THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, DEGREES OF INCLUSION AS EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICES OF LABOR ELITES.

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Despite a long tradition of research on class politics, the labor movement, socialism, and related subjects, there is still no comprehensive explanation for why different national labor movements opted for varying ways of entering the political arena. This dissertation fills that void by developing and testing a theory for the emergence of social democracy and competing models of labor politics. On the basis of a comprehensive typology, it accounts for the formation of different types of social democratic parties – quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary – as well as for the failure of social democracy that coincides with the embrace of either insurrectionism (through a bolshevik or an anarchist-syndicalist type) or moderate syndicalism as alternative models.

I argue that these varying ways for labor to enter the political arena emerge as optimal choices of labor elites in response to varying degrees of labor inclusion as a set of external constraints. This encountered environment is defined by the extent of labor’s institutional and behavioral integration into some given polity. When labor elites make suboptimal choices due to the effects of exogenous factors on their decision-making process, outcomes move ‘off the equilibrium path’.

The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation to test the suggested theory extends to all sufficiently industrialized and independent polities during the late 19th and early 20th century. It involves a systematic assessment of socio-economic data, constitutional and other legal documents, party statutes, party programs, as well as programmatic statements from leading labor movement elites. I show that labor elites made generally optimal choices in the vast majority of cases. Varying degrees of labor inclusion as a causally determining external constraint therefore correctly predict the outcome in 17 out of 20 investigated countries. An additional analysis of cases that are ‘off the equilibrium path’ accounts systematically for the sources of suboptimal decision-making.
Gewidmet meinen Eltern,
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”

Karl Marx, I8th Brumaire (1852)

“(Social democracy) is a revolutionary but not a revolution-making party. (…) Our task is not to organize the revolution, but to organize ourselves for the revolution.”

Karl Kautsky, The road to power (1909)

"(To establish) a distinct Labour group in Parliament, who shall have their own whips, and agree upon their policy, which must embrace a readiness to co-operate with any party which for the time being may be engaged in promoting legislation in the direct interests of labour"

James Keir Hardie, Motion to the first conference of the Labour Representation Committee (1900)

“The organizations of revolutionaries must consist first and foremost of people whose profession is that of a revolutionary. (…) Give us an organization of revolutionaries, and we shall overturn the whole of Russia!”

Lenin, What is to be done? (1902)

“(F)reedom can be created only by freedom, that is, by a universal rebellion on the part of the people and free organization of the toiling masses from the bottom up.”

Mikhail Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy (1873)

“The Federation has maintained that economic organization is adequate to deal with all of the problems of wage-earners. Its political action is simply to utilize the functions of trade unions in another field.”

Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (1924)
Kautsky, Hardie, Lenin, Bakunin and Gompers offer an eclectic variety of solutions for the same task: how to advance the interests of the emerging working-class in the political arena. The models suggested by Kautsky and Hardie have become the most popular ones in the labor movements of the late 19th and early 20th century. Both of them entail the formation of mass-based social democratic parties, and the call for socialism as a fundamental objective. But the strategies suggested to achieve that goal feature important differences. Hardie stands for evolutionary progress toward socialism, within the existing institutional environment, while Kautsky envisions a type of social democratic party that combines a rhetorical emphasis on revolutionary change with pragmatic efforts of mobilization and organization building.

It is well established that the emergence of labor movements is the result of industrialization, a process which created a new social and political actor with its own unique interests and demands. However, despite extensive research on the topic of labor politics, there is still no comprehensive explanation for why various national labor movements opted for different ways of advancing their agenda. Why has the formation of social democratic parties become the most frequently chosen model for labor’s presence in the political arena? Why have labor movements in the vast majority of cases embraced either one of the two types of social democracy, rather than the alternative models suggested by Lenin, Bakunin, and Gompers? On the other hand, why has the formation of social democratic parties failed in some cases, in favor of either one of those competing approaches into the arena of politics?

The goal of this dissertation is to provide a general explanation for the emergence of social democratic parties during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. That fundamental research interest translates into two more specific questions. First of all, why have social democratic parties been formed at all in most cases, while they failed in a minority of instances? An explanation for why in some cases, labor elites predominantly opted for other ways to enter the political arena – either one of the models suggested by Lenin, Bakunin, and Gompers – is crucial for delineating the conditions under which social democracy is most likely to fail or to succeed. Secondly, whenever social democracy did emerge, why have social democratic parties been founded in different varieties? What can explain the embrace of a quasi-revolutionary party type, as it is outlined by Kautsky, in some cases, and the foundation of evolutionary social democracy, for which Hardie stands, in others?

My response to these questions translates Marx’ observation from his ‘18th Brumaire’ into a fundamental premise for the explanation of variation in labor politics: the actions of those individuals that founded social democratic parties, or alternatively, embraced other ways of channeling labor’s demands into the political arena, responded to an environment created by others. Their choices cannot be understood without taking the nature of this environment into account. My argument, however, is not a deterministic one: the given circumstances Marx refers to, create a context, or a set of external constraints, within which
conscious actors make decisions, but the circumstances alone do not determine their choices. The explanation I am suggesting also extends to those instances, where choices for some model of labor politics don’t match theoretical predictions derived from underpinning ‘structural’ determinants.

I argue that varying ways for labor to enter the political arena occur as choices of labor elites in response to varying degrees of labor inclusion. Labor inclusion as the ‘encountered environment’ is defined by the extent of labor’s institutional and behavioral integration into some given polity. It represents the external constraints on labor elites’ decision making process about how to advance the interests of their constituency in the arena of politics. When labor elites make optimal choices, the model of labor politics they adopt can be predicted through an assessment of labor inclusion as the ‘encountered environment’. When labor elites make suboptimal choices due to the effects of exogenous factors on their decision-making process, outcomes move ‘off the equilibrium path’. I understand optimality as a choice for a model of labor politics that provides the most rewarding ratio of costs and benefits in some given environment. When labor inclusion is at the comparatively highest level, moderate syndicalism, as it is suggested by Gompers, is the optimal response. Insurrectionism, either through Lenin’s bolshevism, or through anarchism-syndicalism, associated with Bakunin, is the optimal model of labor politics in an environment of comparatively lowest inclusion. Social democratic parties represent the optimal choice of labor elites to the two categories of inclusion located in the middle: when labor inclusion is low, quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal model; when it is higher, evolutionary social democracy is optimal. The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation will reveal that in the vast majority of cases, actors made decisions that are to be expected on the basis of circumstances “transmitted from the past”: in 17 out of 20 investigated cases – a comprehensive set of sufficiently industrialized countries – labor elites adopted a model of labor politics that represents an optimal response to a particular degree of labor inclusion. An analysis into exogenous effects on labor elites’ decision-making process will provide a systematic explanation for the factors that moved the three remaining outcomes ‘off the equilibrium path’. It will also provide the opportunity to understand, how in some of the cases characterized by generally optimal choices, labor elites made specific decisions that decreased the degree of success, or institutionalization, accomplished through the model of labor politics they adopted.

**Alternative explanations**

Other than the argument sketched here, the existing explanations for social democratic party formation are exclusively structural and deterministic: they relate a particular aspect of the environment encountered by the labor movement at large to the variety of observable outcomes. A ‘socio-economic’ approach was first explicitly suggested by Bull (1922) and later extended by Galenson (1952). From this
perspective, the scope and pace of industrialization represent the encountered circumstances that trigger labor’s decisions about how to channel workers’ interests into the political arena. The ‘status system’ approach, associated most prominently with Lipset (1983) and John Kautsky (2002), grants that role to national variations in the strength of the aristocracy and the pervasiveness of feudal status systems.

The determinism of both approaches prevents them from acknowledging that the encountered circumstances only provide an environment for the choices made by labor elites. The agency of labor elites itself is not systematically included into the suggested explanations. This is problematic for two major reasons: first of all, it results in the formulation of theories that do not spell out their fundamental behavioral underpinning. The conditions, under which agents translate a specific environment into a choice predicted by an analysis of that environment, remain unspecified. Second, it prevents us from systematically explaining those cases, where the observable choices deviate from the predictions formulated on the basis of a structural theory. On top of that, the exclusive focus on structural variables also informs the way in which both approaches conceive of the environment encountered by labor. Neither the status system nor the socio-economic approach acknowledges the importance of behavioral elements for the characterization of this environment, for example the behavior of the state executive or the behavior of competing political parties, toward labor.

The foundation for any good theory should be an adequate conceptualization of the phenomenon one is interested in explaining. The typologies of social democratic parties developed by the existing theories do not meet that standard. Both the status system and the socio-economic approach categorize social democratic parties as either ‘radical’ or ‘reformist’ in nature. This lack of complexity is not a problem in itself, since parsimony is naturally an important goal of theory formulation. The exclusion of certain features of an outcome one wishes to explain from a phenomenological description is problematic, when it biases the theory or prevents the detection of an important causal relation. Both these approaches reduce the typology of social democratic party types to a crude description of their ideological orientation. The reference to evolutionary social democracy as ‘reformist’ underestimates the crucial emphasis of this party type on socialism as the fundamental objective. Identifying quasi-revolutionary social democracy as ‘radical’ evades its pragmatic, legalistic, and reformist features. A sufficient explanation for the relationship between encountered circumstances and labor elites’ choices requires a more complex phenomenology: one that spells out ideological variations in a more systematic fashion and that also includes a description of organizational differences. Only on the basis of such a typology is it possible to

1 See Sartori (1970) for a classic contribution on the importance of concept formation. See also Collier and Mahoney (1993), and Goertz (2005a)
understand the respective effects of different sets of variables, or in other words, different features of the environment encountered by labor elites, on specific aspects of labor elites’ choices.

Both approaches to social democratic party formation are characterized by another crucial fallacy: they do not distinguish explicitly between models of labor politics and any given organization’s extent of mobilization success. The choice for a particular model of labor politics might lead to more or less success in mobilizing the targeted worker constituency. But it is very important to acknowledge that no specific model is inherently superior to another one in guaranteeing an optimum of mobilization. The relative success of any given model of labor politics depends on the environment to which it is adopted, but also on a number of exogenous factors that are noted by contributions from the literature on class formation, most succinctly Katznelson (1986): the effects of linguistic and religious cleavages as alternative sources of political mobilization, but also the pervasiveness and extent of industrialization itself. Lipset (1983) as an example for the status system approach as well as Bull (1922) and Galenson (1952) for the socio-economic theory of party formation, associate greater radicalism with higher mobilization success. John Kautsky’s (2002) failure to disaggregate these two factors is even more apparent, since he identifies varying “degrees of socialism” as his dependent variable. Disentangling “forms of labor politics” and “degrees of mobilization success” is a prerequisite for investigating the interaction of the two concepts, and for delineating the respective effects of potential explanatory variables on either one of these phenomena.

The existing explanations are also plagued by deriving their generalizations from a limited universe of cases. This would not be problematic, if the choice of cases did not compromise the suggested theories and the substantive conclusions derived from them. I believe, however, that in these two instances of theory building, the underpinning selection of cases does just that. The explicit formulation of a socio-economic explanation by Galenson (1952) and Bull (1922) largely builds on a comparison of Sweden and Norway. But the suggested causality between the nature of industrialization and party formation has also found its way into more encompassing theoretical statements, as well as a large number of case studies and historical narratives. Only a wider comparative perspective is able to reveal that the causal relation between variation in the nature of industrialization and social democratic party formation suggested by the socio-economic approach is a spurious one.

The status system approach is rooted in the analysis of American ‘exceptionalism’. An idiosyncratic explanation for the US case, which is characterized by the absence of a feudal status system, is taken as the logical point of departure for an encompassing theory of party formation. The failure to subject its theoretical propositions to a systematic and more encompassing empirical test also veils the inadequacy of

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See for example Totten (1966) for the case of Japan. Almost every case study I encountered, historical or topical, establishes some sort of causal connection between features of industrialization and the choice for a particular model of labor politics. The earlier work of Lipset (1963) and Kornhauser (1959) are examples for broader applications of the socio-economic approach.
the status system approach as a comprehensive explanation for social democratic party formation. The causal relation between remnants of feudalism and social democratic party formation is not spurious, however. It represents an incomplete explanation, because the status system approach fails to take into account that repression of labor does not only occur through the aristocracy. It can also result from the unwillingness of a politically dominant bourgeoisie to grant concessions to labor, for example in Belgium, and the Netherlands. Moreover, in other cases, for instance Russia and Japan, feudal repression was so strong that labor predominantly opted for insurrectionist rather than social democratic approaches into the political arena.

The explanation for social democratic party formation suggested here responds to the pitfalls of the existing approaches. First, labor elites are systematically included into the suggested explanation, and the environment they encounter is treated as a set of external constraints for their choices about the adoption of a particular model of labor politics. The interaction between this context and the agency of labor elites is systematically accounted for. Second, I provide an adequate phenomenology of social democratic parties and alternative models of labor politics as the foundation for the proposed theory that distinguishes between function, goals, strategies (means), and forms of organization. Third, on that basis, I am able to delineate, how different aspects of the environment encountered by labor elites, political and socio-economic variables, affect different elements of these models of labor politics. Fourth, I distinguish conceptually between ‘forms of labor politics’ and ‘degrees of mobilization success’. The focus of the empirical analysis is on an explanation for qualitative variations in models of labor politics exclusively, while ‘degrees of mobilization’ will be employed as an indicator for evaluating the choices made by labor elites. And eventually, the suggested explanation is applied to the entire universe of cases from the late 19th and early 20th century, in which social democratic party formation was possible.

This dissertation develops an innovative approach to explain social democratic party formation along with an exhaustive empirical test. But in addition to that, I will also provide evidence for my claims about the inadequacy of existing approaches by subjecting them to an empirical verification in the same set of cases. This evaluation of alternative approaches will reveal that out of a universe of 20 cases, within which social democratic party formation was possible, the socio-economic and the status system explanation only predict 11. Labor inclusion, which I suggest alternatively as the most important feature of the environment encountered by labor elites, taken as a causally determining external constraint, accounts for a total of 17 cases.

The following second chapter will contain a more extensive evaluation of these two competing explanations for social democratic party formation, and the way in which the analysis conducted here responds to their shortcomings. In that context, we are also going to see that there is a wide variety of contributions, which pursue research in related, or adjacent fields, while their specific explanatory interest
is different from the one pursued here. A broad class formation framework, for example, seeks to account for ‘overall syndromes’ in the character of the left, while I am interested in explaining the actual formation of specific manifestations of labor politics in general, and social democratic parties in particular. Other contributions are interested in the explanation of social democratic party transformation rather than the initial establishment of social democracy. A particularly eclectic research tradition is interested in historical accounts for the emergence of the labor movement at large. There is an even wider variety of ‘adjacent’ fields of research that will be reviewed in the following chapter. At that point, I will outline in more detail, how these contributions relate to the causal argument and explanatory interest pursued here. I am also going to use findings from these perspectives to sketch the substantive context, from which social democratic party formation occurred and within which my suggested theory is located.

Social democratic party formation as the ‘dependent variable’

The empirical analysis into the formation of varying models of labor politics conducted here extends to the initial formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. Once labor elites have opted predominantly for one particular model of labor politics and institutionalized it successfully, all ensuing developments with respect to social democratic parties are considered stages in the transformation of social democracy. The starting point for the empirical analysis conducted here therefore varies for the included cases, as it depends on the initial emergence of the labor movement and the case specific entry of labor into the political arena. The overall cut off point for my analysis is the year 1919. After that point in time, a number of new developments have changed the general context for the choices of labor elites, among other things the emergence of corporatist forms of labor inclusion or the wide diffusion of communism as a new alternative in labor politics. It is, of course, impossible to exclude all intervening variables from a comparative analysis. However, by using 1919 as the chronological end point, at least these two and a number of other factors can be ‘held constant’.

It is for this particular period of time that I wish to explain the formation of different types of social democratic parties, as well as the absence of social democracy. In the latter case, a ‘positive’ explanation for the embrace of alternative models of labor politics is designed as the flipside, or the logical extension, to an explanation for the non-formation of social democracy. The theory I am suggesting to explain these

3 See for example Katznelson (1986), Bartolini (2000), and Mikkelsen (1996, 2005)
5 See Kocka (1983), Abendroth (1972), or the edited volume by van der Linden and Rojahn (1990)
6 Other ‘external’ factors include the nature of the international environment, improvements in communication technology, the full inclusion of women into the political process, the erosion of isolated socio-cultural milieux, to name just a few. For general discussions of the ‘many variables, few cases’ problem see Lijphart (1971); King, Keohane and Verba (1994); and Brady and Collier (eds.) (2004)
phenomena thus requires a typology of different models of labor politics during the initial formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena as a conceptualization of my ‘dependent variable’. This typology entails a description of five different models of labor politics, which were previously introduced through the statements of Kautsky (quasi-revolutionary social democracy), Hardie (evolutionary social democracy), Gompers (moderate syndicalism), as well as Lenin (bolshevism), and Bakunin (anarchism-syndicalism), who represent two types of insurrectionism. An extensive conceptualization of these competing models, summarized in table 2, also contains, for additional clarification, a comparative assessment of those social democratic party types that emerged from the transformation stage – reformist and pragmatic social democracy.

Based on the research about party institutionalization, I argue that party formation or the establishment of an alternative model of labor politics is successful, when the new organization assumes the following three characteristics. First of all, successful party formation requires the establishment of an ideological model that becomes dominant within the organization. Ideology is therefore not treated as an abstract set of ideas, but as a practical tool for the social integration of members, activists, and the party’s constituency. This means that labor elites need to devise an ideological model that responds effectively to the demands of their potential supporters, as they are shaped by the existing environment. The concept of ideology emerges from the formulation of goals and the means, or strategies, suggested to accomplish these goals. In the second place, the party also needs to have implemented a feasible organizational model that sustains the continuous maintenance of its functions. Just as the ideological underpinning, an adequate organizational model needs to respond effectively to the external constraints faced by the party and its leaders. And in the third place, on top of these two ‘internal’ features, a certain threshold of ‘external’ public support needs to be crossed in order to consider party formation to be successful.

In addition to this perspective on party institutionalization that is concerned with a minimum threshold for considering a party to be formed successfully, Huntington (1968) also suggests that a party can achieve different degrees of institutionalization, or in other words, different degrees of success. This entails, along the conceptual dividing lines outlined here, both ‘external’ success in mobilizing the worker constituency, and ‘internal’ success in establishing a coherent and stable organization with a dominant ideological orientation. My research interest is about qualitative variations in models of labor politics, which requires a conception of institutionalization as the passing of a minimum threshold. However, as I will outline later in more detail, I am going to identify varying degrees of success, or institutionalization, as an indicator for evaluating the agency of labor elites.

7 See Randall and Svasand (2002) for an overview.
8 See Ulam (1960) and Matthias (1957) for arguments about the ‘social integrative’ function of ideologies.
The five competing models of labor politics that have emerged from labor’s formative stage in the political arena are conceptualized along one single analytical roster. This framework recognizes the prerequisites for successful party formation by distinguishing between variations in function, ideology, and organization. The functional dimension refers to the basic *raison d’être* of a particular type of political association. The social integrative ideologies of competing models of labor politics are understood as a combination of formulated goals and the means proposed to obtain these goals. Varying approaches to organization manifest themselves through different – internal – decision making procedures, and different patterns regarding the relations entertained with the world outside.

Social democracy represents a single party species or family, because the members of that family, respectively the manifestations of the species, share the following characteristics.\(^9\) Social democratic parties are established to advance the interests of the emerging industrial working-class in the political arena (function). Their fundamental objective is the implementation of socialism, at that time understood most basically as the collectivization of the means of production (ideology). Their organizational model is mass-based and ‘internally’ democratic, as well as ‘externally’ embedded into a broader set of labor associations (organization).

These being the features that define social democracy as a generic party family or species, a number of ideological and organizational characteristics identify evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties as distinct party types or members of that family. In the domain of ideology, both party types claim socialism as the fundamental objective of their efforts, but they suggest radically different means to obtain the socialist end. It is this particular difference that provides the underpinning for the terminology employed here to distinguish the two social democratic party types. Evolutionary social democracy proposes an evolutionary pursuit of socialism, through the gradual transformation of political and socio-economic conditions. This approach is guided by the voluntarist belief that electoral participation will lead to the seizure of political power and thereby enable the actual legislation of socialist policies, if necessary through cooperation with bourgeois parties, without the need for a fundamental reversal of the existing institutional environment.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, is guided by a fundamentally deterministic world view, derived from a vulgarized version of marxism, which was formulated most prominently by Karl Kautsky.\(^10\) The widely held expectation that the internal contradictions of capitalism will inevitably lead to its demise and the appearance of a fundamental crisis as a revolutionary opportunity, functions as the underpinning for the significantly more revolutionary rhetoric of this social democratic party type.

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9 See Gunther and Diamond (2002) for the ‘biological’ terminology used here.
10 The most succinct account for his conception of social democracy and the road to socialism is Kautsky (1909)
at the same time, revolutionary rhetoric is combined with pragmatic day to day efforts of mobilization and organization building as well as an equally pragmatic accommodation with the entrenched elites. Practical improvements for its constituency resulting from electoral and legislative involvement as partial steps on the road to socialism are the defining features of evolutionary social democracy. This concern is not entirely absent from quasi-revolutionary social democracy, either. But most importantly, these forms of activities are approached from a tactical point of view. They are regarded as opportunities for mobilization and organization building as the most crucial tasks of the party. The growing strength of the organization and an increasing number of supporters are seen as a prerequisite for the seizure of power and a fundamental political re-organization, once a revolutionary situation occurs, which in itself is understood as a necessary, pre-determined, result of historical development.

Organizational variation between the two party types is less pervasive than these ideological differences. Both of them are mass-based and democratically organized. They are also embedded into a network of secondary associations. The extent of embeddedness is somewhat higher for quasi-revolutionary social democracy, where the party is designed to act as the coordinating center and point of reference for an extensive counter culture. The most important difference in terms of party organization, however, reveals itself through different patterns of ‘external’ relations with the unions. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy sees itself as one branch of the same movement, next to the unions, which are engaged in advancing the economic interests of their constituency through activities around the workplace. But the political takes precedence over the economic struggle, and the party assumes a position of leadership over the unions and the entire underpinning web of labor associations. The situation is reversed in the case of evolutionary social democratic parties. They were formed by the unions, as their vehicle to conduct the economic struggle through political involvement, and as a result, the unions assume a leadership position over the party.

These characteristics identify social democracy as a party species or family, and quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties as different members of that family or different party types. In addition to that, some differences within each of these two categories of parties can be observed as well. Variations within the evolutionary party type are only differences of degree, however. This entails differences in the emphasis on socialism as the ultimate goal, and a number of idiosyncratic features, for example the unique focus of the Australian Labor Party on nationalism. In quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, two distinct sub-categories, or as I refer to them here, variants of the party type, can be identified. The first one of them, the parliamentary, or, because of its origin, ‘German’ variant, combines parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities in order to mobilize its constituency. The second one, an extra-parliamentary or ‘Belgian’ variant, focuses exclusively on extra-parliamentary forms of mobilization. In addition to this strategical variation that belongs conceptually to the domain of ideological
orientations, a slight organizational difference exists as well: the influence of the unions and the paradigmatic role of syndicalism are somewhat larger for the Belgian, compared to the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. At the same time, even in the Belgian variant, other than in evolutionary social democracy, the political struggle and the party take precedence over the unions.

While social democratic parties have emerged as the most frequently embraced model of labor politics in the late 19th and early 20th century, some cases have seen the failure of social democratic party formation and the adoption of alternative models of labor politics. In order to understand the conditions, under which social democracy is likely to fail or to succeed, a theory that extends to instances characterized by the absence of social democratic party formation requires a ‘positive’ explanation for the adoption of these alternative models, and accordingly, a typology that includes these types of political associations as well. Bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism as two types from the species of insurrectionism, as well as the species of moderate syndicalism are therefore incorporated into the same analytical roster that has been used to conceptualize different types of social democracy.

The basic function of social democratic parties, group and interest representation of the newly emerging industrial working-class in the political arena, also defines the three alternative models of labor politics. Other than social democracy, however, these approaches are either based on a more extensive or a more restrictive definition of their target group: bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism are generally more extensive, since they explicitly include peasants as one constituency of their revolutionary coalition. Moderate syndicalism on the other hand, comes in several variants: the most restrictive one that targets skilled workers exclusively, a second one that is equivalent to social democracy in that it is geared toward all of industrial labor, and a third most extensive one, which attempts to appeal to ‘producers’, a coalition of industrial workers, peasants, as well as agricultural and commercial smallholders.

These slight variations in the functional domain notwithstanding, the defining differences between social democratic party types and alternative models of labor politics are located on the ideological and organizational dimensions of the typology introduced here. To begin with, bolshevism is equivalent to social democracy in its pursuit of socialism as the ultimate goal. But it is distinct from both types of social democratic parties in terms of its proposed strategy and the associated organizational model. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy employs much revolutionary rhetoric, but it is not truly a “revolution making” party. Bolshevism on the other hand is insurrectionist in nature, because it actively pursues a strategy of actual uprising and revolution. In order to make this approach feasible, bolsheviki are organized in a fundamentally different fashion than the mass-based and democratic social social democratic parties: from
the top down, through secret local cells and a strong center that is maintained by “professional revolutionaries”.  

Anarchism-syndicalism comes in a perplexing variety of competing forms, but at the most basic level, it represents a different type of insurrectionism that is equally geared at the implementation of socialism as the collectivization of the means of production. Other than bolshevism, however, an insurrection is not designed to ‘capture’ the state. It is designed to destroy the state, abolish the centralized exercise of political authority altogether, and make the establishment of socialism as a socio-economic system possible. Again contrary to the approach of the bolshevik, anarchism-syndicalism is organized in mass-based anarcho-syndicalist unions, and autonomous anarchist cells. All of the specific expressions of anarchism-syndicalism reject the formation of a political party and involvement in the electoral process.

Moderate syndicalism as the third alternative to social democratic party formation also focuses exclusively on the organization of workers through unions, around the workplace. These unions and their centralized federation are primarily involved in economic activities, such as strikes or wage bargaining. They accept the political integration of their constituency into the existing party system, and refrain from establishing an independent presence in the political arena. However, they are politically involved through selective interventions into the process of policy making and electoral competition, for the achievement of specific reforms benefiting their constituency. Both anarchism-syndicalism and moderate syndicalism abstain from direct involvement in electoral politics and the formation of an independent political party. But they do so for very different reasons. Anarchism-syndicalism rejects parliamentary politics as a façade, while moderate syndicalism relies on the indirect transfer of its concerns into the electoral and parliamentary arena, through the entrenched parties as a transmission belt. Moderate syndicalism is also distinct from all other models of labor politics introduced here with respect to its fundamental objective. Other than social democracy as well as bolshevik or anarchist-syndicalist insurrectionism, moderate syndicalism does not formulate socialism as its fundamental objective. The agendas of moderate syndicalist unions are geared at the transformation of market-based economics into a reformed, or ‘tamed’, version of capitalism.

11 The term “professional revolutionaries” has been coined by Lenin in “What is to be done?” (Lenin 1902)
12 I am using the term anarchism-syndicalism, in order to incorporate anarchism and the pursuit of ‘direct action’, as well as anarcho-syndicalism. These are two distinct forms of organization, but both of them emerged from the original anarchism of the mid to late 1800s, which is most closely related to the conflict within the First International between the ‘authoritarian’ supporters of Marx and the anarchists around Bakunin.
13 Prior work on American labor politics typically uses the terms “business unionism” or “pure and simple unionism” (see Rayback 1966 for an example of a general history and Voss 1993 for an analytical contribution). I am using the term ‘moderate syndicalism’ here, because I believe it to be more fitting. The existing terminology emphasizes the absence of an independent presence of labor in the political arena, which the term moderate syndicalism does as well. However, my understanding of ‘moderate syndicalism’ also implies the occurrence of selective political interventions into the political arena through entrenched elites as a transmission belt, while the terms “business unionism” and “pure and simple unionism” imply, incorrectly I would argue, a lack of political engagement.
Contours of the suggested theory for social democratic party formation

The socio-economic and status system theories conceive of the environment encountered by the political actors of the labor movement, as varying types of industrialization or different degrees of aristocratic dominance, respectively. Other than the socio-economic approach, I understand industrialization and the resulting economic deprivation of workers as the prerequisites for social democratic party formation or the embrace of alternative models of labor politics, but not as a causal factor that can explain variation in party formation outcomes. Industrialization and the emergence of an industrial working-class is the *sine qua non* condition for the occurrence of labor politics. Economic deprivation of workers is the logical prerequisite for the formulation of a political agenda with socio-economic goals, in the case of social democracy the call for socialism. The status system approach does not make this conceptual distinction, but it does correctly identify political variables as the environment that shapes labor elites’ choices. However, the explanation it suggests is incomplete, because the focus on the role of the aristocracy is too narrow to understand the nature of the political environment, to which labor elites responded. I suggest that the environment encountered by labor elites in their decision-making process about how to advance the interests of their constituency in the political arena, can best be conceived of as varying degrees of labor inclusion. Historically, the nature of labor inclusion emerges from the interaction between economic development and institutional adaptation to a capitalist and industrial economic system. This is the reason why the process of industrialization is indirectly related to variation in labor inclusion. In this substantive context, the role of the aristocracy emphasized by the status system approach can be a decisive factor in the determination of inclusiveness, but it is not the only one.

I argue that labor elites’ decisions about the formation of social democratic parties or the embrace of alternative models of labor politics, occur in response to a polity-specific environment of labor inclusion. Every polity is defined by a particular set of opportunity structures for channeling labor’s interests and demands into the political arena. Accordingly, different models of labor politics, as they were outlined in the previous section, represent optimal responses to different configurations of such external constraints, so that in essence, each category of labor inclusion comes with an equivalent ‘optimal’ model of labor politics. Social democracy emerged as the dominant way for labor to enter the political arena, simply because the majority of industrialized states of the late 19th and early 20th century were characterized by degrees of labor inclusion that were conducive to the formation of social democratic parties. In only a few cases – Japan, Russia, and the United States – were other models of labor politics better suited as a response to the existing environment of inclusion.

The term labor elites encompasses actual industrial workers as well as political entrepreneurs from a variety of other social groups, who attempted to mobilize workers. My treatment of labor elite agency is
informed by the rational choice variant of the new institutionalism. The causal relation between labor inclusion as the ‘encountered circumstance’ and a particular model of labor politics rests on the premise of ‘optimal agency’ by labor elites. A particular environment of inclusion is only translated into the expected outcome, when labor elites make an optimal decision that recognizes the given opportunity structures defined by a particular configuration of inclusion. The agency of labor elites is optimal, whenever the adopted model of labor politics represents the most rewarding ratio of costs and benefits for channeling labor’s interests into the arena of politics. The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation will reveal that in the vast majority of cases, labor elites did in fact make optimal choices. There are only three countries – France, Switzerland, and Canada – where the outcome predicted by an assessment of labor inclusion entirely deviates from the actually observable outcome. Rather than just dismissing these instances as idiosyncratic or exceptional, however, I conduct an empirical analysis into the sources of ‘suboptimal’ decision making. Methodologically, optimal agency is therefore not understood as an empirical assumption. It represents a scope condition for the effects of labor inclusion as a causal determinant.

A sociology of knowledge perspective allows us to study systematically the exogenous effects on labor elites’ decision-making process. These can trigger suboptimal choices and an outcome in terms of labor politics that would not have been predicted on the basis of analyzing the encountered environment of inclusion. The following empirical analysis will reveal four such sources of suboptimal decision making by labor elites. First, the diffusion of ‘external knowledge’, i.e. paradigmatic models of labor politics imported from the outside. Second, in some cases, it is the environment of inclusion itself that contributes to triggering the adoption of suboptimal models of labor politics, whenever its nature is difficult to evaluate, or subject to frequent fluctuations. In addition to these two manifestations of ‘external’ influences, ‘internal’ sources of suboptimal decision-making represent a distinct second category. This includes those factors that are located ‘within’ the investigated labor elites, as a result of a number of internalized social characteristics, most importantly the social background in terms of class or status group affiliations, but also specific features pertaining to their political socialization.

In terms of the environment of inclusion encountered by labor elites, I distinguish between four categories on an ordinal scale, ranging from lowest to low, higher and highest degrees of inclusion. My conceptualization of labor inclusion is based on, but at the same time, extends beyond, historical institutionalist accounts as a third fundamental type of approach to issues of labor politics. In the socio-economic and status system explanations, the environment encountered by labor elites is defined by polity-

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14 See for example Levi (1997)
15 For the introduction of a sociology of knowledge perspective into an institutionalist framework see Wuthnow (1989), and the edited volume by Skocpol and Rueschemeyer (1996)
specific features of industrialization, or the pervasiveness of feudal status systems, respectively. Institutionalist scholars have studied a wide variety of questions in the domain of labor politics. They generally argue that the most important ‘structural’ feature related to their specific outcome of interest, are variations in the nature of political institutions.

The existing contributions that are based on an institutionalist perspective either follow a particularly wide or a particularly narrow research interest. Hattam (1992) for example focuses on the effects of the courts as a particular type of institution on the varying trajectories of labor politics in Britain and the United States. Bartolini (2000) and Mikkelsen (2005) on the other hand attempt to explain the emergence of general configurations of labor politics or the overall left across cases. There is no institutionalist account that is interested in explaining the formation of social democratic parties specifically. And the tendency to suggest a deterministic causal relation, without the explicit consideration of elite agency, is as commonplace for institutionalist contributions as it is for the socio-economic and status system approaches.

Moreover, the existing historical institutionalist accounts for variations in labor politics that employ references to the inclusiveness of different ‘encountered’ environments, do not extend beyond the consideration of institutional channels of inclusion. Contrary to such a conceptualization of inclusiveness, for example in Bartolini (2000), I argue that institutional channels are only one important element of labor inclusion. An adequate conceptualization needs to incorporate its behavioral dimensions as well, because important variations in the degree of labor inclusion and the related outcomes of party formation also depend on the behavior of entrenched political elites, which occurs on top of the existing ‘rules of the game’. The incorporation of behavioral channels of inclusion is particularly important for the distinction between higher and highest inclusion cases: without a consideration of behavioral components of labor inclusion, it would be impossible to make such a distinction and to explain the success of social democratic party formation in the higher inclusion cases of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia on the one hand, and the lack of party formation in the United States as an example for highest inclusion on the other.

Along these lines, I conceive of labor inclusion as a latent variable that emerges from the assessment of its institutional and behavioral manifestations. In the institutional domain, the extent of inclusion depends on the following dimensions: the scope of worker enfranchisement in a particular polity, the extent to which responsible government is practiced, and the degree of political liberties granted to workers and their associations. Behavioral inclusion of labor occurs in the following ways: through the behavior of the state executive toward workers and labor organizations, through the extent to which entrenched political elites, most commonly competing parties, attempt to appeal to workers as a voting constituency, and eventually, through the extent to which these entrenched elites attempt to include labor elites organizationally, as cooperation partners, candidates for elected offices or actual party members.
Varying overall degrees of inclusion emerge from a joint consideration of these components. Each of the equivalent four overall categories of labor inclusion is based on a specific systematically defined combination of its component indicators, rather than a simple addition. In instances of lowest inclusion, labor is completely excluded from the political arena by particularly pronounced and permanent repression through the state. Inclusion is at the lowest level in all its institutional and behavioral manifestations. Low inclusion is defined by a comparatively less repressive state executive, and most importantly, the opening of one institutional avenue into the political arena for labor, as a limited form of incorporation. This degree of labor inclusion comes in two different variants, depending on which kind of institutional channel is opened for the access of labor. In some cases, low inclusion emerged through the granting of higher or highest levels of worker enfranchisement, while political liberties and the practice of responsible government remain comparatively precarious. In the second set of cases from the low inclusion category, worker enfranchisement was at the lowest possible level, and limited inclusion of labor only occurred through the at least minimal guarantee of political liberties and responsible government.

Higher inclusion polities are characterized by liberal-constitutional institutions and a state executive that behaves in a more neutral fashion toward labor. This distinguishes the higher from the low inclusion category, where one or even two institutional channels of inclusion remain precarious. What distinguishes higher from highest inclusion cases is the behavior of entrenched elites, most commonly competing parties, toward labor elites and the worker constituency at large. Both types of polities are characterized by generally liberal, inclusive, institutions. But entrenched elites in cases of highest inclusion make significantly more pronounced attempts to include the emerging labor movement into their fold, both the larger worker constituency through electoral, and labor elites through organizational inclusion.

Each one of the outcomes of labor’s formative stage in the political arena introduced before represents an optimal response to one of these four categories of labor inclusion. The existing environment of labor inclusion is relayed to labor elites through two causal mechanisms: first, directly, through the perception of some given environment of inclusion; and second, indirectly, through the demands of their constituency, which are shaped by exposure to the same kind of environment. Labor inclusion as the set of external constraints encountered by labor elites will result in the according outcome of party formation predicted by an assessment of this environment on the premise of optimal agency.

First of all, the quasi-revolutionary type of social democracy as one model for labor’s entry into the political arena represents the optimal response to an environment of low inclusion. The guarantee of limited access to the political arena allows for the formation of a mass-based social democratic party. But the precariousness of these concessions to the labor constituency makes an approach attractive that attempts to appeal to a predominantly excluded and repressed constituency through revolutionary rhetoric. At the same time, party leaders accommodate with the entrenched elites by signaling that they are not attempting to
engineer an actual insurrection, in order to not endanger the existence of their organization and the inclusionary concessions that have already been made. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy became the most frequently adopted model of labor politics, because the majority of cases studied here were characterized by low inclusion. Quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties were formed as an ‘optimal’ response to a given context of low inclusion in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Italy, Argentina, and Hungary. In Switzerland and France, quasi-revolutionary social democracy emerged in an environment of higher inclusion as a suboptimal response of labor elites.

Low inclusion represents the category with the largest number of cases. This allows for a more fine grained empirical investigation of different ways in which low inclusion occurs, and how that affects labor elites’ choices. We are going to see that quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties emerged in two different variants, each of which represents an optimal response to a specific version of the low inclusion polity. A ‘parliamentary’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that emerged in the German SPD, combines electoral participation, campaigning, and parliamentary involvement with extra-parliamentary activities. An ‘extra-parliamentary’ variant that has been formulated by Belgian social democrats, emphasizes the pursuit of extra-parliamentary forms of worker mobilization exclusively.16

The ‘parliamentary’ or ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is therefore the optimal response to the German, Danish, and toward the late 1890s also the Austrian, pattern of inclusion. These cases are examples of the kind of low inclusion polity that allows for labor’s access to the political arena through the granting of enfranchisement, while political liberties and the practice of responsible government remained somewhat precarious. The Belgian ‘extra-parliamentary’ model is the optimal variant for all remaining cases from the low inclusion category, where enfranchisement was largely absent, and limited inclusion of workers only occurred through the at least minimal guarantee of political liberties and responsible government.

Labor elites in Switzerland, France, and Canada made suboptimal choices with respect to the overall type of model they adopted for labor’s entry into the political arena. A different kind of suboptimal choice, one for a suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, can be observed for a number of cases that belong to the kind of low inclusion polity, in which enfranchisement is absent during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Labor elites from Belgium, Sweden, and Norway opted for the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as the optimal response to this environment. But their counterparts in Italy, Argentina, Spain, Hungary, and the Netherlands made a

16 The prototypical formal codifications of these two variants of quasi-revolutionary social democracy are the 1891 ‘Erfurt program’ of the German SPD for the parliamentary variant (SPD 1891), and the 1894 ‘Charte de Quaregnon’ of the POB in Belgium for the extra-parliamentary variant (POB 1894).
suboptimal choice by opting for the parliamentary ‘German’ variant, despite the absence of enfranchisement.

Evolutionary social democracy has emerged as an optimal response to higher inclusion in the cases of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. The opening of all three institutional channels in this category of inclusion is a prerequisite for the formation of evolutionary social democracy that is absent in low inclusion polities. The liberal-constitutional framework in higher inclusion cases makes the legislation of socialism and the establishment of a union-dominated party a feasible strategical approach. The presence of responsible government as the first one of three institutional channels of inclusion makes access to executive power an attainable goal. Effective worker enfranchisement is a necessary prerequisite for gaining positions of executive authority as well as for the actual legislation of socialist policies. And eventually, the organizational model of evolutionary social democracy relies on the effective guarantee of political liberties, both for the unions and the party.

No social democratic parties at all were formed during the formative stages of labor politics in the cases of Japan, Russia, Canada, and the United States. In Russia and Japan, labor elites responded in an optimal fashion to a lowest degree of inclusion by embracing insurrectionist strategies: bolshevism in Russia, and various forms of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism in Japan. It is only in these environments of lowest inclusion, which are characterized by the complete absence of institutional inclusion and a particularly repressive state that extremely costly insurrectionist alternatives are better suited than more moderate approaches. In these cases, any form of labor’s political activity is faced with heavy repression. The maximalist promise of actual insurrection and revolutionary turnover in political power is therefore particularly appealing in this situation, where the labor constituency is completely excluded from the political arena. And moreover, in this environment of labor inclusion, the possibility of establishing a mass-based party with an open organization is much more precarious than in all other types of polities. The organizational models suggested by insurrectionist approaches either rely entirely, in the case of bolshevism, or significantly, in the case of anarchism-syndicalism, on secrecy and underground activities. As such, they are much better suited to the particularly repressive environment of lowest inclusion than the open and democratic forms of organization favored by social democratic parties.

Highest inclusion in the United States has led to the absence of social democracy, and the embrace of moderate syndicalism. The difference between the American case and the neighboring instances of higher inclusion underscores the importance of behavioral channels of inclusion. Highest and higher inclusion polities are largely similar to one another in terms of institutional inclusion, as they are both characterized by a liberal-constitutional framework with full access for labor to all institutional channels of inclusion. What distinguishes these two categories is the significantly more inclusive behavior of competing parties in the United States. The responsiveness of these entrenched political elites in America made moderate
syndicalism and the decision to forego the establishment of an independent presence in the political arena a rewarding strategy. In cases of higher inclusion, a lack of responsiveness made the formation of an independent political party significantly more attractive than the pursuit of moderate syndicalism and the integration of labor into the existing party system.

**Methodology and analytical procedure**

The analysis of social democratic party formation or the embrace of alternative models of labor politics in this dissertation combines a consideration of the largest possible number of cases with in-depth accounts of historical sequences and causal mechanisms. Analytical narratives of individual cases are embedded into a broad comparative framework, and the results of specific case studies are consolidated, both verbally and numerically, for the purposes of comparison and theory building. Along these lines, the empirical analysis will proceed along four analytical steps. Different types of data and measurement strategies will be employed for each of them.

The first one of these steps is designed to define the scope for the applicability of the proposed theory and to identify the cases that will be included into the analysis. A specific country will only be included, if it meets the following two requirements. First, it needs to be ‘internally’ sovereign by the year 1914, because otherwise, the pervasiveness of nationalist or anti-colonial movements and their relationship to socialism would interfere as an intervening variable. Second, each case must have accomplished a minimum of industrial development, identified by the presence of a sufficiently sizable industrial labor force. Sufficient industrialization represents the *sine qua non* condition for social democratic party formation. The determination of industrialization levels is based on data detailing the size and structure of the labor force, derived from national census reports. This procedure yields a universe of 20 cases, all of which are then included into the empirical analysis of party formation conducted here. As I will outline in more detail later, social democratic party formation was *possible* in all of these cases: not only because they were sovereign and sufficiently industrialized, but also because the variation of labor inclusion across these cases did not extend to a degree of repression, in which the formation of mass-based parties is materially impossible because of the nature of the existing environment. This degree of repression would only be accomplished by the modern totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that emerged in the aftermath of World War I.

In the second step, the analytical focus is on the nature of labor inclusion as the ‘environmental’ causal factor related to the formation of varying models of labor politics. I will provide a comprehensive analysis into the variation of labor inclusion across all cases that is organized along one single analytical roster. Varying degrees of institutional inclusion across cases will be derived from an analysis of
constitutional and other legal documents as well as quantitative data about the scope of enfranchisement. In addition to these primary sources, it is necessary to rely on secondary literature as well, especially for the investigation of labor inclusion’s behavioral dimensions.

Thirdly, I am going to focus on the interaction between the existing environment and the agency of labor elites in establishing different dominant models of labor politics across cases. The determination of party formation types respectively the institutionalization of alternative models of labor politics will be derived primarily from each organization’s founding document. This includes party platforms expressing the ideological orientation of the party as well as organizational statutes. In addition to these formal expressions of a party’s ideological and organizational model, the programmatic contributions of parties’ leading theoreticians and the defining practices of the organization will also be used as primary sources for the determination of party formation outcomes.

The suggested theory for social democratic party formation is thus subjected to an empirical test for all cases that also define the scope of that theory. In-depth case studies, capable of uncovering in more detail the causal mechanisms underpinning the causal argument suggested here, will be conducted for idealtypical cases from each category of labor inclusion: Russia as an example of lowest inclusion, Germany for low, Britain for higher, and the United States as an instance of highest inclusion. These four cases are also of particular importance in the present context for another reason: they were the birthplace for those models of labor politics that have accomplished a paradigmatic status as a role model for the other cases included in this analysis.

As such, they are important for understanding the process, through which particular models of labor politics have been diffused far beyond their original birthplace. This is what I referred to before as the transfer of ‘external knowledge’ into the decision-making process of labor elites. In some cases, this transfer was successful: whenever the external model and the domestic environment of labor inclusion, into which it was imported, suited each other; or, alternatively, when the imported model was sufficiently adjusted to fit the needs of a different environment, i.e. set of external constraints. But in a number of other cases, ‘external knowledge’ introduced an ideological and organizational model into a particular national labor movement that did not suit the context, in which the movement had emerged. It was adopted nonetheless, because of the imported model’s paradigmatic status. In these instances, the diffusion of ‘external knowledge’ functions as one of several sources for the suboptimal decisions of labor elites noted above.

The fourth and final analytical step is designed to uncover the effects of ‘external knowledge’ and other exogenous factors on the decision making process of labor elites in those cases, where suboptimal models of labor politics, or suboptimal variants of such models, have been adopted. In this context, the prior case specific investigations of cases with suboptimal choices will be condensed into a systematic
analysis. The theory I am suggesting is not geared at explaining varying levels of success or institutionalization accomplished by different parties or alternative models of labor politics across cases. But the assessment of these phenomena – degrees of ‘internal’ systemness and variation in ‘external’ mobilization success – can serve as an important indicator for the extent to which parties made optimal, respectively suboptimal choices. To that end, I am going to consider election returns and party membership figures across cases. On top of that, the overall division of the left, which results from suboptimal choices of party elites and limited social democratic institutionalization, can serve as an overall composite indicator for the presence of suboptimal choices.

Organization and overview of findings

Following on the introduction, this dissertation is going to proceed to a further elaboration on the suggested theory and its conceptual and operational underpinnings in chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapter 2 contains a more extensive consideration of the existing literature. Based on that, I am going to outline the substantive context, the general architecture, and the causal predictions of my explanation. I also offer a more extensive discussion of the methodological considerations that guide the empirical analysis. Chapter 3 conceptualizes social democratic party formation and the embrace of alternative models of labor politics as the ‘dependent variable’ of this study. This entails the outline of a typology of social democratic parties and alternative models of labor politics as well as a determination as to how exactly the successful respectively unsuccessful formation of social democratic parties can be identified. In chapter 4, I elaborate on varying degrees of labor inclusion and the agency of labor elites as the two factors that constitute my explanation for social democratic party formation, in a sense the ‘independent variables’. That chapter contains an encompassing conceptualization and operationalization of labor inclusion, followed by an assessment of elite agency. I am going to elaborate on the prior discussion of optimal agency as a scope condition in more general terms. Based on that, I outline variation in the costs and benefits of varying models of labor politics as the determinants of optimality, along with a conceptualization of different determinants for suboptimal decision making. Eventually, chapter 4 concludes with a decision analysis that details the reasons for why different models of labor politics represent optimal responses in different environments of inclusion.

The remaining chapters are going to present the empirical analysis on the basis of the previously outlined analytical procedure. Chapter 5 identifies the background to social democratic party formation, through the selection of cases within which the emergence of labor politics was possible, and through an assessment of labor inclusion across these cases. This empirical analysis into the background of party formation will proceed as follows. In the first place, I am going to analyze ‘internal’ sovereignty as the first prerequisite for social democratic party formation. In the second place, the role of industrialization as the
sine qua non condition for social democratic party formation will be discussed. These two steps are designed to identify the set of cases to be included in the empirical analysis, because they were ‘internally’ sovereign and sufficiently industrialized before the year 1914.17 Following on this process of case selection, the remainder of chapter 5 is geared at a comparative assessment of labor inclusion across all previously selected cases. Labor inclusion represents the ‘external constraints’, in response to which labor elites decide about their preferred model of labor politics. The investigation of variation in labor inclusion is divided into four sections, each of which represents one particular category of inclusion – lowest, low, higher, and highest. One analytical roster that considers each of the six dimensions of inclusion separately will be applied to all cases, in order to allow for effective comparative assessments.

Chapters 6 to 11 contain the analysis of social democratic party formation, respectively the embrace of alternative models of labor politics. I am going to explain the formation of varying models of labor politics as the outcome of an interaction between the previously outlined ‘encountered environment’ of labor inclusion on the one hand and the agency of labor elites in response to that environment on the other. The observable outcome in some given case can be an optimal or a suboptimal response by labor elites to some given environment. In the latter case, an additional account for the exogenous sources of labor elites’ decision-making process is designed to uncover the determinants of suboptimal choices. In this general context, chapter 6 presents an overview of labor’s formative stage in the political arena across all cases, along with the observable outcomes in terms of labor politics, from a comparative perspective. In chapters 7 to 10, social democratic party formation or the embrace of alternative models of labor politics will be discussed on a case by case basis, on the background of the suggested theory, the prior elaboration on varying degrees of inclusion, and the introductory comparative overview. These case studies are organized on the basis of outcomes in terms of varying models of labor politics. Chapter 7 is about those cases that saw the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, chapter 8 is about evolutionary social democracy, chapter 9 about moderate syndicalism, and chapter 10 is about insurrectionism.

Chapter 7 on the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy begins with Germany as the in-depth case study and an example for the adoption of the ‘German’ parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as an optimal response. This is followed by an analysis of Denmark as the second one of two cases, where labor elites made an optimal choice by embracing the ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy to an environment, in which the limited institutional incorporation of labor typical for low inclusion polities is guaranteed through the channel of enfranchisement. Norway and Sweden are examples for the optimal embrace of the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-

17 The cases that are included into the analysis on the basis of this case selection procedure are: United States, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, France, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Argentina, Japan, and Russia.
revolutionary social democracy. Formally, labor elites implemented party platforms that were largely
derived from the German programmatic paradigm, but an extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-
revolutionary social democracy emerged through parties’ practices during the formative stage of labor’s
entry into the political arena. These choices represented optimal responses to the specific version of a low
inclusion polity, in which enfranchisement was absent, while limited incorporation of labor, typical for this
second version of the low inclusion polity, was guaranteed through the at least minimal guarantee political
liberties and responsible government. This is followed by an investigation of Belgium, where an ‘extra-
parliamentary’ approach comparable to Sweden and Norway was not just successfully practiced, but on top
of that, formally codified as a distinct, hence ‘Belgian’ variant, of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic
party type.

Labor elites in the Netherlands followed the lead of their German, rather than their Belgian comrades,
by opting for the ‘parliamentary’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, despite the absence of
enfranchisement during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. This suboptimal choice had some
noticeable, but from a comparative perspective, only small effects, on social democracy’s ‘external’
mobilization success, and the degree of systemness, because the channel of enfranchisement was opened
relatively soon after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. In Austria, the choice
for the German variant was initially suboptimal as well, given the complete absence of enfranchisement
before 1897. However, the late growth of the Austrian working-class and the guarantee of enfranchisement
at an even earlier point in time than in the Netherlands made sure that the initially suboptimal choice would
become an optimal one, because the environment of inclusion was adjusted from one without to one with
worker enfranchisement.

In Italy, Hungary, Spain, and Argentina, comparable to the cases of Austria and the Netherlands, labor
elites made suboptimal choices with respect to the variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy they
adopted. In all of these cases, too, labor elites embraced the German parliamentary, instead of the Belgian
extra-parliamentary model, although the electoral channel of inclusion was not open for the access of labor.
The consequences of these decisions were significantly more pronounced in Italy, Hungary, Spain, and
Argentina, than they were in Austria and the Netherlands: far lower levels of worker mobilization and
internal party institutionalization, the emergence of strong insurrectionist competitors, and a permanent
division of the left.

However, even though labor elites in these cases embraced the German parliamentary model as a
suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, they did make an overall optimal choice by
embracing quasi-revolutionary social democracy as a party type. They did thus conform to the substantive
expectation derived from the theory suggested here. This does not apply to the cases of France and
Switzerland, where labor elites did not just adopt a suboptimal variant of some generally optimal party
type. They opted for quasi-revolutionary social democracy as a suboptimal type, although higher inclusion in both these cases would have suggested an entirely different model of labor politics, evolutionary social democracy, as the optimal response. It is these two cases of Switzerland and France, in addition to Canada, where the choice for some model of labor politics would not have been predicted on the basis of the given environment of inclusion. As a result of these suboptimal decisions, Switzerland and France can be identified as the most apparent underperformers in terms of electoral mobilization and internal party institutionalization.

Chapter 8 is dedicated to the analysis of those cases, in which evolutionary social democratic parties were formed: Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. In all of these instances, evolutionary social democratic parties emerged as the optimal response of labor elites to an environment of higher inclusion. This analysis will outline the similarities across these cases in terms of labor inclusion and the procedural pattern through which these parties emerged. At the same time, the idiosyncratic features of party formation and how they are related to slight variations in the given environment of inclusion will be discussed as well. However, other than in the group of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties, the observable differences in the evolutionary category are variations of degree rather than discernible variants or sub-categories.

Chapter 9 discusses those cases, in which social democratic party formation failed, and moderate syndicalism emerged as the dominant model of labor politics. Moderate syndicalism pursues a strategy of worker incorporation into the existing party system, organization around the workplace through unions, and only selective political interventions instead of a permanent independent presence in the political arena. This model of labor politics has been implemented as the optimal response to an environment of highest inclusion in the United States. In Canada, moderate syndicalism emerged as a suboptimal response to an environment of higher inclusion, where the formation of an evolutionary social democratic party would have been optimal.

Social democracy also failed to form successfully in the final one of four different categories. But in this constellation, discussed in chapter 10, social democratic party formation failed in response to lowest inclusion, and the alternative models of labor politics predominantly embraced by labor elites in these cases were insurrectionist in nature: bolshevism in Russia, and anarchism-syndicalism in Japan. Despite a lower degree of institutionalization and mobilization success of insurrectionism in Japan, when compared to Russia, insurrectionist models of labor politics represented the optimal response to the ‘encountered environment’ of lowest inclusion that characterizes both these cases.

The case by case investigations will already contain important comparative references. But it is only in chapter 11, when I return to an explicitly comparative perspective again. There, I am going to outline an assessment of the predictive power of labor inclusion as a causally determining external constraint, compared to the competing explanations for social democratic party formation, the socio-economic and the
status system approach. The analysis of labor elite agency is already an integral part of the case studies discussed before. But on the basis of these case specific considerations, a systematic discussion about the role of elite agency and the varying sources of suboptimal decision making will follow in chapter 11. This discussion will include the cases, in which labor elites opted for a generally suboptimal model of labor politics, in Canada, Switzerland, and France, as well as those instances of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, where labor elites could have improved the mobilization success and internal institutionalization of their party by opting for the Belgian ‘extra-parliamentary’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which was better suited to their specific configuration of low inclusion, than the German ‘parliamentary’ variant. Since chapter 11 already contains a comparative assessment of optimal vs. suboptimal choices across all cases, the concluding chapter 12 will summarize the findings of this dissertation only briefly, and then outline a few broader implications of the research presented here.

Contributions and avenues for further research

This dissertation makes a number of important contributions to the fields of party politics and political development, the study of labor politics, and to historical institutionalism as an approach in political science. First of all, it provides a comprehensive explanation for the formation of social democratic parties as the leading model for labor’s presence in the political arena. Despite extensive research on questions of labor and politics, no satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon exists yet. In this context, an explanation for the formation of different types of social democratic parties is combined with an account for the failure of social democracy and the embrace of alternative models of labor politics in some cases. The analysis of labor inclusion as an underpinning environmental constraint is accompanied by a comparative assessment of alternative explanations. In the second place, given the current lack of an adequate and theoretically grounded typology of social democratic parties, the phenomenology of social democracy and alternative models of labor politics suggested here is an important contribution in and of itself.

Thirdly, the approach employed in this dissertation contributes to the general historical institutionalist literature. It outlines and practices an innovative way of including a consideration of agency into an explanation with important institutionalist elements, and it responds to the general criticism of determinism that is often times directed toward historical institutionalism. This is accomplished by treating institutions, which represent one element of a broader concept of labor inclusion, as an environment rather than a determinant for the agency of labor elites. The behavior of labor elites within this environment and the intervening factors that contribute, in some cases, to suboptimal decisions not to be expected on the basis of considering the given context of inclusion, are then analyzed in their own right. In a sense, a Durkheimian
approach emphasizing explanation and prediction is thereby combined with a Weberian attempt at interpretation. The approach employed in this dissertation could also be understood in the context of Elias’ ‘figurational’ conceptualization of long term historical processes. Comparable to his concept of ‘figurations’, my integration of structural and agency perspectives is designed to transcend a strict micro-macro divide.  

In the fourth place, the theory and empirical analysis outlined in this dissertation can also function as the foundation for further theory building in a number of ways. Throughout this dissertation, I am making an effort to refer to the various ways, in which connections to adjacent fields of research can be made. The degrees and processes of labor inclusion are an important contributing factor to an understanding of further regime trajectories after the end of World War I. This is a question that has been most explicitly addressed for European cases by Luebbert (1987), but it is also an implicit part of the explanatory interest in Moore (1966). A systematic analysis of labor inclusion, as it is outlined here, can help to shed new light on this type of research, which at this point focuses largely on the effects of peasant inclusion, while the equivalent kind of research for Latin America, as in Collier and Collier (1991), has already pointed out the importance of labor inclusion for the emergence of modern political regimes.

The general concept of inclusiveness, along with the analytical framework utilized here, can also be applied to other types of social movements and the way in which they entered the political arena. This is true for historical examples, such as feminism, christian democracy, or liberalism, but also for contemporary phenomena. One potential application, for example, exists with respect to the patterns of interaction between the state and entrenched elites on the one hand and the new islamism or other forms of religiously based political contestation on the other. Eventually, one more adjacent field, to which the work discussed here can contribute, is the study of party development. At this point, the transformation of social democracy has been understood largely as a mechanic response to changing circumstances, mostly socio-economic, for example in Lemke (1992), Merkel (1992), or Pontusson (1995). Kitschelt (1994) and Przeworski and Sprague (1987) have introduced the concept of party agency into this debate, by showing that social democracy is capable of responding creatively to challenges that occur as the result of ‘external’ developments. But no existing contribution has yet systematically formulated, let alone empirically analyzed, how the variation in formation experiences of social democratic parties affects their further transformation. On the basis of the research outlined here, such an analysis is now possible.

18 Elias (1939) is his major work. See Quilley and Loyal (2004) for a succinct summary of Elias’ ‘figurational’ approach. See the edited volume, to which their contribution belongs, for reflections on Elias, and empirical work inspired by his approach.

19 See Kalyvas (2003) for one of only few contributions to the study of ‘new’ religious mobilization that is comparative in nature, and that emphasizes the role of institutions. The focus of most of the literature is on values and group identities, with little interest in systematically incorporating the role of the state and institutions.
The following three chapters of this dissertation detail the suggested theory of party formation along with its conceptual, operational, and methodological underpinnings. As a first step in that direction, this current chapter formulates my explanation’s basic architecture and its substantive context in the broadest and most comprehensive fashion. To begin with, I am going to evaluate the previously noted socio-economic and status system approaches. Contributions along these lines represent competing theories, as they focus on the same explanatory interest as this dissertation: the formation of social democratic parties. In the second place, a number of adjacent fields of research will be introduced and reviewed. This entails different approaches, which deal with a variety of related issues, while the phenomenon they seek to account for is significantly different from the particular explanatory interest pursued here. I am going to identify deviations and continuities compared to my own approach. But at the same time, these contributions also provide the basis for a description of the substantive context, within which my explanation is located. In the third place, eventually, I am going to provide a broad overview of this substantive context. This includes most importantly the themes of industrialization, class formation, and institutional development. A description of the fundamental architecture of my own explanation will emerge from an assessment of this substantive context, within which it is situated, as it emphasizes causal factors – varying degrees of labor inclusion as external constraints and the agency of labor elites – that are embedded within those related phenomena.

Following on that, the remaining two chapters are geared at elaborating further on this initial statement of my proposed explanation. Chapter three conceptualizes the formation of social democratic parties and the variety of alternative models of labor politics as the ‘dependent variable’ of this study. This entails an outline of my typology of social democratic party types and competing models of labor politics,
followed by an assessment of prerequisites for inferring that a particular model of labor politics was formed ‘successfully’. Chapter four outlines my explanation for social democratic party formation, and its underpinnings by engaging in the conceptualization and operationalization of the two causal factors studied here, in a sense the ‘independent variables’: degrees of inclusion as the external constraints on labor elites’ choices, and the agency of labor elites itself.

**Prior attempts to explain social democratic party formation**

Both existing approaches to explain social democratic party formation – a ‘socio-economic’ and a ‘status system’ theory – understand the emergence of varying forms of labor politics as the result of structural determinants. First, the status system approach proposed by Lipset (1983, 1996) and John Kautsky (2002) establishes a causal relation between the presence of a system of rigid status differentiation and the emergence of social democracy. Their explanation relies on the existence compared to the absence of a native aristocracy, respectively the relative strength of a nation’s feudal heritage, as the major independent variable.

The approach suggests that class consciousness is a prerequisite for the establishment of pronounced manifestations of labor politics. This sort of group identity, however, is said to emerge only in response to status differentials that are characterized by the presence of feudal structures and a native aristocracy: “Where they (workers, KV) confronted only capitalism but no aristocracy, they did not develop class consciousness,” and therefore formed no independent socialist party, argues Kautsky (2002, 20). Lipset (1983, 2) proposes that “rigid status systems are conducive to the emergence of radical working class movements”, and Burnham (1974, 128) comes to the compact conclusion “No feudalism, no socialism.” Even though their arguments are basically dichotomous, Lipset (1983) and even more so John Kautsky (2002) imply a continuous causal relationship: the stronger feudal structures are, the stronger class consciousness will be, and the more radical the according working class response.20

Secondly, the socio-economic approach relies on national variations in the process of industrialization as the major independent variable. It suggests that differences in the speed, timing, direction, scope, or the

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20 Lipset’s (1983) argument entails two consecutive steps of social democratic party formation and in each of them, a related causal factor. He argues that social democratic party formation as a first order question depends on the nature of status systems: without pronounced remnants of feudalism, social democracy will not emerge. It is the overall degree of worker exclusion, as the second step in his argument, that decides about the nature of social democratic party formation. In that sense, he carefully introduces a wider perspective, similar to the general argument about labor inclusion pursued here, but the overall emphasis of his account remains strongly on the role of feudalism, the aristocracy, and status systems, despite this slight conceptual extension. Nonetheless, John Kautsky (2002) represents a much more blunt formulation of the status system approach, and also a more explicitly ‘continuous’ as opposed to a ‘dichotomous’ causal argument about the relation between feudalism and social democratic party formation. That being said, Kautsky (2002) is more careful in integrating the significance of industrialization conceptually into his argument, as a necessary prerequisite for social democratic party formation.
overall character of industrialization are directly causally related to the emergence of different forms of labor politics. Edvard Bull (1922, 330) provided the classic statement of this type of argument:

“The sudden reorganization of the traditionally agrarian nature of society, and the foundation of industrial centers in proximity to the new electric power plants (in Norway, KV) created a working class more open to revolutionary ideas, than the comrades from the two neighboring countries, which emerged from an older and more gradual development.”

Galenson (1952) in his own analysis of Scandinavian labor movements elaborates on Bull’s original account. He adds the direction and the character of industrialization as two more independent variables in addition to speed and timing, which were introduced by Bull. The general argument about a causal relation between features of industrialization and the nature of labor politics has thereafter been referred to as the ‘Bull-Galenson hypothesis’, but it did not remain confined to the analysis of Scandinavia. Kornhauser (1959) and the earlier work of Lipset (1963) are examples of a generalized version of this proposition, and many more accounts rely on similar premises implicitly.

A related argument based on socio-economic factors has been suggested to account for the absence of socialism in the United States. The social inclusion approach was initially formulated by Perlman (1922) in the context of the broader American exceptionalism discourse. He argues that the non-formation of socialism in the US is the result of higher levels of economic well-being, or from a different perspective, lower levels of economic deprivation, in the industrial working class. Since there is no variation regarding the embrace of socialism as a fundamental objective of varying models of labor politics except for the United States, this argument has never been extended into a comprehensive theory for variation in social democratic party formation.

In my evaluation of the two existing theories for social democratic party formation throughout the following paragraphs, I am going to emphasize their most fundamental characteristics, and how they are related to the basic architecture of my own alternative theory: first, the focus of the existing explanations on exclusively structural determinants, and the failure to consider the agency of labor elites; second, the lack of a conceptual distinction between the sources of labor’s demands on the one hand, and the determinants of labor elites’ strategical and organizational choices on the other; third, the failure to conceptually separate the qualitative features of different models of labor politics from the extent of mobilization success accomplished by any of these models.

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21 This is my own translation from the German original text.
22 For virtually all of the specific cases discussed here, there are contributions that build such theoretical premises into their general description of the historical development of social democracy and the labor movement. I already noted Totten (1996) as one specific example.
The role of elite agency

The existing explanations for social democratic party formation are purely structural and deterministic. In both these respects, they lack a systematic inclusion of agency. First of all, they are deterministic, because they regard the variety of observable outcomes in terms of different models of labor politics as the direct consequence of a certain feature that characterizes a given environment. Secondly, they are purely structural, because the conceptualization of this external environment is based exclusively on an assessment of ‘structural’ features, either the nature of industrialization in the socio-economic or the presence respectively extent of feudalism in the status system approach. This determinism and the exclusive focus on structural variables is problematic for two reasons: first, because the theories thus established fail to spell out their behavioral underpinnings; and second, because it prevents us from understanding systematically those case, where the observable outcome deviates from ‘structural’ predictions. The failure to include a systematic account for agency and the exclusive reliance on a structural explanation is not merely an omission that reduces accuracy in the representation of complexity in actual historical processes. It is also the source of inadequate theory building. This inadequacy becomes readily apparent, whenever structural determinants do not translate into the outcomes predicted by models based exclusively on structural factors.23

Arguing that the existing theories fail to spell out their behavioral underpinning is not to say, that the two approaches do not provide a sketch of those causal mechanisms that supposedly link either differences in the nature of industrialization or status systems to variation in party formation outcomes. The status system approach emphasizes the way in which status differentials trigger heightened class consciousness in the working class. Socio-economic explanations argue along similar lines that the group identity of labor depends on the way in which industrialization occurs – gradually or sudden, on a small or large scale, through the state or private corporations, etc. The failure to spell out the behavioral underpinning for their theories applies to the causal link between the structural environment and the working-class constituency on the one hand and those individuals that I refer to here as labor elites, who actually engage in the political organization of workers, on the other. The existing explanations lack a systematic account for how an encountered environment is translated into choices of organizational and ideological models through the agency of labor elites.

Both these approaches and indeed large parts of the theory guided literature on class formation and labor politics treat the labor movement as a homogenous group, which responds in unison to some selection or combination of structural determinants. It is plausible to expect that political entrepreneurs emerging

23 Each of the two existing ‘structural’ theories accounts for only 11 out of 20 cases, respectively.
from the labor movement or those that claim to act on its behalf – both of them might become ‘labor elites’ –
would devise a model of labor politics that responds to the perceived needs of their constituency. Even if
one takes that for granted, two questions remain open. The first one is about a conceptual distinction
between labor elites and the labor constituency at large and about how to understand the nature of elite
agency specifically. The second question requires a prior establishment of labor elites as an independent
actor. It is more specifically about the kind of environment that is most influential in triggering the choices
of labor elites in terms of varying models of labor politics.

At the most basic level, I argue that any theory of labor politics in general, or social democratic party
formation in particular, needs to distinguish systematically between the labor movement at large and labor
elites. How exactly do labor elites act across different cases, how do they translate a given environment into
decisions about models of labor politics, which exogenous factors influence their decision-making process,
and how can that result in outcomes, which are not to be expected from an assessment of any given
structural environment? Any theory that is serious about spelling out the causal mechanisms between
suggested cause and outcome needs to take into account conceptually the interaction between the demands
of the labor movement, the environment that shapes those demands, the role of labor elites, as well as the
endogenous and exogenous factors that influence the behavior of labor elites. To understand, more
specifically, why and how social democratic parties were formed, it is necessary to systematically include
the perception of opportunity structures defined by an encountered environment through labor elites, and
the interaction of these elites with the given environment and the working class at large. In short, a viable
theory of social democratic party formation requires what the existing explanations are lacking: a
systematic inclusion of agency.

The omission of agency in comparative labor movement theories reflects the ‘structural bias’ of the
underlying research paradigms. It is exactly for the reasons discussed above that practitioners of approaches
coming from an equally ‘structural’ and ‘deterministic’ institutionalist perspective call for a systematic
inclusion of agency – historical institutionalism (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Thelen 1999), political process
theory (Meyer 2004, Meyer and Minkoff 2004, Goodwin and Jasper 1999), as well as proponents of a “new
interactional structuralism” in the study of contentious politics (Hanagan 1998). My attempt to
systematically include the role of agency responds to their call for an advancement of structure based social
theories in general, but it is also the prerequisite for the development of an adequate theory of labor politics
in particular.

Including a systematic treatment of agency requires a prior conceptual distinction between the labor
movement at large and political elites within the labor movement. Support for different party models
depends on the way in which the demands of the labor movement at large are shaped by perceptions of
labor inclusion; and this factor, along with socio-economic and other variables influencing the ‘national’
character of different movements, can explain the relative and absolute success – or in other words, the extent of institutionalization – accomplished by a particular model. But the formulation and ‘supply’ of a party model through labor movement elites is an antecedent to this process. Labor elites devise party models in response to their own perception of labor inclusion and their perception of labor’s demands stemming from their constituency’s exposure to varying degrees of inclusion. However, labor elites’ perception and evaluation of these external constraints can be less than optimal, which is why in some cases, a particular institutional environment does not easily translate into the ‘structurally’ predicted choice of party model. A systematic inclusion of agency into an explanation for the formation of labor politics therefore needs to account for additional exogenous sources that inform elites’ decisions about party models.

To this end, a historical institutionalist framework, such as the one I employ here, can learn much from a sociology of knowledge approach. Wuthnow (1989), Skocpol and Rueschemeyer (1996) and Rueschemeyer and van Rossem (1996) employ this perspective to study the articulation and dissemination of ideas in a particular historical context and the way in which these ideas are translated into political movements (Wuthnow 1989) or practical social policies (Rueschemeyer and van Rossem 1996). They study the receptiveness of various historical environments for ideas and their expression, as well as how structural determinants shape these ideas and their articulation. It is precisely this particular juncture between the existence of structural determinants and their translation into actual party models, where the role of elites, and the way in which they articulate ideas and strategical recommendations, has to be investigated.

My attempt to include a systematic treatment of agency along these lines is also informed by the rational choice variant of the new institutionalism. The very nature of this approach emphasizes the micro-foundations of political processes, whereas historical institutionalism usually starts from the perspective of macro-politics and structural variables. Rational choice institutionalist such as Levi and others have added to our understanding of the micro-foundations of institutional models by scrutinizing results that are “off the equilibrium path” (Levi 1997, p. 31): they focus on cases, where outcomes deviate from the predictions derived on the basis of structural variables. A combination of both these perspectives with a historical institutionalist framework allows for the following two types of analysis. First, we are able to understand the process through which labor elites translate an existing set of external constraints into choices that represent optimal responses to the encountered environment in some cases, as well as suboptimal choices in others. And second, we can study the effects of exogenous factors on labor elites’ decision-making process, which can explain the emergence of suboptimal choices.
Sources of labor’s demands and determinants for labor elites’ choices

The next point of contention vis-à-vis the two existing explanations for social democratic party formation relates to the second question noted in the previous section. I argued there that on top of the socio-economic and status system approaches’ failure to distinguish systematically between labor elites and the labor movement at large, it needs to be ascertained, which aspect of the environment encountered by labor elites is most relevant in determining choices for varying models of labor politics. I argue that degrees of labor inclusion perform this particular function. Socio-economic factors and varying systems of status differentials have important effects on the labor movement in the political arena as well, but they fail as an explanation for the choice of social democratic party types or alternative models of labor politics. Moreover, other than the two competing explanations and indeed large parts of the theory guided literature, my conceptualization of labor inclusion as the decisive factor for the emergence of different models of labor politics is in itself based on a consideration of institutional and behavioral components. A detailed conceptualization of labor inclusion will be outlined later on. At this point, I wish to simply support my conceptual framework, in which labor inclusion represents the most important aspect of the environment encountered by labor elites in their decision-making process about the implementation of varying models of labor politics.

At the most basic level, I argue that the existing explanations come to inadequate conclusions about the decisive factors influencing labor’s choices, resulting in limited empirical applicability, because they fail to distinguish between the causes for labor’s demands and goals on the one hand, and those factors that shape labor elites’ organizational and strategical choices on the other hand.24 Each of the two approaches subscribes to either one of two distinct theories of ‘alienation’. Socio-economic alienation theory, both in a marxist and an explicitly non-marxist variety25, emphasizes the role of socioeconomic conditions in alienating the working class and shaping its programmatic and strategical choices. Along these lines, labor’s engagement in the political arena occurs as a response to economic exclusion; and different models of labor politics emerge as a result of variation in socio-economic variables. An alternative political alienation theory has been suggested by Bendix (1964) for political movements of the nineteenth century in general, and was embraced by Lipset (1983, 1996) and Kautsky (2002) for their analyses of social democratic party formation in particular. From this perspective, class conflict and class formation occurred

24 The limited predictive power of the two existing explanations will become apparent through the comparative empirical analysis in chapter 11. The socio-economic and the status system explanation correctly predict 11 out of 20 cases, while the nature of labor inclusion, taken as a causally determining external constraint, without the consideration of exogenous factors, accounts for 17 out of a total of 20 cases.
25 The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848) and the preface of Das Kapital (Marx 1848) are examples for the marxist variety. Galenson (1952) and Rostow (1964) embrace the concept of ‘social alienation’ from a non-marxist perspective.
in response to political exclusion. As a result, the emergence of varying models of labor politics, including the establishment of social democratic parties, is determined by political variables. The status system approach, more specifically, conceives of the nature of the political environment encountered by labor by reference to varying systems of status differentials.²⁶

The socio-economic approach to social democratic party formation relies on qualitative variation in the process of industrialization to explain the formation of different social democratic parties. The related social inclusion approach focuses on another set of socio-economic factors, which can be summarized as the relative extent of economic deprivation. The suggested causal relationship between higher economic deprivation and the emergence of socialism, or conversely, greater economic well-being, and the absence of socialism is rooted in the investigation of American labor politics. The so-called American exceptionalism literature has produced an implicit explanation for the formation of social democratic parties on the basis of studying the absence of socialism in the United States. The original formulation of this line of research dates back to the work of Werner Sombart (1906), which has informed an immensely long lived research tradition. Sombart (1906) and his successors hold a wide variety of socio-economic and political factors responsible for the absence of socialism in the United States.

Perlman (1928), in the context of this classic exceptionalism literature, focuses more specifically on the effects of higher levels of socio-economic well-being as one of these factors. He argues that the lack of socialism in the United States is the result of greater degrees of ‘social inclusion’, which in effect means higher levels of economic well-being, or conversely, lower economic deprivation of workers, compared to the industrialized societies of Europe. The absence of feudalism is one of several political factors emphasized by research from an American exceptionalism perspective, which has become the underpinning for an encompassing theory of social democratic party formation. Variation in ‘levels of economic deprivation’, on the other hand, has never been developed into a general theory for variation in social democratic party formation or alternative models of labor politics, even though its analytical premises often sneak into arguments about labor politics. The ‘social inclusion’ approach is neither adequate as a theory of social democratic party formation, nor does it hold as a specific explanation for the absence of socialism in the United States.

First of all, socialism from this perspective is understood in a particularly broad fashion, as a substantive agenda and the formulation of goals – both socio-economic through the call for collectivization of the means of production, and political through demands for the protection of workers’ political interests – on the basis of a particular form of organization and strategy: a mass-based social democratic party

²⁶ The concept of ‘political alienation’ also provides the underpinning rationale for the institutionalist literature on labor politics, but there is no institutionalist explanation for social democratic party formation specifically.
involved in the electoral arena. I would argue that it is necessary to distinguish more explicitly between distinct dimensions, along which social democracy and variation across different party types can be identified: on the one hand, socialism as a socio-economic agenda, along with an additional set of political demands, which taken together describe the goals of social democracy; as well as strategical and organizational orientations on the other.

At first sight, a causal effect of different levels of economic deprivation on the socio-economic agenda of some given model of labor politics appears at least as a possibility. But there is no plausible reason for why different strategical or organizational choices of social democratic party leaders or other labor elites should depend on the extent of economic deprivation. This alone makes an approach untenable that would suggest levels of economic deprivation as a causal factor for variation along all these component features of varying models of labor politics – goals, strategies, and forms of organization. However, even if one reduces the applicability of a socio-economic “level of deprivation” theory to the goals of varying models of labor politics, such an approach would be infeasible, simply because there is no variation across social democratic parties with respect to the embrace of socialism. Evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties do not differ with respect to the formulation of socialism as the fundamental objective. Variation across the two party types occurs with respect to strategical orientations of how to enter the political arena, according organizational differences, and in terms of varying emphases on political versus socio-economic demands.

This observation can also illustrate the second point noted above, namely the fact that a social inclusion approach, in addition to being infeasible as a theory for social democratic party formation, is not applicable to explain the absence of socialism in the United States, either. Socialism as an ideology and tool for social integration only occurs within an organizational vessel that enters the political arena on behalf of labor. In addition to its ideological underpinning, this vessel is also characterized by different strategies and forms of organization. In the case of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties, the call for socialism was an implicit element in the original formation of this party type. Evolutionary social democratic parties on the other hand initially entered the arena of politics, and the electoral arena more specifically, without a socialist agenda. Labor parties in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia initially established themselves as an independent political party of workers, yet without a socialist agenda. They only embraced socialism after they had already entered the electoral arena, as a means of distinction vis-à-vis their prior liberal cooperation partners.

27 This does not mean that quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties began their formative stage in the political arena as prototypes of quasi-revolutionary orientations in all respects. In the case of the German social democrats, the establishment of a quasi-revolutionary orientation occurred over time through the shedding of Lasallean traditions. Similar developments occurred in Denmark and Sweden. However, in all cases of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, these parties were born with the demand for socialism, and they certainly had embraced that agenda, when they entered the arena of electoral politics.
Regardless of the point in time, when socialism was adopted as the fundamental objective of the party, this illustration should clarify that the embrace of socialism requires a prior decision for entering the political arena as an independent political formation. In the United States, labor elites decided against entering politics as an independent force, and in favor of channeling labor’s demands into the political arena through the entrenched elites, in response to the presence of highest labor inclusion. My explanation for the absence of socialism in the United States will therefore emphasize the decision to not enter the arena of politics as a permanent association. The absence of socialism as an underpinning ideology is only the logical consequence of that earlier decision. We are going to see in my comparative assessment of the American case that differences in the process of embracing socialism are the result of labor inclusion as a set of ‘political’ variables, and not socio-economic levels of economic deprivation. This illustrates that even in the domain of goals as one element in the typology of varying models of labor politics, political variables are key.

Eventually, contrary to the premise of the social inclusion approach, it is by no means an accomplished fact that the willingness of workers to engage in radical forms of labor politics increases with the extent of economic deprivation. Already Marx and Engels argued that the *Lumpenproletariat* as the most deprived stratum of industrial workers should not be expected to embrace socialism, but quite to the contrary, was most likely to be bought off by reactionary political tendencies. The following cases studies are going to provide ample evidence that supporters of social democratic parties and the majority of socialist activists came from the better off sections of the industrial proletariat. Hamilton (1967), in addition to several other empirical studies, has shown for the case of the France in the 1950s that more radical orientations and forms of behavior are not contingent on higher levels of economic deprivation. Socialism and left politics have the capacity to flourish in an environment of relative affluence. These observations contribute to undermine an explanation for the emergence of different models of labor politics through variation in ‘levels of economic deprivation’ as a causal factor. This approach, which is based on the rationale of socio-economic alienation, fails as a comprehensive theory for social democratic party formation, but also as a specific explanation for the American case.

Overall, Bartolini (2000) is quite correct when he demands that the two processes of alienation introduced here – socio-economic and political – have to be distinguished analytically for a satisfactory explanation of labor politics. On top of that, I would like to emphasize the need for an additional conceptual clarification. As the prior debate about the social inclusion approach should have illustrated, the determinants for variation in strategical and organizational choices need to be separated from those factors.

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28 This argument hints at the importance of labor elites in the formulation of political agendas and the channeling of discontent observed by Hamilton (1967) for the nature of working-class politics in the French Fourth Republic.
that shape the formulation of goals and a substantive agenda as an additional element in different models of labor politics. The socio-economic and the status system theory as well as the social inclusion approach, which represents a different kind of socio-economic explanation, all suggest that it is exclusively one kind of ‘alienation’ along with an according set of variables – either socio-economic or political – that informs both labor’s organizational and strategical choices on the one hand, and the group’s goals on the other (see figure 1).

First, it is an artificial distinction to argue that workers had either political or economic concerns exclusively. Even from the most cursory reading of labor history, it should be readily apparent, that workers have had both kinds of grievances and that parties appealing to labor attempted to respond to both of these types of demands by incorporating them into their platforms. As a result, both socio-economic and political alienation along with the variables determining the nature of these processes, should be considered as contributors to the substantive agenda or the goals of social democratic and other models of labor politics. Proposing that it is either socio-economic or political variables exclusively that trigger labor’s political activities and shape the goals and the substantive agenda of varying models of labor politics makes the proponents of political and socio-economic alienation theory go through great lengths in stretching their own concepts and in dismissing what is represented as a competing explanation. Neither one of the two approaches takes into account that both processes of ‘alienation’ are complimentary in shaping the formulated goals of varying models of labor politics, and that socio-economic and political demands assume varying degrees of importance across specific cases or categories of cases.

The later outline of a party typology as well as the empirical analysis of party formation will provide ample evidence for this claim, and it will also detail national variations with respect to the relative importance of political and socio-economic demands through the introduction of what I call there differences in substantive emphasis. Political demands, political alienation, or, in other words, the political as opposed to the economic struggle of labor were of somewhat greater importance for the quasi-revolutionary than the evolutionary social democratic party type. But this feature of the quasi-revolutionary party type is not determined by the presence of a native aristocracy, as it is suggested by the status system approach. It applies to a number of cases – Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – which were characterized by bourgeois dominance and only limited remnants of feudalism. Moreover, the greater emphasis on political demands was always embedded in both a long term perspective of economic revolution and specific economic policy demands.

Second, the failure to separate the respective effects of socio-economic and political variables on different components of varying models of labor politics – goals, strategy, organization – is rooted to some extent in the existing approaches’ lack of a party typology that makes such a conceptual distinction. Each of the theories suggests that not just the goals of varying models of labor politics, as discussed above, but
indeed all these three defining elements depend on either socio-economic or political variables exclusively. The determinants of a substantive agenda, or in other words, the goals of some political organization, are a theme, however, that is entirely separate from the question about which type of variables have contributed to the emergence of different organizational and strategical choices.

I have argued previously with respect to the social inclusion approach in particular, that there is no plausible reason for why levels of economic deprivation as one kind of socio-economic variable should be related to the strategical and organizational orientations of varying models of labor politics. This argument applies to different types of industrialization as another kind of socio-economic variable in the same way. The strategical and organizational features of varying models of labor politics represent different mechanisms for mobilizing the working class and channeling its formulated goals (both political and socio-economic) into the political arena. The extent, speed, scope, timing, or direction of industrialization, as well as other socio-economic factors, such as the extent of economic deprivation, are not related to these strategical choices. In the process of labor’s entering the political arena, both political and socio-economic alienation had to be channeled through the same (‘political’) bottleneck, whose width and flexibility across cases is conceptualized here as varying degrees of labor inclusion.

Political variables, or more specifically, degrees of labor inclusion in the context of my argument, are therefore related to the goals as well as the organizational and strategical components of varying models of labor politics. Socio-economic variables, on the other hand, have nothing to do with the organizational and strategical choices of labor elites. The status system approach correctly identifies political variables as the determining factor for variation in labor politics. Nonetheless, the specific focus on status systems as an explanatory factor reveals a conceptualization of labor’s political environment that is far too narrow. Moreover, the status system approach also fails to appreciate the role of socio-economic alienation as a trigger for labor’s political activity, and the intricacies of the involved causal mechanisms. Without industrialization, no industrial working-class would exist, and without economic deprivation, a formulation of socio-economic goals and platforms would be unnecessary.

**Disaggregating mobilization success and type of model**

The distinction between forms of organization and the extent of mobilization that I introduced briefly before, leads us to a consideration of my third major point of contention with the existing alternative theories: the failure of the status system and the socio-economic approach to an explanation of social democratic party formation, as well as the remaining theory guided literature on labor politics, to appreciate and explicate that distinction. Their analyses are characterized by an aggregation of different (categorical) models of labor politics with varying (ordinal) degrees of mobilization success into one single dependent
variable. Both approaches implicitly associate more radicalism with greater degrees of mobilization success. I argue, on the other hand, that no model of labor politics is inherently better suited to achieve more success in mobilizing workers as the targeted constituency. The comparative assessment of mobilization success later on in this dissertation will provide the factual underpinning for this conclusion. Making such an inference, however, requires a prior conceptual distinction between forms of organization and the extent of mobilization success.

Katznelson (1986), based on Rokkan’s (1970) classic framework of political development in Western Europe, identifies linguistic and religious cleavages as alternative sources for political mobilization. If present in a particular case and effectively pursued by political entrepreneurs, they might diminish the extent of mobilization success through the class cleavage. Moreover, the pervasiveness of industrialization itself is naturally a contributing factor to the mobilization potential of the class cleavage. I wouldn’t disagree with these suggestions, but it is important to consider the choices of labor elites as another determinant for the extent to which the class cleavage is mobilized. Good choices for models that suit their environment increase mobilization success, and bad choices diminish it. It is along these lines that I will consider the extent of mobilization success: as an indicator for the presence of optimal or suboptimal choices by labor elites. But before discussing this point further later on, I will first elaborate on the conceptual distinction between mobilization success and forms of labor politics as the logical prerequisite.

By aggregating forms of organization and degrees of mobilization success into one dependent variable, an identification of those causal factors that are most relevant for the emergence of varying models of labor politics becomes impossible. I argue that any theory trying to explain cross-national variations of the labor movement needs to disaggregate the dependent variables of interest: the success of the labor movement in mobilizing the class cleavage is conceptually and empirically distinct from the organizational and ideological choices that emerged as dominant.

If one distinguishes between these two concepts, the socio-economic approach actually suggests two separate causal connections. First, a causal relation between industrialization variables and the forms of labor politics, manifested for instance through labor’s dominant ideology or form of organization; second, a causal relation between industrialization variables and the quantitative extent of working class mobilization. I already argued that the question as to how exactly industrialization relates to the mobilization success of labor is beyond my immediate explanatory interest, since I focus on an explanation

29 See tables 12, 13, 14, and 15, which display different indicators on social democratic parties’ internal institutionalization and external mobilization success. The Australian Labor Party as an evolutionary social democratic party has accomplished the highest degree of electoral success out of all parties studied here. Labour in Britain as another example for evolutionary social democracy had the largest number of members (even though it should be taken into account that the majority of these individuals became party members automatically through their union affiliation). In general, success and lack of success in mobilization and internal institutionalization are relatively equally distributed across different types of parties.
for different forms of party formation. Suffice it to say at this point that there is some debate as to how exactly varying patterns of industrial development are related to mobilization success, but the general notion that the extent and characteristics of industrialization are systematically related to the organizational and electoral success of labor is not seriously contended. Bartolini (2000) in the only large n analysis of this proposition finds no evidence for a causal relation between the timing of industrialization and the earliness or strength of left electoral mobilization, while the tempo of industrialization (rate of growth and rapidity) is more significantly related to the levels of left growth. Overall, he comes to the conclusion that, all else being equal, the extent of industrialization and urbanization as two elements of labor’s social mobilization are significantly related to the extent of electoral support for the left, i.e. mobilization success.

Research about the nature of class formation (Katznelson 1986) has added non-economic factors to our understanding of labor’s mobilization success. Katznelson’s more encompassing conception of class formation allows for the inclusion of other sources underpinning labor’s identity as a social group, such as linguistic affiliations or religious convictions. He argues that the potential of unions or left parties to mobilize the working class depends not only on workers’ socio-economic situation (shaped by the character of industrial development), but also on the pervasiveness of linguistic, ethnic, or religious cleavages in their respective society. If a religious cleavage, for instance, is strong, workers might be drawn to support catholic or conservative parties rather than working class parties; this was the case in Italy, Germany, but also in other continental European cases. Any theory attempting to account fully for labor’s mobilization potential therefore needs to take into account these non-class determinants of labor’s mobilization potential.

However, while Bartolini’s analysis provides evidence for the relation between industrialization variables and the extent of labor mobilization, he also finds that a social mobilization model alone, relying exclusively on variables associated with industrialization and urbanization, does not explain much of the cross-country variation in the forms of working class ideology and organization (Bartolini 2000, 177): “That social mobilization models explain so few of the differences among the countries at each historical moment is astonishing.” In addition to Bartolini (2000) as the only large n analysis of this proposition, there are several case studies, such as Lafferty (1971) and Kocka (1980) that provide evidence to reject the Bull-Galenson hypothesis. These findings lend important empirical support to a crucial premise for my argument, namely that industrialization variables only have to be considered when trying to explain the extent of working class mobilization, but have nothing to do with the forms of ideology and organization that emerged as dominant.

30 See Rokkan (1970) and his framework of understanding the development of parties and party systems as the cumulative effect of channeling subsequently emerging cleavages through existing institutional arrangements. See Lijphart (1979) with an empirical analysis of class vs. linguistic vs. religious voting.
There is a related issue of measurement that makes it difficult to determine the relationship between industrialization and varying forms of labor politics suggested by the socio-economic approach. The progress made in the collection and estimation of industrial development data as well as more recent research on industrialization in general have reversed or at least significantly qualified much of the earlier conventional wisdom with respect to assessments about a country’s relative speed, timing, and nature of industrial growth. Britain, for instance, continues to be regarded as the typical example of steady and gradual growth, but there is much debate about the extent and the reasons for slow growth in the late Victorian period (cf. Cameron 1993, Harley 1991). Fisher (1992) evaluates new research on the case of Germany that dates the onset of industrialization at an earlier point in time than previously assumed. France used to be portrayed as a case of sluggish growth during the 19th century (Roehl 1976), but newer research (cf. Sylla and Toniolo 1991) rejects this characterization of French industrialization. This is already an extensive, but by no means a complete list: it should be enough to demonstrate that simple assertions about the causal relations between levels of industrialization and varying forms of labor politics stand on shaky grounds, because they are based on assumptions about national characteristics of industrialization that cannot be easily sustained.

Nonetheless, a socio-economic perspective is certainly a valuable contributor to an explanation for variation in the quantitative extent of labor mobilization, when that issue is distinguished from qualitative variation in the forms of labor politics. For the status system approach, on the other hand, the aggregation of these two distinct concepts represents a more fundamental problem. This is true for both Lipset’s (1983) and John Kautsky’s (2002) contribution, but the fallacy is more apparent in Kautsky’s specific causal argument. He identifies varying ‘degrees of socialism’ as his dependent variable. Greater degrees imply both greater mobilization success and a more radical orientation. There is no plausible reason for why such a connection should be expected to exist, and the later empirical analysis will in fact reveal that it is not tenable.

 Pronounced class consciousness, which I believe to be more of a rhetorical figure than a useful concept, functions as the focal point for the status system approach. I have carefully excluded the issue of ‘class consciousness’ from this discussion, although it is a frequently used rhetorical device, most importantly from a status system perspective, which contrasts the presumed presence of class consciousness in Europe to its presumed absence in the United States as the determinant for the presence of socialism in Europe and its absence in the United States. This is the reason for why I will evaluate this discussion in the empirical analysis of the American case. At this point, I would like to argue simply that the undifferentiated use of the term class consciousness is more of an obstacle than a helpful device in understanding variations in social democratic party formation. Giovanni Sartori’s (1970) verdict of “concept stretching” clearly applies to the way in which the term class consciousness is used in the status
system explanation. It contains all at the same time expectations of extensive mobilization, political
alienation, and particularly radical rhetoric, merged into one giant conceptual apparatus. The three
conceptual and theoretical fallacies outlined in this section are therefore in no small measure related to the
undifferentiated use of that term.

If one distinguishes forms of organization and mobilization success from one another, the socio-
economic hypothesis about the relation between industrialization and varying forms of labor politics
reveals itself as a spurious causal connection. The status system approach emerges as an explanation that
correctly identifies ‘political’ variables as the determining factor for the choices of varying models of labor
politics. But at the same time, it remains what I would call an incomplete explanation, because it
misconceives the nature of the ‘political’ environment that informs labor’s choices (see figure 1). I argue
that the status system approach represents an incomplete explanation, because it considers only one set of
‘political’ determinants affecting labor’s choices for varying ideological and organizational models, but at
the same time, extends what should be regarded as a bounded inference to an encompassing theory. The
variety and complexity of different dimensions of labor inclusion cannot be understood by reference to
feudalism alone. First of all, the continuing existence of feudal structures can be an underlying factor that
contributes to the political exclusion of labor, but it is by no means the only one. Exclusion or inclusion of
the working class does not just reflect the interests of the aristocracy, but also depends strongly on the
willingness and capacity of the native bourgeoisie to grant concessions to the labor movement. Secondly,
irrespective of the specific actor that dominates the political environment, into which labor emerged,
repression of labor can occur in varying degrees of intensity. Depending on the extent of repression and
exclusion, labor elites will have to make different decisions about the model of labor politics that responds
in the most optimal fashion to their specific environment.

**Adjacent areas of research**

It is surprising that above and beyond the limited amount of contributions from the perspective of the
socio-economic and status system approaches discussed above, no other systematic accounts exist for
variations in social democratic party formation, while at the same time, there is an abundance of
contributions interested generally in labor politics, the left, social class, the emergence of the welfare state
and related issues. It is possible, albeit paradoxical, that the overwhelming interest of comparative research
in issues of class formation, cleavage politics, and related topics associated with the emergence of the
socialist left, has redirected scholarly attention away from the mechanics of party formation, more narrowly
understood. Throughout the following paragraphs, I am going to provide a sketch of these and other
research traditions, which I refer to here as adjacent fields of research. I am using this term to identify
thematically related scholarship, which pursues different specific explanatory interests. Some of these
collections are invaluable for my later outline of the context, within which social democratic party
formation occurred.

Theories of party formation for different party families and case studies on social democracy

First of all, systematic attempts to explain the determinants and mechanics of party formation have
been made for generally much less researched types of movements and political agendas. These
contributions have a functionally similar research interest, compared to this dissertation, by attempting to
theorize about the causal determinants for the emergence of specific types of political parties. But the
substance of their research is different, in that the focus of these works is not on social democratic parties
or alternative models of labor politics. Research along these lines extends to Christian democratic parties
(Kalyvas 1996, van Keersbergen 1995) and liberalism (Gould 1999) during the late 19th and early 20th
century. It also encompasses more recent phenomena, such as the emergence of left-libertarian (Kitschelt
1988), or radical right (Kitschelt 1995) parties.

As far as social democracy is concerned, there are no contributions interested in explaining party
formation specifically, beyond the socio-economic and status system approaches noted here. However,
there is an abundance of case specific literature on social democratic parties with little interest in the
formulation of a general theory for party formation. These works often entail accounts for the emergence as
well as the development of social democracy. Many of these contributions are one case studies, but there
are also pieces that extend to limited forms of comparison, by contrasting, for example, Britain and
Germany (Eisenberg 1989), or social democratic parties in Southern Europe (Puhle 2001) This is only a
brief sketch of this kind of literature, but throughout the following empirical analysis of specific cases,
many more of these contributions will be noted and discussed.31

The transformation of social democracy

Systematic comparative research on the transformation of social democracy, as the second type of
literature reviewed here, is much more eclectic than attempts to explain the formation of social democratic
parties. This perspective is different from the particular explanatory interest pursued here, because it
focuses on the transformation, but not the initial establishment of social democracy. At the same time, no

31 See Laybourn (2000) for Britain; Spain: Heywood (1990), Germany: Löschel and Walter (1992), Russia: Swain (1983), Japan:
Totten (1966)
account exists as of yet that would outline a generalized theory about the transformation of social democracy. Typically, contributions from this perspective analyze party development during one particular stage or context.

Lemke (1992), Merkel (1992), Pontusson (1995), and a variety of similar contributions revolve around the development of social democracy in response to changing class structures, economic internationalization and the reform of the welfare state ever since the 1970s. In one way or another, most of these pieces predict social democratic decline in response to changing circumstances, most importantly as a result of the erosion of traditional milieus of support. This “demise” perspective has been criticized by Kitschelt (1993, 1994) as simplistic and overly deterministic. In his own work on the same time period, he emphasizes the ability of social democratic parties to respond creatively to external developments and to make strategic choices that are capable of preventing decline.

Przeworski and Sprague (1986) investigate the consequences of varying strategies pursued by social democratic parties in the process of entering the electoral arena. Their work features some overlap with the research I pursue here, as both studies are interested in a comparatively early stage of social democratic development. But in terms of historical sequences, the focus of their analysis is on the stage of party transformation, at least for the majority of cases, in which electoral participation was severely limited during the initial formative stage of entering the political arena. Kirchheimer (1966) focuses on yet another stage in the development of social democracy. His research is interested in characterizing the changes that occurred in the post war era, when many social democratic parties came to accept the market principle and opened themselves toward support from social groups other than their traditional working class constituency. For this development, he coined the classic terminology of the “catch all” party.

I will further elaborate on my own conceptualization of social democratic parties during their process of transformation in the following typology chapter. The perspective outlined there rejects what I believe to be a premature inference by Kirchheimer (1966) about the shedding of previously acquired traditions in social democracy. The typology outlined there that includes social democratic parties from the transformation stage, can function as the underpinning for the formulation of a general theory about the transformation of social democracy, which extends beyond the period specific conclusions of the existing literature. Moreover, the theory of party formation developed here represents an important contribution to the study of party transformation. As of yet, none of the existing work takes into account the effects of varying formation backgrounds on the strategical choices of social democracy during their further transformation. I would argue that these formation backgrounds affect the decisional autonomy enjoyed by later generations of social democratic elites, and therefore, are a crucial variable to consider for understanding the process of party transformation.
The labor movement and alternative models of labor politics

There is probably an even greater number of studies interested in the formative stage of the labor movement in general or alternative models of labor politics more specifically. These two types of contributions are substantively related to my own research interest, as they focus on the broader environment, within which, or from which social democracy emerged. The empirical historical research on the labor movement, some of which is comparative in nature, will be discussed in the relevant case studies. Research on alternative models of labor politics will be noted in those cases that have seen the successful emergence of an alternative to social democracy or at least a significant challenge for social democratic parties through any such model – bolshevism, anarchism-syndicalism, or moderate syndicalism.

Many of the contributions reviewed here, both theoretically inclined and descriptive, with a wide variety of specific explanatory interests related to the labor movement, include a consideration of institutions as independent variables. The class formation framework to be discussed later on, for instance, reserves a prominent role for the effects of institutions. Many single case studies discuss the implications of variation in political liberties and other institutions that are crucial for the political action of labor. But on top of that, there is also an explicitly institutionalist approach to questions of labor politics that focuses on institutions as the decisive causal factor from a comparative perspective.

Some institutionalist explanations pursue a particularly narrow research agenda, by focusing exclusively on the effects of one particular set of institutions on varying trajectories of the labor movement, for instance Hattam (1992), who is interested in the effects of the courts on different ways in which labor entered the political arena in Britain and the United States. There is also a wide variety of medium range institutionalist theories pertaining to the labor movement in the most widely understood fashion, for example in the context of research on the emergence of the welfare state (Steinmo 1994), or the study of social revolutions (Skocpol 1979). It is surprising that there is no institutionalist account for the explanation of social democratic party formation. Bartolini (2000), who considers institutional variations in the context of a broader class formation framework, attempts to explain “left experiences”, but not specific manifestations of actual organizations. Mikkelsen (2005) investigates the effect of institutional and socio-economic variables on “overall syndromes” of labor politics.

My particular explanatory interest is neither into the effects of one particular set of institutions, nor is it about a broad characterization of varying “left experiences” or “overall syndromes”. I investigate the effects of labor inclusion as a latent variable that emerges from a consideration of its component indicators on actual organizational and ideological manifestations of labor politics. Thus, not only my research strategy, but also my explanatory interest is different from the existing institutionalist literature. As a consequence, the approach outlined here represents the first comprehensive explanation for the formation
of social democratic parties and alternative models of labor politics that takes an institutionalist point of departure.

In that way, the theory suggested here builds on prior work, which highlighted the importance of institutional differences for understanding variation in labor politics from a comparative perspective. But at the same time, it is characterized by some important innovations or extensions to a purely institutionalist explanation. There are two important issues that I would like to note in this context, both of which will be discussed in more detail later on. First of all, the explanatory framework suggested here includes a systematic consideration of agency. The failure to include a systematic account for the agency of labor elites is a major pitfall of the existing institutionalist literature, comparable to the same kind of omission in the status system and socio-economic explanations for social democratic party formation.

Secondly, not only in terms of the overall causal argument, but also with respect to the conceptualization of the environment encountered by labor elites, I am systematically taking into account the effects of behavioral factors on top of institutional variations. The combination of both these issues allows for a dynamic investigation of the interaction between the agency of labor elites with the behavior of the state and entrenched political elites. A consideration of exogenous effects on the decision making process of labor elites about how to channel labor’s demands into the political arena, moreover, makes a systematic explanation for those cases possible, where outcomes deviate from predictions made on the basis of studying labor inclusion as an external constraint.

**The class formation framework**

One particular approach to the historical study of labor politics that I refer to here as the class formation perspective deserves to be singled out, for two related reasons. First of all, it represents the most comprehensive framework for an understanding of how the working-class emerged and entered the political arena. And in the second place, as such, it contains the most concise outline of the substantive context, within which my particular research about social democratic party formation is located. However, in and of itself, a class formation perspective is unsuitable as an explanation for social democratic party formation and the alternative choices for competing models of labor politics.

Katzenelson (1986, p. 4) describes the explanatory interest of a broad class formation framework as follows:

“This book is about different reactions to proletarianization in nineteenth-century France, Germany, and the United States. It seeks to explain variations in the formation of working classes in these countries at the moment when class emerged as a way of organizing, thinking about, and acting on society; and it asks how initial patterns of sentiment, behavior, and organization shaped class relations later in the century.”
This framework and the contributions operating within its parameters therefore pursue causal arguments that are significantly broader than my own. This applies both to their explanatory interest, which includes forms and degrees of labor’s political mobilization, but also the suggested causal factors, which extend to socio-economic, cultural, religious, and institutional variables. Katznelson (1986) and his colleagues emphasize the characteristics of class formation within specific cases, while at the same time trying to develop a framework that allows for a systematic explanation of varying patterns of development.

To that end, Katznelson (1986, 14) distinguishes between four different levels of class formation, instead of the classic Marxian dichotomy of the (objective) “Klasse an sich”, and the (subjective) “Klasse für sich”.32 Katznelson’s first level describes the fundamental structure of capitalist economic development – the commodification of money, land, and labor, as discussed by Polanyi (1944). The second level still belongs to the socio-economic domain, but contains more specific aspects of systematic economic differences pertaining to labor, for instance the nature of national labor markets and typical social relations around the workplace.

The third level describes workers’ dispositions, while the fourth level entails the nature of collective action as a social class: (p. 20) “This kind of behavior is self-conscious and refers to activity that is more than just the common but unself-conscious shared behavior of members of a class.” His extended formulation of class formation allows for the systematic inclusion of factors determining the nature of dispositions at the third, and the forms of collective action at the fourth level, which extend beyond the socio-economic domain. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the kinds of political struggles that Rokkan (1970) identified as pre-industrial determinants for the nature of political contestation in Western Europe: conflict between different religious orientations, between state and church, between urban and rural interests, as well as conflict along linguistic cleavages. It also allows for studying the effects of previously established institutions that were designed to regulate these pre-industrial cleavage dimensions.

Bartolini (2000) represents the most comprehensive empirical analysis about the nature of class formation and the collective action of the working class that uses this framework as a guiding principle. He studies the mobilization success as well as the predominant forms of collective action of the working class in Western Europe. He identifies four different “left experiences” that are designed to characterize the overall nature of early class mobilization: trade unionism, reformist marxism, orthodox marxism, and marxism-syndicalism (p. 120). The analysis begins in the late 19th century, and extends over an entire century. It thus encompasses both a certain period of what I refer to here as the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena for some cases, and the transformation of initially established models of labor politics.

32 See Marx in “Das Elend der Philosophie” (Marx 1847)
His study accomplishes a longue durée perspective as well as a broad characterization of the collective political action of the working class across Western Europe. But these two benefits of a broad class formation perspective come at a price, which makes the approach unsuitable as a concrete explanation for social democratic party formation and the establishment of alternative models of labor politics. First of all, his analysis is comprehensive longitudinally, but it misses some cases that are crucial for an explanation of social democratic party formation. It contains only Western European countries, and therefore lacks examples for the absence of social democracy. Only by including the United States and Russia as instances of non-formation is it possible to understand the process of party formation as a first order question, in contrast to the lack of party formation, which coincided with the embrace of alternative models of labor politics.

As I noted before, not only the socio-economic and status system approaches employ an exclusively structural and deterministic perspective. This applies also to what I referred to before as other contributions that are comprehensive in nature and interested in theory building. The class formation literature singled out here falls into that category. The reliance on exclusively structural features applies both to the lack of acknowledging the agency of labor elites and the failure to include behavioral components into the conceptualization of the environment that is suggested to shape labor’s choices about its engagement in collective political action. Comparable to the socio-economic and status system approaches, the failure to establish labor elites as an important intermediate factor in a causal argument about a suggested external environment and the observable outcome in terms of varying models of labor politics, makes it impossible to study exogenous influences on the choice of specific models of labor politics.

Bartolini’s analysis emphasizes the effects of political factors, understood in terms of a given institutional environment, but he does not take into account the actual behavior of the state and competing parties vis-à-vis labor. I am going to elaborate on this point later on, when I develop my own approach to conceptualizing the extent of labor inclusion. In that context, we are also going to see that it is the failure to take into account cases characterized by the absence of social democratic party formation, such as Russia, Japan, or the United States, which makes it impossible to acknowledge the importance of non-institutional factors in the conceptualization of labor’s encountered environment.

The previously noted failure of the socio-economic and status system approaches to distinguish between the forms of labor’s political organization and the extent of mobilization success also applies to the class formation perspective, albeit in a somewhat different fashion. The class formation framework allows for a conceptual distinction between labor’s orientations and the extent of mobilization. But in Bartolini’s (2000) empirical application of this approach, the particularly broad conceptualization of qualitative differences in the forms of labor politics as overall ‘left experiences’ makes it impossible to
study the formation, the role, and the implications of specific political organizations, which are the actual components of the overall syndromes he studies.

The Italian case for instance can adequately be characterized as what Bartolini (2000) calls an overall “marxist-syndicalist” orientation. But at this level of abstraction, it is impossible to ascertain the determinants for the formation of specific organizations, and how they contribute to the overall nature of the left: in the Italian case, anarcho-syndicalist unions on the one hand and a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party on the other hand. Only by disaggregating the nature of orientations into its component organizational units is it possible to understand the process of social democratic party formation specifically. And moreover, only by studying specific manifestations of labor politics rather than overall syndromes is it possible to understand the way in which strategical choices within one organization have shaped the fortunes of a competing model of labor politics. In the case of Italy for example, I am going to argue that it was precisely the strategic choices of Italian social democrats in their specific environment of labor inclusion that have favored the emergence of significant syndicalist competition.33

To sum up, the class formation perspective allows for a distinction between (qualitative) orientations of labor and varying degrees of mobilization success, as demonstrated by Bartolini’s (2000) analysis. But at the same time, even a more narrow substantive focus on orientations, separated conceptually from degrees of mobilization, is still not specific enough for an analysis of variation in the formation of different social democratic party types and alternative models of labor politics. My own account therefore focuses on an explanation for the formation of social democratic parties and alternative models of labor politics as specific manifestations of labor’s collective political action. In that context, my primary research interest is about the determinants of social democratic party formation, while the choice for alternative models is treated as a logical extension to a theory of social democratic party formation.

Research on industrialization

The process of industrialization can be regarded as a component element for the broad class formation framework. Research on industrialization, as the final adjacent field reviewed here, exists in an abundant and eclectic variety. The socio-economic approach to the analysis of social democratic party formation, which suggests that variation in the nature of industrialization determines the choice of varying models of labor politics, has already been discussed extensively above. As far as the general literature on

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33 This issue will be discussed in much detail in the Italian case study. We are going to see that the embrace of a parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, in an environment of lowest enfranchisement, has caused serious problems of mobilization for the Italian PSI. In other cases with a comparable environment of inclusion, for example Sweden, Belgium, and Norway, an optimal choice for an extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy prevented the emergence of an anarcho-syndicalist alternative.
industrialization is concerned, I am going to focus here on those contributions that are relevant for an understanding of industrialization as an element of the context, within which social democratic party formation occurs. Based on that discussion, I will illustrate the role of industrialization in my causal argument.

At the most basic level, there are three different ways to conceive of industrial development. To one extreme end, industrialization is regarded as a universal process. The breakthrough of an industrial mode of production might occur at different points in time, and in the context of different national or regional circumstances. But eventually, the overwhelming might of industrialization and its corollaries will level previously existing differences, and by and large, produce the same effects wherever it was set in motion. This perspective is evident in Marx’ own writings, in Kautsky’s elaborations on marxism, but it can also be found in later explicitly non-marxist accounts.³⁴ To the other extreme end, traditional historians focus on the uniqueness of individual cases above anything else.³⁵ With the amount of evidence regarding national variations in labor politics at our disposal today, no scholar would seriously conceive of labor’s response to industrialization along the lines of an approach emphasizing a universal pattern of development anymore. On the other hand, the complete rejection of comparability across cases is, of course, not a suitable starting point for any account interested in theory building (cf. Zolberg 1986).

Alexander Gerschenkron’s approach to understanding industrialization is an attempt to reconcile these two extremes.³⁶ His “Economic backwardness in historical perspective” is based on the premise that economic development is to some extent a universal process, but at the same time characterized by national differences that are more than just temporary noise in a universal explanation. It is because of a country’s relative backwardness and the way in which it substitutes for missing prerequisites that different patterns of industrialization occur. These patterns manifest themselves in two important ways: first, “with regard to the speed of development (the rate of industrial growth)”, and second, “with regard to the productive and organizational structures of industry (…)”. (Gerschenkron 1962, 7). His substantive explanations and his assessment of specific cases have triggered an enormous amount of empirical research, and much controversial debate. His fundamental premise to understand industrialization as a process with universal and case-specific elements, however, underpins the work of many social and economic historians, even if they do not share his substantive inferences (cf. Sylla and Toniolo 1991). In the context of my argument,

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³⁴ See the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848), the preface of Das Kapital (Marx 1848), and Kautsky (1906). See Haupt (1986b) for an analysis of the emergence of marxism as a school of thought. For non-marxist accounts see Rostow (1964)
³⁵ See Sylla and Toniolo (1991) for a discussion of universality vs. uniqueness in studies of industrialization.
³⁶ See Gerschenkron (1962) as his ‘classic’ contribution. There is also a wide variety of pieces dedicated to assess the legacy of his argument.
this basic premise is a crucial one, as I will discuss in more detail throughout the description of my explanation’s architecture in the following section.  

I argue that variation in industrialization cannot directly explain the emergence of different models of labor politics. But at the same time, industrialization and variations thereof across cases have other important effects on the nature of labor politics. The presence of sufficient industrialization is a logical prerequisite for the emergence of varying models of labor politics, and the occurrence of economic deprivation as a consequence of industrialism is a prerequisite for the formulation of socio-economic goals (see figure 1). Another specific set of features pertaining to varying patterns of industrialization are the typical size of industrial establishments and the regional concentration of industry. Larger firms and regional concentration result in a greater concentration of workers, which enhances the potential for political mobilization. In the case of Russia, for example, both these factors contributed greatly to a significant degree of political mobilization, despite the relatively small size of the Russian working class.

Neither one of these two variables affects labor’s demands regarding the adoption of varying models of labor politics. But they can have an important effect on the success of any such model in mobilizing the worker constituency. However, even in this respect, the agency of labor elites is key. The case of Spain, for example, was characterized by heavy concentration of industry in a number of areas outside the capital of Madrid, on the political periphery of the country. These favorable conditions for mobilization, however, were not exploited by the Spanish social democrats, who focused their mobilization efforts on the comparatively less industrialized political center of the country.

Even though there is no direct effect of cross-national variation on the adoption of different models of labor politics, different degrees of inclusion as the causal determinant for variation in party formation, depend on the dynamic interaction of industrialization and institutional development from pre-industrial to industrial societies. Industrialization requires certain prerequisites, such as a market economy, the protection of private property, technological knowledge, a skilled labor force, or sufficient sources of investment (cf. Harley 1991). The provision of these requirements in itself is the result of institutional adaptation, as observed in the case of Britain as the first industrializer (cf. Kemp 1985, Harley 1991).

According to Gerschenkron (1962), later industrializers such as Germany or Russia, had to substitute for the lack of requirements, in the case of Germany by encouraging the formation of cartels and large banks, and in the case of Russia through even more direct forms of state involvement.

Gerschenkron’s specific dichotomies of early vs. late and prerequisite vs. substitute are debatable. However, it is widely accepted that the emergence of different sets of institutions in different cases was

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37 See Landes (1991) for a discussion of what remains more critical and what is more widely accepted in Gerschenkron’s work.
38 See Riasanovsky (2000)
39 See Heywood (1990)
shaped by a specific constellation of socio-economic and political factors at the juncture of development from a pre-industrial to an industrial society. Varying degrees of labor inclusion, as one particular outcome of this adaptation process, are therefore shaped by the nature of industrialization. And as a consequence, the emergence of different models of labor politics across cases, which result from variation in labor inclusion, is indirectly related to case-specific characteristics of industrialization.

**Framework of causal mechanisms and substantive context**

The discussion of conceptual and theoretical pitfalls of the existing explanations for social democratic party formation and the review of contributions from adjacent areas of research were designed to provide a foundation for the outline of my own explanation’s basic architecture and its substantive environment. The explanatory interest pursued here is located at the end of the causal chain displayed in figure 2: the formation of a dominant model of labor politics in a particular national polity. Different models can be understood in terms of their function, their ideology (consisting of goals and the means proposed to obtain those goals), as well as their form of organization (comprising both internal and external aspects).

In most cases, where industrialization and the emergence of the class cleavage occurred throughout the 19th and early 20th century, working class engagement in the political arena resulted in the successful formation of a social democratic party. Social democratic parties in themselves have come in two distinct types, either evolutionary or quasi-revolutionary. The latter type, moreover, occurred in a parliamentary and an extra-parliamentary variant. In some cases, no social democratic party has been formed at all, in favor of choices for alternative models – either the formation of an insurrectionist left wing organization or a mobilization of the class cleavage in the context of the existing party system, through the embrace of moderate syndicalism.

In a number of instances, social democratic parties emerged alongside insurrectionist left-wing competitors during their formative stage or its immediate aftermath, typically anarchist-syndicalist organizations or early bolshevik associations as the precursor for communist parties. The successful establishment of a left-wing competitor in addition to social democratic parties depends on a combination of a particular configuration of low inclusion with suboptimal choices of social democratic elites. In that sense, the presence of a fragmented left will be discussed from the perspective of social democratic party formation and the choices of party elites. A more detailed analysis of the determinants for the emergence of insurrectionist or moderate syndicalist models will only be pursued in those cases, where no social democratic party was successfully established, in order to better understand the determinants for the lack of social democratic party formation. In cases, where a significant insurrectionist alternative emerged in addition to a social democratic party, the presence of a divided left will serve as one of two indicators for
suboptimal choices of labor elites, in addition to lower social democratic mobilization success. Both of these issues will be assessed in more detail in a following section on the agency of labor elites.

**Degrees of labor inclusion as the result of institutional adaptation**

The causal argument to explain these phenomena suggests that the emergence of varying models of labor politics depends on the effects of political variables as external constraints for the choices of labor elites. Varying degrees of labor inclusion across cases are the result of different institutional adaptation processes triggered to some extent by the requirements of industrialization, while in some cases, important characteristics of the pre-industrial order survived. The nature of labor inclusion in Russia before 1917, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the survival of pre-industrial social relations, such as the continuing dominance of a feudal aristocracy and an absolutist state.

I argue, more specifically, that the external constraints informing the choices of labor elites in terms of how to channel the substantive demands of their constituency into the arena of politics can be conceived of as varying degrees of labor inclusion. The ‘latent’ overall degree of labor inclusion is the result of variation in its component ‘manifest’ indicators, which extend to institutional and behavioral variables. Formal institutions of labor inclusion emerge from varying degrees of worker enfranchisement, variation in the effective guarantee of political liberties, and the extent to which responsible government is practiced. The behavior of the state executive and its enforcement agencies toward labor and the behavior of competing parties, or more generally, entrenched political elites, compliment these institutional variables. Competing parties practice varying degrees of electoral inclusion vis-à-vis the larger labor constituency, and different degrees of organizational inclusion toward labor elites.

There are two distinct causal mechanisms, through which variation in degrees of labor inclusion affects the choices of labor elites about the adoption of a particular model of labor politics (see figure 2): in the first place, directly, through the perception of some given environment of inclusion; and second, indirectly, through perceiving the demands of their constituency, which are shaped by industrial workers’ exposure to the same environment. This second causal mechanism and the role of the broader working class constituency in the explanation suggested here will be discussed now. The assessment of labor elites’ overall decision-making process on the basis of that second causal mechanism as well as the first, direct, perception of their environment of inclusion, will follow after that.
Industrialization and pre-industrial conditions

As the second, indirect, causal mechanism affecting labor elites’ choices noted above, the extent of labor inclusion determines the demands of the broader worker constituency with respect to all three elements of varying models of labor politics as the dependent variable. Political variables, as discussed in the previous section (cf. figure 1) shape preferences of workers for organizational and strategical choices, as well as the formulation of goals by varying models of labor politics. Degrees of labor inclusion, more specifically, represent the way in which political factors are conceptualized here. The effects of varying degrees of labor inclusion on the dispositions of workers are the prerequisite for workers’ demands vis-à-vis labor elites as one of two causal mechanisms through which degrees of labor inclusion are relayed to labor elites. These effects of a given environment of inclusion on workers’ dispositions can be understood as one element of Katznelson’s (1986) “third level of class formation”. Socio-economic variables and pre-industrial cleavages are two additional such factors that shape the dispositions of workers. However, these two sets of variables are not related to the demands of the worker constituency about which model of labor politics to adopt. Preferences about different forms of labor politics depend exclusively on the given environment of labor inclusion.

Although socio-economic variables are not causal for variation in models of labor politics, industrialization, economic deprivation, and the broader process of class formation assume an important role in defining the context, within which the establishment of social democratic parties or alternative models of labor politics takes place. First of all, industrialization is the historical process that has brought the working class into existence. It therefore represents a threshold for the possibility of party formation, and practically, for the inclusion of a specific case into the empirical analysis. Industrialization and the emergence of an industrial proletariat are the sine qua non condition for the formation of social democracy or alternative models of labor politics. Socio-economic variables are not causally related to variation in the adopted models of labor politics. But in addition to industrialization as a sine qua non condition for the emergence of an industrial proletariat, the presence of economic deprivation as a consequence of industrialism is a prerequisite for the formulation of socio-economic goals and demands (cf. figure 1).

Secondly, on the basis of the previously discussed research about industrialization, industrial development is also understood as a process that is subject to cross-national variations. It has assumed its specific form in interaction with pre-industrial arrangements, including the economic and technological potential as well as the existing institutional and political environment at the onset of industrialization: a process of institutional change in a given polity was the result of pressures from socio-economic change, but the nature of institutional change also shaped the type of industrialization by enabling and at times impeding industrial growth. Varying degrees of inclusion across cases, which I treat as the causal factor
related to the emergence of varying models of labor politics, depend to some important extent on a country’s specific process of adaptation to the requirements of an industrial mode of production and exchange. Varieties of industrialization, which might include the survival of pre-industrial arrangements, are therefore indirectly causally related to the process of party formation.

Thirdly, the type of industrialization process and the extent of economic deprivation, along with the nature of pre-industrial arrangements and the perception of a given environment of inclusion, have shaped the characteristics of the working class in a particular country. All these features can have an important causal effect on the mobilization potential of labor. The presence of linguistic or religious dividing lines, as two examples for pre-industrial arrangements, and their successful mobilization, can impede the potential of mobilization along socio-economic lines of identification. The overall size of the industrial labor force, which is naturally an important determinant for the absolute extent of mobilization depends crucially on the pervasiveness of industrialization. Certain specific features of the industrialization process, such as the regional concentration of industry, or the predominant size of industrial establishments, can also have significant effects on labor’s mobilization potential. And eventually, the extent of political exclusion as well as the relative degree of economic deprivation can also act as powerful triggers for workers’ willingness to get involved in the political process.

Any model trying to explain the relative and absolute success of varying forms of labor politics needs to take into account variation along these variables. The explanatory interest of this dissertation, however, is not on variations in mobilization success, but the emergence of different forms of labor politics, which is a conceptual distinction that prior explanations for social democratic party formation are lacking. In order to arrive at an explanation for variation in models of labor politics, an additional two sided conceptual clarification needs to be taken into account. We need to distinguish between varying elements that define models of labor politics – goals, means (or, in other words, strategy), organization – and how these elements are related to political and socio-economic variables respectively (cf. figure 1). As outlined before, the occurrence of industrialization represents a prerequisite for the emergence of the working class, while economic deprivation is a prerequisite for the formulation of socio-economic goals in the context of a broader substantive agenda as one element of varying models of labor politics. But at the same time, qualitative variation in industrialization and different levels of economic deprivation are not related to variation in models of labor politics as the outcome studied here.

The agency of labor elites

The indirect effect of varying degrees of inclusion on labor elites’ decision-making process works through the transfer of this environment through the broader worker constituency. This describes one of
two causal mechanisms through which degrees of inclusion affect labor elites’ choices. On top of that, as noted above, degrees of labor inclusion also have a direct effect on labor elites’ choices (see figure 2). The combination of these two sources defines the variety of considerations that affect labor elites in the process of deciding about the adoption of a particular model of labor politics. Labor elites make these choices based on their direct perception of some given environment of inclusion and indirectly through their perception of labor’s demands regarding models of labor politics. The combination of these two causal mechanisms establishes varying degrees of labor inclusion as the external constraint on labor elites’ choices about the dominant model of labor politics in a given polity.

In some cases, labor elites translate external constraints, transmitted through these two causal mechanisms, into outcomes, i.e. models of labor politics, which would be predicted on the basis of the given environment. In these instances, labor elites make optimal choices. In other cases, outcomes deviate from these expectations, they are “off the equilibrium path”, as Levi (1997) would say, from the previously noted perspective of rational choice institutionalism. In such instances, labor elites make suboptimal choices. A sociology of knowledge approach, introduced above, alerts us to these exogenous effects on labor elites’ decision-making process, which come in a variety of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ ways. ‘External’ factors include the diffusion of ‘external knowledge, understood here as the import of preconceived models of political organization from the outside, and the nature of the existing environment of labor inclusion itself, whenever it is subject to rapid changes or difficult to grasp, thereby causing problems for labor elites in accomplishing an accurate evaluation of the given external constraints. ‘Internal’ sources of suboptimal decision making by labor elites include internalized characteristics, most importantly their background of political socialization, or their status group and class affiliations.

An optimal outcome in terms of the adoption of a particular model of labor politics is an outcome that features the greatest overall rewards, or in other words, the most rewarding cost-benefit ratio, in a particular environment of labor inclusion. It is the result of a decision-making process that is informed by a rational evaluation of the existing conditions. Labor elites provide an optimal response to a given environment of inclusion, when they identify and implement an ideological and organizational model that is best suited to advance the agenda of their constituency in that particular environment. I suggest that the evaluation of costs and benefits of varying models of labor politics, defined by choices about goals, means, and forms of organization, in a specific environment of inclusion, is based on labor elites’ consideration of the following four factors. These factors, moreover, can also be linked specifically to either one of the two causal mechanisms outlined above that translate the given environment of inclusion into choices for varying models of labor politics.

The direct perception of a given environment as one of two causal mechanisms noted above determines the calculation of personal risks accruing to labor elites through the establishment of a particular
model of labor politics across different environments. It also informs considerations about the necessary investment in organization building. These two variables represent the cost side in the decision-making process of labor elites. The potential for access to political authority provided by different models in varying environments of inclusion as one of two components of the benefits side is also transmitted directly through the immediate evaluation of their environment by labor elites. A maximum degree of institutionalization or success is the second one of two potential benefits that results from the adoption of a particular model of labor politics in a given environment of inclusion. This particular feature, other than the previous three, is also linked to the demands of the broader worker constituency and the way in which it is shaped by the existing environment of inclusion as the second causal mechanism introduced before. But on top of that, considerations about the potential success of some given model across different environments of inclusion also depend on the direct evaluation of that environment, and the calculations of labor elites about the sheer feasibility of various models of labor politics.

If labor elites make an optimal decision in a specific environment of inclusion, then the organizational and ideological model of labor politics implemented in this case, can be predicted as a result of the existing background conditions, defined as varying degrees of inclusion. If labor elites make suboptimal choices, then the outcome of labor’s formative stage in the political arena will deviate from what would be expected from an analysis of the existing background conditions. Making such a determination allows us to investigate the relative impact of the above noted exogenous factors on suboptimal choices and as a result, to explain the according formation of models of labor politics that would not have been predicted on the basis of considering the given external constraints exclusively.

Successful party formation, degrees of success, and evaluating the agency of labor elites

I have previously distinguished my own research interest about the formation of different models of labor politics from the determinants for varying degrees of mobilization success. I argued that prior attempts to explain social democratic party formation aggregated these two factors into a single dependent variable, while I distinguish conceptually between the features of some given model of labor politics and the according qualitative variation across cases on the one hand, and the mobilization success of any such model on the other.

This being said, a minimum of ‘success’ in mobilizing the working class is naturally a prerequisite for concluding that some model of labor politics was formed ‘successfully’. Moreover, on top of ‘mobilization success’ as the extent to which the overall labor constituency is mobilized, the success of some given model of labor politics also expresses itself in an additional way, as the extent to which an organization accomplishes stability and coherence. Throughout the following paragraphs, I am going to elaborate on
these two conceptual issues. Based on that, I will then discuss the role that varying degrees of success across different instances of labor politics have for evaluating the role of labor elites.

Most basically, I distinguish between a minimum of success and varying degrees of success in establishing a particular model of labor politics. The former represents a prerequisite for coming to the conclusion that a particular model of labor politics was indeed established. The latter describes the extent to which that model succeeded in mobilizing the labor constituency and in achieving internal stability and coherence for the organization. This argument describes two related conceptual distinctions: first, between a minimum threshold of organizational success and varying degrees of success on the one hand; and secondly, between different dimensions of ‘success’ – the mobilization of the working class at large, and the strength and coherence of the organization. Both of them rely on the literature about party institutionalization: Huntington (1968) introduced the distinction between party institutionalization as a minimum threshold and varying degrees of institutionalization. The distinction between different dimensions of institutionalization – internal ‘systemness’ and external ‘mobilization’ – has been added by later contributions elaborating on Huntington’s original argument.40

Suboptimal choices of labor elites might diminish the ‘degree of success’, or in other words, the ‘degree of institutionalization’ to such an extent that their envisioned model of labor politics will not pass the minimum threshold for concluding that a particular model of labor politics was formed successfully. This has, of course, happened on countless occasions, across all cases, to those organizational attempts that did not emerge as dominant models of labor politics. The so-called Zubatov police unions were an attempt to establish a moderate syndicalist organization in Russia around the beginning of the 20th century. But they failed to obtain a minimum of institutionalization or success, which is why they have to be considered as unsuccessful in the sense that they were not formed or successfully institutionalized. An earlier variant of evolutionary socialism, based on the ideas of Ferdinand Lasalle, was equally unsuccessful in establishing its ideological model as the dominant orientation of German, Danish, and Swedish social democrats. Lasalleanism therefore failed to pass the minimum threshold of institutionalization. In both of these instances, and there are many more, the establishment of a particular model of labor politics failed, or in other words, lacked a minimum of success or institutionalization.

However, there is also a second, qualitatively different constellation: when a particular model of labor politics passes the minimum threshold of institutionalization, but accomplishes only a limited degree of success. I am not trying to suggest a comprehensive explanation for varying degrees of mobilization success, since my explanatory interest focuses on varying forms of labor politics. At the same time, significantly lower degrees of institutionalization, or in other words, a limited extent of success, associated

40 See Randall and Svasand (2002)
with a particular instance of social democratic party formation, can serve as an indicator for suboptimal choices by labor elites. The fragmentation of the overall left during or in the immediate aftermath of labor’s formative stage in the political arena, through the successful establishment of an insurrectionist competitor alongside social democracy in cases, where social democratic party formation would have been the optimal response to a given environment of labor inclusion, can be regarded as a consequence of limited social democratic institutionalization. The overall fragmentation of the left therefore becomes a composite indicator for the presence of suboptimal choices by social democratic party elites, at least in those cases, where labor was not successfully included into the existing political system by other means. Whenever that was the case, limited institutionalization of social democracy did not lead to the emergence of a strong insurrectionist competitor, simply because on top of social democracy, moderate competing parties provided a significant appeal to the labor constituency. This includes, for example, the Freisinn (liberal party) in Switzerland, or the liberals in Canada.

Varying degrees of ‘internal’ systemness and ‘external’ mobilization are two conceptually distinct dimensions of institutionalization or success. They are also affected in different measures by the above noted two causal mechanisms, through which degrees of labor inclusion are translated into the decision making process about the adoption of some model of labor politics by labor elites: the direct perception of a given environment of inclusion and the way in which degrees of inclusion are transmitted to labor elites indirectly through the demands of the broader worker constituency, based on their own exposure to this environment.

By taking these two issues into account, it is also possible to make a conceptual argument about how specifically these two causal mechanisms affect different dimensions of institutionalization. ‘External’ mobilization success depends to a larger extent on the way in which labor elites understand and respond adequately to the demands of their constituency, as they are shaped by a given environment of inclusion. ‘Internal’ systemness, on the other hand, is more directly affected by the direct impact of that environment. The sheer feasibility of a particular model of labor politics, and the typical response of the state to formation attempts is directly captured by the nature of labor inclusion. However, even in that second

41 The qualification regarding the presence of left fragmentation during or in the immediate aftermath of labor’s formative stage in the political arena has a particular analytical purpose. It allows us to exclude the effects of a variety of additional factors on left fragmentation that occurred later on. In the cases of Argentina, Spain, and Italy, for example, fragmentation of the left through the formation of anarcho-syndicalist unions was set in motion already well before the outbreak of World War I. We are going to see in the according case studies that the suboptimal choices of social democratic party elites noted in the text had a significant impact on the limited success of social democracy and the emergence of anarcho-syndicalism. In the case of Germany, on the other hand, left fragmentation only occurred throughout the 1920s, three decades after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. The emergence of a strong communist party might have had a lot to do with the behavior of social democratic party elites at the beginning of the war and during the transition period from empire to republic, and the SPD’s decisions were certainly influenced by the formation history of the party. But the specific choices themselves occurred after the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena studied here. In the cases of Spain, Italy, and Argentina, on the other hand, limited mobilization success in the aftermath of the formative stage in the arena of politics can be traced directly to choices made during the initial formation period of social democratic parties.
respect, a minimum of success or varying degrees of success in terms of ‘internal’ systemness, associated with a particular model of labor politics, also depend on the amount of support provided by the labor constituency as active participants in the organization.

This brief outline should clarify that the interaction of different causal mechanisms, which translate varying degrees of labor inclusion into the decision-making process of labor elites with different dimensions of success or institutionalization is complex and characterized by multiple interdependencies. Only careful attention to these issues throughout the empirical analysis can reveal the unique patterns of interaction through which different causal mechanisms are related to varying degrees of success or institutionalization across different cases. This being said, regardless of the case specific patterns, both ‘internal’ systemness and ‘external’ mobilization, along with the overall division of the left, can be used as indicators for the presence of suboptimal choices across all cases.

The previous discussion should clarify the position of varying degrees of success accomplished by social democratic parties, or in other words different degrees of institutionalization, in the suggested argument. However, even though my research interest is not geared at explaining different degrees of institutionalization, by using these as an indicator for suboptimal choices, the following related issue has to be considered: other causal factors that affect varying degrees of social democratic institutionalization, in addition to suboptimal choices made by party elites. There are two different elements from the substantive context of my explanation that are relevant here (see figure 2). These two types of causal factors, which might affect varying degrees of social democratic institutionalization in addition to suboptimal choices by labor elites, are, first, the extent of industrialization, or more specifically the size of the industrial working class; and second, the effects of worker mobilization along non-economic cleavages.

The first factor has already been clarified conceptually, and can easily be held constant in the following empirical analysis. But the second issue requires an additional conceptual and theoretical response.42 Other than suboptimal choices by labor elites about the kind of political model they adopt, limited overall institutionalization, and most importantly, lower degrees of ‘external’ mobilization, could be due to the presence of a particularly pronounced non-economic social cleavage, as one element of case-specific ‘pre-industrial conditions’. This encompasses the variety of conflicts and identification patterns that Rokkan (1970) has suggested as determinants for the nature of political development and party competition in Western Europe. According to such a perspective, degrees of institutionalization, most importantly ‘external’ mobilization, should be higher in those societies, which are comparatively

42 A related issue – support for social democratic parties from non-worker constituencies – will be addressed in the case studies, where this phenomenon was clearly noticeable, for example Italy and France. The lack of detailed data on this subject unfortunately prohibits a comparative empirical analysis.
homogenous in terms of these potential dividing lines. They should be lower, when a significant non-economic cleavage acts as an obstacle to the mobilizing efforts of labor elites.

If other types of social cleavages affects limited social democratic institutionalization along these lines, it might become problematic to use the presence of limited institutionalization as an indicator for suboptimal choices by party elites. I will provide a brief empirical and then a conceptual and theoretical response to this issue. First, the empirical analysis of party formation within specific cases and the later comparative assessment of suboptimal choices across cases will pay attention to the potential effects of intervening variables. We are going to see that there is no case, of course, that was entirely devoid of non-economic cleavages. In several instances, non-economic cleavages were particularly pronounced, but did not result in limited ‘internal’ institutionalization or comparatively lower ‘external’ mobilization success. This applies, for instance, to Belgium, Germany, and Austria (cf. Rokkan 1970), which, as the later empirical analysis will show, are examples for at least adequate, and in the case of Austria, above average degrees of mobilization success.

In all these three cases, labor elites made optimal choices by devising a model of labor politics that represented the best suited response to the existing environment of inclusion. They were capable of mobilizing their constituency successfully, despite the presence of identity configurations of workers that were strongly influenced by non-economic factors, or in other words, pre-industrial cleavages. This is not to say that the presence of such cleavages did not pose a problem for labor elites, or did not have noticeable results: in the case of Germany, for example, catholic workers in the Rhineland and Westphalia supported the catholic Zentrum, rather than the social democrats, and stayed loyal to its Christian Democratic successor party until well into the 1960s. But at the same time, the choice for an optimal model of labor politics seems to have been the more important factor in guaranteeing adequate degrees of mobilization. At the very least, these observations allow for the relatively safe conclusion that labor elites did not make a suboptimal choice.

These considerations are also an important underpinning for the following conceptual argument about the potential effects of pre-industrial cleavages on varying degrees of party institutionalization. Most importantly, due to the immense complexity and scope of the involved processes and variables, the nexus encompassing the respective effects of different factors on mobilization success can never be completely resolved. Taking the argument about the importance of labor elites seriously, however, also implies that an equivalent set of complex causal mechanisms suggested here to account for social democratic party formation would have to be extended to the mobilization efforts along non-class cleavages, in order to

43 See Berghahn (2005), Ullmann (1999), and Ritter (1963) for accounts of voting behavior during the Kaiserreich and the specific issue of catholic workers.
understand their effects on the success of social democratic mobilization. It is simply impossible, or at the very least unfeasible, to account for such a wide range of phenomena with an equal amount of attention to detail, within one single theoretical framework.

At the same time, taking into account the role of political elites in the context of efforts to mobilize non-class cleavages also provides the key for my approach to treating the potential effects of such cleavages on the degree of institutionalization associated with different models of labor politics. The mere presence of non-economic cleavages in itself does not explain anything about the mobilization of people along any of these dividing lines. Just as the mobilization of the class cleavage requires elites, who engage in the political organization of workers, the same is true for pre-industrial cleavages and the extent to which entrenched elites use these identification patterns to appeal to the labor constituency. In New Zealand and Australia, for instance, ethnic dividing lines across the immigrant population were not successfully employed by entrenched elites as a means of mobilizing workers along non-class characteristics. In the United States, on the other hand, this is precisely what happened, and as a consequence, contributed, among other things, to the incorporation of workers into the existing party system.

In that sense, the efforts of entrenched elites, or as I refer to them here, competing parties, to appeal to and mobilize workers, contribute to determining varying degrees of labor inclusion as the external constraint that informs labor elites’ choices about the adoption of different models of labor politics. Competing parties might attempt to appeal to workers with an agenda that emphasizes economic policies, or alternatively, by trying to make other cleavages and identification patterns more salient. Typically, as the following empirical analysis will show, competing parties combined both these strategies, although the focus on non-economic pre-industrial cleavages varied across cases: it was certainly more pronounced in the United States than for example in the case of Britain. Most importantly, however, along these lines, the effects of pre-industrial cleavages on the nature of labor politics are already incorporated into the causal argument suggested here: as a potential tool for the counter-mobilization of workers in the hands of competing parties that can, if successfully applied, contribute to higher degrees of inclusion. By proceeding this way, it is possible to treat limited institutionalization and the resulting fragmentation of the overall left as an indicator for suboptimal choices of labor elites, while at the same time ensuring that the scope of investigated phenomena does not increase to such an extent that the development and test of a causal theory becomes infeasible.

Summary of the suggested explanation and theoretical predictions

Based on the sketch of my explanation’s context and architecture in the preceding sections, the following paragraphs are designed to summarize the suggested explanation and its specific substantive
predictions. I suggest that different models of labor politics emerge as a response of labor movement elites to a country specific degree of labor inclusion. Whenever labor elites translate external constraints into according choices of political organization in an optimal fashion, degrees of inclusion can directly predict the dominant form of labor politics that will emerge. Table 1 illustrates the expected outcomes in this scenario of optimal elite agency. All the predictions derived from an analysis of labor inclusion environments therefore depend on the optimal agency of labor elites; or, in other words, on the ability of leaders to evaluate the existing external constraints and to translate them into the most appropriate response. Each model of labor politics is characterized by a combination of orientations in terms of goals, means (strategy), and forms of organization.

Suboptimal choices are the result of a number of exogenous factors: most importantly a fluctuating environment of inclusion that is difficult to grasp, the effects of ‘external knowledge’, as well as internalized features of labor elites, such as typical patterns of political socialization or status and class affiliations. On top of the consideration of the effects of varying degrees of inclusion on the choices of labor elites, the respective case studies as well as the final comparative assessment in chapter 11 will analyze the effects of these exogenous factors for those cases, where labor elites made suboptimal choices. Whenever labor elites make optimal choices, by translating the necessities of the given environment into the most rewarding choice for a particular model of labor politics, the following outcomes can be expected.

In a lowest inclusion type of polity, structural conditions make it particularly difficult for a social democratic party to form. The near complete exclusion of the working class from the political arena and the extremely limited opportunities for open political organization render the task of forming a mass-based radical party particularly difficult. Labor elites will therefore resort to other organizational and ideological models that are more promising under the existing circumstances. These insurrectionist alternatives have come as an anarchist-syndicalist approach, based on the flat out rejection of the state as a vehicle for political change, or as the bolshevik strategy of capturing the state through a homogenous and secretive group of professional revolutionaries.

Social democratic party formation is also predicted not to occur in a situation, where labor inclusion is so extensive that the demands of the working class can successfully be integrated into the existing party system. Compared to the adjacent category of high inclusion, highest inclusion occurs, when not only institutional channels are opened for the access of labor to the political arena. On top of that, highest inclusion also requires active and successful efforts of the entrenched political elites, typically competing political parties, to appeal to industrial workers: both electorally to the labor constituency at large, and through the organizational inclusion of labor elites. The formation of an independent party would be more costly and overall less rewarding than the introduction of workers’ demands into the existing parties. In
instances of highest inclusion, moderate syndicalism therefore represents the optimal response to the encountered environment.

Social democratic party formation is predicted to occur, when labor elites are faced with either low or higher degrees of inclusion. A quasi revolutionary party is the expected outcome in a polity that is repressive enough to warrant the call for a revolutionary transformation of politics and the dominant patterns of socio-economic relations. But at the same time, the avenues for legal organization opened to labor by this type of polity, compared to the lowest inclusion type, prevent labor elites from advertising actual insurrection in order to not endanger the achievements that have already been made: the situation is miserable, but not hopeless enough to warrant a truly insurrectionist approach. This scenario is representative for much of continental Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, which is the reason why quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents the most frequently embraced model of labor politics.

The larger number of cases, and the presence of variation across low inclusion polities with respect to the specific configuration of low inclusion, allows us to distinguish in more detail between different variants of the quasi-revolutionary party species. The German or parliamentary variant emphasizes both extra-parliamentary mobilization and parliamentary activities. The Belgian or extra-parliamentary variant focuses on extra-parliamentary forms of activities exclusively. The German variant represents an optimal response to an environment of inclusion, in which limited access for labor to the political arena is facilitated through the granting of worker enfranchisement. The Belgian variant is the optimal model of labor politics in an environment that lacks enfranchisement, but guarantees a certain extent of political liberties and the at least limited practice of responsible government.

An evolutionary social democratic party is the expected response to a higher inclusion type of polity. Labor elites acting in an optimal fashion realize that a call for insurrection or even just half-hearted revolutionary rhetoric do not fit into an environment that has made significant progress toward the political integration of the working class. However, while the political inclusion of labor is comparatively high, socio-economic deprivation remains, of course, a pressing issue; an issue, moreover, that the existing party system fails to address adequately. Any successful appeal to the working class as a social group with particular political and socio-economic demands should therefore combine a focus on legalistic forms of organization with demands for a fundamental re-organization of the economy. Evolutionary social democracy, accordingly, does not do away with the call for socialism as a goal, but it takes into account the broader scope of legal political organization by emphasizing an evolutionary and decidedly non-insurrectionist path toward that goal.
Methodology

The approach to explain social democratic party formation pursued here seeks to combine macro and micro perspectives of social scientific research, through the proposed substantive explanation and through the employed research strategy. First of all, the substantive theory suggested here combines a macro-perspective on social structures and institutions with a micro-perspective on the agency of labor elites within a set of external constraints established by structural factors. The suggested argument proposes a processual understanding, according to which an external environment of labor inclusion is relayed into the decision-making process of labor elites and the according choices for different models of labor politics. In that sense, the interaction between entrenched elites and encountered environment on the one hand with labor elite agency and mass mobilization on the other could be understood as what Norbert Elias calls a social and political ‘figuration’. Elias’ approach emphasizes the historically bound effects of broad structural factors on social-psychological processes, which is precisely my concern here, as I am interested, more specifically, in analyzing, how an ‘encountered environment’ of labor inclusion affects the decision-making process of labor elites in adopting some model of labor politics. Proceeding along these lines allows for an extension of historical institutionalist accounts in political science, whose causal arguments often rely on an ‘automatic’ pre-determined effect between institutions and outcome of interest. My argument treats institutions, along with other non-institutional elements of labor inclusion as an environment, in response to which specific actors make choices.

The behavior of labor elites that occurs within this ‘encountered environment’ is treated as an important process in its own right. Whenever models of labor politics are adopted that would not be predicted on the basis of the given set of external constraints, an analysis of labor elites’ decision-making process is designed to reveal those exogenous factors that move their choices “off the equilibrium path”. A concern with the prediction of broadly understood phenomena is thereby combined with an interest in interpreting specific instances of elite behavior beyond the narrow confines of a structural theory. The causal argument thus constructed can be understood along the conceptual underpinnings for ‘two-level theories’ discussed by Goertz (2005a, 240). He distinguishes between two kinds of explanations in this context: those that depend on a conjuncture of two necessary prerequisites for some outcome of interest to occur (Y=X*Z), and a second kind that is characterized by “equifinality”, meaning that an outcome of interest can occur through more than one path (Y=X+Z). The theory suggested here represents a hybrid of these two basic approaches. First of all, a sufficient level of industrialization in an internally sovereign polity is a necessary prerequisite for the formation of some model of labor politics, while at the same time,

44 See Elias (1939) and Quilley and Loyal (2004).
qualitative variation in the nature of industrialization do not directly influence the outcome of interest (it only affects the degree of mobilization success directly). Secondly, based on this necessary prerequisite, the outcome of interest can occur as the result of two explanatory factors (agency of labor elites and the nature of labor inclusion) through two different paths, meaning that the suggested theory is characterized by “equifinality”: The formation of some model of labor politics can occur as an optimal response of labor elites to an environment of labor inclusion, which favors the model of labor politics that does actually emerge. The same model can also occur as a suboptimal response of labor elites to an environment of labor inclusion, which does not favor the model of labor politics that does actually emerge. On top of that, other than in Goertz’ (2005a) scheme, the two causal factors suggested here interact with one another: the agency of labor elites emerges in response to some given environment of labor inclusion.

Secondly, on top of the substantive explanation, whose parameters I just described, the strategies and tools of research employed here also reflect an underlying concern for bridging macro and micro levels of analysis. Most fundamentally, this is evidenced by my attempt to combine a broad comparative assessment with in-depth analyses of individual cases. Subjecting the suggested theory to an empirical test along these lines requires a perspective on many cases at once, combined with a focus on dynamic developments and interactions in selected cases. A ‘larger n’ correlational analysis can show the overall validity of my claim that varying degrees of labor inclusion are able to predict the formation of different models of labor politics. Specific within case analyses on the basis of the suggested theory are designed to further investigate the validity of the underpinning causal argument and the nature of the causal mechanisms suggested here. The empirical analysis will combine an encompassing perspective based on the largest possible number of cases with a comprehensive set of case studies, and more in-depth analyses of idealtypical cases.

The analysis conducted here can therefore best be characterized as a comparative case study. But on top of using the comparative method and a consciously selected set of cases for in-depth investigation, I am following Lijphart’s (1971) as well as King, Keohane and Verba’s (1994) advise, by increasing the number of cases to allow for more effective causal assessments. A larger n analysis, based on a stringent evaluation of quantitative and qualitative data, will extend to all included cases, which at the same time, also define the scope of the suggested theory. Out of all these cases, four idealtypical examples will be selected for a more in-depth analysis.

Prior work on social democratic party formation as well as theoretical contributions from ‘adjacent’ fields of research have not combined these two perspectives effectively. Lipset (1983) uses a variety of cases for illustrative purposes, but he does not conduct a comprehensive analysis, nor does he outline a stringent procedure of case selection. Kautsky (2002) excludes a number of cases from his analysis, because he does not consider them to be ‘truly’ social democratic, for example the French and Italian
socialists. He makes that claim on the basis of their supposedly limited base of supporters and voters. I argued previously that it is important to conceptually distinguish the establishment of varying models of labor politics from the extent of mobilization success. The empirical analysis and actual case selection later on will show that both of these cases, as well as a number of other cases Kautsky (2002) does not consider, have clearly passed a minimum threshold of institutionalization, even though their extent of success was comparably low. A complete exclusion of such cases prevents us from studying the causes for limited levels of institutionalization, which are to some large extent the result of suboptimal choices of party elites.

Bartolini’s (2000) analysis is encompassing with respect to the sheer number of included variables and the time period he investigates. His failure to consider behavioral elements of labor inclusion on top of institutional factors, however, is largely the result of not including the American case. Moreover, the exclusive focus on Western Europe also prevents him from studying the absence of social democratic party formation in Japan and Russia, and as a result, the issue of party formation as a first order question. A comprehensive analysis that includes cases irrespective of the observable outcome or geographic location, as it is conducted here, significantly improves the validity and the scope of the proposed theory. Combining this perspective with more in-depth case studies helps to verify the validity of the suggested causal mechanisms.

The comparative assessment of all included cases in the analysis conducted here is not based on a static chronology. Cases are not compared to one another during one fixed period of time that is applied to all cases alike. Each of the included cases has experienced its own stages of development, defined by the onset of industrialization, the emergence of labor associations, and eventually a turn of the labor movement to politics. In order to allow for effective comparisons across cases, I determine labor’s formative stage in the political arena for each case individually.

The empirical analysis conducted here will be based on a comparison of included cases during their respective formative stages of entry into the political arena. I conceive of this formative stage as a period that begins with the initial attempt of a nationally organized labor movement to become involved in the arena of party politics. The end point of labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena is the successful institutionalization of a predominant model of labor politics in a specific case. While the ‘larger n’ analysis will focus exclusively on this formative stage, as well as its immediate aftermath, the in-depth case studies are going to move back in time a little bit more, in order to investigate the process through which some environment present during labor’s formative stage in the political arena has been created by prior historical developments.

The general cut off point for the empirical analysis is the year 1919. It would be an undue overstatement to claim that the processes and outcomes investigated for one particular era are readily applicable to other periods of time. Doing so would require the introduction of many additional variables
that can be ‘held constant’ for this study. This entails, but is by no means limited to, the existence of historical precedents of labor politics as points of reference, the nature of the international environment, the availability of time-specific means of political communication, or the diffusion of additional models of labor politics, most importantly state incorporation strategies and communism, after 1919.

Within these overall temporal coordinates, cases need to meet two requirements to qualify for inclusion. The theory of social democratic party formation suggested here and the according comprehensive empirical analysis are limited to cases, where the emergence of a significantly large industrial working class occurs within an independent, ‘internally’ sovereign state. Industrialization is the *sine qua non* condition for the formation of social democratic parties, while at the same time, qualitative variation in the nature of industrialization is not causal for the emergence of different models of labor politics. The focus on ‘internally’ sovereign polities is informed by the following consideration: whenever labor emerged in the context of anti-colonial movements, for instance in Egypt, South Africa, and India, it became a part of these movements, rather than a political formation with primarily socio-economic concerns. Excluding cases that lack ‘internal’ sovereignty prevents this variable from interfering with the analysis. The included cases represent a comprehensive selection, and as such they also define the substantive scope of the suggested theory. On top of that, four idealtypical cases will be selected as representatives of either one of the four outcomes studied here. This analysis is geared at more detailed ‘process tracing’ in the context of an analytical narrative (Levi 1999) that allows for the in depth investigation of causal mechanisms. Russia will serve as an example for the absence of party formation and the embrace of insurrectionism. Germany stands for the embrace of quasi-revolutionary, and Britain for the adoption of evolutionary social democracy, while the United States are selected as an example for the absence of social democratic party formation and the embrace of moderate syndicalism as an alternative.

For all of the cases to be included here, it is the onset of industrialization that defines the general ‘possibility’ of social democratic party formation. Within the general time frame presented above, different cases have experienced the onset and various stages of industrialization at different points in time, and accordingly, formative stages of labor’s entry into the political arena vary across cases. It is, of course, impossible to find a definitive point in time, where the transformation to an industrial mode of production has become irreversible: industrialization is a process and not a discrete event, and moreover, many different types of variables – technological, economic, social, and political – can serve as indicators for the extent of industrialization (Kerr et al 1969, Cameron 1993, Sylla and Toniolo 1991). One of these indicators, however, is more easily recognizable than all the others, and it emphasizes the importance of institutional adaptation processes discussed earlier on as a prerequisite for the institutionalization of an industrial mode of production. What I am referring to here is the fundamental political decision that has made possible the “release” of the technological and economic forces advancing industrialism (cf. Crafts
This particular point in time opens a ‘window of opportunity’, within which various forms of labor politics could have emerged. However, what is most relevant within this ‘window of opportunity’ is the investigation of the so-called ‘second labor movement’ that emerged in a somewhat more synchronous fashion in the late decades of the 19th and the early 20th century.\(^{45}\)

This case selection and the identification of a ‘window of opportunity’, where party formation was possible, takes into account the principles suggested by Mahoney and Goertz (2004). They argue that negative cases (where a certain outcome cannot be observed) should be paired with positive cases on the basis of a ‘possibility principle’: “…(…) only cases, where the outcome of interest is possible should be included in the set of negative cases; cases where the outcome is impossible should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations.” (p. 653). Party formation therefore has to be possible in all of the cases to be included here: they need to be sovereign, and therefore at least largely free from the effects of anti-colonialism on the agenda of the labor movement; they have to be sufficiently industrialized to sustain the foundation of social democratic parties or alternative models of labor politics; and eventually, within their specific environment of labor inclusion, party formation must be materially possible.

The final point in this list requires further elaboration. One could imagine a scenario, in which repression was so intense and effective that the formation of any political organization becomes impossible. Or alternatively, the opposite kind of situation, where a polity is directly responsive to citizens’ demands to such an extent that intermediating political associations become obsolete. The first one of these situations is an actual historical reality, totalitarian and modern authoritarian regimes\(^{46}\), while the second one, a perfectly responsive polity, where parties in the conventional sense might not be required anymore, is conceivable, but only a hypothetical scenario. If any one of the cases meeting the ‘internal sovereignty’ and ‘industrialization’ requirements listed above, were characterized in either one of these ways, party formation would become substantively impossible. The case would move outside of what Mahoney and Goertz (2004) identify as the “possibility space” for the outcome of interest, in this study the formation of some model of labor politics.

\(^{45}\) For the distinction between a ‘first’ labor movement, largely composed of skilled artisans, and a second labor movement that involved unskilled and semi-skilled factory workers in larger numbers, see Kocka (1983), Katzenelson (1986), or Thompson (1963). This distinction is, of course, only applicable to those cases, where industrialization has been stretched over longer periods of time, including Britain as the most prominent case, but also Germany, France, Belgium and the US. In other cases, where industrialization occurred through textile and other light manufacturing as well as heavy industry at the same time, such as Japan and Russia, this distinction is less relevant. Although the ‘second’ labor movement is the focus of attention here, an inclusion of earlier developments in those cases, where this applies, is still important, since the experiences of the ‘first’ labor movement have always had a pervasive impact, albeit differently across cases.

\(^{46}\) The reference to “modern authoritarian” regimes reflects Luebbert’s (1987) assessment of variation in regime types during the interwar period. He distinguishes them from traditional dictatorships of the 19th century that were based on a dominant position of traditional, mostly landed, interests. “Modern” authoritarian regimes are based on a wider coalition of support, as they include peasants, the middle-class, and workers in different kinds of configurations. The ability to establish these coalitions requires a more efficient and capable state than the one that held “traditional” dictatorships together.
Figure 3 shows how I frame the ‘possibility space’ of social democratic party formation along these lines, and how varying degrees of inclusion that can be observed for the cases studied here fit into that conception. Higher and low degrees of inclusion are clearly within the realm of possibility, when it comes to social democratic party formation. In the category of low inclusion, repression is pronounced, but at the same time accompanied by formalized institutions that guarantee at least minimal access to the political arena. This makes the formation of political organizations possible. Higher inclusion is based on an institutionally liberal polity, and thus provides a comparatively wider range of opportunities for labor to organize. The substantive theory suggested here predicts that social democratic party formation will occur in these two categories. But in response to qualitative variations in labor inclusion between higher and low inclusion polities, I argue that it is going to occur in different ways: An evolutionary social democratic party is the optimal response to an environment of higher inclusion, while quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal response in a context of low inclusion. Different variants of the quasi-revolutionary party type, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, emerge in response to different configurations of labor inclusion within the overall category of low inclusion.

Social democratic party formation is predicted not to occur in the categories of lowest and highest inclusion, in favor of alternative models of labor politics, moderate syndicalism in highest, and insurrectionism in lowest inclusion polities. But at the same time, even though social democratic party formation is not predicted to occur in these two categories, it was at least materially possible. Lowest inclusion in the cases of Russia and Japan, as remains to be shown in more detail later one, created an extremely repressive environment for labor, but not to such an extent as to make the formation of political organizations entirely impossible. That extent of effective repression would only be accomplished by the more capable totalitarian and modern authoritarian states after World War I. They represent the ‘adjacent’, even less inclusive, category next to lowest inclusion, further down the continuum of inclusion. In the case of totalitarian and modern authoritarian regimes, social democratic party formation is not only not predicted, but more than that, it becomes materially impossible. However, this particular category only became a historical reality after the end of World War I, through the emergence of totalitarianism and modern authoritarian types of regimes.

Other than this category of ‘lower than lowest’ inclusion, which has become a historical reality after the end of the time period studied here, the second category, in which social democratic party formation becomes materially impossible, is only a hypothetical scenario. In a perfectly responsive polity, political association for the purpose of interest representation would not be necessary anymore, since citizens’ demands would be ascertained in some other rationalistic way, and solved through an appropriate policy response. Entrenched political elites in highest inclusion cases appeal to labor in various ways that distinguish this category from the cases of only higher inclusion. But at the same time, diverging socio-
economic and political interests as well as the according principles of contentious politics and interest representation have not disappeared or become obsolete. As a result, labor in highest inclusion cases still sees the need for political involvement, and the formation of social democratic parties is one of the options, through which that engagement could have been pursued. The theory suggested here predicts that labor elites will pursue a different course of action, the embrace of moderate syndicalism, but at the same time, social democratic party formation is not materially impossible.

Different kinds of data will be used for consecutive steps in the empirical analysis conducted here. In the first place, the assessment of ‘internal sovereignty’ as one prerequisite for the possibility of party formation and inclusion into the analysis will be based on an adjusted list of cases from the “Correlates of War” project (cf. Gleditsch 2004). Secondly, the presence of sufficient levels of industrialization as the second one of these prerequisites and the sine qua non condition for social democratic party formation will be identified through an analysis of harmonized national census reports. The focus in this context will be on the number of industrial workers in the economically active population. My own calculations for an assessment of this indicator are derived from a collection of national census data by Bairoch et al. (1968) and Bairoch (1971).

Third, labor inclusion represents the set of external constraints, in response to which labor elites make choices about models of labor politics. Variation in labor inclusion across cases will be identified through an analysis of constitutional and other legal documents, combined with an assessment of the existing secondary literature. The determination of party formation outcomes across these categories of inclusion, in the fourth place, will primarily be derived from an analysis of parties’ foundation documents. The use of this data source will be accompanied by an analysis of programmatic contributions by party leaders and theoreticians as well as primary and secondary accounts for the observable practices of these parties, respectively alternative models of labor politics. Assigning such a central role to formal programmatic documents for the determination of the party’s character requires an additional discussion, as one could argue that other expressions of the party’s behavior or orientations are more reliable than formal party agendas. There are three major reasons, for why I believe that party agendas are the most appropriate data source in this context: One, focusing on formal agendas is to some extent a pragmatic choice, since they are available for all included cases, and also lend themselves easily to a systematic comparative approach. Two, social democratic parties have always been programmatic parties, meaning that formal party agendas and comprehensive transformative designs have always had a much greater role for these parties, compared to their traditional conservative or liberal, but also their religion, ethnicity, or language based rivals. And eventually, three, it should be kept in mind that, whenever possible, I am going to combine an analysis of formal agendas with an account for the actual practice of the party. This is, for example, crucial in the case of Swedish and Norwegian social democracy, since in both these instances, a formal agenda borrowed from
the German SPD as the paradigm of the parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was combined with a practice that made both these parties representatives of the Belgian extra-parliamentary variant.

Fourth, the empirical analysis is guided primarily by the theory of social democratic party formation introduced here, but I made every effort to use the existing alternative explanations as additional “multiple working hypotheses”, in order to try to circumvent what Chamberlin (1965, 754) refers to as “parental affection for a favorite theory.” I am going to evaluate the predictive power of the socio-economic and the status system explanation, compared to that of degrees of inclusion as an external constraint, without a consideration of exogenous effects on the choices of labor elites. To that end, I am going to use the data and results from my previous analyses of labor inclusion and industrialization. And finally, fifth, for the analysis of optimal and suboptimal choices, I am going to employ a wide variety of data that can help illustrate the extent to which some given model of labor politics was successful in external mobilization as well as internal institutionalization. This includes quantitative data on party membership and election results, but also primary and secondary accounts for the extent to which some ideological orientation was rooted in the broader labor constituency.
CHAPTER 3

COMING TO TERMS WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FORMATION – CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

A typology of social democratic parties and alternative models of labor politics

Party typologies in the literature

The previous chapter was designed to sketch the architecture of my explanation for social democratic party formation in the broadest and most comprehensive fashion. Throughout the following chapter, I am going to elaborate on the conceptualization of social democratic party formation and the embrace of alternative models of labor politics as the ‘dependent variable’ of this study. This entails an outline of a typology for social democratic party formation, which will be discussed now, followed by a delineation of prerequisites for concluding that some given model of labor politics was formed successfully, or in other words, was institutionalized.

The absence of an adequate typology is just as surprising as the lack of a comprehensive theory for the formation of social democracy. In some cases of contributions from ‘adjacent’ fields of research, this is the logical consequence of a different explanatory interest: Bartolini (2000) for example, who takes the same wide ‘class formation’ perspective as Katznelson (1986), is interested in explaining the mobilization of the class cleavage and general variations in the dominant outlook of the European left across cases. He distinguishes between different “left experiences” based on their fundamental ideological orientation (trade unionism, reformist marxism, orthodox marxism, marxism-syndicalism) and the extent to which the left in general is unified or fragmented in the political arena (p. 120). I will argue later that his distinction between reformist and orthodox marxism is one of degree rather than type. But apart from that, his typology is adequate for the kind of question he is asking. The same can be said about Mikkelsen (2005) and his
attempt to provide a synthesis of national variations in working class politics by distinguishing between union, party, and party-union strategies of the labor movement. Both of these typologies are not adequate, however, for the purpose of studying different types of social democratic parties rather than syndromes of ideological orientations or differences between union or party dominated strategies typical for the overall left.

The existing accounts that are interested more specifically in an explanation for social democratic party formation, employ no explicit or only an insufficiently specified typology. I have argued previously how this shortcoming not only reduces descriptive accuracy, but furthermore, poses a more fundamental problem for the suggested theories: the existing approaches are not able to delineate the respective roles and effects of socio-economic and political variables on varying elements of different models of labor politics. Lipset (1983) as a representative of the status system approach distinguishes only between radical and reformist labor politics. Kautsky (2002) treats social democracy as one generic kind of party – a democratically organized mass based party emerging from the labor movement and affiliated with trade unions. He does not elaborate further on qualitative variations within that party species, but distinguishes only between different “degrees” of socialism across cases. This implies at the same time differences in the level of radicalism and in the degree of mobilization success, where greater mobilization is associated with more radicalism.

The socio-economic approach, through the contributions of Bull (1922) and Galenson (1952), begins with a broad perspective on the nature of the entire labor movement, as it is shaped by the effects of a particular pattern of industrialization. Bull (1922, p. 331) characterizes this initial scope of his analysis as follows: “The (investigated) working classes differ with respect to their economic and social position of power, as well as their psychological constitution.” Based on this point of departure, he identifies the resulting variation in social democratic party formation, by distinguishing between ‘radicalism’ and ‘reformism’.

The problematic aggregation of qualitative variation across different models of labor politics and different levels of mobilization success has already been discussed before. It is an implicit part of all these contributions, but particularly apparent in Kautsky (2002). That point left aside, the typologies of existing approaches represent laudable attempts to develop a parsimonious conceptualization. But the exclusive focus on a distinction between radicalism and reformism as the decisive criterion for distinguishing different social democratic parties is too narrow. Actual national variations of social democratic party formation and the specific effects of a given environment on the choices of labor elites cannot be adequately identified and understood by reference to this one factor alone.

47 This is my own translation from the German original.
Hamilton (1967, 5) suggests a conceptualization of the term ‘radical’, which can help to illustrate another inadequacy of the reformism vs. radicalism dichotomy used by the existing approaches. He identifies as ‘radical’ “a preference – by individuals, parties, or voluntary organizations – for basic institutional changes in the character of society, for changes in the character of its stratification, in the structure of the economy, and in the kind and extent of political controls.” The two social democratic party types from the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena are clearly radical on the basis of this understanding, as both of them are pushing toward a fundamental social and political re-organization, through the implementation of socialism. The emphasis of the existing typologies on ‘reformism’ in evolutionary social democracy obscures the programmatic commitment to socialism as a fundamental objective. The emphasis on ‘radicalism’ in what I refer to as quasi-revolutionary social democracy underestimates the elements of pragmatism and accommodation with the entrenched elites that characterize the strategic orientation of this party type, in addition to its radical rhetoric.

