNSC 1441, justified military action (Harvey 2004: 193-215; Massie and Roussel 2005).

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From the parliamentary records, however, it is clear that Canada was overwhelmingly anti-war, even between the passing of 1441 and the 2002 winter break. Only the right-of-centre Canadian Alliance called for going it with the US. High-profile party leaders like Stephen Harper, Stockwell Day and Peter McKay continually criticized the Prime Minister for dithering – and, once the decision was made in March 2003 – for turning his back on Canada’s traditional allies (e.g., Harper and Day 2003). Within the ruling Liberal Party, only one representative – Defence Minister John McCallum – openly broke ranks and hinted that he was in favor of joining the coalition. Among his party colleagues, the majority interpreted the invasion as unnecessary or at least premature, a significant minority loudly called it hypocritical, and a select few MPs opined that Washington’s goal was neither to change nor to disarm the Ba’athist regime, but instead, was simply a show of America’s power. A number of Liberal MPs, including cabinet members and senior members of the Commons foreign-relations committee, publicly complained about US unilateralism.

In this last framing, Canadian independence became a function of outright defiance of the US. Very critical remarks about the US government, including President Bush, were voiced by MPs Brent St. Denis, John Cannis, Janko Peric, Yvon Charbonneau, and, especially, Carolyn Parish and Natural Resources Minister, Herb Dhaliwal. MPs from the remaining three parliamentary parties generally supported the government position. The centrist Progressive Conservative Party under the leadership of internationally experienced former prime minister Joe Clark judiciously expressed

325 These remarks are discussed by Paul Cellucci (2005), the American ambassador to Ottawa from the period, who himself was a passionate participant in this debate.
agreement with the Liberals, while the left-of-centre New Democratic Party and the nominally separatist Bloc Québécois entered a competition of sorts in calls for the further distancing from the Bush administration.326

Judging by their arguments, the majority of Liberals were not opposed to the removal of Hussein per se. The Prime Minister himself suggested that he could appreciate a military intervention without UN approval.327 Yet Canada’s non-participation was justified with respect of the dominant interpretation of Canadian independence. Consider the texts left behind by Foreign Minister Graham and Chrétien. In a speech in the House of Commons in January, Graham quoted President Bush’s State of the Union address that the United States “does not depend on the decision of others”. Then he said: “Canadians expect no less from their government. And why would Americans expect less of us than they expect of themselves?” (quoted in The Globe and Mail, January 30, 2003, A1). Several weeks later, Graham argued: “… I think we should be where we are, have our policy, which is to support the multilateral system with good arguments and to say to them, ‘We’re staying put. And you’re better to have an ally and friend that debates frankly than to have someone who says yes, sir’” (quoted in National Post, February 15, 2003). In both speeches, Canada is articulated as independent from and/or equal to the United States. As in the nationalist (in society) and liberal internationalist (in elite texts) discourses, the emphasis was on the difference with the


327 See, e.g., Le Devoir, March 19, 2003. Speaking on the fortieth anniversary of his first election to parliament, he also expressed hope that the US would accomplish its mission quickly and with minimal casualties. A similar expression of respect for the US military came from Graham, who said “Godspeed” once the invasion troops moved into Iraq (National Post, March 25, 2003).
United States: Canada could not make its own policy (or non-policy), but it could also deliberate, disagree, and, ultimately, staying the course in the face of the superpower pressure.

CONCLUSION

The Iraq War stands as one of the most divisive events in the post-Cold War international politics. The US decision to topple Hussein by way of a full-scaled invasion of Iraq faced a sizable opposition at home and abroad. Like in its Cold War-era interventions, some of which were discussed in previous chapters, Washington vigorously pursued a “more flags” program. In contrast to Korea, but much like in Vietnam, the results of this effort were mixed. Most US allies – traditional or potential, formal and informal – puzzled over the need for such costly endeavor. Among the traditional friends and allies, and in contrast to Vietnam, Britain led a dozen of states in committing its forces and international political capital to the invasion. This chapter has argued that it was the Blair government who managed to wed liberal internationalism to Atlanticism and thus lock-in Britain on the road to war.

As for Canada, it declined membership in the US-led coalition against Iraq and – like in Vietnam – it openly questioned some aspects of American foreign policy. (And like in Vietnam, Ottawa’s measured criticism of Washington’s international security policy had no observable implications on the economic relationship between the two countries). Indeed, in both pre- and post-invasion phases, Canada was firmly on board with the US in its war on terror. That the boundary between the two campaigns was blurry was evident from Ottawa’s decision to strengthen Canada’s Afghan mission in
March 2003, symbolically “freeing up” US troops for Iraq. Only in this sense is it possible to talk about Canada’s “intervention if necessary, but not necessarily intervention” (Haglund 2005: 180).

By late 2003, there was little doubt as to who was right. For the Blair government, Iraq became a huge embarrassment. Although public opinion swung in favor of the war once the invasion force swiftly made its way to Baghdad, support dissipated even more swiftly as the enormously high costs of the occupation of Iraq became evident. Worse, the government became a target of the allegations of lying about the state of Iraq’s weapon arsenal. Prime Minister Blair became “B-liar,” or, much more charitably, a naïve, “accidental American” (Naughtie 2004). A set of official inquires found no evidence of intentional deception: if Blair mislead the nation, it is because he mislead himself first.

Secret documents leaked to the press in 2005 deepened doubts of Blair and his party, which prompted Blair to step down. At the time of this writing, inquiries and leaks on the British road to Iraq have revealed enough ambiguities to feed the critics for years to come. Like Blair, Chretien was forced out of office by the members of his own party. But in contrast to Blair’s case, Iraq was Chretien’s most wildly popular decision, going down in history as his “legacy.” Predictably, once the occupation of Iraq turned sour, even the nominally pro-war Alliance (who eventually managed to merge with the Progressive Conservatives and wrestle the power away from the Liberals) came to agree on the wisdom of sitting out the Iraq War. In an election campaign speech in December 2005, the Conservative Party leader declared thus: “Our role is in Afghanistan. It is not in Iraq” (cited in London Free Press, December 14, 2005, A2).
So what does the Iraq case tell us about the Anglosphere? On the surface, Canada’s defection from the supposedly Anglospheric coalition of the willing – like New Zealand’s for that matter – once again shows that common identity does not automatically lead to common policy. (At the time of the Iraq War, most programmatic pronouncements for an active English-speaking alliance operationalized the Anglosphere core as the Anglo-Australian-American trio [cf. Garton-Ash 2004]). Histories of any special relationship – including the special relationships within the Anglosphere – include cases of both deep cooperation as well as unexpected defection. No doubt, choices made by human agents affect final foreign outcomes, but what cannot be discounted is the power of discourse and debates over those choices (cf. Sharp 2005).

Within British and Canadian foreign policy debates on Iraq, it was repeatedly made clear that the national selves belong to a community of English-speaking states, at least more so than to any other similar community. In Canada, liberal internationalism kept Canada out of Iraq by insisting on Canada’s membership in a multilateral UN, while its continentalist challenger argued for following the traditional English-speaking allies. The former discourse prevailed, showing that history is not destiny. In Britain, Alanticism and liberal internationalism justified British participation in Iraq by working together against the countercurrents of Europeanism. The latter discourse lost, showing that geography is not destiny either. In the words of one historian, “Thirty years after withdrawing from east of Suez and joining the European Community, Britain still often behaves as if the Atlantic Ocean is narrower than the English Channel” (Reynolds 2006: 330).
CHAPTER 8

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Questions of identity may insinuate their way into all forms of politics, but all forms of politics are not about questions of identity. Geroid Tuathail (1996: 652)

In Chapter 3, I made a theoretical argument and then I moved to evaluate it empirically in three sets of case studies, presented in Chapters 4-7. What remains to be done is to evaluate this argument against other theories. After a short overview of my argument, I move to a series of conversations with specific literatures in IR, as categorized in six sections: 1) war plans; 2) appeasement; 3) hegemony; 4) the democratic peace; 5) interdependence and institutions; 6) security communities. In each of these discussions, I evaluate the strength and weakness of my theoretical framework and its contribution to IR, carefully specifying when the validity of each claim goes beyond the reach of my evidentiary base. The concluding section considers the value my framework added to the constructivist research program.

Before I move on let me clarify what I mean by the idea of testing one’s theoretical framework against its rivals in the discipline of IR. Without going into the deeply philosophical question “what constitutes a good theory?” it can be said that because observation is always theory-laden, theories are never evaluated against the empirical world, only against other theories or alternatives (Elman and Elman, ed., 2003). In the ideal world, any evaluation of alternative arguments should follow the identical
metatheoretical grounding and the identical evidentiary base. In this sense, alternatives can be seen as zero-sum oppositional, complementary or supplementary.  

As I explained in Chapter 2, IR is no ideal world to evaluate one’s argument against the alternatives. In that chapter, I brought constructivism into an ontological line with realism and liberalism in order to perform a statistical analysis of the effects of the Anglosphere identity on the levels of participation in specific cases of U.S.-led military interventions. Now I propose to bring realism and liberalism closer to constructivism’s intersubjectivist ontology. In principle, realism and liberalism assume that states understand their strategic position with little or no distortion; what matters in these perspectives is not meaning so much as information. Discourses and debates within and between states reflect material realities on the ground: what actors say, in short, is a function of the distribution of material capabilities at home and abroad—anything from guns and butter to information about guns and butter.

In practice, however, many realist and liberal accounts of world politics move to analyze the effect of power and interest on international relations through process-tracing, a tool comparable to discourse-analytic methodology I employed in the earlier

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328 In general, ad hoc arguments does not constitute a valid alternative explanation. Consider Canada’s decision to stay out of the Iraq War in March 2003, the hard case for the Anglosphere (Haglund and Jockel 2004-5). The extant commentary on the topic has focused on two factors: Chretien’s desire for a foreign policy legacy and a pending provincial election in Quebec. These explanations are clearly ad hoc because they concentrate on the proverbial “here and now.” At the same time, they sneak in particular theories on how Canadian foreign policy is made. The first explanation believes in the primacy of the prime prime minister in foreign policy decision-making; the second believes that Canadian foreign policy is a function of the federal government’s appeasement of a province known for its anti-war tendency and separatist history. These two explanations may be correct, but unless it can be demonstrated that they are metatheoretically comparable to my account, they are not fair game. For theories of Canadian foreign policy, see Nossal (1997). For these two explanations of the Iraq decision in particular, see Haglund (2004), Roussel and Massie (2005) and Vucetic (2006).
Epistemologically speaking, most positivists see process-tracing as methodologically valuable because it promises to get at causal mechanisms, and away from mere correlations. For process-tracers, historical evidence that suggests decision-makers “think and act” like positive-theory realists (e.g., a self-interested egoist) or positive-theory liberals (e.g., that democracies do not fight each other) is counted in favor of theory. Agents’ subjective understandings of social facts like war and peace serve as a source of evidence, as do intersubjective meanings—whether most actors within state structures think and act the same. I cannot defend this assertion at length, but consider, for example, how Fareed Zakaria, a neoclassical realist, process-traces changing beliefs on what material power meant to US decision-makers in the nineteenth century (1998) or how James Lee Ray, a liberal, defends a claim that democracies do not fight each other (1998). The value of these two studies lies in the attempt to examine whether the logics of realism and liberalism operate as advertised. And even if realists and liberals reject process-tracing on theoretical and/or methodological grounds, one could illustrate how realist and liberal logics compare against their constructivist counterparts. If realists and liberals are correct, texts left behind by the decision-makers should reflect realist and liberal worldviews; i.e., realism and liberalism can each be individually hypothesized to be dominant in discourses and debates. In this sense, realism and liberalism can be treated as social facts: the objective material environments such as the balance of power

329 Logically, process tracing can also be used to reject alternative explanation (George and Bennett 2005).

330 And they do so by process-tracing cases which are puzzling or anomalous from a structural perspective. Neoclassical realism and liberalism may be said to have a strong tendency toward intersubjective ontology, but they still differ from constructivism in substantive terms (Hopf 2002: Ch. 6; Krebs, forthcoming: 21-6).

331 Only in this sense can one argue that a systemic theory can be seen as a theory of foreign policy (cf. Wendt 1999).
or democratic alliances will be easily translated in foreign policy debates. In turn, in the alternative argument, continuity and change in realist and liberal ideas will thus affect continuity and change in foreign policy understandings.

Three additional caveats are in order. First, while my case studies in Chapter 4-7 enabled me to probe the propositions on the influence of discourses and debates on foreign policy, they do not constitute a systematic test of a generalizable theoretical framework. History is not a laboratory, plus contextualized generalizations are not meant to adjudicate among the comparative predictive power of individual and decontextualized propositions. Second and related, because I cannot clam full metatheoretical flexibility or offer sufficient empirical variance to unambiguously disentangle the relative effect of all variables and logics associated with alternatives versus my framework, what I provide here should strictly be seen as an illustration. The task of this chapter is to provide basic raw material upon which subsequent research can expand. Last, I do not claim that my analysis breaks new historical ground or dislodges alternative readings of history; rather, the most I seek is a demonstration that old stories can be retold in novel and theoretically profitable ways.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

The theoretical framework I used to explain the Anglosphere generally proved useful. The proposition that foreign policy debates—and therefore the direction, shape, and form of foreign policy—will follow the dominant discourse in society has been overwhelmingly borne out in all of my case studies. This finding validates a DA of identity as a way to explain the construction foreign policy orientations toward other
states. The empirical record is more mixed with respect to the proposition on the effect of debates on the fit between identity and the perceived reality. In the case of the “great rapprochement,” I found that British foreign policy toward America twice changed because it did not fit the dominant discourse of identity—once in each of the two Venezuela crises. Once America’s aggressive posture vis-à-vis Britain changed in response to a demonstrated misfit between identity and the perceived reality in the winter 1895-6, US foreign policy stayed the course. For one, in supporting Britain’s campaign in South Africa, the US government weathered a strong misfit between anti-imperialist identity and support for an intervention carried by the once hostile British Empire.

With respect to the ANZUS treaty, the fit between the dominant foreign policy discourse and Australian and NZ alliance choice held, but not after some debate over how to read the new events like the Korean War. The regional military alliance came to exclude Britain only after Australian and NZ decision-makers successfully convinced their audiences—and themselves—that British exclusion would be nominal. In Suez, Australia experienced no misfit between Britishness at home and Britishness abroad, but Canada did, in a major way. Save for the francophone Quebec, Ottawa’s decision to side with the UN and US split the country and the policy held only because the government framed Britain’s own action as un-British—which proved correct once the so-called Suez Tories in London fell from grace.

In Vietnam, Australian and Canadian policies generally resonated with the dominant discourse of identity. While both states saw each other as independent, Australian decision-makers defined independence as the ability to help America first and Britain second, while their Canadian counterparts moved to establish their state as
unique, particularly against the closeness and similarity with the US. Last, in Iraq, British policy contradicted the dominant reading of the British Self, but Whitehall ignored the misfit and pushed ahead to join the US-led military coalition. In Canada, the foreign policy debates served only to show how government policy seamlessly fit the dominant reading of the Canadian “we.”

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**Table 8.1 Do debates shape foreign policy? An overview**

As Table 8.1 shows, nine out of fourteen cases supported my argument on the role of foreign policy debates on the fit between identity and policy. I expected debates to change policy only when foreign policy elites managed to convince their audiences on the significance of the misfit. Out of six clear cases of misfit, government policies changed in three (Britain in Venezuela I and II; the US in Venezuela I), but, anomalously for my theoretical framework, held in three (the US in the South African War, Canada in Suez, and Britain in Iraq) as well. Two other cases of misfit were too ambiguous to call (Australia and NZ in ANZUS).

In my reading of the historical evidence, misfit failed to produce change in all three cases because the critics of government policies failed to come up with a winning
argument. US support of Britain against the Boers held because the proponents framed the support as consistent with the racialized hierarchy of human civilization, in which the Boers trailed behind the Anglo-Saxons. In Suez, the critics of the Pearson government failed to demonstrate why support for imperialism constituted national interest, against an interest in performing good citizenship in the UN. And in Iraq, British policy held against all kinds of demonstrated contradictions due to the inability of the critics to dispel the iron link between British identity and the AASR. An important finding in all three cases is that misfits held because policies were supported by fairly unified governments. Even if dissent existed, like in the Republican Party during the South African War or in Blair’s Cabinet in the run-up to the Iraq invasions, the government managed to keep it under control. I will return to the implications of this finding below.

WAR PLANS

One of most obvious and frequent criticisms of the Anglosphere concerns the historical presence of intramural war plans. Realists in particular are quick to note that long after the Anglo-American rapprochement, the two great powers/empires of North America kept planning for war against each other until the eve of WWII. Ever since the US’ “color-coded” War Plans were declassified in 1974, journalists and scholars have perused them either to show how history had changed or, more typically, to amuse their readers.332 In the color scheme of American war planning in the period between the two

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332 In a recent article on the subject, the Washington Post (December 30, 2005) offered that the plan’s aim was to “bring these Molson-swigging, maple-mongering Zamboni drivers to their knees!” (italics in the original). The comic tone can be seen as a testament to the unthinkability of a US-Canadian war. My discussion of war plans, however, draws on scholarly sources such as Preston (1977), Ross (2004) and Rudmin (1993).
wars, the UK was “Red,” Canada “Crimson,” Australia “Scarlet” and New Zealand “Garnet” and all four discussed as potential enemies countering to the contemporary discourse on the durability and unbroken continuity of the Anglosphere. As for the British side, archives have shown that in 1921 Canada, then an increasingly sovereign and independent actor in foreign and defence affairs, developed “Defence Scheme Number 1,” a plan for a pre-emptive, four-pronged attack on the US (targeting Albany, Minneapolis, Seattle and Great Falls, Montana).

On the surface, these historical records offer solid evidence for the realist argument in which the rapprochement emerges not as a function of some common identity, but rather on cold-blooded calculus. There are two problems with this claim. First, military and diplomatic historians typically minimize the political significance of such documents. In this view, war plans can be seen as a standard operating procedure, commissioned as much for pedagogical purposes as for strategy and defence (Bourne 1967: 402; Grenville 1964: 389; 1979: 23-9; Kennedy 1979: 8-10). Steven Ross, for example, finds that the US State Department consistently refused to participate in war planning well into the 1930s, despite numerous official requests lodged by various

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333 For example, the war plan Red, double approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy in 1930, listed the conquest of Canada as a tactical and strategic priority in a war against the British Empire. The plan called for, first, cutting off British supply and communication lines at Halifax and Winnipeg; second, establishment of bridgeheads at Buffalo, Detroit, and Sault Ste. Marie; and, last, attacking Montreal and Ottawa from Vermont. In 1935, following the war plan Red schema, the US Army held a practice invasion of Canada in upstate New York which involved fifty thousand soldiers, the largest peacetime military maneuvers in US history. In the same year, Congress heard the testimony of a USAF officer who, in all seriousness, warned Americans of the airborne threat to Boston and Baltimore posed by Canadian float (“pontoon-equipped”) aircraft, operating from the numerous lakes (“sheltered water areas”) in Ontario and Quebec. Most remarkably, Red was still a must-read for Army and Naval War College students in 1939, as Germany was preparing to invade Poland.

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agencies (2004: 8-10, 95-6). The proverbial civilians, who ran international relations more often than soldiers, did not seem to concern themselves much with war planning.

Second, even if we treat war plans as a smoking gun, the balance of evidence probably works against the realist argument. My own survey of the British war-planning records in 1894-6—spanning the War Office, including the Military Intelligence Department, Admirality, the Naval Intelligence Department, and the defence papers at the Colonial Office—indicates an abject ignorance of the US factor. Instead, the papers exhibit a twin focus on the European powers, including European rivalries overseas, and on the maintenance of naval supremacy. Where the US is mentioned, its navy is suggested as a non-enemy, both in terms of capabilities and intentions. Moreover, British support for the Monroe Doctrine is so taken for granted that it is never mentioned in these documents.334 Finally, as a testament of the primacy of politics over military strategy, there are indications that Chamberlain’s interference in the planning process resulted in the removal of the US from the list of possible enemies (Campbell 1970: 175).

In the 1890s, US war planning took place almost exclusively in the US Naval War College. After the Spanish-American War, war planning was extended to the War and Navy Departments and, after 1903, the US Army College as well as to the Joint Army and Navy Board, which was created to coordinate the services’ concurrent drafting of war plans. Like their British counterparts, American records show no overwhelming preoccupation with an Anglo-American war. American designs for an invasion of Canada have existed since 1892, though they were drafted—the first probably by Mahan—

334 Particularly remarkable are documents in the War Office: 35/55; 106/40; CAB 8/1. Note that some war plans against the US may be “missing” (Bourne 1967: 325, 330).
–as purely theoretical exercises (Ross 2004: 8-10). During Venezuela I, a war plan against Britain was drafted in the form of a short outline in the winter of 1895, but a full strategic plan was designed only in 1910, and later became incorporated in the general color-coded schemes which included Germany (Black), Japan (Orange), France (Gold) as well as various combinations of imperial alliances.