Not only the two existing explanations for social democratic party formation specifically, but indeed most of the study of working class politics, is curiously unrelated to the general literature about party typologies. From that kind of perspective, the scope quite naturally is even wider – the goal is to develop a comprehensive, yet parsimonious typology of political parties in general. Gunther and Diamond (2003) review the dimensions, along which various authors have classified parties, and present their own typology, which emphasizes the “extent of organization” on a continuum ranging from “thick” to “thin” as the most important factor (p. 172, italics are mine). Additional factors brought forward by other authors include the function performed by parties, like interest (Lipset 1961) or group (Kitschelt 1989) representation, as opposed to electoral competition (Kitschelt 1989); the desired scope of social integration and societal change (Neumann 1956); the ideological location of parties (Sartori 1976); or the attitude of the party toward the state and its political competitors, distinguishing between anti-system and pluralistic orientations (Gunther and Diamond 2003).

From all of these perspectives, social democratic parties are treated as a generic species without further classification of its types or variants, and sometimes even as only one particular expression of a more encompassing label. Since one element of my explanatory interest is to uncover variations within the species of social democracy, a more detailed typology is necessary. However, in the interest of cumulative theory building called for by Gunther and Diamond (2003), I believe that it is crucial to locate any more detailed phenomenology of different expressions of the social democratic species, or, in other words, different members of the social democratic family, as well as alternative models of labor politics, in the context of these broader typologies.
Contours of a typology for varying models of labor politics

The common features of social democratic parties, which define them as a generic party species or family as well as the specific differences between individual family members, or party types, can be identified along the dimensions of party typologies suggested in the literature. This allows us to build on the existing typologies and at the same time, to refine the somewhat unsatisfactory classification of parties underpinning prior attempts at explaining social democratic party formation as well as broader studies of working class politics.

This typology is derived from an empirical phenomenology of variations in social democracy and alternative models of labor politics that will receive much of its factual underpinning in the following comparative case study. It includes the two social democratic party types that emerged during labor’s formative stage in the political arena (quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democracy), and the three competing models of labor politics from this era (bolshevism, anarchism-syndicalism, moderate syndicalism). Since my logical point of departure is the analysis of social democratic party formation, I am going to treat bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism as two types from the species of insurrectionism. These competing models of labor politics are added to this typology in order to allow for a ‘positive’ explanation regarding the choices of labor elites in those cases, where social democratic party formation failed. In addition to that, the two types of parties that developed from a transformation of social democracy (reformist and pragmatic social democratic parties) will be included to further clarify the distinctiveness of earlier social democratic party models and to provide an underpinning for using this study as a building block to an analysis of party transformation. It should also be noted that evolutionary social democratic parties emerged both as the initial manifestation of social democracy during labor’s formative stage in the political arena and from a transformation of social democracy. In some cases, social democracy was founded as the evolutionary type from the very beginning (in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand), while in others, evolutionary social democratic parties have been the result of a transformation from an earlier quasi-revolutionary orientation (for example in Sweden and Norway, but also, at least formally, for a brief period of time in the early 1920s in Germany).

Figure 4 is designed to clarify the logical hierarchy of species, types, and variants in labor politics utilized here, as well as the process of social democracy’s transformation after its initial formative stage. The detailed typology of various models of labor politics suggested here is displayed in table 2. Out of all the organizations considered for this taxonomy, the variety of outcomes investigated in this study more specifically extends to the following models of labor politics, which occurred during labor’s formative stage in the political arena: first, quasi-revolutionary social democracy; second, (early) evolutionary social democracy; third, moderate syndicalism; and fourth, insurrectionism through its specific manifestations.
bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism. These models and the other included political organizations will be distinguished and characterized along three major dimensions: with respect to their function, their ideology and their organization. These defining elements for the phenomenology outlined here are rooted in the literature on party typologies introduced above. The function of a party or an alternative model of labor politics identifies the organization’s basic raison d’être with respect to the role it wishes to assume in the process of political conflict. The ideological dimension encompasses the organization’s goals, and the means suggested for achieving these goals. Organizational variation across different models of labor politics entails internal decision-making procedures as well as the pattern of relations entertained with the world outside.

The taxonomy outlined in the following sections will be organized along these three component dimensions, beginning with the functional, then the ideological and eventually the organizational domain. In each of these categories, I will first describe the nature of the respective criterion in more detail. On the basis of that conceptualization, I am going to treat the following issues for each of the three dimensions, respectively: the shared features of social democratic parties from the formative stage, which define them as members of a generic party family or species; the differences between quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democracy as the two family members or types of parties; and the according characteristics of alternative models of labor politics studied here – bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism as two types of insurrectionism, and moderate syndicalism as a generic species of labor politics. Eventually, for further clarification, the relevant features of those social democratic parties that emerged from a process of party transformation will be added selectively. This includes reformist and pragmatic social democratic parties, which only emerged through transformation processes. But it also extends to those instances of evolutionary social democracy, which resulted from the transformation of earlier quasi-revolutionary orientations, as opposed to those evolutionary social democratic parties that were initially founded that way.

Function

The functional dimension of party typologies suggested by Lipset (1961), Kitschelt (1989) and others, defines an important shared characteristic of social democratic parties that emerged during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. The fundamental justification for their existence advanced by both the quasi-revolutionary and the evolutionary party type, is the representation of the newly emerging working class in the political arena. The same is true for anarchism-syndicalism and bolshevism as insurrectionist, ‘revolution making’ models of labor politics, but also for moderate syndicalism, which stands for the organization of labor around the workplace, the integration of workers into the existing party
system, and the pursuit of selective political interventions. All of these forms of labor’s political representation are indeed a product of industrialization and class formation.

There is one particular difference between quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties on the one hand and alternative models of labor politics on the other hand in this functional domain. The three alternative models of labor politics – bolshevism, anarchism-syndicalism, and moderate syndicalism – are characterized by slightly different definitions of their targeted constituency, when compared to social democratic parties. All these models of labor politics are engaged in group and interest representation, and more specifically, claim to act as the representative of industrial workers’ interests in the political arena. But above and beyond that social group as one component, somewhat wider or narrower definitions of their constituency can be observed. Social democracy fashions itself as the representative of industrial workers, while anarchism-syndicalism and bolshevism explicitly embrace peasants and agricultural laborers as an additional pillar of their revolutionary coalition.48 Bolshevism emerged as a distinct model of labor politics through the split of the RSDRP, the Russian social democratic party, beginning in 1902. For the purpose of this study, anarchism-syndicalism is treated as one generic insurrectionist type of labor politics. In its actual manifestations across cases, a wide variety of diverging approaches within this general category have occurred.

Moderate syndicalism exposes much internal variation with respect to the identification of its target group, which is the most important defining criterion for different variants within this particular species of labor politics. The functional variations regarding the extent of their desired constituency are also reflected by according organizational differences. First, a craft-based type of moderate syndicalism, most prominently advanced by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), features a particularly narrow definition of their targeted constituency, by focusing exclusively and most explicitly on the organization of skilled industrial workers. Second, an industrial type is equivalent in its functional self identification to social democratic parties, as it attempts to organize and appeal to all industrial workers, through an organization of unions based on industries rather than craft or skill. In the case of the US, where industrial

48 It should be noted that some important variations within the group of social democratic parties occurred with respect to the mobilization of peasants. Lahme (1982) analyzes the efforts of Danish social democrats in appealing to the peasantry, and the way in which peasants emerged as an important group of supporters for the party. The German social democrats had difficulties in breaking peasant loyalties to their proto-feudal overlords in the east of the country, but the extensive debates about the agrarian program of the party are a testament to the importance of this issue (cf. Gutsman 1981). Luebbert (1987) even elevates variation in the extent to which social democratic parties incorporated the peasantry to an important causal factor in explaining regime trajectories after World War I. Moreover, in many cases, various social groups supported social democratic parties, even though their propaganda was primarily geared at industrial workers, for example the liberal middle-class in Italy or smallholder peasants in France. My argument presented here about the focus of social democratic parties on industrial laborers as their target constituency is not affected by these issues. First of all, serious attempts at peasant mobilization that went hand in hand with the adjustment of codified programs and official strategical statements only occurred after the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. They are therefore a phenomenon pertaining to the transformation stage of social democracy, while the focus of this study is exclusively on the formative stage of party institutionalization. And in the second place, I am not studying the actual social composition of party support, which in some cases involved quite an eclectic variety of groups, but instead the formulated and codified strategical orientations of parties.
unionism competed with the most strongly entrenched craft-based form of union organization, the Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.) is the most prominent representative of this particular type of moderate syndicalism. A third type, eventually, is especially wide in its scope, as it targets not only industrial workers, but an even broader group of ‘producers’. This conception is associated with the Knights of Labor, and is geared at all those individuals that are engaged in the pursuit of ‘productive’ economic activities, most importantly industrial and rural workers, but also master workmen, as well as commercial and agricultural smallholders.

An important feature in the transformation of social democracy is the functional adaptation of matured social democratic parties, their embrace of ‘electoral competition’ over ‘group representation’ and the development from a ‘working class’ to a broader ‘people’s party’. Reformist social democracy as one of these two transformed types of social democracy represents an intermediate step in between these two functions (see tables 2 and 4). The German SPD after the 1959 Godesberg program as well as New Labour in Britain are examples of this type of social democracy. 49 Both these parties are characterized by efforts to merge the party’s traditional function with an integration into the pluralistic form of political competition in modern democracies and the attempt to appeal to new social groups in addition to the traditional worker constituency.

Pragmatic social democracy represents nothing more than a blueprint of a party model currently entertained by various revisionist factions, pitted against the preservers of a still predominant reformist orientation. 50 In terms of its function, pragmatic social democracy moves one step further away from the idea of group and interest representation that characterized the initial manifestations of social democracy toward the full embrace of electoral competition as the party’s fundamental raison d’être (cf. figure 2). As a consequence, pragmatic social democracy as a party model continues a path of development that reformist social democrats had only partially embraced before. 51

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49 See SPD (1959) for the Godesberg program and Labour (1995) for the revised party platform in Britain.
50 The new party program of the SPD, which was adopted 2007 in Hamburg (cf. SPD 2007), reaffirmed a ‘reformist social democratic’ orientation of the party. In the debates about the new agenda, ‘pragmatic’ social democrats were pushing for a significantly less ‘reformist’ and more ‘pragmatic’ approach, but they failed to succeed in their efforts against the party’s left wing as well as the party mainstream. The debate, among other things, revolved around the term ‘democratic socialism’, which has become a semantic code for ‘reformist’ social democracy. The term ended up in the program against ‘pragmatic’ opposition. The most prominent representatives of ‘pragmatic’ social democracy are certainly current finance minister Peer Steinbrück and current foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. In the British Labour party, many of the convinced ‘new revisionists’ around Blair would have preferred an even more pronounced break with the socialist past, when they launched their attack in the mid 1990s, but they had to settle for ‘reformist’ instead of ‘pragmatic’ social democracy. The so-called ‘Schröder-Blair paper’, a ‘Third Way’ manifesto of then British prime minister Blair and German chancellor Schröder could be considered the only explicit prominent formulation of a ‘pragmatic social democratic’ agenda (cf. Schröder and Blair 1998).
51 Kirchheimer (1966) famously argued that social democratic parties have developed from class-based parties engaged in the business of interest representation toward electoral ‘catch all’ parties already in the 1950s and 1960s. The argument about the development of social democratic transformation outlined here implies that his conclusion was premature. The transformation toward a true ‘catch all’ party, through which all links to an earlier function of class representation were severed would only be complete, if what I refer to here as pragmatic social democracy ever became the dominant model. This is not the case currently, and the recent
Arguing that the embrace of electoral competition over group representation represents an important characteristic of transformed social democratic parties does not mean that early social democracy was not engaged in electoral politics. The parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy and evolutionary social democratic parties were heavily involved in electoral politics, and the extra-parliamentary efforts of the ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary parties were geared at opening the electoral channel for labor participation. What distinguishes these cases from transformed social democratic parties is the role of electoral competition. For those early types of social democracy, it represented a strategical mechanism for group representation and the advancement of their constituency’s agenda. For transformed social democratic parties, electoral competition becomes a goal in and of itself, and participation in plural politics emerges as more of an underpinning rationale for the party than the representation of constituency interests.

Ideology

The desired scope of social integration and societal change, the ideological location of parties as well as the distinction between anti-system and democratic orientations have previously been identified as further elements of general party typologies suggested by the literature. These variables, rather than representing independent domains, can best be understood as specific dimensions of the broader concept of ideology, conceived of as a complex combination of world views, goals and strategical recommendations: a party’s fundamental attitude toward the state, whether a party seeks an all-encompassing social transformation or only specific reforms, or where it is located on the left-right continuum are all important aspects of its ideology. Incorporating these elements into a typology of social democratic parties and other models of labor politics helps to avoid the reductionism of the existing approaches to social democratic party formation and labor politics.52

For the purpose of this study, I understand a party’s ideology as a combination of two interrelated types of orientations: first, the organization’s goals and second, the means suggested to achieve these goals. The six specific dimensions of party ideologies introduced here (see table 2) belong to either one of these two logical categories. A fundamental objective and a particular substantive focus describe the goals expressed by various models of labor politics. Variation in terms of the means proposed to achieve these

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52 See Hamilton (2000) for a general assessment and critique of the marxist, revisionist, and leninist systems of thought, which provide, at least to some extent, the intellectual underpinning for three of the models of labor politics included in this study: quasi-revolutionary social democracy, evolutionary social democracy, and bolshevism.
goals emerge from a given model’s fundamental strategy, the view on how social and political change occurs, the attitude toward the state, and the point of view regarding cooperation with ‘bourgeois’ parties.

Goals

First, socialism as the fundamental objective united both social democratic party types from the formation stage as well as bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism. In all these cases, socialism was understood as the abolition of private property and the exercise of collective control over the means of production. Differences in between these models of labor politics exist with respect to the more specific elaboration on how precisely collective control can be accomplished. But at the most basic level, socialism understood along these lines is the fundamental objective of all of these organizations. Moderate syndicalism’s fundamental objective, by contrast, is most adequately understood as the achievement of ‘reformed capitalism’ through a significant adjustment of capitalist forms of economic exchange, without the complete abolition of private property or the market principle.53

One different kind of distinction between evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties specifically exists with respect to the pattern, through which socialism was embraced as the party’s fundamental objective. Evolutionary social democracy initially entered the political arena as an independent formation, and thereby departed from the labor movement’s prior pursuit of moderate syndicalism, without a socialist agenda. Socialism was only embraced at a later point in time, as a means of distinction vis-à-vis the earlier liberal cooperation partners. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, entered the political arena with a socialist agenda from the very beginning.

Existing differences across varying models of labor politics in terms of how to implement socialism, can be understood as varying positions of different approaches in the space of conflict between individual self-determination and rational planning. Meyer (1989) argued that socialism seeks to combine precisely these two main goals through the abolition of private property and the collective control of the means of production. On the one hand, at the macro-level, the objective of socialism is the establishment of political and economic structures, which are capable of making rational planning and decision-making for the well being of the entire society possible. On the other hand, at the micro-level, socialism seeks to create an

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53 The ‘producerist’ variant of moderate syndicalism represented by the Knights of Labor in the US, was formally based on the design of a cooperative economy that would abolish the wage system altogether. In that sense, the ideology of the Knights shows some pronounced similarities to the orientations of early utopian socialism as well as the following cooperative movement that became an important pillar of comprehensive labor movements and counter cultures. At the same time, the Knights never formally adhered to socialism in the sense in which it is understood here, as a call for the abolition of private property, even though the Knights’ fundamental platform demanded the nationalization of certain industries (cf. Voss 1983).
environment that allows for self-determination of the individual with regard to his economic and social relations.

In essence, the abolition of private property has emerged as the initial response to this problem by all of these organizational models, thereby becoming the defining feature of socialism in the early stage. However, with respect to the actual implementation of socialism, varying models of labor politics have provided somewhat different responses to the dilemma of reconciling efficient steering at the macro level with individual self-determination. Bolshevism has occupied one extreme end of the continuum by emphasizing efficient steering at the macro level, and later by actually practicing state ownership of the means of production. Anarchism-syndicalism occupies the other extreme by emphasizing individual self-determination and cooperation at the micro level. Quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democrats are located in the often times uneasy center by trying to find pragmatic solutions for this dilemma and to reconcile these two conflicting objectives.

In addition to the functional adaptation described above, the transformation of social democracy can also be observed in the domain of ideology. Having abandoned socialism as their fundamental objective is a defining feature of both reformist and pragmatic social democracy (see tables 2 and 4). Reformist social democrats continue to utilize the term ‘democratic socialism’. But the semantics should not overshadow the fundamental fact that this type of social democracy has made its peace with capitalism and accepted the market principle as the defining feature of economic organization. Other than pragmatic social democracy, however, which foregoes the formulation of any fundamental objective, and accordingly, seeks to eliminate references to ‘democratic socialism’ from the party’s agenda, reformist social democratic parties embrace as a fundamental objective the desire to establish a ‘tamed’ or ‘reformed’ version of capitalism.

Evolutionary social democratic parties that emerged from a party transformation, on the other hand, are distinct from their reformist and pragmatic cousins in this respect. They continue to formulate socialism as their fundamental objective, but other than evolutionary social democracy from the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, socialism is not understood as the direct collective ownership of the means of production anymore. Instead, socialist economic organization is supposed to emerge from an extensive welfare state and income redistribution.

The revisionism of Eduard Bernstein that emerged during the mid 1890s was the first ‘evolutionary socialist’ challenge to the dominant quasi-revolutionary orientation of the SPD and the Second International. But much of the inspiration for Bernstein’s initiative came from his involvement with the

54 This term figures prominently in all party platforms passed by the German SPD after World War II, and has become a semantic code for ‘reformist social democracy’: the 1959 Godesberg program that introduced ‘reformist social democracy’ to replace the still formally valid quasi-revolutionary orientation, the 1989 Berlin program, as well as the most recent 2007 Hamburg program.
55 Bernstein (1899) is the most concise summary of his arguments.
English labor movement. After Bernstein’s initial failure to change the dominant orientation of his party, some previously quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties embraced an ‘evolutionary socialist’ orientation later on, during the further development of their transformation stage, in various different ways. First, in some cases this happened as a *de facto* abandonment of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. This has usually occurred through a gradual weakening of the traditionally extensive, isolated social network of labor and the toning down of revolutionary rhetoric, without having culminated, however, in the adoption of a new party agenda yet. This *de facto* party change could clearly be observed for the German SPD after World War II, and before the adoption of the Godesberg program in 1959, but to some extent already during the Weimar Republic. Second, the embrace of evolutionary social democracy by parties that initially emerged as quasi-revolutionary has also occurred through a formal revision of the party agenda. This took place temporarily in the case of the SPD, when it adopted the evolutionary socialist Görlitz program, written by Bernstein himself, in 1921. But it only lasted until 1925, when the re-affirmation of vulgar marxism and a quasi-revolutionary orientation occurred through the Heidelberg program. In other cases, such as Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, a similar programmatic adjustment has taken place and lasted for longer periods of time.

In some instances, previously quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties skipped the stage of ‘evolutionary socialism’ altogether, by embracing ‘reformist social democracy’ right away. The dividing line between evolutionary and reformist social democracy is somewhat blurred, because both these types of social democracy often times embrace similar specific policy agendas. Some social democratic parties emerging as ‘evolutionary’ from a programmatic transformation replaced demands for collectivization with demands for redistribution and the extension of the welfare state. This change is most apparent in the social democratic parties of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium. However, these cases remained ‘evolutionary socialist’ models, despite their diminished emphasis on collectivization, because they explicitly regarded income distribution and the welfare state as only another way of defining socialism. The Canadian Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), founded in 1932, represents a unique mixture of both these facets of socialism, collectivization and the welfare state, in evolutionary social democratic parties. The Regina Manifesto as the party’s fundamental programmatic orientation contains references to both these pillars, respectively definitions of socialism at the same time.56

Reformist social democracy is actually characterized by similar policy proposals, but does no longer emphasize the function of these specific policies as a transmission belt into socialism. Having made their peace with the market, reformist social democratic parties adjusted their ultimate goal from socialism to a reformed version of capitalism. The most apparent examples for ‘reformist social democracy’ are the

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56 See CCF (1934) for the Regina Manifesto.
German SPD after the adoption of the Godesberg program, and New Labour after the abandonment of the famous Clause IV in the party statute that called for the nationalization of the means of production. These two ‘reformist social democratic’ agendas are different from the earlier ‘evolutionary socialist’ revisionism of Bernstein and Crosland (1957), and the ‘evolutionary socialist’ agendas of the later Scandinavian social democracy, because they have abandoned the call for a socialist transformation of society.

Second, in addition to the formulation of a fundamental objective, a particular organization’s *substantive focus* represents another pillar in the description of its goals. Reference to this aspect is designed to further clarify both the formal orientation of the organization and the emphasis of its practical activities. The self image as the representative of the emerging working-class unites all five models of labor politics emerging during labor’s formative stage in the political arena, despite some slight differences in the specific definition of their overall constituencies. As a consequence, all of these organizations emphasize the socio-economic interests of their target group, which makes economic policies a key substantive focus.

What divides evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democracy from one another is the fact that the quasi-revolutionary party type also embraces the struggle for fundamental political rights as one of its key concerns. In the parlance of socialist theoreticians at the time, including Kautsky, Lenin, Engels, Bernstein, and many others, these two types of contestation are identified as the economic and the political struggle, respectively. Different orientations regarding the relative salience of these two forms of conflict represent an important divergence between evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

The evolutionary party type is not entirely unconcerned about questions of constitutional governance, fundamental freedoms and voting rights, but these cornerstones of the political struggle are much less important for defining the party’s orientation than the pursuit of socio-economic goals. The economic struggle is the single most important substantive focus of evolutionary social democrats. Quasi-revolutionary social democrats also regard a socio-economic transformation to socialism as the ultimate goal of their activities, which makes economic policies a key issue. But other than the evolutionary party type, quasi-revolutionary social democracy emphasizes the struggle for fundamental political rights much more strongly. Logically, the political struggle is only a step on the road to socialism. But political freedom is generally regarded as a prerequisite for the implementation of socialism. For the strategical orientation of quasi-revolutionary social democrats and the substantive focus of their day to day efforts, the political struggle is therefore accorded primacy over the economic struggle.57

The political struggle is also dominant in the activities of bolshevism and anarchism-syndicalism, similar to the orientation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. But the perspective on the role of political change and its relation to the desired socio-economic transformation is somewhat different. Quasi-

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57 See the Erfurt Program of the SPD (1891) and Kautsky (1909)
revolutionary social democracy adheres to the idea of a “revolution in two stages”. The establishment of fundamental political rights through a liberal, political, revolution is the first one of these stages, and a prerequisite for the second, a socio-economic transformation toward socialism. As a consequence of this conception, but also through the actual practice of the organization, quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties embraced fundamental political rights as an objective in and of itself, a necessary compliment to socialism as a socio-economic system.

Russian social democracy was initially based on the same conception. But the embrace by Lenin of a “revolution in one stage” marks the divergence of bolshevism from its earlier social democratic roots. Other than the social democrats, Lenin argued that a socialist revolution, meaning the collectivization of the means of production, has to follow immediately on the defeat of an illiberal political system. Bolshevism accorded primacy on the political struggle in order to topple an autocratic regime. But other than in quasi-revolutionary social democracy, bolshevism never embraced liberal institutions as a goal in and of itself. Anarchism-syndicalism is equally maximalist in its conception of revolution as bolshevism. Notwithstanding the differences regarding strategy and its perspective on the state, which will be discussed later, anarchism-syndicalism also regards the political struggle as key, and features an equally maximalist conception of revolution as bolshevism does. As a consequence of that, anarchist-syndicalists reject liberal-constitutional institutions just as the bolsheviki do, but other than their insurrectionist cousins, seek to abandon the centralized exercise of authority altogether. Moderate syndicalism, eventually, accepts liberal institutions as the legitimate ‘rules of the game’. While moderate syndicalism is not entirely uninvolved in campaigns for political goals and institutional reforms, its substantive focus is clearly on economic policies and practical improvements for its constituency in the framework of the existing institutional environment.

The transformation of social democracy into reformist and pragmatic party types also affects these parties’ substantive focus, in addition to the general abandonment of socialism as the fundamental objective. The emphasis on fundamental political rights that characterized earlier quasi-revolutionary parties became obsolete in the consolidated liberal institutional environments, within which these transformed social democratic parties operate. But the same argument that has been made previously about the differences between reformist and pragmatic social democracy in the domain of functional adaptation and parties’ fundamental objectives can also be extended to this issue. Kirchheimer (1966) argues that social democracy has essentially evolved into a ‘catch all’ party after the end of World War II. This development entails both the embrace of a wider constituency (‘function’ in the suggested typology) and a

58 See Kautsky (1909) and Plekhanov (1904) for an argument about a revolution in two stages in the context of tsarist Russia. 59 See Lenin (1902) as an early theoretical formulation of this approach. See Lenin’s “April theses” (Lenin 1917) as a suggestion to implement a revolution in one stage in the context of an actual revolutionary situation.
policy agenda that is primarily determined by electoral calculations and therefore more flexible than earlier agendas, which were shaped most significantly by programmatic commitments (‘goals’ and ‘means’).

Not only his assessment of their functional adaptation, as argued above, was premature for the reformist social democratic parties of the post World War II period, but also the evaluation of their substantive focus. His argument is fitting for the type of social democracy currently envisioned by a number of revisionists that I referred to as ‘pragmatic social democrats’. In this case, programmatic commitments and a pronounced substantive focus have become obsolete and are replaced by a flexible variety of economic and non-economic policies. For reformist social democratic parties, which were the actual object of study for Kirchheimer, his argument does not hold. Their programmatic commitments have clearly become more flexible than the rigid ideologies of earlier quasi-revolutionary parties. But at the same time, they still feature comprehensive transformative agendas, even though socialism as an ultimate goal was replaced by the conception of a significantly reformed and tamed version of capitalism. In post World War II social democracy, two specific kinds of substantive emphasis can be observed, which also function as the defining features of different variants of reformist social democracy (see tables 2 and 4): in the first place, a continued emphasis on economic issues, typical for the 1959 Godesberg SPD as well as New Labour in the 1990s; and secondly, a pronounced red-green variant that has incorporated environmental concerns into an extended vision of reformed capitalism, which is typical for the German SPD after the 1989 Berlin program.60

Means

The fundamental objective and the substantive focus define the goals pursued by the variety of political associations included into this typology as the first pillar of their ideological orientation. In addition to that, a second interrelated element of ideology are the means proposed to accomplish whatever goals, defined by a fundamental objective and a specific substantive emphasis, the organization might have. For the purpose of this study, I distinguish between four component indicators, which add up to a characterization of the means suggested for the accomplishment of the organization’s goals (see table 2): the fundamental strategy, the view on how change occurs, the attitude toward the state and the perspective on cooperation with bourgeois parties.

The attitude toward the state captures a party’s fundamental idea about the function of the state in the pursuit of the organization’s goal. Social democratic parties of all types as well as the bolsheviki embrace

60 See SPD (1959), SPD (1989) and Labour (1995). The British plurality electoral system and the resulting lack of a relevant green party are one plausible explanation for why Labour did not go through a similar transformation of embracing ‘green’ issues as the German SPD.
the state as a vehicle (albeit not necessarily the only one) for implementing their agenda. This sets them apart from the anarchist-syndicalist type of insurrectionism. Anarchist-syndicalists focus on direct action (in many cases, including the populist People’s Will in Russia and some elements of the early Japanese anarchist movement, even terrorism) and the activities of mass-based anarcho-syndicalist unions. Thus, they either ignore the state or try to sabotage and destroy it. Moderate syndicalism is comparable in this respect to anarchist-syndicalists, in that its organization is not primarily geared at ‘capturing’ the state directly, be it through insurrection or electoral politics. Moderate syndicalists aim at shaping the state and its policies indirectly, through selective political interventions.

While the attitude toward the state represents a somewhat independent dimension, the remaining elements of a party’s proposed means are more strongly interrelated with one another. Variation in these respects – the view on how change occurs, the fundamental strategy, and the attitudes about cooperation with bourgeois parties – defines the most crucial distinctions not only between both social democratic party types, but all of the models of labor politics from the formative stage. In terms of their goals as the first pillar of the ideological domain, despite some variation in their respective substantive focus, both quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties are committed to socialism as their fundamental objective. This is one of the defining features of social democracy as a species or family of parties. It is thus not in terms of their fundamental objective or the end of their struggle, where both social democratic party types from the formative stage differ. They do have radically different approaches with respect to the means they suggest in order to accomplish that goal. This is what sets them apart most strongly and thereby provides the background on which a distinction between them as two distinct members of the same family can be made.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy formulates the accomplishment of socialism through revolutionary means as its fundamental strategy, and adheres to a view on how change occurs that is essentially deterministic. This approach is based on a vulgarized version of marxism associated with the works of Karl Kautsky, but also Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue. The collapse of the capitalist order and the eventual victory of socialism are regarded as inevitable consequences of the contradictions of capitalism. The working class has the heroic but already pre-determined task of executing this historical necessity. At the same time, however, neither one of the parties in the Second International that subscribed to this doctrine, was truly insurrectionist. The reference to revolution functioned as a rhetorical device for the social integration of their constituency as well as a semantic code for a fundamental transformation of the existing order without an actual insurrection. Karl Kautsky (1909) expressed this perspective most

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61 See Kautsky (1909), Guesde (1901), Guesde (1867-1882), Lafargue (1892), and Lafargue (1895)
succinctly: “(Social Democracy) is a revolutionary, but not a revolution making party. (...) Our task is not to organize the revolution, but to organize ourselves for the revolution.”

Regardless of whether they emerged during the formation or the transformation stage, all evolutionary social democratic parties share a set of common characteristics that identify them as a generic type of social democratic party, distinct from their quasi-revolutionary comrades. Evolutionary social democracy rejects the determinism of quasi-revolutionary vulgar marxism. It maintains support for ‘socialism’ as the ultimate goal of the movement, but instead of expecting the immediate collapse of the capitalist order, advances a voluntarist understanding of the path toward socialism. This represents an approach that emphasizes an evolutionary transformation and does away with revolutionary rhetoric. This set of ideas has come to be associated with Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism, but the agenda of the British Labor Party after 1918, while not referring to Bernstein, was ‘evolutionary social democratic’ in the sense suggested by this typology as well. The same is true for the later Swedish and Norwegian social democrats, as well as the formal party platform of the German SPD in between 1921 and 1925, although in these cases, evolutionary social democracy was the result of a transformation process, rather than the initial foundation of these parties.

Other than ‘quasi’-revolutionary social democrats, bolsheviki and anarchists-syndicalists were truly revolutionary, as they envisioned an overthrow of the existing order through an insurrectionist act. This identifies them as insurrectionist models of labor politics, while their specific strategies for carrying out a revolution make them distinct types of the insurrectionist species. Bolshevism envisions a revolution that is carefully planned and implemented by a centralized and tightly organized group of professional revolutionaries. What makes this more than just a simple coup d’état is the strategical orientation toward the complimentary forceful mobilization of the masses and the control over a semi-affiliated periphery of supporters. Anarchism-syndicalism on the other hand relies on the spontaneity of the masses and the emergence of a revolutionary opportunity through a mass rising in the context of a general strike. Direct action and in the most extreme cases, assassinations and acts of terrorism, can be regarded as a logical corollary to this strategy, because their function is to weaken an oppressive state. Throughout the historical transformation of anarchism-syndicalism, however, these two approaches, anarcho-syndicalism and anarchism, have evolved as distinct ideological and organizational variants.

We are going to see in the following section that the basic form of organization adopted by anarcho-syndicalists as one branch or element of anarchism-syndicalism and moderate syndicalists are quite similar. Their respective fundamental strategies, however, are characterized by a pronounced difference. Anarchist-syndicalists pursue an insurrectionist model of labor politics that envisions the overthrow of the existing order through a combination of direct action and mass-based unions engaged in a general strike. Moderate syndicalists also concentrate on unionism and the organization of their constituency around the workplace. But their equally indirect approach into the arena of politics is not guided by the desire to stage an
insurrection or a fundamental transformation of the existing institutional environment. Moderate syndicalists launch selective interventions into the arena of politics, through lobbying for specific legislative projects and the political pressure they can build up with their constituency and their leaders, who are both actively integrated into the entrenched party system.

As a corollary of these fundamental strategies, all models of labor politics from the formative stage, except for quasi-revolutionary social democracy, share an essentially voluntarist view on how change occurs. In the case of evolutionary social democracy, change is accomplished through electoral and legislative action. The fundamental strategies of bolshevism, anarchism-syndicalism and moderate syndicalism are quite different, but they share with evolutionary social democracy the conviction that the kind of changes they envision will be the immediate result of human agency. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, regards the political and socio-economic transformation it propagates as the pre-determined consequence of scientifically derived rules of historical development.

The final element in the domain of suggested means concerns the issue of cooperation with 'bourgeois' parties. This is essentially a further elaboration on the fundamental strategical recommendations codified by the party. It represents an important distinguishing factor between evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Evolutionary social democratic parties sought to emancipate themselves from their non-proletarian competitors by developing a unique programmatic appeal. Embracing a socialist agenda provided them with that opportunity. At the same time, from their inception, they were willing to engage in cooperation and coalition building across class lines. For moderate syndicalism, cooperation with 'bourgeois' parties is even more essential. It is one of the defining features of the approach: without the ability to relay labor’s concerns to the entrenched elites within parties, legislatures, and the executive, the strategy of selective interventions into the political arena would be infeasible. The bolshevik and anarchist-syndicalist variants of labor politics were equally straightforward in their professed and practiced rejection of cooperation with the ‘bourgeoisie’. The position of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties on the other hand, is more complex. Officially, quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties rejected cooperation with the liberals or other representatives of the old order, but de facto, various forms of cooperation occurred frequently, even in those examples of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that are typically thought of as the most intransigent.

The transformation of social democracy can also be observed in the area of means that are suggested by the party in the pursuit of whatever goal it might have. The abandonment of quasi-revolutionary

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62 See Frankel (1969) with a very instructive discussion about determinism and voluntarism in different conceptions of socialist ideology.

63 The Second International during its 1904 congress in Amsterdam resolved that social democracy was to abstain from cooperation with bourgeois parties, except for “temporary cooperation”, and only under “exceptional circumstances” (see Second International 1904).
orientations has led to the embrace of gradual strategies toward socialism typical for evolutionary social democratic parties, or an emphasis on specific reforms without the reference to socialism as the ultimate goal in reformist social democracy. Alongside both of these developments, previously quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties have also given up their adherence to a deterministic world view. What functioned as an essential tool of social integration in some of the oppressive environments during their initial formative stage was replaced by an embrace of voluntarism. This adaptation process allowed for a significantly more efficient involvement in a process of actual and significant political change. Due to the nature of liberal-democratic contentious politics, the willingness to cooperate with bourgeois parties and the actual practice of such cooperation, for example in coalition governments, is a defining feature of all social democratic party types from the transformation stage.

The ‘pragmatic’ social democratic party type is designed to move one step further away, both from socialism and reformed capitalism as the previous programmatic commitments of quasi-revolutionary, evolutionary, and reformist social democracy. Pragmatic social democracy foregoes the formulation of any fundamental objective. As a consequence of that, the fundamental strategy envisioned by pragmatic social democratic revisionists is characterized by an emphasis on the ability of the party to balance a variety of social interests and to manage political demands as well as the organizational tasks of governance more efficiently than their competitors. Pragmatic social democrats actively reject fundamental political change, or regard it as impossible under the given socio-economic and political circumstances of complex, pluralistic societies.

On top of the variation in between quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary parties as two distinct members of the social democratic family, there is also some systematic variation within these groups with respect to their strategical orientations. In the category of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, actual subgroups or variants can be systematically observed; and the means suggested by these variants of quasi-revolutionary social democracy to obtain their goals represent the most important distinguishing feature. During their respective formative stages, different quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties were confronted with some significant variation in their specific institutional environment. In some cases, the electoral channel was already available at a comparatively early point in time, during the party’s formative stage. In other cases, electoral participation only became a meaningful pursuit, after party formation was already completed. In response to different environments, some quasi-revolutionary parties embraced a combination of electoral and extra-parliamentary tactics during their formative stage. Others focused

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64 One of Gerhard Schröder’s most recognized slogans during his eventually successful 1998 election campaign is the most succinct expression of the concern of ‘pragmatic social democracy’ with efficient management and the abandonment of fundamental goals: “Wir wollen nicht alles anders, aber vieles besser machen”, which translates as “We are not about doing everything differently, we are about doing many things better.”
exclusively on extra-parliamentary activities, such as community building, the provision of mutual aid and assistance, political strikes, suffrage demonstrations, worker education etc.

This distinction applies to the formative stage of parties, but it has important repercussions for their further development, even in those cases, where the electoral route eventually became available. Germany and Denmark are the idealtypical representatives of the first – parliamentary or German – variant, which is characterized by the practice of electoral and extra-parliamentary activities during their formative stage. Belgium, Norway, and Sweden are the idealtypical representatives of the second variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. I am referring to this variant as the ‘Belgian model’, because the Belgian party did not only practice exclusively extra-parliamentary tactics during its formative stage. It also formally adjusted its party platform in response to this practice. Swedish and Norwegian social democrats on the other hand, adopted the programmatic paradigm codified by the German SPD. But they adjusted their practice during their formative stages by focusing exclusively on extra-parliamentary activities and forms of mobilization, which is why they became representatives of the ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

Organization

Organizational differences across party types are the defining criterion of the comprehensive typology suggested by Gunther and Diamond (2002). I treat the organization of a particular model of labor politics as one of three dimensions here, in addition to function and ideology, which have been discussed previously. Labor elites’ choices about particular organizational models are to some significant extent related to the envisioned function of the organization and its underpinning ideology. But at the same time, forms of organization are not simply an extension of those two features. They are an important independent dimension in and of itself. For my purposes here, I am going to distinguish between internal procedures and external relations as two component dimensions of organizational models. The former consists of varying rules for decision-making and different patterns of elite-mass relations within the party. The latter extends to the degree of embeddedness vis-à-vis the party’s targeted constituency and, more specifically, the relations the party entertains with the unions.

Before discussing these organizational features in more detail, I am now going to outline the reasons for why the nature of party organization is included here as an independent dimension, rather than being conceived of as an extension of ideology and function. First of all, while it is undeniable that a party’s goals and strategies inform its fundamental organizational approach, the causal arrow also works in the opposite direction. It is important to distinguish between the concepts of ideology and organization, in order to be able to discuss the patterns of interconnectedness between them. In the case of Russian social democracy,
for instance, questions of organization were the single most important theme of internal conflicts between
the Bolsheviki and their competitors. The insurrectionist strategy of bolshevism as one element of its
ideology is therefore rooted to some degree in considerations of organizational feasibility and effectiveness
in the context of a particularly oppressive regime. A similar argument can also be made for all other models
of labor politics discussed here. This is not to say, however, that all ideological orientations result from the
consideration of organizational questions. The relation between these two elements of a party model is
characterized by a complex pattern of interconnectedness, where causal arrows point in both directions at
the same time.

Second, on top of the interconnectedness between ideology and organization, both of these two
concepts are also connected individually to particular aspects of the external constraints – degrees of labor
inclusion – that inform the strategical choices of labor elites. Distinguishing between the two concepts is
therefore a prerequisite for theory formulation and the empirical analysis guided by that theory. It allows us
to delineate specifically, how the existing set of external constraints and its effects on the demands of the
labor constituency are related to both of these dimensions, respectively.

Third, the distinction between organization and ideology as separate categories is also helpful,
because it allows for a more precise definition as to what it requires to conclude that a particular model of
labor politics was formed successfully. This will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
There, I am going to argue that in addition to external institutionalization, both the establishment of a
dominant ideology and a feasible organization are necessary for inferring that a particular model of labor
politics was successfully established. Social integration through a dominant ideological orientation is
conceivable, albeit unlikely, without an effective organization. And a functioning organization might have
been established, but be hampered in its effectiveness by a lack of ideological harmony and social
integration.

Fourth, organizational differences that are related to ideological variations describe some important
deviations between quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties. The exclusion of the
unions from direct influence within quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties, for instance, is directly
related to the ideological orientation of this party type, which regards the political as more eminent than the
economic struggle. Evolutionary social democratic parties, on the other hand, are, of course, involved in
political conflict, but for this party type, the political arena is regarded as another playing field, in addition
to the workplace, to advance socio-economic policies: the economic struggle is conducted by political
means. This is also reflected by the decisional dominance that the unions exercise within evolutionary
social democratic parties from the formative stage. But at the same time, it is in the realm of organization,
where the most significant continuities in between social democratic parties from the formative period and
from the stage of party transformation can be observed. It is precisely the mass-based and democratic
model of organization that all social democratic parties have in common, while in the domain of ideology, as outlined above, some significant reversals of prior fundamental goals have occurred in the process of party transformation.

*Internal procedures*

As one dimension of a party’s model of organization, internal procedures encompass the formal decision-making rules as well as the typical patterns of elite-mass relations within the party. While social democracy has gone through a significant process of transformation with respect to its formulated goals, there is a pronounced continuity of communalities in terms of internal procedures. Quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties from the formative stage, as well as evolutionary, reformist, and pragmatic types that resulted from a party transformation are all mass-based, with a decision-making process that is organized democratically from the bottom up. Their organization relies on a hierarchical structure with local groups, a nationwide center, and intermediate branches, which are more or less pronounced, depending on the importance of subfederal or regional political opportunity structures.

The organizational variation in between different social democratic party types is not insignificant, but it is much less pronounced than the fundamental variation in between social democracy on the one hand and alternative models of labor politics on the other. Varying relations with the unions, which belong to the domain of external relations, and will be discussed in the following section, also affect the internal procedures of different social democratic party types. As a consequence of variation in strategical orientation and patterns of emergence, the unions assume different roles in the decision-making procedures of quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary parties. They have a dominant position in evolutionary social democracy, evidenced by their financial contributions, the organization of party membership through union affiliation, and the presence of union delegates with voting rights in the party’s organizing bodies. In quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, unions are not equally influential in internal party matters; individual rather than union delegates are dominant, and the emphasis is on individual membership in the party rather than automatic membership through workers’ trade union affiliation.

The extra-parliamentary Belgian variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy features greater union influence within the party than the parliamentary German variant. But other than in evolutionary social democracy, unions are not domineering, and the party assumes a position of leadership within the labor movement. Evolutionary social democratic parties that emerged from a transformation process are

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65 See the debate of Michels (1911) and his classic argument about the “iron law of oligarchy” in the German case study. He noted the deterioration of democratic decision-making in the SPD. The point made here, however, is not about the quality of democracy within parties. It is about the existence and respect for formal democratic decision making.
different in terms of their decision-making procedures compared to evolutionary parties from the transformation stage in one particular respect. Without the prior tradition of union influence and without a pattern of emergence, in which the party owes its existence to the unions directly, evolutionary social democratic parties that developed from an earlier quasi-revolutionary orientation are devoid of dominant union involvement in internal decision-making processes. Reformist and pragmatic social democratic parties still adhere firmly to the general social democratic organizational model outlined above. But they have seen the gradual centralization and professionalization of party activities, and accordingly, an increasing influence of the center and diminished importance of local groups and delegates at party conventions.

These specific variations within the social democratic family are noteworthy and important, but they are relatively insignificant, when considering the organizational differences between social democracy in all variations on the one hand and its competitors on the other. The organization of the bolshevik alternative in particular is fundamentally different from social democratic party types and variants. Bolshevikism is organized from the top down, without the practice of formal democratic decision-making procedures. A strong center exercises control over secret local cells, which have no autonomy and only limited opportunities to influence the decisions of the center. Bolshevikism is based on mass support and therefore exposes a “thick” organization, along the lines in which Gunther and Diamond (2002) employ the term. But at the same time, it is not mass-based in the sense that there is a large number of party members, who pay dues and are involved in the party’s activities on a regular basis. Lenin’s definition of formal party membership is limited to a small group of “professional revolutionaries”.

66 The masses that are supposed to follow the bolsheviki have no way to reach into the party, other than in social democratic parties, where they can easily become party members. Instead, mass support for the bolsheviki is provided by a constituency that is at best semi-affiliated with the organization, but not a formal part of it.

Moderate syndicalism is equally mass-based as social democratic parties, while anarchism-syndicalism as a relatively broad concept encompasses both mass-based anarcho-syndicalist unions, and anarchist cells, which operate underground, but at the same time, unlike the bolshevik, autonomously and without a strong guiding center. Both anarchism-syndicalism and moderate syndicalism abstain from the formation of a political party and the establishment of an independent presence in the arena of electoral and legislative politics. Anarcho-syndicalist unions as one component of anarchism-syndicalism, as well as moderate syndicalism, therefore pursue a similar organizational approach. Both these models of labor politics rely on associations of laborers around the workplace, through craft or industry specific unions, and

66 See Lenin (1902) for his ideas about party membership and the role of ‘professional revolutionaries’. See Keep (1963) for a detailed assessment of the internal debates surrounding the Second Party Congress of the RSDRP, where the split between the Menshevik and the Bolshevik occurred on the basis of contending definitions of party membership.
a central union federation. What distinguishes moderate syndicalism and anarchism-syndicalism in terms of organization, is the complimentary presence in the anarchist-syndicalist model of underground activities and secret anarchist cells that see themselves as part of the broader movement, in addition to anarcho-syndicalist unions.

External relations

As noted above, the external relations entertained by a party or an alternative model of labor politics to the world outside are closely interconnected with its internal procedures. This is particularly true for the function of trade unions: their role within the party is naturally reflected by an according pattern of external relations entertained by the party vis-à-vis the unions. In addition to this specific dimension of external relations, varying models of labor politics also expose different degrees of overall embeddedness in their targeted constituency. In the context of comprehensive party typologies, such as the one suggested by Gunther and Diamond (2002), all of the models of labor politics discussed here would qualify as “thick” organizations: they aim at permanent mass support and establish stable connections with auxiliary or secondary associations. This characterization is helpful for a contrast between the mass organizations of the late 19th and early 20th century on the one hand and more recent electoral alliances respectively personalistic parties on the other. But in a more specific elaboration on variation across different models of labor politics, important differences in the extent of embeddedness can be observed.

At the most basic level, it is fair to argue that quasi-revolutionary parties are designed as more embedded entities than their evolutionary comrades. Not all examples of quasi-revolutionary social democracy were successful in accomplishing ‘very high’ degrees of embeddedness, but all of them aspired to do so. The social integration of labor, as well as the isolation from the world outside was more pronounced than in evolutionary social democratic parties, which emerged in a more inclusive environment.67 The integration of the party into a system of auxiliary organizations is still more extensive for evolutionary social democratic parties than for the reformist and pragmatic types that emerged through a process of transformation. The functional adaptation of these parties to the pursuit of electoral competition instead of group representation required, and at the same time, was enabled by, the erosion of

67 The greatest extent of embeddedness probably existed in the Belgian labor movement, although the case of Germany is most frequently noted as an example for an extensive working class counter culture at this early stage of development. After the completion of the formative stage studied here, the Austrian social democrats became the most embedded, and the Austrian labor movement the most ‘insular’ one. In cases such as Argentina, Italy and Spain, quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties were designed as a party model along the same lines. However, they never succeeded in becoming as integrated into an overall working-class culture as their comrades in Belgium, Germany, and later on Austria, but also Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. An assessment of this divergence will be a central theme in chapter 7, which deals with the empirical analysis of quasi-revolutionary social democratic party formation.
social milieus that were affiliated with the party and its secondary associations. Pragmatic social democracy represents a further step in that direction, while the reformist party type is still characterized by the survival of some of these traditional affiliations, especially in those areas, where industrial production and support for social democracy were most pronounced.

Anarchism-syndicalism as a model of labor politics was also conceived of as a highly embedded entity. It succeeded to accomplish this goal particularly in those areas, where social democratic parties failed to pursue effective strategies of mobilization. The embeddedness of bolshevism and moderate syndicalism, on the other hand, is only limited, but for different reasons. It is a defining feature of the bolshevik approach to exclude the masses from direct influence in party affairs and to shield itself from the perils of state repression. Communist parties in liberal regimes are not incorporated into this typology, since they only occurred after the end of the time period covered here. But other than the original bolshevism, they were not equally endangered by political persecution. As a result, they conceived of themselves, and often succeeded, comparable to earlier quasi-revolutionary parties, as highly embedded entities at the core of working-class counter cultures. This is most apparent for the case of Italy, but also Spain and France. Moderate syndicalism, on the other hand, is characterized by a limited extent of embeddedness, but not because of an undemocratic and hyper-centralized form of organization, as is the case for bolshevism. It is the defining feature of moderate syndicalism to accept the political integration of its supporters into the existing party system. The political loyalties of unionized workers are not with the union itself, which for them is mostly a functional vehicle for the pursuit of their socio-economic goals, but with the various parties that make up the entrenched party system.

The relationship between party and unions is the second component of external relations. In evolutionary social democracy, the greater importance of unions for internal decision-making is also reflected by a different pattern of external relations between party and unions. Evolutionary social democratic parties from the formative stage owe their existence directly to the organizing efforts of the unions, and remain in essence a vehicle of the unions to conduct their economic struggle by political means for an extended period of time. In quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, unions and the party are two branches of the same movement, while the party and the political struggle are regarded as dominant.

Even despite these significant differences in party-union relations, social democratic parties from the formative stage are both characterized by some form of productive interaction or sharing of tasks with the

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68 This process has been analyzed for the case of Germany by Lösche and Walter (1992)
69 See Blackmer and Tarrow (eds.) (1975) for a collection of contributions about communism in liberal regimes, for the cases of Italy and France. See Tarrow (1979) for an overview of the topic. See also Brown (ed.) (1979) with accounts for varying factions of the left across countries.
unions. That distinguishes them strongly from all competing models of labor politics. For anarchism-syndicalism and moderate syndicalism, the question of party-union relations is irrelevant, of course, since both these models of labor politics abstain from establishing a party as a permanent presence in the arena of electoral and legislative politics. Unions are therefore not just dominant in these two models, but the exclusive agent for the conduct of the economic struggle, by economic and political means, as well as the political struggle, which is, naturally, far more relevant for the orientations and practices of anarchism-syndicalism. Bolshevism finds itself at the opposite end of the continuum. Both syndicalist models abstain from direct involvement in party politics, social democratic parties engage in some form of shared responsibility with the unions, while bolshevism subordinates the unions and the economic struggle entirely to the party and the political struggle.

The transformation of social democracy into reformist, pragmatic and evolutionary types of parties can also be identified in terms of the changing nature of party-union relations. Evolutionary social democratic parties that emerged from a transformation process are distinct from those that were initially founded as the evolutionary type, in terms of their functional relation to the unions. The diminished role of direct union influence within the party that has been noted above, is mirrored by the external relations of the party vis-à-vis the unions, as well. The development toward reformist and pragmatic social democracy typically entails the loosening of ties between unions and party. Initially two branches of the same movement, party and unions now see themselves more and more as independent actors with increasingly conflicting objectives. In reformist social democracy, the traditional proximity between party and unions still commands a greater presence. Pragmatic social democratic revisionists, however, are intent on cutting even those ties to a much stronger extent, thereby making the unions only one cooperation partner among others.  

From blueprint to practice: successful and unsuccessful party formation

The previous section outlined a comprehensive phenomenology for models of labor politics. All of the organizations studied here can be identified along the components of this typology. The mere blueprint for a particular model of labor politics, however, does not necessarily equate to its successful implementation in any given case. The American Socialist Party or the Russian Mensheviks, for instance, were based on particular organizational and ideological models that can easily be identified on the basis of the typology.

70 It is worth some considerable debate, as to which of these two related developments occurred first. Was it the erosion of traditional social milieux and the decrease in capacity of large scale mass organizations, in this case unions, to mobilize their constituency, which caused the diminishing “thickness” in party organization (See Gunther and Diamond, 2002 for the notion of “thick” parties)? Or was it the party’s strategical decision to embrace, first reformist, and now, at least partially through the practice of some of its proponents, pragmatic social democracy, that led to the erosion of social milieux?
outlined above. They also ‘existed’, at least in a rudimentary fashion. But neither one of these organizations ever succeeded in fully implementing, or institutionalizing, their blueprint of a party model. A study that wishes to contrast the presence to the absence of party formation requires a concise definition as to what it takes to infer that one particular model of labor politics was formed “successfully”, while in another case, the establishment of the same or a different model was “unsuccessful”.

This section is designed to formulate the requirements for ‘successful’ party formation. These features are, of course, logically related to the components of my typology outlined above. I am going to argue that successful party formation occurs, when the party, or an alternative model of labor politics, has accomplished both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ institutionalization through the following characteristics: internal institutionalization requires first, systemness through the establishment of an effective organization and secondly, social integration through the establishment of an dominant ideological model. External institutionalization requires a minimum of public reification, or more specifically, a continuous and pronounced presence in the electoral or the extra-parliamentary playing field of the political arena.

All of these three features are related to the functional dimension of my party typology, which is understood as the underpinning raison d’être for the existence of a particular model of labor politics. If either one of these three components is missing, the given model of labor politics cannot adequately fulfill its desired function. Social integration through a dominant ideological model is naturally related to the ideological component of the typology outlined above. It describes the extent to which an ideological blueprint is successful in becoming dominant within the organization and thereby to work as an effective mechanism of social integration. Systemness as the final one of three prerequisites resonates with the organizational dimension of my typology. It captures the extent to which an organizational model is actually implemented in practice, and whether, as such, it is successful in allowing for the pursuit of the party’s function and for the social integration of its members through some dominant ideological orientation.

LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) outline a set of minimum requirements to distinguish a party from earlier political clubs or assemblies of local notables. They argue that a political organization needs to meet four criteria to be called a party: continuity in organization; a manifest organization at the local level and communication between central and local levels; self-conscious leaders determined to hold power; and the striving for popular support. While this is a good starting point, the threshold of their definition is too low for the purpose of this study. The acknowledgement of fringe parties without any continuous popular support and electoral representation as instances of “successful” party formation wouldn’t leave any case, where no social democratic party was formed.

The prerequisites of successful party formation have also been analyzed from the slightly different perspective of party institutionalization, both as the passing of a minimum threshold and as varying degrees
of institutionalization. Huntington (1968) as the founder of the institutionalization concept used it in a broader context, but argues that, *inter alia*, it can also be applied to political parties. He conceives of institutionalization as a “process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (p. 12), and distinguishes four dimensions of this concept: Adaptability (longevity and functional adaptation capacity), organizational complexity, autonomy, and coherence.

This typology has generated a very productive debate, and a number of contributions have added in a meaningful way to Huntington’s original suggestion. Levitsky (1998) argues that the ‘infusion of values’ into an organization is an important prerequisite of party institutionalization, which has previously been overlooked. Janda (1980) introduced the idea of an external dimension: institutionalization requires being ‘reified in the public’s mind’. Randall and Svasand (2002) have synthesized prior work for the purpose of providing a coherent typology: they distinguish between attitudinal and structural aspects of party institutionalization, both of which can be observed on an external and an internal dimension. This yields a two-by-two typology with four separate elements of party institutionalization: Systemness of the organization (including longevity, coherence and complexity), value infusion, public reification, and decisional autonomy.

I argue that decisional autonomy should not be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for party institutionalization. Evolutionary social democracy from the formative stage (Britain, New Zealand, Australia) and the extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy (Belgium, Sweden, Norway) depended (to varying degrees) on collective trade union membership, financial contributions from the unions, as well as joint policy coordination committees. But there should be no doubt that all of these parties were institutionalized and capable of pursuing their function, although they lacked full decisional autonomy. Apart from that, however, the contributions to the debate about party institutionalization provide an excellent underpinning for a conceptualization and measurement of “successful party formation” in the context of this study.

For that purpose, the concept of reification as it is used by Janda (1980) and Randall and Svasand (2002) needs to be expanded. Successful party formation should also require a minimum of continuous electoral success and representation (at least in those cases, where elections take place) in addition to being reified in the public’s mind. *External institutionalization* as a more encompassing term is therefore better suited, because it allows for including the electoral aspect. This is also a somewhat pragmatic choice, since the electoral representation of a party can be easily measured, while the same is not necessarily true for the mental image of parties in the mind of late 19th century citizens. Based on this conceptual underpinning, a minimum degree of continuous electoral success and legislative representation represent the first prerequisite for “successful party formation”. Whenever the electoral channel is not available, this requirement needs to be waived in favor of an equivalent degree of extra-parliamentary engagement. In the
case of labor, this occurred through various forms of continuous extra-parliamentary activities, but also through participation in specific transformative events, such as general strikes, for example in the case of Spain in 1917, or involvement in revolutionary efforts, such as the 1905 and the 1917 February Revolution in Russia, or the Hungarian “Chrysanthemum Revolution” of 1918.

The infusion of purpose, which can take the form of shared values, as suggested by Levitsky (1998), but also other forms of social integration, is the second prerequisite. In the case of social democratic parties, it can be assessed by investigating the adherence to and expression of a common ideology. The idea that an ideological formulation has a social integrative function is crucial for this argument. Matthias (1957) discussed this function of ideologies for the vulgarized version of marxism developed by Kautsky in the German SPD. Kautsky’s ideological model became the defining feature of the SPD’s practice and the party’s codified agenda. Many accounts of his philosophy criticize its inherent logical contradictions. On the one hand, Kautsky and thereby the SPD’s ideological model, emphasize the prospect of revolution as a logical consequence of the internal contradictions of capitalism. But on the other hand, it is precisely this deterministic mindset that prevents the party and its supporters from actively pursuing a revolutionary strategy. It is easy to find logical flaws here, and to note the negative long term implications of the attentism and passivism inherent in this approach.

Matthias (1957), however, emphasizes that it does not do Kautsky and his quasi-revolutionary ideology justice to criticize it from what he refers to as a “history of ideas” perspective. He suggests a point of view that emphasizes the social-integrative function of Kautsky’s approach for the German SPD, and by extension, I would like to add, also a variety of other parties that have successfully adopted his model. Hamilton (1991) provides a critical assessment of Marx and Engels’ writings, from which Kautsky’s vulgar marxism is derived. This kind of analysis, both his discussion of Marx and Engels, but also other contributions that deal specifically with Kautsky, are very insightful and contribute immensely to a detection of logical, empirical and other kinds of flaws and inconsistencies. However, for the empirical study of political mobilization and how it is affected by some ideological ‘supply’, it is crucial to evaluate not just the logical consistency and social scientific merit offered by some system of thought, in the present context, Kautsky’s vulgar marxism. It is crucial to understand, how some set of ideas is diffused and received by the constituency, and how, as such, it contributes to social integration. Kautsky’s ideological model was so successful, not despite, but because of its inherent contradictions. The revolutionary rhetoric and the emphasis on the necessary collapse of capitalism provided a long term, quasi-religious, perspective of salvation for the party. The pragmatic day to day efforts and the emphasis on organization building were carefully implemented so as to avoid criminal persecution. But in the context of the long term ‘salvation’ perspective, these efforts were infused with meaning and sense. As such, they responded perfectly to the
demands of party activists at the time, and provided the necessary social integrative glue that held the party together, and that was used by party elites to appeal to their constituency.

A similar argument about the social integrative function of ideologies has also been outlined by Ulam (1960), not just for the case of the German SPD, but for different manifestations of labor politics in general. Along these lines, my empirical analysis of party formation will therefore attempt to uncover the ways in which different ideological models responded to the demands of varying national labor constituencies as well as the given environment of inclusion that has shaped these demands. The second prerequisite of successful party formation is therefore the establishment of an ideological model of labor politics, which in this study, will primarily be understood as a tool for social integration.

The third and final element is what Randall and Svasand (2002) refer to as ’systemness’, i.e. whether a party exists continuously and permanently, and whether it has developed a coherent, but at the same time complex form of organization. This aspect of successful party formation can be assessed in empirical terms through an over time investigation of party membership levels, organizational density, the existence or absence of organized sets of governing bodies and decision-making procedures, the amount of party revenues, or the occurrence of regular and standardized party communications. A particular model of labor politics will be identified as “successfully formed”, if it has accomplished all three of these characteristics: external institutionalization, as well as internal institutionalization through the establishment of a dominant ideological model for the purpose of social integration, and systemness through the establishment of an effective organization.

This way of using the institutionalization concept is based on the identification of minimum thresholds that need to be passed in order to consider a particular model of labor politics ‘successfully formed’ or ‘institutionalized’. On top of understanding institutionalization as the passing of a minimum threshold, Huntington (1968) also suggested that political organizations can be characterized by different levels of institutionalization, or in other words, varying degrees of success. I have argued previously that the explanatory interest of this dissertation focuses on qualitative variations across different models of labor politics. To that end, the identification of a minimum threshold of institutionalization is necessary.

Varying degrees of institutionalization or success, on the other hand, are used as an indicator for the extent to which labor elites made optimal choices in translating a given environment of labor inclusion into an according choice for a best suited model of labor politics. Limited institutionalization on either one of the dimensions discussed above is affected by a variety of factors, but among others, it helps to identify cases of suboptimal choices, along with the overall division of the left. To that end, the following empirical analysis into the effects and sources of suboptimal choices is going to consider varying degrees of institutionalization, both with respect to the ‘external’ mobilization of the labor constituency, and the ‘internal’ domain of institutionalization.
CHAPTER 4

EXPLAINING THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY – LABOR INCLUSION AND ELITE AGENCY AS ‘INDEPENDENT VARIABLES’

Degrees of labor inclusion as external constraints

The concept of labor inclusion

Based on the initial sketch of my explanation’s fundamental architecture, the previous chapter was designed to conceptualize social democratic party formation and the embrace of alternative models of labor politics as the dependent variable of this study. This chapter will elaborate further on the suggested explanation for social democratic party formation. First, in the following section, I am going to discuss my conceptualization and measurement of degrees of inclusion as the external constraints on labor elites’ choices, and their role in my causal argument. In the second place, I will elaborate on my discussion of agency, and the way in which labor elites translate some environment of labor inclusion into an according decision for different models of labor politics. The combination of these two components constitutes the suggested explanation for the formation of social democratic parties and alternative models of labor politics.

I argued previously that political variables are key to understand the determinants for variation in the adoption of different models of labor politics. At the same time, socio-economic factors are a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of labor into the political arena in the first place. Industrialization as the process that created the industrial working class is the sine qua non condition for the foundation of social democratic parties. And economic deprivation of workers as a consequence of industrialism is the necessary prerequisite for the formulation of a socio-economic agenda in general, and the statement of socialism as a fundamental objective by social democratic parties in particular. Along these lines, socio-
economic factors are a crucial determinant for social democratic party formation, but they are not responsible for variation across cases with respect to the goals, means, and forms of organization adopted by different models of labor politics.

While this determines the respective roles of varying degrees of inclusion on the one hand and socio-economic variables on the other, it is still necessary to develop an appropriate conceptualization and measurement strategy to allow for comparing degrees of inclusion across cases. There have been two fundamental approaches to define the ‘openness’ of a political system for labor. The first one emphasizes the importance of social status systems and figures most prominently in the contributions of Lipset (1983, 1996), Kautsky (2002), and Burnham (1974). I have argued previously that the status system approach represents an ‘incomplete’ explanation, because it conceives of the process of party formation exclusively as a response to aristocratic dominance. It does not take into account that the political exclusion of labor can also occur through repression by dominant liberal parties. Moreover, it does not distinguish between different degrees of repression, which is crucial to explain the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy on the one hand and insurrectionist models of labor politics on the other.

The second approach, from a new institutionalism perspective, emphasizes the role of informal and formal ‘rules of the game’ in mediating and shaping conflict and social contention. What is known as ‘political opportunity’ or ‘political process’ theory in the field of sociology and social movement studies is based on a much wider conceptualization of political opportunities. It subsumes all factors external to the movement itself into this category and therefore lacks analytical clarity, a fact lamented extensively by practitioners of the approach (cf. Meyer 2004, Goodwin and Jasper 1999). A different variant of an institutionalist perspective to understand the openness of a political system that is more adequate can be derived from a historical institutionalist approach. Historical institutionalism is interested in discovering the ways in which political contestation is shaped by its institutional environment. Historical institutionalists define institutions in a broad or a narrow fashion (cf. Thelen and Steinmo 1992). A broad definition includes formal institutions as well as norms and social structures, while a more narrow definition is provided by Hall (1986, p. 19), who understands institutions as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy.” Since a broad definition makes the historical institutionalist approach converge into the non-discriminatory nature of understanding political environments along the lines of the political process model (cf. Meyer 2004), a narrow conception is recommendable.

71 Well-known introductions to the historical institutionalist approach have been produced by Thelen (1999) and Thelen and Steinmo (1992).
Based on an implicit or explicit embrace of historical institutionalism or related fields such as the new interactional structuralism in the study of contentious politics (cf. Hanagan 1998) or political process theory (cf. McAdam 1996), many studies feature different conceptualizations of political opportunities for the working class, depending on their respective explanatory interest: Rothstein (1992) studies the effects of labor market institutions, Hattam (1992) the role of the courts, Collier and Collier (1991) distinguish between state and party incorporation strategies, Mikkelsen (1996, 2004) and Boudreau (1996) study state repression, and so forth.

However, with the exception of Bartolini (2000), and to some extent Mikkelsen (2004), there is no attempt to arrive at an encompassing conceptualization of labor inclusion for the study of labor politics. Bartolini embraces an institutionalist perspective by emphasizing the impact of political integration on the labor movement, measured along the lines of enfranchisement, state capacity, fundamental freedoms, government repression, responsible government, fair representation, and access to executive power. Hence, he includes both formal rules and an account for the behavior of the executive as independent elements of political integration. I would agree with his assessment that in addition to formal institutions understood along the lines of Hall’s definition, varying degrees of labor inclusion also depend very much on the willingness and capacity of the state executive to integrate the labor movement.

Nonetheless, Bartolini’s (2000) specific conceptualization of state behavior is essentially ‘quasi institutionalist’. He does not treat the actions of the state toward labor as a dynamic element in his explanation. However, even during a limited formative stage, the behavior of the state has been subject to significant changes that are crucial for the emergence of varying models of labor politics. In the cases of Germany and Italy, for example, the embrace of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is strongly linked to the alternation between attempts at complete repression and limited toleration in the context of a partially liberalized set of institutions. Moreover, this quasi-institutional perspective is not capable of taking into account the way in which the state reacts to the development of labor politics, either, and how the further interaction between these two actors developed. These are issues that require both a dynamic perspective on the agency of the state executive and a type of empirical analysis that includes an investigation of specific cases. Otherwise, the behavior of the state becomes a reified quasi-institutional component of the explanation.

Moreover, Bartolini (2000) does not include the behavior of competing parties as an additional element of political integration. I disagree with that choice, because the extent to which existing liberal, linguistic, religious or conservative parties have successfully appealed to the working class represents an important inclusive mechanism in its own right. It is probably his focus on European cases that led to excluding this aspect, because it is precisely this point that can illuminate the differences between the cases of party formation in places such as Britain, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand on the one hand and
the lack of party formation in the US on the other. Along these lines, I suggest a concept of labor inclusion that identifies national variation based on formal institutions, the behavior of the executive, and the behavior of competing parties. Formal institutions define the constraints for the executive, competing political parties, and labor movement elites themselves. But in addition to that, the behavioral manifestations of the executive and competing parties are important separate dimensions with an independent effect on varying degrees of labor inclusion.

Components and measurement of labor inclusion

In the following section, I am going to outline the conceptualization and measurement of the component dimensions of labor inclusion. The specific – formal-institutional and behavioral – indicators used to capture varying degrees of labor inclusion across cases are displayed in table 3. Each of these dimensions is applied to an analysis of labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. As manifest variables, all of these indicators combined determine varying overall degrees of labor inclusion as a latent variable. For each component dimension of labor inclusion, I distinguish between four different levels of measurement on an ordinal scale, ranging from lowest to low, to higher and eventually, highest inclusion. Latent overall degrees of labor inclusion, as I will discuss in the section following on this one, emerge from an aggregation of these factors, on the basis of previously determined critical junctures that distinguish the overall categories from one another. Labor inclusion as a latent variable emerges from a consideration of worker enfranchisement, political liberties, responsible government, the behavior of the state executive, the behavior of competing parties with respect to the organizational inclusion of labor elites, and the behavior of competing parties in terms of electoral inclusion, vis-à-vis the broader labor constituency.

Worker enfranchisement

The first one of the three institutional components of inclusion, worker enfranchisement, identifies the extent to which workers are effectively included into the electoral process. Goldstein (1983) describes a variety of techniques used to impair the political inclusion of disadvantaged groups along this dimension in 19th and early 20th century Europe. I conceive of his list of specific measures as elements of either one of two separate dimensions of suffrage exclusion, each of which tackles a different step in the electoral process. A particular type of restriction either limits the right to vote directly, or is designed to impair the effectiveness of the workers’ vote.

Suffrage discrimination that affects the right to vote directly, places restrictions on workers’ access to voting. Most commonly, such restrictions came in the form of material and education requirements, or as
high age thresholds. Material factors limit the vote to individuals with a minimum amount of income, property, or a minimum tax payment, based on income or property. Limits on the right to vote based on educational background make literacy or a specific minimum of formal education a prerequisite. It is fairly obvious how such measures would exclude workers from gaining the right to vote, given their socio-economic situation and typical educational background in the late 19th and early 20th century. In many cases, the third type of restriction, the implementation of high age thresholds, sometimes up to 29 or 30 years of age, also affected workers disproportionately.

However, a polity that gives a large number of people the right to vote, is not necessarily characterized by a high degree of enfranchisement. In many cases, both a smaller and a greater distribution of the right to vote were combined with measures designed to impair the effectiveness of the vote. This is a separate dimension of suffrage discrimination, but one that can limit enfranchisement just as effectively as the flat out denial of voting rights. Goldstein (1983) distinguishes between direct and formal, direct and informal, and indirect forms of suffrage discrimination in this context. Direct and formal discrimination occurs, when electoral systems assign different values to the votes of different categorical groups of individuals: in class, curia, or estate based systems, certain social groups elect different numbers of representatives; an arrangement that in all cases was greatly skewed toward the aristocracy, and to the greatest disadvantage of peasants and workers. Plural voting as a second type of direct and formal discrimination does not divide the voting population into various castes with their own representatives, but allots additional votes to specific groups, usually based on material or other requirements that disadvantaged workers and peasants.

Direct and informal discrimination comes in the form of corruption, electoral fraud, threat, and bribery. While even consolidated democracies might experience instances of such discrimination, what distinguishes some cases of late 19th and early 20th century politics, is the systematic and all encompassing use of such techniques, culminating in a practice of ‘managed elections’, a pattern that was most pronounced in the cases of Spain before 1919 and Argentina before 1913, but also typical for Hungary and the South of Italy around the turn of the century.

This form of suffrage discrimination can have an even more exclusive effect than direct and formal limits placed on the effectiveness of the workers’ vote through curia based systems or plural voting. These systems, while they are greatly skewed to the disadvantage of workers, also guarantee some minimum of legislative representation. Whenever ‘managed elections’ are effectively implemented, elections become ‘ineffective’ to such an extent that workers might not be able to receive any parliamentary representation at all, even in those instances, where the right to vote is distributed widely. This was the case in Spain, where despite universal male suffrage before 1876 and after 1890, and a significantly large working class support, the first socialist deputy was only elected in 1910. Indirect discrimination, by contrast, is the comparatively
mildest form of suffrage discrimination. It occurs, when electoral districts are apportioned unfairly, usually to the disadvantage of urban centers, when the open instead of the secret ballot is practiced, or when voting is indirect, through intermediaries, rather than for the actual candidates directly.

A measure for the inclusiveness of a given franchise therefore needs to take into account both of these dimensions, the extent to which workers were given the right to vote, and the effectiveness of the workers’ vote, compared to other enfranchised groups. Universal male suffrage as the widest possible extension of voting rights in the time period under investigation requires that at least 20% of the total population have the right to vote (cf. Mackie and Rose 1982, Goldstein 1983). A significant extension of the right to vote to the working class, but one short of universal male suffrage, exists in those cases, where at least 15% of the entire population have the right to vote. When the vote is granted to in between 10 and 15% of the population, some segments of the working class are included (workers with comparatively higher skills, education and income levels), but whenever the right to vote falls below 10% of the total population, voting rights for workers are mostly symbolic or non-existent. In such cases, the measures implemented to obtain such a low level of voting rights, such as minimum property, income, or education requirements, will a priori exclude the vast majority of workers from the electoral process.

In the case of worker enfranchisement, the four ordinal levels of labor inclusion result from the combined effects of two separate aspects that may affect the extent of enfranchisement: the right to vote, and the effectiveness of the vote. At the highest level of inclusion, universal male suffrage must be present, and elections must be effective, i.e. no measures that limit the effectiveness of the workers’ vote may be in place. Enfranchisement is higher in either one of two scenarios: first, when the right to vote has been extended significantly, i.e. to at least 15% of the population, and elections are effective at the same time; second, when universal male suffrage is in place, but combined with some limited form of infringement on the effectiveness of the right to vote. Enfranchisement is low, when some limited extent of voting rights (10 – 15% of the population have the right to vote) is combined with effective elections; or, alternatively, when the vote extends to more than 15% of the population, but elections are not entirely effective. In the lowest category of exclusion, when enfranchisement is only symbolic or non-existent, the right to vote is either limited to less than 10% of the population; or, alternatively, when the right to vote is extended to a larger part of the population, elections are largely ineffective, as the result of any one or a combination of the techniques outlined above.

Political liberties for labor

The political liberties at the disposal of labor represent the second one out of three constitutive elements of formal institutions contributing to varying degrees of inclusion. The development and
implementation of liberal and constitutional principles beginning in the 17th century included a wide variety of individual freedoms, but for the purpose of this study, the focus is on political liberties in particular, rather than other individual rights and entitlements, such as the protection of private property, the freedom of movement etc. Inclusion on this dimension varies according to the extent to which the two fundamental types of political liberties, first, the freedom of speech and press, and second, the freedom of association and assembly, are formally guaranteed or restricted, through constitutional or other legal means. The actual behavior of the executive, as we will see later, might deviate from these formal provisions, but at this point, the emphasis is exclusively on the legal-institutional dimension.

Formal restrictions on the freedom of speech and press can occur, when explicit constitutional guarantees are absent, but they can also be the result of simple legislation limiting the constitutionally guaranteed exercise of these freedoms. Goldstein (1983) distinguishes between direct and indirect forms of restrictions. Direct measures explicitly prohibit or punish undesired publications. Prior censorship, the most repressive kind of restriction, requires any publication to be checked before it goes to print, and prohibits the distribution of undesired material. Punitive or post publication censorship does not require delivery of materials before publication, but it provides for post hoc punishment of individuals and associations responsible for the production and dissemination of undesired content. Indirect repression is less apparent, but equally effective, and less wasteful of a state’s resources. Instead of devising an extensive administration occupied with the conduct of censorship, newspapers and journals are required to pay security bonds or special press taxes that effectively render publication unfeasible. This is a particularly efficient technique for inhibiting the legal production of mass publications and working class newspapers.

The freedom of assembly and association can also be severely restricted, even in those instances, where this liberty is constitutionally guaranteed. Working class organizations - unions as well as political associations – and their right to assemble, can either be restricted through explicit legislation or under the Roman law tradition that requires governmental authorization for groups to assemble and associate. In some cases, most notably Germany from 1878 to 1890, but also Italy in the 1890s, explicitly anti-socialist legislation suspended the right of assembly and association for the socialist movement. This should be considered a particularly severe form of restriction. In other cases, direct legislation was comparatively mild, in the sense that it was less intrusive and not explicitly framed as an attack on the socialist movement. In cases such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, or Belgium, either on the basis of simple legislation or constitutional amendment, the dissolution of assemblies or associations was possible, usually under the provision that they represent a ‘threat to public security’, but political liberties were not permanently and formally suspended for a significant period of time.

For the purpose of this study, inclusion on the dimension of political liberties is considered highest, when the freedom of speech and press as well as the freedom of association and assembly, both for the
political and economic activities of labor, are constitutionally codified and unrestricted through other legal means for the entire formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena. Inclusion on this dimension is higher, when political liberties are guaranteed, but at the same time, comparatively mild restrictions exist. Restrictions are considered mild and political liberties mostly guaranteed, when restrictions are either of a temporary short lived nature, or when they have only limited effects on the labor movement. Inclusion is considered low, when political liberties are constitutionally codified, but at the same time limited by heavy restrictions throughout a significant period of time during the party’s formative stage. Inclusion is at the lowest level with respect to political liberties, when the freedoms of assembly and association and the freedom of speech and press are either not even constitutionally guaranteed, or, in case they are, suspended by other legal means for the entire formative period.

Responsible government

The third formal institution contributing to varying overall degrees of inclusion is the principle of responsible government. This concept identifies the extent to which policy making and the composition of the executive depend on the support of a publicly elected parliament. An exception to this definition needs to be allowed for presidential types of government, where the executive is not elected by parliament, but is accountable to the voting public directly. The principle of responsible government is not equivalent to measuring labor’s access to executive power or its actual influence on policy making. Even in those cases, where responsible government was firmly established, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, labor’s influence on executive appointments and policy making during the formative stage was non-existent, due to exclusion from the electoral process. However, even under these circumstances, an established practice of responsible government functions as an inclusive mechanism. A polity that is firmly based on this principle contains an opportunity structure for labor inclusion that is not present in those polities that limit the possibility of responsible government. Enfranchisement and responsible government are separate categories, and it is for these reasons that they have to be kept apart in the actual empirical analysis.

Labor inclusion on this dimension is highest, when the principle of responsible government is firmly established, i.e. when the composition of the executive and policy making require parliamentary support; or, alternatively, in presidential types of government, when the executive is directly accountable to the voting public. Inclusion is higher, when only temporary or limited restrictions on responsible government exist. It is low, when responsible government is significantly impaired through either one or a combination of these factors: the undue influence of an unaccountable upper chamber of parliament, the exclusion of important policy areas from the authority of parliament, or the exclusion of executive appointments from
parliamentary responsibility. In the remaining lowest category, there is no popularly elected parliament at all, or, if it exists, it is only advisory or mostly ignored by the executive.

Behavior of the state executive

The actual behavior of the state executive is the fourth constituent element of a given polity’s degree of inclusion. This dimension identifies the way in which, above and beyond the realm of formal institutions and party competition, the state’s executive, its bureaucracy, and its enforcement agencies behave toward labor. This entails both the aspect of an overall long term strategy toward the emerging labor movement and specific actions of the state in response to labor’s activities. In both these respects, the formal-institutional side captured by the measurement of political liberties, naturally reflects to some extent, and at the same time, might limit, the actions of the state. But a state’s behavior toward labor, as Anderson and Anderson (1967, 281) have convincingly demonstrated, deviates in many instances from the existing legal-institutional provisions.

Inclusion on this dimension is at its lowest, when the state’s overall attitude and strategy vis-à-vis labor is particularly hostile, evidenced by permanent repression of labor’s activities throughout the entire formative period. The behavior of the executive can be identified as one of low inclusion, when the state is predominantly hostile, and engaged in frequent specific acts or stages of repression against the labor movement. However, other than in the previous category, the state is not ‘particularly hostile’, because repression is not permanent, and periods of hostility alternate with other periods, where a significant easing of repression can be observed. Higher inclusion on this dimension occurs, when the state behaves in a predominantly neutral fashion toward labor. Typically, conflicts between employers and employees are regarded as a domain beyond the direct sphere of state influence. Acts of repression might also take place, but they are typically milder in nature or occur as singular events, which is a marked contrast to the frequent display of hostility in the low inclusion category.

The highest category of inclusion is a theoretical possibility, but it has not actually occurred for the time period under investigation. The incorporation of labor directly through the state and corporatist organizations linked to the state has been discussed by Collier and Collier (1991) in their analysis of Latin American labor movements. State incorporation of labor occurs, when the state directly mobilizes labor as a source of support and legitimacy, and in doing so, typically circumvents liberal forces. State incorporation is an illiberal response to the challenges of modernization, whose “preeminent feature”, according to Collier and Collier (1991, 169), is “the attempt to address the social question by repressing the preexisting unions and replacing them with highly constrained, state-penetrated labor organizations that would avoid class conflict and instead ‘harmonize’ the interests of capital and labor.” This is similar to
what Luebbert (1987) in his analysis of interwar political regimes in Europe has called “authoritarian corporatism”, which in its most extreme form, amounts to fascism.

Collier and Collier (1991) regard state incorporation strategies as a fundamental alternative to party incorporation strategies. Out of eight investigated cases in Latin America, six pursued party incorporation strategies, while state incorporation could only be observed in two cases (Brazil since the early 1930s, and Chile since the 1920s). This is indicative of the fact that the strategy of state incorporation became only fully developed and available after the time period investigated here. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th century, state incorporation was only a theoretical possibility, but not a feasible option. If one applied Collier’s and Collier’s (1991) framework to this study, all investigated cases would fall either into what they refer to as the “repression period” or into their category of “party incorporation”.

If I sought to frame Collier’s and Collier’s (1993) argument according to the concept of labor inclusion outlined here, a “state incorporation” strategy would consist of lowest inclusion on all dimensions, except for the behavior of the state, which would be characterized by at least a minimum of inclusiveness. This exemplifies the fact that “state incorporation” is illiberal, by repressing free labor associations and other political liberties, by delegitimizing party competition, and by eliminating enfranchisement and responsible government; but at the same time, the behavior of the state is inclusive through the recognition of the social question, the acknowledgement of labor as a source of support for the regime, and the paternalistic provision of social welfare.

The conservative aristocratic welfare policies pursued by Bismarck in Germany, Disraeli in Britain, and at least envisioned by factions from within the Russian nomenklatura at the beginning of the 20th century, can be regarded as weak precursors to authoritarian corporatism, and so could the appeals of Bonaparte to the lower classes during the Second Empire in France. But the idea of pacifying labor socially, while excluding it politically, came only to full blossom after the end of the first World War. Social inclusion through the state in these precursors to corporatist incorporation of labor was not pronounced enough to reverse or counterbalance political exclusion. At the same time, the amount of repression toward labor was not so high as to effectively suppress any form of political organization. Bismarck’s “stick and carrot” strategy did neither have enough of the stick nor the carrot to be effective.

Behavior of competing parties toward labor (electoral and organizational)

In addition to formal institutions and the behavior of the state, the behavior of competing non-proletarian parties toward labor can have an important inclusive or exclusive effect in its own right. For the time period in question, non-proletarian parties were typically conservative aristocratic, confessional catholic or protestant, linguistic, or, perhaps most importantly, various currents of liberal parties. In the
United States, through the fundamental evolution of the political system toward a growing importance of
the executive branch during the progressive era in the early 20th century, the presidency as a political actor,
as well as insulated executive agencies, assumed some of these functions, which were traditionally
exercised by political parties. A more encompassing terminology would therefore identify the actors
discussed here as ‘entrenched political elites’ in general. In the vast majority of instances, however,
including the United States before the first decade of the 20th century, these entrenched elites were
organized in competing political parties. The behavior of competing parties or more generally, entrenched
political elites, has to be kept analytically separate from the behavior of the state, even in those cases,
where representatives of one particular party also represent the state as prime ministers or cabinet members.
Along these lines, I distinguish between two separate dimensions in the behavior of competing parties: first,
their behavior toward the working class at large in the realm of electoral inclusion; and second, their
behavior toward labor elites.

**Electoral inclusion of labor through non-proletarian parties** identifies the extent to which these
parties appeal to and incorporate the working class through activities in the arena of electoral politics.
Inclusion on this dimension is at its highest, when existing non-proletarian parties accomplish a successful
and permanent electoral mobilization of an overwhelming share of the working class. It is higher, when
electoral mobilization is significant, but neither permanent nor overwhelmingly large. Low inclusion can be
observed, when attempts at electoral mobilization are made, but eventually fail to incorporate a significant
share of the working class vote. Not even a significant attempt at electoral inclusion during the formative
stage of labor’s entry into the political arena can be observed in the remaining lowest category of electoral
inclusion.

The second dimension pertaining to the behavior of competing parties toward labor and the final
dimension overall stands for the **behavior of these parties toward labor elites**; more specifically, it
measures the extent to which non-proletarian parties incorporate labor elites into their own apparatus, as
activists, permanent cooperation partners, or candidates for public office. It should be noted that this is
quite different from the forms of cooperation and coalition building, in particular between liberal and social
democratic parties that offered themselves after the formative period of social democracy had been
completed. In these cases, cooperation occurs between two distinct and separate organizations, a pattern
that was most prominent in the form of so-called red-green (labor and liberal small holder) coalitions in
Scandinavia.

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72 See Shefter (1978), who argues that transformations in the balance of power between different institutions in the US functions as
the equivalent of substantive party conflict in other cases.
The availability of this cooperation option at an early point in time and its actual implementation in the form of government coalitions greatly favored the amount of policy accomplishments achieved by Scandinavian social democrats and allowed for their less ruptured programmatic transformation later on. But it had only a limited effect during the formative stage of social democracy, and it is conceptually distinct from organizational inclusion, which is understood as the incorporation of labor elites into an existing party’s political and administrative apparatus, but not as the extent of cooperation between separate and distinct organizations. Inclusion on this dimension is highest, when labor elites are comprehensively and permanently incorporated into existing parties. Higher inclusion requires some significant success in this regard, but did not accomplish permanent or comprehensive success. In cases of low inclusion, attempts at organizational incorporation were made, but they were only successful to some limited or temporary degree. The lack of significant attempts at organizational incorporation of labor elites is indicative of the lowest category of inclusion in this domain.

Varying overall degrees of labor inclusion

These six separate dimensions represent the building blocks for an overall assessment of labor inclusion during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. A particular overall degree of inclusion in a specific case is the result of aggregating these manifest indicators, which are measured on four different ordinal levels, into four equivalent latent categories. These four latent categories of overall highest, high, low, or lowest inclusion can be constructed through a simple numerical aggregation of its component indicators. While this is an entirely adequate procedure, it is even more insightful to delineate a priori the thresholds or critical junctures that have to be passed in order to move from one category to the next.

In the following empirical analysis, a country will be considered a case of lowest inclusion, if it provides no explicitly legal opportunity for the political organization of the working class at all. For that to be the case, degrees of inclusion have to be lowest on all six manifest indicators. These cases can best be characterized as examples for a repressive exclusion of labor. Attempts at social democratic party formation under such circumstances are faced with the extremely difficult task of developing a mass appeal, a mass membership, and ‘systemness’ in the framework of a very repressive regime.

Lowest inclusion is most easily accomplished in a polity that lacks any constitutional foundation, but it can also occur in defiance of a formally established constitution. In this category of inclusion, political liberties are non-existent, a legislature does either not exist or has no significant impact on policy making and the executive, and enfranchisement is symbolic at best. There is either no functioning party system that could provide a channel for integration, or existing parties make no attempt at appealing to labor. The
behavior of the state reflects the lack of formal institutional guarantees and is particularly repressive throughout the entire formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena.

The second type of polity, characterized by a low degree of inclusion, is still comparatively repressive, but it is qualitatively different from a lowest degree of inclusion polity, because it has opened at least one formal-institutional channel for including the working class. This represents the critical juncture in between lowest and low inclusion cases, which is why this category can best be characterized as a case of repression and limited inclusion.

The threshold between lowest and low inclusion can occur as the opening of any one of three formal institutional channels (enfranchisement, political liberties, or responsible government). The empirical analysis of late 19th and early 20th century polities investigated here, however, will show that this type of limited inclusion in the low category has occurred either through enfranchisement on the one hand or a combination of political liberties and responsible government on the other. Within the low inclusion category, therefore, two forms of limited inclusion do typically occur: limited inclusion through enfranchisement, and limited inclusion through the practice of responsible government and the guarantee of political liberties.

In addition to that, the behavior of the executive typically reflects this difference in formal-institutional backgrounds, and is therefore slightly more inclusive as well: permanent repression indicative of the lowest category is usually replaced by executive behavior that alternates between periods of repression, and the temporary easing of hostility. In this nexus between limited formal guarantees and volatile executive behavior, concessions to the working class remain precarious. Depending on the particular nature of formal-institutional inclusion, the case of low inclusion has the potential for more inclusive competing parties as well, but this is not necessarily the case.

In the third type of polity, degrees of inclusion are not only higher than in the previous one. They are also more reified, and the general trend hints toward a continuation of inclusion rather than a reversal of previously granted concessions, which is reflected by a predominantly neutral behavior of the executive. Opportunities for the legal organization of labor politics, as well as other fundamental freedoms exist. The principle of responsible government is firmly established, and there is either full enfranchisement with no qualifications, or at least the expectation of full enfranchisement in the near future. Thus, with respect to the three formal institutions, inclusion is usually highest, and only in a few instances at the level of higher inclusion. Whenever that is the case, the trend, however, is toward a full embrace of liberal democratic constitutional guarantees.

The effective establishment of inclusive institutions on all three dimensions sets the higher category apart from low inclusion. The critical juncture in between higher and highest inclusion is represented by the behavior of competing parties. The failure of non-proletarian parties to effectively incorporate labor in the
context of a formally liberal polity distinguishes higher inclusion cases from instances of highest inclusion. Existing parties make some efforts at integrating the working class, but when these efforts are eventually met with little success, it is this particular factor that tips the balance toward just higher instead of highest inclusion. Higher inclusion cases are therefore instances of institutional liberal inclusion, but they do not amount to the kind of thorough liberal inclusion achieved in the highest category.

**Optimal agency as a scope condition and the sources of suboptimal elite behavior**

**Optimal agency as a scope condition**

Varying degrees of inclusion across cases only provide the external environment, within which and in response to which labor elites make their decisions about the adoption of a particular model of labor politics. The encountered environment does not determine the observable outcomes. Previous attempts to explain variation in models of labor politics, as already discussed extensively before, lack a systematic account for how encountered environments are translated into choices of organizational and ideological models through the agency of labor elites altogether. A systematic consideration of agency in an explanation for the formation of labor politics therefore needs to account for the sources that inform elites’ decisions about party models and the causal mechanisms that translate them into their decision-making process. Doing so is key for two related reasons: first of all, it is the prerequisite for testing the validity of the suggested causal effects exercised by some given environment. Only a systematic assessment of agency allows us to identify, which aspect of the encountered environment informs choices about varying models of labor politics. Second, including a systematic account for elite agency is also the prerequisite for investigating the effects of exogenous sources on labor elites’ decision making process.

Support for different party models and their respective levels of institutionalization (or, in other words, success) depend on the response of the labor movement to the mobilizing efforts of labor elites. But the formulation and ‘supply’ of a party model by labor movement elites is an antecedent to this process. Labor movement elites devise party models in response to their own perception of labor inclusion. However, their assessment of these external constraints can be less than optimal, which is why in some cases, a particular institutional environment does not easily translate into the ‘structurally’ predicted choice. In these cases, limited institutionalization (or, in other words, limited success) will result from suboptimal

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73 Hamilton (1967) has emphasized the importance of what he refers to as “working-class leaders” in activating and channeling grievances as well as providing frames of reference to their constituency. His argument is located in a different substantive context, but his argument and the empirical findings of his study support the crucial role I assign to labor elites.
choices, and an additional analysis is necessary to uncover the effects of exogenous factors that contributed to suboptimal choices by labor elites.

My attempt to include a systematic treatment of agency is informed by a sociology of knowledge approach (Wuthnow 1989, Skocpol and Rueschemeyer 1996, Rueschemeyer and van Rossem 1996) and the rational choice variant of the new institutionalism (Levi 1997). In some cases, labor elites translate structural conditions into outcomes, i.e. models of labor politics, which would be predicted from the structural background. In other cases, outcomes deviate from these expectations, they are “off the equilibrium path”. It is at this point, where the focus on the micro-level suggested by the rational choice institutionalism (Levi 1997) is included into the argument outlined here. Along the lines of a sociology of knowledge perspective, the observer is then able to analyze systematically the exogenous sources of elites’ preference formation, in order to understand these deviations. Previous research has dismissed them as exceptional cases, disregarded them, or had to resort to the introduction of ad hoc variables supposedly unique to the social and cultural environment of a particular case.

Hall and Taylor (1998, 24) note how “the new institutionalists in sociology (...) argue that many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with some transcendent rationality. They argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices.” The challenge in developing a systematic explanation for the adoption of different models of labor politics is therefore to combine the following two perspectives effectively: first, to outline the relation between different structural environments, in my case defined by varying degrees of inclusion, and those models of labor politics that are “most efficient” in channeling labor’s demands into the political arena within such an environment. But in addition to that, secondly, it is also necessary to take into account those practices that cause labor elites to embrace models of labor politics that do not conform to the “transcendental rationality” noted by Hall and Taylor (1998).

An additional challenge in this context is to suggest a systematic conceptualization for the sources of ‘suboptimal’ decision-making that extends beyond the “culturally specific practices” of one particular case. By doing so, instead of having to resort to the unsystematic introduction of ad hoc variables, I suggest an approach that accounts systematically for the deviation of elites’ choices from an optimal response. But at the same time, I do not presume that labor elites’ choices are necessarily optimal, as a most efficient response to an existing environment of labor inclusion, on the basis of a neutral evaluation, which can be uncovered through the consideration of some “transcendental rationality.”

Along these lines, my logical starting point for the analysis of labor elites’ behavior and party formation outcomes is an assumption of optimal agency: labor movement elites, who can rely on an optimal, hence perfectly accurate, perception of labor inclusion, and whose judgment is not impaired by
other exogenous factors, have the capacity to translate the necessities of this situation into an organizational and ideological model of labor politics that is perfectly suited for the respective environment of inclusion.

The predictions for different party models or the absence of party formation, derived from an analysis of varying degrees of inclusion, thus depend on an optimal translation of these external constraints into the various possible outcomes. Whenever this requirement is met, an evolutionary type of social democracy will emerge in a situation, where inclusion is higher, but not yet highest. A quasi-revolutionary model represents the optimal response to low degrees of inclusion. More specifically, a parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal response to a type of low inclusion polity that accomplishes limited labor incorporation through the granting of enfranchisement. An extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal model for a version of the low inclusion polity, which accomplishes limited inclusion through the at least minimal guarantee of political liberties and responsible government, but without the presence of enfranchisement. Both in the highest and the lowest category of inclusion, social democratic party formation is predicted to not occur, in favor of other models of labor politics that are better suited for these environments: insurrectionist approaches in instances of lowest inclusion, and moderate syndicalism in highest inclusion polities.

In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on the programmatic statements from above, by outlining the micro-foundations of my theoretical framework. First, I am going to discuss, how I conceive of optimal choices as the analytical point of departure. Second, based on that conceptualization, I will outline an analysis about the decision making process of labor elites, and show how and why different models of labor politics emerge as optimal choices in different environments of inclusion. In the third place, I will discuss the sources of suboptimal decisions as those choices that deviate from the previously sketched “equilibrium path”. Along these lines, I am going to show that suboptimal choices can be explained systematically, and contrary to the observation of Hall and Taylor (1998), that they extend beyond unique and case specific cultural practices.

**Optimal choices of labor elites in varying environments of labor inclusion**

I conceive of ‘optimal’ agency as a situation, in which a particular model of labor politics is adopted by labor elites to an environment of labor inclusion, where this model is better suited than all other competing approaches. I do not understand optimal decisions or best suited models as those choices, which accomplished the highest gains for laborers in the long run. Making such evaluations would require an impossible amount of historical foresight. And moreover, it would be extremely difficult to devise a set of indicators that could define these highest possible gains. Is it the relative levels of income or wealth? The
provision of social benefits by the state? Job security? The amount of vacation time? Or possibly a number of non-economic indicators, such as the consolidated guarantee of political and personal liberties?

Contrary to such a perspective, I conceive of optimal decisions for an ideological and organizational model of labor politics as a choice that represents the most rewarding ratio of costs and benefits for channeling labor’s interests into the political arena at the point in time, when the choice is being made. Different environments of labor inclusion provide different sets of opportunity structures, within which different models of labor politics are more or less effective and rewarding. The extent of their effectiveness can be established by analyzing the costs and benefits that would accrue to labor elites as a result of making a specific choice for a model of labor politics in a particular environment of labor inclusion.  

The costs of devising a particular model of labor politics, as it is defined by its components ideology (goals, means) and organization, consist of the following two elements. In the first place, these costs involve the personal risks to labor elites arising from the attempt to mobilize workers through a particular model of labor politics across different environments of inclusion. This can potentially include a wide variety of issues, some mundane and others life threatening. In the present context, the understanding of personal risks includes the threat of criminal persecution in response to political activities through a particular model of labor politics. In some cases, for example in autocratic Russia before 1917, political involvement came with the risk of numerous forms of prosecution, including the death sentence. In other cases, and this includes liberal-constitutional polities such as the United States, Switzerland, or others, involvement in ‘revolutionary’ activities would not result in death sentences, but possibly long term incarceration, expulsion or other serious forms of punishment.

Second, in addition to the personal costs that are likely to accrue for an individual engaging in a certain form of labor politics in a specific environment of inclusion, the overall amount of investment in organization building is another contributing factor to the costs of different models of labor politics in

74 This approach also implies that in some cases, an optimal choice during labor’s formative stage might turn out to be suboptimal in the long run. In the case of German social democracy, for example, the adoption of a quasi-revolutionary type of party represented the optimal response to the particular German environment of labor inclusion in the late 19th century. During the revolutionary turmoil of 1918 and 1919 as well as during the ensuing liberal Weimar Republic, however, the same contradiction between revolutionary rhetoric and pragmatic practices that had earlier on guaranteed social integration, would start to haunt the party: it was torn between an accommodation with the dominant elites in the army, bureaucracy, and the judiciary on the one hand and the revolutionary promise on the other. Division of the left, and the inability to withstand the onslaught of fascism were the consequences. In the US case, moderate syndicalism represented an optimal choice in the sense in which I employ the term here, as the model with the most rewarding benefit-cost ratio for channeling labor’s interests into the political arena at the time. However, many students of American social policy and the US welfare state, for example Esping-Andersen (1990) and Steinmo (1994), note how the level of social provision in the United States has remained significantly below that of many European cases, in which social democratic parties were formed. Steinmo (1994) argues that there is a direct causal connection between this outcome and the lack of social democratic party formation. In a sense, therefore, an optimal choice at the time, at least according to Steinmo (1994), would result in a suboptimal outcome in the long run. At the same time, one could also pursue a somewhat different argument for the US case, and this illustrates the problems associated with conceptualizing optimality as long term gains of the labor movement. If the gains of labor were conceptualized as the average yearly income, or upward social mobility, the long term gains of American laborers would be significantly higher than in the kind of analysis that Steinmo (1994) conducts.
varying environments of inclusion. At the most basic level, some investment in organization building is necessary for any type of labor association, regardless of the given environment of inclusion: offices need to be rented, propaganda material is being printed, agitators are sent to remote places, and so on. However, some forms of organization are inherently less costly than others. This observation applies most importantly to a distinction between moderate syndicalist strategies and those approaches that require an independent presence of labor in the political arena. Moderate syndicalism builds on the existence of trade unions, and only launches selective interventions into the political arena. For its political influence, it can therefore rely on the existing parties and their infrastructure. The formation of independent organizations of labor in the political arena, on the other hand, also requires additional organizational efforts on top of the existing association of laborers around the workplace.

In this attempt to model the decision making process of labor elites, the costs of establishing a particular form of labor politics across different environments have to be set in relation to the according benefits, i.e. the expected political gains from a specific type of organization in a particular environment of inclusion. There are two kinds of benefits that vary across different models and varying environments. There is, first of all, the potential of success or institutionalization for some model of labor politics across different environments. This extends to the ‘internal’ organizational strength and cohesion as well as the ‘external’ mobilization success of a particular model that labor elites expect in some given environment. Both organizational and ideological components contribute to the expected success or degree of institutionalization acquired by some given model of labor politics. The effects of the ideological features of different models are most important for the extent to which a given approach resonates with its constituency. The radical rhetoric, for example, that is an implicit part of both insurrectionist models and quasi-revolutionary social democracy, should accomplish greater degrees of mobilization success, the more repressive the given environment of inclusion. The focus on an evolutionary pursuit of socialism, on the other hand, should be significantly more effective in mobilizing the worker constituency in an environment that is characterized by liberal institutions, in which the gradual legislation of socialist policies and institutional reforms is possible.

The fundamental organizational strategies underpinning different models of labor politics are an additional contributing factor to the model’s expected success or degree of institutionalization. This could be understood as an almost mechanic relationship between the organizational approach associated with a particular model of labor politics and a given environment of inclusion. In the most extreme case of a misfit between the two, organizational demise will occur due to the near infeasibility of a particular model of labor politics in a specific environment of inclusion. The extent of investment necessary for organization building as an element of the cost side applies to different models of labor politics more uniformly across varying environments of inclusion. But the possibility of organizational demise as the most extreme form
of failed institutionalization depends crucially on the specific environment, in which a given model of labor politics is established.

An evolutionary social democratic party, for example, requires the presence of a mature trade union movement and the ability to translate union activity into the foundation of a political party that functions as the political branch of the unions. Such an approach requires institutional inclusion in all three channels considered here to be effective. Without the guarantee of political liberties, the foundation of unions as the most fundamental prerequisite for this strategy, let alone the effective communication between unions and the party, would become extremely difficult. Hence, in an environment of lowest inclusion, for instance in Russia, the formation of an evolutionary social democratic party would be close to impossible, because such an organization would be much more susceptible to being crushed by the authorities. But organizational demise is not necessarily the result of repressive interference by the state. In an environment of highest inclusion, for example in the United States, the formation of independent parties of labor is always threatened by the potential of organizational demise as well, because the integration of workers as the potential constituency of these parties into the existing party system makes successful mobilization extremely difficult. Organizational demise thus represents the inversion of successful institutionalization as an expected benefit. In any given case, both the adopted ideology and its fit with the broader labor constituency as well as the implemented organizational model and its ‘mechanic’ relation to the given environment of inclusion, contribute to the extent of institutionalization, which, in case of a suboptimal choice, can result in organizational demise.

In the second place, the benefits of adopting a particular model of labor politics in a given environment of inclusion also extend to the ability of labor elites to gain or shape the exercise of political authority in order to implement policies that favor their constituency. The mechanisms and constraints of different environments of inclusion, both through their institutional and behavioral foundations, favor varying models of labor politics in different contexts. This includes extreme and readily apparent variations, such as those that can be found, when comparing the context of higher inclusion in cases such as Britain, New Zealand, or Australia, to lowest inclusion in Russia. An insurrectionist model of labor politics, provided that it becomes institutionalized and successful in accomplishing a revolution, would provide immediate access to political power and the ability to implement a given political agenda in both of these categories. But an evolutionary social democratic approach is much more likely to result in capturing the state in an environment of higher inclusion than in the case of Russia, where the necessary channels for access to executive responsibility are shut down.

These factors that determine labor elites’ considerations of costs and benefits in establishing a particular model of labor politics in some given environment of labor inclusion are relayed to labor elites through two distinct causal mechanisms. The direct perception of a given environment of inclusion by labor
elites informs the calculation of personal risks as one of two components of the calculation of costs. The projected investment in organization building also depends on that particular causal mechanism, as well as the consideration of the opportunities that different environments of inclusion afford to varying models of labor politics in terms of gaining access to political authority. The expected success or level of institutionalization for some model of labor politics in a specific environment of inclusion depends on the direct evaluation of that environment and the sheer ‘mechanical’ feasibility of different models, as well as the indirect transfer of varying degrees of inclusion into the decision making process of labor elites, through the demands of their constituency, and the way in which they are shaped by the same environment.

Table 5 displays the results of a decision analysis based on this conceptualization of costs and benefits for the various models of labor politics across the four categories of labor inclusion introduced here. I am using this tool to allow for the outline of a succinct general argument about the decision-making process of labor elites and the determinants of optimality in the adoption of varying models of labor politics. The upper half of table 5 represents the respective benefits and costs of choosing a particular model of labor politics across different environments of inclusion. The costs and benefits of making particular organizational and ideological choices that come with different models of labor politics are translated into a numerical scale from 0 to 10. Higher costs or benefits stand for higher values. As discussed above, the value for the cost side of this analysis emerges from an addition of personal risks and the necessary investment in organization building associated with a particular model of labor politics in some given environment of inclusion. The value for the benefits side results from an addition of the expected level of institutionalization and the degree of possibility to achieve access to political power through some given model in a specific environment of inclusion. The bottom part of table 5 shows the benefit-cost ratios derived from that analysis. Figure 5 contains a graphical representation of these benefit-cost ratios and an attempt to illustrate the causal relation between degrees of inclusion and the choice for different models of labor politics in a continuous fashion. Much of the factual underpinning for these conclusions will be added throughout the various case studies.

The numerical values in table 5 should not be understood as having some intrinsic meaning in and of themselves. They only make sense as a proxy, through a comparison across categories. It should also be kept in mind that this is necessarily a reductionist approach to understand the decision making process of labor elites. It has to be regarded as an attempt to delineate at the most elementary level the conditions, under which different models of labor politics represent optimal responses to varying environments of inclusion. Above and beyond the conceptualization and treatment of elite agency introduced here, labor elites shape the outcomes of party formation, the success of their organizations, as well as the broader implications of political development in many different ways. These features of elite agency apply to qualitative and case specific variations in the forms of labor politics, as well as to the effect of party leaders
on the extent of mobilization success and the effectiveness of their organization. It would be impossible, however, to include all of these idiosyncratic effects into a comprehensive analysis. The actual case studies to be conducted later will develop a more detailed picture of labor elites’ choices and decision making processes based on the initial point of departure outlined here. 

Taking these considerations into account, table 5 shows that the pursuit of insurrectionist models of labor politics is always associated with extremely high costs, in all four categories of labor inclusion. This is the result of the personal risks associated with that form of political involvement and the necessity of high investments in organization building. The extent of persecution is usually more vicious, the less liberal a particular regime. But that is only an insignificant variation in degree in this context. What matters is the fact that activities geared at preparing an actual insurrection will lead to criminal persecution, and, if detected, the abolishment of the organization.

This applies to all categories of labor inclusion alike. Environments of higher and highest inclusion are equivalent to one another in terms of the costs associated with the establishment of different models of labor politics even above and beyond the similarities regarding insurrectionist models of labor politics. Both these categories of inclusion are characterized by liberal institutions, which allow for the free expression of political preferences, practice responsible government, and guarantee worker enfranchisement. The costs associated with the formation of labor organizations therefore involve little personal risk, with the exception of insurrectionist approaches, and extend only to the necessary investments in organization building. Leaving aside unique differences across cases regarding specific difficulties in this respect, these costs should be the same across the two environments of inclusion. As already noted above, moderate syndicalism requires fewer investments than the formation of independent parties of labor. By definition, it is designed as an approach that relies on the existing organizational infrastructure of parties as well as the executive branch of government, and therefore does not need to invest in the establishment of its own presence in the political arena. Both quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties, on the other hand, need to make these additional investments in organization building.

What distinguishes the higher and highest inclusion categories from one another are the benefits that labor elites can expect from the implementation of different models of labor politics. Insurrectionism,

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75 Przeworski and Sprage (1987) discuss and analyze the effects of party elites on vote maximization from a comparative perspective. It should also be noted that some of the idiosyncratic variation in elite agency noted here is to some extent determined and therefore conceptually included through the sources of suboptimal elite agency introduced before. The dominance of middle class professionals and intellectuals in the social democratic parties of Argentina and Italy, for example, represents a stark contrast to the presence of leaders that emerged from organized labor in Germany or Belgium. The presence of an August Bebel in Germany, and the lack of a comparable figure in the other two cases, is in no small measure related to limited mobilization success in those cases. And this particular variation is to some extent captured by the nature of social group affiliations typical for labor elites across cases, which represents one of four potential sources of suboptimal decision making.
assuming its successful implementation, provides the maximum of benefits to labor elites in terms of gaining access to political authority, by completely reversing the balance of power between insurrectionist labor leaders and the entrenched political elites. The expected variation in the mobilization success of insurrectionism across the two categories results in the slight difference in overall benefits noted in table 5. While institutional inclusion is similar in higher and highest inclusion polities, the more responsive behavior of entrenched elites in highest inclusion cases should make insurrectionist models somewhat more feasible and likely to accomplish higher mobilization success in environments of higher inclusion. The same argument also applies to a greater mobilization potential of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

The effects of more responsive entrenched elites, most commonly competing parties, are most apparent, when comparing the benefits of moderate syndicalism and evolutionary social democracy as an alternative across higher and highest inclusion polities. As noted above, both models of labor politics come with the same amount of costs in both scenarios. But the benefits of moderate syndicalism are significantly larger in highest inclusion polities. Both the access to political power and the ability of labor elites to shape policies on the one hand as well as the mobilization success of moderate syndicalism on the other depend on the existence of entrenched elites that respond effectively to the political interventions and demands formulated by moderate syndicalist organizations. It is the defining feature of highest inclusion as the only type of polity, in which entrenched elites have accomplished such an extent of labor integration. And it is precisely the lack of an effective integrative response of entrenched elites in higher inclusion cases that significantly reduces the benefits of a moderate syndicalist strategy in such an environment. As a corollary of this constellation, it is to be expected that evolutionary social democratic models tend to be more appealing to the labor constituency in cases of higher inclusion, where the inability of entrenched elites to respond to labor’s claims has already manifested itself before the establishment of a party.

While the consideration of costs and benefits pertaining to different models of labor politics in the higher and highest inclusion categories depends crucially on the behavior of entrenched elites, the opportunity structures for party formation in low and lowest inclusion cases result from a more complex interaction between the surrounding determinants. Moderate syndicalism is geared at an accommodation with its political environment. As a result, it should not accrue any additional costs in terms of personal risks on top of the investment in organization building that also applies to higher and highest inclusion type of polities. This is true for low inclusion polities, which idealtypically allow for limited forms of labor associations. However, in the case of lowest inclusion, even such extremely careful attempts at worker mobilization result in the potential of criminal persecution, which is why the costs of moderate syndicalism in such an environment are somewhat higher than in the remaining types of polities. At the same time, the benefits of moderate syndicalism are negligible in an environment that predominantly or completely
excludes labor from the political arena, but they should be slightly higher in the less repressive instances of low inclusion.

Above the threshold of moderate syndicalist forms of organization, essentially all models of labor politics that demand significant political changes are met with fierce resistance by the state in lowest inclusion polities. Activists propagating independent political organizations of labor, regardless of whether they are insurrectionist, evolutionary social democratic or quasi-revolutionary social democratic in nature, face heavy repression, persecution, and severe punishment. In addition to that, costs of organization building for these forms of labor politics are also unusually high in the repressive environment of lowest inclusion, in which every organizational effort is under the constant supervision of the authorities. As a result, the costs for all of these three models of labor politics, regardless of the extent of their radicalism, are at a maximum in an environment of lowest inclusion.

The costs for quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties in low inclusion polities are larger than in the higher and highest categories on the one hand, and smaller than in instances of lowest inclusion on the other. The personal risks associated with political activity along the lines suggested by these models of labor politics are significantly larger than in the institutionally liberal polities with higher and highest inclusion. But the opening of limited institutional inclusion as well as the less permanently repressive state make these approaches into the political arena less costly in terms of personal risks than in the category of lowest inclusion, which is entirely devoid of a responsive state and institutional inclusion. The benefits of evolutionary social democracy are smaller in lowest inclusion, both as a result of the infeasibility of the model in providing access to political power and as a consequence of its lack of appeal to the worker constituency. As noted above, it is nearly impossible in an environment of lowest inclusion, to institutionalize a model of labor politics and propagate it successfully, which by definition requires the guarantee of extensive political liberties and the possibility of effective and open communication between its trade union and political branches. The at least minimal guarantee of political incorporation in cases of low inclusion increases the expected benefits of evolutionary social democracy significantly, when compared to the lowest inclusion category.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy is treated as the same kind of threat to the established order as the evolutionary party type in cases of low inclusion. The pragmatic and largely legalistic practices of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties function as an important signaling device vis-à-vis the state to prevent outright dissolution of the organization. As a consequence, the costs associated with the establishment of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties are not higher than those of evolutionary social democracy. However, the embrace of more radical rhetoric in quasi-revolutionary social democracy functions as an important signaling device and social integrative mechanism vis-à-vis the party's constituency. As a result, the potential for mobilization success of quasi-revolutionary social democracy,
and thereby the expected benefits of the model, are significantly higher than for the evolutionary party type in an environment of low inclusion.

When the respective costs and benefits discussed above are set in relation to one another, different optimal responses by labor elites emerge for each type of polity. Every environment of labor inclusion comes with a model of labor politics that represents a most rewarding approach of labor into the political arena. Table 5 shows the numerical values of these cost-benefit ratios, and figure 5 contains a graphical representation. The causal argument outlined here is based on categories of inclusion. But the graphical display shows that we can also conceive of the causal relation between degrees of inclusion and labor elites’ choices in a continuous rather than a categorical fashion. The numerical values assigned to different categories of inclusion and models of labor politics do, of course, not increase from one level to the next at the threshold between different categories. They evolve in a gradual fashion in between and across these categories.

The theoretical implication of this observation translates into the following substantive expectation. There is a significant grey zone at the border between different categories of inclusion, and the question of optimality becomes more difficult to assess in this particular area. As a result, one would expect to see an at least significant role played by the model of labor politics that has been identified as optimal in the adjacent degree of inclusion through a categorical argument. There is ample empirical evidence for this expectation that will be discussed in more detail throughout the following comparative case studies. Insurrectionist models of labor politics, which are predicted to become dominant in an environment of lowest inclusion, have also become a relevant model of labor politics in those low inclusion cases that find themselves at the bottom of their category, because the extent of inclusion is comparatively smaller than for the other low inclusion cases. This applies to Hungary, Spain, Argentina, Italy, and to Austria before the 1890s. A similar relationship is also observable for the top end of the higher inclusion category, represented by the case of Switzerland. Here, moderate syndicalism as the expected response to an environment of highest inclusion competed for a significant period of time, longer than in all other cases, with the attempts at social democratic party formation.

**Sources of suboptimal evaluation and judgment by labor elites**

The previous paragraphs outlined the way in which I conceive of the “equilibrium path” in the causal relation between degrees of labor inclusion on the one hand and labor elites’ choices for different models of labor politics on the other. However, as argued extensively above, the choices of labor elites are not necessarily, or at least not exclusively, informed by a neutral evaluation of the existing environment and an according optimal translation of these considerations into the most efficient and most rewarding model of
labor politics. In the following paragraphs, I am going to outline a systematic conceptualization of sources that contribute to suboptimal decision making of labor elites in the process of adopting a particular model of labor politics in a given environment of inclusion. Whenever labor elites respond to external constraints in a significantly suboptimal fashion, structural determinants might not readily translate into the outcome that is predicted by a consideration of degrees of inclusion as the external environment faced by labor elites: the observable outcome in such a case is “off the equilibrium path”. The term ‘optimal’ should not be understood too literally as a situation in which labor elites ‘did everything right’. That is naturally never going to be the case, when human behavior is the object of inquiry. I conceive of ‘optimal’ agency as a kind of behavior, through which the fundamental features of an existing environment of labor inclusion are translated into the best suited choice regarding an organizational and ideological model of labor politics.

At the most basic level, suboptimal agency can be observed, when labor elites embrace a type of model that does not fit the external environment. But at the same time, the large number of cases in the low inclusion category and the qualitative variation in the provision of limited inclusion within that category allow for an additional more fine grained empirical analysis. We have previously distinguished between two variants of the quasi-revolutionary party type, each of which represents an optimal response to a particular version of the low inclusion polity: the parliamentary variant is best suited in an environment, in which limited institutional inclusion is accomplished through the granting of enfranchisement, while the extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal response to the type of low inclusion polity that accomplishes limited labor incorporation without enfranchisement, through the at least minimal guarantee of political liberties and responsible government.

The adoption of a ‘wrong’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents another kind of suboptimal elite agency that can be systematically explained. But other than the adoption of a type of labor politics, which is not ideally suited to a given environment of inclusion, the choice for a suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy does not amount to an outcome not predicted by the theory suggested here. The causal argument developed here expects the adoption of a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party in an environment of low inclusion. Even if a suboptimal variant of that generic party type is adopted, the causal connection between the generic environment of inclusion and the according party type can still be observed. The more fine grained analysis into the variants of low inclusion and quasi-revolutionary social democracy that is conducted on top of this fundamental causal argument allows us to provide additional evidence for the crucial effects of labor inclusion on the nature of party formation.

My research interest in this dissertation is about explaining the formation of different models of labor politics. I am not primarily interested in accounting for different degrees of institutionalization or levels of success across cases. Nonetheless, considering this issue is of crucial importance in this context – not as a ‘dependent variable’, but as an indicator for the presence of suboptimal choices. A justification for treating
varying levels of institutionalization or success along these lines has already outlined before, in the second chapter of this dissertation. I demonstrated there that suboptimal choices by labor elites are identifiable as a cause for limited success or institutionalization, even though other factors, such as the effects of worker mobilization along non-economic cleavages, might also affect the overall degree of institutionalization. Moreover, the effects of attempts at worker mobilization along non-economic dividing lines are already built into the causal argument here, as one potential strategy pursued by entrenched political elites in appealing to workers. On top of limited institutionalization or success, the overall fragmentation of the left can be used as an additional factor to identify suboptimal choices.

The empirical analyses into elite agency and the sources of suboptimal choices are going to show that instances of lower, external, mobilization success or limited, internal, institutionalization of the organization, are directly related to the prior adoption of a suboptimal party type, or a suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. In the following paragraphs, I will develop a systematic account for the sources of suboptimal decisions across cases. In that context, I am going to distinguish between an internal and an external dimension. ‘Internal’ sources of suboptimal choices are located ‘within’ labor elites, as internalized social characteristics, most importantly their background in social group affiliation, and the nature of their political socialization. ‘External’ sources on the other hand entail exogenous factors that cause suboptimal choices, most importantly the diffusion of external knowledge, but also the nature of a given environment of inclusion itself, whenever it is difficult to evaluate or subject to frequent fluctuations.

The question of differences in perspective and background between labor movement elites and the ‘regular worker’ is an implicit element of many historical accounts for working class politics. No discussion of the Russian labor movement, for example, would be complete without mentioning the divide between intellectuals from a mostly bourgeois background dedicated to the leadership of the movement, and the workers themselves, whose mentalities were shaped by a peculiar mix of peasant and factory experiences.  

But the background in socialization is only one of several sources that can be responsible for suboptimal choices of party models. In addition to the intellectual as the dominant figure of the Russian labor movement, labor elites came from a variety of different backgrounds in other cases. In the cases of Germany and Britain, both skilled workers and intellectuals were influential. The French social democrats were dominated by middle-class professionals, most importantly lawyers and teachers. The “twelve apostles” as the leading circle of Dutch social democracy also belonged largely to that particular social group. In Argentina and the rest of Latin America, physicians have become the archetypical leading figure

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76 See Rogger (1983) and Zelnik (1972) for a particularly pronounced emphasis on the peasant background of Russian workers and the mass-elite divide that characterized the Russian labor movement.
of social democracy. In Japan, different social democratic factions were also dominated by different sets of leaders: intellectuals, middle-class professionals, and workers.77

Different socialization backgrounds of labor elites compared to the majority of workers, along with the particular characteristics and expectations of the group to which the elites belong, their mentalities and repertoires of behavior, can all be understood as an internal dimension of sources for suboptimal behavior. This includes internalized features pertaining to social group affiliations, but also the effects of a particular type of political socialization. All of these and other related factors can trigger a misperception or even a complete disregard for external conditions, by making other cognitive schemes more accessible: In some cases, labor movement elites might project their own desire to disassociate themselves from the mainstream of cultural practices in their society on the labor movement, which is a feature of elite behavior that has been observed in the case of Russia (Ascher 1972, Haimson 1955).

In some cases, the so-called ‘labor aristocracy’ is more radical than the majority of the labor movement, for example in France, because the skilled artisans constituting this group have been shaped by low degrees of inclusion before the late 1870s, and were incapable to adjust to a changed environment after the consolidation of the Third Republic in the early 1880s. In other cases, the same type of group is more moderate than the rest of labor, as has been observed in Britain, because their perception of external constraints was shaped by a gradual increase of inclusion over time (cf. Voss 1993). These examples illustrate an important programmatic statement that has been noted before: the presence and effects of suboptimal decisions are not determined by their potential underpinning sources. All potential sources of suboptimal decisions are subject to a complex interaction with the labor constituency at large as well as the existing environment of inclusion. They do not necessarily lead to the adoption of a suboptimal model. In the case of Russia, for example, the detachment of intellectuals from the labor constituency at large was responsible for serious mobilization problems of social democratic agitators in the late 1890s and early 1900s. But eventually, bolshevik labor elites made an optimal decision for the most effective and rewarding model of labor politics. In the case of France, on the other hand, the political socialization of labor elites through a pattern of pronounced revolutionary activity has contributed to the adoption of an overly radical model of labor politics that was suboptimal in the consolidated Third Republic’s environment of higher inclusion.

In addition to these internal sources of suboptimal judgment, there is also an external dimension. From this perspective, suboptimal choices do not come ‘from within’ the respective elites and their internalized social characteristics, but from the outside. The first kind of external source for suboptimal agency stems from the nature of labor inclusion itself. The misperception of objective degrees of inclusion

77 For Germany, see Kocka (1983), for Japan see Totten (1966) and Ayusawa (1976), for France see Voss (1993).
becomes more likely, whenever a given environment of inclusion is difficult to read; that is, whenever some polity’s institutions and political approaches to the working class are subject to frequent changes, or when the nature of the regime altogether is not quite clear. The nature of Prussia after 1848, or the German Empire after 1871, and their attitude toward the working class for example, were quite apparent, both for the majority of workers and labor movement elites. French labor leaders, on the other hand, in their formative stages between the 1850s and the 1880s, were under the impression of frequent regime changes, from the short lived second republic (1848-1852) to the repressive Second Empire (1852-1870), and then the Third Republic, which was only consolidated as a higher inclusive type of polity by the mid 1880s. Hence, a misperception of external constraints by labor elites is much more likely to occur in the case of France during this time period than in Germany. A second kind of external source for suboptimal decision making occurs as the diffusion of ‘external knowledge’. Wuthnow (1989) and Rueschemeyer and van Rossem (1996) trace the process, through which ideas are articulated and then translated into organizational vessels in the context of individual cases with stable sets of environments. But what happens, when ideas move across borders, i.e. when they travel from an institutional environment that favored their emergence to a different environment that might not be equally well suited?

The quasi-revolutionary version of marxism vulgarized by Karl Kautsky during the Second International was designed as a universal explanation and recommendation for the entire international working class. However, other than expected by Marx and stated in the preface of *Das Kapital*, the industrially more developed country did not necessarily represent a picture of the less developed country’s future. Quasi-revolutionary marxism à la Kautsky, which was shaped by the particular institutional environment of post-1871 Germany, traveled to many places that did not necessarily share the socio-economic, or even more importantly, the political characteristics of Germany at the time. In many cases, and this should not be forgotten here, the imported model did work well (where the nature of labor inclusion was most similar to Germany), while in other cases, it was adopted, transformed into a native model, or abandoned relatively quickly. There are, however, those cases, where the ‘external knowledge’ channeled into a particular polity was embraced by labor movement elites as a heuristic device to interpret their native conditions, and as a source for their strategic choices, even though the model from the outside did not quite match the situation at home.

While the story of ‘external knowledge’ applies most prominently to the dissemination of Kautskyan marxism during the Second International, it has also occurred in other contexts. Evolutionary Japanese social democrats, for example, embraced models of christian socialism, which were very much at odds with the actual institutional constraints from before and even after 1925, when the Japanese polity changed from

78 See Marx (1867)
a lowest to a low degree of inclusion. American labor elites were actively engaged in diffusing their model of moderate syndicalism, which emerged as the optimal response in their own environment of highest inclusion, to the case of Canada, which was characterized by higher inclusion. In all of these and a number of other cases, ‘external knowledge’ appears as an authoritative statement that is embraced as an easily accessible heuristic, although the model from the outside does not necessarily fit the context into which it was imported.
CHAPTER 5

THE BACKGROUND TO SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FORMATION

Internal sovereignty and sufficient industrialization as prerequisites

‘Internal’ sovereignty

Based on the theory outlined in the previous part of this dissertation, the following third part is going to assess the historical background of social democratic party formation. This entails two distinct kinds of analyses: in the first place, I am going to select the cases that qualify for inclusion into the further empirical analysis, and that also define the substantive scope of the theory suggested here. This will be accomplished by identifying cases, in which social democratic party formation was possible. To that end, a case needs to meet the two previously outlined requirements: the presence of an independent, ‘internally’ sovereign state, as well as a sufficient level of industrialization.

Independence or ‘internal’ sovereignty focuses on the autonomy of a state to make decisions about domestic – most importantly fundamental political-institutional and socio-economic – policies. We are going to see that a number of cases included here clearly meet that criterion, while their ‘external’ sovereignty, or independence in terms of foreign policy decision-making, is debatable. However, given that my research interest is about the political environment that affects the organizational opportunities for labor as well as the nature of socio-economic policies, the presence of ‘internal’ sovereignty is clearly more important, while the question of foreign policy decision making is only of minor relevance.

Along these lines, I am going to identify states that were continuously sovereign and independent for at least 30 years before 1914, which then continued to be sovereign and independent after 1914. The exclusion of states without ‘internal’ sovereignty during this time period is geared at excluding the potential
effects of labor’s involvement in broader anti-colonial movements as a potential intervening variable. Wherever industrialization occurred and a labor movement emerged under the dominance of a colonial power before 1914, it is impossible to place it in the context of a comprehensive comparison. In some of these instances, namely Egypt, South Africa, and India, labor developed into an integral part of the larger independence movement. Thereby, rather than challenging the authority of a native polity, it was working toward the establishment of such a polity, with the colonial power as its primary opponent. In other cases, where the colonial power and the colony are in close geographical proximity, the labor movement, just as in the cases of Egypt, South Africa, and India, also features nationalist and anti-colonial demands. However, it also engages in cooperation, and sometimes even becomes an integral part, of the colonial power’s labor movement, for example in the cases of Poland and Finland, vis-à-vis Russia.

These cases – Egypt, South Africa, India, Finland, and Poland – as well as all other equivalent instances that lack ‘internal’ sovereignty are therefore excluded from the empirical analysis. However, the Finnish, and even more so the Polish movement will be considered in the context of the Russian case study. On top of that I also excluded 21 micro-states with a population of less than 250,000. This yields a pool of 49 states that meet the independence requirement as it was outlined above. This list, displayed in table 6, is derived from a classification established by an elaboration on the Correlates of War project by Gleditsch (2004). He focuses on the issue of independence from an International Relations perspective, as a question of ‘external’ sovereignty. This is the reason for the one deviation of my own assessment from his data. He considers Austria and Hungary as one single case, which is certainly appropriate from the perspective of ‘external’ sovereignty. In terms of domestic policies, however, as the following case study will show, Hungary enjoyed almost complete autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian empire, and should therefore be considered ‘internally’ sovereign. As a consequence of that, I am going to treat Austria and Hungary as separate cases here.

Australia and New Zealand are also considered independent and sovereign by Gleditsch (2004). There is, however, considerable debate about the point in time, when both these countries acquired full sovereignty. This being said, the vast majority of concerns that could be brought forward against Gleditsch’s classification, apply to questions of foreign affairs and ‘external’ sovereignty. Gleditsch (2004) considers them sovereign from an International Relations perspective, even though their autonomy in terms of foreign policy decision making remained incomplete, partly substantively, and partly formally, until well into the 20th century. As far as ‘internal’ sovereignty, or the ability to make domestic decisions autonomously is concerned, however, both of these cases have to be considered independent for the time period in question here. The following case studies will note that New Zealand received the ability of domestic self-governance already in 1852. This happened in Australia only in 1901, with the establishment of the Australian federation. But the previously separate colonies that made up that federation were
Sufficient industrialization

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I have argued that industrialization has the following important effects on labor politics. First, national patterns of industrialization interact with pre-industrial arrangements in the production of institutions in industrial societies. This includes those institutions of inclusion that are causally related to the formation of social democratic parties and other forms of labor politics. Second, different patterns of industrialization as well as its quantitative scope, along with the effects of non-economic cleavages, affect the mobilization potential of varying models of labor politics. I have also argued that qualitative variations in the process of industrialization are not directly causally related to the emergence of different models of labor politics. Instead, industrialization and the occurrence of a significantly large working class represent a prerequisite, a *sine qua non* condition for the formation of social democratic parties or alternative models of labor politics.

In my outline regarding the applicability of the suggested theory of party formation and the process of case selection, significant industrialization was identified as the second one of two prerequisites for the inclusion of a particular case into the empirical analysis, in addition to the focus on independent, ‘internally’ sovereign states with a population above 250,000. The independence prerequisite yielded a universe of 49 cases. Out of these cases, only 20 meet that second requirement to be included into the empirical analysis as sufficiently industrialized. The identification of those 20 industrialized cases out of the previously established pool of 49 independent states will be discussed now.

In order to be included, industrialization and the emergence of a sufficiently large working class have to occur in the final decade investigated in this study, from 1910 to 1920. For the determination of varying levels of industrialization, I am going to employ harmonized data on the sectional structure of economic activities, derived from national census reports (cf. Bairoch et al. 1968 and Bairoch 1971). By including all sufficiently industrialized cases into the empirical analysis about the adoption of different models of labor politics, the highest possible n can be accomplished. As a logical corollary of that, these cases also provide the scope of the suggested theory.

There are many ways to define significant or sufficient industrialization, including but by no means limited to indicators like economic growth patterns, the diffusion of industrial technology, the output of industrial products, the consumption or output of basic materials like pig iron or iron ore, the size of
railway networks, the number of telegraph posts and so forth (cf. Cameron 1993). Based on indicators of this sort, a conventional wisdom has emerged that identifies different points in time, where countries experience the most significant push toward an industrial mode of production. Gerschenkron (1962) distinguishes between Britain as the early and Germany as the prototype of a late industrializer. Bairoch (1971) identifies four stages (1760 in England, then 1800, 1860 and 1900), during which industrialization has become irreversibly dominant in different cases during the late 18th and throughout the 19th century.

Out of the pool of existing measures for industrial development, one type of indicator is especially relevant for the study of labor politics: the number of industrial workers. If one wishes to study the potential for party formation and to establish a reliable indicator for the point in time, when a given society passes the threshold, where the formation of political organizations of labor becomes possible, this is the ideal indicator. The only available source of data reporting the distribution of the population across sectors of the economy before WW II are the respective national census reports. Until today, the compilation assembled on the basis of national records by Bairoch et al. (1968) is the only one of its kind. Their classification is based on a comprehensive scheme, but just like all other quantitative measures on industrialization, this particular type of data is also plagued by inconsistencies and limits to comparisons across cases. However, since my primary concern is not a cross case comparison of these data, but rather a within case assessment regarding the passing of an initial industrialization threshold, the available data can effectively be used for that purpose.

On a global scale, as displayed in figure 6, the effects of industrialization are not quite as pervasive as they are in those parts of the world, which were most affected by industrial development in between the late 18th and mid 20th century. The number of industrial workers, i.e. those individuals employed in the second sector of the economy, has constantly increased ever since the year 1700, but it is nowhere near the growth pattern that can be observed for the entire economically active population. Particularly for the time period studied here, industrialization remained a phenomenon that was limited to selected regions of the world. The dominance of European countries in the list of sufficiently industrialized cases is therefore not surprising. Table 7 displays the absolute values regarding the entire economically active population and the number of industrial workers for those sufficiently industrialized cases that will be included in the empirical analysis.

In order to be considered sufficiently industrialized in the sense outlined here, a particular case needs to have a sufficiently high share of industrial workers in the economically active population. I decided to set this threshold at a level of 15 %. This is necessarily a somewhat arbitrary choice, but there are a few

79 Standard publications on historical statistics such as Mitchell et al. (1993) also derive their figures on the sectional distribution of the economically active population from Bairoch et al. (1968).
considerations that can serve as an underpinning rationale. Most importantly, given that my research interest is about the formation of political parties, one should establish a threshold that identifies the emergence of a sufficiently large social group for the purpose of political contestation. The relevance of a constituency in the electoral market has served as a guideline in this context, even though, of course, not all groups of laborers in specific cases were actually admitted into the electoral process. In this context, 15% of the economically active population represents, at least from an aggregate perspective, a reasonable minimum for a social group to be recognizable and potentially influential.

At the same time, in a number of cases, such as Italy, Spain or Russia, industrialization was quite pervasive in certain regions, but almost entirely absent in the rest of the country. The average aggregate value is therefore not an adequate reflection of the actual scope and pattern of industrialization. When the number of workers is represented as a share of the entire economically active population, as it is here, the pervasiveness of industrialization in those industrialized regions cannot be adequately captured. Social democratic parties or other forms of labor politics can emerge in both these types of cases: in a small country, where the industrial working class forms a large group relative to the rest of the population; or in a larger country, where on the aggregate level the group of industrial workers is relatively small compared to the rest of the economically active population, but where, at the same time, clusters of industrialization and accordingly networks of labor can emerge in particular regions of the country: such as Petersburg and Moscow in Russia, the northern parts of Italy, or the political periphery of Spain, in the Basque country, and Catalonia.

The argument about the mobilization potential of workers also extends to other specific features of the industrialization process across cases, for example the average size of firms. The values of these variables across cases are not directly related to the kind of ideological and organizational model of labor politics adopted. But as has been discussed extensively above, they can possibly be related to varying degrees of mobilization success. These issues cannot be adequately captured by a comprehensive overview, and moreover, the question of mobilization success is not my primary research interest. For the more detailed case studies in the following analysis of party formation, these issues will be discussed on a case by case basis, as an additional underpinning for the determination of ‘sufficient industrialization’, but also as an element of the analysis of party formation and worker mobilization itself.

For the following empirical analysis, table 8 displays those 20 cases that were selected for inclusion, because they met the previously discussed independence requirement, and because they were sufficiently industrialized along the lines defined here. The table shows the share of industrial workers in the entire economically active population, based on the absolute figures from table 7. In all of the cases included there, social democratic party formation or the establishment of alternative models of labor politics was possible. The 28 remaining cases that did not qualify as sufficiently industrialized were excluded, because
the size of the industrial work force in the economically active population was below 15 % (Bulgaria, Romania, Brazil, Mexico), or because no data were available (Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran (Persia), Liberia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Turkey/ Ottoman Empire, Uruguay, Venezuela). In the latter case, given the lack of attention to industrialization data in national census reports, it is extremely likely that the threshold of sufficient industrialization was not met.

Portugal as the 29th excluded case could not be taken into account, although it was independent and sufficiently industrialized, for a different reason. It is the only one of the theoretically valid cases, for which no primary sources regarding the Partido Socialista Portugues, or, for that matter, secondary literature, is available in a language I understand. All relevant contributions about socialism in Portugal before 1919 are available only in Portuguese (da Fonseca 1976, Silva 1989, da Costa 1964, Monica 1982, Monica 1985, Monica 1986). Freire (2001) is available in an English version, but focuses on anarchism. Gallagher (1989), Puhle (2001), Eisfeld (1984), Kayman (1987) and a number of additional publications investigate the refoundation of the socialist party in the early 1970s and its role during and after the 1974-75 Revolution.

**Variation in labor inclusion during labor’s formative stage in the political arena**

Varying degrees of labor inclusion represent the context for labor’s entry into the political arena in all those ‘internally’ sovereign countries, where industrialization has produced a sufficiently large working class. Whenever labor elites translate this environment into an optimal choice for a model of labor politics, a given degree of inclusion will predict the observable outcome. Based on the conceptualization and measurement of labor inclusion discussed previously, table 9 shows the results of an analysis of degrees of inclusion on six component indicators for all 20 cases. The following discussion of individual countries reports the basis for this assessment on a case by case basis. At the same time, comparative evaluations will be included into these brief case studies, whenever it is necessary to illustrate and justify a specific kind of assessment.

The overall degree of inclusion inferred from the aggregation of these indicators is based on the previously outlined definition of critical junctures in between lowest, low, higher, and highest inclusion. At the same time, a simple aggregation of equivalent numerical values on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4 also helps to illustrate the distinction between those four different categories. Furthermore, it shows the extent of variation within each of these groups, which is of particular relevance for the class of low inclusion polities. The analysis for all included cases encompasses the respective country specific formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena.
The following case by case discussion that provides the basis for the evaluation of degrees of inclusion across all cases and indicators will also include a description of enfranchisement, and the legal bases underpinning the practice of elections. In addition to that, table 10 summarizes varying degrees of enfranchisement as one component of labor inclusion across all cases up front. The table includes the previously introduced two elements of enfranchisement – the right to vote, and the effectiveness of the worker’s vote.

The extent to which workers had gained the right to vote is inferred from the average share of the population with the right to vote during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. According levels of inclusion are assigned to varying degrees of voting rights on the basis of the discussion outlined in the previous chapter. The resulting value is adjusted through a subsequent analytical step, in which factors impeding the effectiveness of the workers’ vote are considered. This is particularly relevant for the cases of Spain and Argentina, and to some extent Germany. Spain and Argentina had a comparatively wide franchise during labor’s formative period (14.45 % in Spain, and universal male suffrage in Argentina), but a number of informal restrictions, culminating into the practice of ‘managed elections’, rendered elections entirely ineffective for members of the working class. The preliminary score of inclusion derived from an analysis of the right to vote is therefore adjusted accordingly, and, for the cases of Spain, and Argentina, results in an overall lowest category of enfranchisement.

In the case of Germany, universal male suffrage for elections to the federal legislature was accompanied by two comparatively mild restrictions on the effectiveness of the vote – the absence of a federal legislative body before the 1867 election to the parliament of the North German federation, and the unfair apportioning of electoral districts in between 1871 and 1918. The effects of these measures, however, were relatively mild, compared to Spain and Argentina, and this is reflected in a smaller adjustment of the preliminary score for the case of Germany.

Other cases, such as Hungary, Austria, and Russia, also administered restrictions on the effectiveness of the vote. Duma elections in Russia after 1906 were conducted through a curia based electoral system, and so were Austrian elections until 1907; electoral fraud and bribery, similar to the practices in Spain and Argentina were common place in Hungary, as was the unfair apportioning of electoral districts. However, in all these instances, other than in Spain and Argentina, the right to vote was already distributed so sparsely, falling into the lowest category of inclusion, that no more additional adjustment of the overall enfranchisement measures is necessary.

Enfranchisement was highest in the cases of France, Switzerland, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand: universal male suffrage was the norm during the entire formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, and elections were not seriously impaired by restrictions on the effectiveness of the vote. No such restrictions were in place in Britain, Canada, and Denmark, either, but in these cases,
enfranchisement was only higher, but not highest, because the right to vote was restricted directly through property and education qualifications. In terms of overall enfranchisement, the case of Germany falls into the same category as these three countries. As already noted, the workers’ vote in Germany was not fully effective, but the right to vote was granted to a larger share of the population, compared to Britain, Canada, and Denmark. All the remaining cases are instances of lowest enfranchisement, either through the implementation of measures limiting the effectiveness of the vote, as in Spain or Argentina, or through an a priori exclusion of workers from the electoral process altogether. A discussion of enfranchisement will be included in the following case by case analysis of all the six manifestations of labor inclusion during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. This assessment provides the underpinning for the quantitative codes displayed in table 9.

**Comprehensive liberal incorporation of labor as highest inclusion**

During the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena, the United States stand out as the only example of a polity that has accomplished a highest degree of inclusion. This ‘thorough liberal incorporation of labor’ is different from higher inclusion in only one, yet crucial respect (see table 9). Both higher and highest degrees of inclusion require an institutionally liberal polity. Thus, all cases that fall into these two categories will be equally inclusive on all formal-institutional dimensions of inclusion: they are characterized by the practice of responsible government, the guarantee of political liberties for labor, and highest enfranchisement. Moreover, the behavior of the executive toward labor is typically neutral in all of these cases.

There is the possibility for some instances of higher inclusion polities to fall short of highest inclusion on one of the formal-institutional dimension. But the crucial difference between these two categories manifests itself through the variation in the behavior of competing parties. Non-proletarian parties, most importantly liberals, in the case of higher inclusion polities, might make attempts at incorporating labor, both organizationally and electorally. But despite these efforts, they eventually fail to create a stable electoral coalition under the inclusion of labor, and to incorporate labor elites into their organizational apparatus. The key to understanding the nature of highest inclusion lies in the successful and lasting establishment of such a coalition. In the United States, during the entire formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, varying coalitions of actors succeeded in incorporating labor organizationally and electorally. This is the defining distinction between higher and highest degrees of inclusion, but it can only occur on top of an institutionally liberalized type of polity.
**Responsible government:** The principle of responsible government has become fully effective in the United States at a comparatively early point in time, long before the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena. It should also be noted that the United States and Argentina are the only two cases with a presidential type of government investigated here – in this arrangement, the accountability of the executive branch is not guaranteed through parliament, but directly through the voting public. The United States Constitution of 1787 established a presidential type of government with an elected president as the head of the executive and head of state, alongside a separately elected bicameral parliament (Congress).\(^{80}\) The House of Representatives as the equivalent of a lower house has always been directly elected; the members of the Senate, designed for the representation of states, were initially elected by state legislatures, until in 1913, through the 17th amendment to the Constitution, the practice of direct senatorial elections was implemented.

**Political Liberties:** Freedom of speech, assembly, and association are guaranteed through the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the US constitution, which came into effect in 1791. Until the 1960s, various violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights through individual states were justified on the grounds that the bill of rights only applies to the federal level. Passing of the 14th Amendment in 1868 provided the legal basis for a gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights into State constitutions. State constitutions contained their own separate provisions for political liberties. Infringements on these liberties through individual states have never affected labor as a social group, since they were geared primarily at discriminating against blacks in the former confederate states after the end of the Civil War.

**Enfranchisement:** Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of the Constitution, delegate responsibility for making decisions about voter eligibility to the individual states, but give Congress the right to also make or alter such decisions. Several amendments to the constitution provide the basis for the gradual process of imposing more limitations on the prerogatives of state legislatures to regulate voting individually, by stipulating that the right of citizens to vote “shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State” because of membership in a particular group: 15th amendment of 1870 (race or “previous condition of servitude”), 19th of 1920 (sex), 24th of 1964 (legally ‘poll tax’, effectively race), 26th of 1971 (reduction of minimum voting age to 18).

During the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena, universal male suffrage was the norm, although blacks in the former Confederate States continued to suffer from informal and indirect

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80 See USA (1787) and the Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay (1787). See the US case study in chapter 9 for a much more extensive account.
electoral discrimination, officially sanctioned or legislated by these states, until the passing of the 24th Amendment in 1964 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. While this represents, of course, a restriction on the franchise, it did not affect labor as a social group or category. In 1828, property and minimum tax requirements had been removed by most states, and by all states in 1865. By the early 1920s, all states had restricted voting to US citizens, while in between the 1840s and that time, some Midwestern and Western states extended the right to vote to aliens with the expressed intent to become citizens. Between 1890 and 1926, a total of 18 states had introduced a literacy requirement designed to discourage electoral participation of recently naturalized, usually lower class, immigrants, but the impact of this test on voter eligibility was only marginal.  

Behavior of the executive: Specific acts of government repression of labor occurred, but the behavior of the executive toward labor was predominantly – and explicitly – neutral. This being said, repressive and often violent acts against labor occurred frequently, but they were enacted by private security forces on behalf of corporations, or regional and local law enforcement agencies. Other than the federal executive branch, courts often acted with hostility toward the activities of labor, in particular during instances of strikes, public gatherings, or picketing, on the basis of the 1890 Sherman Act, which was initially designed as anti-trust legislation. It was only in 1914 that a revised law, the Clayton anti-trust act, backed by then President Wilson, explicitly exempted unions from anti-trust jurisdiction and thereby prevented indictment of union activity on this basis.  

Behavior of competing parties: The encompassing organizational and electoral inclusion of labor into the existing party system is a unique and decisive feature of the US case. This kind and extent of inclusion occurred through different sets of actors throughout varying stages in the political development of the United States: the Jacksonian democrats in between the 1820s and 1840s, and both major parties individually during the third party system until the end of the 19th century. During the following progressive era, inclusion occurred through a loose coalition of progressive politicians that could be found in both parties, as well as through entrenched elites in the executive branch. During each of these stages, political elites included labor through a combination of strategies: policies, electoral appeals along socio-economic, sectional, and ethnocultural dividing lines, as well as patronage.

Institutional liberalism as higher inclusion of labor

Examples of higher inclusion polities are distinct from highest inclusion cases, because they fall short of the highest level of labor inclusion in one crucial respect: the established non-proletarian parties are successful in incorporating labor in highest inclusion polities, while they fail to accomplish this in examples of higher inclusion. The crucial distinction between higher and highest inclusion is therefore not related to variation on any one of the formal-institutional dimensions of labor inclusion (responsible government, enfranchisement, political liberties) or the behavior of the executive. The threshold between both categories is defined by the extent of organizational and electoral inclusion of labor through the behavior of established parties.

This being said, there is some minor variation within the group of higher inclusion cases in terms of formal-institutional openness toward labor: not all the cases found in this category – Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, France, Canada, Great Britain – have accomplished fully liberalized polities with highest inclusion on all three formal-institutional dimensions. This is only the case for Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia. Great Britain and Canada still fell short of full enfranchisement of labor before 1919, and political liberties in France were only fully guaranteed ever since the mid 1880s.

The following case by case overview will illustrate these formal-institutional differences within the group of higher inclusion polities in more detail. The observed differences are important for understanding variation in party formation outcomes across these cases, but they are of no consequence for the distinction between higher and highest inclusion polities. Despite the slight or temporary deviation from highest levels of inclusion on some of the institutional dimensions, institutionally liberalized polities were firmly established in all of these cases, and the trend was toward a full embrace of liberal democratic principles.

In addition to this variation in terms of formal-institutional openness, there is some significantly more important variation within this group regarding the extent to which the existing parties established links to the labor constituency, before their efforts eventually failed to prevent the formation of an independent party of labor (see table 9). Switzerland is the case, where the established party system, most importantly the liberals, came closest to the US example of labor incorporation. Affiliations between liberals and labor continued to be close, even after the completion of party formation. Lib-lab cooperation in Australia, New Zealand, and Britain was successful temporarily, but earlier connections between liberals and labor ceased to exist very soon after party formation was on its way to institutionalization.

Even within this group, however, there was some significant variation with respect to the extent of labor incorporation by the liberals, before party formation became irreversible: Established parties in Britain struck roots in the organized labor movement for quite a while throughout the late 19th and early 20th century. In New Zealand, if anything, cooperation was even closer and resulted in the formation of a
formal liberal-labor federation in 1899. In Australia, on the other hand, lib-lab cooperation was the least successful and most short-lived. In Canada, organizational incorporation was successful before 1919, but electoral inclusion remained limited, due to the lack of full labor enfranchisement. In the case of France, organizational incorporation was pronounced, due to the affinities of many workers for the radical liberals, but organizational inclusion remained limited, as a consequence of the generally elitist nature of French political parties.

These variations within the category of higher inclusion polities will be discussed throughout the following case by case analysis, and they will also provide an important underpinning for detecting differences in party formation outcomes later on. However, while this sort of fine-grained analysis is important, it remains crucial to keep in mind that the most significant distinction is not within this group of higher inclusion polities, but in between the categories of higher and highest inclusion. The most important question regarding the nature of party formation outcomes is concerned with the variation in between the United States as an example for the absence of party formation and the group of higher inclusion polities, where social democratic parties were formed successfully.

Switzerland (1870 to 1904)

Responsible government was established through the 1848 constitution, based on which a federal government (Bundesrat) was elected by parliament.\textsuperscript{82} Political Liberties were codified in the constitutions of 1848 and 1874, through which freedom of press and the rights of assembly and association were guaranteed. Enfranchisement: The 1848 constitution established a federal state and a bi-cameral legislature, with elections to the lower house (Nationalrat) based on universal male suffrage. The upper house (Ständerat) was designed to represent cantonal interests. This design was reaffirmed in the 1874 constitution.\textsuperscript{83}

Behavior of the executive: Singular incidents of repression and hostility occurred in Switzerland as they did all over Europe in this time period, but overall, the executive pursued a predominantly neutral policy of non-involvement. Behavior of competing parties: The liberals achieved significant success in mobilizing workers electorally and in incorporating labor elites until the 1890s. Strong electoral support for liberals from labor and the working class continued even after party formation was complete. However, the introduction of proportional representation in 1919 functioned as an exclusive mechanism, since it allowed for the definite external institutionalization of social democracy and prevented the inclusion of labor into

\textsuperscript{82} See Switzerland (1874) for the revised federal constitution.
\textsuperscript{83} See Thomson (1974) for political liberties under the 1874 constitution, and a general discussion about the genesis of the constitution. See Docherty (2004) for an assessment of political liberties with an emphasis on the right of association.
the existing party system. This represents a fundamental contrast to the case of the United States, where political parties behaved in an even more inclusive manner, and a plurality electoral system favored this strategy.\textsuperscript{84}

**New Zealand (1901 to 1918)**

*Responsible government:* No single formal constitution existed, but a series of constitutional provisions based on the establishment of British sovereignty in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. Most of these provisions were consolidated into one document in the Constitution Act of 1986. The New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852 as one of these provisions established a bicameral parliament, consisting of a popularly elected House of Representatives and an appointed Legislative Council. The Legislative Council was not publicly accountable, but had only limited effects on policy making, especially after the 1891 reform, which replaced life long membership with seven year terms.\textsuperscript{85} *Political Liberties:* Freedom of press, assembly and association became recognized and effective throughout the second half of the 19th century; trade unions were officially legalized in 1878. *Enfranchisement:* Very early broad enfranchisement of the population was accomplished even before the country’s independence in 1907. Universal male suffrage was introduced in 1879. From 1866 to 1879, male suffrage was limited by some property qualifications.\textsuperscript{86}

*Behavior of the executive:* The executive pursued a neutral strategy of regulating and pacifying conflicts between labor and capital at a comparatively early point in time, in particular through the 1894 arbitration act, which introduced a compulsory conciliation and arbitration system for labor disputes. After a gradual development of increasingly excluding labor representatives from the decision making under this system in the early 1900s, the conservative government elected in 1912 completely abandoned its underlying principle of peaceful co-existence. It used the provisions of the act to crush the Waihi miners’ strike of 1912 and the Dockworkers’ strike of 1913. These forms of involvement in the realm of industrial relations were combined with efforts to combat socialist activity in general. Overall, for the entire time period under investigation, however, only limited or mild forms of repression occurred, and a predominant policy of neutrality was pursued. *Behavior of competing parties:* There was an extensive cooperation of liberals with labor representatives in the 1890s, and an according electoral mobilization of labor. Throughout the first decade of the 1900s, however, the failure of lib-lab cooperation came as the result of a

\textsuperscript{84} See the Swiss case study for a more extensive elaboration on the behavior of competing parties.  
\textsuperscript{85} See New Zealand (1840-1891) for the relevant constitutional documents.  
\textsuperscript{86} See Mackie and Rose (1983) for the nature of the electoral system.
divergence of interests within the earlier coalition. This development became most apparent through the disputes about industrial relations and the practices established by the 1894 arbitration act. 87

Australia (1890 to 1908)

Responsible government: The legal practice of the Westminster system provides for a prime minister and a cabinet accountable to the federal parliament, although the 1900 constitution did not officially mention the office of prime minister. 88 The House of Representatives and the Senate share policy making responsibility; the upper house has no undue influence and is in itself accountable to the public. The constitution equipped the governor-general as the representative of the British monarch, and the monarchy itself, with some extraordinary executive and legislative authority, such as the conduct of foreign affairs on behalf of Australia, and the right to reverse legislation. The first issue has led to debates regarding the extent of Australian sovereignty in foreign affairs, but is irrelevant for the question of labor inclusion. The second issue could have led to an impediment of executive accountability, but since these formal privileges were never exercised, a fully responsible government existed during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. Before the formation of an Australian federation in 1900, the principle of responsible government had already been well established in the Australian colonies individually.

Political Liberties: Freedoms of press, assembly, and association were guaranteed and effective already before independence in 1901. Furthermore, trade union activity was already officially legalized throughout the six colonies in between 1878 and 1901. Enfranchisement: Universal male suffrage without any plural voting privileges was introduced in 1902. Before independence in 1901, universal male suffrage (and women enfranchisement in South and Western Australia) was the norm, while in some colonies, limited forms of plural voting were practiced.

Behavior of the executive: Episodes of repression of union activity, such as during the 1890 maritime strike occurred, but the executive’s attitude toward labor conflicts was predominantly neutral. Behavior of competing parties: Lib-lab coalitions in Australia failed at a comparatively early point in time, compared to Britain, Canada, and New Zealand. Temporary and sporadic cooperation occurred before the 1890s, but eventually the established party system failed to incorporate labor elites and to mobilize labor electorally. 89

88 See Australia (1900) for the constitutional document.
89 See Docherty (2004, 337) for political liberties, Mackie and Rose (1983) for the electoral system, as well as Cole (1956) and Markey (1990) for a general discussion of the institutional environment and the behavior of entrenched elites.
France (1879 to 1905)

*Responsible government:* The Third Republic’s constitution of 1875 stipulates that parliamentary support is necessary for the installation of the executive and policy making. The upper house (Senate) shares this responsibility with the lower house (National Assembly), but is not in itself unaccountable or equipped with an undue influence. *Political Liberties:* Despite the establishment of a liberal constitution in 1875, restrictions on political liberties sanctioned by legal provisions enacted before this time, were not fully reversed before the mid 1880s. Freedom of the press became effective, when the press law of 1881 abolished newspaper taxes and other instruments of indirect censorship. Freedom of assembly and association became effective through the provisions of 1879 and 1884 respectively; the former discontinued earlier legislation outlawing socialist agitation and meetings; the latter legalized trade unions. Hence, with the exception of a brief period in the early 1880s, political liberties for labor were guaranteed and effective. *Enfranchisement:* Full and meaningful universal suffrage existed from 1848 to 1851 and then again after 1871. In between 1851 and 1870, democratic forms under the 1848 rules were retained, but elections were “managed”.

*Behavior of the executive:* Heavy repression of unions and socialist activity occurred in the aftermath of the Paris Commune and before the consolidation of the Third Republic in the mid 1880s. Singular events of repression occurred after that date, especially in response to anarchist-syndicalist activities. *Behavior of competing parties:* Both radical and moderate liberals were successful in mobilizing segments of the working class electorally. Organizational inclusion of labor was more limited, due to the elitist nature of all parties, as well as the split of the labor movement in unions predominantly determined to abstain from parliamentary politics, and a socialist party dominated by middle class professionals.

Canada (1894 to 1919)

*Responsible Government:* With the establishment of a Canadian Federation through the British North America Act of 1867 (later referred to as the Constitution Act), Canada adopted the Westminster model for its federal government, along with the British common law tradition and the absence of a single written...
A governor general represents the British monarchy as the formal head of state, but the prime minister and the rest of the executive are accountable exclusively to the lower chamber of parliament (House of Commons). The Senate as the second chamber was designed as a counter balance to the lower house, formed by representatives from the provinces and appointed by the governor general. Despite the Senate’s lack of accountability and its influence on policy making, effective responsible government had already gradually been accomplished before that date on the basis of precedent and common practice, rooted in the British parliamentary tradition.

**Political Liberties:** Before the Canadian charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted as an explicit bill of rights as the first part of the Constitution Act of 1982, the 1867 North America Act and the underpinning transfer of the Westminster model also transferred an implied bill of rights based on British precedent and practice to Canada. This legal vehicle was used by the federal government and courts to overrule provincial legislation infringing on fundamental political liberties. Regional variation in the effectiveness of political liberties left aside, as far as the federal level is concerned, political liberties were guaranteed and effective.

**Enfranchisement:** Electoral laws were the responsibility of the provinces, with the exception of the time period from 1885 to 1898. During the formative stage of the party, suffrage in all provinces had some restrictions based on income and property that resulted in an enfranchisement of about 15% of the population. A gradual increase of enfranchisement in the provinces occurred in between 1916 and 1920, until in 1921 universal adult suffrage was established.94

**Behavior of the executive:** Incidents of trade union repression and infringement on labor’s political activity occurred, but this did not amount to a permanent attitude of hostility and repression; the state was predominantly neutral. **Behavior of competing parties:** Several Lib-Lab coalitions in various organizational forms emerged before 1919, and so did electoral mobilization of workers through liberals. Other than in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, this pattern became less attractive to labor elites only after 1919, especially with the beginning of the Great Depression. However, the extent of electoral inclusion remained naturally limited, due to the restrictions inherent in the electoral system.

**Britain (1893 to 1918)**

**Responsible government:** Responsibility of the executive to parliament was gradually established throughout the 19th century. However, the role of the not democratically accountable upper house as a

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93 For the 1867 Act see Canada (1867).
94 See Docherty (2004) for political liberties, and Mackie and Rose (1983) for the nature of the electoral system.
decisive part of the legislative process ended formally only through the Parliament Act of 1911, which put the upper house in a position of only being able to delay legislation. Nonetheless, effective responsible government had already gradually been accomplished before that date on the basis of precedent and common practice.\footnote{See Anderson and Anderson (1967) and Bendix (1978) for a discussion of British gradualism and an overview of institutional development. See Hepple (1986, 305-306) for the gradual extension of responsible government and the role of the upper house.}

Political Liberties: Freedom of the press existed \textit{de facto} since 1869, when the last indirect restrictions were removed; special newspaper taxes had already been abolished in 1861. A \textit{de jure} guarantee of press freedom had been in place since 1695. The freedom of assembly and association was formally established in 1689, and practically guaranteed since 1848; the right to form unions specifically was granted in 1824. Enfranchisement: Gradual enfranchisement was marked by the Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884 as well as the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1918. Through this entire time period, some limited plural voting was practiced, but on a much smaller scale than in the cases of Austria and Belgium. In 1911, plural voting privileges were granted to 7\% of the population, while in Austria, these privileges were given to 40\% of the population in between 1896 and 1907.\footnote{See Anderson and Anderson (1967), Docherty (2004) and Goldstein (1983) on political liberties, as well as Mackie and Rose (1983) and Goldstein (1983) on enfranchisement.}

Behavior of the executive: Severe repression of trade union activity and strikes was the norm until the 1870s. After that date, comparatively mild incidents of repression continued, but, overall, the executive’s strategy switched to a policy of neutrality. Behavior of competing parties: Attempts of liberal and conservatives to appeal to the working class electorally were pursued in particular since the 1884 reform act. Around the same time, organizational inclusion of labor elites through Lib-lab candidates was practiced since the mid 1880s. Both attempts were only successful temporarily and on a limited scale.\footnote{See Goldstein (1983) for the behavior of the state executive and the nature of repression. For the behavior of competing parties, see the British case study for a more extensive discussion.}

Limited access to the political arena and repression as low inclusion of labor

The greatest amount of within group variation can be observed for the category of low labor inclusion. It is also the category with the largest number of cases. Out of all the twenty sovereign and sufficiently industrialized countries during the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, eleven can be classified as examples for polities that pursued a strategy of repression and limited incorporation of labor, i.e. low inclusion. The United States are the only example of highest inclusion during labor’s formative stage of entering the political arena. Six cases are characterized by higher degrees of inclusion, as institutionally liberalized
polities, and two more cases – Japan and Russia – are examples of lowest degrees of inclusion polities, which followed a path of complete exclusion and repression of labor.

Examples of low inclusion polities belong to one category, because in all of these cases, a generally hostile and repressive behavior of the state executive co-existed with some limited form of labor inclusion. This distinguishes examples of low inclusion from cases, where an institutionally liberal polity was present, on the one hand, and those cases, where labor was completely excluded from the political arena on the other.

While variation within the group of higher inclusion polities does not expose any systematic features that would allow for generalization, low inclusion polities can be categorized into two distinct subgroups. The defining feature of all low inclusion polities is the existence of one significant channel for labor inclusion, while at the same time, other institutional-formal dimensions remain closed, and the state executive behaves in a predominantly hostile manner. In this context, limited inclusion has occurred in two distinct ways: first, through the opening of the electoral channel, while limits on political liberties and the practice of responsible government continued; or secondly, through the guarantee of political liberties and the practice of responsible government, to varying degrees across cases, while the electoral channel remained closed. Denmark and Germany are the two examples for the first type of limited inclusion, while all remaining cases belong to the second subgroup.

In addition to the configuration of degrees of inclusion on different formal-institutional dimension within specific cases, examples of low inclusion polities are also different in terms of the overall extent of inclusion, i.e. the quantity of inclusion on each dimension. This variation is illustrated by the numerical indicators assigned to specific dimensions across cases in table 9, as well as the overall degree of inclusion resulting from these observations. Germany and Denmark are the examples for the first one of two versions of the low inclusion polity, in which the limited incorporation of labor is accomplished through higher enfranchisement, while the guarantee of political liberties and the practice of responsible remain precarious, at the low level of inclusion. The cases of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are all prototypical representatives of the second version of the low inclusion polity: during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, the electoral channel was inaccessible for labor, but responsible government was practiced, and political liberties were mostly formally guaranteed. Austria, Italy, Argentina, Hungary, and Spain belong to this same category, but the extent of inclusion on the dimensions of ‘political liberties’ and ‘responsible government’ was significantly lower. Moreover, during the formative stage of entry into the political arena, the Austrian environment of inclusion belonged to the category of low inclusion that lacked access to the electoral channel. However, the actual rise of the Austrian labor movement and the consolidation of the party occurred in a different environment, because the electoral channel was opened through the electoral reforms of 1897 and 1907.
Germany (1863 to 1891)

Responsible government: The 1871 constitution was not a popular constitution, but instead an agreement of the German states’ hereditary rulers. The popularly elected lower house (Reichstag) had no influence on executive appointments of the Emperor; important policy areas, in particular matters of foreign and military affairs, were excluded from its decision making authority. The upper house, appointed by state executives, and dominated by Prussia (where the workers’ vote in popular elections was not effective, due to a ‘curia’ based electoral system), had an undue influence on policy making.

Political Liberties: Before 1878, political liberties were precarious; pre-publication press censorship in Prussia ended in 1849, special newspaper taxes were removed in 1874, but other forms of indirect censorship continued until 1917. Trade unions were legalized in the majority of German states throughout the 1860s; in the two most industrialized states Prussia and Saxony in 1869 and 1861. However, both political and union activities of the labor movement lacked full legal guarantees. From 1878 to 1890, the Sozialistengesetz abolished freedoms of assembly, association, and press with respect to all political efforts of the labor movement; these stipulations did not apply to organizations that were designed to be active exclusively in connection with a specific impending election. With the discontinuation of the Sozialistengesetz in 1890, the pre 1878 legal status was re-established.

Enfranchisement: Universal male suffrage with a high age threshold (25 years) for elections to the German federal parliament (Reichstag) was implemented in 1871. However, before the 1867 elections to the Reichstag of the North German Federation, there was no German state and hence no federal elections: the majority of workers were only enfranchised through the Prussian Diet, with a ‘curia’ electoral system. Moreover, the German electoral system featured a grossly unfair apportioning of electoral districts (no change in the nature of electoral districts occurred from 1871 to 1918 despite higher population growth in the industrial centers).

Behavior of the executive: The attitude of the executive toward labor activities was hostile and repressive. This is particularly true for the role of the imperial government during the 1878 to 1890 period of the Sozialistengesetz. Before the 1871 foundation of the Empire, and to some extent thereafter, regional variation could be observed, with Prussia pursuing a particularly repressive policy, compared to the less repressive Southern states. Hence, the executive’s behavior toward labor was hostile, but the extent of

98 See Germany (1871) for the constitution of the Empire, and Prussia (1850) for the Prussian constitution.
repression was not as great as in the cases of Russia and Japan, because of a less repressive period before 1878, and regional variations across the federally organized German Empire.

Behavior of competing parties: The attitude of competing parties toward organized labor became predominantly hostile and exclusive during the 1870s. Before that time, some attempts at organizational inclusion of labor elites and electoral mobilization of workers through the liberal movement, and lib-lab cooperation occurred. Both of these routes of inclusion eventually failed. After the mid 1870s, there were no more significant attempts at organizational inclusion; electorally, during this time period, catholic and liberal parties successfully appealed to some segments of the working class, but these efforts were limited to the Southern states, and the catholic western provinces of Prussia.\(^{100}\)

**Denmark (1871 to 1888)**

**Responsible government:** The comparatively liberal constitution of 1849 was replaced by a significantly less democratic and inclusive new constitution in 1866. Legislative authority was shared by the monarchy and a bicameral parliament; the lower house (*Folketing*) was popularly elected, the upper house (*Landsting*) remained the domain of the propertied classes. Ministers remained accountable to the monarch, until the principle of ministerial accountability to the Folketing was de facto conceded in 1901. In between the 1870s and 1901, the monarchy continuously appointed conservative governments from the unaccountable Landsting, despite a majority of oppositional forces in the lower chamber. Hence, other than in Norway and Sweden, where only mild restrictions existed, Denmark continued to be characterized by a significant impairment of the principles of responsible government throughout the period of party formation.\(^{101}\)

**Political Liberties:** Both freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly and association were codified in the 1849 constitution, and remained in place after the constitutional revision of 1866. Prepublication censorship was prohibited through the 1849 constitution, and trade unions were formally legalized in 1849 as well. At the same time, however, a vague constitutional provision of 1849 also allowed for the dissolution of assemblies and associations. Enfranchisement: Danish electoral law since the 1849 constitution enfranchised a significant segment of the working class: from 1849 to 1915, in between 15 and 18 % of the population had the right to vote. The Danish franchise fell short of full universal male suffrage through minor property qualifications, a high minimum voting age of 30, and the explicit exclusion of

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100 The in-depth case study on the case of Germany elaborates and provides numerous sources for the behavior of the state executive and the behavior of competing parties.
101 For the Danish constitution of 1849 and the revised constitution of 1866 see Denmark (1866). See Cole (1956) for an assessment of the constitution and the changes in between 1849 and 1866. See Logue (1982) for a discussion of Danish political development since the 1880s.
personal service employees and recipients of poor relief from voting. Universal adult suffrage with only a slightly reduced voting age of 29 was introduced in 1915. Secret voting was introduced only in 1901; this represents an infringement on the effectiveness of the vote, but only a negligible one, compared to other types of infringements, such as plural voting, curia based voting systems etc.  

Behavior of the executive: Despite formal guarantees of political freedoms, the Danish government frequently resorted to acts of repression against socialist meetings, trade union activities and the socialist press. Repression and hostility toward labor were particularly pronounced during Jacob Estrup’s term as prime minister from 1875 to 1894. Behavior of competing parties: Before and during the party formation period, some limited cooperation of labor elites with the liberal Venstre took place. Due to the comparatively wide franchise, some attempts at electoral inclusion of workers into the liberal movement occurred as well.  

Belgium (1879 to 1894)  

Responsible government: The 1831 constitution established Belgium as a constitutional monarchy, based on the principle of popular sovereignty. Moreover, the upper house (Senate) was publicly accountable and without undue influence on decision making. Political Liberties: Freedom of the press was guaranteed through the liberal 1831 constitution, and became fully effective, after indirect impediments (special newspaper taxes) were removed in 1848. Freedom of assembly and association was guaranteed in the 1831 constitution as well, but it remained precarious, due to continuing legal restrictions on union activity: the reform of 1867 removed the Napoleonic laws, which made any activities of economic associations illegal, but allowed only mutual aid societies, and not unions, which were only fully legalized in 1921.  

Enfranchisement: The Belgian régime censitaire from 1830 to 1893 was based on a particularly high minimum tax requirement, and gave only 2.2% of the adult male population the right to vote. The new electoral system of 1893 introduced a plural voting scheme that continued to be in favor of wealthy and educated citizens: universal male suffrage, which gave 22% of the population the right to vote, was combined with the right to cast extra votes based on income and education. Unconditional universal male  

103 For assessments about the role of the state executive and competing parties see Landauer (1959a), Cole (1956), Logue (1982) and Wuthnow (1989)  
104 For the Belgian constitution of 1831 see Belgium (1931).
suffrage was only introduced in 1919. Therefore, while the right to vote was significantly extended in 1893 to include the entire working class, the effectiveness of the workers’ vote remained low.\textsuperscript{105}

Behavior of the executive: Despite constitutional guarantees, the executive’s attitude toward labor was predominantly hostile. While freedom of press, assembly and association were effective during ‘quiet’ times, the typical response to strikes, political demonstrations, and mass agitation was one of vigorous repression. This pattern became most apparent during the mass protests of 1871-73, 1886, and 1892, which were characterized by both political (universal suffrage) and economic demands (reduction in working hours). Behavior of competing parties: The Catholic Party and the auxiliary network of political catholicism exercised some influence on Belgian workers, and its religious appeal by definition was designed to cut across class divisions. However, due to the restrictive electoral system and the almost complete electoral exclusion of workers before 1893, electoral inclusion of workers naturally only occurred after this point in time, when the formative stage of the party was already completed, and organizational inclusion of labor elites remained limited.\textsuperscript{106}

\textbf{Netherlands (1878 to 1894)}

\textit{Responsible government:} The 1848 revision of the 1815 constitution established the principle of responsible government and executive accountability. After initial conflicts between the monarchy and a liberal parliamentary majority, the principle of responsible government became effective during the decade following on the implementation of the constitution. \textit{Political Liberties:} The 1848 constitution guaranteed freedoms of press, assembly, and association. Indirect censorship through special newspaper taxes was abandoned in 1869; trade unions were formally legalized in 1872. However, the right of assembly and association was not fully effective. Continued incidents of trade union repression, and dissolution of assemblies and meetings occurred on the basis of a constitutional amendment of 1855 that restricted the right of assembly.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Enfranchisement:} Along with the 1848 constitutional revision, limited suffrage with strict wealth and property qualifications was instituted. Qualifications were eased gradually through the reforms of 1887 and 1896, while in 1896, as a counter measure, the minimum age was raised from 23 to 25. Enfranchisement of the working class increased gradually over time, but remained minimal during the formative stage: it was

\textsuperscript{105} For the nature of the constitution, Belgian political development, and political liberties see Hamerow (1983) and Anderson and Anderson (1967). See Mackie and Rose (1983) and Goldstein (1983) for enfranchisement.

\textsuperscript{106} See Hepple (1986) and Cole (1956) for the behavior of competing parties, see Cole (1956) and Goldstein (1983) for the behavior of the state executive.

\textsuperscript{107} Netherlands (1815) contains the original 1815 constitution and the revisions of 1840, 1848, and 1887. See Docherty (2004, 179-180) for political liberties, Anderson and Anderson (1967) for overall institutional development, Goldstein (1983) on political liberties, enfranchisement, and the behavior of the state executive, as well as Cole (1956) for the behavior of competing parties.
only after the reform of 1896 that for the first time more than 10% of the total population had the right to vote. The number of enfranchised individuals increased from 11% in 1900 to 14% in 1905, and 16% in 1910. Universal male suffrage was introduced in 1917, female enfranchisement followed in 1919.

Behavior of the executive: Despite the formal guarantee of political liberties through the 1848 constitution, the state was far from appealing to labor or acting neutrally. Repression of trade union activity as well as political activities of labor occurred regularly before and during the stage of party formation.

Behavior of competing parties: The Catholics exercised some influence on Dutch workers in the Catholic southern provinces, and its religious appeal by definition was designed to cut across class divisions; however, due to the restrictive electoral system and the almost complete electoral exclusion of workers before the 1900s, electoral inclusion of workers only occurred after the completion of the party’s formative stage, and organizational inclusion remained limited. Moreover, compared to Belgium, the reach of Dutch catholicism was geographically limited, since only the two southern provinces North Brabant and Limburg were predominantly catholic.

Norway (1885 to 1891)

Responsible government: Norway was under the authority of the Swedish crown from 1814 to 1905, but maintained autonomy for the majority of its internal affairs, through the 1814 constitution. The gradual process of increasing emphasis on independence from the Swedish crown throughout the 19th century occurred in conjunction and interdependence with the extension of principles of constitutional government. A Norwegian parliament existed since 1814; its role was strengthened through the 1869 reforms that allowed parliament to decide by itself for how long to remain in session.

Beginning in 1884, the Swedish crown recognized the Norwegian executive’s exclusive accountability to parliament. The principle of responsible government, therefore, was established before the formative period of the party, and was only mildly impaired by the continuing dominance of the Crown in foreign affairs and the lack of safeguards, be it through tradition or constitutional amendment, that this principle would continue to be respected. This defines Norway (comparable to Italy and Sweden) as an intermediate case in between Germany on the one hand, where important aspects of responsible government were explicitly prohibited, and Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain, where the principle has either been codified constitutionally or has established itself already much earlier, throughout the 18th century, through common law practice.108

Political Liberties: The 1814 constitution contained provisions for the guaranteeing of fundamental civil and political liberties, at the time designed for the protection of the liberal, national, constitutional movement. Pre publication censorship was abandoned in 1814, and other restrictions on the press were mild; trade unions were never officially outlawed. Nonetheless, freedom of assembly and association were not fully effective before and during the formative stage of the party; the absence of a precise codification of labor’s political liberties was used on many occasions to interfere with its activities. Enfranchisement: Suffrage was extremely narrow until 1884, and even after the electoral reforms at that time (introduction of male suffrage with property qualifications), continued to exclude the majority of the working class (9.4% of the population were enfranchised in 1885). Enfranchisement was gradually increased after the completion of party formation: the introduction of nearly universal male suffrage (excluding individuals receiving public assistance) occurred in 1898. Females gained the right to vote, subject to the same limitation, in 1913; and universal suffrage was introduced in 1919.

Behavior of the executive: The royalist aristocratic state and the dominant landowning nobility were hostile toward labor’s demands, and even the liberal governments since 1884 did not pursue a fundamental policy change. Behavior of competing parties: Until the 1880s, the labor movement supported liberal politicians and the liberal ‘Venstre’ during a brief period of lib-lab cooperation. Later on, a consolidated social democratic party would cooperate with liberals (red-green coalitions), but these were instances of cooperation between distinct organizations and not examples of organizational inclusion. Since party formation occurred before meaningful enfranchisement of the working class, electoral inclusion of workers through liberal parties was impossible. With the expansion of the franchise since the late 1890s, liberals started to compete with the labor party for the workers’ vote, but this occurred only after the completion of party formation.

Sweden (1883 to 1897)

Responsible government: Accountability of the executive to parliament and the exclusive legislative authority of parliament were not formally guaranteed in the 1809 constitution, but instead achieved gradually throughout the 19th century. This distinguishes Sweden (as well as Norway and Italy) from Belgium and the Netherlands, where the principles of responsible government were codified in the initial liberal constitutions of 1831 and 1848. It also distinguishes Sweden (as well as Norway and Italy) from Britain (and by extension, the British dominions), where despite the lack of a formal constitutional guarantee, principles of responsible government had been gradually achieved already throughout the 18th century. The principle of responsible government was therefore not as firmly entrenched as it was in the
cases of Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but it had gained greater recognition than for instance in the case of Germany, where important elements of this principle were explicitly rejected.

The initial Swedish constitution, based on the 1809 “Instruments of Government” and the 1810 “Parliament Act”, gave parliament legislative authority, but also required royal sanction for every law; moreover, in the areas of economic and administrative policies, the monarch remained the sole legislative authority. The monarchy also remained the source of executive authority and ministerial accountability. The replacement of the estate based parliament with a bicameral legislature (first chamber representing the provinces and localities, second chamber popularly elected) in 1865 marks an important milestone in the development toward responsible government, as does the establishment of the office of prime minister in 1876. 109

**Political Liberties:** Fundamental political liberties were formally codified in the constitutional documents of 1809 and 1810. Freedom of the press became effectively guaranteed after the discontinuation of indirect, post publication censorship measures in 1838. Freedom of assembly and association on the other hand remained somewhat precarious during the formative period of the party. A ‘public safety’ law of 1864 was frequently used to undermine the freedom of assembly, both with respect to union and political activities until the 1890s, and trade unions were only officially legalized in 1885. **Enfranchisement:** With the introduction of a bicameral parliament in 1866 came an extremely narrow franchise, which extended the right to vote to only around 6% of the population, based on property qualifications. Universal male suffrage was introduced in 1907, but the minimum voting age was raised from 21 to 24. Universal adult suffrage based on a minimum age of 23 was introduced in 1921. 110

**Behavior of the executive:** Government policy toward the organized labor movement during the formative period of the party was predominantly hostile. Repression was particularly pronounced during the 1880s, when trade union gatherings and strikes were frequently broken up, socialist assemblies subjected to police obstruction, and claims of lèse majesté were used as the legal basis for arresting labor activists. **Behavior of competing parties:** Due to the narrow franchise before 1907, no significant attempts at electoral inclusion were possible during the formative stage of the party. Social Democracy embraced the liberals as a cooperation partner relatively early (red-green coalitions), and liberals made some attempts at cooperation with labor elites, but the local union-party organizations that provided the nucleus of the party eventually kept both movements organizationally distinct.

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109 See Sweden (1809) for the constitutional documents and Anderson and Anderson (1967) for an assessment of constitutional development.
110 See Docherty (2004), Goldstein (1983), and Mackie and Rose (1983) for political liberties and enfranchisement. See Wuthnow (1989) for the behavior of the state executive.
Austria (1863 to 1889)

**Responsible government:** Following on the conflicts between the neo-absolute Habsburg monarchs and the liberal movement during the post 1848 period and several constitutional experiments, the 1867 constitution provided the basis for a limited monarchical form of governance. Legislative authority was shared by a bicameral parliament and the Emperor. The lower chamber (Abgeordnetenhaus) was initially elected by regional assemblies, and only since 1873, subject to direct popular elections; the upper chamber (Herrenhaus) remained the domain of appointed aristocrats. Ministers were appointed and dismissed by the Emperor, although they were legally accountable to parliament at the same time. Hence, the principle of responsible government was acknowledged to some extent, but significantly impaired by the ongoing legislative authority of the emperor, the undue influence of a publicly unaccountable upper chamber on law making, and the lack of full ministerial accountability to parliament. 111

**Political Liberties:** The 1867 constitution contained a catalogue of guaranteed civil and political liberties, but neither freedom of the press nor freedom of assembly and association were effective during the formative period of the party. Special press taxation was abolished only in 1899, and other forms of indirect repression of the press continued until 1918. Unions were formally legalized in 1870, and freedom of assembly and association was conceded at times, but remained precarious until 1918, based on the application of the emergency clause contained in the constitution or the 1867 “public security” law.

**Enfranchisement:** The Austrian franchise remained extremely narrow throughout the entire formative stage of the party, with an average of less than 6% of the population having the right to vote in this time period. A fifth curia for all males over 24 years was established in 1897, thereby extending the right to vote close to universal suffrage, but the continuing practice of a curia based electoral system that remained in place until 1907, continued to impair the effectiveness of the vote. Universal male suffrage was introduced in German speaking areas in 1907.

**Behavior of the executive:** The executive’s response to labor’s political activities was one of particular hostility. Despite constitutional guarantees, assemblies and strikes were frequently broken up, often with excessively violent means. Repression was most pronounced from 1884 to 1891, when Vienna and its surroundings were placed under emergency police rule, but it was less prevalent in the early formative stage. **Behavior of competing parties:** During the early formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, some attempts at cooperation between liberals and the emerging labor movement occurred. Liberals

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111 For the variety of constitutional documents that are relevant here see Austria (1867) and Austria-Hungary (1867). See Anderson and Anderson (1967) for a discussion of constitutional development. See Goldstein (1983) for political liberties, executive behavior and enfranchisement. For enfranchisement, see also Mackie and Rose (1983). See Konrad (1983) for the behavior of the state executive and competing parties.
involved themselves in auxiliary labor organizations and sought to establish various forms of political cooperation with labor elites. Electoral inclusion remained impossible due to the nearly complete exclusion of workers from the electoral process.

Italy (1877 to 1895)

_Responsibility government_: The 1861 constitution of the Kingdom of Italy was based on the 1848 _Statuto Albertino_, the constitution of Sardinia-Piedmont. Despite the establishment of a bicameral parliament, the executive was initially appointed by and exclusively accountable to the monarch; the practice of executive accountability to parliament was achieved gradually throughout the remainder of the 19th century, and the office of prime minister, which was not prescribed in the constitution, was established. The Senate was not publicly accountable (it was appointed by the King), and shared policy making responsibility with the lower house. _Political Liberties_: The 1861 constitution guaranteed freedom of the press and freedoms of assembly and association in principle, but various means were used to limit these guarantees. Prior censorship was abolished since 1848, but indirect restrictions on the press were administered until the late 1890s. Constitutional guarantees regarding the freedom of assembly and association were regularly revoked before 1900, with a constitutional amendment of 1886 that allowed the dissolution of meetings and associations for vague reasons representing the most explicit form of infringement; moreover, unions were formally legalized only in 1889.\(^{112}\)

_Enfranchisement_: The original electoral laws of the Kingdom of Italy, based on the _Statuto Albertino_, were extremely restrictive; based on education and property qualifications, only around 2% of the population were enfranchised. The franchise was somewhat, but not yet significantly, widened to around 8% of the population in 1882 through the reduction of property and education thresholds. Near universal male suffrage with minimal restrictions was established in 1912 and full universal manhood suffrage followed in 1919. Throughout this entire time period, in addition to restrictive franchise laws, the effectiveness of the vote was impaired through informal discrimination, intimidation, and bribery, particularly in the South.

_Behavior of the executive_: The executive was predominantly hostile toward labor, but the most severe instances of repression occurred only after the establishment of the party in 1892. The most violent episode of repression happened in the context of the 1898 May day celebrations and demonstrations. Food riots in the South spread to the alienated poor of Milan and caused rebellion. The riots were violently suppressed

\(^{112}\) See Italy (1848) for the statuto albertino as the basis of the later Italian constitution. See Hamerow (1983) for an overview of constitutional development and the practice of responsible government, as well as Docherty (2004), Mackie and Rose (1983) and Goldstein (1983) on enfranchisement and political liberties.
by the army, on the basis of invoking military law. In response to these events, an intense period of prosecution of labor organizations, socialist leaders, and publications occurred. A substantial easing of repression and a predominantly neutral attitude toward labor occurred only through the liberal government under Giovanni Giolitti beginning in 1901.

Behavior of competing parties: Catholicism as a potential competitor for the allegiances of workers was not yet an electoral force during the formative stage of the party. Conservative as well as moderate and radical liberals were elitist in nature, and made no significant attempts to include labor elites organizationally. Electorally, it was the rigid electoral system, the elitist nature of both conservative and liberal forces, as well as the nationalist emphasis of Italian liberalism that prevented significant attempts at electoral inclusion. The interaction between the liberals and the socialists after 1900, during the Gilolitt era, represent forms of cooperation between two distinct organizations, but not organizational inclusion of labor elites. A unique feature of the case of Italy is the electoral appeal that the socialists exercised on the typically liberal constituency throughout the 1890s and the 1900s: here, liberals were electorally incorporated by the socialists, not the other way round.113

Argentina (1882 to 1896)

Responsible government: The 1860 Argentinean constitution was modeled after the US example. It established a presidential type of government, and a bicameral legislature, with two popularly elected houses: the chamber of deputies designed for popular representation and a Senate geared at the representation of the provinces. Responsible government therefore was formally guaranteed, but it was not fully effective, because of the de facto limited accountability of the executive, fostered by a prior tradition of authoritarian governance, the limited time period, during which the legislature was in session each year (May to September), and the centralization of power in the executive during the reign of the “Generation of Eighty” from 1880 to 1916. Political Liberties: The 1860 constitution formally guaranteed political liberties. At the same time, the executive had the ability to declare a ‘state of siege’ and suspend these liberties. Additional legal means designed to restrict labor’s political activities were only implemented after the formative stage of the party was already complete: the 1902 law of residence allowed authorities to expel unruly individuals, who were not Argentinean citizens (this applied to a large segment of the working class); the 1910 law of social defense was geared specifically at making anarchist propaganda illegal, but was also used against socialist agitation. During the formative period of the party, therefore, political

113 See Miller (1990) for the behavior of the executive and the behavior of competing parties, as well as Docherty (2004) and Goldstein (1983)
liberties were effective, and only impaired mildly through the potential threat of a ‘state of siege’, which was, however, not regularly implemented before the early 1900s.\textsuperscript{114}

Enfranchisement: The electoral laws were the responsibility of the national legislature, and were not formally codified in the constitution. Congress implemented universal male suffrage without property or education requirements, but delegated the specifics of electoral rules to the local level, through various pieces of legislation, enacted throughout the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. While the franchise was formally wide, the effectiveness of the vote was extremely limited before the 1912 reform of the electoral system, for two important reasons: First, while voting was naturally limited to Argentinean citizens, workers were actively discouraged from gaining citizenship and thereby gaining the right to vote. This was a particularly significant issue, since by 1895, 83\% of manual workers were foreign nationals. Second, the ruling oligarchy ensured continued electoral dominance through ‘managed elections’, similar to the practices in Spain and Italy, through an all encompassing system of bribery, fraud, intimidation, and local patronage.

Behavior of the executive: Authorities on the local, provincial, and national level acted with hostility toward labor’s demands, whenever they perceived labor activities as a threat. Extraordinary and particularly severe repression, however, occurred only after the formative stage of the party had already been completed, during the first decade of the 1900s. Party formation therefore took place in a hostile, but not in a permanently repressive environment. Behavior of competing parties: The elites of the ruling oligarchy were intent on keeping potential competitors out of the political process, and made no efforts to broaden their base of support by appealing to labor. The \textit{Union Civica Radical (UCD)}, formed in 1891, challenged the oligarchy, but it sought to represent the growing middle classes and elite dissidents.

Hungary (1868 to 1903)

\textit{Responsible government:} The 1867 \textit{Ausgleich} (compromise) between Austria and Hungary established the Dual Monarchy under the Habsburg monarch. Hungarian autonomy over its domestic affairs was restored, while the emperor and joint ministries remained in charge of foreign affairs, defense, and the administration of Austria-Hungary as a free trade area and customs union. The Hungarian prime minister and his cabinet were appointed by the Emperor, but at the same time accountable to a bicameral Hungarian parliament. The ongoing influence of the monarch in key policy areas and his more than symbolic influence on executive appointments as well as the undue influence of a publicly unaccountable

\textsuperscript{114} For the Argentinian constitution of 1860 see Argentina (1860). See Walter (1977) and Walter (1990) for comprehensive accounts of the legal environment, within which Argentinian labor and Argentinian socialism operated. See Spalding (1977) for the repressive 1902 and 1910 laws.
upper house seriously impaired the principle of responsible government. However, other than in the cases of Russia and Japan, through the constitutional codification and actual practice of parliamentary approval for policy making and executive appointments, at least a limited form of responsible government was established. 115

**Political Liberties:** The restoration of limited Hungarian self-governance in 1867 occurred in conjunction with the reinstatement of formally guaranteed political liberties. The liberties, however, were counteracted by restrictive combination laws and continued restrictions on the freedom of the press. Formal regulations regarding the freedoms of assembly and association went through different periods that were characterized by heavy repression, but also limited liberalization. Hence, other than in Russia and Japan, and similar to cases such as Germany, Italy, Austria, and even Spain, a complete and permanent absence of political liberties did not occur in the party’s formative period. In between 1867 and 1872, no repressive laws prohibiting infringements of constitutional liberties existed yet, since Austrian laws to this effect were not applicable anymore. In 1872 and 1884, respectively, somewhat ambiguous combination laws were passed, which formally strengthened the rights of assembly and association, also with respect to trade unions, but at the same time, provided for various legal mechanisms to disallow and suspend these liberties. In 1898, a more severe and repressive combination law replaced these earlier regulations. It was primarily geared at preventing rural workers from organizing, but also affected the urban proletariat. Pre publication press censorship was discontinued in 1867, but indirect forms of censorship continued throughout the entire period under investigation.

**Enfranchisement:** Suffrage for the Hungarian parliament remained extremely limited for the entire period under investigation, resulting in a near complete exclusion of the working class from the electoral process. In addition to limited suffrage, other methods were used to limit the effectiveness of the enfranchised population – most importantly, the unfair apportioning of electoral districts and the frequent use of manipulation and electoral fraud, especially under Liberal Prime Minister Kalman Tisza.

**Behavior of the executive:** The Hungarian nomenclature’s response to labor’s demands was of particular hostility. Despite constitutional codification and legal guarantees, socialist press and labor organizations were subject to heavy repression. A more liberal course toward urban workers was pursued temporarily after the implementation of the restrictive 1898 combination law, but eventually abandoned in favor of a restoration of the previous severe form of repression after 1907. However, what distinguishes Hungary from the most repressive cases of Russia and Japan is the comparatively early emergence of

115 See Austria-Hungary (1867) and Austria (1867) for the constitutional documents in the context of the Ausgleich. See Cole (1956) for a discussion of the constitutional arrangement and its effect on the labor movement.
formal labor organizations in a comparatively less hostile environment, from 1867 to 1872, as well as occasional significant periods of liberalization throughout the 1880s and 1890s.

Behavior of competing parties: During the formative period of the political struggle of the labor movement, none of the parties of the Hungarian nomenclatura, neither the various conservative factions nor Tisza’s liberals made any significant attempts to include labor elites. Electoral inclusion was impossible due to the particularly restrictive Hungarian franchise.  

Spain (1878 to 1888)

Responsible government: After many constitutional experiments and alternating forms of governance throughout the 19th century, the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1874, and a constitution was established in 1876. The inherent instability of the restoration monarchy led to Primo de Rivera’s coup in 1923. The 1876 constitution did not formally establish the offices of ministers and prime minister, but it was commonly accepted constitutional practice to nominate a separate executive that was primarily responsible for the conduct of government. The cabinet was nominated by the monarch, but at the same time responsible to parliament. Parliament was bicameral, with the lower house publicly accountable, while the upper house was explicitly designated as the domain of the oligarchy, the large landowners, the church, and the military. Therefore, while some elements of responsible government were present, this principle was seriously impaired by the continuing influence of the monarch on policy making and ministerial appointments as well as the undue influence of the upper house.

Political Liberties: The 1876 constitution established political liberties, but several legal mechanisms counteracted the effectiveness of these constitutional provisions. Pre-publication censorship had not been practiced since 1837, but indirect forms of censorship continued to be administered until 1883. Freedom of assembly and association was severely limited by legal provisions that counteracted the formal constitutional guarantee, and unions were only formally legalized in 1887.

Enfranchisement: The 1876 restoration monarchy initially abolished the previously established practice of universal male suffrage and established male suffrage with heavy property qualifications, until, beginning in 1890, universal male suffrage was restored. During all of the party’s formative period, therefore, the right to vote was extremely narrow. At the same time, in the time periods immediately before and after the party’s formation stage, the right to vote was more encompassing than anywhere else in

116 See Hitchins (1990) and Goldstein (1983) for an assessment of executive behavior, political liberties, and enfranchisement. For the latter, see also Mackie and Rose (1983).
117 For the 1876 Spanish constitution see Spain (1876). See Hamerow (1983) for an assessment of the constitution, and Anderson and Anderson (1967) for responsible government and executive accountability in particular.
Europe at the time. Even during these times, however, the Spanish system of managed elections in essence nullified workers’ right to vote by making their vote all but ineffective. An arranged alternation in government between the two oligarchic parties was upheld by local patronage, corruption, bribery and electoral fraud that made ‘managed elections’ essentially meaningless and completely ineffective. Hence, even when considering the eras immediately before and after the party’s formative period, enfranchisement was extremely limited.

Behavior of the executive: While formally, the political liberties for labor can be characterized as a complex of constitutional guarantees on the one hand and counteracting legislation on the other, comparable to cases like Germany, Italy, Austria, or Hungary, the actual behavior of the executive was one of the most repressive throughout all of Europe. Similar to Russia, Hungary, and Japan, the Spanish oligarchy was most intransigent toward the demands of the labor movement. This is the case, however, only for the time since the late 1890s; during the formative stage of the party, in particular after it turned from a secret to an open organization in 1882, the behavior of the executive remained hostile, but was not yet as intransigent as in the time period after the turn of the century. Behavior of competing parties: The oligarchic parties were extremely exclusive and made no effort to incorporate labor elites into their organizations. The wide franchise would have allowed for an electoral inclusion of workers, but the oligarchic parties pursued a strategy of arranged alternation in power and disenfranchisement of workers instead, which effectively excluded labor from the political arena.

Complete exclusion and repression as lowest inclusion of labor

Organized labor was subject to episodes or even a systematic pursuit of repression in all industrializing societies. But it was only in the cases of Japan and Russia that labor was completely excluded from political participation during its formative stage of entry into the political arena. These two manifestations of lowest degrees of inclusion are characterized by the absence of any significant channel for incorporation – inclusion is lowest on all existing dimensions. This distinguishes lowest inclusion from the adjacent category of low inclusion, which features not only a somewhat less hostile executive, but also the opening of at least one significant institutional channel for the incorporation of labor.

Lowest inclusion polities also tend to feature a more repressive and hostile state executive. In specific cases, however, it can be difficult to distinguish a particularly hostile attitude, indicative of lowest inclusion, from one that is merely “predominantly hostile”, indicative of low inclusion. Executive behavior was clearly hostile toward labor in all low inclusion polities, but, if anything, probably even more
repressive in the cases of Hungary and Spain, and for extended periods of time also in the cases of Germany, Austria, and Italy. What distinguishes the cases of Japan and Russia from these examples of low inclusion is the permanence of repression throughout the entire formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena. Nonetheless, this particular empirical assessment remains a difficult one to make, and the dividing lines within the category of low inclusion might be nearly as pronounced as those in between low and lowest inclusion polities. The variation in the domain of formal-institutional channels for labor inclusion is therefore a better suited set of indicators to distinguish between examples of lowest and low inclusion. Lowest inclusion polities are exclusionary vis-à-vis labor on all dimensions, while low inclusion polities have opened one channel for the incorporation of labor.

Japan (1901 to 1919)

Responsible government: The toppling of the Tokugawa shogunate that represented a somewhat centralized version of feudalism, in 1868, resulted in the reinstatement of imperial rule and the implementation of a set of sweeping reforms, commonly referred to as the “Meiji Restoration”. This adoption of western political, technological, and economic practices was geared at the preservation of Japanese independence and the political influence of its oligarchy; technological and economic modernization was combined with political centralization and authoritarianism.

The Imperial Oath of 1868 declared the goal of implementing a constitution, an announcement that resulted in the 1889 Meiji Constitution. The constitution was not understood and designed as a vehicle for inviting public deliberation, but rather as a tool for strengthening the base of support for imperial governance. The Emperor’s role was justified by reference to divine sanction; he held exclusive executive authority, and the cabinet was accountable to him alone. The bicameral parliament, composed of a publicly accountable lower house and an upper house of peers and individuals nominated by the emperor, shared legislative authority with the emperor; its support was required for passing the budget. The emperor, however, had the right to reinstate previous year’s budget without parliamentary approval as well as the right to dissolve the Diet at any point in time.

The Japanese case lies somewhat in between the case of Russia with its complete absence of the principle of responsible government on the one hand, and the cases of Austria, Hungary, Germany, Spain, and Italy.

118 See Goldstein (1983) for this comparative evaluation.
120 For the original Meiji constitution see Japan (1889). See Bendix (1978) for an assessment of Japanese political development. See Totten (1966), Ayusawa (1976), and Nimura (1990) for the legal environment, within which Japanese labor operated, as well as the behavior of the state and the behavior of competing parties.
and Denmark on the other hand, where a severely limited form of responsible government was established. The Japanese constitutional arrangement had the potential for limited responsible government, but it only realized this potential throughout the 1920s, when the oligarchic parties established "quasi-supremacy" (Pyle 1978) and in a limited form from 1890 to 1894, when the Emperor had to dissolve the Diet frequently, because of parliamentary opposition to the imperial budget. The time period from 1895 to 1918 is characterized by unchallenged imperial governance and an accommodation with the elite oligarchy represented in the Diet. The formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena is therefore characterized by the absence of even limited responsible government.

*Political Liberties:* Article 29 of the second section of the 1890 Meiji Constitution on the rights and duties of subjects contains provisions for the granting of political liberties, specifically the rights of speech, assembly, and association. However, Article 17 of the 1900 Peace Preservation Law, which was repealed only in 1926, explicitly suspends these rights for the labor movement and workers. Legislation that counteracts constitutional guarantees has occurred in cases such as Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Spain as well. However, what sets Japan apart from these cases is the fact that these measures permanently suspended political liberties of labor for the entire formative period under investigation, while in the other cases, the restrictive legislation only applied under certain circumstances and was never upheld for the entire formative stage. Despite constitutional codification, therefore, political liberties for Japanese labor were practically non-existent until at least 1926, and after that date, continued to be precarious.

*Enfranchisement:* The right to vote was limited through a minimum tax requirement that allowed only around 2% of the population to vote for the Diet’s lower house in between 1900 and 1919. After the tax requirement had been reduced from ten to three yen in 1919, still giving only 6% of the population the vote, universal male suffrage was announced in 1923 and introduced in 1925. This makes Japan the case with the lowest enfranchisement out of all the industrialized societies of the late 19th and early 20th century.

*Behavior of the executive:* The behavior of the executive was most intransigent toward the demands of the labor movement during the entire formative period. Any attempt at organization or journalistic enterprise, regardless of whether it represented political efforts or union activity, was almost immediately suppressed by the police. This applied to all factions of the labor movement, although the repression of the anarchist-syndicalist movement that was on the rise since 1903, was particularly violent. *Behavior of competing parties:* The oligarchic and elitist parties represented in the Japanese Diet from 1890 to 1918 made no effort at organizational inclusion of labor elites. The extremely restrictive franchise ruled out any noteworthy attempt at electoral inclusion.
**Russia (1883 to 1919)**

**Responsible government:** For most of the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, no formal constitution or other legal mechanism limited the autocratic rule of the Tsar. It was only through the ‘October Manifesto’ issued by the Tsar in 1905 in response to the revolutionary turmoil and the ‘Fundamental Laws’ of April 1906 that Russia received the equivalent of a constitution. This constitution established a bicameral parliament with a publicly elected lower house (Duma) and an upper house (State Council), whose members were nominated by the Tsar (exclusively after 1910; in between 1906 and 1910, half of the members were elected by the upper strata of Russian society, the clergy, the local zemstvo administration, and the Universities).

The Council of Ministers (cabinet) and its chairman (equivalent of a prime minister) were appointed by and exclusively accountable to the Tsar. The Duma had the right to question cabinet members and its approval was required for most laws and about 60% of the budget. However, the rights of the Tsar to disband the Duma, and to rule by decree when it was not in session, were frequently used until June 1907, to such an extent that the extremely limited provisions for responsible government were effectively nullified. Autocratic governance by the Tsar continued to be legitimized by an explicit reference to divine sanction. The ‘Stolypin Coup’ of June 1907 by then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pyotr Stolypin, with support from the Tsar, provided the legal basis for Duma majorities that would not question the Tsar’s right to rule in an unlimited fashion, thereby making the Duma entirely subservient to the executive branch. The Provisional Government established through the 1917 February Revolution pursued plans to establish a liberal constitution based on the principle of responsible government, but these were never realized as a consequence of the Bolshevik seizure of power in the October Revolution.\(^{121}\)

**Political Liberties:** No codification of political liberties existed before the 1905 October Manifesto and the April 1906 Fundamental Laws. The 1906 constitutional document contains references to political liberties of the Empire’s subjects, but does not formally guarantee them. Political liberties remain explicitly subordinated to simple laws and the primary legislative authority of the Tsar. This sets the case of Russia apart from cases like Germany and Italy or even Spain and Hungary, where political liberties could be (and often times were) suspended based on legislation invoking threats to public security. In the case of Russia, no such justification was necessary, and the guarantee of political liberties remained explicitly at the discretion of the autocrat. A very brief period of guaranteed political liberties occurred only under the rule of the Provisional Government that lasted from March to November 1917 as a consequence of the February

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121 See Russia (1906) for the Fundamental Laws, Russia (1906a) for the Duma statute, and Russia (1906b) for the statute of the State Council. For a discussion of the 1906 institutions and the October Manifesto of 1905 see Szetfel (1976). For a much more extensive discussion see the Russian case study in chapter 10.
Revolution. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks through the October Revolution, and the ensuing establishment of the Soviet Union, however, prevented a lasting implementation of political liberties.

Enfranchisement: Before the establishment of the Duma through the October Manifesto of 1905 and the April 1906 Fundamental Laws, there was naturally no enfranchisement, due to the absence of a parliament. The elections to the first and the second duma, in between 1906 and 1907 were governed by a wide franchise, but an extremely skewed curia based voting scheme that severely impaired the effectiveness of the vote. The most important measure of the ‘Stolypin Coup’ of 1907 was the implementation of even heavier restrictions on the electoral system that led to a further dramatic cut in the representation of workers and peasants.

Behavior of the executive: The particular extent of its intransigence as well as the permanent uninterrupted pursuit of repressive measures marks the behavior of the Russian executive as a case of particularly heavy repression, compared to other cases, such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries that were predominantly, but not permanently, repressive. With the exception only of a brief period of no more than two months - the ‘days of freedom’ beginning with the issuing of the 1905 ‘October Manifesto’ until the violent suppression of the Moscow uprising in December – the policy of the Russian autocracy toward labor was one of particularly heavy repression. Pre publication censorship was practiced until 1905, but even after that date, indirect forms of censorship drove the socialist press underground. Socialist gatherings and union activities, even those of non-socialist workers, met not only with legal and bureaucratic obstacles or police obstruction, but were frequently subjected to violent suppression by the police and the military. Behavior of competing parties: Some very limited attempts at cooperation between liberals and various socialist factions occurred during the rise of the liberal Zemtsvo movement, and in the context of the 1905 revolutionary turmoil. However, pronounced class and status divisions, reinforced in the arena of politics by a curia based electoral system, prevented significant attempts at organizational or electoral inclusion of workers by non-proletarian parties.
CHAPTER 6

FORMATIVE STAGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AND VARIATION IN MODELS OF LABOR POLITICS – A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

The institutionalization of different models of labor politics

The previous chapter of this dissertation investigated the background to the entry of organized labor into the political arena. A sufficient level of industrialization in an ‘internally’ sovereign polity was introduced as the prerequisite, the *sine qua non* condition, for the formation of social democratic parties or alternative models of labor politics. Varying degrees of labor inclusion were analyzed for the selected cases as the external environment, in response to which labor elites make their choices about how to advance the interests of their constituency in the arena of politics. The following chapters analyze the process through which labor inclusion as a set of external constraints informs the agency of labor elites in establishing social democratic parties or alternative models of labor politics across these cases. This investigation encompasses the case-specific formative stages of labor’s entry into the political arena throughout the 19th and early 20th century.

Based on the previously introduced typology, I distinguish between the following outcomes resulting from this formative stage: In one broad category of cases, the formation of social democracy as the dominant model of labor politics can be observed. More specifically, social democratic parties emerged as either an evolutionary or a quasi-revolutionary type of party, the latter of which came in two distinct variants: a ‘German’ parliamentary and a ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary model. In a second broad category, social democratic party formation failed, in favor of either one of these two alternatives: moderate syndicalism or insurrectionism, the latter of which occurred as a bolshevik and an anarchist-syndicalist type. My explanatory interest thus encompasses the formation of different types of social democracy and
the emergence of alternative models of labor politics, which coincided with the absence of social democratic parties.

The conclusion that a particular model of labor politics was formed ‘successfully’ or failed to emerge, as the dominant model, is based on the prerequisites for party institutionalization outlined before. ‘Successful’ party formation requires passing a minimum threshold of institutionalization in three distinct ways (cf. table 11): first, in terms of ‘systemness’, through the firm establishment of a widely accepted and effective organizational model; second, through the implementation of a dominant ideological model for the purpose of social integration; and thirdly, on top of these two ‘internal’ components, ‘external’ institutionalization is required, either through electoral representation, or, whenever the electoral channel is unavailable, through other forms of public reification. Table 11 provides an overview of outcomes resulting from labor’s entry into the political arena, with respect to these three indicators for institutionalization.

The accomplishment of ‘systemness’ is dated at the point in time, when a formal party organization on the basis of an accepted organizational model was established. Actual mass membership, regular communications between the center and the periphery of the party, as well as other factors that were introduced previously as defining features of ‘systemness’, might not have been in place at that particular point in time already. The point in time associated with systemness in table 11 thus represents either the accomplishment of systemness or the beginning of a straight path toward that goal. Regardless of the exact point in time, at which parties achieved systemness, what the overview in table 11 focuses on, is the kind of organizational model, within which that goal was realized. Methodologically, the achievement of systemness is linked to a party’s founding assembly, congress, or an organizational statute implemented at such an occasion. The according reference in table 11 is to the point in time, when a particular, widely accepted organizational model was initially established along the lines outlined above.

Social integration through the establishment of a dominant ideological form represents a second internal prerequisite for successful party formation. It occurred at the point in time, when the party agreed on its first dominant fundamental program. Ideological disputes and challenges to an existing agenda have also taken place after the completion of the formative stage. However, the importance of the party’s founding document lies in its role as an official doctrine and a point of reference for all following revisionist attacks. Programmatic documents and contributions to the debate about the nature of the first fundamental program that occurred during the formative stage of the party, before this program was agreed upon, did not have the same status and relevance. Any revisionist intent on changing the orientations and practices of the party would attempt to alter its dominant ideological form, expressed by a fundamental program. The process leading toward the establishment of a dominant ideological form was marked by various contradicting contributions that were not regarded as ‘official’ doctrine. This sets the ideological debates that occurred before the agreement on a founding document apart from later revisionist challenges.
The achievement of social integration through the establishment of a dominant ideological form is therefore dated at the point in time, where the party sanctioned a particular ideological and political agenda as its fundamental and official doctrine. The nature of these orientations is expressed most importantly through the program itself, but also through additional programmatic contributions of its creators. On top of these formal statements of some given ideological underpinning, the actual practice and strategy of the party are going to be considered as well. These observations are used as the underpinning for assessing the nature of the dominant model of labor politics across cases, whenever all the prerequisites for successful party formation were met.

The external institutionalization of social democratic parties in the late 19th and early 20th century has usually occurred through electoral representation. However, in some cases, where even after the completion of systemness and social integration, the electoral system would continue to exclude the working class, the electoral route remained inaccessible for labor. In these cases, it has to be determined, whether external institutionalization has occurred through social democracy’s decisive involvement in large scale events or continuous forms of extra-parliamentary activities. In those cases, where electoral participation was possible, either during or after the completion of the party’s formative stage, the party is considered externally institutionalized, after it has reached at least 10 % of the vote in two popular elections.

The formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena is conceived of as the time period from an initial organizational manifestation of labor politics that is directly linked to the following event of party formation, until the point in time, when the organization in question has achieved systemness and social integration. External institutionalization is a prerequisite for ‘successful’ party formation, but the organizational and ideological characteristics of the party, its very nature, are decided in the process leading to its establishment as an independent organization on the basis of a dominant ideological form. The point in time, when this first organizational manifestation occurred, is displayed in table 11, along with the data on systemness, social integration, external institutionalization, and the outcomes resulting from the process of labor’s entry into the political arena.

Varying degrees of institutionalization as an indicator for suboptimal choices by labor elites

The suggested theory and the following empirical analysis focus on qualitative variation across cases with respect to the formation of varying models of labor politics. This explanatory interest requires a particular political association to pass a minimum threshold of institutionalization, along the lines discussed above, to conclude that it was formed successfully. I am not primarily concerned with varying degrees of institutionalization or success, and I have argued previously that it is important to keep qualitative variation in models of labor politics analytically separate from varying degrees of success. In that context, however, I
also argued that limited success of some model of labor politics can serve as an indicator for the presence of a suboptimal choice by labor elites. Suboptimal choices result in the adoption of a generic model of labor politics that features a less rewarding ratio of costs and benefits in a particular environment of inclusion than at least one better suited model. Limited degrees of success or institutionalization are a consequence of such a misalignment between external environment and selected model.

The suggested theory depends on whether it is possible to establish a causal relation between the overall degree of inclusion and various outcomes of labor politics through the agency of labor elites. Suboptimal choices of labor elites understood along these lines occur, when a decision for a suboptimal species or type of model is made. Within the group of quasi-revolutionary parties, an additional more fine grained distinction between different variants of the generic type was added. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents the optimal response to an environment of low inclusion, but each one of the two quasi-revolutionary variants is better equipped to respond to a particular configuration of low inclusion. In these cases, even when labor elites made an optimal choice in terms of the fundamental approach into the arena of politics, by embracing the quasi-revolutionary type of social democracy, there are instances, where adopting a different variant of this generic type could have accomplished greater success in mobilizing the labor constituency and in institutionalizing a specific organizational model. The theoretical propositions about the causal effect of labor inclusion can be strengthened through an additional more fine-grained analysis of variations within species or types of labor politics, especially for the group of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties.

The provision of some model of labor politics is an antecedent to the mobilization of the labor constituency. Internal and external institutionalization vary already in the very early stages of party formation, but the effects exercised by the decisions of labor elites on varying degrees of success accomplished with their selected model can only be fully observed after the process of party formation is completed. The impact of suboptimal, compared to optimal choices, on the degree of social democratic institutionalization across different cases is therefore studied for the time period after the establishment of some organizational and ideological approach noted in table 11.

Varying degrees of success can be identified for all three elements of institutionalization discussed above. But the extent of systemness and the extent of external institutionalization, when it occurred through electoral representation, lend themselves more readily to a systematic comparative assessment. To that end, I am going to use comparative data on party membership for an evaluation of varying degrees of systemness, and social democratic parties’ election results for the extent of external institutionalization. Variation across cases with respect to the extent of social integration through the dominant ideological underpinning of the party and the extent of external institutionalization in those cases, where the electoral
route was inaccessible, cannot be easily quantified. I am going to take these issues into consideration throughout the specific case studies and the concluding discussion of suboptimal agency by labor elites.

Moreover, when comparing varying degrees of success with respect to external institutionalization and systemness, the pervasiveness of industrialization should be taken into account. This factor has previously been identified by reference to variation across cases regarding the number of industrial workers and their share in the entire economically active population. Controlling for the size of the industrial working-class across cases allows us to compare the relative success in mobilization and systemness. It should also be noted that data for these two indicators are not available at the individual level. It is therefore not possible to isolate the support for the party by labor as the targeted constituency. Qualifications of the results inferred from aggregate data along these lines can therefore only be made through an additional interpretation on a case by case basis. The comparative data on external institutionalization and systemness presented here will be invoked frequently throughout the following case studies. Chapter 11 contains a systematic analysis of suboptimal choices made by labor elites on the basis of these comparative figures and the additional discussion throughout the preceding case studies.

Tables 12 and 13 display the election results of social democratic parties throughout and immediately after their respective formative stages in the political arena. These data are complete in that they encompass all the cases, in which the electoral route became accessible to social democratic parties, either during or in the aftermath of labor’s formative stage in the arena of politics. The average electoral support calculated for table 12 is designed to measure the success of external institutionalization after the completion of the internal prerequisites for party formation – systemness, and social integration through a dominant ideological model. Due to varying degrees of labor enfranchisement across cases at different stages in the formation of social democracy, the presence of at least higher electoral inclusion is another prerequisite to mark the beginning of the period, for which average electoral support is calculated. Thus, the stage described by this figure begins after the establishment of an organizational and ideological model (cf. table 11) and the presence of at least high electoral inclusion (cf. table 9).

Table 13 displays the ratio of electoral support and industrialization. It controls for the overall size of the industrial working-class in order to produce a more adequate indicator for the relative success of external institutionalization across cases. The figure for a party’s average electoral support is derived from table 12. The value for the extent of industrialization, understood as the share of industrial workers in the entire economically active population, is derived from table 8. The given cases fall into different categories of electoral performance, based on the ratio between these two factors. Four cases are ‘overperformers’, because their average electoral support is larger than the number of workers in the entire economically active population. The largest number of cases are ‘adequate performers’. Their average of electoral support is lower than the worker share in the population, but larger than half of that value.
‘Underperformers’ fall below that threshold. The electoral performance of social democracy in the United States and Canada is so low that neither one of these cases qualifies as having passed a minimum threshold of external institutionalization.

The same analytical procedure is applied to social democratic membership figures as an indicator for varying degrees of systemness. Table 14 displays the absolute values for party membership in those cases, for which reliable data are available. Table 15 controls for the size of the industrial working-class. The indicator for systemness is calculated as the ratio of party members and the absolute number of industrial workers present in some given case.

The following analysis is going to focus on qualitative variation across cases with respect to the formation of different models of labor politics. But throughout these case studies, variation in degrees of success or institutionalization, along the lines discussed here, will be taken into account as well. Most importantly, limited success, both in terms of external institutionalization and systemness, will be employed as an indicator for the presence of suboptimal choices by labor elites. To that end, the data displayed here will be embedded into the respective case-specific environment. The following case studies are going to trace the process of establishing varying models of labor politics across the selected set of cases. The analysis is organized along variation in outcomes: the first section entails the quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type, while the second one discusses the formation of evolutionary social democracy. The third section deals with those cases that saw the absence of social democratic party formation, along with the embrace of moderate syndicalism, and the final one focuses on the absence of social democracy, where it coincided with the embrace of insurrectionist models. Following on these case specific analyses, the final chapter 11 offers a systematic assessment of suboptimal choices by labor elites on the basis of the case by case assessment and the comparative data outlined above.
CHAPTER 7

THE FORMATION OF QUASI-REVOLUTIONARY
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

The German SPD as the model party of parliamentary socialism

Much has been written about the German SPD as the model party of socialism, the first mass party of the working-class, the engine of the Second International, and the intellectual forerunner of European and global social democracy. I am not going to argue that these labels are fundamentally inadequate, but the following analysis of social democratic party formation in Germany attempts a more nuanced assessment, resulting, most importantly, from the benefit of a systematic comparative perspective. This programmatic statement applies to two distinct, yet related, themes implied by those commonly used terms: first, the process of social democratic party institutionalization itself, and the way in which it created an initially unique response to a specific environment of labor inclusion in Germany; and secondly, the complex process through which this particular model of labor politics was diffused to and adopted in other cases, a number of which did not share some of the crucial features that made the SPD an optimal choice in the context of the German environment of labor inclusion.

The latter of these two points is an important aspect in the analysis of many of the remaining cases, and then the comparative investigation of optimal vs. suboptimal choices in chapter 11. At the same time, a brief overview of the export of knowledge with a focus on the country of origin (i.e. Germany), rather than its recipients, will already be part of the analysis in this chapter. The first aspect, however, is naturally the focal point of this case study: to understand, in the context of the theory suggested here and the comparative framework, in which it is embedded, the nature and the determinants of social democratic party formation in the case of Germany. The formative stage of labor’s entry into the arena of party politics began in 1863, through the foundation of the ‘Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV)’. It resulted
in ‘social integration through the adoption of a dominant ideological model’ with the passing of the quasi-revolutionary Erfurt program of 1891. ‘Systemness’ on the basis of a dominant organizational model was accomplished through the statutes enacted by the SPD at the Halle party congress in 1890, and ‘external institutionalization’ was achieved during the same year, as a result of the impressive election results of the 1880s (see table 11).

This issue of party institutionalization in Germany is conceptually distinct from the external diffusion of the SPD’s model, but at the same time, the two processes are closely related to one another. The quasi-revolutionary orientation of the SPD was an optimal response by labor elites to an environment of low inclusion. A wide variety of other cases had this particular degree of labor inclusion in common with Germany during their respective formative stages of labor’s entry into the political arena: Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Argentina, Hungary, and Spain (see table 9). The universal defining elements of quasi-revolutionary social democracy – pragmatic efforts at organization building, accommodation with the entrenched elites, combined with a ‘proto-religious’ salvation perspective and revolutionary rhetoric – are therefore also universally applicable as elementary pillars of optimal responses to an encountered environment of low inclusion across those cases.

The unparalleled success of the SPD in election results and membership acquisition until well into the late 19th century (cf. tables 12 and 14) was a crucial underpinning for its standing as the ‘model party’, in addition to the leading role of its intellectuals in the ideological discourse and the diffusion of socialism. It is elementary to acknowledge that the SPD’s success, or in other words, the extent of its institutionalization, was the result of having adopted a specifically ‘German variant’ of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, whose characteristics have to be distinguished conceptually from those above mentioned universal features that apply to both the German and the Belgian variant of the quasi-revolutionary party type alike. The ‘German variant’ emphasizes electoral mobilization. It is the optimal response of labor elites to a particular version of the low inclusion polity, in which the electoral channel is effectively opened for worker participation, while the remaining two institutional avenues, political liberties and responsible government, remain precarious.

The vast majority of the other low inclusion polities, with the exception only of Denmark, were characterized by a different version of low inclusion, one in which limited access to the political arena was implemented by providing certain amounts of political liberties to workers and by practicing at least a minimum degree of responsible government, while the electoral channel remained shut down. In all these cases, the universal features of quasi-revolutionary social democracy represented the pillars of an optimal response by labor elites. However, given the absence of any effective worker enfranchisement, the German ‘parliamentary’ variant was clearly suboptimal, compared to the ‘Belgian’ variant, which emphasizes the extra-parliamentary mobilization of workers. The ‘Belgian’ variant, however, was only adopted in
Belgium, Sweden, and Norway, which is the reason for why the diffusion of German social democracy was at the same time a blessing and a curse for social democracy in the remaining cases of Italy, Argentina, Spain, and the Netherlands: it relayed some of the universal features of a generally optimal model of labor politics to these countries, but at the same time, triggered the adoption of a particular variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that was suboptimal.\footnote{122}

On the basis of these considerations, the formation of German social democracy will be analyzed through the following steps. In the first place, I am going to discuss industrialization and labor inclusion in Germany as the background for the emergence of labor politics. I will elaborate on the previously introduced comparative sketch of cross country variation in labor inclusion, and provide an analysis that includes a more extensive investigation of over time developments and geographical variation within Germany. In this context, I will also treat the specific nature of industrialization in Germany and the way in which it is related to the emergence of the German environment of labor inclusion, and the characteristics of its working-class.

Secondly, I am going to analyze the formation of the SPD as the optimal response to this context of low inclusion and the way in which the choices of labor elites interacted with that encountered environment. This analysis will trace the institutionalization of the party in those three respects that have previously been introduced as the prerequisites for successful party formation: ‘social integration through the emergence of a dominant ideological model’, as well as the establishment of organizational coherence or ‘systemness’, and the accomplishment of ‘external institutionalization’. The following investigation will outline, how the organizational and ideological features that eventually emerged as dominant within the party and the labor movement at large prevailed against a number of competing approaches. This includes, in chronological order of their appearance, the state affirming and non-marxist Lasalleanism, the proto-anarchist group “Die Jungen”, and eventually the early manifestations of a new ‘evolutionary’ socialism, which at the time emerged largely through the daily work of local and regional practitioners, while still lacking the ideological superstructure that would only be provided later on by Eduard Bernstein.\footnote{123}

\footnote{122}Labor elites in Denmark made an optimal choice by adopting the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Austrian social democrats, as remains to be shown in more detail later on, made an initially suboptimal choice. However, as a result of the late growth of the Austrian working-class and the opening of the electoral channel through the electoral reforms of 1897 and 1907, the nature of labor inclusion in Austria changed in such a way as to make it the optimal environment for the German model at that later point in time.\footnote{123}See Bernstein (1899)
German industrialization and the nature of labor inclusion

Industrialization and labor inclusion are interrelated with one another through a complex variety of causal linkages (see figure 2). The nature of labor inclusion in Germany, as in all other cases, is the result of a long term path of political development. That being the case, the pressure on institutional adaptation that contributed to the implementation of a specifically German type of labor inclusion depended most crucially on the ultimate step along this path. At that point, it was the desire to enable an industrial mode of production and a market based economy that created the need for institutional adaptation, which, inter alia, resulted into a specific response to the question of labor inclusion. In this first one of two causal directions, it is industrialization, or more generally socio-economic change, which affects the nature of labor inclusion. A ‘liberal’ and gradual approach to industrialization through private initiative and the use of the existing small scale forms of capital provision in Britain resulted in an equally gradual growth of the working-class, both of which greatly enhanced the opportunities for a gradual liberalization of the political environment, into which labor was born. Rapid industrialization and the need to substitute for “missing prerequisites” through greater state involvement in the cases of Germany, Russia, and Japan co-emerged with a significantly more authoritarian approach toward labor.124

Although the nature of labor inclusion is thereby embedded in varying approaches to foster and regulate industrialization, the nature of industrialization, as I argued extensively before, does not in itself determine the model of labor politics that is adopted in a particular case. Entrenched elites, both the state executive and competing parties, respond to the advent and progress of industrialization in distinct ways that are not pre-determined by the character of industrialization or the initial political environment that enabled the process. The cases of Germany and the United States are good examples to illustrate this point. Both of them were characterized by rapid industrialization and an activist role of the state during the most crucial stages of development. But on this background, entrenched elites in the US created an environment of highest inclusion, while in Germany, labor entered a political arena that was characterized by low inclusion.

From the opposite perspective, political development and the nature of labor inclusion also affect the specific pattern of industrialization. First, and most importantly, as Gerschenkron (1962a, 31) put it, “certain major obstacles to industrialization must be removed and certain things propitious to it must be created before industrialization can begin.” The creation of institutions conducive to industrialization is therefore the prerequisite for the process itself, and as such, for the emergence of an industrial working-

124 See Deane (1996) and Cameron (1993) for the conventional wisdom on English industrialization, see Bendix (1978) and Moore (1967) for classic assessments of British political development from a comparative perspective.
class and the entry of labor into the arena of politics. It is along these lines that industrialization, on the basis of the political choices that enabled it, represents the *sine qua non* condition for the emergence of social democracy or alternative models of labor politics.

On top of that, in the second place, the specific character of the institutions that are established across cases in order to enable industrialization also creates variation in the character and pervasiveness of industrialization as well as the qualitative features and the size of the working-class that emerges from this background. Among other factors, the size of the working-class, which depends on the logical priors just discussed, naturally affects the mobilization potential for any model of labor politics in some given case. My analysis of party formation in the case of Germany and elsewhere, however, is not primarily interested in the extent of mobilization success. I argued previously that it is important to distinguish this issue from the choice for some model of labor politics. The extent of mobilization success that workers will eventually provide to a previously adopted model (by labor elites) needs to be conceptually separated from the choice itself.

This being said, the potential for mobilization success that some model of labor politics provides in some given environment is an important consideration of labor elites in their decision-making process about which model to adopt. The benefits provided by some given model depend crucially on the extent of mobilization labor elites expect to accomplish with that model of labor politics in a given environment of inclusion. It is along these lines that the nature of class formation (cf. Katznelson 1986) enters the causal argument presented here. The expectations of some given working-class constituency toward the adoption of some model of labor politics are shaped by the nature of labor inclusion, which in itself is interrelated with the character of industrialization. In the case of Germany, these expectations of the broader labor constituency are the result of an environment of low inclusion that combines explicit and harsh repression with some limited form of incorporation, through the institutional channel of enfranchisement.

The specific focus in the following assessment of German industrialization and labor inclusion is therefore on these previously mentioned issues. First, throughout the following section on the development of industrialization in Germany, I am going to analyze the process through which the institutional choices occurred that created a ‘window of opportunity’ for the emergence of some model of labor politics. On top of that, I will trace the further development and specific character of German industrialization. The section following after that is concerned with the nature of labor inclusion in Germany, as it emerged through a long term process of political development and in interaction with the previously outlined process of industrialization. I am going to show, how on the basis of the unique German path of industrialization a specifically German environment of labor inclusion was created. I am also going to include a discussion about how this environment affected the expectations of the labor constituency toward the adoption of
some model of labor politics by German labor elites. The specific assessment of labor inclusion will provide an overall evaluation as well as an account for over time and geographical variation.

The enabling, development, and character of German industrialization

Industrialization and therefore the emergence of an industrial working-class and its entry into the political arena depend on a number of prerequisites. As outlined in much detail earlier on, this includes the provision of capital, as well as access to the necessary technological and scientific innovations. However, most crucially in the present context, industrialization requires a number of institutions, which are the result of political choices: the protection of private property, the abolition of serfdom, and the removal of feudal obstacles to trade, such as internal tariffs and guild privileges. The successful adoption of these institutions identifies the beginning of a ‘window of opportunity’ for industrialism, the emergence of an industrial working-class, and the formation of some model of labor politics.

It is characteristic for Germany, contrary to the British and French examples, and somewhat comparable to Japan and Russia, that these institutions were implemented in response to external pressures, both military and economic, and fueled by the desire to ‘catch up’ with its more advanced rivals. Wehler (1987) called Germany a case of ‘defensive modernization’, because industrialization and the implementation of the market principle were combined with the continuing dominance of feudal elites, social traditionalism, and only limited political modernization. The opportunities for economic development and military potential through industry demonstrated by England as the first industrializer were a constant companion to German efforts at industrial development. The most direct push toward the removal of feudal vestiges in the arena of political economy, however, occurred through the French influence.

The Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic reforms in Germany between 1805 and 1819 fostered the adoption of institutions conducive to capitalism and industry in a variety of ways. First of all, the territorial consolidation of German states by Napoleon was a crucial step toward the creation of a single market devoid of obstacles to trade and commerce. Secondly, the revolutionary ‘code civile’ and ‘code of commerce’, which contained those above mentioned institutions necessary for industry and capitalism, also spread to Germany, albeit with slight variations across different territories. In those areas that were directly under French control, the Napoleonic reforms were implemented almost without exception. This included the left bank of the Rhine and parts of Northern Germany. The “Confederation of the Rhine”, which covered most of the remainder of Germany, with the notable exceptions of Austria and Prussia, saw the implementation of the vast majority of these reforms. Prussia itself, in the fourth place, was not directly
affected by French reforms, but implemented a far reaching set of modernizing measures along the same lines, also referred to after their primary initiators as the “Stein-Hardenberg reforms”.

These crucial steps led to a gradual abandonment of economic feudalism and the consolidation of countless micro-states into larger territories. However, from the perspective of Germany as a whole, internal obstacles to trade and commerce did not cease to persist, due to the continuing presence of political fragmentation, albeit less extensive than before, along with tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The lack of a consolidated German state also made an activist development strategy more difficult. On this background, it is the formation of the German Zollverein (customs union) that marks the most important watershed for the creation of a single market as the prerequisite for large-scale industrialization. After its foundation in 1833, the union would gradually incorporate all the independent German states that were to become part of the German Empire in 1871. Under the leadership of Prussia, it would engage in a project of removing tariff barriers, guaranteeing the freedom of trade and commerce, and establishing a common external tariff. The creation of the North German Federation in 1866 and the actual foundation of the empire in 1871 are crucial steps on the road to political unification, but the creation of a single market as the removal of one of the most important sets of obstacles to industrialization is inextricably linked to the creation of the Zollverein.

The old guild system that represented another obstacle to industrialization had already eroded throughout the first half of the 19th century. It took until the 1860s, however, before the vast majority of German states, most notably Prussia in 1866, formally abandoned this residue of pre-modern economic organization through the implementation of new commercial codes (‘Gewerbeordnung’). The process of economic modernization in Germany thus occurred gradually, and with some significant geographical variation. The abolition of serfdom in Prussia in 1806 marks the first most apparent step along this path, as one among the many Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic reforms in between 1805 and 1819, followed by the creation of the Zollverein in 1833, the North German Federation in 1866, and the Empire in 1871, as well as the modernization of commercial codes and the abolition of the guild system throughout the 1860s.

The conventional wisdom about the development and the character of German industrialization on the background of these institutional prerequisites centers on the crucial role of large scale banks and cartels as well as the rapid growth in output and in the size of the working-class, both of which are the result of conscious political decisions by an activist state. Along these lines, German economic history in the 19th century is portrayed as an explosive development from a predominantly rural and agrarian economy in the first half of the 19th century to the leading industrial nation by the beginning of World War I. The lack of

125 See Guttman (1981)
126 See Cameron (1993) for a summary of the conventional wisdom on German industrialization.
any significant development in that earlier period is clearly the result of political fragmentation, and more generally the lack of institutional prerequisites, along with the insufficient communication and transportation infrastructure that resulted from the absence of a consolidated state capable of engaging in a concerted development effort. The resulting pattern of economic growth is therefore characterized as one that was sluggish to non-existent before the creation of the *Zollverein* in 1833 and then rapid to explosive throughout the second half of the 19th century, most apparently toward the end of that time period.

With respect to the specific character of German industrialization, the emphasis is on the activist role of the state. This entails, first of all, direct investments in infrastructure (communication and transportation) after 1833. However, most importantly, the role of the state was one of consciously creating the institutional prerequisites for a development strategy that placed primary importance on the role of large scale banks and cartels. Harley (1991) outlines this uniquely German, “corporatist”, approach to industrialization, by contrasting it to the British “liberal” and the Russian ”authoritarian” strategy. Industrialization in Britain could rely on a mature system of finance. Capital was provided to industry through the mobilization of existing wealth, the reinvestment of profits and a conventional system of short term credits. The absence of these “prerequisites” made such a strategy impossible in the cases of Germany and Russia. In Russia, the state stepped in directly to enable the provision of capital, by mobilizing savings, through financial guarantees to firms, and through direct investment in industrial facilities.

The nature of German “corporatist” industrialization derives from an intermediary position between a more advanced Britain and a more backward Russia. Rather than relying on direct state involvement, as in the case of Russia, to substitute for the missing British “prerequisites”, Germany developed an institutional innovation, through the creation of investment banks that financed industrial establishments directly by accepting the long term liabilities of firms engaged in industrial production, and by becoming involved in the actual management of these firms. This gave banks an unparalleled strategical position in the organization and regulation of industry, and helped to create large integrated firms and cartels within branches of industry, in order to keep the risks to investment banks at a minimum. The formation of cartels was initially a specific response to the economic crisis of the early 1870s, but they remained in place, when growth picked up again in the early 1890s, and the crisis was over. The emergence of cartels is contingent on the strategical intentions of the state, as they were never outlawed in Germany during this time period, while they were explicitly illegal in cases such as Britain or the United States. Per court decision of 1897, cartels even accomplished the status of a binding contract under civil law (cf. Berghahn 2005).

Newer research on the character of German industrialization has attempted to qualify some aspects of this conventional wisdom. The first challenge to the conventional wisdom concerns the role of banks and cartels. Burhop (2006) exploits new data sources in order to analyze the causal relation between banking and economic performance in Germany from 1851 to 1913. He comes to the conclusion that there is only
weak evidence for an effect of bank assets on overall economic performance. However, with respect to the modern sector of the German economy, he finds that large scale banks played a key role in the provision of capital, and the promotion of industry, especially during the early stages of German industrialization. Along these lines, a number of recent contributions, without entirely dismissing the importance of large scale forms of economic organization, shift the emphasis from large banks to the role of producers, as well as private and small banks in the promotion of industrialization.

Despite these and a few other minor qualifications, the conventional conclusions about the character of German industrialization are relatively well established. German industry was characterized generally by a significantly more ‘large-scale’ form of organization, compared to the earlier industrializers. This entails the prevalence of cartels, the key role of investment banks, and the resulting close connection between banking and production. As a result, German firms were particularly large, the output per firm was high (almost twice as high as in Britain by the early 1900s), and heavy vertical integration was the norm. Horizontal integration was equally pronounced, because of the prevalence of cartels: there were 8 cartels in 1875, 70 in 1887, 143 in 1895, by the turn of the century 300, and 673 in 1910.127 Goods for industrial production, such as chemicals, electronics, coal, iron, and steel, were significantly more important than consumer goods, most importantly textiles. This represents a marked difference to the earlier industrializers of England and France, but also to the Japanese pattern of ‘later’ development.

This specific character of German industrialization has often been analyzed with respect to its implications for economic performance, and as the background for Germany’s rise to industrial pre-eminence in the early 20th century. It has been argued that apparently, under certain conditions, “it pays to be late”.128 This is not my concern here, as my focus is on the implications of the German character of industrialization for the nature of the working-class and the adoption of some model of labor politics. First of all, in the theory suggested here, labor elites take the demands of their constituency regarding the adoption of some model of labor politics into account, as one aspect of their decision-making process. The overall benefits expected by labor elites from the adoption of some given model of labor politics depend crucially on the expected mobilization potential provided by that model in a particular environment of labor inclusion. In this context, the character of German industrialization reinforced the effects of labor inclusion in the political domain. The strictly bureaucratic-hierarchical, some even say militaristic, organization of industry mirrors the approach to labor inclusion in the sphere of politics. Berghahn (2005, 27) identifies this specific form of economic organization as a “well organized authoritarian producer capitalism”, in which the rules and patterns of decision-making are borrowed from the “General Staff” model of the

127 These figures are presented by Berghahn (2005).
128 See Landes (1991) for a discussion.
Prussian army. It should be noted, however, that in addition to the repressive element inherent in this approach, it also entails legalism and predictability, which distinguishes it from the more ruthless and unlimited forms of repression typical for lowest inclusion polities. As a consequence, German labor was exposed to the same pattern of low inclusion in both the economic and political domains. And moreover, through the extensive scope of state involvement in industrialization, there was no clear separation of these two domains in the eyes of the worker.

In the second place, the character of German industrialization also enhanced the potential for mobilization success, independently from the question of the overall size of the industrial working-class. Larger enterprises, as opposed to small firms, which were more prevalent in France, but also in England, create more opportunities for agitation and mobilization. At the same time, while concentration was increasing over time, Guttsman (1981, 25-26) observes that a large number of workers continued to work in small enterprises. This represents a marked contrast to the case of Russia, where concentration was even more pronounced. Nonetheless, the eventual success of mobilization accomplished by the German SPD, both in terms of election results and membership, depended to some extent on a more large scale form of industrial organization that was not necessarily equivalent to the one featured by some of those cases that were attracted to the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy because of its mobilization success.

On top of the relatively limited debate about the specific character of German industrialization, there is a second area, in which the previously noted conventional wisdom is challenged. This applies to the question of timing and the observable pattern of growth. It is generally accepted that even before the advent of large-scale industrialization around the middle of the 19th century, insulated proto-industries existed in Silesia, Berlin, Saxony, and the Rhineland. The debate is about the watershed that marks the ultimate breakthrough in the pervasiveness of industrial production. Newer research, according to Sylla and Toniolo (1991), observes pronounced growth already during the 1840s and 1850s, while the conventional wisdom emphasizes the later parts of the 19th century. From a more recent perspective, the time period between 1815 and 1850 is not regarded as merely a preparatory stage for a later breakthrough, but as an era that already experienced a significant push toward industrialization. On this background, the progress of German industrialization is regarded as much less rapid and explosive than what used to be commonly assumed before. This conclusion does not question the above mentioned fundamental coordinates for the ‘window of opportunity’, within which industrialization and the emergence of an industrial working-class were possible, but it places greater importance on the earlier Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic reforms.

These findings contribute to undermining the applicability of the socio-economic explanation for party formation, which is to some large extent based on a rhetoric of extreme rapidity in industrial development and the explosiveness of the process, in order to account for the emergence of radical
renditions of social democracy. Germany, in this context, is taken as a key example to illustrate this causal relation. Tilly (1981) has already succinctly criticized the causal mechanisms underpinning the socio-economic explanation for social democratic party formation for the case of Germany. New findings qualifying the previously assumed high pace of German industrialization would further undermine this causal argument. It should not be forgotten, however, that despite these qualifications, as Tenfelde (1990) reminds us, from a comparative perspective, Germany remains a ‘later’ industrializer.

While the pace of industrialization, as discussed before, can be measured in a wide variety of ways, for example through an assessment of infrastructure or output, the focus here, given my specific research interest, is on the numerical growth of the industrial working-class. The pattern of growth characteristic for the German working-class presented here (see tables 7 and 19) is based on the best quantitative estimate available. Judging from these figures, it is undeniable that German growth is, comparatively speaking, rapid, at a value of 32.59% for the time period from 1880 to 1900, with an overall average for all cases at 29.44%. However, not taking into account the particular cases of Spain and Italy at this point, Germany is closer to the pattern of gradual growth than all other rapid industrialization cases. Even though the socio-economic approach does not specify particular junctures between rapid and gradual patterns, these figures can at least qualify some of the overblown rhetoric of extreme rapidity and explosiveness.

The nature of labor inclusion

The nature of labor inclusion in Germany is the result of an interaction between a comparatively rapid and ‘large scale’ process of industrialization and a process of institutional adaptation that combined economic ‘modernity’ and ‘liberalism’ with a pronounced dose of social and political authoritarianism. I have already identified Germany as an example of low inclusion in the earlier comparative sketch of labor inclusion. In this category, state repression coincides with the provision of limited worker incorporation through one specific institutional channel, while the efforts of competing parties in appealing to labor are present, but confined in their scope or only temporary. In the case of Germany, limited institutional inclusion occurred through worker enfranchisement, while political liberties and responsible government remained comparatively precarious. This particular configuration of institutional inclusion identifies Germany, in addition to only Denmark, as an example of a specific version of the low inclusion polity. In the second version of low inclusion, enfranchisement was absent, and limited institutional incorporation of workers occurred only through the provision of at least a minimum of responsible government and political liberties.

Low inclusion polities, regardless of which specific set of channels is opened for the access of labor, are distinct from lowest inclusion cases, because in that category of inclusion, all institutional avenues into
the arena of politics are shut down for labor. On top of that, there is no noteworthy appeal of competing parties to labor in lowest inclusion, and the behavior of the state executive is less repressive in low inclusion cases. Repression of workers was certainly a defining feature of the German polity as an example of low inclusion, during labor’s formative stage in the political arena from 1863 to 1891. However, the extent of repression never reached the intensity, permanence, and comprehensiveness of the Russian or the Japanese case, both of which are examples of lowest inclusion. The possibility of worker participation in elections also gives Germany and Denmark a unique status in the low inclusion category with respect to the efforts of competing parties in appealing to workers as an electoral constituency. In all other low inclusion cases, such an approach was irrelevant, due to the lack of enfranchisement.

Based on the earlier comparative overview, I am now going to discuss these defining features of German labor inclusion in chronological and geographical perspective. The purpose of this assessment is to describe the nature of labor inclusion in Germany as the environment in response to which labor elites adopted some model of labor politics, as well as the temporal and subfederal geographical variations in labor inclusion, and how they are related to according variation in labor elites’ choices.

Development of labor inclusion over time

The formative stage of labor’s entry into politics from 1863 to 1891 occurred in the context of a political arena that was characterized by a consistently low degree of inclusion. The inference of low inclusion does not only apply as an overall assessment to the entire formative period, but also to each of its component stages individually. This is not to say that there was no over time variation, but this was quantitative variation occurring within the confines of the general category of low inclusion, without ever passing the critical juncture to either one of the adjacent categories. The more liberal so-called ‘New Era’ that extended into the early years of the German empire in the 1870s never led to the embrace of full institutional liberalism, which is the defining feature of higher inclusion polities, such as Britain, France, Switzerland, or Australia. The anti-socialist law (Sozialistengesetz), in effect from 1878 to 1890, clearly pushed the extent of labor inclusion further to the repressive side, but it never accomplished the degree of complete labor exclusion that characterized the lowest inclusion cases of Japan and Russia.

Some significant variation in labor inclusion existed across German states, both before unification in 1871 and afterwards, but these issues will be treated in the following section. Leaving the question of geographical variation aside for now, the focus of this over time assessment is on the unified German empire after 1871, and for the preceding eight years of labor’s formative stage, on the dominant German state of Prussia, as well as the Zollverein of 1833 and the ‘North German Federation’ of 1866, which should be understood as predecessors to the foundation of the empire in 1871. With these considerations in
mind, the development of labor inclusion in Germany can be divided into the following three stages. First, based on treating the foundation of the Zollverein as the most important step toward the creation of a window of opportunity for the emergence of industrialization and labor politics, the period from 1833 to 1871; second, after the foundation of the German empire, the ‘liberal era’ from 1871 to 1878; and third, the period of the particularly repressive anti-socialist law from 1878 to 1890. The end to the Sozialistengesetz in 1890, the dismissal of Bismarck, and the so-called ‘Neue Kurs’ (new agenda) in the domestic politics of the Empire occurred alongside the completion of party institutionalization by the SPD in 1890 and 1891. As a consequence, these changes in the political environment certainly affected the further transformation of the party, but not yet the defining features of its initial manifestation.

Before 1871

Before labor entered the arena of party politics through the formation of the ADAV in 1863, the first noticeable political activities of the early labor movement occurred through participation in the attempted liberal revolution of 1848. The immediate response of the state was one of repression, leaving aside variation across German states for now, as the most dominant players at the time were clearly the arch-conservative Prussia and Austria (cf. Stadelmann 1948). Even though there was not yet a concerted strategy toward labor, with the specific configuration of labor inclusion only fully emerging after the foundation of the empire in 1871 and the accelerated growth of an industrial working-class, the basic tendencies of low inclusion could already be observed at this earlier point in time.

Political liberties became precarious in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, and the dissolution of emerging worker associations was accomplished most importantly on the basis of the 1850 Prussian law of association (cf. Tenfelde 1990, 259). Responsible government was largely absent, most apparently in the case of Prussia, but also the other German states, such as Saxony, in which the bulk of early industrialization occurred. Given the lack of a consolidated federal unit before 1871, the question of enfranchisement at the national level was not yet on the agenda. However, the implementation of the North German Federation’s constitution in 1867 gave workers the right to vote, based on the principle of universal suffrage that would four years later also become a defining element of the empire. Thus, with the exception of only four years from the initial foundation of the ADAV in 1863 until 1867, the political representation of German organized labor was born into a political arena, in which political liberties and responsible government were certainly precarious, but where at the same time, labor inclusion through enfranchisement, at least at the federal level, was the norm.

In these few years before the foundation of the empire, the ambivalent character of low inclusion became not only apparent through the combination of enfranchisement with the precariousness of political
liberties and responsible government. In the absence of a consolidated federal unit, and due to the still malleable strategy of the entrenched elites toward labor, the police and the courts assumed a key role in shaping the nature of labor inclusion during the 1860s. Guttsmann (1981, 27) concludes that after 1848, a system of police repression generally prevailed across Germany, but he also argues that “(t)he social democratic movement was not subjected to complete legal arbitrariness, and while the judiciary was biased it was not corrupt or subject to government pressure.” (Guttsmann 1981, 59) This certainly provides a marked contrast to the case of Russia as an example of lowest inclusion, where the judiciary was not independent, and where special emergency courts were established in order to provide a harsh response to the emerging labor movement. The contrast this provides to the German scenario is indicative of low, rather than lowest inclusion, in the case of Germany, even during this early time period, because repression and exclusion are combined with predictability and legalism.

1871 to 1878

Kocka (1981) notes that the so-called ‘New Era’, which characterized the early years of the newly founded German empire after 1871, was rooted in changes that had occurred already during the late 1850s throughout the individual German states. At that point in time, a period of heavy post-revolutionary repression made way for a comparatively more conciliatory approach. This being said, whatever the actual extent of liberalization might have been after 1858, it never resulted in labor inclusion passing the critical juncture from low to higher inclusion. Regardless of whether one assumes the ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ perspective on the potential for gradual democratization and liberalization of the German empire, akin to the British model of political development, it is undeniable that such a development has not taken place to such an extent as to make Germany an example of higher labor inclusion, which requires worker access to all institutional channels into the arena of politics.

While Kocka (1991) identifies the time period from 1858 to 1873 as the liberal “New Era”, Ullmann (1999) argues that it lasted until the late 1870s. First of all, it is clear that such labels can never be applied with surgical precision, as there is always an element of gradual change involved. Secondly, which one of these two contending conclusions is more appropriate, depends largely on one’s point of departure. For the socialists, there was generally much less in terms of ‘liberalism’ during this time period, but the year 1878 clearly marks the beginning of an even more repressive era for the labor movement. The ‘Kulturkampf’, i.e. the struggle of the newly established empire with catholicism, lasted from 1871 to 1878, and then gave way to a more conciliatory approach of the state. The liberals made some strides toward more responsible government in the first half of the 1870s, but their efforts gradually ceased to be promising toward the end
of the decade. For my purposes here, 1878 marks the most important watershed, as it identifies the point in time, at which the particularly repressive *Sozialistengesetz* was enacted.

The constitution of the Empire was established in 1871, and remained in place until the demise of the monarchy in 1918. It has already been discussed in terms of its implications for labor inclusion in the earlier comparative overview. The constitution, along with a number of other legal foundations, created an institutional underpinning for labor inclusion that combined significant enfranchisement (at a higher level of inclusion) with precarious political liberties and extremely limited responsible government. The specific effects of the *Sozialistengesetz* on these institutional manifestations of labor inclusion will be discussed in a later section. At this point, the emphasis is on the first seven years of the Empire in between 1871 and 1878. While enfranchisement guaranteed some access for labor to the political arena, the limits on political liberties and responsible government (both at the low level of inclusion) distinguish the case of Germany from the higher inclusion polities, which provided for a full set of liberalized institutions. But at the same time, it also marks a difference to the lowest inclusion cases of Russia and Japan, where responsible government, political liberties, and enfranchisement were completely absent.

Political liberties across Germany were at the low level of inclusion during this time period, since they were precarious, but not completely absent. The behavior of the state executive was at the same low level, because it was predominantly, but not permanently repressive. It also exposed a certain respect for the limited extent of institutional inclusion that was in fact provided to workers. Before the introduction of the more explicit *Sozialistengesetz* in 1878 and again after the phasing out of the law in 1890, the repression of labor was pursued on the basis of the existing civil and criminal codes. Despite a stronger emphasis on legalism than in cases of lowest inclusion, the state certainly convinced its enforcement agencies and the courts, as Berghahn (2005) put it, to interpret the existing legislation “creatively”, in order to take an active stand against the emerging labor movement. Out of the criminal code, charges of “lèse majesté”, “blasphemy”, “incitement to sedition”, and ”causing a serious nuisance” were frequently applied to prevent or penalize the political and economic activities of labor. “Violation of honor”, “blackmail”, and “announcing a crime” were used in the context of court cases concerned with labor’s activities against strikebreakers.

At the same time, there was no legal foundation prohibiting the formation of political or economic associations by labor during the 1871 to 1878 and then again the post-1890 period. The “*Gewerbeordnung*” (commercial code) explicitly guaranteed the freedom of association, although it limited the right to engage in strikes and made activities against strikebreakers punishable. The formation of trade unions and the right of association had already been enacted in the majority of German states throughout the 1860s. The freedom of expression was limited by ongoing restrictions, but pre-publication censorship had already been abolished in 1849, and special newspaper taxes ceased to be levied after 1874 (cf. Goldstein 1983).
codified guarantee of political liberties combined with constitutional and other legal stipulations limiting the exercise of these freedoms, is indicative of low inclusion in this domain, alongside a type of state behavior at the same low level of inclusion, which oscillated between limited respect for codified rights and harsh repression.

The ‘New Era’ received its label most importantly because of the attempts pursued by the liberal majority in the Reichstag to extend the practice of responsible government, and the temporary cooperation between the executive and parliament. The 1871 constitution gave undue influence to the upper house of the legislature, which was not democratically accountable, and dominated by an arch-conservative Prussia. This severely limited ‘responsible government’, in addition to the exclusion of significant policy areas from parliamentary approval, and the lack of executive accountability to parliament. The opportunities for the practice of responsible government where therefore extremely confined, but the so-called ‘New Era’ of the early 1870s saw the maximum exploitation of that limited potential through the legislative activity of the liberals, most importantly the ‘Nationalliberalen’ as the largest one of the factions, and their close cooperation with Bismarck and the executive. This interaction was fueled by a shared interest in advancing the effectiveness of the new federal administration, by the desire to remove barriers to trade and commerce, and by the Kulturkampf (culture war) against catholicism and the catholic Zentrum party as a common enemy.

Despite this episode of cooperation and actual legislative activity from within parliament, the Reichstag as the lower, publicly accountable, chamber of the legislature and its liberal majority at the time, were not successful in transforming either institutions or political practice toward a larger extent of responsible government. Ullmann (1999) argues that a conservative turn, an end to the limited cooperation between liberals and the executive, and therefore the end of hopes for truly responsible government, occurred throughout the 1870s, but he identifies 1878 as the most visible watershed. This date does not only mark the enactment of the Sozialistengesetz, but also the end of cooperation between a stable liberal Reichstag majority and the executive branch. The deepening split of the liberal movement into its progressive and nationalist factions is indicative of the liberals’ failure to agree on a common strategy vis-à-vis the executive, and on whether their programmatic focus should be about the establishment of national unity or constitutional progress.

While the gradual emergence of responsible government thus failed to materialize, the distribution of seats in the Reichstag did not allow Bismarck to completely ignore parliament, either. This provides a marked contrast to the lowest inclusion cases of Russia and Japan. In Russia, after June 1907, on the basis of a severely circumscribed constitution and an unfair electoral law, the executive succeeded in producing docile and loyalist parliamentary majorities, which would not seriously question or endanger the pursuits of the executive. In Japan, after the repeated refusal of the national diet to accept the executive’s budget drafts
in the mid 1890s, the legislature would subordinate itself in a similar manner to the primacy of the executive branch throughout the entire formative stage of Japanese labor’s entry into the political arena. Responsible government in Russia and Japan was therefore at the lowest level, while in the case of Germany, Bismarck and the executive branch were not able to entirely circumvent the legislature. After the mid 1870s, with the end of the liberal ‘new era’, conflict between Reichstag and the executive continued to persist, as Bismarck was unable to create a stable loyalist coalition of support, something that did happen in the case of Russia after June 1907 and in Japan after the mid 1890s. Only in the late 1880s, for a brief period of time, was there a stable coalition of support for the executive through the ‘Kartell’ of conservative parties and the national liberals, who had moved further to the right of the political spectrum. Almost needless to say that the extent of responsible government in Germany, although greater than in Russia and Japan, did not extend to a full embrace of the principle, which is a feature of higher inclusion polities during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena, such as Britain, New Zealand, Switzerland, and France.

The historiographical controversy about the potential for democratization, liberalization, and the extension of responsible government illustrates very well the ambivalent location of Germany and other low inclusion cases in between the entirely exclusionary instances of lowest inclusion and the constitutional democratic cases of higher inclusion. In this context, Berghahn (2005) argues that the entrenched elites of the Kaiserreich had two fundamental options to escape the impasse that defines low inclusion polities, within which significant mass mobilization and contentiousness have emerged: first, the ‘Staatsstreich’ (coup d’état) from above, or second, gradual constitutional reforms. The first option would have entailed reversing all the inclusionary concessions that had been made to the labor movement (limited responsible government and political liberties, a wide franchise, and a predominantly, but not permanently repressive state executive). In essence, this would have set Germany on the Russian or Japanese course of development, and turned it into an instance of lowest labor inclusion. The second option would have entailed an evolutionary extension of labor’s access into the political arena, akin to the British scenario.

The likelihood of either one of these two options occurring over time defines the controversy between the so-called ‘optimist’ and ‘pessimist’ perspectives. The former, expressed most prominently by Rauh (1973), believes that the gradual ‘parliamentarization’ of Germany and the emergence of a truly liberal order were possible. He argues that the empire was a basically sound institutional arrangement, and already on a path toward gradual change. It eventually failed to move further down that road, because of exogenous factors, such as the outbreak of World War I and the inadequate personal regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II. ‘Pessimists’, such as Ritter (1963), characterize the institutional setup of the empire as basically ‘unreformable’. Implicitly, from this perspective, only the demise of the empire or the pursuit of an even more authoritarian course represented possible routes of escape.
This controversy bears some striking similarity to an equivalent debate about the Russian constitutional arrangement after June 1907, where the same optimistic and pessimistic perspectives exist about the potential for gradual liberalization and democratization in tsarist Russia. If anything, the conditions for the applicability of an optimistic perspective were even more dire in Russia than in Germany. But I am not going to engage in a discussion about which one of these two options was more likely to occur, as it is apparent that in the end, neither a more authoritarian course nor a gradual change toward constitutionalism emerged. Germany remained in the ambivalent location of low inclusion until the demise of the Empire in 1918. The previous outline of two contending perspectives regarding the potential for liberalization helps to illustrate the specific nature of low inclusion and the fact that Germany remained trapped in between lowest and higher inclusion, each of which would have provided a more straightforward way out of the contradictions between mass mobilization, limited inclusion, and harsh repression that are characteristic of low inclusion polities.  

The behavior of competing parties as the final manifest indicator of varying degrees of labor inclusion is only of minor importance for the low inclusion category. The institutional limits already represent serious obstacles for competing parties to appeal to labor in low inclusion polities. Electoral inclusion is hampered by a lack of significant enfranchisement, or in the majority of cases even rendered entirely ineffective, due to the complete absence of enfranchisement. Organizational inclusion is limited by the lack of worker enfranchisement, too, but on top of that, it also suffers from the precariousness of political liberties, which are imposed on the labor movement, and in many monarchical-bureaucratic states, on the liberals in almost equal measure. Despite these obstacles that apply to all low inclusion cases, and the fact that the behavior of competing parties is comparatively inconsequential for the overall nature of labor inclusion in the low inclusion category, some variation across low inclusion cases can be observed. In terms of efforts at electoral inclusion, most importantly the catholic “Zentrum”, but also the liberals, made some noteworthy inroads into the worker constituency after 1871.  

Organizational inclusion of labor elites was attempted to some extent, albeit eventually without significant success, in all low inclusion polities, with the exception only of Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Hungary, all of which are cases with more or less entrenched power sharing arrangements between old and new oligarchic elites. The extent of liberal appeal to the labor constituency in Germany, noted in the comparative overview as existent, but eventually unsuccessful, speaks to the historiographical debate about the German  

129 A number of other low inclusion polities chose the gradual liberalization option: Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. This is naturally of crucial importance for the overall pattern of political development, but it did not affect the initial formation of labor politics, since this gradual change toward constitutionalism only occurred after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena.  

‘Sonderweg’, according to which one of the underpinning causes for the lack of a gradual development toward constitutionalism was the early division of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletarian’ democracy. Without engaging in this debate in too much detail, the comparative overview of labor inclusion presented here can shed some more systematic light on the extent to which Germany was truly ‘exceptional’ or ‘unique’ regarding the lack of cooperation between liberals and labor. Within the category of low inclusion, Germany was, as a matter of fact, characterized by more cooperation between liberals and labor during labor’s formative stage into the political arena than the vast majority of other cases (see table 9).  

Moreover, the true difference to Britain, which is commonly used as a case of comparison to establish German ‘uniqueness’ is not the deviation between proletarian and bourgeois democracy in Germany and the lack of that deviation in Britain. The one feature that distinguishes both cases most strongly with respect to the prospect for gradual constitutional progress is the strength of liberalism in Britain and its weakness in Germany. Liberals and labor parted ways in both cases, and not even at an earlier point in time in the case of Germany. If one considers the formative stage of labor’s entry into the arena of party politics, it took around a decade in both cases, for the liberal appeals to become shallow. These observations suggest a conclusion about the lack of gradual constitutional development and the permanence of democracy in Germany that differs from the argument placing primary emphasis on the supposedly early deviation of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletarian’ democracy. Given that the lack of cooperation between liberals and labor was eventually unsuccessful both in Britain and Germany, and given that such cooperation was more pronounced in Germany than in the majority of other low inclusion cases, there is no adequate empirical foundation for such an inference. I would argue that it is the weakness of liberalism in Germany, and its strength in Britain, as well as in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia (all of which are instances of low inclusion, with less lib-lab cooperation than in Germany), which distinguishes instances of successful evolutionary democratization (Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia) from the case of Germany.

1878 to 1890

The enactment of the anti-socialist law (Sozialistengesetz) in 1878 certainly represented a crucial event in the evolution of the environment, within which the German labor movement entered the political arena. But at the same time, the implemented measures did not represent a rupture in the logic of labor inclusion that had already been pursued in the early years of the empire and across the majority of individual German states before 1871. I agree with Tenfelde (1990, 244), who concludes that “(…) the

131 See Wehler (1986) for an assessment of lib-lab cooperation in Germany before the Sozialistengesetz that emphasizes the period of cooperation over the later parting of ways.
Socialist Law merely represented the climax of the repressive policy conducted by the state against the labor movement.” I would argue, more specifically, that the law did not affect the basic character of Germany as an instance of low inclusion. Quite to the contrary, it made the nature of this environment even more apparent to labor elites and the broader worker constituency. Just like the earlier “New Era” did not change the nature of labor inclusion from low to higher, the Sozialistengesetz did not go so far as to push Germany into the Russian and Japanese category of lowest inclusion. By further limiting, and at the same time, specifying the guarantee of political liberties, while leaving labor’s access to the electoral arena unchanged, the Sozialistengesetz squeezed the political manifestation of German labor further onto the parliamentary road of mobilization, and thereby reified a previously less stable strategical commitment to that effect.

The Sozialistengesetz was passed and enacted in October 1878, with the support of the conservatives, the catholic Zentrum party, and the majority of the liberals, through an overall vote of 221 to 149 (cf. Lidtke 1966, 77). It was renewed on a yearly basis until 1890, when Bismarck was not successful in convincing the Reichstag to support permanent and even harsher anti-socialist legislation. The electoral victories of the SPD and the failure of his strategy vis-à-vis the socialists were important reasons for Bismarck’s dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm II during that same year. The law did not affect the nature of responsible government, and its stipulations did not touch on the regulations of the electoral system. A precarious, albeit not entirely absent principle of responsible government as well as a wide franchise therefore continued to persist. Its major effects on the nature of labor inclusion occurred in the domain of political liberties. On the basis of the new legislation, associations and meetings with social democratic tendencies could be abolished, and social democratic publications were prohibited. These regulations applied to specifically political organizations, most importantly the various sections and branches of the social democratic party, but also to the trade unions. In cases of infringement, the law provided for fines and imprisonment.

Berghahn (2005) observes that following on the enactment, 600 periodicals and 318 associations were dissolved, and hundreds of activists arrested. The law also gave local authorities the right to establish a ‘minor state of siege’ (Kleiner Belagerungszustand) in case of an emergency caused by labor rebelliousness. This mechanism was used in a number of social democratic strongholds, including Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg, and Frankfurt. The behavior of the state executive certainly became more repressive, and the law naturally is also an indicator for the adjustment in strategy toward labor. But at the same time, the characteristic legalism and predictability that distinguishes German executive behavior from the case of Russia during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena, remained relatively unchanged.

132 See Germany (1978) for the text of the Sozialistengesetz.
Moreover, even within the 1878 to 1890 period, during which the law was in place, certain shifts in the behavior of enforcement agencies and the state executive overall can be observed. After the initial widespread repression of labor in the aftermath of the law’s promulgation, it took until 1886 for a new wave of particularly heavy repression to occur.

From this assessment result a number of crucial reasons associated with different dimensions of labor inclusion, for why Germany remained a case of low inclusion, even under the repressive *Sozialistengesetz*, distinct from Russia and Japan as examples of lowest inclusion: first, electoral inclusion remained at the higher level of inclusion from 1878 to 1890, while it was entirely absent in Japan and Russia; second, limited responsible government was unaffected by the law and continued to be practiced in Germany; third, even under the repressive *Sozialistengesetz*, the behavior of the state executive remained more legalistic and predictable, and the over time variation in between more repressive and more conciliatory periods represents another difference to the permanently repressive cases of Japan and Russia. On top of these issues, there is one specific stipulation that makes the limits on political liberties, which are at the core of the legislation, less restrictive than in Russia and Japan. While overall, the freedom of the press and the freedom of association for labor’s political representation were abolished, one important loophole was explicitly provided for through the law: the right to publish and the right to associate, even on the basis of a social democratic agenda, for the purpose of conducting election campaigns to the *Reichstag*.

The Bismarckian social policies, which in the present context belong conceptually to the domain of executive behavior, are another important aspect of labor inclusion during the 1878 to 1890 period. His overall strategy was geared at the political exclusion of organized labor and the social inclusion of industrial workers. To that end, Bismarck initiated a health insurance law in 1883, an accident insurance law in 1884, as well as an old-age and invalidity insurance in 1889. Even though these measures could not prevent the radicalization of organized labor and the successful institutionalization of social democracy in 1891, they certainly had what Berghahn (2005, 233) called an “integrating effect”. This distinguishes Germany from the cases of Japan and Russia, where no equivalent measures with a comparable scope and intentionality were implemented.

Despite these efforts, Bismarck’s social policies fell short of the “authoritarian corporatism” (cf. Luebbert 1987) that emerged throughout the 1920s, and that relied on the active mobilization and social inclusion of labor in the context of an undemocratic regime. As discussed from a comparative perspective before, Collier and Collier (1991) distinguish this kind of state incorporation strategy vis-à-vis labor, which became an option only after the chronological end point of this study in 1919, from the variety of party incorporation strategies, which were the only available option during the time period studied here. Authoritarian corporatism mobilizes labor through secondary associations that are directly linked to the regime. It seeks to provide a positive appeal to labor, and offers material benefits to workers. At the same
time, authoritarian corporatism shuts down all liberal-democratic forms of labor inclusion, comparable to lowest inclusion cases. What distinguishes it from the traditional pre-1919 instances of lowest inclusion are the positive appeal and the attempts at social inclusion of labor, as well as the enhanced effectiveness of the state apparatus in policing the political exclusion of the labor movement.

The actually implemented social insurance schemes of the empire fell short of a full fledged ‘authoritarian corporatist’ response to the labor question. And the loopholes contained within the Sozialistengesetz for the political activities of labor, along with the continuing guarantee of enfranchisement and limited responsible government, are also antithetical to the ideas of ‘authoritarian corporatism’. However, it is interesting to note how Bismarck’s original designs were quite different and much more in line with a vision of authoritarian corporatism than the policies he was capable of implementing against the pressures from within the administration, from the emperor himself, and most importantly, from the non-conservative Reichstag factions. First of all, with respect to the harshness of repression and exclusion, Bismarck certainly was pushing for an even less liberal-democratic approach toward labor. More specifically, he actively pursued the abolition of universal suffrage in Reichstag elections, the restriction of parliamentary authority, the implementation of a permanent anti-socialist law, and the closing down of the electoral participation and association loophole in the Sozialistengesetz.\(^{133}\)

Second, with respect to further ‘corporatist’ measures that did not receive the necessary support, Bismarck wanted the establishment of economic councils on the basis of professions, as well as the formation of an overall nationwide economic council. These institutional designs would have been more than only weak precursors to the later full-fledged authoritarian corporatism. Berghahn (2005) and others note these specific policies, but they fail to acknowledge that this strategy by Bismarck is not equivalent to the ‘coup d’état option’ as one of two previously noted ways out of the impasse created by the ambivalent nature of low inclusion in the face of the labor challenge. The ‘coup d’état option’ is equally repressive, but it does not come with the corporatist social inclusion Bismarck had in mind. As such, it is the equivalent of what Luebbert (1987) refers to as a “traditional dictatorship”. Bismarck’s designs, on the other hand, represented a third, entirely different strategy, one of authoritarian corporatism or state incorporation (Collier and Collier 1992). This particular approach toward labor never materialized in any industrializing society before 1919, and is therefore categorically distinct from the conceptual dividing lines applied in this study. However, Bismarck’s original designs (which were never fully implemented) came very close to the actually emerging forms of state incorporation and authoritarian corporatism after 1919.\(^{134}\)

\(^{133}\) See Lidlke (1966) regarding Bismarck’s intent to adjust the Sozialistengesetz. For the other aspects see Berghahn (2005) and Ullmann (1999)

\(^{134}\) Taking these observations into account, the three routes out of the impasse created by the combination of low inclusion with an emerging contentious labor movement featured somewhat different odds at accomplishing a stable and consolidated regime, had they
Regional variation in labor inclusion

There has been a shift in recent years toward a greater emphasis on ‘regional’ studies in the German historiography of the late 19th and early 20th century. In that context, it was initially the South and the Southwest that were discovered as a so-called “second” Germany, distinct from the Prussian hegemon, and more recently, Saxony as a “third” Germany. The overall focus of German historiography from 1871 to 1918, however, is still on the ‘Kaisereich’, and on Prussia as its most important component. Regional variation in political development, and more specifically, in varying degrees of labor inclusion, is important to consider, however, because deviations from the federal ‘norm’ of inclusion can help to explain regional variation in the responses of labor. As such, ‘subfederal’ assessments are an important mechanism to subject the theory suggested here to further empirical verification.

At the most basic level, regional variation in labor inclusion across Germany can be characterized by the following major distinction. On the one hand, Prussia, but also Saxony, and the majority of other states in the North of Germany tended to be less inclusive, both compared to the federal level and compared to the remaining component states of the empire. This deviation is especially consequential, because the majority of industrial workers resided in these areas. The states in the South and Southwest, on the other hand, exposed a more conciliatory approach toward labor, and an environment of labor inclusion that provided for opportunities of political expression that did not exist to the same extent at the federal level and the rest of Germany. At the same time, in none of these cases did labor inclusion pass the critical threshold to the higher category of inclusion. If separate from the rest of Germany and the influence of Prussia, these states might have been better candidates for the optimistic perspective on the potential for

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gradual constitutional change, but the historical reality was one in which they remained within the confines of low inclusion.

Prussia was in a position to shape the policies and institutions of the empire, because of both its *de facto* and its constitutionally codified *de jure* hegemony. The Federal Council as the upper house of the legislature provided for in the 1871 constitution had a total of 58 votes, which were assigned to the German states according to size. Prussia had 17 votes at its disposal, a plurality, but far from a majority. In practice (*Verfassungswirklichkeit*), however, Prussia was always able to organize a majority for its position. Other ways noted by Ullmann (1991), in which Prussia assumed *de facto* hegemony through constitutional practice, were the power of the Prussian executive and administration, the organization of the army according to Prussian principles, and the fact that typically the Prussian prime minister was also the empire’s chancellor. On top of actual practice, Prussia also had some constitutionally codified privileges, most importantly the plurality of votes in the Federal Council, but also the personal union of the offices of Prussian king and German emperor.

In the distribution of authority between federal level and subfederal components, the individual German states were semi-autonomous in the areas of education and culture, as well as in terms of passing their own state constitutions and electoral laws. Tenfelde (1990, 267) notes that as far as institutionalized variation in inclusiveness toward labor is concerned, the most significant deviations within Germany only occurred throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. At that point in time, repression in the South and Southwest yielded to more inclusive policies, while Saxony and Prussia continued on an unaltered path of repression. On the other hand, Guttsmann (1981, 59) emphasizes that, above and beyond institutional underpinnings, the severity of implementing existing repressive legislation and thereby the extent to which political liberties were guaranteed, represents the most crucial observable variation. In that particular respect, differences between the more repressive North and the less repressive South and Southwest could already be observed long before the end of the 19th century.

In terms of the extent to which responsible government was practiced, the same kind of variation across German states could be observed. Berghahn (2005) notes the more pronounced liberalism in the South and Southwest of the empire, where the liberals were much more prominently involved in the actual conduct of government, and where, as we will discuss in more detail in the following section, even social democrats became concerned with actual policy making, both at the state and the local level. The most comprehensive research on regional variation within Germany exists in the area of electoral systems. At the federal level, universal suffrage, albeit limited by a comparatively high age threshold of 25 years

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136 See Ullmann (1999) for an overview of research on elections under the Kaiserreich.
provided for a highest level of inclusion with respect to the distribution of the right to vote. An overall higher level of inclusion results from the unfair apportioning of electoral districts as a comparatively minor infringement on the effectiveness of the workers’ vote.

What distinguishes the more complex situation in the areas of political liberties and responsible government from regional variation in electoral systems, is the fact that electoral systems in all German states were less inclusive than the electoral system at the federal level. Prussia used a curia system for the elections to its state legislature, which was heavily skewed toward the highest tax brackets. Voting at the state level in Saxony was restricted to owners of a residential building, and in Bavaria, income qualifications were applied. In the proto-typically ‘liberal’ states of Baden and Wuerttemberg, and the liberal ‘patrician’ cities of Hamburg and Lübeck, electoral systems were skewed toward property owners through income and other material qualifications.\(^\text{137}\)

The situation in the liberal Southern German states as well as the liberal cities thus mirrors to some extent the configuration of low inclusion in Belgium and the Netherlands. In those cases, liberal rather than conservative-aristocratic forces were dominant, and as a consequence, the principle of responsible government and the guarantee of political liberties were more firmly entrenched. But at the same time, labor was kept away from full access to the political arena through restrictions on the effectiveness of the franchise that were equally, and often times even more repressive than those of the monarchical-bureaucratic states. Despite a somewhat greater guarantee of political liberties, and a more entrenched practice of responsible government, even the more liberal German states and cities remained largely within the overall category of low labor inclusion. Nonetheless, the regional variation in labor elites’ choices is going to show that even the slight variation in inclusiveness within Germany observed here triggered an according variation in the responses of labor elites, which generally embraced a more pragmatic approach in those areas that were less repressive.

**Labor politics in response to the German environment of inclusion**

The environment of labor inclusion outlined above represents the external constraints in response to which labor elites in Germany adopted their model of labor politics. As argued before, some given environment of labor inclusion is relayed to labor elites through two causal mechanisms: first of all, directly, through the perception and evaluation of that environment, and second, indirectly, through the perception of expectations expressed by the broader labor constituency, which are shaped by the same environment. An analysis into the institutionalization of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in the case

\(^{137}\) See Berghahn (2005) and Goldstein (1983)
of Germany therefore needs to pay attention to both these issues: first, how the given environment of inclusion affected the characteristics of the broader labor movement, and specifically the constituency’s expectations toward the adoption of some model of labor politics; and second, how labor elites directly evaluate the opportunity structures of that environment. Both of these causal mechanisms combined relay to labor elites the costs and benefits they expect from the adoption of different models of labor politics in the context of an encountered set of external constraints. The over time developments in the nature of labor inclusion, as well as the existing subfederal variation, allow for an additional verification of the suggested theory about the relation between degrees of inclusion and the adoption of varying models of labor politics.

In the following paragraphs, I am going to conduct that analysis through these consecutive steps. In the first place, I am going to trace the emergence of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as the dominant model of labor politics in Germany, throughout an evolving environment of labor inclusion, in competition with different alternatives. Secondly, I will outline the characteristics of that dominant model, and how it emerged in response to the previously outlined environment of inclusion. This discussion will detail, how the ideological and organizational dimensions of my general party typology apply to quasi-revolutionary social democracy. In that context, we are going to see, how on the basis of its specific ideological and organizational features, quasi-revolutionary social democracy accomplished social integration through its ideological model, and systemness through its particular form of organization. These are two of the three prerequisites for ‘successful party formation’ introduced before. The third prerequisite, external institutionalization, will be discussed at the end of that section. In the context of these considerations, I am also going to comment on regional variation in the party’s orientation, as they emerged in response to the previously described subfederal variation in labor inclusion.

The emergence of quasi-revolutionary social democracy against competing approaches

The parliamentary, or ‘German’, variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was established in Germany through the organizational statutes of the SPD implemented in 1890, and the Erfurt program of 1891, which serves as the codification of the party’s ideological model. External institutionalization was achieved by 1890, when the party passed 10 % of electoral support in national elections for the second time in its history. These three events represent the completion of ‘systemness’, ‘social integration through the implementation of a dominant ideological model’, and ‘external institutionalization’, as the three prerequisites for successful party formation, or in other words, a minimum of party institutionalization. They are the result of a formative stage of labor’s entry into the arena of party politics that began in 1863 with the foundation of the ADAV (General German worker association), as the first organizational manifestation of labor politics that is directly linked to the later event of successful party formation.
German social democracy emerged as the prototypical model of a disciplined and electorally successful mass-based party, embedded into an environment of countless auxiliary organizations and personal networks, sustained by a vulgarized version of marxism. The quasi-revolutionary orientation of the party, expressed through the 1891 Erfurt Program, is exemplary, and was of crucial importance for the social integration of party members, but it emerged only after almost 30 years of internal debates in competition with ideological alternatives. The ADAV of 1863 as the first organizational manifestation of labor politics was based on the non-marxist state affirming Lasalleanism that also entered the party program of the SAP founded in 1875, in addition to the proto-marxist agenda that was brought to the union by the SDAP of 1869 (the so-called Eisenacher). Throughout the 1880s and early 1890s, the increasing dominance of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was challenged first by the proto-anarchist “Die Jungen” and then later, by an emerging pragmatic reformism.

The ADAV, formed in 1863, was labor’s first step into the arena of party politics, which marks the beginning of the formative stage under investigation here. It began after the early, or ‘first’ labor movement had been involved in the attempted 1848 revolution, at that time still largely as an integral element of the overall liberal movement. The emerging worker associations of the 1840s, both political and economic in nature, lost much of their momentum after the post-revolutionary repression until the late 1850s. It was only at that point in time that the labor movement re-emerged, and eventually entered the political arena as an independent formation. The formation of the ADAV in 1863 marks the beginning of that independent presence of labor in the political arena, even though liberal attempts at electoral and organizational inclusion continued to some extent well into the 1870s.  

The ideological orientation of the ADAV was strongly influenced by the unique political philosophy of its founder. Ferdinand Lasalle’s agenda diverged in two most crucial ways from the Erfurt program that would become the dominant orientation of German social democracy later on. First of all, the orientation of the ADAV and of Lasalle was state affirming. It was based on the belief that socialism could be accomplished in the context of some form of constitutional monarchy under the Hohenzollern dynasty. More specifically, his strategy of achieving socialism was geared at the establishment of collective production units, funded by the Prussian state. This hints at the second distinction, as the way to socialism Lasalle suggested was one of evolutionary development. He avoided revolutionary scenarios and references to the class struggle. Rather than referring to workers as a social class, he understood them as another ‘Stand’ (that is state, or état), which further highlights his continuing intellectual affiliation with the liberal movement.

Social democracy’s path from 1863 to 1891 might best be characterized as a gradual abandonment of Lasalle’s heritage, and then following on that, the emergence of a dominant quasi-revolutionary social democratic orientation against the competition of the proto-anarchists and the emerging reformists. The 1875 Gotha unification congress marks the midway in the process of ‘de-lasalleanization’. It brought together the ADAV and the proto-marxist SDAP, which was founded 1869 in the city of Eisenach (hence the term Eisenacher to refer to the adherents of the party), by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht. The union of these two currents created in 1875 the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAP) in the city of Gotha. The agenda of the unified party was based on a combination of a watered down marxism with important Lasallean elements. It was designed as a compromise between the two factions, and for that reason fiercely attacked by Marx himself (cf. Marx 1875).

The Erfurt Program of 1891 marks the final step in crushing the vestiges of Lasalleanism, and in defending a dominant quasi-revolutionary agenda against other competitors. Friedrich Engels (1891), in his “Critique of the Draft Social Democratic Program of 1891”, was satisfied with the outcome of this process: “The present draft differs very favorably from the former program (the 1875 Gotha agenda, KV). The strong survival of outmoded traditions – both the specific Lassallean and vulgar socialistic – have largely been removed, and in terms of its theoretical aspects the draft as a whole is based on present-day science (…).” This represents a marked contrast to Marx’ assessment of the compromise Gotha program of 1875 as “reprehensible and demoralizing for the party”. 139

While the state-affirming orientation of Lasalleanism became more and more untenable throughout the repressive era of the 1878-1890 anti-socialist laws, the same period saw the emergence of a new challenge from the other side of the field. The so-called Jungen (the young) opposed the strictly legalist and pragmatic course of the quasi-revolutionary mainstream, and asked for a more radical, truly rather than ‘quasi’ revolutionary perspective. Many proponents of this approach would only become ‘real’ anarchists after the expulsion from the party in 1891. Their rhetoric and their rejection of parliamentary politics as a façade, however, already echoed anarchist orientations, which is why I refer to them here as proto-anarchists. Engels referred to the activities of the only loosely coordinated group as a “revolt of writers and students”140. As a faction within social democracy, and later on as part of the anarchist movement, they were relatively insignificant. But their emergence shows that the increase of repression after 1878, in a sense a movement further toward lowest labor inclusion, provided at least some limited support to an insurrectionist appeal. The overall increase in anarchist agitation during this time period, most importantly through Johannes Most, social democrat and member of the Reichstag, has to be seen in this same context.

139 Marx (1875) wrote this in the letter to Wilhelm Bracke that introduced the actual text of his Gotha program critique.  
140 Engels (1890) in a letter to the daily “Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung”
After the challenge of *die Jungen*, the pendulum of ideological confrontation swung back to competition from the ‘reformist’ side again toward the end of the 1880s. The new challenge to the quasi-revolutionary mainstream emerged from the every day practices of social democrats in the more liberal, therefore more inclusive, southern and southwestern states of the Empire, and a number of likeminded cities. This ‘practical reformism’ would also characterize the unions and the expectations they relayed into the party, when they embarked on a more independent course with the beginning of the 20th century. Throughout the mid 1890s, these early ‘reformist’ tendencies would provide the underpinning for the formulation of an explicitly ‘evolutionary socialist’ party model, by Eduard Bernstein. At that earlier point in time, however, ‘reformism’ was only practiced, without providing the underpinning or springboard for a new party model that would contradict the dominant quasi-revolutionary orientation.

The so-called “Eldorado speech” of the leading ‘reformist’ and leader of the Bavarian branch, Georg von Vollmar, held in June 1891, before the Erfurt party conference, became the first manifest of the early ‘pragmatic reformism’. He argued that the fall of Bismarck, and the end of the repressive *Sozialistengesetz* allowed for a more pragmatic course and the pursuit of a more tangible “program of action”, which should deserve more emphasis than the lofty long-term revolutionary goals, as they were eventually adopted in Erfurt. His suggestions met with pronounced resistance from the leading advocates of a quasi-revolutionary orientation.¹⁴¹ This was the first time that the previously only practiced reformism was transformed into a more programmatic statement that conflicted with the emerging dominance of the quasi-revolutionary party model. However, throughout the following half decade, Vollmar retreated and became a mere practitioner of reformism again, while Bernstein took on the task of confronting the reigning quasi-revolutionary vulgar marxism with a competing party model, based on an evolutionary socialist perspective.

Pragmatic reformist practices, as long as they fall short of becoming the underpinning for an ideological critique, are not antithetical to the nature of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Quite to the contrary, it is an inherent element of the quasi-revolutionary party model to combine pragmatism and reformism with a long term perspective of revolution and proto-religious salvation. It is from this perspective that one should appreciate Ignaz Auer’s famous remarks in a letter to the revisionist Eduard Bernstein:

“My dear Ede, what you are demanding does not belong into party resolutions, it should not even be talked about, it is something that you simply do. All of our work – even under the shameful law – has always been that of a reformist social democratic party.”¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Ritter (1963) notes the interventions by Kautsky and Bebel against Vollmar during the 1891 Erfurt congress.
¹⁴² The content of the letter is noted by Engels (1907). Translation is my own, from the German original. “Shameful law” refers to the anti-socialist law of 1878 to 1890; “Ede” is short for “Eduard”, Bernstein’s first name.
The early pragmatic reformism, Vollmar before his Eldorado speech in 1891 and then again after his retreat, as well as the later more practical approach of the unions operated within the ideological parameters set by quasi-revolutionary social democracy. They simply did reformism in the context of the long term perspective of salvation established by the vulgar marxist agenda. This is also precisely the reason, for why the distinction between reformist and radical social democracy, which defines the vast majority of the theoretical literature on social democratic party formation, is inadequate. The dividing lines between the two party models are more complex, and quite different in nature than what a simplistic differentiation between ‘reformism’ and ‘radicalism’ would suggest.

Ending the discussion of competing approaches to the quasi-revolutionary mainstream that eventually became dominant in the party through the passing of the 1891 Erfurt program at this point implies that a number of important internal debates that characterized the party throughout the 1890s and early 20th century will not be included. This is the case, because they are not relevant for the subject of inquiry pursued here, which is the initial formation of a dominant party model. In the case of German social democracy, a quasi-revolutionary party type established its dominance against the previously discussed three competing approaches, by the beginning of the 1890s.

All the later challenges to the quasi-revolutionary orientation occurred after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena, throughout the transformation of social democracy. This includes the left opposition to Kautsky and the party mainstream, which emerged, led by Rosa Luxemburg, throughout the beginning of the 20th century. It stood for a more voluntarist approach to the workers’ revolution, borrowing to some extent from anarchism and syndicalism, while quasi-revolutionary social democracy is characterized by determinism and attentism. Bernstein and the evolutionary socialist model he propagated emerged throughout the mid 1890s, but his revisionist challenge stayed with the party until well into the years of the Weimar Republic or even the post World War II period. It occurred after the initial formation of a dominant model, even though its pragmatic underpinnings, as noted above, had already emerged at an earlier point in time. Bernstein’s evolutionary social democratic revisionism is thus outside of the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena studied here, but some references to his argument will be made throughout the following analysis, as a means of clarifying the social integrative function of the quasi-revolutionary mainstream.143

The nature of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that established itself as dominant in Germany in the early 1890s can be characterized in the context of the previously established typology of varying models of labor politics. In the sphere of ideology, understood as a combination of formulated goals and

143 This tripartite division of ideologies characterized the party throughout the 1890s until the outbreak of World War I. Grebing (1991) referred to the expression of the dominant quasi-revolutionary approach as a ‘centrist’ ideology, which stood for the party mainstream, and which had to defend itself against challengers from the left and right.
suggested means, quasi-revolutionary social democracy exposes the following crucial features. Its fundamental objective is the implementation of socialism as the collectivization of the means of production. This is equivalent to evolutionary social democracy, but quasi-revolutionary social democrats focus more strongly on the political struggle and the achievement of liberal democracy than their evolutionary cousins, who were already born into a consolidated set of liberal institutions. In terms of strategy, or the means proposed to achieve these goals, quasi-revolutionary social democracy seeks a pragmatic accommodation with the entrenched elites, but at the same time, pursues an appeal to its constituency that emphasizes revolutionary rhetoric and the historically determined necessity of socialism.

With respect to organization, quasi-revolutionary parties emerge as dominant over the unions; and accordingly, within the broader labor movement, the political enjoys preeminence over the economic struggle. Both types of social democracy, however, feature bottom-up democratic forms of decision-making. The specifically German, or parliamentary, variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is distinct from the Belgian variant of the same party type in terms of the way in which constituency mobilization is pursued: through electoral participation and extra-parliamentary activities in the German, but exclusively through extra-parliamentary activities in the Belgian model. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents the optimal response of labor elites to an environment of low inclusion. More specifically, the German, or parliamentary, variant of this party type represents an optimal response to a particular configuration of low inclusion, in which the electoral channel is opened for labor access, while political liberties and responsible government remain precarious. In the context of the comparative argument outlined before, labor elites in Germany made an optimal choice, because quasi-revolutionary social democracy provides the most rewarding ratio of costs and benefits in an environment of low inclusion (see table 5 and figure 5).

The features of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic model of labor politics that emerged as dominant in Germany, and how they emerged in response to the existing environment of labor inclusion, will now be evaluated in more detail. This discussion is based on the elements of a party typology introduced before (see table 2). In the first place, I am going to discuss the ideology of German quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which consists of projected goals and suggested means to accomplish those goals. Based on that, I will outline, how the party’s ideology succeeded as a tool for the social integration of its adherents, which represents one of three prerequisites for ‘successful’ party formation. Secondly, I am going to discuss the organizational model along the same lines, beginning with the features of party organization (internal and external), followed by a discussion about the party’s systemness as the second prerequisite for ‘successful’ party formation. A consideration of ‘external institutionalization’ as the third prerequisite will follow after that.
Vulgar marxism as the dominant ideology of quasi-revolutionary social democracy

The Erfurt program of 1891 as the codified ideological model of the party contained a marxist analysis of capitalism and the class struggle along with a statement of socialism as the long term goal, to be accomplished through a fundamental social transformation, on the basis of revolutionary political change. The optimism of the party regarding the achievement of socialism was based on the conviction expressed in the program, that the inherent contradictions of capitalism themselves make overcoming capitalist exploitation and the victory of socialism inevitable. The second half of the agenda lists a set of specific demands, sometimes characterized as the party’s minimum program. Some of these items were general stipulations geared at the establishment of a truly liberal polity, with guaranteed political rights, fully effective universal suffrage, and a proportional representation electoral system; others were specific demands for policies to be enacted in the contemporary era of only limited parliamentary authority during the Empire, ranging from secular education over the guarantee of trade union rights to specific issues of worker protection, health care, and progressive income taxes. The analytical and more abstract first part of the program was formulated by Karl Kautsky, and the collection of specific demands by Eduard Bernstein.

The Erfurt program and the programmatic contributions of Karl Kautsky represent the most important documents defining the initial expression of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Kautsky condensed Marx and Engels’ original works, as well as Engels’ later elaborations on their original contributions into a party strategy. He thereby, for lack of a better terminology, vulgarized marxism, or, as Haupt (1986b) would argue, was the one to create marxism in the first place. The appeal of the quasi-revolutionary vulgar marxist model that was later emulated by other social democratic parties, and only sometimes adjusted to national circumstances, however, was not limited to formally codified ideology. The programmatic contributions themselves explicitly referred to electoral participation as the via regia to socialism. But the most important transmission belt into the hearts of leaders and members as well as the congress resolutions of parties abroad, was the model put to practice by the SPD, and the impressive election results achieved by doing so.

144 See SPD (1891) as the original German text for this and all the following references to the Erfurt program. Translations are my own from the German original.

145 See his “Road to Power” (Kautsky 1909) as the most succinct expression of his system of thought. For the political economic marxist underpinnings see Kautsky (1898), for his conception of revolution Kautsky (1902), for the relationship between democracy and socialism, the role of parliamentary involvement for the party, and the ‘political struggle’ in general see Kautsky (1911). See Kautsky’s response to Bernstein’s revisionism in Kautsky (1899): in many ways, the revisionism controversy reinforced the importance of vulgar marxism and a quasi-revolutionary orientation, for the party in general, but also arguably in Kautsky’s rhetoric.

146 Ritter (1963) calls Kautsky’s particular system of thought “Kautskyanism”, a term that is frequently used in the literature; see for example Grebing (1991) and Lehner (1977). I am using the term ‘vulgar marxism’ here in order to illustrate the historical and philosophical roots of his arguments, and to illustrate that the term marxism is not directly linked to Marx himself: see Haupt (1986b).
Goals in the party’s ideology

Consistent with the proto-religious salvation perspective inherent in quasi-revolutionary social democracy, the **fundamental objective of the party**, that is socialism as the collectivization of the means of production, is the Garden of Eden, or as the Erfurt program puts it, the “greatest welfare and universal harmonious perfection”. Socialism is at the same time the prerequisite, the incarnation, and the only path toward that ultimate state of being (cf. SPD 1891).

“Only the transformation of capitalist private ownership of the means of production – land and soil, pits and mines, resources, tools, machines, means of transportation – into collective property, and the transformation of the process of production into a socialist form, which means production for and by society, will turn large enterprises and the constantly growing productivity of labor from a source of misery and oppression for the hitherto exploited classes into a source of greatest welfare and universal, harmonious perfection.”

Even though socialism occupies such a central position, neither the Erfurt program nor the later programmatic work of the party ever developed an actual design of the socialist utopia. Bernstein’s revisionism was, among other things, keen on steering the party toward a course, where it would become serious about the technicalities of socialism and collectivization. He misunderstood that socialism was more than anything else a seemingly tangible perspective of salvation for the party’s constituency and its activists, and much less a precise collection of economic action plans. It is not surprising that Labor in Britain as the decidedly evolutionary socialist model party was the one social democratic party that actually developed such a blueprint for collectivization and socialism, and also implemented important parts of it during its tenure in office from 1945 to 1951.¹⁴⁷

The **substantive emphasis** of the party was characterized by a combination of socio-economic and political goals. The importance of that observation only becomes apparent through a comparison with the evolutionary social democratic contrast in mind, as those parties emphasized almost exclusively socio-economic goals, and understood the existing political arena as a generally satisfactory playing field for advancing those goals, in addition to the struggle around the workplace. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, as it becomes apparent through the Erfurt program, places primary emphasis on the political struggle and fundamental institutional changes (SPD 1891):

“The struggle of the working class against capitalist exploitation is necessarily a political struggle. Without political rights, the working class cannot carry on its economic struggles and develop its economic organization. It cannot bring about the transfer of the means of production into the possession of the community without first having obtained political power.”

¹⁴⁷ For an assessment of Labour in office from 1945 to 1951 see Pearce (1994), Francis (1997), and the edited volume by Fyrth (1993)
Other than the bolsheviki, whose concern for political rights was inspired exclusively by tactical considerations, quasi-revolutionary social democrats embraced political rights as an inherent component of their agenda. The emphasis on the political struggle, moreover, translates into the organizational characteristics of the party and the dominant position it seeks to establish vis-à-vis the unions.

*Strategy or the proposed means in the party’s ideology*

Debates about tactics assumed a much greater role for the programmatic work of the party and its internal debates than discussions about the fine print of socialism and collectivization. The formulation of strategical recommendations, or the suggested means to accomplish socialism, however, should not be understood as a mere technicality, not even when the point of departure for inquiry is the social integrative function of an ideology. If the formulation of socialism as the fundamental objective is the ultimate Garden of Eden, then the formulation of strategy describes the road to salvation, which makes the ultimate goal seem tangible.

The divide between revolutionary and pragmatic elements in the set of proposed means, or strategical recommendations, is not equivalent to a separation of appeals between the constituency and the entrenched elites, in the sense that the radical talk is for the workers, while the pragmatic signals are for the state. True, the entire package of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was based on a careful balancing act that certainly took both these poles and their conflicting interests into account. But at the same time, the nature of the ambivalent low inclusion environment, with a combination of limited concessions and harsh repression, had contributed to creating a labor constituency that in and of itself responded positively to the party’s combination of revolutionary and pragmatic elements in the formulation of its strategy.

*Determinism* and the expectations about the impending collapse of the capitalist order belong to the revolutionary elements in the party’s strategy. August Bebel summarized this issue most succinctly, when he coined the now famous expression *der grosse Kladderadatsch* (the Big Bang), which describes the point in time, when the entire capitalist-bourgeois order will collapse, because of its internal contradictions. According to Kautsky (1906), this event was bound to occur, as the result of a necessary and predetermined pattern of historical development, captured and formalized by the scientifically derived laws of marxism. Ritter (1963) notes that the optimistic perspective of the party regarding the collapse of capitalism was also, on top of the argument about the inherent contradictions of capitalism, fueled by the expectation that social democracy would be successful in diffusing its ideas beyond the confines of the industrial proletariat: to rural areas, smallholders, and the armed forces.

Kautsky also famously stated that “social democracy was a revolutionary, but not a revolution making party”, meaning in this context that the emergence of the big bang of capitalism does not depend on the
actual actions of labor and the party (cf. Kautsky 1909). It depends on the way in which the ‘bourgeoisie’ deals with the crises of capitalism. Bebel, as the practitioner of vulgar marxism and the actual leader of the party, rather than its resident intellectual, made sure to emphasize the arrival of the new era over the time of waiting: “Bourgeois society is working so vigorously toward its own destruction that we need only wait for the moment when we can pick up the power which has already dropped from its hands.”¹⁴⁸ In his main work “Die Frau und der Sozialismus” (Women and socialism), he emphasizes the nearing of the big bang and the advent of socialism, as the result of intensifying class divisions, the accelerating process of emiseration, and the ensuing growth of support for radical change not only from industrial workers, but from all quarters of society, including rural workers, middle class salaried groups and small property owners.

The reference to the class struggle and the prevalence of revolutionary rhetoric are the remaining revolutionary elements in the party’s formulated strategy. They are embedded in the previously noted deterministic expectation of intensifying class divisions and the collapse of capitalism. The Erfurt program of 1891 provides an excellent example for this kind of rhetoric that proved to provide a formidable appeal to the German worker constituency:

> “Ever greater becomes the number of proletarians, ever more massive the army of excess workers, ever more stark the opposition between exploiters and the exploited, ever more bitter the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which divides modern society into two hostile camps (…).”

The ‘quasi’ in quasi-revolutionary social democracy derives from the fact that the party was not insurrectionist in nature: The emphasis on the class struggle, revolutionary rhetoric, and the expectation of pre-determined capitalist collapse entered not only a temporary alliance, but an actual intellectual merger, with the pragmatic practices of the party. Kautsky’s previously noted statement in “The Road to Power” about social democracy as a “revolutionary, but not a revolution making party” continues with an argument about the relationship between determinism, revolution, and pragmatic practices: “Our task is not to organize the revolution, but to organize ourselves for the revolution.”

Preparing for the revolution entailed a number of pragmatic practices that the SPD deemed adequate in Germany’s specific environment of low inclusion: first, and most importantly, actually building and maintaining the organization in the expectation of capitalism’s great collapse. This is a common theme of all quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties, but it was particularly pronounced in the case of Germany. Moreover, the most important means of mobilizing support for the party in the specifically German (and Danish) version of the low inclusion polity was participation in elections and the conduct of propaganda in the context of election campaigns and parliamentary debates. The remaining pragmatic

¹⁴⁸ August Bebel at the 1891 party congress, cited in Guttsmann (1981, 274)
practices are to some extent geared at making the growth and maintenance of the organization possible. This entails most importantly the emphasis on legalism and an accommodation with the entrenched elites instead of insurrectionism.

Bebel famously called the pragmatic exploitation of the electoral channel for propaganda and mobilization to the ultimate end of organizational strength the “old, proven, and victorious” tactic, at the occasion of the 1890 party congress in Halle. The so-called Organisationspatriotismus (patriotic identification with the party and its organization) that entailed a number of pragmatic and mundane endeavors only makes sense in the context of the revolutionary expectations outlined above. Organizational patriotism and determinism would eventually make the party immobile in the face of changing external circumstances, and to some extent, organizational cohesion would become an end in itself rather than a means to an end. These are precisely the reasons, for why the party was incapable of fully exploiting the much anticipated revolutionary situation, once it presented itself in 1918. It also provides the underpinning for Robert Michels’ now famous critique of the party and his argument about the “Iron Law of Oligarchy”: every political mass organization was bound to develop oligarchic forms of leadership, it would eventually end up seeing the organization as an end in itself rather than a means to an end, creative dissent would not be tolerated, and eventually the party will become immobile in the face of changing circumstances. Both these issues are crucial in understanding how the initial formation of the party influenced its later transformation. However, during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, the dialectical combination between a tangible focus on organizational strength and the long term perspective of salvation provided a powerful appeal to the party’s constituency and its activists.

The specific environment of labor inclusion in Germany literally squeezed social democracy into the electoral channel in order to conduct its mobilization efforts. While political liberties were generally precarious during labor’s entire formative stage of entry into the political arena, participation in elections, which were organized on the basis of a wide franchise, offered the ideal means of agitation. The repressive Sozialistengesetz of 1878 to 1890, as discussed before, only reified this strategical orientation: it further limited political liberties, while leaving higher enfranchisement untouched, and providing an explicit legal guarantee for social democratic agitation in the context of election campaigns.

The emphasis on the electoral channel of inclusion in the absence of responsible government had already been a defining feature of the German environment of labor inclusion before 1878. As a result, social democracy was already set on a path of using the electoral channel for propaganda purposes, because other channels were not equally accessible, and an actual legislative strategy was unfeasible, given the lack of responsible government. The 1870 party congress of the SDAP (the proto-marxist Eisenacher), as the SPD’s organizational predecessor, passed a resolution, according to which the party was supposed “to participate in the elections and the debates exclusively for agitational purposes (…)” (SDAP 1870). The
stipulations of the Sozialistengesetz further pushed the social democrats on a path of mobilizing its constituency through parliamentary means. It also provided the background on which the party was able to assume dominance over the unions, since the party paradoxically continued to exist in the political arena (albeit in an organizational form that was adjusted to the new post-1878 realities), while the unions were not able to engage in any form of politics (given that they were by design not involved in election campaigns).

These characteristics of the German party – the focus on the electoral channel of mobilization, and the lack of a strong syndicalist element – are unique to the ‘parliamentary’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and as such, represent the optimal response to a version of the low inclusion polity, in which enfanchisement is the norm. The dominance of the political struggle, and the focus on organizational maintenance in the face of an ambivalent environment of inclusion, on the other hand, are universal features of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that characterize both the German and the Belgian variants of that party type.

During a December 1894 Reichstag speech, August Bebel concluded that it is no longer possible to “overthrow the state and the social order by violent means, by the erection of barricades or by pitched battles in the streets.” The desire of the SPD to accommodate with the entrenched elites, the party’s strictly legalistic approach and its rejection of insurrectionism are all encapsulated in his statement. This pragmatic aspect, however, was combined in the same speech with the revolutionary rhetoric and the rejection of the state and ‘bourgeois’ society that was equally typical for the party. The party and its leaders signaled to the entrenched elites on countless occasions, including this one, that they were not interested in conducting an actual revolutionary battle on the streets. The fact that the state never engaged in the previously mentioned ‘coup d’état from above’ option, which would have set Germany on a path toward the Russian and Japanese model of lowest labor inclusion, indicates that the entrenched elites understood the signals. At the same time, public rhetoric against the party was naturally sharp, and social democracy was stigmatized as an ‘insurrectionist’ party and a gang of vaterlandslose Gesellen (fellows without a fatherland).

Legalism, accommodation with the entrenched elites, and the refusal of insurrectionist or putchist schemes even continued to dominate the party during the repressive era of the Sozialistengesetz. If anything, the emphasis on legalism became even more pronounced during that time period (cf. Steinberg 1972). It was in response to the legalistic course and the pragmatic, quasi-revolutionary, party that the above noted proto-anarchism of die Jungen emerged. They demanded an actual insurrectionist approach.

149 The minutes of the Reichstag sessions in December 1894 and January 1895, which were dedicated to discuss the threat that social democracy represented, were published and reprinted numerous times (cf. Germany, Reichstag 1895)
and an end to strict legalism. The party leadership and the vast majority of the party’s adherents, however, saw strict adherence to the legal environment as the guarantee that the already granted inclusionary concessions would not be reversed, and that the party would not be violently crushed by the authorities. It was precisely the desire to maintain organizational strength, or from a more fundamental perspective, to guarantee the survival of the organization that informed its legalistic and accommodating strategy. Just like the general emphasis on organizational strength, this particular strategy to serve that purpose only receives its greater meaning in the context of the fundamental deterministic expectation of capitalist collapse, at which point a strong organization is required in order to usher successfully into the new era of socialism.

The fundamental opposition to the ‘bourgeois’ order also entailed a formal rejection of cooperation with any of the parties representing the bourgeoisie, i.e. all other parties. This issue would come to the forefront only toward the beginning of the 20th century, when French socialist Alexandre Millerand caused a crisis of the Second International upon entering a liberal government as minister for industry in June 1899. The Second International at its Amsterdam Congress of 1904 officially resolved that cooperation with non-proletarian parties was only admissible for a limited period of time and under exceptional circumstances. Despite the uproar caused by Millerand’s decision, pragmatic cooperation with non-proletarian parties, albeit short of ministerial posts at the national level, had always been part and parcel of quasi-revolutionary social democratic strategy, even in the case of German social democrats, who acted in the most intransient fashion during the 1904 congress.

The codified rejection of cooperation with the bourgeoisie is certainly a radical element of the party’s strategical formulations. It is rooted in the desire of the party leadership to secure the purity of the movement against ‘embourgeoisement’, and to not help the survival of capitalism by entering alliances with its architects. The Erfurt program of 1891 clearly expresses this pursuit of exclusiveness (SPD 1891):

“This social transformation (into socialism, KV) amounts to the emancipation not only of the proletariat, but of the entire human race, which is suffering from current conditions. But it can only be the work of the working class, because all other classes, notwithstanding the conflicts of interest between them, stand on the ground of the private ownership of the means of production and have as their common goal the preservation of the foundations of contemporary society.”

However, despite programmatic statements to the contrary, German quasi-revolutionary social democrats engaged in cooperation with the non-proletarian parties on numerous occasions. The party passed a resolution in 1890, according to which its supporters were to be motivated to engage in strategic voting for the ‘lesser evil’ in those cases, where social democracy was unable to obtain enough votes to progress to the second round of voting (in a majority-runoff electoral system). In 1897, the party went even further, by encouraging active support for non-proletarian second ballot candidates, whenever they can be

150 See Second International (1904) for the congress resolution.
expected to share some of the party’s demands. In 1912, these selective forms of cooperation even resulted in a formal second ballot agreement with the progressive liberals. 151

Some even more pronounced forms of cooperation with competing parties emerged at the local and regional levels, particularly in the more inclusive South and Southwest of the country. It is in these areas, where the early ‘pragmatic reformism’ emerged that had been noted above. It should be kept in mind, however, that a possibly even more pronounced form of pragmatism in the Southern branches of the party is not antithetical to the quasi-revolutionary model. Quite to the contrary, it is one of its inherent elements, even though the extent of pragmatic accommodation might have been somewhat more pronounced in some of the more liberal regions of the country. What is antithetical to the spirit of quasi-revolutionary social democracy are the attempts of evolutionary socialists to use these pragmatic efforts at cooperation as the spring board for the development of a new revisionist ideological superstructure that would maintain the focus on pragmatism, but do away with the revolutionary perspective.

*Social integration through the dominant ideological model*

Rather than analyzing party ideology merely from a history of ideas perspective, I have argued previously that it is of crucial importance to understand its social integrative function vis-à-vis workers at large. When the party formulates goals and strategies that respond in an optimal fashion to the demands of the broader labor constituency, as they are shaped by a particular environment of inclusion, such a constellation enhances the opportunities for achieving an optimum of mobilization success. 152 In the case of Kautsky’s, and thereby the SPD’s strategical statements, it is easy to find fault with the inconsistencies of the program, but it was precisely its inconsistency, resulting in the promise of socialism as the necessary outcome of a hard daily struggle, which appealed to the German labor movement of the late 19th century. 153 Bernstein would later on criticize the firm expectation of continuing emiseration, and the increase in two sided antagonistic class relations, as the prelude to capitalist crisis and the necessity of socialism. He was quite right in doing so, on the basis of the economic indicators for the late 19th century that he studied. 154 However, he was not capable of understanding that intellectual honesty and predictions rooted in empirical

151 See Guttman (1981, 275)
152 ‘Structural’ features that benefit mobilization success have been discussed extensively before: the size of the industrial working-class, the predominant form of industrial organization, most importantly the size of firms, and the extent to which political entrepreneurs successfully mobilize labor along competing non-economic cleavage dimensions (cf. Rokkan 1970 and Katznelson 1987).
153 See Korsch (1929) for a systematic critique of ‘Kautskyanism’. Bernstein’s revisionism emerged against Kautskyanism in the context of actual intraparty debates. Critical comments on Kautsky as well as the understanding of his ideology as an ‘integration approach’ by Ritter (1963).
154 See Berstein (1899) as a summary of his ‘revisionist’ writings. For an evaluation of Bernstein see Gay (1952) and Gneuss (1957). See Meyer (1992) and Grebing (1991) on the relation between Kautsky and Bernstein.
reality were only of secondary importance, compared to the quasi-religious appeal these expectations provided to the party and its supporters. In August Bebel’s own words, as the leading figure of social democracy and publicly acknowledged Gegenkaiser (Anti-emperor), in the revisionism controversy against Bernstein: “It is utterly false tactics to rob the party of its enthusiasm and of its willingness to make sacrifices by pushing its goals into the indefinite future.”

Ulam (1960, 160) even goes further than that and criticizes what he believed to be a different kind of determinism in Bernstein’s argument: “It was equally naïve of Bernstein to discard Marxist determinism while implying the acceptance of liberal determinism, to think of an uninterrupted growth of material well-being and democracy as leading rather easily to socialism, to believe the English pattern to be, essentially, the universal pattern.” Other than Kautsky’s revolutionary determinism, however, Bernstein’s evolutionary voluntarism did not offer a convincing appeal to a labor constituency, which was born into an environment devoid of liberal democratic institutions as the fundamental prerequisite for a gradual process of legislating labor into the socialist future. Bernstein’s fundamental strategical recipe was shaped by his interaction with the English labor movement. If the SPD had embraced his approach as party ideology during its formative stage into the arena of party politics, it would have made a suboptimal choice, due to the import of external knowledge from an environment, in Britain, that was optimally suited to evolutionary social democracy. The German environment of labor inclusion, on the other hand, was the optimal context for the adoption of quasi-revolutionary social democracy on the basis of Kautsky’s recommendations.

One important reason for the optimality of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the appeal of its underpinning ideology to a labor constituency that was shaped by the experiences of Germany as a low inclusion polity. Harsh repression and the perception of exclusion from ‘bourgeois’ society provided a fertile soil for revolutionary rhetoric and the long-term perspective of salvation offered by the determinism of vulgar marxism. At the same time, the pragmatic elements in the party’s ideology were not only signals to the entrenched elites; they were implicit elements of the party’s appeal to its constituency. In a partly liberalized polity, such as Germany at the time, insurrectionist schemes were perceived as too costly, given that there are other tangible and less costly roads to salvation.

The extensive network of auxiliary organizations affiliated with the party created a comprehensive counter culture. The insular nature of the labor movement, with its own clubs, papers, bars, alongside interaction in the factories, and possibly at union and party meetings, created a situation, in which workers would pass through the institutions of socialist socialization from ‘cradle to grave’. This wide web of workers’ activities would only come to full bloom throughout the more liberal era of the Weimar Republic.

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155 August Bebel at the 1898 party congress, cited by GUTSMANN (1981, 295)
after 1919, but its roots are firmly entrenched in the shared experience of exclusion during the late 19th century, and in particular during the era of the repressive *Sozialistengesetz*.

The nature of worker culture during this time period is a particularly well-researched topic. I am not going to elaborate more on it here, but I wish to place this phenomenon in the context of my argument about the social integrative function of the party’s ideology. Guttsmann (1981, 130) argued that the “ghettoization” of the party occurred in response to social exclusion by all of ‘bourgeois’ society, political repression of the state, and the authoritarianism of employers. These external constraints are certainly an environment that favored the emergence of an extensive insulated counter culture, such as the one that did emerge in Germany. But at the same time, his argument remains ‘structural’, just as the majority of theoretical and comparative contributions to the study of social democratic party formation in general. The phenomena Guttsmann (1981) notes only provide the environment, in response to which labor elites created a network of associations that eventually made up a comprehensive counter culture, because workers embraced these associations. One important contribution to the creation of that counter culture, then, is the formulation of party ideology as its backbone. Without the emphasis of that ideological formulation on the class struggle, the preservation of ‘class purity’, and the long term perspective of salvation, the counter culture of workers would not have been able to instill a feeling of sense and meaning in its constituents. It would also have no political relevance, since without that ideological underpinning, worker cyclists would just be workers riding bicycles. They would not be one of several pillars making up a comprehensive counter culture, all destined to jointly walk the path toward socialist salvation.

This argument about the necessity of considering elite agency and the problematic determinism in the typical account of working-class counter culture can best be illustrated by a comparison to other cases. Belgian labor elites, for example, were equally, if not more successful, compared to their German comrades, in establishing a comprehensive counter cultural network. One ingredient for that success was the formation of a variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that responded in an optimal fashion to the specifically Belgian version of the low inclusion polity. In the case of Italy, on the other hand, one reason for the disassociation between worker culture and the socialist party was the embrace of a party model that did not respond in an optimal fashion to the given configuration of low inclusion. The presence of ‘special’ anti-socialist legislation is also not suitable as an (equally deterministic) explanation for the emergence of a comprehensive counter culture with an embedded political party. Legislation similar in nature to the German *Sozialistengesetz* also existed in the cases of Italy and Argentina. Neither one of these cases, however, saw the emergence of a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party that was equally

156 Kramer (1987) offers an overview of approaches on working-class culture from a marxist perspective, Tenfelde (1990, 262 et seq) with a succinct overview, Guttsmann (1981) with a particular emphasis on the legal, political, and socio-economic context, within which working-class counter culture emerged, Lidtke (1985) is the classic English contribution on the subject.
successful as the German and Belgian comrades in establishing an extensive network of counter cultural worker organizations around it.

Features of the dominant organizational model and the achievement of systemness

*External organization*

The Erfurt program represents a succinct summary of the party’s ideological orientation, which functioned as a tool for the social integration of its constituency. The sources that identify the organizational characteristics of the party are more varied. On top of that, the need to adjust flexibly to the changing legal environment often created situations during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, where the formal language of the party’s organizational statutes deviated from its actual practice (cf. Ritter 1963). Based on the previously outlined typology, the *external aspects* of the party’s form of organization encompass the kind of relation it entertains with the unions, and the extent to which it is generally embedded in an environment of auxiliary organizations.

All quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties strived, by design, for a particularly high degree of *embeddedness*. This entailed the creation of a party that would assume coordinating functions and provide meaning for a network of worker organizations. Not all specific manifestations of the quasi-revolutionary party type were successful in devising a party along these lines – the Italian, Spanish, Hungarian, Argentinean, and Dutch parties suffered from serious deficits in establishing successful links to organized labor during their respective formative stages in the political arena. The German party, on the other hand emerged as a prime example for the actual realization of very high embeddedness. The previous outline of the specifically German working-class counter culture already provided ample evidence for that point.

The *relations entertained with the unions* represent a second aspect of the party’s external organization. The actual nature of these relations in the case of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is to some large extent encapsulated in the ideological formulations noted above. The emphasis of the labor movement overall is on the political struggle, and this translates into a pattern of relations with the unions, where the party assumes a dominant position, without, however, seeking to treat the unions as an entirely subservient set of organizations, which is a defining feature of the bolshevik model of labor politics. The de facto dominance of the party over the unions is not only the consequence of an according party ideology, but also a somewhat paradoxical result of the institutional environment created through the *Sozialistengesetz*. The ‘free’ or social democratic unions were abolished in that particular form in between 1878 and 1890. The worker organizations that continued to exist during this time period in the economic arena were explicitly prohibited to engage in any form of political activity. This erosion of political liberties
applied to the party in equal measure, but the party was able to continue its political involvement through
the loophole of the *Sozialistengesetz* that allowed political associations for the purpose of electoral
campaigning. As a result, the party would continue to exercise a strong presence in the political arena,
while the unions were de facto precluded from developing any form of coherent agenda. Even after 1890,
when the law was phased out, unions continued to be barred from direct involvement in politics, at that
time, more narrowly understood. Within those continuing limitations, however, the social democratic
unions were able to establish the *Generalkommission der Freien Gewerkschaften Deutschlands* as their
umbrella organization during that same year, and to develop a more independent course from that point
onward.

The *Sozialistengesetz* thus made the German labor movement a predominantly ‘political’ movement.
And moreover, it created an environment, in which the unions were effectively precluded from carrying
their socio-economic concerns directly into the arena of politics. This used to be the British pattern, first
through the practice of moderate syndicalism, and then eventually through the Labor Party as a permanent
presence in the arena of politics. In the case of Germany, the institutional environment encountered by
labor elites did not allow for such a pattern of development that would have led to the formation of an
evolutionary social democratic party, based on the dominance of the unions over the party. In the case of
Germany, due to the optimal response of labor elites to the given context of labor inclusion, a pattern of
external relations between party and union emerged, in which the party established its dominance. Over
time, however, the further the experience of the *Sozialistengesetz* moved to the past, the more were the
unions able to emerge as an equal partner within the broader labor movement. The most important
watershed for that form of equality was the formal agreement on mutual consultation between SPD and the
‘General Commission’, passed at the occasion of the Mannheim party conference in 1905 (cf. Berghahn
2005, 210 et seq). Other than the evolutionary socialism of Bernstein, however, the pragmatism of the
unions could very well be integrated into the overall quasi-revolutionary mainstream of the party. As
discussed above, the unions simply did reformism, which is a defining criterion of quasi-revolutionary
social democracy, instead of creating an ideological ‘evolutionary socialist’ superstructure around it.

**Internal organization**

A democratic form of internal organization, a branch structure, and a hierarchy of decision-making
that works from the bottom up are defining features of all social democratic party types. The exercise of
internal democracy along these lines has been famously criticized by the previously noted classic
contribution of Michels (1911). His argument about the oligarchic tendencies within the party is certainly a
relevant topic for inquiry. However, my most important concern here is to distinguish the social democratic
principles of organization from those featured by other models of labor politics, most importantly in this context, the explicitly undemocratic and elitist bolshevism. My concern is therefore not so much with the ‘quality of democracy’, to borrow terminology from a different field of political science, but with the institutionalized opportunities for democratic participation, and the adopted organizational model. This undeniably was democratic and organized from the bottom up in the case of social democracy, but undemocratic and from the top down in the case of bolshevism.\textsuperscript{157}

The formal organization of the unified party established at the Gotha conference of 1875 already exposed these features, but it was abolished in 1878, with the enactment of the \textit{Sozialistengesetz}. Even during the time of the anti-socialist law, a minimum of democratic decision-making was maintained, even though the need for secrecy rendered formal procedures more difficult to implement. The leadership of the party was maintained at the local level by narrow circles of activists, the so-called \textit{Corpora}. It was accompanied by an ‘electoral organization’, which was legal under the provisions of the \textit{Sozialistengesetz}, since the law allowed association and communication for the purpose of electoral campaigning and parliamentary involvement. At the national level, the leadership over the party was exercised de facto by the \textit{Reichstag} faction and its executive board. Thus, in this organizational respect as well, the anti-socialist law did not alter the effects of the pre 1878 environment of inclusion; it reinforced them by squeezing the party further into the electoral channel.

These institutional peculiarities of the \textit{Sozialistengesetz} also created an entirely different role for the leadership of the party, compared to instances of lowest inclusion. In the case of Russia, for example, the top level of the party leadership had to act from its residence in exile almost without interruption. This led to radicalization and more centralist organizational schemes in insurrectionist models of labor politics. Under the peculiar framework of the \textit{Sozialistengesetz} in Germany from 1878 to 1890, the leadership of the party was exercised by members of the \textit{Reichstag}, who acted under the protection of immunity. Only those leading social democrats, who were not MPs, had to go into exile. This scenario favored more pragmatic orientations. It also provided the underpinning for a pattern of party organization that assigned a significantly more important role to the local level.

Communication between the national and the local levels was maintained through \textit{Vertrauensleute} (trusted representatives). They were not elected through a formalized procedure, but they depended on at least implicit support and trust from their local party unit. Their task was to act as an intermediary in between different levels of the party hierarchy. This represents a marked contrast to the centralized top

\textsuperscript{157} I am not going to pursue this debate about Michels (1911) further, but it should be noted that the vast majority of authors that have written about the democratic credentials of the party disagree with Michel’s dire conclusions and argue that intra-party democracy was actually quite pronounced, despite the pressures on the necessity of strong leadership and party unity in a repressive environment: see for example Ritter (1963) and Guttmann (1981)
down decision-making of the bolsheviki, and the role of the agents that Lenin installed in local party organizations. Their job was not to act as an intermediary between different organizational levels, but quite to the contrary, to make sure Lenin’s orders were followed and adequately implemented at the local level. In Germany, some important variation in the organizational features of the party occurred across specific localities, depending on the severity with which the *Sozialistengesetz* was implemented. After 1890 and the end of the law, it was the variation in ‘Vereinsrecht’ (laws of association) across German states that created a multifaceted system of responses to institutional and legal obstacles. What applied uniformly to the entire party is the way in which local party organizations continued to exist between 1878 and 1890 in a camouflaged fashion, as social clubs, mutual aid societies, regular gatherings at social democratic bars, or in the context of a legal ‘electoral organization’.

Even though hierarchical decision-making from the bottom up was almost impossible to implement in a procedurally sound fashion under the socialist law, the 1878 to 1890 period did not lead to a reification of secrecy and conspiratory methods, both of which are antithetical to the principles of internal party democracy. When the party emerged from the *Sozialistengesetz* in 1890, it almost immediately implemented a formal set of procedures that guaranteed internal party democracy and bottom up decision-making, at the occasion of the party congress in Halle. Even after 1890, however, the specific rules of the Prussian law of association still required a few flexible adjustments. The law, for example, forbade a hierarchical relationship between local units and a national organization. The party did in fact rely on such a relationship, but it had to be creative in bypassing these and a number of other obstacles. To that end, the party organized formally public meetings (which were legal, while internal party conferences were not) to elect delegates. It also continued to rely on the work of the more clandestine *Vertrauensleute* to maintain the interaction with the national level. Only in 1905 could a formal system of delegation that was homogenous for the entire party be implemented, and the *Vertrauensleute* were abolished.

This shows, most importantly, that democratic decision-making from the bottom up as the basic principle of internal party organization characteristic for the social democratic party type was firmly engrained within German social democracy. The organizational adjustments made during the era of the *Sozialistengesetz* and even afterwards are truly just flexible reactions to the given environment. They were not used as a pretext to turn the party into an undemocratic organization. Along these lines, within a constantly evolving legal environment, the party went through a number of specific changes throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, which are described in much detail by Guttsmann (1981, 150 et seq). But the fundamental principles of party organization were already established through the 1890 Halle Congress, and long before that, engrained in social democracy as the organizational principles to be aspired to. Other than in the case of insurrectionist models of labor politics that emerged as optimal responses to an environment of lowest inclusion, the time of the *Sozialistengesetz*, due to the way in which it continued to
allow for electoral agitation, strengthened the importance of the local party unit, bottom up decision-making and democratic procedures.

The achievement of ‘systemness’

The previous two sections described the characteristics of the party’s organization, in the context of the given environment of inclusion. At this point, I am going to discuss briefly, how the party accomplished ‘systemness’, that is organizational coherence and effectiveness on the basis of the dominant organizational model outlined above. Systemness, in addition to ‘social integration through the implementation of a dominant ideological model’ represents the second of three previously discussed prerequisites for successful party formation, or in other words, a minimum of party institutionalization. Systemness requires regular communications between the center of the party and the periphery, a formalized budgetary process, and a minimum of mass support. Given the focus of the SPD on organization building and preservation, it is not surprising that the party is typically considered the model for a coherent and effective organization.\textsuperscript{158} While these prerequisites for systemness had already been accomplished throughout the 1870s, before the foundation of the SPD, the definitive characteristics of the party’s organization were codified during the first party congress after the phasing out of the anti-socialist law, which was held in Halle in October 1890.

Ritter (1963, 58-66) describes in much detail the budgetary process of the party and its channels of communication, as two crucial elements of systemness. He argues that under the repressive Sozialistengesetz from 1878 to 1890, the party’s finances were organized comparatively loosely, due to the illegality of a formal party organization. But even during that time period, party discipline, including the relative orderliness of financial contributions, was pronounced. After 1890, beginning with the Halle congress, an increasing centralization and professionalization of the budgetary process occurred.

The party also directly owned a wide variety of papers – regional, local, national – and special interest publications, including satirical and theoretical journals as well as later on, more and more publications for particular sections of a comprehensive working-class counter culture, such as magazines for workingmen cyclists, worker choirs etc. The Vorwärts was and still is to this day the formal central organ of the party, but Ritter (1963) notes that the Leipziger Volkszeitung and the Hamburger Echo emerged as the de facto leading papers. Moreover, even though the socialist press was rendered illegal by the Sozialistengesetz, the party already had 60 papers at its disposal, when the law ended in 1890. After the closing down of most of the party newspapers in the first wave of repression following on the implementation of the law, the social

\textsuperscript{158} For a comprehensive discussion of party organization see Ritter (1963) and Guttsman (1981).
democratic press reemerged again throughout the mid 1880s and then grew significantly toward the end of that decade.

Regular party conferences at all levels of the emerging party hierarchy and an active two way process of communication were the norm even during the 1860s and 1870s. Throughout the 1890s and the beginning of the 20th century, the party hierarchies and channels of communication would become more and more reified and professionalized. Even during the era of the Sozialistengesetz, party communication continued to be maintained. “Der Sozialdemokrat” as the major organ of the party in this time period, was published and printed from Zürich since 1879, and distributed within Germany by local party activists. National party conferences could not be held in Germany anymore, but they did take place abroad (Switzerland in 1880 and 1887, and Denmark in 1883). Secret conferences of party leaders with local and regional activists would take place across various localities within Germany.

Given the size of its membership (see table 14), the party certainly was ‘mass-based’, which represents the final prerequisite for a minimum of party institutionalization. In addition to its election results and the prominence of its intellectuals, it was the success in membership acquisition that gave the SPD its status as the model party of socialism.159 Surpassed only by Labour in Britain, it was by far the largest social democratic party out of all cases, for which adequate data were recorded, with 521,000 members in the first decade of the 20th century, 999,552 in the second, and 883,519 in the third (see table 14).160 These numbers are certainly impressive, given that the Swedish social democrats are in second place from 1901 to 1910 with only 74,821 members.

The relative success in membership acquisition accomplished by the SPD, however, is much more limited than these absolute figures reveal. If the overall number of industrial workers across cases is accounted for, as shown in table 15, the SPD only occupies a position in the middle of the field, trailing behind the cases of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Britain, and Sweden. The optimality of membership acquisition in these cases was thus significantly more pronounced than in the case of Germany. The attractiveness of the German party as a model is therefore rooted to some extent in a membership size that is not exclusively the consequence of outstanding efforts at mobilization, but also the result of a particularly sizable industrial working-class. The relative mobilization success of the party, on the other hand, while still notable, is more limited. These conclusions that we can draw with historical hindsight and on the basis of succinct comparative data did not come as easily to labor elites at the time. It is therefore only natural that the successful diffusion of the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was aided by

159 Tenfelde (1990, 262 et seqq) provides a succinct summary about the size of local branches, the number of party secretaries etc., which are all issues, on top of the plain membership figures, indicative of the party’s extent of institutionalization.
160 The British figures are so much higher because of automatic membership of union members in the party.
the absolute size of its membership, while labor elites in those cases that adopted the German model did not necessarily analyze the SPD’s relative mobilization success.

The external institutionalization of German social democracy

External institutionalization has previously been introduced as the third prerequisite of successful party formation. It is a relatively broad concept that can entail a number of specific ways through which the party becomes reified in the public mind. In that sense, the extensive working-class counter culture noted above that emerged alongside or around the party is also indicative for the presence and the extent of its external institutionalization. At this point, however, the focus is on electoral representation, which, as outlined before, represents the most stringent way of assessing external institutionalization, at least in those cases, in which the electoral channel became available to workers.

In the case of Germany, as one of only two low inclusion polities next to Denmark, the electoral channel was opened for labor access from the very beginning of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. The emphasis of the party on the electoral channel and forms of mobilization that revolve around elections, moreover, has been noted on many occasions. This strategical orientation that emerged in the case of Germany is an optimal response to the encountered version of the low inclusion polity, in which worker access to elections was guaranteed, while other institutional channels into the political arena remained precarious. External institutionalization through a minimum of electoral support occurred for the German party already by the year 1890, through the elections of 1887 and 1890, when the party passed the critical electoral threshold of 10 % for the second time in its history. No other social democratic party would achieve ‘external institutionalization’ at such an early point in time.

From the perspective of an overall increase in electoral support, the success of German social democracy must have been perceived by its sister parties as impressive throughout the late 19th and early 20th century. In between 1884 and 1895, no other party came even remotely close. However, it should also be noted that after 1895, other parties approached and eventually surpassed the SPD: initially (1896-1900) the Belgians with 21.3 % compared to 27.2 % for the SPD, and from 1901 to 1905 Australia with 25.2 %, compared to the SPD’s 31.7 %. By 1906-1910, the German party had lost its pole position to the Australians, and after 1911, the election results of the SPD ceased to be exceptional altogether, as a wide variety of sister parties either overtook or came indistinguishably close to their German comrades, including the Australian and Belgian parties, but also the social democrats of Sweden, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Norway (see table 12). Tenfelde (1990, 24) concluded that “(a) comparison with other industrial nations clearly shows the level of organizational development which the German labor movement attained after the turn of the century.” While his statement is, of course, not entirely inadequate, and the
overall success of the SPD was impressive, the comparative assessment of ‘mobilization success’ presented above does already help to qualify his conclusions.

On top of that, it should also be taken into account that the case of Germany provided better opportunities for mobilization than the majority of other cases, given the large share of the German working-class in the economically active population (see table 8). The pervasiveness of industrialization that created this outcome is therefore another crucial prerequisite for the overall mobilization success of the SPD that was not present in a number of other cases, which adopted the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. It is understandable that labor elites looked at the impressive overall election results of the SPD, which were favored by the large share of industrial workers in the population, rather than calculating the German party’s relative mobilization success. When the extent of industrialization is thus controlled for, as shown in table 13, the success of the SPD is much more limited, and the party is relegated from its pole position in absolute election returns to a place in the middle of the field in terms of relative mobilization success. We can draw these conclusions with historical hindsight and on the basis of succinct comparative data, but labor elites at the time did not have these benefits. The overall electoral success of the SPD was rooted in the adoption of the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as an optimal response to the specifically German version of low inclusion. But it was further advantaged by the large share of industrial workers in the population. In other cases, on top of possibly a different environment of inclusion, that particular prerequisite for high overall mobilization success was not necessarily present, and an evaluation of relative mobilization success was significantly more difficult to accomplish.

Conclusion

The optimality of the SPD in the German environment of low inclusion

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy emerged as the optimal response of German labor elites to their environment of low inclusion. Moreover, the parliamentary variant of that party type adopted through the foundation of the SPD represented the optimal response to the specific configuration of low inclusion in the case of Germany. Generally, low inclusion is defined by the opening of one set of institutions for labor’s access to the political arena, while other channels of inclusion remain closed or precarious. Whenever this is accomplished through the channel of enfranchisement, a particular variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is optimal that emphasizes agitation and mobilization through election campaigns and parliamentary involvement. The previous analysis has shown that German labor elites were literally squeezed into pursuing a parliamentary and electoral variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy:
inclusion in other domains approached the lowest level of inclusion, while enfranchisement remained at the higher level, and the abolition of political liberties was explicitly not applied to the pursuit of electoral agitation.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy was the optimal response to the German environment of low inclusion, because it provided the most rewarding ratio of benefits and costs (see table 5 and figure 5). Insurrectionism as one of three alternative models of labor politics gained in appeal during the 1880s, through the proto-anarchism of die Jungen within the party, and generally an increase in anarchist agitation. The potential for access to political authority as one component of the benefit side in labor elites’ decision-making process is high in quasi-revolutionary social democracy and insurrectionism, as both of them expect a complete turnover of political power in the event of a revolutionary situation. Overall, however, quasi-revolutionary social democracy provides more benefits to labor elites, because its expected mobilization success as the second type of benefit is greater than that of insurrectionism. In order to understand this distinction, one has to take into account the previously outlined description of the nature of the German working-class and its orientations toward the political process. On the one hand, labor was socialized into a repressive and exclusionary environment, but on the other hand, the given environment of low inclusion also provided for certain concessions that somewhat decreased the attractiveness of an insurrectionist approach, compared to a more legalistic perspective.

Slightly higher benefits of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, compared to insurrectionism, contributed to greater overall rewards. But what distinguishes the two models much more in a low inclusion environment occurs on the cost side. The costs of outright insurrectionism are always at a maximum, in any environment of inclusion, because of the maximum of personal risks that accrue to labor elites, when they actively agitate for an overthrow of the existing order. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, pursued a strictly legalistic perspective, and it is in the nature of low inclusion polities to not pursue an exclusively repressive strategy. As a result, low inclusion polities, including Germany, respected to some extent those manifestations of labor politics, for which institutionalized channels had been formally opened. There were, of course, still greater risks for labor elites than in a fully liberalized environment of higher inclusion. But these risks were not at a maximum, as they were in lowest inclusion polities. As a result, the overall rewards of quasi-revolutionary social democracy are higher in low inclusion polities than those of insurrectionist models, mostly because of the higher costs associated with insurrectionism, but also because of quasi-revolutionary social democracy’s somewhat greater mobilization potential on the benefits side.

Thus, compared to insurrectionist models, it is largely the cost side that determines the greater optimality of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. This is different, when contrasting the quasi-revolutionary to the evolutionary approach, where the former emerges as more rewarding in an
environment of low inclusion because of the greater benefits its provides, while the costs for either one of
the two models are the same. State repression of labor in Germany certainly made a distinction between a
social democratic approach on the one hand, and insurrectionist or moderate syndicalist models on the
other. The costs of moderate syndicalism were low, because there were no risks for labor elites in adopting
a model that is by definition based on a loyalist attitude toward the regime. As a matter of fact, Bismarck’s
designs for dealing with the labor question involved a scheme to actively encourage moderate syndicalist
organizations. Insurrectionist models, on the other hand, always come with heavy costs for its proponents.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy was in an intermediate position, because it represented a
fundamental opposition to the regime, and was subject to harsh repression, but at the same time, never to
the same extent as insurrectionism, because it signaled the state that it was not in the business of actively
carrying out an actual insurrection. That same state, however, made no distinction between different
factions of social democracy. The evolutionary socialists were equally abhorred as quasi-revolutionary
social democrats were, since they were both pushing for socialism, the abolition of private property, and the
establishment of liberal democracy.

The costs of the two models, both regarding the personal risks to labor elites, and the necessary
investment in organization building, are therefore the same. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy offers
more rewards to labor elites, compared to its evolutionary cousins, because it provides significantly better
opportunities for the mobilization of the labor constituency. Heavy repression and exclusion created a
working-class in Germany that was extremely receptive to the radical rhetoric and the long-term
perspective of salvation offered by the vulgar marxist ideology that defines quasi-revolutionary social
democracy. The appeals of evolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, and this became apparent in
the controversy around Bernstein, appeared shallow in an environment that did not provide the necessary
institutional prerequisites for a gradual road toward socialism.

Moderate syndicalism provides the least rewarding ratio of costs and benefits in an environment of
low inclusion. This assessment is based on the earlier discussion of Bismarckian corporatist plans.
Bismarck’s schemes would have created an entirely new environment of labor inclusion, combining lowest
inclusion in terms of liberal-democratic principles with a corporatist incorporation of the labor
constituency. He failed to implement his plans, except for a number of worker insurances, which were
certainly important but not nearly as far-reaching as his original designs. Authoritarian corporatism
therefore had to wait until after 1919 for its full emergence, and accordingly, such a category does not exist
in this study. The reason for why moderate syndicalism provides only limited rewards to labor in an
environment of low inclusion is the fact that these “traditional dictatorships”, as Luebbert (1987) would call
them, do not make active efforts at labor incorporation. Founding ‘loyalist’ moderate syndicalist unions in a
context of low inclusion does therefore not come with any significant costs, other than a minimum of
organization building (there are no personal risks and no need for organizational investment into an independent presence in the political arena). But at the same time, moderate syndicalism also does not provide any benefits in an environment of labor inclusion that is devoid of active efforts to appeal to the labor constituency. It becomes more rewarding in an authoritarian corporatist context, where such benefits are provided, while its costs remain low.

The previously outlined geographical and over time variations in the environment of labor inclusion in Germany support this argument about the relation between labor inclusion, elite choices, and the emergence of a particular model of labor politics. We have seen that in those areas, which were more inclusive toward labor, in the South and the Southwest of the country, a less radical and more pragmatic orientation emerged in the according regional branches of the party. Over time, the relative change in the appeal of competing approaches depended on the direction into which the pendulum of institutional inclusion and state behavior was swinging. The more state affirming and evolutionary socialist Lasalleanism was most attractive during those time periods that held the promise of an increase in labor inclusion. The fortunes of quasi-revolutionary social democracy were on the rise under the Sozialistengesetz, which clearly revealed the repressive side of Germany as a low inclusion polity.