In a comparative perspective, it is indicative that American war planners assigned lower probabilities to wars against Britain versus those against other potential adversaries. For example, the first war plan against Spain—drafted by the Naval War College class of 1895—clearly identified the “liberation of Cuba” as a political aim of the campaign (Ibid.: 12-13). Similarly, the designs against Germany, drafted even before Venezuela II, identified countering the rise of the German threat in the western hemisphere as a political objective of the campaign. It is also worthwhile to note that US strategic planners drafted their first “two-ocean” plan against a Spanish-Japanese coalition, not a British-Japanese coalition as the patterns of contemporary alignments would suggest (Ibid.: 15). Against the realist argument, I last posit that any evidence of intramural war plans should be balanced against the evidence of an unusual sense of camaraderie between British and American navies. In all likelihood, people who strongly advocated closer ties between the US and Britain were not the political and cultural elites, but naval officers. So while many great powers/empires sometimes cooperated in naval affairs (e.g., Samoa), the degree and character of Anglo-American cooperation had always suggested a degree of specialness not found elsewhere (Allen 1969: 577-584, 608; Bourne 1967: 343-4; 1970: 172; Neale 1965: 80-95).
As another cause of the Anglo-American rapprochement, realists are also likely to cite appeasement, a policy of backing off in the hope of avoiding war. Kennedy (1988) posits that from 1865 onwards, Britain maintained its preeminent position among great powers/empires chiefly by managing to appease some challengers in order to retain resources to deter others. From this perspective, Whitehall backed down not only in Venezuela I, but in every single subsequent dispute with Washington, from the updating of the isthmian canal treaty in 1898-9 to the acceptance of the US claim in the Alaskan panhandle boundary dispute in 1902. In a realist worldview, what enabled change to occur without violent struggle in the western hemisphere was not what the contemporary Anglo-American elites called “sentiment,” “feeling” or “imponderables” but the time-honored policy of “apaisement.” Lest it be theoretically overvalued as in the case of intramural war plans, my argument is that appeasement must be placed in its proper historical context. In Chapter 4, I argued that Anglo-American elites followed a racialized ontology of security in which British concessions to America—and so American gains to Britain—were mostly interpreted as a net gain for the Anglo-Saxons. If it is true that Anglo-Saxonism constituted a major force in the Anglo-American relations in the nineteenth century, then the concept of relative gains is inapplicable and appeasement is no longer a meaningful category. This means, among other things, “that had push come to shove, Americans might well have taken a more conciliatory stance” (Rock 2000: 40; cf. Azubuike 2005). This counterfactual, I suggest, is entirely defensible when juxtaposed against the historical record.
For the historian Kenneth Bourne and IR realists who readily cite his work (e.g., Layne 1994), the entire period between 1838 and 1848—marked as it was by the expansion of the boundaries of Maine, the annexation of Texas, the division of Oregon and, ultimately, the conquest of one half of Mexico—can be seen by a series of net losses for Britain, as America’s main continental rival. Arguably, Bourne’s thesis is overdrawn. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which settled the northern Maine boundary, confounds the argument in terms of both outcome and process: not only did the agreement in fact “broadly favoured the British” but it was also directed at sub-state actors in the US (the Patriots and their Anglophobic supporters) rather than at the US qua great power/empire (Burke 2007: 265). As for Texas, British resistance is probably a myth propagated by first generations diplomatic historians. From London, “the Band of outlaws who occupy Texas” (Foreign Secretary Palmerston, 1837) appeared neither fit for independence nor—being a predominantly Anglo-Saxon Band of outlaws—for permanent incorporation in the Latin Mexico (cf. Roeckell 1999).

The Oregon dispute is a major anomaly for the realist argument. If Britain was the appeaser and the US was appeasee, like realists claim, why did the US accept the historical division of the Oregon territory (Columbia District, in the contemporary British parlance)? In the realist coding of the crisis, the US was negotiating from the position of strength, yet the division of what was an enormous chunk North America west of the Rocky Mountains, north of Mexico (42\textsuperscript{nd} parallel) and south of Russia (54\textsuperscript{th} parallel) came to favour Britain. For one, the British proposal to place the US-British boundary on the 49\textsuperscript{th} parallel, accepted in April 1846 by a 38-12 vote in Congress, left the greater part of North America in British hands (Canada is larger than the US). In addition to the
enormous real estate, Britain ensured an Asian trade route for British North America, won the navigation rights in the Columbia River and retained a naval base at Esquimalt plus the entire Vancouver Island, which extended south of the 49th parallel. For the perspective of an appeasee, US behaviour over Oregon is puzzling, even if we accept, for the sake of the argument, that a looming possibility of a war with Mexico in early 1846 softened Washington’s stance (could it be that the US was quick to appease, as the push came to shove?). Also note that Washington respected the Oregon agreement even after it purchased Alaska from Russia, despite the fact it rendered the US an oddly non-contiguous state. Last, note that Oregon was not a final settlement of the British-American border: though boundary disputes occurred in the future—above all, in the case of the Alaska panhandle question created by the Alaska purchase—the US never once tried to wrestle any Northwest Pacific territory away from Canada, much less to fundamentally abrogate the Oregon settlement.

Another major, and glaringly obvious, anomaly for realists is the British stance in the American Civil War (Elman 2004: 568, fn. 5; Roussell 2004: 109; Schweller 2005: 160). Objectively speaking, given the spectacular growth of its North American rival, Britain had strong strategic reasons to intervene in the American Civil War on the side of the Confederation or at least to prevent the Union from winning. For one, if there ever was an opportunity for the British to reverse the losses from the alleged appeasement period, the civil war was it, yet Whitehall decided to stick to the policy of neutrality.

Also problematic of the appeasement argument is the lack of outsider acknowledgment that what transpired in Venezuela I constituted appeasement of one side by the other. For one, Britain’s concessions to the US in 1895-6 hardly inspired
Germany to press the case for the Boers or France, at Fashoda in 1898, to claim its portion of the Nile basin (On the latter occasion, once the Royal Navy mobilized for war, the French decided to give up their claims). Like comparable units in the international system, Britain and the U.S. both competed over territory, borders and markets in what they saw to be their spheres of influence, yet it was precisely the other great powers/empires who regarded the Anglo-American competition as something of a sham, at least as far the rest of the world was concerned.

Contra realism, I suggest that a curious harmony of interests between two English-speaking great powers/empires was a running theme of the century. In the politics of international and transnational identities in which the Anglo-Saxons stood against other races, Britain could not meaningfully lose out to the US. Because of shared identity, in other words, Britain and the US never competed in ways similar to comparable dyads at the time. An *Economist* editorial from the period of the Crimean War captured British views of budding American imperialism:

> You cannot forever uphold the semi-civilised, semi-Spanish, degenerate Mexicans or Nicaraguans – with their effeminate habits and their enfeebled powers – against the hasting, rushing, inexhaustible energies of the Anglo-Saxon Americans. Criminal, course, violent as they often are, it cannot be denied that they rule and conquer by virtue of superior manhood…Central America people and *exploité* by Anglo-Saxons will be worth to us tenfold its present value” (cited in Schultz 1998: 70).

To be sure, much more empirical evidence is required to show that the dynamics of appeasement is consistently contradicted in the Anglo-American dyad. But even if one rejects my argument on empirical grounds, there remains a theoretical point to be made about the necessary link between appeasement and identity. The Munich case
demonstrates precisely why appeasement needs to be seen in a broader context. Britain’s appeasement of Germany failed because Britain and Germany did not constitute a community unified by any intersubjective understandings. One was a democratic state interested in preserving the international status quo established after the last world war, while another was a militaristic totalitarian state bent on overturning the world order. Conversely, Britain’s appeasement of America in Venezuela worked because both states shared the same view of the world as a hierarchy of racialized global empires. In other words, appeasement is likely to succeed precisely when it is not perceived as appeasement but some sort of reciprocated restructuring. According to the view of one East Coast newspaper in January 1896, London’s decision to appease Washington: “No American has dreamed of attributing this to cowardice” (Rock 2000: 43). I will return to the link between crisis and intersubjectivity in the section on security communities.

HEGEMONY

Structural realists tend to downplay all state attributes save for the distribution of capabilities. The structure of international politics, in this view, mainly arises from the differences of capabilities among chief states.335 In one version of this argument—known as offensive realism—the overweening deterministic power of the distribution of capabilities is modified by the geographic location of great powers, particularly with respect to the so-called “stopping power of water.” John Mearsheimer, the founder of this school of realism, argues that “island great powers” like Britain behave differently

335 This position is traditionally associated with the structural realism (neorealism) of Kenneth Waltz. The end of the Cold War put structural realism to rest as it showed that a change in dominant ideas within one combatant—the Soviet Union—could significantly change the international structure.
than “continental great powers” like Germany which still behave differently like
“regional hegemons” like the US (2001). In this theory, all great powers balance bids for
ageconomy, but the inefficiencies such as buck-passing—waiting for someone else to
balance—make hegemony possible. In the last two hundred years, the US stands as the
sole great power to pull off a lasting regional hegemony—by far the safest situation in the
dangerous Hobbesian world of international politics (Ibid.: 141). America won its
hegemony by outsmarting European great power balancers, particularly Britain (Ibid.:
251).

Colin Elman has expanded Mearsheimer’s theory to specifically deal with the
puzzle of American hegemony in the face of European determination to prevent it (2004).
For Elman, American success was a magnificent fluke—“local considerations,” namely
the “improbable” absence of balancers capable of intervening against US expansion in
North America made possible the century-long US rise to regional hegemony (Ibid.:
563). In the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, his main case study, Elman discovers that a
host of ongoing security concerns in its own European region prevented France holding
onto the Louisiana territory and thus thwarting America’s westward expansion. In a
parallel argument, Elman also offers that Britain similarly acquiesced to America’s rise
because its own region was ultimately Europe, not North America (Ibid.: 567). As
evidence in favour of his claim, Elman counterfactually reasons that “If France had not
sold the territory, it is very likely that an Anglo-American alliance would have followed”
(Ibid.).

From the Anglosphere perspective, one could argue that Britain never prevented
America’s rise to power in the entirety of the nineteenth century, not because of hurdles
such as buck-passing or “local considerations”, but because of shared identities similar to those expressed in the Anglo-Saxonist discourses of the 1890s. Bradford Perkins, the historian who coined the term “great rapprochement,” described the Anglo-American relationship in the period of the Louisiana Purchase as the “first rapprochement” (1955). Elman cites Perkins’ work, but does not refer to the possibility of a tacit, identity-based alliance between Washington and London. Particularly relevant are the dynamics of the Louisiana Purchase in the so-called Franco-American Quasi War of 1788-1900.\textsuperscript{336} This sea war, fought mainly in the Atlantic, broke out when the US Navy moved to retaliate against the forces in the service of Revolutionary France who had harassed American merchant shipping in order to stymie Britain’s transatlantic trade.

What matters for my argument is how seamlessly the Anglo-American security cooperation developed against France. The Quasi War, like Venezuela II, involved a great power/empire triangle in which the presence of a significant Other greatly enhanced the Anglo-American closeness and similarity.\textsuperscript{337} No formal or operational plan existed to guide this cooperation, but like in the later wars fought on the sea—say, the Opium Wars or Spanish-American War—the Royal Navy and the US Navy found ways to support each other, by sharing not simply information but also ammunition and supplies. That American merchants were welcomed into the convoys led by British warships appeared

\textsuperscript{336} The term quasi refers to the undeclared nature of the war. Retrospective labels also include the Pirate War or Half-War. In this sense, it is not true that France is the only European great power/empire never to have fought the US.

\textsuperscript{337} Anglo-American cooperation was not confined to the Atlantic. In Asia-Pacific, the Spanish-American War has become a well-known case of Anglo-American naval and intelligence cooperation, but a similar case can be made with respect to other nineteenth century conflicts in the region, from the Opium Wars to the Boxer Rebellion. In fact, in the six decades from the Treaty of Wangxia of 1844—America’s first diplomatic agreement in Asia—to the famous Open Door era, Britain and the US nearly always found themselves on the same side of international conflict/cooperation.
just as natural as the expectation that British merchants came under the protection of American warships (Perkins 1955: Ch. 7; Burke 2007: 212-4). The wartime alliance no doubt facilitated Britain’s acquiescence of America’s annexation of Louisiana three years later.

Against offensive realism, I submit that Britain was not an absent, extraregional great power in nineteenth century North America. Rather, it was a regional (if insular) power whose discourses of identity established the US as a similar and close Other, at least in comparison to other units in the international system. So in addition to geography, the inefficiencies of European balancing or “local considerations,” I propose that America’s accomplishment of regional hegemony was facilitated by Anglo-Saxonism—or some earlier discourse of identity binding the two English-speaking states together. If proven correct, this proposition would not necessarily render the offensive realist account invalid, but could validate the implication of my identity-based account of the puzzle of America’s extraordinary rise in the world of great powers and empires.

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

As I said in Chapter 2, liberals argue that three factors lead to the liberal or Kantian peace—democratic institutions and norms, economic interdependence and international law and institutions (Russett and Oneal 2001). Let us begin with the first leg of this tripod—the claim that democracies do not fight one another. Liberals and realists differently read Venezuela: for liberals, the Anglo-American peace “broke out” in the winter of 1894-5 primarily because both states were, comparatively speaking, “great
democracies. For realist critics of the liberal peace, Venezuela I was a “near-miss”—peace was caused by Britain’s last minute appeasement of the US (Layne 1994; Maoz 1997; Owen 1994; and Russett 1995, cf. Rock 2000, Thompson 1999). On the basis of available evidence, I can address but one empirical aspect of this debate—the perceptions of other states. Ceteris paribus, international conflict/cooperation is a function of perceptions of military threat in realism or, in liberalism, of interdemocratic friendliness or liberalness. For realists, perceptions is a continuous variable which can explain why English-speaking states formed cohesive military alliances when the outside threat was perceived as high (e.g., the expansion of Asian communism in Korea) but quickly disengaged into “hiding” when the threat came to be perceived as low (e.g., Vietnam).

For liberals, it is the variation in the perceptions of liberalness that accounts for the ebb and flow of Anglo-American conflict/cooperation in the nineteenth century—liberalness was low in 1812, but high in 1895. Since the evaluation of perceptions relies on the interpretation of text, my account can directly be set against alternatives. If realists are right, the Anglo-American decision-makers would filter information in terms of relative capabilities and geographic proximity. If liberals are right, the decision-makers would make sense of the world mostly in terms of regime type. And if my account is right, these individuals would follow the dominant identity relations above all.

338 Realists saw Venezuela I as their hard case, given that there were no more democratic states at the time than Britain and the US. The term great democracies is Churchill’s (1950: Vol. 4).
339 Neither realism nor liberalism foregrounds a theory of perceptions and I fully accept that perceptions may in fact be used as auxiliary factors in both traditions. However, there is no doubt that this particular debate came to the question of whether political elites perceive their opponents as liberal and democratic (Owen 1997: 15, 589-90; cf. Russett and Oneal 2001: 106; Farnham 2003). As per Table 2.1, the focus on subjective phenomena such as perceptions shifts the levels of analysis further away from the proposed comfort zone.
To evaluate the realist proposition, consider the texts left behind by Admiral A.T. Mahan and President Theodore Roosevelt. Being authored by the most influential believers in Realpolitik and geopolitik\textsuperscript{340} in America at the time, these texts can be said to constitute a hard case for liberalism and constructivism. The findings significantly confound realism. Mahan’s central recommendation was that the US needed an activist foreign policy in the hemisphere (as well as in Asia-Pacific) lest it finds itself encircled by Germany and/or Japan (Turk 1987: 3, 28; also see Kennedy 1987). The British Empire disappeared from Mahan’s list of strategic liabilities simply because Mahan saw it, like other believers in Anglo-Saxonism, as an extension of the American Self.\textsuperscript{341} In a world in which the state came second to race, it was easy for the otherwise arch-realist Mahan to write and act as the “apostle of Anglo-American friendship” (Allen 1969: 563; also see Rock 1989: 53; Turk 1987: Ch. 4). Roosevelt, one American president who apparently lived and breathed European-style Realpolitik, similarly mixed nationalism with Anglo-Saxonism. Like a good realist, he obsessed over the German threat to American interests is well-documented; unlike a good realist, however, he called for the global hegemony of “men who spoke English.” For Roosevelt, civilization was always policy, but the “foremost civilizing power” was usually Britain, not America (Ninkovich 1986: 241, 234; Tilchin 1997: 19, 99, cf. Gossett 1999: 318-20).

\textsuperscript{340} The terms refer to a school of thought, developed in the 1880s Germany, which held that the ultimate goal of the state is competition for the control of resources, territory and populations. The main representatives of this thought in Britain were intellectuals like Dilke and Seeley (Chapter 4).

\textsuperscript{341} In 1894, he wrote a pamphlet entitled “Possibilities of Anglo-American Reunion” and three years later expressed an agreement with Lord Balfour’s idea of race patriotism. For Mahan, patriotism applied to all English-speaking polities and “may well extend its embrace in a time yet distant, to all those who have drawn their present civilization from the same remote sources” (1897: 257-9).
To be sure, I command no fine-grained evidence to claim that these texts are emblematic of the entire US elite or even the entire textual opus left by Roosevelt and Mahan outside my period. But there is no doubt that two of America’s leading and most influential advocates of international competition cast their thoughts in racialist terms echoing that of Seeley, Dilke, Balfour, Chamberlain and other proponents of Anglo-Saxonism discussed in Chapter 4. At a minimum, this finding solves a long-standing puzzle in the analysis of the 1900s American foreign policy—why Washington felt less threatened by the “tangible” threat posed by the British Empire than by the “hypothetical” threat posed by the German Empire (Kennedy 1980: 292).

For liberals, the main story of nineteenth century North America is that of the “long” democratic peace (Roussel 2004). In a nutshell, respect for contracts and transparency inherent in the behaviour of British and American democracies minimized the threat of cheating or the need for armed enforcement in various intramural settlements in the period. In Venezuela I and II, like in the disputes over Civil War damages or those over Oregon and Alaska boundary, both states opted for legal and binding procedures for conflict resolution abroad which were a familiar feature of the domestic, liberal democratic order at home. There are two related problems with the liberal story: first, in the nineteenth century, great powers/empires rarely submitted major disputes (such as those pertaining to their own boundaries or their breaches of wartime neutrality) to international arbitration. Second, such submissions were no more frequent between democracies than between autocracies. A more convincing story, in my reading of historical evidence, is that which emphasizes race over liberalness.
Let us begin with a comparison of America’s expansion policy in the aftermath of the Texas Annexation. In the northwest (Oregon), the US peacefully settled its territorial dispute with the British Empire; in the southwest (Mexican Texas), it went to war with Mexico. From the US perspective, there are four cross-case similarities: the territorial dispute, temporal proximity (the disputes were nearly simultaneous), commercial interests (a trade route to Asia) and a dominant foreign policy position (the Manifest Destiny of westward expansion). Given similarities in structural conditions, liberals argue, the variation in the outcome must be a function of regime type—Britain was a democracy, Mexico was not. According to Maria Fanis, the liberal hypothesis falls short because there is no evidence to suggest that American elites differentiated British North America from Mexico primarily in terms of regime type (2001: Ch. 4). According to Fanis’ analysis, which is backed up by an impressive DA of the period, a much stronger explanatory variable is Anglo-Saxonism. In what is now a familiar story, this discourse implied cooperation with the racially similar Britain, but conflict against the racially different Mexico (Ibid.; Horseman 1981).

My DA, pitched half a century later, unearthed something remarkably similar: American policy-makers’ views of regime type were inescapably cast in terms of racial evolutionism. In the dominant Anglo-Saxon worldview, democracy was regarded to be in short supply everywhere but in the racially dominant English-speaking world (Oren 2002). In the case of Britain, this finding is corroborated by Kennedy, who finds that British elites, for no “objective” reason, differentiated German and American democracies. In British eyes, Germany appeared to be a racial outsider precisely because of its low scores on “democracy” and “liberty.” Germany’s lag in the racial evolution, in
this view, caused a failure of democratic institutions, which, in turn, facilitated excessive “pride” and “aggressive nationalism” (1984: 21; also see 1980: 389, 399). The differentiation of German and American democracies had consequences for the way Whitehall understood foreign policy probabilities: while a German invasion of Belgium appeared likely, an American invasion of Canada was virtually unconceivable.\footnote{Anglo-Saxonism can also explain the otherwise peculiar international and transnational behavior in large swathes of Asia and Africa controlled from London. Not only did Americans in British colonies receive preferential treatment over other nationals in employment, housing or business contracts, but they were asked to participate in the day-to-day functions of the empire, such as jury duty in India. Similarly, once the U.S. acquired its own empire in Asia, its colonial officials extended similar privileges to British citizens (Kramer 2007).}

Like the perceptions of military threat, those on interdemocratic friendliness are heavily influenced by perceptions on common racial identity. What remains possible is that the identity-as-democracy was perhaps less salient then the identity-as-race. A more definitive conclusion requires a more focused research design, but one could easily speculate that the antecedent ontological position of the Anglo-American elites at the time has been race, not democracy. To borrow from another context, it could be that Anglo-Saxon democracy was decisive for the rapprochement, not merely Anglo-Saxon democracy. I will return to the question of race and democracy in the next chapter.