The export of German social democracy

The model of labor politics that was thus adopted in response to the specific environment of labor inclusion in Germany became the paradigm of a socialist party, and was diffused to a great number of other countries, as the following case studies will show. As noted before, the quasi-revolutionary model adopted by the SPD was such a successful export article for three major reasons: first, because of the extent of ‘systemness’ it managed to accomplish (membership, organizational effectiveness); second, because of its external institutionalization (election results); and third, because of the relative theoretical sophistication of its intellectuals and the ability of the party to formulate and codify an ideological model that was extremely successful as a tool for the social integration of its constituency.

For some other countries, the success story of the SPD was more of a curse than a blessing, however. The model was regarded as inherently superior, for all of the above mentioned reasons. This perception was reinforced by the way in which the ideological proponents of quasi-revolutionary social democracy stressed the universality of marxism, and as a consequence, the universality of the SPD’s model, which was built on that system of thought. However, the parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy

161 Ritter (1963, 40) looks at an additional kind of diffusion: the adoption of the SPD’s concept of a mass-based party by competitors within the German party system.
adopted by the SPD was by no means inherently superior. It provides an optimal response only in an environment of low labor inclusion, which, moreover, needs to feature a specific configuration of low inclusion that accomplishes limited institutional incorporation through the provision of enfranchisement. However, next to Germany, this particular configuration of low inclusion only existed in Denmark during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. All other cases were either characterized by an entirely different degree of labor inclusion, or, in case they belonged to the low inclusion category, by a configuration of low inclusion that was devoid of enfranchisement, and instead, accomplished limited institutional incorporation of labor through the at least rudimentary practice of responsible government and the provision of at least a minimum of political liberties.

The German paradigm was a blessing only in two particular constellations. First, the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was an optimal response to the Danish environment of labor inclusion. Denmark was characterized by the same configuration of inclusion as in Germany, and the German model could therefore be adopted without much adjustment. Second, the German paradigm was also a blessing in those cases that were characterized by a ‘non-enfranchisement version’ of low inclusion, whenever the mobilization strategies of the party were adopted to this environment. This is precisely what happened in the cases of Sweden, Norway, and Belgium. Here, the universal features of quasi-revolutionary social democracy were imported from Germany. But at the same time, the German paradigm was adjusted to a ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that emphasized extra-parliamentary forms of mobilization in these environments of low labor inclusion, which were devoid of enfranchisement.

In the cases of Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Hungary, no such adjustment took place. Labor elites in these cases made the optimal, theoretically predicted, choice for quasi-revolutionary social democracy in an environment of low inclusion. But they made a suboptimal choice by adopting the German parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy instead of the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant, in a configuration of low inclusion that was devoid of enfranchisement, and where therefore electoral mobilization and parliamentary involvement as crucial features of the German paradigm, were significantly less effective. In the cases of Switzerland and France, choices of labor elites even moved “off the equilibrium path” defined by the causal argument about the effects of labor inclusion as a causally determining external constraint. Labor elites in these cases adopted quasi-revolutionary social democracy to an environment of higher inclusion, in which evolutionary social democracy as an entirely distinct type of party would have been the optimal response.

162 We are going to see in the case study of Austria that the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy also became an optimal response there, once the environment of labor inclusion changed through the embrace of enfranchisement in 1897 and 1907.
Nowhere better than here – Denmark and the optimality of the German paradigm

Next to Germany, Denmark is the only other case in the low inclusion category, where limited institutional incorporation of labor was accomplished through the provision of enfranchisement. The configuration of labor inclusion during labor's formative stage in the political arena is identical to the one found in Germany (see table 9). Both cases are characterized by the precariousness of political liberties and only limited responsible government, combined with a higher level of enfranchisement. All other cases in the low inclusion category accomplished limited institutional incorporation through a reversed combination of these institutional channels, with the at least minimal guarantee of political liberties and responsible government, but without any enfranchisement.

In response to the specific configuration of low inclusion in Denmark, labor elites made an optimal choice by adopting the ‘German’ parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. This model emphasizes parliamentary involvement and electoral participation as strategies for the mobilization of the labor constituency, in addition to extra-parliamentary tactics. The ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, on the other hand, is infused with a significant dose of syndicalism, and focuses exclusively on extra-parliamentary activities during its formative stage. The ‘German’ parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy accomplished systemness in Denmark on the basis of the ‘Social Democratic League’, founded in 1878. The according ideological orientation of the party was codified through the 1888 Copenhagen program. External institutionalization, through successful electoral representation, occurred from 1895 to 1901, when the party received 17.1% of the vote in the general election (see table 11).

The Danish ‘Social Democratic League’ is the only example of a party investigated here, where the first organizational manifestation of the later dominant model occurred as a national section of the First International. The Danish section, founded in 1871, is directly linked to the successful formation of a social democratic party later on. In all other cases, national associations linked to the First International either collapsed or became the nucleus of anarchist organizations. On the path toward dominance of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type, from 1871 to 1888, Danish social democracy went through a process of ‘de-lasalleanization’ that mirrors the development in the German SPD throughout the 1860s and 1870s.

Before the SDL’s establishment as a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party, its predecessor organization’s propaganda activities ended quite abruptly, when the Danish Section of the First International was abolished in 1873, only two years after it had been founded. Its leaders were arrested or extradited, most importantly Louis Pio, founding father and most recognized figure of early Danish social
democracy. There is a direct link between that first organizational manifestation of labor in the political arena and the later event of successful party formation, because the SDL of 1878 was founded by the rank and file of the 1871 Danish section of the First International. The first programmatic agenda of the SDL had already been agreed upon two years earlier during an assembly held at the Gimle restaurant in the city of Frederiksberg. The 1876 Gimle Program was modeled after the German party’s Gotha Program, which combined proto-marxism with Lasallean influences in an uneasy compromise. The same conflicting ideological and organizational coordinates could also be observed in the case of Danish social democracy.163

From that point in time onward, Lasalleanism was gradually purged from the party’s agenda, through the 1882 revision of the Gimle program, the 1888 Copenhagen program, the 1890 revision of the Copenhagen program, and the new party program of 1913.164 1882 marks the beginning of the introduction of vulgar marxism into the party’s agenda, but at that point only as an overhaul of the earlier partly Lasallean agenda. A quasi-revolutionary ideology would be firmly established as the unrivaled dominant program in 1888, at the Copenhagen party congress. The programmatic adjustments that occurred afterwards, in 1890 and 1913, represent a reaffirmation of that earlier decision.165

The 1888 Copenhagen program, through which its likely main author, Peter Knudsen, adopted the marxism of Karl Kautsky to Denmark, was quasi-revolutionary par excellence. It combined a marxist analysis of the class struggle and historical development, and an emphasis on the inevitability of socialism and revolutionary rhetoric on the one hand with a practical minimum program on the other. The revolutionary agenda co-existed with pragmatic practices of organization building and mobilization, through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means, as well as pronounced efforts to establish the party in the context of a broader working class counter culture. As far as the focus on constituency mobilization through parliamentary involvement is concerned, the first social democratic deputies had already been elected to the Folketing (lower house of parliament) in 1884. The SDL was therefore in an ideal position to pursue that strategy effectively. Finally, legalism, rejection of insurrectionist schemes, and the hope of a pre-determined path toward the socialist future characterized the SDL just as much as the German ‘original’.

A number of other parties adopted the parliamentary ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in the same way as the Danish social democrats did, by leaving its fundamental characteristics relatively unchanged, for example in the cases of Italy, Spain, Argentina, Hungary, and the Netherlands.

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163 See Landauer (1959a, 446) for the emulation of the German party’s 1875 Gotha program by the 1876 Gimle program.
164 See Callesen and Lahme (1978) for a collection of these programmatic documents.
165 See Lahme (1982) for a comprehensive assessment of programmatic development. Lahme (1982, 382) calls the 1913 agenda an “unnecessary program”, as it only reiterated the already codified quasi-revolutionary mainstream. He concludes that the program was adopted to provide an outlier for the most orthodox marxists.
But it was only in the case of Denmark, where the parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, thus embraced, represented an optimal response to the specific configuration of low inclusion. In those other cases, the lack of enfranchisement would have made the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy an optimal response.

The ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was actually implemented in the cases of Sweden and Norway. The outcome of labor’s formative stage in the political arena that can be observed in Denmark is therefore much more similar to the case of Germany than the other two Scandinavian countries. This is evidenced, in the ideological domain, by the exclusive focus of Swedish and Norwegian social democrats on extra-parliamentary tactics of mobilization during their respective formative stages. In the domain of organization, too, the Danish social democrats are more similar to their German than to their Swedish and Norwegian comrades. The SDL in Denmark was based on individual membership, and on a dominant position of the party vis-à-vis the unions. Both these are defining features of the organizational model typical for the ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Social democracy in Sweden and Norway, on the other hand, was characterized by a more influential position of the unions within the party, and automatic party membership through union affiliation. This being said, the role of the unions was not as pronounced as it was within evolutionary social democracy, and the political struggle was regarded as prevalent, compared to the economic struggle, even in the extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

These findings contradict a number of accounts, which place Danish social democracy in one category with its Swedish and Norwegian counterparts, sometimes explicitly as one manifestation of a uniquely Scandinavian model of social democracy. This classification is based on a number of misconceptions. First of all, as outlined in the preceding paragraphs, it fails to provide an appropriate assessment of variation in social democracy from a comparative perspective. But secondly, it also fails to recognize the overwhelming communalities of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. All of them emerged from their formative stages of entry into the political arena with the universal characteristics of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, most importantly the combination of revolutionary rhetoric with pragmatic practices, and the embedding in a vast network of auxiliary organizations. Any distinction made between these parties is therefore a minor one, compared to the fundamental difference between evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary types of parties, or even more so beyond that, compared to insurrectionism and

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166 Austria has already been mentioned before in this context as a case, where the German variant was initially not the ideal response to the Austrian configuration of labor inclusion. It became optimal, because the environment changed very soon after the model became established.

167 See Galenson (1952) for these organizational differences.

168 See Sassoon (1996) as an example for a general history of socialism, which makes that point. But see also Bartolini (2000, 87) with the same conclusion. Wuthnow (1989) argues that all three parties basically belong into the same category, although some slight variation between them in terms of their ‘radicalism’ can be observed.
moderate syndicalism as alternative models of labor politics. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy as a generic party type represents an optimal response to an environment of low labor inclusion.

Third, speaking of a Scandinavian model of social democracy, or placing the Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian parties into the same category, confuses the outcome of the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena with developments after the conclusion of that formative stage. The establishment of social democratic dominance is a crucial communality of these three cases, even though it was more pronounced in Sweden and Norway.\footnote{See Esping-Andersen (1990) and Pempel (1990).} The emergence of social democratic corporatism in Scandinavia and authoritarian corporatism in Germany during the interwar period (cf. Luebbert 1987), as well as the policy accomplishments of Scandinavian social democrats, however, are not related to the nature of social democratic party formation in and of itself. First of all, the opportunities for successful cooperation with small holder liberal parties, a unique feature of Scandinavian political development, were a necessary prerequisite for social democratic corporatism. On the side of social democracy, what was required to make this constellation possible, was the successful mobilization of the labor constituency and the establishment of an effective party organization. All of the three Scandinavian parties accomplished that, because they responded in an optimal fashion to their respective environments of labor inclusion. The nature of that environment, however, was different, when comparing Denmark on the one hand to Sweden and Norway on the other. In that sense, social democratic dominance and social democratic corporatism emerged, not despite, but because different variants of quasi-revolutionary social democracy were adopted to different configurations of labor inclusion in these cases, the ‘German’ variant in Denmark, and the ‘Belgian’ variant in Sweden and Norway.

Other than those approaches that identify a ‘Scandinavian’ model of social democracy, there is also a competing perspective that attempts to distinguish the orientations of social democratic parties in these three cases. Wuthnow (1989), as noted above, argues that variation in between the three parties was only minimal. He claims that if one wishes to make a distinction between them, the Swedish SAP would have to be considered the most radical, followed by the Danish SDL, and then the Norwegian DNA as the least radical. Bull (1922) and Galenson (1952) argue that the Norwegian DNA was the most radical, followed by the SPA in Sweden, with the Danish SDL as the least radical. Arter (1999, 74) says that the Swedes were the least radical, while the Norwegians and the Danes jointly occupy the pole position in radicalism. The variation in these assessments already provides a hint that a simple distinction between these parties on the basis of their relative radicalism might be problematic. These competing assessments provide good evidence for my earlier argument that a distinction of social democratic parties based on a radicalism vs. reformism dichotomy is misleading. This kind of classification misunderstands the nature of quasi-
revolutionary social democracy, which is based on a unique combination of pragmatism, indeed reformism, with radical rhetoric, and vulgar marxist expectations of capitalism’s collapse. All three Scandinavian parties emerged as quasi-revolutionary in nature. Any variation across these cases with respect to the relative importance of pragmatism and radicalism is one of degree only. Real variation across these parties, as outlined above, occurred with respect to their tactics of mobilization, and their forms of organization, with Sweden and Norway as examples for the ‘Belgian’, and Denmark as an example for the ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

The same applies to a comparison between the German SPD and the Danish SDL. In both these cases, quasi-revolutionary social democracy became dominant as a model of labor politics that is based on an intellectual and practical merger of revolutionary and pragmatic elements. Existing arguments that emphasize the reformism of Danish compared to the revolutionary and orthodox nature of German social democracy are therefore not entirely on the mark, because they underestimate the extent to which the German party was pragmatic, and the Danish party radical. Both of these elements were an inherent part of both parties’ ideological orientations, as manifestations of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Variation in between the two cases is therefore one of degree. Taking that into account, it is undeniable that the Danish social democrats emphasized pragmatic practices and the potential of reforms within capitalism to a greater extent than their German comrades. This variation makes sense in the context of the general causal argument suggested here. Germany and Denmark clearly belong to the same category of labor inclusion, and as a matter of fact, feature the exact same configuration of inclusion. However, the case of Denmark, in this context, is somewhat similar to the Southern states within the German Empire, which shared the basis characteristics of low inclusion with the federal level of the German polity and the remaining states. But at the same time, they were slightly less repressive than their counterparts, without, however, moving so far as to embrace higher or even highest levels of inclusion. This applies in a similar fashion to the case of Denmark (see table 9). As a consequence, it is to be expected on the basis of my causal argument about the relation between labor inclusion and the formation of labor politics that the pragmatic element within Danish social democracy was more pronounced. However, just as the Southern German pragmatic ‘reformists’ never moved outside of the quasi-revolutionary party model as an ideological umbrella, neither did the Danish social democrats. Slightly higher inclusion only allowed for a more effective emphasis on pragmatic practices, but this did not lead to a dismissal of the revolutionary elements of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

See for example Bartolini’s (2000) classification of ‘early ideological orientations’. He distinguishes between orthodox marxism, which according to his argument, characterizes the German SPD, and reformist marxism, which he believes to be the underpinning ideology of the Danish SDL.
The pragmatic merger of quasi-revolutionary
Social democracy and syndicalism in Sweden and Norway

Sweden and Norway distinguish themselves as the only two cases, except for Belgium itself, where the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy emerged as the dominant model of labor politics from labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Using the label ‘Belgian’ to designate the specific variant of the generic party type that was adopted by the ‘United Norwegian Labor Party’ (DNA) and the ‘Social Democratic Labor Party’ (SAP) of Sweden, does not imply that these parties owe their foundation in any immediate way to the influence of the Belgian ‘Parti Ouvrier Belge’ (POB). As a matter of fact, the impact of the POB as an export article was relatively limited, compared to the dominant position assumed by the SPD during the late 19th and early 20th century. This is a dilemma in and of itself, of course, because it represents an important underpinning for the choices of social democrats in Argentina, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. There, labor elites adopted the ‘German’ parliamentary variant, even though the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy would have provided a significantly better fit with their specific configuration of low inclusion, which was devoid of enfranchisement, and therefore lacked the opportunity structures necessary to engage effectively in constituency mobilization through parliamentary involvement and electoral agitation.

In Sweden and Norway, labor elites adopted the extra-parliamentary ‘Belgian’ variant as an optimal response to the given environment of low labor inclusion, in which limited institutional incorporation typical for that category of inclusion was provided by higher levels of responsible government and political liberties, while enfranchisement was at the lowest level (see table 9). I am referring to the ‘extra-parliamentary’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as the ‘Belgian’ model, because the Belgian POB formally codified this approach through its party program of 1894. In Norway and Sweden, on the other hand, extra-parliamentary quasi-revolutionary social democracy emerged through the practice of both parties, without any formal codification, and also without direct involvement of the Belgian POB. The influence of German social democracy was much greater, even in Norway and Sweden, but both parties adjusted their practices to the given configuration of labor inclusion, and as a result, ended up practicing a model of labor politics that shares its most fundamental features with the one that was formally codified in Belgium: a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party that combines radical rhetoric with pragmatic
practices, that emphasizes organization building, and is embedded into a large underpinning web of labor associations.\footnote{171 See Ritter (1963) for a discussion of the German party’s influence in Scandinavia, see also Bartolini (2000) and general histories of socialism such as Sassoon (1963), even though some of his conclusions, given the broad scope of his synthesis, sometimes lack comparative accuracy.}

On top of these universal features of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type, the DNA and the SAP also embraced those characteristics that identify them as proponents of an ‘extra-parliamentary’, or ‘Belgian’ variant of that type, which represents a merger of quasi-revolutionary social democracy with syndicalism. This becomes apparent, in the domain of ideological orientations, through the pursuit of exclusively extra-parliamentary forms of mobilization during the party’s formative stage in the political arena. In the domain of organization, both parties are distinct from the ‘German’ variant, because the unions play a greater part in internal party affairs, and because of the mechanism of automatic party membership through union affiliation.\footnote{172 See Galenson (1952) for these organizational features. See Sainsbury (1993), Tingtsen (1973), and Tomasson (1973) for a discussion of the SAP’s ideological development.} At the same time, union influence did not reach the levels practiced in evolutionary social democratic parties, and other than in that party type, the political struggle was regarded as dominant over the economic struggle, even in the syndicalism infused ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Labor elites made an optimal choice, when they adopted this model of labor politics in the cases of Norway and Sweden, because of the nature of low inclusion that characterizes both countries. The mobilization success accomplished by the DNA and the SAP provides ample evidence for that conclusion (see tables 12, 13, 14, and 15).

Swedish social democracy has its roots in local chambers of labor, which were engaged in political activities and industrial action at the same time. The first one of these groups that provided the nucleus for the 1889 formation of the Social Democratic Labor Party (SAP), was formed in Stockholm in 1883 (see table 11). At that time, the industrial organization of the labor movement in Sweden was still in its infancy: the first trade unions of skilled artisans were only founded in the early 1880s, shortly before the unions turned to politics. The Norwegian tradition of industrial action and organized unions began already in 1872 with the founding of a pioneer printers’ union in Oslo. The movement of agricultural laborers and small farmers headed by unemployed school teacher Marcus Thrane from 1848 until its collapse in 1851 was not a union in the modern sense of the word. Important features of the Thrane movement were not unlike those exposed by the British Chartists, since its propaganda, in addition to agitation geared at the improvement of socio-economic conditions, strongly emphasized demands for universal suffrage.

Just like in Sweden, the formation of the Norwegian Labor Party (DNA) in 1887 was precipitated by the founding of local cells, but in the case of Norway, these groups were socialist associations, purely political in nature. They were not labor chambers, as in Sweden, which were characterized by a synthesis of
industrial and political action. The first of these groups were founded in Oslo (at the time Kristiania) and Bergen in 1885. They emerged from the collapse of the Radical Party, which had previously functioned as a loose umbrella for a wide variety of emerging radical tendencies. Moreover, the development toward an independent large scale party in Norway was sped up by the unions’ rapid disillusionment with the first liberal government led by the Venstre party since 1884. Both of these currents flowed into the formation of the DNA, resulting in a synthesis of union representation and socialist agitation within the party. In the case of Sweden, as outlined before, this synthesis already occurred in the form of local chambers of labor, which then moved forward to create a nationwide socialist labor party.

Thus, Swedish, Norwegian, as well as the Belgian social democrats, are similar to the evolutionary socialist labor parties of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia in the sense that all of these parties owe their formation directly to the organizing efforts of trade unions, or other forms of labor associations, for instance mutual aid societies. However, other than labor parties in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, the Swedish, Norwegian, and Belgian social democrats emerged as quasi-revolutionary parties. Moreover, in terms of organization and party-union relations, they were different from those labor parties, because they had full decisional autonomy; direct union interference in party affairs was never as pervasive as it was in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. Eventually, and perhaps most importantly in this context, the political struggle of labor was awarded primacy over the economic struggle in the three examples of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. Labor parties in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia emerged as vehicles of the unions in the political arena to accomplish improvements of labor’s socio-economic conditions through direct involvement in parliamentary politics. In these cases, the economic struggle was regarded as more important, but with the foundation of labor parties, the economic struggle began to be conducted by political means. Quasi-revolutionary parties are closely intertwined with the industrial labor movement, most apparently in the cases of Sweden, Norway, and Belgium, which were even organizationally linked to the unions, but they did not function as mere vehicles of trade unions in the political arena: the political struggle dominated the economic struggle.

In both Sweden and Norway, socialist orientations ended up as dominant over pure ‘bread and butter politics’. In Sweden, this already happened before the actual foundation of the party, and in Norway, after only a brief period of internal debates. Following on the challenge by a purely ‘economic’ perspective vis-à-vis a still somewhat undifferentiated socialism, both cases then went through a rapid development toward quasi-revolutionary social democratic dominance. Socialism rather than ‘bread and butter politics’ had been dominant in the SAP since its foundation in 1889; the internal debates precipitating this outcome had already taken place within the local chambers of labor that synthesized industrial action and socialist agitation. In the following years of programmatic development, the emerging dominance of quasi-revolutionary social democracy had to contend with two additional ideological challengers that were also
most influential in the cases of Germany and Denmark: first the evolutionary socialist and state affirming Lasalleanism, and then anarchism.

The SAP’s first extensive programmatic statement of 1889 still represented a compromise between proto-marxism and the evolutionary socialism of Lasalle. The agenda was borrowed from the SPD’s Gotha program, a consensus document agreed upon by the marxist and the Lasallean factions. This initial agenda, however, would never achieve a status of dominance and wide acceptance. The pressure toward an embrace of a quasi-revolutionary party model was not yet successful during the 1891 Norkoeppling congress, which reaffirmed the 1889 compromise decision. But eventually, a quasi-revolutionary social democratic agenda emerged as dominant, at the 1897 Stockholm Congress. The 1897 program was derived largely from the Erfurt program that represents the paradigmatic codification of a quasi-revolutionary orientation. At that point in time, Lasalleanism had already ceased to be the primary opponent, and was replaced in that role by anarchism. Hence, within a period of only eight years, Swedish social democracy had resolved its internal debates in favor of a quasi-revolutionary agenda, abandoning the gradual and evolutionary socialism inspired by Lasalle, which had already been watered down significantly in the 1889 program. The new party program of 1907, which emerged under the impression of the fierce anti-revisionist countentendency in the Second International, was even closer to the Erfurt original, and served to reaffirm the embrace of a quasi-revolutionary party model from 1897.

Other than in Sweden, socialism in Norway emerged as dominant over pure ‘bread and butter politics’ within the confines of the newly established party. After the formation of the DNA in 1887 by socialist agitation groups and trade unions, the socialist associations needed only a few years to assume leadership of the party. The very first program adopted by Norwegian social democracy in 1891 was already quasi-revolutionary in nature, as it was largely a direct copy of the SPD’s Erfurt program. The debates that characterized the very early years of German, Danish, and Swedish social democratic parties between marxists and lasalleans, however, never occurred in the DNA. After the foundation of the first predecessors of the party in 1885, the social democratic associations in Oslo and Bergen, and the formation of a national organization in 1887, a quasi-revolutionary agenda was established in 1891, after only a few years of internal debate – not between lasalleans and marxists, but between socialists and proponents of ‘bread and butter politics’ pure and simple.

The labor parties of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia were designed as parliamentary vehicles of organized labor in the context of a liberal polity, and the quasi-revolutionary parties of Germany and Denmark, despite other severe limitations on the formal institutional guarantees regarding their political activity, were able to participate in parliamentary politics, and to use election campaigns and appearances

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173 See Ritter (1963, 100)
in parliament for the purpose of general agitation and propaganda purposes, in addition to an equally noticeable concern for actual policy making. The ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy with its emphasis on the electoral route to socialism was not an optimal response to the configuration of labor inclusion in Sweden and Norway. In both these cases, electoral inclusion was at the lowest possible level during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. Nonetheless, Swedish and Norwegian social democrats took their ideological inspiration from the German and Danish quasi-revolutionary agendas. However, Sweden and Norway are the only two cases, where the imported party model was adopted to a different environment of labor inclusion through an adjusted political practice.

Swedish and Norwegian social democrats did not formally embrace the Belgian, extra-parliamentary, variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy – they simply implemented it on top of their formal ideological statements, which were almost literal translations of the German originals. They adjusted the paradigm’s practice, because their emphasis during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena was on extra-parliamentary tactics exclusively. This entailed, most importantly, demonstrations and political strikes for universal suffrage, the construction of a network of mutual aid organizations and cooperatives, and eventually the establishment of “folk schools” for working class education and socialist propaganda. The final point is one of the most defining, and also most innovative, elements of the extra-parliamentary forms of mobilization pursued in Sweden and Norway. Given the specific environment of labor inclusion in Sweden and Norway, which was much more similar to the case of Belgium, and the lack of access to the electoral channel, which is a prerequisite for a successful pursuit of electoral and parliamentary strategies of mobilization, typical for the German and Danish parties, the decision of the SAP and the DNA seems almost too self-evident. However, all other cases from the low inclusion that features the same configuration of low inclusion as Sweden and Norway decided differently: Socialists in the Netherlands, Argentina, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Spain all made an optimal, theoretically predicted choice for quasi-revolutionary social democracy in an environment of low inclusion. But at the same time, they chose to embrace the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy with its emphasis on the electoral route to socialism, although this route was not available to them at the time. Only the Belgian social democrats formally adopted a ‘native’, exclusively extra-parliamentary, variant of the quasi-revolutionary party model. The Swedish and Norwegian social democrats practiced the ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, without making formal adjustments to their party agendas.

The underpinning cause for the successful adjustment of their political practice to ‘native’ requirements can be found in the successful merger between the industrial labor movement and socialist agitation groups. In both these cases, the two groups accomplished the establishment of a truly unified party with a common agenda. In all the other cases of low inclusion without enfranchisement, social democratic parties were dominated by middle-class professionals and socialist intellectuals with little roots
in organized labor, who emphasized the electoral route in an environment of lowest electoral inclusion, and who failed to embrace extra-parliamentary tactics effectively. The effective, indeed optimal, embrace of the ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in Norway and Sweden, and the underlying infusion of syndicalism into the party, eventually prevented the emergence of strong left insurrectionist currents, which could have profited from limited social democratic mobilization success. This is precisely, what happened in the cases of Italy, Spain, Argentina, Hungary, and to some, albeit significantly smaller extent, in the Netherlands. It did not happen in Sweden and Norway, because social democrats in these two cases adjusted their tactics, and made an optimal choice by embracing the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

The logical contradictions between formal party ideology and actual political practice in the cases of Sweden and Norway could have become a source of internal friction. There are two reasons, for why this did not happen: first, the extra-parliamentary activities of social democracy in these two cases revolved around ‘people’s education’ and the struggle for universal suffrage. As a consequence, there was a logical connection between the ideological emphasis on the electoral route to socialism, and the practice of extra-parliamentary activities that were geared at making this route accessible to labor. Second, other than in Italy, Argentina, Hungary, and Spain, and comparable to Austria, the electoral route in Sweden and Norway became accessible very soon after the completion of the party’s formative stages. Thus, even if party members or sections of the party leadership might have had reason to engage in a debate about the appropriateness of the electoral ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as the formal party agenda, such challenges would have lost their fuel as soon as significant enfranchisement occurred. In the case of Sweden, universal suffrage was introduced in 1907; near universal suffrage in Norway was implemented in 1898. In the Netherlands, Argentina, Italy, Hungary, and Spain, no adjustment of the German electoral variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy occurred. The consequences of this failure are clearly reflected in the significantly lower extent of mobilization success in these cases, both with respect to party membership (see tables 14, 15) and electoral performance (see tables 12, 13). The negative effects of not having successfully embraced extra-parliamentary tactics in an environment of lowest electoral inclusion are, of course, most severe in the cases of Hungary and Spain, where the electoral route has remained inaccessible for the working class in the long run. Social democracy is Sweden and Norway, on the other hand, has accomplished impressive degrees in both internal and external institutionalization (see tables 12, 13, 14 and 15).

174 Hungary arguably only saw competitive elections after the fall of communism in the late 1980s, and Spain only after the end of Franco’s dictatorship in the late 1970s, with only a brief interruption during the Second Republic and the elections of 1931, 1933, and 1936. Italy introduced near universal male suffrage in 1912, and full universal suffrage in 1919; the Argentinian practice of ‘managed elections’ continued until the electoral reforms of 1913.
The Belgian variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy

The extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that emerged as the dominant model of labor politics in Sweden and Norway exclusively through the practice of these parties, occurred in Belgium through practice and formal codification. This is the reason for referring to this variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as the ‘Belgian’ variant. Its formulation and implementation, both in terms of ideology and party organization, represented an optimal response to the specific environment of inclusion in Belgium. Belgian social democracy emerged from an eclectic variety of prior organizations; the most explicitly political of those were the ‘chambers of labor’. The Chambre du travail founded in 1875 in Brussels as one of the first of these associations is therefore considered to be the first organizational manifestation linked to the later event of party formation (see table 11). Belgian social democracy accomplished ‘systemness’ on the basis of the Parti Ouvrier Belge (POB), founded in 1885. The formal codification of an extra-parliamentary quasi-revolutionary orientation occurred through the passing of the Charte de Quaregnon in 1894.

The constellation of labor inclusion in Belgium is characterized by the same basic configuration of various components of inclusion as in Sweden and Norway. In all three cases, worker enfranchisement was absent, and limited institutional incorporation typical for overall low inclusion polities, was accomplished through the provision of at least minimal responsible government and political liberties. Variation in the extent of liberal strength in Belgium and the Netherlands on the one hand, and Sweden and Norway on the other, is the most important cause for the according quantitative variation in labor inclusion. The practice of responsible government and the guarantee of political liberties had already been extended in Sweden and Norway beyond the levels found in Germany, even though all these cases are characterized generally by aristocratic dominance in the context of a monarchical-bureaucratic state (cf. Wuthnow 1989). The greater extent of responsible government in Sweden and Norway is an indicator for the success of the liberals in exercising pressure for institutional reforms.

Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other hand, are characterized by highest levels of responsible government (see table 9), which is indicative of an even greater strength of liberalism, quite naturally so, because of the successful liberal revolutions that occurred in both these cases. At the same time, the dominant liberal, and later on, other non-aristocratic, but also non-proletarian, for example linguistic and religious parties, pursued a repressive course toward the emerging labor movement. Both these cases are therefore the prototypical examples for labor repression in the context of a liberal constitutional order. This was accomplished through the repressive behavior of the state, some formal infringements on the guarantee of political liberties, but most importantly, by closing down workers’ access to enfranchisement. That
particular institution also precluded significant efforts of competing parties to appeal to labor as an electoral constituency (see table 9). Overall, therefore, the extent of labor inclusion was equally low in Belgium as in those cases, such as Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, which were characterized by aristocratic dominance in a monarchical-bureaucratic state. What distinguishes these cases is the specific configuration of labor inclusion. A generally repressive environment of low inclusion made quasi-revolutionary social democracy, as it was eventually adopted, the generally optimal approach into the arena of politics. The specific configuration of low inclusion, through the absence of enfranchisement, but the presence of a more extensive guarantee of political liberties, made the Belgian variant of that generic party type the optimal choice of Belgian labor elites.

Before the POB was founded as a solid organizational vessel in 1885, and its dominant ideological orientation was agreed upon in 1894, various predecessors had come into existence. A direct path between the POB and an initial organizational manifestation of the political branch of Belgian labor can be established to the Belgian Socialist Party, founded in 1879, and the local chambers of labor, formed in 1875, that brought the party into existence. In the 1860s and early 1870s, Belgians were also involved in the First International, and then its Anarchist/ Federationist variant, but the remnants of these organizations had no direct influence on the formation of the POB.

The POB’s foundation can be traced back to the formation of local ‘Chambers of Labor’ in various cities, most importantly Brussels, throughout the year 1875. These organizations were equivalent to those found in Sweden in the early 1880s. They practiced a combination of political propaganda and industrial action. After failed efforts to form a comprehensive Belgian Labor Union, two separate socialist parties were founded by these local associations in Flanders (Ghent) and Brussels, while Walloon organized labor was predominantly anarchist, bound organizationally to the remnants of the First International. The separate socialist parties founded in Ghent and Brussels would merge to form the Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) in 1879, and as such, be eventually incorporated into the POB at the occasion of its foundation in 1885.

The programmatic debates occurring between the organizational setup of the party in 1885 and the adoption of the dominant quasi-revolutionary *Charte de Quaregnon* in 1894 were somewhat different from those that occurred in the cases of Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. In these cases, the evolution toward a quasi-revolutionary agenda was accomplished through the removal of Lasallean influences. In the case of Belgium, no similar ‘de-lasalleanization’ occurred, because Lasalleanism never had an important part in the party’s ideological debates in the first place. Internal debates were in between ‘bread and butter politics’, the eventually dominant quasi-revolutionary orientation, and a more radical voluntarist faction that was strongly influenced by Blanqui’s insurrectionism. Dissent of the latter group led to the formation of a
Socialist Republican Party in 1887, but the labor leaders that followed the Blanquist ideologues into the party, returned home to the POB only three years later, in 1890.

The emergence of Belgian social democracy thus occurred on the background of worker associations that were directly involved in the process of party formation. Party membership was formally linked to membership in a constituent union or some other constituent organization of the party, including the previously noted ‘chambers of labor’, but also a wide variety of additional social, cultural, and economic associations. This constellation has led some authors to classify Belgian social democracy as a "labor party”, comparable to those founded in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia.\textsuperscript{175} However, both organizationally and ideologically, the Belgian party belongs firmly into the camp of quasi-revolutionary parties. The organizational links of the POB, founded in 1885, to the trade unions, are not much different from the situation in Sweden and Norway. Unions and other labor associations did in fact contribute decisively to party formation, but other than in the cases of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, direct union involvement within the party was never as pervasive; and most importantly, in the ideological world of the party, the political struggle was regarded as dominant over the economic struggle.

Within this context, the Belgian labor movement is unique for the extent to which the political struggle was embedded into a network of auxiliary organizations. What is often discussed as the insular nature of labor vis-à-vis the rest of society, with its own media outlets, clubs, social networks, leisure activities, in addition to union and party organization, was most pronounced in the case of Belgium, even more so than in Germany, which has received much scholarly attention in this respect. In the early Belgium labor movement, various forms of activities and organizational vessels were most effectively merged into one single movement. Both of these aspects, the vast and integrated auxiliary network, and the dominance of the political struggle, are important elements of the organizational model of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.\textsuperscript{176}

The dominant ideological orientation of Belgian social democracy found its expression through the \textit{Charte de Quaregnon}, agreed upon in 1894.\textsuperscript{177} At that time, the Belgian electoral system had just been significantly opened to working class participation in 1893, but the document still represents the particular experience of the Belgian labor movement as an outsider in an institutionally liberal regime, where political liberties and responsible government are formally guaranteed, but labor remains excluded, due to the restrictive nature of the electoral system. The \textit{Charte de Quaregnon} is the most apparent example for a formal adjustment of the generic quasi-revolutionary party type to a different version of the low inclusion polity. Sweden and Norway were not much different from German and Danish social democracy with

\textsuperscript{175} See for example Sassoon (1996)
\textsuperscript{176} See Strikwerda (1997) for the role of the socialist pillar in the broader Belgian polity and society.
\textsuperscript{177} See POB (1894) for the original text of the Charte de Quaregnon.
respect to their official programmatic statements – the SPD’s Erfurt program functioned as the blueprint for all these parties’ agendas, and sometimes even as the template for an almost literal copy. But in practice, Swedish and Norwegian social democrats effectively adjusted their tactics to the particular institutional environment found in their own polities: they adopted extra-parliamentary tactics during their formative stage, and only embraced electoral agitation, after significant concessions of enfranchisement had been gained through action on the streets. Belgian social democrats were quite unique, because they did not only adjust their practices, but in addition to that, formulated their own formal version of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, adjusted from the German paradigm to a scenario, where the electoral route was not yet accessible.¹⁷⁸

Both the Erfurt Program and the *Charte de Quaregnon* are expressions of a quasi-revolutionary orientation, and accordingly, both parties combined revolutionary rhetoric with pragmatic practices. Both documents also contained a marxist analysis of socio-economic development, and emphasized the inevitability of socialism. However, the Belgian party, both formally through its founding document, and through its actions, was significantly more voluntarist and less state fixated than its German counterpart. These characteristics can be identified through the elements of French insurrectionist traditions entered into the program, the heavy emphasis of the *Charte de Quaregnon* on moral change and values, and the acknowledgment of the potential for the emergence of socialism through collective self-organization. Despite variation regarding the specific expressions of revolutionary and pragmatic elements, when comparing the Erfurt program and the *Charte de Quaregnon*, both of these elements were present. In all these respects, most importantly the aspects of collective self-organization and the emphasis on voluntarism, the *Charte de Quaregnon* could be considered a blueprint for how to adjust the vulgar marxism of German social democracy to an institutional environment that does not allow for electoral participation. If elections as the *via regia* to socialism are not present, the party needs to embrace tactics that emphasize other channels of mobilization, while at the same time the orthodox determinism of the SPD’s vulgar marxism and its emphasis on the electoral route to socialism become significantly less plausible. All the while, Belgian social democracy was quasi-revolutionary *par excellence*, because of the combination of pragmatic practices and an emphasis on organization building with revolutionary rhetoric, even though it came from an early French insurrectionist rather than a German marxist tradition.

¹⁷⁸ See Cole (1956) and Landauer (1959a) for a discussion of ideological development.
The parliamentary road to socialism without access to parliament
in the Netherlands

The Dutch social democrats emerged in an environment of repression and limited inclusion, generally comparable to the other low inclusion cases discussed so far. The foundation of the Dutch party as the quasi-revolutionary type of social democracy was therefore an optimal response to that environment. The first organizational manifestation of labor politics in the Netherlands that was linked to the model that would emerge as dominant later on was the Social Democratic Association’ (SDV) of 1878. The Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) and the program implemented at the occasion of the 1894 party congress in Zwolle mark the implementation of the organizational and ideological features of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as the dominant model.

However, as far as the adopted variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is concerned, Dutch social democracy should have emerged much like its Belgian counterpart, or the somewhat similar cases of Sweden and Norway. Both Belgium and the Netherlands are examples of labor repression and limited inclusion in the context of a liberal regime, while Sweden and Norway represent examples of partially liberalized polities. In all of these cases, however, low inclusion occurred through the practice of at least minimal responsible government and political liberties, while enfranchisement was absent. More specifically, the Netherlands were not only equivalent to Belgium in terms of their configuration of labor inclusion; both cases were characterized by the exact same degrees of inclusion as well, distinct from the cases of Sweden and Norway, since Belgium and the Netherlands were characterized by a highest, rather than only higher degree of responsible government (see table 9). To be sure, Dutch social democracy was founded as a quasi-revolutionary type of party, and therefore represents an optimal response to its overall environment of low inclusion. However, during its formative stage, other than their Belgian comrades, Dutch social democrats never embraced the practice of extra-parliamentary tactics and community building. Dutch social democracy embraced the parliamentary ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, although the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant would have been the optimal response to the Dutch environment of labor inclusion.

The consequences of labor elites’ suboptimal choice in the Netherlands are not as pronounced, however, as in other cases, because the gap between an electoral strategy and the absence of enfranchisement was closed relatively soon after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. The underpinning causes for the suboptimal choice of Dutch labor elites are the diffusion of external knowledge through the dominant German paradigm, as well as the social characteristics of social democratic party elites, who were largely of a middle-class background, without any ties to the organized labor movement. The infusion of syndicalism into quasi-revolutionary social democracy that occurred in
the cases of Belgium, Sweden, and Norway, did therefore not take place in the Netherlands. Other than in the POB, whose leadership came from the rank and file of the labor movement and the unions, the Dutch SDAP was led by middle class professionals, the so-called ‘Twelve Apostles’. This explains to some large extent the inability, but also the unwillingness of the SDAP, which saw itself primarily as an electoral association, to engage in community building and extra-parliamentary activities to the same extent as the Belgian POB.

Before the SDAP was founded in 1894 as a solid vessel, the efforts of labor in the political arena experienced a number of ideological and organizational permutations. Dutch labor politicians were involved in the First International as well, but the initial organizational manifestation of the labor movement in the political arena that can be directly linked to the later event of party formation, occurred in the form of the SDV (Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging), which had branches in the major cities of the Netherlands. These local groups and their loose nationwide network helped to found the SDB (Sociaal Democratische Bond) in 1881 as the first united socialist party. The SDB initially opted for an electoral route to socialism, and participated in the 1888 elections. But eventually, under the leadership of Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis, the party decided during its 1893 congress in Groningen, to follow a strictly extra-parliamentary and anarchist path and to abstain from electoral participation. It was the pro-election faction within the SDB, gathered around the “Twelve Apostles” that chose to leave the organization and form its own party.

The focus on parliamentary tactics and hopes of electoral socialism were quite unjustified during the formative stage of the party, which was completed in 1894 with the formal installation of the SDAP, and the adoption of a fundamental program at the Zwolle party congress: limited electoral inclusion of the working class occurred only in the early 1900s, in the aftermath of the 1896 electoral reforms, and universal male suffrage was introduced in 1917. Despite the similarity to the Belgian case, the SDAP chose to adopt a platform that was almost a literal copy of the German SPD’s Erfurt program, rather than looking for inspiration in Belgian social democracy. The Belgian POB, in the same year of 1894, when the SDAP in the Netherlands adopted its program, formulated a revised version of the SPD’s vulgar marxism. The POB’s agenda was adjusted to the specific configuration of low inclusion in Belgium, which was equivalent to the Dutch constellation. The Belgian social democrats succeeded in incorporating an emphasis on extra-parliamentary tactics into the umbrella of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. In the case of the Netherlands, the proponents of extra-parliamentary tactics could not be kept under the umbrella

179 See Cole (1956) for a discussion of the ‘Twelve Apostles’  
180 Note the paradigmatic role that Nieuwenhuis played for the efforts of the proto-anarchists in Germany, who were involved in a similar conflict with the party mainstream (cf. Ritter 1963).
of a unified social democratic party, and consequently, turned to anarchism, evidenced by the split of the SDB in 1893.

The consequences of Dutch social democratic leaders’ failure to adopt their version of a quasi-revolutionary agenda to the specific configuration of labor inclusion, is noticeable, but minimal, compared to the cases of Spain, Hungary, Italy and Argentina. When the electoral route became eventually available, by passing the threshold into low electoral inclusion in the early 1900s, high inclusion by 1915, and highest inclusion through universal male suffrage in 1917, Dutch social democrats were able to engage in parliamentary socialism, relatively soon after the internal components of party formation were completed. However, the extent of electoral support for the Dutch social democrats remained significantly below that of the Belgians, even after workers in both countries had gained similar degrees of access to enfranchisement.  

The comparatively lower extent of electoral support for social democracy in the Netherlands during these later years is rooted in the initial failure of social democratic leaders during the formative stage of the party, to engage more effectively in extra-parliamentary tactics, when parliamentary tactics were ineffective in mobilizing the labor constituency. Belgian social democrats, on the other hand, succeeded to a greater extent than their Dutch comrades in striking roots within the working class, before the electoral route became available, through the establishment of their own version of the quasi-revolutionary party model that acknowledged the given configuration of labor inclusion. The significant anarchist split that occurred in the Netherlands is indicative of the lack of a syndicalist infusion into quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which did take place in Belgium.

**Austria and the delayed establishment of an ideal environment for parliamentary socialism**

The Austrian Social Democratic Workers’ party (SDAPÖ) arguably developed into the most effective and socially integrated party after the conclusion of the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena studied here. The party’s success in systemness, electoral mobilization, and the social integrative effects of the party’s ideology and practice, are evidenced by the comprehensive counter culture of workers of which the party was an integral component. At the most basic level, the backbone for this success is the fit between the nature of the adopted model of labor politics, and the environment of inclusion, in response to which it was adopted. The SDAPÖ embraced the organizational and ideological features of the

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181 After the introduction of universal male suffrage in both cases (Netherlands 1917, Belgium 1919), the Dutch social democrats won 22% of the vote in 1918, 19.4% in 1922, 22.9% in 1925, and 23.8% in 1929. Belgian social democrats gained 36.6% in 1919, 34.8% in 1921, 39.4% in 1925, and 36% in 1929.

182 See Gruber (1991) for an account of “Red Vienna” as the center of Austrian working-class counter culture. See Leser (1968) for a comprehensive discussion of Austro-marxism.
‘German’ parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy through the ‘statement of principles’ passed at its 1889 party congress in Hainfeld. The models’ dominance was the result of a protracted process of internal debates that began, akin to the overall German development, with the foundation of the Vienna branch of the ADAV in 1863.

It is a unique feature of the Austrian case that the ‘parliamentary’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was initially, at the point in time of its adoption, a suboptimal choice in the Austrian environment of inclusion, because Austria at that time accomplished limited institutional incorporation of labor, which defines the low inclusion category, through minimal responsible government and political liberties. However, Austria lacked the crucial institution of worker enfranchisement at the time, an elementary prerequisite for the successful pursuit of the ‘German’ model, which relies on parliamentary involvement and electoral agitation for the mobilization of its constituency. What distinguishes Austria from the other cases, within which the same kind of suboptimal choice was made, is a combination of these two circumstances: the late growth of the Austrian working-class, which occurred to a significant degree only after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena, and the institutional reforms of 1897 and 1907, which established worker enfranchisement. As a consequence of these two factors, the ‘German’ model of labor politics became optimal, because the environment of inclusion was changed, before any significantly sizable working-class could emerge.

The basic pattern of labor inclusion and party formation found in the Netherlands can also be observed in the case of Austria. The similarities in the configuration of labor inclusion between these two cases can serve as evidence for the previously made claim that specific combinations of exclusion and inclusion can be the work of very dissimilar constellations of historical actors. The Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy was the domain of a monarchical-bureaucratic state and politically influential aristocratic elite. The political system of the Netherlands in the second half of the 19th century, on the other hand, was the result of a successful liberal revolution in 1848, which wrestled the establishment of responsible government, and the guarantee of political liberties from a previously dominant monarchical-bureaucratic state. After a transitional period in the immediate aftermath of the proclamation of the 1848 constitution, the Dutch polity ended up firmly embracing liberal principles. At the same time, labor was deprived of the opportunity of political involvement that the liberal movement had achieved for itself, through repressive policies of the executive and a restrictive electoral system. A diametrically opposed coalition of actors in Austria was responsible for the creation of a similar configuration of labor inclusion: workers were excluded from the electoral process, but at the same time, limited inclusion occurred through a restricted guarantee of political liberties and a limited practice of responsible government (see table 9). To be sure, the extent of inclusion on these dimensions was significantly lower than in the case of the Netherlands: political liberties remained precarious in Austria, while, legally, they were mostly unrestricted in the
Netherlands; the principle of responsible government was severely impaired in Austria, but fully guaranteed in the Netherlands.

The quantitative variation on these dimensions can also help to understand differences in between these two cases, but what is most important is the fact that in both Austria and the Netherlands, the electoral route remained inaccessible for labor until the first decade of the 1900s. The dominant coalition of actors in the case of Austria bears many similarities to the case of Germany, and both cases are vastly different from the Netherlands in this respect. However, in terms of varying configurations of labor inclusion created by these different coalitions, Austria is much more similar to the Netherlands than to the case of Germany.

Given these similarities in the nature of labor inclusion, one would have expected the Austrian social democrats to turn for inspiration to their Belgian, rather than their German comrades. There are three major reasons for why this did not happen. First of all, the Chart de Quaregnon as the codified underpinning of the ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was only agreed upon in 1894, five years after the Austrian social democrats had already adopted their own agenda. Secondly, the historical process through which the Belgian POB emerged was quite different from the way in which the SDAPÖ was founded. The POB emerged on top of an already existing comprehensive network of labor associations in a country that was one of the earliest industrializers. The Chart de Quaregnon was catered specifically to an integration of this eclectic set of underpinning organizations, and the nature of the ‘Belgian’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy only truly manifested itself through the party’s practice. Thirdly, a consideration of knowledge diffusion from the outside is the final crucial aspect of this explanation. In the case of Austria, the intimate relations between German and Austrian social democrats strongly influenced the shape Austrian social democracy was about to assume. The first manifestation of Austrian labor in the political arena was the Vienna branch of the German ADAV that established a formal organization in 1863, long before Austrian labor had the potential to become an actual mass movement.183 Even after the establishment of a German nation-state without Austria in 1871, close contacts continued to be maintained. The Erfurt Program of 1891 might have become the model for the quasi-revolutionary type of social democracy, but the first one of two party programs that exposed and codified this agenda was the Austrian party’s 1889 Hainfeld statement of principles, which was largely the work of Karl Kautsky himself.184

Denscher (1949) also noted the extensive financial contributions that the SPD provided to its Austrian comrades.

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183 Konrad (1983) noted that Austrian social democracy emerged ‘prematurely’ and initially, in the 1860s, represented only a formal organization, without any mass following.
184 See Ritter (1963, 101). The second example is the agenda of the Spanish PSOE, adopted in 1888, which was strongly influenced by the French marxists Guesde and Lafargue.
The consequences of having adopted the suboptimal parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in the Netherlands, to an environment that was devoid of enfranchisement had only minor, yet noticeable consequences. First of all, a significant split within the labor movement between the pro-election and a significant anarchist faction occurred in the Netherlands, other than in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and Norway. The long term effects of the suboptimal choice in the Netherlands were much less pronounced than in the cases of Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Argentina, however, because the gap between the ideological orientation on electoral politics and the lack of enfranchisement, was closed relatively soon after the completion of party formation. At the same time, the Dutch social democrats did receive less electoral support in the aftermath of party formation than their Belgian, Swedish, and Norwegian comrades, because they did not sufficiently adapt the German quasi-revolutionary model to their specific environment of inclusion, and therefore confronted serious problems of mobilization, given their emphasis on electoral agitation, which was significantly less effective in the Netherlands, given the absence of any significant worker enfranchisement.

Why then was the Austrian party so successful electorally and in terms of organizational institutionalization, although it was characterized, in 1889, by the same misfit between an environment of inclusion that was devoid of enfranchisement, and the adoption of the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which emphasized mobilization through electoral agitation and parliamentary involvement? While the same basic predicament existed in Austria, there is one crucial difference that can account for varying degrees of mobilization success across these two cases. Industrialization and the emergence of a sizable working class occurred much earlier in the Netherlands than in Austria. The size of the Austrian working class only amounted to the Dutch proportions in the 1840s of around 24% in the 1910s. But after that point in time, the earlier gap between the two cases was almost closed by an Austrian jump from 24.27% in the 1910s to 33.27% in the 1920s, compared to 35.64% in the Netherlands.

This means that the most important stage for Dutch social democracy to strike roots in the labor constituency occurred at a time, during the 1880s and 1890s, when the contradiction between a party model oriented toward electoral mobilization and the absence of enfranchisement was still in place. Austrian

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185 The anarchist split was more pronounced in the case of Austria, leading to a particularly strong anarchist current throughout the 1880s (see Ritter 1963, 100), comparable to those of France, Spain, Italy, and Argentina, and less significant, but still relevant in the Netherlands. Anarchism declined in both Austria and the Netherlands soon after the electoral channel was opened for labor access. The cause of the initial strength of anarchism between Austria and the Netherlands can be traced to the quantitative variation in degrees of inclusion across these two cases: while the configuration of inclusion on various dimensions was comparable, the Austrian polity was indeed more restrictive in the granting of political liberties and in the practice of responsible government than the Netherlands.
186 See tables 12 to 15 and the comparative evaluation later on for a detailed elaboration on the issue of mobilization success and the degree of internal institutionalization.
187 See table 8 for the development of the share of workers in the economically active population. The increasing relative share of industrial workers in Austria is also the result of the territorial rearrangements after the end of WW I, and the according loss by Austria of many agriculturally dominated and less developed regions.
social democrats, on the other hand, were subjected to the judgment of a fully developed working class only later, beginning in the 1900s, when, after the establishment of a fifth curia for all males over 24 in 1897 and the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907, the electoral route had become fully available. This allowed the Austrian social democrats to mobilize the working class much more effectively than their Dutch comrades since the 1880s and 1890s, and the long term consequences in terms of mobilization success could be observed well into the 1920s (see tables 12, 13, 14, and 15). It was also at that point in time, with the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907, that the Austrian polity would assume the same configuration of inclusion that had been present in the German Empire since 1871.

The cancelled wedding of social democracy and syndicalism in Italy

The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) established its dominant organizational model in 1895, and codified its ideological orientation in 1892. Both of these defining elements of varying models of labor politics identify the PSI as an example of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which emerged as dominant from a formative stage in the arena of politics that began with the foundation of the Figli di Lavoro in 1877. The choice of Italian labor elites for quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents an optimal response to the Italian environment of low inclusion, as it is predicted on the basis of the causal relation between labor inclusion and labor politics suggested here. The PSI’s embrace of the parliamentary ‘German’ variant of that generic party type, on the other hand, was a suboptimal decision, given that Italy was an example of a low inclusion polity, in which limited institutional incorporation occurred through the channels of responsible government and political liberties, while worker enfranchisement remained at the lowest level.

The limited success of the PSI in mobilizing large numbers of workers into its organization is certainly an indicator for this suboptimal choice and a result of the party’s failure to engage in extra-parliamentary forms of mobilization as effectively as those parties that did adopt the ‘Belgian’ variant to an environment, in which enfranchisement was largely absent, and extra-parliamentary mobilization therefore the only viable course of action. A smaller extent of mobilization success by the PSI has led some authors to conclude that the Italian, as well as the Spanish and French social democrats, are examples of a distinctly different model of party organization. Kautsky (2002, p. 39ff.) for instance excludes these cases from the social democratic category altogether, and argues that they did not have a sufficiently large mass base in order to qualify. In terms of their underpinning ideology, Bartolini (2000) characterizes the early ideological orientation of the left in Italy and France as marxist-syndicalist. This inference is, as I argued before, the result of an explanatory interest that is different from the one pursued here: Bartolini analyzes the configuration of the overall left, rather than particular instances of political organizations.
However, in order to understand the limited mobilization success of Italian socialists, it is imperative to analyze not just overall ideological syndromes, but specific instances of party organization and ideology, and the way in which the ideological and organizational model chosen by Italian labor elites interacted with the existing environment of labor inclusion. Doing so will also demonstrate that it would confuse the issue at hand to look at the cases of Italy and France through the same theoretical lense: true, the overall left and also the social democratic parties in both these cases share some important similarities, but they are the outcomes of very dissimilar causal mechanisms.

In order to arrive at an adequate explanation for the case of Italy, it is necessary to not dismiss it as a case without a ‘real’ social democratic party, as John Kautsky does – a conclusion, moreover, which is not at all supported by the evidence collected here. The Italian PSI has definitely had significantly less success in mobilizing workers as party members than the previously investigated examples of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Belgium (cf. Miller 1990). The number of members mustered by 1900 is comparable to the Socialist Party of America in 1904 (slightly less than 20 000), but the relative mobilization success of the Italian PSI is, of course, significantly higher, when considering the respective size of the industrial labor force in both cases: 3 390 000 in Italy, and 8 760 000 in the United States during the 1900s. However, even the United States, with such a comparatively low degree of mobilization, are a case, where ‘systemness’ was successfully established (see table 14).

The relevant cases for comparison, in order to distinguish examples of party formation from those instances, where parties failed to establish ‘systemness’, are the cases of Canada, Japan, and Russia. Neither one of the various attempts at party formation in these countries established ‘systemness’: regular party membership is significantly lower than in the case of Italy, and even the United States; no permanent links between an organizing center and a periphery were established; no permanent organ for party communication existed, no continuous flow of revenues was secured: hence, overall, no solid organizational vessel with a permanent membership base was created.

The Italian PSI, on the other hand, qualifies as an example of ‘systemness’ in all these respects: Its membership base was smaller than in other cases, but it was permanent, and its members were active in regular and continuous party activities. The PSI had an organizing center (the Direzione) and a hierarchical organization pyramid with affiliated sections. Communication between the center and the periphery occurred through the party newspaper ‘Avanti’, which was in print continuously since 1896, and various theoretical journals, most importantly ‘Critica Sociale’. The party was based on permanent financial contributions of its members and a regular budgetary process. It is undeniable that the success of the PSI in all these respects was significantly below the levels achieved by other quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. But it would be entirely inadequate to consider the PSI a case of non-formation and dismiss it from the analysis, as Kautsky (2002) does, thereby placing it in the same category as the obvious
examples for a lack of social democratic ‘systemness’ in Japan, Canada, and Russia. As a matter of fact, the case of the PSI is an extremely instructive source for a fine-grained analysis into the relationship between the given environment of labor inclusion and the choices made by party elites. The limits of its mobilization success throughout the first two decades of the 1900s are an important indicator for the suboptimal choices made by the party vis-à-vis a specific configuration of labor inclusion during its formative stage.

First of all, the Italian PSI represents an optimal response to the overall level of labor inclusion during the formative stage of the party, and falls well into the framework of the general theoretical expectations established here. Like all cases investigated so far, Italy, during this time period from 1877 to 1895, belongs to the low category of repression and limited inclusion. The quasi-revolutionary model that emerged is the theoretically predicted response to this particular level of inclusion. However, within this general framework, the specific variant of the quasi-revolutionary party model established by the PSI, was only suboptimal. The PSI emulated the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, while it should have looked for inspiration to the cases of Belgium, Norway, and Sweden. Much of the limited mobilization success of the party in the aftermath of its formative period can be traced back to the misalignment between the adopted variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and the existing environment of labor inclusion.

In this respect, the case of Italy is strikingly similar to the cases of Austria and the Netherlands. Labor elites in both these cases opted for the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and an emphasis on the electoral route to socialism, although lowest levels of enfranchisement effectively made this path inaccessible. I also argued that the consequences of this misfit were quite negligible in Austria, because the electoral route became available relatively early after the completion of party formation in 1889, through the electoral reforms of 1897 and the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907. Moreover, the growth of industrial labor in Austria was clearly behind the Dutch development, and somewhat, but significantly, behind the Italian pattern in the 1880s and 1890s. In the case of the Netherlands, the effects of the same sort of misalignment on electoral and organizational mobilization success in the aftermath of party formation were more noticeable than in Austria, because of the earlier growth of the Dutch working class.188

Out of these three cases, it was the case of Italy, where the effects of this misalignment on mobilization success were most pronounced. Other than in the other two cases, the electoral route in Italy remained closed to the majority of workers for a significantly longer period of time: it was only in 1919

188 See tables 12 and 13 for the comparative assessment of electoral support in the aftermath of the formative stage, and tables 14 and 15 for party membership.
that universal suffrage was implemented in Italy, and the threshold of lowest inclusion was only passed through the extension of the suffrage in 1912. A roughly comparable development in the case of Austria started in 1897, and culminated in the establishment of universal suffrage in 1907. In the case of the Netherlands, universal suffrage was only established in 1917, but the critical juncture of lowest inclusion in terms of enfranchisement was overcome in 1896 already, and beginning at that point in time, the right to vote, other than in Italy, was gradually extended to a growing share of the population. Hence, the failure of not embracing extra-parliamentary tactics and instead emphasizing the ‘German’ electoral route to socialism in an environment of lowest enfranchisement can be observed in all of these cases, but the effects of this miscalculation were most pronounced in the case of Italy.

What added to this Italian dilemma was a political practice that was most typical for the cases of Spain and Argentina, but also widespread in the case of Italy, particularly in the South of the country. In all these instances, the practice of ‘managed elections’ and manufactured parliamentary support for the executive excluded workers from effectively exercising their voting privileges, even when the right to vote was distributed widely, in the cases of Argentina (since 1853) and Spain (until 1876, and then again beginning in 1890) even to the extent of universal male suffrage. What makes this practice so relevant for the strategic choices of labor elites is the fact that it seemingly opens the electoral channel, thereby encouraging electoral participation and an emphasis on the electoral route to socialism, while at the same time rendering this strategy completely ineffective. Or, in other words, it is much more difficult to make an optimal choice in this type of environment than in those, where the electoral route is either clearly inaccessible or effectively open.

In addition to that, an embrace of the Belgian model with its emphasis on extra-parliamentary tactics, while more promising than the German model, was less feasible in Italy than in the cases of Belgium, Norway, and Sweden. The configuration of varying elements of labor inclusion is comparable across all these cases, but the extent of inclusion along these lines was significantly lower in Italy. The practice of responsible government was fully established in Belgium, and guaranteed with some limitations in Norway and Sweden, while it remained precarious in Italy during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. Political liberties as well were more firmly established in those cases than in the case of Italy. The effective pursuit of extra-parliamentary activities in the context of an organized party, however, requires both at least a minimal guarantee of political liberties and the justifiable hope to achieve concessions through action on the street that would open the electoral route, and make access to the executive branch feasible – an expectation that is, of course, the more promising the more effectively the principle of responsible government is practiced.

Another factor that added to the Italian dilemma of organized socialism is the surprising electoral success of the party that occurred long before significant reforms opened the electoral route to a significant
number of workers in 1912. It contributed to make electoral participation seem more promising than extra-
parliamentary activities, despite the restrictions placed on the access of workers to voting. However, while
the election results of the PSI were impressive, already during the formative stage, with 6.8% in 1895, but
particularly in its aftermath, with 13% in 1900, 21.3% in 1904, and 19% in 1909, they were not the result
of a successful mobilization of workers.

The socialist parliamentary group was composed almost entirely of middle-class professionals.189 It
was because of this personal appeal, but also due to the involvement of the liberals in the trasformismo
arrangement190, and the emphasis of social democrats on the achievement of liberal democratic goals that
the PSI received much of its electoral support from middle class voters. Michels (1908) estimates that
during the 1904 election, in which the PSI received 326,016 votes, 256,874 workers were eligible to
participate. Not all of these workers cast their vote; not all who did participate, voted for the PSI, and
another significant share of the workers’ vote might have been ineffective as a result of ‘managed election’
practices. Electoral support for the PSI, therefore, must have come from a different source, and it is
plausible to assume that out of all the enfranchised social groups in Italy at the time, middle-class citizens
with liberal orientations were most likely to vote for the socialists. Middle-class voters in Argentina that
were disenchanted by the power sharing arrangements and the managed election practices of the new and
old oligarchic elites ended up founding their own radical republican party as a political outlet in 1891, the
Union Cívica Radical (UCR), instead of supporting the socialists. In the case of Italy, the same social group
did support the socialists, and therefore contributed to a degree of electoral success that did not reflect an
equivalent extent of roots and support in the industrial working class. In addition to the middle-class vote,
the second largest pillar of electoral support for the PSI came from propertied worker-artisans, sometimes
referred to as the Italian ‘labor aristocracy’.191

Interestingly enough, the embrace of extra-parliamentary tactics in Belgium, as a contrast, was
fostered by an extent of enfranchisement even below the restrictive Italian system. During the formative
stage of the party, both systems were severely restrictive, at the lowest possible level of inclusion. But
within that category, voting rights in Belgium before 1893 were even more limited than in the case of Italy:
beginning 1885, in between 8 and 9.1% of Italians had the right to vote, while in Belgium this applied to
only 2.2% of the population. This makes Belgium the case with the lowest distribution of the right to vote
after Russia and Japan. As a consequence of that, the PSI was able to find an electoral niche, based on the

189 See Miller (1990, 101). In 1900, only two of 33 socialist members of parliament were workers, 12 were lawyers, 2 physicians, 6
professors, 4 PSI functionaries, 1 engineer and 4 other middle class professionals.
190 Trasformismo stands for the agreed upon alternation in power between the parties representing different factions of the
oligarchical elites, which undermines the effective functioning of formal liberal democratic institutions and the emergence of a
competitive party system.
191 See Landolfi (1996) and Miller (1990)
In the historical development of Italian social democracy, first anarchism and later anarcho-syndicalism were permanent companions. The relative strength of these movements compared to the more dominant position of social democracy in other cases is a direct consequence of the type of limited inclusion polity that could be observed during the party’s formative stage and in its aftermath. The closure of the electoral route for a comparatively long period of time during and after the completion of party formation has sparked relatively strong anarchist and later anarcho-syndicalist movements in Spain, Italy, Japan and Argentina, while in Russia and Hungary, bolshevik orientations would gain dominance over anarchist currents as a left insurrectionist alternative to quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

In Belgium, Sweden, and Norway, the potential for a strong anarchist current as a response to lowest enfranchisement was counteracted by social democracy’s embrace of extra-parliamentary tactics during the party’s formative stage. And in addition to that, the opportunities for anarcho-syndicalist strength were curtailed by an increase in the level of enfranchisement relatively soon after the completion of party formation. The survival of an initially hopeful anarchist current in the Netherlands was counteracted, despite social democracy’s failure to embrace extra-parliamentary tactics more extensively, by relatively speedy enfranchisement. A permanent insurrectionist alternative to social democracy (anarchism-syndicalism or bolshevism) emerged as a strong current alongside social democracy only, when the electoral route remained closed for a significantly long period after the beginning of labor’s entry into the political arena. France, where anarcho-syndicalism emerged in the context of a liberal regime, is the only case that cannot be explained by reference to the institutional elements of labor inclusion. I will discuss the role of suboptimal decision making by labor elites that triggered this unexpected outcome later on in this chapter.

The distinctive feature of Italian anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists is their initial organizational affiliation with the Italian socialist party. In all other cases, anarcho-syndicalists remained outside the organizational apparatus of socialist parties, in favor of unions dedicated exclusively to extra-parliamentary activities. Italian anarchists and later anarcho-syndicalists, on the other hand, tried to gain dominance within the PSI and to use the party as an organizational vessel, but failed in both instances. First, in 1892, through the establishment of the Partito dei Lavoratori Italiani (PLI) as the predecessor of the PSI, the mainstream socialists excluded the anarchists of the First International, who had already been on the

192 An important consequence, but one that is beyond the scope of this analysis, are the effects of limited worker mobilization through the PSI on the interwar regime type and the victory of fascism in Italy. See chapter 11 and the conclusion for a tentative assessment of this issue.
decline ever since the early 1880s. And second, following on varying, yet always limited, degrees of success in gaining control of the PSI, the anarcho-syndicalist faction eventually left the party after its final defeat during the 1906 party congress in Rome. At that point in time, the leading anarcho-syndicalist within the PSI, Antonio Labriola, came to the conclusion that “Italian syndicalism can never hope to be the majority in the Italian Socialist Party.” 193

Although Italian anarchist-syndicalists, different from their counterparts in other countries, remained within the PSI for such a comparatively long time, they did not only fail to gain dominance within the party, they were also entirely unsuccessful in even remotely influencing the PSI’s formal ideological orientation. The party’s 1892 “maximum program” remained unchanged for the entire time period until the defeat of the parliamentary system in 1922, and even the short term “minimum programs” agreed upon at various party congresses during this time period, were never infused with anarcho-syndicalist orientations. Syndicalism and vulgar marxism in Italy remained ideologically distinct, just as they did in Spain or France, despite the organizational involvement of Italian anarcho-syndicalists with the PSI. 194 It was only in Belgium, where syndicalism and extra-parliamentary tactics were combined into an ideological synthesis with vulgar marxism, while Swedish and Norwegian social democrats practiced this synthesis, without formally codifying it as their party ideology.

Based on these observations, it is entirely adequate to infer, as Bartolini (2000) does, that the overall ideological orientation of the Italian left was characterized by a combination of marxism and syndicalism. However, in order to understand the limited mobilization success of Italian social democracy, and the emergence of a strong anarchist-syndicalist competitor, it is imperative to acknowledge that the ideological model of the PSI was a variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that failed to practice extra-parliamentary tactics. Vulgar marxism and syndicalism dominated the ideological orientation of the Italian left, but they remained entirely separate currents, other than in Belgium, Sweden, and Norway, where social democratic parties embraced extra-parliamentary tactics borrowed from syndicalism. The PSI would have done better, i.e. made an optimal choice, with the infusion of syndicalist elements into its ideological portfolio. This is exactly what Belgian, Swedish, and Norwegian social democrats did in the context of a configuration of labor inclusion comparable to the case of Italy. However, in order to make this determination, it is equally imperative to move beyond the aggregate perspective on the overall left pursued by Bartolini (2000) in favor of analyzing specific instances of party formation.

193 Labriola (1906, 73) in Miller (1990)
194 The only brief and in terms of ideological rapprochement actually counterproductive infusion of syndicalist thought at the central level of the PSI’s organization occurred during Mussolini’s tenure as the editor of Avanti from 1912 to 1914. He gained his position through a package deal with the more intransigent against the more flexible marxists. But once he was editor, he propagandized his own unique approach to syndicalism and his contempt for parliamentary politics.
Distinctions between various social groups involved in the leadership of the labor movement—middle-class professionals, intellectuals, actual workers—and ideological dividing lines within the group of quasi-revolutionary socialists existed in all social democratic parties. But these differences were particularly pronounced in the case of the PSI. The Milan Congress of 1891 was the most important milestone on the road toward the establishment of a unified party open to both the ‘operaists’ and the middle-class professionals, but the rift between these two groups would continue to dominate the party. This was quite different in the case of Germany, for instance, where a much more homogenous synthesis between various social groups involved in the party leadership emerged. This is best illustrated by the cooperation between the party leader, and laborer, August Bebel, and the party’s leading theoretician, the middle-class intellectual, Karl Kautsky. Despite their differences in social background, both men stood for the same party ideology and organization. A similar cooperation and division of labor never emerged within the Italian PSI: Filipo Turati, the middle class professional and party theoretician, was also the de facto party leader for most of the time during the 1890s and 1900s, but there was never the equivalent of an August Bebel in the PSI.

The PSI experienced similar theoretical debates as the SPD in the aftermath of party formation, most importantly through the emergence of a revisionist current in the early 1900s, but also through the challenges of a more voluntarist approach in the early 1910s, comparable to the left opposition to the party mainstream embodied by Rosa Luxemburg in the German party. But during this entire time period, the quasi-revolutionary mainstream in the SPD was much more homogenous and unified than in the Italian party. What is commonly identified as the “reformists” and “revolutionaries” in the PSI are two shades of gray from the same quasi-revolutionary party model: in the SPD, these two shades of gray would act in unison, while they became two independent factions in the case of the PSI.

When the establishment of the PSI began to take form in 1891 at the Workers’ congress of Milan, these ideological dividing lines were not yet relevant, they only emerged during the development of the party throughout the 1890s and 1900s. In 1891, the inception of the path toward the birth of a unified party resulted not from an ideological compromise but rather from a fusion of different social groups and organizational models. It was at this point in time, that the previously organizationally distinct socialist clubs dominated by middle class professionals on the one hand, and organizations open exclusively to workers on the other, would agree to from a common unified party.

The first organizational manifestation of Italian labor in the political arena were the Figli di Lavoro, founded in 1877 by Erminio Pescatore in Milan. The design and composition of this organization is comparable to the chambers of labor that provided the underpinning for the formation of social democracy in Belgium, Sweden, and Norway. The organization combined elements of trade union activity with the tasks of a political party. Membership was not only de facto, but explicitly de jure, limited to workers, “in
the most restrictive sense of the word.” The *Figli di Lavoro*, along with local trade unions, formed the Italian Workers’ Party (POI) in 1884, which in 1885 also incorporated the Lombard Labor Federation.

Around the same time, socialist clubs of middle class professionals and intellectuals emerged, but they remained organizationally distinct from these workers’ associations. The most important one of these clubs was the Milan Socialist League founded in 1889 by Filipo Turati and his colleagues. Their intellectual exchange also brought into existence a theoretical journal, *Critica Sociale*, founded in 1891. The separation of these two currents of the Italian labor movement was explicitly supported by both sides. This perspective changed only in 1891, in response to the 1890 repression of a fragmented labor movement, when the Milan workers’ congress was summoned and commissioned with the task to create a unified party separate from the anarchist movement.

The congress marks the initial move toward the creation of a broad unified party under the inclusion of the previously separate ‘operaist’ and intellectual factions. The program commission appointed in Milan elaborated on a party agenda that was presented and adopted at the 1892 Congress of Genoa, which saw the formation of the ‘*Partito dei lavoratori italiani* (PLI)’ on the basis of the 1891 Milan congress. The party agenda, or ‘maximum program’ agreed upon in 1892 would remain in place as the Italian social democrats’ fundamental orientation until the defeat of the parliamentary system in 1922.

The 1892 party program was a classic expression of the vulgar marxism that dominated the Second International, and it was clearly influenced by the 1891 Erfurt program of the SPD. It demanded socialism through the socialization of the means of production as the ultimate goal of the party. It declared the party as revolutionary, because of its dedication to a fundamental transformation of social and economic relations. The perspective of the agenda was deterministic beyond doubt: socialism and the revolutionary transformation it embodies were regarded as the inevitable consequence of capitalism’s contradictions. The political struggle of the party geared at fostering this development was to be fought through participation in elections, while the subordinate economic struggle was the task of the unions. However, throughout the further development of labor politics in Italy, the unions and the party were distinctly less intertwined with one another than in other cases of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

While the decision for an ideological model was thereby made in 1892, the eventually dominant organizational setup of the party would only be established at the 1895 Congress of Parma. Before that point in time, effective through the decision of the 1892 Genoa Congress, the Italian social democratic party was based on automatic collective membership through its affiliated unions, clubs, and mutual aid societies. Individual membership and an abandonment of this practice occurred only in 1895. This point in time marks the establishment of the dominant organizational model of the party. On top of the lack of a

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195 See *Figli di Lavoro* (1877)
syndicalist infusion into the party’s ideology, these procedural decisions of 1895 also mark the farewell to a fusion of syndicalism and quasi-revolutionary social democracy in the organizational domain. In those cases that accomplished an effective integration of quasi-revolutionary social democracy and syndicalism – Belgium, Norway, Sweden – the party’s organizational model reflected this constellation. Parties in these three cases were based on the exact set of ideas that the PSI rejected in 1895: a combination of automatic trade union with individual membership, and an influential role of the unions within the party, while at the same time assigning dominance to the political over the economic struggle, and treating the party as the center piece of the broader labor movement. The choices of the PSI against an infusion of syndicalism are also reflected in the name change effected in 1895. The party congress of 1893 established the ‘Socialist Party of Italian workers’ (PSLI) while the 1895 Parma congress changed the party’s name to ‘Italian Socialist Party’ (PSI).

The organizational constitution of the party as the vessel within which Italian social democracy would accomplish ‘systemness’ was therefore completed in 1895. The establishment of a dominant ideological form as the framework for the social integration of its members occurred already in 1892. The decisions of the 1893 Congress of Reggio Emilia and the 1896 Congress of Florence represent only clarifications, albeit important ones, of these earlier decisions. The 1893 congress added to the previously established ideological model by adopting the party’s first minimum program. The minimum program amplified the party’s emphasis on the electoral route to socialism, by defining a list of immediate legislative demands and by setting rules and guidelines for socialist members of parliament.

The resolution of the congress to rule out cooperation with the executive and the non-proletarian parties added to the decidedly quasi-revolutionary nature of the party, just as much as the later practice of engaging in this form of cooperation despite the earlier decision to the contrary. This contradiction between revolutionary rhetoric and pragmatic practices is not a deviation from the quasi-revolutionary model; it is one of its defining features, to be found in all cases of quasi-revolutionary parties, even those, like Germany or Austria, which are commonly regarded as the most intransigent examples of its kind.

The 1896 Congress of Florence then removed any doubt that the newly created party would embrace the German emphasis on the electoral route rather than infusing syndicalist and extra-parliamentary tactics into its ideological orientation. In a debate about the tactics of the party, Filipo Turati introduced a resolution that would formally instruct local sections of the PSI to focus on the electoral struggle. The resolution passed, against intense opposition from the Southern socialists, led by Arturo Labriola, who would later embrace independent anarcho-syndicalist organizations. Their competing resolution emphasized extra-parliamentary activities and suggested to instruct local sections to do exactly the opposite of what Turati had in mind: to engage in extra-parliamentary activities above everything else and to subordinate electoral success to that endeavor for the time being. It was Enrico Ferri, who suggested a
compromise solution, according to which local sections, depending on their specific situation, should decide by themselves, which set of tactics they wish to utilize.

It illustrates the previously discussed dilemmas of Italian socialism very well that Ferri’s compromise solution had no chance against the intransigent position of Turati. The formative stage of Italian social democracy was therefore complete at this point in time: through the establishment of the German variant of the quasi-revolutionary party model, with its focus on the electoral route to socialism, in an environment that did not allow for a significant electoral inclusion of the working class. During its formative stage, Italian social democracy failed to arrange some form of ideological or organizational synthesis between its quasi-revolutionary electoral current and the extra-parliamentary approach. Doing so formally and practically, as in Belgium, or exclusively through an adjustment of the German model in practice, as in Sweden and Norway, was the prerequisite for mobilization success in these cases. But in the case of Italy, the failure of Enrico Ferri’s intriguing suggestion to at least allow for local and regional flexibility in the choice of tactics, if no synthesis of the two currents seems to be possible, illustrates the final failure of these efforts and thereby the establishment of a party variant that would seriously limit the mobilization of workers by the Italian socialists throughout the early 1900s.

Russia or Austria? Hungarian labor elites in an unclear environment of inclusion

The choice of a suboptimal version of the quasi-revolutionary party model in Italy has led to limited mobilization success of the PSI, and also left Italian socialists ill equipped to resist the onslaught of fascism in the early 1920s. In the case of Hungary, elements of authoritarian corporatism only took some hold beginning in the early 1930s. Before that point in time, Hungary saw a continuation of the traditional forms of authoritarianism that existed in most of Europe during the late 19th century, which was only interrupted by an eventually unsuccessful attempt at emulating the Russian bolshevik experiment in the late 1910s. The limited mobilization success of Hungarian social democracy before 1918, the party’s lack of capacity to oppose the introduction of authoritarian corporatist elements in the early 1930s, the emergence of a strong insurrectionist alternative on the left (anarcho-syndicalism in Italy, bolshevism in Hungary), and the failure of the 1918 revolution are all consequences and indicators of having embraced a suboptimal variant of the quasi-revolutionary party model during the party’s formative stage. In this respect, Hungarian social democracy is comparable to the Italian case.  

196 Hungary is different, of course, with respect to the further course of historical development after the completion of party formation. In Hungary, the initial failure of the traditional authoritarian arrangement in 1918 has led to a brief interlude of a soviet experiment, and then the continuation of the earlier form of traditional dictatorship until the early 1930s. In Italy, on the other hand,
However, compared to Italy, two differences in the interaction between party model and existing environment of labor inclusion stand out. First, the even more apparent closure of the electoral route makes Hungary an even more obvious example for the inadequacy of the German variant of the quasi-revolutionary party model in the context of lowest electoral inclusion. Second, the slightly higher restrictions imposed on the guarantee of political liberties, and on the principle of responsible government (see table 9), made it even more difficult for social democrats in Hungary to effectively embrace an alternative, extra-parliamentary, variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

Hungary, as well as the case of Spain, are therefore the most obvious examples for the limitations of the German party model, and the added dilemma that an extra-parliamentary version of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was more difficult to implement than in the cases of Belgium, Sweden, and Norway. It was not as difficult as in the cases of Japan and Russia, however, since in both these cases, political liberties were not only precarious, as in Hungary or Spain, but entirely suspended, responsible government was absent, and the behavior of the executive was even more repressive (see table 9).

In cases of lowest inclusion (Japan, Russia) as well as the least inclusive examples of the low inclusion category (Argentina, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Spain), a significant insurrectionist alternative emerged on the left. Other than in Japan and Russia, however, where no social democratic party emerged, as predicted by the existing environment of inclusion, slightly, but sufficiently higher degrees of inclusion in the low inclusion cases resulted in the successful formation of a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party. Although party formation did occur in these cases, all of the emerging parties were plagued by a significantly lower extent of mobilization success, as a direct consequence of these factors: first, suboptimal choices for the parliamentary over the extra-parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy; and second, a more restrictive environment than in the comparatively more inclusive examples of low inclusion. However, and this is the essential point here, the environment in these less inclusive cases of low inclusion was restrictive enough to trigger the emergence of an insurrectionist alternative of the left, but at the same time, not so restrictive as to prevent the formation of a social democratic party.

In Austria, as has been discussed previously, the opening of the electoral route at a comparatively early point in time after the completion of party formation (beginning in 1897, and then fully in 1907) prevented the continuing strength of this insurrectionist current, and also favored the Austrian social democrats’ mobilization success. In Italy and Argentina, the earlier insurrectionist current on the left lost much of its appeal due to the introduction of an effective electoral process, beginning in 1912 in both cases. But this adjustment of electoral inclusion occurred too late to make up for the losses in mobilization

the embrace of a fully liberalized polity in 1919 was followed by fascism only three years later. See the comparative assessment in chapter 11 and the conclusion for a discussion of the relationship between labor inclusion, the choices of labor elites, and the nature of interwar regime types.
suffered by social democratic parties before: the focus on electoral tactics and the German party model by the mid 1890s in an environment that would only allow for meaningful electoral participation two decades later significantly impaired the mobilization success of both Italian and Argentinean social democrats.

These limits to social democracy’s mobilization success were most apparent in the cases of Hungary and Spain, however, the two examples of the least effective social democratic parties before 1919. In both cases, social democracy embraced the German variant of the quasi-revolutionary party model in an environment of lowest electoral inclusion. When social democracy was confronted with a truly ‘revolutionary’ situation, in Spain during the General Strike of 1917, and in Hungary during the 1918/1919 revolution, both parties were ill equipped to exploit this situation for long term gains. These examples, just as the behavior of the German social democrats in 1918 and 1919, demonstrate that quasi-revolutionary social democracy is truly not ‘revolution making’, as Kautsky famously said. In the cases of Spain, and Hungary, moreover, social democratic parties suffered from their earlier failure to strike roots in the working class.

The failure of Hungarian social democrats to emulate the more fitting Belgian model of quasi-revolutionary social democracy or to develop their own solution in response to an environment of lowest electoral inclusion, combined with precarious political liberties and severely limited responsible government, was largely the result of knowledge diffusion from the outside. The formation of the Magyarorszagi Szocialdemokrata Part (MSZDP), the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, in 1890, was the direct result of Austrian social democrats’ involvement. The failure of previous attempts to establish a mass-based party in Hungary prompted the initiative of the Second International in encouraging an Austrian dispatch to support their Hungarian comrades. The 1889 Pressburg meeting of Austrian and Hungarian social democrats paved the way for the 1890 social democratic congress and the formation of the MSZDP. The party program adopted at this occasion was derived largely from the Austrian party’s 1889 Hainfeld program, which is one of the first codifications of vulgar marxism.

‘Systemness’, albeit only limited mobilization success, would be accomplished in the context of the organizational vessel founded in 1890, but the ideological divisions between various factions were not resolved through the adoption of the 1890 party program. It took until 1903, before the quasi-revolutionary orientation within Hungarian social democracy emerged as clearly dominant. The dividing line regarding the party’s ideological model was largely in between two groups that were commonly referred to as “moderates” and “radicals” (Hitchins 1990). This is somewhat of a misnomer, because, as a matter of fact, the “moderates” in Hungarian social democracy were prototypical proponents of the quasi-revolutionary party model. They stood for the 1890 party program, which advocated socialism, class struggle, a revolutionary transformation, and which shared the deterministic perspective that the collapse of capitalism was the necessary consequence of its own contradictions. “Radicals” on the other hand were decidedly
more voluntarist in nature; they rejected what they perceived as an excessively legalistic approach of the “moderates”, they did not entirely reject violence as a means of achieving political goals under the given circumstances, and they advocated a more explicit and encompassing embrace of extra-parliamentary tactics.

Other than in Belgium, where voluntarism and extra-parliamentary tactics were successfully synthesized with the vulgar marxism of the Second International, or Sweden and Norway, where this synthesis was implemented in practice, no such synthesis occurred in Hungary. Just as in Italy, Argentina, and Spain, all examples of similar configurations and degrees of labor inclusion, these conflicting currents remained separate in Hungary. The path leading toward the dominance of the quasi-revolutionary, legalistic and electoral, faction in the MSZDP, began in 1896. The elections to the party leadership at that time were carried by a younger generation from the “moderate” faction. That same year, the majority of the “radicals”, in response to this defeat, left the MSZDP to form the ‘Independent Socialist Party’, which later on would provide the nucleus for the emergence of Hungarian communism.

The dominance of a quasi-revolutionary orientation over its earlier internal rivals was codified in the form of a new party agenda only in 1903. The 1903 party program took its lead from the SPD’s 1890 Erfurt program. It contains some rhetoric about the underdeveloped nature of Hungarian capitalism compared to the West. But this observation did not provide the basis for a specifically Hungarian model of social democracy. The program essentially reproduced the spirit and content of the Erfurt program; the only tangible major difference was the estimate that as a consequence of underdevelopment, the eventual collapse of capitalism and the opportunity for socialism would take more time in Hungary.\footnote{197 See Hitchins (1990) and Cole (1956) for specific discussions of organizational and ideological permutations in Hungarian social democracy.}

Before the formation of an organizational vessel that would later achieve ‘systemness’, in 1890, and the establishment of a dominant ideological model as the basis for social integration, in 1903, labor had already begun its entry into the political arena in the late 1860s. Considering the relative backwardness of Hungarian industrialization, the first manifestation of labor in the political arena emerged at a very early point in time. The 1867 conference of the typographical trades represented the first systematic effort at establishing organized labor in Hungary. The first political organization of the Hungarian labor movement emerged only one year later, through the foundation of the \textit{Altaanos Munkasegylet} (AME), the ‘General Workers’ society’. The AME emphasized the political struggle of the labor movement, such as the demands for political liberties and universal suffrage, while the \textit{Pest-Budai Munkaskepzö Egylet}, the ‘Pest-Buda Workers’ Education society’, emphasized community building and economic demands. It was initially
founded as a mutual aid society with support from employers, but soon developed into a distinctly socialist organization as well.

Before the division between “moderates” and “radicals” occurred in the 1890s in the context of the newly founded MSZDP, the debates within the early Hungarian labor movement revolved around a different set of issues. First, the discussions between proponents of the political struggle (organized around the AME, with an ideological orientation toward Lasalleanism), and proponents of community building and the economic struggle (organized in the Pest-Buda and other workers’ education societies) were most prevalent through the entire 1870s. Eventually, after the formation of a unified party under a socialist banner failed in the mid 1870s, two separate groups, founded in 1878, accepted the respective heritage of the AME and the workers’ education societies: the ‘non-voters party’ was geared at the achievement of political demands for labor, most importantly universal suffrage, while the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MMP) emphasized the economic demands of the working class.198

Second, the debate between Lasalleans and proto-marxists that was so prevalent in the cases of Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, was never equally relevant in the case of Hungary. Here, divisions centered on the conflict between the political struggle on the one hand, and mutual aid societies on the other. Initially, proponents of the political struggle embraced Lasaellanism, but in the mid 1870s, during the attempts to form a unified party under inclusion of both the “economic” and the “political” current, the proponents of the political struggle took the German SDAP’s proto-marxist Eisenach program as their ideological model. The failed attempt at unification in the 1870s that triggered the formation of two separate organizations, was eventually remedied by the 1880 merger of the Non-voters party and the MMP to form the Magyaroszagi Altalanos Munkaspart (MAMP), the General Workers’ Party of Hungary.

Third, the debate about Hungarian social democracy’s relationship with its Austrian comrades was resolved with a compromise: both parties were to remain organizationally separate, while they agreed on entertaining close relations with one another. This opened the opportunity for Austrian involvement in the adoption of a new party program and the renaming of the MAMP as the Social Democratic Party of Hungary in 1890. This date marks the establishment of a lasting organizational vessel for Hungarian social democracy, and the initiation of a path toward the embrace of the ‘German’ variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. In addition to opening the MAMP for cooperation with Austrian social democrats, and the Austro-Hungarian socialist conference in 1889, this choice was also precipitated by the MAMP’s decision to join the Second International in 1889.

198 See Süle (1967) for a discussion of mass-elite relations in the Hungarian labor movement and the role of intellectuals in the formulation of ideological ‘supply’.
Spanish and Argentinean socialists in the blind alley of alleged labor enfranchisement

The environments of labor inclusion in which social democracy emerged in Spain and Argentina share a striking similarity. Not only do both cases belong to the lower half of ‘low inclusion’ cases, in which a lowest level of enfranchisement is combined with only slightly higher, but still severely limited, inclusion on the dimensions of ‘political liberties’ and ‘responsible government’. This also applies to the other cases from this category – Italy, Austria, and Hungary. In addition to that, Spain and Argentina are unique in terms of the techniques through which worker enfranchisement was kept at the lowest possible level, and this particular similarity would have an effect on the formation of social democratic parties that is most apparent and most easily discernible in these two cases.199

Electoral fraud, bribery, and local networks of patronage that exchanged favors for electoral support were common place in many partially liberalized polities during the late 19th and early 20th century. In the cases of Hungary and the South of Italy, these practices even amounted to more encompassing systems of managed elections and arranged alternations or sharing of power, similar to those that could be found in Argentina and Spain. However, not only were the ‘caciquismo’ and ‘managed elections’ arrangements the most encompassing and systematic ones in these two cases. Argentina and Spain were also the only two cases, where these practices were established on top of a formally wide guarantee of the right to vote. As table 10 illustrates, the right to vote in Argentina was at the highest possible level (universal male suffrage) during the entire formative period of the party. In the case of Spain, universal male suffrage was granted until 1876, and then, after the establishment of the Restoration Monarchy during that year, again since 1888. Universal suffrage was therefore temporarily interrupted during the formative period of the party, but it was in place immediately before its beginning and in its aftermath, and therefore had a significant impact on the practices and formal orientations of the party. However, despite the experience of a most encompassing distribution of the right to vote in these two cases, the vote of the working class was entirely ineffective, as a consequence of ‘managed election’ practices.

What makes this situation that is unique to the cases of Argentina and Spain so relevant for the strategic choices of labor elites is the fact that the electoral channel seems to be open, thereby encouraging electoral participation and an emphasis on the electoral route to socialism, while at the same time rendering this strategy completely ineffective for as long as the practice of ‘managed elections’ persists. Argentinean

199 There is a slight difference between Argentina and Spain regarding the extent of formal political liberties during the formative stages of both parties. Political liberties in Spain were precarious, while they were somewhat guaranteed, albeit with limitations, in the case of Argentina. More severe measures to formally restrict political liberties only occurred in Argentina after the completion of party formation (see the earlier comparative overview of labor inclusion). At that point in time, however, political liberties in Argentina deteriorated to the low level that had already been present in Spain before.
and Spanish labor elites were in a unique strategical dilemma: should they try to seize the opportunities of electoral participation, seek to gain from the potential propaganda effects campaigning might provide, hoping that over time, the unfair practice would be abandoned, and the workers’ vote would become truly meaningful? Or should they refuse to be part of this sham of an electoral process, criticize it for what it was, and instead, focus on extra-parliamentary activities?

The entrenched oligarchic coalition in Spain was hard pressed to maintain its control over many urban districts already in the 1890s, but it took until 1917, before political contestation erupted in an all encompassing general strike. In Argentina, it took until 1912 for this arrangement to come to an end. In its place, Argentina saw the establishment of a meaningful electoral process through the reforms of 1913, while in Spain, another form of authoritarian governance, this time without the pretense of elections, emerged through Primo de Rivera’s pronunciamiento in 1923. Hence, with the benefit of hindsight, we know now that these arrangements were to last for a significant period of time, while socialist elites in both Argentina and Spain did not have this benefit, and therefore made decisions that were clearly suboptimal: they decided in favor of electoral participation, and emerged as loyal followers of the dominant German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, in an environment, where, as we know now, electoral participation would remain ineffective for a significant period of time.

However, not only did Argentinean and Spanish social democrats fail to arrive at a synthesis of extra-parliamentary and parliamentary tactics. It is safe to say that the Spanish PSOE and the Argentinean PSOA were more exclusively focused on electoral involvement at the explicit and intentional expense of extra-parliamentary activities than any other electorally oriented quasi-revolutionary social democratic party: Danish and German social democrats did embrace parliamentary tactics and the electoral route during their formative stage, but they also engaged in extensive community building and extra-parliamentary activities at the same time. Even the elitist Italian PSI was able to strike some roots in the labor movement’s network of auxiliary organizations.

Spanish and Argentinean social democrats, on the other hand, failed to establish these links systematically. This failure is a direct consequence of both parties’ decision to adopt the electorally oriented German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and on top of that, to abstain from extra-parliamentary activities almost entirely, leaving this ripe field to the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists. Just as in the Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, and for a brief period of time Austria, an embrace of the Belgian variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy would have been a better choice. However, because of the unique nature of enfranchisement in Spain and Argentina, and the false hopes it created regarding the viability of the electoral route, a more optimal decision was very difficult to make.

The consequences of this miscalculation were significant: out of all the social democratic parties investigated here, comparable only to the Hungarian socialists, who were in a unique dilemma of their own,
Argentinean and Spanish social democrats were by far the least effective in terms of mobilizing their constituency. All the while, anarchists, and later anarcho-syndicalists, who chose to reject the parliamentary route, enjoyed an extraordinary amount of mobilization success. Moreover, when the electoral route became eventually accessible, Argentinean social democracy did accomplish ‘external representation’, but its election results identify it as one of three significant electoral underperformers, even when the relatively smaller size of the Argentinean working class is taken into account (see table 14).

The electoral route in Spain did not become available during the time period investigated here; external representation of the PSOE before 1919 occurred not through elections, but instead through the party’s participation and leadership provided in the 1917 general strike. The events during that year, however, were not the result of an at least somewhat consciously executed strategy. The PSOE was cast into the events, trying to make the best out of it. But it is in no small measure due to the fragmentation of Spanish labor, rooted in the lack of mobilization success achieved by the PSOE during its formative stage and its aftermath, that no long term gains could be accomplished through the events of 1917. The lack of external mobilization success and systemness in Argentina are also consequences of, and indicators for, the suboptimal choice for a parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, made by socialist elites during the formative stage of the party.

In the cases of France, Switzerland, and Canada, socialist elites chose a model for entry into the political arena that did not fit the overall category of inclusion. Their choices cannot be explained by reference to the structural environment alone. Argentinean and Spanish socialists, on the other hand, made an optimal choice by implementing a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party; that is, they successfully translated overall degrees of inclusion into a theoretically predicted type of party. Their choices were suboptimal only in terms of the variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that they chose to adopt, by emulating the German variant, and on top of that, by exaggerating its electoral component. Within the general context of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, the adoption of the Belgian variant with its focus on extra-parliamentary activities would have been a more optimal decision.

The social composition of Spanish and Argentinean social democrats is quite similar to the Italian example. In all these cases, parties were dominated by middle-class professionals and, often times self taught, intellectuals. Pablo Iglesias, the unrivaled leadership figure in the early PSOE was somewhat of an exception: he was self taught, and became a preeminent and prolific writer, but as a printer by training, he also came from a working class background. It was Iglesias, who adopted vulgar marxism and a quasi-revolutionary party model to the case of Spain. But he did not derive his knowledge of marxism from the original texts. His education in what was to become the vulgar marxism of the Second International came from reading and interacting with the French marxists, most importantly Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue. This is not surprising. Iglesias attended evening classes to learn French, rather than German, and it was
French marxists, like Lafargue, who campaigned in Spain throughout the 1870s to oppose the dominant anarchist faction of the First International in support of marxist orientations.²⁰⁰

The original statements of vulgar marxism were already schematic, inherently contradictory, and overly deterministic. We have argued previously, however, that despite these conceptual and theoretical weaknesses, Kautsky’s marxism has to be understood from the perspective of the functions it performed for the social integration of party members. And in this respect, it was extremely successful, at least in those cases, where degrees and configurations of labor inclusion were similar to the German example: in Denmark, and, after some delay, in Austria. In other cases, Kautsky’s vulgar marxism has successfully been adopted to a somewhat different environment of labor inclusion, and synthesized with additional ideological elements or an adjusted practice – in Belgium, Sweden, and Norway.

If the Kautskyan version was schematic, this applies even more so to Guesde’s rendering of marxism. It does not come as a big surprise, then, that the kind of marxism adopted by Iglesias to the case of Spain, as it was derived from Guesde and Lafargue, was equally, if not more, schematic and deterministic. Hence, not only did Spanish social democrats adopt the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which was not well suited to the Spanish environment of inclusion in the first place. The PSOE exaggerated the emphasis on parliamentary and electoral tactics, in the absence of any meaningful worker enfranchisement. This outcome is in no small measure due to the specific channels of knowledge diffusion, through which the vulgar marxist model was delivered and implemented in Spain.

It was in the 1870s, when Iglesias became part of the growing movement of organized labor, in 1873 as a member, and the following year, as the president of the compositors’ union. The typographical trades, like in so many other countries, were also the pioneers of the Spanish labor movement, beginning with the 1871 formation of a printers’ union in Madrid. While labor had already entered the political arena in the late 1860s and early 1870s through the anarchist dominated Spanish section of the first International, it was only in the late 1870s that the first attempts at the formation of social democracy occurred. The foundation of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) in 1879 was precipitated by the formation of the ‘grupo socialista madrileño’, established in 1878, as the first manifestation of labor in the political arena that is directly linked to the following event of party formation. The most important task the group set itself was to prepare the foundation of a nationwide mass-based party organization.

1879 is the most convenient point in time for marking the beginning of a path toward ‘systemness’, but this path would only be completed throughout the early 1900s, albeit with significantly less mobilization success than in most other social democratic parties. An exponential growth of party membership occurred only in the aftermath of the 1917 General Strike, which can serve as yet another

²⁰⁰ See Cole (1956) and Heywood (1990)
piece of evidence for the misguided exaggerated emphasis on electoral participation (see table 14 and 15). Moreover, in 1879 the PSOE was still a clandestine organization. It took until 1882, before the party adopted its first formal agenda and statute, and ceased to exist underground (cf. Cole 1956).

The limited mobilization success of the party is also a consequence of its focus on Madrid, at the expense of organizing efforts in the more industrialized regions of Catalonia and the Basque country. This emphasis in organization has its roots in the geographical location of the party leadership, but it is also a result of the party’s ideological focus on the parliamentary arena, physically located in Madrid, at the expense of extra-parliamentary activities and the mobilization of its constituency, which was far more developed in the industrialized regions outside the capital (cf. Heywood 1990).

The definitive statement of the party’s dominant ideological form occurred only in 1888, after various earlier attempts at formulating a program and subsequent revisions, beginning in 1880. The 1888 party program established the previously outlined form of schematic vulgar marxism, for which Heywood (1990) has coined the fitting term “decaffeinated marxism”. What Heywood fails to take into account in his sharp criticism of the PSOE’s ideology and practice, however, is the fact that the marxism of other quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties was almost equally “decaffeinated”. That being the case, “decaffeinated marxism” worked very well in mobilizing labor in the cases of Germany, Denmark, and Austria – not despite, but because it was so deterministic and schematic, thereby instilling a sense of optimism and inevitable victory in the party’s constituency. It failed to deliver in the case of Spain, as well as the cases of Argentina, Italy, and to some extent the Netherlands, because the German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy relied on the accessibility of the electoral route – a prerequisite that was absent in these cases.

The similarities in the development of social democracy and the overall left in Argentina and Spain were a result of a similar environment of labor inclusion. The respective choices made by leaders in the socialist and the anarchist camp in this environment were sustained by distinct channels of knowledge diffusion from the outside. Italian and Spanish anarchists, working immigrants as well as professional propagandists, brought anarchism to Argentina, while the socialists turned to European social democracy for inspiration. The organizational separation and ‘division of labor’ between an extra-parliamentary anarchist left and a socialist party excessively focused on the parliamentary arena mirrors the Spanish situation as much as the underpinning configuration of labor inclusion.

The statutes, principles and minimum program of the PSOA, agreed upon in 1896, were the work of Juan Bautista Justo, who also acted as the dominant figure of the party leadership until his death in 1928. Justo had gained extensive knowledge of continental European marxism through his close interaction with European socialists, and his travels to Europe. He was a pragmatic politician, who was intent on setting
Argentine socialism on a path of electoral victory, largely influenced by the impressive election results accomplished by the German SPD in the late 1880s and early 1890s.  

The political practice of the PSOA as well as the 1896 principles of the party, drafted by Justo, reflect the core elements of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. The agenda calls for a truly revolutionary transformation of the socio-economic and political situation; it demands the collective ownership of the means of production, and is based on a class analysis of Argentine society. The one single element of vulgar marxism that is most pronounced in Justo’s world view and the party’s constitution is the positivist emphasis on the inevitable arrival of a socialist society. It is debatable, whether this particular emphasis is the result of Justo’s own training as a physician and scientist, or due to the influence of the Second International’s marxism. Either way, the deterministic world view so prevalent in the PSOA’s ideological foundation is a core element of vulgar marxism.

Adelman (1992) has argued that the party’s pragmatism, its cautious attitude toward political strikes, and Justo’s contacts with revisionist social democrats are indicators of ideological deviations from a more intransigent ‘European’ model. He fails to take into account that the combination of legalism and pragmatic practices with revolutionary rhetoric is at the core of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic model everywhere. The embrace of parliamentarism and an electoral route to socialism are defining features of its dominant German variant. In both these ways, the Argentinean PSOA, with its excessively legalistic approach, its determinism, its pragmatism, coupled with marxist revolutionary rhetoric, is equally, if not more, quasi-revolutionary, than the original European parties.

Before the establishment of the PSOA in 1896, organized Argentinean socialism developed through local nationality based groups of immigrants. The German ‘Club Aleman Vorwärts’ was the first one of these associations, founded in 1882. French socialists formed their own separate group in 1891, Italians followed in 1894, and the 1892 ‘Agrupacion Socialista’ represented the first attempt to form a ‘native’ Spanish speaking socialist organization. The ‘Agrupacion Socialista’, which changed its name to ‘Centro Socialista Obrero’ in 1894, also provided the nucleus for the foundation of the Partido Socialista Obrero International (PSOI) in 1895. The Club Aleman and other nationality based groups merged into the PSOI, but the established nationality networks continued to exist even within the umbrella of a unified organization. The change of name from PSOI to Partido Socialista Obrero Argentina in 1896 is indicative for the efforts to create a ‘native’ Argentinean socialist party rather than just a combination of nationality clubs.

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201 See Walter (1977) and Walter (1990) for Justo’s interaction with European socialists.
202 For a discussion of the PSOA’s ideological orientation and organization see Adelman (1992) and Walter (1977)
203 The German SPD also explicitly rejected the general strike as a political tactic through party congress resolutions in 1905 and 1906.
Quasi-revolutionary social democracy as a suboptimal choice

in Switzerland and France

All the quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties discussed so far have emerged in the context of illiberal or partially liberalized polities, characterized by low degrees of inclusion. Labor elites in these cases made optimal decisions about the model of labor politics they adopted, and thereby translated an existing environment of labor inclusion into a theoretically predicted response. At the same time, a more fine-grained analysis of specific configurations of various channels of inclusion has revealed that in Spain, Hungary, Argentina, Italy, and the Netherlands, suboptimal decisions have been made with respect to the particular variant of the quasi-revolutionary party type. The adoption of the extra-parliamentary ‘Belgian’ variant would have been optimal in the existing environment of lowest electoral inclusion, combined with higher levels of inclusion on the dimensions of ‘political liberties’ and ‘responsible government’, while the actually embraced ‘German’ variant represented a suboptimal decision. The cases of France and Switzerland are two additional examples for the successful establishment of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. However, different from all the other manifestations of this party type, the French and Swiss parties emerged in the context of an institutionally liberal polity, characterized by higher inclusion (see table 9). The optimal response to this environment of labor inclusion would have been the formation of an ‘evolutionary’ social democratic party.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy is a model of labor politics that represents in essence a bet on a brighter future, in which social democracy is projected to have the opportunity to ordain fundamental socio-economic change in the context of a liberalized polity. In the meantime, quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties focus on organization building and keep up their hopes that a transformation toward fully liberal democracy will occur, to make the implementation of a socialist agenda possible. In some cases, such as Hungary, Spain, Italy, or Argentina, this opportunity has never fully presented itself. In other cases, such as Germany or Austria, the determinism that made organization building and discipline possible during oppressive times, stood in the way of developing an actual policy agenda for socialism, once liberal democracy had come about.

Labor elites that made their decisions about how to enter the political arena in the context of liberal democratic polities should not have had to concern themselves with the ‘political struggle’ of accomplishing liberal democratic reforms. An institutional environment that should have enabled them to achieve tangible gains for their constituency as partial steps on the road to socialism was already in place. Moreover, the greater costs of organization building that are associated with an integrated quasi-revolutionary party as opposed to the evolutionary socialist party model that shares a much more
straightforward division of labor with the unions and other labor organizations, should also prevent the emergence of a dominant quasi-revolutionary model in the context of a liberal democratic polity. And eventually, the demands for a revolutionary transformation, class struggle, and the eventual inevitable victory of socialism should appeal more strongly to a working class that is socialized in the context of an illiberal or only partially liberalized polity. In a liberal democratic polity, on the other hand, a concrete plan for more immediate political and material gains should be more appealing, because it resonates much more effectively with the existing institutional opportunities for socialist parties to actually implement a socialist agenda. Despite all these considerations, French and Swiss socialist elites, in the context of institutionally liberal polities, did in fact embrace a suboptimal ‘quasi-revolutionary’, but not the predicted optimal ‘evolutionary’ party model. In order to account for the cases of France and Switzerland, the emphasis needs to be on an additional analysis for elite agency and the sources of suboptimal decision-making, on top of an investigation into the nature of labor inclusion.

When Swiss labor elites entered the political arena as an independent force in the early 1870s, the movement had already existed in the sphere of economic self-organization for more than three decades. Local unions and mutual aid societies had been formed by highly skilled artisans, for example watchmakers in Geneva, throughout the 1840s. In the 1830s, journeying craft workers from Austria and Germany, mostly in the area of Zürich, founded the first labor organizations in Switzerland. Their efforts represent the prelude to a series of external influences that shaped the Swiss labor movement. Another earlier form of external influence occurred through the contacts of Swiss labor with German socialists in the 1860s. This pattern of knowledge diffusion from the outside that continued in different forms throughout the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena will emerge as one of the crucial explanatory factors for the choices made by Swiss socialist elites in terms of organizational and ideological models around the end of the 19th century.

Swiss labor entered the political arena with a first attempt at party formation in 1870, followed by another unsuccessful attempt a decade later. It took until 1888 for Swiss socialists to establish a solid and lasting organizational vessel. The organizational setup of the Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP), established by the Swiss workers’ congress in Bern on October 21 of 1888, emulated the example of the German socialists: the SP was designed as a mass-based party, with individual membership rather than automatic collective membership through union affiliation. At the same time, Swiss social democrats envisioned a party that would become deeply intertwined with the existing network of unions and other auxiliary associations.

204 See Cole (1956) for a discussion of external influences on the Swiss labor movement, in particular the German and Russian party leaders, who spent their exile in Switzerland.
While the organizational design of the SP closely resembled the quasi-revolutionary party model, the ideological orientation of the party, expressed through the 1888 Bern program, still contained elements of both evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary agendas. First of all, it was clearly a socialist program, something that both evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democracy have in common. The Bern program claimed as its major goals the establishment of a “purely democratic state” and the collectivization of the means of production (p. 1). The program also contained a marxist style analysis that revolves around the nature of alienation, a labor based theory of value, as well as the nature of class dominance, and the reactionary character of the Swiss state, despite its liberal institutions.

However, the agenda lacked other defining elements of quasi-revolutionary social democracy – the revolutionary rhetoric, the references to class struggle, and to the inevitability of a fundamental political and socio-economic transformation. Instead of emphasizing the inevitable decline of capitalism, the Bern program suggested a concrete plan for how socialization was to be accomplished. The means of production were to be transferred into public ownership gradually, and only after an extensive process of evaluation and planning, to be conducted by a “commission for economic policy making”, whose members were to be chosen through a popular election (p. 3). Moreover, the Swiss expropriators were not just to be expropriated. The Bern program outlines specific guidelines, for how previous owners were to be compensated for their losses. In all these respects, the 1888 agenda of Swiss social democrats shares many similarities with the evolutionary socialist parties of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. In sum, therefore, the Bern program represented an ideological combination of quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic elements.

The ideological moderation of the party was accompanied by a practice of cooperation with the liberals, most importantly through the participation in cantonal governments in Bern and Geneva. Participation at the federal level was still out of reach at the time, due to the entrenched liberal dominance. The doctrinal question of cooperation with non-proletarian parties and participation in liberal governments that occupied the Second International, particularly after the socialist Alexandre Millerand entered the French government headed by the moderate liberal Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau in 1899, was initially of no particular concern for the Swiss social democrats. Their ideological moderation, codified through the 1888 Bern program, did not conflict with pragmatic practices – it supported them. The situation was different for purely quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties, all of which were engaged in similar pragmatic practices, to varying degrees, despite formal statements to the contrary. In these cases, the coexistence of pragmatic practices and a purely quasi-revolutionary party model represented an inherent logical contradiction that led to much internal friction.

It was in 1904, when the Second International, during its meeting in Amsterdam, officially sanctioned the already established ambivalent behavior of social democracy vis-à-vis the liberals. The congress
resolution declared participation in liberal governments and cooperation with non-proletarian parties undesirable, counterproductive, and antithetical to the goals of socialism, but it allowed socialist involvement in liberal governments for a limited period of time, in the case of "exceptional circumstances" during an "emergency situation".  

It was under the influence of this debate in the Second International that the Swiss social democrats adjusted their earlier consensus agenda, based on a compromise between marxism and evolutionary socialism, to a full blown quasi-revolutionary party program. The SP had already emerged with the organizational characteristics of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in 1888, but it was only through the adoption of the 1904 Aarau Program that the party was also moved firmly into the quasi-revolutionary camp with respect to its ideological model. After the involvement in liberal cantonal governments throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, the 1904 statement of Karl Moor about these experiences that reflects the 1904 decision of the Second International’s congress, can serve as a suitable illustration for the Swiss social democrats’ change of heart: “Whenever the Radicals are offering ministerial positions, their intention is only to turn us into docile pets.” The abstention of the majority of the Swiss delegation from the vote on the non-cooperation resolution at the Amsterdam congress shows, however, that opinions on this issue remained divided within the party, just as they were in most other member organizations of the Second International.

Around 1904, therefore, with the adoption of the Aarau program, the contradiction between pragmatic practices and revolutionary rhetoric that is typical for the quasi-revolutionary party type also began to apply to the Swiss party. In all other cases, with the exception only of France, the contradictions of the quasi-revolutionary model were a necessary price to pay in order to make the mobilization of workers through the infusion of hope and optimism possible in an illiber al or partially liberalized environment. But in Switzerland and France, this was not the case: in the context of a liberalized polity, both parties could have avoided the inherent contradictions of the quasi-revolutionary model by subscribing to ‘evolutionary’ socialism. In the context of a liberalized polity, the revolutionary rhetoric, the references to the inevitable capitalist decline, and the almost mythical emphasis on a better future, typical for quasi-revolutionary social democracy, were quite unnecessary. The tools of parliamentary politics were already in place, and the appeal to socialism as an end of the movement would have been enough of a ‘unique selling proposition’ and mechanism for social integration in the market of electoral competition.

The 1904 Aarau program, however, is an archetypical expression of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and like most other party agendas during the era of the Second International, clearly inspired

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205 See the resolution of the Amsterdam congress (Second International, 2004)
206 Karl Moor in 1904, cited by Degen (1993, 19)

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by the SPD’s 1891 Erfurt program. It contains a marxist analysis of social development and ‘bourgeois democracy’ in Switzerland, it is deterministic, emphasizes the class struggle, and contains a significantly more pronounced revolutionary rhetoric than the 1888 Bern program. It also reaffirms the desire to be more than an exclusively ‘political’ party – as the “standard bearer of a great cultural struggle” (p. 5). The demand for collectivization of the means of production as one of the elements of the party’s “declaration of principles” already figured prominently in the 1888 agenda. But other than in the Bern program, the more cautious provisions regarding owner compensation and the establishment of a committee to evaluate the feasibility of this collectivization agenda are nowhere to be found in the 1904 document.

The contradiction between quasi-revolutionary parties’ typical focus on the political struggle and the presence of liberal democratic institutions in Switzerland is elegantly circumvented in the program’s second section, the marxist analysis of Swiss society. Economic expropriation has not only caused material misery, but it also undermines the realization of formally existing political liberties for the majority of the working class: Switzerland remains a class dominated polity, because legislation and the actual implementation of constitutional guarantees are both undermined by the dominant position of the bourgeoisie. In response, Swiss social democrats demanded the establishment of a “purely democratic polity” and the “defense of liberal freedoms”. They argued that these values had been abandoned by the liberals, who initially carried the banner of liberty, and managed to codify these guarantees in the Swiss 1848 and 1876 constitutions. All the while, quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties that emerged in illiberal or partially liberalized polities struggled to wrestle even the most basic liberal achievements from both aristocratic and bourgeois dominated governments.

This formation of a quasi-revolutionary party in the context of higher inclusion is one of two distinct particularities of Swiss social democracy in terms of the interaction between degrees of inclusion and party formation, which it shares only with the French socialists. The second particularity is unique to the case of Switzerland. With respect to the first point, it is instructive to compare the Swiss and French examples of party formation to the cases of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. All of these cases represent examples of higher inclusion polities, for which the formation of evolutionary socialism would be predicted as the optimal response. However, in Switzerland and France, labor elites made suboptimal choices and embraced the quasi-revolutionary party model, while they made optimal choices in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. In all of these cases, however, different choices occurred not only in a comparable environment of inclusion, but also in the context of a growing radicalization of labor, for which a growing number of industrial struggles is indicative207.

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207 See Degen (1993) for the Swiss cases. For Australia and New Zealand, note the collapse of the conciliation committee in New Zealand and the maritime strikes in both countries. Note also the increasing number of strikes in Britain, France and Switzerland during this time period.
It is plausible that in such an environment, parties trying to appeal to labor would emphasize their uniqueness vis-à-vis their liberal competitors by humming a catchier tune and by radicalizing their agendas. This is exactly what the embrace of socialism and collectivization by the British Labour Party in 1918 sought to accomplish. However, other than in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, French and Swiss social democrats responded to a similar environment by making a suboptimal choice. Their ‘unique selling proposition’ and attempt to respond in an adequate fashion to a radicalization of their constituency was the embrace of a quasi-revolutionary party model, with its focus on class struggle, determinism, and its revolutionary vulgar marxist rhetoric.

This decision of Swiss and French social democrats cannot be explained by a reference to labor inclusion as the external constraint on labor elites’ choices alone. It requires an analysis into the effects of exogenous sources on labor elites’ decision making process. Out of the variety of factors that can contribute to move a particular outcome in terms of labor politics “off the equilibrium path”, the diffusion of external knowledge played an important role for the suboptimal choices in both cases, but much more so in Switzerland than in the case of France. In the French case, it was the unclear nature of the institutional environment and the particularly contentious political socialization of French labor elites that had a more important effect, while both these issues were of comparatively minor importance in Switzerland.

The consequence of the misfit between model of labor politics and the nature of labor inclusion was a significant undermobilization of the labor constituency in the two cases. Both in terms of membership levels and election results, Swiss and French socialists are obvious underperformers. Election returns for the Swiss and French socialists were the lowest of all social democratic parties, with the exception only of Argentina, where social democrats made their own form of suboptimal choice, at an average of 14.6 % in France and 18.5 % in Switzerland (see table 12). When the level of industrialization is controlled for, the underperformance of both parties becomes even more apparent (see table 13). The absolute and relative undermobilization in terms of party membership is not quite as apparent as it is with respect to election results for the case of France, but considering the French tradition of worker contentiousness, a much higher potential certainly existed (see table 15).

There is a second particularity of Swiss social democracy in terms of the interaction between party formation and degrees of inclusion, in addition to the first one just discussed. But with respect to this second point, other than the first, Switzerland is unique. It is the only case that is located just in between two adjacent levels of inclusion (see table 9). I argued previously that the critical juncture between higher and highest degrees of inclusion is marked by the behavior of competing parties, and the extent to which they succeed in incorporating the working class and labor elites, either as voters or as party members and cooperation partners. The institutional elements of varying degrees of inclusion (enfranchisement, political liberties, responsible government) are largely similar between higher and higher inclusion polities, both
categories represent either fully or nearly consolidated liberal democratic polities with highest degrees of inclusion on all institutional dimensions. Highest overall inclusion in the United States occurred on the basis of such an institutional environment, but on top of that, it also required the inclusive effect of an existing party system that was successful in mobilizing and incorporating labor, thereby preventing the formation of an independent social democratic party. Hence, social democracy was formed in New Zealand as an example for overall higher inclusion, not because the country was less democratic or institutionally liberalized than the United States (both cases share the same features on all institutional elements of degrees of inclusion, and also similar types of executive behavior), but because entrenched elites in the US were successful in incorporating labor, while they failed to do so in New Zealand.

The liberals in Switzerland, just like in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and France as other examples of overall higher inclusion, eventually failed to incorporate labor and prevent the formation of an independent party. However, within the group of higher inclusion cases, Swiss liberals came closer to an incorporation of labor than all the others. Lib-lab cooperation in the cases of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia was a temporary alliance that was favored by the liberals in order to establish or maintain electoral dominance in the era of growing enfranchisement. Nowhere, with the exception of the US, did an established party and labor cooperate as closely as they did in the case of Switzerland (cf. Thomson 1974). The failure of earlier party formation attempts in 1870 and 1880 is largely due to the inclusion of organized labor into the liberal movement, both electorally and organizationally. Even when social democracy established a lasting organizational vessel in 1888, this form of close cooperation would continue until well into the first two decades of the 20th century, when the eventual failure of lib-lab cooperation in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand had already become more than apparent. Swiss social democrats achieved ‘external institutionalization’ through the elections of 1902 and 1905 (see table 11), but a lasting party formation could have been prevented, if Swiss liberals had been able to continue their previously successful incorporation strategy.

One crucial institutional reform that was implemented in Switzerland in 1919 through a parliament dominated by the liberals contributed to undermining the inclusive capacity of Swiss liberalism – the change from a plurality to a Proportional Representation electoral system. This is a most crucial difference to the case of the US, where a plurality electoral system for legislative elections remained unchanged. As a consequence of that, the institutional environment and the negative effects of single member district plurality on the successful formation of new parties (cf. Duverger 1951, Cox 1997) favored the efforts of the existing parties to incorporate labor into the established party system in the US. In Switzerland, the change to PR functioned as an exclusionary mechanism, by undermining the ability of the liberals to incorporate labor and prevent a lasting establishment of social democracy. The continuing practice of a
plurality electoral system in the US functioned as an inclusive mechanism vis-à-vis labor, because it significantly raised the costs for labor leaders to engage in the formation of an independent party.

It is a widely assumed premise of election studies and analyses of electoral systems that Proportional Representation is more ‘inclusive’ than plurality, because plurality tends to prevent the translation of new social demands into an innovative party, whereas PR favors it.\(^208\) Holden (2006) makes this premise explicit in his discussion of the inclusive respectively exclusionary effects of various types of political institutions: he argues that plurality and majority rules impose limits on inclusion, and that PR is the most inclusive type of electoral system. The example of labor in the US shows that such an absolute claim cannot be sustained: here, plurality had an inclusive effect, because it favored the successful incorporation of labor into the existing party system.

The distinction between the extent of inclusive respectively exclusionary effects of various electoral systems, implicit in much of the literature on electoral institutions, and made explicit by Holden (2006), is also inadequate for a second reason: it looks only at the institutions themselves, and fails to take into account the behavior of actors within a given institutional environment. A comparison between the British case of party formation and the US case can serve to illustrate this point. The American plurality electoral system functioned as an inclusive mechanism. The same electoral system did not prevent party formation in the case of Britain. In order to explain this variation, it is necessary to look into causal factors beyond the institutional environment. Competing parties in Britain failed to successfully incorporate labor, while they succeeded in the US, although the same favorable institutional environment – an inclusive plurality electoral system – existed in both cases.

The French case is similar to the case of Switzerland, because in France, too, a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party emerged in an environment of higher inclusion. Within this general context, however, several important differences can be observed. First, although socialist elites in both cases made suboptimal decisions, the sources that informed these decisions were different. Second, while the overall degree of labor inclusion falls into the same category, Switzerland was more inclusive than France during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. Third, from a historical perspective beginning even before the formative stages of party formation, the case of France has seen a distinctly different pattern of political development that has not just affected the specifics of social democratic party formation, but intertwined with this aspect, the features of the overall left.\(^209\) Fourth, although the general outcome of party formation is similar across both cases, the actual historical process, through which a unified social democratic party was created in France in 1905 differed from the Swiss pattern of development. And

\(^{208}\) A process that Zuckerman (1975) refers to as the politicizing of a social cleavage.

\(^{209}\) See Bendix (1978) and Moore (1966) for a general interpretation of French state formation and political development.
related to that, while the nature of the dominant organizational and ideological model adopted was quasi-revolutionary in both cases, the French party emerged with a different set of specific features within this general context, most importantly with respect to the intensity of internal debates.

The suboptimal choice made by French socialist elites (point one) is closely related to the second point listed above, the configuration of degrees of inclusion. In Switzerland, highest degrees of inclusion on all institutional dimensions, as well as a predominantly neutral executive, were in place ever since the establishment of the 1848 constitution. This was long before labor began to enter the political arena in 1870, and more than that, only shortly after the beginning of Swiss labor organization in the economic realm. In France, on the other hand, when labor entered the political arena in 1879, the country was still under the influence of vicious repression in the aftermath of the 1871 Paris commune, and an according set of restrictive laws and regulations. After the authoritarian, in some respects proto-corporatist, rule of Louis Napoleon during the Second Empire from 1852 to 1870, and the dominance of conservative forces in the National Assembly after the defeat against Prussia and the collapse of the Empire in 1871, it was only through the constitutional laws of 1875 that the Third Republic was established as a liberal regime. The consolidation process of liberal democracy, however, lasted until well into the 1880s. Before that time, the fear of another Paris Commune sustained the continuous repression of revolutionary activists, socialists, and labor leaders.

This policy was pursued on the basis of laws from the Napoleonic era and the Second Empire as well as exceptional legislation implemented in the context of the 1871 revolutionary turmoil. The fundamental provisions of the Napoleonic laws of 1810 geared at the restriction of political liberties, namely freedom of assembly and freedom of press, remained in place until 1881. Trade unions in particular were only legalized in 1884. The exceptional laws against socialist agitation and assembly were abolished in 1879. In the meantime, during the second half of Louis Napoleon’s rule in the 1860s, the ‘Liberal Empire’, some of the restrictive Napoleonic regulations were relaxed in practice, but even during this time period, remained far from highest or even higher degrees of inclusion.

A higher degree of inclusion during the formative period of French social democracy in the domain of political liberties, compared to highest inclusion in Switzerland, is therefore not the result of continuously imposed mild restrictions. It is the result of temporarily vicious repression and severe restrictions until the mid 1880s, which then gave way to a full guarantee of political liberties and a change of executive behavior from repressive to neutral. Numerically speaking (see table 9), the overall score of 3 in the French case for the domain of political liberties, is the result of severe restrictions during the early period of party formation (score of 2) and highest inclusion (score of 4) thereafter. The behavior of the executive was overall predominantly neutral (score of 3), but this evaluation is derived from the time period after the mid 1880s.
Socialist elites in France, therefore, made their eventual choice about a model of labor politics at a point in time, in the early 1900s, when political liberties were fully guaranteed, the executive behaved neutrally, and overall, a consolidated liberal polity had been implemented. In this environment, a quasi-revolutionary party model is a suboptimal decision. However, these same elites had also been subject to the exclusionary policies and low degrees of inclusion that characterized the French case until the mid 1880s. The dispassionate observer with the benefit of hindsight is correct in coming to the conclusion that French socialist elites would have made an optimal choice, if they had adopted an ‘evolutionary’ socialist model in the context of higher inclusion. But French socialist elites at the time made a suboptimal decision, because they were still under the impression of the exclusionary and repressive measures that characterized the early years of the Third Republic.

In the case of France, therefore, the suboptimal choice of socialist elites to embrace quasi-revolutionary social democracy in an environment of higher inclusion is the result of an inaccurate evaluation of the existing environment. This was not the case in Switzerland, where higher inclusion had been in place continuously during the formative stage of party formation, and even long before that. The inadequate evaluation of the existing environment of inclusion by French socialist elites was therefore triggered by the volatility of this environment itself.

This dilemma for French socialist leaders was reinforced by the third feature distinguishing the cases of France and Switzerland listed above: In the case of French socialism and the French working class, referring to the formation of social democracy as the entrance of labor into the political arena is a bit of a misnomer. A wide variety of revolutionary movements and currents had existed in France throughout the late 18th century and thereafter, and socialist agitators as well as workers as a social group have contributed significantly to the revolutions of 1789, 1830, 1848, and especially the attempted revolution of 1871. Hence, in the case of France, but also in Britain, in a different context and through different manifestations, such as the non-revolutionary legalist Chartist movement, workers had already entered the political arena long before the second half of the 19th century. It would therefore be more precise to speak of the entry of organized labor into the arena of party politics: in this respect, labor’s path into the political arena in France, and Britain, toward the end of the 19th century, is indeed an original entrance rather than a re-entry.

In addition to the living experience of actual prosecution and repression during the Paris Commune and its aftermath, French organized labor and socialist elites were also molded by the historical memory of a pronounced pattern of revolution and counter-revolution, typical for the French model of political development.210 This background could only have strengthened the previously outlined perception of their

210 Hamilton (1967) observes the historical origins of worker radicalism in France, and how these orientations persisted over time, even after relative economic affluence changed the socio-economic environment, into which workers were born.
environment by socialist elites that is not based on an entirely rational evaluation of opportunity structures. The references of French socialists to a hostile environment and an unfriendly state are therefore much easier to comprehend than the critique of the native liberal institutions by Swiss social democrats. Their analysis of bourgeois society appears as more of a post-hoc rationalization for adopting a party model advocating the implementation of a liberal polity as a prerequisite for socialism, in the context of an already existing liberal polity.

What was just discussed, the variation regarding the underlying sources of suboptimal decision-making (point one), as well as the configuration and historical development of various elements of labor inclusion (points two and three), defines the variation in background condition in between the cases of France and Switzerland. In this context, French social democracy as well as the overall left emerged with somewhat unique characteristics, and as the result of a different historical process (point four).

Other than in Switzerland, where the electoral channel had been continuously available since 1848, the lack of electoral inclusion before 1875 in France has provided the basis for a strong anarcho-syndicalist movement. The anarcho-syndicalists dominated the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), from its foundation in 1895 until the early 1920s. The embrace of a particularly rigid and doctrinal extra-parliamentary course by the CGT represents a suboptimal decision of its own, given the existing environment of labor inclusion ever since the mid-1880s. It was the result of an earlier revolutionary pattern in French political development and the volatile nature of labor inclusion in the emerging Third Republic.

As a consequence, both the socialists oriented toward parliamentary involvement on the basis of a quasi-revolutionary agenda and the particularly anti-parliamentary French anarcho-syndicalists adopted more radical agendas than one would have predicted from an analysis of the existing environment of inclusion. Hence, the overall configuration of the French left shares a striking similarity with the situation in Italy, where an anarcho-syndicalist left rejected parliamentary involvement, and coexisted with a middle-class dominated quasi-revolutionary social democratic party. In both cases, moreover, the relative mobilization success of social democracy was much smaller than in most other cases, in terms of electoral support (see table 13) as well as party membership (see table 15), while anarcho-syndicalist movements in France and Italy were among the strongest of all industrialized societies at the time.

While the outcomes, both regarding the formation of a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party and the configuration of the overall left share some striking similarities between both cases, the underlying causal mechanisms are quite different. As we have seen before, the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in Italy was basically an optimal response to the existing environment of inclusion. In this context, Italian socialists only adopted a suboptimal variant of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic model. The PSI failed to respond adequately to the specific configuration of labor inclusion in Italy, which called for a more effective integration of extra-parliamentary activities into the agenda and the practices of
the party. This would have required an incorporation of extra-parliamentary tactics, as they were emphasized by the anarcho-syndicalists, into the ideological and organizational umbrella of the party. Syntheses of this kind have been successful in Belgium, Norway, and Sweden, but they failed in Italy and France.

In the case of Italy, the failure to do so occurred in the context of aggravating circumstances. Most importantly, in an environment of low overall inclusion and lowest electoral inclusion, it was the surprising electoral success of the party as the result of votes from liberal minded middle-class voters that made electoral participation seem more promising than it actually was for mobilizing labor and accomplishing policy goals. This and a few other circumstances can help to explain, why the PSI failed to embrace extra-parliamentary tactics more effectively, and why the Italian left emerged as fragmented between an extra-parliamentary anarcho-syndicalist current and an excessively electoral socialist party. These outcomes are the result of an existing environment of inclusion that was difficult to grasp.

In the case of France, we have seen that there were extenuating circumstances for labor leaders as well, but not to the same extent as in Italy. The formation of a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party was, other than in the case of Italy, a fundamentally suboptimal decision, in the context of a higher inclusion polity. The same applies to the choices made by anarcho-syndicalist unions. Their rejection of party politics and parliamentary involvement was even more intense than the position of their Italian counterparts. Anarcho-syndicalists in Italy, at least until their eventual defeat in 1907, remained organizationally involved in the PSI, while French anarcho-syndicalists were significantly more doctrinal in rejecting any involvement with parliamentary affairs and political parties.

Hence, the potential for cooperation between these two currents of the labor movement and the possibilities of some form of ideological synthesis or practical compromise were significantly higher in Italy than they were in France. This can serve to illustrate further the extent to which French socialist elites and labor leaders in general, failed to arrive at an adequate evaluation of their existing environment. It also shows that in the case of France in particular, an investigation into the sources of labor elites’ suboptimal decision-making is necessary. Despite significantly higher degrees of inclusion in the case of France, the actual labor movement, represented at the time by the anarcho-syndicalist CGT, and an electorally oriented socialist party dominated by middle-class professionals, were even further apart and much less likely to arrive at some form of synthesis than in the case of Italy.

This dilemma of French labor was not the result of an irreconcilable adversity of French workers to parliamentarism. Voss (1993) observed that the vast majority of CGT members were not anarcho-syndicalists, despite the dominant orientation of their organization. The CGT emerged out of a merger of the national trade union federation and the federation of labor councils, the “bourses du travail”. These were mutual aid societies and political organizations at the same time, similar in purpose and design to the
“chambres du travail”, which constituted the foundation of the Belgian, and in a similar fashion, the Swedish and Norwegian labor movement. However, in Belgium, Sweden, and Norway, an effective synthesis of labor councils with the parliamentary representation of labor emerged, while it failed in France and Italy.

There is an explanation for the suboptimal choices of French and Italian labor elites that contributed to this outcome, but the miscalculation in the case of France was much more pronounced than in the case of Italy. In the case of Italy, a significantly more repressive environment and a seemingly open electoral channel made a decision of socialist party leaders for a more of extra-parliamentary tactics difficult. In France, on the other hand, inclusion was higher in an institutionally liberalized polity. It is only the inadequate evaluation of the existing degrees of inclusion by French labor elites, as the consequence of earlier periods of heavy repression and a particularly pronounced revolutionary tradition, which can explain the suboptimal choices made by both the anarcho-syndicalists and socialist party leaders. While the PSI would have benefited from an infusion of anarcho-syndicalism into its ideology and practices in the exclusionary Italian environment, the French anarcho-syndicalists and socialists could have used a dose of realism.

Fragmentation and doctrinal conflict do not just characterize the situation of the overall left in the case of France. They are also defining features of the internal situation in the social democratic party that was founded in 1905, and the preceding path of party formation. After the suppression of political dissent through the Second Empire and in the aftermath of the Paris Commune, the first organizational manifestation of labor in the political arena occurred in 1879. The *Federation du parti des travailleurs socialistes de France* (FPTSF) was founded in Marseille on the initiative of Jules Guesde, the foremost proponent of vulgar marxism in France, who was, as noted before, even more schematic in his marxism than Kautsky himself. The FPTSP adopted a marxist agenda at its 1880 Congress in Rouen, but after the party came under the control of the more moderate ‘possibilists’ led by Paul Brousse in 1882, Guesde and his followers left, to form the *Parti Ouvrier* (PO), renamed *Parti Ouvrier Francais* (POF) in 1893.

A unified social democratic party, however, would only be accomplished with the foundation of the *Section Francaise de l’Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO) in 1905, which explicitly established French social democracy as a national section of the Second International. The entire formative period leading to this event is one of endless factional struggle and countless attempts at party formation. In addition to the marxists led by Guesde and Paul Lafargue and the possibilists led by Brousse, there were at least two more distinct and vocal factions: the more pragmatic *Parti socialiste francais*, led by Jean Jaurès, which merged with the possibilists in 1902, and the Blanquist faction, whose orientation combined a uniquely French tradition of republican insurrectionism with socialism.
The SFIO was established as an uneasy alliance of these currents at the Congress of Paris in 1905, on the basis of a vulgar marxist program, dictated by the dominant Guesdist faction. Over time, the more pragmatic and ideologically flexible Jean Jaurès would assume de facto leadership of the party, but this does not change the fact that the party was established on the basis of a quasi-revolutionary vulgar marxist agenda. Jaurès is often time referred to as a ‘reformist’ or ‘moderate’, which is meant to suggest a deviation from the reigning mainstream of the Second International. It is undeniable that Jaurès had a different agenda than the more doctrinal Guesde and Lafargue. But what applied in a similar fashion to the Italian PSI leader Turati, also applies to Jaurès. In the context of intense doctrinal struggle, both of these individuals were noted as more moderate or pragmatic politicians, because the differences within the quasi-revolutionary mainstream were so pronounced in these two cases. However, Jaurès accepted and supported the SFIO’s quasi-revolutionary agenda, while many truly ‘evolutionary’ socialists left the SFIO.

The electoral performance of the SFIO (see table 13) and the party’s membership (see table 15) remained clearly below the levels accomplished by the vast majority of social democratic parties elsewhere. This is yet another indicator for the suboptimal choices made during the party’s formative stage, and the fragmentation of labor into an anti-parliamentary anarcho-syndicalist faction and a parliamentary socialist party that failed to establish roots in the labor movement. The extent of the party’s failure to mobilize workers electorally would appear even larger, if we were able to calculate precisely the amount of electoral support the socialists gathered from other social groups. We have to rely on Lindemann’s (1983, 138) assessment that the SFIO received the majority of its support not from the industrial proletariat, but instead from a wide variety of other social groups, including most surprising sources, such as smallholder peasants. Hamilton (1967, 275) notes the tradition of agrarian radicalism in France as a possible explanation for this phenomenon. What made matters more difficult for the SFIO, regarding the mobilization of workers, in addition to the extreme abstentionism from the parliamentary arena preached by the CGT, was the proximity of much of the industrial proletariat to the liberal republican parties.

In this respect, the French case is quite similar to the example of Switzerland, where liberals were more successful in mobilizing workers for their cause than in any other higher inclusion polity. In Switzerland, this included both electoral and organizational inclusion: workers were not only regarded as a voting constituency, but the proximity between liberals and labor extended into institutionalized forms of cooperation between the liberal party and the organized labor movement. In the case of France, various liberal currents were as successful as in Switzerland, and more successful than in any other higher inclusion polity, to mobilize workers electorally, but no institutionalized organizational cooperation, comparable to Switzerland, ever occurred (see table 9). French organized labor remained in the extra-parliamentary offside, and French political parties, including the socialists, were massively dominated by privileged social groups.
CHAPTER 8

THE FORMATION OF EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Britain as the not so deviant case

Britain is often referred to as the deviant case of socialism – a reformist island in an ocean of turmoil, intransigence and revolutionary ambitions. This is not only an incorrect assessment empirically, but also one that clouds our theoretical understanding of social democratic party formation. True, British social democracy emerged on the basis of an ‘evolutionary socialist’ party model, while the majority of social democratic parties embraced a quasi-revolutionary orientation. However, far from being a unique feature of British social democrats, this also applies to the cases of New Zealand and Australia. As one of three examples of ‘evolutionary social democracy’, Britain is by no means an exception. Moreover, if one looks into the category of quasi-revolutionary social democracy with more attention to detail, there is not only much idiosyncratic variation, but, on top of that, one can detect the existence of two distinct variants of the general model.

Labeling Britain as a deviant case usually implies a perspective that quasi-revolutionary social democracy and revolutionary rhetoric are the norm in late 19th and early 20th century labor politics. According to this premise, a party that does not meet these expectations is regarded as something of a pathology, for which a unique set of symptoms must be held accountable. This obscures the fact that party formation in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia fits perfectly into the context of an encompassing explanation, as it is suggested here. The decisions of labor elites regarding party models in these cases are optimal responses to existing circumstances, just as the adoption of an insurrectionist approach in Russia, quasi-revolutionary social democracy in Germany and Belgium, or the decision for moderate syndicalism in the US were optimal in the sense in which the term is employed here.
There were only three examples of evolutionary socialist parties, not because labor elites in New Zealand, Australia, and Britain somehow strayed from the right path, but rather because the majority of polities at the time were characterized by low degrees of inclusion – with the formation of a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party as the optimal response to this environment. Moreover, in the other ‘higher inclusion’ polities of France, Switzerland, and Canada, the three remaining candidates for the adoption of ‘evolutionary socialism’, labor elites made suboptimal choices by favoring other models of labor politics. These three countries are the truly deviant cases, because they defy an explanation that relies exclusively on environmental variables.

The diffusion of evolutionary social democracy from Britain

Filing Britain as a deviant case can also lead to underestimating the effects that the diffusion of its ‘evolutionary socialist’ model has had on the formation of other social democratic parties, as well as the limits of this diffusion. The successful transport of the British party model to New Zealand and Australia are the most apparent examples. Knowledge diffusion in these two cases occurred during the colonial history of both countries, and also thereafter, when close bonds with Britain continued to be maintained. Immigration from the mother country and the creation of subsidiary labor organizations as direct transplantations from Britain were the practical transmission belts for the import of the British model of labor politics.

The creation of labor parties in New Zealand and Australia became a success story, because the degrees of inclusion in these two cases were most similar to those existing in Britain at the time. The indicators for mobilization success – electoral support and membership levels – identify Britain and New Zealand as adequate performers, and Australia as an overperformer (see tables 13 and 15). This observation also helps to reject an argument that is implicit in much of the literature on working class politics, and explicitly stated in the status system approach to social democratic party formation by Kautsky (2002) and Lipset (1983): From this perspective, radicalism is equated with mobilization success, and moderation with failure. Within the entire set of social democratic parties, however, no such correlation can be detected: The Australian party is the best electoral performer of all social democratic parties, and quasi-revolutionary parties can be found in all three categories, as overperformers, adequate performers, and underperformers. Mobilization success is not the result of more radicalism or higher class consciousness, two terms that are often used interchangeably – it is the result of devising a party model that responds in an optimal fashion to an existing environment of labor inclusion. In some cases, this involves a more radical rhetoric, in some a truly revolutionary, insurrectionist approach, and in other cases, the adoption of ‘evolutionary socialism’.
Canada would have been another logical candidate for the diffusion and adoption of the British model. Why then did Canadian labor elites follow a path of party system incorporation, although degrees of inclusion would have favored an adoption of the British ‘evolutionary socialist’ model? The analysis of the Canadian case later on is going to show that the British model had to compete with the eventually more pervasive diffusion of the US model of labor politics in Canada. The suboptimal decision of Canadian labor elites to follow a path of moderate syndicalism in an environment of higher inclusion was only rectified a few decades later, when the ‘Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF)’ was formed as an ‘evolutionary socialist’ party in 1932. In the cases of New Zealand and Australia, on the other hand, the British model remained largely unchallenged, with the exception only of few, much less significant factions: some continental European immigrants in New Zealand and Australia sought to advance anarchist and vulgar marxist agendas, other established labor elites favored continuing cooperation with the liberals. But they were no match against the sheer numbers and the persuasive power mustered by proponents of the British party model.

The existing limits to the diffusion of the British ‘evolutionary socialist’ party model can also be observed in the cases of France and Switzerland. As outlined before, socialist elites in these cases embraced quasi-revolutionary social democracy, although in the existing environment of inclusion, ‘evolutionary socialism’ would have been the optimal response. The diffusion of the British party model was largely unsuccessful, despite the similarity of degrees of inclusion in between these three cases. In the cases of France and Switzerland, ‘imported’ vulgar marxism, as well as ‘native’ revolutionary traditions in the case of France, were more pervasive.

In many other cases, elements of the British model were part of national debates about the preferable path for labor politics. This applies most importantly to the organizational features of the labor party as a political vehicle founded directly by the unions, and based on mediated union rather than direct individual membership. Similar models were discussed in all industrialized societies during the late 19th and early 20th century, even in the cases of Russia and Japan, the two least inclusive and therefore least suitable cases for this particular approach to labor politics. In the cases of Sweden, Norway, and Belgium, as outlined before, the unions had a more direct hand in party formation than they did in the other examples of quasi-revolutionary parties. This is clearly a consequence of the debates that have taken place in Britain ever since the defeat of the Chartist movement. However, despite direct union involvement, the emphasis of the Belgian, Swedish, and Norwegian parties on the political struggle, and the significantly more limited influence of the unions on party affairs are indicative of the limits of the British model’s appeal in these cases. After the completion of party formation stages, in the context of many revisionist challenges to the quasi-revolutionary party model, the British party also became an ideological model for the purveyors of revisionist attacks.
The nature of evolutionary social democracy

In the earlier elaboration on differences within the group of evolutionary social democratic parties, I distinguished between two important kinds of variation (see table 2). First, a distinction between the emergence of evolutionary social democratic parties as the initial outcome of labor’s entry into the political arena, i.e. the formation stage, on the one hand, and the transformation of parties from a different model toward evolutionary social democracy, on the other. Both these variants of evolutionary social democracy share common ground, but also expose some distinguishing characteristics, regarding the extent of union involvement, and the specific policy proposals suggested as the transmission belt to socialism. The second type of variation concerns individual parties’ varying degrees of emphasis on socialism as the ultimate goal, and the introduction of idiosyncratic elements into their ideological portfolio.

My focus here is on the formation of social democratic parties; and in this context, the social democratic parties of New Zealand, Australia, and Britain have, of course, emerged with the typical characteristics of evolutionary socialist parties from the formation stage. Organizationally, all of these examples of party formation were the result of the direct efforts of unions, which sought to create a representation for labor in the parliamentary arena, after earlier attempts at lib-lab cooperation had failed. As a consequence, ‘evolutionary socialism’ was much less concerned with the political struggle emphasized by quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. The agendas of evolutionary socialists also contained political demands and calls for institutional reforms, but their major focus was on the short term achievement of immediate material gains and the long term achievement of socialism for their constituency. For ‘evolutionary social democracy’, socialism did not require two stages of development, as it did for quasi-revolutionary social democrats in illiberal or partially liberalized polities – a first stage of liberal reforms culminating in the establishment of democracy, and a second stage of socio-economic transformation resulting in the establishment of socialism. The first stage had already been completed, or at least mostly completed, through earlier developments, in the institutionally liberalized polities of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia.

The British Labour party was subject to an eclectic variety of programmatic influences. With the exception of only a small faction of Marxists, all relevant ideological currents that contributed to the formation of the party are located firmly outside the insurrectionist and quasi-revolutionary camps. The eclectic underpinning of the party’s evolutionary socialism, however, should not conceal the fact that the party was based on a programmatic commitment, which fulfilled the same social-integrative function as vulgar Marxism did for quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. The demand for a nationalization of the means of production, codified in the famous Clause IV of the 1918 party statute, was initially thought
of as one programmatic element among others to emphasize the unique appeal of labor vis-à-vis its liberal competitors. Within only a short period of time, however, collectivization and the call for socialism became more than that. They developed into a mechanism for social integration within the party, different from vulgar marxism in terms of ideological complexity, level of abstraction and substance, but performing a similar function.

The formation of Labour as the model party of evolutionary social democracy

In the context of gradual industrialization and political liberalization throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Britain saw the rise of strong unions long before the foundation of a political party. Initially, unions didn’t see themselves as revolutionaries and not even necessarily as socialists. Until the end of the 19th century, they were not yet dominated by socialist forces, but remained more or less under the control of conservative or liberal oriented leaders. They sought to improve the living conditions of the working-class and for most of the 19th century intended to do so through union activities and the exercise of influence on the already existing conservative and liberal political parties. Along with gradual enfranchisement, liberal and conservative forces also sought to appeal to labor as a new electoral constituency. The Disraelian social policies can be regarded as another type of attempt, in a different domain, to incorporate the labor movement into the existing order.

Similar to the case of France, it is something of a misnomer to refer to the formative period of the Labour Party as the entry of labor into the political arena. Labor in Britain had already embraced politics, long before the end of the 19th century. The formative period of the Labor party, which began with the formation of the Independent Labor Party (ILP) in 1893, could therefore more precisely be referred to as the entry of organized labor into the arena of party politics as an independent actor. Before that point in time, labor’s initial embrace of politics occurred already in the 1830s, through the Chartist movement, and after the dissolution of the Chartists in the late 1840s, through a temporary incorporation into the existing party system.

In the 1830s, during a period of lowest electoral inclusion of labor, the Chartists’ single most important concern was universal suffrage. Their necessarily extra-parliamentary activities were geared almost exclusively at struggling for labor’s access to the parliamentary arena, from which it was excluded

211 cf. Fried (1991), 186
212 cf. Taylor (2000), 8-49
213 cf. Laybourn (2000), 1-22
at the time.\textsuperscript{215} The ‘People’s charter’ of 1838, formulated by William Lovett, as the defining document of the movement, contained six main demands, which were all political in nature – universal suffrage, the secret ballot, fair electoral districts, abolishment of property qualifications, annual general elections, and a salary for Members of Parliament.\textsuperscript{216}

At the same time, Chartism amounted to something of an embryonic socialist agenda, because many of the diverse factions associated with the movement embraced demands for socio-economic reforms in addition to political liberalization (cf. Thompson 1984, 1971). When the Chartists’ petitions to Parliament were rejected repeatedly, in 1839, 1842, and 1848, the movement started to phase out – as a consequence of its apparent failure to gain institutional reforms, and because of its internal fragmentation. The immediate enfranchisement demanded by the Chartists did not happen, but after the demise of the movement, the Reform Acts of 1867, 1884, and the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1918 mark the alternative path of gradual enfranchisement that has emerged as a typical feature of British political development.

In between the failure of Chartism and the entry of labor as an independent force into the arena of party politics in 1893, labor remained in politics, but during this period of time, concentrated its efforts on cooperating with the existing liberal and conservative parties. In order to understand the eventual outcome of party formation in Britain, the British case should therefore be contrasted to the United States. In the US, labor incorporation into the existing party system was eventually successful, while it failed in Britain. For this comparison, the period from 1893 to the early 1920s is crucial to understand the British pattern of development. It was during this time that a reevaluation of labor elites’ earlier affiliation with the existing parties, and later the successful formation of an independent labor party occurred. At the beginning of this period, party system incorporation of labor and preventing the formation of social democracy was still within the reach of established party elites. However, other than in the United States, where incorporation eventually proceeded successfully, liberal and other party elites in the case of Britain failed in creating an environment of highest inclusion.

In addition to the failure of traditional party elites in incorporating labor as successfully as their American counterparts, it was also the ability of the emerging Labour Party to synthesize its various constituencies and ideological currents into an encompassing organizational form and an appealing programmatic statement. In addition to the Chartist emphasis on electoral inclusion, mentioned above, and the utopian socialism of Robert Owen, Fabianism and the heritage of the ILP contributed most strongly to the eventual consolidation of the Labor Party as an ‘evolutionary socialist’ party.

\textsuperscript{215} cf. Fried (1992) pp. 187-188
\textsuperscript{216} The People’s Charter (1838)
Other than the earlier Chartism and Owenism, Fabianism emerged around the end of the 19th century. It exercised a significant influence on the labor movement of that period, and has remained influential until today, throughout the entire 20th century. Fabianism developed out of the debates and publications of the Fabian Society, an early socialist ‘think tank’ based on middle-class intellectuals, but by no means a political mass movement. Its agenda was idealtypically ‘evolutionary socialist’ – it regarded the capitalist state as an arrangement, which can be permeated and gradually transformed to socialism. This process has to be carried out through the extension of collective at the expense of individual control, be it at the community, the local, or the state level.

Fabianism deemed collectivization particularly important in terms of land and industrial capital, which ought to be emancipated from individual and class ownership and returned to the community by nationalization. These goals were to be obtained by parliamentary means or through local activities. Moreover, the Fabians rejected the notion of class struggle. They were neither in favor of a revolutionary rise of the working-class nor did they want a party based on a membership and electoral support cutting sharp across class divisions.

The ILP accepted the intellectual leadership and the ‘evolutionary socialist’ approach of the Fabians. But its constituency and practical outlook were somewhat different from the middle-class Fabian society. The ILP was firmly based on a working-class membership, dedicated to the advancement of labor’s political agenda in the context of an independent mass-based party. This placed them in opposition to the Fabians’ playing down of class divisions. In the context of introducing explicit class politics into the Labor Party, the ILP also added its own unique and strong insistence on altruism and brotherhood, nationally and internationally, to the programmatic and practical synthesis of the Labour Party.

At the end of the 19th century, however, this somewhat eclectic variety of ‘evolutionary socialist’ tendencies coexisted next to a still dominant perspective of partisan neutrality or even explicitly liberal and conservative orientations. The votes of the expanding working-class electorate were absorbed by the Conservative and, most importantly, the Liberal Party, both of which formed own workingmen clubs and incorporated demands for improving working-class living conditions into their agendas to appeal to the new electorate. Explicit lib-lab cooperation in the electoral arena was the most apparent manifestation of this arrangement.

Throughout the formative period of the Labour Party from 1893 to 1922, the contradictions between the traditional constituencies of the two existing parties and working-class demands became more and more evident. In practice, neither party did convincingly push for those social reforms that they advocated during

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217 cf. Fried (1992) pp. 389-402; also reference to comparative article on Fabians and German think tank on party development
218 cf. Laybourn (2000), 1-22
their election campaigns. Their appeal to workers therefore proved to be artificially constructed. In the long run, neither one of both parties was able to respond to and effectively represent the political demands of the working class. The founding of an independent political party of labor was the result of labor elites’ gradual realization that cooperation with the traditional parties eventually proved to be more and more worthless in order to realize the demands of their constituency. This conviction was most pronounced and widespread within the younger trade unions, which prior to 1900 associated with the ILP, while the more traditional unions were still attached to the Liberals and remained so until the beginning of WW I. 219

The decline of labor’s affiliation with the existing parties from 1893 to 1922 occurred in conjunction with various steps toward completing the formation of an independent social democratic party. After the first organizational manifestation of labor in the arena of party politics through the formation of the ILP in 1893, party formation proceeded through the incorporation of the ILP into the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900, together with the Fabians and some of the unions. 220 The institutionalization of Labour’s dominant organizational form occurred in two steps, first through the formal establishment of a unified party with an encompassing ambition in 1906, but it was only completed through the adoption of a party statute in 1918, which for the first time allowed for the possibility of individual membership in addition to automatic membership through the unions and other affiliated organizations.

It was at the same party congress in 1918, when Labour also embraced an ‘evolutionary socialist’ agenda through the provisions of its party statutes and its program “Labor and the new social order”. Party formation was complete with the achievement of ‘external institutionalization’ in 1922, which marks the second point in time for Labor to receive more than 10 % of the popular vote in a general election (cf. Figure 10). Beginning with the formation of the ILP in 1893, the failure of the existing party system to incorporate labor, and the success of labor elites to establish a solid organizational vessel and a programmatic agenda for social integration, became apparent and institutionalized only in the early 1920s.

The Labour Party that emerged out of the first stage of party formation in 1906 was already dominated by socialist leaders. But until 1918, its formal orientation essentially remained one of bread and butter politics, rather than explicitly socialist. It was only during its 1918 congress that the party rid itself from the liberal and conservative traditions acquired during the earlier period of party system incorporation, by adopting an explicitly socialist agenda. The indicator for the reshaped party with its new socialist agenda is the famous Clause IV of the new party constitution, which committed Labour to call for the public ownership of the means of production.

220 See Labour Representation Committee (1900) and Labour Representation Committee (1901-1905) for the original proceedings.
There is still some debate in the literature about the extent to which Clause IV was an honest expression of Labour’s socialist convictions. That hardly matters, however, because after only a short time period following on the 1918 program, Clause IV and the demand for collectivization would become widely embraced by the party and its activists. The ‘evolutionary socialism’ of the party, symbolized by Clause IV, would therefore fulfill a similar social integrative function as vulgar marxism did for quasi-revolutionary social democracy. The substantive content of these two programmatic statements is, of course, quite different, and so is the extent of social integration of the labor movement in the context of low inclusion polities. Although Clause IV had an integrating and a distinguishing function with respect to the world ‘outside’ the party, it did not alienate the British working-class from its political environment, which is exactly what happened in the case of Germany and other instances of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Here, the labor movement created an encompassing counter culture, opposed to and as a result of, the exclusion of labor in ‘low inclusion’ polities (cf. Rokkan 1964).

But in both cases, we can speak of a dominant social integrative ideology. In the case of Germany and other low inclusion polities, quasi-revolutionary orientations served the purpose of instilling hope, motivation and optimism for a political struggle in a hostile environment. In the case of Britain and the other examples of ‘evolutionary socialism’, the call for collectivization and socialism, symbolized by Clause IV in the British case, performed a similar function as a means to secure the cohesion and the distinctiveness of the party for their members and against their competitors. The adoption of socialism was dictated by the desire to establish a party platform, which was genuine enough to distinguish Labour from its competitors, particularly the Liberals. This was necessary for the identification of its members with the party as well as for providing reasons to vote for Labour. Clause IV also served as the most visible symbol of an integration ideology, because the way, in which it was worded, appealed to all the different branches, which had previously merged into the Labour party. Clause IV was worded in a way, which could unite many different approaches under its roof.221

Clause IV might have been an honest statement of socialism or not, it might have been regarded as a rather unimportant statement at the time it was made; and it might have been additionally favored by many other reasons mentioned in the literature, like the wartime experience or the perception of the Bolshevik experiment. However, all of these are issues of minor importance. What is most important is the role that Clause IV played in integrating the party and securing cohesion. Its social-integrative function is the reason, why Clause IV became so important for the party, and why, furthermore, it would remain so until the end of the 20th century.

221 See Seyd, Patrick (1987), 2
The social integrative function of socialism became most apparent, when Clause IV was challenged by revisionism. It took the Labour Party until the 1990s to abandon its commitment to the collectivization of the means of production, and even at that point in time, this occurred only after an intense internal debate. Earlier on, the revisionism of Crosland (1957) failed, and did not result into an adjustment of the party agenda, although his suggestions did not even amount to an abandonment of socialism. Crosland’s agenda was still firmly located in the ‘evolutionary socialist’ camp, he only wanted to replace the focus on nationalizing the means of production as a way to socialism, with an emphasis on redistribution and the extension of the welfare state. The ‘new revisionism’ of the 1990s that resulted in a successful revision of the party agenda and the abandonment of Clause IV, clearly left the camp of ‘evolutionary socialism’, by embracing a ‘reformist social democratic’ agenda.

The late failure of lib-lab cooperation in New Zealand

New Zealand is not only one of the two cases, besides Australia, where the British party model was most successfully implemented. It also shares a striking similarity to the British model in terms of the pattern of development, through which social democracy emerged. The establishment of an independent ‘evolutionary socialist’ party occurred after the eventual failure of an earlier stage of successful lib-lab cooperation between liberal politicians and labor leaders. If anything, this pattern of development is even more apparent in the case of New Zealand, because the stage of cooperation was more pronounced than in Britain, as was the eventual breakup of the lib-lab coalition. Moreover, the transfer of native arrangements from Britain is not only at the core of an explanation for labor politics, but, of course, even more fundamentally, the underpinning cause for the constitutional structuring of New Zealand, including the existing degree of inclusion vis-à-vis labor. Also in this respect, however, New Zealand had some unique characteristics, while at the same time, it belonged to the same overall category of inclusion as Britain did.

In terms of existing degrees of inclusion during the formative period of labor politics, both Britain and New Zealand have previously been characterized as instances of overall higher inclusion: institutionally liberalized polities, which are shy of highest inclusion, as in the United States, only because the existing party system was not able to incorporate labor in the long run. This similarity distinguishes Britain and New Zealand as largely similar manifestations of the same overall category of inclusion. But in one important respect, New Zealand was more inclusive than Britain – universal male suffrage was already granted in 1879, thereby creating an environment of highest electoral inclusion long before labor entered the political arena. An increase from higher to highest inclusion in Britain occurred only after the completion of party formation in 1919.
This difference in enfranchisement should be partially responsible for the somewhat closer lib-lab cooperation in the case of New Zealand. The encompassing enfranchisement of labor at a very early point in time made electoral inroads into this constituency even more promising for the liberals than it did in Britain. Moreover, other than in the case of Britain, where both Liberals and Conservatives attempted to appeal to labor, it was almost exclusively the liberal party that sought to include labor into its base of electoral support in New Zealand. Labor support was the key for liberal party elites to establish electoral dominance beginning with the first election of the “party period” in 1891.222

In return, the liberal governments under John Balance and Richard John Seddon, which were elected with the support of labor, had to make important concessions to their cooperation partners: first, labor politicians became part of the cabinet and the government bureaucracy; and second, in 1894, New Zealand became the first country to introduce a compulsory conciliation and arbitration system for labor disputes.223 Hence, other than in Britain, the era of lib-lab cooperation in New Zealand was not only one of temporary electoral coalitions and organizational inclusion, but it amounted to an early involvement of labor elites in government and the production of tangible far-reaching policies of labor protection.

After this initial establishment of a more encompassing lib-lab coalition, however, the process of estrangement and eventually divorce also occurred in New Zealand. Moreover, similar to Britain, the gradual dissolution of lib-lab cooperation in New Zealand proceeded in conjunction with the institutionalization of an independent ‘evolutionary socialist’ labor party. This organizational and ideological model adopted by labor elites in New Zealand is a logical and predictable consequence of the existing background of inclusion, or more specifically, the eventual failure of liberal elites to create an environment of highest inclusion. But at the same time, the historical process of party formation in New Zealand, as well as in Australia, cannot be adequately understood without tracing the channels, through which ‘evolutionary social democracy, initially developed in the context of British labor politics, was transplanted to these two cases.

The diffusion of the British influence in labor politics occurred through three distinct channels: first of all, immigration provided for the establishment of a labor force that had received its political socialization either directly or indirectly – as far as second and later generation laborers are concerned – from the British model of labor politics. Second, on this background of cultural and linguistic proximity, but also as a consequence of the material availability of the according literature, the labor movement in New Zealand and Australia continued to be exposed to British rather than ‘foreign’ influences. This is true for the vast majority of labor, with only few exceptions of militant activists, who imported marxist or anarchist

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222 See Mackie and Rose (1983) for the term “party period” and the absence of institutionalized parties before 1891.
223 See Olssen (1990) and Docherty (2004) for the emergence and the functioning of the conciliation and arbitration procedure.
traditions. Both these channels would continue to exercise a significant influence, long after the establishment of an overwhelmingly ‘native’ labor movement (cf. Olssen 1990).

Third, the most apparent transfer of organizational and ideological models of labor politics from Britain occurred during the formative period of labor in the arena of economic organization, but it also continued to shape the nature of labor politics in the long run. In New Zealand, when occupation based craft unions began to be formed in the 1840s, in the building trades (1842), by printers (1862), or tailors (1865), they were often founded as immediate subsidiaries of a British parent organization. The first national association moving beyond craft divisions at the occasion of the founding of the Trades Union Congress in 1885, was also modeled after the British example.

The defeat of labor during the 1890 maritime strikes and the repressive policy pursued by the executive did not result in an alienation of labor from politics. It strengthened the conviction held by the majority of labor elites that cooperation with the liberals could result in a reorientation of policies and an end to conservative dominance. The opportunities for this sort of cooperation were enhanced by the nature of social divisions in New Zealand at the time. Other than Australia, New Zealand came significantly closer to the nature of the English status system: politics and the economy until the defeat of the conservatives in 1891 were dominated by large land owners and sheep breeders (cf. Cole 1956). The lib-lab alliance against the dominant landed elite was one of workers and small property owners, not unlike the later red-green coalitions in Scandinavia.

Initial manifestations of labor in the political arena occurred already beginning in the late 1870s, but these were not directly linked to the later event of party formation. After the election of the plasterer S. P. Andrews to parliament in 1879, the Working Men’s Political Association, mostly concerned with the protection of workers against cheap ‘foreign’ labor, was founded. Beginning in the 1880s, Trades and Labour councils established ‘parliamentary’ and ‘political’ committees at national, regional, and local levels, designed as working groups to coordinate organized labor’s electoral and parliamentary activities. These ‘political’ activities of labor were still firmly entrenched in the context of lib-lab cooperation at the time, but throughout the early 1900s, they would become the nucleus of an independent party of labor, whose institutionalization was completed by 1922 (see table 11).

The time of closest lib-lab cooperation throughout the 1890s even culminated in the establishment of a formal Liberal-Labor federation in 1899. Around the same time, however, the first signs of trouble for the lib-lab alliance were already on the horizon, when by the end of the 19th century, the first labor candidates stood for election independently from the Liberals. The initial organizational manifestation of labor in the political arena directly linked to the later event of party formation was the foundation of the Socialist Party in 1900. This first occurrence of an independent party designed to appeal to labor, and organizationally separate from the liberals, came from the fringes of organized labor. At the time, the majority of labor elites
were still inclined to continue the traditional cooperation with the liberals. The Socialist Party was somewhat more radical than the rest of New Zealand labor at the time, and even the ‘evolutionary socialist’ agenda that social democracy in New Zealand was about to embrace. The Socialist Party later merged into a unified Labor party; and although it remained a splinter group during its entire brief period of existence, which did not emerge from the center of organized labor, it played an important part in the formation of the Labor Party and the dissolution of the lib-lab alliance, by setting an example as the first independent manifestation of labor in the arena of party politics.

The estrangement of the core and center of organized labor in New Zealand from its liberal cooperation partners started to manifest itself more clearly only a few years later. This process began to culminate in the formation of independent political structures, distinct from the liberals, with the formation of the ‘Political Labor League’ in 1904. The period from 1904 to the completion of ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’ in 1916 and 1918, respectively, was marked by various organizational permutations, splits, and mergers. The first one of these events, the formation of the ‘Labour Party’ in 1910, represents only a change of name, but a significant one, because for the first time, the explicit label ‘political party’ was applied to an arrangement that was previously only referred to as a ‘league’ for labor politics. The establishment of a lasting organizational model, however, was only accomplished through the 1916 re-foundation of the ‘Labour Party’ as a unifying force for all factions of labor in the political arena. In the meantime, the United Labour Party of 1912 had replaced the first Labour Party, and the Socialist Party of 1901 was merged with the United Labour Party to form the Social Democratic Party in 1913.

All these prior organizational efforts eventually provided the underpinning for the ‘new’ Labour Party formed in 1916. The various streams that flowed into the formation of the New Zealand Labor Party were as eclectic as they were in the case of Britain. However, in both cases, the influence of the unions was overwhelming, and the organizational features of the new party were the result of direct union involvement. Both “Labour” in Britain and in New Zealand were formed as a political vehicle of the unions, when they realized that the consensus and the benefits underpinning their earlier affiliation with the liberals had been used up. After the establishment of a lasting organizational form in 1916, it took two more years for the newly minted party to establish a dominant ideological model. The 1918 party declaration added the party firmly to the ‘evolutionary socialist’ column. It demanded the nationalization of the means of production and the establishment of socialism, but it professed to pursue this goal as an “advance towards socialism”, i.e. through evolutionary change rather than revolution.\(^{224}\)

The dissolution of the previous lib-lab coalition and the emergence of an independent party of labor became complete with the external institutionalization of the ‘Labour Party’ through the elections of 1919

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\(^{224}\) See the 1918 ‘party declaration’ (NZLP 1918)
and 1922. The coalition that had started in the 1880s as a common front of smallholders and workers against large property owners gradually depleted its reserves of common ground in the meantime. While labor turned toward the formation of its own party, the smallholders that had previously supported the liberals transferred their allegiances to independent conservative candidates, and after 1911, to the newly minted “Reform Party” that unified the center right forces.

The involvement of labor leaders in liberal governments and the implementation of the conciliation and arbitration system for labor disputes in 1894, a unique progressive measure at the time, were the two most apparent ways in which labor benefited from the arrangement with the Liberal party. The path toward the formation of an independent party of labor as a response to the estrangement from the liberals was also directly linked to the development of decision making in the context of the industrial conciliation and arbitration act.