The first wave of the DP debate, which pitted realists and liberals, was resolved by a seemingly simple conclusion: democracies never or almost never fight one-another. While I do not dispute the validity of this conclusion on its own terms, my analysis suggests, at a minimum, that the realist-liberal debate should be opened up for other theories, such as those that historicize the meaning of democracy. In all cases of foreign policy construction examined in this dissertation I found little or no evidence to support a thesis that decision-makers responded to international crises either on the basis of their...
perceptions of military threats, which is a realist argument, or interdemocratic friendliness, which is what liberals believe. These perceptions, in my theoretical framework, can be seen to emanate from certain identity relations—revisionist, militaristic states are threatening, democratic states are friendly. (Put differently, material features such as military capabilities or regime types do not speak for themselves, but are subject to available discourses and debates.) On the basis of my findings, I agree with constructivists who have argued against the transhistorical assignment of liberal subjectivity. Various empirical studies, ranging from the nineteenth century US-German relations to US-Indian relations of the 1970s, have suggested that democracies are not inherently peaceful with each other (Oren 2002; Widmeier 2005; also see Adler and Barnett 1998: 424-5; Barkawi and Laffey 2001; Risse-Kappen 1995: 492-503; Williams 2001). In short, neither are democracy and liberalism the same thing nor are all democracies the same across time and space.

To the extent that constructivists are right, there are two main lessons for the DP research program. The first concerns historicization: the DP should be theorized within a specific context, with attention to the contents and contestations of explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (conflict/cooperation). The second lesson relates to interaction and learning. Given the dyadic focus of the DP research, liberals accord a theoretical status to interaction, yet they stop short of theorizing the conditions under which democracies learn (from experience) that other democracies prefer peace over war.343 The proposed mechanism is fairly simple: if states believe that a friendly relationship will last and behave accordingly, they are less likely to feel sensitive to

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threats and, in turn, are less likely to pursue precautionary policies that could undermine the relationship itself. A benign or virtuous cycle of belief and behavior is likely to result. But liberals must also recognize that what is a benign cycle for some states may be a vicious cycle for others. I will return to this point below.

INTERDEPENDENCE AND INSTITUTIONS

From a liberal perspective, one of the causes of the liberal peace is interdependence, a feature of the international society in which each state is dependent on other states. In IR, interdependence tends to be expressed in terms of political economy, but there are strong arguments in favor of linking interdependence to identity-formation (cf. Russett and Oneal 2001: Ch. 4; Wendt 1999: 344-9). What interests me now is a particular approach to interdependence which links asymmetries in interdependence with exploitative bargaining.

According to Keohane and Nye (1989), the features of every state in the international society are sensitivity and vulnerability; the first refers to the openness to external economic pressures and the second to the ability to withstand costs associated with these pressures. Relations among states are therefore differentiated in terms of resource asymmetries, which themselves constitute an important source of power. Keohane and Nye, whose framework goes under the rubric complex interdependence, are not interested in the genesis of the states’ vulnerability to other states—how, why and when asymmetric interdependencies occur?—as much as they are interested in categorizing the relationships between pairs of states. In their view, the US-Canada
relationship is characterized by Canada’s extremely high vulnerability to economic pressures from the US (Ibid.: Ch. 7). Let us consider this case in more detail.

Trade and investment flows between the countries have been among the world’s highest for a century, especially since the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in February 13, 2003, Prime Minister Chrétien described these flows thus:

In 2000, Canada bought more U.S. goods than all 15 countries of the European Union combined and three times as much as Japan. Thirty-eight U.S. states count Canada as their largest export market, including the state of Illinois. In turn, Canada exports more to Illinois alone than it does to the entire European Union.

Energy security is fundamental to American prosperity. We supply the U.S. with 94 percent of your natural gas imports. Close to 100 percent of your electricity imports. And 35 percent of uranium for nuclear power generation.

In 2002, Canada supplied the U.S. with 17 percent of its imported crude and refined oil products – more than any other foreign supplier, including Saudi Arabia. Canada’s oil sands contain 2.5 trillion barrels of oil, of which 315 billion barrels are recoverable with current technology. This surpasses the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia.

Chrétien’s speech captured some aspects of North American interdependence, but not its fundamentally asymmetric character. A more comprehensive overview, based on the 2000 data, would have also mentioned that while more than 85% of Canadian trade went south, only 25% US trade went north and that roughly 35% of Canada’s GDP was purchased by the US, compared to only 2.5% of American GDP that was bought by Canada. Full 15% of Canada’s GDP was contingent on the free, (almost) million dollars-a-minute flow of goods over the border making the US government—not the Bank of Canada or Ministry of Finance—the most important actor in the Canadian economy.
An even more asymmetric interdependence characterizes Canada’s defence, where in anything from strategy and military doctrine to material procurement and professional training, Canadian forces rely on the US. And here is where bilateral institutions come in: the two countries have a joint defence command and a more-or-less common defence industry and their forces have strived for ever-higher levels of interoperability. (In the aftermath of 9/11, the US and Canada agreed to allow troops from either country to cross their mutual border and serve under the command of the country that they enter, if either country is attacked by terrorists.) In fact, transgovernmental and transnational institutions can be said to define the US-Canada relationship. Reportedly, so rich is the network of bilateral agreements and institutions between the two states, that neither government has been able to count them (Roussel 2004). But while institutions are said to lean towards cooperation in several ways—from enhancing transparency and information flows to heightening beliefs in a common destiny—institutional membership, like trade flows, can logically be used as a bargaining chip. Given America’s enormous bargaining power in this relationship, Canada’s choice in the Iraq War is puzzling. As The Economist (15 March, 2003) put it at the time: “How could the superpower’s neighbour and biggest trading partner be against?”

Evidence suggests that Ottawa was confident Canada defection’s from the coalition of the willing would not lead to punishment from the US such as, say, economic boycott or blockade. Unlike much of Canadian punditry, the government was right. Washington expressed minimal disappointment over Canada’s decision, certainly compared to an outcry over the defection of other long-standing allies (Unlike French fries which temporarily became “freedom fries” in 2003, Canadian bacon was never
renamed “freedom bacon.”) The Anglosphere perspective suggests the following explanation of the puzzle: in Iraq, the US never moved to exploit Canada’s dependence partly because it regarded the Canadian Other as part of the American Self. In this view, the US-Canada region represents a mature, Kantian security community within which asymmetric dependence and exploitative bargaining cannot exist. So while the region may indeed be a poster case for complex interdependence, the outcomes within this dyad may be better explained by the developments examined in this genealogy.

Shared identity, I posit, can account for the seemingly counterintuitive relationship between economic dependence and international security policy independence is US-Canadian relationship more generally. Writing in 1965, the Canadian diplomat John Holmes described the puzzle as a “paradox”:

Canada, though closest of the allies to the United States in geography and culture, has a record of more independent thought and action than more distant allies. So unquestioned is the mutual commitment of the North American partners that Canadians often feel more assured in their diplomacy than, say, Australia or Germany (1965: 107).

Holmes wrote in the midst of the escalation and Americanization of the Vietnam War, from which Canada stayed out. Like in 2002-3, America’s leverage in 1964-5 was strong, but Washington never once moved to use economic tools to induce Canada to change its policy and/or to punish it for sticking to it. After years of negotiation, the US and Canada were on the verge of signing a limited free-trade pact based on the integration of the North American automotive industry, which came to be known as the so-called Auto Pact and is often seen as the progenitor of the general free trade agreement
which came into effect in 1988.\textsuperscript{344} The motivation was there also: oral history evidence shows that President Johnson resented the economic integration with the faltering Canadian ally (Bothwell 2007: 226, cf. Holmes 1971: 185, 192). Yet US trade policy toward Canada continued unaffected by the Vietnam situation. Once again, Canada’s asymmetric dependence on the US had no direct bearing on Canada’s independence in international security policy. In fact, it is safe to say that disputes like Iraq and Vietnam have been fairly consistent in the Canadian-US relationship, at least in number, though not in severity. In defence matters, the two allies disagreed over at least one major issue at least once in every decade since the end of the WWII. Generally, America has generally regarded Canada’s defence spending as “too low,” while Canada has generally seen American foreign policy as “too much.” What matters is that no dispute has escalated in sanctions comparable to those the US imposed on Britain during Suez.

The Holmes paradox has received its share of scholarly attention in Canada over the years. Two standard explanations of the paradox go under the rubrics of good management and invisibility. The first sees Canada as the most consistently successful foreign lobbyist in the history of Washington D.C., a state actor who knows how to work the decentralized US state like no other. Henry Kissinger, an American diplomat, recalled in his memoirs how “Canadian leaders have a narrow margin of manoeuvre, that

\textsuperscript{344} The free trade debate was fierce in Canada, pitting the Canadian \textit{homo economicus} against the Canadian \textit{homo sociologicus}. The task for the Canadian government was therefore to strike a balance, rather than privilege one identity over the other. Within the Liberal cabinet, the minister of trade Mitchell Sharp battled the finance minister Walter Gordon and eventually “triumphed” (Donaghy 2002: 65; also see Azzi 1999: 116, cf. Norrie \textit{et al} 2007). But in historical and comparative terms, this was hardly a triumph. Canada retained control over its banks, restricted the sale of American magazines, and gained or kept its preferential access in the North American markets for automobiles and capital. Canada’s own preferential access to US defence contracts was absent from these discussions as was the concern that US-Canada relations over Vietnam had anything to do with trade.
they utilized with extraordinary skill” (1979: 383). The second explanation underscores the fact that Canada rarely shows up on the proverbial radar screen in Washington (Nossal 1997: 80). Indicative is an official report of the Iraq war in June 2003, which lauded the contribution of the Canadian air force. After the report caused some dismay in Canada, Washington admitted that it had confused Operation Enduring Freedom for Operation Iraqi Freedom when talking about Canada’s role. This constitutes a great lever in the bilateral relationship: the US is unlikely to punish an invisible actor.

A related and important finding is that the same self-other relationships seems to vary across issue-areas. In my DA of the 1964-5, the Canadian Self could easily accommodate a close and positive US Other in terms of the Auto Pact, but reject the same meanings with respect to the carpet bombing in Vietnam. Because Canadian discourses of identity may operate differently in different debates, it is possible for Canadian foreign policy makers to simultaneously argue for seemingly contradictory policies, such as being pro-US in trade but anti-American in international security or global governance. The overall pattern of state action will thus reflect different discourses and debates across issue-areas, rather than being determined by a single dominant discourse or a single debate.

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345 See “War? What War?” (editorial), Globe & Mail, June 24, 2003. An Ipsos-Reid poll published in the same newspaper on April 14, 2003, showed that most US respondents were unaware of Canada’s stance on the Iraq war. Generally, see Nossal (1997: 80).

346 Historians who have spent equal time studying both security and economics in US-Canada relations indeed believe in the separability of at least two issue-areas: “Politics was politics, and trade was trade” (Bothwell 2007: 227, also see 1992: 70-1; Donaghy 2002: 178; Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 234; Thompson and Randall 2002: 238). In my DA of the Canadian texts prior to the Iraq War, many Canadian commentators seemed worried that various issue-areas in the bilateral relationship may be linked. The government, however, was confident that the US would never bring its asymmetric power to bear from one area of the bilateral relationship to another (Globe & Mail, April 8, 2003).
That common identity trumps dependence in the Anglosphere is also evident in the US relationship with the other two junior allies in the Anglosphere core: Australia and NZ. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 5, the fact that the US deliberated – instead of simply overruling – on the needs of its junior allies in the ANZUS negotiations is evidence of a shared “we” feeling which compels friends to accommodate each other, regardless their power asymmetries (Adler and Barnett 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995). America’s willingness to offer security to Australia and NZ may be puzzling from the perspectives which stress the need for states to act selfishly in order to survive, but not so from the perspective of shared identity. From this perspective, the “back door” which ANZUS “bolted” in 1951 did not belong to Australia or New Zealand, but to the Anglosphere as a whole (Lowe 1999: 77-8; 2001: 193; cf. Umetsu 2004). For the Anzacs, foreign policy independence from Britain was meant to strengthen not the state/nation but the English-speaking security community.

Liberalism in IR supplies numerous theoretical perspectives, most of which cannot be entertained here, but they typically fail to adequately theorize the intersubjective nature of international institutions (e.g., Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001: 763, 771, 777, cf. Wendt 2001). Institutional choices over distribution problems and membership involve multiple equilibria and the variation in institutional form makes for an important research question. At the same time, such research may suffer from a major omitted variable bias if it does not attempt to explain how certain frames and prior arrangements came into being in the first place. Rather than being a function of calculations aimed at maximizing utility, alliances and other international institutions
may arise from shared identities, such as the Anglosphere. Under certain conditions, I argue in the next section, institutions may be seen as parasitic on identities.

SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Liberals appear to have colonized the Kantian legacy in IR theory, but Kant’s central international theory text may also be read as constructivist. For Thomas Risse, Kant’s “Pacific federation” — the idea proposed in *Perpetual Peace* (1777) — is not simply a liberal zone of peace but a security community (1995, 2008). Like the liberal zones of peace, security communities are products of benign cycles of socialization — state actors become socialized into the cooperation practices such that they make them part of their identity and that identity in turn sustains an interest in cooperation as an end in itself. The difference between the two concepts lies in shared identity — both the liberal zones of peace and security communities stress the pacific effects of interdependence and institutions, but where liberal stress shared democracy, constructivist emphasize shared identity. Therefore, it is shared identity — or friendship — which causes mutual and dependable expectations of non-violence and peaceful change. From the constructivist perspective, the concept of the liberal zone of peace can therefore be seen as a subset of the concept of security communities.347

Security communities are often misunderstood as instances of pure harmony. This view is patently false: like the best of nuclear families or liberal democracies, security communities are characterized by the ability to resolve conflict as peacefully and as efficiently as possible. The distinguishing feature of the Anglosphere, in fact, is the

347 And since democracy is but one of possible shared identities, it follows that security communities may be made up of authoritarian and other illiberal states (Adler and Barnett 1998).

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ability to agree to disagree without fear of violent retribution. In this study, I have selected hard cases for the Anglosphere—Suez, Vietnam and Iraq are bywords for the disagreements among member states on how best to run the sensitive issues of security and defense. But contrary to the tenets of a realist world inhabited by distrustful and egoistical states, none of these disagreements have prompted violent reprimands.

As suggested in the preceding section, in Iraq and Vietnam, the US never punished Canada for distancing itself from American military interventions in those countries. The same can be said for the US reaction to Britain’s decision to stay out of Vietnam. In this case, despite repeated US requests for military assistance, the British government never sent a single regiment, not even a “platoon of bagpipers,” as US President Johnson memorably put it at one time (cited in Dumbrell 1996: 220; Colman 2004: 148). In fact, one could argue that Washington’s effort to internationalize its war in Vietnam (the “more flags” program) failed mainly because Britain, as America’s go-to ally, never got on board (Ellis 2004: 267). Yet just like in the case of Canada, Vietnam never came to strain Anglo-American relations, even during the war itself. On the American side, the government continued to share its nuclear secrets only with its British ally as well as give support to the beleaguered pound; the American people certainly continued to regard Britain as America’s number one friend. On the British side, its

348 Nuclear secrets included submarine technology and, later, Polaris missiles. As for public opinion, in March 1965, a Gallup poll indicated that most Americans regarded Britain as America’s “most reliable ally” (Bartlett 1992: 109; cf. Dumbrell 2001: 34-8).
successive governments refrained from criticizing the American conduct of the war, certainly as compared to US allies in the western hemisphere or France. \textsuperscript{349}

In the history of intramural disputes in the Anglosphere, the Anglo-American disagreement over Suez stands as the most severe. For one, the states of the Anglosphere core are yet to experience a reprimand comparable to the American reaction in 1956. In a standard account of this crisis, it was Britain who deceived its principal ally about the decision to use force against Egypt. As a result, the US, angry at what it saw as betrayal, launched a holier-than-thou diplomatic campaign against the imperialistic Britain in the UN. Eventually, it decided to pull the plug on Britain’s finances and oil supply. Once London complied, the special relationship moved on, with Britain practically toeing the American line ever since. The crisis went down as a short-term “family tiff,” in the words of US President Eisenhower (cited in Baylis 1984: 71). In a revisionist account of the Suez crisis, Eisenhower came to regret his decision to punish Britain (Roberts 2007: 434). The whole brouhaha, in this view, had to do with contingencies of the US presidential election in November 1956, rather then the differences in preferences between the two allies. Two aspects of the Suez story are germane for the Anglosphere. First, US economic sanctions against Britain in 1956 must be measured against a long and continuous history of economic support. Issues surrounding the convertibility of the pound began in 1947, when the holders of British currency sold truckloads of it. The

\textsuperscript{349} See, e.g., Logevall (1999: 403). Clive Ponting put forward the so-called deal thesis, which regards the Anglo-American relations over Vietnam as a function of an informal and secret agreement in which America agreed to prop up the unstable pound as long as Britain did not devalue its currency and pursued security policies in line with the American containment strategy, such as holding the “east of Suez” military presence. This thesis is embraced by objective interest-based theories of the AASR, even though the deal itself was nothing more than an intersubjective belief (e.g., Busch 2003: 196; Colman 2004: 78-85; Dumbrell 1996).

Second, British elites—as I discussed in Chapter 6—were themselves divided over Suez, many of whom preferred Canada’s or even America’s positions to the policy of their government. Judging by Britain’s post-Suez foreign policy record, the effect of America’s punishment was the rise of specialness accorded to the US. The famous words uttered by a Liberal Party politician after the crisis—“We must never get out of step with Americans—never” (Ibid.)—became something of a rule number one of British foreign policy. From this perspective, it can be argued that sanctions—like appeasement—work most efficiently within a shared intersubjective space. Had Britain interpreted America’s attack on its economy in 1956 as an attack on the British state or nation, rather than on the Suez Tories, international relations would have probably taken a different historical turn. France, the other European belligerent at Suez and America’s second-closest European ally, read the lessons of the crisis very differently. Already in 1957, France pushed for the creation of the European Economic Community, an institutional precursor to the EU—a polity which came to constitute the Anglosphere challenger in the

350 Judging by behavior alone, the only British cabinet that put Europe before America in the entire post-Suez period was the one led by Edward Heath (1970-4). The AASR can be seen as the “mother of special relationships” or the “ultimate instance of a security community” (Krotz, forthcoming; Bially Mattern 2005: 17).
discourse on Western civilization of the early 2000s (Chapter 1). After Suez, the intersubjective space between Paris and Washington further narrowed.  

In the field of IR, Suez has become a paradigmatic case for theories of alliance politics. Studies from a variety of perspectives—from those focused on misperceptions, two-level games, bureaucratic politics and transnational networks to those stressing democratic norms and identity have each told a separate story of the crisis—but they all observe the extraordinary resilience of the Anglo-American alliance (Holsti and Hopmann 1973; Neustadt 1970; Richardson 1996; Risse-Kappen 1995; Kitchen 2004; Kowert 1998; Mattern 2005). The history of Anglosphere disputes like that over Suez demonstrates an important feature of security communities—the so-called counterfactual validity. Like in liberal democracies or nuclear families, disagreements within a community that is sharing an identity do not necessarily lead to a failure of the idea and practices of that community. Instead, what distinguishes security communities from other types of groups of states is the ability to quickly and easily patch up intra-group rifts and weather serious crises. Security communities are not simply no-war communities, but primarily durable-peace communities. One could submit in fact that

351 Washington perceived French and British actions in Suez very differently in the first place (Risse-Kappen 1995: 97). For a comparative perspectives on Suez, see Darwin (2006); Louis and Owen (1989). To be sure, Suez was not the first Cold War crisis in which British and American allies disagreed over what constituted a threat or how to rank-order threats. Dynamics similar to Suez occurred during the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. For London, the event was a robbery of Britain’s wealth. For Washington, the event could have been a robbery, but it was entirely secondary to the global war against communism. The allies argued, and the outcome of the debate was similar to Suez: Britain’s realization that its foreign policy was subject to “what was tantamount to a U.S. veto on British military action (Marsh 2003: 78). Like after Suez, the AASR strengthened after the Iranian Oil Crisis, as evidence in the cooperation to inspire a coup against the Mosadeq government in 1953.
foreign policy disagreements within security communities may lead to an enlargement and deepening of communal ties, as suggested by the post-Suez AASR track record.

One conclusion is that policies are more consistent when rooted in identity, then when locked-in by institutions. Because the structures which make or break security communities are primarily intersubjective, even the abolishment of NATO, ANZUS or NORAD would not constitute a death blow to the Anglosphere in the realm of international security. What could harm the Anglosphere is a break in the current practices of non-violence, consultation or even compensation. That the Suez crisis indeed constituted exactly one such break is view advanced in IR in the work by Janice Bially Mattern. In her reading of the crisis, Anglo-American intersubjectivity completely collapsed in the fall of 1956, leaving the two sides with no established practices with which to communicate with each other (2005: 10, 56, 98, cf. fn. 10). What saved the AASR in Suez was the way in which Britain and the US renegotiated the terms of their mutual understanding using narratives from their overall cooperative relationship with one another. In this renegotiation the US framed Britain’s Suez position as a very un-British thing to do (much like the Canadian government at the time). In Bially Mattern’s account, this frame not only carried the day in the US or even the UN, but also in Britain itself—Whitehall’s policy became seen as a major misfit with the British Self. Britain shifted its policy simply in order to erase painful contradictions in its identity discourse.