The act provided for a system of dispute resolution that subjected both employers and labor to the judgments of councils established through the act. The right to strike remains guaranteed, but once a ruling was made, both parties had to abide by it, and on the part of labor, strikes in defiance of a previous ruling became illegal. At the time of its inception, the act was considered a milestone for the protection of workers’ interests by labor leaders, not just in New Zealand. It is obvious, however, that the benefits for labor under this institutional arrangement depend on the extent to which labor interests are represented in the governing bodies established by the act, which are in charge of making specific decisions. The arrangement worked well for less than a decade after its inception. Already beginning in the early 1900s, however, unions were gradually excluded from decision making, and the rural interests within the liberal party became increasingly concerned about labor militancy, disruptive behavior, and labor’s growing expectations: the coalition between industrial workers and property owners, and be they only smallholders, was reaching its limits. After 1912, with the change in government to the conservative Reform Party, the arbitration act, founded initially as a progressive instrument, started to be used as a tool of labor repression.

Exclusion of unions from decision making ensured employer friendly rulings, and strikes in opposition to such rulings would then become illegal and subject to dissolution. Unions that defied these rulings became ‘unregistered’, thereby legally powerless; and employers, with support from the executive, attempted to replace them with more docile ‘blackleg’ unions. Crushing the Waihi miners’ strike in 1912, and the dockworkers’ strike in 1913 are the two most visible manifestations of this shift in policy. They occurred in the context of the government’s general increase in weariness toward growing labor militancy and socialist tendencies.

The inability of the liberals to maintain a stable coalition under the inclusion of smallholder interests and labor that resulted in the more confrontational approach of the new conservative government is the logical underpinning for the following formation of an independent party of labor. In this context, the
formation of social democracy in New Zealand as an ‘evolutionary socialist’ party is the theoretically predicted response of labor elites to an environment of higher inclusion: New Zealand remained an institutionally liberalized polity, despite the less labor-friendly policies of the conservative government, which makes quasi-revolutionary social democracy a suboptimal response. But labor inclusion in New Zealand did not amount to the same extent of highest inclusion that could be found in the United States. The choice of an ‘evolutionary socialist’ model was an optimal response to the existing environment of inclusion – different from France and Switzerland, where labor elites responded in a suboptimal fashion to a similar background of higher inclusion by forming a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party – under the influence of ‘external knowledge’ in Switzerland, and the misperception of existing degrees of inclusion in France. Labor elites in New Zealand were not subject to the same distorting effects on their decision making process.

**Nationalism and evolutionary social democracy in Australia**

Out of all the three cases that saw the emergence of ‘evolutionary socialist’ parties, Australia is the example with the least pronounced and shortest period of lib-lab cooperation. In the colonies, it was limited to sporadic electoral alliances before the 1890s, and the efforts of labor to lobby individual officeholders through the parliamentary councils set up by the unions. But independent efforts of labor to support working class candidates occurred already in the 1870s, other than in New Zealand, where the majority of organized labor continued its cooperation with the liberals until the early 1900s. At the ‘federal’ level, in absence of self-governance before the establishment of an Australian federation in 1901, organized labor maintained its belief that the liberal dominated colonial ministries would accomplish gains for their constituency only until the violent defeat of the maritime strikes in 1890. Defeat in the arena of economic struggle resulted in the reification of labor’s turn to politics. As a consequence of this decision, which was only reinforced by the suppression of the 1890 strikes, the unions institutionalized their earlier presence in the political arena. “Labor Leagues” as independent proto-parties were formed in the colonies throughout the early 1890s, beginning with New South Wales and Queensland in 1890.

These two organizations represent the initial organizational manifestation of labor as an independent force in the political arena, directly linked to the later event of party formation. At that point in time, in 1908, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) would emerge as a typical representative of the organizational

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225 Cole (1956) assigns crucial importance to the 1890 strikes as well. He speaks of labor’s turn to politics, however, which is not entirely correct, since labor had already been involved in the political arena before. But the 1890 strikes certainly reified that initial tendency and also contributed, in the long run, to a strategical reorientation from moderate syndicalism to evolutionary social democracy.
features of the evolutionary socialist party model: as a party that emerged through the immediate efforts of the unions, and that functioned as a parliamentary vehicle of the unions, in order to continue the struggle for economic gains by political means. The comparatively early institutionalization of independent labor organizations in the political arena, and the limited success of lib-lab cooperation, distinguishes Australia from the case of New Zealand. In both cases, it was the failure of competing parties, and the liberals as the ‘natural’ cooperation partner of labor in particular, to establish highest degrees of inclusion that gave way to the formation of social democracy. But the extent of this failure was most pronounced in the Australian case, and as a consequence of that, lib-lab cooperation in Australia was significantly less pronounced than in New Zealand, and social democracy emerged in Australia at a much earlier point in time.

After the initial entry into the political arena as an independent force in the early 1890s, the institutionalization of a dominant organizational form at the federal level was completed in 1908 (New Zealand 1916, Britain 1918). With the establishment of federation in 1901, the earlier exclusively regionally organized ‘labor leagues’ formed the “Federal Parliamentary Labor Party”. But systemness through the establishment of a dominant organizational form occurred only after these two prior steps, with the formation of a truly ‘federal’ party, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), in 1908. Social integration through the establishment of a dominant ideological form occurred before the completion of systemness, in 1905 (New Zealand 1918, Britain 1918). At that point in time, the State Labor Parties’ conference, still a loosely organized federal association of regional parties, adopted the “Party objectives” and the “Fighting Platform” as an ‘evolutionary socialist’ agenda. This program would later on be incorporated as the programmatic foundation of the ALP. External institutionalization of Australian social democracy – through the elections of 1901 and 1903 – occurred even before the process of ‘internal’ institutionalization was completed. In Britain and New Zealand, it took until 1922 in both cases for ‘external institutionalization’ to occur.

The absence of self-governance and representative institutions at the federal level before 1901 represents a crucial contrast to the case of New Zealand that can help explain the limited extent of lib-lab cooperation in Australia, and the earlier formation of an independent party of labor. Representative institutions for all of New Zealand had already been established in 1852, while in Australia, self-governance was limited to the individual colonies before the formation of the federation in 1901. Before that, governance at the ‘federal’ level was exercised only through the British colonial ministries. Labor turned to the political arena – at that time, however, not yet as an independent actor of party politics – around the same time in both cases, beginning in the late 1870s and early 1880s. When this happened in New Zealand, representative institutions at the ‘national’ level already existed, and organized parties followed in the early 1890s. Lib-lab cooperation could therefore successfully be practiced at the ‘national’ level. When organized labor turned to politics in Australia, no such opportunity structure existed.
This made it significantly more difficult for liberals in Australia to accomplish highest degrees of inclusion, i.e. to create a stable coalition under the inclusion of labor. This is the causal mechanism responsible for the creation of an independent, ‘evolutionary socialist’, party of labor, that could also be observed in the cases of Britain and New Zealand. But it was even more apparent in the case of Australia, where lib-lab cooperation failed, before it had a chance to develop beyond the earliest stages of infancy. In addition to the absence of representative institutions at the ‘national’ level before 1901, it is also the nature of social divisions in Australia that made matters more difficult for the liberals. In this respect, too, a comparison with the case of New Zealand can serve as an illustration. I already argued earlier on, that New Zealand was home to a much more pronounced system of status differentials than Australia. Until the early 1890s, the political arena in New Zealand was dominated by the interests of large landowners and sheep breeders. No comparably entrenched, conservative-aristocratic force existed in Australia. In New Zealand, therefore, liberals were able to form an electoral coalition against these large landed interests, under the inclusion of smallholders and organized labor. No such common enemy, that was at least capable of sustaining a lib-lab coalition until the early 1900s in New Zealand, existed in Australia. Because of the absence of a traditional conservative opponent, liberalism in Australia only truly emerged as a movement with a common cause after the formation of the Australian Labor Party – as an anti-labor or anti-socialist rather than an anti-conservative or anti-aristocracy movement.

This comparison between New Zealand and Australia, and the formation of social democracy in the Australian environment, characterized by the absence of an aristocratic-conservative political force, serves as a crucial piece of evidence to reject the status system explanation for the formation of social democracy, suggested by Kautsky (2002) and Lipset (1983). According to the status system approach, social democracy emerges only in confrontation with native aristocratic-conservative forces. If this were the case, no Australian social democratic party should ever have emerged. But it has, and as a matter of fact, it has emerged as the single most electorally successful social democratic party (see table 13). In the aftermath of the party’s formative period, from 1908 to 1930, the ALP received an average election return of 46.3 %, more than 10 % ahead of the second most successful example, the Austrian social democrats, who received an average of 35.2 %, from 1907 to 1930. The ALP maintains its position as the most significant electoral overperformer, even when varying levels of industrialization are being controlled for (see table 14).

Hence, the presence of variation in conservative-aristocratic dominance across New Zealand and Australia rules out the nature of status systems as an explanation for the formation of social democracy. In both these cases, ‘evolutionary socialist’ social democracy emerged as a parliamentary vehicle of labor, in response to a context of higher inclusion, which in turn is the result of the liberals’ inability to incorporate labor into the existing party system. The two cases vary only in terms of the relative extent of liberal failure: in Australia, lib-lab cooperation was much less pronounced, and failed at a very early point in time,
due to the institutional differences and the variation in social status systems discussed above, while it extended to a temporary coalition in the case of New Zealand, as well as Britain, for that matter.

The slight but significant differences in political development between Australia and New Zealand, and the later formation of representative institutions at the ‘national’ level had another important effect. It exercised a considerable impact on the ideological model assumed by the Australian Labor Party. The “party objectives” and “fighting platform” adopted in 1905 as the foundation for the ALP’s ideological model contained a commitment to socialism and the nationalization of the means of production. This, along with the party’s emphasis on policy change through parliamentary involvement and a complete lack of revolutionary rhetoric, established the ALP firmly as a manifestation of the ‘evolutionary socialist’ ideological model.

However, other than in New Zealand, and also Britain, for that matter, the ALP was significantly more nationalist, and protectionist vis-à-vis the immigration of ‘foreign’ labor. Similar tendencies existed in the earliest period of labor politics in New Zealand as well, especially in the agenda of the 1879 Working Men’s Political Association, but they never arrived as prominently as they did in Australia in the eventually dominant party model. Australian labor’s nationalism was directed against the import of cheap competition from China, Japan, India, and elsewhere, but it also represented a means of distinction vis-à-vis the British colonial influence. The reason for why it became more characteristic of the ALP’s than the NZLP’s agenda lies in the absence of representative institutions at the national level in Australia before 1901. Organized labor in Australia was not just involved in a struggle of ‘domestic politics’ to achieve economic gains for its constituency. It was also part of the larger federationist movement, intent on advancing the case of national autonomy and self-governance, against the continuing colonial influence of Britain. This orientation was so much more pronounced in Australia, because, other than in New Zealand, where representative institutions for the entire country were already established in 1852, Australia only received self-governance at the ‘national’ level in 1901. Thus, the social integrative ideology established by the ALP was somewhat different from those other two ‘evolutionary socialist’ parties in Britain and New Zealand. All three belong to the ‘evolutionary socialist’ camp organizationally and ideologically, through their commitment to socialism and the nationalization of the means of production. But in addition to that, the ALP accomplished the social integration of its constituency by adding a significant dose of nationalism to its ‘evolutionary socialist’ agenda.

226 See the earlier discussions of methodology and cases selection in chapter 2 and chapter 5. The involvement of Australian labor in anti-colonial movement not as pronounced as in other cases, for example India. Australia as well as Norway and Hungary qualify as ‘internally’ sovereign polities. Nonetheless, the residual effect of colonial influence can certainly serve as an explanatory factor for idiosyncratic variation of social democracy in these cases.
CHAPTER 9

THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FORMATION AND
THE DECISION FOR MODERATE SYNDICALISM

Moderate syndicalism as an optimal choice in the American environment of highest inclusion

American exceptionalism?

In the following chapter, I am going to argue that the absence of social democratic party formation and the pursuit of an alternative strategy by American organized labor can be explained as the rational response of labor elites to an environment of highest labor inclusion. From a variety of possible options, one of which was the formation of a social democratic party, a ‘moderate syndicalist’ strategy of unionism, selective political interventions, and party system incorporation emerged as the dominant model of American organized labor’s entry into the political arena. To make this point, I will be analyzing the mechanisms through which highest inclusion was accomplished, and the strategic choices made by labor elites in response to the existing environment.

The American environment of highest inclusion is largely similar to the adjacent category of higher inclusion in terms of institutional channels, as in both cases, liberal democratic polities were in place. The crucial difference that distinguishes highest from only higher inclusion occurs in the behavioral domain of labor inclusion. It is the presence of successful efforts by entrenched elites to incorporate labor into the existing political system. Moderate syndicalism was initially the typical form of labor politics in the higher inclusion cases of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand as well, but in all these cases, the failure of entrenched elites to effectively incorporate labor led to the decision for an independent presence in the political arena. Socialism was only adopted later on as a fundamental objective, which then made these parties evolutionary social democratic in nature. In order to understand the lack of socialism as a widely
diffused ideology in the United States, it is therefore necessary to first account for the lack of any independent presence of labor in the political arena. If the successful formation of some independent party of labor had occurred in the United States, it is by no means self-evident that such a party would have embraced socialism. But without the first step of establishing labor as an independent force in the political arena, there are no political agents and no organizational infrastructure that could have diffused socialism as a social integrative ideology.

This research agenda, and the comparative context, in which it is embedded, should speak for themselves, but no account of this issue can get around establishing a link to the perennial discourse about American exceptionalism – a debate that revolves around the classic question posed by the German sociologist Werner Sombart in 1906: “Why is there no socialism in the United States?” There are many fine summaries and evaluations of contributions to this debate. For my purposes here, it is sufficient to pursue two forms of synopsis for the remainder of this section: I will explore the methodological, conceptual, and substantive implications of this debate, insofar as they can help to shed light on and distinguish my own research strategy, as well as the contributions that I hope to make with my approach and the substantive explanation it carries. In this context, and throughout the following empirical analysis, I will also present a broad but encompassing overview of the various prior explanations for the absence of socialism in the US, and I am going to outline, how the explanation suggested here relates to this earlier work. In the following second section of this case study, I will briefly summarize the role of industrialization and degrees of inclusion as the background to labor politics. After that, the specific interaction between inclusive efforts and labor elites’ responses will be analyzed for the crucial periods of labor’s entry into the political arena.

European ‘normality’ and the American ‘exception’

Probably the most important implication of the exceptionalism discourse is a common analytical premise underlying studies about the lack of socialism in the United States, which has also been criticized succinctly: the juxtaposition of the US case and ‘Europe’. ‘Europe’ as a hypothetical abstraction is ‘normal’, because socialism and ‘class warfare’ supposedly existed in abundance, while America is the exception from this norm, celebrated by some, lamented by others. The variety of outcomes and causal

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227 Before Sombart took up this issue, almost every leading theoretician of socialism tried to come up with an answer, including Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Trotsky, and Lenin. See Engels (1893) and his letter to Friedrich Sorge, December 2, “Why there is no large socialist party in America.” See Moore (1970) for a fascinating analysis of socialist intellectuals’ perception and evaluation of America. See also Marx and Engels (1848-1895), a collection of letters to Americans.

processes we have already observed for European and non-European cases has provided a sufficient amount of evidence to allow for the conclusion that a comparative ‘strategy’ of contrasting an American exception to an imagined European ‘norm’ is misleading, to say the least. Katznels (1997), Zolberg (1986) and Foner (1984) make an important point by calling for a truly comparative research strategy that moves beyond the almost mythical references to ‘European’ socialism and American defiance of socialism.

This entire dissertation responds to their programmatic demand, by presenting the only encompassing comparative assessment of social democratic party formation. The benefits of this approach are not limited to obtaining a better understanding of the American case, which is what Katznels (1997) and Foner (1984) have in mind. Including the United States into a comprehensive analysis of social democratic party formation also helps construct a better general theory. As I argued before, the most convincing comparative explanations for variation in models of labor politics are based on the consideration of institutional explanatory factors, such as Bartolini (2000) and Mikkelsen (2005). However, all of them consider European cases exclusively. By doing so, they miss the importance of non-institutional factors that contribute to varying degrees of inclusion. I have previously identified these non-institutional dimensions of labor inclusion as the behavior of competing parties in terms of mass inclusion, the organizational inclusion of labor elites through competing parties, and the behavior of the state executive.

The failure to account for the behavioral dimension of inclusion, most importantly the electoral and organizational inclusion of labor through ‘competing parties’, is a direct consequence of excluding the American case. For a comparison between the categories of low and higher inclusion, to which all European cases belong, the non-institutional dimensions are theoretically important, but they account for only minor differences in outcomes. Higher degrees of electoral inclusion through liberal parties in France and Switzerland, compared to the cases of New Zealand, Australia, and Britain (see table 9), can help explain the limited mobilization success of French and Swiss social democrats. Liberal attempts at organizational inclusion of labor elites in Norway and Sweden, during the most crucial stage of party formation, compared to the absence of such efforts for the majority of other cases in the low inclusion category, can help to contribute to an explanation for later social democratic dominance, which got off its feet through the coalitions of socialists and liberals in the 1920s and 1930s. The inclusion of labor through insurance programs as another behavioral manifestation of incorporation was actively pursued by the state executive in Germany. This attempt was not extensive enough to overcome labor’s discontent regarding its simultaneous political exclusion, but it foreshadowed later episodes of corporatist ‘state incorporation’ of labor.  

229 See the earlier discussion in chapter 2 and chapter 4, and Collier and Collier (1991)
These effects are noticeable, and theoretically important, but they are less visible vis-à-vis the overwhelming causal dominance of institutional factors for the explanation of party formation outcomes in the cases that have been discussed so far. The US case, on the other hand, can simply not be understood, if we limit ourselves to an analysis of the institutional differences that contribute to labor inclusion. It is precisely the behavior of entrenched political elites, or ‘competing parties’, above and beyond the institutional dimension, that can explain different outcomes in between the categories of higher (evolutionary socialism) and highest inclusion (moderate syndicalism). If we only look at the institutional foundations of labor inclusion, the United States are no different from Switzerland, New Zealand, or Australia, and only slightly different from France and Britain.

Thus, a truly comparative and encompassing, yet precise and rigid, approach does not only help to illuminate the nature of the American case as one example of labor politics among many others, rather than an exception to an imagined European ‘normality’. This is what made Katznelson (1997) and Foner (1984) emphasize the importance of embedding the US case into a comparative framework. But, maybe even more important than that, including the US case into a comparative analysis of social democratic party formation is a prerequisite for a good explanation: America is a litmus test for any general theory that proposes to account for the processes and outcomes of social democratic party formation.

Exceptional, unique, or anomalous?

In addition to the lack of an explicitly comparative consideration of the American case in previous studies, the exceptionalism debate also has a seldom noted semantic problem: What exactly is the meaning of ‘exceptional’? Does the term imply that the US is anomalous, in the sense that every systematic explanation has to include one sentence about how all that has been said is true for the entire world, Europe, industrialized societies, etc., while it does not apply to the United States? Or does ‘exceptional’ simply imply that the US is well within the boundaries of a systematic explanation, but just happens to be the only case falling into a specific category established by that theory?

Most of the contributions to the classic exceptionalism literature, beginning with Sombart (1906), could be construed as examples for the second meaning of the term. But their emphasis on the uniqueness of the American condition, and the laundry list of characteristics held accountable for American deviance, firmly place this research tradition in the first camp. Sombart, for instance, argues that the “normal” pattern of party formation links the degree of industrialization in a particular polity systematically to the strength of the labor movement and socialism. America deviates from this pattern, because it is

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230 In addition to Sombart (1906): Hartz (1955), Perlman (1928), and Lipset (1996)
characterized by a set of unique features, not to be found anywhere else: the individualistic and market affirming mentalities of the American worker, the civic and political integration of labor, the material rewards imparted on workingmen by capitalism, social mobility, and the open frontier in the West.

From this perspective, the difference of America does not just represent a particular, and maybe even unique, point on a continuum that can be grasped systematically; it does not represent an example of a category that falls well within the limits of a general theory – America is so different that it simply defies the kind of systematic explanations, which can be derived from and applied to other cases. It is not my job to discover the roots of this misconception, but I would dare to suggest that it has a lot to do with a desire of those, who originated it, to believe that America stands out from all other countries, either as the shining example of republicanism, pragmatism, and virtue, or, from a different angle, as the worst case of exploitative capitalism, and the devilish deceit of the working man. My forthcoming analysis will show that the understanding of the United States as an anomalous case defying systematic explanations cannot be upheld. We are going to see that the US fits perfectly into the systematic explanation for variation in models of labor politics suggested here – and not only that, it is the consideration of the American case that helps refine this explanation for the benefit of a better theory.

Now, given that we don’t understand the term ‘exceptional’ in the sense of anomalous, how exceptional is the US case? During the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena, in an all-encompassing set of 20 cases, quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties were formed in a total of 13 instances. Three of these parties can be identified as the ‘Belgian’ extra-parliamentary variant, and ten of them were identified as the parliamentary ‘German variant’. Three parties were formed on the basis of the ‘evolutionary socialist’ model of social democracy. And the remaining cases (United States, Canada, Russia, and Japan) are the four examples for the absence of social democracy as the outcome of labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. Hence, with respect to the question of social democratic party formation, the United States belongs to the same category as three other cases: not exceptional.

However, the causal mechanisms that have created this outcome and the alternative strategies pursued by labor elites are quite different across these cases. In Russia and Japan, the lack of successful party formation was the result of labor’s exclusion from the political arena; instead of social democracy, labor elites predominantly pursued an insurrectionist alternative. In the United States, it is the result of labor’s complete incorporation into the existing party system. Instead of creating an independent political formation, labor elites pursued a ‘moderate syndicalist’ strategy of unionism, selective political

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231 Not suprisingly, the latter perspective is often articulated by socialist and other radical thinkers. I have, of course, exaggerated my point here: some of the consensus historians that hold the American ethos of liberalism accountable for the absence of socialism, for example Hartz (1955), regret the confining effects of this ethos, but they would, of course, not use the overly drastic language that I am paraphrasing here.

232 See table 11 for the following discussion.
interventions, and party system incorporation. Canada as the last remaining case from this group does clearly not belong to the same category as Japan and Russia – we have previously identified Canada as a representative of higher inclusion. But at the same time, it does not belong to the ‘highest inclusion’ category either, which is represented by the US case. Canada, as we will argue in the following chapter, should have seen the formation of an evolutionary socialist party, akin to the cases of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. It did not, because ‘external knowledge’, more specifically the import of the US model of labor politics, prompted Canadian labor elites to pursue a suboptimal strategy of party system incorporation, when an evolutionary socialist party would have been the ‘optimal’ response to the existing environment of inclusion.

Thus, the US case is one out of four cases characterized by the lack of party formation, and it is one out of two cases, where labor elites pursued a path of moderate syndicalism. But it is the only case with a highest degree of inclusion, where moderate syndicalism occurred as the optimal response to such an environment. In this specific way, the US is truly exceptional, not as an anomalous case, but as the only representative in a general category that results from a systematic and encompassing theory.

‘Class consciousness’ and social democratic party formation

In addition to the lack of a comparative perspective, and the problematic use of the term exceptional, the study of American labor politics is also plagued by two interrelated problems of logic and conceptualization: an insufficient specification of the dependent variable (socialism as a social and ideological syndrome, party formation, socialist class consciousness?), and circular arguments about the relation between collective worker identities, often times referred to as class consciousness, and party formation.

With respect to the first issue, the inadequate specification of explanatory interest, part of the problem might result from the broadness of the ‘exceptionalism’ theme. Many authors are not just interested in the domain of presumed US deviance in the areas of socialism and labor politics; exceptionalism is understood and approached as a far more encompassing overall syndrome that extends into all areas of American politics and society. This is most apparent in the work of Lipset (1996, 26): to him, the absence of socialism is only one element of a larger expression of American exceptionalism.

“This country is an outlier. It is the most religious, optimistic, patriotic, rights-oriented, and individualistic. With respect to crime, it still has the highest rates; with respect to incarceration, it has the most people locked up in jail; with respect to litigiousness, it has the most lawyers per

233 Shafer (1999) for example investigates American exceptionalism in a wide variety of domains, he discusses the methodological and conceptual implications of exceptionalism, and looks at exceptionalism from a psychological perspective as a heuristic of people’s self understanding and self projection
capita of any country in the world, with high tort and malpractice rates. It also has close to the lowest percentage of the eligible electorate voting, but the highest rate of participation in voluntary organizations. The country remains the wealthiest in real income terms, the most productive as reflected in worker output, the highest in proportions of people who graduate from or enroll in higher education (post-grade 12) and in postgraduate work (post-grade 16). It is the leader in upward mobility into professional and other high-status and elite occupations, close to the top in terms of commitment to work rather than leisure, but the least egalitarian among developed nations with respect to income distribution, at the bottom as a provider of welfare benefits, the lowest in savings, and the least taxed.

It is no small wonder that there are specification problems with respect to the explanatory goal, on the basis of such a broad perspective. But the same issue also plagues many of the contributions with a more narrow focus on the exceptional nature of America in terms of socialism and labor politics. The classic exceptionalism literature, ranging from Sombart (1906), over Commons (1935), Perlman (1928), and Hartz (1955) to Lipset (1996), treats socialism as a broad syndrome that requires the ideological dominance of socialist thought in the working class, the organization of class through a socialist party, and the existence of strongly felt class affiliations, commonly referred to as class consciousness. This is a very high threshold that might not even be crossed by what classic exceptionalism imagines as the typical ‘European’ working class. But this approach is even more problematic for a different reason: it does not delineate, how these various elements of ‘socialism’ are related to one another, and which causal factors from the exceptionalists’ laundry list are to be held responsible for which specific aspect of the socialist syndrome. Foner (1984) has alerted us to this problem of specification, particularly with respect to the inextricable link between ‘class consciousness’ and ‘social democratic party formation’, implicit in the classic exceptionalism contributions.

Wilentz (1984) juxtaposes this classic exceptionalism literature, also commonly referred to as the ‘consensus explanation’, to the ‘new social history’ approach that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The ‘consensus explanation’ posits that the unique American condition, defined among other things by overwhelmingly individualistic and republican values, the absence of feudal structures, the self image of workers as citizens rather than outsiders to the political system, has stifled the emergence of class consciousness. Without class consciousness, then, the formation of a socialist party is impossible. The ‘new social history’ approach on the other hand makes every effort to show, and often does so very convincingly, that collective identities and action on the basis of class divisions have occurred in the US just as much as anywhere else in industrializing societies. The failure of party formation, then, is not due to the lack of class consciousness, which existed in abundance, but the result of either the deficiencies of labor elites, or the consequence of external intervention by entrenched elites, who infused a sense of ‘false consciousness’ into the American working class: through the satisfaction of minimal demands to prevent calls for more, or

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234 See Zolberg (1986) for a discussion.
the ‘infection’ of American workers with non-economic identification patterns, to prevent nationwide collective action on a class basis.

Despite the differences between these two approaches with respect to their diagnosis of US workers’ collective identities and their explanation for the lack of party formation that results from this assessment, both of them share what Wilentz (1984, 2-3) has identified as an “essentialist” assumption: “Simply put, both versions of the exceptionalism argument assume that a powerful working-class socialist movement – a political species that American historians usually presume existed in nineteenth- and twentieth century Britain, France, and Germany – is the *sine qua non* of true class consciousness.”

Wilentz thus criticizes the way in which the classical exceptionalism literature simply takes for granted the premise that the existence of socialist parties proves the existence of class consciousness in the proletariat. But, maybe even more importantly, it should also be acknowledged that the classic exceptionalists’ treatment of class consciousness and party formation, as it is portrayed and rejected by Wilentz (1984), is standing on its head, and needs to be turned back on its feet. While Wilentz criticizes the way in which the presence or absence of a socialist party is used as an indicator for the absence or presence of class consciousness, the same type of criticism also applies to the opposite causal direction, which figures prominently in the classic exceptionalism literature as well: Writers like Sombart and Lipset operate on the implicit and not substantiated assumption that class consciousness is a prerequisite for socialist party formation. The inadequate specification of the dependent variable thus results into the formulation of a faulty circular argument: ‘The US has not had a class conscious proletariat, and therefore no socialist party, which is also the empirical evidence that proves the absence of class consciousness’ (!)

I have already argued before that the strength of class identities held by wage laborers is not causally related to the outcome of party formation. The organizational and ideological model of labor politics that emerged as dominant in a particular polity is a result of labor elites’ decisions made in response to the external environment of labor inclusion. The numerical strength of labor, the nature of its collective identities, most importantly the extent to which laborers see themselves as an economic formation, and the influence of non-economic features on the nature of the collective (Katznelson 1986), are important factors to help account for the extent of labor’s mobilization success, but they are not directly related to the specific organizational model chosen for the transfer of labor’s demands into the political arena. The establishment of a social democratic party is not the automatic outflow of a labor movement that yearns for socialism. In the cases of Australia, New Zealand, and Britain, socialism only became entrenched as a fundamental objective after labor stepped into the political arena as an independent political formation, following on many years of moderate syndicalism.

To put it simply, using the US case as an illustration – if class consciousness is indeed lower, as the ‘consensus historians’ argue, or, if it is indeed broken more strongly by non-economic factors than in other
countries, then this situation might make it more difficult to mobilize laborers on the basis of their socio-economic communalities, regardless of how this mobilization takes place. This would affect the mobilization strength of an independent political party of labor just as much as it would affect the mobilization of labor in the context of a moderate syndicalist strategy. Which kind of strategy emerges as dominant, and consequently, why the strategy of social democratic party formation did not emerge as the dominant alternative, is a question entirely unrelated to the extent of class consciousness and the success of any given mobilization strategy.

The treatment of ‘class consciousness’ in the exceptionalism literature

Before moving on to another implication of the existing exceptionalism literature, it is in order to elaborate more extensively on the prior treatment of class consciousness and thereby to provide further underpinning for the proposition I just made regarding the delineation of causal processes. I have argued that class consciousness, along with other cleavage dimensions, and their interaction with one another, is causally related to the extent of labor’s mobilization success, independent of the particular model chosen for labor’s entry into the political arena. This responds to Katznelson’s (1986) more sophisticated conception of class formation, which also allows us to consider the emergence of specifically national working classes in their own right, with their own characteristics.

My way of delineating the categories of class consciousness and party formation thus implies that class consciousness as an analytical category is only of secondary importance, when it comes to explaining variation in party formation outcomes. The issues I wish to address now can provide additional justification for my strategy of dealing with the theme of class consciousness. Moreover, the following discussion will also highlight some of the most important earlier attempts at explaining the absence of social democratic party formation. In most basic terms, I would argue that class consciousness is not only a secondary factor for the explanation of party formation outcomes, while it is, along with other cleavage dimensions, crucial for explaining the mobilization success of labor – in addition to that, the prominent role, illustrated above, class consciousness has assumed in much of the exceptionalism literature, has clouded the path to an adequate understanding of labor politics more than it has helped.

In the first place, the often implicit understanding in the classic exceptionalism literature of what it requires for an individual or a group of workers to be class conscious is misleading, to say the least. Thompson (1963) in his classic study of the English working class conceives of class consciousness as a set of shared experiences in the factory and community, which provide the underpinning for group identification, and the desire to act collectively on the basis of that identity. From this perspective, class is one of many potential cleavage dimensions that trigger individuals to act as a group in the political realm.
Thompson’s definition could easily be transferred to a definition of religious, ethnic, linguistic or other group identities that have historically been important for the formation of political parties and the political mobilization of groups and individuals. Through logical extension, this understanding of class can also be applied to the efforts of political elites interested in mobilizing groups by invoking their socio-economic characteristics.

On the basis of this understanding of class consciousness, and combined with the sensitivity for comparative assessments suggested by Katznelson (1996) and Zolberg (1986), it would be entirely reasonable to argue that the formation of a social democratic party or, for that matter, any party that seeks to appeal to laborers on the basis of socio-economic characteristics, requires class consciousness. In the same way, other instances of electoral mobilization can be understood: christian democratic parties required elites that were able to appeal to the religious identities in the electorate, and an electorate that responded to these appeals, because religion was an important element of their identity configuration; linguistic parties in Flanders and Wallonia appeal to the electorate on the basis of their geographical and cultural affiliations, and so on.

The problem of the classic exceptionalism literature, and of the second ‘essentialist’ branch in the study of US labor politics (the ‘new social history’ approach), is the fact that this is not the kind of definition these authors have in mind, when they use the term class consciousness. What they have in mind is not just collective identity born in the workplace and/ or the community, and collective action on the basis of some socio-economic dividing line: it is the full assault of a homogenous army of laborers on their entrenched and powerful enemies, the capitalists and the aristocracy. The assessment of the contemporary observer E.L. Godkin, then editor of “The Nation”, in 1867, illustrates this mental image very well.

“There (in Europe, KV) the workingmen on a strike is not simply a laborer who wants more wages: he is a member of a distinct order in society, engaged in a sort of legal war with the other orders … His employer is not simply a capitalist in whose profits he is seeking a larger share: he is the member of a hostile class, which … it is considered mean or traitorous for him to hope to enter. This feeling, we need hardly say, does not exist in America.”

This description is quite different from a neutral definition of class consciousness, as it is suggested by Thompson. Where Thompson requires collective identity as the result of shared experiences, and collective action, this approach requires a specific kind of identity and specific forms of collective action (hostility, social isolation, and class warfare). Unfortunately, the classic exceptionalism literature, at least implicitly, subscribes to this exaggerated version of class consciousness. By doing so, a threshold for ‘class consciousness’ is established that extends far above the one that underpins the majority of scholarly contributions to the history and politics of the labor movement elsewhere.

The inadequacy of this approach becomes even clearer, when the prerequisites for the exaggerated version of class consciousness are compared to the requirements commonly established for other, non-
economic, cleavages contributing to electoral mobilization. The same authors that stamp the label ‘not class conscious’ on the American working class place a lot of emphasis on the importance of ethnic and religious dividing lines for the political mobilization of workers, and the effect of this form of mobilization on undermining the salience of socio-economic cleavages. Logically, the same high threshold that is used for the diagnosis of class consciousness should also be applied to the mobilization efforts along other, non-economic, cleavage dimensions. But it isn’t: group identification or ‘consciousness’ and the mobilization of catholics, natives, immigrants, evangelical protestants, etc., can occur without the conduct of nationwide religious or ethnic ‘warfare’ as the functional equivalent of ‘class warfare’. There is no reason to expect socio-economic identifications and collective action to result in class warfare, as a prerequisite for coming to the conclusion that the American working class is class conscious, while the salience of religious and ethnocultural affiliations for political mobilization is readily diagnosed without the presence of an equivalent nationwide religious or ethnic ‘warfare’.

Therefore, on the basis of Thompson’s neutral understanding of class consciousness, there is no reason to conclude that the dominant strategy of American labor, characterized by unionism, selective political interventions, and party system incorporation, lacked class consciousness. The strategy of the AFL leadership, for instance, as the core of the dominant ‘moderate syndicalist’ model that emerged in the US during the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena, mobilized laborers on the basis of their socio-economic position for collective action, both in terms of activities around the workplace and in terms of specific political interventions. True, the AFL engaged in political activities to a lesser extent than other alternative models of labor politics had suggested; the demarcation lines of who exactly the AFL tried to mobilize primarily, from within the group of wage laborers (skilled workers) were relatively narrow; and the specific organizational model of the AFL and the majority of its affiliated unions (craft based) reflected this preference. Rather than representing deviations from a ‘European norm’ of class consciousness, however, these features represent elements of the specific type of class consciousness that emerged as dominant in the United States. 235 However, these characteristics do not change the fact that the strategy the federation implemented was one of collective action on the basis of collective identities, rooted in shared experiences in the workplace and the community. This is precisely the standard definition of class consciousness suggested by Thompson.

Secondly, even without this fine distinction between different conceptions of class consciousness, the ‘new social history’ has provided ample evidence for the presence of collective identification and action by the working-class that extends beyond the more narrow conception of labor politics pursued by the AFL

235 This point could be regarded as a response to Zolberg (1986) and Katznelson (1986), who call for identifying the nature of American labor’s class consciousness, rather than distinguishing a priori between different degrees of class consciousness.
national leadership. Especially its city and state federations engaged themselves more strongly in the political arena and pursued a less cautious approach than their parent organization. Stromquist (1996) observed this for the case of Cleveland, and similar studies exist for a variety of other locales. A related branch of studies focuses on the activities of unaffiliated workers, and finds that there is no reason to conclude that the American working class was not characterized by class conscious behavior (even on the basis of the above noted ‘exaggerated’ understanding of the term).

At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that American organized and unorganized labor, class conscious or not, did not choose to form a permanent independent party. The authors that operate on the basis of the premise that American labor did expose ‘class consciousness’, therefore come to the conclusion that a specific feature of American labor history is the divergence between workplace militancy and the lack of equally militant and permanently independent political activity.\textsuperscript{236} This division hints at the way in which I have previously delineated the respective causal processes that can account for the emergence of a dominant model of labor politics on the one hand and the mobilization success of any such model on the other. Regardless of whether the diagnosis is ‘class consciousness present’ or not, the division between the workplace and the political domain is undeniable. And that is precisely the ground on which a historical institutionalist analysis, extended through a consideration of the behavior of ‘competing parties’ or entrenched political elites, must stand. Finally, all that being said, the previous discussion should, above all else, have clarified that the causal argument ‘lack of class consciousness causes absence of party formation’ cannot be sustained.

Another way, in which the issue of ‘class consciousness’ is integrated into an explanation for the lack of social democratic party formation, is suggested by Dawley (1976). He writes from the perspective of the ‘new social history’ and studies labor activities in the shoemaking town of Lynn, Massachusetts. He argues that the egalitarian rhetoric of earlier republicanism was transformed into a class conscious political agenda by the end of the 19th century. However, the early establishment of democratic institutions prevented the further growth of this identification and acted as the “nail in the coffin of class consciousness”. This perspective, linking democratic institutions to the absence (or decay) of class consciousness, which in turn explains the lack of social democratic party formation, is also an important element of the comparative analyses pursued by Kautsky (2002) and Lipset (1983).

There is some validity to this argument, but it is too simplistic and too imprecise. The effects of democratic institutions are definitely important for the inclusion of labor, but there is no reason for why they should be expected to undermine class consciousness. What democratic institutions in the US did, was

\textsuperscript{236} See Wilentz (1984), Wilentz (1985), and Wilentz (1989). See also Voss (1993) with a slightly different twist on this argument, to be discussed in more detail later on.
to provide the necessary condition for the inclusive behavior of established elites toward labor, but they did not determine that behavior to occur. The analytical category ‘class consciousness’ is entirely unnecessary for considering the effects of democratic institutions on the lack of party formation.

First of all, democratic institutions were in no way unique to the United States during the entry of organized labor into the political arena. The “free gift” of the suffrage (along with other prerequisites of – white, male – democracy) was handed to the worker during this time period not just in the United States, but also in Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand, and with some minor qualifications, in Britain, Canada, and France. Contributions from the classic exceptionalism perspective commonly contrast the absence of class consciousness in America to its presence everywhere else. Since democratic institutions existed during the emergence of organized labor in many other instances, this simply cannot be the reason for why class consciousness supposedly failed to emerge or decayed in the United States. And furthermore, the existence of democratic institutions in all these places did not prevent the formation of a social democratic party. Studying democratic institutions as the condition for inclusive behavior by entrenched elites is not enough to account for the divergence between the United States on the one hand, and the remaining democratic cases on the other hand: the behavior itself that occurred on the basis of the democratic institutional condition has to be studied.

A closely related treatment of ‘class consciousness’ figures prominently in the ‘status system’ explanation for the absence or presence of social democracy. Hartz (1955) and Burnham (1974) argued that the lack of party formation in the United States is the consequence of the post-feudal nature of American society: The lack of an aristocratic elite resulted in the absence of class consciousness in the proletariat (because class consciousness supposedly only develops in response to a rigid status system dominated by the aristocracy); and without class consciousness, no social democratic party formation was possible. This is precisely the argument that Lipset (1983) and Kautsky (2002) have extended into a comprehensive theory of social democratic party formation.

I already argued before that there is no reason to expect class consciousness in the exaggerated variant used by these and other contributions from the classic exceptionalism literature to be a necessary condition for the formation of a social democratic party. But in addition to that, a simple comparative assessment will provide enough evidence to discard the causal connection established by these accounts between the presence of an entrenched aristocracy and the formation of social democratic parties. We have seen that in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands, where liberal forces were dominant, social democratic parties emerged in response to a repressive bourgeoisie. This relation is even more obvious for the cases of Australia and Switzerland, but also Canada after the 1920s, where status systems were even less ‘aristocratic’ than in those two instances. In all of these cases, social democratic parties emerged without the presence of an entrenched aristocracy. On the other hand, status systems were extremely rigid in Japan
and Russia. According to the argument suggested by Hartz, Burnham, Lipset, and Kautsky, this is the most fertile ground for social democratic party formation. Alas, neither Japan nor Russia has seen the successful emergence of a social democratic party.

Toward a comparative, positive, and historical analysis of American labor politics

Up to this point, I have discussed several shortcomings and implications of the classic exceptionalism literature: first, the lack of a truly comparative perspective and the juxtaposition of the American case as the exception to an imagined European norm; second, the meaning of the term ‘exceptional’; third, the inadequate specification of the dependent variable, the circular arguments about party formation and class consciousness resulting from this inadequacy, and the misleading treatment of class consciousness in general. I have also attempted to outline, how my approach to the question of social democratic party formation and the explanation that it carries, respond to these issues. At this point, there are two additional implications I would like to discuss,

First, because of the nature of the question asked by Sombart and all the following generations of scholars interested in American labor politics (“Why is there no socialism in the United States?”), the emphasis of these studies is on the absence of something (socialism), rather than the presence of something else (a distinct strategy of American organized labor that emerged as dominant). I would argue that in order to understand the absence of social democratic party formation, an investigation of US labor politics needs to pay keen attention to the way in which, positively, a particular dominant strategy emerged that responded to the existing American environment.

Nelson (1997) makes an important point, when he alerts us to the exaggerated emphasis of American labor history on the AFL, and the agenda of Samuel Gompers. He argues that many of the affiliates of the AFL – national unions, but also city and state federations – pursued a somewhat different approach than Gompers and the national leadership, often times more militant, more political, more open for industrial over craft organization, and more welcoming toward unskilled workers. This is an astute observation, but his conclusion is misleading. He argues that a study of elite behavior and leadership effects is unnecessary, and should be replaced by a stronger emphasis on the conditions, in which organized labor emerged and operated.

I would argue that the failure of previous works to account systematically for elite behavior beyond Gompers and the national leadership of the AFL should not result in dismissing the role of labor elites altogether. But it should open our eyes to the fact that what we refer to here as the US model of labor politics, which emerged as dominant during labor’s entry into the political arena, is not confined to the specific strategy pursued by the AFL leadership and Gompers. Their approach is, of course, an important
element of the overall model that emerged as dominant, but a sufficient portrayal of this model requires consideration of the entire ensemble of actors representing the American ‘moderate syndicalist’ strategy, and how it differs from the strategic recommendations made by those that advocated a socialist party, a communist party, a labor party, or farmer-labor parties as the preferable model of labor’s presence in the political arena. The emergence of a dominant model that is characterized by unionism, selective political interventions, and party system incorporation has to be analyzed as the historical outcome of a struggle between different alternatives, in response to a given environment of labor inclusion.

The explanation suggested here helps not only to explain the absence of social democratic party formation in favor of an alternative strategy. It explains why organized labor has not entered the political arena as an independent party altogether. The British example illustrates the possibility of an independent party of labor without a socialist agenda. As outlined before, at the point of its initial formation, in 1906, the Labour Party operated on the basis of a reformist agenda, without demands for the nationalization of the means of production, which, at the time, was the epitome of a socialist program. It was only in 1918 that socialism, codified through the famous Clause IV, emerged as the dominant agenda and the crucial mechanism for social integration.

Explanations for the lack of social democratic party formation in the United States therefore need to distinguish between the mechanisms of party formation on the one hand and the embrace of a particular ideological model on the other. This is one of the foundations, on which the account pursued here, and the according delineation of causal mechanisms, is based. The forces that prevented the formation of a social democratic party, therefore, are the same forces that prevented any independent party of labor. Furthermore, studying the absence of socialism rather than the presence of something else also clouds our understanding of how exactly the non-formation of a social democratic party in the US can be identified. Consider the data about social democratic party formation displayed in table 11: In the cases of Japan and Canada, party formation was unsuccessful, because neither one of the three requirements for successful party formation was met: the attempts at party formation in these cases failed to accomplish first, ‘systemness’, through the establishment of a dominant organizational model; second, ‘social integration’, through the establishment of a dominant ideological model; as well as third, ‘external institutionalization’. In Russia, party formation failed, because of the lack of ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’, while the Menshevik involvement in the revolution of 1905 and the 1917 February Revolution should be considered successful ‘external institutionalization’.

In the United States, after various attempts at establishing a social democratic party ever since the formation of the ‘Social Party’ in 1868, the Socialist Party of America emerged as an ‘internally institutionalized’ party on the basis of the organizational and ideological model implemented in 1901. The party had permanent communication between the leadership and the periphery, an active and committed
rank and file of activists, and a regular budgetary process, which are the prerequisites for ‘systemness’ outlined earlier on. In addition to that, despite much factional conflict, the ‘evolutionary socialist’ Indianapolis program of 1901, emerged as the dominant ideological model of the party that functioned as a device of social integration, at least until the early 1920s, when the communist split occurred.

Hence, in both these respects, American social democracy was significantly more advanced and much more firmly established than its Russian, Japanese, and Canadian counterparts. The factor that is to be held accountable for the lack of permanent and successful party formation in the United States is the failure to establish ‘external institutionalization’ through long term electoral representation. The average electoral support for socialist parties in presidential elections between 1892 and 1930 (table 13) amounted to 2.2% of the electorate. The Socialist Party of America never obtained more than 10% in at least two consecutive elections, which was established previously as the minimum threshold that needs to be passed to consider any given attempt at party formation ‘externally institutionalized’.

Second and lastly, Wilentz (1984), Foner (1984) and others criticized the lack of historical perspective in the study of American exceptionalism. The American ethos, the dominance of liberalism and republicanism, are often treated as eternal and never changing truisms rather than potentially important causal factors that are bound to specific historical environments, occurring through the behavior of actual agents. I agree with their assessment: *a study of US labor politics needs to consider the historical development of industrialization, institutional environments, the behavior of entrenched elites, and the strategical recommendations and actions of labor elites*. This is why the remainder of this case study is dedicated to an analysis of the interaction between institutional conditions and the behavior of entrenched elites on the one hand with the responses of labor elites on the other, throughout the historical evolution of the American polity. But before engaging in this over time analysis, a brief assessment of the role of industrialization and the institutional dimensions of inclusion as the background to labor’s entry into the political arena will be outlined in the following section.

**Industrialization and democratic institutions as the background to highest labor inclusion**

American industrialization

The inclusive behavior of entrenched political elites toward labor occurred in the United States on the background of industrialization and a liberal polity with democratic institutions. In the context of my argument, industrialization and the establishment of the market principle are treated as the *sine qua non* of social democracy. At the same time, industrialization and the specific characteristics it has assumed in the context of different national polities are not causally related to the outcome studied here: the particular
dominant model, through which labor entered the political arena. This outcome is the result of the activities of labor elites, in response to a polity-specific degree of inclusion, constituted by various institutional and behavioral dimensions.

Before analyzing the way in which inclusion took place in America, and how labor elites responded to it, during different historical eras, it is in order to briefly illustrate this background. Industrialization created a ‘window of opportunity’ for the emergence of independent political action of labor. The emphasis in defining the onset of industrialization and the opening of that window is linked to the political decisions that made the release of industrialization and the dominance of the market principle possible. In the case of Germany, for example, large scale industrialization was enabled through the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic reforms of 1805-1819, and the establishment of a ‘national’ market through the Zollverein (Customs Union) of 1833. In the case of Russia, the possibility of industrialization on a large scale is marked by the emancipation of the serfs in 1861.

In both these cases, and all other instances, too, the possibility of industrialization is, of course, not equivalent to the actual process itself. German industrialization only took off in the second half of the nineteenth century, and in Russia, even later than that. In the case of the United States, the gap between the political-institutional underpinnings for industrialization and the actual process itself was even wider. The legal underpinnings pertaining to the market principle, the protection of private property, the freedom of commerce and labor, and other prerequisites for industrialization, had already been present during the colonial period, when they were, of course, broken by the predominance of states and colonial dependency on Great Britain. The establishment of the legal-institutional basis for industrialization is therefore marked by the replacement of the Articles of Confederation through the Constitution of 1787 and the enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1789.

The actual process of industrialization, however, and the eventual emergence of the market principle and manufacturing as the dominant operating standard for the political economy of the entire country only occurred in the post Civil War period. Students of American industrialization commonly identify the end of Southern reconstruction and the ‘compromise of 1877’ that elevated the Republican Rutherford Hayes to the presidency, as the turning point, at which the dominance of industrialization, manufacturing, and the market principle irrevocably manifested themselves. Before that point in time, manufacturing and industrialization were confined almost exclusively to the Northeast (cf. Meyer 2003). Rural interests as well as the ‘producerist’ and state rights’ impulses of Jacksonian democracy prevented the emergence of a

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237 See Cameron (1993) for a summary of the conventional wisdom on different national patterns of industrialization. See Teich and Porter (1996) for an edited volume on national variation in industrialization across Europe and the US.
nationwide coalition for industrialization and development. After 1877, the federal government was finally in a position to advance an activist strategy of industrialization.

Regional patterns and an uneven balance in the geographical distribution of industrial operations continued after that point in time, with the manufacturing belt spanning the Northeast and parts of the Midwest, pockets of mining operations and railroads in the West, and emerging industrial centers on the Pacific coast. The year 1877 does not stand for the extension of actual industrial operations to the entire country. It marks the irrevocable dominance of industrial interests, manufacturing, and the market principle for the political economy of the United States, while rural interests were relegated to sectional dominance in the South and partly the West, without being able to influence policies at the national level (cf. Bensel 2000).

The pattern and tempo of American industrialization is often compared to that of Germany. The problems of identifying and comparing differences in speed and character of industrialization that we have discussed earlier on left aside: even if we accept this conclusion, it does, of course, only apply to the rate of industrial growth, the onset of industrialization, etc., but not to the political environment, in which the process occurred. The greatest ‘spurs’ in industrial development in the US are indeed, initially, the 1840s to 1860s, and then, on a larger scale, the late 19th century, similar to the German pattern of development (cf. Meyer 2003). Even though the nature of state involvement was qualitatively different, both cases have seen the active pursuit of industrialization by an activist state. However, other than in Germany, industrial development in the United States occurred in the context of a democratic polity. The similarities in economic development, compared to the entirely different set of outcomes regarding the adopted models of labor politics, provide further evidence for the limited predictive power of socio-economic explanations (cf. Bull 1922, Galenson 1952) for variation in labor politics.

Benson (2000) has alerted us to the problem of industrialization in the context of democratic institutions. Barrington Moore (1966) and others have shown that industrialization is usually the project of a small minority, against the desires of the overwhelming majority of people in pre-industrial societies. The pro-industrialization elites can pursue their project in illiberal societies, because the absence of democratic institutions shields them from the effects of public opinion. It makes them immune (at least to some extent) from anti-industrialization sentiment, and the demands for a share in the wealth acquired through manufacturing. In democratic societies, by contrast, the existence of effective channels for citizens to influence economic policy making should prevent industrialization and economic development. Benson (2000) argues that the way in which the Republican party, in between 1877 and 1900, engineered an

238 See for example Shefter (1986) and Bensel (2000)
electoral coalition that included groups otherwise critical of industrialism, made the unlikely outcome of development in the context of democratic institutions possible.

There are different propositions about the roots of late 19th century American industrialization in the first half of the 19th century. Meyer (2003) contrasts the two major explanations: first, industrialization in the United States emerged from the impoverishment of agriculture, which forces rural inhabitants to move to the cities and accept employment as factory workers; second, prosperous agriculture and manufacturing benefit each other in the process of economic development. Regardless of which one of these accounts we follow, it is clear that the emerging dominance of the market principle has its roots in the first half of the 19th century, and gradually asserted its dominance over older republican – Jeffersonian agricultural, and egalitarian ‘producerist’ – traditions during this time period. Jacksonian democracy has not only originated the mechanisms of party competition that would later on provide the tools used by the Republican party to build a coalition for enabling industrial development after 1877. It also marks the period, during which, as Sellers (1991) and Watson (2006) argue, the market principle, as one of the underpinnings of later large scale industrialization, gradually emerged as dominant.

The social inclusion explanation for the lack of social democratic party formation in the United States is rooted in a specific account for the nature of industrialization. As another variant of a socio-economic approach, the argument about the effects of social inclusion on the features of the American working-class, does not so much focus on the roots of American industrialism and the qualitative features of industrialization. The social inclusion approach, suggested most prominently by Perlman (1928), emphasizes the results of industrialization as a causal underpinning for the absence of social democracy. At the most basic level, its proponents argue that industrialization in America has produced a level of economic well-being for industrial labor that is without match in any of the other industrializing societies. The less pronounced degree of economic deprivation caused American workers to not develop class consciousness and demands for socialism.

I discussed the problematic treatment of class consciousness in the American exceptionalism literature, to which the social inclusion approach belongs, in the previous section. In chapter 2, I also discussed the inadequacy of the social inclusion approach as a general explanation for social democratic party formation and as a specific account for the US case, from a conceptual and theoretical perspective. A comprehensive empirical analysis that would correlate varying levels of economic deprivation across the cases studied here to outcomes of party formation is unfortunately not possible, given the lack of adequate data. Such an analysis could show, whether American workers truly were in such a comfortable position, compared to the other cases. However, there is a full repository of more eclectic empirical evidence to

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239 Meyer (2003) himself argues against the conventional wisdom and favors the second explanation.
refute the claims of the social inclusion approach. A great number of case studies on the socio-economic characteristics of leaders, party members and the rank and file of social democracy come to the conclusion that there is no single determinate relation between the level of economic deprivation and the likelihood of embracing a radical socialist agenda. Even more than that, the vast majority of empirical evidence hints at a causal relationship that is exactly the reverse of what the social inclusion approach would expect: workers are more prone to embrace socialism in an environment of relative affluence. This explains the composition of socialist parties during the formative stage studied here, which derived the majority of their activists from the significantly better off sections of the industrial proletariat. And from a related perspective, it can also explain the continuing adherence to socialism in the context of increasing affluence. Hamilton (1967, 7) makes this point most succinctly:

“(…) (E)conomic development may, given certain kinds of social organization, be correlated with an increase in radical demands rather than with satiety. If this is true, we need not be surprised that the political left in some countries has maintained its strength or even grown in the face of increasing affluence. What relationship does exist between deprivation and radicalism, we argue, will depend on underlying group pressures which may both provide a frame of reference and activate or channel grievances that would otherwise remain latent, without any political significance. In general, our findings support this assumption.”

The rise of labor and the nature of labor inclusion

Turning our attention back to the roots rather than the effects of industrialization again, the rise of organized labor, in response to the regional patterns and stages of development discussed above, is not all that different from the developments in other industrializing societies. What is usually referred to by scholars of English and continental European industrialization as the ‘first’ labor movement is a collective of artisan-workers, who were strongly affected by the economic and status consequences of the market principle and automatization. Their programmatic response to these developments remained strongly linked to liberalism, and ‘producerist’ principles, pitting the ‘productive’ forces in society against the financiers and industrial employers. A similar development occurred in the United States during the first half of the 19th century. The ‘first’ American labor movement was geographically limited to the Northeast, and somewhat different in orientation, compared to its counterparts in Britain and continental Europe: it was more strongly embedded in similar ‘producerist’ agendas of small farmers as well as the more encompassing rhetoric for states’ rights against the efforts of manufacturing elites to use the federal government as a tool to protect emerging corporations and to fund ‘internal improvements’ for the benefit of industrial development.

240 See for example Kocka (1983), Wehler (1979), Thompson (1963), Abendroth (1972)
Organized labor during this time period was largely local in nature, and it took until the late 1860s, before it emerged as a nationwide force. At that point in time, the formation of large corporations, the efforts of the Republican party to pursue a strategy of economic development, and the concomitant large scale immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, also changed the nature of the labor movement, its composition, demands, and the roots for its discontent. While industrial workers and factory production became dominant, the earlier tradition of artisan ‘producerism’ and the coalitions, within which it emerged, continued to exercise an influence in the ‘second labor movement’ that was greater than in the cases of Britain and Germany.

It is often times argued by exceptionalism scholars, and commonly accepted by their critics, that American workers received the ‘free gift of the suffrage’, that they were born into an institutionally liberal and democratic polity. While this is without doubt true for the ‘second labor movement’, and even the majority of the ‘first labor movement’, it is not true for the initial manifestations of organized labor in the early 1800s. The institutional ‘Jacksonian’ reforms implemented universal, male and white, suffrage for local, state, and federal elections throughout the 1820s. The peculiar regulation in Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of the Constitution delegates the authority for electoral legislation to the states and Congress. However, during this time period, it was largely the states that executed this formal authority. States’ institutional reforms are therefore not only important for the political conflicts within states, but also for electoral politics at the federal level.

The institutional reforms of the 1820s that extended voting rights and political participation in general to the entire male and white population cannot be understood without considering the pressure exercised by the emergence of organized labor and workingmen parties. These initial manifestations of labor in the political arena, at least inasmuch as they appealed to non-properties workers, faced only a partially liberalized polity, similar to the situation encountered by the English Chartists in the 1840s and by the ‘second labor movement’ in all those European cases that were previously identified as examples of low inclusion. The crucial difference to the United States is, of course, that democratic reforms were implemented in response to these demands, thereby establishing the institutional background for a pattern of highest inclusion vis-à-vis labor, ever since the late 1820s, long before organized labor emerged as a nationwide force.

However, the fact that institutional liberalization is in part a response to the initial manifestations of organized labor in the 1820s, alerts us to the importance of studying the development of labor inclusion from a long term historical perspective. The particular temporal focus of my case studies is on what I have previously introduced as the ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena. I also qualified this term, when I argued that in many cases, where industrialization occurred at an early stage, labor had already been engaged in politics long before the time period that I consider here the ‘formative stage’. In
those cases, for example France and Britain before the late 1870s or early 1890s, respectively, it would be more appropriate to speak of the formative stage of labor politics as the entry of nationally organized labor into the arena of party politics. The same is true for the United States: what I consider the ‘formative stage’ here is the time period from the first attempt at social democratic party formation in 1868 until the early 1920s, which marks the end of the historical period studied in this dissertation. However, just as in Britain and France, labor had already entered politics long before this ‘formative period’. This is even more apparent in the case of the United States, where the first workingmen parties emerged in the 1820s and 1830s. However, at this stage, labor was not yet a nationwide organized force. That is a new development from the second half of the 19th century.

At the same time, however, the inclusion of labor in the US cannot be understood without attention to the time before a more narrowly understood ‘formative period’. Before labor entered the political arena as a nationwide force beginning in the 1870s, earlier historical stages had already seen inclusive efforts by entrenched political elites toward labor. The study of inclusion during the ‘formative’ stage needs to be accompanied by an analysis of earlier periods. The most fundamental conclusion emerging from this sort of historical analysis is the acknowledgement that labor inclusion in the United States, on the basis of liberal democratic institutions, occurred through different mechanisms at different stages of American political development, before, during, and after a more narrowly understood ‘formative stage’. It will be one of the central elements of my following over time analysis to shed light on these mechanisms, and the way in which institutional background and different strategies pursued by entrenched elites led to the political inclusion of labor, and as a consequence of that, the lack of social democratic party formation and the pursuit of moderate syndicalism as an alternative.

The actual inclusion of labor through entrenched political elites, previously referred to as ‘competing parties’, occurred on the background of an institutionally liberal polity. The elements of this institutional background have been outlined for the United States and all other cases in the previous chapter. There we have seen that the United States was one of several cases, in addition to Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia, where during the entire ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena, inclusion was highest on all formal-institutional dimensions: Workers enjoyed full enfranchisement, through universal male suffrage, and the guaranteed effectiveness of the vote; political liberties through the freedoms of expression and association, were guaranteed; and the principle of responsible government was practiced. The particular American outcome characterized by the absence of a social democratic party, or, for that matter, any independent party of labor, and the pursuit of an alternative strategy is therefore not the result of simply institutional differences, or economic development patterns. It is the result of the inclusive behavior of entrenched political elites – ‘competing parties’ – on top of a predominantly neutral state executive throughout various stages in the process of political and economic development.
Stages, actors, and mechanisms of labor inclusion

Shefter (1978) noted that on the basis of a democratic institutional background, American political development is characterized by varying patterns in the interaction of institutions – legislatures, parties, presidency, executive agencies – and the dominance of one set of institutions over others at various stages of development. The ascendance and establishment of legislative and party dominance from the 1820s to the late 1890s was followed by the strengthening of the executive branch vis-à-vis the legislature during the progressive era, and then resulted in a pattern of ‘responsible party’ government, characterized by a strong executive combined with strong parties, during the New Deal era. In all cases of parliamentary government discussed so far, dominant political elites are indeed organized in ‘competing parties’. This term does not entirely apply to the United States, because, as Shefter (1978, 95) observed, “(i)n American politics, institutional conflicts are the functional equivalent of party conflicts.”

Hence, when referring to ‘competing parties’ as contributors to the inclusion of labor in the United States, I understand this term more broadly as the entire set of entrenched political elites that were in a position to implement policies and forge social and political coalitions. Before 1896, these were party elites, but after that historical turning point, which is commonly held to mark the ascendance of the progressive era, the executive branch, through the Presidency and somewhat insulated executive agencies, has become equally important for the process of labor inclusion. The inclusion of labor during the New Deal era then occurred through the combined efforts of party politicians and the executive branch.

This periodization reflects the common distinction of stages in American political development on the basis of electoral realignments. V.O. Key (1955, 17) originated the idea that several “critical elections” mark “a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties.” Silbey (19991) provided the most extensive criticism of this approach, arguing that a perspective on party systems is not sufficient, and that an adequate periodization needs to encompass the nature of leadership, the importance of particular institutions, the strength of government, and popular attitudes toward politics. Based on these premises, he distinguishes between an anti-party elite dominated era from 1789 to 1838, a partisan-factional period from 1838 to 1893, a postpartisan bureaucratic era from 1893 to 1948, and a nonpartisan personalist era ever since.

While Silbey’s criticism of the realignment approach’s emphasis on party systems and electoral politics is warranted, his specific periodization is of only minor importance here. My analysis is paying keen attention to the additional factors he suggests, especially the varying importance of different sets of political institutions. However, in terms of periodization, I follow the established distinction between stages of American political development, as it is suggested by the realignment approach: first, what is usually
referred to as the ‘Jacksonian era’ from the 1820s to 1854 differs from Sibley’s account in only one important way: He dates the establishment of party dominance and electoral politics over earlier patterns of elite dominated politics at the end of the 1830s. For my purposes, however, it is of crucial importance to include the previous two decades that mark, not yet the dominance of party politics, but the gradual emergence of ‘Jacksonian democracy’. Second, the realignment of the mid 1850s is not crucial to Silbey, because the pattern of party politics and legislative dominance continues without interruption. However, in terms of labor inclusion, the realignment of electoral support among the established parties and the rise of Republican dominance during the era of the ‘third party system’ are of crucial importance to understand changes in the mechanisms of inclusion and the actors pursuing it.

Third, both Silbey and the conventional realignment approach identify the mid 1890s as a critical turning point in American political development: it marks the intensification of geographically based electoral alignments, but more importantly, the rise of progressivism as a dominant force in both major parties. Progressivism did not just suggest a substantive agenda in response to the ramifications of industrialization; it also sought to undermine the party dominance that had established itself ever since the 1820s. Fourth, while Sibley identifies the entire post-party period, beginning in the late 1890s, as an era of bureaucratic dominance, others, like Shefter (1978) emphasize the qualitatively new elements of the New Deal era, both with respect to the institutional configuration, and the substance of policies.

The substantive focus of my work is on the ‘formative period’ of party institutionalization that ends around the same time as the peak of the progressive era in the early 1920s. However, in order to understand the differences between the US case and the example of Canada after the ‘formative period’ (the formation of an ‘evolutionary socialist’ party in response to the Great Depression in Canada, and the continuing absence of party formation in the US), it is crucial to highlight the undeniable innovations in institutional arrangements and substantive policies that occurred during the Great Depression and the New Deal era.

The emergence of executive and bureaucratic dominance, beginning in the mid 1890s, also hints toward the ‘behavior of the state executive’, which I identified previously as another important behavioral dimension of labor inclusion. I argued that in the United States, executive behavior was overall neutral, compared to the extent of repression found in the illiberal or only partially liberalized polities characterized by low inclusion (see table 9). This assessment does, of course, not imply that repressive acts against labor did not occur. However, there are four major reasons, for why the federal executive in the US should not be understood as repressive, but rather as predominantly neutral: first, those episodes of federal involvement in labor repression, whether during the increasingly frequent strikes of the late 19th and early 20th century, or the “Red Scare” of the late 1910s and early 1920s, were rare and comparatively timid, compared to the
extent of repression in low inclusion polities. Second, during the crucial ‘formative stage’ and even in some earlier periods, the executive and legislative branches of government were often sought by labor activists as a balancing force against the undeniably hostile verdicts of local and federal courts.

Third, the most permanent and vicious forms of repression were not enacted by state and federal executives, but by private police forces, commissioned by employers, most notably the infamous ‘Pinkerton Detective Agency’. In this respect, as well, legislatures and the executive branch of government were identified as potential allies against such efforts, rather than enemies. Fourth, during the ‘party period’ until the mid 1890s, the role of the federal executive was limited by the dominance of parties and legislatures. When the executive branch rose in importance during the progressive era, its outlook on labor issues had also significantly changed. This was most apparent during the Wilson presidency from 1912 to 1921. Wilson explicitly rejected “class legislation” in favor of either group involved in economic conflicts, and thereby officially proclaimed an attitude that we have previously identified as the epitome of a ‘neutral’ state executive. The regulatory efforts of his administration definitely fall short of what Collier and Collier (1991) have identified as a ‘state incorporation’ strategy. But they also responded positively toward labor’s demands for leveling the playing field against the entrenched power of businesses, and in particular large corporations.

The process of incorporating labor through the sustained efforts of ‘competing parties’, or more generally, entrenched political elites, and the overall neutral behavior of the executive branch, which will be traced in the following section, answers the question as to why no social democratic party was formed in the United States, and why American labor elites pursued an alternative strategy of moderate syndicalism. This process occurred on the background that has been described in the previous paragraphs. First, as we have argued before, industrialization only provided the sine qua non condition for the entry of labor into the political arena, but it did not determine the kind of model for labor’s political engagement that would emerge as dominant. In the United States, organized labor emerged through a pattern of industrialization that was first confined to the Northeast, but then extended gradually to other regions. After 1877, through the efforts of an activist state, industrialization and the market principle also became the dominant policy and mode of operation for the entire country.

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241 Nelson (1997) introduces state repression as an important factor in explaining US workers’ reluctance to join unions. While this is generally true, it is not helpful for a comparative assessment, because repression was even higher in other cases. Moreover, portrayals of repression depend very strongly on the author’s ideological point of departure, and are often times not adequately placed in a comparative perspective. Nelson (1997) with a pronounced emphasis on the intensity of repression, Rayback (1966) with a more balanced view, Shefter (1986) notes the presence and important effects of repression, but places it in a comparative perspective, and comes to the conclusion that even though the extent of repression in the US should not be underestimated, it was comparatively timid in the US.

242 See Hattam (1992, 1993). This issue will be discussed more extensively in the following analysis of stages and mechanisms of inclusion.

243 Shefter (1986) notes the ‘company town’, which literally shielded its inhabitants, workers for a particular company, from the benefits of public policies and rules, as the most extreme form of labor repression through private agencies.
Second, the process of labor inclusion through entrenched political elites occurred on the basis of an institutionally liberalized polity, the foundations of which were completed in the late 1820s. Third, labor inclusion occurred in different ways, and through different types of institutions and agents in different periods of American political development. Each of these periods is characterized by different patterns in the dominance and interaction of these institutions. Fourth, as a consequence of that, inclusion during the ‘formative period’ of labor’s entry as a nationwide force into the arena of party politics from 1868 to the early 1920s, was only one important stage of inclusion that led to the absence of social democratic party formation. But this outcome cannot be understood without prior reference to the earlier stages.

The four major periods of American political development outlined above do not conform to the chronology of labor’s involvement in the political arena. The ‘formative stage’ of nationally organized labor’s entry into the arena of party politics begins in the 1860s, with the initial organizational manifestation of social democracy in 1868, and the ascendance of the Knights of Labor as the first permanent and truly nationwide labor association. During this time period, the entry of labor into the political arena occurred in the context of what is commonly referred to as the third party system. This electoral arrangement based on the institutions of partisan conflict and party politics that had been established during the earlier ‘Jacksonian’ period began to emerge in the immediate antebellum years around 1854.

After 1896, labor incorporation in the United States occurred in the context of the ‘progressive’ era, which reached its peak during the Wilson presidency. The late 1910s and early 1920s also mark the end of what we have identified as the ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena, with the emergence of the Soviet Union, the Comintern, and generally communism as a widely diffused organizational alternative for the political involvement of the labor movement. The period afterwards is therefore irrelevant for our primary explanatory interest. The developments during the time of the Great Depression and the New Deal era in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s occurred after what we have referred to as the ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena. However, the emerging coalition of this era, and the mechanisms of labor inclusion implemented then will be discussed briefly, in order to illustrate the diverging paths of the United States and Canada in terms of social democratic party formation around that time. Table 16 summarizes the major agents and mechanisms of labor inclusion throughout these four critical eras of American political development. It also highlights the major historiographical points of contention, as far as they are relevant for the argument presented here. In the following paragraphs, the crucial episodes in the process of labor inclusion will be analyzed in chronological order, on the basis of this outline.

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‘Jacksonian democracy’ and the challenge of the workingmen parties

The nature of ‘Jacksonian’ party politics

In the 1820s, a new mode of political conflict emerged in the United States, during an era that is commonly referred to as “Jacksonian democracy”, the “age of Jackson” (Schlesinger 1945), or more generally the “age of egalitarianism” (Benson 1961). On the background of rapid economic and technological change, sweeping institutional as well as substantive policy reforms opened political participation and the scope of government to the masses. It is also the era, during which the path toward dominance of the market principle was paved.244 With respect to the nature of contentious politics, ‘Jacksonian democracy’ established a type of political conflict, organized around stable party identifications, high electoral participation, and elaborate campaigns that continued well beyond the era itself as the dominant modus vivendi of the “party period” until the end of the 19th century.245

Following on the demise of the previous “regime of notables” (Shefter 1978), the Democratic party and the Whigs commanded the political loyalties in the new era of mass politics. The establishment of mass parties began at the local and state levels in the early 1820s, with Martin van Buren and the Albany Regency as the emerging upstate New York pillar of the later Democratic party. From New York, Democratic party organization spread to other states, and eventually, in between 1831 and 1835, to the federal level (cf. Watson 2006). Although Andrew Jackson, President from 1829 to 1837, was not personally involved in the initial efforts at Democratic party institutionalization, he emerged as the most important symbolic figure, practitioner, spokesperson, and eponym of the new era, ever since he lost his 1824 bid to John Quincy Adams through a presidential appointment by the House of Representatives that defied Jackson’s plurality in terms of the public and the electoral college vote. Jackson thus found a symbolic issue to rally public support behind him by mobilizing the public’s outrage against the apparent oligarchic tendencies that had denied him the presidency at that point. The Whigs as a diverse collective of anti-Jacksonians formally embraced the status of a party, albeit reluctantly, in the mid 1830s, along with the Jacksonian techniques of party politics.

This rise of two party dominance is inextricably linked to the growing involvement of regular citizens – the proverbial ‘common man’ – in the political arena. Earlier forms of political conflict as the domain of elites were replaced by mass conflict, along with the emergence of egalitarian rhetoric and the attempts of party elites to mobilize the masses for their agendas. One of the groups that entered the political arena

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244 The two most prominent studies emphasizing this issue are Sellers (1991) and Watson (2006)
245 See McCormick (1986), but Silbey (1999) makes the same point, only on the basis of a slightly different periodization
during this period were the artisan-workers of the ‘first’ labor movement, whose status and economic position were negatively affected by the rise of automatized manufacturing ever since the early 19th century.

My goal for the remainder of this section is to show, first, how this discontent was incorporated into the second, ‘Jacksonian’ party system by its political entrepreneurs. Secondly, we are going to see, how the successful inclusion of labor and the curtailing of labor party formation at this early stage created a crucial prerequisite for the eventual prevention of social democratic party formation during the ‘third party system’ and the ‘progressive era’. These two stages of development represent the external environment during labor’s more narrowly defined formative stage of entry into the political arena. I am going to argue that the emergence of workingmen parties throughout the 1820s pressured the political entrepreneurs of the second party system to embrace egalitarian rhetoric and to formulate electoral appeals toward workers along socio-economic dividing lines, to implement sweeping democratic reforms, and to enact a comprehensive set of conciliatory labor policies. All of these measures functioned as the most important ‘mechanisms of inclusion’ during this period, which, in effect, led to the decay of the workingmen parties, and the inclusion of organized labor into the existing party system. In addition to these measures, the same party elites created techniques that were already relevant during this period, but would only emerge to full bloom during the following ‘third party system’: the use of local patronage and electoral appeals along ethnocultural dividing lines as the precursor for the dominant political machines of the second half of the 19th century. My analysis will be based on the premise that the Democratic party, Jackson’s and van Buren’s creation, functioned as the most important agent of inclusion. The affiliation of the Democrats with urban workers and small farmers is the diagnosis of the majority of authors, but it has been challenged by others. We will see later on that this criticism does not affect the causal argument suggested here, but it does shed new light on the extent and the relevant agents of labor inclusion during this period.

From a comparative perspective, the most important contrast to the American pattern of inclusion during this period that contributed to the short and long term curtailing of independent party formation is to the cases of England, New Zealand, Australia, later on Canada, and, in a slightly different context, France and Switzerland. Here, labor entered the political arena, just like the Jacksonian workingmen parties, after realizing that an improvement of its legal, economic, and social status required political changes that could not be accomplished through activities in the economic realm alone. However, it was only in the case of the United States, where entrenched elites, through the mechanisms outlined above, successfully responded to these challenges, while in all other cases, the failure to ensure highest inclusion led to the permanent establishment of independent social democratic parties.
The recurring political challenge of labor to the ‘Jacksonian’ party elites

The initial activities of organized labor during the late 18th and early 19th century were limited: geographically to the urban and manufacturing centers of the Northeast; in terms of scope, to engagement in the ‘economic realm’ (striking, mutual aid, small-scale collective bargaining); and organizationally, to the local level and membership of journeymen from a single craft. The first recorded activities of labor associations occurred already during the revolutionary era – the 1778 strike of the Royal Gazette printers in New York, and the seamen’s strike of 1779 in Philadelphia. They decayed almost immediately after the particular conflict that triggered their foundation had come to an end. The first more permanent labor ‘associations’ and ‘societies’ emerged throughout the 1790s, in response to the gradual ascendance of competitive markets and the growing awareness of employers regarding labor costs. It was again Philadelphia and New York, where this new impetus originated, with the New York printers (1794) and the Philadelphia shoemakers, whose organization lasted from 1794 to 1806. Other than the very first efforts at association, these examples were emulated in other trades (cabinetmakers, masons, coopers, tailors) and different regions (Baltimore, Washington, even New Orleans) (cf. Rayback 1966, 55).

Although some of them lasted for more than a decade, they were not strong enough to resist the negative effects of two distinct developments: first, the 1812 depression that rendered drives for organization, and even the maintenance of existing membership levels, significantly more difficult; and second, the series of verdicts from local courts that declared labor associations illegal conspiracies, after the precedent set by the 1806 judgment in the case against the leaders of the Philadelphia shoemakers. The motivation for organized labor to enter the political arena came from realizing that certain improvements for its constituency could only be accomplished through legislation or government control: this included issues like working hours, workplace safety, affordable public services, minimum wages, publicly organized insurance schemes, but also restrictions on government support for large corporations. However, in addition to these substantive policy issues, it was also the recurring and especially pronounced hostility of the courts toward organized labor in the US that contributed to labor’s turn toward politics.

The revival of labor’s economic organizations and activities in the late 1810s went hand in hand with growing militancy and the embrace of politics. These developments were naturally triggered by economic concerns, which had become increasingly relevant as a consequence of continuously growing market  

247 The role of the courts in curtailing the rise of independent labor parties is central to the argument suggested by Hattam (1992, 1993). Generally, the courts in the US, as well as in Britain, for that matter, contributed much to the organizational insecurity of labor, despite constitutional or quasi-constitutional guarantees of the contrary. However, other than in the low inclusion cases, which are characterized by a predominantly repressive state executive, the same verdict does not apply to the US. The state executive was regarded as a potential ally against the political activism of the courts, while in cases such as Germany, Italy, Austria, or Sweden, the state itself pursued repressive policies, designed to undermine the organizational efforts of labor.
pressures. But the turn toward politics occurred in response to the dissatisfaction with the political elites of the decaying first party system, and the pressure exercised by the courts.

In this context, the first step into the arena of politics consisted of finding allies for the workingmen’s legislative agenda, and engaging in temporary electoral alliances with the existing elites. The “Workingmen’s platform”, drafted by the newly emerging labor associations in the late 1810s, contained the agenda, based on which organized labor entered the political domain. The platform contained a combination of economic, general socio-political, but also political-institutional demands: the ten hour day, abolition of imprisonment for debt, abolition of the militia system, protective laws against employer bankruptcy, abolition of chartered monopolies, universal education, and the introduction of universal suffrage. This last issue is particularly interesting in light of the classic exceptionalism argument about the effects of the “free gift of the suffrage” on the lack of class consciousness and social democratic party formation. It is simply not true that organized labor in the US never had to fight for fundamental political rights, in this case universal suffrage. What sets the US case apart from all other cases is the fact that labor’s call for electoral inclusion was met by the emerging ‘Jacksonian’ parties within less than a decade, thereby setting the stage for a pattern of highest inclusion that would continue by different means later on, while in the higher inclusion cases, for different reasons, no equally successful pattern of labor incorporation emerged.

In order to advance the agenda that is most succinctly summarized by the “Workingmen’s platform”, organized labor engaged in political activities that should be familiar to the observers of lib-lab cooperation in Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The nature of the cooperation partner was different in the US, but the type of cooperation was largely similar. First of all, labor associations and leaders staged, or were involved in, local and state campaigns for an extension of voting rights – not so dissimilar from the efforts of the Chartists in the 1840s (while the outcome varied). Secondly, labor associations fielded tickets for local and state offices, most of the time in cooperation with established elites, who were not necessarily affiliated with a party. This is quite naturally the case, since during this time period the establishment of party organizations was just in its infancy, but it does represent a contrast to the party centered pattern of lib-lab cooperation in the other Anglo-Saxon democracies and Switzerland, as well as the electoral appeal of the radical republicans to French and that of the liberal Freisinn to Swiss workers.

In the US, the political affinities of workers were split between the protectionist ‘high tariff’ position of the Federalists, and the Jeffersonian Republican party, for its anti-elitist rhetorical elements, and despite its agrarian character. Before the emergence of the ‘Jacksonian’ Democrats, however, the majority of

248 See Workingmen’s Platform (1818).
organized labor sought the old Republican-Democrats as their political ally. However, before the new Democratic party responded successfully to labor’s demands throughout the late 1820s and 1830s, it was precisely the failure of the first party system, most importantly the Republican-Democrats, to incorporate labor, which triggered labor’s second more far reaching step into the political arena. This second step moved beyond the earlier American version of lib-lab cooperation, and ventured into the formation of independent workingmen parties as an alternative to the emerging Democrats and Whigs.

The classic interpretation of ‘Jacksonian democracy’, most closely associated with Schlesinger (1945), portrays the new Democrats as the party of the ‘common man’. He argues that in terms of its rank and file, its leadership, electoral appeal, underpinning ideology, and practical policy record, the Democrats stood for the interests of a social coalition of small farmers and the emerging urban proletariat. Benson (1961) in his analysis of ‘Jacksonian’ democracy in New York rejects Schlesinger’s claim that the Democrats were the epitome of egalitarianism during this era. He suggests that both parties, the Whigs as much as the Democrats, were equally dominated by elites, and that both of them embraced egalitarian rhetoric for strategic electoral purposes.249

Benson’s concern with the question as to whether the Democratic electoral appeal was sincere or only strategic in nature is quite irrelevant, but he adds an important observation to the analysis of labor inclusion during the ‘Jacksonian’ era: The Democrats embraced labor concerns – organizational inclusion of labor elites, electoral appeals to workers, substantive policies, institutional reforms – only in response to the pressure that was exercised by the formation of independent workingmen parties. This ‘second’ step of organized labor into the political arena, after the initial step of formulating a political agenda and seeking cooperation with established elites had not been sufficiently recognized, is therefore crucial for understanding the inclusive efforts of the emerging ‘Jacksonian’ elites.

The foundation of workingmen parties began in 1828, their decay was complete in 1832. This ‘second step’ into the political arena was followed by a third, somewhat different, step from around 1834 until the late 1830s. The particular responses of entrenched elites to these challenges in terms of institutional reforms, adjustment of electoral appeals, and substantive policies occurred throughout the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s. Moreover, and this is particularly discernible for the case of New York and the federal level, the depth of labor incorporation and the extent of concessions to the workingmen increased over time.

Philadelphia was the forerunner in the formation of independent labor parties with the 1828 founding of the “Republican Political Association of the Workingmen of the City of Philadelphia”. The party’s electoral ticket for the 1828 city council elections combined some of its own candidates with ‘Jacksonians’

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249 The most radical interpretation along these lines goes even further and portrays ‘Jacksonians’ as “expectant capitalists”, who were eager to improve their position in a competitive market economy against the entrenched position of corporations protected by high tariffs (cf. Hofstadter 1948).
and Federalists pledged to support the workingmen agenda. The Philadelphians emerged directly out of the Mechanics Union. The “New York Workingmen Party”, founded in 1929, had comparable roots within a group of mechanics, but organizationally, its formation resulted from an internal split in Tammany Hall, the Democratic political machine of New York City. Similar workingmen parties emerged during the early 1830s in upstate New York, all over New England, in Pennsylvania, and in Ohio.250

After the decay or dissolution of all these party formation attempts only a few years after their emergence, in the years 1831 and 1832, organized labor’s third step into the political arena occurred after 1834. At this stage, labor’s political activities were based on qualitatively new developments regarding the organization of labor in the economic arena: in addition to an overall solidification and increase in membership (at least until the 1837 depression), labor organizations significantly widened their geographical and organizational scope during this time period: first, through the foundation of numerous city federations; second, through the organization of trade unions at the national level, beginning with the 1835 “National Typographical Society”; third, by establishing a ‘producerist’ organization attempting to appeal to skilled and unskilled workers, master workmen, and farmers: the 1831 “New England Association of Farmers, Mechanics, and other Workingmen”; and fourth, through the establishment of a national organization of city federations, the 1834 “National Trades’ Union”.

All of these organizations were involved in activities beyond the economic realm – they engaged in politics through the formulation of legislative agendas and lobbying at all levels of government. They thus represent the epitome of moderate syndicalism. The one issue that occupied the political efforts of labor more than anything else those days was the question of banking at the state and the federal level, fueled by the desire of labor leaders to push the existing parties to abolish chartered monopolies.

In addition to the political interventions of unions and labor federations, the ‘third step’ of labor’s entry into the political arena during the mid- to late 1830s also entailed another series of attempts to establish permanent political representations. Labor elites realized that despite a variety of policy concessions and institutional reforms (to be discussed comprehensively later on), the ‘Jacksonian’ party politicians still fell short of translating their electoral appeals to labor, centered around promises to enact the “Workingmen’s platform”, into actual policies. The continuing exercise of pressure through the renewed political engagement of labor as an independent formation was also triggered by another round of conspiracy verdicts, designed to undermine labor organizations, in between 1834 and 1836 (cf. Rayback 1966). However, at this stage, the desire and extent of independent labor party formation was significantly smaller than in the late 1820s and early 1830s: much of the political activity of labor at this later stage occurred through the political interventions discussed above rather than independent party formation.

250 See Rayback (1966) and Benson (1961)
Already at this early stage in the development of American labor politics, moderate syndicalism emerged as dominant over projects of independent party formation.

The workers involved in the New York Democratic machine of Tammany Hall returned to organize themselves as the “Workingmen’s General Committee” in 1834, following on the failure of their prior “Workingmen Party” in the early 1830s. After their defeat within the fold of the Democratic party organization, and their christening as ‘locofocos’, they split and fielded their own electoral ticket in 1836. With support from some Democrats and Whigs, the ‘locofocos’ worker ticket was successful in gaining seats in the state legislature. The electoral pressure on the Democrats through the loss of a significant amount of votes to the new organization forced Tammany Hall and the upstate Albany Regency to embrace labor’s agenda on currency and banking in exchange for the locofocos’ return to the party fold. As we will see later on, it was not only the electoral appeal of the state’s Democratic party machines that was adjusted to labor’s demands – locofocoism established itself as an influential force for the entire party, and the promises made to labor in New York were also translated into practical policies, in various states, and at the federal level. In addition to New York as the case of labor politics in the 1830s that has received most scholarly attention, similar, but not quite as far reaching independent political manifestations of labor also occurred in other locales. Labor associations in Massachusetts nominated their own candidate for governor in 1833. The New England Labor Association transformed itself into a permanent, albeit only short lived, political organization. In Pennsylvania, another gubernatorial candidate was fielded by labor.

Labor inclusion as the response of entrenched elites

To summarize, the challenge of labor to the entrenched elites of the dissolving first and the emerging ‘Jacksonian’ party system occurred in three consecutive steps: first, toward the end of the 1810s and the early 1820s, through the staging of universal suffrage campaigns, the formulation of a legislative agenda, and attempts of unions to engage in specific interventions in electoral politics. Second, after these initial moderate syndicalist efforts failed to accomplish more than only incipient concessions, labor engaged in the formation of independent workingmen parties in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Third, despite sweeping institutional and some significant policy reforms, a large share of the “workingmen’s platform” from the late 1810s was only implemented in response to labor’s renewed efforts to enter the political arena as an independent force in the mid to late 1830s; at this time, however, the intensity of independent party formation decreased, compared to the late 1820s, while the scope and depth of unions’ selective political interventions increased.

The formation of independent political parties of labor would continue to fail throughout the remainder of American political development. But the strategy of selective political interventions, through
lobbying and specific electoral support, would become one of the major foundations of the American model of labor politics that emerged as dominant during the ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena from 1868 to 1921. The foundations for this later development were already laid during the ‘Jacksonian’ era: The entrenched elites of the 1820s to 1840s used a variety of mechanisms to incorporate labor, which eventually prevented the formation of independent labor parties during the second party system and set a precedent for continuing levels of highest inclusion during the following stages of development. The various mechanisms of inclusion during the ‘Jacksonian’ era that occurred in response to the challenge of the workingmen parties included: first, institutional reforms, which enabled mass participation and opened the party system to the possibility of political interventions; second, the establishment of political machines along ethnocultural and residential lines, fueled by systems of spoils and patronage; third, the formulation of electoral appeals to the emerging labor constituency that incorporated the demands of the workingmen parties; fourth, policy concessions to labor at the state and federal levels.

Institutional reforms

The institutional reforms associated with the principles of ‘Jacksonian’ democracy were enacted at the state level. However, because of the centrality of states for questions of electoral rules and other procedural issues at the federal level, discussed above, these decisions were paramount for the nature of national politics. Three most important avenues of reform stand out: first, the removal of property, minimum tax and similar voting prerequisites, which resulted in the widespread guarantee of universal – white, male – suffrage; second, the extension of the vast majority of public offices to popular vote; and third, procedural changes regarding the selection of candidates for public office that enabled the centrality of parties in setting the legislative agenda and determining the nomination process. All of these specific measures have to be regarded as elements of an encompassing movement toward the opening of the political domain to the mass public, and the undermining of the typical elite dominated pattern of politics during the post-revolutionary era.

First, during the formative stage of decision making about the preferable organizational and ideological model of labor politics, American organized labor entered a political arena that guaranteed universal male suffrage. Before this time in the late 1860s, however, the incipient manifestations of the ‘first’ labor movement, as outlined above, had to struggle with various restrictions on the right to vote, through property or minimum tax qualifications. Before 1776, all 13 colonies had such requirements, but already during the revolutionary period, eight colonies slightly alleviated the rigidity of these thresholds. By 1828, when Jackson was elected president for the first time, 14 states still imposed material thresholds.
It was only in 1840, when most of the laggard states eventually implemented white male suffrage, including Connecticut, Louisiana, and New Jersey. Virginia in 1851 and South Carolina in 1865 were the last two states to abolish property requirements. Thus, the push toward universal suffrage occurred in two major stages: the first one during the transformation of the elite based first party system into the era of Jacksonian democracy, and the second one, from 1828 to 1840, when ‘Jacksonian’ party politics and egalitarian rhetoric established their dominance.  

Second, in addition to letting all white males vote, another crucial element of institutional reform occurred on the ‘supply’ side of the political system: while previously, only legislators and the highest ranking executive positions were publicly elected, the ‘Jacksonian’ reforms throughout the 1820s and 1830s greatly increased the number of public offices subject to popular election (cf. McCormick 1986). Both of these measures naturally increased the potential of mass mobilization and the dependence of politicians on public support. The third most important Jacksonian institutional reform – giving party conventions the authority to nominate candidates – was equally suited to overcome the dominance of first party system elites, by giving way to the centrality of parties in the political process, and enabling the innovative elements of ‘Jacksonian’ party organization.

A system of delegate conventions to elect candidates and write platforms was one of the crucial innovations of the ‘Jacksonian’ era. This procedure made it possible to exercise pressure on the party leadership, to influence the party’s agenda, and it brought factional differences into the spotlight of the public. It gave parties the opportunity to incorporate challengers, such as the workingmen parties and committees; or, from a different angle, it gave challengers the opportunity to influence programmatic and personnel decisions from within the party. The elaborate electoral campaigns of the period, which caught the keen interest of foreign travelers – both actual visitors, such as Tocqueville, and fictional characters such as Jules Verne’s English gentleman Phileas Fogg – served both political and social functions. They were instrumental in establishing stable intergenerational patterns of party identification for the huge corps of activists that replaced the earlier pattern of politics as the domain of a small group of notables.

It is Benson’s (1961) achievement to alert us to the fact that these institutional reforms can be interpreted as the attempts of ‘Jacksonian’ political entrepreneurs to mobilize the masses against the elite dominated politics of the first party system. Regardless of whether they represent strategic calculations of party elites (which is Benson’s perspective) or sincere efforts to make politics more egalitarian (Schlesinger, 1945), in effect, these measures did respond to the recurring challenges of labor. In a specific

251 See Kleppner (1982, 1992) for the evolution of electoral systems.
252 Tocqueville is, of course, the most famous and influential of the actual visitors. Phileas Fogg is the main character of Jules
Verne’s “In eighty days around the world”.
historical analysis, however, it is, of course, difficult to discern, whether the ‘Jacksonian’ institutional
reforms were the direct result of the foundation of workingmen parties, organized labor pressure, or even,
more generally, pressure from various groups previously excluded from politics. Alternatively, it might
very well have been the case that the mobilization interests of political entrepreneurs should be at the core
of an explanation for the emergence of the ‘Jacksonian’ party system.

As far as my argument regarding the incorporation of labor into the existing party system through
these institutional reforms is concerned, two points about this debate have to be made. First, it is well
established through historical inquiry, that the pressure of workingmen, if not responsible for the initial
introduction of universal suffrage, was definitely causal for defeating a number of Whig efforts to reverse
the openness of electoral procedures.\(^{254}\) And second, most importantly, the question as to whether the egg
(workingmen parties’ pressure) or the chicken (institutional reforms) was there first, is largely irrelevant for
the argument I am suggesting. Regardless of whether institutional reforms enabled mass access to politics,
and thereby the opportunity of workers to exercise pressure on the existing party system, or whether
institutional reforms themselves are a result of growing public pressure for participation – the outcome we
are interested in here (labor incorporation) is the same. Institutional reforms are a crucial building block for
labor inclusion during the Jacksonian era; they allowed workers and organized labor access to the existing
party system. This was the prerequisite for other forms of inclusion, and thereby contributed to the
emergence of moderate syndicalism as the dominant model of labor politics, and the incorporation of labor
into the existing party system during this era and beyond.

Hence, two out of the three avenues of Jacksonian institutional reform – the introduction of universal
suffrage and the extension of popular elections to the vast majority of public offices – effectively responded
to the demands of the workingmen platform and the labor organizations that sought to advance this agenda.
These reforms had an inclusive effect on the labor movement, because organized labor realized that the
second party system was a permeable institutional arrangement, open for the movement’s agenda: the costs
of establishing an independent party outweighed the potential benefits, while the focus on the economic
struggle and selective political interventions through the existing party system promised the same rewards,
without the cost of building a party organization (see table 5). Moreover, the centrality of parties for the
political process – as the third avenue of Jacksonian institutional reform – had an inclusive effect by
forging stable identifications of workers with the existing parties. Once these identifications had been
established, they would contribute negatively to any cost-benefit analysis of labor leaders into the
opportunities for founding an independent party of labor in the future. The potential for mobilization
success of different models of labor politics across environments of inclusion has previously been

\(^{254}\) See Rayback (1966) and Schlesinger (1945)
identified as an element of labor elites’ calculations on the cost side of their decision-making process. Organizational demise, which becomes more likely with the incorporation of workers into the existing party system, represents the negative inversion of mobilization success. The threat of organizational demise therefore significantly decreases the benefits of all alternative models of labor politics that are geared at the establishment of an independent presence in the political arena.

The inclusive response to labor’s demands for institutional reforms and the creation of a permeable party system with stable identification patterns represents a marked difference to the cases of Britain and France. In the case of Britain, similar reforms, as they were demanded by the Chartist movement in the 1840s, were not satisfied by the entrenched elites, at least not before the suffrage acts of 1884 and 1919. Hence, other than in the US, the development prior to the formative stage of nationwide organized labor’s entry into the arena of party politics was not used to establish an institutional arrangement for labor incorporation. And as a corollary of that, no stable party identities could emerge, either.

The same argument applies to the case of France, but in an even more apparent fashion: Before the consolidation of the Third Republic in the early to mid 1880s, workers in the political realm had made the same experience over and over again: their demands for a republican and democratic form of government could only be accomplished through revolutionary efforts, and in response, they were met by an equally sweeping counterrevolution. During most of the crucial periods before its actual ‘formative stage’, labor politics encountered repression, and the complete absence of an institutional arrangement that would have allowed labor to channel their demands into an existing party system. When degrees of inclusion in the institutional realms of labor incorporation eventually passed the threshold to highest inclusion after the mid 1880s, the decision making process of French labor leaders regarding how to enter the political arena was still heavily influenced by the collective, social, and individual memories of exclusion and repression during earlier periods.

Thus, a comparison of the United States to France and Britain can illustrate the important effects of institutional inclusion before the ‘formative stage’ of nationwide organized labor’s entry into the arena of party politics on the potential for highest inclusion during the ‘formative stage’. And this, in turn, is the prerequisite for the eventual incorporation of labor into the existing party system and the lack of social democratic party formation. In the other cases from the overall higher inclusion category (Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland), other than in Britain and France (as well as Canada), institutions were at the highest level of inclusion, just like in the US. In these cases, the question of institutional reforms during earlier stages of development is not paramount for explaining the inability of existing elites to incorporate labor later on. This observation hints at the importance of investigating the other forms of labor inclusion during the Jacksonian era, above and beyond the institutional reforms discussed so far.
One of these other mechanisms of labor inclusion was the use of spoils and patronage in the context of the emerging urban political machines. Tammany Hall in New York City, the Daley and Kelly-Cermak machines in Chicago, Crump in Memphis, to name just a few, represented the culmination point of innovative party organization and mass inclusion, enabled by institutional ‘Jacksonian’ reforms. Political machines were organized geographically, on an ethnocultural basis, in specific neighborhoods; machine politicians and ‘bosses’ provided electoral appeals, policies, spoils and patronage (public jobs, infrastructure projects), as well as direct welfare services to their constituents, in return for electoral loyalty.255

Other than the workingmen parties, the unions, as well as the initial socio-economic appeal of ‘Jacksonian’ party elites, the emerging machines were based on cross-class ethnocultural coalitions. Their specific practices varied across locales, but by and large, political machines would emerge as a dominant player in local and state politics in all urban areas throughout the 19th century. The ‘Jacksonian’ period saw the gradual rise of machine politics in response to the institutional reforms of the 1820s and 1830s, but it would take until the second half of the 19th century, before the innovative cross-class appeal of the machines, fueled by the distribution of spoils and patronage established dominance over earlier socio-economic appeals.

The socio-economic dividing line, based on which labor initially entered the political arena, and which triggered inclusive measures by entrenched elites on the basis of class appeals, was accompanied by the gradual ascendance of machines’ ethnoculturally based, cross-class, mechanisms of inclusion. These developments occurred along with changes in the electoral appeals employed in the national political arena, to be discussed in the following section. The prerequisite for the distribution of spoils and patronage that sustained the emerging machines and enabled this important mechanism for inclusion, was another institutional innovation of the ‘Jacksonian’ era: the insulation of the bureaucracy from the earlier ‘regime of notables’ and the transfer of influence to the new mass parties.

Shefter (1977) regards the system of spoils and patronage implemented by machine politicians on the basis of reforms that made access to the bureaucracy possible, as the crucial mechanism for the containment of class conflict. He argued that throughout the 19th century, and in particular during its second half, the institutionalization of machines enabled the characteristically American way in which these

255 Shefter (1977, 1986) in his analyses of machines and unions and their interaction focuses on the immediate material rewards provided by machines, but it is undeniable that they also advanced policy appeals and implemented actual policies for their constituents: The Locofocos and the pressure the policy concessions they were able to extract from the New York Tammany Hall machine as well as from the federal government are the best illustration (see Benson 1961).
conflicts were channeled and regulated. I would argue that the provision of tangible material rewards to workers as one of the two innovative elements of machine politics was definitely a crucial factor for the incorporation of labor. But at the same time, and this is where I deviate from Shefter’s proposition, it is only one of several pieces of the puzzle. The unlocking of access to the spoils of the state through the ‘Jacksonians’ and the distribution of these gains to cross-class coalitions has to be regarded in the context of a variety of other inclusive measures, as they were analyzed here. In and of itself, patronage cannot guarantee the inclusion of labor and prevent the formation of an independent labor party.

There are two major lines of reasoning to sustain this suggestion: first, Shefter himself refers to the activities of machines beyond the mere distribution of spoils, which had an inclusive effect on labor, without integrating these issues into his theoretical proposition: the policy appeals, ethnocultural and socio-economic, offered by local machines and their national and state parties, the welfare services, as well as the implementation of actual policies that responded to labor’s socio-economic demands and interests.256

Second, from a comparative perspective, there is ample evidence of instances, where spoils and patronage were used excessively as mechanisms for worker inclusion, but failed to produce the same outcome (labor incorporation and absence of party formation) as in the US. In Spain, Argentina, and Italy, local systems of spoils and patronage, in the context of exclusionary power sharing agreements between the entrenched elites, provided benefits in return for electoral support. But in these cases, the equivalent of machine politics was not embedded into a permeable party system, an institutionally liberal polity, an effective electoral appeal to labor, and a series of conciliatory labor policies. Without these further mechanisms of inclusion, as they were practiced in the US, spoils and patronage in and of themselves could not incorporate labor and prevent party formation. Hence, spoils and patronage in the context of the emerging ethnocultural political machines, were only one element in a series of inclusive mechanisms that all contributed to the incorporation of labor and the curtailing of independent party formation.

Electoral appeal to labor

In addition to overestimating the role of spoils and patronage, Shefter (1994) underestimates the role of policy appeals to labor. From his perspective, political machines as the major inclusive mechanism represented a strategy of moderate Democrats, with a middle class background, to buy organized labor with spoils and patronage, and to incorporate them into residential associations, on the basis of ethnocultural identities. I don’t intend to dismiss this argument at all – it is one of the major inclusive mechanisms vis-à-

256 Shefter (1986) himself lists a number of these policies, but does not grant them an important status in his argument. I will discuss the inclusive effects of policy concessions in the following section.
vis labor, created by Jacksonian party elites and perfected during the third party system. But at the same time, Shefter's analysis underestimates the role and importance of policy appeals in general, and socio-economic based appeals in particular.

The emerging 'Jacksonian' Democratic party elites fashioned an electoral appeal to labor that combined socio-economic demands and egalitarian rhetoric with references to ethnocultural dividing lines. While initially, during the 1820s and 1830s, the heyday of labor's entry into the political arena, socio-economic appeals and class rhetoric were paramount, ethnocultural appeals gradually emerged as dominant, and culminated in the full bloom of urban political machines in the second half of the 19th century.

In the debate about the relative salience of socio-economic and ethnocultural/religious cleavages in parties' appeals to labor and as a source of voting behavior during the 'Jacksonian' era, Benson (1961) and Shefter (1978) stand for the emphasis on ethnoreligious appeals, while Schlesinger (1945) interpreted 'Jacksonian' democracy as an era of class conflict. Benson (1961) in his analysis of the 1840 election in New York, comes to the sweeping conclusion that ethnocultural appeals were overall and generally dominant. This inference is not only based on a very narrow empirical perspective that might not warrant his generalizations, but furthermore, it also does not allow for statements about the patterns of mass politics and electoral appeals during the crucial time period of the 1820s and 1830s.

Other than the earlier interpretation suggested by Schlesinger (1945), Benson and Shefter stress the Democrats' stand on cultural and religious issues: catholic and recently immigrated workers were not incorporated into the existing party system through appeals to their socio-economic position, but instead by emphasizing the role of the Democrats as the party intent on defending the interests of immigrants and catholics against the moral and religious tutelage of 'natives' and protestants. This assessment is derived from a broader characterization of the Democrats as the party of 'negative liberalism' (McCormick 1986). This agenda entailed a focus on states’ rights, individual liberties, and laissez-faire. It emphasized the protection of workers from the economic incursions of an activist state intent on promoting industrial development and supporting business, as well as from the incursions of activist protestants, who attempted to use the state as an instrument to force their own moral codes of temperance and other moral-religious values on catholics and immigrants.

The role of ethnocultural electoral appeals, during the Jacksonian era, and in particular the following third party system, should not be underestimated as a mechanism for labor inclusion. However, the new 'ethnocultural' approach dismisses the importance of class rhetoric and labor incorporation through socio-economic appeals during the 'Jacksonian' era too easily. In an impressive analysis, Watson (2006) shows how the early stages of the second party system were characterized by an extensive use of class rhetoric,
and how, gradually, ethnocultural appeals did not replace, but rather amend earlier socio-economic cleavages.

In their investigation of the crucial case of New York, Ryan (1979, 1981) and Johnson (1978) show how the growth of a religious cleavage throughout the Jacksonian era is the direct consequence of economic transformations. The emerging evangelical revivalism was the result of the increasing separation of home and work. In upper and middle class families, evangelicalism gave women greater authority over their children and family, while male breadwinners used it as an ideological underpinning to justify their authority within the community, and as a means to establish social control over their employees. A number of laborers responded to the challenge of evangelicalism by embracing calls for liberty and demands for religious tolerance. Thus, workers’ discontent with economic conditions and their demands for economic improvements went hand in hand with demands for religious tolerance (by non-evangelical workers, most importantly catholics) and control over their private sphere (alcohol consumption, religious preferences). The anti-masonic movement, which provided another one of the pillars of the anti-Jacksonian Whig party, had a different substantive agenda, but it was quite similar in spirit to the evangelicalism crusade.

The initial agenda of the Democrats emerged in response to economic dividing lines. The incorporation of ethnocultural appeals later on cannot change the fact that during the 1820s and 1830s, the electoral appeal of the Jacksonian party placed a heavy emphasis on socio-economic issues, which in many instances resulted in a rhetoric of ‘class warfare’. The Democrats fashioned themselves as the party of liberty, individual and states’ rights, against government interference into the private and economic realm of workers, as the party of producerist republicanism. Other than during the later ‘New Deal’ era, government intervention during the ‘Jacksonian’ period was not perceived as a tool for advancing the socio-economic interests of labor. It was heavily associated with support for ‘internal improvements’, meaning the extension of infrastructure, on the basis of which industrial development and the emergence of big corporations would be possible. The ‘laissez faire’ agenda of the Democrats had an appeal to workers, because economic interventionism was perceived as benefiting business, and evangelical demands for incursions of the state into the private realm were perceived as an assault on individual liberties. The Whigs, on the other hand, portrayed themselves as the party of ‘positive liberalism’. An interventionist state intent on implementing ‘internal improvements’ and ‘moral values’ was portrayed as a prerequisite for economic development and social uplift.

Watson (2006, p. 195) neatly summarizes this interaction of ethnocultural and economic cleavages:

“(…) religion and ethnicity had not substituted new motives for the voters’ political activities. Indeed, ethnocultural tension only tended to reinforce the previously established patterns of

257 See Watson (2006)
Jacksonian politics. The original polarity between Democrats and Whigs, between the party of liberty and the party of improvement (…) only grew in the fires of ethnic and cultural conflict."

This pattern of party conflict and the activities of opposing political entrepreneurs is a typical example for attempts of party elites to activate different cleavage dimensions for the mobilization of a constituency. The ‘Jacksonians’ recognized the benefit of responding to socio-economic dividing lines, and the emerging anti-Jacksonian coalition that would later develop into the Whig party, responded not only by suggesting an alternative agenda, but, more than that, by attempting to alter the parameters of the party system, through the introduction of a new dividing line into the arena of contentious politics. In the first place, this occurred through the anti-Jacksonians’ embrace of the old federalist position on tariffs. High tariffs were designed to protect the manufacturing interests in the North, while they disadvantaged Southern cash crop producers, who depended on exports to European markets. The anti-Jacksonians argued that high tariffs would not only benefit manufacturers themselves, but also the employees of protected industries. Hence, in response to the class appeal of the ‘Jacksonians’, the incipient Whigs emphasized a sectional economic policy that cross-cut class divisions.

Second, the introduction of an ethnoreligious dividing line into the political arena represented an even more far-reaching attempt to change the parameters of political conflict. The embrace of evangelical religious appeals in the context of the temperance and Sunday mail delivery issues as well as the anti-catholic, anti-papist, anti-immigrant rhetoric of the emerging Whigs was designed to cut across not just class lines, but socio-economic cleavages in general, by mobilizing evangelical protestant and native workers for the party. In both these respects, the Jacksonians emphasized the divergence of interests between the federal government and employers on the one hand, and workers, immigrants, and small farmers on the other. The emerging Whigs focused on the harmony of interests within the manufacturing sector and within entrenched ethnocultural communities. In response to these challenges by the Whigs, the ‘Jacksonian’ party elites did not abandon their socio-economic agenda. But they realized that a counter attack on the ethnoreligious front, which their competitors had opened, by emphasizing the liberty of workers from the tutelage of moral crusaders and the state, could reinforce their previous socio-economic appeal.

This sequence of events bears much similarity to the way in which mass political conflict was institutionalized in other modernizing societies. In response to the challenge of labor’s entry into the political arena, the foundation of christian democratic parties was designed to mobilize workers along religious identifications that cross cut socio-economic cleavages. The Conservatives in Britain fashioned an appeal to workers that included references to traditional values, albeit without the christian democratic label and affiliations, as well as a rhetoric of paternalism and superior management skills (cf. Beer 1965). The crucial difference to these cases is the fact that the institutionalization of mass political conflict in the US
occurred about half a decade earlier than anywhere else in the industrializing world. This has important ramifications for the opportunities of labor party formation. Religious and ethnocultural, or non-economic identifications in general, became more important for defining the parameters of mass conflict, because they emerged during a time period before the actual ‘formative’ stage of nationwide labor’s entry into the political arena, when the labor movement was still in its infancy. In all other industrializing societies, the activation of non-economic cleavages in the context of party conflict, and the concomitant efforts of labor politicians to make the economic cleavage salient, occurred during a time period, when the labor movement had already reached organizational maturity.

Thus, the introduction of religious and ethnocultural dividing lines and the efforts of political entrepreneurs to increase their salience over earlier socio-economic cleavage dimensions are by no means unique to the United States. But the sequence of events – the activation of religious conflicts long before labor became a nationwide mature organization – has indeed only occurred in the US. And this, in addition to the other ‘mechanisms’ of inclusion during the ‘Jacksonian’ era, was one contributing factor to the later absence of social democratic party formation, and the embrace of an alternative strategy. The ‘second’ labor movement of the late 19th century emerged into a political arena, where patterns of ethnoreligious conflict, and stable party identifications, had already been well established. This made efforts to emphasize the salience and autonomy of socio-economic dividing lines much more difficult for potential labor party entrepreneurs.

Policy concessions to the labor movement

The actual policies enacted in response to the demands of organized labor at the local, state, and federal levels might not have been the most important inclusive mechanism, but without at least a minimum of concessions, other types of inclusion would have been perceived as shallow. Moreover, from within the entire set of measures geared at labor incorporation, the causal mechanism between workingmen pressure on the one hand and policies on the other hand is the most easily discernible one. The majority of policy demands contained in the “Workingmen platform” of the late 1810s were implemented at various levels of government throughout the ‘Jacksonian’ era. Moreover, the debate about banking, currency, and chartered monopolies that became paramount throughout the late 1820s as one of the most important issues of the time has led to a variety of measures at the state and federal levels that responded positively to the demands of organized labor.

At the state level, throughout the 1820s and 1830s, a majority of states abolished imprisonment for debtors, ended the practice of compulsory militia drills, and enacted mechanics’ lien laws, all of which were crucial elements of the “Workingmen Platform”. With the implementation of republican systems of
education, another crucial demand of organized labor was met (cf. Rayback 1966). Moreover, the majority of states also replaced paper money and chartered monopolies with hard money and a free banking system, combined with the structural control of banks (cf. Schlesinger 1945). This issue was part of the original “workingmen’s platform”, and has then evolved into the focus of labor’s lobbying and electoral efforts throughout the 1830s. Later on, in the early 1840s, when the issue of the ten hour day arose as a central demand of organized labor, a great number of states responded by enacting according legislation throughout the late 1840s and early 1850s.\(^{258}\)

At the federal level, several policies and the active support for them by the federal executive, stand out. With respect to the two pressing economic policy questions of the time – banking and ‘internal improvements’ – Andrew Jackson supported policies that were also part of organized labor’s agenda. His opposition to the national bank and the circulation of paper money was the single most important issue in this context. In agreement with the demands of organized labor, Jackson vetoed the recharter of the Bank of the United States in 1832. In his veto message, Jackson gave explicit expression to the egalitarian impulse of the time, couched his decision in an anti-elitist rhetoric, and framed it as a veto designed to defend the interests of the disadvantaged strata in society.\(^{259}\) There can be no doubt that both in terms of policy content and rhetorical packaging, his veto was designed as an appeal to the small farmer and worker constituency of the Democratic party. Taking this into account, it should be very difficult to argue that socio-economic motivations and inclusive mechanisms were not important during the ‘Jacksonian’ era.

Moreover, espousing the ‘negative liberalism’ of his party, Jackson was also opposed to interventionist policies and ‘internal improvements’, which at the time, were considered pro-business. He refused federal aid or subsidies for such infrastructure projects as the building of roads and canals; the single most visible issue in this context was his decision to veto the Maysville Road bill in 1830. Martin van Buren, successor of Jackson as president from 1837 to 1841, continued Jackson’s policy on banking, under pressure from the New York ‘locofocos’. He embraced many elements from their economic program, and this agenda culminated in his support for the implementation of an independent treasury and the abolishment of state bank notes in 1840.\(^{260}\) Other policies that should be noted in this context are: first, van Buren’s executive order of 1840 implementing the ten hour day for federal employees, which foreshadowed legislation establishing maximum working hours in many states throughout the 1840s and

\(^{258}\) See Rayback (1966) for an overview. Note that in some of these cases, despite the enactment of legislation, the supervision and actual enforcement of these measures represent another problem. The disappointment of organized labor with the success of these policies, and for that matter, later labor legislation, has led to an increasing emphasis on the effectiveness of policies. But this changes nothing about the inclusive effects of these policies at the time of their implementation.

\(^{259}\) See Jackson (1832) for the original text.

\(^{260}\) Again, this measure was repealed in 1841, so that its actual effect on the economy was very limited. But that does not change anything about the inclusive effect of the measures vis-à-vis organized labor, or the fact that it helped unite the Whigs against van Buren’s ‘locofocoism’ in the 1840 presidential election.
early 1850s; and second, the continuing support of the Democratic party for the distribution of land in the
West to settlers instead of using the land as a source of income by selling it to investors. This entire
ensemble of policies is only one, but a necessary element, in the set of inclusive mechanisms employed by
‘Jacksonian’ elites toward labor.

Historiographical controversies about the ‘Jacksonian’ era

Two out of three historiographical controversies about the ‘Jacksonian’ era that have some bearing on
the argument I am suggesting here, have already been discussed: first, the debate about the extent to which
the Democrats really were the advocate of the ‘common man’, and relatedly, whether their agenda and
electoral appeal to egalitarian principles were sincere or strategic; second, the relative salience and
importance of ethnocultural and economic party appeals and voting behavior. One final debate will be
introduced briefly now: the discussion about the extent to which both parties, and not just the Democrats,
functioned as inclusive agents toward labor.

One element of Benson’s (1961) interpretation that has been neglected so far is his claim that a
significant share of workers as well as the rank and file of organized labor and the workingmen parties
were incorporated through the emerging anti-Jacksonian coalition and the Whig party. Beforehand, it was
commonly accepted that the majority of workers and organized labor had pledged their allegiance to the
‘Jacksonians’, after the efforts at workingmen party formation had been countered by inclusive measures of
the Jacksonian party elites. While the Democrats appealed to workers through their anti-elitist, producerist,
and libertarian rhetoric, the Whigs attempted to counter this appeal by emphasizing the harmony of
interests between employers and workers in the manufacturing sector and the positive effects of high tariffs
on both groups. Moreover, Benson (1961) argues that in the case of New York, one pillar of the anti-
Jacksonian coalition was rooted in the failed workingmen parties’ adherents, who did not return to the
Democratic party fold.

Watson (2006) finds a compromise position between Benson (1961) on the one hand, and Schlesinger
(1945) on the other, who emphasizes the role of the Democrats as the only relevant inclusive actor. He
disagrees with the earlier conventional wisdom, and concludes that a certain share of workingmen support
was indeed transferred to the Whigs, in response to their tariff position, their criticism of Jackson and
Democratic party machines, as well as their ethnoreligious appeals to evangelical protestants and natives.
However, he also disagrees with what he regards as an exaggeration of the Whig role in labor inclusion by
Benson (1961). Watson concludes: first, that the majority of workingmen, despite some significant success
of the Whigs in attracting worker support, developed loyalties for the Democrats; second, that the majority
of activists and supporters of the workingmen parties eventually returned to the Democratic party fold; and
third, that the ethnocultural appeal of the Democrats to catholics and immigrants strengthened the ties of workers to the party throughout the 1840s, when immigration of Irish and German catholics dramatically changed the ethnic composition of the American work force.

While I do sympathize with Watson’s (2006) compromise position, there is no need to decide either way on this issue, since it does not affect the general argument suggested here. As noted briefly in the introduction to this section, whether labor inclusion should be interpreted as having occurred exclusively through one party (the Democrats), predominantly through one party, or through both parties, does not change anything about the fact that labor inclusion did occur. It leaves us with a minor puzzle related to the agents of inclusion, but this open question does not affect the general argument about labor inclusion and its mechanisms that have been analyzed here.

Conclusion

The process of labor incorporation during the ‘Jacksonian era’ is crucial for the short and long term curtailing of independent party formation. The response of the entrenched ‘Jacksonian’ elites to the challenge of the workingmen parties and other forms of political pressure exercised by organized labor during this period was one of inclusion, pursued along four major avenues: first, through institutional democratic reforms that opened politics to the public and established a pattern of mass conflict, centered around two major parties and partisans with stable party identifications; second, through the emergence of urban political machines, which incorporated labor along residential lines into cross-class ethnocultural coalitions, fueled by the distribution of spoils and patronage; third, through electoral appeals to labor, by machines, local, state, and federal party organizations, initially socio-economic in nature, and then gradually reinforced by ethnocultural appeals; fourth, through the implementation of policies that responded positively to the legislative agenda demanded by organized labor, at the state and the federal level.

The incorporation of labor into the existing political order during its ‘formative stage’ of entry into the political arena from the late 1860s to 1921, cannot adequately be understood without reference to the previous pattern of emerging highest inclusion during the ‘Jacksonian’ era. Otherwise most similar cases from the higher category of inclusion lacked this prerequisite. In some instances (Britain, France, Canada), the institutional basis for the emergence of stable party systems and mass mobilization was absent. In all three countries, some crucial components necessary for a completely liberal polity were missing, both before and during the ‘formative stage’ of nationwide organized labor’s entry into the political arena. In the remaining cases (New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland), the necessary institutional foundations - highest inclusion on all institutional dimensions – existed during and even before the ‘formative stage’, just like in
the US. However, despite the existence of the necessary institutional prerequisite, stable party systems, and the inclusive measures they generated (policies, electoral appeals, political machines with spoils and patronage) did not occur in these cases before the end of the 19th century.\(^{261}\) They did emerge in the US already throughout the 1820s, the beginning of the ‘Jacksonian’ era. And the opportunities for labor inclusion that occurred as a result were used by the entrenched elites of the second party system, who thereby created the necessary conditions for the failure of social democratic party formation during the late 19th and early 20th century.

The ‘third party system’ and two variants of moderate syndicalism

The actual ‘formative stage’ of nationwide organized labor’s entry into the political arena occurred on the background of the institutional arrangements and political developments of the ‘Jacksonian era’. It begins in the late 1860s, while the ‘third party system’ was underway to reach its stable phase of electoral alignment that lasted from 1873-76 until the early 1890s. The realignment that marks the transformation from the ‘second’ to the ‘third’ party system began with initial electoral fluctuations around 1854. The mid 1890s represent not just the end of the specific partisan coalitions of the third party system, but more generally the end of party and legislative dominance altogether.\(^{262}\) Labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena from 1868 to 1921 therefore extends across the stable phase of the third party system, the fundamental realignment of the mid 1890s, and the ensuing progressive era, which was characterized by a decrease in partisan affiliations, and the relative increase of executive vis-à-vis party and legislative influence.

Compared to the earlier ‘Jacksonian’ era, labor politics during the second half of the 19th century has two distinct characteristics: first, the altered institutional and partisan environment of the ‘third party system’, noted above; and second, the emergence of labor as a nationally organized force in the economic realm. After the failure of the workingmen parties in the 1820s and 1830s, organized labor was, of course, not entirely removed from partisan politics, but the next stage of challenges to the existing party system as an independent force only occurred beginning in the late 1860s.

The social reform movements of the 1840s and 1850s – land reform, anti-slavery, cooperatives – were sometimes electorally involved, and sometimes included organized labor. But they did not represent

\(^{261}\) In the cases of New Zealand and Australia, the continuing colonial dependence on Great Britain throughout the 19th century contributed to delaying the emergence of stable ‘domestic’ party politics. Switzerland, as has been noted before, is the case that was closest to the US pattern of highest inclusion. What delayed the institutionalization of the Swiss party system was the exclusively cantonal, i.e. subfederal, organization of parties before the end of the 19th century. Moreover, the lack of highest inclusion in Switzerland is also due to institutional reforms in the late 1910s (the introduction of PR) that had an exclusionary effect.

\(^{262}\) The various stages of development within the third party system have been identified by Kleppner (1991)
encompassing attempts of labor elites to enter the political arena as an independent force. Moreover, while the land reform movement that developed a comprehensive legislative agenda, received undivided labor support, unions and workers were strongly divided over the issue of slavery. The establishment of cooperatives represents an effort to escape the necessity of political involvement altogether, by shielding workers as ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ from the pressures of capitalist markets. However, the social reform movements of this time would have an important effect both on the populist movement and various manifestations of labor’s political ambitions during the late 19th and early 20th century.

Organized labor constituted itself as a nationwide force in the economic realm throughout the 1850s and 1860s. During this time period, the first permanent and nationwide unions were established. They were based on a more efficient form of organization that would allow the unions’ survival even in times of recession. The defining features of this organizational strategy were the centralization and professionalization of activities, the formation of new federations, and the factual focus on skilled workers, despite formal statements to appeal to unskilled laborers as well. All of these are developments foreshadowing the particular variant of the ‘moderate syndicalist’ model that was later on adopted by the AFL.

Organizational solidification continued during and after the Civil War. The war, despite conscription and loss of life, did not have an adverse effect on the strength of the movement. Organized labor expanded its activities during the war and the immediate post-war period, at least until the 1868 depression. However, even though a number of national unions, local associations, and city federations dissolved during the recession, this was the first time in the history of the American labor movement that a significant number of organizations survived the adverse effects of a declining economy: organized labor had truly established itself as a nationwide force.\(^\text{263}\)

Labor’s strategy at the time is often referred to as “pure and simple” unionism, meaning that the newly emerging trade unions of this period focused exclusively on the economic realm and turned their back on political involvement.\(^\text{264}\) While it is true that organized labor during this time period refrained from any significant attempts at independent party formation, it is not entirely correct to conclude that it completely eschewed politics. It would be more appropriate to argue that organized labor, albeit with lower intensity than before, continued to launch interventions into the political domain: when large-scale employer associations formed in response to labor’s organizational efforts during the late 1860s, trade unions frequently turned to politics in order to prevent anti-labor legislation called for by employers.

\(^{263}\) See Rayback (1966) for an overview of labor’s emergence as a national force.

\(^{264}\) This terminology dates back to Perlman (1928) and Commons (1935).
Political lobbying was also a prime concern for unions in their efforts to push for the adoption of eight-hour working day legislation in the late 1860s and early 1870s.

Hence, already during the early realignment stage of the third party system, ‘moderate syndicalism’, characterized by a strategy of ‘unionism, selective political interventions, and party system incorporation’ was the dominant model of organized labor’s presence in the political arena. The earlier outcome of the ‘Jacksonian’ era, when ‘moderate syndicalism’ emerged as dominant over the formation of workingmen parties, thereby continued during the early stages of the third party system.

A distinctively new set of developments only occurred in the 1870s, after the establishment of labor as a nationally organized force, and the completion of the realignment that began in the mid 1850s: first, the emergence of new as well as the re-emergence of old alternatives to the dominance of ‘moderate syndicalism’; and second, the diversification of ‘moderate syndicalism’ into different variants: both the Knights of Labor and the AFL that emerged during the third party system, as well as the later International Workers of the World, represent only different manifestations of the same ‘moderate syndicalist’ principle. But they are characterized by some important idiosyncrasies. The period of the ‘third party system’ is the stage, on which the AFL version of ‘moderate syndicalism’ emerges as dominant not only over alternative models of independent party formation, but also over the Knights’ version of ‘moderate syndicalism’. During the following ‘progressive’ era, and, for that matter, all following stages of American political development, new challengers have entered the arena, but the AFL continued to be dominant.

In this context, the focus of much the existing literature on American labor politics is on the differences between the Knights of Labor and the AFL, geared at an explanation for why the Knights failed and the AFL emerged as dominant. The strategical and ideological recommendations of both these organizations are regarded as mutually exclusive, but not as what they really are – only two variants of the same ‘moderate syndicalism’ approach. While the differences between them are clearly relevant in explaining their relative success, an acknowledgment of their similarities is crucial for explaining the failure of independent party formation as a fundamentally distinct alternative to the ‘moderate syndicalism’ of both the Knights and the AFL. Only a broader comparative framework that extends beyond the limited perspective on one particular case can open our eyes to this phenomenon.

The following analysis of labor inclusion and labor elites’ strategies during the third party system as the first part of labor’s ‘formative stage’ in the political arena will therefore pay keen attention to both the differences and the communalities of the models suggested by the Knights and the AFL. This investigation will proceed as follows: First, the nature of the third party system, and the innovations in labor inclusion, compared to the previous ‘Jacksonian era’, will be outlined. This represents the background of ‘highest inclusion’ to the strategic choices and organizational attempts of labor elites. Second, the various models that were proposed by labor elites in response to this environment will be assessed comparatively.
This investigation is geared at responding to two interrelated questions: the most fundamental question, as to why the ‘moderate syndicalist’ approach emerged as dominant over other organizational models, especially the formation of an independent social democratic party; and only on the basis of this explanation, the question as to why the specific ‘moderate syndicalist’ variant of the AFL emerged as dominant over an alternative version of ‘moderate syndicalism’, as it was suggested by the Knights of Labor. Both types of responses are rooted in an analysis of labor inclusion during the era of the third party system. The provision of highest inclusion created an environment, to which ‘moderate syndicalism’ represented the optimal response. And within the group of ‘moderate syndicalist’ options, the AFL model was better suited to respond to the particular nature of ‘highest inclusion’ in the United States.

Agents and mechanisms of labor inclusion during the third party system

Labor inclusion during the third party system occurred on the background of the institutional arrangements created during the ‘Jacksonian era’. Party and legislative dominance continued in an uninterrupted fashion, but the substantive underpinning of partisan conflict had changed as a result of the electoral realignment of the mid 1850s and the implications of the Civil War. As a consequence, agents and mechanisms of inclusion were subject to significant evolution and change in between the second and third party systems, while the fundamental institutional balance of power remained in place.

Table 16 displays an overview of labor inclusion during the crucial stages of American political development. For the third party system, the first important difference to the earlier Jacksonian era is about agency. We have previously introduced the historiographical debate about the relevant agents of inclusion during the ‘Jacksonian era’. There is some controversy as to whether labor was predominantly incorporated into the existing party system through the Democrats, or whether the Whigs were to some significant extent based on labor support as well. For the third party system, there is no doubt that the newly emerging Republican party established itself as at least an equally, if not even more important, agent of inclusion. The Democrats on the other hand, as we will see later in more detail, lost some of their earlier working-class support during the realignment stage of the third party system, while they remained an important agent of labor inclusion.

Secondly, as far as the mechanisms of inclusion are concerned, some important changes have occurred during the third party system. Institutional reforms, which were an important contributing factor for inclusion during the second party system, had already been completed in all states by the 1840s, with

265 See McCormick (1986) and his characterization of the second and third party systems as the "party period"
266 Shefter (1978) on the role and the importance of institutional conflict in American political development
the exception of only two laggards – universal suffrage was introduced 1851 in Virginia and 1865 in South Carolina. On aggregate, therefore, institutional reforms played no role in labor inclusion during the third party system. Furthermore, policy concessions had been crucial for inclusion during ‘Jacksonian’ times, when the majority of states undertook comprehensive efforts to respond to the legislative demands of the ‘Workingmen platform’. They became less important during the third party system, but did not completely disappear. The extent of conciliatory labor policies, however, was reduced from the encompassing ‘Jacksonian’ programmatic response to only particularistic concessions.

The two remaining items noted in Table 16 stand out as the crucial mechanisms for inclusion during the third party system: the electoral appeals of the two major parties and the practices of local political machines. Both of these inclusive mechanisms were not new. But they reinforced, and brought to a full bloom, patterns of inclusion that had been introduced initially during the ‘Jacksonian’ era. The historiographical debate about the relative salience of ethnocultural and economic sources for voting and party appeals already applied to the second party system. But it is undeniable, as we have argued before, that socio-economic appeals were of crucial importance for labor inclusion during that period. It is equally undeniable that ethnocultural appeals have increased in importance during the third party system.

Strong class identities continued to exist at this time, but they were less frequently translated into the political realm, where sectional economic policies and ethnocultural appeals had become dominant. As a matter of fact, much of the post-bellum political development of the third party system can be understood as repeated attempts of established elites to maintain their focus on ethnoreligious and sectional cleavages, while challengers (Western farmers, small Southern farmers, labor) attempted to introduce class-based or other socio-economic cleavages as new parameters of political conflicts. The success of labor inclusion along ethnocultural and sectional economic policy lines is the key to understand the lack of successful independent party formation during this era. This outcome, moreover, would not have occurred without the sustaining of electoral appeals through the activities of political machines. At the local level, both skilled and unskilled workers were organized within ethnocultural cross-class political machines, whose influence and importance for labor inclusion increased significantly from the ‘Jacksonian’ era to the third party system.

Parties and electoral alignments during the third party system

The third party system and the mechanisms of labor inclusion that it generated, emerged in response to the dissolution of the second party system’s partisan affiliations. The combination of socio-economic cleavages, emerging ethnocultural identities and limited sectional variation in partisan support, typical for the ‘Jacksonian era’, dissolved in the mid 1850s. The trigger for the electoral realignment that resulted in
the third party system was the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which opened the state of Nebraska to the extension of slavery. Previously, the issue of slavery was largely excluded from the national party system, which allowed both parties to translate their agenda into local appeals in the North and South, while at the same time maintaining an effective nationwide organization.267

Slavery and the question of its westward extension triggered the realignment that dissolved the second party system. But as a single issue, it was only the most tangible indicator for a more fundamental cleavage and the beginning of a more far reaching shift of electoral allegiances. The emphasis on a sectional, non-class, socio-economic cleavage as one immanent parameter of political conflict during the ‘Jacksonian era’ (the Whigs’ economic development and high tariff agenda) culminated in the intensification of political identifications along sectional lines that ended the second party system. The reference to the ‘harmony of interests’ between employers and employees in the manufacturing belt of the North, and the emphasis on a policy of high tariffs, designed to protect the manufacturing interests in the North, while equally opposed to the interests of export oriented cash-crop producers in the South, had already been a crucial element of the Whig agenda. Combined with moral appeals to abolitionism and evangelical social uplift, it was later pursued by the Republicans as a means of electoral mobilization, and as such, it also identifies the ensemble of underpinnings for the Civil War itself.

The collapse of the Whigs in 1854 over the issue of slavery led to a coalition of former anti-slavery whigs, free-soilers, abolitionists, and other disgruntled northern Democrats as the foundation for the Republican party. The new political formation cut across the defining cleavages of the second party system. What emerged in its place, according to Kleppner (1991), was a reorientation of the party system and parties’ agendas along explicitly sectional lines. What needs to be added to Kleppner’s conclusion is the fact that, on aggregate, for the entire duration of the third party system, ethnocultural cleavages, which often reinforced socio-economic grievances, but to some extent, cross-cut sectional alignments, became paramount for electoral mobilization as well. This development had already begun during the immediate ante-bellum period, as a consequence of increasing anti-immigrant and anti-catholic rhetoric, pursued by the Know-Nothing-Party. The majority of its followers would join the new Republican movement by the late 1850s and early 1860s.

This process is crucial for the issue of labor inclusion, because it alerts us to the fact that, despite the activation of a sectional cleavage by both major parties, the Democrats maintained some parts of their

267 It should be noted, however, that despite regional variation in electoral appeals, both parties were able to formulate such appeals on the basis of a common philosophical underpinning. The Democrats, for example, portrayed themselves as the party of laissez-faire and ‘negative liberalism’. In the North, this was translated into an appeal to immigrant workers that focused on their freedom from state intervention into their private and economic affairs. In the South, negative liberalism was translated into demands for state rights and the liberty of states to make their own policies, without interference from the federal government, and by logical extension, the powerful northern manufacturing interests.
Northern labor constituencies: labor was kept within the Democratic fold through the well-known ethnocultural appeals to immigrants and catholics, but also as a consequence of the continuing appeal of the old laissez-faire and producerist agenda. In addition to these two ‘Jacksonian’ issues, a certain share of Northern workers also responded positively to the invocation of black emancipation as a threat to labor. The internal tensions within the Democrats as a consequence of regional variation in their appeal did, of course, lead to the temporary split of the party in 1860, but in the reconstruction and post-reconstruction eras of the third party system, the sometimes difficult alliance of the now increasingly ‘solid South’ and select groups of Northern labor continued.

In this realigned system of partisan affiliations, a sectional cleavage dimension emerged on top of other lines of conflict (ethnocultural and socio-economic). These other cleavages continued to exist during the pre-war, war, and reconstruction periods, and then gained in importance again after the end of reconstruction. On this background, labor inclusion occurred along three major avenues: first, through the adjusted, and evolving, electoral appeals of the two major parties; second, through the incorporation of workers into local political machines, on the basis of these appeals, and fueled by spoils and patronage. Both these mechanisms contributed to a continuation of the earlier pattern of strong partisan affiliations and activist parties, but the importance of machines increased significantly. Third, inclusion was also supported through particularistic policy concession at the federal, state, and local level, although no encompassing socio-economic program for labor was implemented in this period, other than during the ‘Jacksonian era’.

**Electoral appeals and political machines as mechanisms of labor inclusion**

During the stable alignment stage of the post-reconstruction third party system after 1877, the two previously noted most important mechanisms of labor inclusion – complex electoral appeals based on ethnocultural, socio-economic, and sectional divisions, and local political machines – are inextricably linked to one another. Kleppner (1991, 196) pointedly describes late 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century political conflict in America, characterized by the interaction of ideological appeals and local party organizations, as the equivalent of “political churches”, which “embodied a typically American form of political confessionalism”:

> “Differences in religious outlooks underlay contending definitions of what was, or was not, sin; and religiously rooted differences in conception of the nature of man and of the world produced incompatible views of the relations in society and politics. At stake were not simply distinctions between life-styles, but ones integrally connected with irreconcilable religious values. That these differences structured party oppositions meant that parties became the secular analogues of...

268 Kleppner (1991) also notes that the issues of sabbath desecration and temperance, which were previously associated with the Whigs, has become increasingly, but not entirely, independent of party affiliations. If this is indeed true, it is evidence for an even greater importance of sectional over ethnocultural and socio-economic cleavages, at least during the war and the reconstruction period.
churches. Each party represented, not a single denomination, but a loosely structured set of denominations sharing a collective central tendency. As Republican to evangelical pietists symbolized right behavior and a socially transforming morality, Democracy meant to ritualists right belief and a defense of laissez-faire hedonism. This dispositional consonance between religious outlooks and party characters produced a late nineteenth century electoral universe characterized by extraordinarily high levels of voter participation and by long-term stability.”

The same historiographical debate that is led with respect to voting behavior during Jacksonian times also finds its expression in contributions that criticize the exaggerated emphasis on ethnocultural issues during the third party system. Wilentz (1984), as noted before, argues that ethnocultural appeals only reinforced previously existing socio-economic identities and grievances. While his conceptual criticism is right on the mark, it is still true that the rhetorical emphasis on ethnocultural issues in electoral competition has markedly increased toward the end of the 19th century. As of now, there is abundant empirical evidence for the importance of ethnocultural affiliations for the projection of party images and voter identification patterns. Whether these patterns are only superimposed on existing socio-economic cleavages, and to what extent they reinforced these division lines, is of only minor importance for the argument pursued here. What is important is the undeniable fact that the electoral appeals that both parties projected of themselves during this time prevented the introduction of a pronounced, class-based, socio-economic dividing line through independent labor party formation into the political arena.

Shefter (1978) traces the development of the Republicans from a diverse movement, infused with much anti-party sentiment, which took over the heritage of the collapsed Whigs, into an effective party organization that employed the use of spoils and patronage from the federal level, and through local political machines, to an unprecedented extent. It was only through the establishment of stable party affiliations and tangible material rewards, that a diverse coalition of supporters could be held together in the context of the Republican’s agenda of economic development. Bensel (2000) made the point that several elements of this coalition, most importantly in our context, organized labor and workers, were not originally disposed to support a program of industrialism. The success of the Republican strategy to incorporate these groups is also evidenced by the fact that the two most prominent factions that turned their back on the party during the late 19th century did not do so in response to its economic development agenda. One of these groups, the ‘Mugwumps’, left the Republican coalition in the late 1870s and early 1880s because of its extensive use of patronage, ‘bossism’, and corruption. The prohibitionists of the late 1860s and 1870s left the party, because they felt that it was too pragmatic on the question of temperance.

While the Whigs had been present in the South through votes from the richer agricultural strata and slave holders, the Republicans naturally lost that source of support. The party had only two sources of constant electoral support in the South during the third party system: blacks and farmers from the mountain counties as the only group of whites, to whom the Democratic white supremacy agenda did not appeal,
given that they lived in a racially homogenous area (cf. Kleppner 1991). These losses, as defining elements of the 1854 electoral realignment, however, were more than compensated by the increasing support for the Republicans from an eclectic variety of social groups in the North. There, the majority of former Whigs joined the Republican fold, as did the previously Democratic advocates of Western “free soil”. For our purposes, the most relevant contributing factor to the new Republican coalition was the significant increase in support from ‘native’ and protestant workers, who were attracted by the religious, anti-immigration, and to some extent also ‘anti Southern’, rhetoric of the party. Based on these voter realignments, Kleppner (1991) concludes that the Republicans emerged as more of a Yankee Protestant party than the Whigs had ever been.

The Democrats, on the other hand, emerged as dominant in the former Confederacy after the war, and thereby also as a viable challenger on the national stage, despite the overall dominance of the Republicans. McCormick (1986) argues that during this time period, the Democrats engineered very different appeals across sectional dividing lines, which allowed the party to continue its existence as a nationwide force. However, he fails to note that the agenda of ‘negative liberalism’ and laissez faire that held this uneasy coalition of Northern labor and Southern agricultural interests together, was not so different from the underpinning of the ‘Jacksonian’ Democrats. What has changed in the meantime is the extent of support given to the party from these two sources: the party became more Southern, and less urban, but it was still the common basis of ‘negative liberalism’, in terms of states’ rights, personal liberties, and ‘producerist’ economic freedom, which bound these two forces together.

The coalition of Democratic support that emerged after the war and reconstruction encompassed the vast majority of Southern social groups, with the exception only of the above mentioned black Republicans and small farmers from the mountain counties. Other than during the ‘Jacksonian era’, both small farmers and large estate holders, who then tended to support the Whigs, came into the Democratic fold. But, of course, the Democrats’ resurgence in the South, and thereby as a national force, would not have been possible without the disenfranchising of black voters.

This overwhelming coalition of white Southerners, who responded to the sectional appeal of the party, joined forces with Northern workers of catholic and immigrant backgrounds, who saw the party as the protector of their personal and economic interests. The fact that the Democrats continued to campaign successfully in the North during the war as the peak of sectional confrontation, despite their association with Southern interests, Republican ‘patriot or traitor’ rhetoric, and the fragmentation of its party organizations, shows that the party’s appeal to its Northern constituency persisted even in an extremely hostile environment. Moreover, in addition to the well-established laissez-faire producerist and
ethnocultural appeals of the party, the Democrats also made inroads among Northern laborers, and Northerners in general, by appealing to racial prejudice against blacks.\textsuperscript{269}

The available quantitative analyses of late 19\textsuperscript{th} century voting behavior in the North largely confirm that voters reacted in kind to these adjusted party appeals.\textsuperscript{270} The two most important dividing lines for party support are found to be related to residency status, and religious affiliation. In terms of the first dimension, ‘native’ voters tend to be strongly Republican, with the exception only of catholic ‘natives’. The amount of support for the Democrats increases for recently immigrated individuals. In terms of religious affiliations, a relatively pronounced division exists between Democratic leanings by Catholics and other ‘ritualistic’ religious groups on the one hand, and support of evangelical ‘pietistic’ groups for the Republicans.

For the argument pursued here, it is quite irrelevant, whether these ethnocultural affiliations reinforced previous socio-economic dividing lines, as Wilentz (1984) argues. Either way, the electoral appeals of both major parties continued to effectively blend in with the underpinning philosophy of their respective socio-economic agendas – the interventionism, both morally and economically, of the Republicans, and the laissez faire attitude of ‘negative liberalism’, equally in both domains, by the Democrats. The intense party identifications developed in response to these appeals, and the local political machines that practically incorporated the labor constituency into cross-class coalitions, are the key inclusive mechanisms during this time period that contributed to highest inclusion and the absence of independent party formation.

\emph{Particularistic policy concessions}

What is frequently overlooked by “ethnocultural” scholars is the fact that despite the great relevance of ethnocultural and sectional appeals, not only might these appeals have been inextricably related to socio-economic interests, as Wilentz (1984) argues, but in addition to that, there was a significant number of policy concessions to labor that were clearly socio-economic in nature. Compared to the ‘Jacksonian’ era, when a relatively comprehensive legislative agenda was implemented in response to labor’s demands, policy concessions were more particularistic during the third party system.

Nonetheless, the frequent eruption of class-based grievances from the 1870s to 1890s (both through labor and farmers, and sometimes through a coalition of the two social groups) could not have been contained without a set of conciliatory policies. The other inclusive measures – electoral appeals and local

\textsuperscript{269} Kleppner (1991) observes that this strategy was particularly pronounced in the cases of Maryland and Missouri.
\textsuperscript{270} See Bridges (1984), Benson (1961), Kleppner’s (1991) analysis of deKalb County. See also Bensel (2003, 2004), who specifically investigates the role of the polling place and the processes of group pressure and group identification at work during the act of voting.
machine politics – would have been perceived as shallow, if this had not been the case. As a matter of fact, one of the most frequently heard charges of labor elites during this time period was about the limited scope of these policies. But their mere existence continued to be perceived by the majority of labor elites as sufficient proof that there was still the opportunity for labor to permeate and influence the existing party system, as they had before, during the ‘Jacksonian’ era.

There is a strong correlation between the granting of policy concessions and a prior political challenge of organized labor to the entrenched party elites. This pattern had already been observed during the ‘Jacksonian era’, and it occurred in a similar fashion during the third party system. The labor reforms of the late 1870s and 1880s were a direct response of party elites to the attempted formation of independent parties, among them the socialists, and the increasing political involvement of the Knights of Labor. Shefter (1991) notes that during this time period, elites from both parties, at the state and federal levels, campaigned on ethnocultural issues, such as liquor laws, while making more and more labor friendly legislation, along socio-economic dividing lines, especially during the late 1880s and early 1890s.

Four major types of conciliatory labor policies were enacted during this time period. First, both at the federal level and throughout many states, one important demand of organized labor, the establishment of labor statistics bureaus, was met. In 1884, Congress created a national bureau of labor, and by the turn of the century, thirty states had set up equivalent agencies (cf. Rayback 1966). The majority of industrialized states had already started this trend in the 1880s, with the foundation of labor bureaus in Maine, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois.

Second, during the same time period, various limits on the use of convict labor were implemented and enforced. Organized labor had long protested the practice of substituting regular with much cheaper convict labor. As an initial step, the labeling of convict produced goods was introduced in many states. Between 1883 and 1886, democratic legislatures in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and republican legislatures in New Jersey and Indiana passed anti-convict labor laws, which forbade the practice altogether. In 1887, the federal government followed suit. By the year 1900, other states had emulated this legislation, so that at this time, it was only the Southern states that still resisted.

Third, various legislative steps were taken to appease labor with respect to the issue of foreign worker imports. It was a popular practice among employers to substitute striking workers with temporary contract labor from abroad. The 1885 Foran Act disallowed this practice. It was amended in 1887 to make enforcement more feasible. 271 Fourth, various state governments gave tacit acceptance to the emerging mechanisms of industrial dispute resolution, which is indicative of what we have previously introduced as a predominantly neutral behavior of the state executive. In some cases, most notably New York City, formal

271 See USA (1885) for the original text of the Foran Act.
boards of mediation and arbitration were established. In addition to these major issues, other forms of legislation, which to some extent foreshadowed the progressive labor program of the early 20th century, complimented the list. This includes continued legislative efforts to reduce working hours, amendments of the penal code to prevent coercion of union members by employers, and the enactment of the first tenement housing code in New York City.

As I argued already with respect to the labor policies of the Jacksonian era, the question here is not whether objectively, organized labor truly benefited from these measures, whether they were sufficiently enforceable, and so on. The important point is the fact that along with other mechanisms of inclusion, these conciliatory policies succeeded in incorporating labor into the existing party system and prevented independent party formation. In order to explain the lack of party formation, it is irrelevant, whether these policies and other inclusive mechanisms only created an illusion of responsiveness, or whether they did truly benefit labor. What is important to understand the strategical response of organized labor is the fact that conciliatory policies, electoral appeals, and political machines created the impression of responsiveness, and moreover, established institutional arrangements and stable party identification patterns that functioned as obstacles for independent party formation.

No similar ‘package’ of inclusive mechanisms amounting to a comparatively highest degree of inclusion existed in the otherwise similar, or only slightly different, cases from the category of higher inclusion (see table 9). At the beginning of labor’s ‘formative stage’ of entry into the political arena, competitive party systems had emerged in all the instances of higher inclusion as well. But each of these cases lacked at least one of the elements that guaranteed highest inclusion in the US. First of all, in the cases of France and Britain, some fundamental institutional underpinnings for highest inclusion were missing: the lack of full enfranchisement in Britain before 1919, and the formal-legal infringements on political liberties in France before 1884. Thus, in these two cases, any inclusive appeal to labor through the entrenched elites would be seriously hampered by the lack of formal institutional inclusion, i.e. the failure to guarantee labor the same fundamental opportunities of access to the political arena as other more privileged groups.

Second, the centrality of ethnocultural, religious, and sectional cleavages in the US was unsurpassed. It contributed to a set of parameters defining contentious politics that pushed explicitly class-based cleavages further to the background than in any other case. In some of the higher inclusion cases, explicitly religious appeals were present in, or even the defining feature of one of the entrenched parties, for example

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272 The denomination ‘otherwise similar’ (in terms of highest institutional inclusion) refers to the cases of Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland. ‘Only slightly different’ refers to France, Britain, and Canada, because there were some infringements on full institutional liberalism in these cases. Moreover, the case of Canada is a ‘deviant’ case, because the prediction regarding party formation derived from a purely institutional analysis does not suit the actual outcome: this issue, and the important role of ‘suboptimal’ elite agency in Canada will be discussed in the following chapter.
in France, but most clearly in Switzerland. However, the religious appeal co-existed with at least equally strong class-based dividing lines. In other cases (Britain, New Zealand, Australia), the existing parties attempted to forge an almost exclusively economic appeal to labor, on the basis of their traditional agenda, which regarded labor as an extension to their conventional constituency. The socio-economic appeals of liberals, and conservatives, to labor, were therefore increasingly perceived as artificially constructed and shallow. In the US, on the other hand, the labor constituency could relate to and identify with the innovative ethnoreligious appeals of the existing parties that incorporated them, not as an artificial addendum to an older, opposing, set of interests, but instead as one element of a coalition pursuing the same agenda; equal members of a “secular church”, as Kleppner (1991) would put it.  

Third, the distribution of spoils and patronage through local political machines was used as an effective inclusive mechanism toward labor nowhere else except for the United States. Shefter (1977) holds the role of machines accountable as the single most important mechanism for labor inclusion in the US, and, by extension, for the lack of independent party formation. We have already argued before, by comparing the US to the cases of Spain, Argentina, and Italy, that this is not an entirely adequate conclusion. The extensive use of spoils and patronage in these cases could not prevent party formation, because the material and psychological rewards of patronage were not embedded into the same ensemble of additional inclusive mechanisms, as they were in the US: highest institutional inclusion through a democratic polity, electoral appeals, and conciliatory labor policies were all lacking in these cases.

The same can be said about the case of France, which is another example that can be used to refute Shefter’s argument. As he observes himself, patronage was practiced in a nearly excessive fashion during the emerging Third Republic. If it were only about patronage, France should not have seen the formation of an independent party of labor. But it did, because the use of patronage was not embedded in the same ensemble of further inclusive mechanisms, although in the case of France as an instance of ‘higher inclusion’, labor exclusion was much less pronounced than in the ‘low inclusion’ cases of Spain, Argentina, and Italy. Nonetheless, even at the most fundamental level of democratic institutional inclusion, France was lacking, because political liberties were only fully guaranteed to labor ever since the mid 1880s.

Fourth, policy concessions to labor were made in all higher inclusion cases as well, most extensively in New Zealand, where the first formalized nationwide arbitration and dispute resolution system was established in 1894. This shows that conciliatory labor policies, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to prevent party formation, a lesson that politicians in many of the low inclusion cases, most notably Germany, had to learn as well. They are a necessary prerequisite for labor incorporation, but one that will only help to prevent party formation, if the other mechanisms described above are in place, too. And this

273 Again, whether this ethnocultural agenda was ‘objectively’ in the interest of laborers is of no relevance here.
was not the case in any of the higher inclusion cases that did make policy concessions to labor, but only in the United States, as the single representative of ‘highest inclusion’.

Labor politics in the context of highest inclusion

It is for these reasons that the US was exceptional in the sense in which the term was introduced earlier on: as the only representative of highest inclusion during (and even prior to) labor’s formative stage – not as an anomalous case, but as an empirical manifestation that can be explained through a systematic theoretical framework. The dominant model of organized labor’s presence in the political arena that consisted of pursuing a ‘moderate syndicalist’ strategy in response to the environment of the ‘third party system’ is a perfectly rational, in fact ‘optimal’, response to this environment. This strategy continued to be ‘optimal’ during the following progressive era as the second phase of labor’s formative stage – but slightly adjusted under the somewhat altered institutional circumstances of the first two decades of the 20th century.

The evolution of moderate syndicalism as the dominant model of labor politics, and the continuing failure of independent party formation attempts will assessed throughout the following paragraphs. In the first place, I am going to discuss the way in which independent party formation failed as a consequence of highest inclusion. Second, I will trace the process through which moderate syndicalism as the optimal response to this environment also emerged as the dominant model. Third, I am going to investigate more specifically, how the AFL variant of moderate syndicalism emerged as dominant over the competing variant suggested by the Knights of Labor.

Before moving on to a detailed analysis of models of labor politics and their interaction with the existing environment of highest inclusion during the third party system, a brief overview of these models and a summary of my argument will be outlined now. In most general terms, ‘moderate syndicalism’ succeeded as the dominant model of labor politics, because it represented the optimal response to the existing environment of highest inclusion. The combination of unionism as a struggle centered around the workplace, party system incorporation of the worker constituency, and the use of flexible political interventions by organized labor allowed ‘moderate syndicalism’ to eschew the dominant patterns of partisan politics, while at the same time, advancing labor’s agenda in the economic and the political arena. The superior suitability of ‘moderate syndicalism’ to this particular American environment can also be inferred from a contrast to the failure of independent party formation as the fundamental alternative. Challengers of various kinds, to be introduced in more detail below, who pursued projects of independent party formation, had to struggle with the psychological and institutional obstacles erected as a consequence of the entrenched patterns of partisan conflict, along the lines discussed extensively above.
First of all, widely held partisan identifications, as a result of both the Jacksonian era and the third party system, made it extremely difficult for challengers to enter the political arena as an independent force. There are both ‘objective’ and ‘psychological’ reasons for this. Objectively, political machines as well as federal party organizations had primary and unrivaled access to the resources of the state that kept their organizations alive and attractive. They also resisted institutional reforms, such as the introduction of Proportional Representation, which would have decreased the opportunity costs for new challengers’ entrance into the political arena.274 In addition to that, intense partisan identification patterns and their psychological underpinning made it difficult for new challengers to break the existing and establish somewhat cross-cutting new identities that were necessary to sustain their alternative party.

Secondly, it was not just the fact that partisan identifications were strong and that the entrenched parties controlled access to the state’s resources as well as the electoral rules. It was also the substance of partisan conflict, the parameters of contentious politics in general, that made labor parties or other formations based on explicitly socio-economic dividing lines difficult projects to pursue. Through the efforts of both major parties, as discussed above, socio-economic concerns were strongly linked to, some argue superseded by, ethnocultural and sectional electoral appeals. As a consequence, competitors attempting to introduce a class-based, or even just a more explicitly socio-economic, cleavage into the political arena, would not just have to persuade voters of an alternative substantive agenda: even more fundamentally, they would have to alter the parameters of political conflict altogether.

Third, the previous two issues refer to the agency of ‘competing parties’, or, more broadly, entrenched political elites in general. In addition to their efforts, it was also the behavior of the state executive that made entry of labor into the political arena as an independent force more difficult. We have previously argued that despite the existence of repressive acts, the state executive acted in a predominantly neutral fashion, thereby contributing to, or at least not diminishing, highest degrees of inclusion.275

In this environment, independent party formation is associated with an immensely high amount of costs. But the benefits of party formation – access to the spoils of the state, legislative influence, members of organized labor as candidates for public office – could also be attained through other means that came with significantly lower costs. ‘Moderate syndicalism’ allowed organized labor to obtain the same rewards and benefits as independent party formation would have, but without the costs of party formation: the material resources, the human resources, the costs of organization building, and the potential psychological effects of failure. Independent party formation efforts were unsuccessful, because the

274 Note, again, the contrast to Switzerland, where PR was introduced in response to the pressure of religious based parties, but in effect, benefited the social democrats.
275 See the earlier debate about the role of the state executive in the US.
majority of labor leaders and the labor constituency pursued a strategy of ‘moderate syndicalism’, not least, because they learned from the various party formation failures.

In the following analysis, the variety of different models for labor’s presence in the political arena and the emergence of ‘moderate syndicalism’ as the dominant model will be analyzed in their specific historical context. As in virtually all other cases investigated here, each of the previously introduced models of labor politics (see table 2) was present in the US as well. First, the two insurrectionist models, anarcho-syndicalism and bolshevism, were only of very limited relevance during this time period, and therefore require no further mentioning. Second, moderate syndicalism as the dominant model will be discussed in general terms, then followed by an analysis of why the AFL variant emerged as dominant over the Knights of Labor variant.

Third, before engaging in this analysis, the variety of alternatives to ‘moderate syndicalism’ will be discussed. All of these have in common that they suggested a permanent independent presence of labor in the political arena. Some of the specific manifestations of independent party formation were explicitly social democratic in nature from the very beginning, both of the quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary variety. Others were reincarnations of the ‘labor party’ model already suggested during the Jacksonian era by the ‘workingmen parties’. But the most potent threat to the entrenched elites of the third party system were the various attempts at establishing farmer-labor parties. The social democrats would only emerge as the major rival for the entrenched two party dominance during the following progressive era.

The failure of independent labor party formation

Ideological differences and variation in electoral appeals notwithstanding, the key to explain the failure of social democratic party formation is to understand the reasons for why any attempt at forming an independent party of labor was unsuccessful. The failure of social democracy is the result of the same set of causal factors as the failure of other independent parties of labor. Whether the Greenback-Labor party or the Populists, as the two most promising challenges to the entrenched elites, had a social democratic program or not, or whether they would eventually have adopted one, is irrelevant. Both of these attempts failed, as did the explicitly social democratic party formation attempts, not because of too much or too little socialist ideology. Despite obvious idiosyncrasies, they all failed for the same underlying reasons, discussed extensively above: The third party system was based on a pattern of highest labor inclusion, in which independent party formation was only the second best alternative to the model of ‘moderate syndicalism’, as a consequence of the ‘objective’ and ‘psychological’ obstacles to independent labor party formation established by the entrenched elites.
There were six major waves of independent party formation, either led by, or under the inclusion of labor: first, a number of local and state labor parties during the late 1870s, and occasionally thereafter; second, the Labor Reform Party, 1870-1872; third, the Greenback-Labor Party, 1876 to the early 1880s; fourth, the Populist Party of the early 1890s; fifth, the “United Front” campaign that gave birth to the United Labor Party and the Union Labor Party in the late 1880s; and sixth, the various permutations of the social democratic camp ever since the first attempt at party formation in 1868.

Each one of these independent party formation attempts – social democratic, labor, and labor-farmer – can serve as a case study illustrating the inclusive mechanisms of the third party system. Moreover, specific conciliatory labor policies, at the state, local, and federal levels, can be traced back to prior attempts at independent party formation, or generally, an increase of labor’s presence in the political arena. Labor’s independent party formation attempts are thus indicative of the limits or a crisis of highest inclusion. But these crises were only of a temporary nature: instead of allowing for the establishment of independent manifestations of labor in the political arena, labor’s challenges only led to a reinforcement of inclusion.

First, local and state labor parties during the late 1870s emulated the workingmen parties of the ‘Jacksonian era’, but their substantive scope was much more limited. They usually emerged in response to specific issues, and were often successful in pressuring legislation, by threatening the dominance and stability of the entrenched party system. The workingmen party of California is the most notable example of the time for this type of labor engagement in the political arena. The party agitated against the Central Pacific Railroad and the Chinese immigrants employed by the company; it thus combined anti-capitalist and anti-industrialism propaganda with racist and nativist elements. The party was instrumental for the enactment of the federal 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act that effectively banned Chinese immigration. Similar single-issue challenges of labor occurred in a variety of localities during this time period, but the parties bearing these challenges would disappear, after the entrenched parties resolved the issue. It was in Massachusetts, with the candidacy of Wendell Phillips as governor in 1870, and in Pennsylvania, where the most substantively encompassing local labor challenges were launched (cf. Unger 1964).

Some of these local and statewide developments contributed to the establishment of the “Labor Reform Party” in 1870. This was the first time, ever since the challenge of the workingmen parties in the 1820s and 1830s, that a coordinated effort was made by organized labor to enter the political arena as an independent force. In terms of organizational scope, the fragmentation and geographical isolation of labor in the 1820s was also reflected by the emphasis of the workingmen parties on the local and state levels. The “Labor Reform Party” on the other hand, based on the emergence of a nationwide labor movement in the economic arena, had the ambition to combine local and state with federal activities. In terms of substantive emphasis, the first wave of ‘Jacksonian’ workingmen parties campaigned for an encompassing “workingmen platform”, while the second wave of the 1830s was already significantly more focused on the
single representative issue of banking and currency. The “Labor Reform Party” continued this pattern by emphasizing above all other issues the questions of monetary reform, on the basis of the Greenback program.

Before the Civil War, organized labor had been cautious about all paper money schemes, but ever since, parts of the movement embraced Greenbackism, which was portrayed as an effective solution to counteract the dominance of finance capital and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few. The Greenback agenda also promised ample opportunities for cooperation with discontent farmers. At the most basic level, greenbackism was about the devaluation of currency, federal control over monetary affairs, the rejection of adherence to the gold standard, and the rejection of subsidies for industrial development (cf. Unger 1964).

The National Labor Union (NLU) as the prime example of nationwide organized labor at the time adopted a “Greenback platform” in 1867. The failure of entrenched elites to respond to their proposals, very much similar to the initial experiences of the Jacksonian workingmen parties, triggered the formation of the “Labor Reform Party” as the political branch of the NLU in 1870. However, only shortly after the nomination of a presidential ticket at its Columbus congress in 1872, both the political and the industrial branch of the NLU dissolved.

Much of the literature on this subject argues that it was a ‘turn to politics’ that led to the demise of the NLU. This line of argument understates the extent to which other models of organized labor were involved in politics. The so-called ‘pure and simple unionism’ was never exclusively about economic involvement. The dominant strategy of labor at the time can better be understood by using the term ‘moderate syndicalism’, as a combination of ‘economic’ activities and selective political interventions. The failure of the NLU was not about having intensified its political involvement, but rather about the way in which it adjusted its political strategy. Through the formation of an independent party, the political activities of the NLU fell prey to the inclusive mechanisms of the ‘third party system’. A ‘turn to politics’, or rather an intensification of political involvement through different means, along the lines of ‘moderate syndicalism’, without independent party formation, would most likely have avoided the demise of the NLU.

Other than for many of the state labor parties mentioned above, policy concessions were not the inclusive mechanism most relevant for the failure of the Labor Reform Party. The Republicans as the nationally dominant party continued their industrial development agenda, without monetary reforms, while the Democrats were in no position to enact such far-reaching legislation during this time period. Unger’s (1964) analysis about the general decline of Greenbackism is compatible with the argument I am suggesting here in a different context. The party formation attempts that tied themselves to the Greenback agenda, one of which was the Labor Reform party, failed because of the two remaining inclusive mechanisms introduced above: The incorporation of laborers into local political machines and the electoral
appeal of the Republicans to cross-class ethnocultural coalitions functioned as a bulwark against the efforts of the NLU. The approach of the Democrats, on the other hand, who “shouted louder” for Greenbackism than the Greenbacks themselves (Unger 1964, 348), to incorporate this socio-economic dividing line into their agenda, did not disrupt the existing partisan stability: to the contrary, they helped to include the Greenback appeal into the existing party system, and thereby made their own contribution to the curtailing of independent party formation. The dissolution of the NLU and the Labor Reform Party in 1872 is therefore the direct consequence of the inclusive measures prevalent during the third party system.

While the Labor Reform Party attempted to appeal to a labor constituency, the roots of two other major attempts at independent party formation during this time period, the Greenback-Labor and the Populist Party, were agrarian in nature. But both parties attempted to forge an electoral alliance with labor, and moreover, focused their agendas on the question of Greenbackism, or more broadly, financial and industrial control. After the limited success of the initial Grange and Greenback fraternal societies, which were largely agrarian in nature, to appeal to labor, and the failure of the Labor Reform Party in 1872, Greenback-Labor parties emerged in the mid to late 1870s out of fusions between labor parties and agrarian Greenback parties at the state level. The national Greenback-Labor party was founded on this basis in 1878.

The anti-industrialism agenda of the originally purely agrarian movement had an appeal to workers as well, not so dissimilar from the producerist agenda of the Jacksonian Democrats, although Greenbackism as a specific set of demands emerged only beginning in the 1840s. The party made some impressive electoral inroads immediately, at the state, local, and federal levels. But it disintegrated in the mid 1880s, when it effectively ceased to exist as a nationwide political force. The same argument that has been made with respect to the Labor Reform Party also applies to the Greenback-Laborites. The party was not capable of cutting through the established patterns of partisan affiliation, both for the above mentioned ‘objective’ and ‘psychological’ reasons.

In addition to the mechanisms of inclusion that prevented independent party formation in general, the attempts to unite labor and farmers on the basis of a producerist, anti-industrialization platform culminating in the demands for monetary reform, also failed because the entrenched elites exploited the divergence of interests between these two constituent groups to their advantage. This is most apparent for the role of the Populist party, and the 1896 presidential election that is often regarded as a watershed not only for the third party system, but the period of party dominance in general.

The Populist Party represents the second major attempt at forging a farmer-labor coalition on the basis of an anti-industrialism agenda. Other than the earlier Greenbackism, the Populists were based on a broader programmatic perspective. The party’s 1892 Omaha Platform combined the rhetoric of monetary reform against the interests of financiers and big corporations that was supposed to appeal to both farmers and workers, with a wide set of policies designed to attract the labor constituency. This included, among many
other issues, the call for a graduated income tax, and restrictions on labor import. Of particular interest for the characterization of the platform is its demand for the nationalization of the means of production in the areas of transportation and communication. This issue responded to the discontent of farmers vis-à-vis the vested interests of railroad companies, but it was expected to hold sway in the labor constituency as well. It could very well be interpreted as a proto-socialist agenda, given that it fell somewhat short of the call for the nationalization of all the means of production, which was the epitome of socialism at the time.  

The election of 1896 and the absorbing of populism into the Democratic party is a key example for the various inclusive measures provided for by the third party system, while at the same time representing the end of the ‘party period’. The patterns of labor inclusion that led to the dissolution of the Greenback-Labor party also apply to the case of the Populists, but in this case, the matter is even more apparent. The Populist party had some initial electoral success during the 1892 presidential election, when its candidate James Weaver carried four Western states (Colorado, Kansas, Idaho, Nevada), and received 8.5% of the popular vote. In between 1892 and the crucial realignment election of 1896, the Democrats made every effort to incorporate the demands of the Populists into their own agenda, against internal opposition. As a consequence, the Populist Party supported the Democrats’ populist William Jennings Bryan in his 1896 presidential bid, and effectively disappeared from the political arena. In turn, the populist agenda became dominant within the Democratic party. The absorbing of populism into the Democrats effectively captured one of the existing parties for the populist program, while at the same time preventing the successful formation of an independent new party organization.

The evolution of the Democrats’ electoral appeal was the most important inclusive mechanism to prevent the long term presence of the Populist Party in the political arena. But more important for labor inclusion during this final stage of the third party system were the inclusive efforts of the Republicans. In 1892, many of the contradictory electoral appeals of both parties to labor, described above, were still in place and effective. The Republicans emphasized their own ethnoculturally based agenda, along with a focus on high tariffs and the gold standard as instruments for economic development, which were portrayed as benefitting both employers and workers in the manufacturing areas of the Northeast. Democrats on the other hand emphasized the producerist and laissez faire tradition of the party, both with respect to economic issues and the private liberties of immigrant and catholic workers.

As a consequence of these cross-cutting appeals, electoral support in the manufacturing areas of the North was still divided between both parties. The firm embrace of populism by the Democrats in 1896 led

276 Note, however, as a point of reference, the initial nationalization agenda of the British Labour Party (Labour 1918). In this document, drafted by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the party commits itself to nationalization of the means of production, but places particular emphasis on the transportation and communication sectors.
277 See the Presidential election atlas edited by Archer et al. (2006)
to a massive migration of worker support to the Republicans, even in those states, such as New York, where Democratic machine politics was most pronounced. This realignment can serve as evidence for the failure of populism and its previous incarnations to forge an effective nationwide labor-farmer alliance against the electoral appeal of the Republicans and the incorporation of workers into cross-class political machines.

The fifth instance of independent party formation attempts during the third party system, noted above, originated from organized labor’s ‘United Front’ campaign in the early 1880s. Other than the Greenback-Labor party and the Populists, the parties established as the result of this campaign were exclusively geared at appealing to workers, and had their roots in the organized labor movement. Other than the previously introduced Labor Reform Party, which originated from organized labor as well, the ‘United Front’ parties were not based primarily on the Greenback issue. Eventually, as far as the specific mechanisms that prevented the success of the ‘United Front’ parties is concerned, they are a prime example, comparable to the earlier state labor parties, for the inclusive effects of policy concessions. Conciliatory policies, as discussed above, were less important for understanding the failure of the various incarnations of the monetary reform issue, through the Labor Reform Party, the Greenback Labor Party, and the Populists. In these cases, conciliatory policies through monetary reform did not occur, while the effects of party system incorporation through electoral appeals and local political machines were key for preventing independent party formation.