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352 From a constructivist perspective, another type of disagreement which may lead to a break-down of a security community concerns what may be called deindividuation (Wendt 1999: 299, 306). What could have a destabilizing effect on the Anglosphere would be a move to erase barriers among member states, such that New Zealand may merge with Australia or Canada with the US. The Anglosphere operates on a degree of shared identity, but it does not imply a single identity. In this vein, while a demand for unification would constitute a deal-breaker for the Anglosphere, most other types of disagreements are likely to turn into nothing but family tiffs.
In this view, in the attempt to “fix the meaning” of the Suez conflict between the two governments, the US overpowered Britain. This form—or “face”—of power is usually prefixed with the adjectives “productive,” “symbolic” or “social” (Barnett and Duval 2005; Bially Mattern 2005, Williams and Neumann 2000). Power to control discourse and win debate is an important element in the life of security communities because it serves to re-establish disrupted or even broken identities. The community members may become estranged in terms of beliefs and behaviors, but they will use power to produce or re-produce the discourses of identity most in alignment with their own. I have not read the Suez crisis from the Anglo-American perspective as closely as Bially Mattern, so I cannot judge her claim that the AASR disappeared in November 1956. What I can judge is her treatment of collective identity as a single narrative, whereby the AASR persisted only so long as states continued to author it.

In my reading of the Anglosphere, which encompasses the AASR, collective identity is simultaneously produced across issue-areas, a feature which gives it extraordinary resilience. Because discourses of identity may operate differently in different debates, it is possible for foreign policy makers to simultaneously argue for seemingly contradictory policies, such as being pro-US in trade but anti-American in international security or global governance. For example, a frequently reached conclusion in the study of US-Canada relations is that “[p]olitics was politics, and trade was trade” (Bothwell 2007: 227, also see 1992: 70-1; Donaghy 2002: 178; Granatastein and Hillmer 1991: 234; Thompson and Randall 2002: 238). Indeed, the “defections” from US interventions in Vietnam and Iraq never prevented Ottawa from pursuing closer economic ties with the southern neighbor. Arguably, the US-Canadian intersubjective
space was so broad as to accommodate breaks in collective identity over matters of international security. In light of this empirical insight, I suggest that a break-up of a security community occurs only if *most* narratives of shared identity in *most* issue areas collapse. In such situations, intersubjectivity collapses such that frames on the misfit between identity and the perceived reality—e.g., “if you kill us, you will no longer be yourselves!”—tend to be ignored, temporized or ridiculed. A full collapse of security community is therefore rare, though not impossible; civil war, for instance, can be seen as a collapse of an *amalgamated* security community (cf. Deutsch *et al* 1957).

From a holistic theoretical perspective, however, Bially Mattern’s insight that states talk themselves and each other into maintaining the cooperative relationships and shared identities is not at odds with my own theoretical framework. I agree that identities like the Anglosphere are possible because they are talked into existence, but the talking is done by multiple actors and in multiple issue-areas. Because international politics takes places in different issues areas, just as it takes place in different communities, it is logical to expect that different issue areas are characterized by different levels of identification. The significant Other, if my framework is correct, should not be treated as uniform across contexts. In future research, I intend to theorize how the interaction between two state actors can be simultaneously Kantian in international security, Lockean in trade and Hobbsean in international environmental policy. Before concluding, let me consider the possible contributions my study makes to the constructivist research program in IR.

In the last edition of *Handbook of International Relations*, a chapter on “security cooperation” concluded that “constructivism…may be best fitted to explain security cooperation [but] the theory is much too indeterminate at present to allow for the
development of distinct hypothesis, let alone prediction” (Müller 2002: 385). This study has responded to this criticism by evaluating a set of hypotheses – though I prefer the words propositions, conjectures and arguments—against a large and diverse body of evidence and against the main alternative explanations. In having done so, I am hardly alone and I am confident that the next edition of Handbook will have a lot more to say about constructivist contributions to the study of international security.

The first generation of constructivist scholarship has focused on demonstrating how state/national identities trump contrary material pressures. What was missing from this work, among many things, was a theorization of the origins and dynamic of state/national identity, as reflected, for example, in an absence of questions such as how situations are defined, how new events may change those definitions or how plausible alternative are marginalized. These questions have now been answered and, predictably, not in a uniform way. For one, as I explained Chapter 2, poststructuralists reject the idea of turning constructivist ontology into a research design with falsifiable hypotheses. In their view, such mainstreaming cannot succeed because it is ontologically inconsistent with a core constructivist assumption which holds that identities are never stable, never all the way down (e.g., Bially Mattern 2005: 11, cf. Wendt 1999).

In my conceptualization of identity, I bracketed the question whether identity may be some corporeal entity with fixed, essential characteristics. After all, social scientists cannot be sure how much down is all the way (Wendt, forthcoming). What I have suggested instead is a framework that regards identity as sedimented levels of discourse. At the level of state-society relations, identity is fairly stable within relatively short temporal periods. At the level of foreign relations, identity is less settled and is shaped
by debates among different political actors who draw upon more sedimemented discourses to interpret current policy practices. Foreign policy debates are all the more significant since they are hardly ever contained within the borders of a single state.

Another departure from the first generation of constructivism in IR concerns the status of agency. Like realism and liberalism which it criticized, constructivism regarded structures (albeit ideational, not material) as constraining, quasi-everlasting and highly resistant to change. Agency, in this view, was not a property of creative human agents, but a meaning reduced to discursive repetition. The good news about bracketing human agency was that it obviated the thorny problem of having to theorize the agents’ dilemmas over the most meaningful course of action in a given context. Action simply followed the dominant ideational structure. The bad news was that many identity-to-foreign policy explanations fell short at explaining variation in policy toward different states, regions or issue-areas. Political actors were found to be subject to several identities, some of which mattered more than others in given situations (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 578-9; Kowert and Legro 1996: 486-8).

My theoretical framework does not seek to diminish human agency. Because discourses are diverse and often internally inconsistent, claims made on behalf of identities are open to critique and negotiation. This means that debates over the meaning of the Self offer an opportunity to theorize the role of human agents in the social construction of reality. Human agency, at a minimum, can be seen as a temporary process of social engagement, informed by the past, but oriented toward the future.
This move is in line with the current generation of constructivist work on identity which stresses identity as process rather than structure. The key empirical questions are who actors become in this process and how change emerges out of social interactions. The current approach more closely follows constructivism’s ontological mantra of the mutual constitution—or co-constitution, co-determination—of agents and structures. In all social activity, there are agents and structures which operate simultaneously, in a continuous feedback loop. Within a geographical and historical context, human agents behave in meaningful ways to form routines; solidified over time and space, routines became structures—discourses, identities institutions and so on—which then come to restrict action by defining the conditions of human agency. Because structures are constructed, they are contestable and malleable. Contestability, I argued, increases with the perceived misfit between identity at home and and the perceived practice abroad.

The theoretical moves made in this dissertation are likely to be followed by others. Earlier I noted how a misfit between discourse and policy may fail to illicit change in cases where policy is supported by unified government. This finding points to an area in which my theoretical framework can be improved. At the moment, debates are assumed to occur in a space minimally encumbered by institutional constraints. To more profitably theorize the role of misfit between identity and policy I should therefore relax the assumption that roughly all speakers are institutionally equally endowed. This finding suggests that research on the institutional aspects of argumentation is on the right track in furthering the research agenda of active-voice constructivism in IR (Legro 2005; Krebs, forthcoming).
This theorization of human agency is an imperative because it has a potential to add much value to constructivist explanations of conflict and cooperation. In his take on the late nineteenth century international relations, for example, Kennedy observes that “most British and German nationalists appear to have adopted a rather neat interpretation which encompassed both a recognition of their enmity and of their racial similarity: namely, that the qualities of the other people, being similar to their own, made it into a formidable and worthwhile opponent” (1984: 389; italics in original; also see Ibid.: 1980; Hilton 2006: 41). In this sense, Kennedy is right to think that there is “no strict correlation between the cultural world and the political” (Ibid.: 393; also see Ibid.: 386; 1974: 290, 399). I argued that “culture” itself does not make or break the word – the uses of culture do. To settle on the “sign” in the correlation between culture and foreign policy we need to account for the outcome of foreign policy debates. Theorization of debates is admittedly a modest step, but hopefully one taken in the right ontological direction.

CONCLUSION

The Anglosphere can be seen as a security community, and a particular social structure of international politics which rests on collective identity as well as material factors such as interdependence and institutions. In drawing attention to the role of debates in national and international politics, I produced a theoretical framework which can account for both the text and the social and political context in which the text is produced and consumed or, to put it differently, sold and undersold. Identities, I argued, are formed and transformed endogenously in both state-society and state-state
interactions. Some of these identities tend to change, others tend to stick, and still others turn into routines, enabling the ontological securitization of some courses of action over others. Because the Anglosphere is based on contestable identity in the first place, differences among the core states—as expressed in divergent international security policies—do not spell the end of the community. In fact, the very maintenance of the community is contingent on the ongoing contestation, not only in diplomacy by also in the national contexts of each member state. The Anglosphere will endure so long as it continues to resolve its intramural differences peacefully, through consultation and recognition of the needs of member states.

To appreciate the durability of the Anglosphere, it is instructive to turn to Coral Bell’s essay on the AASR published in 1972, after Britain won membership in the European Economic Community. Bell observed that the AASR has had it share of tiffs, but it “never decayed so much to render it ineffective” (1972: 106). To the extent that the AASR was based on values and institutions seen as “familiar and acceptable” by American and British societies, she argued, “it is rather difficult to see exactly why it should be expected to decline” (Ibid.: 106, 117). History proved Bell right: Britain’s newborn European identity developed in parallel with the more established Anglo-American identity, without ever causing the decline of the latter. Reflecting back on this period, For Henry Kissinger, America’s top diplomat, concluded that the AASR involved a pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became impossible to ignore British views. Evolved a habit of meeting so regular that autonomous American action somehow came to seem to violate club rule… This was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claim; it was formalized by no document; it was carried forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternative were conceivable. Britain’s influence was great precisely because it never

Kissinger also suggested that the AASR, being so extraordinary, is “particularly impervious to abstract theories” (Ibid.: 39, cf. Hitchens 2004: 318).

I have attempted to supply one such theory. I have argued that the extraordinary nature of the AASR and, in turn, the Anglosphere, rests on the way the discourses of identity have been negotiated in select English-speaking states. Like comparable attempts at theorizing international politics, I cannot claim to have provided anything beyond a set of concepts, conjunctures, causal mechanisms and criticism for further investigation. An identity-based approach may be necessary to explain and understand the Anglosphere, but it is hardly sufficient. For an abstract theory with grander ambitions, it may be necessary to synthesize different approaches or variables associated with different approaches. Once again, theoretical competition should not be seen as a zero sum fight in which the empirical success of one account automatically means anomaly for another. The recognition of the possible complementarities among different research traditions improves our chances at solving problems hitherto regarded as impervious to theory. In the reminder of this dissertation, I turn to the Anglosphere once again, engaging from the perspectives of policy and ethics.
CHAPTER 9

THE ANGLOSHERE AS POLICY?

For the past hundred years, and more especially since 1918, the English-speaking peoples have formed the dominant group in the world; and current theories of international morality have been designed to perpetuate their supremacy and expressed in the idiom peculiar to them. E.H.Carr (2001 [1939]: 80)

As discipline, IR can be defined by its “diversity and difference,” but one thing it does not seem to debate is a belief that IR should not be done “for IR’s sake,” meaning the pursuit of knowledge itself (Wæver 2007: 306). Ostensibly, IR is supposed to mediate between the world of scholarship and the world of policy-relevance and, on average, most scholars do not hesitate to supply “advice to the prince,” i.e., their recommendations to policy makers (Ibid.). Not every scholar would agree that her knowledge product, so to speak, has a “sake” but few (still) deny that knowledge they produce has nothing to do with any human aspirations. A scholar may profess disinterest in the objects of her study and ignore the political and social consequences of her research, but she cannot pretend that these consequences do not exist: our research questions are always normative and so is our theory. In IR, this point is usually associated with Robert W. Cox’s dictum that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1996: 87).

Cox famously divided theory into two mutually constituted types: “problem-solving” and “critical.” The first begins with “as-is” (or at least “as-if”) reality and proceeds, in a somewhat instrumental fashion, to explain its puzzles, kinks, inefficiencies
and other problems. In the preceding chapters, for instance, I showed how war can be replaced cooperative security among some nations—such is my contribution to a more efficient reproduction of the existing world order. The second type of theory, what Cox somewhat idiosyncratically called “critical,” starts with a belief that many realities are possible and proceeds, in a self-reflexive manner, to point out to realities most conducive to emancipation, defined as the universal human subject’s pursuit of goals in ways that do not stop other universal human subjects from doing the same. By geneologizing the Anglosphere, I came close to doing critical theory, but I ultimately backpedalled from it by concluding that the Anglosphere represents an ontological exception in international relations. From a critical theory standpoint, the Anglosphere problem is not simply how this particular state of affairs came about and what it does to the political life but whether it ought to be in the first place.

In this chapter I perform two tasks. The first is to go back to my problem-solving theoretical framework and draw out the main policy implications. I focus on two themes which I think are often missing from similar discussions in IR: talk and path dependence. The second task is to consider the politics of asserting a particular reality implied in the Anglosphere, including my own genealogy of this discourse. My take here will rely on postcolonial theory, another disciplinary road less traveled. As usual, there is a caveat: the current practice of writing IR arguably follows the ethos and aesthetics of conventional social science which separates positive from normative. To go back to the Coxian typology of theory, the problem-solvers put aside normative questions in the hope—or fear?—that critical theorists will pick it up. The problem-solvers working from the constructivist tradition, to be sure, have been uneasy with this practice.
Constructivism’s emphasis on construction, contingency, contestability and, ultimately, change, makes it harder to temporize normative issues. Currently fashionable practice in book-length studies is to allocate a chapter or a part of the chapter for normative reflection (e.g., Bially Mattern 2005, Crawford 2002). If this is seen as mere tokenism, what I suggest below will be regarded as an afterthought or even an exclamation mark. There is a method behind this inadequacy: first, I do not feel particularly qualified to perform a full-blown normative critique of the Anglosphere, considering that it should speak to the way I tried to “solve” the Anglosphere problem. Too many personal biases and subjective preferences are at play. Second, this dissertation is already way too long. What I suggest therefore is not a full-blown normative critique—or an auto-critique—but a set of entry points for a conversation with normatively-inclined IR theorists.

POLICY RELEVANT VS. POLICY DETERMINANT

In my reading of the history of international security cooperation, the Anglosphere shows a remarkable consistency across time and space. In Chapter 4, I identified the turn-of-the century Anglo-American rapprochement as an important juncture in the making of English-speaking exceptionalism in international relations. With careful qualifications, I called it the origins of the Anglosphere. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Anglo-American relationship oscillated between close friendship and occasional rivalry. The fourth decade saw the de-dominionization of the British Empire and, subsequently, the multiplication of special relationships between and among English-speaking states. For one, Australia, Canada and NZ assumed greater independence, if only to shift their alliance portfolios from the imperial defence to
America. The Cold War strengthened the Anglosphere cooperation further, especially in Europe. In Asia and Africa, the Anglosphere faced considerable ups and downs. In Chapters 5 and 6, I examined the well-known cases of ANZUS, Suez and Vietnam from the lesser-known perspectives of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These represent only some “failing-offs and faults” within the Anglosphere in this context; the fuller account of ups and downs would probably span dozens of events from Palestine/Israel and Iran in the late 1940s and early 1950s to Grenada in 1983. The end of the Cold War destabilized the Anglosphere, with its core members drifting into alternative directions. The US and Canada together moved to enlarge trade on the continent they share with Mexico, while Australia and Britain began their push into Asia and Europe, respectively. With 9/11, the Anglosphere rose again, as reflected in a common front in Afghanistan. In Iraq, however, two core members refused take up arms. Defections by Canada and New Zealand from the US-led coalition of the willing led to no observable retaliation by the superpower. Among the various concepts in IR theory, security community by far the best describes the Anglosphere. So if the turn of the twentieth century rapprochement marked the ascent of the community, the post-WWII period can be characterized by its growing maturity (Adler and Barnett 1998).

To the extent that the Anglosphere is a lasting international phenomenon, what does it mean for policy? There are many types of knowledge generated by IR that could be seen as policy relevant, but three types are said to be the most “useful”– conceptual models, generic knowledge and actor-specific models (George and Bennett 2005: 270-3). My study supplies all three. Conceptually, my research suggests that the “international” can be divided up into groups of states or security communities within which the rules of
the international game are specific, not universal. Generic knowledge and actor-specific models combine, on the one hand, the general conditions under which a policy is likely to be effective and, on the other, specific “images” of the actors. Consider, first, the role of talk as a general condition of policy: in no small part, my theoretical framework has treated identity as a function of talk. Because identity is spoken into existence in foreign policy debates, what “we” say about “them” has profound implications for international conflict/cooperation. To affect international outcomes, foreign policy makers should therefore pay attention to identity discourses and debates in other states and learn which discourses dominate. This will enable them to anticipate outcomes in the debates on foreign policy and try and shape them, if possible or desirable. What I have suggested is that substance and style both matter for outcomes: what one argues may be as important as how one argues it. The ability to show how events, policies, and institutions fit with the dominant understanding of identity will win hearts and minds. Conversely, the arguments that fly in the face of the dominant reading of reality will be easily resisted. Argumentation has both direct and indirect effects on world politics because it shapes individual foreign policies and because of its effects in the so-called transnational public spheres (Mitzen 2005). Because identities are generated and sustained both at home and abroad, states – i.e., those political actors who speak on behalf of them – can talk themselves into war and peace more often than some IR theories allow.

Within security communities states perceive each others as friends or at least friendly, but by default this also means that relations among security communities must be less-than-friendly. For example, the Anglosphere—or the West, EU, transatlantic community—may see the “rest” variously as competitive, hostile or backward. Each
discourse entails different policies, some which may be more productive of peace than others. Like friendship, rivalry may be associated with trade and tourism, but enmity is usually not. And while enmity involves predatory policies, these may be carried with utmost respect for sovereignty and basic human rights; in the civilization/barbarism identity relationship, however, actions and reactions are likely to include policies associated the imperial and colonial era—terrorism, guerilla warfare, permanent occupation, torture and so on. Policy makers—including their advisers like speech writers and public relations officers—must be aware that the language they choose will profoundly affect the way in which the “world hangs together” (Ruggie 1998).

Within the Anglosphere, talk is no doubt facilitated by the shared language in a sense that the usual transaction cost of translation is absent. But I have also argued that the English-speaking states form an intersubjective community, within which subjects draw from a widely shared pool of cognitive, affective and linguistic resources. The implications of this argument are many, particularly for theories of linguistic relativity, and I have no space to draw them out here. What is more obvious is a finding that talk is not purely rational as in the Habermasian ideal of a single, overarching and universal code of action. Coercive power, I have found, is as constitutive of the Anglosphere as are deliberative validity claims. My analysis of intracommunal disputes clearly showed why the social construction of reality is always a political construction of reality as well. US foreign policy positions—coming from objectively the strongest member of the club—carried the day in several cases—arbitration in Venezuela I and II, a peace treaty with Japan in 1950, the non-intervention in Suez and near-unilateral interventions in Vietnam and Iraq. But the US did not always get what it wanted and it certainly did not get it
when it wanted to. On Suez, Vietnam and Iraq, Canada and Britain spoke out, with no small impact on the timing and sequence of US foreign policy decision. Even the comparatively tiny and very junior Australia and New Zealand were able to get the US to shelf its original plans for a post-WWII regional order in Asia-Pacific. Within the Anglosphere, it seems that the more the weak talk, the more varied the effects of objective power asymmetries. Multilateralism and close consultation with the allies may by constitutive norms on which the Anglosphere rests, not unlike in more formalized security institutions like NATO (cf. Risse-Kappen 1995).

The second major area of policy relevance in this study concerns the path dependent nature of social structures like the Anglosphere. This concept holds that initial conditions heavily influence the future course of events (Pierson 2000). Once the institutions and practices of Anglo-American security cooperation were established and survived, they perpetually reinforced one another. Each successive renewal of old wartime alliances further reinforced the Anglosphere identity, deepening and enlarging a deep sense of common purpose among the publics, elites and, especially, military establishments. That policy choices play a causal feedback role is evident in the example of the UKUSA Community and/or Echelon/ABCA agreement, premier networks for intelligence-sharing among English-speaking states. While these institutions were created in the specific wartime circumstances (WWII and the Cold War), today they are part of the cooperative security arrangement that define the Anglosphere. Rather than being a means to an end—fighting international communism—these institutions are now seen as ends in themselves. As a theory of path dependence suggests, once the
Anglosphere started down a certain path, it was extremely difficult to change course, even if some actors were disposed to do so.