The activities of organized labor in the political arena that resulted from the ‘United Front’ campaign are to some significant extent intertwined with the previously introduced state labor parties and farmer-labor alliances. But at the same time, they represent a discernibly independent attempt of organized labor to enter politics. We have previously argued that the terms ‘business unionism’ and ‘pure and simple unionism’, used to describe the prevalent strategy of American organized labor, are something of a misnomer. Even during ‘quiet’ times, organized labor was regularly involved in politics through selective interventions. The ‘United Front’ campaign, however, represented an intensification of this pattern and an attempt at creating a more permanent presence of labor in the political arena, without initially being geared at independent party formation. Moreover, the campaign brought together, at least temporarily, representatives of various factions of the labor movement – Knights, unionists, socialists, Greenbackers – for a common cause.

The “United Front Campaign” was initiated by delegates from 14 trade unions and the Knights of Labor in 1882. It was designed to coordinate labor’s interventions into the political arena, in order to make political involvement more effective. But at the time, it was not intended as an alternative to the existing parties: organized labor sought to exercise pressure on the two major parties through the same flexible interventions as before, only on the basis of a broader alliance of support, with higher intensity, and in a
more coordinated fashion. The campaign was the trigger for a wide variety of local and statewide political activities, while it was not able to fulfill its initial promise of uniting a variety of different factions for a common cause in the long run.

In New York City, an 1886 convention of labor reform clubs, trade unions, Knights, Greenbackers, and socialists called themselves “Progressive Democracy”, and nominated Henry George as candidate for the mayoral election, on the basis of a labor platform. He finished second in the race, ahead of the Republican candidate, and in response, the two major parties implemented a wide reaching program of labor reform policies. These policies, outlined in the previous section, were the key inclusive mechanism that prevented the continuing presence of the new proto-party in the political arena. At the same time as these inclusive mechanisms exercised their effect, the concomitant internal struggle between the constituent factions of the party led to a split between the socialists and the other groups in 1887. The former organized themselves as the “Progressive Labor Party”, and the latter as the “United Labor Party”, but both factions declined in the aftermath of the split.

Similar developments occurred in all industrialized centers of the country. Labor tickets were successful in municipal elections in New England, Newark, Richmond, and even Key West. The United Labor Party of Chicago, founded in 1886, elected representatives to the state legislature. Candidates from the Knights of Labor fold were elected as Congressmen, state senators and state assemblymen in Colorado. Flexible coalitions with the Republicans and Democrats and joint electoral tickets, which foreshadowed the pattern of interventions during the progressive era, were successful in Massachusetts, Connecticut, upstate New York, New Jersey, Cleveland, and St. Louis. In 1887, labor tickets carried local elections in 19 Midwestern communities, and a United Labor party candidate scored an impressive result against a joint Democratic-Republican candidate in Chicago.

From these local and statewide efforts in the context of the “United Front” campaign, two attempts at party formation with national ambition ensued. Up to this point, the campaign had been well within the limits of the ‘moderate syndicalism’ model, while it was innovative in two major ways: by trying to unite a larger alliance of labor movement factions, and by coordinating political interventions more effectively. The formation, in 1887, of the “Union Labor Party” and the “United Labor Party” as independent national parties also marks the end of the previously somewhat successful ‘United Front’ campaign. An eclectic variety of labor reform policies had already been implemented or approached by this point in time, in response to the earlier flexible intervention strategy.

Both party formation attempts therefore had to fight an even greater uphill battle than the Greenbacks, Populists, and the Labor Reform Party: in addition to the inclusive effects of local political machines and entrenched parties’ electoral appeals that affected all of these instances, the parties resulting from the United Front campaign also faced a situation in which at least a significant set of their policy demands had
already been implemented. The much more limited electoral success of both parties, compared to the farmer-labor party formation attempts, can serve as evidence for this point. And so does the fact that they dissolved within only a few years after their inception, both at the national and local levels, through the political infighting in between the eclectic variety of groups united under their umbrella.

At the same time, the actual policy achievements as a result of the pressure exercised by the campaign clearly surpass what had been accomplished as a consequence of those parties’ activities that rallied supporters around the Greenback issue or monetary reform in general. Particularistic labor policies that were of a far less encompassing nature than the policy concessions of the ‘Jacksonian’ era, could more easily be accommodated by the entrenched elites than the far reaching calls for monetary reform, which endangered the very existence of the Republican’s industrial development agenda and the vested interests of Northern manufacturing elites. The Jacksonian’s agenda, on the other hand, was more encompassing, not least because of the banking reforms that were implemented throughout the 1830s and early 1840s.

The failure of social democracy, as the final one of six different attempts at independent party formation, is just another example for the failure of labor based party formation in general. Moreover, during the third party system, social democracy was still in its infancy. It would only emerge as a viable challenger for the entrenched elites, and indeed as the dominant alternative to ‘moderate syndicalism’ throughout the progressive era. The membership development and election results of socialist parties provide evidence for this point. Social democracy in the United States would only emerge as a mass-based organization with significant membership by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, with more than 40000 members in 1908, and close to 120000 in 1912. The Socialist Labor Party had around 1500 members in 1883.278 In terms of election returns, a social democratic ticket obtained 0.2% in the 1892 presidential election, and 0.3% in 1896, while the Socialist Party reached its peak of 6.2% in 1912.

At that later point in time, social democracy would fulfill many of the functions, which other third party challengers performed during the third party system: pressuring the existing parties to adjust their agenda, or to enact actual policies, which in turn would guarantee the dominance of the entrenched party system. However, during the second half of the 20th century, the importance of social democracy in this context was only secondary, compared to the labor and labor-farmer parties discussed above. This is also evidenced by the fact that during this time, social democrats themselves were not focused on their own party exclusively. Most of the socialist leaders and rank and file dedicated only some of their energy to the party itself. They were equally involved in the activities of other labor organizations, including the Knights, the unions, the emerging AFL, but also many of the state labor parties and the national “Union Labor Party”. The internal frictions within the socialist camp are, of course, another reason for the limited success.

278 See table 15 for the 1908 value. See Rayback (1966) for the 1883 value.
of social democratic parties before the progressive era, but this by no means a phenomenon exclusive to socialism in the US.

The various permutations of social democratic parties during the third party system will therefore only provide the basis, on which the role of social democracy during the progressive era will be discussed more extensively. At that later point in time, the effects of the inclusive mechanisms that have so far been analyzed for the labor and labor-farmer parties of the third party system, will also become apparent for the specific case of social democracy. At this earlier stage, it is of particular importance to show that social democracy was not only secondary in importance, compared to these other party formation attempts, but also, how socialism was strongly intertwined with the other challengers of ‘moderate syndicalism’. In the end, of course, the same argument about the effects of highest inclusion applies to social democratic party formation attempts in the same way as it applied to any attempt at independent party formation.

The initial formulations of socialism in the United States occurred already during the mid 1840s and early 1850s. At that stage, socialist thought was predominantly imported through German immigrants, and became closely associated with the various social reform movements of the time that had been introduced earlier on. Hermann Kriege, who was a member of the “Bund der Gerechten” in Germany, formed a socialist society in the mid 1840s that was absorbed by the land reform movement. Wilhelm Weitling, one of the most influential leaders of the “Bund”, planned to organize banks of exchange as a practical means of revolutionizing economic and political structures, upon his arrival in America. His followers in Germany had previously been excluded from the Bund, when Marx and Engels took charge, and renamed it “Bund der Kommunisten” in 1847. Joseph Wedemeyer is the final one of these three early socialists that exercised some influence in the US. He formed the short-lived Proletarian League of New York City in 1852. None of them continued the earlier tradition of electorally involved workingmen parties. Based on their roots in the mid-century German labor movement, their focus was on mutual aid, proletarian education, and social transformation, through the intervention in economic exchange patterns, rather than through political involvement.

The re-emergence of socialist thought and organizational efforts after the end of the Civil War was once again the result of foreign exports, most importantly from Germany and through the First International. As a consequence, the same conflicts between Lasalleans, proto-marxists, and anarchists that split the labor movement in most of continental Europe, were also prevalent in American socialism. The Lasalleans, whose concepts emerged in the context of Prussian authoritarianism, and who were therefore particularly estranged from American conditions, formed a “German Workingmen’s Union” in New York City in 1865. It was modeled after Lasalle’s ADAV, but reorganized itself as an actual political party – the “Social Party” – in 1868. After miserable election results that same year, it integrated itself into the NLU, its Labor Reform Party, and the First International.
The First International in the US, and the party formation attempts it triggered, were thus plagued not only by the conflict between the Internationals’ “anarchist” and “marxist” wings, but also by the additional involvement of the Lasalleans. As a consequence of programmatic divergence between these factions, two socialist parties were founded in 1873: the mainstream “Social Democratic Party of North America”, which united both factions of the First International, and the Lasallean “Labor Party of Illinois”. The 1868 Social Party is therefore the first organizational manifestation of social democracy in the United States (cf. Figure 11). But before the formation of the Socialist Party of America in 1901 as the dominant institutionalized organization from the social democratic camp, the initial manifestation of social democracy in 1868 would experience a variety of further permutations.

The three original factions in the socialist camp – the proto-marxists, early anarchists, and Lasalleans – were temporarily united through the Socialist Labor Party, founded 1876 in Philadelphia. It is by far the most important predecessor of the later Socialist Party of America, but some of its constituent elements can be traced back to the 1868 Social Party. The Socialist Labor Party represented the first successful attempt of social democracy in America to enter the arena of electoral politics and to establish at least an incipient mass base. Its organizational drives, moreover, were not limited to the United States: the first manifestation of social democracy in Canada was a regional section of the American mother party, founded 1894 in Toronto.

In the United States, the party was well aware of the limitations of political involvement in the context of a fully developed party system with entrenched elites and deeply rooted patterns of partisan affiliation. At its founding congress, the party passed a resolution that limited direct electoral involvement as an independent force to those sections that were able to exercise a “perceptible influence”.\footnote{Resolution cited by Rayback (1966)} Whether it is the result of considerations about the potential for electoral success, or only the consequence of its members’ natural instincts, is impossible to determine. But ever since its first congress, most of the party’s sections became heavily involved in electoral politics, and almost wherever they did, the party was able to secure impressive results: in New Haven in 1876, and throughout the year 1877, in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Chicago.

In light of this unexpected success, the earlier resolution about political activity was revised in 1877. From there on, electoral involvement as an independent formation was to be the main goal of the party. While the election campaigns of 1878 continued to bear fruit in a variety of places, such as Chicago, New York, and St. Louis, the decline of the party occurred only a few years later. The earlier manifestations of social democracy were absorbed by the mid century reform movements, and the Labor Reform Party,
respectively. At this stage, the Socialist Labor Party as the first unified and encompassing social democratic organization failed, when it aligned itself with the Greenback cause in 1880.

Thus, the same pattern is evident for all these instances of social democratic party formation during the third party system: Strategic calculations geared at integrating social democratic organizations into the dominant challengers to the entrenched party system, led to the demise of both. The inclusive mechanisms of the third party system would therefore affect social democracy in two distinct ways: first, directly, by preventing the establishment of a viable mass base of support; and second, indirectly, by contributing to the demise of those supposedly more promising third party challengers, with which social democratic leaders aligned themselves. The various factions that would later provide the underpinning for the Socialist Party of America remained within the Socialist Labor Party, which was reduced to 1500 members by 1883. The others turned to anarcho-syndicalist organization, joined the Anarchist International, and in 1881, formed the “Revolutionary Socialist Party”.

‘Moderate Syndicalism’ as the optimal response to highest inclusion

While all of the attempts to establish labor as an independent party failed as the result of highest inclusion during the third party system, moderate syndicalism as the optimal response for labor’s presence in the political arena became dominant. I argued previously that both the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor are only two different variants of the same moderate syndicalist model, the Knights as a representative of a ‘producerist’, and the AFL as the ‘craft-based’ variant (see table 2). In essence, either one of them would have represented an optimal response to an environment of highest inclusion. The reasons for the survival of the AFL and the demise of the Knights have to be determined by looking at the fine points of the nature of highest inclusion in the United States and the strategical choices of these two organizations. We are going to see that the major reason for the federation’s dominance was the eventual decision of the Knights to abandon the core of ‘moderate syndicalism’ by throwing their support behind the Populist Party. But even more important than understanding the relative success of one syndicalist variant and the demise of the other is to elaborate on the role of highest inclusion as the environment that favored ‘moderate syndicalism’ in general – both the initial Knights of Labor and the AFL variant – over the fundamentally different alternative of independent party formation.

Moderate syndicalism was previously introduced as one of several alternative models for labor’s presence in the political arena (see table 2). From a comparative perspective, the differences within the ‘moderate syndicalist’ camp, at this historical stage represented by both the AFL and the Knights, are much less significant than the differences between ‘moderate syndicalism’ and other fundamentally distinct models. In contrast to all social democratic party types, ‘moderate syndicalism’ is not designed as a
permanent presence in the political arena. While social democratic parties attempt to be directly involved in elections as an independent force, or agitate to open the electoral channel for their participation, ‘moderate syndicalists’ eschew that form of political engagement. Their fundamental rationale and organizational principle is unionism: local chapters are organized around the workplace, and their most important focus of activity is ‘economic’, through negotiations with employers, strikes, picketing, or by raising awareness for labor issues in the broader residential community. This is accompanied by various forms of mutual aid and practical solidarity among members, through insurance schemes, cooperatives, and the distribution of other tangible benefits.

However, other than the anarcho-syndicalists, moderate syndicalists do not seek a complete revolutionary transformation of political and economic structures. They want to reshape the state and reform, not abandon, market based economies. In addition to economic activities, or more generally ‘unionism’ as the underlying organizational principle, moderate syndicalism also uses political involvement to accomplish that goal. However, political activities are not geared at the formation of an independent party. They are designed to intervene politically in a flexible and selective fashion. This implies that political interventions or involvement in electoral politics are not designed to establish partisan affiliations. Support for a particular candidate or party is the result of strategic calculations pertaining to the specific instance of electoral politics. It is not the result of a pronounced partisan affinity, in an environment, in which partisanship is defined through an eclectic variety of parameters, which often cross-cut the class-based identities and socio-economic concerns of organized labor. These fundamental principles apply equally to the Knights of Labor and the AFL as the ‘producerist’ and the ‘craft-based’ variant of moderate syndicalism. They also characterize the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which emerged during the ‘New Deal era’ as a representative of a third, ‘industrial’, variant of moderate syndicalism. The ‘International Workers of the World’ (IWW), which were founded during the progressive era, in the early 1900s, are also based on an industrial form of organization. They also exposed some of the fundamental features of moderate syndicalism, but the IWW was infused with a large dose of anarcho-syndicalism, and therefore represents a unique form of association that is located conceptually in between those two categories.

All three variants of moderate syndicalism were based on some form of class solidarity, but their respective definitions of social class varied. The AFL arguably had the most narrow understanding of collective identity and mobilization. The federation and its affiliated unions emphasized the organization of skilled workers, and accordingly, sought to establish and coordinate unions on the basis of craft affiliations. The International Workers of the World were based on industrial organization, and as a consequence, united workers of different trades and skill levels in one single union. The Knights of Labor, on the other hand, were most closely linked to earlier republican and ‘producerist’ traditions. Their organizational focus
as well as their substantive appeal were geared at a coalition of all those, who gained their livelihood by actually producing goods, rather than living of capital or the work of their employees. This includes skilled and unskilled workers as well as small farmers and master workmen or supervisors, and has a striking similarity to the earlier ‘Jacksonian’ coalition.

All three variants of ‘moderate syndicalism’ were involved in politics on the basis of the principle outlined above – through flexible interventions, which accompanied the integration of its members into the existing party system. That being the case, there is some variation with respect to the intensity of political involvement. Both the Knights and the IWW were heavily engaged in electoral politics, albeit not as an independent force. The AFL, on the other hand, was generally more cautious toward politics, and favored a more limited involvement. However, even the most so-called ‘purely unionist’ elements within the AFL and its affiliated unions, notably Samuel Gompers and his supporters, were aware of the necessity to achieve legislative in addition to ‘purely’ economic gains.

The failure of independent party formation is a consequence of the same phenomenon as the success of ‘moderate syndicalism’. The reasons for the demise of labor’s attempts to establish an independent presence in the political arena are also responsible for the relative dominance of ‘moderate syndicalism’. The various mechanisms contributing to ‘highest inclusion’ in the United States – electoral appeals of the two major parties, local political machines, policy concessions – established ‘objective’ and ‘psychological’ obstacles to independent party formation. In light of this environment, the focus on unionism, alongside flexible, non-partisan, political interventions is the ‘optimal response’. It allowed labor to obtain a set of economic and political accomplishments, without the costs of party building. This general argument applies to all different variants of ‘moderate syndicalism’, but a more fine-grained analysis about the specific nature of highest inclusion in the US, and the strategic choices made by different types of syndicalist organizations, can reveal, why one version of this strategy emerged as dominant over the others. In the following two sections, this investigation will be conducted for the Knights and the AFL, which emerged during the third party system; the IWW as a child of the progressive era will be discussed in a later chapter.

*The Knights of Labor as a variant of ‘moderate syndicalism’*

It is a common misconception of previous accounts, to equate the demise of the Knights of Labor to the failure of labor party formation in general. From this perspective, most prominently expressed by Voss (1993), the moderate syndicalist model of labor politics represented by the Knights and its specific feature
of emphasizing a coalition of skilled and unskilled workers, is regarded as a necessary prerequisite for
independent party formation. The Knights’ organizational approach is understood as only an intermittent
stage on the way to a viable party of labor. Accordingly, if one is able to explain the failure of the Knights,
one is also in a position to provide a comprehensive explanation for the failure of labor party formation, or
even socialism, in general.

This is a misleading argument for two reasons: First, it fails to take into account the eclectic variety of
other sources that could have led to successful independent party formation. Second, it makes the
unsustainable assumption that the organizational model of the Knights was destined to evolve into an
independent party. I argue that explaining the demise of the Knights provides us with an explanation for
why one of the potential sources of independent party formation was unsuccessful, but it does not represent
in and of itself a sufficient explanation for the failure of party formation in general.

Voss (1993, 235) also argues that “(t)he failure of the Knights of Labor marks the moment, when,
from a comparative perspective, the American labor movement began to look exceptional.” She comes to
this conclusion because of her underlying concern with the question of class consciousness and collective
class-based action. We have previously argued that both major variants of the American exceptionalism
discourse, the ‘consensus’ and the ‘new social history’ approach, are based on a misleading “essentialist
assumption”. Party formation requires class consciousness – in the ‘exaggerated’ variant introduced before
– and the lack of class consciousness, respectively its gradual decay, can explain the absence of party
formation in the United States.

Voss (1993) gives this debate a somewhat new twist by claiming that the exceptional nature of
American labor is decided at the step from consciousness to collective action. She argues that class
consciousness existed in abundance, but collective action on the basis of this identity failed, because the
coalition between unskilled and skilled workers that sustained the impressive growth of the Knights in the
mid 1880s, eventually broke apart. In this way, she deviates from both earlier variants of the
‘exceptionalism’ discourse, but her argument is still based on the same ‘essentialist’ assumption, only in a
more nuanced fashion. Other than the ‘consensus’ explanation, Voss does not deny the existence of class
conscious workers. But contrary to the ‘new social history’ account, she distinguishes explicitly between
consciousness as the basis for collective action and collective action itself. According to Voss, it is not the
initial and inherited lack of class consciousness that can explain the demise of the Knights, but the inability
of its leaders to sustain class consciousness within a broad coalition of skilled and unskilled workers, in
response to various external forces. This includes most importantly pressure from employers, but also the

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280 See also Marks (1989) for a similar argument.
behavior of the state, which remained neutral, when the Knights would have required support against employer attacks.

Despite a more nuanced approach, she still falls victim to two of the same misleading premises as other variants of the exceptionalism discourse: first, she makes an assumption about what it requires for class consciousness to exist that extends beyond the ‘neutral’ understanding of the term. From her perspective, the solidarity in between skilled workers that provided the foundation of the AFL and its affiliated craft unions, and that contributed to the inability of Knight leaders to sustain the previous coalition underpinning their organization, is not class consciousness. We have previously argued that this perspective fails to accept the US case on its own terms, and to recognize the fact that class consciousness in America was not absent, but different, just as different configurations of class solidarity and types of collective action have emerged in all industrializing societies (cf. Zolberg 1986, Katznelson 1986, 1997). Second, she regards the American case as an anomaly, because at the end of the day, there is no systematic explanation that could account for why the British and French labor movements, her cases of comparison, were successful in sustaining a continuing broad coalition of skilled and unskilled workers, while US labor failed to do so.

I would argue that for as long as the Knights pursued an agenda of moderate syndicalism, which they did until the point in time, when they decided to throw their support behind the populists in the early 1890s, they were a valid challenger to the emerging AFL. Many of the specific reasons Voss (1993) introduces to explain the relative success of the federation, compared to the demise of the Knights, are indeed quite valid. But the decline of the Knights is by no means the precursor for the necessary failure of independent party formation. It is the result, however, of the inclusive mechanisms in a highest inclusion polity that made their revised strategy in the electoral arena unsustainable.

In this context, it is crucial to investigate the external environment of inclusion during and before the third party system. Doing so will necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the roots to be held accountable for the failure of independent party formation were already planted during the Jacksonian era. Other than Voss (1993) argues, the American labor movement did not begin to look exceptional, when the Knights failed; the sources for the failure of independent party formation as the most striking element of exceptionalism date back to the beginning of ‘highest inclusion’ during the Jacksonian era. Hence, the failure of the Knights is definitely one important case study amongst others to understand the nature and the effects of highest inclusion, but it is not nearly as central for an understanding of the American case of labor politics as Voss (1993) argues.

The foundation of the Knights of Labor coincides with the initial manifestations of social democracy in the United States, thus marking the beginning of the formative stage of nationwide organized labor’s entry into the political arena. One year after the formation of the Lasallean ‘Social Party’, the ‘Holy and
Noble Order of the Knights of Labor’ was founded in 1869 by a group of garment workers in Philadelphia. It was initially formed on the basis of two major conclusions, derived from previous experiences of organized labor: the Philadelphia workers that founded the Knights established it as a secret organization, to avoid blacklisting and prosecution by employers. In order to exercise pressure more effectively and to prevent the fragmentation of organized labor, the new organization was geared at uniting workers from different crafts and trades under one umbrella.

After sluggish growth and the complete concentration on local activities, the leaders of the Knights realized that an effective national organization was necessary to obtain their goals. Most prominent among them was Terrence Powderly, who presided over the national umbrella of the Knights from 1879 to 1893, during the impressive rise and eventual decline of the organization. Abandoning the secret status of the Knights, *de facto* in 1879, and *de jure* in 1881, was a prerequisite for effective nationwide organization.281 Throughout the 1880s, the Knights saw an impressive growth of membership, the formation of numerous local chapters, and the institutionalization of a viable national umbrella. After the Gould railway strikes of 1885, they emerged as the undisputed leader of the labor movement. The membership of the organization rose from 104,000 in 1885 to 703,000 in 1886. The demise of the Knights is evidenced by the decline in membership to around 100,000 by the end of the century.282

The labor policies of the mid to late 1880s that had been noted above, were one element of the response to the growing pressure exercised by the Knights and other factions of organized labor during this time period. They were part of a broader ensemble of inclusive mechanisms, along with the electoral appeals of the entrenched parties and the partisan affiliations of workers that were also sustained through the integration in local cross-class political machines. The state executive, both at the federal and the sub-federal levels, responded with a divide and conquer tactic. Officially, both federal and state governments declared neutrality and argued that conflicts between employers and workers have to be resolved without interference from the state. But the mid 1880s also saw a number of repressive acts against labor activities. These were fueled by a general concern with labor radicalism, and were advocated as a response to radical and violent elements of organized labor, but in many cases also involved sentences against legitimate forms of protest.

This shows, as was argued before, that executive behavior was not free of repression. But in the context of otherwise highest inclusion, singular repressive acts by the state executive and a generally neutral attitude did not favor independent party formation. The divide and conquer strategy of the state executive helped to channel labor activities in a way that favored party system incorporation over the

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281 Rayback (1966) refers to 1881, while Shefter (1986, 1986a) refers to 1879
282 See Voss (1993), Rayback (1966), and Shefter (1986)
pursuit of independent party formation projects. In ‘lower’ and low inclusion polities, on the other hand, more extensive forms of repression, as well as a state executive much more openly disposed to support the dominant interests, coexisted with the absence or weakness of other inclusive channels. Hence, labor in the US did have an alternative to radical forms of organization, while labor in low and lowest inclusion cases did not. As far as the Knights are concerned, the pressure exercised by employer organizations, and the repressive acts, which were most often engineered and implemented by private security forces, and only in some cases, by the state directly, along with the inclusive mechanisms of the third party system, created a difficult set of circumstances.

The demise of the Knights is the consequence of its leaders’ strategic choices, made within and in response to this specific environment. In this context, it is important to note that the particular variant of moderate syndicalism associated with the Knights was only dominant for the national umbrella organization and the leadership around Powderly. Their strategical recommendations were geared at the establishment of a producerist coalition, not only based on skilled and unskilled workers, but also under the inclusion of other producers – farmers and small manufacturing enterprises. This organizational model was sustained by a substantive agenda that was decidedly anti-industrialist, rejected the wage system, and demanded the establishment of a cooperative ‘producerist’ economy. This approach, of course, has its roots in a similar coalition of the Jacksonian era, as well as the various incarnations of labor-farmer alliances during the third party system. Powderly himself was a member and elected official for the Greenback-Labor party – as the mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania. Powderly and the national umbrella of the Knights always advocated against the use of strikes, since they contradict the idea of a ‘producerist’ coalition under the inclusion of small employers. This substantive agenda also provided the intellectual underpinning for the pursuit of producer and consumer cooperatives by the Knights’ national leadership.

However, this position of the Knights’ national umbrella was not only contested by opposition at the national level. More than that, the majority of local chapters acted on their own, without much consideration for the resolutions and statements of their national organization. The issue of striking is the most apparent example for this contradiction: despite the official position against strikes, they were one of the most frequently employed tactics of local chapters, especially during the peak of the organization in the mid 1880s. The fact that the majority of local organizations did not share the national umbrella’s enthusiasm for consumer and producer cooperatives can serve as another example.

This patchwork of internal contradictions between opposing strategical recommendations, organizational models, and ideological orientations, in the context of employer pressure and highest inclusion in the mid to late 1880s, provided the background for the demise of the Knights. The organization failed because of two related strategical dilemmas. In the first place, the Knights combined the defining elements of all different variants of moderate syndicalism under one umbrella, and were not able to pursue
any one of these variants effectively. Secondly, in this context, the last attempt to find a way out of this
dilemma effectively created a new, even more fundamental problem. The final strategical decision of the
Knights was to align themselves with the Populist Party in the mid 1890s. This decision essentially
represented an abandonment of moderate syndicalism, which made the Knights vulnerable to all the
constraints on independent party formation of labor in the context of highest inclusion.

The failure of uniting skilled and unskilled workers in one organization, which is emphasized by Voss
(1993) and, in a different context, Marks (1989), is only one specific manifestation of a more encompassing
phenomenon – the inability of the Knights to pursue an amalgamated version of moderate syndicalism that
would unite elements from all the variants introduced previously. Toward the end of the 1880s, the loss of
support from unskilled workers did, of course, represent the most pressing strategical dilemma of the
Knights. The following stages of strategical reorientations by the national organization shed light on the
various internal dividing lines that had already existed before, but only became fully apparent during this
period of decline.

First of all, after unskilled workers left the organization in large numbers, the Knights reoriented
themselves toward a focus on the skilled workers that remained in the organization. However, the emerging
AFL, at that point in time still as the F.O.O.T.A.L.U., was much better equipped to appeal to skilled
workers. It was not characterized by the internal divisions over this issue that surfaced within the Knights
during the mid 1880s: first, there was no similar conflict between skilled and unskilled workers within the
organization, because from its inception, the AFL focused on skilled labor; and second, the Knights were
founded on the premise of uniting these two groups under one umbrella. Even when the majority of
unskilled workers left the organization, strategical debates about how to react to this loss continued within
the Knights. The AFL, on the other hand, never experienced a comparably divisive debate about this issue.

Secondly, an even more fundamental dividing line became apparent only a few years later. The
producerist agenda of the national umbrella might not have had much relevance for local chapters,
especially in the Northeast, which engaged exclusively in strikes, wage bargaining, and labor-based
political activity. But when the national level decided to support the Populist Party in the early 1890s, the
dividing line between the producerist coalition, advocated by the national leadership, and the laborite
agenda, came to the forefront.

Hence, within only a decade of existence at the national level, the Knights were characterized by an
eclectic patchwork of contradictory variants of moderate syndicalism: first, the national leadership in the
1880s and 1890s favored a producerist agenda and organization, which only received significant support in
the Western states; second, the majority of members and local chapters in the Northeast were naturally
focused on unionist and laborite activities, both in the economic and political arenas; and third, the initial
founding fathers of the Knights were most concerned with a unification of skilled and unskilled workers, a coalition that broke apart in the mid 1880s.

The other organizational manifestations of moderate syndicalism were much better equipped to survive in a difficult environment as it was characterized by both pressure from employers and highest inclusion, because they focused their efforts on a single type of ‘moderate syndicalist’ organization. First, the AFL made little efforts to appeal to unskilled workers – the vast majority of its affiliated unions were craft based and focused on skilled labor: no comparable conflicts between both groups or about the preferable mobilization strategies ever occurred in the AFL as they did for the Knights. The later success of the CIO, which organized unskilled workers, and its incorporation into the AFL, occurred at a point in time, when, as a consequence of ongoing automatization, the demarcation lines between both groups, and the according importance of crafts, had become much less pronounced.

Second, the IWW was successful in uniting skilled and unskilled workers in the early 1900s, because this same trend had already manifested itself somewhat earlier in the industrial sector, from which that organization emerged – mining operations in the West. Third, none of these challengers, for the period of the third party system the AFL, for the progressive era the IWW, and later on the CIO, attempted the ambitious project of forging a ‘producerist’ labor-farmer alliance. Their focus was exclusively on labor, both ideologically and in terms of organizational scope. From this perspective, the Knights of Labor have to be regarded as the last manifestation of an anti-industrialism agenda that emerged in the early 19th century, thrived during the ‘Jacksonian era’, but eventually, became untenable in this form, because of ongoing socio-economic development and the acceptance of the industrial mode of production by the majority of laborers.

Both internal conflicts that ripped the Knights apart – the divisions about the mobilization of skilled and unskilled workers, and the divergence of interests between those that favored a producerist coalition and others that emphasized an exclusively laborite appeal – had come into the open as a consequence of the external pressures exercised on the Knights during the mid 1880s: first, pressure from employers who sabotaged the cooperative ventures of the Knights, and viciously countered their strikes. In some cases, the state executive, at the federal and sub-federal levels, was involved in repressive acts, but overall, the state acted in a predominantly neutral fashion. However, even a neutral executive favored the demise of the Knights, for two reasons: because highest overall inclusion provided labor with alternative channels of activity, unavailable in those cases with lower degrees of inclusion; and moreover, because the lack of involvement by the state naturally favored those forces – employers and their associations – that were in a dominant position, with significantly better resources and a single minded desire to crush labor organizations, while labor itself was divided among many factions. Second, in addition to this form of ‘negative’ or destructive pressure exercised through employers, the pressure that occurred on organized
labor through the mechanisms of highest inclusion has to be taken into account as well. Voss (1993) in her analysis of the interaction between ‘external’ developments and internal strategic decisions fails to acknowledge the importance of inclusive measures toward labor for the demise of the Knights.

Third, the pressure from alternative models of ‘moderate syndicalism’ contributed to the dilemma of the Knights as well. The Knights, as was outlined above, combined all the various contradicting elements of different variants of ‘moderate syndicalism’ in their amalgamated organization. The AFL on the other hand represented one single variant of moderate syndicalism with much less internal contradiction. When the F.O.O.T.A.L.U. as the predecessor of the AFL and the Knights negotiated a sharing of tasks and responsibilities in 1885, they were unable to reach a working agreement. In the ensuing conflict over territory, members, and local chapters, the newly founded AFL was in a far better position. The Knights vacillated in between various fundamental strategic decisions, all of which represented variants of moderate syndicalism that had already been present to some extent as a faction of the organization for a long time. The AFL on the other hand was based on a single, much less contradictory, variant of moderate syndicalism.

Voss (1993) in her explanation for the failure of the Knights emphasizes only one of two internal dividing lines – the conflict between skilled and unskilled workers, and the inability of the Knights to sustain this coalition. I would argue that in addition to this cleavage within the organization, the divergence of interests between those that favored a producerist coalition and others that emphasized an exclusively laborite appeal was at least equally important for the failure of the Knights. It is true that the cleavage between skilled and unskilled workers and the loss of support from the latter group after the organization’s peak in 1886 caused the more noticeable numerical decline, and moreover, represented the first dividing line to surface. But even after that point in time, the Knights could have survived as a viable organization, if they had not made the strategic choices that they did.

As noted above, after the unskilled workers had left, the Knights briefly tried to fashion themselves as an organization for the skilled elements of labor – more out of necessity than choice. However, in search for a viable organizational alternative, the Knights decided toward the early 1890s to formally align themselves with the Populist Party. This decision was well in line with the producerist inclinations of Powderly and his followers, as far as the substantive orientation of the Populists is concerned. But, first of all, this decision intensified the internal division between ‘unionists’ and ‘producerists’ that has already been noted above. As a consequence, practical support for the Populist strategy only occurred in the West and South; the Northern labor constituency of the Knights did not participate in these efforts. Second, and most importantly, the decision to align the Knights directly with a political party, marks a significant deviation from the core of ‘moderate syndicalism’. ‘Moderate syndicalism’ emerged as the optimal response in a ‘highest inclusion’ polity like the United States, because it eschews the establishment of
permanent partisan affiliations, and instead relies on a strategy of flexible alignments with the existing parties. When the Knights affiliated themselves with the Populists as the last resort to secure the continuing relevance of their organization, they ceased to be a viable moderate syndicalist alternative.

It is often argued that a “turn” toward politics, evidenced by the embrace of populism, was responsible for the decline of the Knights, compared to the dominance of the AFL. This argument is based on the premise that the AFL was not involved in politics. We have already argued before that such a premise is unsustainable. We will see in more detail in the following section that the AFL was involved in politics at every stage of its development, albeit with lower intensity than the Knights. The difference between the Knights and the AFL at this stage is not about political involvement per se, but about the form of political involvement. Both organizations initially pursued a moderate syndicalist strategy of flexible interventions, without independent party formation or partisan affiliations. The Knights changed this strategical orientation in the early 1890s, when they decided to align themselves with the Populist Party. Their support for the populists as an outsider to the entrenched party system was a suboptimal choice: the variety of mechanisms discussed above that nurture the highest inclusion in the US led to the demise of the Populists and the final ‘nail in the coffin’ for the Knights of Labor.

The AFL as the dominant variant of moderate syndicalism

The emerging dominance of the AFL during the third party system provides further evidence for the causal argument about the optimality of moderate syndicalism in an environment of highest inclusion, and the accordingly lower rewards of independent party formation. On top of that, the following analysis will also elaborate on the specific reasons for why the AFL’s variant of moderate syndicalism emerged as dominant over the competing variant suggested by Knights of Labor. The AFL as a national federation of affiliated trade unions emerged out of the conflict with the Knights of Labor in the mid to late 1880s. It is at the core of the model of labor politics that became dominant in the United States. However, in order to interpret the characteristics of this model, the entire set of actors that were affiliated with the AFL have to be acknowledged, not just the AFL as a national umbrella and its national leadership. This includes the variety of unions affiliated with the organization, and the AFL’s own city federations.

Even if the analytical focus is exclusively on the AFL national level, it should be clear that the term ‘pure and simple unionism’ is a misnomer, insofar as it implies that the federation was uninvolved in politics. It is true that the AFL was much more cautious about political involvement than the Knights, or the later IWW. But this is nothing more than a variation of degree; the truly important categorical distinction is between those models of labor politics that advocated independent party formation on the one hand and all the types of ‘moderate syndicalism’ on the other, which abstained from it. This includes the
Knights before their decision to support the Populists, and the AFL. The following analysis will show that the federation, and even its leadership circle around Gompers, were involved in politics, alongside purely ‘economic’ activities, from the very beginning. The extent of political involvement intensified during the following progressive era.

This conclusion will become even more apparent, when the analytical focus is widened beyond the inner circle of the AFL’s national leadership around Samuel Gompers, to include the somewhat autonomous activities of national unions and city federations. A number of national unions affiliated with the AFL embraced industrial over craft organization, especially throughout the further development of the AFL in the progressive era. More importantly in our context, national unions themselves entertained their own political activities, and some of them were involved in pressuring the federation to intensify its political interventions. The same is true for a number of city federations, as has already been mentioned above, which were actively involved in political campaigns and electoral politics. Based on these considerations, a more multi-faceted picture of the dominant type of moderate syndicalism in the US emerges than the one that results from an exclusive focus on the AFL national leadership. However, even for Gompers and his associates, political involvement and the launching of selective political interventions was an integral party of their strategical orientations.

There are two defining elements of the AFL’s variant of moderate syndicalism, which are at the core of an explanation for the superior suitability of its approach in the environment of the third party system, and as result, the federation’s dominance over the moderate syndicalism of the Knights of Labor. First of all, the AFL embodied one single variant of moderate syndicalism, while the Knights were defined by a patchwork of different organizational and ideological recommendations, which led to a period of successive strategical re-orientations after the mid 1880s. The AFL defined class solidarity along the lines of skilled workers, and accordingly, the majority of its affiliated unions were based on the principle of craft organization. Organizing unskilled workers was a problematic business in all industrializing societies, but it was particularly difficult in the United States, as a result of their affiliation with local political machines. Skilled laborers, as a result of higher levels of education and more pronounced class solidarity, were easier to convince of the benefits of working-class economic and political activity. By focusing on skilled labor, the AFL was able to bypass one of the key inclusive mechanisms of the ‘third party system’, the incorporation of unskilled workers into local political machines.

Second, the AFL was continuously involved in the political arena, but it never abandoned the defining principles of moderate syndicalism. The superior suitability of the AFL model does not stem from its more cautious approach. Above all, the federation distinguished itself from the Knights by never trying to enter politics as an independent force, and by refraining from attempts to influence the partisan affiliations of its members. It thereby avoided the negative consequences experienced by all previous party formation
attempts and by the Knights of Labor, when the organization abandoned this core of ‘moderate syndicalism’ in the early 1890s. In all of these instances, labor elites had to face the ‘objective’ and ‘psychological’ obstacles to party formation established during the third party system, but the AFL did not. Hence, in both these respects, the AFL was able to avoid the pitfalls of earlier labor organizations that resulted directly from the inclusive mechanisms established during the ‘third party system’. The nature of inclusion during this era favored the federation’s type of ‘moderate syndicalist’ approach, and the organization was sufficiently aware of its environment to stick to their specific organizational model.

The roots of the American Federation of Labor date back to the Cigarmakers’ Union of the 1870s. It was here, where Samuel Gompers and his associate Adolph Strasser would develop and implement an organizational model, which they would later apply on a much wider scope to the AFL. Both of these leading figures have had a background in marxist circles and socialism. The connection between this background and their later strategical recommendations is often overlooked. But these earlier inclinations represent important sources for their model of labor politics that would later emerge as dominant for the case of the United States.

In the first place, their rejection of independent labor party formation is a lesson learned from observing, or, in Strasser’s case, being directly involved in, earlier party formation attempts. Strasser was a socialist activist, and in response to that experience, came to the conclusion that the foundation of an independent socialist party was “not feasible in America”. Gompers was never actively involved in official socialist party politics, but much of his socialization into the labor movement occurred through studying marxist writings, and by debating socialism and labor politics with fellow workers and activists (cf. Gompers 1927). Just as Strasser, however, he was keenly aware of what I have previously introduced as the ‘psychological’ and ‘objective’ obstacles to party formation in the United States: “Labor men were identified with political parties and guided by the same sense of loyalty to them that influenced so large a part of the American citizens.” His recommendation acknowledges the importance of this particular inclusive mechanism: “The Federation has maintained that economic organization is adequate to deal with all of the problems of wage-earners. Its political action is simply to utilize the functions of trade unions in another field.” (Gompers 1927)

However, secondly, marxist socialization also informed Gompers’ and Strasser’s approach to labor politics in another, ‘positive’, fashion. The Knights of Labor still clung to old ‘producerist’ conceptions about an alliance between workers and small farmers. Gompers and Strasser realized, and would later commit the AFL to this approach, that an effective pursuit of workers’ demands requires a focus on organizations designed to represent labor exclusively. This premise is informed by the classic marxist tenet

283 Strasser cited in Rayback (1966)
that the liberation of workers can only succeed through workers themselves, albeit in a different context, and accordingly, on the basis of a different strategy. It also highlights the fact that, other than the Knights, or the labor-farmer alliances for that matter, Gompers and Strasser, and along with them the AFL, accepted the advent of industrialism. The marxists rejected the anti-industrialization approach of the English Luddites, and regarded economic modernization as a prerequisite for socialism. In a similar vein, the AFL would later distinguish itself from the Knights and their producerism agenda by acknowledging that an industrial mode of production was there to stay, and by attempting to advance labor’s agenda in the context of this environment.

Strasser’s and Gompers’ ideas were first codified and put to practice for the Cigarmakers’ Union at its 1879 national convention. At this point, the union would commit itself to activities around the workplace, and limit its political engagement to flexible and selective interventions, which is the defining principle of ‘moderate syndicalism’. The substantive focus of ‘economic’ activities was on the question of wages. In addition to that, the focus on skilled workers was accomplished through an increase in membership fees, designed as a source of revenue for the financial services to its members, such as sickness and unemployment benefits. Finally, compared to the vast autonomy held by local chapters of the Knights, the Cigarmakers’ union adopted a centralized form of organization in 1879. The formation of the “Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada” (F.O.O.T.A.L.U.) in 1881 was the first attempt to transfer the organizational model of the Cigarmakers to a wider scope. The F.O.O.T.A.L.U. was designed as a national federation of trade unions, akin to the role that would later be assumed by the AFL as its successor.

Even at this stage, political involvement was one defining element of the organization’s foundation credo. The F.O.O.T.A.L.U. stated electoral lobbying for its legislative program as one of two major tasks, in addition to the provision of support for the foundation of local and national unions (cf. Rayback 1966). The terms ‘business unionism’ or ‘pure and simple unionism’ are designed to distinguish these new developments from earlier, and later, attempts at independent party formation. But they are a misnomer, because they imply that the organizations described by these terms eschewed politics. It is crucial to note that this is not the case: the F.O.O.T.A.L.U., as well as the AFL and the unions affiliated with it, did not engage in projects of independent party formation, which is why they survived, while the Knights declined. But they were continuously involved in politics, even at this very early stage, when the F.O.O.T.A.L.U. was formed. That’s the reason for why the term ‘moderate syndicalism’ is more appropriate to designate these organizations. Differences between the AFL and other models centered on unionist organizations should be understood as different expressions or types of this basic ‘moderate syndicalist’ principle.

The AFL was founded in December 1886, after the negotiations between the F.O.O.T.A.L.U. as the representative of a number of affiliated trade unions and the Knights over a sharing of tasks and
responsibilities had failed. It was during this time period in the mid 1880s that the conflict between both types of ‘moderate syndicalism’ amounted to an actual hands on competition for members, territories, and political recognition. Thus, when the AFL emerged as the dominant labor organization from this struggle, this outcome was not just the result of an abstract battle of ideas. The AFL inherited the basic tenets of its organizational model from its predecessor. As a federated union of all crafts and trades, it declared as its major tasks the establishment of local and state federations, as well as national unions in those fields where none existed, the granting of support for boycott and strike activities of affiliated and external organizations, and eventually, to secure legislation and influence public opinion. Hence, political involvement, albeit explicitly short of independent party formation or direct involvement as an organization in partisan politics, was a defining element of the AFL’s foundation agenda as well.

In an environment of employer pressure and highest labor inclusion, the Knights collapsed over the internal divisions that emerged from the organization’s amalgamation of various contradicting elements derived from different variants of moderate syndicalism, and the eventual abandonment of moderate syndicalism’s core, by establishing an independent presence in the political arena. The AFL survived and emerged as dominant, because it pursued a single coherent variant of moderate syndicalism, and because it eschewed the pitfalls arising from the inclusive mechanisms of the third party system, by not establishing an independent presence in the political arena. The AFL refused to engage in independent partisan activity, and thereby avoided having to use limited resources for the establishment of partisan affiliations and independent political organizations. The AFL also focused on the organization of skilled workers. By doing so, it avoided the problems associated with the organization of unskilled workers. These apply to all industrializing societies alike, but in particular intensity to the United States, where this group was incorporated into local political machines, as one of the crucial inclusive mechanisms of the third party system.

The AFL also proved to be more resilient as an organization than its competitor, as a direct consequence of its limited focus on skilled workers, higher membership fees, centralized organization, and the rejection of labor-farmer alliance schemes. It should be noted that this organizational strategy is by no means unique to the American case. The vulgar marxist social democrats in Germany operated on the basis of strikingly similar assumptions. The major difference to the American case, where the US is truly exceptional, is the way in which the AFL as a moderate syndicalist organization approached the political arena.

However, none of these defining elements of the AFL’s organizational model was uncontested. But in spite of conflicts, the extent of internal divisions never approached the same critical level as it did for the Knights of Labor. What was crucial for the survival and emerging dominance of the AFL were the strategical decisions made by the organization, but also its organizational resilience and efficiency. Out of
the three most important internal debates – centralization, industrial unionism, and political involvement – the latter was the most crucial one. With respect to the first issue, a number of national unions initially refused to join, because they did not want to become subservient to the federation’s centralized authority. But over time, the federation was able to establish its role at the top of the hierarchy of labor organizations, while national unions and even city federations maintained a certain amount of decisional autonomy.

Secondly, internal conflict also occurred about the issue of unskilled workers, since a significant number of labor activists continued to support the principle of industrial unionism. The American Railway Union (ARU), founded in 1893, and led by Eugene Debs, united various crafts and trades into one single industrial union, and thereby set an example that would later be followed in a number of other economic domains. The United Brewery Workers and the United Mine Workers were the first unions to follow this example. However, with the exception of the International Workers of the World, which would later on emerge as an ‘industrial union’ and moderate syndicalist challenger to the AFL, the majority of industrial unions were incorporated into the AFL, despite the federation’s formal orientation to the contrary. By not interfering with these specific incidents of deviation from the federation’s organizational principle, the AFL was able to dissipate the pressure for industrial organization, at least until the 1940s.

Third, even the defining core of ‘moderate syndicalism’, represented by the rejection of independent party formation and the pursuit of flexible and selective interventions in politics, was in dispute. The debate about political involvement that took place in the AFL during the early to mid 1890s provides another piece of evidence for my previous argument that the term ‘business unionism’ and its implications represent a misconception. We have already seen that the initial founding agendas of both F.O.O.T.A.L.U. and the AFL contained commitments to political activity. But during this later time period, intense pressure from a significant faction within the AFL pushed the national leadership to intensify its political involvement. In doing so, Gompers and his supporters were able to dissipate more far reaching calls that wanted the AFL to become the leader of independent party formation projects. As a result, the AFL, other than the Knights, remained committed to a model of moderate syndicalism, even though the federation intensified its selective interventions into the political arena.

Initially, at the 1892 AFL convention, a number of socialist trade unionists argued that the federation should take the lead in the formation of an independent political presence of labor. The call for independent political action became stronger throughout the following year, when a political program drafted by the socialists was recommended by the AFL convention to its affiliates. The agenda contained labor’s most important policy demands, and was employed by the majority of city federations and national unions as the basis for active alliances with the Populists, and the basis for labor tickets in local, state, and federal elections. Despite the enthusiastic endorsement for independent political action by a significant share of AFL members, the convention never formally adopted the program, thanks to the tactical maneuvering of
Gompers. Eventually, in response to the pressure from below, the AFL convention adopted a moderated version of the initial ‘political program’ as the federation’s ‘legislative platform’.

The AFL thus continued to avoid the trap that contributed to the Knights’ demise during the same period, when they formally aligned themselves with the Populist Party. The continued adherence to moderate syndicalism by the AFL proved to be superior to the Knights’ strategy of entering the political arena as an independent force. It was only after the defeat of William Jennings Bryan, the populist presidential candidate of the Democrats, in 1896, that the pressure of the AFL’s rank and file for an independent political presence through affiliation with the Populist Party, began to subside.

Hence, in all these three respects, the AFL made decisions, which recognized the obstacles to partisan labor politics that were a consequence of the inclusive mechanisms of the ‘third party system’. The AFL stayed well within the boundaries of the ‘moderate syndicalist’ model, while the Knights strayed from it by embracing an electoral alliance with the Populist Party. While the Knights represented an amalgamation of various contradicting elements derived from different types of ‘moderate syndicalism’, the federation avoided the according internal dividing lines by organizing itself on the basis of a single version of the ‘moderate syndicalist’ principle. Its conflicts never approached the critical level of those that plagued the Knights of Labor. Most importantly, however, the previous analysis has shown why moderate syndicalism in and of itself represents the ‘optimal’ response to the environment of highest inclusion during the third party system. Projects of independent party formation, on the other hand, failed for the same reasons, which made ‘moderate syndicalism’ thrive.

**Organized Labor and progressivism – continued inclusion through new channels**

The outcomes of labor’s entry into the political arena resulting from developments during the Jacksonian era and the third party system were solidified in the adjusted institutional environment of the progressive era. Highest inclusion of labor and ‘moderate syndicalism’ as the ‘optimal’ response to this environment had emerged as dominant over projects of independent party formation from these earlier periods. Despite different configurations of partisan affiliations and specific differences regarding the agents and mechanisms of inclusion, both previous stages in American political development were characterized by overall similar environments of labor inclusion. In both instances, inclusion was carried out by party organizations and local political machines. It occurred through electoral appeals, policy concessions, and the provision of patronage. Differences between both periods, illustrated in figure 16, and discussed extensively above, are noticeable and consequential for the response of labor elites. But the changes in the institutional balance of power that define the progressive era have led to an even more significant transformation in the nature of labor inclusion, without, however, altering the extent of it.
The second part of organized labor’s ‘formative stage’ in the political arena took place in the context of a new set of parameters defining inclusion. But a continuing level of highest inclusion would also sustain the continued dominance of ‘moderate syndicalism’ over attempts at independent party formation. The AFL had emerged as dominant from previous struggles between moderate syndicalism and independent party formation as well as struggles between different variants of moderate syndicalism. However, the final solidification of its position would occur during the progressive era, albeit under different circumstances.

The following analysis will show how this process unfolded, and how labor elites’ choices evolved in the context of a new environment of inclusion. In the first place, this requires a general discussion of the new parameters of contentious politics, which manifested themselves during the progressive era. Second, the specific agents and mechanisms of labor inclusion that emerged in this context will be analyzed. Third, after this elaboration on the altered nature of highest inclusion during the progressive era, the continuing dominance of the AFL as the response of labor elites to this environment will be assessed. Fourth, the challengers to ‘moderate syndicalism’ in this stage of American political development will be discussed. These were most importantly the social democrats that emerged as the primary alternative to ‘moderate syndicalism’ during this period. But in addition to that, the AFL’s rendition of ‘moderate syndicalism’ was also challenged by reincarnations of the old labor party approach.

My analysis of party formation failure in the context of highest inclusion during the progressive era will encompass the time period from 1896 to 1921. There is some debate about the temporal scope of progressivism, but it is commonly accepted that the peak of progressive politics at the federal level occurred during the Wilson presidency from 1913 to 1921 (cf. Link and McCormick 1983). But most importantly for my explanatory interests here, the general cut off point for the analysis of social democratic party formation has been set around the same time, by the end of the 1910s and the early 1920s, when communism became available as a widely diffused organizational alternative for labor politics. Another opportunity for independent party formation that was curtailed by an entirely new environment of labor inclusion, only occurred during the great depression and new deal era, beginning in the late 1920s. This period does not fall into the scope of my explanation, but I will briefly consider it after the analysis of labor inclusion and party formation during the progressive era, because it provides an important contrast to illustrate the case of Canada, as well as to provide a more comprehensive picture of the American case.

The progressive era and labor inclusion

The nature of labor inclusion during the progressive era can be summarized by three simple observations, which become apparent from the outline in table 16: first, a greater number of inclusive agents in a more fragmented and eclectic environment of opportunity structures for political involvement
than during the earlier ‘party period’; second, as a corollary of this adjusted environment, an accordingly higher number of specific inclusive measures; and third, along with these qualitative changes, a continuing highest level of labor inclusion. The following analysis will show, how highest inclusion through different means continues to provide an environment that can explain the ongoing dominance of ‘moderate syndicalism’ over independent party formation. Overall, the nature of inclusion evolved from an emphasis on legislative and party inclusion of workers and labor leaders to a pattern of administrative inclusion. But before conducting a detailed analysis of labor elites’ choices, the nature of contentious politics during the progressive era as the environment for these choices will be outlined in more detail now.

There is a great deal of historiographical debate about the character, origins, and agents of progressivism. Some of these debates will be assessed later, insofar as they are relevant for the research pursued here (see table 16). Only one of the three issues noted in table 16 should already be tackled at this point – the question as to whether there even was such a thing as ‘progressivism’ or a ‘progressive era’. The great deal of debate and the vast number of contradicting contributions, in particular about the groups that advocated progressive reforms, has led some scholars to conclude that the term progressivism is inadequate altogether.284

Considering these arguments, Stromquist (1997, 143) concludes that “(l)ike the proverbial cat, progressivism comes back from the latest historiographical fray mangled and scarred, almost beyond recognition, but very much alive.” I would argue that just because there is considerable debate about the specific contours of progressivism, the term should not be dismissed. Moreover, above and beyond the issue of terminology, the time period in between the realignment election of 1896 and the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929 is characterized by a number of distinctive features, compared to the earlier ‘party period’. These differences that also include important changes in the nature of labor inclusion, have to be considered for an analysis of labor politics – regardless of whether one calls it the ‘progressive era’ or not. For the sake of simplicity, and also, because the term has proved to be resilient to criticism over the decades, I will continue to employ it here.

Shefter (1978), as a consequence of his research interest in bureaucratic rules and patronage politics, emphasizes the institutional changes as the most important distinguishing feature of the progressive era, compared to the earlier ‘party period’. In his typology of party systems, the time period from 1896 to the late 1920s is characterized as an era, in which government has become ‘bureaucratic’ and parties ‘irresponsible’. This means that legislatures and parties as the dominant actors in the process of policy making and the key arenas of contentious politics were replaced by the rise of somewhat insulated bureaucratic agencies, and generally, an increase in importance of the executive branch.

284 See Link and McCormick (1983) for an overview of this debate.
The defining feature of the realignment that occurred in the 1896 presidential election was a transfer of votes from almost all social groups toward the Republicans. This was the precursor to a situation, in which patterns of party influence became frozen and somewhat uncontested: the Republicans dominated federal politics and the North, at a ratio of 3 to 1 in the major industrialized areas, despite Bryan’s populist farmer-labor strategy, while the Democrats had evolved even more solidly into the party of rural, especially Southern, America (cf. Sanders 1999). The overwhelming dominance of ethnocultural voting blocs from the third party system broke apart at the national level after 1896. Thus, at the very peak of party dominance by the end of the 19th century, the mass mobilization required for the effective maintenance of this system started to collapse, simply because the sectional variation in partisan support and the national dominance of the Republicans left very few elections competitive.

This provided the background, on which the progressive movement was able to advance its agenda. Given the ‘frozen’ distribution of partisan preferences, progressives made the strategical choice to abstain from aligning themselves to supporters from either party exclusively. They attacked the entire set of institutional background conditions and substantive policies that defined the third party system. To that end, progressive politicians channeled their demands into the existing two parties, and sought support from an eclectic variety of social groups that had previously not played a dominant political role. As a result, progressivism manifested itself as a general social and political movement that acted as a pressure group within both major parties. Parts of the movement were affiliated with actual ‘progressive’ organizations, such as the National Municipal League. But overall, progressivism occurred more as a general political and social trend that was diffused in an eclectic and only loosely coordinated fashion: through local associations, political clubs, progressive papers and magazines, ‘muckraking’ journalists, religiously motivated social reformers, and so on. Although progressives were not organized in one single organization or party, progressivism nonetheless became a mass movement with nationwide repercussions. Link and McCormick (1983, 9) even argue that “(p)rogressivism was the only reform movement ever experienced by the whole American nation.”

Two important general consequences followed from the institutional reforms characteristic of the progressive era: first, on average, the executive branch of government became significantly more important than before. In the institutional balance of power, it established dominance over legislatures and parties at the federal, state, and local levels. Second, both as a prerequisite and as a result of progressive institutional reforms, the extent of partisan mobilization decreased significantly. Party membership fell, but the most important indicator for the reduced role of parties in political and social life was the sharp decline in voter turnout, when compared to the earlier ‘party period’ (cf. McCormick 1986).

These general changes are inextricably related to a fundamental transformation in the environment of labor inclusion. As a combination of various developments, this transformation amounts to a fragmentation
of political opportunity structures for organized labor and the emergence of an eclectic variety of actors and inclusive measures instead of the more parsimonious environment of inclusion present during the earlier ‘party period’. Three most important developments stand out: First, the executive branch of government emerged as an independent agent of inclusion. Second, local party machines continued to function as a crucial agent of labor inclusion in some localities, while in others, progressive institutional reforms successfully curtailed their influence. Third, electoral appeals and specific cooperation with party politicians in the legislative and electoral arena were also important for inclusion during the progressive era. But other than in the earlier ‘party period’, the pattern of cooperation now involved labor elites and self declared progressive politicians from both major parties as a cross-cutting pressure group.

The question as to who exactly these progressive politicians from both major parties were, and which groups supported their agenda, still triggers the bulk of the debate about the progressive era. It is widely accepted that progressivism involved an eclectic variety of social groups in one way or another – farmers, old and new middle classes, professionals, businessmen, and workers. Much of the scholarly disagreement centers on contradicting claims about which one of these groups was the decisive leader or originator of progressivism.

The earliest analyses of progressivism, such as deWitt (1915), characterized progressivism as a movement of ‘common men’ – workers, farmers, small businessmen. This interpretation bears a striking similarity to the contours of the Jacksonian coalition, and thereby underestimates the involvement of new actors. The particular role of farmers’ grievances as the source of progressivism is at the core of both classic and more recent studies. Sanders (1999) in her reformulation of the classic argument concludes that the initial most visible leaders of progressive reform were disenchanted middle class Republicans. But over time, specific progressive policies came to depend most crucially on support from agrarian areas.

Along these lines, Sanders (1999) acknowledges earlier influential analyses of progressivism following on the ‘common men’ type interpretations, which introduced a new actor into the debate by emphasizing the role of the ‘old’ urban middle class as initiators of progressive reforms. Hofstadter (1955) in his classic formulation of this approach argues that this group pursued an agenda of progressivism as an attack on the dominant political machines. Through the previous ascendance of party politicians and ‘bosses’, but also the growing power of big corporations, the lawyers, professors, and ministers that constitute the ‘old’ middle classes, had lost much of their earlier social status and political influence. Progressivism was their vehicle to regain social and political dominance. These findings are corroborated through studies of progressive leaders by Mowry (1951) and Chandler (1954), who identify middle class professionals as the engines of progressivism. Hays (1957) and Wiebe (1967) provided a similar argument.

285 See Hicks (1931) and Sanders (1999)
along these lines, but their emphasis is on the role of the “new” middle classes. They argue that progressives were not backward looking ‘old’, but forward looking ‘new’ professionals: physicians, scientists, engineers, social workers. “The heart of progressivism”, as Wiebe (1957, 166) puts it, “was the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means.”

The role of workers as one constituent group of supporters for progressive measures was never called into question by any of these contributions. But none of them would have assigned organized labor or workers the role as leaders or key agents of progressivism. Huthmacher (1962) and Buenker (1973) explicitly study the relation of urban working class immigrants to progressivism. They conclude that urban immigrants gave critical support to progressive politicians, who acted in their interest, without being involved as actual leaders or organizers. A number of more recent contributions throughout the 1980s and 1990s emphasize the role of workers and organized labor as an important agent of progressivism. Stromquist (1997) and others argue that it was the urban working-class, which defined and determined the progressive agenda. In a related vein, but with a somewhat different conclusion, Kolko (1963) had already emphasized the critical role of workers a few decades earlier. He argues that progressivism was nothing more than a ploy of the wealthiest sections of the American public, of finance and business interests, to undermine the real forces for change in the interest of labor – the socialists, and the IWW – by enacting half-hearted reforms to appease labor.

The treatment of workers and organized labor in analyses of progressive reforms raises two major issues: first, the distinction between workers as either leaders or on the other hand, as supporters and beneficiaries of progressivism; and second, the extent to which progressive policies truly benefited the labor constituency. The claims of the new and old middle class interpretations are clearly guided by an emphasis on leadership and the failure to acknowledge the roots of mass support for progressive policies. From this perspective, the answer to the question as to which social group is most heavily linked to progressive measures is exclusively grounded in studying the leaders, but not the supporters of progressivism. Buenker (1973) and Huthmacher (1962) make a more explicit distinction, by identifying and analyzing the interaction between progressive politicians and the labor and immigrant constituencies that supported them. Link and McCormick (1983) and Stromquist (1997) emphasize the independent agency of organized labor more strongly, but in effect, their analysis is based on the same appreciation regarding the distinction between progressive leaders and supporters.

As far as the analysis conducted here is concerned, there is no need to pursue these particular nuances much further. It is well established that progressive policies were never exclusively the work of labor leaders and activists themselves, but often originated out of other, more privileged groups, such as the above mentioned old and new middle classes. The extent, to which laborers in and of themselves pursued progressive reforms, which is the issue that contributions from the new social history current speak to, is of
no major importance for the argument pursued here. Highest inclusion of labor, to which progressive policies contributed, might have occurred completely without the active involvement of labor elites, or entirely as their own work: what is important for the analysis conducted here, is the fact that progressive policies did occur, and how they affected the strategic decisions of organized labor.

A second and related issue arises from the kind of interpretation suggested by Kolko (1963). From his perspective, progressive reforms don’t deserve their name, because they were only a ploy of propertyed interests against the ‘common men’. A similar line of argument is also implicit in the work of Hofstadter (1955), who belongs to those that identify the old middle classes as the major agent of progressivism. For him, progressive reforms were not ‘truthful’. They were not designed as an honest attempt to ameliorate the ills of industrialism; they were motivated by the self-serving interests of the old middle classes. Progressivism was their way of regaining political influence; workers and farmers were used only as a constituency in order to make the pursuit of these self-serving goals possible. This is an important debate for those that wish to discover and explain the ‘nature’ of progressivism. But it is of minor importance here – comparable to the debate about how ‘truthful’ and altruistic the Jacksonian labor reforms truly were. It is of no consequence for my explanation, whether workers and organized labor responded positively to the progressive agenda as a result of ‘false consciousness’ or due to a true and honest satisfaction of their needs. In order to understand the effects of highest inclusion on the lack of party formation and the pursuit of ‘moderate syndicalism’, the only thing that is relevant is to understand the way in which the environment created by progressive elites was perceived by labor leaders and how it affected their strategical response.

This approach to labor politics during the progressive era therefore responds to the work of Buenker (1973) and Thelen (1969). Both of them argue that progressivism should not be understood as an imaginary unified reform movement. It can best be studied as a series of shifting coalitions on a wide variety of issues that only loosely belong to a larger ‘progressive’ agenda. Studies of progressivism therefore should focus on individual reforms and the specific coalitions that supported them. For my explanatory interest, progressive policies and institutional reforms will be analyzed in the context of labor inclusion. Progressive measures, along with other inclusive mechanisms inherited from the party period, have created an environment of highest inclusion, within which ‘moderate syndicalism’ continued to thrive, while independent party formation continued to be a ‘suboptimal’ alternative.

In the following paragraphs, the agents of inclusion that emerged from the revised institutional environment of the progressive era and the inclusive measures associated with them, will be discussed (see

286 Different conclusions about nature of progressive agents are also rooted in the analysis of different legislative levels: Sanders (1999) focuses on the agrarian roots of progressivism on the basis of an analysis that is concerned with the federal level. Wiebe (1967) emphasizes the new middle class, based on an analysis of states.
first, progressive politicians as a cross-cutting pressure group in both major parties; second, the local political machines inherited from the ‘party period’, which continued to remain an important actor of labor inclusion in some areas, while progressive reforms were effective in curtailing their influence in others; and third, the elevated role of the presidency and the executive branch in general, which emerged as a direct consequence of the progressive institutional reforms.

Progressives as a cross-cutting pressure group in both major parties

Progressive policies and institutional reforms were introduced into the legislative arena through self-declared progressive politicians that were affiliated with both major parties. The ongoing debate about the most important agents of progressivism should already have illustrated the specific problem of clearly identifying the background and motivations of progressive politicians. But as outlined above, this debate is quite irrelevant for the explanation I am pursuing here. At this point, I am trying to ascertain, how a number of progressive measures contributed to a new environment of labor inclusion. This environment consisted of three types of measures – first, institutional reforms, second, electoral appeals to the worker constituency and cooperation with labor elites, third, substantive policies – which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. But before engaging in that analysis of specific mechanisms of inclusion, it is necessary to outline the overall process of labor inclusion that occurred through these mechanisms.

Compared to the previous two stages of political development, which are commonly referred to as the ‘party period’, the pattern of cooperation between entrenched elites and labor elites as well as the effects of electoral appeals to the larger worker constituency significantly changed during the progressive era. We have seen for Jacksonian times that the Democratic party emerged as the somewhat more important agent of inclusion in the field of federal and statewide party appeals. During the third party system, organized labor attempted to cooperate with specific candidates from both major parties in particular instances of elections, and workers in general responded positively to varying electoral appeals of the two major parties, which resulted from a combination of ethnocultural, sectional, and socio-economic issues. In principle, this pattern of selective intervention and cooperation by organized labor, along with the incorporation of workers into the folds of both major parties, continued during the progressive era.

What changed during this period is the emergence of a more stable affiliation of organized labor, as well as the according electoral support of workers in general, with a particular set of party politicians. These affiliations, however, did not neatly divide along party lines, in such a way that one of the two parties emerged as the major agent of inclusion, as the Democrats did during the Jacksonian era. Instead, they established affiliations, although more loosely than the partisan identities of the party period, with self-declared ‘progressive’ politicians from both parties. Over time, however, throughout the evolution of
progressivism, the bulk of organized labor support gradually shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats, without ever being entirely absorbed. Nonetheless, these developments foreshadowed the emergence of a more stable association between organized labor and the Democrats that was characteristic for the following New Deal era.

The overall shift of electoral support to the Republicans by almost all social groups in the 1896 election was followed by the stabilization of party support along strictly sectional lines. Until the early 1910s, the Republicans continued to be strongly influenced by a progressive faction, and they received the vast majority of electoral support in the manufacturing areas of the North. This pattern changed, when the Democrats were able to win a House majority in 1910 and 1912, through a large increase of support from the manufacturing belt as well as Midwestern agricultural areas, while maintaining solid support from the South (cf. Sanders 1999). The same pattern also became apparent in the 1912 and 1916 presidential elections, when Woodrow Wilson emerged as the icon of progressivism, although his 1912 success was, of course, partly the result of the temporary split of the Republicans into a progressive and a conventional faction.

The new reform coalition that emerged in the 1910s under the progressive banner, eventually became more heavily affiliated with the Democratic party. It consisted of Southern and Western populist Democrats as well as the new rank and file of urban Democrats from the North. At the same time, the majority of previously Republican progressives returned home after the decay of their newly founded party in 1914. But other than during the previous decade, they now occupied only a minority position. Over time, while originating first within the Republican party fold, progressivism therefore became closely affiliated with the Democrats, while it was relegated to a minority position in the Republican party after the reelection of Wilson against the Republican progressive Charles Evans Hughes in 1916.

In a sense, based on Sanders’ (1996) conclusion, progressivism found its way into the Democratic party, leading to its revitalization in the 1910s through a series of permutations. But the major supporters of progressive policies can be traced back to the failed attempts at establishing farmer-labor parties throughout the post-bellum stage of the third party system. This coalition eventually became the vehicle through which the Democratic party secured its rise during the 1910s, after all the previous attempts at forging a farmer-labor alliance had failed, ever since the end of the Jacksonian era. If the focus is on the entire progressive era, however, both the Republicans and Democrats functioned as important vehicles of progressive reforms. Self-declared progressive politicians from both parties contributed to the inclusion of the labor constituency.
Institutional reforms

As the first one of several mechanisms of inclusion during the progressive era, the institutional reforms demanded by progressive politicians represented a response to the dominant system of party politics. They were designed to curtail the influence of parties, local political machines, and their ‘bosses’. All of the specific institutional reforms that are associated with the progressive agenda stood in direct opposition to the extension of public involvement in politics that occurred during the Jacksonian era: First, the reduction in the number of public offices subject to election created an insulated space for the conduct of ‘neutral’ expert governance, which progressives believed to be unaffected by the irregularities and the self-serving nature of partisan politics. Hofstadter (1955) and Shefter (1991) would add that these and related institutional reforms also served the personal interests of the progressive ‘middle class’ politicians that pursued them.

Second, the formal strengthening of the role of the chief executive, at the federal, state, and local levels was motivated by a similar desire to allow for efficient management and the neutral adjudication of social conflicts. But in addition to that, both of these measures combined also created an entirely new agent of labor inclusion during the progressive era, through the increasing importance afforded to the presidency, and the establishment of executive agencies. These agencies were insulated from the direct influence of the mass public as well as legislatures, and entrusted with important tasks of public administration and policy making, including a wide variety of labor related issues, which had previously been the prerogative of parties, machines, and legislatures.

Third, the selection of candidates through public primaries instead of party conventions was crucial in removing the authority over the process of nomination and agenda setting from the hands of party machines. Giving parties this authority is exactly what the Jacksonians had wanted earlier on, to remove the nomination process from the hands of the oligarchic elites of the first party system. Fourth, the imposition of additional institutional limits on the activities of party organizations was another way of directly curtailing the reach of parties into public affairs. One such measure was the delegation of the nomination process for local elections to the city instead of the ward level, designed to weaken the influence of the machines, which were organized around specific wards. Fifth, civil service reform through the establishment of a merit based recruitment system and the removal of government jobs from the influence of party politicians was motivated by the progressives’ desire to take away one of the major assets that local party machines had obtained earlier on: the ability to reward their supporters and activists with public or government sponsored employment (see Shefter 1991).

These institutional reforms served the needs of progressive politicians, who were intent on curtailing the political influence of parties and local machines. In pursuing and implementing this agenda,
progressives that affiliated themselves with both major parties significantly transformed not only the entire institutional balance of power, but also the opportunity structures for labor’s political involvement. In addition to the presidency and executive agencies that emerged as an inclusive actor in its own right through these reforms, and the continuing relevance of machines in a number of localities, it put progressive politicians in charge of labor inclusion. On the background of these institutional reforms, they entered selective and temporary electoral alliances with labor elites, and projected electoral appeals to the labor constituency, which effectively contributed to the maintenance of highest levels of inclusion. Other than during the earlier ‘party period’, however, inclusion during the progressive era did not occur through the unique combinations of ethnocultural and socio-economic appeals that distinguished both major parties. Progressive politicians appealed to labor and cooperated with labor leaders in specific instances of elections on the basis of specific socio-economic issues that cross-cut earlier cleavages as well as the party lines of the progressive era.

**Electoral appeals and cooperation with labor elites**

The electoral appeals of progressive politicians, and the opportunities for cooperation with labor leaders in the realm of electoral politics, which these appeals created, are therefore the second type of inclusive mechanism associated with progressive politicians from both major parties. The electoral appeal of ‘progressivism’ is much more difficult to identify than those of the entrenched parties during earlier periods of American political development. The parties of the 19th century passed their own mutually exclusive formal resolutions, platforms, and campaign planks. Despite sectional variation and individual candidates’ emphases, it is possible to assess electoral appeals through an analysis of these original documents. Progressive politicians, on the other hand, acted as individual candidates, held together through only loosely coordinated pressure groups within both parties. In order to ascertain the overall ‘electoral appeal’ of progressivism, we have to rely on the observations and inferences from the existing analyses about the nature, background, and appeals of progressivism. It is helpful in this context that the conclusions about the intellectual contours of progressivism and, relatedly, the specific electoral appeals it generated toward the labor constituency, are much more widely accepted, while interpretations about the most important agents of progressive reform are hotly contested.

Progressivism as the intellectual background for the specific electoral appeals of politicians associated with the movement responded to the related processes of industrialization and collectivization during the second half of the 19th century. The factory condition, the process of urbanization, and the exercise of political control through local machines are all manifestations of this overall development. They affected a variety of otherwise disparate groups – farmers, workers, and middle-class urban residents – in different
ways, but created a set of conditions that allowed for joint political action. The eruption of farmer protests, the Knights of Labor, the labor party formation attempts, or the middle-class “Mugwumps” can all be understood as precursors to progressivism. But their efforts remained isolated at the time, and the attempts of forming a political party based on farmer-labor alliances failed for the same reasons as all independent party formation projects did.

In a sense, progressivism can be understood as another attempt of channeling the demands of farmers and labor into the political system – in cooperation with, or under the leadership of, middle-class professionals. Other than the attempts of party formation during the third party system, it was successful for two major reasons: first, because it circumvented, and eventually reduced in importance, the inclusive mechanisms that had previously prevented independent party formation – the influence of local political machines, and the partisan identities generated by the two entrenched parties; and second, because farmers and labor had allies within the major parties that were equally dissatisfied with the status quo, albeit for different reasons. Progressivism was introduced into the political arena on the basis of these earlier developments during the 1870s and 1880s, but it only succeeded through a strategical reorientation that took the obstacles to independent party formation into account: progressive politicians acted as pressure groups within both major parties, and thereby avoided the trap of independent party formation.

After the limited success of proto-progressive campaigns during this earlier time period, the realignment of 1896 as well as the previous depression of 1893-1894 created a more favorable environment for the emergence of progressivism. The worsening economic conditions intensified the call of farmers and workers for a more comprehensive response to the collateral damages of industrialism. And the sectional variation in partisan support resulting from the 1896 election created a perfect opportunity for progressive politicians and their strategy of channeling their agenda into both major parties rather than continuing to pursue independent party formation projects. It is important to note that despite the crisis of the system of party politics, neither one of the two major parties vanished; and while progressivism was successful as a sweeping movement for change in many respects, both parties were able to absorb the movement rather than to decay as independent organizations and to make room for the formation of a new party.

Both workers and farmers came to be convinced that an increase in government interventionism was key to solve the problems which confronted them as a result of industrialization: the power of big corporations, the decline in agricultural prices, unemployment, decreasing wages, insufficient public utilities, poor housing conditions etc. For the urban middle classes, the call for government intervention and more efficient management was an opportunity to attack the power of local machines, party bosses, the inefficiency of political management, and the ‘corrupt’ nature of politics. Based on these developments, progressive politicians carried their agenda into city politics first; from here, progressivism gradually diffused to the state, and eventually the federal level.
At the local level, the early progressivism took the form of practical attempts to improve working and living conditions in the congested cities, as well as to establish more efficient and ‘rational’ forms of city management and the provision of public utilities. Link and McCormick (1983) distinguish between two motivations for the early urban progressivism by referring to its two major figures during the late 19th century: The demands for more efficient government that originated from local businessmen and professionals led to the success in mayoral elections by a number of progressive candidates, most notably William Strong in New York City from 1895 to 1897. The demands of the urban masses for welfare services, affordable public utilities, and fair systems of taxation are most closely associated with Hazen Pingree, mayor of Detroit from 1890 to 1897, or the city of Cleveland from 1901 to 1909.

Progressivism moved to the state and the federal level only throughout the first decade of the 20th century. At this time, an ever increasing number of progressive candidates entered state and federal politics. Progressive politicians were successful in pressuring their respective party to incorporate progressive demands into their agendas. A number of institutional reforms as well as substantive progressive policies were implemented at the federal level during this time period. McCormick (1986) observes some important regional differences in the rise of progressivism. He argues that in the South, progressivism was a truly passionate mass movement, on the basis of southern egalitarianism, but at the same time, under the exclusion of blacks. In the West and North Central regions, progressivism was largely agrarian and anti-railroad in nature, inspired and nourished by the earlier populist movement. In the manufacturing areas of the Northeast, progressivism naturally focused more strongly on urban problems. As a consequence of the weakness of populism and the strength of political machines, progressivism in Northeastern cities had to forge the most eclectic social coalitions, and faced the strongest opposition from the entrenched party bosses.

Despite these regional differences, progressivism was characterized by a shared set of underpinning rationales and a common, albeit eclectic, and sometimes contradictory, agenda. McCormick (1986) argues that at the most basic level, the movement shared a distinct set of attitudes toward industrialism. Link and McCormick (1983) trace the intellectual roots of progressivism. They argue that the two separate motivations of social justice and social control influenced the progressive agenda, inspired by earlier republican and evangelical movements. What added to the progressive formula, was the important role that science, rationality, and efficiency as products of the industrial era played. Other than the earlier farmer-labor protest movements or the Jacksonian democrats, progressive politicians accepted the realities of corporations and industrial patterns of production. Their goal was not the establishment of an idyllic producerist economy, but instead to ameliorate the conditions of industrial life.

The support of progressives for interventionism and regulation represented a general approach to politics that had previously been closely associated with the Whig and Republican agendas of ‘internal
improvements’ and ‘positive’ liberalism. At the same time, the progressive agenda also had some important common ground with the traditions of the Democratic party, which was based to some significant extent on opposition to the negative consequences of industrialization. The electoral appeals of progressives therefore combined the interventionism of the Whigs and Republicans with the concern for the collateral damages of industrialization that was native to the Democratic tradition.

This allowed for the introduction of progressive demands into the entrenched parties, where, at the same time, the traditional agendas of both parties also contained obstacles en route. The Republican agenda of the third party system was designed as a vehicle for economic development, based on the rhetoric of social harmony between employers and workers. It was not much inclined to lend an open ear to the protest movements against economic development and industrialism. The Democratic agenda on the other hand was strongly influenced by a concern for the interests of rural America as well as the demands of Northern, in particular, immigrant workers. But it was based on the premise that the interests of both these constituencies, in the economic and private realms, were best served by a policy of non-intervention and laissez-faire, something that has previously been referred to as ‘negative liberalism’.

The electoral appeal of progressivism, however, was clearly based on a principle of ‘positive liberalism’ and interventionism; but other than the earlier Whig and Republican agendas, interventionism now was designed as a means to serve the interests of previously disadvantaged groups. Thus, it was not only progressivism’s political strategy to target both major parties at the same time, in order to diffuse its agenda. The electoral appeal thus projected also has roots in the traditional appeals of both these parties, while at the same time, progressivism had to face equal amounts of opposition from those elements in the entrenched parties’ orientations that contradicted the progressive agenda.

On this background, specific progressive politicians crafted electoral appeals that were designed for labor, wherever workers were relevant as a voting constituency. However, as a specific inclusive mechanism, electoral appeals did not only attract workers as a mass constituency. They also allowed for the political interventions by ‘moderate syndicalist’ labor elites that will be outlined as one important element of the labor response to the environment of highest inclusion, which these measures helped to create.

**Progressive labor policies**

Even more important than the electoral appeals of progressive candidates, however, were their actual policy records. The two – electoral appeals and cooperation with labor elites on the one hand as well as substantive policies on the other – are inextricably linked to one another, but each of them represents a distinct mechanism of inclusion associated with progressive politicians from both major parties. Many of the specific substantive policies to be summarized now, which were introduced into the party and
legislative arenas by progressive politicians, occurred in a context of cooperation and lobbying efforts from labor elites in the AFL and its affiliated organizations.

Reforms at the local level were already noted before. Above all, they revolved around the provision of more efficient and affordable public utilities, and a list of practical improvements regarding housing and living conditions. In addition to that, they also extended to a reorientation of local taxation in the interest of greater social justice. At the state level, the bulk of progressive legislation was implemented in the first two decades of the 20th century. First, one of the primary concerns on the progressive agenda was the issue of child labor. Regulations had already existed in most states, but it was only in this period that more effective policies and mechanisms of supervision were accomplished. Second, new legislation for working women was passed, both regarding maximum work hour and minimum wage laws.

Third, concerns for safety and health in factories and mines led to the modernization of regulations in the Northern and Western states. Health issues in overcrowded tenement districts resulted in legislation establishing minimum standards in a number of states with large cities. Fourth, the occurrence of industrial accidents and the practice of employers to eschew financial responsibility for the damages incurred through such events resulted in two specific types of measures. Initially, many states forbade labor contracts that placed the responsibility for accidents explicitly on the employees. Moreover, by the year 1917, a total of 30, including all of the Northern states, had established insurance schemes for injured workers. And eventually, the further regulation of working hours did not only extent to children and women, who were regarded as particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of long working hours. Maximum working hours for men were also introduced in a number of states, particularly along the West Coast, although the diffusion of this particular measure was more limited.

During the same time period, but with some considerable delay, progressive policies also arrived at the federal level. As far as labor protection legislation is concerned, the federal government had to yield most legislative authority to the states. But it did become active in those areas, where it was in charge. This applied to all those trades and issues that affected commerce across state borders, as well as federal employees. Along these lines, the federal government passed laws on maximum working hours for workers in the District of Columbia and federal employees that were modeled after the already existing state regulations. The federal level also added legislation on behalf of children and those groups of workers, which were most apparently involved in interstate commerce – seamen and railway workers. After the founding of labor statistics bureaus throughout the final two decades of the 19th century in most of the states and at the federal level, labor gained even more recognition through the establishment of a department of labor at the federal level. In 1903, labor issues became an integral part of the new department of commerce and labor, while in 1913, a separate department of labor was founded.
The progressive legislative agenda culminated in a number of further measures that were designed to regulate corporations and control business practices. These policies were the concern of large parts of the population, but they also resonated with the labor constituency in particular. Initial efforts to this end occurred already during the Roosevelt administration. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) received the authority to set maximum rates for railroad companies in 1906. The pure food and drug act and the meat inspection act of 1906 were geared at improving the safety and quality of medicine and nutrition.

Many proposals initially developed during this time became law under the following Wilson administration. The 1913 Underwood-Simmons Act reduced the protective tariff and established a graduated income tax. The 1913 Federal Reserve Act occurred in response to the traditional demands of farmers and workers for currency reform, although it did not accomplish the far reaching suggestions of the earlier farmer-labor alliances. Earlier attempts to regulate competition and prevent monopolies led to the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914.

The Clayton Act of 1914 was regarded by labor leaders as a milestone for the protection of labor organizations from the courts. While the earlier Sherman Act gave courts the opportunity to prosecute labor activists and leaders on the basis of conspiracy charges, the new legislation was designed to prevent such prosecution. Section 6 of the Act states that

“(t)he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor … organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help … or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall any organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws.”

Section 20 is even more explicit in abolishing the instrument of injunctions that had previously been used frequently to deter protest or punish labor activists:

“That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States … in any case between … employers and employees … involving, or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy of law.”

Labor leaders celebrated the new piece of legislation. Samuel Gompers even went as far as calling it “Labor’s Magna Carta” Later developments showed that this inference was not entirely justified, since activist conservative courts, under pressure from employer interests, found other creative ways to attack labor organizations. But the Act nonetheless represented a milestone for labor in its attempts to seek

287 See USA (1914) for the text of the Clayton Act.
288 See Jensen (2006)
support from the federal government against the activities of the courts. As such, it is one of many pieces of progressive legislation that exercised an inclusive effect, along with other mechanisms of inclusion.

The continuing influence of political machines, despite progressive reforms

Up to this point, we have seen how in an adjusted environment of contentious politics and labor incorporation, progressive politicians as a pressure group in both parties acted as an inclusive agent vis-à-vis labor. Institutional reforms, electoral appeals, and the creation of opportunities for cooperation with labor elites, as well as progressive policies, were the three inclusive measures associated with this particular actor. Despite the attempt of progressively inclined politicians to shatter the influence of local political machines through the institutional reforms outlined above, some of them survived and maintained their position, while others decayed.

The continuing relevance of political machines in a number of localities is one reason for the more fragmented nature of labor inclusion during the progressive era. During the ‘party period’, local political machines and their ‘bosses’ pursued their own agendas and interests, to be sure, but they were integral components of larger parties, and among other things, engaged in translating party images and appeals to their specific local constituency. After progressivism was successful in curtailing the influence of machines in many localities, and in establishing itself as a viable force in statewide and national party politics, machines became a more contested and autonomous actor than before.

However, and that is the most important point here, despite the pressures exercised on political machines, they survived in many instances, and wherever they did, continued to operate as an important agent of labor inclusion, albeit in the context of a different environment, and somewhat more separated from the overall inclinations of their respective parties. But even in this environment, the practices of political machines continued to thrive: local machine politicians continued to create and maintain cross-class alliances based on ethnocultural identities, fueled by patronage and material rewards, despite the attempts of progressive reformers to insulate the bureaucracy and public funds from their reach.

Link and McCormick’s (1983) overview of regional variation in progressivism already contained a hint with respect to the relative ability of political machines to withstand the pressures resulting from progressive reform efforts. Shefter (1983) has provided the most extensive analysis of “regional receptivity to reform”. He argues that the relative strength and scope of party organizations that were established during the third party system can account for the success of progressivism to crush local machines in some places, while they remained influential in others. Cross-class issues, such as the tariff question, and ethnocultural identification patterns were crucial ingredients of the third party system’s political machines. As a consequence of the greater salience of these cleavages in the Northeast, the most solid party
organizations emerged in that particular region. In the West, on the other hand, where these cleavages had significantly less mobilization potential, party organizations were weaker and much smaller in scope and integrative power. When progressive reforms were approaching, local machines in the Northeast were often successful in defending their assets, and in maintaining their specific mechanisms of labor inclusion, against progressivism.

Shefter (1983) illustrates his argument by reference to the representative cases of California and New York. California stands as an example for a progressive victory over weak party organizations. Other than in the Northeast, patronage in California was not administered by party organizations, but instead directly through the “Political Bureau” of the Southern Pacific Railroad. The progressives, organized in the “Lincoln-Roosevelt League”, attempted to liberate the Republican party from the influence of the railroads. They were successful, because they were able to mobilize social groups for their agenda that were previously unmobilized. This alliance of support included newly enfranchised women, farmers, but also organized labor.

New York City is an instance, where strong party organizations were able to withstand the attack of progressive institutional reforms. The key difference to the case of California is the fact that labor in New York City had already been heavily mobilized through the local machines throughout the third party system, and even the Jacksonian era. Progressives in New York therefore had no resource of unmobilized voters to tap into, when they looked for support. Progressive mechanisms of labor inclusion easily overwhelmed the party politicians in California, while the heavy incorporation of labor into New York City’s local political machines prevented this from happening. When progressive politicians launched candidacies for public office and institutional reforms in the city’s Republican party, the old guard tried to diffuse the movement by adopting parts of it, but never to the extent, where it would have undermined their position of dominance: The progressive candidate Charles Evans Hughes received the old guard’s support for his campaigns in 1906 and 1908, but his co-existence with a ‘non-progressive’ state legislature prevented the implementation of far reaching institutional reforms. In the area of patronage, Shefter (1983) observes that a certain amount of public funds was redirected to insulated executive agencies with the support of the local bosses, who at the same time maintained effective control over the approval of these budgets. 289

289 Shefter’s (1983) focus is on the bureaucracy and patronage. Another obstacle to labor inclusion through progressives (but one that applies regardless of regional receptivity to reform) is the ideological domain. Progressivism is not only based on an agenda of social justice, but just as much on the motivation of social control, evidenced through the thriving movements of temperance, mandatory school attendance and others, as noted by Link and McCormick (1983). Just as workers during the Jacksonian era and the third party system rejected the Whig and Republican appeals to these issues, it also created an obstacle to worker support for progressive reformers.
By logical extension, Shefter’s (1983) observations can also help to shed further light on regional variation in the success of the farmer-labor parties from the late 19th century. They were strongest in the West, but more easily curtailed in the Northeast, where populism and greenbackism failed to forge an effective and long term alliance with the labor constituency. Higher electoral mobilization of workers in the Northeast, and a greater influence of cross-class ethnocultural communities functioned as an effective inclusive mechanism against these attempts in the Northeast, while the relative weakness of these mechanisms allowed populism and farmer-labor alliances to thrive more strongly in the West. Thus, in addition to shedding light on the regional receptivity for reform, these comparisons within the US case can also help to further strengthen my argument about the effects of the inclusive measures of the third party system on the lack of party formation.

While Shefter’s interpretation of the US case (Shefter 1978, 1983, 1986, 1984a) is very insightful, his comparisons to a number of European cases unfortunately lack accuracy. He argues that the institutionalization of party and local machine politics after the Civil War is similar to the establishment of “corporatist” institutions in Europe after World War I. First of all, labor inclusion across European cases was much more diverse than he assumes. Corporatist inclusion only occurred in a limited number of cases after World War I, most notably Italy, Germany, and Spain, but also to some extent Hungary and Austria (cf. Luebbert 1987). In other instances, earlier periods of specific environments of labor inclusion had led to social democratic forms of corporatism, or simply the incorporation of labor through the existing party system. Only in these cases, most notably Britain, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands (as well as Australia and New Zealand), previous periods that exhibited a lack of highest inclusion, led to a different outcome than in the United States. Here, party system incorporation occurred through the existing party system, without the formation of a new party based on labor, in response to highest inclusion. In the other cases, the lack of highest inclusion, but the existence or later emergence of effective liberal democracies, i.e. higher inclusion, created an environment, where labor was incorporated through party politics, but other than in the US, through the formation of a new independent party based on labor.

The Presidency and the federal executive branch as a new inclusive actor

The institutional reforms that progressive politicians were able to enact, have transformed the entire environment of labor inclusion. In addition to their – regionally varying – effects on the position of local political machines, a second manifestation of their impact is the altered role of the presidency and the executive branch of government overall in the process of labor inclusion. Generally, as a result of progressive institutional reforms, the executive branch of government emerged as an independent agent of inclusion. This is not to say that the chief executive, whether at the local, state, or federal level was entirely
irrelevant for labor inclusion before. Andrew Jackson or Abraham Lincoln were certainly crucial political figures for the incorporation of labor. But their contribution to labor inclusion was one of the party man, who occupied the office of president, rather than through the formal executive authority of the presidency. The strengthening of the executive branch of government made the presidency as an institution an inclusive agent in its own right, along with the insulated executive agencies that were established during the progressive era.

Labor inclusion through these agents occurred in a number of ways that will be outlined in the following paragraphs: first, through the initiative or support for progressive policies, in cooperation with the progressively inclined politicians noted above; second, through explicit cooperation with labor elites at the highest political as well as through ‘administrative’ cooperation at lower levels; and third, through the conduct of ‘expert’ governance for the purpose of business regulation and conflict adjudication, in the context of executive agencies insulated from the legislature. This particular pattern of inclusion that established a number of direct links between organized labor and the executive branch, culminated in particularly intense forms of cooperation during World War I.

McCormick (1986) marks the second term of Theodora Roosevelt from 1905 to 1909 as the point in time, when progressivism moved from the cities and states to the federal level. He argues that the embrace of federal politics was the result of a growing awareness that national solutions were required for the accomplishment of progressive goals. Roosevelt had always fashioned himself as an outsider to his own party, and was a supporter of progressive labor reforms, explicitly so in order to counteract radical tendencies within the labor movement. All of the progressive policies from this time period that were noted above, received the explicit support of the president, or occurred as the result of his own initiative: the initial attempts at anti-trust legislation, the regulation of business practices through the creation of the ICC, the Pure Food and Drug Act, or the Meat inspection Act.

A number of much more far reaching measures were suggested by Roosevelt during the two final years of his presidency. Many of these suggestions – the introduction of income taxes, restrictions on activist courts in their campaigns against strikers, accident protection, reduction in working hours – became law during the following Wilson administration. But in addition to that, they also led to the split of the Republican party into a progressive and a conservative faction for the 1912 presidential election. Woodrow Wilson, who finished the race as the successful contender, forged an effective synthesis of progressive rhetoric and the more conventional laissez-faire inclinations of his party. But already in 1912, he fashioned himself as the “true progressive candidate”. In retrospect, historians identify him as the most important figure of progressivism, although the initial progressive movement itself originated elsewhere.290

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290 See for example Link and McCormick (1983), McCormick (1986), or Rayback (1966); more critical Jensen (2006)
addition to his support and initiative in the arena of progressive domestic policies already noted before, Wilson also pursued an agenda of codifying international labor standards. In this context, he was an active supporter for the foundation of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919.

Explicit cooperation with labor elites at the highest political and at ‘administrative’ levels represents a second mechanism of labor inclusion associated with the federal executive branch during the progressive era. Both Roosevelt and Wilson cooperated with labor elites, in terms of substantive policy issues, and in the context of election campaigns. Samuel Gompers supported Roosevelt in 1905. After the incorporation of a number of AFL demands into the Democratic Party Platform for his 1916 re-election campaign, Gompers publicly endorsed Wilson.\(^{291}\) A number of specific labor policies resulted from this cooperation, in addition to a regular correspondence and exchange between the two, as well as Wilson’s appearances at AFL events. Hence, the same pattern of selective cooperation and temporary alliances with progressively inclined politicians that had already been observed before, also extended to the office of the president.

At the intersection between ‘administration’ and ‘politics’, William B. Wilson, secretary of labor from 1913 to 1921, interacted on a regular basis with the AFL and its executive council. In the domain of ‘expert’ governance, the creation of insulated executive agencies, some of which were designed to allow for an efficient, ‘rational’, and fair adjudication of social conflicts, has to be regarded as the third and final inclusive mechanism associated with the executive branch. In general, the progressive era has seen the foundation of many such agencies, designed to take important elements of policy making and implementation away from the ‘self serving’ and ‘irrational’ parties and their ‘bosses’. Of particular importance for organized labor were the foundation of the USDA, the precursor of the FDA, in 1906, the regulation of railroads through the ICC, founded in 1904, the creation of the Department of Labor in 1913, on top of the previously established federal labor statistics bureau, the activities of the Commission on Industrial Relations from 1912 to 1915, and the foundation of the War Labor Board in 1917.

The Commission on Industrial relations was created by Congress in 1912. Its final 1915 report contained an extensive account of injustices suffered by labor as well as the outline of a comprehensive public insurance scheme in response to the precarious condition of workers. While many of its proposals were not implemented until the 1930s, the War Labor Board was of particular immediate importance for the inclusion of labor through the executive branch. The conditions during World War I led to more intense cooperation and centralized planning for an economy geared at sustaining the war effort. The War Labor Board was created in order to adjudicate and pacify social conflicts during the war and to enhance overall economic planning. Throughout its existence, organized labor was fully involved and integrated in its activities.

\(^{291}\) See Jensen (2006), as well as Gompers (1927) in his autobiography
The effects of this experience, however, lasted well beyond the war itself: organized labor had finally arrived at being fully acknowledged as a ‘respectable’ force that was on good terms with the president, their ‘own’ secretary of labor, and a wide variety of progressive politicians. Moreover, akin to the situation in Britain after the end of World War II, the experiences with the War Labor Board helped to persuade the public and political elites of the need for centralized bargaining, planning, and conflict adjudication, even after the war had been terminated. A large number of states established permanent commissions for industrial arbitration, modeled on the federal example, in between 1919 and 1921.

Labor’s response to an adjusted environment of inclusion during the progressive era

The moderate syndicalist model of American labor politics emerged as dominant from the previous third party system in the particular version pursued by the AFL and its affiliated organizations. It continued to be dominant in the altered institutional environment of the progressive era. This outcome has to be understood as the ‘optimal’ response of labor elites to this new environment, which provided an equally highest degree of inclusion as the previous party period did, albeit through different actors and mechanisms. Throughout the following paragraphs, I am going to outline, how the dominant type of ‘moderate syndicalism’ that revolved around the AFL, interacted with the new environment of inclusion during the progressive era. The lack of success of alternative models of labor politics will be outlined thereafter. The failure of social democratic and labor party formation attempts represents the flipside of moderate syndicalism’s superior suitability to highest inclusion. Before engaging in the analysis of these two types of contenders for dominance in the arena of labor politics, I will first outline my general explanation as to why ‘moderate syndicalism’ continued to be the optimal option for labor elites’ response to the altered environment of inclusion during the progressive era. We have argued previously that ‘moderate syndicalism’ emerged as dominant, because it gave labor elites the opportunity to accomplish the same benefits as independent party formation would have, but without the higher costs of party formation. During the progressive era, the altered institutional environment discussed above created a new situation, in which party formation continued to be as costly as before, while ‘moderate syndicalism’ continued to be not only less costly than party formation; it also promised comparatively higher rewards than before. Thus, in most basic terms, the cost-benefit evaluation of both models of labor politics made moderate syndicalism even ‘more optimal’ compared to independent party formation than during the previous party period.

On the one hand, independent party formation continued to be as costly as during the party period for the following reasons. The demobilization of partisan identities and affiliations characteristic of the progressive era went hand in hand with an overall lower electoral mobilization potential, lower voting participation, and an overall decreased importance of the legislative arena. At the same time, as has been
discussed before, the two major parties managed to adapt to the new circumstances, and continued to be well entrenched.  This applies especially to the Northeastern regions of the country, where local machines withstood the attack of progressive institutional reforms without permanent damages. In these areas, which are, of course, most crucial for an analysis of labor politics, local political machines continued their strategy of cross-class ethnocultural community building, patronage, and electoral mobilization.

As a consequence of these developments, parties challenging the entrenched system continued to face the same objective and psychological obstacles as their counterparts from the party period. This includes the electoral system, the continuing access of machines to funds for patronage, the continuing relevance of ethnocultural identities in a number of localities, and the ongoing existence of partisan identities. However, since it is undeniable that overall, the importance of these inclusive mechanisms has significantly declined as a result of progressive reforms, the following second line of argument is even more important. The general decline in the potential of partisan mobilization affected not only the existing parties, but naturally, also new contenders. As a result of this constellation, the ‘relative distance’ between the entrenched parties and their challengers remained the same as during the ‘party period’.

Secondly, while independent party formation thus remained as costly as before, the ‘moderate syndicalist’ alternative had become more rewarding as a consequence of the altered institutional environment of the progressive era. The shift in importance from the legislative to the executive branch made parties and legislatures less relevant for the process of labor inclusion. The increasing importance of executive and administrative inclusion changed the entire pattern of contentious politics to a situation, where interest group pressure and lobbying achieved crucial importance; not just vis-à-vis legislators, but now increasingly so toward the executive branch of government directly. This is at the core of the ‘moderate syndicalist’ model, which is defined by selective and temporary political interventions, while independent party formation requires the opportunity for partisan mobilization, and is therefore a ‘suboptimal’ strategy in this new environment.

As a result of these two developments, the gap in cost-benefit calculations between the moderate syndicalist strategy and independent party formation became even wider. The institutional reforms and the altered nature of contentious politics of the progressive era thereby created a set of circumstances, within which moderate syndicalism was elevated as an even more fitting response to the existing environment of inclusion than during the ‘party period’, compared to other models of labor politics.

The continuing dominance of moderate syndicalism

The development of the AFL and its affiliated organizations can be identified through an assessment of union density, membership figures, interpretations of its overall influence on workers or society in general and a number of other ways. All of these conclusions pertain to the question of mobilization success, and thereby a phenomenon that is not the primary research interest pursued here. My explanatory interest is geared at explaining the dominance of a particular model of labor politics over others. This makes it necessary to understand how the choices of labor elites in terms of alternative models to enter the political arena respond to a given environment of inclusion. As far as the issue of mobilization success is concerned, the important question in this context is only the relative success of one model over others, but not the absolute success of any such model.

For the case of the AFL and its affiliated organizations, many labor historians have traced the development of mobilization success over time. Nelson (1997) investigates the overall evolution of union density from the early 1800s to the 1990s. For the time period under investigation here, he observes an impressive growth of unionization in between 1897 and 1904, from 3.5 to 12.3 %.^{293} Stagnation and decline in between 1904 and 1916 to a value of 11.2 % are then followed by a new peak of 19.6 % in 1921. The vast majority of union members during this time period belonged to organizations affiliated with the AFL. It is Rayback (1966), who investigates the membership development of the AFL in more detail. At the peak of union density in the first decade of the 20th century, in 1904, the AFL had 1 675 000 members. Just as overall union density, AFL membership declined in the following few years until 1910, when the figure continued to be below the 1904 value. It was only after this watershed year of 1910 that another significant increase in membership was recorded.

Rayback (1966), Nelson (1997) and many others offer various explanations for these “shifting fortunes” of American labor unions.^{294} However, rather than trying to explain absolute ‘mobilization success’, for my purposes here, it is only necessary to observe, which particular model of labor politics received most support, and thereby emerged as dominant over others. This is the question of ‘relative mobilization success’, which is not in dispute in any contribution or by any of the existing indicators. The AFL and its affiliated organizations continued to thrive after they established their initial dominance during the last stage of the ‘third party system’, while all of the new and old challengers decayed. It is clear, as Rayback (1966) shows, that by 1909, the AFL had established dominance, not only vis-à-vis other challengers, but also over its own affiliated organizations.

\[\text{293 Union density is calculated as the percentage of the nonagricultural labor force enrolled as dues paying members of unions. For the figures employed here, see Nelson (1997, 5). For international comparisons see Docherty (2004).}\]

\[\text{294 The term “Shifting fortunes” appears as the title of Nelson’s (1997) book.}\]
Note, however, that there is some debate about the extent to which the political strategy of city federations and other national unions was often less cautious and more radical than the approach of the AFL leadership. Moreover, despite the preeminence of centralized leadership, national unions belonging to the AFL and its own city federations maintained a certain amount of autonomy. Both of these issues and their implications have already been discussed in the previous section. As far as the question of internal organization is concerned, the character of the AFL changed quite significantly throughout the progressive era. We have previously argued that the idealtypical model of the AFL as a craft based organization of skilled workers was never entirely exclusive. Already during its early years, the federation had incorporated a number of unions that were based on the principle of industrial organization. This development continued and intensified during the progressive era, when the AFL established “trades councils” of various crafts involved in the same industry on top of its ordinary craft based organization.

These developments slightly changed the organizational features of the AFL’s particular type of ‘moderate syndicalism’. But the core of ‘moderate syndicalism’ itself – the focus on ‘economic’ activities, combined with selective political interventions and the incorporation of workers into the existing party system – was not affected by these changes. The AFL and its affiliated organizations continued their strategy of ‘moderate syndicalism’ during the progressive era. In the political realm, this approach is defined by temporary and selective forms of cooperation with entrenched elites from both major parties. As a consequence of the altered institutional environment of the progressive era, two important changes in the pursuit of this strategy occurred: first, cooperation of local, state, and federal labor elites that belonged to the domain of the ‘moderate syndicalist’ model revolving around the AFL, occurred most frequently with politicians that identified themselves as ‘progressives’; second, in addition to electoral cooperation with parties and legislatures, direct involvement with the executive branch of government achieved crucial importance.

During this entire time period, the AFL never altered the ‘moderate syndicalist’ core of its political strategy. The same applies to those of its city federations, for example in Cleveland, and a number of other localities, which, according to contributions from the ‘new social history’ approach, were more heavily involved in political action and more radical in orientation than their national federation and its leadership. In 1905, the AFL issued “Labor’s bill of grievances” a list of political demands and a legislative agenda. A Labor Representation Committee, designed to pursue a coordinated political campaign on the basis of this agenda, was founded in 1906. Some termed these developments a ‘turn to politics’. But essentially, they represented nothing more than the intensification of a pattern of political involvement that had already been practiced before. It was not a change in strategy, but only the foundation

295 For the case of Cleveland, see Stromquist (1997).
for a more systematic approach into the political arena.\textsuperscript{296} Other than the earlier “United Front” campaign, which emerged with comparable goals, the AFL never attempted to extend its activities within the arena of politics into independent party formation projects.

The Labor Representation Committee was charged with supporting “labor friendly”, i.e. ‘progressive’, candidates from both major parties. Significant funds and efforts were invested in these efforts. Beginning in 1908, this pattern of selective intervention was extended to the internal proceedings and resolution drafting procedures of both major parties. Despite the more cooperative approach of the Democrats to the demands of labor, the AFL continued its earlier strategy to support specific candidates from both major parties during the 1908 congressional elections. In 1912, both the Democrats and the progressive splinter of the Republicans incorporated the entire legislative platform that was delivered to them by the AFL, while the old guard Republicans adopted a selected number of labor’s demands.

This pattern of selective political involvement for ‘progressive’ politicians also extended to the question of recommendations issued by the AFL for upcoming presidential elections. During the first decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, no formal recommendations were made, but the AFL leadership, and here in particular Samuel Gompers, made their preferences quite clear, even in the absence of formal resolutions.\textsuperscript{297} The AFL favored the Republican Roosevelt in 1900 and 1904, the Democrat Bryan in 1908, and Wilson in 1912 and 1916 – all candidates that explicitly ran under the banner of ‘progressivism’.

These selective interventions into electoral politics – for both legislative and executive offices – on behalf of ‘progressive’ candidates, were accompanied by direct cooperation with the executive branch of government. That second aspect of labor’s response to the new environment of inclusion during the progressive era was already outlined above, in the previous section. In pursuing this strategy, the AFL and its affiliated organizations continued to uphold a strategy of ‘moderate syndicalism’ that represented an ‘optimal’ response to an environment of highest inclusion. And the adjusted nature of inclusive agents and mechanisms during the progressive era rendered the cost-benefit ratio of this particular strategy even more rewarding to labor, compared to independent party formation, than during the earlier ‘party period’.

\textit{The continuing failure of independent party formation}

While moderate syndicalism continued to thrive under the altered institutional environment of the progressive era, attempts at independent party formation continued to fail. Party formation failed for the same reasons that were underpinning the relative success of ‘moderate syndicalism’: the existing obstacles

\textsuperscript{296} See AFL (1905) for the original text of “Labor’s bill of grievances”.
\textsuperscript{297} See Rayback (1966) for a discussion and Gompers (1927) for his own evaluation, in his autobiography.
to party formation during the progressive era made such attempts costly, while even higher rewards than during the party period could be accomplished through the selective political interventions of ‘moderate syndicalism’, at a much lower cost than independent party formation.

During the progressive era, social democracy emerged as the major challenger to the dominant model of moderate syndicalism, a role that during the party period had been fulfilled by the various manifestations of labor and labor-farmer parties. In this position, social democracy functioned as a vehicle to exercise pressure on the entrenched parties – pressure that helped sustain the progressive policies of the era; even though these policies were not as far reaching as the socialists’ agenda itself.

In the long run, the same thing that had happened to populism by the end of the 19th century, happened to social democracy during the progressive era. Populism had become absorbed into the Democratic party by the 1896 presidential election. A reformist variant of social democracy has begun to be adapted by the Democratic party during the progressive era already. But it was only during the Great Depression and New Deal period, that this earlier development would culminate in a solid adjustment of the party’s appeal. The inclusive mechanisms that were in place during the New Deal era therefore created a situation, in which a significant part of social democratic thought entered the party system through the Democratic party’s evolving programmatic appeal and the welfare state agenda pursued by the federal government. During the progressive era, the continuing failure of social democratic party formation is the result of equally highest degrees of inclusion, albeit by different means than during the following New Deal era and the previous party period.

Social democracy had first manifested itself as an independent organization through the foundation of the Lasallean “Social Party” in 1868. But the most important forerunner to the 1901 Socialist Party as the dominant organizational model of socialism in the United States was the Socialist Labor Party of 1876. These developments that occurred during the third party system were already outlined before. On the basis of a number of further permutations to be discussed below, systemness as one of three prerequisites for successful party formation was established in 1901 through the formation of the Socialist Party of America. Social integration through the establishment of a dominant ideological form occurred through the enactment of the evolutionary socialist “Indianapolis program” at the same 1901 party congress (see table 11).

The absence of successful party formation, as has been noted before, is therefore due to the failure of social democracy to achieve external institutionalization through a minimum of electoral representation (see tables 11, 12 and 13). The lack of mass mobilization to such an extent that it does not qualify here as sufficient external institutionalization is the result of two interrelated causal factors: first, mass mobilization and electoral success were costly and difficult to accomplish, as a consequence of the obstacles to party formation during the progressive era, and the continually high ‘relative distance’ in mobilization potential
and opportunities, compared to the entrenched parties. Second, the majority of labor elites, as well as rank and file organized labor, embraced ‘moderate syndicalism’ as an alternative to social democratic party formation. That approach into the political arena was not only significantly less costly than party formation, but the altered institutional environment of the progressive era, and the increasing importance of interest group politics also promised higher rewards, compared to party formation, and compared to the potential rewards of moderate syndicalism during the party period.

The Socialist Party of America as the vessel that accomplished ‘systemness’ for American social democracy was founded in 1901 as a merger of the 1898 Social Democratic Party and a majority of the former members of the 1876 Socialist Labor Party. The “Social Democracy of America”, founded in 1897, had some important programmatic influences, without being a part of the formal merging process. The first one of these contributing sources to the new party, the Socialist Labor Party, had reached a stage of stagnation after some initial electoral successes by the mid 1880s. The attempts of the SLP to branch out into the economic realm by founding its own union federation, the “Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance”, in 1895, revitalized the party for a while. But conflict with the Knights and the AFL, as well as internal friction over the relative salience of the economic and political struggles, respectively, led to eventual stagnation only half a decade later.

The “Social Democracy of America”, founded in 1897, was based on a uniquely American variant of socialist ideology, commonly referred to as “Yankeefield socialism” (cf. Rayback 1966). Although the Social Democratic Party of America, founded in 1898, as the second pillar of the Socialist Party of America, represented a reaction against this agenda, some of its elements and supporters eventually ended up in the SPA as well. “Yankeefield socialism” revolved around the idea of a cooperative socialist utopia, based on Edward Bellamy’s 1888 scenario “Looking Backward”. His writings had a considerable influence, in particular throughout the American Midwest. In terms of practical politics, “Yankeefield Socialism” culminated in the demand for the colonization of a western state on the basis of cooperative socialist principles.

Eugene Debs as the most prominent figure of American socialism in the progressive era initially supported this approach, but eventually dismissed it as idealistic toward the late 1890s. After the “Social Democracy of America” had been founded in 1897 on the basis of the cooperative commonwealth idea, the converted Debs and others attempted to remove the colonization demand from the party platform. When they failed, they founded the Social Democratic Party in 1898. The party and its leadership around Debs and the pragmatic marxist Victor Berger shared a homogenous commitment to a solidly “evolutionary socialist” agenda. The “Chicago Declaration of Principles” was passed at the party’s founding congress in

298 Shannon (1955) notes the opposition to unification by the SLP leadership, most notably Daniel de Leon.
1898. The platform contained a number of specific labor demands, ranging from wages to working hours and other issues. It also stipulated various fundamental institutional reforms, such as the right of initiative and referendum and the introduction of a Proportional Representation electoral system. These demands were typical for social democratic parties in all industrializing societies, regardless of which particular party type they represented.

It is the following two elements of the program, which place the party firmly in the ‘evolutionary socialist’ camp. First, the emancipation of the working class was to be accomplished through activities in the economic realm and through independent action in the political arena. But the economic struggle was not deemed second in importance to politics. Moreover, other than the SLP, the Social Democratic Party made no efforts to challenge the dominance of the existing unions and the AFL in the ‘economic’ domain. The party grew to some extent out of the organized labor movement, but its focus was exclusively on the political struggle. The recognition of equal importance accorded to the political and economic struggle and the need for cooperation between the political and economic branches of the labor movement identifies the party as distinct from its quasi-revolutionary cousins. And so does the abstention from class struggle rhetoric. But in addition to that, in the second place, what identified the party as ‘socialist’ was its commitment to the public ownership of the means of production. The language in the document is more cautious than that of comparable ‘evolutionary socialist’ parties – by emphasizing the collectivization of monopolies, the means of transportation and communication, and mining facilities – but the gist of the agenda is the same.

The “Indianapolis party program” that was adopted by the Socialist Party of America in 1901, was based on the Chicago declaration, but it was adjusted to reflect the contributions of the SLP to the new party. However, the SLP was much more heterogeneous than the Social Democratic Party. As we have seen before, it was initially based on a combination of marxists, Lasalleans, and anarcho-syndicalists. While the anarcho-syndicalists had left the organization in the 1880s already, friction between the remaining two camps continued, but the marxist faction around Daniel deLeon dominated most of the party. As a consequence, the document passed in Indianapolis in 1901 as the dominant ideological model represented a slight change from the earlier solidly ‘evolutionary socialist’ Chicago declaration. But most of these changes were only cosmetic in nature, the overall gist of the party’s orientation remained clearly ‘evolutionary socialist’. Other than the Chicago document, the new platform now contained a brief marxist inspired socio-economic analysis, and some stronger language about the exploitative nature of capitalism. It
also significantly expanded the number of industries that were to be nationalized. But in neither one of these ways did any of the implemented changes overturn the earlier ‘evolutionary socialist’ orientation.\footnote{299 See Social Democracy of America (1898) for the Chicago declaration, and Socialist Party of America (1901) for the Indianapolis party platform.}

The minor programmatic compromises that were made by the leadership of the Social Democratic Party allowed for the establishment of a more broadly based socialist party than ever before. The advances in membership and electoral success reconciled Debs and the others, who were previously opposed to the merger, with the concessions they had to make. The newly founded and eclectic Socialist party of America had 19,932 dues paying members in 1904, and 22,828 in 1905, before reaching a new peak in 1908 with 41,751 members. The all time membership high of 117,984 occurred in 1912 (see table 14). In relative terms, compared to the number of industrial workers at large, the party was significantly smaller than most of its counterparts in the majority of industrialized societies. But even in terms of this membership/industrial workers ratio, the SPA (1.02 \%) was larger than the Argentinean socialists (0.59), only insignificantly smaller than the French (1.04), and just slightly below the Italian PSI (1.66) for the 1911-1920 time period.

In absolute figures, the SPA was larger than many of its European counterparts during the first and second decade of the 20th century; larger than social democratic parties in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Switzerland from 1901-1910; and only surpassed in the size of its membership by the Austrian, German, and British social democrats during the second decade of the 20th century (see table 14). It is therefore undeniable that the SPA had succeeded in establishing a viable mass base of members during the progressive era. This is only one important element of ‘systemness’, however. The practice of a regular budgetary process, permanent internal proceedings, and communication between the center and the periphery of the party are the remaining aspects. In its major strongholds in the West and the industrialized centers of the manufacturing belts, the party published a number of partisan papers – the “Call” in New York, the “Appeal to Reason” in Kansas, the “Daily Socialist” and the “Social Democratic Herald” in Chicago. Membership figures, budget records, and reports of internal party proceedings are well documented in these papers, and in the “Socialist Party National Bulletin”. Moreover, national party congresses, along with the nomination of presidential tickets and campaign platforms, occurred on a regular basis throughout this period.

However, despite the accomplishment of “systemness” and “social integration” – the latter on the basis of the 1901 “Chicago Declaration of Principles” – the party never achieved “external institutionalization”. Its electoral successes were impressive throughout the first two decades of the 20th century. Meyer London was elected to the House of Representatives for New York, from 1915 to 1919, and 1921 to 1923, Victor Berger for Wisconsin from 1910 to 1912. The party had several dozen mayors in
industrial cities, university towns, mining as well as Western farming areas. It was represented by an impressive number of city council members, state legislators, and a wide variety of other public offices (cf. Shannon 1951). But despite these accomplishments, the party never passed the threshold of permanent nationwide recognition through elections: The 6.2% Eugene Debs scored for the party in the 1912 presidential election were to remain its all-time peak. After 3.3% in 1916 and 3.5% in 1920, the party stayed permanently below 1% (see table 12).

The price for the temporary successes of the party and the establishment of a viable mass base was the eclectic nature of its adherents. The compromise between the various factions codified in the 1901 Chicago Declaration held until 1919. At this time, with the advent of the Russian Revolution, the formation of the Communist International, and the diffusion of truly ‘revolutionary’ socialism as an alternative, earlier frictions led to the split of the party. As Shannon (1955) and Rayback (1966) observe, there existed a great number of potential breaking points before that time. Shannon (1951) vividly describes the differences in outlook and mentalities that distinguished the rural socialists from the West and the city dwellers from the East, in particular New York City. Rayback (1966) provides an overview of social backgrounds to be found in the party membership: socialist agitators, both of the marxist and the “Yankeefield” variety, trade unionists, regular workers, farmers, but also those social groups that are typically associated with progressive reforms in general during this period – social workers, ministers, professors, and small businessmen.

While these dividing lines should not be dismissed as irrelevant, the most important cleavage within the party revolved around ideology and strategy. The group of leaders that is usually referred to as the “right” wing – Debs, Victor Berger, London and others – represents the “evolutionary socialist” mainstream of the party. The ‘left’, around Leon Greenbaum, represented a unique ideological mix of mainstream vulgar marxism and syndicalism. When bolshevism knocked on the door in 1919, the party embraced it, while the vast majority of ‘quasi-revolutionary’ social democrats in Europe rejected bolshevism. Before the 1919 split, the ‘evolutionary socialist’ right had maintained dominance over the eclectic “left” wing. The left remained within the party, however, for the lack of a better alternative, and also because of their desire to keep the movement unified. The availability of bolshevism as an ideological and organizational alternative eventually triggered the party split in 1919. Initially, the left attempted to commit the Socialist Party to the principles of the Third International and bolshevism. When they failed, the adherents of the left faction abandoned the socialists, and founded their own – communist – party.

Despite their eventual demise as an organization with a viable mass base after the split, the social democrats of the progressive era fulfilled the same important functions within American politics and the labor movement as the earlier workingmen parties of the Jacksonian era, and the various labor and farmer-labor parties of the third party system. First, the pressure exercised by the social democrats through their
presence in the electoral arena functioned as a catalyst for the progressive legislative agenda. Despite intense competition between the AFL and the socialists, the AFL would not have been as successful as it was in gaining recognition for labor’s cause without the additional pressure from the socialists. Second, the presence of the social democrats and their activities within the AFL also pushed the federation to embrace political involvement more systematically than before, as evidenced by the formation of its Political Representation Committee in 1906 and the ensuing intense electoral involvement.

The fate of social democratic party formation during the progressive era was shared by a number of insulated attempts to install labor and farmer-labor parties. With the exception of the National Labor Party of 1919, and Robert LaFollette’s Progressive Party of 1924, none of these extended beyond a limited geographical scope. The National Labor Party emerged from various local organizations, but it was rejected by both the AFL and the socialists, who feared for their respective territories. The Progressive Party was not explicitly a labor party, but it advocated a significant number of reforms in the interest of organized labor as well as small farmers. The earlier local and statewide projects that occurred throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, became relatively more prevalent after the demise of the socialists in the late 1910s. In 1922, a farmer-labor party was formed in Minnesota. Around 1920, local and state labor parties were founded in Connecticut, Chicago, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and Utah. The American Labor Party (ALP) was founded in New York in 1919, and became an important and influential force in New York City local and state politics.

Conclusion

Despite select local instances of limited success, the labor and labor-farmer parties of the progressive era did not match their earlier preeminence during the third party system. For that time period, they operated as the primary challenger of moderate syndicalism. In that role, they pushed the entrenched parties to adopt elements of the labor agenda and to create an environment of highest inclusion. In the progressive era, social democracy had taken over the position as the primary rival to the dominance of moderate syndicalism.

During this time period, ‘highest inclusion’ was accomplished by three distinct actors (see table 16): first, progressive politicians, who operated as a loosely coordinated pressure group in both major parties; second, local political machines in those regions, where machines withstood the assault of progressive institutional reforms; third, the presidency and insulated executive agencies. These actors and the eclectic number of inclusive mechanisms they pursued, continued to ensure highest inclusion during the progressive era, albeit in a significantly different way than during the previous third party system. The rising importance of interest group politics due to the emergence of the executive branch as an agent of labor
inclusion and the distribution of progressive politicians across both major parties, provided even more benefits for a ‘moderate syndicalist’ strategy than before. At the same time, due to the overall decline in electoral mobilization, and the continuing importance of local political machines particularly in the manufacturing belt of the Northeast, independent party formation continued to be as costly as it used to be before.

Social democratic party formation as well as other attempts to establish independent parties of labor therefore continued to fail in the United States during the progressive era, as they had during the previous two stages of development. This lack of success in the case of social democracy during the progressive era is not for lack of “systemness” or “social integration” (see table 11). It is the result of the Socialist Party’s failure to achieve “external institutionalization”. This particular shortcoming is the direct consequence of two interrelated factors, both of which are grounded in the existence of highest degrees of labor inclusion: first of all, external institutionalization through permanent electoral representation failed, because of the continuingly existing obstacles that affected all attempts at independent party formation. Secondly, as the flipside to this development, social democracy failed as well, because ‘moderate syndicalism’ is not only of superior suitability to the progressive era’s environment of highest inclusion, but eventually, because the vast majority of labor elites acknowledged this, and decided to pursue a ‘moderate syndicalist’ approach.

Inclusion during the New Deal era as the final ‘nail in the coffin’ for social democracy

Another new environment of inclusion

After the demise of the Socialist Party following on its 1919 split, the intermittent ascendance of the Progressive Party in the mid 1920s, and the even more limited success of the NLP, the next opportunity for independent political action of labor only occurred in the context of the Great Depression. But the inclusive mechanisms emerging throughout the New Deal era in response to the economic recession ensured ongoing highest inclusion, and as a consequence, the failure of independent party formation. ‘Moderate syndicalism’ continued to represent the ‘optimal’ choice of labor elites during this time. But throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, both the environment of labor inclusion, and the nature of the ‘moderate syndicalist’ model pursued by the AFL changed significantly.

The time period spanning the depression and the following decade of interventionist measures, commonly referred to as the New Deal, is outside the time period under investigation here. For a number of reasons discussed extensively before, my substantive focus only extends until the late 1910s and early 1920s, when communism emerged as a widely diffused new alternative of labor politics. However, in order to present a comprehensive picture of US labor politics even beyond a more narrowly understood
‘formative stage’, I will briefly outline the contours of inclusion and labor’s response during this time period. Moreover, this overview will help us in our following analysis of the Canadian case: while continuing highest degrees of inclusion prevented independent party formation in the United States, the lack of such an environment steered Canadian labor to eventually embrace the establishment of social democracy in 1935.

As table 16 indicates, labor inclusion during what I refer to here as the Great Depression and New Deal era shows some marked differences to the earlier progressive era. But other than many analyses would suggest, these differences are not as pronounced as often times assumed. Shefter (1978) identifies the “New Deal” coalition emerging around the Democratic party as an eclectic variety of social groups: the ‘solid south’, urban residents, organized labor, farmers’ associations, and ethnocultural minorities. These groups secured Roosevelt a sweeping victory in the 1932 election in response to his promise of a “New Deal” and an activist government. They also guaranteed Democrats’ control of Congress until 1938. These developments do indeed represent a marked difference to the progressive era at large, in terms of the patterns, but most importantly, the extent of electoral support. For the entire time period in between 1896 and the late 1920s, self-declared progressive politicians from both major parties acted as an inclusive agent toward labor. During the Great Depression and New Deal era, the Democrats emerged as the single most important actor of inclusion in the arena of party politics (see table 16). At the same time, however, this represented a development that could already be observed for the decade following on the 1912 presidential election, when the Democrats and Woodrow Wilson fashioned themselves as the epitome of ‘progressivism’, on the basis of a social coalition similar to that of the New Deal era.

Moreover, in addition to the Democratic party, the two remaining agents of labor inclusion from the progressive era also played a prominent role in the late 1920s and the 1930s, although in a slightly different way than before. First of all, the presidency and somewhat insulated executive agencies – some of which were already created during the progressive period – continued to act as an important agent of labor inclusion. But the extent of interventionism arguably elevated the executive branch to an even more important position than before. In cooperation with “New Deal” planners in the administration, and a Congress dominated by the Democratic party, the presidency initiated and supported a vast number of reforms in response to the disastrous consequences of the depression.

Three types of measures can be distinguished. First, a short term response to unemployment and economic misery through direct relief and public work programs. This includes the establishment of the “Federal Emergency Relief Administration” in 1933, from which four million families, about one sixth of the population, received funds. But it also extends to work relief programs, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the programs enacted on the basis of the 1933 “National Industrial Recovery Act”, and the Works Progress Administration established in 1935. Thus, direct relief efforts extended through both
the ‘early’ and the ‘late’ stages of the New Deal. Second, work relief continued beyond the New Deal era itself, but at the core of the attempt to provide a long term response to the inherent insecurities of market economies were the establishment of old age and unemployment insurance schemes. This was the goal of the 1935 Social Security Act, but another aspect of a more permanent solution to unemployment was the reform and extension of the public employment service administration.

In the third place, the New Deal legislative agenda also included the improvement of organized labor’s rights and the enactment of further protective labor policies. While during the previous progressive era, the state remained explicitly neutral, legislation during the New Deal era indicated that both New Deal legislators and the executive branch made a number of active contributions to improve labor’s judicial and bargaining positions. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 clarified the language of the 1914 Clayton Act to guarantee labor’s right to organize against activist conservative courts. The government’s support for organized labor became most apparent through the establishment of labor protection codes, maximum hour laws and binding collective bargaining procedures, prescribed by the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, and the 1935 Wagner Act.

This most comprehensive set of labor friendly legislation represented the core of the inclusive mechanisms present during the New Deal era. Although some of the specific measures, most notably the Norris-LaGuardia Act, were sponsored by progressive Republicans, the New Deal policies were undoubtedly most closely associated with Roosevelt and the electoral appeal as well as the legislative record of his Democratic party. As such, these were the two actors that were most crucial for the ongoing guarantee of highest inclusion. In addition to actual legislation, the presidency and executive agencies also contributed to labor inclusion through two further mechanisms: a pattern of intense cooperation with labor elites that had already been initiated during the progressive era; as well as the utilization of relief and public works funds for the provision of patronage to loyal supporters directly from the federal level.

This process is also important to understand the effects of the New Deal era on the role of local political machines. I argued previously that machines survived and maintained their important role for labor inclusion during the progressive era in all those localities, where the progressives failed to overwhelm strongly entrenched party organizations. During the New Deal era, political machines came under even more pressure than before, but continued to survive in a number of select places. In these localities, they continued to contribute to highest inclusion of labor through their practice of ethnocultural community building and the provision of patronage in return for political support. Shefter (1983) observes that machines remained strong in those areas, where local ‘bosses’ supported Roosevelt and his agenda. In places such as Pittsburgh and Chicago, Roosevelt strengthened loyal machines and their ‘bosses’ by providing them with funds from New Deal programs. Where local machines opposed Roosevelt, supporters
of his coalition would challenge the dominant local oligarchy. In New York, this even resulted in the formation of associations outside the established party hierarchy.

Moderate syndicalism and independent party formation in the New Deal era

Overall, there is no doubt that organized labor reacted positively to this new environment of inclusion. The AFL as well as the newly emerging C.I.O. were crucial supporters of the New Deal agenda, and became heavily involved in the electoral campaigns and legislative battles of the era. The brief period of increasing electoral support for the communists did not last for much longer than the initial economic recession, and the socialists never came close to their peak from the progressive era. The legislative agenda of the New Deal as well as the intense cooperation of legislators and the executive branch with labor, were regarded as ample proof for the ability of ‘moderate syndicalist’ interventions to succeed. At the same time, the ‘objective’ and ‘psychological’ obstacles to party formation remained in place: The benefits of ‘moderate syndicalism’ continued to outweigh the benefits of party formation, while at the same time, party formation continued to be more costly than ‘moderate syndicalism’.

The emergence of the C.I.O. as an industrial union during the early 1930s challenged the strategy of the AFL to emphasize the organization of skilled workers. But the difference between the two organizations is only one of degree (see table 2): both of them were proponents of ‘moderate syndicalism’ by emphasizing ‘economic’ activities and the selective nature of political interventions, without the desire to create a permanent independent presence of labor in the political arena. What distinguishes them as different variants of ‘moderate syndicalism’ is the scope of their respective target groups. As a result of the impressive success of the C.I.O. in organizing unskilled workers, the AFL itself abandoned its exclusive appeal to skilled workers and the predominance of craft based organization – a development that eventually resulted in the merger of both federations in 1955. What is important to note at this point is the fact that despite the AFL’s increasing willingness to embrace the organization of unskilled workers and the emergence of the C.I.O., the core of ‘moderate syndicalism’ as the dominant model of US labor politics remained unchanged during the New Deal era.

The continuing provision of highest inclusion and the corresponding lack of independent party formation represent a marked contrast to the case of Canada. With the foundation of the CCF in 1935, Canadian labor elites eventually embraced the formation of an independent ‘evolutionary socialist’ party. In the United States, during the same time period, the foundation of an independent social democratic party continued to fail. It should be noted, however, that during the New Deal era, to some extent foreshadowed by earlier developments, important elements of the social democratic agenda were absorbed into the existing party system. The conclusion that the Democrats embraced social democracy through the New
Deal agenda, comparable to the incorporation of populism in the late 19th century, is hardly original. But the nature of this transformation and the position of the New Deal Democrats in a typology of social democratic party organization (cf. Figure 2) have not yet been spelled out adequately.

Kloppenberg (1986) conducts a comparison of the intellectual underpinnings of American ‘social democracy’ during the New Deal era with social democratic parties in France, Germany, and Britain. He identifies ‘socialism’ as a catch all designation for what I introduced as ‘evolutionary’ and ‘quasi-revolutionary’ types of social democracy. ‘Social democracy’ in his terminology is roughly equivalent to what I refer to as ‘reformist social democracy’. In essence, he identifies both the later social democratic parties of his three European cases and the New Deal Democrats as ‘reformist social democratic’. But some important differences between these parties exist as a result of their formation background: using his terminology, ‘social democracy’ in the US emerged from liberalism, while in Europe, it has roots in ‘socialism’.

I believe that there are two problems with his analysis: first, his terminology lacks some of the precision that is necessary to make distinctions within the group of European cases. Second, using his terminology again, European “socialism”, just as American “social democracy”, emerged from the liberal movement as well. But what is much more important than these minor issues is his general argument, which is very perceptive. The transformation of the Democrats into a ‘reformist social democratic’ party occurred in response to impending and earlier challenges of left wing competitors to the entrenched party system – the social democrats, the continuing attempts at forming labor parties, and later for a brief time period the communists. Even if one comes to the conclusion that in this particular way, social democracy has eventually arrived in the United States, America still remains exceptional, in the sense in which I introduced the term earlier on: The embrace of a social democratic agenda by the Democrats changed the patterns of contentious politics from within, but at the same time, also prevented the formation of an independent and new party organization. In Canada, on the other hand, it was the lack of inclusiveness that, for better or worse, allowed for the foundation of a social democratic party during the same time period. However, in a sense, the Democrats in the US became the first ‘reformist’ social democratic party, long before previously quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic parties elsewhere evolved into that particular type of social democracy.  

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300 The German social democrats adopted a reformist social democratic orientation to replace the still formally upheld quasi-revolutionary agenda in 1959 (See SPD 1959 for the Godesberg program). British Labour replaced its evolutionary socialist agenda with a reformist social democratic party model in 1994 (See Labour 1995 for the new party agenda).
Conclusion

This entire chapter represents an application of my theory of social democratic party formation to the case of the United States. In contrast to both variants of the American exceptionalism literature – the classic and the new social history approach – I attempted to show that the American case is not anomalous. I argued that the failure of social democratic party formation in the United States is not a deviation from a presumed pattern of European ‘normality’. It can be explained as the rational response of American labor elites to an environment of highest labor inclusion. The American case is not anomalous, because it fits perfectly well into a systematic theory of social democratic party formation.

But at the same time, America is exceptional in the sense in which I introduced that term before. It is the single representative in a particular explanatory category derived from a systematic theory. The lack of social democratic party formation alone is not a unique outcome, however: just like the United States, Japan and Russia, too, have not seen the successful institutionalization of social democracy during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. What makes America exceptional is the fact that it was only here, that social democracy failed to emerge as the consequence of comparatively highest degrees of inclusion. In Japan and Russia, party formation failed as a result of lowest inclusion, the nearly complete exclusion of labor from the political arena.

The comparative context, into which the study of American labor politics is embedded here, has not only helped to better understand the US case: it is a prerequisite for the formulation of a theory that incorporates the institutional and behavioral dimensions of inclusion and their respective effects on labor politics. What sets the American example apart from all other cases is not the uniqueness of its institutional setup, or the formal guarantee of political entitlements, i.e. the inclusion of labor through liberal institutions. The cases of New Zealand, Australia, and Switzerland provided the same extent of institutional inclusion as the United States, while Britain, France, and Canada deviated only slightly from highest inclusion on these formal-institutional dimensions. Moreover, in terms of the specific characteristics of the polities investigated here, none of the institutional features of the US – federalism, divided government, plurality electoral system – is unique. Only a comparative analysis of the American case can illustrate the necessity of accounting for the behavioral dimensions of inclusion in a theory of social democratic party formation: the behavior of ‘competing parties’, or more generally, entrenched elites, in terms of electoral and organizational inclusion of labor, as well as the behavior of the state executive.

Throughout this chapter, I attempted to trace the interaction and interdependence of these two processes – the provision of highest inclusion by entrenched elites and the response of organized labor to this environment – through four distinct stages of American political development. In this context, my goal was to conduct what I previously referred to as a ‘positive’ analysis. I attempted to combine an account for
the absence of something (social democracy) with an explanation for the presence of something else
(‘moderate syndicalist’ as an alternative model of labor politics that emerged as dominant in the US). But
before I engaged in this empirical analysis, I started out with an assessment of the perennial debate about
American exceptionalism. In that context, my goal was to place my research in the context of this debate
and to outline the premises underpinning my argument.

My analysis revealed that highest inclusion of labor was a constant of American political development
– during the ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena as well as the periods before and after
(see table 16). highest inclusion was provided through varying actors and mechanisms at different stages –
the Jacksonian era, which preceded a more narrowly understood formative stage of ‘labor politics’, the
third party system and the progressive era, which encompassed that ‘formative stage’, and the New Deal
era, which followed on it. The observed variations have important effects on the nature of labor politics, but
the generally dominant response of labor elites remained the same throughout: the embrace of ‘moderate
syndicalism’ as the dominant model of labor’s presence in the political arena, and the failure of social
democratic as well as other attempts at party formation.

Moderate syndicalism represents a specific and distinct approach to labor politics (see table 2). At the
most basic level, moderate syndicalism revolves around unions as the only organizational foundation.
Primarily, unions and their federation are concerned with ‘economic’ activities; political involvement
occurs on this basis, through selective and temporary interventions, but without the permanent
establishment of an independent presence in the political arena. The provision of highest inclusion
throughout, as well as immediately before and after, American labor’s formative stage in the political arena
can explain the choice of labor elites for ‘moderate syndicalism’ as the dominant model of labor politics
and against social democratic party formation.

The environment of highest inclusion in its various permutations throughout American political
development made ‘moderate syndicalism’ an optimal, and social democratic as well as other forms of
independent party formation, a suboptimal choice. The opportunity structures for political action of labor
created through this environment rendered party formation more costly than moderate syndicalism, while at
the same time allowing moderate syndicalism to accomplish the same rewards. Party formation, social
democratic and otherwise, was costly because of the ‘psychological’ and ‘objective’ obstacles that were
defining features of the environment of highest inclusion in the US: the electoral system, the access of
entrenched parties to patronage and other state resources, entrenched local machines, as well as deeply
rooted patterns of partisan identification (see table 5).

Over time, this gap in cost-benefit evaluations only increased in favor of moderate syndicalism.
Partisan identifications and mobilization declined for the entrenched parties during the progressive era, but
this also made it equally difficult for outsiders to mobilize supporters: the ‘relative distance’ in mobilization
potential between challengers and entrenched parties remained the same. Meanwhile, the institutional reforms of the progressive era increased the importance of the executive branch, which became more insulated from the influence of parties and legislatures, and thus a direct target of interest group politics and lobbying. As a result, moderate syndicalism was in a position to reach into regions of the American political system that had become inaccessible to mass parties and legislators.

Accounts for the lack of independent party formation should not be ignorant about the effects that eventually unsuccessful formation attempts have had on the entrenched party system and the evolving nature of contentious politics. In this analysis, we have observed on several occasions that emerging party challengers were successful in channeling parts of their agenda into the dominant parties. The old guard’s embrace of their challengers’ demands thereby prevented independent party formation, as much as it changed the dominant parties themselves: the workingmen parties of the Jacksonian era pushed the Democrats to embrace democratic institutional reforms, as well as substantive labor policies; populism found its way into the Democratic party in the mid 1890s; progressivism channeled its agenda into both major parties, and only the possibility of an independent new party emerging from the movement contributed to the receptiveness of both major parties to progressive ideas. Finally, important traces of the social democratic agenda were absorbed by the Democrats during the New Deal era.

Rosenstone et al. (1996) in their classic contribution hold this to be the primary role of all – not just social democratic or other labor based – “third party” challengers. What they fail to take into account, however, is the fact that the choice of entrenched elites to respond positively to labor’s demands, and to pursue a number of additional strategies in order to guarantee highest inclusion is by no means predetermined, or an inherent element of the American political system. Highest labor inclusion occurred on the basis of inclusive institutions – worker enfranchisement, responsible government, political liberties. But in addition to those institutional dimensions, highest inclusion also required the inclusive behavior of the entrenched elites – ‘competing parties’ – and an at least neutral state executive. This did happen in the United States, but as the result of specific historical processes. It is not an inherent feature of the American political system or of some intangible never changing ethos.

Moreover, their theoretical perspective does not suffice as an explanation for the absence of social democratic party formation in the US. First of all, it is not spelled out, under which circumstances entrenched parties do decide to incorporate the agenda of their challengers, and whether that alone is sufficient to prevent party formation. While most of the demands of the Jacksonian workingmen parties were met, some of the crucial concerns of prominent third party challengers never entered the entrenched parties. The Democrats embraced parts of the Greenbackers’ agenda in the 1880s, but never the most far reaching calls for banking control and currency deflation. The nationalization of a significant share of the means of production was a prominent element in the agenda of the Populists and the social democrats. Far
from actually being implemented anyway, none of the entrenched parties ever embraced this particular issue. Policy concessions and the adjustment of electoral appeals are important mechanisms of labor inclusion, but they are far from telling the whole story. In order to explain the lack of social democratic party formation, it is insufficient to only look at the transfer of issues and policies into the entrenched party system. Above and beyond these mechanisms, inclusion was also accomplished through the important channels of patronage, ethnocultural community building, and cooperation of both legislators and the executive branch with labor elites.

Secondly, Rosenstone et al. (1996) also provide no explanation for why organized labor would embrace moderate syndicalism as the dominant strategy of entering the political arena. According to the logic of their argument, organized labor should have engaged in continuously repeating attempts at party formation in order to force their agenda on the entrenched parties. Even if one concedes that some attempts at party formation might have been guided by exactly that motivation, it is still undeniable that the presence of a moderate syndicalist strategy far exceeded that of attempts at independent party formation. This shows that a theory for the failure of independent party formation cannot be accomplished by looking at the function of failed formation attempts for the existing party system.

Considering my argument about the suboptimal nature of social democratic party formation in the American environment of highest inclusion, does this warrant the conclusion that the failure of socialism in the US was inevitable? I don’t think so. First of all, we have seen that highest inclusion was not a defining feature of the American political system, or a predetermined consequence of some uniquely American ethos. It was the result of specific actions of entrenched political elites that occurred on the basis of highest institutional inclusion. If these actions had not occurred, which is a distinct historical possibility, then overall highest inclusion (as a result of its behavioral and institutional components) would not have occurred, and as a consequence, social democratic party formation would have been the ‘optimal’ response of organized labor.

Secondly, even in the context of highest inclusion, the failure of socialism was not inevitable. We have seen in the cases of Switzerland and France, and will observe the same for the case of Canada, that labor elites made ‘suboptimal’ decisions: that is, they opted for a model of labor politics that is worse suited to a given environment of inclusion than some other alternative model. This outcome can occur as the consequence of several sources of suboptimal decision making: internalized features of labor elites, an incorrect assessment of the existing environment of inclusion, or the intense diffusion of an external model of labor politics. The previous analysis has shown that labor elites in the US were very much aware of the

301 Consider in this context the previously outlined methodological underpinning of this study. Drawing on Goertz (2005), I argued that the proposed causal argument is characterized, among other things, by “equifinality”: an observable outcome can occur in more than one way, more specifically, as either an optimal or a suboptimal response to some given environment of labor inclusion.
limitations of independent party formation, and there is also no indicator that a majority of them were eager
to start a revolution, even when that was not the optimal choice for American workers. It is also clear that
‘external’ models of labor politics did not play as great a role in the US as they did in other cases. This can
explain, why US labor elites did not make a ‘suboptimal’ choice. But at the same time, it would have been
a historical possibility for that to happen, if any one of the above mentioned, or a different, source of
suboptimal decision making had assumed a more prominent position. And whether a decision for social
democracy, which was suboptimal at the time, because it featured a less rewarding benefit-cost ratio of
entering labor’s demands into the political arena, would have been ‘better’ in the long run, is an entirely
different question.302

Moderate syndicalism as a suboptimal choice in the case of Canada

Just like in the United States, moderate syndicalism emerged as the dominant model of labor politics
in Canada during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena. This makes Canada one of four
instances, where no social democratic party was successfully institutionalized, in addition to Japan, Russia,
and the US. We have argued before that the lack of party formation can occur as the result of two distinct
causal processes, along with the corresponding embrace of different alternative models: In Russia and
Japan, lowest inclusion resulted in the lack of social democracy, and the embrace of insurrectionist
alternatives; in the United States, highest inclusion was the causal factor to be held responsible for the
absence of party formation, but as an alternative model, organized labor in the US embraced moderate
syndicalism.

Canada does not fit neatly into this twofold typology, since the emergence of moderate syndicalism as
the dominant model occurred in an environment of higher, but not highest inclusion. I have previously
argued that in an environment of higher inclusion, evolutionary social democracy represents the optimal
choice. Labor elites in Canada made a suboptimal decision by embracing moderate syndicalism. It is
therefore one of three cases, besides France and Switzerland, where labor elites opted for an organizational
and ideological model of labor politics that would not have been predicted on the basis of the existing
external constraints on labor elites’ behavior. In the following analysis, I will trace the ‘formative stage’ of
Canadian labor politics to provide evidence for this claim. I am also going to show how the diffusion of
‘external knowledge’ from the United States contributed to the ‘suboptimal’ choice for moderate
syndicalism by Canadian labor elites.

302 See also the earlier discussion of optimality, and the problems associated with measuring long-term gains or success.
The configuration of inclusion in Canada that provided the background to the response of labor elites is almost identical to the one present in Britain during labor’s formative stage in the political arena (see table 9). Along the three formal institutional dimensions, both political liberties and responsible government were fully guaranteed, and therefore at the highest level of inclusion, while labor enfranchisement was below that threshold, only reaching higher inclusion. Other than in the US, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, and France, but comparable to the case of Britain, the franchise of workers was limited by material suffrage requirements. Universal suffrage was only enacted in 1921, after the completion of labor’s formative stage in the political arena.303

The lack of full enfranchisement alone represents an insurmountable obstacle for the guarantee of overall highest inclusion. We have previously argued that any of the ‘behavioral’ mechanisms of inclusion, pursued by entrenched elites, usually ‘competing parties’, and the state executive, requires full, i.e. highest, inclusion on all institutional dimensions as an underpinning. Other than in the US, where full enfranchisement occurred during the Jacksonian era already, even this fundamental prerequisite for the possibility of overall highest inclusion was lacking in the case of Canada. One should not expect labor elites to perceive their existing political environment as permeable, and therefore to forego their own attempts at mass mobilization through party formation, when even the most basic guarantees for political inclusion, in this case enfranchisement, are not fully guaranteed. In the cases of Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia, party system incorporation of labor through the entrenched elites was not accomplished, although formal institutional inclusion was highest on all dimensions, for the lack of sufficiently inclusive behavior by entrenched elites. Because of the lack of highest institutional inclusion in Canada, the opportunities for independent party formation were even more favorable than in those cases.

Despite this lack of full enfranchisement, liberals in Canada pursued similar forms of lib-lab cooperation as in the cases of Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Switzerland: representatives of organized labor ran for public office on liberal tickets, and in return, labor would get involved in election campaigns on behalf of the liberals, very much in keeping with what we had previously identified as the strategy of moderate syndicalism. These attempts of organizational inclusion by liberals were quite extensive, probably more so than in the cases of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. We have previously argued that within the group of cases with evolutionary socialist parties, the initial lib-lab cooperation was most pronounced in New Zealand and least in Australia, with Britain as an intermediate case. Having classified lib-lab cooperation as failed in all of these instances derives from the fact that eventually, the entrenched liberal elites were not successful in maintaining their coalition with labor. In the United States,

303 See the discussion of Canada in the comparative overview of labor inclusion in chapter 5.
on the other hand, organizational inclusion of labor through entrenched elites was at the highest level, for all the reasons outlined in the previous chapter.

Canada is located in between these two categories: Organizational inclusion of labor, primarily through lib-lab cooperation, was higher than in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, because it continued to be pursued in Canada, even when in all other cases, those forms of cooperation had already failed. It was lower than in the US, on the other hand, because Canadian labor elites were never fully incorporated into the existing party system: organizational inclusion was explicitly one of lib-lab cooperation, in between an established party and an emerging political actor, but labor elites were never effectively merged into existing party organizations and local political machines, as they were in the US.

Electoral inclusion of workers at large, as the second dimension of inclusive behavior by ‘competing parties’, was naturally limited by the lack of full enfranchisement. This makes Canada an intriguing case, because serious attempts at organizational inclusion went hand in hand with an apparent lack in the potential for electoral inclusion: while labor elites pursued forms of electoral cooperation with the liberals, the worker constituency at large could never be entirely incorporated, because it did not even have full access to the electoral arena.

We have previously encountered two fundamental strategies of attempting to ensure highest inclusion of labor: first, in the US, through the incorporation of labor demands into electoral appeals and the corresponding policy records of both major parties, combined with the creation of political cleavages and loyalties along ethnocultural and other non-class identification patterns. Second, in a number of other cases, through the appeal of a liberal party to labor as one element of an explicitly anti-conservative coalition. The first one of these strategies succeeded in the US, while the latter did not succeed, although it almost prevented party formation in Switzerland, and went relatively far in New Zealand as a mechanism to sustain lib-lab cooperation and to prevent the foundation of an independent social democracy. Seriously hampered by the lack of full enfranchisement, and despite comparatively far reaching organizational inclusion, entrenched elites in Canada never successfully pursued either one of these strategies.

Considering this background, an explanation for social democratic party formation based exclusively on the existing constraints to the behavior of labor elites would predict the formation of an evolutionary socialist party. If labor elites in Canada had opted for such a model, they would have made an ‘optimal’ choice. I would argue that from the variety of factors that inform suboptimal decisions of labor elites, the diffusion of ‘external knowledge’ was most crucial in the case of Canada. Instead of pursuing a strategy tailored to their unique domestic environment, Canadian labor emerged into the political arena to a large extent as a foreign subsidiary of American organizations.

In the cases of New Zealand and Australia, external knowledge was crucial in shaping the organizational and ideological model of labor’s presence in the economic and the political arena, too. As
outlined before, the initial trade unions, union federations, patterns of lib-lab cooperation, and the eventual establishment of evolutionary socialist parties in these two cases, were heavily influenced by the diffusion of the British model of labor politics: through intellectual exchange, the actual foundation of ‘colonial’ unions as British subsidiaries, and the continuing flow of immigration from the British isles. However, other than in Canada, the exported model was well suited to the environment of both these cases: just as in Britain, degrees of inclusion were higher in New Zealand and Australia, which made the choice of evolutionary social democracy an optimal one in all three cases. In Canada, on the other hand, the model imported from abroad was not well suited to the domestic environment. ‘Moderate syndicalism’ that emerged as the optimal choice of labor elites in the American environment of highest inclusion, was a suboptimal choice in the Canadian context of higher inclusion.

Initially, until the 1870s, the pattern of development and the forms of external influence on Canadian labor in the political and economic arenas were strikingly similar to those of New Zealand and Australia. Just as in these two cases, the major external source of influence on the Canadian labor movement came from Britain. The mechanisms through which ideas and forms of organization from Britain reached Canada, were equivalent to those at work in the other two colonies: intellectual exchange, immigration, and the establishment of ‘local’ subsidiaries by British labor organizations. The first permanent and large scale trade unions were founded as craft based organizations by mechanics in 1853, and carpenters in 1872. Both of them were direct subsidiaries of their British parent organizations.

Australia and New Zealand, however, continued on this path without interruption, while in Canada, American ‘external knowledge’ began to outweigh the British influence around the 1870s. During this time period, the balance between these two sources of influence gradually changes, both in terms of intellectual proximity, and in terms of the number of Canadian workers on the membership rolls of labor organizations originating from the United States. It is no small wonder that the turning point in this development would occur around this time: we have previously outlined, how both American industrialization and labor organizations became a nationwide factor beginning in the 1860s.

During the early heyday of US organized labor in the 1880s and the following two decades, the majority of large scale labor activities with American origin were explicitly designed as North American organizations, to encompass Canada and the United States. Both the Knights of Labor and the AFL as the two most important variants of ‘moderate syndicalism’ at the time were deeply involved in Canadian union organization. As part of this involvement, they also exercised an enormous influence on Canadian labor’s approach into the political arena. The Knights founded their Canadian subsidiary in 1881. During the same year, the F.O.O.T.A.L.U. as the predecessor organization of the AFL was founded as an explicitly North American union federation. The Canadian unions, most of which were affiliated with the F.O.O.T.A.L.U
and later the AFL, either understood themselves as ‘international’, i.e. North American, or emerged as subsidiaries respectively sister organizations of their American counterparts.  

Ever since the early 1880s, a similar struggle as in the United States, between the Knights of Labor on the one hand and the AFL with its affiliated craft unions on the other, occurred in Canada, too. Other than in the US, however, the Canadian craft unions dominated by the AFL faced an additional dividing line: they did not only compete with the Knights as another type of ‘moderate syndicalism’, but also with a number of unions, who resented the American influence, and fashioned themselves as explicitly Canadian organizations.

This conflict on two fronts initially took place within the “Trades and Labor Congress of Canada”. The TLCC was founded in 1883 as a federation for all Canadian unions. Initially, throughout the following decade and a half, the Knights of Labor dominated the organization. But gradually, as another symptom of the Knights’ demise in the US and a similar, somewhat delayed, development in Canada, the AFL and its affiliated Canadian unions prevailed. At its 1902 convention, they were in a position strong enough to expel both of their competitors from the TLCC: the Knights of Labor as well as those unions that were eager to pursue a Canadian path of labor organization and politics – the national unions of carpenters, shoemakers, cigarmakers, and painters. The castaways formed an alternative organization in 1903 – the “National Trades and Labor Congress” that would be renamed “Canadian Federation of Labor” in 1908. Other than the Knights of Labor in the US, which completely decayed, the new Canadian federation would continue to exist with a noticeable number of affiliated unions. But until the merger of various Canadian union federations as the Canadian Labor Congress in 1956, the AFL affiliated TLCC remained the dominant force within the Canadian labor movement.

As a consequence, the particular variant of ‘moderate syndicalism’ pursued by the AFL in the United States also emerged as dominant in Canada by the early 1900s. During the most crucial period of labor’s formative stage in the political arena throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, Canadian labor’s approach to politics was dominated by an imported American model that was based on one fundamental premise: to pursue a moderate syndicalist strategy of political interventions and to stay away from independent party formation. This was perfectly suited to the American environment of highest inclusion, but it represented a suboptimal choice in Canada, where the context of labor inclusion was much more similar to the one of only higher inclusion present in Britain.

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304 See Charpentier et al. (1985)
305 It emerged from the Toronto Trades and Labor Congress, and before being named TLCC in 1886, went by the name of Canadian Labor Congress from 1883 to 1886
306 The AFL and the Knights never belonged to one federated organization in the United States, but they did in Canada. The relative dominance of the AFL and the decline of the Knights have to be understood through a comparative assessment of two separate organizations in the US. In Canada, the shift in voting power at TLCC congresses allows for an even more straightforward illustration of the relative influence of these two competing variants of moderate syndicalism.
We have previously seen that the most elementary feature in the evolution of labor politics in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand was the gradual shift in strategy from ‘moderate syndicalism’ toward social democratic party formation. Earlier strategies of temporary political interventions and cooperation with the entrenched elites gave way to an embrace of independent party formation, in response to the lack of highest inclusion. A comparable development never occurred in the case of Canada. Moderate syndicalism had been dominant in labor politics ever since the inception of the first large scale unions, the Knights of Labor, and the AFL. In that respect, Canada is no different from Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. But it deviated from their pattern of development, when as a consequence of ‘external knowledge’ imported from the US, labor politics continued on its path of ‘moderate syndicalism’, while in the other three cases, previously ‘moderate syndicalist’ organizations embraced independent party formation.

Support from the unions and other types of labor associations is, of course, crucial for the successful institutionalization of evolutionary social democratic parties. This is what we have observed in the cases of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, where party formation occurred as the result of unions stepping into the political arena through the formation of independent labor parties. But the importance of arranging an efficient sharing of tasks has also been a crucial factor in the establishment of those quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties that emerged before the existence of effective labor organizations in the economic realm. It is exactly this lack of support from the majority of unions, which continued to adhere to a ‘moderate syndicalist’ strategy, which made the attempts at social democratic party formation during labor’s formative stage in the political arena futile exercises in the case of Canada.

The various attempts to establish a social democratic party before 1920 only resulted in the emergence of temporary splinter groups. In the United States, social democracy was successful in accomplishing ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’ as two of three prerequisites for successful party institutionalization. American social democracy failed because of its lack of ‘external institutionalization’ as the third prerequisite (see table 11). In Canada, social democracy was not even able to accomplish ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’. Neither one of the recorded party formation attempts succeeded in establishing an effective and permanent organization along with a dominant ideological model as a mechanism of social integration.

Each of these attempts only existed for a limited period of time, and none of them was able to form an at least incipient mass base. In the United States, the 1901 Socialist Party united various quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary factions under a predominantly evolutionary socialist agenda as a permanent mechanism of social integration, at least until the communist split in the 1920s. No such unifying organization or an ideological compromise as a tool for social integration, like the SPA’s 1901 “Indianapolis program”, ever occurred in Canada. Without the influence of the unions, which were able to
mobilize support for an evolutionary socialist agenda in Britain, social democratic factions in Canada never effectively joined in one single organization.

The Socialist Labor Party, an offspring of the American SLP, was founded in a number of eastern provinces throughout the early 1890s. The 1894 Toronto section was most likely the first one of these party formation attempts, and therefore represents the initial organizational manifestation of social democracy in Canada. But it only lasted for a few years, until in 1898, former SLP activists formed the Canadian Socialist League. Attempts at institutionalizing a unified social democratic party would fail throughout the following two decades. The Socialist Party of Canada, founded in 1904, was designed to accomplish that goal. But after only three years of existence, the evolutionary socialist faction split from the predominantly quasi-revolutionary organization. The Social Democratic Party of Canada was founded in 1911 by the dissidents, but neither one of the two parties alone was able to establish systemness. As a consequence of the failure to form one dominant organization, no ideological model, either through compromise or the dominance of one variant of social democratic thought, ever emerged as an effective mechanism of social integration in Canada.

In terms of ‘external institutionalization’ as the third prerequisite for successful party formation, election returns of Canadian social democrats were even below the American results. The numbers displayed for Canada in figure 12 encompass all labor candidates, most of which were involved in some form of cooperation with the liberals, not just self declared socialists. The average result of 1 % for all federal elections in between 1900 and 1930 can hardly qualify as successful ‘electoral representation’. Moreover, other than in the US, where social democracy alone accomplished a peak of 6.2 % in 1912 that was well above the average value, social democratic and labor candidates in Canada never obtained more than 2.1 % of the vote.

Canada thus experienced the continuing pursuit of ‘moderate syndicalism’ as the dominant outcome of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. This makes it one of four cases, where social democratic party formation failed. However, in the United States, Russia, and Japan, the lack of social democratic party formation is the predicted response of labor elites to the existing environments of labor inclusion. In Canada, on the other hand, labor elites opted for ‘moderate syndicalism’, although social democratic party formation would have been the optimal response to its environment of higher inclusion, comparable to the cases of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. This suboptimal choice of Canadian labor elites is the direct consequence of the influence exercised on Canadian organized labor from the United States. The AFL and its affiliated Canadian unions set labor politics on a path that was optimal under American conditions of highest, but only the second best choice in the Canadian context of more limited higher inclusion.

This divergence between predicted and actual response would only be corrected after the end of what I have identified here as the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. Table 17 displays an
overview of the further trajectory of all those cases, where no social democratic party was institutionalized during that formative stage. In the United States, as we have already seen before, the continuing guarantee of highest inclusion throughout the Great Depression and New Deal era would also result in the ongoing dominance of ‘moderate syndicalism’. In Canada, however, during a comparable economic recession in the same time period, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was founded in 1932 as an independent and permanent presence of labor in the political arena.

The foundation of the CCF represented the direct response of labor and small farmers to the impact of the Great Depression. The party obtained systemness, as well as social integration through the passing of the 1934 “Regina Manifesto”. The manifesto was a proto-typical ‘evolutionary socialist’ agenda. But it combined the classic demands for socialism through nationalization of the means of production with the call for socialism through redistribution and the erection of an extensive welfare state.\(^{307}\) In the US, on the other hand, the demands of labor and farmers during the recession resulted in the embrace of their positions by the entrenched elites, through the Democratic New Deal coalition and the policies it enacted. While a continuing lack of highest inclusion in Canada thus eventually resulted in the foundation of a social democratic party, the continuing guarantee of highest inclusion in the US provided the background for the ongoing dominance of moderate syndicalism.

It is at this turning point in the 1930s, where the Canadian path of labor politics converged on the British, and started to diverge from the American model. However, this is by no means a surprising or unexpected development. On the contrary, it is the optimal response to the Canadian environment of labor inclusion. But it is a response that occurred with a delay of several decades. Hence, what is much more surprising – or, as I put it here, a suboptimal response of labor elites to the existing environment of inclusion – was the earlier similarity of Canadian labor’s response to the American pattern of development.

\(^{307}\) For the text of the “Regina Manifesto” see CCF (1934)
CHAPTER 10

THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
AND THE EMBRACE OF INSURRECTIONISM

Russia as the ideal environment for the emergence of bolshevism

Introduction

Throughout labor’s formative stage of entering the political arena, Russia has emerged as one of four cases, where no social democratic party was formed, in addition to Japan, Canada, and the United States. Social democratic party formation failed in the US, because labor elites responded to an environment of highest inclusion by predominantly opting for a ‘moderate syndicalist’ alternative. In Canada, moderate syndicalism became the dominant model of labor politics, but this outcome occurred as a suboptimal choice in an environment of higher inclusion, within which the formation of an evolutionary socialist party would have been the optimal response of labor elites. Russia and Japan also experienced the failure of social democratic party formation. However, this occurred as the result of lowest inclusion of labor, and the dominant alternatives embraced by labor elites were variations on the insurrectionist model of labor politics: anarchism-syndicalism in Japan and bolshevism in Russia. The attempts of entrenched elites to completely exclude labor from the political arena – in other words: the presence of lowest inclusion – made social democratic party formation a less rewarding choice than insurrectionist models.

This chapter is designed to apply my theory of social democratic party formation to the case of Russia. Doing so will provide two types of insights: first of all, it will help to illustrate and explain the failure of social democracy in the specific case of Russia. But secondly, having included Russia into a comparative analysis also helps to refine the theory itself. None of the previous attempts to approach the issue of social democratic party formation incorporates Russia, or for that matter, any ‘negative’ case,
where party formation failed. From a methodological perspective, it is of crucial importance to test the implications of a theory by including cases, where the outcome of interest did not occur.\textsuperscript{308} Moreover, by considering Russia as one such case, an observer of social democratic party formation also has the opportunity to extend the scope of that theory. An analysis of the Russian case does therefore not only function as a means to illustrate the absence of certain factors that are causal for social democratic party formation in other cases. It also contributes to a more precise understanding of the conditions under which social democratic party formation is likely to fail or to succeed in general.

Including Russia, as well as other cases of non-formation, such as Japan, Canada, and the United States, thus represents an important theoretical contribution that has not yet been provided by any of the earlier attempts to explain party formation from a comparative perspective: neither the status system approach (Lipset 1983, Kautsky 2002), the socio-economic approach (Bull 1922, Galenson 1952), nor prior explanations with important institutionalist components (Bartolini 2000, Mikkelsen 2005).\textsuperscript{309} The omission of Russia, however, is most problematic for the status system approach, because it is one of several cases capable of falsifying the suggested theory. Lipset (1983), John Kautsky (2002) and others link the formation of social democratic parties to the presence of a native aristocracy respectively a strong feudal heritage. We have already seen that this explanation proves to be inapplicable to the cases of Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, or Australia, where social democratic parties formed despite the lack of a pronounced feudal status system. But in addition to that, it also fails to account for the cases of Russia and Japan. In both these instances, remnants of feudalism were particularly strong, but social democratic parties failed to form in either one of them.

While Russia has not yet been included in an encompassing theory of social democratic party formation, it has, of course, been an important topic of historical research. As of now, there exists a large body of literature – descriptive and analytical – on the Bolshevik Revolution, the February Revolution, the revolutionary turmoil of 1905, and the process of Russian modernization as a broadly construed background to these events. In this context, many authors have studied the nature of bolshevism, the emergence of Russian social democracy, and the intellectual as well as political battles in between its Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. Russia also figures prominently in a wide variety of classic comparative analyses of political and socio-economic development: the study of social revolutions by Skocpol (1979), state formation by Bendix (1978), and industrialization by Gerschenkron (1962).

My particular explanatory focus is on one specific aspect embedded in this wide range of historical research on Russia during the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century: the reasons for the failure of Russian social

\textsuperscript{308} See Mahoney and Goertz (2004) and the prior discussion of this topic in chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{309} The historical institutionalist explanations included here pursue a different explanatory interest, as they are interested in the broader process of class formation and the emergence of “overall syndromes” (Mikkelsen 2005) or “left experiences” (Bartolini 2000)
democracy as one element in an encompassing theory of social democratic party formation. In order to avoid confusion, I should note again the way in which I employ the term social democracy here – as a generic type of political party with a specifically defined set of common characteristics that has emerged in two varieties, quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary (see table 2). These two types of social democratic parties expose some important strategical and organizational differences, but both of them are distinct from other models of labor politics, most importantly in this context, bolshevism. I am repeating this earlier statement here, because the Russian bolsheviki, of course, referred to themselves as social democrats, and their roots were within the broader socialist movement. Whenever I am referring to the failure of social democratic party formation in Russia, I understand this as the failure of either a quasi-revolutionary, an evolutionary, or some uniquely Russian variant of non-insurrectionist, mass-based, and participatory social democracy. I should also add that the term labor elites, in the way in which I introduced it before, extends to a wide variety of individuals. It is not restricted to workers, who emerged through the ranks of organized labor – the *praktiki* of Russian social democracy. Labor elites as those individuals that assume or desire a leading role in the movement have come from a wide variety of social backgrounds: some were actual workers, others were intellectuals, or middle-class professionals. Divergence in social background between the leaders of the movement and the ‘historical subject’ working-class exists in many of the cases investigated here. But it is particularly pronounced in the case of Russia.

And eventually, it should be noted that my primary explanatory focus on the failure of mass-based social democracy is accompanied by a corresponding interest in a ‘positive’ explanation for the relative dominance of an alternative model of labor politics. I already argued before that in order to understand the failure of social democracy in the United States, it is of crucial importance to account for the relative dominance of moderate syndicalism as an alternative strategy. The same argument applies to the case of Russia: Explaining the failure of mass-based social democracy is the flipside of an explanation for the relative dominance of bolshevism as an alternative model. In the United States, highest inclusion provided the background for both the failure of social democracy and the dominance of moderate syndicalism. The same is true for the case of Russia: lowest inclusion provides an environment that made mass-based social democracy only a second best choice, and an insurrectionist model the preferable option.

I have shown previously that insurrectionist models of labor politics are always associated with high benefits in allowing labor elites access to the exercise of political authority, provided that they are

310 Much of the research on Russian social democracy has focused on this issue: the way in which intellectuals estranged from Russian society and politics regarded the struggle of labor as their way to pursue their own ‘historical destiny’. Or, from a different perspective, this translates into an assessment about how the mass-elite division in the Russian labor movement has contributed to the failure of mass-based social democracy. I am not disagreeing with these inferences. But I will show later on, how the exclusion of labor from the political arena has favored this particular divergence, and how, as a consequence, this has contributed to the emergence of an elitist approach to political leadership within social democracy.
successful in staging an insurrection. This positive contributor to the benefits side of labor elites’ decision-making process is significantly reduced by these models’ expected mobilization success, the more inclusive the encountered environment becomes (See table 5 and figure 5). Moreover, independent of this variation in potential benefits, insurrectionist models always come with extremely high costs (see table 5 and figure 5). It is for these reasons that in all of those cases, where existing degrees of inclusion allow for at least minimal access of labor to the political arena, other less risky approaches are always better suited than insurrectionism. In an environment of lowest inclusion, such as the one found in Russia, on the other hand, any form of independent political action of labor is prosecuted and repressed. As a result, the costs of forming an evolutionary, quasi-revolutionary or an insurrectionist party are the same. But the potential benefits of insurrection outweigh those of other party types. This particular pattern of benefit-cost ratios is unique to cases with lowest degrees of inclusion. Insurrectionism is equally costly in all environments, but it is only in instances of lowest inclusion, where other models of labor politics have an even worse benefit-cost ratio than insurrectionist approaches. The relative dominance of bolshevism and the failure of a mass-based social democratic party in Russia is therefore a perfectly rational, indeed optimal, response to the existing environment of labor inclusion.