Path dependence does not suggest, however, that there is anything deterministic, inevitable or preordained about the Anglosphere. Each choice that built this identity was historically contingent. The “great rapprochement” would have been less likely if, say, France had decided to keep Louisiana or if one or more European great powers/empires intervened in one or more of the wars fought by the US in the nineteenth century. As counterfactual history suggests, the post-1902 international relations have been punctuated by many turning points in which no single equilibria existed. The market for the “what if” stories of WWII is particularly robust, at least in some circles (Buchanan 2008). But what this study suggests is that the Anglosphere identity constituted one of the most likely – if not the most likely—policy and institutional equilibrium in more than one national context and in more than one major post-WWII turning point. What is remarkable is that the Anglosphere discourse manifested itself across a wide historical and geographical spread—from Anglo-Saxonism in the 1890s America, British race patriotism in the 1950s Australia, Canada and New Zealand to Atlanticism in the 2002-3 Britain. Rather than being one policy idea among many, the Anglosphere, I argued, is co-constitutive of the discourses of at least five states. If a theory of path dependence is right with respect to these, then the Anglosphere is unlikely to be expunged from the identity repertoires at home and, in turn, from the international sphere. The positive feedback loop cannot easily reverse course, I submit, not least because the belief that English-speaking states constitute an ontological exception may in fact be irreversible because it is sustained by constant practice across the globe, much of it unconscious.
From the perspective of the Anglosphere discourse, the “international” is not a political sphere defined in terms of relations among sovereign, territorial states, but also a social structure characterized by relations among historical, cultural and political nations which share so much they need not to verbalize common interests. This unconscious—sometimes also regarded as subconscious or subliminal—cooperation is what IR theory calls the logic of habit or practicality (Hopf 2002; Pouliot 2008). Within security communities like the Anglosphere, the possibility of violence does not exist because “[n]onviolent settlement of disputes is part of an inarticulate know-how that informs all further practices” (Pouliot 2008: 279). Rather than being a matter of instrumental calculations, role playing (appropriateness) or deliberation (persuasion), the policies constitutive of the Anglosphere thus become a simple—as well as ontologically prior—matter of habit.

From an ontological perspective, there is another view of path dependence. Many proponents of the Anglosphere see it as teleological (e.g., Bennett 2007; Coquest 2005; Roberts 2006; Hitchens 2007). In this view, identities, institutions and policies evolve on the basis of a foundational normative principle, such as beliefs in the superiority of putatively Anglo values and institutions in the modern world. To the extent that such principle is indeed the foundation of the Anglosphere discourse and that this discourse will continue to run strong, then the boundaries of the possible have already been set. For example, if the members of the Anglosphere core continue to see each other as first-choice allies, all subsequent policy-making efforts will be spent on the ways to make this alliance work. Compared to this macro-choice, the degrees of participation in US-led coalitions of the willing will be a matter of micromanagement. Canada is as likely to
abrogate its US alliance as the US is likely to militarily invade Canada—neither which is very probable in the foreseeable future. Similarly, Britain may get closer and deeper into the EU, but its mercurial special relationship is likely to continue to exert its influence on British foreign policy making. The Anglosphere can be seen as that background knowledge—say, a “master policy”—which shapes how particular policy options are related to one another in particular contexts. From the perspective of path dependence, the Anglosphere is not simply policy relevant; rather, it is policy, at a macro level at least. To paraphrase Margaret Thatcher’s epigraph in Chapter 2, when it comes to policy-making, the Anglosphere is not up for debate; instead “[i]t just is and that is that.”

If the Anglosphere is macro policy, where does it lead? As I argued in Chapter 1, the Anglosphere discourse emphasizes the values and institutions held by states, rather than non-state actors. Subsequent empirical chapters on occasion complicated this state-centric approach by showing the effect of transnational English-speaking civil society—religious and business leaders—on conflict/cooperation outcomes between and among English-speaking states. Overall, however, the founding category of international relations held. So to the extent that the agency of the Anglosphere is state-based, the Anglosphere policy can be said to lead to two types of actors—corporate and collective (Wendt 1994). The corporate form of agency refers to centralized and formally unitary organization such corporations, states or empires. In the international system, examples of corporate agency are hegemons—arguably, the contemporary US makes a bid for hegemony— or authoritative international organizations like, arguably, a future, post-constitution EU. The collective form of agency refers to decentralized groups of formally independent state and non-state actors who cooperate on a regular basis. These agents
can be institutionalized at various degrees. At the international level, examples of less
institutionalized collective agents include the international campaigns to ban or promote
certain practices (e.g., land mines, climate change) or the international bodies charged
with implementing particular tasks (e.g., contact groups for Namibian independence or
peace in the Balkans). More institutionalized collective agents are defined by an
authority to coerce its members into cooperation, such as the EU. As a collective agent,
the Anglosphere potential outstrips the EU because it does not rally around a single
geological landmass, but around language, values and institutions. Along the same lines,
the Anglosphere is obviously far more limited than the UN, a collective agent founded on
claims of universality.

Considering that its constituent elements have retained their formal individuality
but still cooperated on a regular basis, the Anglosphere has historically acted as a
collective agent. At the same time, it must be recognizes that there has been no shortage
of calls for the incorporation of the Anglosphere. The first came not long after it became
possible to speak of multiple English-speaking states, right after the U.S. separated from
the British Empire in 1776. In Britain, one could easily imagine Britain’s King George
urging for a forceful (re)unification with America, though surely there were voices—e.g.,
Edmund Burke—who stressed the need to achieve this goal peacefully. On the other side
of the Atlantic, the first constitution of the new American state, the Articles of
Confederation, can be seen as the primer of international incorporation: Article XI pre-
approved the unification of the thirteen colonies and what in 1777 passed for the colony
of Canada. As I explained in Chapter 3, calls for a corporate Anglosphere identity picked
up at the turn of the twentieth century. They have been fairly consistent ever since.
Some of these calls ended in spectacular failures (e.g., proposals for the unification of Anglophone Caribbean or East Africa), others have been temporarily shelved (e.g., the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement once discussed between U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and Britain’s Prime Minister Harold Wilson), but many have been realized, turning into familiar features of the international landscape (e.g., AASR, ANZUS, NORAD). The turn of the twenty-first century saw yet another spike of calls for some form of incorporation of the Anglosphere core into the “American superstate” (Johnson 1999). For the states of the Anglopshere course, the voluntary surrender of sovereignty and individuality for the purpose of merging with the US is so far from the discursive realm of possibility as to be inconceivable, at least at this geographical and historical conjuncture. But if path dependence is right, the initial conditions for a future emergence of the Anglosphere state may already be in place. Such a state may emerge gradually, Australia and New Zealand may join up first and then ask the US for an American-Australasian superstate. The future core may not resemble the current one and America may be decentered in favour of Canada, Australia or, for that matter, India. The larger point is that there may be, as path dependence theorists like to say, “glacial” or “big, slow-moving and invisible” consequences of the Anglosphere policy. The Anglosphere, as a security community, has amassed so much social and material capital over the decades that its dissolution may be unlikely (cf. Wendt 1999: 312).

At the same time, every path dependency is replete with new choices and possible new directions. The self-other distinctions that are now blurred within the Anglosphere can be accentuated by “exogenous” shocks at national, regional or global scale, anything from demographic or environmental shifts, flu pandemic, or economic
depression. The forces that have generated the Anglosphere are in principle always subject to change (Adler and Barnett 1998: 57-8). There are “endogenous” sources of tension, mainly related to what is sometimes called “deindividuation” (Wendt 1999: 299, 306). The Anglosphere operates on a degree of shared identity, not a single identity and this difference is critical. On the one hand, to succeed in making itself viable in the long-run, any identity must be tolerant of multiple affiliations and misfits. On the other, it is hard—though not impossible—to imagine how it can be simultaneously tolerant and pluralist, on the one hand, and normative, on the other. The optimistic proponents of the Anglosphere may regard tolerance as a source of resilience, but any shared identity that claims some sort of loyalty of millions—if not billions—of people must be characterized by fissures. In this sense, state/national identities like Australian liberal internationalism or Asianism, British Europeanism or little Englandism, Canadian globalism and anti-Americanism or New Zealand’s indigeneity may all be counted as evidence of pluralism and tolerance within the Anglosphere core. But if and when dominant, each one of them is counterdiscursive to the Anglosphere as policy. Endogenous contestations, like exogenous shocks, make the Anglosphere non-deterministic in its outcomes.

One tension that can be seen as both endogenous and exogenous lies in the nature of the relationship between the Anglosphere and other units in the international system, be they non-state actors, old nation-states, new empires or, indeed, other security communities. While the Anglosphere-friendly policies may cultivate a Kantian identity internally, they may simultaneously imply a Lockean or even Hobbsean identities externally. As I noted in Chapter 1, one of the main criticism of the Anglosphere proposals is that they imply hierarchical, particularistic and exclusionary politics. My
genealogy has found that the critics are right: the Anglosphere emerges in the context of identity relations among states/nations on the inside as well as those on the outside. One possible effect of the Anglosphere as policy is therefore a division of the world into mutually exclusive security communities. In a pessimistic scenario, the communities would not only create tensions for those societies who may wish to keep multiple affiliations, but would also engage in a Hobbsean, zero-sum contest for world supremacy. In an optimistic scenario, the communities would operate in a Lockean order of self-interested cooperation, possibly leading to multilateral and even Kantian solutions to the problems of the world as a whole.  

Given this range of outcomes, should the Anglosphere be treated as a conscious policy? I turn to this question in the next section.

OUGHT THERE BE THE ANGLOSPHERE?

In Chapter 1, I discussed the insecurity of the Anglosphere proponents in dealing with the question of political correctness. At its most politically correct, the Anglosphere discourse recognizes that the values and institutions are associated with the historical experience of England/Britain, but argues that they are culturally neutral. These values and institutions spring from the basis of modern, post-Enlightenment liberal toleration of individual choices of expression and association and as such contrasted precisely against “traditional” forms of political life organized on the basis of religion, ethnicity or race.

Bracketing the ambiguous role of language for a moment, what is constitutive of the social arrangements that underpin the Anglosphere is individual autonomy, not cultural

353 In science fiction, these two scenarios are imagined, respectively, in George’s Orwell’s 1984 and Neal Stephenson’s Diamond Age (1995), a text in which the word Anglosphere was first coined.
collectivity. So rather than being case as racist, the Anglosphere can be seen as emancipatory, at least as far as such Kantian cosmopolitan projects can go.\textsuperscript{354}

From a strict postcolonial viewpoint, the Anglosphere discourse constitutes Eurocentrism \textit{par excellence}.\textsuperscript{355} Eurocentrism or Orientalism can be defined as a discourse which sees Europe—or the putative West—as exceptional and superior to the rest. The discourse implies a theory of history which sees the progress of human civilization to modernity as linearly and singularly associated with Europe’s rise to global preeminence. Postcolonial theorists challenge this view on both empirical and theoretical grounds. According to the former, the idea of Western exceptionality and superiority simply clashes with the empirical record.\textsuperscript{356} The purpose of such postcolonial or subaltern history is not to suggest that the West was somehow trumped by the rest, but rather to shake the established views of the history of Western civilization.

Postcolonial theory insists that Europe, the West or the Anglosphere cannot be seen as a discrete, self-enclosed entity which outdid other discrete, self-enclosed temporal and spatial entities—e.g., Africa, China, India, the East, the South and so on—in the race

\textsuperscript{354} The origins of cosmopolitan political theory can be traced the Cynic thinks of the Ancient Greece who argued that all human beings belong – or should belong – to a single community. In political theory and normative IR, cosmopolitans primarily speak to communitarians, who imagine a future not unlike the present in which different communities coexist, each pursuing own conception of the good. To appreciate the polyvalence of contemporary cosmopolitanism, see the special issue of \textit{Public Culture} 12: 3 (2000).

\textsuperscript{355} I regret the simplification. Postcolonial theory is a polyvalent field which escapes brief and straightforward summaries. For a recent edition of a well-known statement, see Chakrabarty (2007).

\textsuperscript{356} Consider two illustrations from the putative Muslim perspectives. In the first, the main agents of the original “age of discovery” were not the Christian Southern Europeans, but the Muslim West Asians, who dominated what was known as the world trade between seventh and fourteenth centuries. In this view, even the discovery of Australia belongs neither to the Dutch or British but to the Makassans, themselves part of the Muslim global trade. Second, the fourteenth century Ottoman Empire institutionalized the value of religious tolerance in the ways which escaped Europe and the West until well into the twenty-first century (Findley 2005: Ch. 4, Hobson 2004: Ch. 2-4, 7; Jones 1993).
to some singular modernity. Instead, these entities are relational and mutually constituted, always developing simultaneously through cultural encounters, dialogues and, last but not least, violent clashes. The point behind mutual constitution is a simple one: the ancient Greeks could not think of Europe without simultaneously thinking of Asia, just like talking about the contemporary West is not possible without an organizing idea of the East. Rather than being a single case study, any consideration of Europe must at once also be about Europe’s significant others, otherwise, to continue with a methodological analogy, such consideration will suffer from an omitted variable bias. From this perspective, the debate over whether the Anglosphere constitutes the telos of Western-led emancipation of the humankind over the continental Europe/EU is what Americans like to call insider baseball. In this discourse, the subject may be located in within-West relations, but its location was previously made possible by the previous West/Rest difference. Furthermore, the conceptualization of the Anglosphere in terms of concentric circles treats large chunks of the East/South as basically marginal or derivative (e.g., India). Peace and cooperation between and among some English-speaking democracies may be contingent on the exclusion of other states, some of which may be English-speaking democracies. Like “zones of peace and war,” the Anglosphere is “not separate and discrete phenomena explained by the presence or absence of liberal institutions within states but effects of mutually constitutive international political, social and economic relations” (Barkawi and Laffey 2001: 2, also see Ibid. 2006: 346-9).

If we agree with Cox and other critical theorists, then we must agree that any theory developed in a Western context as fundamentally Eurocentric or pro-Western. Orientalism, for one, is said to have spiked in the nineteenth century, an era in Western
societies began to develop sciences of human affairs (Said 1978). Postcolonial theory argues that the liberal and, ultimately, emancipatory, perspectives that are said to undergird the Anglosphere are historical artifact are still beholden to ideas and discourses that have characterized colonial expansion and neocolonial exploitation. Many of the values and institutions that define the contemporary Anglosphere have a rather poor record from a liberal, much less cosmopolitan perspective. Furthermore, the Kantian paradise promised in the Anglosphere discourse is a priori constituted as hierarchical, in which the Anglosphere, much like the past empires from which its current power stems, sees itself as an agent for rescuing the world.

The question of race is particularly problematic from the postcolonial perspective. As I said in Chapter 1, no proponent of the Anglosphere fails to mention the anti- or non-racialist character of the project or even her personal opposition to any discourse that sustains an order on the basis of arbitrary categorization of human beings. What unites the Anglosphere are values and institutions as well as the English language, not the shades of whiteness of the core states. The rhetorical move usually goes under the rubric colorblind or colormute which refers to an attempt to transcend and erase race. In one sense, the Anglosphere is nothing but the Kantian peace which (also) happens to speak English. Qualitatively-oriented researchers in the democratic peace tradition readily accept that democratic institutional features mean different things in different contexts (and for that reason, they break a hitherto single variable of democracy into types and sub-types such as centralized/decentralized, social/liberal, elitist/non-elitist, pacifist/militant and so on). The democracy variable is yet to be broken into subgroups categorized across categories such as language, ethnicity, religion or even race. On the
last factor, despite its uncomfortable political character, race may yet to prove central to the Kantian peace thesis, particularly if liberals are serious in drawing on Kant’s thought to identify additional sources of international peace. Indeed, in search of ever-better specified models of the Kantian peace, liberals typically call for a “broader” reading of Kant, yet no liberal to my knowledge has covered the lesser-known works such as *Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) or *Physical Geography* (1802) in which the great philosopher wrote sentences such as “Humanity achieves its greatest perfection with the White Race.”

Could it be that the Kantian peace may simultaneously be the racist peace? The findings in this study suggest that race or racialized identity accounts for different patterns of behavior among particular subgroups of democracies and particular historical contexts. While the 1890s Anglo-American relations may be dismissed as the easy case for the racist peace, there is strong evidence to suggest that racialized identities à la Anglo-Saxonism shadowed foreign-policy making in and around the Anglosphere well into the second half of the twentieth century. But consider the material covered in Chapter 5. I argued that the US-led regional defence pact against communism in Asia-Pacific never became an Asian NATO partly because Australia could not accept Japan—or any other Asian nation—as an equal. The multilateral, multiracial Pacific Pact was thus reduced to the trilateral, “white man’s” ANZUS. This finding speaks to the “why is there no NATO in Asia?” puzzle, which in IR refers to the observation that the U.S.

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357 Barkawi and Laffey (2006: 332). Also see Baum (2006: 70). As postcolonial critics in IR have noted, Kant’s theorizations fell remarkably silent on the major questions of his time such as the genocide of indigenous populations in the Americas or the African slave trade. In the words of one postcolonial theorist, “I am therefore asking for a pause before proposing Kant as the prophet for ethics and pacific union” (Grovogui 2007: 235).
“consistently treated the newly minted North Atlantic region differently than the newly minted Southeast Asian region (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 578). The question constitutes a puzzle for realism, but not for constructivism. For Chris Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, U.S. policymakers saw their potential Canadian and European allies as historically, politically, culturally and, indeed, racially positive and close, at least relative to their potential Asian allies such as Philippines and Thailand (2002: 575).

My reading of the historical evidence confirms the constructivist account. American, Australian, British and New Zealander policy-makers paid considerable attention to the possible military and strategic contributions to the “Asian NATO” by states like Thailand or the Philippines and how these measured up against Communist assets in China and Southeast Asia. Realists, it seems, are right to stress the military threat perception. Yet in my reading the central discussion in all of these documents are reserved for the discussions on the racial make-up of the future alliance, namely on the ways in which a “Pacific Pact” could simultaneously satisfy Australian and New Zealander demands for an institution exclusive of Asian and American wishes for an alliance that would not look like a racist alliance. For Canberra and Wellington, who understood Asia-Pacific through a simultaneous dichotomization of the West (freedom and democracy) and East (communism) and white (European or Western) vs. Asian (Asiatic), any Asian inclusion in an anticommunist defence arrangement in the region made no sense. My analysis accords with David Capie’s account of Australian and NZ side of ANZUS (2003). Indirectly, it also agrees with Amitav Acharya’s argument that the Asian NATO never obtained because the identities of America’s Asian allies rejected the norm of collective defence since they saw it as another form of Western domination.
(2005). The effect of racialized identities did not disappear at some magic point in the twentieth century. For one, my DA found that the British and Canadians Selves in 2002-3 identified the Islamic Other in partially racial terms, but what made the racialization on the historical scale impossible was the dominance of discourse on multiculturalism.

For many critics, the move to bracket race is counterproductive—while its biological foundations have been called in questions for the past hundred or so years, race remains a relevant social and political concept. The colorblind/colormute approach, in this view, is not only impractical but also harmful in the quest for human equality. Race-talk significantly declined since the 1960s, thought its echoes can still be heard in the debates on the comparative advantages of tradition and order over change. For one, defining the Anglosphere in terms of a particular historical and geographical distribution of values and institutions corresponds to what is known as neo-racism or differentialist racism (Balibar 1991). From this perspective, widely accepted by postcolonial theory, the exclusionary and discriminatory practices hitherto associated with the biologically untenable concept of race have simply continued in the guise of the talk of ethnicity.

358 In the same chapter, I also considered the alliance behavior in the Korean War. In January 1951, External Affairs Minister Spender wrote to Prime Minister Menzies that Japan was “the only country which represents an actual threat to Australian security in the foreseeable future” (Meaney 2007: 404). That Japan could be declared the “actual threat” to Australia in the midst of a military engagement in Korea against North Korean and Chinese communist—and against the advice of military leaders—is a clear testament of the social constructions of threat perceptions. Like in the case of American perception of threats against Germany in the 1890s, here, too, the objectively tangible threats did not translate into the actual threat perception. Rather than calculations on the military capability or geographic proximity—or regime type for that matter—what determined the main national security threat was identity. Though Australia’s allies treated Japan as an ally—and despite the fact that Australian troops in Korea were supplied from Japanese factories—Canberra continued to treat Tokyo as an enemy.

359 In this view, being colorblind/colormute in process and outcomes is not the same as the refusal to see/hear color in the colonial/imperial histories that have made the world possible in the first place. The same criticism arguably applies to the attempts to bracket race in analyzing the various components of the Anglosphere phenomenon (e.g., Deudney 2001: 204).
culture, civilization and, ostensibly, language, values and institutions. In articulating difference in terms of non-racial features, the Anglosphere discourse breaks with the scientific racism of the old school, but not necessarily with racism per se. Like any discourse, its content is contingent on the emergence of new social facts (e.g., multicultural make-up of the Self), but not entirely devoid of its own history (and memory). In short, the Anglosphere is a product of its racist past and that past has not receded. From a strict postcolonial perspective, therefore, the Anglosphere must give up the false pretense of being reactively non-racist and strive to be proactively anti-racist in its organization (e.g., “rotating core”), norms (e.g., massive redistribution of wealth) and operation (e.g., inclusion of all states, nations and societies, regardless of their features). Whether such eminently cosmopolitan community could still claim particular language, values and institutions is doubtful.

An argument that the absence of race implies the presence of (neo-) racism is familiar to IR theory (Doty 1993; Vitalis 2000). In general, postcolonial approaches in the discipline have shown how Eurocentrism pervades much of IR theory, from the assumption of “great-power agency in empirical inquiry [to] the often unacknowledged Anglo-American politics shaping the definition of key events [to] the presumed ethical character of the West” (Barkawi and Laffey 2007: 335). Critical theory, with its emphasis on reflectivity and the political character of theory, has arguably paved the way for what is sometimes seen as the postcolonial turn in IR.\[^{360}\] But what for some looks like an obvious theoretical and political alliance, for others is an example of appropriation.

\[^{360}\] For postcolonial perspectives in IR, see, inter alia, Barkawi and Laffey (2006); Darby (2004); Grovogui (2007); Inayatullah and Blaney (2004), Krishna (2001), Slater (2005) and Vitalis (2000).
According to John Hobson (2007), by postulating Europe and its conceptual corollaries as the central obstacle to global emancipation, critical theory, too, commits the sin of Eurocentrism. Specifically wrong-headed is critical theory’s insistence on the “Westphilian narrative” (sic), a discourse which locates the origins of international relations in the seventeenth century Europe, when the putative problem of intra-Christian religious differences was solved by establishment of sovereign states. Political authority, in this view, rests with spatially demarcated units who recognize each other’s juridical supremacy within, though not beyond the territorial borders. In one sense, the conceptualization of sovereignty can be seen as IR’s contribution to a more general social science practice of ontologizing European history in terms of spatial and temporal “ruptures” which have come to define modernity (Wagner 2001).