The following empirical analysis will investigate the specific interaction between the provision of lowest inclusion and the response of labor elites in the case of Russia. First, I am going to illustrate the process of Russian industrialization as the sine qua non condition for social democratic party formation. Second, on the basis of the earlier brief outline, I will discuss the nature of Russian labor inclusion more extensively. Degrees of inclusion provide the external environment to which labor elites responded in their decision-making process about the adoption of some model of labor politics. This outline will, in the third place, provide the basis for a more detailed analysis of the various models of labor politics that were suggested in response to this environment. The goal of this investigation is to show, how the external environment of inclusion created favorable conditions for the dominance of insurrectionist models, while it represented a background, on which mass-based social democracy, as well as other alternatives, were only suboptimal choices.

Industrialization in Russia as a prerequisite for labor politics

The presence of a sufficient level of industrialization represents the fundamental prerequisite for the emergence of an industrial working-class and the formation of social democratic parties. The creation of a ‘window of opportunity’ for industrial development, and accordingly labor politics, depends crucially on the establishment of political institutions enabling industrialization. In the following paragraphs, I am going to provide a brief survey of the Russian process of industrialization. This overview is designed to identify
that ‘window of opportunity’ and to provide a justification for classifying Russia as sufficiently industrialized in order to qualify for inclusion in this comparative analysis.

Despite the overall mixed record of the reform, the abolition of serfdom stands for the establishment of capitalism as the dominant political economic principle in Russia. Before February 1861, when Russian peasants were emancipated from their legal ties to a feudal lord by imperial decree of Tsar Alexander II, industrial development on a larger scale was impossible. Both the availability of laborers and the commercialization of agriculture are crucial prerequisites for industrialization. Serfdom was an obstacle to both these necessities, and its removal in 1861 thus represents the beginning of a ‘window of opportunity’, within which industrial development is possible.\textsuperscript{311} Before emancipation, industrialism was limited to extremely insulated and small proto-industries. Initially, until the beginning of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the demand for manufactured goods had been satisfied exclusively by “home production”.\textsuperscript{312} It was during the reign of Peter the Great, since the early 1700s, when the first attempts at proto-industrial manufacturing were made, under the direct supervision of the state. Peter’s industrial policies were triggered by the needs of the military, and focused on iron production. His initial limited impetus for industrial development was never entirely abandoned throughout the following century and a half, but any effort at industrial production faced the insurmountable obstacle represented by the lack of labor supply, which is a direct consequence of the institution of serfdom. As a result, workers in Russia’s proto-industrial factories had to be “scraped from the bottom of an empty labor barrel”, and included orphans, criminals, or prisoners of war as those individuals that had no ties to a feudal lord (Blackwell 1982, 11). Ever since the year 1840, a small core of independent workers emerged, when entrepreneurs gained the right to lay off serf laborers (Göbel 1920). But only the removal of serfdom in 1861, despite the reform’s somewhat mixed record, provided the opportunity for industrial expansion beyond insulated proto-industries.

Compared to England as the first industrializer, Russia was not only late, but as a result of its lateness, also in need of substitutes for what Gerschenkron (1962) refers to as the “missing prerequisites” of industrialization. The private accumulation of capital without extensive state interference was characteristic for “early” industrial development in England. In Russia, the substitutes for private capital accumulation were provided by the autocratic state. The majority of Russian industry was run by private entrepreneurs. But other than in England, or for that matter, the majority of other late industrializers, too, the Russian state steered and influenced industrial development to a much greater extent. The only domain in which the state directly financed and managed industry were the railroads. But short of direct control, the autocracy

\textsuperscript{311} There are important limits on the extent to which emancipation served as an impulse for modernization: Blackwell (1982, 27) called the Imperial Decree of 1861 a “curious blending of the impulse to modernize and the wish to maintain the traditional agrarian order.”

\textsuperscript{312} The term Goebel (1920) uses is “Hausindustrie”
practiced a policy of industrial development through the provision of capital and subsidies to enterprises, financed by the extraction of surplus from the peasants and the export of grains.

In between 1861 and the mid 1880s, state promotion of industry and the corresponding industrial growth were still somewhat limited. A more significant increase in production only occurred in between that later point in time and the beginning of World War I. This period saw an enormous industrial expansion and high growth rates.\textsuperscript{313} Much of that impetus toward industrial development is attributed to Sergei Witte, finance minister from 1892 to 1903. He became the iconical figure and foremost architect of Russian state induced industrialization during this time period. Industrialists and entrepreneurs regarded him as one of their own, and he remained in close contact with his peers throughout his time in office.\textsuperscript{314} During his tenure, a higher proportion of public funds were assigned to industrial expansion than at any other point in between 1861 and 1917.\textsuperscript{315}

Despite the enormous expansion of industrial production in between the 1860s and World War I, in particular after the mid 1880s, Russian industrialization remained incomplete. A number of institutional obstacles still impeded market principles, and the commercialization of agriculture, even despite Stolypin’s land reforms after 1906 (cf. Blackwell 1982, Riasanovsky 2000). In addition to peasants and workers, who resented the autocracy and its industrialization policies, even factions from within the nomenclatura as well as parts of the aristocracy were opposed to the course of socio-economic modernization. As a result, Russia on the eve of World War I was still largely agrarian in nature, and some of its crucial heavy industries remained underdeveloped (cf. Blackwell 1982).

The large number of peasants populating the country leads John Kautsky (2002) to dismiss Russia during this time period as an appropriate case for the analysis of social democratic party formation. He argues that the country was incapable of giving birth to mass-based social democracy, due to the limited extent of industrialization. Despite the undeniable importance of agriculture and the large number of peasants, one can only strongly disagree with that assessment. First and most importantly, a comparative perspective on the share of industrial workers in the economically active population should provide evidence. I introduced this indicator earlier on as the key measure for the comparative assessment of industrial development across cases (table 8). The Russian value of 16.29 % in the 1890s is well above the minimum threshold of 15 % introduced before. From a comparative perspective, Russia is clearly below the values for the majority of other industrializing societies. But it is well above at least two cases, which have seen the successful institutionalization of social democracy: Sweden and Hungary. Moreover, the value of

\textsuperscript{313} For a comprehensive review of the exact figures pertaining to the expansion of industry in Russia during this time period, see Blackwell (1982, 43 et seqq)
\textsuperscript{314} For a concise discussion of Witte’s policies in the general framework introduced here, see Kochan (1966, 14 et seqq)
\textsuperscript{315} See Rogger (1983), who also notes that there is some debate as to whether Witte could have done more to stimulate economic development.
16.29% from the 1890s certainly has become significantly larger throughout the following two decades, when the major stage of industrial expansion occurred.316

All other indicators for industrial development also uniformly identify Russia as one of the major industrializing societies. Growth rates reached a yearly average of 7 to 8% throughout the 1890s. The annual increase in overall industrial production between 1885 and 1914 amounted to an average of 5.72%, higher than in the United States (5.26%), Germany (4.49%) and Britain (2.11%). As a result, Russia was close to being the fifth largest industrial power in 1914. The fact that labor productivity increased more slowly than output only strengthens my argument about the sufficiently large size of the Russian working-class.317

One additional point supporting my assessment that simply in terms of the size of its working-class, Russia would have been capable of sustaining a social democratic party, derives from the particular nature of Russian industrialism. The concentration of industry in few select ‘pockets’ has already been noted for a number of other cases before. But the extent of regional exclusivity as well as the concentration of workers in large industrial establishments is particularly pronounced in the case of Russia. Both of these features increase the opportunities for mass mobilization of workers, because organizational efforts and propaganda can much more easily be accomplished in concentrated and large, as opposed to small and scattered industries.

Kochan (1966) identifies eight main industrial areas for the year 1896: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Poland, the South Russian Ukraine, the Urals, Baku, the South West, and Trans-Caucasia. These regions accounted for 58% of the entire factory labor force in European Russia. In 1902, the provinces with the largest number of industrial workers, listed in descending order, were Moscow, Petersburg, Wladimir, Petrikau, Jekaterinoslaw, Riga, Twer, Kostroma, Nishni-Nowgorod, Warszawa, Charkow, Kiew, and Cherson. Huge enterprises with more than 1000 workers in these areas accounted for 35% of the entire work force. That degree of concentration in extremely large factories is higher in Russia than in all other industrializing societies at the time.318 By 1912, the central industrial belt covering the Northwest around Petersburg and the Ukraine produced 62% of all industrial output and employed 63% of all workers (cf. Rogger 1983). Keep (1963, p. 6) argues that the number of Russian workers “seems a paltry figure, when set against a total population (in 1897) of 129 Million. But the industrial workers were concentrated in key centers, from which, if they acted in an organized manner, they could exercise an influence out of all proportion to their numerical strength.”

316 Goebel (1920) observes that the largest increase in the size of the industrial proletariat occurred after the 1890s
317 See Rogger (1983) for these figures
318 See Goebel (1920) and Rogger (1983, 21 et seqq)
There is also a related debate with a long tradition about the ties of the Russian working class to its peasant background. It has been suggested that the continuing involvement of Russian workers with their peasant community and the large share of laborers who were employed on a seasonal basis and returned to the countryside frequently, represents an obstacle to mass mobilization.\footnote{319 See Zelnik (1972) and Rogger (1983) for an assessment of this controversy.} While this peculiar feature of the Russian working-class cannot be denied, it should not be understood as an impediment to party formation. First of all, the number of seasonal workers and the extent of ties to the village declined significantly already in the 1890s. Goebel (1920) concludes that this feature of the Russian working-class has been greatly exaggerated. In his analysis of official employment records, he finds that in 1893, the vast majority of workers were constantly employed in industrial enterprises, without returning to the countryside: 72% from a sample of 763,000 workers in the entire country; 89.22% of all workers in Petersburg, and 80.47% in Moscow.

Moreover, Zelnik (1972) and Rogger (1983) argue that whatever peasant ties still existed in the Russian working-class, if anything, made Russian workers more contentious and resentful vis-à-vis industrialism and factory working conditions, and thereby more easily mobilizable. The increasing extent of industrial strife already in the 1890s can serve as evidence for that argument. The mixture of peasant experience, alienation from the urban industrial environment, and exposure to radical literature in the cities, accompanied by learning how to read and to discuss politics, made workers with a peasant background more rather than less susceptible to political mobilization. Taking all of these points under consideration, there is no good reason to exclude Russia from an analysis of social democratic party formation. I am in complete agreement with Riasanovsky (2000, 428) and his final conclusion about the significance and role of Russian labor: “With all due qualifications, from the 1880s on, an industrial working class constituted a significant component of Russian population, an essential part of Russian economy, and a factor in Russian politics.”

**The nature of labor inclusion during labor’s formative stage in the political arena**

Within the ‘window of opportunity’ for industrial development and the emergence of labor politics opened by the 1861 peasant emancipation, 1883 marks the actual beginning of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. The analysis of labor inclusion and the corresponding responses of labor elites in this dissertation focus on that formative stage and its specific duration across the variety of cases. In Russia, the foundation of “Emancipation of Labor” represents the beginning of that formative stage. The group represents the origin for the eclectic variety of organizational and ideological models from the social
democratic fold. It was the first attempt of marxist intellectuals to begin shaping labor’s political consciousness and to steer labor into the arena of politics. The ‘formative stage’ of labor’s entry into the political arena ends with the successful institutionalization of the Soviet regime in the early 1920s. At that point in time, social democratic party formation was not only the second best choice anymore – it had become impossible.

In the following paragraphs, degrees of inclusion as the background on which labor elites developed their model for entering the political arena will be outlined for the case of Russia. In the first place, an overall assessment for the entire time period in question will be made, based on the earlier comparative overview. This will provide the basis for my general argument about labor elites’ decision-making process. Secondly, the evolution of labor inclusion will be outlined from an over time perspective. My argument about the relationship between lowest inclusion and social democratic party formation as a suboptimal, compared to insurrectionism as the optimal response, can be strengthened by such a more fine grained analysis.

Roots and fundamental characteristics of lowest labor inclusion in Russia

The defining feature of Russian modernization during the late 19th and early 20th century was the pursuit of economic development in the context of a continuously autocratic political system. Bendix (1978) identified the reference to divine sanction as the epitome of pre-modern rule. The process of modernization has given rise to a “mandate for the people” as a different mode of justification for the exercise of political authority. In the case of Russia, autocratic rule and the reference to divine sanction continued in an uninterrupted fashion until the very end of the ancien regime. Ever since the 18th century, Russian tsars also embraced the idea of popular legitimacy. They began to define the mandate of the people as the exercise of autocratic power in the interest of the people: the tyrant rules as the executor of the public will.

The “Fundamental Laws” of 1832 formally codified the role of the tsar along these lines: “The Russian Empire is ruled on the firm basis of positive laws and statutes, which emanate from the Autocratic Power.” As a result, the autocrat acted as the sole source of political power and legitimacy, which was both divinely sanctioned and exercised on behalf of the people. This assessment applies to the entire formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena. As we will see later in more detail, the introduction of a constitution in 1906 has not changed this fundamental feature of the Russian political system before 1917.

320 See Russia (1832) for the text of the Fundamental Laws
Overall, Russia represents the case, where labor was most apparently excluded from the political arena. It is the idealtypical example for lowest inclusion – even more so than Japan, where an equivalent environment of repression and exclusion was accomplished by political maneuvering on the basis of a constitution throughout the entire formative stage of labor politics. In the case of Russia, not even a constitutional foundation existed until 1905. Political liberties, responsible government, and enfranchisement as the three institutional dimensions of inclusion were completely absent before that point in time, and thereby for the largest part of labor’s formative stage. Despite the passing of a constitution in 1905, no permanent change in the nature of labor inclusion occurred. Inclusion remained at the lowest level, with the exception only of a very brief interlude immediately after the new constitution had been implemented. After 1907, until the overthrow of tsarism in 1917, lowest inclusion was solidly entrenched again. However, during that time period, other than before 1905, it occurred despite the existence of a formal constitution. During this time period, the techniques of accomplishing lowest labor inclusion in Russia therefore converged on the Japanese model. The overall result, however, was the same in both cases: labor elites were confronted with an environment of lowest inclusion for their entire formative stage in the political arena, in the case of Russia with only a very brief exception after the 1905 revolution.

I argued previously that excessive repression of labor through the specific activities of the state executive, on top of institutional exclusion, is an important indicator for the dividing line between low and lowest inclusion. Other than in low inclusion cases, where specific acts of repression were certainly frequent and forceful, nothing comes close to the violent and vicious oppression of labor in Russia. Most importantly, labor persecution in Russia was permanent, with only few brief exceptions, while in all the cases characterized by low inclusion, periods of repression and appeasement alternated. The outline of the evolution of inclusion in the following section will illustrate this point in more detail.

The behavior of competing parties in terms of the organizational inclusion of labor elites and the electoral inclusion of workers at large is a crucial factor for distinguishing cases of highest and higher inclusion. It is insignificant in defining the threshold in between lowest and low inclusion. Overall, the repression of political activity in Russia did not only extend to workers and peasants. For the most part, all other political forces outside the nomenclatura, most importantly the liberals, were also largely excluded from political participation. This precludes any effective attempts at inclusive behavior from those ‘competing parties’ already by institutional design: first, if the liberals are not allowed to organize or to become involved politically, they have no opportunity to incorporate labor elites; and second, in the absence of a parliament, or later on, effective enfranchisement, ‘competing parties’ are not able to include the larger worker constituency electorally. Moreover, the social dividing lines between the middle-class professionals that constituted the small liberal movement in Russia, and the Russian labor movement, both its workers and intellectuals, were particularly pronounced. Even the introduction of parliamentary
representation in 1906 only reinforced these divisions, because of the mutual isolation of different social
groups imposed by the curia based electoral system.

The Russian case thus distinguishes itself from all others, with the exception of Japan, because
inclusion is at the lowest level on all dimensions (cf. figure 9): in terms of enfranchisement, political
liberties, and responsible government as the three institutional factors, as well as the behavioral elements of
inclusion: the behavior of the executive, the behavior of competing parties in terms of electoral inclusion,
and the behavior of competing parties in terms of organizational inclusion of labor elites. In all the adjacent
cases of low inclusion, at least one institutional channel of inclusion was opened for the access of labor to
the political arena. And in none of them was the persecution and repression of labor through the state
executive as permanent as in the cases of Russia and Japan.

When labor elites were in their formative stage of devising an organizational and ideological model in
the context of this environment, insurrectionism was not the only option, but the one that provided the best
ratio of costs and potential benefits. As I showed before, even the most limited concessions to labor in
terms of institutional and behavioral inclusion by the state, significantly decreased the rewards of
insurrectionism, and made other less costly models comparatively more rewarding. Only in Russia and
Japan insurrectionism was clearly the most rewarding model, because inclusion in these cases was also
undoubtedly at the lowest level. But the closer a particular case approaches lowest inclusion from within
the adjacent category of low inclusion, the more likely the emergence of an insurrectionist alternative
becomes. This applies to all cases at the lower end of the low inclusion category: Spain, Hungary,
Argentina, and Italy (see table 9). It is to be expected, therefore, that within the low inclusion group,
communism and anarcho-syndicalism were most pronounced in these cases, where they existed as viable
alternatives for labor politics alongside social democratic parties.

The evolution of labor inclusion over time

The shifting fortunes of various models of labor politics in Russia are inextricably linked to the
evolution of labor inclusion over time. As an overall assessment, lowest inclusion was the regular pattern
faced by Russian labor elites during their formative stage of entry into the political arena. But within that
general context, some important changes have occurred over time. Tracing these changes is not just an
effort geared at providing a more thorough and comprehensive description of labor inclusion. The
adjustments to the nature of labor inclusion – institutional and behavioral – have never altered the

321 Austria would have become part of this category, had it not been for the electoral reforms of 1897 and 1907, and the late growth
of the Austrian working-class.
fundamental nature of Russia as a case of lowest inclusion. But within that framework, the specific evolution of inclusion has led to according adjustments in the strategical responses of labor elites and the varying fortunes of different models of labor politics.

By tracing the interaction between these two processes, we are in a position to accomplish two additional goals, besides the above mentioned depth of description: first, to outline in more detail the causal mechanisms underpinning the relation between degrees of inclusion and the response of labor elites suggested here; and second, to provide further evidence for the validity of that causal connection. At the most basic level, the following two particular forms of interaction between the evolution of inclusion and the strategical responses of labor elites can be observed in an over time analysis: first, in those situations, where entrenched elites took steps to increase the level of inclusion, the fortunes of mass-based social democracy were on the rise, and accordingly, the position of insurrectionism as the optimal model was weakened. This is exactly in line with what we would expect on the basis of the fundamental theoretical suggestion made in this dissertation. Secondly, it is a defining feature of Russian political development in this time period that whenever even the most minimal hopes for political participation were thus raised, a period of reaction was already waiting around the corner. After such a reactionary response and a return to the ‘old ways’, insurrectionism would even more clearly appear as the optimal, and to some contemporaries even the only feasible model of labor politics.

At the most aggregate level of analysis, a chain of events along these lines has occurred on four separate occasions in between 1861 and 1917. First, after the ‘liberal’ reforms of the 1860s, a period of reaction beginning in the late 1870s reversed the vast majority of what little headway had been made. Organized labor was not yet a relevant force to speak of at that time, which is why the next one of these two reactionary turns affected labor, whose formative stage in the political arena only began in 1883, to a much greater extent. Second, after the October manifesto of 1905, which announced the introduction of a constitution after the revolutionary turmoil of 1905, another reversal of limited ‘liberal’ accomplishments occurred already in June 1907. The heyday of mass-based social democracy in Russia, and a relative decline of insurrectionism, occurred during this brief period of limited freedom and low inclusion from 1905 to 1907. It was followed by a return to the increasing dominance of insurrectionism after the reversal of limited labor incorporation and the restoration of lowest inclusion in 1907. Third, after the restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907 and an immediate clampdown on labor activities, the time period from 1908 to 1911 saw a limited extent of toleration for a number of labor activities that had spilled over from the previous ‘years of freedom’, but without actually passing the threshold to ‘low inclusion. Beginning in 1911, even these extremely limited loopholes for labor activity were more viciously

322 There is debate about the exact duration of the “time of freedom”. This issue will be discussed more extensively below.
suppressed again. Fourth, in a sense, the developments during the revolutionary year of 1917 continued this earlier pattern even after the overthrow of tsarism through the February Revolution. During the first ‘liberal’ stage of the revolution, political liberties were guaranteed, but the Bolshevik seizure of power in October put an end to this brief and provisional period of higher inclusion. In an environment of lowest inclusion, social democratic party formation was at least possible. With the gradual consolidation of the Bolshevik system until 1921 as a regime that was even below the lowest level of inclusion, the possibility of party formation ceased to exist altogether. The few months after the 1917 February revolution were not sufficient to allow for successful party institutionalization.

Even below this most abstract level of analysis, similar forms of interaction between variations in inclusion and the labor response can be found. First, the same observations can be made when comparing over time developments in particular localities. Whenever local authorities pursued either a more or less inclusive approach, an according response regarding the relative fortunes of mass-based social democracy and insurrectionist models would follow. And second, a similar argument can also be made in terms of geographical variation. In those regions of the country, where labor repression was not as pronounced as in others, mass-based social democracy became the dominant response of labor elites, and insurrectionism had significantly less followers. This applies most clearly to the Polish and Baltic parts of the Russian Empire, where the Mensheviks and the Bund as mass-based non-insurrectionist social democratic factions were much more influential than their Bolshevik rivals. This geographical variation in the relative dominance of different models of labor politics is directly related to the corresponding variation in degrees of inclusion. In all of these instances, from an over time perspective on all of Russia, an over time perspective on specific localities, and in an investigation of geographical variation, mass-based social democracy, which is most suitable to environments of low and higher inclusion, flourished to some extent during periods of limited freedom, while the fortunes of insurrectionist models were on the rise after the abandonment of previous concessions. Throughout the following paragraphs, based on the outline displayed in table 18, the evolution of labor inclusion from 1861 to 1917, on the basis of the stages of development introduced above, will be discussed in more detail.

*Lowest inclusion through autocratic governance without constitutional basis, 1861-1905*

Before 1905, lowest inclusion of labor without any constitutional basis occurred through an autocratic political system. The defining features of absolute autocracy continued until that point in time in an almost uninterrupted fashion ever since the 15th and 16th century. Bendix (1978) observes that the principles of

323 See Hofmeester (1990) for a discussion of the Jewish labor movement and the Bund.
autocratic rule in Russia were imposed through the establishment of the muscovite dynasty during that time period. An important foundation for the continuous lack of participatory institutions was already laid at this early point in time: while in the majority of Western European cases, aristocrats and monarchs agreed to various forms of power sharing in the context of proto-parliamentary institutions, no such thing happened in the case of Russia.

The power of local princes and boyars and the according fragmentation of political authority had been the dominating feature of politics until the 15th century. The conquests of the Muscovites in the 15th and 16th century ended the dominant role of local aristocrats and resulted in the centralization of authority and administration under their rule. Other than in England as the prototypical case of codified arrangements between aristocrats and the monarchy, however, the Russian gentry was not involved in the exercise of political authority by the new autocracy. Their local autonomy was crushed without a stake in the centralized polity as compensation. They became what Bendix (1978) refers to as a “service aristocracy”. Their independent sources of wealth, income and status were curtailed and replaced by dependence on the tsar: their elevated position was now derived from the assignment of offices in the autocracy’s service. Moreover, other than in the majority of Western European cases, the autocracy did not have to contend with a catholic church that regarded itself as a counter force to secular rulers. The orthodox church functioned as a legitimizing factor for the exercise of autocratic authority, without pronounced political ambitions of its own.

Throughout the further Russian political development until the beginning of the modernization policies in the 1860s, various adjustments in the balance of power between the aristocracy and centralized authority occurred, in both directions. But the fundamental principle of autocratic control and governance without constitutional basis remained unchanged. Under Catherine II, czarina from 1762 to 1796, aristocrats were somewhat compensated for their submission to autocratic rule: they were given greater autonomy over the use of their domain and more freedom in exercising control over their peasants. This reform, however, would not contribute to increasing the political autonomy of the aristocracy vis-à-vis the autocrat, as a potential precedent for the establishment of participatory institutions. Quite to the contrary, it would solidify the bonds between both actors, and intensify the dependence of peasants on their local lords that would hamper the process of modernization until the very end of the ancien regime, despite the 1861 emancipation and Stolypin’s land reforms of 1906.

The pattern of lowest labor inclusion throughout labor’s formative stage in the political arena can thus be traced back to its precedents in the early history of Russian state formation. After the centralization of political authority in the 15th and 16th century, a very limited conflict between autocracy and aristocrats for political influence never threatened the autocratic exercise of power and did not result in the establishment of early participatory institutions. In England as the idealtypical counter example, the establishment of such
institutions began soon after the centralization of political authority in the 11th century. These institutions, most importantly parliament, served as a set of opportunity structures that were later on used by other social groups in their efforts to gain access to the political arena.

In Russia, the absence of such institutions and patterns of power sharing was compensated by concessions to the aristocracy regarding control over their peasants. The specific interaction between both these agents did therefore not only result in the absence of participatory institutions as an impediment to political modernization; the deal that was cut between the two groups in order to compensate the aristocracy for its loss of political influence functioned as an obstacle to socio-economic modernization as well. Eventually, under the constant threat of peasant rebellion, and confronted with the emergence of the middle class and later on labor as political rivals, the political fortunes of the centralized autocracy and the feudal lords became inextricably linked to one another.

This is how Russia emerged into its own era of socio-economic modernization that began with the peasant emancipation of 1861. The earlier pattern of autocratic rule and the absence of participatory institutions continued in an almost uninterrupted fashion, and would eventually be extended to industrial workers as well, when they emerged as an independent social and political actor. Based on this historical background, Russia from 1861 to 1905 became the idealtypical case of lowest labor inclusion, where the exercise of political authority lacked any constitutional basis. Within this time period, as noted above, two different eras can be distinguished: first, the age of limited liberal reforms from 1861 to 1878, and a time of reaction from 1878 to 1905.

The limited liberal reforms implemented in the aftermath of the 1854-1856 Crimean War never functioned as an effective first step toward more far-reaching changes in terms of participatory institutions and the rule of law. Alexander II regarded the reforms as a means to modernize Russia, but never intended to change the fundamental nature of autocratic governance. Even his very limited measures met with strong resistance from the gentry and parts of the nomenclatura. An attempt on his life in 1866 marks the end of the actual reform period. The autocracy continued to support the changes that had already been implemented until around 1878, when individual acts of violence and organized terrorism by the populists from *Narodnaya Volya* (People’s Will) significantly intensified. 1878 therefore marks the definite end of a cautiously liberal era and the beginning of a time of reaction. The curtailment of earlier reforms became even more prevalent after 1881, when Alexander II was assassinated and replaced by his son, Alexander III. The accession of Nicholas II in 1894 reaffirmed the continuation of the unaltered autocratic course, which finds its expression in Article I of the reformulated “Fundamental Laws” of 1892: “The emperor of
all the Russias is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. God himself commands that his supreme power be obeyed, out of conscience as well as fear.\textsuperscript{324}

For the question of labor inclusion, three of the liberal reforms from the 1860s are relevant: first, the abolition of serfdom, which was already discussed extensively before as the policy that enabled the process of industrialization. Second, the reform of the judiciary in 1864 was designed to make the courts independent from political interference, and judicial procedures more transparent. It also introduced formal equality before the law. But even after the reform, actual equality and the rule of law still existed only on paper. Arbitrary acts against the disadvantaged strata of society continued on a large scale despite formal equality (Keep 1963, 2). The third, and in this context most important one of the Alexandrine measures was the reform of local government from 1864. Through the establishment of the Zemstvo system, partial self-governance at the local and district level was introduced, under the inclusion and participation of society. Zemstvos were local and district wide assemblies for the gentry, propertied townsmen, and the peasants. The formal deliberations in between the autocracy and the nobility leading to the 1861 peasant emancipation acted as an important precedent for the Zemstvo reform.

The responsibility of the new assemblies was to provide advice to the local and regional administration on strictly technical matters. They had no independent sources of revenue, no legislative responsibility, and the justification for their existence flowed directly from the autocratic principle and the will of the tsar. Most importantly, they were not allowed to get involved in any public debate that was deemed to have repercussions for the national level. This way, the Zemstvos did not function as truly participatory institutions, and they were far from acting as legislatures by any stretch of the imagination. But at the same time, they became an important precedent for public deliberation and a forum for debate in the events leading to the 1905 revolutionary turmoil. And in addition to that, however limited they were, the Zemstvos represented the first officially sanctioned forum for public deliberation and the first opportunity for groups other than the aristocracy to get involved in public affairs.

The reforms that were enacted in the first half of the 1860s came to a slow halt by 1866, and began to be reversed already after 1878. But the ‘time of reaction’ as a period, during which the limited reforms of Alexander II were reversed by his two successors, began most apparently with the accession of his son Alexander III in 1881. First, the earlier attempts at judicial reforms were effectively reversed. Already before 1881, the changes to judicial procedures were counteracted by the establishment of special court martial. These extraordinary courts were not even subject to the limited formal boundaries imposed on the ordinary judicial system. Over time, an increasing number of offenses were delegated to the authority of

\textsuperscript{324} Article I of the “Fundamental Laws” of 1892 remained unchanged until the end of the Empire in 1917, and can therefore also be found in the 1906 revision of the “Fundamental Laws” (See Russia 1906 for the original text)
these special courts, including all forms of politically motivated injunctions against the existing order. In the late summer of 1881, the introduction of “temporary regulations” gave appointed local officials broad discretion over dealing with “threats to public order”. These policies, along with the establishment of “land captains”, who had vast judicial and executive powers vis-à-vis the peasantry, resulted in the complete nullification of earlier attempts to create a somewhat independent judicial branch.

Second, the already limited role of the Zemstvos as participatory institutions was curtailed even further through a number of counter-reforms in the early 1890s. Election procedures, akin to the curia system introduced later for the state duma, had been heavily skewed in favor of the gentry and against the peasantry since the inception of the Zemstvo system. In 1890, further limits on the right to vote for zemstvo representatives were imposed on peasants. The 1892 increase of property requirements for the right to participate in zemstvo elections in the cities completely excluded labor from these proceedings. But even significant parts of the propertied middle classes lost their right to participate. Ever since 1894, the new tsar Nicholas II continued the reactionary agenda his father had initiated. The extension of ‘temporary regulations’ further undermined any effort to guarantee the rule of law. While Alexander III had severely limited the right to participate in Zemstvo elections, Nicholas II curtailed their already extremely limited range of responsibilities. The new tsar also transferred political authority over a wide variety of issues to the central bureaucracy, away from the local level altogether.

The only social groups that benefited from the time of reaction were the nobility and the small but growing group of industrial entrepreneurs: The absence of judicial equality and the pursuit of ‘political offenses’ through extraordinary courts protected them from peasant and worker contentiousness. The lack of any serious effort to implement a land reform guaranteed the advantaged socio-economic position of the gentry. The modernization policies of the 1890s benefited the material interests of the new class of industrialists. And the reversal of inclusiveness in already severely limited local Zemstvos made sure that these two groups were the only ones with meaningful access to the political arena, through official and informal channels.

In the context of undeniably lowest inclusion, an important counter tendency to the complete exclusion and oppression of labor from within the nomenclatura emerged during this time period. The formation of industrial laborers as a distinct social group, combined with the continuing practice of autocratic governance and labor repression led to an internal struggle within the administration. Keep

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325 Riasanovsky (2000) provides a more extensive description of the counterreforms during this era. I focused on the issues that are relevant for the question of labor inclusion. Riasanovsky (2000) adds the ‘University Statute of 1884’, which abolished university autonomy and stripped students of the right to organize, as well as the general policy of Russification and the imposition of orthodox faith on the population.

326 Other aspects of Nicholas’ counterreforms were the imposition of further limits on the freedom of education, the intensification of earlier efforts at Russification, and an increase in religious persecution.
(1963) locates the centers of the two contending factions in the ministry of the interior and the ministry of finance, respectively. The ‘modernizers’, led by then finance minister Sergei Witte, wanted to pursue a strict course of socio-economic development. They regarded the exploitation of industrial workers as an unfortunate necessity, and labor’s discontent as a temporary phenomenon that the police and the military were able to handle.

The ‘paternalists’, for lack of a better term, were concerned about the negative effects of industrialization on domestic security and military readiness. They were not as optimistic about the ability of the state to contain the discontent that resulted from socio-economic exploitation and political alienation. They were no political revolutionaries, of course, but their approach to the labor question did not resonate well with the autocratic inclinations of the tsar and the general agenda of modernization: in order to contain worker protest, and to improve living and working conditions as a prerequisite for conscription to the armed forces, the ‘paternalists’ in the administration proposed to allow workers purely economic forms of self-organization, i.e. the liberty to organize unions. Their internal rivals rejected such ideas as a direct threat to the goal of industrial expansion, which they believed required unequivocal support for the entrepreneurs that ran industrial establishments. We will see later on in more detail that limited experiments of police controlled labor unions as a uniquely Russian version of ‘moderate syndicalism’ were attempted in the early 1900s. But overall, both the autocratic tendencies in the administration and the pursuit of industrial development outweighed the concerns of the ‘paternalists’. Even the extremely limited forms of labor inclusion suggested by this group within the nomenclatura were never effectively implemented before 1906.

Substantive laws for the protection of labor’s socio-economic interests belong conceptually to the behavior of the state executive. The few pieces of protective labor legislation that were enacted throughout the 1880s and 1890s in Russia were so rudimentary that they were not able to compensate for the lack of real political inclusion. In 1882, working hours for children and women were reduced. A factory inspectorate was established during the same year, but its subordination to the ministry of finance was designed to guarantee that the interests of entrepreneurs would continue to be safeguarded. Furthermore, only a few years later, in 1885, the prerogatives of factory inspectors were explicitly curtailed, in order to prevent too much attention to the concerns of industrial workers. Kochan (1966) argues that another set of elementary pieces of labor legislation implemented through the Act of 1886, occurred as a response to the preceding period of strikes. Children labor was limited to an eight hour working day, night work was prohibited for children, and regulations geared at assuring proper and regular payment of workers were passed. Eventually, in 1897, night work was limited to a maximum of 10 hours, and the maximum for day time work was set at 11 hours and a half. Keep (1963, 8) concludes that these measures “were inspired less by social or humanitarian motives than by concerns for public order, and were very loosely applied in
practice.” They represented the most minimal concessions that the modernizers were willing to make to those that had a more paternalistic approach to the labor question. We have already seen in the case of Germany, that the combination of social inclusion and political exclusion did not lead to a demise of labor’s political ambitions. In the case of Russia, political exclusion and socio-economic deprivation of workers were even more pronounced, and labor legislation much more limited than the comparatively far reaching insurance schemes implemented by Bismarck. The failure of these limited policies to change the nature of lowest inclusion in Russia is therefore readily apparent.

Thus, during the entire time period from 1861 to 1905, labor inclusion was constantly at the lowest level. This assessment applies both to the ‘liberal’ period from 1861 to 1878 and the ‘time of reaction’ in between 1878 and 1905 (see table 18). Lowest inclusion requires the absence of any institutional channel of access to the political arena as well as the effective absence of inclusive behavior by the state executive and ‘competing parties’. We have seen in the preceding paragraphs that in the domain of institutional inclusion, not only did Russia lack a constitution. Even the most fundamental prerequisites for the establishment of effective participatory institutions and the rule of law were missing. Accordingly, labor inclusion was solidly at the lowest level on all three institutional dimensions - political liberties, enfranchisement, and responsible government.

In the realm of political liberties, political organization of any kind was not only not guaranteed; it was explicitly prohibited and persecuted. The same applies to all forms of economic organization. Unions and strikes continued to be illegal, despite the previously outlined temporary efforts of certain factions in the nomenclatura to allow for very limited forms of strictly economic labor associations. Freedom of press and speech were nonexistent. Moreover, during the time of reaction, first Alexander III and then Nicholas II severely increased the persecution of undesired publications (cf. Keep 1963). Enfranchisement as the second institutional dimension of inclusion was altogether impossible, since no parliament existed. Even at the local level, for strictly technical issues, a heavily skewed curia based electoral system and the introduction of property qualifications for assemblies in the cities during the time of reaction effectively excluded workers from having any influence on the composition of the zemstvos. Responsible government, eventually, as the third institutional dimension of inclusion, was entirely absent at the national level. Even at the local level, it did not exist, despite the introduction of the zemstvo system, since the local assemblies only acted as advisory bodies.

As far as the behavior of the state executive is concerned, the vicious and violent oppression of any form of political activity as well as expressions of mass content is well documented.327 The insulated and

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327 For an excellent overview from a comparative perspective, see Goldstein (1983, 278-286). See also Kochan (1966, 33), in addition to the remaining literature on Russian political development in the late 19th and early 20th century, and the standard literature on social democracy more specifically.
limited peasant protests during this time period were mostly contained by the authority of the ‘land
captains’ and local police forces, and only rarely required the support of the military. The activities of the
populists and the terrorist elements of the Narodnaya Volya during the 1880s and 1890s were subject to the
most severe responses by the state. Even the comparatively moderate zemstvo movement that became
dominated by liberal forces toward the end of this time period, faced arrest and prosecution. The response
of the executive to the activities of organized labor was just as vicious as the way in which the autocracy
dealt with peasant protests. Beginning in the late 1890s, when the first mass strikes occurred in the St.
Petersburg textile industries, protests were broken up in the most violent fashion by the police, the military,
and Kossack brigades. Labor activists had to work underground, because of the constant fear of arrest and
severe penalties. Any attempt at inclusive behavior by competing parties was severely limited by the
institutional environment. The only more extensive form of cooperation between labor elites and the liberal
movement occurred in the context of the rise of the liberal zemstvo movement as a political force before the
1905 revolution. But this was hardly an instance of inclusive behavior by the liberals toward organized
labor. It was rather an attempt of labor elites to use the zemstvo campaign for their own strategical purposes

The labor movement during this time period was just in its infancy. Initially, the modernization
policies had triggered an anti-industrialist responses and calls for the defense of the village community. The
nature of this discontent was still largely rooted in the peasantry. It was translated into the political arena
through the romantic and idealistic variant of insurrectionism suggested by the populists, albeit under the
skeptic eyes and sometimes open hostility of the peasants, on whose behalf they acted (cf. Goldstein 1983).
A more effective and better organized labor movement only emerged in the late 1880s and throughout the
1890s, which is also the time period that saw the emergence of Russian marxism, and its growing
dominance over earlier populist conceptions of revolution. The pattern of limited liberal reforms and
reactionary response that characterized the time from 1861 to 1905 would serve as a precedent for a similar
chain of events in the crucial years from 1905 to 1907. At that later point in time, however, organized labor
and the various factions of social democracy would occupy the center of the stage. In the following section,
I am going to outline the further development of labor inclusion in Russia after 1905. We are going to see
that a similar pattern of limited liberal reforms, in 1905 and 1906, followed by a reactionary response
afterwards, created conditions that favored insurrectionist over mass-based social democratic approaches,
all of which emerged, however, from the marxist socialist camp.
After the revolutionary events of 1905 and the proclamation of the “October Manifesto”, in which the tsar announced the establishment of a constitution, Russia briefly approached the type of partially liberalized political system that was prevalent throughout most of Central and Western Europe during the late 19th century. Just how brief exactly this time period really was, is a matter of some debate. Schwarz (1967) refers to the “days of freedom” and has in mind the less than three months from the publication of the manifesto until the violent suppression of the Moscow and Petersburg uprisings in December. The vast majority of authors, however, speak of “years of freedom”, thereby indicating that the period of semi-constitutional governance ended with the electoral reforms enacted by Stolypin in June 1907.

Looking at this controversy from the perspective of labor inclusion, the variation in terminology and interpretation can be seen as stemming from varying emphases on different elements of inclusion as the decisive factor for determining the end of limited political freedom. Schwarz (1967) observes that after the annunciation of political liberties in October 1905, repressive behavior by the state, at the national and local level, receded significantly. This occurred to some extent as a conscious political effort, but in many respects also as the result of confusion by a number of officials about how to interpret the tsar’s announcement and his intentions. From this perspective, therefore, the end of freedom is linked to the behavior of the state executive. The vast majority of authors, however speak of the “years of freedom”, because they emphasize the end of institutional inclusion through the formal reversal of limited enfranchisement and the factual retraction of political liberties in June 1907 as the decisive factor.

Both of these approaches make a valid point. A comprehensive picture of the ‘era of freedom’ needs to combine their respective concerns with behavioral and institutional inclusion. Based on this fundamental premise, I believe that it would be inappropriate to consider the suppression of the December uprisings of 1905 as the definite end to low inclusion. We have previously defined lowest inclusion as the absence of any access to the political arena for labor, meaning the presence of lowest inclusion on all constituent dimensions. While Schwarz (1967) is correct in pointing out that the response of the state to the events in Petersburg and Moscow in December 1905 represents a return to the pre-October repressive behavior, it did not yet result in the complete abandonment of any form of inclusion. Limited political liberties and enfranchisement continued to be in place until June 1907.

It is therefore more appropriate to speak of the ‘years of freedom’ as the time period from October 1905 to June 1907, when Russia experienced the provision of low inclusion as a deviation from the regular

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328 See Russia (1905) for the original text of the October Manifesto.
329 Italics in “days” and “years” “of freedom” is mine.
pattern of lowest inclusion for a brief period of time. However, taking into account Schwarz’ (1967) argument at the same time, it is helpful to conceive of the abandonment of these limited guarantees to labor as gradual process rather than a discrete event. This process began through the state’s response to the December 1905 uprisings, but was only completed through the institutional reforms and the renewed clampdown on labor activities of June 1907. In between these two points in time, a number of incidents and developments indicate a gradual process toward the eventual restoration of lowest inclusion. One important milestone that Rogger (1986) emphasizes is the establishment of field court-martials, akin to a similar measure during the ‘time of reaction’ in the late 19th century.  

The term “years of freedom” that is commonly employed to designate this era, however, has to be used with caution for yet another reason. Even during this time period, Russia was still characterized by autocratic governance. However, through the establishment of a constitution, the granting of limited political liberties, and the partial enfranchisement of its society, the Russian political system cautiously incorporated a number of liberal traits. In terms of labor inclusion, the so-called ‘years of freedom’ elevated Russia for a brief period of time from lowest to low inclusion of labor. Nonetheless, after less than two years of semi-constitutional governance, lowest inclusion was restored beginning in June 1907, by what is referred to either as a ‘counter reform’ or a ‘coup’, executed by then prime minister Stolypin and tsar Nicholas II. The constitution itself was not abandoned after 1907, but institutional inclusion through political liberties, enfranchisement, and responsible government returned to the lowest level of inclusion. And the extent of specific repressive action by the state, which was somewhat eased during the ‘years of freedom’, returned back to a pattern of permanent repression.

The revolutionary events of 1905 that pressured the autocracy to make these limited and temporary concessions resulted from the divergence between autocratic politics and socio-economic modernization. Both vicious repression and the temporary nurturing of liberal hopes during the 1860s have to be regarded as precedents for the rise of mass political protest. Initially, however, as Pipes (1990) observes, the demands for the establishment of a constitutional order were an elite phenomenon. The zemstvos in the cities had emerged as a forum of deliberation for the middle-class liberal movement by the early 1900s. Additional support for liberal demands came from within the universities.

The majority of the marxian socialists with their concept of a revolution in two stages regarded the events of 1905 initially as an exclusively liberal affair: their time was to come only after the liberal political revolution had given rise to a republic, which was regarded as the prerequisite for a socialist socio-economic transformation. Pipes (1990), Keep (1963) and others argue that eventually, the socialists jumped

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330 Rogger (1986) describes these courts as extra-legal institutions specifically designed to deal with anti-government crimes. Their jurisdiction extended to all forms of sentences, including capital punishment. The records of these courts register 7,000 fines, 2,000 individuals expelled to other regions, and 21,000 exiled to ‘distant provinces’, aka Siberia.
on the revolutionary bandwagon, even though their propaganda was not causal for the chain of events that unfolded in 1905. Wildman (1967) on the other hand, based on a survey of events in various localities, comes to the conclusion that the socialists were an important actor already in 1905.\textsuperscript{331} Regardless of the issue of social democratic involvement, it is clear that the major demands of the revolution were the establishment of a liberal order, the curtailment of aristocratic privileges and the enactment of a land reform on behalf of the peasantry.

The weakness of Russian liberalism is to some extent the direct consequence of Russia’s socio-economic backwardness and limited industrialization. Paul Milyukov (1905, 169), historian and leading member of the liberal movement, described the Russian liberals as “not bourgeois, but intellectual”. Max Weber (1906, 244) argued along the same lines that they were isolated from the forces of industry and finance, as the “bearer of a political and socio-political idealism”. The liberal movement in Russia consisted of three major groups: the gentry that was involved in the zemstvos, technical experts employed by these local assemblies (teachers, physicians, statisticians), and members of the free professions (academics, lawyers, physicians). Liberal demands for concessions from the autocracy were advanced through the zemstvo movement, the 1902 underground paper “Liberation” that gave rise in 1903 to the “Union of Liberation”, and the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets) founded in 1905.

The autocracy, as evidenced by the largely symbolic “Law of December 12” in 1904, which was designed to pacify the liberals, was not yet willing to make any meaningful concessions.\textsuperscript{332} But after the assassination in July 1904 of the hardliner Plehve, minister of the interior since 1902, it had made some limited attempts to respond with more caution and moderation. Kochan (1966) observes how the comparatively liberal replacement for Plehve, the former governor-general of Vilna, Svyatopolk-Mirsk, made some efforts in this direction. The autocracy also practiced a limited form of toleration for the political activities of the zemstvos. But ultimately, these efforts were not able to overcome the dominant counter tendencies in the administration that pushed for a swift crushing of public rebellion, especially toward the end of the year, when discontent continued despite more restraint by the state, and when at the same time, the military situation in the war against Japan worsened.

After the autocracy, despite some limited attempts in the second half of 1904, had thus proven to be incapable of satisfying the demands of the liberals, the events commonly referred to as “Bloody Sunday” made their protest a mass phenomenon. On January 22 of 1905, the police killed hundreds of workers at the occasion of a mass demonstration. What proved to be most upsetting for Russian society at the time was the

\textsuperscript{331} Similar historiographical debate also with respect to the first expression of mass discontent by labor in the 1890s: Wildman (1890) argues that social democrats were already actively involved in these events, while Pipes (1990), Keep (1963) and others disagree with that assessment.

\textsuperscript{332} See Russia (1904) for the December Law
fact that the protesters were not even radicals, but loyalist supporters of the Gapon unions, which had been
founded at the initiative of the ‘paternalistic’ faction of the nomenclatura (see Pipes 1990). The
unwillingness of the regime to respond to the agenda of the liberals also resulted in the radicalization of
liberal demands and tactics. After these events, turmoil, strikes and peasant rebellions spread throughout
the entire country. Repression of this extent of mass discontent was impossible, since the largest part of the
army was in the Far East fighting the Russo-Japanese War. Concessions to the demands of the masses were
the only chance for the autocracy to survive. Pipes (1990) argues that change came in two stages. Initially,
the tsar formally invited suggestions for the future of Russia from the public, and established a commission
to review the proposals. None of the essential liberal demands were supported by the regime. The tsar only
promised a purely consultative public assembly in March 1905 and enacted a slight liberalization of the
rules governing political activity in the universities. In response, political propaganda, mass discontent, and
strikes resumed again by the end of September 1905.

In response to the new wave of political protest and the continuing inability to suppress it, the tsar
eventually issued the October Manifesto of 1905. The manifesto was no formal legislative act. It was an
announcement of the tsar to establish an elected Duma with legislative prerogatives, to guarantee the rule of
law, and to codify civil liberties. It also contained the promise to further extend these entitlements over
time. The liberals interpreted the document as the first step toward a true constitutional monarchy, but the
following two years would show that the tsar was not willing to make lasting concessions. His only interest,
as Riasanovsky (2000) pointedly shows, was to reestablish law and order immediately, and to safeguard the
principle of absolute autocracy in the long run. The October Manifesto accomplished its major goal: mass
protests began to decline, and by January 1906, public order was restored. In response to the
announcement, the opposition split into two major camps: the liberals were satisfied with the promises
made by the tsar, while the radicals, including the vast majority of social democrats, rejected the proposals,
and demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly. As a consequence of the split, those forces that
continued to protest were easily suppressed by the regime: by the end of the year, the members of the
Petersburg worker assembly (Soviet) were arrested, and the uprisings in Moscow were violently broken up.

The actual Russian ‘constitution’ – the new “Fundamental Laws” of April 1906 – was enacted on the
basis of the October Manifesto.333 The first state Duma as the newly established Russian parliament was
convened for the first time one day after the constitution went into effect. Overall, during the ‘years of
freedom’, the Duma would be elected twice. In both instances, it was dissolved by the tsar, when the
representatives refused to support prime minister Stolypin’s plans for land reform. Instead of the
constitutionally prescribed five years, the first Duma survived for 73 days. The second Duma was in

333 See Russia (1906)
session for three months, from February to May 1907. One of the major goals of the 1905 revolutionary movement was to curtail the privileges of the aristocracy through a fair redistribution of land. The regime’s designs for land reform did not even come close to satisfying the demands of even the moderate liberals.

*The restoration of lowest inclusion after June 1907*

The provisional nature of the new constitution, and the continuing desire of the tsar to rule as an autocrat without interference from society became apparent after the dissolution of the Second Duma. Some authors refer to the changes in electoral laws enacted by prime minister Stolypin and tsar Nicholas II in June 1907 as a “coup” and a breach of the constitution. The implemented measures further decreased the representation of workers, peasants, and national minorities in the Duma, by a factor of 0.5. They benefited the nobility, whose representation was increased by a factor of 1.5, and gave the minister of the interior the right to manipulate electoral districts. All this being said, the actions of Stolypin hardly qualify as a coup. True, they were in violation of the electoral regulations codified through the Fundamental Laws. But at the same time, even in the new constitution of 1906, all authority continued to flow explicitly from the divinely sanctioned autocrat. The ‘constitution’ contained a clause that gave the tsar the right to abolish the Duma and declare the constitution invalid (cf. Wood 2003). Accordingly, the concessions made by the tsar were his to make, but also his to revoke. Rather than understanding the events of June 1907 as a coup, they should be regarded as an indication for the fact that the autocracy had never been truly willing to make lasting concessions to society. It revealed the October Manifesto and the Fundamental Laws of 1906 as what Max Weber (1907) had already called them very soon after they were enacted: a “Scheinkonstitution” (façade constitution).

The third and the fourth Duma, both of which were elected under the new rules, sat through their entire five years. They didn’t have to be resolved, because the majorities produced by the adjusted electoral procedures were always dominated by tsarist loyalists and other conservative forces. The electoral reforms of June 1907, however, only mark the first step into a new era, which lasted until the February revolution of 1917. The intensification of press censorship and repression of political activities after 1907, in combination with the initial electoral reforms, effectively restored the extent of labor inclusion from low to the earlier level of lowest inclusion. But other than in the time period before 1905, lowest inclusion from 1907 to 1917 was accomplished despite the existence of a constitution. From 1907 to 1917, Russia thus returned to lowest inclusion of labor after its brief constitutional experiment. But the constitution itself,

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334 Kochan (1966) is one of these authors. For a description of the controversy see Szeftel (1976).
335 See Pipes (1990). See also Goldstein (1983, 5)
although disregarded, was never abandoned.\textsuperscript{336} During this time period, labor exclusion occurred through simple legislation, political maneuvering, and through the manufacturing of loyalist majorities in the Duma. Before 1905, the presence of labor exclusion was even more apparent because of the complete lack of a constitutional foundation, but the result – lowest inclusion both before 1905 and after 1907 – was the same.

Within the general context of lowest inclusion after June 1907, two specific time periods can be distinguished before the overthrow of tsarism through the 1917 February revolution. In a sense, the previous gradual abandonment of low inclusion that occurred already during the ‘years of freedom’ continued further toward more and more repression, even after the threshold of lowest inclusion had been passed again after June 1907. Initially, along with the more restrictive electoral laws and the factual abandonment of what little had been gained in the domain of political liberties, a massive clampdown on labor and union activities occurred throughout the year 1907. From 1908 to 1911, a policy of very limited toleration was practiced by the autocracy vis-à-vis the unions and other forms of labor associations that had spilled over from the earlier period of low inclusion. The limited toleration of these activities provided a number of loopholes for social democrats that used tolerated ‘legal’ associations for the pursuit of ‘illegal’ political goals. The eventual abandonment of this very limited policy of toleration only occurred toward the end of the year 1911, a development that has been discussed extensively by Swain (1983).

\textit{The nature of labor inclusion across its six component dimensions in between 1905 and 1917}

The preceding paragraphs outline the political and social developments underpinning the adjustments of labor inclusion that occurred as a result of the constitutional experiment triggered by the 1905 revolution and the Stolypin counter reaction of 1907, respectively. In the following paragraphs, I am going to discuss how exactly the according institutional and behavioral changes manifested themselves in both time periods, along the six constituent dimensions of labor inclusion outlined before (see table 18).

First, the introduction of the Fundamental laws provided the opportunity for at least limited \textit{responsible government} to occur. The publicly elected lower house of the Russian parliament (Duma) had the right of interpellation, but its vote was not required to elect the Council of ministers (cabinet) and its chairman (prime minister) into office. Both these appointments remained the exclusive prerogative of the tsar.\textsuperscript{337} The Duma’s support was required for most laws and about 60 % of the budget. But as the lower

\textsuperscript{336} Rogger (1983) argues that the autocracy’s concern for international ‘respectability’ was the main reason for not completely abolishing the constitution. I believe that another plausible explanation would be the interest of the autocracy to be able to refer to the existence of constitutional guarantees in its political struggles with the liberals and the socialists.

\textsuperscript{337} Riasanovsky (2000) notes that for the first Executive under the new constitution, Sergei Witte as the chairman of ministers was given the liberty to select ministers by himself. But this is not an indication for responsible government, because support from the Duma was not required.
house of parliament, it had to share its limited authority with an upper house that was not accountable to the public. In between 1906 and 1910, half of the members of the State Council were nominated by the Tsar, and the other half were elected by the upper strata of Russian society, the clergy, the local zemstvo administration, and the universities. After 1910, all members of the State Council were appointed by the tsar. Hence, even formally, responsible government was severely limited, through the undue influence of an unaccountable upper house, the exclusion of important policy areas and the missing influence of parliament on executive appointments.

If the executive and the autocrat had respected the limited prerogatives of the Duma in between 1905 and 1907, low inclusion on the dimension of responsible government would have been possible. We have previously argued that lowest inclusion in this domain occurs, when there is no popularly elected parliament at all, when it acts exclusively as an advisory body, or when it is effectively ignored by the executive. In Russia during the ‘years of freedom’, the parliament had formal legislative authority, despite the existing limitations. But the executive did not respect the prerogatives of the legislature: both Dumas elected in between 1905 and 1907 were dissolved very shortly after their inauguration. Therefore, responsible government continued to be at the lowest level, even during the ‘days of freedom’. This makes Russia from 1905 to 1907 the only example of an overall low inclusion case, where formal provisions for responsible government are effectively nullified. After the Stolypin counter reaction of June 1907, the absence of responsible government became even more apparent. It was precisely the desire of the autocracy to govern without interference from the Duma that motivated Stolypin’s move in the first place. As a consequence, the executive branch continued to ignore the legislature entirely, and could be sure that it would not interfere, because of the loyalist majorities that the new electoral regulations produced.

Second, the dimension of enfranchisement was at the core of the transition from the 1905-1907 ‘years of freedom’ to the following restoration of lowest labor inclusion. The initial electoral laws enacted on December 11 of 2005 enfranchised the vast majority of the male population for the first two duma elections. The ‘right to vote’ as the first element of enfranchisement was thus raised to the highest level. However, certain limitations that were imposed on the ‘effectiveness of the workers’ vote’ as the second element of enfranchisement reduced the level of inclusion on this dimension to low. Both elections were governed by a curia based voting system that skewed the results to the disadvantage of peasants, and most significantly, industrial workers. Rogger (1983) calculates that the vote of one landowner was equal to that of 3.5 townsmen, 15 peasants, and 45 workers. Moreover, after the first Duma failed to produce a majority
to the liking of the nomenclatura, significant pressure was exercised on voters during the second election in many localities.\footnote{Swain (1983) and Rogger (1983) observe various forms of how pressure was exercised practically, through intimidation of voters by public officials, direct administrative interference, but also through state subsidies for newspapers of the right. These measures were practiced in a comparatively limited fashion during the first Duma, to an already larger extent for the second election, and then in a much more encompassing fashion for the elections to the third and fourth state duma.}

While these measures contributed to significantly impairing the effectiveness of the vote, a consideration of both the ‘right to vote’ and the ‘effectiveness of the vote’ combined leads to the conclusion that the level of worker enfranchisement was raised to low inclusion from 1905 to 1907. After the changes to the electoral procedures in June 1907, however, the effects of an even more restrictive curia system as well as government influence on voters became so extensive that the earlier limited enfranchisement was effectively restored to a level of lowest inclusion. First, as a result of the reduction of electors for the curias of workers and peasants, Rogger (1983) observes that for the third and fourth Dumas, one percent of the population now chose almost two thirds of the Duma representatives. Second, as noted above, the previously limited forms of administrative interference for the first two Duma elections were extended into a much more encompassing system of influencing electoral outcomes.

Third, references to political liberties were part of the 1905 October Manifesto and the April 1906 Fundamental Laws. This represented a novelty, compared to the complete absence of any such codified reference beforehand. Overall, political liberties for labor were elevated from lowest to low inclusion in 1905, while after 1907, the earlier status of lowest inclusion was restored again. A low level of inclusion from 1905 to 1907 represents progress for labor compared to the earlier period of time, but it also indicates that political liberties remained precarious even during the so-called ‘days of freedom’.

First of all, the constitution never formally guaranteed these liberties. They were explicitly subordinated to simple laws and the primary legislative authority of the tsar. More specifically, in terms of political organization, the right to form political parties was never formally guaranteed, not even between 1905 and 1907, but during the ‘years of freedom’, the activities of both socialist and liberal parties were more widely tolerated. The formation of trade unions was made legal in March 1906, but bound to very strict limitations: unions were only allowed to advocate narrowly defined economic goals, they were not allowed to get organized above the local level or to form federations, they were under the close supervision of the police, and eventually, unions were explicitly barred from cooperating with the social democrats (cf. Swain 1983). In terms of the freedom of expression, prior press censorship as the most restrictive form of control was abandoned in 1905, but the repression of free speech continued even during this time period (cf. Goldstein 1983).
Overall, the lack of formal guarantees even during the ‘years of freedom’ prevented effective political liberties. They remained precarious, but the significant variation, at times confusion, of local authorities, in terms of how to interpret the October Manifesto and the new Fundamental Laws, as well as the introduction of a limited right to form unions and the abolition of prior press censorship created windows of opportunity for political expression that had not existed before 1905. Following on the end of the semi-constitutional experiment in June 1907, much of the earlier confusion was clarified in favor of an illiberal interpretation.

The gradual easing of press censorship from 1905 to 1907 as a result of the abolition of pre-publication control in 1905 was followed by renewed efforts at the severe prosecution of undesirable material after 1907. Political parties continued to be outlawed at all times, but in this respect, too, an illiberal interpretation of the existing regulations was on the rise again after 1907 (cf. Riasanovsky 2000). The limited right to form unions was never formally abandoned after 1907, but in the context of a renewed struggle against ‘revolutionary’ tendencies, unions suspected of ‘illegal’ activities were prosecuted as viciously as the political activists (cf. Swain 1983).

Rogger (1983) recounts the records of the Petersburg Metal Workers’ Union regarding the immediate closure of trade unions by the authorities after the June 1907 reaction: 159 unions were closed down in 1907, 101 in 1908, 96 in 1909, and 88 in 1910. During the entire time period from 1907 to 1912, 604 unions were refused legal registration. Membership levels in the remaining unions decreased drastically after the restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907, as a direct consequence of the abandonment of the limited political liberties that existed during the ‘years of freedom’. The fate of the unions is indicative for the restoration of lowest inclusion in the domain of political liberties, but it also provides evidence for the increasingly repressive behavior of the state as the first of the behavioral dimensions of inclusion.

Fourth, with respect to the behavior of the state executive, the time period from 1905 to 1907 represented the only one of the stages investigated here, where the state systematically eased the extent and scope of labor repression. Under the impression of the 1905 revolution, and in the context of the constitutional experiment, an overall tendency of greater toleration occurred, at least vis-à-vis those factions of the opposition that were not perceived as terrorists. Episodes of violence, for instance those during the December 1905 Moscow uprising, happened as well from 1905 to 1907. And periods of greater toleration can also be observed at other points in time, for instance in 1904 toward the Zemstvo movement, or in a very limited fashion toward labor activists from 1908 to 1911. But in these cases, the easing of repression was the result of political necessity or the lack of state capacity, while from 1905 to 1907 it was the expression of an at least temporary explicit agenda at increased political inclusion of labor. The behavior of the state executive thus reached a low level of inclusion during this time period, before returning to the policy of permanent repression after 1907. The re-establishment of special courts after June
1907 by Stolypin is the most apparent illustration of the new reactionary course of the autocracy (cf. Riasanovsky 2000).

Eventually, in terms of the attempts of ‘competing parties’ to include labor, no significant changes occurred during the 1905 or the 1907 transition. We have already seen that the cooperation between the social democrats and the liberals in the events leading to the 1905 revolution represented an effort of the socialists to utilize the Zemstvos for their own purposes, but not an attempt at inclusive behavior by the liberals. In between 1905 and 1907, liberals and socialists strongly disagreed over how to proceed, and whether to embrace the manifesto or to reject it as worthless. But the liberals made no attempts to appeal to a worker constituency or to include the rank and file of the emerging union movement into their organizations. Moreover, as outlined above, the institutional limits imposed on political activity, prevented any effective attempt at inclusive behavior toward labor before 1905 and after 1907.

Considering these six constituent dimensions of labor inclusion, it becomes apparent that Russia, for the brief time period from October 1905 to June 1907, at least temporarily crossed the threshold of low inclusion. Lowest inclusion, which had been solidly entrenched for the time period from 1861 to 1905, was restored equally solidly after June 1907. I argued previously that low inclusion requires the opening of access to the political arena through at least one institutional channel; the defining feature of lowest inclusion, on the other hand, is the absence of any, even the most limited, form of inclusion on all constituent dimensions. Low inclusion in Russia from 1905 to 1907 was unique, compared to those cases, where low inclusion was the regular and overall pattern of labor inclusion, for the following major reasons. First of all, low inclusion in Russia was the exception to a ‘normal’ pattern of complete exclusion from the political arena. A general pattern of low inclusion entails both the implicit hopes for further liberalization and the precariousness of the existing guarantees as the standard operating practice. Secondly, if anything, low inclusion in Russia from 1905 to 1907 was even more precarious than in all other cases; the swift end to the constitutional experiment after June 1907 serves as evidence for this point. And thirdly, Russia was the only case, where low inclusion occurred without noticeable respect for even a limited practice of responsible government (see table 18). This particular feature of the Russian case only adds to the precariousness of the inclusive institutions established after October 1905.

339 cf. Schwarz (1967), who also describes in much detail the diverging positions of the Bolsheviki and Mensheviki toward the Zemstvos.
Labor elites and the supply of varying models of labor politics in response to lowest inclusion

Even though low inclusion in Russia lasted for only two years, the temporary provision of limited access to the political arena from 1905 to 1907 and the following restoration of near complete exclusion had important implications for the prospects of the Russian labor movement, the fortunes of mass-based social democracy, and my argument about the interaction between labor inclusion and social democratic party formation. First of all, because of the brief time period of less than two years, during which low inclusion was in place, the ‘years of freedom’ do not change the overall assessment of Russia as a case of lowest inclusion, which was the norm for the remaining 32 years of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Overall, Russia has to be considered a case of lowest labor inclusion. Low inclusion in other cases emerged as the intentionally granted limited respect for labor’s economic and political activities. In the case of Russia, all periods studied here are characterized by the lack of any significant respect for, or toleration of labor. It was simply the inability of the state to completely suppress labor’s activities that triggered a brief more conciliatory period.

But secondly, even the brief and extremely limited opening of access for labor to the political arena significantly changed the fortunes of mass-based social democracy, at least until the reversal of the conciliatory reforms. After the emergence of an insurrectionist model of marxism in the Russian context of lowest inclusion before 1905, mass-based social democracy was on the rise from 1905 to 1907, and bolshevism declined. This is exactly the pattern of development predicted by the theory suggested here: once even limited access to the political arena is granted to labor, the likelihood of social democratic party formation increases and the rewards of insurrectionist alternatives decline. The ‘years of freedom’ allowed for the rise of an incipient mass-based social democratic party, but the reversal of the constitutional experiment is the key to explain its later demise.

Third, after the temporary rise of mass-based social democracy during the 1905 to 1907 period, the fortunes of bolshevism and other insurrectionist currents were on the rise again after the restoration of lowest inclusion beginning in June 1907. This occurred as the logical consequence of the calculations of labor elites and the demands of the worker constituency in response to the altered institutional environment. In the end, the earlier reforms that had given rise to an incipient mass-based and non-insurrectionist social democracy, favored the strengthening of insurrectionism after the initial concessions were revoked. Incipient mass mobilization had become possible and was practiced by both unions and the reinvigorated social democratic party in between October 1905 and June 1907. After the reaction beginning in June 1907

340 See Swain (1983) in his analysis of the effects of the 1905-1907 period on the fortunes of mass-based social democracy and union organization.
had made mobilization in the context of democratically structured organizations increasingly more difficult, inscriptionist models of labor politics were able to steer the already mobilized workers into their direction, for the lack of a better alternative.

The limited policy of toleration in between 1908 and 1911 guaranteed the survival of some open political activities in the context of the ‘legal’ and officially apolitical labor movement that had survived the clampdown after June 1907. During this time period, mass-based social democracy was already in decline, but bolshevism as the inscriptionist alternative still remained somewhat precarious, since even the extremely limited forms of toleration for labor associations practiced during this time period helped to sustain the hopes for the feasibility of a mass-based and democratically organized social democratic party. After 1911 and the most apparent restoration of lowest inclusion, however, insulationism eventually emerged as the most rewarding model of labor politics.

My general argument about the relation between labor and its environment can also be seen from a wider perspective, in the context of the debate about the possibility of evolutionary political development toward liberal democracy in Russia. An ‘optimistic’ point of view suggests that the 1917 revolution could have been avoided, and a gradual embrace of liberal institutions could have occurred, if the constitutional concessions of 1905 had not been revoked by 1907. The ‘pessimistic’ argument holds that the 1917 revolution was unavoidable as a consequence of explosive industrialization, peasant discontent, and earlier patterns of autocratic governance. A similar debate also exists for the potential of a gradual transition into liberal democracy in Germany, even though the Russian debate focuses more on the socio-economic pressures against liberalization. In the German case, the controversy revolves more around the specific institutional setup of the 1871 constitution of the Empire.

While I tend to agree with a perspective that does not see socio-economic pressures as inescapable, this debate is speculative and relatively insignificant for the argument pursued here. The incipient constitutionalism of 1905 did not evolve further after 1907. Instead, earlier limited constitutional concessions were revoked. As a result, inscriptionism emerged as the optimal model for labor’s presence in the political arena in between 1907 and 1917, while the restoration of lowest degrees of inclusion made mass-based social democracy a suboptimal choice. The reasons for why the bolsheviks were eventually successful in staging their revolution is beyond my explanatory focus. I am merely interested in accounting for the relative dominance of the bolshevik model of labor politics compared to the failure of mass-based social democracy.

This brief overview illustrates the shifting fortunes of mass-based non-inscriptionist social democracy and inscriptionist models of labor politics in response to the previously outlined environment.

341 See Szeftel (1976) for a summary of this debate
of labor inclusion in Russia. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I am going to elaborate on the response of labor elites to their environment of inclusion in more detail. I will discuss the most important models considered by labor elites, and their interaction with the existing environment of labor inclusion. This discussion is designed to illustrate the relative benefits and costs of these competing models, and as such, to provide the background for evaluating the relative optimality of these approaches in the context of the Russian environment of lowest inclusion. I am going to distinguish between four relevant models of labor politics that have emerged in Russia during labor’s formative stage in the political arena: first, the Gapon and Zubatov unions as a uniquely Russian version of moderate syndicalism; second, the evolutionary socialist party model that has flourished within the Russian social democratic workers’ party (RSDRP) toward the late 1890s and in between 1906 and 1911; third, the Menshevik faction of the RSDRP, which represents the quasi-revolutionary mass-based mainstream of European social democracy; and fourth, the bolsheviki, who emerged as a faction of the RSDRP and stood for an insurrectionist model of labor politics.

We are going to see that in response to the Russian context of lowest inclusion, the insurrectionist model of the bolsheviki was the optimal response by labor elites. I am also going to outline, how exactly bolshevism emerged as the dominant model of labor politics, compared to its competitors. Bolshevism entailed the most favorable cost-benefit ratio out of all the competing models of labor politics. The eventual dominance of bolshevism is therefore to be expected in an environment of lowest inclusion, and represents an entirely rational, indeed ‘optimal’ response to this environment. Moderate syndicalism, evolutionary social democracy and quasi-revolutionary social democracy failed to become institutionalized. Just as the relative dominance of bolshevism, their failure is to be expected in an environment of lowest inclusion. The political goals and organizational strategies suggested by the competitors of bolshevism were less suitable to a context of lowest inclusion. It is also to be expected on the basis of the theoretical framework suggested here that quasi-revolutionary social democracy comes closest to challenging bolshevism as the dominant model, since it is the approach that approaches bolshevism’s cost-benefit ratio more than all others in an environment of lowest inclusion.

This general argument can be further strengthened by subjecting the case of Russia to a more fine-grained over time analysis, along the lines noted above. In that context, we are going to trace the fortunes of different models of labor politics in response to a shifting external environment, along the lines noted above. I am going to start by discussing moderate syndicalism. The various manifestations of evolutionary social democracy will be treated in the second place, followed by an analysis of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. The investigation of the failure of these models of labor politics will be followed by an analysis of the emerging dominance of bolshevism in the fourth place.
The predictable failure of moderate syndicalist experiments

Moderate syndicalism has emerged as the dominant model of labor politics from labor’s formative stage in the United States, where it represented the optimal response to an environment of highest inclusion. It is based on the organization of workers exclusively around the workplace and the pursuit of predominantly economic goals. It is not geared at establishing a permanent presence in the political arena. Its political interventions are selective and occur primarily through the exercise of political pressure on the entrenched elites, along with the integration of workers into the existing political system. Because of these features, moderate syndicalism is, quite naturally, a prevalent phenomenon in the most liberal regimes of the late 19th and early 20th century. Only on the background of a more far reaching extent of labor inclusion can moderate syndicalism emerge as a promising model of labor politics. And it was exclusively in the United States as the only case of highest inclusion, where moderate syndicalism has emerged as the optimal model of labor’s presence in the political arena.

The ‘Zubatov police unions’ are not typically referred to as moderate syndicalist organizations, since they emerged under the direct sponsorship of the Russian state in the most illiberal of polities at the time. In that respect, they bear an important similarity to later authoritarian corporatist forms of labor inclusion. But they share some crucial characteristics with moderate syndicalism, when it comes to the relationship between the state and its entrenched elites on the one hand and the role of labor organizations on the other. Typical moderate syndicalist organizations in liberal regimes are designed to ‘integrate’ workers into a permeable political system that grants them the freedom to organize and advance their demands. In illiberal regimes, such as Russia, moderate syndicalism was geared at ‘integration’, too, but in this case into a kind of political system that disregarded or repressed the interests of workers. As a result, the attempts to establish moderate syndicalist organizations in Russia could only have been successful, if the defining features of the Russian political system itself had changed from a “traditional dictatorship”, as Luebbert (1987) would say, to “authoritarian corporatism”. It is in the nature of lowest inclusion as a specific version of a “traditional dictatorship” to not respond effectively to the demands of organized labor. If moderate syndicalism had succeeded, it would have been an indicator for a change in the nature of labor inclusion. The failure of the Zubatov police unions as a result of continuously lowest inclusion is therefore another piece of evidence for the causal connection between degrees of inclusion and the response of labor elites.

The initiative for the so-called police unions came from within the Russian nomenclatura. After the support of the state for this labor integration experiment had ended, moderate syndicalism would never be appropriated by labor elites as a relevant model of their own. It had become apparent that in the unchanging context of lowest inclusion, moderate syndicalism was the least rewarding of all models of labor politics. The costs of moderate syndicalism are lower than those of all other alternative models: for as long as the
police unions did not overstep very limited boundaries, they were tolerated by the state. But the potential benefits of moderate syndicalism in an environment of lowest inclusion – as a result of the eventually unresponsive nature of the nomenclatura – are so low that a cost-benefit evaluation entails only negligible rewards (see table 5 and figure 5).

The police unions were named after Sergei Zubatov, head of the Moscow police, and representative of the ‘paternalist’ faction in the nomenclatura. He saw them as a channel for allowing workers to express their grievances, without endangering the autocratic political framework. More than that, he understood the inclusion of labor along these lines as a means to guarantee the autocracy’s survival. He founded the first union of this kind in the early 1900s. Rogger (1983) describes in more detail, how his initiative spread to a number of other Russian cities throughout the following years. The Zubatov unions offered lectures and other educational activities, but they also engaged in direct interventions in the economic and the political domain. Union leaders would demand concessions on behalf of industrial workers directly from employers. But on top of that, the unions also staged marches and protests that were directed toward the autocracy.

Moderate syndicalists in liberal political systems accept the existence of an established party system and attempt to influence the political decisions of entrenched elites to their advantage. The Zubatov variant of moderate syndicalism proceeded along the same lines vis-à-vis the autocracy in an illiberal regime. At a march staged by Zubatov and his collaborators in February 1902, which mobilized about 50000 workers, the participants expressed their support for the tsar. Referring to themselves as loyal subjects of the Empire, their demonstration was designed as an expression of their trust in the autocrat and his determination to take care of labor’s concerns.

For a few years, his efforts were reluctantly supported by the autocracy, and the police unions were tolerated. But eventually, the previously mentioned ‘modernizer’ faction within the nomenclatura prevailed over the ‘paternalists’. Sergei Witte and the other modernizers believed that the goal of successful industrial expansion would be impeded by granting workers even the most limited opportunities for self-organization. The final reason triggering the termination of the police union experiments in July 1903 was the growing independence of the Zubatov unions from the state and their original creator. This became evident during the general strike in Odessa in the summer of 1903, which was actively supported by the local police union. As a result, the state revoked its earlier concession to allow for this limited form of labor organization, and Zubatov was dismissed from his office.

The termination of the police union experiment in 1903 also marks the end of the paternalists’ hope to change the nature of the autocracy into what Rogger (1983) refers to as a ‘paternalistic monarchy’. The decision of the autocracy to abolish the police unions is an indicator for its inability to make even the most minimal concessions to the emerging labor movement. The reaffirmation of lowest inclusion that is implicit
in the abolition of the police unions thus marks the definite end to what could have become one of the first systematic state incorporation strategies toward labor.\footnote{342 See also the discussion of this theme in the context of the German case study.}

A number of police unions founded in between 1901 and 1903 continued to exist for a few more years, even after their formal abolition in July 1903. The most influential one of them was the “Assembly of Russian factory workers of St. Petersburg”, founded and led by the priest Gapon. The violent suppression of the Gaponites’ appeal to the tsar in a January 1905 mass demonstration, aka “Bloody Sunday”, became the ultimate trigger for the ensuing revolutionary turmoil, and for turning the liberal demands into a mass phenomenon. Just as the Zubatov unions, the Gapon organization understood itself as an association of workers, who are “faithful subjects” of the autocracy.

Pipes (1990) argues that in spite of the same roots, Gaponites and Zubatov unions exposed some important differences. The most important one of them was the fact that the Gapon organization embraced key elements of the liberal agenda, as evidenced by its petition to the tsar worded for the occasion of the January demonstration that turned into “Bloody Sunday”: the assembly demanded the introduction of universal suffrage, responsible government, and civil liberties, in addition to economic policies on behalf of its worker constituency. The Gaponites and their leader thus formally embraced an agenda that was abhorred by the autocracy. The assembly was also prepared to force these concessions through a violent struggle, if the tsar was not willing to listen to his “faithful subjects”. Originating initially as another manifestation of ‘moderate syndicalism’, the Gapon organization thus evolved into a pressure group for fundamental political reforms, when its leaders realized that change might not occur from within the autocratic regime.

After “Bloody Sunday” of January 1905, labor elites abandoned their last hopes that the autocracy might be willing to embrace the gradual inclusion of labor and its demands through some form of ‘paternalistic monarchy’, as a prototype of state incorporation. It becomes even more apparent, therefore, that ‘moderate syndicalism’ in the context of lowest inclusion is bound to fail, if the regime is not willing to respond to the demands of labor. The possibility of a state incorporation path vis-à-vis labor ended in January 1905. After 1907, and even under the semi-constitutional experiment from 1905 to 1907, neither the state nor labor elites pursued any more attempts at establishing a uniquely Russian form of ‘moderate syndicalism’.

This development illustrates the causal connection between degrees of inclusion and the response of labor elites. In an environment of lowest inclusion, moderate syndicalism is not feasible. A repressive and unresponsive regime makes open organization and selective interventions geared directly at the regime difficult to impossible. There are lower costs associated with the formation of moderate syndicalist
organizations: confessions to act within the boundaries of the entrenched political system makes prosecution appear less likely, and fewer organizational resources are necessary for an open, exclusively economic organization, especially under direct state sponsorship. However, because the potential benefits of this model of labor politics are negligible in an environment of lowest inclusion, moderate syndicalism is the least rewarding of all the different models, despite lowest costs. It is therefore to be expected that after the brief experiments in the early 1900s, ‘moderate syndicalism’ would vanish from the stage of Russian labor politics as a viable model. Because of the negligible rewards of moderate syndicalism in an environment of lowest inclusion, the decision of labor elites to forego further attempts at establishing moderate syndicalist organizations is perfectly rational.

The failure of mass-based social democracy in Russia

Just like moderate syndicalism, mass-based, non-insurrectionist social democracy in Russia failed, because benefit-cost evaluations of such models entailed fewer rewards, compared to their insurrectionist competitors. Bolshevism as an insurrectionist model of labor politics was better suited to the Russian environment of lowest inclusion. On this background, social democracy in the way in which I employ the term here, was only a suboptimal alternative. As it would be predicted by this theoretical framework, bolshevism was successfully institutionalized throughout the most crucial part of labor’s formative stage in the first two decades of the 20th century. The various non-insurrectionist social democratic models, on the other hand, failed to accomplish systemness and social integration as two crucial prerequisites of successful party formation.

This relative dominance of bolshevism and the failure of social democracy are directly causally related to the nature of labor inclusion in Russia, through the following causal mechanisms. First of all, the ‘window of opportunity’ for the institutionalization of social democracy is extremely small in a context of lowest inclusion. As a consequence of permanent repression, mass based organizations exist under the constant threat of dissolution and persecution. The same applies to insurrectionist models, but the organizational strategy of bolshevism is better suited for such an environment. A mass-based and democratically structured party organization is much more prone to be detected and seriously hampered in its organizational efforts than the elitist and clandestine organization of professional revolutionaries established by the Bolsheviks.

Second, after the experiences with the failure of mass-based social democracy and the overall unwavering authoritarianism of the autocracy ever since the 1890s, the majority of the rank and file of Russian labor elites gradually transferred their allegiances to insurrectionist approaches. Bolshevism became the dominant model of labor politics, because the majority of labor elites eventually regarded it as
superior, compared to the attempts at social democratic party formation. The support for insurrectionism altogether was even greater, if one also takes into account those labor activists that supported the populist-anarchist Socialist Revolutionaries. Given the existence of lowest inclusion, this increasing support for insurrectionism is a perfectly rational, indeed optimal, response to the existing environment of inclusion.

Third, the decision making process at the level of labor elites, both the leaders and the rank and file of the Russian labor movement, was accompanied by an equivalent development at the mass level. Ever since the end of the constitutional experiment in 1907, bolshevism gradually received more support from the worker constituency at large. It thus became a mass movement, although the decision making center of the bolsheviki was carefully shielded from mass participation.

Menshevism as the Russian version of quasi-revolutionary social democracy has emerged as the most important and influential model of mass-based social democracy in Russia, but it was not the only one. During the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, both quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary types of social democracy have been suggested. It is important to keep in mind that both these approaches as well as the insurrectionist bolshevism emerged from within Russia’s social democratic party, formally established in 1898. And all of them can trace their roots to the first organizational manifestation of social democracy through the formation of the Liberation of Labor group in 1883. Despite the party split of 1902, officially separate Bolshevik and Menshevik organizations were only established in 1912. For the longest time during the formative stage of Russian labor politics, the respective battles between quasi-revolutionary, evolutionary, and insurrectionist models of labor politics therefore took place as factional conflicts within the same party organization, rather than isolated attempts of different models to establish themselves through separate organizations.

The development of these competing models of labor politics is therefore not only closely related to the evolution of labor inclusion as the external environment. They are also inextricably linked to one another. This section is devoted to look at the first part of the story – the failure of mass-based social democracy. The flipside of this phenomenon – the relative dominance of bolshevism – will be discussed in the following section. In the remainder of this current section, I am going to begin by outlining the emergence of Russian marxism and social democracy as the underpinning for the following variety of different models of labor politics. Secondly, I will analyze the failure of evolutionary social democratic models on two historical occasions: the related movements of economism and revisionism in the late 1890s and early 1900s, and the so-called liquidationism after 1905. In the third place, the failure of quasi-revolutionary social democracy will be discussed. Before the party split of 1902 and the emergence of bolshevism, quasi-revolutionary social democracy existed as an orthodox counter movement against evolutionary socialist party models, encompassing the later Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. After 1902, the banner of non-insurrectionist mass-based social democracy was carried on by the Menshevik faction.
The alienation of intellectuals from the state and the rest of society is a well documented phenomenon in Russian history (cf. Haimson 1955). As a result, Russia has been the birthplace for a great variety of revolutionary and insurrectionist ideologies ever since the beginning of the 19th century. Before marxism arrived in Russia from the outside, beginning in the 1880s, populism as a domestic Russian variant of revolutionary politics had already taken root. It manifested itself as an organization through the Narodnaya Volya (Popular Will). The activities of the group encompassed general education of the peasantry, political propaganda, as well as assassinations of high-ranking members of the nomenclatura and other terrorist acts. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the earlier position of populism as the dominant current of radical thought was gradually replaced by the marxism that was imported from the West just as industrialization itself had been earlier on.

Populism and marxism were both revolutionary ideologies, but they exposed fundamentally different approaches. First of all, while the orthodox ‘Western’ marxism was deterministic, populism emphasized voluntarism. The marxism of the Second International that gave rise to the quasi-revolutionary type of mass-based social democracy expected a successful revolution to be the necessary consequence of economic development. The working-class and its leaders had the historical obligation to “organize themselves for the revolution”, as Kautsky (1909) put it, but they did not need to “organize the revolution”. Populism on the other hand was voluntarist: A revolution is by no means predetermined by any “laws of history”, it depends on nothing but the specific acts of the subjects of history.

Second, populism was anti-industrialist, while marxism embraced economic development. The populist movement saw itself as the defender of the Russian village community and the interests of the peasantry as well as the new group of peasants engaged in industrial labor. Their revolutionary zeal was directed against the feudal lords, the autocracy, the industrialists, and the socio-economic modernization policies from above. Marxism on the other hand regarded the rise of the bourgeoisie and industrialization as a historical stage that is necessary for enabling socialism. As a consequence, populism thought of the peasantry as the historical subject that would carry out their hopes for a revolution, while marxism saw the working-class in that role. These specific differences identify populism as a voluntarist, insurrectionist and anti-industrialist ideology. The orthodox marxism that dominated the Second International as well as the early Russian social democrats, on the other hand, stood for a deterministic quasi-revolutionary approach that regarded industrialization as inevitable (see table 2).

For as along as marxism contended with the older populist tradition, throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the social democratic family remained unified. Social democracy during this time period exposed the same
basic characteristics as the quasi-revolutionary marxism of the Second International. Its vision for Russia was the formation of a mass-based social democratic party that had so successfully been formed by the German SPD. The backwardness of Russian development made an important modification to the German model necessary, however. Geogiy Plekhanov, the father of Russian marxism, realized that a revolutionary socialist transformation through a mass-based social democratic party is only possible in the context of a liberal political system, where the permanent and democratic organization of workers is feasible. Russia, however, as a result of its socio-economic and political backwardness, lacked this prerequisite. Moreover, due to its weak bourgeoisie, the Russian marxists of the late 19th century believed that Russia had only little hope of seeing a liberal revolution any time soon. Plekhanov therefore emphasized the notion of a revolution in two stages: a bourgeois revolution that would bring about political liberties and democratic institutions, and a socialist revolution that would then transform a capitalist market economy into socialism.

Out of these two stages, the second one was crucial for Russian social democracy, according to Plekhanov: “Economic liberation is our great end, to which every political movement is a subordinate means.” At the same time, however, due to the peculiar nature of Russia as a case, where no successful liberal revolution had yet occurred, social democracy needed to support the bourgeoisie in its efforts to bring about a political revolution. This created a tactical problem for social democracy that the early Russian marxists thought of as a uniquely Russian phenomenon: they needed to struggle with the bourgeoisie for economic liberation and cooperate with them in their common cause for political freedom.

Plekhanov as well as his associate Pavel Axelrod and the other early Russian marxists neglected to see that social democracy faced a similar political struggle in many Western European countries as well: all those cases that were characterized by low inclusion (see table 9) lacked many of the crucial elements of a truly liberal polity, and as a consequence of that, mass-based party organizations were precarious. But despite that specific oversight, the core of their argument was quite correct: Russian social democracy faced particular difficulties in bringing about a socialist transformation through mass-based social democracy, because the absence of liberal institutions was particularly pronounced here: besides Japan, it was the only case at the time, where labor was completely excluded from access to the political arena, and confronted with a lowest degree of inclusion. In all the low inclusion cases, access to the political arena was precarious, and so was the foundation and survival of mass-based parties. But the complete absence of any access to the political arena in Russia, i.e. the existence of lowest inclusion, made the establishment of mass-based social democracy even more difficult.

However, despite this strategical dilemma, the original Russian marxism of the 1880s and 1890s made every effort to stay close to the original imported from the West. Haimson (1955) argues that Plekhanov as the originator of Russian marxism was indeed more orthodox and deterministic than the other marxists of the Second International and even Kautsky himself. In terms of party organization, Russian social
democrats realized that they would have to adapt the Western party model to the unique nature of the Russian environment of ‘lowest inclusion’. But despite this minor qualification, the desire to follow the path of history laid out by the original marxist prophets, made the Russian social democrats embrace the quasi-revolutionary mass-based party model that was so successfully practiced by the German SPD. As Keep (1963, 17) said: “For Axelrod, German Social Democracy always remained the ideal. He dreamed of building up in Russia a broad party of the working class which would one day be powerful enough to challenge the whole might of the autocracy.”

Wildman (1967) argues that marxism gained dominance over populism in the Russian intelligentsia after the famine of 1891. He describes, how many of the young intellectuals at the time came to realize that industrialization was inevitable. They began to regard the anti-industrialist impulse of the populists as futile, romantic, and misguided. Marxism on the other hand promised scientific truth, the inevitability of revolution, as well as the prospect of joining a great pan-European movement: “The isolation of the intelligentsia would be overcome, for their comrades in the revolutionary struggle would be the proletariat, not only of Russia, but of all nationalities. Populist exclusivism and provincialism would be left far behind.” (Wildman 1967, 18)

The translation of marxism to the specific Russian environment of political exclusion and socio-economic backwardness occurred in the context of the “Liberation of Labor” group, which was founded by exiled intellectuals, among them Plekhanov and Axelrod, in 1883. Their group was tiny, but it nonetheless represented the first organizational manifestation of Russian social democracy (see table 11). Moreover, its influence was not limited to the formulation of a Russian variant of marxism. The group attempted to initiate social democratic organizations in Russia, and to provide intellectual and strategical guidance for the incipient movement. The first local social democratic organizations were founded in the context of the general rise of labor unrest in the 1890s. The movement was most successful in the Western provinces of the Russian empire, in Poland, Belarus, and the Baltics, while it remained embryonic in the ethnically Russian parts of the country.

At this early stage, the social democrats had no formal nationwide organization, and their activities revolved around a “general education” approach. Despite the aspiration of mass-based social democratic party formation, the breakthrough to a more serious pursuit of that goal only occurred in the mid 1890s. This time is marked by a strategic reorientation of social democratic activities that finally made an attempt to turn the idea of a true social democratic party into reality. The new strategy had already been practically implemented in a number of localities, especially in the Western provinces. But the formal codification of the new increasingly popular practice only occurred in 1894, through the publication of the pamphlet “On Agitation” by Alexander Kremer and Martov, another member of the Liberation of Labor group. Their basic message was that social democracy should move beyond the earlier strategy that focused exclusively
on raising workers’ consciousness through general and socialist education in small underground circles. They suggested that social democracy should employ propaganda and agitation to build a party from the bottom up and to steer its members into the realm of political action.343

Wildman (1967) identified “On Agitation” as the central document for the strategical approach of social democracy during this time period. But at the end of the day, the pamphlet did not outline a new set of ideas: it only translated the already existing desire to establish a politically involved mass-based party from a vague idea into a more tangible political strategy. Many activists initially resisted the abandonment of the earlier “general education” strategy. Frankel (1969) observes that the new agitation approach was attacked from two directions: by those that advocated spontaneity of the working-class, and others that believed general education to be necessary to raise the level of political consciousness of Russian workers before sending them into political action. As a result, the transition to the “new” strategy was not a smooth one, but it was ultimately successful, as Wildman (1967, 57) concludes: “Although the scattered social democratic groups introduced agitation at various times, under various influences, and with varying success, the over-all pattern of development was strikingly uniform.”

These developments – the initial formulation of Russian marxism, the goal to establish a mass-based party, the translation of that idea into a tangible strategy through “On Agitation” – provide the background for the emergence of different party models ever since the late 1890s. Before that point in time, Russian social democracy had no organizing center, apart from the Liberation of Labor group, whose efforts were hampered by its location in exile. The foundation, in 1898, of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) in Minsk, represented the first attempt to establish social democracy as a nationwide organization. The party was immediately crushed by the authorities, and all of the nine delegates, except for one, were arrested. But with the establishment of an initial center of gravity, an eclectic variety of specific organizational models of labor politics would emerge, and their factional battles would take place within the RSDRP.

Those models that continued in the earlier mass-based social democratic tradition were imported from the West: first, quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which after the party split in 1902 was inherited by the Menshevik faction; as well as second, the variety of evolutionary social democratic models that manifested themselves as economism and revisionism from the late 1890s to the early 1900s and as liquidationism after 1905. Russian social democracy before 1902 emulated the example of the SPD, as outlined above, and menshevism would continue to look westward to its comrades in Germany and the Second International afterwards. Evolutionary social democracy in Russia was inspired by the emergence

343 For the text of “On Agitation” see Kremer and Martov (1894)
of revisionist tendencies against the quasi-revolutionary mainstream in Germany and the formation of evolutionary socialist parties in Britain and elsewhere.

Marxism as an imported ideology did gain dominance over populism as a Russian tradition of insurrectionism. But none of the party models originating from it – quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary – succeeded in institutionalizing a mass-based social democratic party in Russia. The steps that were taken to adjust mass-based social democracy to the Russian environment, were not sufficient. The Russian context of lowest inclusion made imported party models that came from societies with low and higher labor inclusion only suboptimal choices. The one model of labor politics originating from the early social democratic movement, that was successfully institutionalized, bolshevism, really was an adaptation of marxism to the specifically Russian environment of labor inclusion. This was something its competitors were not able to accomplish.

In its process of adaptation, bolshevism was as much inspired by marxism as it was by the earlier populist traditions, which marxism had replaced in the 1890s. Other than the mainstream marxism, bolshevism was not deterministic; it was as voluntarist as the populists’ approach. Bolshevism also successfully exploited the contentiousness of the peasantry, which was regarded as the major revolutionary subject by populism, while all other models of labor politics continued to regard the working-class alone as the decisive actor in the process of revolutionary transformation. It remained different from the earlier populist tradition, and embraced the tenets of marxism in its support for industrial development and modernization. The superiority of a specifically Russian solution to the existing environment of lowest inclusion, and the dominance of insurrectionism, become even more apparent, if one also takes into account the renaissance of populism in the mid 1900s. The Socialist Revolutionaries, founded in 1903, continued the earlier populist tradition of appealing to the peasantry with an anti-industrialist and romanticized variant of insurrectionism. But especially toward the end of the ancien regime, they also received a significant amount of support from the urban working-class.

The failure of evolutionary social democracy

Suggestions to turn the RSDRP into an evolutionary social democratic party occurred during two distinct historical periods as serious alternatives to the competing quasi-revolutionary and insurrectionist factions. Neither the related trends of economism and “revisionism” in the late 1890s to early 1900s nor “liquidationism” after 1907 were capable of establishing a more permanent dominance even within the RSDRP. The lack of institutionalization of evolutionary socialist party models is therefore even more

344 Frankel (1969) makes a similar argument in a slightly different context.
apparent than the failure of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. The Mensheviks made some progress toward developing a coherent social integrative ideology for Russia, and also established an incipient mass base, both through the RSDRP, when they dominated it, and through separate Menshevik organizations. Evolutionary party models on the other hand neither came close to that level of mobilization, nor did they ever obtain a dominant position within the RSDRP for a significant period of time.

Evolutionary social democracy in Russia therefore lacked institutionalization on all three constituent dimensions of successful party formation: first, in terms of systemness, the overall failure of the RSDRP to accomplish a sufficient mass base also means the failure of its various evolutionary factions (see table 11). The existing party statistics (see table 14) allow for a differentiation between Menshevik and Bolshevik members, but they do not identify the economists, revisionists or liquidationists.\(^{345}\) Judging from the delegate votes at party congresses, however, the support of these factions was much smaller than that of its Menshevik and Bolshevik competitors (cf. Keep 1963)

*Social integration* through the establishment of a dominant ideological form represents the second prerequisite for successful party formation. The various manifestations of evolutionary social democracy had self-contained ideological models. But they never succeeded in implementing them as the dominant ideological form within the RSDRP or any other party organization. Third, the Mensheviks were directly involved in the 1917 February revolution and to some extent the 1905 revolutionary turmoil. They also had some, albeit very limited, electoral representation in the newly established Duma after 1905. The various manifestations of evolutionary social democracy never accomplished *external institutionalization* through either one of these channels.

In the Russian context of lowest inclusion, both quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary party models are inferior to insurrectionism in terms of their cost-benefit ratios. But when comparing these two variants of mass-based social democracy to one another, the evolutionary type is even less suited to an environment of lowest inclusion than the quasi-revolutionary type. Both models are associated with similar high costs: the efforts at organization building, the need for clandestine operations and secrecy, and the threat of being arrested and persecuted. In an environment of lowest inclusion, the evolutionary social democratic approach of translating the interests of the unions into the political arena, cooperating with other parties, and achieving a gradual reformist evolution to socialism through concrete legislation, is very unlikely to be successful. The potential benefits of this model are therefore small.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy on the other hand subordinates the unions to the political branch of the movement. It is nourished by hopes for the inevitability of a socialist transformation. This approach promises higher benefits in an environment of lowest inclusion, because it is more keenly aware

\(^{345}\) See data on party membership in Keep (1963). See also table 15.
of the limitations imposed by the lack of liberal institutions and the existing limits to organizing a politically conscious trade union movement that would direct a party into political action. Its revolutionary perspective also promises a greater potential appeal to a worker constituency that is subjected to permanent repression and exclusion. As a result, the benefit-cost ratios of both variants of mass-based social democracy are inferior to the relative rewards entailed in an insurrectionist approach, but an evolutionary party is even less suitable or promising than the quasi-revolutionary type. The more limited success of evolutionary social democratic models in influencing the party agenda and mobilizing the masses is therefore a logical consequence of the calculations of labor elites within the Russian environment of lowest inclusion.

The following analysis of evolutionary social democratic party models in the late 1890s and after 1905 will also reveal a particular feature of the political discourse within Russian social democracy: the obsession with questions of organization. We have seen before that evolutionary social democracy as a generic party model distinguishes itself by way of its evolutionary strategy to achieve socialism and its particular organizational relation to the mass of workers and the trade unions. The evolutionary socialist model regards the party as the representative of the broader labor movement within the political arena: in a manner of speaking, the party is sent into politics by the unions. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and also bolshevism, albeit to a much larger extent, see the unions and the broader labor movement as subordinates of the party, as much as the purely economic struggle is subordinated to the political struggle.

In the case of Russia, all three manifestations of evolutionary social democracy fit well into the general party typology (see table 2), both with respect to the suggested strategy and the relationship between party and labor movement. But the two most important evolutionary models, economism and liquidationism, emphasized above all the question of organization and their suggestion to establish the RSDRP as a party designed to translate the interests of the broader labor movement into the arena of politics, rather than acting as the undisputed leader of labor.

Economism and revisionism

We have seen previously that the early development of Russian marxism was guided by the goal of establishing a mass-based social democratic party. This general idea was translated into a more tangible political strategy through the publication of “On Agitation” by Kremer and Martov in 1894. But even before that, as Keep (1963) points out, a number of local social democratic groups, especially in the Western parts of the empire, had already successfully employed the “agitation” approach. The underpinning rationale of “On Agitation” that reflected the early consensus of Russian marxism was to establish a mass-based party that would be located on top of the decisional hierarchy of the Russian labor
movement. It was to be organized democratically, and derive its legitimacy from the input of local chapters. But on that background, the party was designed to assume leadership of the movement and to steer labor into the political arena through propaganda and agitation. In this context, the economic struggle of labor was subordinate to the political struggle exercised through the social democratic party.

This model of social democracy that belonged to the quasi-revolutionary mainstream of the Second International was initially supported by both the Mensheviks, who would continue in this tradition, and the Bolsheviks, who would later develop a deviating insurrectionist model of labor politics. At the time, both these later factions were referred to as the politiki, those that regarded the economic as subordinate to the political struggle. The common adversary of the politiki were the related, yet distinct, tendencies of economism and “revisionism”. Both of these were evolutionary social democratic party models, which positioned themselves against the prevalent quasi-revolutionary social democratic mainstream that had emerged throughout the 1880s and 1890s.

The revisionists formulated a critique of quasi-revolutionary social democracy based on the ideas of Eduard Bernstein. They appropriated his arguments that were developed in the context of signs for gradual liberalization, and the objective improvement of living standards for labor in Germany, and transferred them to the case of Russia. Bernstein as well as his Russian disciples argued that the expectations of quasi-revolutionary marxism regarding the continuous emiseration of workers and the inevitability of revolution don’t stand the scrutiny of the historical developments ever since the 1870s. As a result, in order to accomplish socialism, a gradual evolution through specific reforms and cooperation with liberal parties is necessary.

Bernstein’s revisionism was rejected by the German social democrats, because it represented a direct threat to the social integrative qualities of the dominant quasi-revolutionary party model, even though many of his adversaries might have agreed with his conclusions. In the case of Russia, due to economic backwardness and the complete political exclusion of labor, Bernstein’s model was even less applicable than in Germany. As a result, revisionism played only an extremely limited role in Russia. Its suggestions for the transformation of the RSDRP into an evolutionary social democratic party never received any significant support within the party. Peter Struve as the major proponent of revisionism at the time eventually left the party and became a supporter of the Russian liberals.

A much more potent threat to the dominance of the politiki was the related movement of economism. It also belonged to the evolutionary social democratic camp, but it did not adopt Bernstein’s revisionism. The Economists emphasized the question of party organization over the issue of an evolutionary pursuit of socialism. Furthermore, their party model was justified by an analysis of the nature of the Russian working-

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346 See the debate in the German case study, and for illustration, Auer’s letter to Bernstein (noted by Engels 1897).
class rather than an imported assessment, as was the case with the Russian revisionists. Haimson (1955) finds that economism briefly became the most prevalent model within the RSDRP in between 1898 and 1902. The quasi-revolutionary and hierarchical party model that had emerged as dominant around the time, when “On Agitation” was published in 1894, started to decrease in influence after the arrest of Martov, Lenin and other politiki in January 1896. The first congress of the RSDRP in 1898 still agreed on a party program that was based on the approach of the politiki. But the arrest of the newly elected Central Committee immediately after the end of the meeting struck another crucial blow to the proponents of the political struggle and a hierarchical mass-based party.

Economism as an evolutionary social democratic party model replaced the void left by the earlier dominance of the politiki after 1898. For a brief time period, until 1902, ‘economists’ dominated social democracy both in Russia, especially in Petersburg, and within the exile circles around the Liberation of Labor group. As we will see later on in more detail, Menshevism and Bolshevism, which became adversaries after 1902, were united as opponents of economism between 1898 and 1902. To that end, they organized themselves around the newspaper “Iskra” beginning in 1901 (cf. Liebich 1997). At the second party congress in 1903, the “Iskra” group initially presented itself as a united front against the Economists. They were successful in defeating Economism, but they also split into the two factions that would later on emerge as independent parties and entirely different models of labor politics: the Mensheviks, who continued the earlier tradition of quasi-revolutionary social democracy and the Bolsheviks, who developed a new kind of insurrectionist model of labor politics. After 1902, economism would continue to be a somewhat influential current within the RSDRP, but it would never become dominant again. Moreover, post 1902, the Mensheviks and the Economists realized that their differences, at least in terms of party organization were minor ones, compared to the insurrectionist and elitist model proposed by bolshevism.

Akimov, who started out as a disciple of the orthodox and determinist Plekhanov, became the primary proponent and chief theoretician of economism. His party model entailed the idea of a more evolutionary path to socialism, but he was concerned primarily with questions of party organization and party-union relations. He sought to shape the RSDRP as the political arm of the trade unions in the political arena, whereas the anti-economists of the Iskra faction saw the party as the undisputed leader of the labor movement. Akimov accorded primary importance to the economic struggle that would find just another expression through the activities of the party in the arena of politics. The Iskrites saw the economic as subordinate to the political struggle. In terms of party organization, the Iskra group wanted a hierarchical and efficient party that would be able to lead labor into the political domain. Akimov and the Economists wanted to rely on the “spontaneity” of the working-class, and envisioned an “open forum” party model, akin to the labor parties that were about to emerge in Britain and elsewhere, within which the trade unions
and their members would be dominant. Lenin spoke for the entire Iskra group, when he criticized Akimov’s proposal as one that would turn the party into nothing but a “service group” for the trade unions.  

Akimov’s model of party organization and economism’s ideas about the role of the party vis-à-vis the worker constituency and the trade unions were based on a specific vision regarding the nature of the working-class. Akimov argued that a politically conscious and militant working-class had already existed in Russia before social democracy began its agitation and propaganda campaigns on the basis of Plekhanov’s adaptation of marxism. The social democratic party should therefore function only as an expression of that consciousness and the interests of workers. The party should not attempt to indoctrinate the labor constituency and force its political interests upon them. Akimov’s approach to the relationship between the party and the larger labor movement alienated both the later Mensheviks and Bolsheviks that were united against economism until 1902. And throughout the further development of Russian labor politics afterwards, the Mensheviks would continue sticking to their conviction that the party and the political struggle should be dominant over the trade unions, the larger worker constituency, and the economic struggle. Along these lines, the Menshevik mainstream and its concept of party-labor relations continued to adhere to the quasi-revolutionary model, while Akimov would stay true to an evolutionary social democratic approach. However, when it comes to the practical question of internal party organization, the suggestions made by the Economists at the 1902 party congress and thereafter were virtually the same as those that were later embraced by Menshevism. Both of these factions distinguished themselves from the Bolsheviks, who succeeded to have their model of party organization enacted at the 1903 congress.

Before 1903, the traditional type of social democratic party organization at the local level consisted of two separate committees: one for the intelligentsia that was in charge of making the strategic decisions, and a second, subordinated one, for the workers (cf. Frankel 1969, 90). Akimov suggested the creation of a single executive committee, whose members would be elected by all the adherents of the party in a particular geographical area. At the time, both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, united under the banner of Iskra, stood against Akimov’s proposals, and argued for more centralization. However, when the party split into Menshevism and Bolshevism matured after 1903, the dividing lines between these three factions changed. The Mensheviks still rejected the Economists’ suggestions regarding party-labor relations. But when they were confronted with Lenin’s ultra-centralized model, beginning at the 1903 party congress, and after having been released from the obligations to the Iskra group, they were in a position to formally embrace the model of party organization suggested by Akimov (cf. Frankel 1969).

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348 See Frankel (1969)
Russian menshevism would embrace a fundamental organizational tenet of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type: the democratic bottom-up organization of the party. This is one of the crucial features that both evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary party models have in common (see table 2).

The Economists’ model of a mass-based evolutionary social democratic party that would act as the representative of the broader labor movement in the political arena only experienced a brief period of limited dominance from 1898 to 1902. The failure of the RSDRP to accomplish institutionalization throughout the entire formative stage of labor politics also implies the failure of evolutionary social democracy during this particular time period. In terms of systemness as the first of three prerequisites for successful party formation, it is undeniable that social democracy had made some impressive inroads into the worker constituency during this time period. The party had established a number of local groups, but the overall membership of the party remained embryonic (cf. Keep 1963). Moreover, in between 1898 and 1902, there was no formal organizing center, no regular budgetary process, and the Economists, who dominated the party around this time were never able to establish permanent communication between the center and the periphery. All of these are constituent indicators for systemness, and they were all but absent during this time.349

Second, in terms of social integration, it is equally undeniable that the evolutionary party model embraced by the economists had been adapted by a number of local chapters, and that it also dominated the exile circles around the Liberation of Labor group during this time (cf. Frankel 1969). But given the lack of systemness as a necessary underpinning, the ideological model suggested by Akimov and the Economists could never be successfully imprinted on the party as a mechanism of social integration. Thirdly, the lack of external institutionalization is most apparent in the case of the Economists’ variant of evolutionary social democracy. As we have seen before, the absence of a parliament before 1906 made public reification through elections impossible. Around the time of the 1905 revolutionary turmoil, when both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks took their first step toward external institutionalization separately, the Economists had already been defeated as a viable model of labor politics within the RSDRP.

*Liquidationism*

The evolutionary social democratic party model suggested by “liquidationism” after 1905 was even less successful than the earlier economism in approaching institutionalization. Economism did dominate the social democratic movement for a limited period of time, from 1898 to 1903. But liquidationism never even emerged as dominant within the RSDRP, let alone outside of the party. The term is derived from the

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349 See also my earlier comment on party membership during this time period.
suggestion of a newly emerging faction within social democracy after 1905 to “liquidate” the clandestine and underground elements of the party. In its place, the “liquidators” or “liquidationists” wanted to establish an evolutionary socialist party, along the lines of the party model developed earlier on by Akimov. In that sense, liquidationism was a renaissance of the earlier Economism approach. Its unique features are not derived from any fundamental difference to the Economists, in terms of the model of labor politics suggested. They lie in the specific circumstances, through which liquidationism emerged.

After the break up of the anti-economist Iskra group into a quasi-revolutionary Menshevik and an insurrectionist Bolshevik faction in 1903, the fortunes of Menshevism’s mass-based party model were on the rise during the years of freedom from 1905 to 1907. It was precisely the greater extent of political liberties during this time period, and the hopes for the gradual extension of freedom, that motivated the formation of “liquidationism”. It emerged from Menshevik and Economist circles, but the majority of the Menshevik faction rejected it. Its proponents argued that under the new conditions of greater political freedom after October 1905, revolutionary rhetoric, actual insurrectionist plans and the maintenance of an underground party structure had become obsolete. The only limited extension of inclusion from a lowest to a low level did not justify this suggestion. We have seen before, that an open form of party organization that relies on the extension of the unions into the political arena and that foregoes the emphasis on a long-term revolutionary perspective, is an optimal choice of labor politics only in an environment of higher inclusion. Even the Russia of the ‘years of freedom’ was far from that degree of inclusion; it remained solidly at the very bottom of the low inclusion category. It is even more surprising that the liquidationist model would continue to challenge the two dominant factions of the party even after the June 1907 reforms restored lowest inclusion, and made evolutionary social democracy an even more suboptimal model.

The liquidationists’ proposal to abandon the underground activities of the party was at odds with both the Menshevik and the Bolshevik factions. The Mensheviks, other than their rivals, did embrace the idea of a mass-based and democratically organized party. But they were also keenly aware of the specific Russian circumstances, i.e. the presence of lowest inclusion, which required a certain amount of secrecy and underground operations (cf. Swain 1983). Although Liquidationism clearly represented an evolutionary social democratic party model, distinct from the Menshevik position, Lenin as the dominant leader of the Bolsheviks would denounce his Menshevik rivals as “liquidationists” for their refusal to follow his ultra-centralist proposals for party organization. Already in 1906, this tactic became apparent, when the Bolsheviks argued that Menshevism invested “(…) too much energy in parliamentary and legal activities at the risk of liquidating the underground party (…)” 350 Lenin would continue to accuse the Mensheviks of

350 See Rogger (1983, 231)
liquidationism, even when they, such as Trotsky, explicitly demanded the unification of ‘legal’ and underground activities into one coherent party organization.351

After the initial emergence of a liquidationist faction, distinct from both the Menshevik and the Bolshevik during the ‘years of freedom’, Swain (1983) observes that liquidationism would continue to seek opportunities to challenge the party mainstream on several occasions after June 1907. In 1909, the suggestion to liquidate the underground party and replace it with an evolutionary model was brought forward during meetings of the Petersburg and Moscow social democratic trade unionists. During the January 1910 plenum meeting of the RSDRP’s Central Committee in Paris, the cooperation between ‘legal’ and underground activists was codified as the official party line. This meant the formal defeat of liquidationist plans within the RSDRP.

But even in 1913, after the earlier limited toleration strategy of the autocracy had already ended for two years, liquidationism made a final challenge. It occurred in the context of the debate in the social democratic movement, which was now formally separated into menshevik and bolshevik parties, and the trade unions, about the introduction of an insurance scheme for workers. The liquidationist, evolutionary social democratic, strategy of pursuing tactical arrangements with the liberals in this matter was refused by both the social democrats and the unions. This marks the point in time, at which liquidationism, and generally the evolutionary social democratic party model, was ultimately defeated as a viable alternative to the Menshevik and Bolshevik approaches.

Liquidationism thus never even established an evolutionary social democratic party model as dominant within the RSDRP or the organized labor movement. As a result, no further detailed elaboration is necessary to conclude that it definitely fell short of accomplishing institutionalization in terms of any of the three prerequisites for successful party formation. The separate analyses of revisionism, economism, and liquidationism have shown that this conclusion applies to evolutionary social democracy in general. ‘Optimal’ conditions for the formation of evolutionary social democratic parties only exist in the context of higher inclusion, as the discussion of the cases of Britain, New Zealand, and Australia has shown. A party model that depends on the transfer of a political strategy and specific political demands from the broader labor movement and the unions into the political arena through evolutionary social democracy as a transmission belt, requires a number of conditions that are absent in cases of low and lowest inclusion. The absence of these conditions is particularly apparent in lowest inclusion cases, such as Russia and Japan.

351 See Swain (1983) for an extensive discussion of Trotsky’s strategy. I would like to note Swain’s introductory comment regarding the use of the term ‘legal’ activist. Even ‘legal’ activists were ‘illegal’ in the Russian environment of lowest inclusion. They are referred to as ‘legal’ activists, because they pursue their (‘illegal’) political activities through the trade unions, which had at least a limited semi-legal status.
First of all, the successful establishment of an evolutionary socialist party requires a ‘mature’ and well-organized trade union movement that is capable of permanent political intervention. The effective organization of unions around the workplace and the establishment of a permanent link between unions and an evolutionary socialist party that acts on the initiative of the unions in the parliamentary arena requires an extent of institutional inclusion that is absent in lowest inclusion cases. Evolutionary social democracy requires the existence of effective unions, which was difficult to accomplish in the context of lowest political liberties in Russia. It also depends on the ability of the party to effectively translate the demands of the unions into specific and binding pieces of legislation. This requires an effective enfranchisement of workers to allow for parliamentary influence of the party and the presence of responsible government.

Neither one of these prerequisites existed in the case of Russia. The limits on the feasibility of evolutionary social democracy are most readily apparent, since even after the partial legalization of unions in 1906, the cooperation of unions with social democracy was explicitly outlawed, and actively persecuted. It is next to impossible under these circumstances to establish an openly organized mass-based party without clandestine operations, whose major task is supposed to be the transfer of political inputs from the unions into specific pieces of labor legislation.

The same argument applies in a somewhat weaker form to instances of low inclusion as well. It is in the nature of low labor inclusion that only one set of channels is effectively opened for labor’s access to the political arena: either the granting of political liberties and responsible government, or the enfranchisement of workers. Optimal conditions for evolutionary social democracy and the successful implementation of this type of party model, however, only exist in those cases, where all institutional channels of inclusion are effectively available for labor access. Evolutionary social democracy requires the right to organize unions effectively, and to allow them to engage in political activities as well as sufficient access to the arena of electoral politics, for which worker enfranchisement is a prerequisite.

In those instances from within the low inclusion category, where labor incorporation occurred through the granting of political liberties, including the right to organize unions, the absence of effective enfranchisement makes the evolutionary strategy to translate the demands of the unions into effective legislation suboptimal. In the remaining cases, where enfranchisement was the open channel for labor access to the political arena, the precariousness of political liberties, including union organization, and most clearly unions’ political activities, causes the suboptimal nature of the evolutionary social democratic strategy.

Secondly, in addition to these conditions that depend exclusively on the institutional background of labor inclusion, there is another feature that makes evolutionary social democracy a suboptimal choice, especially in an environment of lowest inclusion, but also in low inclusion cases. This second aspect of the cost-benefit evaluation of different models of labor politics by labor elites is their expectation regarding the
demands of their larger constituency. As we already discussed before, quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal model, also in terms of the demands of the larger worker constituency, in low inclusion cases. In an environment of lowest inclusion, as in Russia, evolutionary social democracy is less suitable than quasi-revolutionary models, and both of them are inferior to insurrectionism.

Evolutionary social democracy is not popular in an environment of lowest inclusion. When workers are confronted in the most apparent fashion with their exclusion from the political arena, and constant repression, in addition to economic exploitation, the promise of piecemeal change is a shallow one. In such a context, the promise of insurrection is clearly more attractive, especially if one considers that the costs of both models are equally high: persecution is a threat that applied to all social democratic party models alike, regardless of whether they were quasi-revolutionary, evolutionary, or insurrectionist. On that background, it is to be expected that both labor elites and the larger worker constituency favor insurrectionist and quasi-revolutionary over evolutionary models: all of them have the same amount of high costs, but insurrectionism and quasi-revolutionary social democracy promise higher benefits.

The failure of quasi-revolutionary social democracy

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy came closer than all other competing models of labor politics – moderate syndicalism and evolutionary social democracy – to challenge the increasing dominance of bolshevism and to become successfully institutionalized in Russia. But eventually, bolshevism as the optimal response to an environment of lowest inclusion also became the dominant model of Russian labor politics. A quasi-revolutionary type of social democracy dominated the RSDRP at various points in time, and it also created its own separate party structures. Moreover, possibly through the involvement in the 1905 revolutionary turmoil, and definitely through the participation in the 1917 February revolution, quasi-revolutionary social democracy accomplished external institutionalization. Although it thus approached successful party formation more closely than either moderate syndicalism or evolutionary social democracy, it never fully accomplished it.

First, quasi-revolutionary social democracy failed to obtain systemness for more than only a brief period of time. The Mensheviks came closest to establishing a viable mass-based party during the ‘years of freedom’ from 1905 to 1907, when labor inclusion passed the threshold from lowest to low inclusion. After this brief interlude, the fortunes of Menshevism were on the decline, in favor of the gradual rise of their bolshevik adversaries. Mass-based social democracy continued to hold out to some extent until 1911, four years after the end of the years of freedom. But in between 1911 and 1917 the shift of dominance toward bolshevism eventually manifested itself most clearly.

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Second, despite a number of shortcomings in its attempts to translate quasi-revolutionary social democracy to the case of Russia, Menshevism did develop a coherent ideological model of labor politics. However, with the lack of systemness, quasi-revolutionary social democracy was never capable of imprinting their ideological model on an effective party organization. A Menshevik quasi-revolutionary ideology existed, albeit only loosely, but it never became a permanently dominant ideological form within the RSDRP or any other institutionalized party organization, and thereby never functioned as a viable mechanism for social integration.

In the Russian context of lowest inclusion, quasi-revolutionary social democracy represented the second best option after insurrectionist models. Its emphasis on long term revolutionary goals promised a greater appeal to the labor constituency than the shallow and unlikely perspective of piecemeal legislative change suggested by evolutionary social democracy. Moreover, in an environment of complete exclusion of labor on all institutional dimensions, the quasi-revolutionary approach to the relationship between party and broader labor movement was more promising than the one suggested by evolutionary social democrats. We have seen above that evolutionary social democracy is particularly precarious in an environment of lowest inclusion, because that model of labor politics requires institutional inclusion on all channels, which is absent in instances of lowest, and overall precarious in low inclusion cases.

In an environment of lowest inclusion, quasi-revolutionary social democracy is also better suited than evolutionary models, because the former does not have to rely on the existence of a mature and well-organized union movement capable of independent political interventions. By positioning the party as the leader of labor’s political struggle, quasi-revolutionary social democracy is able to circumvent that particular problem caused by the existence of lowest inclusion.

However, even despite these minor differences, both quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democracy are suboptimal models of labor politics in an environment of lowest inclusion, when compared to bolshevism. The insurrectionist approach of the bolshevik does not require open and democratic party organization, which is the defining feature of both types of mass-based social democracy. This organizational principle makes efforts at party institutionalization much more precarious under lowest inclusion. Moreover, by emphasizing insurrection and the immediate relief of workers’ grievances, bolshevism appeals more effectively than evolutionary and quasi-revolutionary social democracy to the demands of a more radicalized worker constituency in an environment of lowest inclusion.

In the following paragraphs, I am going to analyze the failure of mass-based social democracy in its quasi-revolutionary variant for the case of Russia, on the background of the Russian environment of lowest labor inclusion. In this discussion, I will pay keen attention to the evolution of inclusion over time that had been outlined before, and the according shifts in the fortunes of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in response to these changes. In the first place, I will refer briefly to the contours of quasi-revolutionary social
democracy in Russia before the economist stage from 1898-1902, and outline the emergence and the nature of Menshevism after the party split in 1902. Secondly, I am going to investigate the extent of institutionalization of that model of labor politics at the following crucial points in time throughout the further development of the formative stage of Russian labor’s entry into the political arena: during the ‘years of freedom’ from 1905 to 1907; in the following period from 1907 to 1917, during which lowest inclusion had been restored, as well as briefly the era of provisional higher inclusion after the 1917 February Revolution. Eventually, a brief conclusion regarding the failure of mass-based social democracy in Russia will follow in the third place.

_Emergence and features of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in Russia_

After the establishment of the ‘Liberation of Labor’ group in 1883, and the adaptation of marxism to Russia, the first local social democratic organizations emerged throughout the early 1890s. These were in the broadest sense of the term quasi-revolutionary in nature, as they were influenced by the early, pre-economist, marxist consensus and in the process of entering politics through the new “agitation” approach, which gradually replaced earlier “general education” strategies. Economism, as an evolutionary model of social democracy, was on the rise toward the end of the 1890s, until the 1903 party congress. At this occasion, it was defeated by the Iskra centralizers, and Russian social democracy saw the breakup of the earlier Iskra group into a quasi-revolutionary Menshevik and an insurrectionist Bolshevik faction.

Neither economism, as outlined before, nor quasi-revolutionary social democracy before 1903 were able to even come close to systemness, social integration through the establishment of a dominant ideological form, or external institutionalization during this period. There existed no organizational center of the party within Russia whatsoever before 1903, since the delegates to the first party congress in 1898 were immediately arrested. The hold of the Liberation of Labor group on local activities was tenuous at best (cf. Keep 1963). This does not mean, of course, that social democracy’s turn to agitation and local organization building was entirely unsuccessful. But it did not lead to the establishment of a permanent mass-based quasi-revolutionary party.

Keep (1963), Pipes (1990), and Wildman (1967) describe the scope of local social democratic engagement before 1903 in much detail. The first organized activities occurred in the Polish parts of the empire, as well as in those western regions with a large Jewish population, such as Vilnus, Minsk, Warszawa, Brest, and Vitebsk. The Jewish sections within Russian social democracy organized themselves
Their organization was somewhat autonomous, but it effectively acted as one pillar of the larger social democratic movement, within which it would count itself to the later Menshevik faction. From the Western provinces, local social democratic organizations spread to Petersburg, Moscow, and a number of other cities in the European parts of the empire. By the time the second party congress was convened in 1903, the reestablished RSDRP united a total of 26 groups into one party (cf. Ascher 1976).

Wildman (1967) argues that the greater proximity to the West and a longer tradition of industrialization are the decisive factors to explain why social democratic activities and more effective party organization occurred first in Poland, Belarus and the Baltics. He fails to take into account the variation in labor inclusion that created a larger 'window of opportunity' for mass-based social democratic activities in these areas than the other parts of the empire. The extent of repression in this time period was much less pronounced in the non-Russian parts of the country. Keep (1963, 41) finds that the authorities in these regions were “at times prepared to tolerate the conflict between capital and labor in the hope of thereby weakening the national opposition to Russian rule.” In the ethnically Russian areas, on the other hand, particularly in Moscow and Petersburg, attempts at local organization were immediately answered by severe repression. The regional variation in the success of forming local party organizations is therefore directly related to the according variation in labor inclusion. The greater success of local mass-based party formation attempts in those areas with comparatively higher labor inclusion is to be expected on the basis of the theoretical framework employed here.

Keep (1963) Pipes (1990), and Wildman (1967) make similar observations about the limited diffusion of local social democratic organizations during this time period. But they come to radically different conclusions with respect to the effect that social democratic agitation had on the general rise of labor unrest. Pipes (1990) and Keep (1963) argue that social democratic agitation and the increase of labor unrest were two largely unrelated developments. The social democrats agitated for political revolution, while the strikes and protests of regular workers were mostly about immediate economic improvements. Wildman (1967, 60) disagrees: “The dramatic participation of the workers in the emerging nationwide protest would be inexplicable had not social democratic ideology provided the workers with plausible formulas justifying the shift from an economic struggle to a political one.”

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353 Their disagreement is mostly based on different conceptual underpinnings to their arguments. I argued previously that the ‘political’ struggle of labor can manifest itself through the translation of economic and political demands into the political arena. The ‘economic’ struggle on the other hand occurs outside of the political arena altogether, even though evolutionary social democratic parties emerged, when unions decided to conduct their ‘economic’ struggle by ‘political means’. Wildman (1967) implicitly employs this, I believe more adequate, conceptualization. Even though workers might have pursued largely economic demands, they did translate them into the arena of politics. Keep (1963) and Pipes (1990) on the other hand infer the lack of social democracy’s involvement from their conclusion that workers were not involved in a political struggle, simply because the demands that they translated into the political arena, were largely economic in nature. It should be kept in mind, though, that this still does not settle the empirical question about the extent to which social democracy was involved in triggering workers’ entry into the political arena.
Wildman (1967) goes on to show that in a number of specific localities, general worker protests were directly motivated by social democratic agitation – in Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav, the non-Russian West, and a few other places. Regardless of which one of these perspectives one wishes to follow, it does not affect the argument suggested here. Even if social democracy, as Wildman (1967) suggests, was instrumental for mobilizing workers for the protests that occurred throughout the 1890s, these efforts have still not resulted in the successful establishment of a viable mass-based social democratic party during this time period: neither on the basis of an evolutionary nor on the basis of a quasi-revolutionary model.

The first major conflict within Russian social democracy occurred between this still somewhat vague quasi-revolutionary party model, embodied by the Iskra group, and the economist challengers. Economism, as outlined above, was dominant within the party for a limited period of time in between the late 1890s and 1903. At the second party congress in 1903, it was defeated by the Iskrites, but the same meeting also gave rise to the separate Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. It was only after 1903 that the previously imprecise contours of the anti-economists’ party model became more refined, as an insurrectionist bolshevik and a quasi-revolutionary Menshevik variant. Thus, Menshevism as a more concise rendition of quasi-revolutionary social democracy only defined itself through the debates with its bolshevik competitors after 1903.

The divergence between the two factions had already become apparent in the proceedings before the congress that occurred in the framework provided by the Iskra group, especially after Lenin had published “What is to be done” in 1902 as his proposal for party organization and strategy. Although a number of conflicts were already brewing within the Iskra editorial board, between Martov, Trotsky, Akselrod, and Lenin, a common draft for a social democratic program was published in June 1902 (cf. Haimson 1955). The common cause against economism held the later Bolsheviki and Mensheviki together, but this alliance lasted only until the defeat of the economists in 1903. At the same party congress, the split into the two factions became official; or, as Haimson (1955, 181) puts it: “At one stroke, (the second Congress, KV) had restored unity in the RSDRP, and hopelessly divided its ranks.”

After the Iskrites had pushed through their entire program at the 1903 meeting, it was the question of how to define party membership that divided the former allies. In itself, this was only a minor issue, but it stood for a larger dividing line between the two factions, in terms of party organization, party-union relationships, and the preferable path to socialism. Both the Menshevik and the Bolshevik were keenly aware of the particular political environment in Russia. They realized that under the conditions of lowest inclusion, a party had to be established differently than in those cases, where at least some minimal institutional inclusion existed. There was an agreement within the Iskra bloc that the party should consist of a wide mass base and a center that needed to act in a clandestine and conspiratory fashion.
In the disagreement about the definition of party membership, Lenin opted for a narrow definition: “Better let ten people who work, not call themselves party members, than give one windbag the right and the possibility to be a party member.” Axelrod, in support of Martov’s opposing resolution to the congress, favored a wide definition: “We can only rejoice if every striker, every demonstrator, in answering for his actions, can call himself a party member.” 354 The diverging party models built on these definitions would only be fully developed after the congress, but the specific disagreement about the definition of membership already represents an important building block for these two models: the elitist ultra-centralized party of professional revolutionaries envisioned by Lenin, and the mass-based, bottom up, democratic party favored by the Mensheviki. Martov’s formula was supported by 28 to 23 votes, but all the following decisions of the congress were in favor of Lenin and his new bolshevik faction. This was simply the result of Lenin’s political maneuvering. He pushed the delegates from the Bund and the Rabochee Delo (Workers’ Cause) paper to a walkout, so that his supporters would constitute a slim majority. The specific decisions of the congress are much less important than the fact that it represented the first step toward the formulation of two distinct models of labor politics throughout the following years. After the split of 1903, factional conflicts between Menshevik and Bolshevik dominated party life. They occurred along with the establishment of autonomous organizations of both factions, designed to act independently as well as to influence the decisions of the RSDRP. This situation lasted until 1912, with varying intensity and several shifts in the party’s internal balance of power. In 1912, the two factions eventually established formally separate parties.

There are a number of historiographical controversies about the two factions and the RSDRP in between 1903 and 1912. The most abstract of these discussions, and also the most speculative one, is the general debate about the possibility of party unity. Some argue that with the beginning of factionalism in 1903, the competing approaches evolved so far apart that party unity became materially impossible. 355 Others believe that the opportunity of party unity existed until the very end of this time period, or even until after the February revolution. 356 I will forego any further evaluation of this debate, because it has little bearing on the question I am interested in here. But the general concern with the possibility of party unity is related to two other issues that are somewhat relevant in the present context.

One of these two debates revolves around the actual material differences between the two factions. Some authors argue that these dividing lines were real, extensive, and significant. Others, and in some cases even the same authors that identify unbridgeable ideological differences between the two factions, observe a large amount of practical cooperation, especially at the local level, across the factional

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354 See Schwarz (1967, 197)
355 For example Ascher (1972, 1976)
356 This includes Schwarz (1997) and Swain (1983)
Liebich (1997, 32) makes an excellent point in calling for a more nuanced perspective: “As a working hypothesis it may be fruitful to view the relations between bolshevism and menshevism in terms of a broad continuum, each end of which is defined by a Bolshevik or Menshevik ideal type, but where the real historical actors find themselves cutting across the continuum at different angles and different points.”

In a number of instances, especially during the 1905 revolution, and the following ‘years of freedom’, local cooperation was undoubtedly extensive and exercised significant pressure on the leaders of both factions to pursue a path of unification. Furthermore, the initial motivation for rank and file activists to identify with either faction was often times the result of personal affinities, rivalries, or tactical considerations. Despite these two caveats, it is equally undeniable that separate and self-contained Menshevik and Bolshevik models and factions existed, and that the historical consequences of these divisions were indeed real and extremely significant. Moreover, even if cooperation did occur at the local and to some extent at the elite level until 1907, or even 1912, it is equally true that eventually, the schism between the two factions became increasingly more pronounced during this time period. As a result, regardless of which combination of factors triggered the initial decision of party members to identify with either one faction, the ideational divisions between the two factions at the elite level eventually became political realities for the rank and file and their specific approach to politics as well.

The question as to when exactly this transformation from ideational construct at the top elite level to practical and practiced self-contained models of labor politics at the level of rank and file activists occurred is the topic of a second related debate. There are varying assertions as to when the split between the two factions became final, which is equivalent to the existence of two self-contained models of labor politics. Various events related to the interaction between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki are identified as the most important watersheds: a) the second party congress in 1903, when previously lingering conflicts erupted into the initial formation of two separate factions; b) the end of 1907, when the failure of the semi-constitutional experiment led to the restoration of the factional conflicts that had somewhat subsided during the ‘years of freedom’, as evidenced by the conciliatory May 1906 Fourth Congress of Stockholm and the combative Fifth Congress in May 1907; c) 1912, when separate party conferences of both factions declared themselves self-contained and independent parties.

As a result, it is problematic to unequivocally identify specific watersheds that mark the definite establishment of both Menshevik and Bolshevik models of labor politics. But this does not affect the causal

357 Liebich (1997, 31) argues along these lines and identifies a number of specific examples. Ascher (1972, 1976), Keep (1963), Schwarz (1967) observe unbridgeable differences at the ‘macro level’, while noting at the same time, extensive cooperation at the micro-level.
358 See Liebich (1997) and Ascher (1972, 1976) for this assessment.
359 Authors that have a more optimistic perspective on the possibility of party unity also tend to argue that the split became inevitable at a later point in time, for example Swain 1983. Those with a more pessmistic perspective tend to argue that the split became manifest and irreversible earlier on, in some cases even before the 1903 congress, for example Ascher (1972, 1976)
argument I am suggesting, since the overall outcome of interest for my explanation and the general trend in that direction are not disputed. First, neither the ‘optimistic’ nor the ‘pessimistic’ approach to the question of party unity denies the fact that eventually, Menshevism and Bolshevism established themselves as distinct models of labor politics with an identifiable group of followers and practitioners. The quasi-revolutionary social democratic model of the Mensheviks failed to form a mass-based party successfully, while the insurrectionist model of the Bolsheviks did become institutionalized. Second, except for minor variations, the stages of development leading to this outcome are also not under dispute. After the initial party split in 1903, Menshevism gradually became dominant, especially during the years of freedom from 1905 to 1907. Until 1911, Menshevism’s position became significantly more precarious, and after that point in time, an overall decline of Menshevik organizations corresponds with the general increase of Bolshevik dominance. We are going to see later on that this overall development is inextricably related to the evolution of labor inclusion over time.

Menshevism only emerged in response to the party model suggested by Lenin as the underpinning of the Bolshevik faction. His proposals about party organization and strategy appeared in a number of publications: most importantly, the 1902 “What is to be done”, the 1902 “Letter to a Comrade”, and the 1904 “Two steps forward, one step back”. It was in reaction to Lenin’s ultra-centralism and elitism that the Mensheviki started to think more seriously and in more detail about their own approach to organization, strategy, and ideology. Therefore, while quasi-revolutionary social democracy already existed before 1903 through the early Russian marxism and the Iskrites, it only received its specific contours in the battle with bolshevism after the second party congress.

Ascher (1976) argues that there was an identifiable core of Menshevik thought, despite a significant lack of ideological cohesion, the existence of internal contradictions, and frequent changes in specific positions over time. The core of Menshevism that emerged through the conflict with the Bolsheviks shares its basic ideological and organizational tenets with the generic quasi-revolutionary party model. But in some important respects, Menshevism adjusted the model from the outside to the specific Russian circumstances. First of all, in terms of its ideological orientation. Menshevism for the most part stayed close to Kautsky’s vulgar marxist original. Socialism as the fundamental goal of the party was to be accomplished through a revolutionary transformation. In this context, the substantive emphasis was on the institutionalization of fundamental political rights and a socio-economic transformation.

Plekhanov’s early conception of a revolution in two stages – a liberal revolution establishing political liberties, and a later socialist revolution for socio-economic goals – continued to provide the blueprint for

360 See table 2 that contains the typology of different models of labor politics for the following assessment.
the later development of the Mensheviks’ ideological orientations.\textsuperscript{361} It was Axelrod, who identified the strategical necessities resulting from this approach in the Russian environment of lowest inclusion. In those Western polities with higher degrees of inclusion, where liberal institutions had been implemented, the first stage of the revolution was already complete. In Russia, on the other hand, due to the lack of a successful liberal revolution, labor has to fight simultaneously against the bourgeoisie (for economic liberation) and the autocracy (for political liberties). This required cooperation with the liberals against the autocracy and the nobility on common concerns of political freedom, while at the same time, Axelrod and the other Mensheviks believed that it was necessary to keep the labor movement ‘pure’, in order to prevent embourgeoisement.\textsuperscript{362} This is an accurate description of Russian social democracy’s dilemma. But the Mensheviks overlooked the extent to which this problem also plagued many of their comrades in the West – those that acted within low inclusion polities, in which institutional inclusion, while not as limited as in Russia, was still precarious.

The Menshevik strategy of admitting cooperation with bourgeois forces only under exceptional circumstances (in the case of Russia, the lack of a liberal revolution), is also a basic tenet of the general quasi-revolutionary party model. The most significant deviations within the Menshevik camp, measured against the yardstick of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as an ideal type, occurred with respect to the fundamental perspective on how change and revolution are supposed to come about. A defining feature of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the embrace of determinism, the belief that a revolutionary transformation is the inevitable result of the implicit contradictions of capitalism. Plekhanov’s initial adaptation of vulgar marxism to Russia emphasizes this point very strongly. The Mensheviks never formally abandoned that perspective, but particularly Axelrod and to some extent even Martov, were significantly more voluntarist than their mentor. None of these minor issues represents a significant deviation from the ideological orientation of the quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type. As a matter of fact, the Mensheviks were among the most loyal disciples of the Second International’s marxism. The patterns of knowledge diffusion in between the German and Russian social democrats can help to explain this phenomenon. The nearly permanent exile of the major intellectual leaders of Menshevism brought them into close contact with the German party leaders, who at the time were the intellectual and organizational center of the movement. Axelrod in particular entertained close personal and political relations with Kautsky and a number of other European comrades (cf. Ascher 1972).

Since the nature of Menshevism was forged through the battle with the bolshevik, which revolved around issues of party organization and strategy, the Menshevik approach emphasizes these issues, too. It is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{361} See Haimson (1955).
\item \textsuperscript{362} See Ascher (1972).
\end{itemize}
also in this area, where the more meaningful adjustments of the generic quasi-revolutionary approach to Russian circumstances have occurred, without, however, abandoning the basic tenets of the external paradigm. The defining features of Menshevism are most prominently formulated through two pamphlets by Akselrod and Martov, both of which responded directly to one of Lenin’s prior interventions. Pavel Akselrod wrote his two part article “The Unification of Social Democracy and its Tasks”, published in December 1903 and January 1904, in response to “What is to be done”, and the events of the Second Party Congress. Martov’s article from July 1904 was designed as a response to “One step forward, two steps back.”³⁶³ Karl Kautsky in letters to his German, Russian, and other international comrades, supported the efforts of the Mensheviks in devising an appropriate strategy for a mass-based party in the Russian environment. And eventually, one of the most influential critiques of the Bolshevik organizational model that would help shape the contours of Mensheism, was the 1904 contribution of Rosa Luxemburg in “Die Neue Zeit”.³⁶⁴

The Mensheviks proposed “a truly working-class party, depending for its strength on the individual maturity and initiative of its members.” (cf. Ascher 1972) A democratically organized mass-based party cooperates with the unions and the larger labor movement and seeks to raise workers’ political consciousness. But other than suggested by Lenin, the party ought not shield itself from the participation of the mass of workers; its most important task is to educate and organize workers in a participatory and democratic fashion. According to Akselrod in 1904, the main purpose of the party is “politically to enlighten and organize the laboring masses so that they will be able as much as possible to dissolve into the proletariat, to merge themselves in its struggle for emancipation. And in this way, they should transform the revolutionary party, the party of action par excellence into a workers’ party, so that the revolutionary and labor movements will coincide, will more truly become one and the same thing.” (Ascher 1972, 180)

In this respect, both the overall quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary party models as well as its specifically Russian renditions, share the same characteristics. And both of them are distinct from the elitist, undemocratic, and ultra-centralized bolshevik approach. The specifically Russian nuance to the Menshevik’s quasi-revolutionary party model comes from the acknowledgement of Menshevik leaders that the particularly repressive nature of the Russian autocracy makes some adjustments to the imported model necessary. The necessity for leadership from exile and by intellectuals, greater centralization than in Western social democratic parties, and the pursuit of clandestine operations were articulated before the years of freedom beginning in 1905, and after the restoration of lowest inclusion in 1907. At that later point in time, it was Trotsky, who developed a model of combined legal and illegal operations most

³⁶³ Reference original texts; Ascher 1976, Keep 1963
³⁶⁴ See Schwarz (1967).
comprehensively (cf. Swain 1983). But even in an environment of lowest inclusion, and despite some adjustments, the Mensheviks never gave up their vision of establishing a truly mass based party organization.

**Quasi-revolutionary social democracy on the rise during the years of freedom**

The 1905 revolutionary turmoil and the ensuing ‘years of freedom’ from October 1905 to June 1907 created a window of opportunity for the political activities of social democracy that none of its leaders had expected to open up so soon. It was during this limited period of time that the Mensheviks came closest to turning their party model into a reality. The rising fortunes of quasi-revolutionary social democracy are a direct result of the transformation of labor inclusion from lowest to low. The provision of low inclusion in between October 1905 and June 1907 allowed labor some access to the political arena, through the granting of at least minimal political liberties and enfranchisement. We have previously argued on several occasions that quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the optimal response of labor politics to an environment of low inclusion. The rise of Menshevism during the ‘years’ of freedom therefore represents a perfect illustration for the validity of the suggested causal argument.

The revolutionary events of 1905, as outlined before, were not a social democratic revolution, but social democrats became sufficiently involved, in order to come to the conclusion that through these activities, their party had become ‘externally institutionalized’. The activities of the Menshevik representatives in the Duma, and the massive propaganda campaigns launched by the party during the revolution and throughout the following years of freedom, reinforce the validity of that inference. In the following paragraphs, the extent of party institutionalization in the environment of low inclusion during the years of freedom following on the 1905 revolutionary events will be evaluated. First, I will discuss the issue of ‘external institutionalization’, through the involvement in the 1905 revolution, and the effects of these events on the party. Second, I am going to discuss the extent to which quasi-revolutionary social democracy established ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration through the establishment of a dominant ideological model’ as the two remaining prerequisites of successful party formation.

Menshevism as the quasi-revolutionary version of social democracy has definitely accomplished ‘external institutionalization’ through its involvement in the 1917 February Revolution, the provisional government, and the Petersburg Soviet during the interim period before the October Revolution. The question as to whether participation in the 1905 revolution already constituted ‘external institutionalization’ at this earlier point in time is therefore a minor issue. I have already shown before that there is a historiographical debate about the extent of social democratic involvement, both bolshevik and menshevik, in the 1905 revolution. Keep (1963) and Pipes (1990) argue that the socialists were ill prepared to meet the
challenges of the revolutionary developments beginning in autumn 1904. When the revolutionary tide started to extend to the workers, argues Keep (1963, p. 165), the RSDRP and its leaders were “many hundred miles distant from the mills and factories”, where worker protests took place.

Wildman (1967) disagrees with that assessment. Based on a survey of events in various localities, he comes to the conclusion that socialist propaganda was important in transforming workers’ protests into politically charged demonstrations. Even if we don’t follow Wildman’s conclusions, and assume that the social democrats were not directly involved in triggering the revolutionary events of that year, Keep (1963) and Pipes (1990) would not disagree with the assessment that they became heavily involved, once the revolution was on its way. Both these authors as well as scholars of the 1905 revolution outline in much detail, how social democrats became involved in the Zemstvo movement, extensive political propaganda, and a wide variety of local activities, most prominently the uprisings in Petersburg and Moscow toward the end of the year. The activities of Menshevik members of the first and second state Duma during the years of freedom contributed as an additional pillar to the party’s ‘external institutionalization’ during this time period.

In addition to providing the party with the opportunity to become ‘reified’ in the public’s mind, the 1905 revolution created a number of other conditions, which during the years of freedom would help to bring quasi-revolutionary social democracy in Russia closer to ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’ than at any other stage of its development. First of all, the events of 1905 and the promise of liberal institutions seemed to justify the Menshevik’s conception of a revolution in two stages. It provided an important motivation to continue the incipient efforts at building a mass-based party. Schwarz (1967) observes how following on the revolution, the party immediately emerged from the underground and started to exist openly, as a fait accompli. Second, the 1905 revolution and the limited provision of access to the political arena also had a direct effect on the internal situation of the party. Keep (1963, 165) even argues that it was one of the most important effects of the revolution on social democracy “to weaken the authority of the émigré leaders vis-à-vis the local committee men, who could not help but be more alive to the need to adjust the Party’s tactics to the demands of a rapidly changing situation.”

On this background, the RSDRP came closer to ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’, the two remaining prerequisites for successful party formation, than at any other point in its history. It might even have passed that threshold for a brief period of time. But the termination of low and the restoration of lowest inclusion by June 1907 also marked the beginning of a downward spiral for quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Thus, even if one considers the party to be somewhat institutionalized for the 18 months

365 An equivalent historiographical debate exists with respect to the first expression of mass discontent by labor in the 1890s. Wildman (1890) argues that social democrats were already actively involved in these events, while Pipes (1990), Keep (1963) and others disagree with that assessment.
of freedom from 1905 to 1907, that period of time is too limited to justify the conclusion that a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party was formed successfully. Since the Mensheviks and their party model dominated the RSDRP during this time period, the fortunes of the entire party were the fortunes of the Menshevik model of labor politics, at least until the Fifth party congress of May/June 1907, when the Bolsheviks regained a majority.

First, the existence of a mass base of members and activists is one of the most crucial elements of ‘systemness’. Swain (1983) concludes that after the revolutionary turmoil of 1905, the RSDRP had become a true mass party. His assessment might be justified in comparison to the sectarian and conspiratory stage before 1905, but a cross-country evaluation reveals a more complex picture. Table 14 identifies the decade averages in party membership: 37.625 for 1901 to 1910, and 10.000 for 1911 to 1920. The underpinning values for specific years reveal that the membership of the party increases significantly during the time period in question: 25.200 in 1905, 31.000 in 1906, and a peak of 84.300 in 1907. After the end of the ‘years of freedom’, the upward trend is reversed, as predicted by the theory suggested here, to 10.000 in 1910 and again around 10.000 in 11.

It should also be kept in mind that these are particularly optimistic figures, since they include both the quasi-revolutionary, Menshevik and Bundist, activists and the Bolsheviks. A certain number of Bolsheviks during this time period, the so-called conciliators, represented simply a different faction within the party, but one that was willing to strive for unity and respect the decisions of joint party organs. They should be counted as regular party members, just like dissenting factions within other social democratic parties are. A significant part of the Bolsheviks, however, operated through the parallel Bolshevik bodies established by Lenin, and should therefore be excluded from this membership count. This is impossible, however, since their exact number cannot be estimated. The numbers used here are therefore somewhat biased in favor of ‘systemness’.

When taking into account the best available estimates for the number of Russian industrial workers at the time, quasi-revolutionary social democracy has accomplished a peak in its party member/total worker ratio of 0.47 % for the entire first decade of the 20th century (see table 15). That value is the lowest of all social democratic parties studied here, and it decreases even further to 0.09 % for the 1910s. The peaks of the three adjacent cases of Argentina, the United States and France during this time period, all of which were considered instances of successful party formation, register at 0.59 %, 1.02 % and 1.26 %, respectively. Keeping in mind that the figure for the case of Russia is a very optimistic estimate, it becomes already apparent that the party failed to establish a viable mass base, when its overall development is under consideration. This conclusion becomes even more obvious, when taking into account that in the three other least mass-based cases, the membership/industrial workers ratio was permanently at higher levels. In the case of Russia, the peak of 0.47 % is largely the result of an extraordinarily high value for one
particular year only, 1907, which is then followed by a radical decline afterwards, resulting in a ratio of 0.09% for the 1910s.

When the perspective is on an overall assessment, the RSDRP therefore lacks a sufficiently large and at least somewhat permanent mass base as a prerequisite for ‘systemness’. If the focus is on the brief period from 1905 to 1907 or even just the peak of 1907, the conclusion would be a different one: from 1905 to 1907, the ratio of party members and all industrial workers registers at 0.58%; for 1907 alone, the value is 1.04%. These values are virtually equivalent to the long term figures for Argentina and the United States, respectively. Hence, for an extremely brief period of time, the RSDRP passed at least the minimum threshold to consider the extent of its membership ‘mass based’. This alone, however, does not justify Swain’s (1983) overly optimistic conclusion that the RSDRP had become a truly mass-based party. Unlike the other least encompassing parties considered here, in France, the United States, and Argentina, the Russian social democrats were not able to establish a mass base for a significant amount of time. The Argentinean PSA had a sufficient mass base, according to the standards introduced here, throughout the entire 1910s, and even higher membership levels from 1921 to 1930. The American SPA steadily increased the number of its activists throughout the first and second decade of the 20th century, and has to be considered mass-based at least in between the middle of the first, and the end of the second decade (see table 14).

There are two conclusions to be derived from this comparative analysis of the RSDRP’s membership development: firstly, when the focus is on the entire history of the party before the formal split in 1912, the RSDRP lacked a sufficiently large membership as an important prerequisite for ‘systemness’; but secondly, during the years of freedom from 1905 to 1907, the party established an incipient mass base that might have had the potential to transform the RSDRP into a permanently mass-based party. The end to this development toward party institutionalization is the direct consequence of the termination of low inclusion in June 1907. With the restoration of lowest inclusion and the closure of all channels of institutional inclusion that had been opened to a minimal extent during the ‘years of freedom’, the opportunities for a successful institutionalization of mass-based quasi-revolutionary social democracy were significantly reduced. The failure of the RSDRP to further build on its growth period from 1905 to 1907 is therefore inextricably related to the evolution of the Russian environment of labor inclusion.

Second, in addition to the establishment of a viable mass base, the existence of a minimum of party unity is another prerequisite for ‘systemness’. Factional conflicts, and even the existence of formal and informal parallel organizations, are commonplace in all social democratic parties studied here. The Russian case is different in character for two major reasons: firstly, because the two contending factions stood for radically different organizational models that rendered the establishment of and respect for decisional procedures within a joint party extremely precarious; secondly, the parallel organizations established by the
Mensheviki, but especially those of the non-conciliatory Bolsheviki around Lenin, were not only designed to exercise pressure on the RSDRP and to enable majorities within the larger party. They were geared at providing the nucleus of self-contained party organizations. Even before the formal split in 1912, those parallel party bodies acted with significant independence from one another and the RSDRP at large. For both of these reasons, the issue of party unity as the respect for the internal rules of the game and the adherence to one single party organization, is of crucial importance for the question of 'systemness' in the RSDRP.

In most general terms, the party came closer to unity and a feasible working relationship between the two factions from 1905 to 1907 than at any other stage in its history after the initial split of 1903. The possibility of unity was, again, greatly enhanced by the changing environment of inclusion and the provision of low inclusion during the 'years of freedom' from 1905 to 1907. The limited access to the political arena, through the establishment of a parliament, enfranchisement, and at least minimal political liberties, improved the fortunes of the quasi-revolutionary party model over the type of party organization suggested by its Bolshevik competitors. The insurrectionist, ultra-centralized, and elitist approach of the Bolsheviki is an optimal response to an environment of lowest inclusion. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents the optimal response to an environment of low inclusion. With the introduction of low inclusion from 1905 to 1907, the Menshevik proposals for party organization and strategy became the dominant model within the RSDRP, and the point of convergence for the majority of activists. This includes the Menshevik faction itself, the Jewish Bundists, and even a certain number of conciliator Bolsheviki, who were willing to act within the boundaries of the mass-based democratic party structure suggested by the quasi-revolutionary social democratic form of organization.

The opportunities for party unity were further enhanced by another indirect effect of the changing environment of inclusion. As noted before, the decreasing importance of émigrés leaders and the growing influence of local activists was a direct consequence of the improving environment of labor inclusion after October 1905. The sectarian disputes between the émigrés intellectuals appeared somewhat esoteric and inconsequential to the praktiki. The decreasing necessity for conspiratory and clandestine activities strengthened their hand against the intellectuals abroad. This provided the environment, in which a push for party unity through the local activists, as observed by Keep (1963), became possible. It occurred through the practice of cooperation at the local level that had become more feasible in the less repressive environment of the years of freedom, and through the pressure exercised on the party leaders by the praktiki.

Party unity in the framework of a mass-based and democratically organized party therefore seemed feasible after the 1905 October Manifesto. Schwarz (1967) outlines in much detail, how tangible efforts at unification were pursued by leaders of both factions, partly in response to the pressure exercised by local
activists. The Stockholm Congress of Spring 1906 was a testament to these efforts, but the proceedings at the meeting under the banner of unity also illustrate the strong divisions that continued to exist between the two factions. The incipient movement toward unity is evidenced by the ability of both factions to conduct, for the first time, fully democratic local elections of delegates to the congress. At the congress itself, the particularly divisive issue of the social democrats’ behavior toward the unions was settled with a compromise resolution.

Despite the ongoing existence of two significantly different models of labor politics within the party, the Stockholm congress could have become at least a first step toward an effectively unified party. But with historical hindsight, we know now that the first step remained the only one: after the proceedings in April 1906, which united the party under the Menshevik conception of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, Lenin and the non-conciliatory Bolshevik elements made a renewed attempt at implementing a purely insurrectionist model of labor politics within the RSDRP. Lenin opposed party unity, continued to entertain parallel Bolshevik party bodies, and used the fifth party congress of May/June 1907 as another showdown to overpower his opponents. Keep (1963) argues that the fifth congress, during which the Bolsheviks regained an internal majority, was the last ‘true’ party congress. None of the following congresses before the formal split in 1912 would be attended by all the factions of the party at the same time.

Schwarz (1967) argues that the prospect of party unity began to decline already in December 1905, when the first reactionary steps against the previously established limited liberal order occurred. The semi-constitutional experiment was only completely abandoned through the changes in electoral law implemented in June 1907, but Schwarz (1967) is quite correct in pointing out that a trend toward the restoration of lowest inclusion was already on the horizon at that earlier point in time. His position is therefore significantly more pessimistic than that of Swain (1983), who believes that the possibility of party unity continued to exist until at least 1912, i.e. even after the definite restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907.

Their disagreement illustrates that it is problematic to identify a specific point in time, at which both party unity in particular, or the prospect of a mass-based party in general, became unlikely. I believe that it is more adequate to think of this as a gradual process, in which the feasibility of quasi-revolutionary mass-based social democracy decreased, and the prospects of insurrectionist bolshevism improved over time. In this process, both the first signs of reaction in December 1905, and the end of the limited toleration period in 1911 represent important changes in the environment of labor inclusion related to the shifting fortunes of the two competing models of labor politics. With an institutional and comparative perspective as the point of departure, the closure of all institutional channels of inclusion by June 1907, and the restoration of lowest inclusion, represents an at least equally important milestone in this process.
However, despite the difficulties of determining the exact point in time, when the increase in repression changed the respective fortunes of bolshevism and menshevism in general, and the prospects of party unity in a quasi-revolutionary, mass-based, and democratic framework in particular, the general causal relation suggested here remains valid: when the fifth party congress of May/June 1907 saw the defeat of Menshevism, the advent of reaction was already all too clear, although the final blow to the semi-constitutonal experiment occurred only a few weeks later. Thus, the restoration of lowest inclusion and the according decline of opportunities for mass-based social democracy resulted in the first step away from party unity, and toward the decline of the Menshevik party model already at this point in time. This started a process that would catapult the Bolshevik model of labor politics into a dominant position throughout the following years before the 1917 revolutions. To use Schwarz’ (1967, 244) words, after the restoration of lowest inclusion, “Social Democracy found itself where it had been before the Days of Freedom.”

During the period of limited freedom from October 1905 to June 1907, the RSDRP thus came closer to party unity than at any other point in its history. But the incipient movement toward effective unification as one important prerequisite of ‘systemness’ was cut short by the restoration of lowest inclusion. During the ‘years’ of freedom, Menshevik parallel organizations had been largely, but not completely, dissolved, while the quasi-revolutionary party model had become the point of convergence for the entire party. Local Bolshevik parallel organizations were significantly weakened or even abandoned, so that only a certain group of non-conciliatory Bolsheviki under the leadership of Lenin continued to oppose party unity and entertain parallel party bodies. The restoration of lowest inclusion after June 1907 narrowed the organizational opportunities for the open, democratic, and mass-based party model of the Mensheviki. The increase in repression and exclusion also contributed to an increasing popularity of the ‘pure’ Bolshevik model of labor politics within and beyond the RSDRP.

The third element of ‘systemness’ discussed here is concerned with the extent to which an effective hierarchical party organization existed from 1905 to 1907. This issue is somewhat related to the theme of party unity, as Keep (1963) illustrates. He argues that the efforts of the party’s central committee to coordinate local activities into a coherent national organization continued to be seriously hampered by the party schism, even during this period of the most conciliatory climate within the RSDRP. Keep (1963) also provides the most detailed and extensive discussion about the internal organization of the party from 1905 to 1907. The growing number of rank and file members and worker activists often collided with the doctrinaire perspective of the intellectuals, who continued to control the party. But the influence of regular workers and a broad scope of party members was significantly larger than before 1905.

Swain (1983) also observes that the nature of party organization changed throughout the ‘years of freedom’. The somewhat greater opportunities for open political engagement during this time period were exploited to implement a more democratic internal structure. The election of delegates to the Fourth Party
Congress of 1906 in Stockholm is the most important piece of evidence for these efforts in terms of the nationwide party organization. Schwarz (1967) adds more explicitly that the democratization of the party structure occurred in the majority of localities almost immediately after the 1905 revolution. At the same time, clandestine operations continued to be an important element of party life even during the ‘years of freedom’, in addition to the open mass-based activities, such as public meetings, party assemblies, or a wide variety of propaganda activities, all of which had become much more feasible after October 1905.

The conclusion regarding the internal organization of the RSDRP is somewhat similar to those about the membership base and the extent of party unity. During the years of freedom, the RSDRP under the control of the Mensheviki made important steps toward the establishment of an effective, hierarchically organized, and democratic organization. If the extent of labor inclusion had remained at the bottom of the low category from this time period, or even increased over time, it is most likely that this incipient development would have resulted into the accomplishment of systemness in this particular respect. However, low inclusion was terminated in June 1907, in favor of a restoration of lowest inclusion. This evolution of labor inclusion significantly reduced the opportunities for an open and effective mass-based form of organization after 1907, and transformed the environment of inclusion to a situation, in which insurrectionist models emerged as the optimal response again.

The causal relationship between degrees of inclusion and the shifting fortunes of quasi-revolutionary and insurrectionist models of labor politics becomes even more apparent, when considering the regional variation in labor inclusion during the ‘years of freedom’, noted by Keep (1963, 168). Despite the increase of labor inclusion during this time period, the activities of local committees remained under the close supervision of the police, and were often times hampered by police interventions. In those areas of the empire that had already been comparatively less repressive during the pre-1905 era, generally the ethnically non-Russian regions, local repression was also less pronounced in between October 1905 and June 1907. It was in precisely these regions, where local social democratic groups resembled most closely the Western example of a mass-based, democratic, and effectively organized social democratic party.

Fourth, the communication between center and periphery of the organization represents another prerequisite of ‘systemness’. No hierarchically organized party can be considered institutionalized without it. The production and distribution of papers, magazines, and pamphlets for internal as well as external communication had already been one of the primary activities of social democrats before 1905. The presence of low inclusion during the following ‘years of freedom’ implies that significant impediments regarding the party’s ability to disseminate its printed materials still existed. But other than before 1905, the feasibility of such efforts was somewhat enhanced, through a policy of greater toleration, and through the new constitutional references to political liberties.
Considering the repressive environment, the number of theoretical journals as well as papers geared at a mass audience that had already existed before 1905, was certainly impressive. But the productivity of social democratic communication efforts increased significantly during the years of freedom. Keep (1963) estimates that more than a million copies of printed material were distributed in 1905 alone. One can therefore safely assume that every party activist in the ‘periphery’ of the organization had access to communications from the center. As a consequence, it needs to be concluded that this particular prerequisite of ‘systemness’ was present during the 1905 to 1907 period.

In addition to these four major issues, important steps toward systemness can also be observed in a number of other ways. First, the parliamentary activities of the party’s Duma representatives have not only contributed to the ‘external institutionalization’ of the party during this time period. They were also relevant in helping to solidify the hold of the quasi-revolutionary over the insurrectionist party model during the ‘years of freedom’. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy lives through the combination of a long term revolutionary perspective with pragmatic day-to-day activities, not the least of which is the engagement in parliamentary politics. Swain (1983) observes that “during those twenty months of Russia’s constitutional experiment, Social Democrats were gradually, yet successfully acquiring the parliamentary skills of their western brothers.” This practice contributed to strengthening the necessary pragmatic component of the quasi-revolutionary party model. Second, the social democrats also actively fostered the formation of trade unions and pursued more cooperative form of interaction with them. Unlike the bolshevik approach, which seeks to completely subordinate the unions, this is another marking of a mass-based social democratic party. And eventually, it was during the ‘years of freedom’ that social democrats began to be regarded by workers to a more significant extent than ever before as the legitimate representative of their political interests (cf. Keep 1963).

In all of these respects, however, important qualifications regarding the relative success of these efforts have to be made, which are similar to the previous arguments about the defining features of ‘systemness’. Despite the acquisition of practical parliamentary skills, intellectual strife detached from the worker constituency continued during the years of freedom. Steps toward more effective cooperation with the unions and other non-party associations were made, and the legitimacy of the RSDRP’s claim to represent the interests of labor was more widely recognized. Nonetheless, in many domains of the larger worker constituency, the organized labor movement, and even the party itself, the intellectual leaders of the party were often times still perceived as an alien phenomenon.366

The preceding paragraphs have evaluated the extent to which the RSDRP has accomplished ‘systemness’ as one of two defining elements of a party’s internal institutionalization. The fundamental

366 See Haimson (1955) and Ascher (1972), who place particular emphasis on this issue of elite-mass relations.
pattern of the argument about social integration as the second one of these elements is similar to this preceding discussion. Social integration through the successful implementation of a dominant ideological form was closer at hand during the years of freedom than any other period in the party’s development. But it was never fully accomplished in the limited time from October 1905 to June 1907, during which low inclusion was in place. The restoration of lowest inclusion after the years of freedom significantly reduced the opportunities for continuing on a path in that direction.

The basic contours of a quasi-revolutionary party model for the Russian environment had been outlined by Akselrod and Martov in the intellectual battle with the Bolsheviki after the initial party split in 1903, on the basis of Plekhanov’s earlier pioneer work. Despite a number of inconsistencies and contradictions that had been noted above, the most important limits to the social integrative capacity of their ideological model were rooted elsewhere. The dilemma was twofold: in the first place, before 1905, the Mensheviki were unable to imprint their ideological model on an effective party organization, since no such organization existed. For quasi-revolutionary social democracy to be viable as a social integrative mechanism, an effective framework for the dissemination and practice of the party model is necessary. The “organization for the revolution” that is a defining element of quasi-revolutionary social democracy requires an effective party organization that is capable of establishing itself as a nucleus and center for the wide variety of political, social, and cultural activities, through which workers are supposed to ‘organize’ themselves.

Quasi-revolutionary social democracy was more successfully practiced in some cases, such as Germany or Belgium, than in others, such as Italy or Argentina. The extent of success is not the relevant issue here; it is the question whether an effective party organization as the most fundamental prerequisite for the implementation of such a model was in existence. In the case of Russia, this was clearly not the case before October 1905, as has been outlined above. The Mensheviki were therefore incapable of imprinting their ideological model onto an effective party organization as a prerequisite for social integration.

The second part of the dilemma of the quasi-revolutionary ideological model before 1905 comes as the difficulty of practicing this form of social integration in an environment of lowest inclusion. Again, the issue here is not to judge the extent to which some parties were better able than others to successfully practice the kind of social integration through a multitude of social, cultural, and political activities. This argument is about how in the case of Russia before 1905, the environment that is most fruitful for the emergence of a quasi-revolutionary party model did not exist. Quite to the contrary, the presence of lowest inclusion greatly reduced the opportunities for establishing the party as the integrating center for a wide network of labor activities, by outlawing and actively persecuting such efforts, to a greater extent than in those low inclusion cases, where the possibility of labor activities was at least precarious, rather than completely restricted.
The evolution of labor inclusion from lowest to low through the onset of the ‘years of freedom’ in October 1905 contributed to alleviate the effects from both aspects of this fundamental dilemma for the quasi-revolutionary party model suggested by the Mensheviks. First, an effective party organization that would be able to carry the social integrative mechanisms of the quasi-revolutionary model was at least on the rise (‘systemness’). This development, as we have seen above, occurred as a direct consequence of the introduction of low inclusion. Second, crossing the threshold to low inclusion created an optimal environment for the practice of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. It allowed, at least in the most minimal sense, for the forms of organization and cooperation in between the various pillars of the labor movement that quasi-revolutionary social democracy requires. It thus made the model materially more feasible, but also a more plausible choice both for labor elites and the larger worker constituency. The incipient success of quasi-revolutionary social democracy to establish itself as the legitimate representative of its constituency, and the increasingly successful efforts at cooperation with the unions during this time period were noted above in a different context. These developments can also serve as important pieces of evidence for the validity of the causal connection between degrees of inclusion and the fortunes of various models of labor politics suggested here.

Moreover, the establishment of common ground between Mensheviks and the conciliator Bolsheviks opened a window of opportunity for the establishment of a social integrative ideology even beyond the more narrow confines of the Menshevik faction. The compromise formulas that were hammered out during the fourth party congress are one of the most apparent practical manifestations of this trend. But despite the more favorable environment of low inclusion during the years of freedom, a party agenda on the basis of a quasi-revolutionary form of social democratic ideology was never formally codified by the RSDRP. The contours of this ideological orientation existed on the drawing board, an effective party organization that could have carried the approach was on the rise, and the most favorable environment for quasi-revolutionary social democracy, low labor inclusion, was in the making since the 1905 revolution. But the last step of formally codifying a quasi-revolutionary social integrative ideology on top of these background conditions was never successfully accomplished. The internal pressure from the dogmatic bolsheviki around Lenin, who continued to push for a party of an entirely different kind was an important factor that helped to prevent this from happening. Under the impression of rising repression toward the middle of the year 1907, the Bolshevik faction was successful in establishing a majority position at the May/June 1907 party congress.

The same basic argument that has already been made in terms of ‘systemness’ also applies to an explanation for the failure to fully accomplish ‘social integration’ through the establishment of quasi-revolutionary social democracy as a dominant ideological form. The window of opportunity for such an event was much too small, as it lasted only from October 1905 to June 1907, and important steps toward
reversing the provision of at least low inclusion already occurred before that point in time. With the abandonment of low inclusion, the more favorable environment for quasi-revolutionary social democracy disappeared. On the basis of my causal argument, the failure of a quasi-revolutionary social integrative ideology is therefore to be expected.

The restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907 is therefore of crucial importance for understanding the overall failure of mass-based social democracy. A number of steps toward the successful institutionalization of quasi-revolutionary social democracy had been made during the period of low inclusion from October 1905 to June 1907. The RSDRP had become ‘externally institutionalized’ through the involvement in the 1905 revolution and a number of other ways. The party, dominated by the Menshevik faction during this time, also came close to ‘systemness’ and the establishment of a social integrative ideology than ever before or after, but without ever fully achieving these goals.

The beginning of the semi-constitutional experiment in 1905 thus functioned as a catalyst that helped to set free a number of political forces. It opened an officially legitimized public space for political debate. It raised public involvement and hopes for fundamental political change. And it triggered the formation of mass based political organizations. These developments apply to all social groups at the time, but they were particularly pronounced for workers and their organizations. In these respects, 1905 could have been the beginning of a development, in which inclusion above the lowest level would have led to a more permanent dominance of non-insurrectionist, mass-based, participatory models of labor politics. However, the restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907 effectively ended this path. As a consequence, the opening of a window of opportunity for inclusion, followed by the abrupt termination of the experiment, provided an additional impetus for the increasing dominance of insurrectionism, and thereby ultimately the overthrow of the autocracy. To those workers that were mobilized into the political arena during the ‘years of freedom’, non-insurrectionist models that might have sounded plausible and appealing at the time, increasingly came to be out of touch with the new post 1907 political reality. Nonetheless, even after the reaction of June 1907, a significant number of labor activists continued to pursue, in a somewhat adjusted form, the Mensheviks’ approach of a mass-based, democratically organized social democratic party in an environment of lowest inclusion.