For Hobson, “the extent to which many critical IR theorists reiterate the Westphilian narrative means that their analyses are for the White West and for Western imperialism in various senses” (Hobson 2007: 92). By focusing primarily on the order developed in, and imposed by, Europe, critical theory silences and/or partially recognizes the worlds where no classical sovereign order is obvious, at least not in the sense of juridical equality of states. Conceptual models that serve as building blocs for critical theory, too, have been developed almost exclusively from Western experience. In fact, the writings of Cox and his disciples, argues Hobson, never quite manage to overcome the usual binaries of problem-solving theory – great power/proxy, core/periphery, traditional/modern, feudal/capitalist, medieval/sovereign, colonized/imperialist, North/South, East/West, Orient/Occident and so on. Not only did the binaries persist, but
also the monological perspectives in which the empire/West/North speaks while the
periphery/East/South trembles.

That critical theory has no monopoly over critique is an old hat. What is novel
and interesting about Hobson are his recommendations on how to politicize the multitude
of differences around the globe. He calls for a “global reconciliation” between
Eurocentrism and its discursive challengers or, in his words,

>a dialogical dialectic wherein the East prosecutes the unfair and
hypocritical practices of the post-racist West in what might be called the
‘global court of social justice’. This is not a legal entity, though it is
governed like any (formal) court by a certain set of (social) norms that
adjudicate over what is right and wrong (Ibid.: 114, italics in the original).

That deliberation—“dialogical dialectic”—can help the weak overturn the extant political
orders, argues Hobson, is arguably evidenced in the two century-long history of
decolonization, which spans events from the nascent time of the Haitian revolution to the
triumph of Nelson Mandela. What Hobson therefore proposes is to open up space for
talk as a way of recognizes the multiple and overlapping modes of human subjectivity. In
one sense, the global court of justice is therefore but one manifestation of the
cosmopolitan desire to expand the boundaries of political community. In another
sense, it is a call for a gradualist and multilateralist solution for control over the evolution
of international society, against claims by the powerful to speak and act on its behalf.

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361 One can always ask for yet another layer of theory on the mutual constitution of the Self and Other (e.g.
Inayatullah and Blaney 2004). Also, one needs no subscription to critical theory in order to see her
arguments as ethically motivated and aimed at responsible representation of the Other.

362 On the idea of dialogical cosmopolitanism, see Linklater (1998: 77-108). On deliberation theory in
general, see Elster (1998).

363 The term court as opposed to the more general word forum reflects a legalistic flavor to deliberation.
Provided that it can be geared to embody rationality, publicity and uphold all stakeholder identities (thereby empowering the hitherto marginalized), deliberation in the global court of social justice would probably be similar to the way I conceptualized deliberations in Chapter 2. Conceivably, the representatives of the non-Eurocentric discourse could point out to misfit between discourse and reality to challenge and entrap the dominant interpretations. Deliberations over inconsistencies and contradictions—“double standards”—would help better the world.

The question what constitutes of the better world—i.e., what counts as commonly held and normatively desirable good—has been debated for at least two millennia. In my reading of these debates, one position—consistent from Aristotle to Habermas—is that the best we can hope for is to try and build a political community in which all who stand to be affected by it could deliberate what is good, legitimate, egalitarian, just and so on. The defining feature of such deliberative communities is the possibility of social learning via open dialogue. So defined, one such community—modern, inclusive, postcolonial and self-reflexive—is indeed implied Hobson’s idea of a court of global justice. From this perspective, the key normative question therefore is not so much whether one position is more normatively defensive over other, but whether it was archived though normatively defensible process. The primary value of deliberation therefore lies treating the means as an end itself, though certainly not as the end.364

For Hobson, the specific task of IR is to facilitate the opportunity for these kinds of deliberations by theorizing the politics of identity-formation, particularly with respect to

364 This position is consistent with versions of Habermasian “discourse ethics,” a household name in normative IR which sees deliberation as constitutive of ideas such as legitimacy or justice (Linklater 1998). A review of criticisms of this position is not feasible in this chapter.
to the “invisible colour line” (2007: 115). What Hobson is implicitly advocating is nothing less than “phronetic” in IR, a study of international social phenomena based on constant deliberation and judgment over which social actions are good/bad for human beings (Flyvbjerg 2001). For Hobson, one way for IR overcome the in-built double standard is to recognize the fundamental insufficiency of the current philosophical, theoretical, empirical and ethical perspectives and open-up to alternative voices. This route is generally preferred by postcolonial theorists, even if it is obviously fraught with ambiguities over the definition of “tolerance” (do calls for genocide, rape or suicide bombing of civilians constitute alternative voices?). I wish to suggest another way for IR, possibly less dangerous politically: let us geneologize our theoretical buildings blocks from the ground up. Because genealogies would ideally lead to an ontological self-cleansing, the discipline would sensitize itself to the fact that its concepts are simultaneously analytical and normative and thus relevant to the debate over which normative templates should guide us in our judgment. Concepts such as sovereignty, modernity, identity, security community or the Anglosphere are at once analytical containers by which we categorize people as well as prescriptions on how to order the social and political world. Genealogies can show us how these categorizations are constructed, contingent, contested, and how they can be changed in some “global court of social justice.”
APPENDIX A

GENEALOGY AS A RESEARCH TOOL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

History does not belong to us, but rather we belong to it.
(Gadamer 2000: 276)

As Nietzsche pointed out long ago, we cannot help putting forth truth claims about the world.
(Price and Reus-Smith 1998: 272)

On the surface, genealogy appears to be no stranger in International Relations (IR). Ever since the publication of James Der Derian’s On Diplomacy—the discipline’s first book-length genealogical work—hardly a year passed without at least one publication with the word genealogy in one of its titles. An electronic keyword search I performed in a standard academic search engine yielded dozens of genealogies in IR, from book-length studies to brief reflections appearing in policy journals.

The appearances, however, might be deceiving: in my sample of sixty two recent “research methods” course syllabi written by IR instructors for their graduate students only two devoted any portion of the course to genealogy as a research method. My cursory review of recent programs of the professional conferences in IR led to negative results.

365 I accessed syllabi in their electronic forms and collected in order in which they were listed by an online search engine. All contained the English word “methods” in and were authored by self-identified IR scholars in the period between 2000 and 2007. I also considered the programs of the last three annual conventions (2004-2007) of American Political Science Association, International Studies Association, British International Studies Association and European Consortium on Political Research. Rather than at major professional conventions, IR scholars seem to be far more likely to discuss genealogy at more specialized and multidisciplinary conventions, such as those organized by groups such as the History of Political and Social Concepts Groups or the History of the Present.
findings—zero panels on genealogy in the last three years. Finally, a substantive literature review confirmed genealogy’s mysterious nature. Most methods textbooks systematically ignored it, while more than a few applications of genealogy confined their methodological talk to a couple of pages at most.\textsuperscript{366} What these observations suggest is genealogy sports a rather low methodological profile, despite the widespread name-dropping. They also suggest that IR student interested in learning how to apply genealogy in her work would probably have to be self-taught. The purpose of this appendix is to clarify to the reader my own understanding of genealogy.

Rather than representing a break from traditional social science methodologies, I argue genealogy should be seen as a research tool of historical, interpretative inquiry suited for the making epistemologically varied truth-claims. To develop this argument, I divide the appendix into two parts. In the first part, I begin by situating genealogy in the philosophy of science in which I consider two readings of Foucauldian genealogy, one which stresses the enduring problems of collecting and communicating knowledge because of its representational nature and another which calls allows for the possibility of “truth with adjectives.” To the extent that the latter reading is justified, I submit that the difference between genealogy and more mainstream social science methodologies is in degree, not in kind.

In the second part of the appendix, I take this reading to IR. Using illustrations drawn from a sample of book-length genealogical studies in the discipline, I argue in favour of genealogy as a general methodology for the interpretation of text. Both

\textsuperscript{366} In some studies, genealogy is assumed to be such a well-known commodity that it warrants no discussion at all (e.g., Butler 1990). In one case, genealogy appears exactly once in the text – in the title (Ceasar 2003).
poststructuralist and constructivist perspectives, I contend, execute and evaluate
genealogy using the same standard: first comes an analysis of how social phenomena are possible, followed by an account on the consequences these phenomena have in the political world. Genealogy, I further contend, is compatible with causal analysis, broadly defined. Even from the point of view of epistemology, I conclude, the distance between poststructuralism and constructivism tends to be overdrawn: explanation embodies understanding and vice versa and neither should be seen as logically prior to the other.

Two clarifications: first, though methodology and method are usually deployed interchangeably, they are not. Methodology is a theory on how research is or should be done, given the assumptions on the so-called first principles, i.e., those regarding the status of reality (ontology) and/or its place in a knowledge domain (epistemology). Put otherwise, methodology can be seen as a study of methods, which in turn can be seen as techniques for accessing data. Second, by traditional social science, I mean the epistemic science (Flyvbjerg 2001: 57); consequently, by traditional social science methodologies, I mean ideas on how research should be done within the epistemic science. In this appendix, I bracket the questions whether these traditions are desirable for the discipline of IR (cf. Kurki and Wight 2006).

MY FOUCAULT, MY GENEALOGY

Genealogy can be defined as a methodology of identifying the conditions of possibility for social items such as events, policies or institutions. A typical genealogy traces the lineage of a social item by rejecting teleology and stressing contingency—a

367 Here I refer to ideas taught at the Institute for Qualitative Research Methods or the European Consortium for Political Research Summer School in Methods and Techniques.
combination of circumstances that come together in particular ways to produce an outcome. In this usage, genealogy—a term which normally refers to the tracing of family history—was first developed by Friedrich Nietzsche in his nineteenth century critiques of Christian morals and representational metaphysics. Nietzsche argued that reality had no autonomous ontological status aside from human activity and advocated the replacement of science by genealogies—accounts of how social items come into being. Nearly a century later, this idea was picked up by Michel Foucault and it was mostly through Foucault’s writings that genealogy trickled down to IR.\textsuperscript{368}

Not everyone, to be sure, sees genealogy as a methodology. In terms of the broader debate on the status of sociohistorical knowledge, Foucault can be read in two ideal-typical ways.\textsuperscript{369} On the one end of the continuum, Foucault comes off as an opponent to epistemology, a slash-and-burn anti-foundationalist, a “denier” (Williams 2002), “prophet of extremity” (Megill 1985: Ch. 5) and a nihilist (Allen 1993: Ch. 8). In this view, what matters for genealogy is not a codification of methods but politics – the emancipation of marginalized forms of knowledge from the dominant “regimes of truth.”\textsuperscript{370} As per strict nominalist ontology, any methodology is a social item and therefore subject to genealogy, rather than a definition. Foucault himself preferred the

\textsuperscript{368} For the “Foucault effect” on the contemporary humanities and social sciences, see Brass 2000; Brown 2001: Ch. 5; Guttting 2005b, O’Farrell 2005: 1-2, 8-9; McLeod 2001: 98-8; Prado 2000: 1-5. In Foucault’s own working definition, genealogy is a “political history of truth”—a history of the construction of criteria for adjudicating what is true and what is false in relations among subjects and/or objects (1990, Vol. 1: 60).

\textsuperscript{369} For an illustration of the presence of such dual reading of Foucault in IR, see Smith (1996: 29-37) vs. Der Derian (1997: 62) or Ashley (1996) vs. Linklater (1996).

\textsuperscript{370} For this perspective, see Shiner 1982: 397; Bartleson 1995: 78 and Campbell 1998a. Feminist research practice is particularly attentive to the so-called ethical compass. See Mills 2004: Ch. 4 and 5; cf. Woods 2005.
terms “non-defined method” or “anti-science” (citations in O’Farrell 2005: 52 and Shiner 1982: 396, respectively; also see Gutting 2005b: 5). Also, his students tend to talk about a “non-general method,” “ad hoc method,” “un-method,” “non-method,” “anti-method,” with various degrees of approval, (e.g., Anderson 2003, Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, Gutting 2005a, Shiner 1982, Megill 1985, Roth 1981). In this reading, genealogy could never be a methodology, only “analytics” (Anderson 2003: 1; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 184).

On the other end of the continuum, there is a reading which has “Foucault as an epistemologist” (Alcoff 1993) and as a self-proclaimed “positivist” (Foucault 1972: 234; cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 105; Miller 1993: 339). In this view, all knowledge is “local” or “contextual,” meaning that it is contingent on specific historical and social context. Though there is no such thing as a scientific truth defined as propositional correspondence with “reality,” there can be a scientific truth that explicitly recognizes the temporal, spatial and cultural domains in which the truth claim is made. According to Gary Gutting, Foucault recognizes

no cognitive authority beyond that of science…The only general epistemic standard to which Foucault hold his own work is that of historical accuracy. If we count history as a broadly scientific enterprise, then Foucault recognizes no knowledge outside the scientific domain and so counts as a positivist (2005a: 11; cf. 2005d: 64-9).

In this reading, the Foucault effect on the stock of sociohistorical knowledge did not bring about the “death” of truth; instead, it established truth as “historically relative…without being irrational, subjectivist, or ideological” (Alcoff 1996: 229). Truth thus survived, even though it fell somewhere between “epistemological modesty” and the “epistemology of suspicion.” Put otherwise, the Foucault effect produced what can be
called the truth with adjectives—“local,” “situational,” “secondary,” “relative,” “procedural,” “working,” or “small-t.” From Foucault the epistemologist there is only a short step to the Foucault the methodologist. Indeed, this reading stresses how Foucault wrote quite a bit on the question of method, probably in order to clarify that a rejection of an abstract methodological template does not necessarily imply some sort of free rein. For one, as non-definitions or anti-definitions can be conducive to non-communication and anti-communication, Foucault often fell back to “working definitions”—a practice readily embraced by Foucault Studies (O’Farrell 2005: 127-8). That in this appendix I follow the latter reading of Foucault should not preclude attempts to detach Foucault’s ideas from epistemology, modernism, IR, or some other intellectual project. Because I agree that my Foucault may indeed be nothing more than the “American Foucault” I am more then ready to allow for different Foucaults.

It should be noted that Foucault always insisted on problem-driven, not method-driven or theory-driven research. Accordingly, he regarded his own theoretical and methodological contributions as a “toolbox” or “toolkit”: “I would like my books to be a kind of toolbox that people can rummage through to find a tool they can use however

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371 This reading can be seen as based on local/minimal foundationalism and related to the “new” coherence theory (Alcoff 1996: Ch. 4 and 5; Flyvbjerg 2001: 98-107; Hoffman 1991; Prado 2000: Ch. 6-7; Mirchandani 2005: 91-2, 109-110; Williams 2002: 64-5).

372 Three of his main methodological “rules” are reliability, verification, and scope conditions (O’Farrell 2005: 52, 139; Gutting 2005d: 64-9, cf. Kendall and Wickham 1999: 151). I will return to this point later.

373 I tend toward this reading of Foucault partly out of dislike of the relativism of an anti-epistemological reading, in its ideal-typical sense. If there is no epistemic truth (or inherent truth’s value for that matter), only the regime of truth or politics of truth, then all judgments are ethical and political (e.g., Shiner 1982: 383-4). But relativism, in my view, leads to a paradox: precisely for political and ethical reasons we need to be able to make epistemic truth-claims about the world.

they wish in their own area… I don’t write for an audience, I write for users, not
readers.” Nearly all tools in Foucault’s toolkit embody and express a theory of politics
based on the concept of discourse—a structured practice of communication and
signification which render subjects and objects meaningful. This theory treats language
as constitutive of reality, not simply “about” reality. Discourses are said to constitute
social identities or “subject positions” in two continuous ways: first, they
capable/constrain what is possible and, second, they reward/punish practices that are
congruent/deviant with those identities. The individual subjects are at once both socially
productive and subjected and therefore consciously and unconsciously limited or
“marginalized.” Foucault’s discourse theory proposed—but never fully theorized—that
at any given time in a given domain, some discourses can be seen as dominant
(hegemonic or governing) and others as challenging (counterhegemonic, resisting,
alternative or subaltern). While discourses are historical, cumulative and aggregating,
new meanings impose on and, to varying degrees, transform old meanings. In
Foucault’s work, the concept of discourse saw no shortage of empirical and theoretical
action. Most notably, in his studies of the discourses of human sciences, Foucault found
that truth and knowledge (e.g., health and education) are constituted by power and that
“power and knowledge directly imply one another” (1979: 27). That knowledge is

375 Multiple citations, slightly varying translations: O’Farrell (2005: Ch. 4); Gutting (2005c: 112-3); Flynn
(1999: 45); Mills (2004: 15). Referencing Foucault “properly” is becoming an exercise in scholasticism and
will not be pursued in this paper.

376 It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss how discourse relates to concepts such as statements,
configurations, the episteme, regimes/games/politics of truth, historical a priori, dispositif, biopolitics or the
ways in which contemporary discourse theory has departed from Foucault’s original conceptualizations
(e.g., 1972: 49).
socially constructed and co-constituted with power turned into a famous insight known as “power/knowledge” (pouvoir-savoir).

The uniqueness of genealogy as a methodological brand largely comes from its theoretical grounding in discourse and power/knowledge; without this grounding, genealogy would be just another form of history. Indeed, contra “traditional” or “modernist” history, Foucault argued that historical evidence should be analyzed not in order to ascertain its “true” meaning by reference to origins, foundations, rationality, teleology or intention, but in order to show the “interplay” between reality and representation (1972: 125). For Foucault, the main questions of history where not “what happened and why?” but “how did we get here?” and “how did the present become possible?” The purpose of genealogy is therefore not historical accuracy, defined as correspondence between history and objective reality, but “effectiveness” in showing how, to use the earlier example, our assumptions on Australasian mammals or UFOs are conventional rather than natural or logical.

Within Foucault’s toolbox, genealogy is typically seen as the most sophisticated tool for historical research.\(^{377}\) Also typical is a characterization which sees genealogy in terms of three techniques of inquiry: episodes, examples and effectiveness.\(^{378}\) The first two are fairly straightforward from the mainstream methodological perspective. Episodes—also known as historical series, epochs, events or moments—are meant to perioditize the history of a social phenomenon under study. Each episode is narrated


\(^{378}\) Bartelson (1995: 7-8, 73-8, 84-5, 240); also see Dean (1994: Ch. 2).
though examples, which are themselves reconstructed in a discourse analysis of historical documents ranging from diaries left behind by marginal authors to programmatic or pioneering statements on how to maintain social order. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault suggests that a key episode in the development of the contemporary “carceral” society is the eighteenth century debate between two discourses of punishment disciplinary/corporal vs. reformist. One example analyzed in this episode is Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon—an essay which prescribed an efficient disciplinary penal regime. The Panopticon refers to a prison where individual cells surround a central control tower producing a sense of constant surveillance and control (the panoptic “gaze”). In Foucault’s analysis, these disciplinary micro-tactics represent a distinctly modern type of power, which modifies the behaviour of society without the use of physical force.379

The idea of episodes and examples should be familiar to qualitative researchers versed in the theory of case studies. Though Foucault never explicitly offered selection criteria for his episodes and examples, some of the users of his toolbox have concluded that such criteria must follow more-or-less standard social science casing techniques, even if only implicitly. The point is twofold: first, there is no logical distinction between the word case and the word episode as both parcel history into discrete moments.380 Second, if genealogy serves to show, among other things, how the reality could have been different if certain social constructions in history had been different, then it must rely on a comparative method. Indeed, to the extent that one purpose of genealogy is to


380 Far more intellectually defensible is the rejection of casing when the latter is put forward as the statistical method writ small, a qualitative method without qualitative methodology, so to speak.
demonstrate the diversity and specificity of battles between different interpretations of social items, purely random selection of episodes and examples is self-defeating. Indeed, in Foucault’s own works, episodes and examples are not randomly chosen, but as hard/least likely, easy/most likely, anomalous/extreme/deviant/outlying or maximum variation. The judiciousness of empirical shifts the classical to modern episodes or from the examples of Bentham’s Panopticon to a prison warden’s private diary suggest that Foucault paid a great deal of attention to the variability in the scope, depth, and duration of social phenomena under investigation.\(^{381}\) Drawing from Foucault’s own work, it follows that specifying or even standardizing the selection criteria for episodes and examples does not necessarily clash with genealogy’s critical aims. The mechanics of writing genealogy are similar to an interpretative study based on historical case studies: episodes break into examples which are in turn related back to the overall analysis. In this sense, the difference in the principles of case selection between genealogy and more traditional interpretative methods can be seen as practical, rather than principled.

The third feature of genealogies—effectiveness—is not as straightforward from the perspective of the mainstream social science methodology. As I said earlier, unlike “traditional” or “modernist” history which seeks accuracy in the analysis of past events, effective history focuses on a “problem”—a social phenomenon that appears (seems, feels) normal or true (commonplace, natural, intuitive)—and asks how it came about (it “problematizes” it). The idea of effective history has a long pedigree, but most uses, included Foucault’s, tend to agree that effectiveness related to politics, rather than the

\(^{381}\) Bartelson (1995: 8, 76); Flyvbjerg (2001: Ch. 6); Hansen (2006: Chapter 6); Torfing (2005). The so-called paradigmatic cases are chosen on intuition, as they are meant to set the selection standard, rather then being selected on a standard (Flyvbjerg 2001: 80).
search for objective truth or historical accuracy.\textsuperscript{382} In the effective history view, the purpose of research is to disrupt the current habits of thought (to de-stabilize, disabuse, devalue, deschiffrer what we know) and, in doing so, to “invent new ways of knowing and new forms of political participation” (Dean 1994: 216). Disruption is what Foucault had in mind when he offered that the purpose of genealogy is to “intervene” in the past to “diagnose” the present and, to paraphrase the first epigraph, our belonging to history (Foucault 2003: 9; also see Bernstein 1994a: 222-5; Kendall and Wickham 1999: 4; Flynn 1999: 42; Roth 1981: 43). Foucault’s historical analyses of asylums, madness, prisons, medicine and policing can be seen as effective because each demonstrates why some social items were brought about and not others, what did not happen, what is forgotten and so on. In The History of Sexuality, for example, he finds that classical Greek civilization recognized only homosexual acts, not homosexual identities and submits that in terms of sexual practices the Greeks were less libertarian than modern societies (1990, Vol. II: 39). This particular genealogy is effective because it disrupts not only the conventional wisdom on sexuality but also modern narratives on the history of Western civilization.\textsuperscript{383}

\textsuperscript{382} The term effective history is often seen as a translation from \textit{Wirkungsgeschichte}, which should be associated with heremenutics, not genealogy (cf. Shapiro 1988: Ch. 1). Nietzsche’s \textit{wirkliche Historie} (real or true history) or Machiavelli’s \textit{verita effettuale} (effective truth) are the more likely etymological sources (Flyvbjer 2001: 114). Similarly misleading is an identity between genealogy and conceptual history or \textit{Begriffsgeschichte}, a school of thought introduced by Reinhart Koselleck in the early 1970s and further developed by Quentin Skinner and others. (e.g., Hansen 2006: 53, 83, 212). The conceptual history Foucault read came from Georges Canguilhem, not Koselleck (Gutting 2005b: 8-10). Also note that Foucault situated genealogy outside—not against—history (Foucault 1988: 10; also see Roth 1981: 37-40).

\textsuperscript{383} Genealogy is usually seen as ontological, not normative – neither “good” nor “evil” (Sherratt 2006: 152; also see Bernstein 1992b: Ch. 5; Fraser 1989: Ch. 1). Its applications, however, nearly always carry explicit normative lessons.
Effective disruption of status quo assumption about a particular social item usually hinges on the ability to demonstrate how reality and knowledge are contingent and therefore contestable. Contingency, like power, is a broad concept that cannot be easily condensed in a working definition. At the barest, it refers to the idea that the historical constitution of subjects and social items is not subject to destiny or some rational design; instead, it is, to varying degrees, accidental and haphazard. In Foucault’s words

We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or point of reference (citation in Sherratt 2006: 148, also see citations in O’Farrell 2005: 61; Haahr and Walters 2005: 17).

On the surface, it seems that this understanding of contingency as a series of “petty causes” clashes with the idea of “underlying causes,” i.e., with the idea of necessity and/or joint sufficiency on which much of the traditional social science rests. I will return to the question of causation in the next section, but note that a genealogical understanding of contingency does not imply that anything goes. In fact, no tool in the Foucauldian toolkit assumes anything close to “totalizing contingency.” So while a subject or a social item can be genealogized though a series of shifts that do not add up to a progression of the origin-rise-decline-fall sort, each subsequent shift logically entails

384 In the Kantian tradition, contingency can be understood as subject-centered agency – the capacity of a human actor to make judgments and decisions despite structural conditions (whereby agency is proportional to contingency). On discourse and agency, see Bleiker (2003).

385 The term “petty causes” is Gutting’s (2005b: 14).

386 Beliefs in the infinity of meanings and in the “undecidability” of text should be associated with Jacques Derrida, who also can be read as epistemologist for ethico-political purposes (e.g., Campbell 1998a: Ch. 6).
legacies from the past, otherwise there would be no historical continuities and no need for genealogy. From a Foucauldian perspective, discourses make some, not any thoughts and actions possible (Powell and Dimaggio 1991: 11; Veyne 1993: 6). So defined, effective history, too, departs little from more mainstream social science tools.

For the purpose of illustration, consider two of such tools: counterfactuals and institutional analysis. The former refer to the “what ifs” and “might-have beens” of history or the argument that history could have been and could be otherwise. Though nearly always controversial, counterfactuals are an inevitable tool for making causal judgments in social science, particularly when it comes to evaluating explanations of outcomes outside the experimental setting.387 With respect to the second tool, genealogy’s stress on contingency can be easily related to the Weberian research tradition on “unintended consequences” (Kendall and Wickham 1999: 6). One incarnation of this tradition today is new institutionalism, a research program associated most closely with comparative politics (Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 2004). In this perspective, institutions are seen as “rules of the game” that structure all politics. Using concepts such as path dependence and critical junctures, new institutionalists analyze how institutional equilibria endure and change and/or how institutions succeed or fail in dealing with anything from their own unintended consequences to other institutions to exogenous shocks.388 At the time when he wrote, Foucault rejected institutionalism because of its

387 An argument that a cause of an event may be determined by imaging the effect of the absence of conditions that lead to it in the first place goes back to Max Weber. For major controversies and issues, see Fearon (1991) and Clark (2004: Ch. 5).

388 This argument can be pushed to suggest that even the standard rational-choice institutionalism rejects teleology by theorizing the role of choice and interaction against teleology (provided that we accept that rational-choice analysis is really about choices as opposed to teleological outcomes). On this note, see Elster (2007).
narrow conceptualization of power (Flyvbjerg 2001: 117-8). Doubtless he was right:
most institutionalists then—like many new institutionalists today—foreground the ways
in which institutions shape who gets what over whom, when, where and in what
proportion. While these questions are valid, they do not necessarily lead the researcher to
the processes and productive dimensions of power.

Fortunately, institutionalist research program has greatly evolved since Foucault
wrote. Today, many in the so-called historical strand and virtually all in the sociological
strand of the new institutionalism also believe that institutions, like discourses, produce
subjectivities or the meanings of the “who” in “who gets what?”. A recent evolution of
sociological institutionalism into what is labeled discursive or constructivist
institutionalism can be seen as a rapprochement of sorts between institutionalism and
Politically and ethically committed counterfactual or institutional analysis, I submit, can
be as effective as the strictest Foucauldian genealogy. The awareness that all knowledge
is fundamentally uncertain and politically consequential has become more salient since
Foucault, but can be easily traced to the nineteenth century “origins” of the humanities
and social sciences. For one, well-documented is the way in which Weber build on
Nietzsche’s insight that history is stained with an idealized portrayal of the present such
that historical discontinuities are silenced or assumed away. There is an argument that
this position greatly informed Weber’s institutional analysis.389

389 See McCarthy (1997: 76-82; Radkau 2005). Also note that Weber, not unlike Foucault, treated his
analysis as a means, not an end.
To sum up this section, genealogy can be seen as a way of doing history based on the idea that knowledge is always connected to power and contingency. In one reading, genealogy uniquely rejects the possibility of historical representation and epistemological universalism—and thus stands opposite of traditional social science and its methodologies. But in another reading, genealogy can be reappropriated as a methodology based on a local or minimal foundationalism. To the extent that this reading is valid, genealogy can be seen as an eminently usable methodology even within fairly mainstream social science research program. Let us, then, take this reading to IR.

READING GENEALOGY IN IR

Foucault had an early effect on IR (e.g., Der Derian 1987; Shapiro 1988), but at the time of this writing, most genealogies in the discipline are associated with poststructuralism and constructivism. Without going deep into fairly hackneyed moments of disciplinary identity politics, it can be said that poststructuralist and constructivist in IR share a basic ontology (in which reality and knowledge are socially constructed) and empirical research practices (centered on the interpretation of texts and practices), but not epistemology. On the last, while both agree that the promise of positivism is false and argue in favor of interpretation in the sense of Giddensian double hermeneutics, many constructivists are happy to appropriate some broadly positivist standards for making

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390 Both perspectives have “history ‘built in’ as part of theories” (Adler 2002: 102). Note that IR can – and does – study its subject matter in the so-called real time and/or by using formal and mathematical reasoning, but history remains the proverbial laboratory. On the use and abuse of history in the discipline more generally, see Gaddis (1996), Jervis (1976) and Lustick (1996).
truth-claims about the political world.\footnote{391} Different epistemologies, mixed with different aesthetics of research, result in different theoretical and empirical foci between the two camps: poststructuralists tend to privilege the investigation of power/knowledge, in difference to constructivists who focus on the “sociolinguistic construction of subjects and objects.”\footnote{392} I want to argue here that the methodological status of genealogy does not vary between poststructuralist and constructivist perspectives. I make two propositions, one ontological and the other epistemological.

My first proposition is that genealogy can be seen as a tool for making standard social science causal inferences. Foucauldian purists will no doubt raise eyebrows and point out that genealogy simply does not deal with causal logics in terms of “ideas as causes” (Haahr and Walters 2005: 17) and/or that Foucault’s own conceptualization of contingency is in fact a direct denial of causal inferences as such (i.e., 1972: 10-14). Once again, my argument hangs on a particular reading of the theorists: my Foucault not only stands by his invitation to future users to apply genealogy “however they wish in their own area,” but also stands as a local/minimal foundationalist and a methodologist.

In IR, genealogy has already been used in this way. Consider Richard Price’s \textit{Chemical Weapons Taboo} (see note). This book is remarkable for its twofold purpose: the first task is a genealogy of events that led to a near-abolishment of all chemical weapons in world

\footnote{391} Italics are meant to signal that most constructivists correctly see positivist standards to be too demanding for their own good, especially when understood in the empiricist sense of some natural sciences. In a nutshell, that objects of social science are also subjects has consequences for anything from input specification of research design to the intersubjectivity of its evaluation to the normative purposes of research (Almond and Genco 1977; Rorty 1979; Taylor 1969).

politics. The second task is to resolve the puzzle of the non-use of lethal gas in World War II. The puzzle comes from IR theory: if states seek to survive at any cost, as realism submits, why do they discriminate against chemical weapons in war? Why, asks Price, was lethal gas not employed as a weapon of war in World War II (1997: 4)? In particular, why did Hitler—he who is responsible for the Holocaust—decide not to use lethal gas in his scorched earth policy against the Allied onslaught in 1945?

In answering these questions, Price first shelves the conventional wisdom on the general nonuse of lethal gas in war—the arguments that poisonous gas is ineffective on the battlefield or that it is a result of some genetic revulsion towards asphyxiation shared by all humankind. Then he draws on his genealogy to build an alternative causal inference: the chemical weapons taboo, constructed in the aftermath of World War I, caused the end of all chemical warfare thirty years later (1997: 110). In making this argument, Price demonstrates the potential in using genealogy in building mid-range theories and making fairly mainstream causal claims. This potential may well become the standard in genealogical research in IR.

The philosophy of (social) science offers multiple understandings of causation defined as attribution to causes to observed associations (covariations or correlations). From the perspective of the age-old debate between “explanation” and “understanding”—

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393 See Asma (1996); Cartwright (2004) and Little (1991). As for Foucault, his conceptualization of causation varied, but it clear that he never condoned moncausality (i.e., direct correspondence between discourse and action) or idealism (i.e., “collective unconscious”). Related, he never declared that there is “nothing but discourse” or even “nothing outside discourse.” One reading has it that “Foucaultian genealogy…is a historical causal explanation that is material, multiple, and corporeal” (Gutting 2005c: 47, also see 40-1, cf. Deleuze 1988). On the status of reality, materiality, causation and puzzles in Foucault, see Alcoff (2005: 215-6), Burr (2003: Ch. 5), Diez (2001: 89-90), Fairclough (1992: 60-66), Flynn (1999: 37-8), Howarth (2005); Prado (2000: 25-30, 109, fn. 98) and Kendall and Wickham (1999: 39-46).
the so-called *Methodenstreit*—causation can be conceptualized on a single continuum.\footnote{IR debates often reflect larger and older philosophical debates on theories of human experience. The explanation-understanding debate dates back at least to Wilhelm Dilthey (Apel 1984; von Wright 1971). For philosophical discussions of the “reasons as causes” debate as well as the various causation schools (Galilean, Cartesian, Humean, Aristotelian, Weberian etc.), see Cartwright (2004); Little (1991); Turner and Roth (2002); Rorty (1979) and Roth (2002).}

One the one end are “explainers” who define causation as “invariance under treatment”—a mechanistic sequence of empirical occurrences which can be explained in terms of law-like patterns. In this view, once requirements such as independent existence, covariance and temporal asymmetry are met, it is possible to talk of necessary and sufficient conditions under which empirical occurrences obtain. On the other of the continuum are “understanders,” who see the nature of causation as constitutive. In this view, because all empirical events occur within a set of properties and processes in which human actors think and act, the purpose of causal analysis is to understand the ebb and flow in these properties and processes. Different conceptualizations are reflected in the types of research questions pursued by each camp: while explainers tend to focus on the “why?” and “how?” questions, understanders primarily deal with the “how-possible?” and “what?” questions.\footnote{This conceptualization draws from Wendt (1998: 103, 1999: 77-89; 2004) but is fairly mainstream in IR (Adler 2002, Alker 1984, Bartelson 1995; Dessler and Owen 2006; Doty 1993, 1996; Fierke 2005: 9-16; Hollis and Smith 2004; Kurki 2006; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Price 1997; Risse and Wiener 2001; Smith 2000; Weber 1996).}

As I suggested above, genealogy is particularly suited for the latter, but note that both explainers and understanders are self-regarded as bona fide social scientists, to the extent that they both see causation as subject to empirical investigations and that a theory should have consistent implications and engage empirical data in a consistent fashion.\footnote{Also note that both tend to believe in the uncertainty and underdetermination of all knowledge claims (i.e., all truth-claims are subject to revision).}
There have been many attempts to synthesize the explanation-understanding distinction and/or to subsume one vision with another. In IR, the debate has revolved over *one* question in particular: can—or should—constitutive theory be seen as a form of explanation?\textsuperscript{397} For the users of genealogy, the answer is the unpopular “it depends.” On the one hand, no account of a social item is complete without constitutive theory or that any explanation should ideally come in the form of constitutive theory. But on the other, it has been shown that there is no reason to reduce explanation to constitutive theory. My review of Price’s genealogy shows how the same research design, based on common evidentiary base can make both constitutive (the constitution of subjectivity in the nexus of technology and morality) and causal inferences (Hitler’s non-use of chemical weapons against Allied soldiers). In this case, the conceptualization of causation is a pragmatic decision undertaken within an ontologically open research design containing multiple explanatory interests. Genealogy, in Price’s application, stands as a methodologically non-specified research tool serving more than one ontological and/or causational domain. To the extent that this application is valid, one advantage of genealogy—its next claim to fame, if you will—might well prove to be in its relative openness to the ontological complexity of causal relationships under study.

The ontological proposition now becomes an epistemological matter since the co-existence of causal and constitutive theory within a single research design implies the

\textsuperscript{397} This attempt is made by Alexander Wendt (1999, 2004). On the post-positivist side, critics insist that constitution and explanation cannot mix (e.g., Smith 2000). Those from the positivist side contend that constitution is description – a valid, but secondary task of social science (e.g., Dessler and Owen 2006). Related is the attempt to subsume constitution under mechanistic causation, whereby the “how-possible?” and even “what?” questions are related to a set of antecedent conditions that permit a later outcome to occur. In this view, the conceptualization of causation is a matter of theoretical emphasis on permissive or “deep” or proximate or “shallow” causes.
desirability of an epistemological “middle ground” is desirable, can be seen as a step in the right direction for IR.\textsuperscript{398} For poststructuralists and some constructivists in IR, the middle ground is not necessarily desirable and is possibly an attempt to “positivize” IR. Causation, epistemologically speaking, runs directly counter to constitution (Campbell 1998b: 217-8; Hansen 2006: 1, 11, 25-8). In this view, all social phenomena, including the putatively causal effects of taboos, can be seen as the manifestations of constituted realities (e.g., Fierke 2005: 12). Epistemological positions like these can be traced to the Foucault effect and his bid to overthrow the entire representational metaphysics by shifting the status of the subject in social theory. As I said earlier, thanks to Foucault we have come to understand that the subject’s actions take place in discourses as well as that the subject is produced through discourses. For some users of Foucault’s toolkit in IR, the analysis of the discursive constitution of subject positions or identity relations is in fact the \textit{sine qua non} of inquiry, far more pressing than any traditional causal inference.

I want to dispute this position. In my local/minimalist foundationalist reading of it, the Foucauldian subject remains capable of resisting and choosing among the discursive practices that constitute it. The conditions under which this capability (contingency, creativity, etc) varies, in this view, cannot be assumed away but must be subjected to empirical scrutiny (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 109, 115). I contend here that the very effectiveness of genealogy—which poststructuralists see to be the main analytical goal—is a function of rather mundane methodological criteria such as

\textsuperscript{398} On the epistemological middle ground in IR, see Adler (2002); Smith (2000); Wendt (1999). On the variety of constructivisms outside IR, see Hacking (1999) and Searle (1995). On mid-range theorizing in IR, see Johnston (2005) and Risse and Wiener (2001).
reliability, validity and verification.\textsuperscript{399} To even make a bid at effectiveness, I submit, any genealogy must supply satisfactory answers to two basic questions. First, are arguments developed in a logically consistent way (i.e., do the conclusions follow from the explanatory logic and truth-claim conditions of the research methodology)? Second, are arguments rooted in the empirical evidence which can be validated in some way (i.e., are alternative explanations and objections anticipated)?

Consider three representative users of genealogy in IR (note): Jens Bartleson, who initially declares that his methodology must not be taken “too seriously” (1995: 78), goes at length on episode selection and scope conditions (Ibid.: 7-11, 78-87); Richard Price does the same but also adds a discussion of alternatives (1997: 3-4); and Lene Hansen tops both studies both by committing an entire chapter, and then some, on methodological trade-offs in genealogical scholarship (2006: 52-92, 217-20). Each study, in short, shows why genealogy is a methodology, rather than—as some critics would have it—impressionology or opinionology. Further, each of this works constitutes an empirical proof for my argument that the methodological differences between genealogy and traditional interpretative research tools are overstated. So while it is of course correct to argue that Foucault insisted how any criteria are always formulated within certain regimes of truth, be they positivist, post-positivistic, political, artistic, religious and so on, it is equally correct to point out that criteria are always necessary in order to halt the infinite regress and the paradox of denying all truth-claims that constitute knowledge. This leads me to a more general point: in order to talk about

\textsuperscript{399} Any work that attempts to induce meaning from the analysis can be seen as interpretativist. On the status of interpretation in the mainstream methodology, see (Fierke 2001: 127-33); Hopf (2002: Ch. 1); Milliken (1999); Price and Reus-Smith (1998); Risse and Wiener (1999); Silverman (2005); Wedeen (2004).
reality at all, we not only have to reduce it to symbols expressed as words, but we also have to assign certain chronological and geographical stability to each of these words.\textsuperscript{400}

Poststructuralists typically treat stabilizations as “analytical shortcuts,” “acts of faith in research,” “arrestations,” “temporary reification” or “strategic essentialization” and such treatments are said to based on practical, pragmatic or even pedagogical grounds (e.g., Hansen 2006: 19, fn.1). But the point, to paraphrase the second epigraph to this appendix, is that we cannot help but make stabilizations. In anything from conceptual categorization in the form of labels to full-blown formalization of empirical occurrences in terms of time, space, intensity, magnitude, presence/absence, similarity/difference, stability/change, cause and effect and so on, stabilizations are an inescapable part of any human action, including social and political thought. A recent review of Hansen’s \textit{Security as Practice} protests such stabilizations as unnecessary concessions to the mainstream IR made by a self-identified poststructuralist (Shepherd 2006: 656-7). The reviewer is patently unfair: while genealogy makes no stabilizations in principle, in practice it must, regardless of how “unapologetically superficial” or methodologically frivolous it claims to be (Walters 2000: 10; Bartleson 1995: 78). Even Foucault understood that in order to inquire about some intersubjective systems of meanings, one had to assume the stability other intersubjective systems of meanings.Crudely put, no meaningful analysis can make all meaning unstable at the same time.

Let me now bring the epistemological and ontological propositions together. While constitutive theory tends to more systematically reflect back on the meaning of any

\textsuperscript{400} From an epistemological standpoint, a claim that all meaning is unstable is indefensible: even the most anti-epistemological analysis must value some intellectually evaluative criteria – spelling and grammar in the exposition, consistency of the narrative and evidence.
stabilization made by theory, I posit, both causal and constitutive theories stabilize meanings since their foremost ontological task is to account for historically specific conditions in which subjects and objects are constituted. Once the theorization of being is stabilized, research can move onto epistemologically varied pursuits. For poststructuralists, this is typically a theorization of the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures (or agents and agents). For constructivists, this is typically a theorization of the causal conditions present in such relationships. Whether these conditions are seen as necessary and/or jointly sufficient or “productive,” “generative” and/or “adequate” entirely depends on the researcher’s conception of causation. Here too, I submit, the divide between poststructuralism and constructivism tends to be overdrawn.

As I said earlier, explainers define the cause as “invariance under treatment,” a conceptualization usually associated with the Humean philosophy of causation. In IR, many voices—usually belonging to self-declared poststructuralists—have described the Humean model as “rigid” (e.g., Hansen 2006: 10, 25). There are two ironies here. First, there is no such thing as a single Humean model of causation. The “invariance under treatment” theory has indeed dominated, via positivism, the mainstream social science. But there are several “new Hume” reading of Hume which question the invariance under treatment theory (Read and Richman, eds., 2007). In this sense, the Humean model is anything but rigid. The second irony is a poststructuralist call to abandon Hume might end up hurting poststructuralism. Specifically, causal pluralism has a potential to render a poststructuralist claim that constitutive theory is strictly non-causal less defensible or even paradoxical.
Consider the Aristotelian model, which is currently the main significant “Other” to the Humean conception of causation in IR. For the Aristotelians, causal questions are primarily ontological, not epistemological, which implies that constitutive analysis is simply one “form” of causal analysis, but that is “inseparable” from causal analysis.401 The idea of the productivity of discourse is a case in point. To say that discourses make the boundaries of social identity by rewarding/punishing actions that are congruent/deviant with those identities as well as by enabling/constraining what is possible is to imply that constitutive discourses are in some way causal. In this reading, every time one writes that a discourse X “produces” an identity Y, one is in fact making a causal truth-claim. The same goes for other ways of linking X to Y: “rewards/punishes,” “enables/constrains,” “implies,” “directs,” “shapes,” “favors,” “X has consequences/implications for Y” or “Y is dependent on X.”402 Some self-identified constructivists—as well as some self-identified poststructuralists—accept that such relationships can be seen as causal or at least “quasi-causal” (e.g., Hansen 2006: 31). From a “post-Humean” perspective on causation, this is a sensible position. But it is also logical from the perspective of research practice: as per ontological assumptions, X and Y are always mutually constituted, but empirical analysis usually focuses on one side of the relationship, while temprozing or bracketing the other. As I said earlier, no matter how ontologically tentative X and Y, once we write them down we always invest them with analytically operational—i.e., stabilized—identities and interaction patterns. Another


402 Even the very word “because,” according to one historian, “gives warning that causal explanation is at hand” (Hughes 1960: 28).
reason to refuse calling the X-Y relationship non-casual lies in the impossibility of falsifying the null hypothesis—that the relationship is, in fact, causal in the Humean sense. A strictly non-causal claim would be X (probably) means Y, but (probably) not Z. In this reading, to the dismay of many poststructuralists, one effect of greater causal pluralism may be a formalization of constitutive analysis. So while poststructuralists are right to argue that explaining causation cannot be divorced from understanding meaning, they should also recognize the flip side of their argument—understanding meaning cannot proceed without causal inferences.

A general drawback to thinking in terms of binary oppositions such as causal vs. constitutive theory, understanding vs. explanation or, for that matter, constructivism vs. poststructuralism is the lack of sensitivity to possible complementarities. Given the ontological complexity of the social world, any theory should prefer the pluralistic “both-and” over the dualistic “either-or.” And while no single research design should ever be expected to answer all ontologically relevant questions concerning any given phenomenon—the whys, the hows, the whats, and the how-possibles?—a composite methodology which seeks to account for constitution and causation should be seen as both possible and useful. Based on the preceding arguments, genealogy may be exactly one such methodology. Because it is able to shift emphases among different kinds of causal inferences, genealogy can be applied anywhere from highly contextualized understandings of constitutions to historical causal explanations. Epistemologically

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403 X, Y, and Z are not to be confused a type of constitutive analysis that focuses on the intersubjective context “C” (Searle 1995). Here, an analysis of the relationship between a discourse “X” and identity “Y” leads to a conclusion that that X renders Y in C. For instance, a same-sex couple from Whitehorse was constituted as married (Y) by a decision of the Supreme Court (X) in Yukon Territory (C).
varied truth-claims may come to yield an explanatory whole greater than the sum of its parts.

CONCLUSION

Each research program positions itself—and keeps its uniqueness—by making theoretical arguments, not by claiming sovereignty over its preferred research tools. In this appendix, I have suggested that no methodology should be epistemologically disabled *a priori*. Specifically, I have argued that genealogy should not be seen as a primer of Foucauldian antiscience, but as a research strategy for making standard social science truth claims similar to the mainstream qualitative research tools.

In IR, genealogy is typically employed to analyze the ways in which agents and structures are constituted within historically and culturally specific sites, by drawing attention to contingency and, especially, the productive power of discourse. In the reading offered here, however, there is nothing to prevent a genealogist from exploring puzzles and providing new and/or alternative narratives on a variety of research problems: while genealogy can be seen as a principle—and principled—research tool for tackling the “how-possible?” and “what?” questions, it can also be seen as tool for dealing with the “why?” and “how?” questions. In fact, because it can be used in the pursuit of more than one type of causal connection, I have concluded, genealogy may yield a more complete causal inference overall. Such broader view of genealogy is desirable precisely because the political and ethical commitments that follow our analysis never come from either explanation or understanding, but usually from both at once.
Note

The purpose of this appendix is not to scrutinize an unbiased sample of representative book-length genealogies in IR, to contribute to a “genealogy of genealogy in IR” or even provide a literature review (e.g., Milliken 1999). Sampling was based on a chronological spread and the variation in the types of research questions and/or epistemological commitments. I am not personally acquainted with the authors at the time of the writing.

Jens Bartelson’s *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* has the status of a genealogy primer in IR (Sterling-Folker, ed., 2006: 172-5, 329-30; Milliken 1999: 246-8). The book explores twofold question: how is sovereignty spoken into existence through history and what implications do these utterances have for world politics today (p. 4)? Following the constitution of sovereignty over time, Bartelson shows how sovereignty was historically constructed and reified in terms of the inside/outside boundaries. Richard Price’s *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* is equally well-regarded in the discipline. In this book, the author asks what makes chemical weapons “morally illegitimate” and why do we see them as “different”? (p.1). Using a combination of counterfactual reasoning and historical analysis of key episodes such as the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, he shows how the chemical weapons taboo emerged in the social constructions of identity and order (p. 3, 12, 108, 164). Lene Hansen’s *Security as Practice* (2006) is a recent addition to the genealogical research program in IR. After extensive theorization and methodologization of the links between identity, foreign policy and discourse, the author traces the Western debate on the Balkans from the 1870s to 1995. She shows how different representations of Bosnia and the Balkans produced different Western interventions in the Bosnian War (p. 11, 147, 214).
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

No one has seriously taken Foucault’s call to “read everything,” not even Foucault. Any
DA dealing abundant source material must make hard research choices and chose its
sampling strategies. To my knowledge, the most monumental empirical treatment of
social discourse in a large geographical and temporal context belongs to Marc Angenot
(1989), whose “story of the year” 1899 is told from a sample of 1,200 books, 150 daily
newspapers and 400 hundred periodicals. My DA, as I explain in this short essay, was
far less ambitious. My four empirical chapters – which, combined, tell six stories of the
year from five national perspectives – rely on 50 books, 40 daily newspapers and 80
periodicals. As said in Chapter 3, my data set/archive of closely analyzed primary source
texts in the entire dissertation consists of nearly three thousand highly selective, but
representative units of text: 800 for Chapter 4, 500 hundred for Chapter 5, 900 hundred
for Chapter 6, 700 for Chapter 7.

For theoretical reasons explained in Chapter 3, my DA proceeded in three steps,
each corresponding to a level of the content and contestation of identity: society, debates
and decision. This essay explains my research choices and sampling strategies for each
empirical chapter, following with a full primary source bibliography. Because I submitted that the secondary literature serves to substantiate – as well as corroborate – the findings of my DA, it follows that I should write a historiographic essay as well. I refrain from doing so here because such exercise would stretch not only the valuable space, but also the disciplinary norms.

As I said in Chapter 2, my source selection was based on circulation, region and political orientation (place on the right-left continuum and/or level of “independence”) – the dimensions which have been referenced in standard guides on national literatures as well as subject to social historical analysis (e.g., Koss 1981). Informally, newspapers and periodicals were sometimes ranked the “quality” of readership. The latter rankings helped me exclude publications perceived as extreme and thus unrepresentative of the discourses and debates of interest. For example, for the British data on Venezuela II, I excluded the pro-American *The Spectator* and the anti-American (and pro-Venezuelan) *Saturday Review* (Allen 1969: 576; Gerlach 2001: 16; cf., Koss 1981; Mott 1968; Potter 2003). Documentary sources like these favour the voices of journalists and for that reason I tried to mine letters written by more ordinary citizens (“letters to the editor”), wherever possible. To randomize my DA of newspapers and periodicals, I consulted one random edition of each media source per month (or quarter).

Historical research has become easier in the digital age. To generate a basic dataset or archive of newspaper and newsmagazine articles, I started with the available

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404 For Chapter 4, e.g., see *Review of Reviews*, December 30, 1904, 604-5 or publications such as *Newspaper Press Directory* and *Nineteenth Century Readers Guide*. 

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electronic, full-text, word-searchable online databases. Basic keywords searches helped me get a handle on special coverage of major events. An event was defined deductively, using common historical knowledge (e.g., Election + 1894), whereby texts on intramural foreign relations (e.g., “Corinto Occupied”) were excluded from the archive analyzed in the first step. The same principle applied to the additional search selecting on major events of general interest in the period under study (e.g., McKinley + Assassination; Queen Victoria + Jubilee/Death; Gladstone + Death and so on). Where sources were non-digitized and/or where my digital search yielded small and/or biased samples, I resorted to squinting through microfilm reader at the following libraries: Ohio State (Columbus, OH), Griffith University (Brisbane), Libraries and Archives Canada (Ottawa), the National Library of Australia (Canberra) and the British Library Newspapers (London). To access rare books, I went to the British Library.

To identify the bestselling works of fiction and non-fiction at the time, I considered book review sections in the newspapers and periodicals and compared them to secondary sources, such as the so-called histories of the book (e.g., Hackett 1967). Where weekly best-seller lists were not available or ambiguous, I consulted “monthly list of books in most demand” in public libraries. For example, in Chapter 6, Canadian bestsellers in 1955 were helpfully discussed in a reflection on the state of national libraries (Whalley, ed., 1956: 115-127). For the historical period examined in Chapter 6, histories of the book are yet to be written, but the bestseller data is readily accessible

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405 Standard databases included Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, ProQuest, Times Digital Archive, InfoTract, C19, Nineteenth Century Masterfile, PCI, Harpweek, American Periodical Series, America’s Historical Newspapers, Making of America, and Periodicals Archive Online. Note that databases are frequently overlapping and subsuming others and that additional ones are created every year (some were not available through subscription and/or were not functional at the time of my research).
online. For British bestsellers, I looked at data provided by Nielsen BookScan (formerly Whitaker BookTrack; no equivalent in Canada at the time) as well as the lists supplied by *The Guardian* and *The Times*. For similar lists in Canada I turned to *Maclean’s* and *Globe and Mail*, supplemented by book reviews.

**Chapter 4** looked at the texts produced and consumed by the Anglo-American elites at the turn of the twentieth century, focusing on the years 1894 and 1900. The first analytical sample began with a series of keyword searches in standard online databases of historical newspapers and newsmagazine. To diversify this sample – and to minimize the bias in favor of *The New York Times*, *Nation* and *Harper’s* in the US sample and *The Times* in Britain – as well as to roughly equalize the number of texts across national samples, I consulted *Literary Digest* and *Public Opinion* (which were particularly diverse as they contain summaries of editorials and articles from various regions in both the US and Britain) and the three British broadsheets: *Westminster Gazette*, *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Morning Post*. For periodicals, I turned to *Atlantic Monthly*, *Contemporary Review*, *Economist*, *Fortnightly Review*, *Forum*, *Harper’s*, *National Review*, *Nineteenth Century* (and *Nineteenth Century After*), *North American Review*, *Observer*, and (*American Monthly*) *Review of Reviews*. Note that many of these publications catered to transatlantic audiences (Mott 1957: 131-34, 225-30).

In the second analytical step, I considered texts left by foreign policy officials. These can be loosely grouped into public (party platforms, legislative debates, public memoranda, speeches, and publications by foreign-policy decision-makers dealing with things foreign) and private (correspondences, diaries, and inner government documents
such as the memoranda prepared for cabinet meetings, minutes and personal notes – texts that were not publicly available at the time). Both types of sources from this period are available in multiple formats. Key British government records were read at the National Archive at Kew, either in print or the microform. Additional data on the Venezuela crises came from the contemporary journalistic coverage, using the techniques described above. (Judging by the presence of newspaper clippings in private and public records, the press greatly mattered for decision-makers). Secondary sources on public opinion (in the retrospective sense) were helpful, especially those offering national comparatives (e.g., Seed 1958, 1968). In this chapter, as well as Chapters 4 and 5, particularly useful was the popular FRUS - Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.

Chapter 5 dealt with trans-Tasman texts in what can be seen as the Long 1950 (unless noted otherwise, all dates in the chapter refer to 1950). The Australian sample included a dozen newspapers and newsmagazines: The Advertiser (Adelaide), The Age (Melbourne), and The Argus (Melbourne, defunct since 1957), The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, Australian Journal (defunct since 1962), Australian Quarterly (defunct since 1967), Man: Australian Magazine for Men (defunct since 1974), Walkabout (also defunct since 1974), the special “70-year Pageant” Number of The Bulletin (February 1) and literary magazines Southerly and Meanjin. For published works of fiction and non-fiction, I turned to Nevil Shute’s A Town Like Alice, Frank Hardy’s Power Without

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406 As a rule of thumb, I focused on the documents in Cabinet Office (CAB), Foreign Office (FO), and Colonial Office (CO) concerning Venezuela in 1894-6 and 1902-3. Among these, I generally consulted typed letters, memos and minutes, i.e., the equivalent of those published in FRUS. When appropriate, I consulted at hand-written texts, such as comments left by senior officials, on the back, margins, and various printed attachments.
Glory, Frank Clune’s Ashes of Hiroshima and John Tierney’s (aka Brian James) The Advancement of Spencer Button. The NZ sample included one (literary) magazine, three books (two histories and one young adult novel) and four main dailies, respectively: Landfall, William Pember Reeves’ The Long White Cloud (1950 reprint), Harold Miller’s New Zealand, Colin Rich’s Teko-Teko in Waitomo, The Dominion (Wellington), The New Zealand Herald (Auckland), The Otago Daily Times (Dunedin) and The Press (Christchurch).

In the second analytical step, I read the same newspapers and newsmagazines, though without randomization and focusing on articles on foreign relations. This sample was augmented by a reading of specialist magazines such as Current Notes on International Affairs (Canberra). In the last analytical step, I process-traced the drafting of ANZUS, using private and public documents left behind by decision-makers, all of which were read at the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and the National Archive in Kew. In the Australian National Library, paper collections of Percy Spender (MS 4875) and Robert Menzies (MS 4936) were particularly useful. Among the published documents, my main references was Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: The ANZUS Treaty, 1951 edited by Holdich, Johnson, and Andre. For NZ, I mostly relied on the published documentary material in DNZER volumes as well as Ian McGibbon’s Unofficial Channels, a collection of the correspondence among what was basically a four-person foreign policy team in the period under study. To corroborate – as well as substantiate – my analysis, I looked at David McIntyre’s seminal Background to the Anzus Pact, which
covers the treaty from its blueprints, though all drafts, ending with a look of the
diplomacy and politics of signing and ratification.

Chapter 6 looked at Australia and Canada from two temporal perspectives, 1955 and
1964. The selection of the Australian sample followed that described in the previous
chapter, but was expanded to include more than a dozen newspapers and newsmagazines:
The Advertiser (Adelaide), The Age (Melbourne), and The Argus (for 1955), The
Australian (Canberra, for 1964), The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald,
Australian Journal (for 1955), Australian Quarterly, Man: Australian Magazine for Men,
Meanjin, Overland, Quadrant (for 1964), Southerly and Walkabout. For books in 1955, I
turned to two histories: Alexandra Hasluck’s Portrait with a Background and a
university-level textbook edited by Gordon Greenwood, Australia: a Social and Political
History (reprinted until 1975, including in 1965). For the year 1964, I read Donald
Horne’s Lucky Country, Henry Johnston’s My Brother Jack and the paper edition of John
O’Grady’s (aka Nino Culotta) They’re a Weird Mob.

The Canadian sample was bilingual. For the English language texts, I looked in
Globe & Mail (Toronto), The Toronto Star, Montreal Gazette, Canadian Dimension (for
1964), Canadian Home Journal (for 1955), Chatelaine, and Maclean’s; in French, I read
Le Devoir (Montreal), Le Magazine Maclean (for 1964), and La Revue populaire (for
1955). Additional texts included, for 1955: the volume two of Donald Grant
Creighton’s biography of John A. Macdonald, Pierre Berton’s Golden Trail: the Story of

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407 I excluded the widely read Canadian editions of American magazines like Time and Reader’s Digest, which offered many Canadian advertisements, but not many Canadian opinions and editorials.
the Klondike Rush, a collection of essays on Our Sense of Identity edited by Malcolm Ross, the proceedings of the Conference of Canadian Writers in Kingston and three history textbooks used in the primary and secondary education curricula in several anglophone provinces, at different school grades: Canada in the Western World, North America and the Modern World and The Story Of Canada. For 1964, I added W.L. Morton’s The Kingdom of Canada, Frank Underhill’s Image of Confederation, Margaret Laurence’s Stone Angel and Hugh MacLennan’s Two Solitudes, which had just become available in French and therefore turned into a cultural event.

In the second analytical step, I revisited the aforementioned sources but I zoomed in on reports and reflections on foreign relations. This was augmented by the analysis of specialist publications and the international affairs debates in Hansard (quotations of parliamentary speeches are from lower chambers, except where otherwise states). In the last analytical step, I process-traced the Suez and Vietnam decision, using private and public documents left behind by decision-makers, many of which were read at the relevant national archives and libraries in Canberra and Ottawa.

Chapter 7, covering Britain and Canada, from January 2002 to March 2003, began with a selection of three non-fiction bestsellers shared between two national samples – Michael Moore’s Stupid White Men, Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919 (published in Britain as Peacemakers) and Roy Jenkins’ Churchill (Maclean’s described the latter as “[t]he finest book published in the past 12 months” April 22, 2002). In terms of newsmedia, for the British sample, I considered The Daily/Sunday Telegraph, The Economist (Britain section), The Guardian/Observer, The Scotsman (Glasgow), The
Independent, The Times and The Spectator. The sample of book-length texts included two history textbooks, one nationally-used high school advanced-level “core” text (Walsh 2001) and another a history of London for children (Bailey and Maynard 2000) plus Iain Sinclair’s travelogue of sorts London Orbital. For bestselling fiction, I turned to three novels - Allison Pearson’s I Don't Know How She Does It, Ben Elton’s High Society and Zadie Smith’s The Autograph Man.

The Canadian sample followed the same randomization and included The Globe & Mail, The National Post, Le Devoir, Maclean’s and L’actualité. Two of my sources are works of literature. Carol Shields’ Unless is a best-selling novel published by a Canadian author in the period under study and a selection of short stories from The Journey Prize Anthology. For high school history textbooks, I selected two dealing with modern history, both of which were in circulation in most provinces and were available in French (though not part of the Quebec curriculum): Newman (2000) and Fielding and Evans (2000). I added a history of Canada for children (Hacker 2002). Another non-fiction bestseller in this sample was How to Be a Canadian, a satire by the Ferguson brothers.

For the second analytical step, I considered foreign affairs sections of the aforementioned newsmedia sources as well as the parliamentary debates on international affairs debates. In terms of specialist publications, for Britain, I turned to London-based think tanks specializing in foreign policy: the Foreign Policy Centre (“Reports”), Royal

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408 In the latter, I closely analyzed the stories by Leah Postman, Robert McGill, Neil Smith and Emma Donoghue because they spoke most directly to the period under study or, in the words of the compilers of the anthology, because they constituted the “raw material from which versions of our country (its sensibilities, its possibilities…) and our time (its morals, its culture…) might be reconstructed” (Alexis et al 2002: xi).

In the last analytical step, I process-traced British and Canadian Iraq decisions, using a combination of press conference transcripts, press releases/briefings, parliamentary debates, publicly available interviews and freshly written “insider accounts.” While most internal government documents will be hidden from the view of the public for another three decades, a great deal of data has been made available, whether through official bureaucratic and semi-judicial inquiries, leaked documents or published memoirs and diaries.

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409 The Iraq war, perhaps more than any recent war, has received an avalanche of journalistic accounts – often written by the individuals who happen to be more on the inside of the political process than some elected representatives. British road to Iraq has inspired a variety of such reflections, from the official inquiries like the Hutton Report to the self-declared “mid-Atlantic” accounts like Naughtie’s all the way to theatre plays, such as David Hare’s “Stuff Happens,” which dominated London’s National Theatre in 2004.
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