The decline of Menshevism after the restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907

This section will discuss the interaction between lowest labor inclusion and the corresponding decline in the opportunities for mass-based social democracy after June 1907 until the end of the autocratic regime in February 1917. At the most fundamental level, I am arguing that the restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907 has significantly reversed the fortunes of insurrectionist and quasi-revolutionary party models,
compared to the background of low inclusion during the ‘years of freedom’. This almost controlled environment in the case of Russia allows me to describe one of the most effective pieces of evidence for the causal argument I am suggesting. If low inclusion is conducive to the emergence of mass-based social democracy, while lowest inclusion favors insurrectionism, then the evolution of labor inclusion from low to lowest after June 1907 should result in an increasing dominance of bolshevism and the continuing failure to successfully establish a quasi-revolutionary party model.

This is precisely what happened after June 1907, not all at once, but gradually. The preceding ‘years of freedom’ had given birth to an incipient mass base of party activists, a politically minded union movement and other forms of labor associations involved in politics. These rank and file labor elites did not immediately turn their back on the idea of a mass-based party in response to the reaction of 1907. As a creation of an earlier time period, which was characterized by low inclusion, they continued to strive for the establishment of a mass-based quasi-revolutionary party, even in the restored context of lowest inclusion. Their efforts found an ideological expression through Trotsky’s specification of the Menshevik model in response to the new situation, in which a remainder of the earlier incipient mass movement coexisted with the clandestine operations of the party (cf. Swain 1983). The hopes for the success of this approach were sustained for a few years after the June 1907 restoration, even though at that point in time, labor inclusion most clearly passed the threshold from low to lowest inclusion again. After an initial massive clampdown on labor activities along with the June 1907 restoration, the time from 1908 to 1911 saw an absolute minimum of toleration for some of the remaining politically involved labor organizations, or at the very least an unwillingness to suppress them even more viciously. After the replacement of Stolypin with the ultra-conservative Kokovtso as chairman of the council of ministers in September 1911, even this minimum of restraint was eventually abandoned. It is in this context that bolshevism as the optimal response to such an environment eventually emerged as the dominant model of labor politics in Russia. The decline of the Mensheviks in organizational capacity and public appeal represents the flipside to the emerging dominance of the bolsheviks in this environment of lowest inclusion. Menshevik demise was somewhat adjourned in between 1908 and 1911, when some headway was made in forging a new type of quasi-revolutionary social democratic party through the integration of clandestine and open activities. After 1911, however, the trend of Menshevism was entirely downward, while the fortunes of Bolshevism were steadily rising.

Swain (1983, p. 24) observes that immediately after June 1907, the Mensheviks “were loath to admit that the experiment in western-style Social Democracy had been brought to an end by Stolypin’s coup.” According to Ascher (1976), the fortunes of Menshevism started to improve again beginning in 1908, evidenced by the emergence of three strong Menshevik centers in Russia: an underground organization in Georgia, a local chapter in Petersburg, and in a number of localities, the engagement of praktiki, who were involved in tolerated activities, such as workers’ clubs, cooperatives, educational facilities, and
inconspicuous events such as the 1909 temperance congress. This form of toleration is one of the few loopholes left open by the autocracy in between 1908 and 1911. The existence of such loopholes justifies my earlier assessment that despite overall lowest inclusion, some limited forms of labor activities originating from the previous period of low inclusion were tolerated by the state during this time.

Swain (1983) argues that these loopholes combined with the limited ability of the autocracy to effectively persecute all manifestations of political activity, provided a sufficient underpinning for the reemergence of a mass-based party through the combination of open and clandestine activities. In addition to their involvement in labor clubs and associations, the Menshevik also made a renewed attempt to pursue their political goals through cooperation with the unions. As noted above, unions were allowed to exist after October 1905, under extremely restrictive rules. They were not allowed to establish federations with other unions, organize above the local level, cooperate with political parties and groups, or more generally be politically involved at all. Political activity within and through the unions was therefore an extremely delicate affair. But despite such adverse conditions, the Menshevik made some headway in strengthening their ties with the trade union movement, and within the unions, a dedicated core of social democratic activists existed. These efforts have to be considered as even more consequential, if one takes into account that a solidification of union membership occurred throughout the years 1908 and 1909, after a general decline toward the end of the ‘years of freedom’. 367

The limited presence of social democratic deputies in the Duma provided the Menshevik with a third avenue of tolerated activities that could be connected to the realm of clandestine operations in the pursuit of a mass-based party. The Duma representatives themselves established direct ties to the unions in between 1908 and 1911. But even more importantly, although the socialist members of the Duma had to formally renounce any ties to a political party, they accepted the right of the party’s central committee to steer their activities. Initially, the deputies argued that the direct dependency on party bodies complicated their work within the Duma. But eventually, they accepted the right of the Central Committee to veto their recommendations and plans (cf. Swain 1983).

The intensification of ties between clandestine and tolerated activities went hand in hand with a temporary change in the party’s internal balance of power as the center of gravity switched from the somewhat detached émigré to the more pragmatic Russian activists. Under the impression of practical cooperation and the fusion of tolerated and underground work at the local level, some steps were taken to translate these efforts on the ground into a formally codified party model. Trotsky was one of the most vocal and engaged proponents of this approach. In essence, his ‘party model’ did not represent a deviation from the earlier formulation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in Russia. It only stands for a further

367 See Swain (1983), who also provides the numerical evidence.
clarification as to how a mass-based quasi-revolutionary party can be accomplished in an environment of lowest inclusion. The most basic formula of this model was the achievement of party unity and the integration of tolerated activities into the organizational hierarchy of the underground party. As a consequence of these considerations, it is only plausible that the Menshevik attempted to imprint this strategy on the RSDRP as a whole rather than relying on their own separate organizational bodies. These were maintained throughout the entire post 1907 development, but it was only after 1912 that the split between the two factions was finally sealed.

Efforts to translate the integration of tolerated and underground activities into a formal resolution and an according refinement of the RSDRP’s plan of organization occurred at the local level beginning in Autumn 1909. At that point in time, meetings of social democratic trade union activists in Petersburg and Moscow decided in favor of the integration approach, against the liquidation of the underground party, but also against Lenin’s approach of focusing exclusively on clandestine activities and limiting the party to a narrow group of professional revolutionaries. Both meetings expressed their intent to contribute to the establishment of a single unified, mass-based party, designed to preside over tolerated and underground activities at the same time.

The debate was elevated to the national level during the January 1910 plenum session of the RSDRP’s central committee in Paris. The meeting voted in favor of the unity approach, and agreed to undertake a number of practical steps to work toward the integration of tolerated and underground activities. These steps included the launching of a single party newspaper to replace the wide variety of local and factional publishing efforts. But the most far reaching proposal was the invitation of social democrats engaged in tolerated activities, and without formal representation in party bodies, to the next party congress. Even the possibility of granting them voting rights was discussed, and then delegated to the authority of the congress itself.

These decisions are entirely at odds with the dogmatic bolshevik notion of an ultra-centralized party relying exclusively on a narrow scope of members, who act as ‘professional revolutionaries’. Swain (1983) therefore argues that the vote of the Central Committee reversed the earlier victory of the Bolshevik in imprinting their party model on the RSDRP from the Fifth Party Congress in May/June 1907. This interpretation is only true to a limited extent, however. It is correct that the Central Committee decided against the Bolshevik model of a narrow and entirely underground party at its January 1910 meeting. But at the same time, this decision did not formally reverse the vote of the Fifth Party Congress, which is the highest decision-making body of the party. Despite many efforts, the Menshevik organizational model and the strategy of integrating tolerated and illegal activities would never be successfully passed at an official congress of the entire RSDRP.
A sixth all-party congress after the Bolshevik dominated fifth congress of May/June 1907 was never actually held. The so-called ‘sixth party conference’ of January 1912 was convened in Prague. Lenin announced his event as a congress for the entire party, but it was not recognized by the Mensheviks as an official party event. The abstention of the Mensheviks gave the dogmatic Bolsheviks the opportunity to assemble the conciliatory Bolsheviks and other activists, who were previously less strongly attached to Lenin’s suggestions, under their banner of a ‘purely’ Bolshevik party organization. Lenin and his supporters were thus able to broaden the appeal of their party model, while the Mensheviks lost valuable support and resources, which they needed for their vision of a mass-based social democratic party. It gave the Bolsheviks the opportunity to pronounce themselves as the true ‘heirs’ of the assets – both material and symbolic – that belonged to the RSDRP at large.

The formalization of the party split became complete, when the Mensheviks refused to accept the decisions of the congress, and rejected the authority of the newly elected Central Committee. The March 1912 “All Party Meeting” organized by Trotsky in Paris was not attended by the Bolsheviks. It effectively functioned as the final constitution of Menshevism as a separate party, distinct from their earlier Bolshevik comrades. The official split of the small social democratic Duma group along factional lines in Autumn 1913 completed the schism. These final steps toward the formal split of social democracy into two entirely self-contained party organizations in 1912 and 1913 marks the end of the Menshevik hopes to use the broader RSDRP as an organizational vessel for their model of labor politics.

The membership of the RSDRP had already declined to 10,000 by 1911, from a peak of 84,300 in 1907. About half of these were Bolsheviks. The other half were Mensheviks and their affiliated groups, most importantly the Bundists. We had already shown before that even during the ‘years’ of freedom, the mass-based nature of Russian social democracy was precarious at best. After 1907, through the massive decline in membership, the party now definitely fell short of this most important prerequisite for considering Russian quasi-revolutionary social democracy successfully institutionalized. In addition to the failure of establishing a true mass base, the lack of ‘systemness’ also finds its expression in the ongoing erosion of an hierarchical party organization, and the lack of effective links between an organizing center and the ‘periphery’. ‘Social integration’ through the establishment of a dominant ideological form also continued to be beyond the reach of the Mensheviks. First of all, there was no effective party organization on which to imprint such a model. And second, as shown above, even through those party functions and conventions that were still in existence, the Mensheviks never succeeded to formally codify their party model as the dominant ideological orientation of the RSDRP.

368 Even Swain (1983), who is clearly the most optimistic with respect to the potential of a mass-based social democratic party in Russia does not deny this. The same assessment is even more pronounced in Ascher (1972)
After the formal split of 1912 and 1913, the Menshevik built their hopes on their separate organizational structures, but a number of activists would continue to believe that party unity could become possible again at some point in time in the future. However, suffice it to say at this point that the development in between 1913 and 1917, as well as after the October Revolution, did not justify any such hopes. Menshevism was on the decline, further away from ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’ than ever before, while bolshevism emerged as the dominant model of labor politics. These developments after 1913 will be discussed more extensively in a later section, when the focus of attention is switched to the rise of Bolshevism as the flipside to Menshevik demise. The brief return of Menshevism after the February revolution in 1917 will be discussed in the following section.

The ability of the Menshevik to halt their descent and to establish some ties in between open and clandestine activities from 1908 to 1911 is not much disputed in the literature. Swain (1983), however, emphasizes the possibility of party unity and mass-based social democracy more strongly than other authors. He might be too optimistic about the prospects of such a development. But at the same time, he makes two very important contributions. First, he is more keenly aware of the effects of low inclusion during the years of freedom on the prospects of mass-based social democracy after June 1907. Second, he highlights, and justifies through a detailed empirical analysis, the possibility of party unity and the successful institutionalization of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, even under the particularly adverse conditions of lowest inclusion after June 1907. He makes a convincing case about the ongoing efforts at establishing a unified and mass-based social democratic party in between 1908 and 1911.

It is an important methodological and substantive premise of my argument that social democratic party formation is possible in an environment of lowest inclusion. This distinguishes the lowest category of labor incorporation in modernizing societies from the subsequent totalitarian and a number of authoritarian regimes, in which the formation of mass-based opposition parties was outside the ‘possibility space’. Swain (1983) provides support for this premise most explicitly, but other authors concerned with the development of social democracy after 1907 present similar evidence about the ongoing project of the Menshevik to establish a mass-based party during this time period as well. The problem of Swain’s interpretation is about the way in which he equates the possibility of mass-based party formation with its optimality or desirability as a choice of labor elites. From his perspective, putting it very simply, the approach of the Menshevik to pursue a unified mass-based party is inherently superior to the Bolshevik model of labor politics, and party unity is treated as a desirable thing in and of itself. According to Swain

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369 See Mahoney and Goertz (2004) and the earlier discussion of this issue in the methodology section of chapter 2.
370 See Ascher (1972, 1976), and Keep (1963)
the cause for the failure of the inherently good things unity and mass-based social democracy is the inherently bad political obstructionism of Lenin and his supporters.

This evaluation of bolshevism might be true in a normative sense, with respect to Lenin’s political style, and in particular when looking at the later transformation of Russian communism and the development of the Soviet Union into a totalitarian state. But if the analytical focus is on the benefit-cost ratio of both models at the time, the Menshevik approach is by no means superior. Quite to the contrary, under the given conditions of lowest inclusion in Russia, in particular after 1911, bolshevism is the inherently more rewarding model of labor politics. It is undeniable that Lenin never wanted party unity, and pursued all sorts of political maneuvers to obstruct efforts in that direction. However, considering that bolshevism entailed a significantly more rewarding benefit-cost ratio than quasi-revolutionary social democracy, his pursuit of a bolshevik model of labor politics is entirely rational, and has indeed contributed to the successful institutionalization of bolshevism as the optimal response to the Russian environment of lowest inclusion.

Menshevism during the revolutionary year 1917

The development of Menshevism during the revolutionary year 1917 was the result of another brief window of opportunity created by the overthrow of the autocracy through the February revolution. It could have resulted in the formation of a mass-based social democratic party, if the brief period of provisional political freedom after the February revolution had resulted in a permanent establishment of participatory institutions rather than the Bolshevik coup d’état. The shifting fortunes of Menshevism and Bolshevism in between February and October 1917 almost represent a spitting image of the long term development from 1905 to 1917. The 1917 popular revolution brought the Mensheviks to the forefront of events during the following few months. A similar development had happened in 1905 and the subsequent ‘years of freedom’. The extent of involvement in the revolution and the relevance of social democratic activities, however, were much more pronounced in 1917, of course. The Bolsheviks were initially in the back seat during these two time periods, but they would eventually emerge as dominant in both of them. After 1907, the institutionalization of bolshevism and the decline of Menshevism were the result of the restoration of lowest labor inclusion. After February 1917, the Mensheviks made important steps toward institutionalization as a mass-based party, for as long as provisional political freedom and the prospect of stable participatory institutions existed. With the increasing instability through the effects of the war, and the ongoing duopoly of power by the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, the appeal of the Bolsheviks was on the rise again (cf. Pipes 1990).
In essence, quasi-revolutionary social democracy reaffirmed its ‘external institutionalization’ through the involvement in the February revolution of 1917. With the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of provisional political freedoms, the ‘window of opportunity’ for the successful institutionalization of the Menshevik party model was much wider than after October 1905. But it lasted effectively for only about half a year, not enough time for the Menshevik to permanently accomplish ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’ as prerequisites for translating their party model into a political reality. Moreover, while there was no more tsarist police to persecute party meetings, the war and the extremely volatile domestic situation in Russia made this time period a less than ideal environment for the emergence of an institutionalized mass-based party, despite the provision of higher inclusion. The membership of the Menshevik in between 1917 and 1918 mirrors the earlier pattern of development from 1905 to 1907. After a brief peak, here with 200,000 members in August 1917, and still 120,000 members in December 1917, only around 60,000 were left in May 1918, and a constant and rapid demise occurred thereafter.\footnote{The numbers presented by Liebich (1997) are unfortunately a bit too uncritical. These are not official figures of dues paying members, and can therefore not be compared to the numbers from 1905 to 1917. These numbers include a great number of general supporters and individuals that might have identified with the party, or might even have been involved on some occasion, without, however, becoming a permanent party member.}

During the February revolution, the foundation of the Petrograd Soviet and the following spring of 1917, the Menshevik, along with the Socialist Revolutionaries, were the leading political group. In response to this situation, conciliatory bolshevism was on the rise again for a limited period of time. Liebich (1997) argues that the balance of power became reversed in favor of the bolshevik around August 1917. The attempted coup d’etat by General Kornilov led to a swing in mass opinion toward the Bolsheviks, an increase of support in the Petrograd Soviet, and eventually a plurality of Bolsheviks in the Second Congress of Soviets. The Mensheviks also stood on the sidelines during the Bolshevik coup in October 1917. They only received 1 Mio. votes in the elections for the constituent assembly, while the Bolsheviki obtained 9 Mio. votes.

After their seizure of power in October 1917, the Bolsheviki dispersed the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. The Mensheviki protested this blatant disregard for earlier commitments, but they never launched an outright counter offensive against the new regime. Liebich (1997) argues that the most important cause for this restraint is rooted in continuing feelings of solidarity with their former comrades, and a desire to not ‘betray’ their constituency. But in addition to that, I believe that the quasi-revolutionary nature of their party model represents another important causal factor. Unlike the insurrectionist bolshevik model, the Mensheviki felt much more bound to a legalistic approach in the new environment after February 1917 that promised the prospect of a legitimate constitutional order. Even when the Bolsheviks disregarded these rules, the Mensheviki sought to continue their political interventions through the limited...
opportunities that were still available to them after October 1917, rather than through a counter revolutionary effort.

The successful institutionalization of menshevism as a quasi-revolutionary mass-based party had not become impossible immediately after October 1917. For a brief transition period, Mensheviki found themselves in a precarious environment, where some avenues of political involvement still existed. But the trend toward the complete repression of oppositional forces by the Bolsheviki was already all too obvious at that time. The Menshevik press was the first target of the new Bolshevik regime. Their papers in Petrograd were raided only a few days after the Bolshevik seizure of power. The same happened to the wide variety of other Menshevik publications that had sprung up after the February revolution. By July 1918, the entire Menshevik press was shut down. Because the Mensheviks pursued a strict course of legal activity within the Soviet system, they did not establish a permanent underground press.

Until 1922, the Mensheviki continued to participate in Soviet elections, and would appear in a variety of public meetings. By 1919, they were still present in various local Soviets, especially in the South. Mensheviks were invited to speak at the seventh congress of Soviets in December 1919 and the eighth congress, after the end of the civil war, in December 1920. Around the same time, there were still 45 Mensheviks among the 1800 members of the Moscow Soviet, while by the summer of 1921, only 18 delegates were left. Mensheviks would also be allowed to speak on a variety of public platforms and to be involved in debates within a number of local Soviets from 1921 to 1922. During this entire time period from 1917 to 1922, the remaining Mensheviki regarded themselves as a loyal opposition within the Soviet system, a perspective they would continue to adhere to even during their following years of exile.

The end to this transition period and the outright persecution and abolishment of all forms of Menshevik involvement occurred in 1922. The hopes of Menshevism that a legalistic approach, an end to the civil war, and the establishment of order would lead to a liberalization of the Bolshevik regime were not justified. At this point in time, and even more so with the increasing effectiveness of the Soviet Union’s repressive apparatus, the formation of a mass-based social democratic party had become impossible. Under lowest inclusion in modernizing societies as the most repressive and least inclusive category studied in this dissertation, social democratic party formation is difficult to accomplish, but, as the previous analysis of Menshevism after June 1907 has shown, not impossible. Through the significantly more effective pursuit of repression in modern totalitarian and some modern authoritarian regimes, party formation moves beyond the ‘possibility space’.

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372 See Liebich (1997) for a comprehensive overview of Menshevik activities and the increase of Bolshevik repression in between 1917 and 1922.
Conclusion

Russia is a particularly important case for my explanatory interest, because it allows for an analysis about the effects of labor inclusion on mass-based social democracy in an almost controlled environment. An overall lowest degree of inclusion throughout the entire formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena in between 1883 and 1917 is interrupted for a brief period of time by a temporary switch to low inclusion from October 1905 to June 1907, through the provision of enfranchisement, limited political liberties and a less permanent extent of repressive behavior by the state executive. The observed reaction of labor elites and the labor movement at large to the evolution of labor inclusion represents an important piece of evidence for the causal connection between degrees of inclusion and models of labor politics suggested in this dissertation.

Before 1905 and during the revolution, Russian conditions of lowest inclusion have given rise to the bolshevik model as an innovation in labor politics. It is no small wonder that the combination of ideological and organizational proposals inherent in bolshevism emerged in this particular environment. During the ‘years of freedom’ as a limited time period of low inclusion, the rise of bolshevism was interrupted, as a direct result of the changing external environment. As a flipside to this development, quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which represents the optimal response to a background of low inclusion, was on the rise during this time period. After the very limited emergence of a mass-based social democratic party before 1905, Menshevism as the Russian variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy came closer to successful institutionalization during this time period than ever before in its history. The Menshevik accomplished ‘external institutionalization’ through their involvement in the 1905 revolution, and for a brief period of time, in between October 1905 and June 1907, they scratched the threshold of ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration.

The end of the semi-constitutional experiment in June 1907 and the restoration of lowest inclusion then resulted in the predicted reversal of the respective fortunes of Menshevism and Bolshevism. The insurrectionist, ultra-centralized, and elitist model of the Bolsheviki was better suited to the reestablished environment of lowest inclusion, and accordingly, Bolshevism gradually emerged as dominant after 1907, while the quasi-revolutionary mass-based party model started to decline. The continuing existence of some limited loopholes for political organization in between 1908 and 1911, albeit in a general context of lowest inclusion, allowed some of the mass-based and open party structures founded during the ‘years of freedom’ to survive during this time period. After 1911, however, in the context of an even further intensification of repression, quasi-revolutionary social democracy was ultimately defeated, and bolshevism emerged as the dominant model of labor politics in Russia.
In a sense, the revolutionary year 1917 represents a condensed version of the previous long term developments. After the February revolution, Menshevism became dominant briefly under the provisional liberal conditions before the October Revolution. This is also to be expected, since the provision of opportunities for mass-based political organization were significantly increased during this time period, thereby favoring the Menshevik approach that requires at least some limited institutional inclusion. The preferences of labor activists and the larger constituency would swing back toward Bolshevism beginning in August 1917, as a consequence of the ongoing war, increasing instability and socio-economic misery. The final consolidation of the new bolshevik regime following on a precarious transition period from 1917 to 1922 eventually rendered mass-based social democratic party formation impossible.

**Bolshevism as the optimal response to the Russian environment of labor inclusion**

The institutionalization of bolshevism as a viable model of labor politics in Russia is the flipside to the failure of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which has just been discussed, as well as other models of labor politics. The overall lowest degree of inclusion in Russia during labor’s entry into the political arena created the conditions for both these developments. In this environment, the quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary variants of mass-based social democracy were suboptimal choices, while bolshevism represented the optimal response. An analysis into the institutionalization of bolshevism thus provides further evidence for the causal connection between degrees of inclusion and the decisions of labor elites. It also helps to illustrate the conditions, under which social democracy is most likely to emerge, by understanding, for the case of Russia, an environment that is not conducive to the formation of either one of the two types of social democratic parties.

Bolshevism has established itself as the dominant model of labor politics in Russia in two different contexts: first of all, throughout the overall development of labor’s formative stage in the political arena, in between 1883 and 1917; and secondly, during the revolutionary year 1917 itself. It should be noted that the focus of the analysis to be conducted here is on the relative dominance of bolshevism as a model of labor politics, when compared to the remaining approaches, which have been introduced before. It is not an explanation for the eventual success of the bolsheviki in their seizure of power. But the prior institutionalization of bolshevism as a viable party model is, of course, a prerequisite for that subsequent event.

Since much of the historical evidence has already been introduced throughout the preceding sections, the following analysis will be comparatively brief. In the first place, I am going to outline the ideological and organizational contours of the bolshevik model of labor politics. Secondly, I will trace the historical development of the bolsheviki into an institutionalized party of a new kind. The emphasis here will be on
the developments after June 1907. Based on this background, the indicators for the successful institutionalization of bolshevism will be discussed.

The contours of bolshevism

In our previous discussion of early Russian marxism before the initial party split of 1903, I have outlined how Lenin’s bolshevik model of labor politics represented a unique combination of elements derived from marxism as an imported and populism as a natively Russian ideology. Lenin has always fashioned himself as the true representative of pure marxism, which was a label that carried much weight in the dogmatic discussions of the exiled social democratic intellectuals. It was important for him from a tactical point of view to appear that way. But objectively, his model of labor politics stands for an entirely undogmatic innovation that combined elements of populism and marxism with his own ideas about party organization and the strategic role of the party. The Mensheviks were the much more dogmatic marxists. Despite minor adjustments of the imported Western model to the Russian environment, their major concern was to act within the ideological boundaries provided by the vulgar marxist classics. The lack of dogmatism, in spite of his tactical protestations to the contrary, was the great strength of Lenin’s approach. It allowed him to fashion a model of labor politics that was better suited to the Russian environment than the imported quasi-revolutionary and evolutionary social democratic models. While Menshevism was forged in response to the challenge of Lenin’s party model after the publication of “What is to be done” in 1902 and the debates at the Second Party Congress of 1903, Lenin’s proposals emerged in response to the earlier debate with the Economists. A further elaboration on his initial suggestions occurred through his “Letter to a Comrade about our organizational tasks” from autumn 1902 and the 1904 publication of “Two steps forward, one step back”, which was a reply to the Menshevik critique of his proposals.

First, in terms of the role of the party and party-labor relations, Lenin regarded the party as the undisputed leader and indoctrinator of the working-class and the trade unions. This distinguishes the bolshevik approach from Menshevism. The Mensheviks also accorded primary importance to the political over the economic struggle, but they were willing to engage in a cooperative relationship with the unions. Lenin believed that without the guidance of the party, the “spontaneous” labor movement would become opportunistic and abandon revolutionary goals. This is most explicitly expressed in “One step forward, two steps back”. He argues that the party needs to establish a connection to the broader labor movement, but only to steer its inarticulate expressions into the right direction.

Second, Lenin’s vision of party organization is most different from the quasi-revolutionary, mass-based, and participatory approach of the Mensheviks. His own brief statement made in 1904 best captures the essence of his approach: “The organizational principle of revolutionary social democracy strives to
Already in “What is to be done”, Lenin coined the term “professional revolutionaries”. This small group of trustworthy party activists, whose only task in life is their political work, are supposed to provide the leadership for the semi-affiliated mass of workers. His narrow definition of party membership along these lines was the major issue of contention between the Bolsheviki and Mensheviki, who wanted a broader, more participatory definition, at the 1903 Party Congress. His “democratic centralist” model of party organization allowed for the possibility of internal debate before a decision is made. But it denied the practice of true participatory democracy by emphasizing the centralist aspect of the term, and the obedience of activists to the decisions of the party organs. This approach to party organization is not just different from the Menshevik’s idea of a participatory mass-based party. It also distinguishes the Bolsheviki from the neo-populist Socialist Revolutionaries, who emphasized greater local autonomy and were generally more loosely organized.

Third, bolshevism’s attitude toward industrialization is one of its characteristics derived from marxism. Unlike the populists, and similar to the other factions of the RSDRP, the Bolsheviks embraced industrialization and socio-economic development, both because it was inevitable, and because it created the working-class as the social actor that would bring about revolutionary change. In this fourth respect, the expectations regarding the historical subject of revolution, the bolsheviki represented a combination of populist and marxist influences. Bolshevism regarded the working-class as the decisive agent of the revolution, but already at an early point in time, and in particular during the revolutionary year of 1917, Lenin and his supporters realized the importance of reaching out to the Russian peasants. The Mensheviki, on the other hand, never made a comparable attempt, and remained confined to their more dogmatic marxist expectation that revolutionary change will occur through workers and workers alone. This issue also distinguishes bolshevism from the early ‘anti-industrialism’ populists, who placed their hopes exclusively on the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. The later neo-populist ‘Socialist Revolutionaries’ continued to receive much of their support in the countryside, but other than their ideological ancestors, they embraced industrial workers as an additional constituency.

Fifth, Lenin’s conception of the socialist revolution was initially congruent with the approach embraced by the Mensheviki. Both groups clung to Plekhanov’s elementary idea of a revolution in two stages: a bourgeois revolution that would occur with the support of the labor movement; and a socialist revolution that would be made by industrial workers against the bourgeoisie on the background of a liberal political system. Both Plekhanov and the Menshevik faction expected that a significant amount of time would have to elapse between these two stages, in order to allow for the further industrialization of Russia.

373 Lenin cited in Pipes (1990, 354)
and the growing strength of the labor movement as well as the institutionalization of a powerful mass-based party (cf. Schwarz 1967).

Throughout the revolutionary events of 1905, Lenin transformed Plekhanov’s concept into a uniquely bolshevik perspective on revolution that would further contribute to the schism between his and the Menshevik faction, who continued to embrace Plekhanov’s ideas. Lenin now argued that a socialist revolution would immediately follow on an initial political revolution. In both these stages, and not just during the socialist part, the party would play the leading role. In essence, it would stage a bourgeois revolution against the autocracy, the nobility, and the bourgeoisie. This approach and its deviation from the Menshevik conception is to some extent a logical consequence of the Bolshevik model of party organization. Unlike the quasi-revolutionary mass-based party of the Mensheviki, the bolshevik party of a new kind does not require liberal institutions in order to become a viable organization. A long gap between a first and second stage is therefore unnecessary, and even counterproductive, because it creates a situation, in which the momentum of revolutionary zeal might be lost, and workers might become subject to the twin dangers of opportunism and embourgeoisement.

In addition to that, the bolshevik conception of a socialist revolution is also closely related to their attitude about cooperation with the liberals, as the sixth dimension discussed here. Lenin rejected all cooperation with the parties of the bourgeoisie, while the Mensheviks adopted the generic quasi-revolutionary and vulgar marxist approach to engage in cooperation under “exceptional circumstances”. The weakness of the bourgeoisie and its probable inability to stage a liberal revolution by itself was one such exception, which made it possible for the Mensheviks to advocate social democratic support for the bourgeoisie in a first liberal stage of the revolution. They also saw the dilemma of worker embourgeoisement in this recommendation, since they wanted to keep the labor movement pure from opportunism and liberal influences. But the Mensheviki believed that this was the price they had to pay for a successful liberal revolution in the unique Russian environment of political repression and socio-economic backwardness, where the liberal forces were too weak to do it alone.

Lenin, on the other hand, did not need to concern himself with these problems. Unlike the mass-based party model of the Mensheviki, his ultra-centralized party of a new kind could flourish without a liberal stage before the socialist revolution. As a consequence, there was no need to cooperate with the liberals, and face the danger of compromising the revolutionary tendencies and the purity of the party. Seventh and lastly, one of the most fundamental differences between bolshevism and menshevism comes from their varying perspectives on how revolutionary change was to occur. Bolshevism is a voluntarist ideology, while one of the defining features of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is its determinism. The Mensheviki expected a revolutionary situation to be the logical, pre-determined, consequence of economic development. Marxism gave them the intellectual tools to read and understand this development. As a
result, the task of the party was to “organize itself for the revolution” and to be ready, once it comes about. The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, stood for an explicitly insurrectionist approach. If there was to be a successful revolution, it would have to be *made* by the party.

The evolution and institutionalization of bolshevism

The shifting fortunes of mass-based social democracy are inextricably related to the evolution of labor inclusion. The same is true for the model of labor politics proposed by the Bolsheviki, as the inversion of the Menshevik development. Periods of limited inclusion, most importantly from October 1905 to June 1907, which represented the only time period, where Russia passed the threshold from lowest to low inclusion, favored the Mensheviks’ quasi-revolutionary approach as the optimal response to such an environment. But a similar development can also be observed from 1908 to 1911, when some limited loopholes for political activity had spilled over from the earlier semi-constitutional period. From February to August 1917, the extent of inclusion was even greater, at the higher level, but the opportunities for the permanent institutionalization of a mass-based party were cut off through the bolshevik seizure of power.

Overall, however, labor inclusion in Russia was at the lowest level, with a particularly and permanently repressive state executive, and the absence of any institutional channel of inclusion. After the brief experiment with limited political inclusion from 1905 to 1907, this typical pattern would be restored again. This background favored the dominance of bolshevism, which represents the optimal response to such an environment. When looking at the entire formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena, the ‘years of freedom’ were only a brief exception to an otherwise uninterrupted complete exclusion and repression of labor. In the following paragraphs, the over time emergence of bolshevism as the dominant model of labor politics will be illustrated in the context of this evolution of labor inclusion.

I have already discussed quite extensively the early Russian marxism, the formation of the Iskra group, and the initial party split of 1903, which divided the anti-economist Iskrites into the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions as self-contained models of labor politics. The Bolsheviki emerged from the Second Party Congress with a slim majority, and were able to decide most of the votes in their favor. But their triumph could never be translated into an effective control over the party: “Lenin had won a Pyrrhic victory. He had secured the dominant position in the party which he sought, but only by arousing antagonism so powerful as to render his control ineffective. Within a year he found himself in the wilderness.” (Keep 1963, 133)

From this point onward, what emerged as one of the defining features of Lenin and the bolshevik faction in general was their relentlessness in attempting to institutionalize their party model. Before the advent of the ‘years of freedom’, the bolsheviki returned from their previous “wilderness”, so that none of
the two factions was able to establish a clear grip on the party. Keep (1963) argues that during this time period, the Bolsheviks were somewhat more successful in dominating the internal affairs of the RSDRP, while the Mensheviki commanded a greater presence in the emerging larger labor movement. This constellation already foreshadows the ensuing developments during the period of low inclusion from October 1905 to June 1907, just as some limited moves toward political liberalization had already occurred throughout the year 1904.

Once the semi-constitutional order was in place, the Mensheviki were also able to translate their greater popularity within the worker constituency into a clearly dominant position within the party. This constellation was codified in April 1906, at the occasion of the Fourth Party Congress in Stockholm, which pitted the Mensheviks, the Bundists, and the conciliator Bolshevik against Lenin’s dogmatic bolshevik faction. Under the conditions of low inclusion, limited access to the political arena and limited opportunities for mass-based party organization from October 1905 to June 1907, the Mensheviki were on their way to become institutionalized, while the Bolsheviki declined. After the defeat at the congress, Lenin established a secret Bolshevik Central Committee; but the Mensheviki also continued to maintain separate parallel organizations (cf. Haimson 1955).

When the end of the semi-constitutional experiment was already pending, and the period of low inclusion was clearly coming to an end, Lenin was able to use his Central Committee as a pressure group to secure a formal majority for his party model at the Fifth Party Congress in May/June 1907. The increase of separate Menshevik activities outside of the RSDRP, however, prevented actual control of the Bolsheviki over the entire social democratic movement. In between June 1907 and the formal establishment of two entirely separate parties in 1912, the Mensheviki were not able to translate their efforts at party unification and at integrating illegal and legal activities into a formal codification of their party model. The bolshevik approach remained the official party line ever since the congress of May/June 1907. But this was of little use for the Bolsheviki. They were not able to actually transform the RSDRP along the lines of their party model, for as long as a significant faction of Mensheviki opposed their ideas. The eventual formal split of the RSDRP and the establishment of a purely bolshevik organization was therefore the only possible way to turn the bolshevik model into a reality.

The rise of the Bolshevik model of labor politics to dominance after June 1907 is directly related to the evolution of labor inclusion. The end of low inclusion in the summer of 1907 seriously hampered the Menshevik efforts at establishing a mass-based organization. Quasi-revolutionary social democracy had become a suboptimal choice again. As a first step, the changing environment allowed the Bolsheviki to regain a majority within the RSDRP at the Fifth Congress. From 1907 to 1911, their party model was therefore the formal underpinning of the party at large, but in practice, no viable bolshevik party, neither through the RSDRP, nor outside of it, had yet become institutionalized.

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The most crucial turning point in the fortunes of bolshevism occurred by the end of 1911 and throughout the following year. The period of limited toleration for some of the labor activities that had emerged in between 1905 and 1907, came to an end at that point in time. This further intensification of repression had a disastrous effect on the remaining open political activities of labor, and the Menshevik model of integrating clandestine and tolerated activities into one single mass-based party thus became increasingly infeasible. I have previously identified the appointment of the ultra-conservative Kokovtsov as chairman of the council of ministers in September 1911 as the most visible turning point away from the limited toleration that had begun in 1908. Kochan (1966) notes that the February 1912 massacre of workers, who protested in the Lena gold fields, functioned as another such event.

It was on this background of increasing worker unrest and a sharp turn of the autocracy toward the right that bolshevism eventually began to institutionalize its model of labor politics. The establishment of the ‘Russian Organizing Commission’ by Lenin in September 1911 provided the nucleus for the successful formation of a separate bolshevik party. The commission was used for the preparation of the Prague conference in 1912 that sealed the organizational division between the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. What happened to be a disaster for the Mensheviks, who required a broad base of support for their vision of party organization, was a blessing for the Bolshevik. First of all, they were able to attract a large number of less affiliated activists, and the more conciliatory Bolsheviki into their fold. Secondly, unobstructed by the dissenting Menshevik faction, they were finally able to build a party along the lines of Lenin’s strategical suggestions.

‘Social integration’ through the establishment of a dominant ideological form could therefore proceed successfully in the context of the separate bolshevik party. Before 1912, neither the Mensheviki nor the Bolsheviki were able to effectively and permanently imprint their ideological and organizational recommendations on the RSDRP. Membership figures are unfortunately not available for this period of time, but in the context of the bolshevik model of labor politics, the number of official members is much less relevant anyway. It is crucial to take into account that altogether, the prerequisites for party institutionalization are different for bolshevism. Their model of labor politics explicitly rejects a mass-based party with participatory institutions. It would therefore be misleading to use this indicator as a yardstick for their institutionalization. Each distinct model of labor politics needs to be evaluated on its own terms.

Bolshevism became successfully institutionalized after 1912, because it focused on exclusively clandestine activities. This included an extensive underground press, internal communications, and a clear decisional hierarchy, with Lenin at the top, and a number of ‘agents’, who acted as his representatives in

375 Swain (1983) discusses this from a slightly different perspective, as the beginning of the end for the Menshevik unity approach.
local bolshevik chapters. Their most important tasks were to ensure the process of top-down decision-making that had already been Lenin’s central concern in “What is to be done”, and the loyalty of local groups.\footnote{376} This particular organizational setup was naturally much better suited to an environment of lowest inclusion than the open, mass-based approach of the Mensheviki. In addition to this inner core of the bolsheviks, the party was also able to establish much stronger links to the broader labor movement after 1912.

Ascher (1972) concludes that following on the establishment as a separate organization and the institutionalization of Lenin’s party model, the Bolsheviks were able to gain a significant advantage over their Menshevik competitors in attracting support in their constituency. After 1912, a number of legal worker organizations transferred their allegiances to the new Bolshevik party. In August 1912, the elections to the governing board of the Union of Metalworkers in Petersburg resulted in an overwhelming victory of the Bolsheviki. In spring 1913, the Bolsheviks gained control of the All Russian insurance council and the Petersburg insurance office. They even managed to secure half of the seats on the governing board of the Petersburg Printers’ union, which used to be the most important stronghold of Menshevism.

The growing strength of the Bolsheviki in the Duma elections, compared to the Menshevik vote, represents another indicator for their growing ability to reach into their constituency more effectively after 1912. While all of these are important indicators for the institutionalization of bolshevism, the most important one is probably the fact that the bolsheviki were capable of seizing the political opportunities afforded to them during the domestic chaos after the 1917 February Revolution. As noted before, my goal is not to explain the reasons for the success of the Bolshevik insurrection in October 1917, but it is clear that without the prior successful institutionalization of the Bolshevik model of labor politics, this would not have been possible.\footnote{377}

In a sense, the developments from February to October 1917 reflect the long term evolution of the two competing factions in between October 1905 and the end of tsarism. Under the limited provision of political freedom from 1905 to 1907, the Bolsheviki were out of tune with their environment, and a decline of their fortunes was the result. Something similar occurred in the few months after February 1917, which are commonly referred to as the “liberal stage” of the revolution. During this time period, when the prospect of extending a provisional liberal regime into a more permanent environment of higher inclusion still existed, the Menshevik model of a mass-based social democratic party was viable and most promising, while a truly insurrectionist approached seemed to be too costly. It was only in the ensuing domestic chaos,\footnote{376 For bolshevik organizational principles and practice, as well as publishing efforts see Keep (1963). 377 See Wood (2003) on the organizational superiority of the Bolsheviki in 1917.}
under the threat of invasion and counterrevolution, and the radical decline in support for the provisional government, that the Bolshevik model emerged as the most rewarding alternative again.

This constellation has been most succinctly described by Ulam (1990, 179) in his analysis of the bolshevik party model.

“The party thus devised proved to be a workable concept under conditions of political suppression, but could hardly have survived, had the Revolution of 1905 been followed by a really constitutional and free political life in Russia. The Bolsheviks proved to have the ideal organization and the ideal ideology to capitalize on the political and economic anarchy into which Russia was plunged after March 1917.”

The seizure of power by the bolshevik in October 1917 was a swift military operation on a comparatively small scale, but it was preceded by the increasing solidification of the bolshevik party model, and the corresponding decline of the Menshevik approach. The overall support for an insurrectionist model of labor politics would be even larger, if one considers those industrial workers that supported the neo-populist Socialist Revolutionaries during this time period. The simple and straightforward agitation of the Bolsheviki appealed most strongly to the least skilled workers, while the Menshevik’s more complex, some say overly complex, propaganda was geared toward a ‘mature’ labor movement of skilled workers that had not yet emerged in Russia to the same extent as it had in the majority of Western industrialized societies. Just as the Bolshevik model of party organization, also the nature of their propaganda was more in sync with the specific Russian environment. The Mensheviki clung more strongly to the imported vulgar marxist doctrines, while the Bolshevik were more successful with a model of labor politics that was more explicitly and genuinely adjusted to Russian conditions.

The foundations for the relative dominance of bolshevism over their Menshevik competitors were laid after Lenin’s return to Russia and the presentation of his “April Theses”. Very much in keeping with his earlier conceptions, he called for a Bolshevik insurrection and the immediate transition from the initial liberal to the socialist stage of the revolution. For as long as the prospect of extending the provisional liberal order into a permanent one was still viable, his suggestions were suboptimal, when compared to the Menshevik approach. But the continuing threat of a counterrevolution after the first unsuccessful attempt of General Kornilov in August 1917, the ongoing losses in the war, as well as the growing ineffectiveness and decreasing popularity of the provisional government, improved the fortunes of Bolshevism. While the first stage of the revolution was dominated by the Menshevik, other moderate socialists, and the liberals, the new environment after the summer of 1907 established the Bolsheviki as the dominant model of labor politics. In this sense, the previous long term development after October 1905 repeated itself in a condensed fashion in between February and October 1917. The successful establishment of Bolshevik

378 For this argument see Pipes (1990) and Rogger (1983)
dominance over its moderate competitors can be observed both at the mass level, and with respect to the Russian labor elites, represented by delegates to the Soviets and local party activists.

The Petrograd Soviet, which developed into the true center of power over the provisional government, was dominated by moderate forces until autumn 1907. The first nationwide congress of Soviets held on June 16 of 1917, which encompassed delegates from 350 localities, also saw the Bolsheviks as a minority: the Mensheviks had 245 representatives, the Bolsheviks 105, and the Socialist Revolutionaries 285 (cf. Riasanovsky 2000). Toward the end of September, the Bolsheviks obtained a majority in the workers’ section of the Petrograd Soviet and in the Moscow Soviet, the two by far most important assemblies. The Bolsheviks now controlled the two most influential Soviets, and also received a plurality of the votes during the second nationwide congress of Soviets, held in October. For a majority in this crucial body, they could rely on the equally insurrectionist left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries.

Pipes (1990), Rogger (1983), and Riasanovsky (2000) are in complete agreement regarding the related rise in public support for the Bolsheviks and the corresponding decline for the Mensheviks as a second indicator for the eventual relative dominance of bolshevism. In response to Lenin’s “April Theses”, the Bolsheviks gained much support from workers as well as war weary sailors and soldiers. The election results to Russia’s Constituent Assembly support this conclusion. While the Mensheviks received only 1 Mio., the Bolsheviks obtained 9 Mio votes (cf. Liebich 1997). Wood (2003, 51) also makes an attempt to estimate the overall development of the party activists affiliated with the Bolshevik party as a third type of indicator. He argues that after Lenin’s return to Russia and the publication of his “April Theses”, party membership increased from 10,000 to around 500,000 in October. During the same time period, Menshevik membership declined from 200,000 in August 1917 to 120,000 in December 1917, and around 60,000 in May 1918 (cf. Liebich 1997).

Wood’s (2003, 63) overall conclusion regarding the bolshevik appeal during the revolutionary year 1917 is congruent with these specific manifestations of relative dominance over the Mensheviks as a model of labor politics:

“There was clearly much more behind the Bolsheviks’ success than ideological or organizational superiority over other political forces. As implied above, the Bolsheviks were simply much more in tune with popular gut feeling than either the constitutionally minded liberal politicians or the moderate socialists. In particular, Lenin’s adamant stand on peace and land, and his intuitive appreciation of the revolutionary power of the peasantry, contributed greatly to his party’s popularity and its immediate success.”

In a sense, bolshevism thus became institutionalized on two separate occasions. First, it accomplished systemness and social integration on the background of its earlier genesis, in the time period between 1911 and 1917, under the autocratic environment of lowest inclusion. It was also sufficiently reified in the public mind as the third prerequisite of successful party formation, through its involvement in the 1905 and the
1917 February revolution. The revolutionary situation, however, which would allow the Bolsheviki to appeal to the masses and to seize power, would only arrive after the summer of 1917. But the initial institutionalization as a viable party before 1917 was a crucial prerequisite to make this second step possible.

**Conclusion**

In this preceding section, I have analyzed the choices of Russian labor elites in response to the existing environment of labor inclusion. Lowest inclusion favors the institutionalization of an insurrectionist approach, as it was proposed by the Bolshevik party around Lenin. Compared to Bolshevism, other approaches are only suboptimal choices on a background of lowest inclusion. This includes the ‘moderate syndicalist’ model of labor politics, as well as the formation of evolutionary or quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. The actually observable choices of Russian labor elites and the institutionalization of bolshevism as the dominant model of labor politics reflect the theoretical prediction derived from a comparative cost-benefit evaluation. Bolshevism was the most favorable model in Russia from 1883 to 1917, and it also emerged as the dominant model, while alternative approaches failed to become institutionalized. This overall assessment has been complimented by a more fine-grained analysis, within which the evolution of labor inclusion has been related to the over time development of competing models of labor politics.

In the first place, we have seen that in the early 1900s, in a context of unchanged lowest inclusion, at this point in time even without any formal constitutional underpinning, the brief moderate syndicalist experiment of the Zubatov police unions failed. Under the given conditions, this outcome is to be expected. Moderate syndicalism only entails any noticeable rewards, when the entrenched elites make attempts at incorporating labor’s demands into the political arena. The defining feature of an environment of complete exclusion and repression, however, is the effective absence of any such effort. Moderate syndicalism therefore could only have succeeded if the nature of the Russian polity in terms of its orientation toward labor had fundamentally changed. This could have set Russia on an intriguing course as the first example for state incorporation of labor. But since this did not happen, Russian labor inclusion remained at the lowest level, and moderate syndicalism failed.

Evolutionary social democracy as the second model of labor politics studied here entails a more favorable cost-benefit ratio than moderate syndicalism, which promises no tangible rewards whatsoever in an environment of lowest inclusion. But compared to the remaining two models, and especially insurrectionism, evolutionary social democracy was significantly less favorable in Russia. We have seen that in the absence of any significant institutional inclusion, the most crucial prerequisites for the successful
institutionalization of an evolutionary social democratic party model were missing: without the guarantee of political liberties, no politically conscious trade union movement can emerge that would be able to steer an evolutionary social democratic party into political action. Moreover, the absence of responsible government and effective enfranchisement rendered the strategy of a piecemeal legislative transformation into socialism entirely implausible.

Evolutionary social democratic party models became somewhat more favorable and plausible during the brief period of limited political freedom from October 1905 to June 1907. But even during this era, the evolutionary party model remained less favorable than the one suggested by the quasi-revolutionary Menshevik. It is in the nature of low inclusion, which was briefly in place at this time, that not more than one set of channels is effectively opened for labor’s access into the political arena: either enfranchisement on the one hand, or the guarantee of political liberties and responsible government on the other. In the case of Russia, which found itself at the very bottom of this category, low inclusion occurred through limited enfranchisement and a minimal guarantee of political liberties. While this provided some incipient underpinnings for the evolutionary party model, it still lacked many of the necessary prerequisites that make it the optimal choice in an environment of higher inclusion: the lack of responsible government and the limits imposed on enfranchisement made a legislative strategy toward socialism infeasible; the establishment of an effective party and a politically oriented trade union movement were seriously hampered by the ongoing limitations imposed on political liberties.

Economism and revisionism represented the manifestations of evolutionary social democracy in the early 20th century, while liquidationism occurred during the era of low inclusion from 1905 to 1907 as well as the following period after June 1907 that was characterized by the restoration of lowest inclusion. The failure of these party models to accomplish systemness, social integration, and external institutionalization as the three prerequisites of successful party formation is therefore to be expected, when considering the given environment of inclusion in these time periods.

The third model of labor politics discussed here, quasi-revolutionary social democracy, was the most viable challenger of Bolshevik dominance. We have seen that the Menshevik party model promises higher rewards than all other competitors with the exception of Bolshevism. In an environment of permanent exclusion and repression, the menshevik model of combining clandestine operations with open mass-based activities seemed more plausible than the suggestions of evolutionary social democrats. The long-term revolutionary perspective also held a stronger appeal to Russian labor elites and the larger worker constituency than the evolutionary approach, which suggested piecemeal legislative changes that appeared increasingly unlikely in the context of an unwaveringly autocratic regime.

Throughout the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena, quasi-revolutionary social democracy came closest to institutionalization during the ‘years of freedom’ from 1905 to 1907. But
despite ‘external institutionalization’ through the involvement in the 1905 revolution, ‘systemness’ and ‘social integration’ were at best accomplished only briefly. The flourishing of Menshevism during this time period is an important piece of evidence for the validity of the causal connection that I am suggesting here: Quasi-revolutionary social democracy was on the rise, when the environment of labor incorporation evolved to the provision of low inclusion. It is precisely in this context, where quasi-revolutionary social democracy is predicted to emerge successfully. However, the abandonment of the semi-constitutional experiment and the restoration of lowest inclusion in June 1907 prevented the incipient development toward a mass-based quasi-revolutionary social democratic party to become a permanent reality.

After June 1907, Menshevism was on the decline, although in the period from 1908 to 1911, it was capable of making some headway toward institutionalization under lowest inclusion, yet to a significantly smaller extent than from 1905 to 1907. The integration of tolerated and clandestine activities into one single quasi-revolutionary mass-based party eventually failed, after even the most limited loopholes that had spilled over into this era from the earlier period of low inclusion, were shut down again with increasing intensity after 1911. This restored environment of lowest inclusion provided the background, on which bolshevism as the fourth model studied here, eventually emerged as dominant.

The Bolsheviks developed their model of labor politics, and constituted themselves as a viable faction of the RSDRP, in the context of lowest inclusion before 1905. Their rise was only interrupted through the temporary provision of low inclusion from 1905 to 1907 and the limited toleration of labor activities in a general context of lowest inclusion from 1908 to 1911. Beginning in 1912, when the restoration of lowest inclusion had become most apparent, bolshevism as the optimal response to this environment also emerged as the dominant model of labor politics. It was successful in establishing itself as a self-contained party after the formal split from the Mensheviks was sealed in 1912.

Bolshevism as a specifically Russian variant of insurrectionism entails a more rewarding benefit-cost ratio than any of its competitors in an environment of lowest inclusion. It is the most costly model of labor politics in any environment of inclusion. But at the same time, in an environment of lowest inclusion, it also provides the greatest extent of potential benefits. Lowest inclusion represents the only category, where high costs and high benefits result in the comparatively most favorable ratio, compared to all other models of labor politics. In a constellation such as the one found in Russia during labor’s formative stage in the political arena from 1883 to 1917, permanent repression and exclusion from the arena of politics affects all oppositional political forces alike. As a result, the personal and organizational risks of establishing an insurrectionist, a quasi-revolutionary social democratic, or an evolutionary social democratic party are the same. Insurrectionist bolshevism, however, promises much higher rewards than its competitors: an immediate socialist revolution along with the corresponding alleviation of political and socio-economic exclusion, as well as an organizational model that is more plausible as a viable strategy to accomplish these
goals. This situation is unique for instances of lowest inclusion. Through the opening of at least some minimal access to the political arena, other models of labor politics become significantly less costly than insurrectionism. And as a consequence, alternative approaches to insurrectionist models entail a significantly more favorable cost-benefit ratio in all other categories exception for lowest inclusion. The emergence of bolshevism as the dominant model of labor politics, through the choices of labor elites and the public support obtained by the bolsheviks, is therefore an entirely rational, indeed optimal, response to the Russian environment of lowest inclusion.

Labor inclusion and labor politics in Japan –
more Russian than Prussian

Overview

Japan is one of four cases studied here, where no social democratic party was successfully institutionalized during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. In the United States, entrenched elites created an environment of highest inclusion, to which labor elites responded in an optimal fashion by pursuing moderate syndicalism as the dominant model of labor politics. In Canada, moderate syndicalism emerged as dominant, too, but here, as a suboptimal choice in a context of higher inclusion, where the optimal response of labor elites would have been the foundation of an evolutionary social democratic party. Japan on the other hand belongs to the same general category as the case of Russia. During labor’s formative stage in the political arena from 1898 to 1918, an environment of lowest inclusion resulted in the failure of social democratic party formation, while insurrectionist models of labor politics became increasingly popular, before 1918 most importantly through an eclectic variety of strategies revolving around anarchist ideas.379

Japan is somewhat different from the Russian case with respect to the specific mechanisms of labor exclusion and the corresponding response of labor elites, despite the overall similarity in terms of lowest inclusion: lowest inclusion during labor’s entire formative stage in Japan was accomplished based on, and despite the existence of, a formal constitution. In Russia, by contrast, a significant part of labor’s formative stage, the time period from 1883 to 1905, occurred in the absence of any constitutional foundation. The accomplishment of lowest inclusion without a constitutional basis is relatively straightforward, given that there is no legal basis whatsoever for society to insist on political participation. After even the most limited

379 See the earlier assessment of the Japanese case in the context of a comparative assessment of labor inclusion.
constitutional foundation is established, however, lowest inclusion needs to be obtained by circumventing or suspending the legal claims derived from that document.

We have previously seen that this is precisely what happened in Russia after 1907, when lowest inclusion was created by the autocracy despite the existence of a formal constitution. In the case of Japan, after the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1890, labor’s demands for political participation could not as easily be rejected as in Russia before 1905, since a fundamental legal basis for such claims had been established. The way in which an environment of lowest inclusion was created in Japan for labor’s entire formative period is therefore comparable to the constellation in Russia after 1907. Or, viewed from the opposing angle, after 1907 Russia converged on the Japanese variant of lowest inclusion.

Given the presence of a formal constitutional basis for autocratic respectively imperial governance, lowest inclusion in both these instances had to be created by circumventing or suspending formal constitutional guarantees. This occurred through similar techniques across the two cases, in Japan during the entire period of labor’s entry into the political arena, and in Russia after June 1907. Both constitutional documents were granted from above rather than created from below. They contained references to political rights and other liberties, but made the actual guarantee of these entitlements the prerogative of the monarch. They were explicitly subordinated to simple legislation and the executive authority of a divinely sanctioned ruler. 380 On this background, political liberties as the first element of institutional inclusion were effectively precluded for labor in both instances. Enfranchisement as the second institutional dimension of inclusion was regulated through extra-constitutional legislation in both cases, and could therefore easily be manipulated, even despite constitutional preambles and proclamations to the contrary.

The absence of effective responsible government occurs on top of these two foundations. The executive is capable of regulating entry into the parliamentary arena and open political activity in general by creating an environment of lowest inclusion in the domains of political liberties and enfranchisement. On this background, responsible government could still occur for very select social groups that make it through this roster. This happened in a number of low inclusion cases that were characterized by power sharing arrangements between different factions of oligarchic elites, for example Spain, Italy, Argentina, and Hungary. However, it never happened in Russia, and in Japan only briefly from 1890 to 1894, before labor entered the political arena. During that time period, the Japanese parliamentarians insisted on their constitutionally guaranteed right to be involved in policy making, more specifically the passing of the annual budget. In the ensuing power struggle between legislature and executive, the elites represented in the legislature eventually accommodated to the prerogatives of imperial dominance. In Russia, the ‘loyalist’

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380 For a discussion of divince sanction for the exercise of political authority, see Bendix (1978).
majorities of the third and fourth state duma after 1907 never effectively challenged the autocracy by insisting on parliamentary independence and the principle of responsible government.

Why is the contrast between the cases of Russia and Japan significant for the response of labor elites and the development of competing models of labor politics? In Russia, for a major part of labor’s formative stage, from 1883 to 1905, in the absence of a constitution, not even the most fundamental opportunities for the guarantee of institutional inclusion existed. In the case of Japan for labor’s entire formative stage, and for Russia after 1905, at least the potential for responsible government, limited enfranchisement or the guarantee of political liberties existed. This potential was never exploited by Japanese entrenched elites before 1918, so that the extent of inclusion was at the same lowest level as in a constellation, where no constitution is in existence. But labor elites must have perceived such an environment as at least somewhat more permeable and malleable than one that is entirely devoid of any constitutional basis.

It is no small wonder, therefore, that an innovative insurrectionist model, bolshevism, emerged in the Russian environment and not in Japan. In the case of Japan, bolshevism became an important model of labor politics only after the termination of labor’s initial formative stage in the political arena, throughout the 1920s. Before that point in time, anarchism in several variants enjoyed increasing popularity in Japan, while all attempts at social democratic party formation failed. Note again in this context, too, that my explanatory interest is on the institutionalization of different models of labor politics, not on the success of these models in carrying out their agendas. Anarchism in Japan became more popular and viable throughout the first two decades of the 20th century than attempts at social democratic party formation. But at the same time, it was in no position to seriously endanger the stability of imperial and oligarchic governance, unlike the Bolsheviki in Russia, who were able to stage a successful revolution in October 1917.

Taking these characteristics of the Japanese case into consideration also implies that one of the fundamental premises underpinning previous attempts at a comparative assessment of Japanese labor politics are quite misleading. The fact that the Meiji constitution was modeled after the Prussian-German example and the general parallels in political development between Germany and Japan, as they are for example outlined by Bendix (1978), are often times used as the basis for a comparative evaluation of labor politics in Japan and Germany. Such analyses are based on the premise that because of these and a number of other similarities, Japanese and German labor elites found themselves in comparable environments of inclusion. This is evident in Totten (1966, 5): “When the first Japanese industrial workers began to appear in the 1890s, they found themselves in much the same position as their German counterparts decades earlier, in conflict not only with management for better wages and working conditions but also with governmental authorities for the rights of free speech, assembly and organization.”
While Totten (1968) and a number of other specialists of Japanese political development and labor politics have an excellent grasp of ‘their’ case, their comparative assessment is inaccurate. It is true that in Japan and Germany, ‘social alienation’ through economic exploitation was accompanied by ‘political alienation’ through exclusion from the political arena and state repression. But this observation also applies to all other cases from the low inclusion category, including a number of countries, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, in which liberal politicians, but not the old feudal lords and a monarchical bureaucracy, like in Japan and Prussia, were politically dominant. As a corollary of this background, even within the category of low inclusion, variation in terms of how exactly low inclusion is accomplished, has important effects on the responses of labor elites. We have previously seen that an ‘extra-parliamentary’ quasi-revolutionary model emerged in the ‘liberal’ Belgian case, where enfranchisement was limited, but political liberties and the practice of responsible government were in place. This variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is distinct from the German and Danish ‘parliamentary’ model that emerged in an environment, where the limited access to the political arena that defines low inclusion, occurred through enfranchisement, while political liberties and responsible government remained precarious.

Yet, in both these instances, despite variation in the specific configuration of limited access to the political arena, low inclusion is in place, and in response to that environment, the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is the expected outcome. The failure of Totten (1968) and others to distinguish between different variants of low inclusion, as they are practiced idealtypically in Germany on the one hand and in Belgium on the other, is therefore only a minor problem. The major pitfall of their comparative evaluation of Japan is a different one. They fail to see that political alienation does not just occur in cases with low inclusion, such as Germany, but also in cases of lowest inclusion, such as Russia. The observation of similarities between Germany and Japan in terms of political development, status systems, and the presence of ‘political alienation’ does not at all mean that the environments of labor inclusion in those two cases were the same.

This argument is not just an exercise in improving the accuracy of comparative description. It is crucial for an adequate explanation regarding the absence of social democratic party formation in Japan and the treatment of the Japanese case in a comparatively derived theory of party formation. On the basis of his earlier premise about the similarities in political environments faced by Japanese and German labor elites, Totten (1968, 8) goes on to suggest the following argument about the failure of social democratic party formation: “The lack of political rights alone is nevertheless insufficient to explain the limited growth of the labor and socialist movements in Japan. Roughly similar conditions prevailed in Germany at the end of the last century, yet the growth of German social democracy was phenomenal.”

The following analysis will show in more detail that this argument is inadequate in two major ways. I am going to provide evidence that it was indeed the environment of inclusion, created by institutional and
behavioral dimensions, which is responsible for the failure of social democracy in Japan: first, we are going to see that the Japanese environment of inclusion during labor’s formative stage in the political arena is much more similar to the Russian than the German case, even though the Meiji constitution was modeled after the German-Prussian example, and even though Russia lacked any constitutional underpinning until 1905. Second, we are also going to see through a comparative assessment of the size of the Japanese labor force that a supposed lack of industrial development, suggested by Totten (1968) and others as a substitute explanation for the failure of social democracy in Japan, cannot be held responsible. On the basis of an at least sufficient amount of industrialization, the environment faced by labor elites in Japan is similar to the case of Russia with respect to the extent of labor inclusion, but not Germany. As a consequence of that, it is to be expected on the basis of the theory suggested here that Japanese labor politics would develop along a Russian rather than a German pattern. This means that the absence of social democratic party formation and the embrace of an insurrectionist alternative is the predicted outcome for the case of Japan.

With this underlying argument in mind, the analysis of the Japanese case will proceed as follows. First, I am going to outline briefly the process of Japanese industrialization, and most importantly, assess the size of the Japanese industrial labor force from a comparative perspective. This analysis is designed to show that, purely on the basis of socio-economic development, Japan would have been able to give rise to a social democratic party during its formative stage in the political arena. Second, elaborating on the earlier outline, the Japanese environment of labor inclusion will be discussed. This will be done with a focus on an over time development and from an explicitly comparative perspective that is going to contrast Japan to the cases of Russia and Germany. Doing so will provide the factual underpinning for the earlier claim that the case of Japan belongs into the same lowest inclusion category as Russia, rather than low inclusion, as in Germany. Third, on this background, the response of Japanese labor elites to this particular environment of inclusion will be discussed. This analysis is going to show that the failure of social democratic party formation and the growing popularity of insurrectionist models is the direct consequence of the environment of inclusion, as it was created by Japanese entrenched elites during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. This entire analysis will also include a brief discussion of developments after the end of labor’s formative stage in 1918.

**Industrialization and the Japanese labor movement**

In the comparative assessment presented here, the ‘window of opportunity’ for the emergence of industrial workers as a new social and political actor is linked to the fundamental political decisions that enable the process of industrialization. These institutional underpinnings for socio-economic development – the absence of restrictions on one’s choice of profession, the introduction of the market principle, the
creation of a single market – are not necessarily equivalent to the actual beginning of industrialization. In some cases, most importantly the United States, there was a rather large gap between the possibility of industrialization and the actual beginning of the process. In the case of Japan and other industrialization latecomers, on the other hand, the institutional adaptation process was specifically designed to make the development of technology, industrialization and capitalism possible. Once the Meiji reforms had changed the institutional underpinnings, the actual process of industrialization was immediately pursued by an interventionist state.

The role of the state for industrialization that has already been introduced as critical in cases such as Germany and Russia, was also key in Japan. The invention of new machinery as a series of relatively unexpected events eventually led to the universal application of industrial modes of production based on private efforts in England. In the case of Japan, on the other hand, industrialization was the result of a centralized and concerted political effort to pursue a vigorous policy of national advancement.\textsuperscript{381} The institutional underpinnings for the pursuit of industrialization were laid through the Meiji restoration, beginning in 1869. Pyle (1978) observes how during the preceding Tokugawa period, Japan as a political entity and as a market were still somewhat fragmented. Bendix (1978) and others have referred to this era in Japanese political development as a period of “centralized feudalism”, where feudal fragmentation was reduced compared to the earlier full blown feudalism, but not yet fully removed. Administration was still largely a local and regional affair before the Meiji restoration. Feudal privileges and significant restrictions on the movement of goods and people still existed within Japan during this time period.

It was only through the 1869 Meiji Restoration that these obstacles to centralized political authority and the establishment of a true single market were removed. The reinstatement of imperial rule and the toppling of the Tokugawa shogunate were triggered by the inability of the old rulers to respond to the military, technological and economic challenges brought to Japan by its confrontation with Western imperialism. The sweeping reforms implemented through the Meiji Restoration entailed the adoption of Western political, technological, and economic practices. But the underlying goal of these policies was the preservation of Japanese independence and the political influence of its oligarchy. Eventually, of course, the Japanese response to Western imperialism would result in the country’s own pursuit of imperialist policies vis-à-vis its neighbors.

The reform of the institutional underpinnings for economic activity in the context of the Meiji restoration removed the obstacles to the pursuit of industrialization that still existed at the time.\textsuperscript{382} The centralization of the administration and the abolition of tariff barriers within Japan removed the

\textsuperscript{381} See Ayusawa (1976) and Nimura (1990)
\textsuperscript{382} See Pyle (1978) and Ayusawa (1976)
remaining obstacles to trade and commerce. Allowing the free movement of laborers without internal passport controls and granting the right to freely choose one’s place of residence created the necessary labor supply for the emergence of industrial enterprises. This particular reform is equivalent in its role for the enabling of industrialization to the 1861 peasant emancipation in Russia or the 1807 abolition of serfdom in Prussia. Additional measures in Japan were the abolishment of feudal domains, an end to the political control over commodity prices, and the removal of barriers for foreign trade. Making the export of agricultural goods possible allowed for the creation of a source of state revenue that could be invested in support for industrialization. And the abolishment of internal barriers to trade was accompanied by a harmonization of money and banking practices.

The important role of the state in directly promoting Japanese industrialization is not generally disputed. But the earlier conventional wisdom about the extent of state involvement is now accompanied by a slightly different perspective that emphasizes more strongly the role of private entrepreneurs. The conventional “growth from above” perspective is based on the classic Gerschenkron (1962a) argument about industrial latecomers and the necessity of state involvement to substitute for missing prerequisites. The second “growth from below” perspective does not entirely dismiss state involvement, but downplays its extent and significance, compared to the role of private entrepreneurs.

In an effort to mediate between these two perspectives, Ayusawa (1976) distinguishes between periods of Japanese industrialization, based on different types and degrees of state involvement. Initially, in the Tokugawa era that preceded the Meiji restoration of 1868, ‘Western’ methods of manufacturing were used by the shogunate and feudal lords on a limited scale only, as proto-industrial enterprises. In between 1868 and 1882, state involvement was most extensive. The new administration directly initiated, managed and controlled industrial enterprises during this time period, including the operation of model factories. From about 1882 to 1895, direct control of industrial enterprises is turned over to private investors, but indirect state control remains in effect through supervision, subsidies, and investment in infrastructure. These developments provide the background for the following period of industrial expansion, initially from 1895 to 1905, and then to an even larger degree from 1905 to 1919.

Along the lines of the argument outlined before, Totten (1966) suggests that a number of specific features of the Japanese working-class that emerged from this process of industrialization have contributed to the failure of social democratic party formation. Two of these features are most important in the present context: the continuing strong bonds to the village and countryside typical for Japanese workers, the organization of industry occurred in predominantly small shops, and the large share of female workers in the factory labor force. He argues that the unique nature of the Japanese working-class along these lines can explain the lack of a large labor movement in Japan, and the absence of social democratic party formation.
before 1918, because these features limited the mobilization potential of Japanese labor and the willingness to embrace radical approaches.

Firstly, I have already provided a general theoretical refutation of a ‘socio-economic’ explanation for the emergence of different models of labor politics. I have also introduced a wide variety of empirical evidence that should make us doubt the validity of the causal connection between features of industrialization and the radicalism of labor’s political response. Moreover, even the comparative literature on labor politics that is based on a ‘socio-economic approach’ usually suggests a causal connection that results in an entirely different prediction than the one suggested by Totten (1966). We have previously seen that the socio-economic approach, most prominently represented by authors such as Bull (1922) and Galenson (1952) argues that state induced and rapid industrialization results in a more radically minded form of social democracy. If we apply this to the case of Japan, its social democratic party should have been especially ‘radical’.

Second, the strong bond of laborers to the countryside is typical not just for Japan, but also for other instances, in which industrialization occurred in the context of a strong feudal heritage, most importantly in the case of Russia. We have seen specifically for the case or Russia that the combination of rural attachment and industrial occupation, if anything, has made laborers more resentful of industrialism and thus more inclined to take radical action. This expectation is just as plausible for the case of Japan as the opposing one suggested by Totten (1966).

Third, his reference to the size of Japanese industrial establishments hints at the most fundamental conceptual pitfall underpinning his causal argument. There is no plausible reason to expect that the existence of predominantly small shops will make laborers less radical. As a matter of fact, in the case of France, predominantly small industrial enterprises have not prevented an outcome in terms of labor politics that is particularly ‘radical’: a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party accompanied by a strong anarcho-syndicalist tradition. Thus, as I have argued and illustrated before on several occasions, there is no discernible causal relation between the size of industrial establishments and the model of labor politics that emerges as dominant. At the same time, there should be a strong relationship between the average size of the shop and the mobilization success of any model of labor politics. This is precisely the crucial distinction that is missing in the socio-economic approach to labor politics in general, but also in Totten’s (1966) own rendition of this perspective.

It is reasonable to expect that the unique features of industrialization introduced by Totten (1966) and others are related to the overall mobilization success of any potential model of labor politics in Japan. And if he made that crucial distinction between ‘model of labor politics’ and ‘mobilization success’, he would be right in arguing that the small size of industrial enterprises as well as a number of other factors he notes, such as the presence of a large number of temporary workers, and the comparatively large number of
female workers, negatively affect the mobilization success of any model of labor politics. In this particular respect, the Japanese labor movement is indeed at a disadvantage, when compared to the Russian case, where in a similar environment of labor inclusion, the particularly large size of industrial enterprises and the much smaller number of female workers make a larger degree of mobilization success much more likely. But these factors are in no systematic way related to the model adopted by labor elites in the pursuit of their goals. As we are going to see in the analysis of labor’s response to the Japanese environment of inclusion, labor did get mobilized to a significant extent even before 1918. But as a result of the Japanese context of lowest inclusion, this political mobilization predominantly occurred through other channels than social democratic party formation.

A comparative assessment of the size of the Japanese group of industrial workers can also help to put these assertions into perspective. It is undoubtedly true that by the 1910s, the relative size of the Japanese working-class in relation to the entire economically active population, was comparatively small, with a value of 17.65 % (see table 8). Only Hungary (17.52 %), and Spain (13.79 %) had a smaller ratio. Russia’s value for the 1890s was 16.29 %, and by the 1910s, the relative size of its working-class was roughly at the same level as the one of Japan. However, all this being said, the Japanese figure of 17.65 % was still well above the previously justified minimum threshold of 15 %. Furthermore, social democratic parties did successfully form in the cases of Hungary and Spain, although their level of industrialization was even below the one found in Japan.

A look at the absolute figures of working-class size can also help to provide further support for my argument that on the basis of the number of industrial laborers as a potential constituency, party formation would have been possible. Even though Japan was the case with the third smallest industrial labor force in relative terms, the absolute number of workers was comparatively large (see table 7). There were 4,619,000 Japanese industrial workers in the 1910s, which makes the Japanese working-class the sixth largest at the time, after the US, Germany, Britain, France, and Russia, but well ahead of all other cases. This includes countries such as Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark or Belgium, where very successful social democratic parties have been formed.

I introduced the ratio between industrial workers and the entire economically active population previously as the most important indicator for considering a particular case as sufficiently industrialized for inclusion in this study. Japan, as noted above, meets that requirement already. However, in addition to that, it is also reasonable to assume that the absolute size of workers plays an important role in determining the possibility of party formation. A relatively small working-class, in absolute figures, such as the ones in Sweden, Norway, or Denmark, can accomplish high degrees of mobilization success and political influence, because they are involved in a struggle with other equally small groups, in terms of absolute size. But the fundamental possibility of party formation should also be given in a case such as Japan, where there
are almost 20 times as many laborers as in Norway at the time. The extent of labor’s political influence might be smaller, given its comparatively small relative size, but the possibility of party formation, which is my only concern here, is not affected by that caveat.

The nature of labor inclusion in Japan

The central premise of the conventional wisdom about the lack of social democratic party formation in Japan implies, what Totten (1966) states explicitly – that Japanese labor emerged into an environment that is similar to the one encountered by labor in Germany at the time. Based on the earlier sketch of Japanese labor inclusion, I am now going to show in more detail that this premise cannot be upheld. Rather than being similar to Germany, which during labor’s formative stage in the political arena was an example of low inclusion, Japan belongs to the same category of lowest inclusion as Russia.

The Japanese 1890 Meiji constitution was modeled after the German-Prussian example. Moreover, Japanese labor’s entire formative stage occurred in an environment, in which a constitutional foundation and therefore the potential for institutional labor inclusion, existed. This suggests a similarity to the case of Germany, while in Russia, on the other hand, a major part of labor’s formative stage, the time period from 1883 to 1905, took place in an environment that was devoid of a constitution, and therefore even the potential for institutional inclusion of labor. Nonetheless, in terms of the outcome, i.e. the environment of labor inclusion created on this basis, Japan was at the lowest level, similar to Russia, while Germany was characterized by low inclusion. Throughout the following paragraphs, I will first outline the various stages of labor inclusion in Japan, before, during, and after labor’s formative stage in the political arena. The comparative assessment of Japanese labor inclusion during labor’s formative stage in the political arena, in contrast to Russia and Germany will follow in the second place.

The project of the Meiji restoration after 1868 was to adopt Western technological, economic and legal practices to the end of Japanese national advancement. This process, generally similar to the development of state induced industrialization in Russia and Germany, occurred in the context of an authoritarian state. The Imperial Oath of 1868 that announced the goal of implementing a constitution and the actual enactment of the Meiji constitution in 1890, were not designed as a basis for effective public involvement in political affairs. They were regarded as a tool for strengthening the basis of support for imperial governance.

Before 1890, in the absence of constitutional governance, labor inclusion was at the lowest level, comparable to the situation in Russia before 1905. However, given the lack of any significant labor movement at the time, the entire period before 1898, when labor’s formative stage in the political arena began, is only important as a precedent for the following developments. After the enactment of the
constitution in 1890, the representatives in the Japanese diet, which was elected on the most restrictive franchise of all industrialized societies, immediately attempted to utilize the limited potential for responsible government that the constitution afforded to them. This pitted the incipient parliamentary factions against the oligarchy in the imperial administration, which was resolved to prevent any meaningful pattern of parliamentary involvement in affairs of the state. These “implacable hostilities”, according to Pyle (1978), between the legislature and the administration manifested themselves through the diet’s refusal to support the budget. In response, the emperor would reinstate the previous budget and dissolve the Diet.

During this stage, both actors tested their respective resolve in the new institutional environment, and the members of the Diet tried to translate the constitutional potential for responsible government into a political reality. Even this limited attempt to establish the principle of responsible government occurred before the beginning of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. But most importantly, the outcome of this struggle was not a strengthening of the position of parliament, as it had happened in Belgium after the implementation of the 1830 constitution. In Japan, it resulted in the reaffirmation of imperial and administrative dominance over the legislature. After their brief rebellious stage from 1890 to 1894, the emerging parties in the Diet would accept executive dominance and engage in an accommodation with the administration that lasted until the end of World War I in 1918.

Pyle (1978) further divides this overall era of elite accommodation from 1895 to 1918 into two stages. He argues that limited and temporary alliances between some elements of the diet and the oligarchy occurred first, from 1895 to 1900. This would then provide the basis for a mutual long-term accommodation from 1900 to 1918. During this second stage, the dominance of the administration becomes most apparent. From 1895 to 1900, the executive was willing to make a number of concessions to elements in the Diet in order to secure approval for the budget. After 1900, the Diet developed into an arena, in which the factional conflicts that also existed within the executive were rehearsed, in a sense as an appendix or additional playing field for the debates of the administrative oligarchy. The major figures in this conflict were two representatives of the oligarchy that also emerged as party leaders in the Japanese Diet: Ito Hirobumi, who founded the “Friends of constitutional government party” (Rikken Seiyukai) in 1900, and Katsura Taro, who formed his own party in 1913, whose name (Rikken Doshikai) is the functional equivalent to the one chosen by his competitor.383

These developments eventually led to an assertion of parliamentary independence and an at least limited practice of responsible government. But this would only take place after 1918, when labor’s formative stage in the political arena had already been completed. From 1894 to 1918, therefore, during

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383 Many thanks to Kana Fuse and Nanaho Hanada for pointing this out to me.
labor's entire formative stage, the potential for responsible government and for passing the threshold from lowest to low inclusion, existed, but never became a political reality. After 1918, a gradual transition from lowest to low inclusion took place, beginning with the assertion of parties, the Diet, and the at least limited practice of responsible government. Universal suffrage was announced in 1923, and introduced in 1925. Political liberties, which had been explicitly suspended for labor through Article 17 of the 1900 “Peace Preservation Law”, were granted in a very limited form after the enactment of the new “Peace Preservation Law” of 1925, and the repeal of the infamous Article 17 from the 1900 legislation in 1926.

It was only after 1926, through the introduction of universal suffrage, the narrowly circumscribed granting of political liberties and the limited practice of responsible government that the Japanese case would converge on the German model from before 1918. In 1926, Japan became an idealtypical case of low inclusion, in which one channel of access for labor to the political arena was opened through the extension of the franchise, while the other two channels of institutional inclusion, political liberties and responsible government, remained precarious, albeit more extensive than before 1926. During the time period from 1894 to 1918, however, Japan lacked institutional inclusion on all of these dimensions, along with the absence of inclusive behavior by the state executive and competing parties. All of these elements combined represent the epitome of lowest inclusion. This environment remained constantly in place during the entire formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. Toward the end of the 1930s, eventually, the Japanese environment of low inclusion would gradually be transformed into a quasi-totalitarian type of regime.

Thus, during the entire period of labor’s formative stage in the political arena from 1898 to 1918, the environment of labor inclusion in Japan was at the lowest level. This places Japan in the same category as Russia, and distinguishes it from the case of Germany, which was characterized by low inclusion. We have previously identified lowest inclusion as an environment, where labor is effectively excluded from access to the political arena on all institutional channels – responsible government, enfranchisement, and political liberties. In addition to that, there are no discernible attempts of ‘competing parties’ to appeal to labor, neither to labor elites nor electorally to the worker constituency at large, and the state executive pursues a policy of permanent repression. Low inclusion occurs, when at least one institutional channel is opened for the access of labor, and when the repressive behavior of the state becomes less permanent, and alternates with significant periods of appeasement and toleration.

The difference between Japan and Germany during labor’s formative stage in the political arena is most pronounced in the domain of worker enfranchisement. Universal suffrage was introduced in Germany along with the foundation of the Second Empire in 1871, and it continued to be guaranteed until the fall of the monarchy in 1918. The ‘right to vote’ as the first element of enfranchisement was therefore at the highest level of inclusion in Germany. The effectiveness of the workers’ vote was somewhat restricted
through an unfair apportioning of electoral districts, and the absence of a national legislature before the mid
1860s. Taking these caveats into account, worker enfranchisement in Germany was still at the higher level
during the entire formative stage (see table 10). In Japan, on the other hand, the right to vote was severely
limited through a minimum tax requirement that restricted voting to only 2% of the population in between
1900 and 1919. Thus, while in Germany, enfranchisement was at the higher level, it was at the lowest level
in Japan, the country with the smallest extent of enfranchisement out of all the industrialized societies of
the late 19th and early 20th century.

In the domain of political liberties, the differences between the two cases are less extreme, but still
real and significant. Constitutional provisions for the guarantee of political liberties existed in both cases. In
Germany, before and after the anti-socialist law (Sozialistengesetz) of 1878 to 1890, political liberties were
precarious, but not entirely suspended. This only occurred from 1878 until 1890, when the special
legislation against socialist activities was in place. Even during this most repressive time period in
Germany, however, the extent of political liberties was still above the Japanese level from 1898 to 1918.
While social democratic publishing and agitation activities were generally suspended, they were explicitly
allowed to continue in the context of election campaigns.

In Japan, on the other hand, article 17 of the 1900 “Peace Preservation Law” explicitly suspended the
constitutional guarantee of political liberties from Article 29 of the 1890 Meiji constitution for workers and
the labor movement. Article 17 extended to all forms of political and economic organization, with the
exception only of mutual aid associations. It was in the framework of these associations that the
foundations for the formation of unions were laid, but before the 1920s, the regulations of Article 17 were
effectively used to prevent political engagement of labor. The legislation from the year 1900 was only
repealed in 1926, and at that point in time, replaced by the revised “Peace Preservation Law” of 1926. The
new legislation marks the evolution of labor inclusion from lowest to low. The regulations enacted in 1900
effectively outlawed all politically inclined activities of labor. The new rules of 1926 were still repressive,
but they were explicitly directed against “subversive” activity, more specifically those forms of labor
engagement that are geared at “changing the system of private property” or “altering the national polity”.384

Thus, while the 1900 “Peace Preservation Law” provided not even the most limited tolerance for any
form of labor activity, except very narrowly defined mutual aid associations, the rules that were in place
after 1926 were still repressive, but contained a number of loopholes and inclusionary features. During the
time period after 1926, political liberties were therefore precarious, which is a defining feature of low
inclusion, but they were not permanently suspended anymore, which is the definition of lowest inclusion.

384 See Totten (1966), who also notes a variety of additional legislation that was used to suppress labor activities, such as the 1890
Administrative Enforcement Law, or the 1908 Ordinance concerning punishment for political offenses, as well as a number of other
ordinances. See also Nimura (1990).
As a consequence, Japanese labor during its formative stage of entry into the political arena found itself in an environment that was remarkably similar to the case of Russia after 1907. During that time period, Russia had its own constitution that contained references to political liberties, but these were never effectively guaranteed and remained suspended.

The potential for responsible government as the third institutional dimension of inclusion existed in Japan and Germany during labor’s entire formative stage as well as in Russia after 1907. But it was only in Germany, where this potential was transformed into a political reality, albeit only in the most limited fashion. In the context of very restrictive regulations regarding the extent of parliamentary authority, which is a defining feature of low inclusion, conflicts over specific legislation and the annual budget occurred in Germany on a regular basis in between 1871 and 1918. With the exception of the brief time period from 1905 to 1907 in Russia, and 1890 to 1894 in Japan, no comparable permanent pattern emerged in these two cases. Instead, a restrictive franchise and a policy of accommodation between the executive and ‘loyalist’ parliamentary majorities guaranteed the unrivaled dominance of the executive branch and the absence of even the most limited form of responsible government.

We have already argued before that the behavior of competing parties is crucial for a distinction between the categories of higher and highest inclusion, while it is of little consequence for the distinction between lowest and low inclusion. In an institutional environment that prohibits any significant access of labor to the political arena, inclusive behavior of competing parties is already largely precluded by institutional design. In the absence of worker enfranchisement in Japan, parties and cliques that are represented in the legislature did not need to appeal to the labor constituency. Organizational inclusion as well did not occur in any significant measure before 1918, and not even thereafter, until the ‘constitutional’ politicians from this time period were defeated, partly because of the military’s state incorporation strategy vis-à-vis labor beginning in the early 1930s.

In terms of executive behavior as the final dimension of labor inclusion, another difference between the cases of Germany and Japan can be observed. In both instances, repressive behavior of the state was significantly more ‘legalistic’ than in Russia, where labor persecution would often extend in intensity beyond any measure provided for by the underpinning legislation. In Germany and Japan, persecution was vicious and the behavior of the state executive was repressive, but for the most part as an application of the existing repressive regulations. As a consequence, it is undeniable that the intensity and extent of repression was most pronounced in the case of Russia (cf. Goldstein 1983).

In Japan and Germany, on the other hand, the extent of repressive behavior was more strongly linked to the evolution of legislation. As a result, repressive behavior by the state was most pronounced in Germany during the time of the “Sozialistengesetz” in between 1878 and 1890. It was also predominantly repressive before and after that time period, but not permanently and exclusively, as was the case in Japan.
during labor’s entire formative stage from 1898 to 1918. During this time period, the administrative oligarchy left no room for deviation from the restrictive 1900 “Peace Preservation Law” and the additional legislation geared at the repression of labor politics. Any attempt at organization as well as all publishing efforts were almost immediately broken up by the police. The repression of the anarchist movement was most violent, but generally, the permanently repressive behavior of the state applied to all factions of the labor movement in between 1898 and 1918.385

Considering these six constituent dimensions of labor inclusion outlined above, it becomes apparent that Japanese labor during its formative stage in the political arena faced an environment of lowest inclusion, similar to the one found in Russia. This is most evident in terms of institutional inclusion, but also finds its expression through the behavioral elements of inclusion. The case of Japan is therefore quite different from Germany in terms of labor inclusion as the environment for the choices of labor elites. Totten (1966) and others, who imply his premise, are therefore on the wrong track, when they argue that Japanese labor found itself in an environment that is most similar to the one present in Germany during labor’s formative stage in the political arena.

Based on this premise, Totten (1966) and others argue that political-institutional factors cannot be held responsible for the formation of social democratic parties. Instead, it is suggested that socio-economic factors can explain the failure of party formation in Japan. We have already seen that a socio-economic approach is unsuitable for a general theory of social democratic party formation and that it is also not applicable to an explanation for the emergence of one model of labor politics as dominant over the others in the case of Japan. In addition to that earlier conclusion, the previous comparative evaluation of labor inclusion in Japan, Germany and Russia has shown that the causal connection suggested by Totten (1966) and others is based on an incorrect premise.

Other than suggested by these authors, the failure of social democratic party formation is to be expected on the basis of the environment of inclusion faced by labor elites in Japan. In a context of lowest inclusion, social democratic party formation is only a suboptimal choice, and moreover, due to the complete exclusion of labor from the political arena, mass-based social democratic parties are very difficult to establish. It is also predicted on the basis of this particular environment that insurrectionist models of labor politics, before 1918 a number of anarchist variants, and later on, bolshevism, should become popular among Japanese labor elites. Hence, the failure of social democracy in Japan before 1918 and its rapid rise in Germany should not come as a surprise. These outcomes can be linked directly to the varying environments of labor inclusion in the two cases.

385 See Kublin (1952), Pyle (1978) and Ayusawa (1976)
In the following section, the response of Japanese labor elites to their environment of lowest inclusion from 1898 to 1918 will be discussed in more detail. In addition to this analysis of labor’s formative stage in the political arena, we will also briefly trace the developments that occurred after the end of labor’s formative stage in 1918. Doing so will provide further evidence for the relationship between degrees of inclusion and party formation. After the evolution from lowest to low inclusion that occurred in between 1919 and 1926, a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party was on the rise in Japan, which is the predicted outcome in such an environment. The rise of social democracy was, however, terminated by the state incorporation strategy pursued by the militaristic quasi-totalitarian regime after the mid 1930s. At that point in time, similar to the case of Russia after 1921, social democratic party formation had become impossible.

The failure of social democracy and the radicalization of Japanese labor

The following paragraphs are geared at an explanation for the failure of social democracy in Japan during labor’s formative stage of entry into the political arena from 1898 to 1918. I will illustrate and provide evidence for my argument that the lack of party formation is the direct result of the Japanese environment of lowest labor inclusion. As I have shown before on several occasions, such a background makes social democratic party formation a suboptimal choice, and moreover, very difficult to accomplish, due to the absence of any opportunity for legal political activity and the permanent repression of political engagement. In Russia and the United States, the flipside to the failure of social democracy was the embrace of alternative models by labor elites, which represented optimal responses to the existing environment of inclusion: bolshevism as a type of insurrectionism, in response to lowest inclusion in Russia, and moderate syndicalism in response to highest inclusion in the United States.

In the case of Japan, the failure of social democracy is at least as apparent as in those two cases, but the embrace of an optimal alternative model is not quite that clearly observable. As our analysis of Russia after 1907 and Japan during labor’s entire formative period has shown, lowest inclusion can be accomplished even when a constitutional basis is present. However, while the existence of a constitution in Japan during labor’s entire formative period has not contributed to passing the threshold from lowest to low inclusion, it still represents a marked contrast to the case of Russia, which had no constitutional foundation at all before 1905. As a consequence, labor elites in Japan perceived their environment as a more malleable and permeable one than Russian labor elites before 1905.

This specific institutional difference is one important cause for why bolshevism emerged in the case of Russia, while Japan has not seen the invention of an insurrectionist model of labor politics. Another important cause can be derived from a sociology of knowledge perspective. In the case of Russia,
knowledge transfers to labor elites occurred both through the import of foreign models, most importantly Marxism, but also as a result of labor elites’ elaboration on a rich history of Russian revolutionary thought, most importantly populism. Neither one of these two channels was as effective and significant in Japan.  

Despite these given limitations, a variety of political strategies derived from anarchist thought gained increasing popularity in Japan during labor’s formative stage. But it would be an overstatement to argue that they became ‘institutionalized’ in the way in which bolshevism did in Russia after 1912. Furthermore, those Japanese labor elites that remained on a social democratic path into the political arena, went through a period of significant radicalization. These two developments, the growing popularity of anarchism as a type of insurrectionist model of labor politics and the overall radicalization of Japanese labor elites, are to be expected as a generally optimal response to a context of lowest inclusion. But the failure of Japanese labor elites to adjust the imported model to the specific necessities of their environment of inclusion represents a suboptimal form of agency within that general context. In a sense, bolshevism as one variant of insurrectionism would have been much better suited to the repressive, yet comparatively stable Japanese regime. The incitement of rebellion from the bottom up that is inherent in anarcho-syndicalist models or the destabilization of the polity through “direct action” and terrorism can only succeed if either some measure of open political activity is possible, or if the regime is so unstable or incapable that it is in no position to effectively suppress such activities.

These observations hint at two other features inherent in the nature of the Japanese polity and the evolution of labor inclusion, which can explain why anarchism in Japan never succeeded to the same degree as bolshevism in Russia. First, the capacity of the Japanese state to effectively persecute revolutionary threats and the overall stability of the regime were much higher than in the case of Russian tsarism. As a result, even insurrectionist models, which represent the most optimal response to an environment of lowest inclusion, had a much smaller chance for success than in Russia. Second, the growing popularity of anarchism throughout the first decade of the 20th century was contained to some extent by a gradual increase in labor inclusion and the passing of the threshold to low inclusion in 1918. In Russia, on the other hand, this barrier in between lowest and low inclusion was never passed permanently.

This goes hand in hand with the lack of a specifically Japanese philosophical tradition of revolutionary thought. Moreover, the introduction of foreign literature was very difficult, because of distance, geographical location, but also the exclusionary policies of the state. Other than in the case of Russian émigrés socialists, there was no comparable permanent presence of Japanese intellectuals in the centers of marxism abroad. Only with some significant delay did a number of insulated ‘study tours’ of Japanese labor elites to Europe and the United States occur. But these occurred much later than the involvement of Russian labor elites in émigré circles, and they were also much smaller in scope than the permanent presence of Russian intellectuals abroad. Interestingly, by the end of the 1910s, the Japanese anarchist Sakae Osugi makes an argument about the import of ‘foreign’ models to some other ‘domestic’ environment that mirrors the point about knowledge diffusion that I am making in this dissertation. Osugi expresses his doubts about the usefulness of applying imported models to foreign environments, when the nature of the importing environment is significantly different from the environment, within which the imported paradigm was born. Based on this premise, Osugi attempted to link anarchist models of labor politics to anarchist elements inherent in Buddhism as a more suited ideological tradition for the Japanese labor movement. See Osugi (1992).
As a consequence, it is to be expected on the basis of the causal argument outlined here, that the fortunes of insurrectionist models would gradually decline, while the opportunities for mass-based social democracy should increase after 1918, and especially after 1926, when an environment of low inclusion was in place. And this is precisely what happened in the case of Japan.

The following analysis will illustrate the two related developments that result from the presence of lowest inclusion during labor’s formative stage in the political arena in Japan: on the one hand, the failure of mass-based social democracy and on the other hand, the growing popularity of anarchism as an insurrectionist model of labor politics along with an overall radicalization of Japanese labor elites. The caveats in terms of anarchism’s success to become ‘institutionalized’ that were noted above, as well as this dissertation’s explanatory focus on the failure of social democracy, should be kept in mind. The flipside of this development, the embrace of alternative models by labor elites in response to an environment, where social democratic party formation is ‘suboptimal’, only represents an additional illustration for the conditions under which social democratic party formation is not expected to occur.

Ayusawa (1976) notes that socialist literature already found its way to Japan during the early Meiji period in between 1868 and 1890. A variety of publications were translated into the Japanese language, but the socio-economic prerequisites for translating a marxist agenda into practice were still largely absent until the beginning of the 20th century. In the context of a largely agrarian society and an incipient transfer of socialist pamphlets into the country, the first organization that identified itself as ‘socialist’ emerged. The ‘Oriental Socialist Party’ (Toyo Shakai-to) was founded in 1882 by Tarui Tokichi. His group is frequently referred to as a pioneer of Japanese socialism. This is true only in terms of the new party’s label, however. Kublin (1952) argues that Tokichi’s group was a rather unorganized expression of peasant discontent, and Ayusawa (1976) identifies the group as anarchist in nature.

Moreover, above and beyond the question as to whether the party can even be identified as ‘socialist’, there is an additional issue supporting the conclusion that the ‘Oriental Socialist Party’ was not the first organizational manifestation of social democracy in Japan. After the party was constituted in May 1882, it dissolved itself in October 1883 to prevent being crushed by the administration. No direct organizational link exists between the party and the beginnings of the social democratic movement a decade and a half later. The founders of Japanese social democracy from the late 1890s made only passing references to Tokichi and his associates.

The first Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu-to) that embraced a program of political action and worker mobilization was formed in May 1901. It resulted from the preparatory work of a circle of intellectuals, who, not unlike the Emancipation of Labor group in Russia, attempted to translate marxism to the case of Japan. They were organized in the “Society for the Study of Socialism” (Shakai Shugi Kenkyukai) that had been founded in November 1898. The 1901 party functioned as the point of reference for the
eclectic variety of social democratic, but also anarchist and bolshevist factions that would emerge in Japan throughout the following three decades. And since its establishment is the direct result of the efforts undertaken in the context of the 1898 association, the “Society for the Study of Socialism” represents the first organizational manifestation of social democracy in the political arena.

Not only did the first Japanese social democratic party of 1901 function as a reference point for all later ‘proletarian’ parties. Three of its founders represent the most important diverging paths of Japanese labor’s manifestation in the political arena later on. Isoo Abe became a social democrat, Denjiro Kotoku an anarchist, and Sen Katayama a communist. The party program was inspired by the Communist Manifesto, but due to the eclectic variety of the party’s founding fathers, the document represented a compromise of these varying interests.\footnote{\textit{387} It was definitely a socialist agenda, since it contained the demand for the “public ownership of all land and capital necessary for production.” Above and beyond this characteristic, it is difficult to classify along the lines of “evolutionary” and quasi-revolutionary” party models, since it contained very little in terms of strategical recommendations.}

The “total abolition of class differences” posited by the program could be interpreted as a substitute for the more radical rhetoric typical for the quasi-revolutionary party model, but the Japanese party did not engage in a historical materialist analysis. It therefore lacks the typical determinism of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. At the same time, the new party also lacks even more of the defining elements of ‘evolutionary social democracy’. It strongly emphasizes the pursuit of political goals: the introductory paragraphs deal exclusively with the exclusion of labor from the parliamentary arena, and one of the major objectives of the party is “equal access to political power for all people”. Furthermore, given the lack of a strong union movement in Japan at the time, the party was not geared at operating as a representation of the unions in the political arena, which is the typical historical pattern through which evolutionary social democratic parties have emerged in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

Thus, while the \textit{Shakai Minshu-to}, founded in 1901, shares more crucial characteristics with the generic quasi-revolutionary party type than it does with evolutionary social democracy, it can best be understood as a proto-marxist party, comparable to the German SAP that was founded on the basis of the Gotha program in 1875. Just like the SAP, the Japanese party of 1901 was also the product of a compromise, although the range of varying perspectives was different and significantly larger than the one found in the SAP, which represented a union of two different social democratic perspectives: the marxist Eisenach faction and the Lasalleans. The \textit{Shakai Minshu-to} on the other hand united under its roof everything from moderate and quasi-revolutionary social democrats to anarchists and later communists.

\footnote{387 The program is reprinted in Ayusawa (1976, 68)}
More refined and self-contained ‘evolutionary’ and ‘quasi-revolutionary’ variants of social democracy would only emerge gradually throughout the following two decades.

After the party’s foundation congress in May 1901, and the publication of its manifesto in ‘Rodo Sekai’ (The Labor World), edited by Sen Katayama, the party was immediately shut down by the authorities. The circulation of ‘Rodo Sekai’ and all other, non-socialist, papers that published a reprint of the manifesto, was immediately terminated (cf. Ayusawa 1976, 69). Before the authorities took these steps, the translation of labor’s economic struggle into the political arena along with the demands for political rights, through the formation of a mass-based social democratic party, seemed like a feasible strategy for Japanese labor elites. The immediate response of the administration, however, made it clear that the same strategy that was successfully employed in the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties in cases of low inclusion would not work in Japan. In the Japanese environment of lowest inclusion, there existed not even a limited institutionalized window of opportunity for the formation of an open and mass-based organization. The response of the state in 1901 therefore stood for the beginning of a pattern of permanent repression and exclusion of labor from politics during its formative stage of entry into the political arena. It represents the point in time, where the Japanese state opted in favor of an environment of lowest inclusion, rather than utilizing the inclusionary potential that existed in the constitution. According to Pyle (1978), this vicious repression through the administration and the police extended to party organizers, intellectuals, publishing efforts, and the practical labor movement alike.

The social democratic activists that wanted to lay the foundation for a mass-based social democratic party in 1901 thus experienced the immediate dissolution of the party and the repression of their activities. Throughout the remainder of labor’s formative stage in the political arena until 1918, two distinct strategical responses emerged in response to the Japanese environment of lowest inclusion. The first one occurred along a generally social democratic path. Those labor elites that continued to place their hopes on the possibility of party formation adjusted their tactics to the existing environment of lowest inclusion. Sen Katayama, Kojiro Nishikawa, Abe Isoo, and a number of other activists that were involved in the first party formation attempt of 1901, realized that the repressive environment in Japan called for other solutions than an entirely legalistic approach. In order to escape dissolution, and with the long term perspective of forming a nucleus for a mass-based social democratic party, they turned to the organization of what Ayusawa (1976) calls “proto-parties”. In essence, these were legal organizations such as clubs, research institutes or friendly societies that were used as vehicles for ‘illegal’ political activities, such as propaganda, socialist education and organization building.
The most important one of these enterprises was the foundation of “The Institute of Socialism” in the early 1900s, which occurred as a direct response to the dissolution of the Shakai Minshu-to. Katayama, Nishikawa, and Isoo were all directly involved in the foundation and the activities of the institute. The tone of their agitation became significantly more radical. Earlier cautious statements from the 1901 program of the Social Democratic Party about the “abolition of social classes” were now replaced by open references to “class struggle” or “class war”. This adjustment of strategy that can be traced through the evolution of these specific individuals is a clear indicator for the effects of labor inclusion on the strategical responses of labor elites as the central causal argument of this dissertation. In addition to the institute, Ayusawa (1976, 131 et seqq.) notes a number of “friendly societies” and “mutual funds” that operated in a similar way. An officially moderate and apolitical façade was accompanied by growing radicalization and the desire to establish an organizational nucleus for a radical and mass-based labor movement. One of these groups, the mutual aid association Yuai Kai of 1912, later developed into the Greater Japanese Federation of Labor (Sodomei). Other important examples for this type of association and strategy were the Shokko Kumiai Doshi Kai (Society for factory operatives) of 1916, and the 1917 Shin-yu Kai, another mutual aid association.

Along these lines, as the first of two responses to the dissolution of the initial social democratic party formation attempt in 1901, the rhetoric and ideological concepts employed by labor elites became more radical, and the earlier mass-based, open, and legalistic organizational strategy was adjusted to a more clandestine approach. In a sense, the path pursued by Sen, Kjiro, and Isoo at this point in time shows some similarities to the approach of Trotsky after the end of the Russian semi-constitutional experiment in June 1907. Trotsky also developed a strategy of pursuing ‘illegal’ political activities through ‘legal’ worker organizations. The crucial difference between the two cases is the fact that in Japan, no effective underground party existed that could have coordinated these efforts and integrated illegal and legal activities into one single organization.

The individuals involved in these activities gained valuable experiences during this time period, which could be applied to the pursuit of party formation after the evolution of labor inclusion from lowest to low in 1926. But before that point in time, they contributed very little to the establishment of a viable mass-based party. The integration of legal and illegal activities into one single party had only a slim chance of success in the case of Russia. But in Japan, given the absence of an effective underground organization, the efforts at utilizing legal labor associations for illegal political goals remained isolated. Mass-based social democracy was a suboptimal choice in an environment of lowest inclusion, as the one in Japan before 1918. And that is precisely the reason for why the social democratic activists from the first party

388 Ayusawa (1976, 73) with a list of individuals engaged in these efforts.
formation attempt in 1901 decided to not continue the pursuit of party formation for the remainder of labor’s formative stage in the political arena.

This first response to the apparent manifestation of lowest inclusion through the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party in 1901 remained within the confines of the social democratic party model. In this context, the dominant ideological model gradually converged on the quasi-revolutionary party type. But the second response clearly deviated from the social democratic path. The active pursuit of mass-based social democracy was effectively laid to rest by socialist activists, and instead replaced by a strategy of limited organization building, propaganda, and education through ‘legal’ worker associations, in the general context of social democratic ideology. But a number of labor elites, some of which were involved in the party formation attempt of 1901, left the social democratic path altogether and turned to insurrectionist models of labor politics. The evolution of their strategical outlook was accompanied by an increase in militancy at the mass level as well. Both of these developments are to be expected on the background of lowest inclusion, which manifested itself most clearly after 1901.

The “Socialist Party”, founded in January 1906, was an organization that provided a home for both of the above mentioned perspectives for a brief period of time, before they went along their diverging paths. The social democrats wanted to use the party just as they had previously used ‘legal’ labor associations, clubs, and research institutes. They carefully worded the official publications of the party so as to not give the authorities any reason to dissolve it. The at best cautiously social liberal program and the call for “socialism within the limits of the constitution” was clearly not the ‘true’ agenda of its social democratic founders, such as Sen Katayama. It would enable the survival of the organization, which could then be developed as the nucleus of a ‘truly’ social democratic party. But in addition to the social democratic perspective, the party also contained those activists, who stood for the second type of response noted above and who wanted to use the organization as a nucleus for a truly insurrectionist model of labor politics. Shusui Kotoku emerged as their spokesperson. He stood for an insurrectionist anarcho-syndicalist model that rejected parliamentary means as ineffective in the Japanese environment. After the veiled party had been tolerated by the authorities for one year, Kotoku’s speech at a party conference in February 1907 led to the immediate dissolution of the organization. His speech also marks the beginning of organized anarchism in Japan. Over the following decades, it differentiated itself into a variety of more specific trends, most importantly a syndicalist variant that emphasized working through the unions, and a concept of direct action that also entailed acts of terrorism. The growing popularity of anarchism before 1918 and then later on the emergence of bolshevism represent the flipside to the failure of social democratic party formation in an environment of lowest inclusion.

Pyle (1978) outlines in some detail, how in response to the manifestation of lowest inclusion after 1900, a significant part of Japanese labor elites turned toward anarchist tactics of different varieties, some
of which involved the conduct of terrorist acts. Kotoku as the most important figure of Japanese anarchism during this time period emphasized the importance of propaganda and organization building over acts of terrorism. But when a number of anarchists were found considering an assassination of the emperor, the regime used this opportunity to crush the entire movement, even those, as Kotoku, who were not directly involved in any such plans. Kotoku and ten other high profile anarchist activists were executed in January 1911 in response to this so-called “High Treason Incident”. This episode illustrates the greater capacity of the Japanese state to rid itself of its perceived threats, when compared to tsarist Russia. However, it also shows the tactical limitations of terrorism, as it was practiced by a faction of the anarchist movement in Japan, and by the Russian populists. The Russian Bolsheviki were insurrectionists, but they had always rejected terrorism as a political strategy, referring to it as the naïve approach of populism.

Ayusawa (1976, 73) establishes a direct link between the unveiling of the Japanese state as an environment of lowest inclusion and the growing popularity of anarchism: “(T)he ultimate effect of repression of the movement, particularly of the left wing, was to drive the movement underground and to turn it into radicalism.” The rise of anarchist models of labor politics also occurred in the context of an overall increase in labor discontent, which, devoid of an effective organizational framework, expressed itself through a growing number of spontaneous strikes, insulated acts of rebelliousness, and outbursts of local violence. Pyle (1978) notes that these limited and spontaneous, yet forceful, acts of protest increased significantly between 1903 and 1907. Another significant increase of labor contentiousness would occur in between 1916 and 1918, but at this point in time, already in the confines of the friendly societies that had gradually transformed themselves into actual unions throughout the second decade of the 20th century.

Social Democracy after the establishment of low inclusion by 1926

The failure of social democratic party formation in Japan during labor’s formative stage in the political arena between 1898 and 1918 is the direct result of the given environment of lowest labor inclusion. The Japanese state manifested itself as a case of complete labor exclusion and repression for the first time through the application of the 1900 “Peace Preservation Law” in response to the attempted party formation in 1901. This would establish a pattern of lowest inclusion that remained in place until 1918. In between 1918 and 1926, as noted above, the Japanese state was gradually transformed into an environment of low inclusion, through the introduction of enfranchisement, as well as limited political liberties and responsible government.

389 Ayusawa (1976) notes a sevenfold increase of organized labor disputes from 1916 to 1918, when compared to the time period from 1900 to 1911.
The fortunes of mass-based social democracy after 1918 changed drastically in response to this new environment, as it is expected on the basis of my causal argument about the relation between degrees of inclusion and labor’s response. After 1918, the process of party formation resulted in the establishment of “social integration” and “systemness” as the two elements of internal institutionalization. External institutionalization through a sufficient extent of electoral representation was on the rise as well. But this third element of successful party formation was never achieved until after World War II, due to the introduction of a quasi-totalitarian regime toward the late 1930s. The party was well on its way toward external institutionalization, however, through the election returns of 3.9% in 1936 and 7.9% in 1937 (see tables 11 and 18).

The ‘Socialist Masses Party’ thus achieved systemness and social integration as a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party par excellence through its foundation in 1932. The establishment of systemness resulted from a drawn out period of party formation attempts and mergers of various social democratic factions that eventually resulted in the foundation of the Socialist Masses Party as a unifying and stable organization.390 The “July Congress Agenda” of the party as the formal codification of its quasi-revolutionary ideological model advocated the “overthrow of the declining capitalist system”. At the same time, radical rhetoric was combined with a pragmatic emphasis on the importance of organization building and survival. This outlook would become particularly apparent in the party’s attitude toward the emerging military regime of the 1930s. The behavior of the Socialist Masses Party at that time is quite similar to that of the German SPD during World War I and the Spanish PSOE under the dictatorship beginning in 1923. The accommodation of the SMP with the entrenched elites does not represent a contradiction to the nature of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. Quite to the contrary, it is a defining element of that particular model of labor politics.

Totten (1976) observes how the party, once founded on an anti-war and anti-imperialism platform, gradually embraced a “temporary coalition” with the army as a necessary tactic on the road to socialism. Toward the end of the year 1937 and early 1938, the SMP leader Aso Hisashi already engaged in cooperation with Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe. Later that year, Hisashi led his party to support Konoe’s policies of disbanding the parties and reorganizing politics in a quasi-totalitarian fashion. The remaining anti-totalitarian, anti-imperialist elements from the party were expelled throughout the following year. With the accession of the Second Konoe cabinet in July 1940, the Socialist Masses Party dissolved itself in order to make room for the establishment of the “New Structure” as a quasi-totalitarian type of governance.

390 See Totten (1966), who outlines the factional conflicts within Japanese social democracy during this time period in much detail
Conclusion

Despite a number of intriguing similarities in political development, and despite the role of the German model in inspiring the writing of the 1890 Meiji constitution, the Japanese and German environments of labor inclusion are significantly different from one another. During labor’s formative stage in the political arena from 1898 to 1918, Japan was an instance of lowest, and Germany an example of low inclusion. The case of Japan therefore belongs into the same category as Russia, and as a consequence, the same outcome in terms of labor politics should be expected for these two cases: the failure of social democratic party formation and the growing popularity of insurrectionist models of labor politics during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Japan and Russia are also characterized by a number of differences regarding the environment for labor elites’ choices, which have been discussed above. But when it comes to the fundamental question of social democratic party formation and the embrace of alternative models of labor politics, they share the same decisive features.

In Japan, lowest inclusion manifested itself through the response of the state to the first attempt at forming a mass-based social democratic party in 1901. The constitution of 1890 provided for the potential of institutional inclusion. But the suppression of any institutional channel of access to the political arena, and the permanently repressive behavior of the state toward labor illustrates how this opportunity was not exploited. The failure of social democratic party formation and the embrace of insurrectionist models of labor politics, before 1918 most importantly through a variety of approaches revolving around anarchism, was the result of this environment. The effects of lowest inclusion on the response of labor elites can also be observed within the social democratic camp itself. The growing popularity of insurrectionist models after 1901 was accompanied by a radicalization and an adjustment of the socialists’ organizational strategy. Instead of continuing to pursue a strategy of open party formation, social democratic labor elites began to channel their ‘illegal’ political activities through ‘legal’ labor associations, friendly societies, and research institutes. Thus, the failure of social democratic party formation in Japan before 1918 is not an ‘anomaly’ or an unexpected outcome, as some authors, such as Totten (1976) argue. It is the predictable response of labor elites to an environment of lowest inclusion. The fortunes of mass-based social democracy only improved after 1926, when the environment of labor inclusion had been transformed from a level of lowest to low inclusion. As a result, after a number of organizational permutations, a quasi-revolutionary type of social democracy, as would be expected in this context, eventually accomplished systemness and social integration through the foundation of the SMP in 1932. The path to fully successful party formation, which would have required “external institutionalization” on top of these two prerequisites, however, was interrupted by the establishment of a quasi-totalitarian regime toward the late 1930s. In this environment, party formation had become impossible, comparable to the constellation in the Soviet Union after 1921.
The empirical analysis conducted up to this point relied on three consecutive steps. First, all sovereign states that expose a sufficient extent of industrialization were selected for investigation. Industrialization is thereby treated as the prerequisite, the *sine qua non* condition, for the formation of social democracy or alternative models of labor politics. Second, variation in labor inclusion has been analyzed for the selected set of cases. Degrees and configurations of labor inclusion in these polities describe the environment, to which labor elites respond in their decision-making process about the adoption of some model of labor politics. In the third place, the actual choices of labor elites within this environment, and the interaction between external constraints and decision-making were analyzed on a case by case basis.

I suggested that in each category of inclusion, one model of labor politics represents an optimal way for labor elites to channel the interests of their constituency into the political arena. An optimal choice entails the formation of a model of labor politics that features the most rewarding ratio of costs and benefits in response to a given set of external constraints. The absence of social democratic party formation and the embrace of an insurrectionist model of labor politics are best suited to an environment of lowest inclusion. Low inclusion should result in the formation of a quasi-revolutionary, and higher inclusion in the establishment of an evolutionary social democratic party. The optimal response of labor elites to highest inclusion is the absence of social democratic party formation and the decision for moderate syndicalism as an alternative. The outcome in terms of labor politics predicted on the basis of a given level of inclusion depends on labor elites’ translating that environment into an according optimal choice. The given environment of inclusion is relayed to labor elites through two causal mechanisms: directly as a result of their own evaluation of the given set of external constraints, and indirectly through the perception of the
demands voiced by their constituency, which are shaped by the same environment. Understood along these
lines, optimal agency functions as a scope condition for the applicability of the causal relation between
inclusion as the environmental determinant and the observable outcome.

In the vast majority of cases (17 out of 20), labor elites made generally optimal decisions, and thereby
translated an existing structural environment into an outcome that would be predicted on the basis of an
evaluation of labor inclusion as the set of external constraints. This chapter is designed to discuss the role
of elite agency and the sources of suboptimal decision-making more systematically, on the basis of the
case-specific observations from the preceding empirical analysis. Following on the previously outlined
analytical steps, this investigation will proceed as follows. First, I am going to identify those cases, in
which suboptimal decisions have been made, and where therefore, party formation outcomes deviate from
the predictions of a perspective that focuses exclusively on the role of labor inclusion as a causally
determining external constraint. In this context, I am also going to discuss the relative predictive power of
labor inclusion, without the additional consideration of exogenous factors on labor elites’ choices,
compared to alternative theories for social democratic party formation. In the second place, I am going to
elaborate on those cases that feature suboptimal choices, and provide a systematic assessment for the role
of elite agency and the sources of suboptimal decision-making.

**Labor inclusion as a causal determinant and the predictive power of alternative explanations**

The two existing approaches to social democratic party formation suggest a causal connection
between the formation of a particular model of labor politics and some type of underpinning structural
determinant. The socio-economic approach holds variation in the process of industrialization accountable
for different outcomes. Bull (1922) and Galenson (1952) argue that the nature of the working-class across
cases depends on the polity-specific features of industrialization, which then translate into different types of
social democratic parties. The most important factor suggested as the determinant of variation in outcomes
by the socio-economic approach is the speed of industrialization. The socio-economic explanation predicts
the formation of a radical social democratic party in an environment of ‘rapid’ industrialization, and
reformist social democracy, when industrialization is ‘gradual’.

Table 19 displays the relative growth rates of the industrial working-class as an indicator for a case-
specific speed of industrialization, during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Growth rates are
calculated on the basis of decade averages for the absolute number of workers shown in table 7. All
included cases have seen a constant growth in the size of industrial workers for the time period under
investigation. The assessment of gradual versus rapid growth therefore becomes predominantly a question
of comparison across cases. A growth rate of 29.44 % as the overall average of all cases, has been used as
the threshold from gradual to rapid industrialization. The assessment of cases on this basis will serve as the underpinning for evaluating the predictive power of the socio-economic approach.

The status system explanation has been proposed by Lipset (1983) and John Kautsky (2002). They argue that a radical social democratic party only emerges in response to a strong feudal heritage. The absence of social democratic party formation is predicted in an environment that lacks the effects of a status system with pronounced aristocratic dominance on the emergence of a radically minded labor movement. This categorical argument is derived from Lipset (1983). As discussed above, he combines his emphasis on the nature of status systems with an additional consideration of the effects exercised by socio-economic and other political variables. But his primary explanatory factor, both with respect to party formation as a first order question and qualitative variation across cases, is the nature of status differentials. The emphasis on the role of status systems is even more pronounced in Kautsky (2002). He suggests a continuous scale to conceptualize the relation between feudalism and the nature of labor politics by distinguishing between different degrees of aristocratic strength as the causal underpinning for variation in social democratic party formation.

Generally, the status system argument operationalized along these lines, suggests that the more pronounced a feudal heritage is, the more radical social democracy will be. I distinguish between three different categories of aristocratic strength for the following analysis. The feudal nature of some given status system, or in other words, the extent to which aristocratic land-owning elites exercise political control, can either be weak, moderate, or strong. In the weak category, aristocratic political influence is at a minimum, because it has been removed through a lasting liberal revolution, or it was never relevant at all, due to the complete absence of a native aristocracy. The extent of aristocratic strength is moderate, whenever conservative elites have been integrated into a framework of constitutional government. In such an environment, the aristocracy remains an important political player, but is far from exercising dominance over the state. This, on the other hand, is precisely the case in instances characterized by a strong feudal heritage. Aristocratic elites are dominant, and exercise political control in the context of a monarchical-bureaucratic state, sometimes in alliance with a subordinated bourgeoisie. The actual determination of variation across cases in this respect is informed by Kautsky’s (2002) and Lipset’s (1983) assessment of status systems, as well as the empirical analysis of labor inclusion in this dissertation.

The theory suggested here extends beyond the structural and deterministic approach pursued by the status system and the socio-economic approach. However, even without a consideration of exogenous effects on the decision-making process of labor elites, labor inclusion as a causally determining external constraint is characterized by a significantly greater predictive power than the two competing explanations. Table 20 displays the predictions of the status system, the socio-economic and the labor inclusion approach across the 20 selected cases. These expectations are then compared to the actually observable outcomes.
The labor inclusion approach correctly predicts the dominant model of labor politics in 17 out of 20 instances, while both the socio-economic and the status system explanation only account for 11 cases, respectively.

The two approaches fail to provide a more encompassing explanation for different reasons, and they also apply correctly to different sets of cases. The limited applicability of the socio-economic approach has already been demonstrated by a variety of contributions designed to test the hypothesis suggested by Bull (1922) and Galenson (1952). Lafferty (1971) could not find evidence for the effects of socio-economic variables on the type of party formation in an analysis of Scandinavia, as the same set of cases investigated by Galenson and Bull. Tilly (1981) provided a critique of the causal mechanisms linking rapid industrialization to a radical political response, as it is suggested by the Bull-Galenson hypothesis, in his analysis of the German labor movement. The most extensive falsification of the socio-economic approach has been provided by Bartolini (2000, 177). Based on his comprehensive analysis of Western European cases, he comes to the following conclusion: “That social mobilization models explain so few of the differences among the countries at each historical moment is astonishing.”

While the socio-economic approach is based on a spurious causal relationship, the evaluation of the status system explanation requires a more complex argument. Here, the failure to account for a more encompassing set of cases is the result of an incomplete explanation and the misspecification of the underpinning causal mechanism. The status system approach suggests that the emergence of a radical social democratic party depends on the presence of a strong native aristocracy that excludes labor from the political arena, thereby triggering pronounced class consciousness and an according radical response in terms of party formation. I have already criticized the use of the term class consciousness in the American exceptionalism literature, and from the overall status system perspective. Even when leaving this conceptual issue aside, it becomes clear that a radical response of labor to political exclusion through the aristocracy is only one part of the whole story.

This proposed causal connection can be observed in some categories of cases. First, the status system approach applies to a number of instances, in which labor enters the political arena, and is confronted with political exclusion and oppression by a native aristocracy. In all these cases, a radical response did indeed occur in the context of a feudal status system, through the formation of quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties. This applies to the cases of Norway, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and Germany. Second, the status system approach also correctly predicts the observable outcome in those instances, where labor enters the arena of party politics and finds a pattern of political conflict between a conservative aristocracy and a liberal party in the context of a liberal-constitutional polity. This is the case
in Britain and New Zealand. In this particular variant of the ‘moderate’ feudal strength category, the prediction that a reformist social democratic party will emerge, proves to be correct. Eventually, the status system explanation applies to some cases in a third constellation, where a native aristocracy is absent altogether. In Canada and the United States as two examples for this scenario, labor foregoes the formation of a social democratic party, and pursues a strategy of party system incorporation and moderate syndicalism.

In all these categories of cases, the status system approach provides not only a correct prediction of the expected outcome, but also a plausible account for the causal mechanism linking aristocratic oppression to the response of labor elites. Above and beyond this limited set of cases, however, the theory does not hold. It remains an incomplete explanation, because it fails to take into account that labor does not only respond in a radical manner to exclusion by the aristocracy, but also to exclusion by non-aristocratic political forces. Moreover, the concept of inclusion and exclusion is not sufficiently specified. It relies on a dichotomy between the absence and the presence of aristocratic repression, rather than on a continuum of repressive versus inclusive behavior.

First, in the cases of Russia and Japan, a strong system of feudal status differentials was present, but no radical social democratic party was successfully formed, other than in the cases of Norway, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and Germany, which were characterized by the same environment of status differentials. Instead of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, Russia and Japan have seen the formation of an insurrectionist approach in response to exclusion by the aristocracy and a monarchical-bureaucratic state. The status system approach is not able to distinguish these two outcomes, because it does not specify varying degrees of repression.

Second, in a number of cases – Australia, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands – feudalism is weak. According to the status system explanation, this should result in the absence of party formation, because social democracy is argued to respond only to political exclusion by a native aristocracy. In these four cases, however, social democratic parties emerged despite the weakness of feudalism, because party formation responded to the political challenge of liberal and other, typically religion based, competitors.

391 Lipset (1983) himself considers New Zealand as an example of ‘weak’ feudalism. I have previously shown that other than in Australia, New Zealand has actually adopted a more aristocratic pattern of land ownership. On the basis of that pattern, a large quasi-aristocratic economic elite of sheep farmers has also exercised considerable political influence. I have therefore classified New Zealand as an instance with a ‘moderate’ social status system, contrary to Lipset’s classification. Doing so favors the predictive power of the status system approach.

392 In this respect, too, my conceptualization, if anything, is biased in favor of the status system explanation. Kautsky (2002) and Lipset (1983) struggle with the Canadian case, because a social democratic party did eventually emerge, despite the absence of a native aristocracy. However, when focusing exclusively on the initial formative stage of labor politics, Canada is an example for the absence of party formation.

393 Lipset (1983) is aware of the limits of his approach, and suggests a number of intervening factors for the case of Australia, which is most clearly an anomalous case in his theoretical framework. He suggests that immigration of English workers has also transferred the social status differentials from the mother country to the colony. It is difficult to verify this argument empirically. But even if that...
The choices of labor elites, furthermore, were also influenced by varying degrees of repression across these cases: in Belgium and the Netherlands, repression was pronounced, but not executed by conservative aristocratic elites. In Australia and Switzerland, inclusion was higher, but fell short of the highest category occupied by the United States.

Third, in Argentina, Spain, and Italy, a conservative aristocracy accommodated itself with liberal forces in the context of a formally constitutional, but substantively non-competitive party system. Along the lines of the status system explanation, these instances are considered moderate in terms of the political dominance of the aristocracy, just like Britain and New Zealand. They should therefore see the foundation of a reformist social democratic party. In all of these cases, however, labor was predominantly excluded from the political arena by an alliance of conservative and liberal forces, and radical social democratic parties emerged. In the fourth place, the status system approach also fails to explain the specific case of France, where a pattern of party competition between liberal and conservative forces was in place in the context of a liberal-constitutional framework. Despite the only moderate strength of a feudal status system, however, party formation occurred in a radical form, through the embrace of a quasi-revolutionary approach.

The role of elite agency and the sources of suboptimal decision-making

The previous discussion has demonstrated that labor inclusion as an environmental determinant is significantly better suited for an explanation of social democratic party formation than the competing socio-economic and status system approaches. Considering the agency of labor elites has been an important contributing factor to arrive at this causal argument, and it also provides an important underpinning for understanding the causal mechanisms that link external constraints to the observable outcomes. Taking the role of elite agency into account is therefore of crucial importance for all investigated cases. On top of that, it is particularly relevant for those instances, where the predominant model of labor politics deviates from the prediction derived through an analysis of labor inclusion as the external constraint. Suboptimal agency of labor elites that leads to a misalignment between the adopted model and a given environment of inclusion could be observed for the cases of France, Canada, and Switzerland. In all these cases, the presence of higher inclusion would have suggested the formation of an evolutionary social democratic party as the optimal response. Contrary to that expectation, a quasi-revolutionary social democratic party

issue is left aside, he does, of course, run into the problem of accounting for the case of the United States along these lines. If status differentials travel across the ocean along with the immigrants that were originally born in such an environment, then the Italian, Irish, German, and, according to Lipset, also the English immigrants to the US, should have substituted for the lack of a native aristocracy in America. And eventually, even if Australia and the US are left aside in this context, the status system approach still faces the problem of explaining the party formation outcomes in the cases of Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
emerged as dominant in France and Switzerland, while Canadian labor elites predominantly opted for a strategy of moderate syndicalism.

The choice for a model of labor politics that does not represent an optimal response to the given environment of inclusion is the most apparent form of suboptimal agency. In addition to that, I also introduced other kinds of choices that qualify as suboptimal, albeit without moving an observable outcome entirely “off the equilibrium path” (Levi 1997). First of all, as discussed more extensively before, labor elites can make a wide variety of idiosyncratic decisions that either hurt or benefit the mobilization success of their organization. It is impossible to include all of these facets of human behavior into a systematic explanation. 394 Secondly, above and beyond the decision for an overall species or type of labor politics, labor elites might also opt for a suboptimal variant of that generic model. This is a theoretical possibility for all models of labor politics introduced here. But it can only be systematically evaluated for the quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type, simply because it is the only category with a sufficiently large number of cases.

Table 21 displays both kinds of suboptimal choices. With respect to the cases listed in the first part of the table, labor elites opted for a generally suboptimal model of labor politics, and thereby produced an outcome that was not predicted on the basis of labor inclusion as the underpinning environmental determinant. This applies to the cases of France and Switzerland, in which quasi-revolutionary social democratic parties emerged in a context of higher inclusion, and to the case of Canada, where moderate syndicalism emerged as dominant. In all these three cases, evolutionary social democracy would have been the optimal response of labor elites, as the model of labor politics with the most rewarding ratio of costs and benefits in a context of higher inclusion. The instances of suboptimal agency listed in the second part of the table do not amount to a choice for a suboptimal species or type of labor politics. In these cases, labor elites opted for a model of labor politics, whose emergence is predicted as the response to a given degree of inclusion. They only made suboptimal choices with respect to the two variants of quasi-revolutionary social democracy that had been introduced before. In all of these cases, the parliamentary German variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy was adopted, while the Belgian extra-parliamentary variant would have represented the ideal response to a kind of low inclusion polity, in which labor is completely disenfranchised.

I argued before that quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents the optimal response to an environment of low inclusion. Compared to lowest inclusion as the absence of labor access to all three institutional channels, low inclusion occurs, when one particular set of channels is opened for labor

394 Przeworski and Sprague (1987) consider one particular type of elite behavior in this context – the leadership effects of party elites on social democracy’s election returns. I argued before that I am referring to the extent of mobilization success in various respects as an indicator for suboptimal choices. But it is not my intent to fully explain the existing variations in mobilization success.
incorporation. This is the defining feature of low inclusion as an overall category, and quasi-revolutionary social democracy represents the generic party model that is best suited for such an environment. Within the general category of low inclusion, however, labor access has occurred through different sets of institutional channels. This variation produces two varieties of low inclusion polities: one in which limited labor inclusion occurs through the establishment of at least minimal, and in some cases, even extensive, responsible government and political liberties, while enfranchisement is firmly entrenched at the lowest level; and a second one, in which limited labor inclusion occurs primarily through the enfranchisement of the working-class, while political liberties and responsible government remain at a comparatively lower level of inclusion.

The two variants of quasi-revolutionary social democracy represent optimal responses to each of these two scenarios, respectively. The German parliamentary variant focuses on electoral participation as a means of labor mobilization. It is therefore an optimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy only in those low inclusion polities, where the electoral channel is opened for the access of workers and the party itself. The Belgian variant on the other hand emphasizes a syndicalist approach to labor politics, but one in which the party is dominant, albeit through the pursuit of extra-parliamentary tactics. The suboptimal choice of labor elites in the cases of Spain, Argentina, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and for a brief period of time Austria, consisted of adopting the German parliamentary approach during their formative stage, although the electoral channel was effectively shut down for the party and the working-class at large. In all of these cases, the adoption of the Belgian variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy would have been the ideal response to the encountered environment.

These suboptimal choices can be identified by considering the degree of party institutionalization and the overall fragmentation of the left in a particular case. I have discussed this issue from a conceptual and theoretical perspective in the second chapter of this dissertation. I argued there that varying degrees of success accomplished by some model of labor politics depend not only on the choices of labor elites, but also on the extent to which competing parties were able to mobilize labor on the basis of non-economic cleavages. Actual data on varying degrees of institutionalization have been presented in the introductory overview to this comparative analysis and throughout the specific case studies. First, variation in external institutionalization for those cases, where the electoral channel was available, either initially or during the immediate aftermath of the formative stage, were identified in tables 12 and 13 through the election results of social democratic parties. Table 13, more specifically, makes these results comparable across cases, by controlling for the pervasiveness of industrialization. Generated through the same procedure, tables 14 and 15 display varying degrees of systemness, based on social democratic membership figures. On top of these two easily quantifiable indicators, the respective case studies have also noted varying degrees to which a particular ideological model became dominant, as well as the overall fragmentation of the left. All of these
factors are used here as indicators for suboptimal choices. They are symptomatic for a situation, in which a model devised by labor elites was not successful in mobilizing the labor constituency in an optimal fashion. Limited systemness, limited external institutionalization, and limited social integration are all direct consequences of such a misalignment.

I have argued previously that a given environment of inclusion, understood as a set of external constraints on elite agency, is relayed to labor elites through two specific causal mechanisms. In the first place, directly, through the assessment and evaluation of the given environment by those elites. Second, the broader labor constituency expresses its demands about the preferable course of political action to the leaders of the movement. As these demands are shaped by the same environment of inclusion, this interaction functions as an additional, indirect, causal mechanism, through which some given environment enters the decision-making process of labor elites. When labor elites fail to take into account the unfavorable constraints on a suboptimal model of labor politics imposed directly through a given environment of inclusion, this failure contributes most immediately to limited systemness, but relatedly, also to a lack of external institutionalization. A suboptimal response to the demands of their constituency, as they are shaped by some given environment of inclusion, is most clearly related to a lack of external institutionalization. The most important mechanism, through which an effective response to the broader labor constituency is devised, is the formulation of a fitting social integrative ideology.

The fragmentation of the overall left during labor’s formative stage in the political arena or its immediate aftermath occurred in cases, where social democracy successfully emerged as the optimal response to a given environment of inclusion, but coexisted with a significant insurrectionist competitor. In cases of lowest inclusion, insurrectionist approaches represented the optimal response. In low inclusion polities, the successful implementation of anarchism-syndicalism or bolshevism was favored by the failure of social democratic party elites to devise a party model that represented the optimal response to a given environment of inclusion. The fragmentation of the left during labor’s formative stage in the political arena is therefore the result of limited social democratic institutionalization, which in itself is the result of suboptimal choices about the adopted type or variant of social democracy made by party elites.

Excluded from this pattern of left fragmentation are those cases, where the mobilization success of social democracy was limited as a result of suboptimal choices, but where at the same time, workers were incorporated into the political arena through other non-insurrectionist channels, for example liberal parties. This is the case in Switzerland and Canada, where institutional inclusion was at the highest level, and behavioral inclusion comparatively high, albeit without reaching highest degrees of inclusion typical for the United States. The emergence of a fragmented left during labor’s formative stage in the political arena is therefore limited to cases in the low inclusion category. Moreover, within this category, it is favored by a degree of labor inclusion that belongs to the lower half of the low inclusion category. The cases, to which
this applies (Italy, Argentina, Spain, Hungary, Austria before 1897), found themselves directly adjacent to the category of lowest inclusion, where the formation of an insurrectionist model would have been the optimal response (see figure 5). A continuous, rather than a strictly ordinal representation of labor inclusion shows how the evaluation of some given environment of inclusion is more difficult than in other cases, which are more clearly located in the middle of some given category. With a continuous decrease in labor inclusion, the ‘optimality’ of an insurrectionist response, increases accordingly.

Suboptimal choices are favored and determined by a variety of sources. On the basis of a sociology of knowledge approach (cf. Wuthnow 1989), I distinguished previously between external and internal sources of suboptimal decision-making. All these factors describe a particular way in which labor elites’ choices are influenced by considerations that stand in the way of a neutral analysis of the existing environment of inclusion. As a result of such considerations, adopted models of labor politics move “off the equilibrium path”, i.e. lead to the formation of a predominant model of labor politics that would not have been predicted on the basis of considering labor inclusion as the environmental determinant. Internal sources of suboptimal decision-making include typical patterns of political socialization that shaped labor elites in a particular political environment. On top of that, labor elites might also make suboptimal choices as a result of a status or class affiliation that is distinct from that of their targeted constituency. A second ‘external’ dimension extends to influences from the outside that affect the decision-making process of labor elites. This refers, most importantly, to the diffusion of external knowledge through widely disseminated models of labor politics, which originated from a different political environment, and have assumed a paradigmatic status. But in addition to that, problems in the evaluation of the external environment of labor inclusion and the process of devising an adequate response can also be rooted in the unclear nature of that environment itself.

In most cases that have seen some form of suboptimal decision along these lines, a combination of factors can be observed. The diffusion of external knowledge is the most widespread source for the emergence of suboptimal choices. It plays some role, although to different degrees, in all relevant cases. The choice of a suboptimal model of labor politics in the case of France is the most easily discernible example, because it saw the effects of a variety of factors on suboptimal decision making. It is also the country that is most difficult to grasp for theoretical predictions that rely exclusively on environmental determinants, as the only case that cannot be explained by references to socio-economic variations, status systems, or degrees of labor inclusion.

The previous case-specific analysis has revealed one distinctive feature of French political development, which directly affected worker involvement in politics at various points in time before labor’s

395 The case of France, which also experienced the emergence of a strong anarchist-syndicalist current, does not belong to this category of cases. As argued in the French case study, suboptimal choices in France were not only made by social democratic party elites, but also by those labor elites that engaged in the formation of anarcho-syndicalist unions.
formative stage of entry into the arena of party politics as a nationally organized force: a pronounced revolutionary pattern of political change and a frequent reversal of liberal accomplishments through the reassertion of reactionary forces. The general historical as well as the individual memories of these experiences have contributed to the political socialization of a labor movement that emerged as significantly more revolutionary minded, and that translated this mentality into the liberal environment of the consolidated Third Republic.

In the second place, the formative stage of labor’s entry into the arena of party politics as a nationally organized force occurred during the crucial consolidation phase of the new constitutional-liberal regime that replaced the bonapartist Second Empire. The suboptimal choice of social democratic party elites is therefore not simply an issue of political socialization and historical memories, since for a significant period of time, the extent of labor inclusion in the new regime and the question of its survival were precarious and unclear. The earlier pattern of revolutionary political development further contributed to this dilemma. It should also be kept in mind that a response of labor elites, whose revolutionary rhetoric was out of proportion with the liberal-constitutional environment, extended beyond social democracy itself. It also applied to the emergence of a strong anarcho-syndicalist current. The diffusion of external knowledge as a third factor was a contributing factor in the case of social democratic party formation in France, too. However, unlike in a number of other cases, this in itself would probably not have been sufficient to trigger a suboptimal response by French labor elites, simply because vulgar marxism, as it was disseminated through the Second International, was only one out of an eclectic variety of intellectual traditions that influenced French social democracy.

Both limited institutionalization and a fragmented left as the above mentioned consequences of suboptimal choices can be observed for the case of France. The left was strongly divided into a social democratic current on the one hand, and on the other hand, viable anarcho-syndicalist unions as well as later on, a strong communist party.396 In terms of mobilization success after the completion of its formative stage, French social democracy was clearly an underperformer (see tables 12 and 13). The extent of labor mobilization was even smaller than the ratio of election returns and industrialization reveals in table 13. One of the defining features of French social democracy is the eclectic variety of its sources of electoral support. Lindemann (1983), for example, argues that only a small faction of industrial workers voted for the socialists during this time period, while the majority of electoral support came from quarters that are not commonly associated with a social democratic agenda.397 With its choice for a pragmatic, yet rhetorically

396 See Blackmer and Tarrow (1975) for a discussion of communism in the context of liberal regimes in France and Italy.
397 See also Voss (1993) and Bell and Criddle (1988). See Stearns (1971) for an assessment of anarcho-syndicalism in France. The title of his book, “cause without rebels”, illustrates arguments I introduced before, as to which the members of anarcho-syndicalist unions did not share the ideological orientation of their organization and its leaders.
radical, quasi-revolutionary party model, French socialists found themselves in the middle of the two ‘originals’ that they attempted to synthesize: the anarcho-syndicalists on the one side, who rejected parliamentary politics altogether and the radical republicans on the other, who had already mobilized workers into their fold long before the SFIO was founded in 1905.

Unlike in France, the diffusion of external knowledge was the all decisive factor for the choice of a suboptimal model of labor politics in the cases of Canada and Switzerland. In both instances, the exercise of influence from the outside occurred through various channels. First, through the actual organizational involvement of German socialists in Switzerland, and the even more extensive influence of the American AFL in Canada. In the second place, through the reception of the intellectual paradigm as well as the practical success in the formation of German social democracy and American moderate syndicalism. While the roots of suboptimal choices are therefore less eclectic in Canada and Switzerland than they were in France, the consequences in terms of significantly reduced mobilization success are the same. Tables 12 and 13 identify Switzerland as an electoral underperformer, even slightly below the level of relative electoral success of the French social democrats in the aftermath of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. In terms of systemness, identified through variation in membership levels, the limited success of French social democrats is more apparent than that of the Swiss party. The relative membership of the French SFIO is at the very bottom of the cross-national comparison, only slightly larger than that of the Russian, Argentinean, and American social democrats (cf. table 15). Within the group of cases that experienced suboptimal choices in one way or another, Swiss social democracy fares relatively well in terms of party membership. But the party finds itself clearly below the relative membership of all those cases displayed in table 15 that did not establish a suboptimal model of labor politics or a suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy.

The case of Canada, on the other hand, is more difficult to place in comparative perspective. The lack of electoral mobilization to such an extent that not even a minimum threshold of external institutionalization was passed, is one indicator for the failure of social democratic party formation. But this can, of course, not be used as evidence for the lack of mobilization success accomplished by moderate syndicalism as the suboptimal alternative to social democracy that was embraced before 1919. To allow for such an evaluation, it would be necessary to find a way of comparing the mobilization success of Canadian trade unions to the membership and electoral mobilization of social democratic parties elsewhere. Such a comparison would be seriously flawed. Two other observations can help to substitute for the lack of a readily available comparative indicator, but they are clearly less than perfect: first, the relative mobilization success of Canadian trade unions, measured in terms of union density, was significantly lower than in the vast majority of other industrializing societies at the time (cf. Docherty). However, the choice of a
suboptimal model for labor’s presence in the political arena is only one out of a wide variety of factors that could have contributed to this phenomenon.

Second, the eventual institutionalization of an evolutionary social democratic party in between 1932 and 1949 occurred after the completion of labor’s initial formative stage in the political arena. By founding the CCF and establishing it as a viable political party, Canadian labor elites reversed their earlier decision for moderate syndicalism. The previous failure to respond to higher inclusion during labor’s formative stage by forming an evolutionary social democratic party, however, can be regarded as one contributing factor to the particularly limited mobilization success of the Canadian social democrats. The CCF and later the NDP never obtained more than 20% of the vote before 1980. Other than Labour in Britain, which replaced the Liberals as the second dominant party, social democracy in Canada only became entrenched as a viable third party alternative.

The remaining cases listed in table 17 are different from Canada, Switzerland, and France, in that they are not examples for the choice of a suboptimal model of labor politics. In the cases of Argentina, Spain, Hungary, Italy, and Austria, labor elites opted predominantly for quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which represented the optimal response to an environment of low inclusion. However, within that general context, a suboptimal choice was made with respect to the adopted variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy. All of these cases are examples for a type of low inclusion polity, in which the limited incorporation of labor occurred through the guarantee of minimal political liberties and responsible government, but without any significant electoral inclusion of workers. In this constellation, where electoral participation is either entirely impossible, or at least seriously impeded, the adoption of a parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy is clearly a suboptimal decision. The adoption of extra-parliamentary tactics, as suggested by the Belgian variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, which was also successfully practiced by the Swedish and Norwegian parties, would have been the optimal response to such an environment.

While this applies to all cases, the effects of this decision on the extent of mobilization success vary significantly. First of all, in Austria, no negative effect at all can be observed. Anarchism emerged as a viable alternative in Austria during the 1880s, but after a brief peak, it never became as influential as in the cases of France, Italy, Argentina, or Spain. In terms of electoral mobilization, Austrian social democrats emerged as an overperformer, with the second most favorable industrialization/electoral support ratio of all cases studied here (see table 13). The Austrian institutional environment of labor inclusion was comparable to those found in the remaining cases discussed in the present context only until 1897/1907. The electoral reforms enacted at these two points in time made the Austrian case converge on the German pattern of limited inclusion through enfranchisement. The earlier suboptimal choice of the German parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy therefore became an optimal response to the adjusted
environment of inclusion after only a very brief period of time. As a consequence, no permanent effect on the mobilization success of Austrian social democracy can be observed.

A similar development occurred in the case of the Netherlands. But here, enfranchisement for labor occurred significantly after the most important growth period of Dutch industrial labor. As a consequence, electoral mobilization was somewhat smaller than in the majority of other cases, but not to the same extent as in the cases of true electoral ‘underperformers’ (see table 13). Hungary and Spain cannot be compared to the other cases along the lines of electoral mobilization, because the electoral channel remained effectively shut down for a significant period of time after the completion of the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. But the fragmentation of the labor movement in both these cases that was outlined in the respective case studies is clearly the result of the suboptimal choice made by social democratic party elites and the ensuing low extent of social democratic extra-parliamentary mobilization success.

In the case of Italy, limited electoral mobilization of workers was compensated by extensive middle-class support for the PSI. As a result, the suboptimal choice of social democratic elites, the failure to embrace extra-parliamentary methods of mobilization, and the lack of mobilization success can only be identified by reference to the growth of a pronounced anarcho-syndicalist tradition, and later the emergence of a particularly strong communist party. Argentina, eventually, is a most apparent example for the consequences of choosing a suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in both these respects. The industrialization/electoral support ratio of Argentinian socialists falls into the same underperformer category as the cases of France and Switzerland, where labor elites opted for a generally suboptimal model of labor politics (see table 13). The relative size of the party’s membership base is at the bottom of those cases, which were considered institutionalized. Within the complete set of cases, it is second only to Russia, which failed to pass even a minimum threshold of systemness (see table 15). The lack of worker mobilization through social democracy created a situation, in which the labor constituency became mobilized into the political arena through alternative channels, first anarchism, and later on Peronism.

The diffusion of external knowledge was an important source for the choice of a suboptimal variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in all these cases. The paradigmatic nature of the German SPD, its ideological underpinning, and its dominance within the Second International have triggered the adoption of its variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy in all these cases. It is true that the organizational and electoral success of the SPD in the 1880s and 1890s have made the party a role model. But above and beyond the paradigmatic status of the SPD, the actual path of knowledge diffusion exposes some significant variations across cases, as the earlier analyses have shown. Austria and the Netherlands received their vulgar marxist indoctrination directly through their German comrades and neighbors. In Italy, German and French vulgar marxists, who interacted closely with one another, were influential. In Spain, vulgar
marxism originating from Germany was almost exclusively diffused through French intermediaries, while Hungarian social democrats cooperated closely with their Austrian neighbors.

The presence of an ‘unclear environment of inclusion’ as the second one of two ‘external’ determinants of suboptimal elite behavior was particularly important in the cases of Spain and Argentina. In both these instances, labor elites were confronted with an environment, in which the electoral route was seemingly open. Such a configuration of low inclusion would have rendered the German parliamentary variant of quasi-revolutionary social democracy the optimal choice. However, the practice of managed elections effectively shut down any meaningful access for workers and socialist parties to the electoral arena. Social democratic party elites were therefore confronted with a critical dilemma: should they pursue the electoral route that was formally accessible and count on the gradual abandonment of managed election practices, or should they engage primarily in extra-parliamentary activities? Parties in both cases opted for electoral mobilization. The survival of managed election practices and the factual lack of access to the electoral channel for a significant period of time eventually made this choice a suboptimal one. The ‘social background’ of party elites in both these cases is also partly responsible for this decision in favor of electoral participation. The particularly pronounced middle-class leadership in both parties had no strong affiliations to labor organizations ‘on the ground’ and also regarded socialist parties as their vehicles for gaining political influence as outsiders to the entrenched political system.

The preceding analysis seeks to identify those cases, where suboptimal choices occurred during labor’s formative stage into the political arena. It is neither a comprehensive explanation for mobilization success, nor is it supposed to account for all the misfortunes that might have happened to social democratic parties in the aftermath of their formative stages. The factors that contribute to determine varying degrees of party institutionalization or success have already been outlined before. They include most importantly the pervasiveness of industrialization, the extent to which non-economic social cleavages were successfully utilized by competing parties to mobilize the labor constituency, as well as a wide variety of idiosyncratic choices and features of labor elites. On top of that, there is an even wider variety of additional factors that would have to be considered for an assessment of party success after the completion of the formative stage. This is beyond the scope of my research interest, but a few comments are in order to illustrate this point.

Despite their choice for an optimal party model, the Belgian social democrats never conquered the office of prime minister before 1938. Liberal forces in Belgium opted for coalitions with the catholics, rather than the social democrats. Thus, despite a particularly effective social integrative agenda and at least adequate external institutionalization, Belgian social democracy was not able to enter coalitions until a comparatively late point in time as a prerequisite for access to the executive branch.

Labor elites in Germany also made an optimal choice during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. As a result, the party was largely successful in devising an effective social integrative model, in
establishing a functioning organization, in mobilizing its constituency, and in preventing a fragmentation of the left during labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Despite these accomplishments, the interwar period was characterized by a significantly divided left, with obviously disastrous repercussions for the labor movement’s ability to withstand the onslaught of fascism. During this time period, German social democracy opted for executive responsibility, in a coalition with liberal and catholic parties, but social democrats were never able to deliver on their promise of revolutionary transformation as the key element of the social integrative ideology that had kept the party together before 1917.

The inherent contradictions in between pragmatic practices and an accommodation with the existing environment on the one hand and radical rhetoric on the other, had already become most apparent, of course, during the revolutionary situation in 1918. Although preparing for the ‘big bang’ of capitalism and for the implosion of a monarchical-bureaucratic state was the single most important rationale for the SPD before 1918, the party was incapable of exploiting the revolutionary situation, once it presented itself. This failure is not really surprising. It is the logical consequence of the inherent contradictions that characterize the quasi-revolutionary party model. What used to be an ‘optimal’ model under the pre-1918 conditions was far from optimal, once an actual revolutionary situation had occurred, and during the following liberal constitutional period.

Social democrats in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, on the other hand, were not only successful in forging liberal-socialist coalitions. They also achieved dominance within these arrangements, and used their position of power to gradually transform the socio-economic practices of market capitalism. This distinguishes these three cases from the examples of Germany and Belgium, although in all of these instances, labor elites had made optimal choices during labor’s formative stage in the political arena.

To some extent, what can be held accountable, is the pragmatism of Scandinavian social democratic parties and their ability to adapt to changing circumstances that had already been one of their defining features during the formative stage in the political arena. However, to be able to fully explain this divergence, it would be necessary to introduce a number of other causal factors: the nature and strength of liberalism across these cases; the extent to which conservative elites were willing to arrange themselves with the new liberal and socialist challengers after the end of labor’s initial formative stage in the political arena, the determinants for the behavior of social democratic party elites after 1918, to name only the most important ones. All of these developments represent stages in the transformation of social democracy, while the goal of this dissertation was to account for the formation of varying models of labor politics.
CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSION

This dissertation developed and tested an innovative explanation for the formation of social democratic parties. Since the previous chapter has already summarized the major results of this study, this concluding chapter will discuss some implications of the research conducted here for related fields. I noted in the introduction that the results of this study can be used as a building block for the study of social democratic party transformation and the explanation of interwar regime types.

A ‘mechanic’ argument about the vulnerability and immobility of social democratic parties in the face of changing external circumstances (cf. Lemke 1992, Pontusson 1998, Merkel 1992) has already been extended by a different perspective that emphasizes the ability of social democratic parties to influence their destiny (cf. Kitschelt 1994). The findings presented here about the decision-making processes of labor elites and the social integrative functions of party ideologies can help to account with more precision for this continuum between decisional autonomy and constraints. However, other than the deterministic ‘demise’ perspective that sees social democratic parties only as an extension to ‘external’ developments, the perspective opened up with this study allow for a dynamic interactive model that is capable of linking the internal world of the party to the world outside.

It is undeniable that external changes, some of which, in a specific historical context were noted by the ‘demise’ perspective, generally affect social democratic parties. However, it is by no means predetermined that some given party will necessarily react in a rationalistic manner to such external developments. For instance, transformations in class structures or preferences in electoral markets might create a situation, where social democratic parties, if they were a homogenous ‘rational’ actor, would adapt their programmatic orientations or their tactics in a certain way. They often do, and the success of New Labour can serve as evidence for that. But under which circumstances do parties resist pressures to implement such changes? I believe that an understanding of party’s formation history and the process,
through which revisionism occurs, and certain sets of orientations become dominant is crucial to provide an
answer to this question. In that context, a social integrative ideology binds party members together, and
thereby creates a situation, where external change might be perceived as threatening, and therefore will not
lead to an adjustment of the party’s orientation, even though it would be a rational response. In order to
account for the ‘internal’ world of the party in response to challenges from the outside, it is crucial to
understand the social integrative effects of party ideologies in general, as well as a party’s specific
‘formation background’.

A second field, to which the research conducted here can be extended is the study of interwar regime
types. The Italian case study in this dissertation came to the conclusion that a suboptimal choice of Italian
socialist elites has caused a serious under-mobilization of Italian workers through social democracy. The
success of fascism in Italy was, among other things, facilitated by two important factors, one of which is
the limited success in effectively organizing Italian workers under the socialist umbrella. The other one is
the limited potential for cooperation with the liberals. Both of these features distinguish the case of Italy
from the cases of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, where successful organization, and electoral
mobilization of workers coincided with the opportunity for cooperation with the smallholder liberal parties
(red-green coalitions).

This observation for the case of Italy places a somewhat different emphasis on an explanation for
interwar regimes in Europe than the account provided by Luebbert (1987). He argues that fascism emerged
in cases, where social democratic parties made appeals to and mobilized previously unmobilized and
politically inert peasant laborers. Italian socialists, however, were not only blessed with just minimal
success in mobilizing workers, they abstained explicitly and consciously from demands for universal
suffrage before 1912, and were also otherwise very adamant and explicit about not trying to appeal to the
mass of ‘politically immature’ peasant laborers, especially in the South, before 1912. With the change in
party leadership to the so-called ‘revolutionary’ faction during that year, the party eventually discovered the
South and previously unmobilized workers in general.

While Luebbert (1987) argues that it is social democracy’s attempts to appeal to rural workers, which
favors the emergence of fascism, it is equally plausible to argue that the lack of success in organizing
workers through “party integration”, as Collier and Collier (1992) call it, can be causal for the emergence
of an authoritarian-corporatist regime, aided by the lack of cooperation between social democracy and the
liberal movement. The organizational weakness of socialist parties makes it easier for fascism to defeat
opposition from the socialist labor movement, and the lack of cooperation between liberals and social
democracy allows fascists to dominate liberalism.

This approach would have the added benefit of being able to account for the case of Denmark as well,
a case that is at odds with the explanation provided by Luebbert: Danish social democrats were famed, and
sometimes loathed, by other social democratic parties for their programmatic and propagandistic appeals to rural laborers (cf. Lahme 1982). According to Luebbert (1987), this would have been a recipe for the emergence of fascism, but that did not actually happen during the Danish interwar period. The establishment of a social democratic form of corporatism, however, could be observed in Denmark during the interwar period, as well as an effectively organized social democratic labor party with high levels of mobilization success, and the opportunity for cooperation with the liberals.
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APPENDIX A

TABLES AND FIGURES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall degree of labor inclusion</th>
<th>Predicted outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest</strong></td>
<td>Moderate syndicalism adopted as the alternative model of labor politics. Pressure on the existing liberal party to evolve into a ‘reformist’ type of social democratic party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorough liberal inclusion</td>
<td>No social democratic party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher</strong></td>
<td>Variations within the group of evolutionary social democracy of degree (different degrees of emphasis on socialism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional liberal inclusion</td>
<td>Evolutionary social democratic party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Party type occurs in two different variants, a ‘parliamentary’ (German) variant and an ‘extra-parliamentary’ (Belgian) variant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression and limited inclusion</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary social democratic party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lowest</strong></td>
<td>Insurrectionism adopted as the alternative model of labor politics, either through anarchism-syndicalism or bolshevism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive exclusion</td>
<td>No social democratic party</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 1: Different models of labor politics in response to varying degrees of labor inclusion on the premise of optimal agency by labor elites
Table 2: Labor politics during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political and the transformation of social democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>SOCIAL DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>INSURRECTIONISM</th>
<th>MODERATE SYNDICALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variants</strong></td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) ‘German model’</td>
<td>(i) Initially founded as ‘evolutionary’</td>
<td>(a) Focus on ‘traditional’ socio-economic issues</td>
<td>Different degrees of purging value and ideology discourse from rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) ‘Belgian model’</td>
<td>(ii) Evolutionary through transformation</td>
<td>(b) New Left Red-Green version</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stage of emergence</strong></td>
<td>Formative stage</td>
<td>Formative stage and through party transformation</td>
<td>Party transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td>(a) SPO Germany, SDL Denmark</td>
<td>(a) Labor Britain, ALP Australia, Labor New Zealand</td>
<td>(a) Godsberg SPD, New Labour, New Deal Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) P.O.I Belgium, SAP Sweden, DNA Norway</td>
<td>(b) Sweden and Norway, Gastarbeiters faction and Croslan, current smaller left socialists in Europe, Euro-Communism</td>
<td>(b) Berlin SPD</td>
<td>Under debate in S.P.D, Parts of New Labour and other European social democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading theoreticians</strong></td>
<td>Karl Kautsky, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Emile Vandervelde</td>
<td>Eduard Bernstein, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Anthony Crosland, Akmov</td>
<td>(a) Godsberg SPD, Anthony Giddens, FDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Kautsky, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Emile Vandervelde</td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Berlin SPD</td>
<td>Parts of S.P.D Program commission for new Hamburg Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status today</strong></td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Minority status in many European Social Democratic parties; smaller independent left socialists parties</td>
<td>Leading model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic</strong></td>
<td>Group and interest representation</td>
<td>(a) Group and interest representation, (b) Electoral competition as well as group and interest representation</td>
<td>Electoral competition as well as group and interest representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted Group</strong></td>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>‘People’s party’ based on broad and stable coalitions</td>
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Continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>Social Democracy</th>
<th>Moderate Syndicalism</th>
<th>Anarchist-Syndicalism</th>
<th>Insurrectionism</th>
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<td><strong>Types</strong></td>
<td>Socialism</td>
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<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td>Economic policies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fundamental strategy</strong></td>
<td>Emphasis on revolution perspective, combined with pragmatic organization building and accommodation with entrenched elites</td>
<td>Evolutionary transformation</td>
<td>Specific reforms</td>
<td>Insurrection carried out by professional revolutionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude toward state</strong></td>
<td>Capture the state</td>
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<td><strong>Elite-mass relation</strong></td>
<td>Democratic; hierarchical, branches and individual delegates</td>
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<td>Democratic; hierarchical, branches and individual delegates</td>
<td>Undemocratic, strong center and secret cells</td>
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<td><strong>Decision making</strong></td>
<td>De facto, frequent and decentralized</td>
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<td><strong>External embedding</strong></td>
<td>Jointly and in internal coalitions of parties</td>
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<td><strong>Measures on how change occurs</strong></td>
<td>Unionism, selective political interventions, and party system incorporation</td>
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<td>Unions and political parties directly involved in the transformation</td>
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<td><strong>View on how change occurs</strong></td>
<td>Determinism (Capitalist collapse and revolutionary situation inevitable)</td>
<td>Voluntarism</td>
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<td>Cooperation and coalition-building</td>
<td>Cooperation and coalition-building</td>
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<td>Cooperation with bourgeois parties</td>
<td>Cooperation with bourgeois parties</td>
<td>Partial cooperation with bourgeois parties</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Worker enfranchisement</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which workers are effectively included into the electoral process. Enfranchisement has two separate dimensions: (1) the number of workers with the right to vote; and (2) the effectiveness of the workers’ vote compared to other enfranchised categorical groups. Highest: Universal male suffrage (at least 20% of the entire population has the right to vote) and effective elections. Higher: Significant extension of the right to vote (at least 15% of the entire population) and effective elections. Alternatively, universal male suffrage combined with limited infringement on the effectiveness of the vote. Low: Either some limited enfranchisement (10-15% of the entire population) combined with effective elections, or a greater extension of the right to vote (above 15%) combined with techniques impairing the effectiveness of the vote. Lowest: No or only symbolic enfranchisement of the working class: when right to vote is extended to less than 10% of the entire population, or in those cases where right to vote is more extensive (above 10%), but is combined with techniques to impair the effectiveness of labor’s vote.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political liberties for labor</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which (1) freedom of speech and press, and (2) freedom of association and assembly are formally guaranteed or restricted, through constitutional and other legal means. Highest: Political liberties guaranteed and formally unrestricted for entire formative period. Higher: Political liberties are guaranteed and mostly unrestricted (only limited – mild or temporary – restrictions). Low: Political liberties precarious (Significant restrictions). Lowest: Political liberties either not formally guaranteed, or permanently suspended through other legal means.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible government</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which policy making and the composition of the executive depend on parliamentary support (In presidential types of government, executive needs to be directly accountable to the public). Highest: Responsible government effective: composition of the executive and policy making require parliamentary support. Higher: Only temporary or limited restrictions on responsible government. Low: Significant impairment of responsible government (through either one or a combination of these factors: undue influence of an unaccountable upper house, exclusion of important policy areas, exclusion of executive appointment from parliament. Lowest: No popularly elected parliament, only advisory, or mostly ignored by executive.</td>
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<td><strong>Behavior of the executive</strong></td>
<td>The way in which, above and beyond the realm of party competition and formal institutions, the state’s executive, its bureaucracy, and its enforcement agencies behave toward labor. Highest: State incorporation of labor (corporatist, populist, or bonapartist path). Higher: Predominantly neutral policy of non-involvement, and only limited – mild or temporary - repression. Low: Predominantly hostile attitude and frequent acts of repression. Lowest: Particularly hostile attitude and repression for entire formative period.</td>
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<td><strong>Behavior of competing parties – electoral inclusion</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which entrenched political elites, usually competing parties (conservative or liberal as well as parties based on linguistic or religious cleavages) appeal to and incorporate the working class at large through the arena of electoral politics. Highest: Successful and permanent electoral mobilization of an overwhelming share of the working class. High: Significant, but not permanent or overwhelmingly large, success in electoral incorporation of workers. Low: Failed - only temporary or limited – attempts at electoral incorporation. Lowest: No significant attempt to appeal to workers electorally.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior of competing parties – organizational inclusion</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which entrenched political elites, usually competing parties, successfully incorporate labor elites into their apparatus, as activists, permanent cooperation partners, or candidates for public office. Highest: Comprehensive and permanent incorporation of labor elites. High: Significant, but not permanent or comprehensive success in organizational incorporation. Low: Failed – only temporary or limited – attempts at organizational incorporation. Lowest: No significant attempts at organizational incorporation of labor.</td>
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Table 3: Dimensions and measurement of labor inclusion
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<th>Overall degrees of labor inclusion</th>
<th>Degrees of labor inclusion on component dimensions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Highest</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thorough liberal inclusion</td>
<td>Democratic institutions → Highest inclusion on all institutional dimensions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral state executive → Higher inclusion in terms of executive behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competing parties successfully appeal to labor → Highest electoral and organizational inclusion through competing parties</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Higher</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional liberal inclusion</td>
<td>Democratic institutions → Higher or Highest inclusion on all institutional dimensions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Neutral state executive → Higher degree of inclusion in terms of executive behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of competing parties’ attempts to appeal to labor → Below highest degrees of electoral and organizational inclusion by competing parties</td>
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<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Repression and limited inclusion</td>
<td>One institutional channel opened for labor access → Comparatively more inclusion either on enfranchisement (version 1), or combination of political liberties and responsible government (version 2)</td>
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<td>Predominantly repressive state executive → Low inclusion in terms of executive behavior</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Appeal of competing parties to labor insignificant → Low or lowest degree of electoral and organizational inclusion by competing parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lowest</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive exclusion</td>
<td>No participatory institutions → Lowest inclusion on all institutional dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanently repressive state executive → Lowest degree of inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competing parties irrelevant → Lowest degree of electoral and organizational inclusion by competing parties</td>
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</table>

Table 4: Overall degrees of labor inclusion and component indicators
Table 5: Decision analysis for labor elites’ choices about models of labor in different environments of labor inclusion

Notes: Establishes the optimal model of labor politics within a particular category of inclusion. A model is optimal, when it provides more rewards, i.e. a greater benefits-cost ratio than all other models in some given category of inclusion. Costs of different models in varying environments of labor inclusion include (a) personal risks for labor elites, and (b) necessary investment in organization building. Benefits include (a) potential for high degrees of institutionalization (external mobilization and internal strength of the organization, and (b) potential for the ability to gain access to the exercise of political authority.
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Table 6: List of independent states in 1914

Notes: Assessment based on correlates of war data by Gleditsch (2004). Included cases meet the following requirements: independent for at least 30 years before 1914, continuing independence after World War I, above 250,000 inhabitants. Contrary to Gleditsch (2004), Austria and Hungary are here treated as independent states, as both of them were ‘internally’ sovereign.
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Table 7 – Number of industrial workers and the size of the entire economically active population (in thousands)
Notes
Figures are derived from calculations based on national census data, collected and adjusted by Bairoch et al. (1968) and Bairoch (1971). They refer to the country’s boundaries during the year in question (a list of specific years that were used can be found below). Industrial workers are defined as females and males working in “extractive industry”, “manufacturing industry”, and “construction”. Thus, this is no estimate of individuals growing up in worker households, but only of those individuals that are actually employed as industrial workers. The figures presented here are a conservative estimate for all cases; it is possible that some industrial workers have been added to other categories. The category “transport and communications” is not included for any of the cases: in some cases, railroad workers and workers occupied with telegraph installations are therefore part of this excluded category. In the case of Sweden, railroad workers and day laborers in 1870, 1880, and 1900 are part of the category “others occupied” and therefore not part of the combined industrial workers category in this table. In Britain, beginning in 1881, retired persons were not classified according to their previous occupation anymore. US figures don’t include workers in gas, electricity and related public utilities.

Cases and years
Argentina 1919
Australia 1901, 1911, 1921
Austria 1857, 1869, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910 (all of Cisleithania, except the Italian provinces), 1920 (Austrian Republic in post World War I borders)
Belgium 1846, 1856, 1866, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920
Canada 1911, 1921
Denmark 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1901, 1911, 1921 (Figures from before 1901 not included, because they are based on estimates of all household members, while beginning in 1901, individual numbers — which are comparable to the other cases — are available)
France 1840-1845, 1856, 1866, 1886, 1896, 1901 and 1906 (Average of both figures included for 1900s), 1911 (Includes Savoy and Nice beginning in 1866, but excludes Alsace and Lorraine beginning in 1886), 1921 and 1926 (Average of both figures included for 1920s)
Germany 1882, 1895, 1907, 1925
Great Britain 1841, 1851, 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921 (not the United Kingdom)
Hungary 1857, 1869, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910 (all of Transleithania), 1920 (Hungary in its post World War I borders)
Italy 1871, 1881, 1901, 1911, 1921
Japan 1872, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920
Netherlands 1849, 1859, 1889, 1899, 1909, 1920
New Zealand 1896, 1901 and 1906 (Average of both numbers included for 1910s), 1911, 1921 and 1926 (Average of both values include for 1920s, number of workers engaged in mining estimated on the basis of values from previous decade for 1921 and 1926) (Maoris not included)
Norway 1875, 1891, 1900, 1910, 1920
Russia 1897 (includes Russia proper, the Polish territories of Russia, the Russian population in Finland, but not the non-Russian population of Finland)
Spain 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920
Sweden 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920
Switzerland 1880, 1900, 1910, 1920
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<td>20.95</td>
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</table>

Table 8: Share of industrial workers within the entire economically active population for all sovereign and sufficiently industrialized cases

Notes: Own calculations, based on national census data, collected and adjusted by Bairoch et al. (1968) and Bairoch (1971), as displayed in table 7.
### Table 9: Degrees of labor inclusion during the formative periods of labor’s entry into the political arena

**Notes:** Inclusion measurement refers to the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena. It begins with the first organizational manifestation of labor politics that is linked to the later event of party formation. It ends with the accomplishment of systemness and social integration. If no social democratic party was successfully formed, 1919 is used as the end point. See text and table 11 for empirical investigation of labor’s formative stage in the political arena. Degrees of inclusion, overall and on specific indicators, measured on an ordinal scale: lowest (1), low (2), higher (3), or highest (4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formative period</th>
<th>Average share of total population with right to vote</th>
<th>Preliminary score based on right to vote</th>
<th>Factors considered</th>
<th>Effect on score</th>
<th>Final score</th>
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<td>28.38</td>
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<td>20 – 25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>20 – 25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1893 – 1918</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1894 – 1919</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1871 – 1888</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1863 – 1891</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>- Before 1867 election to Reichstag of North German Federation, no German state and no federal elections; majority of workers only enfranchised through Prussian Diet (based on 'curia system')</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1882 – 1896</td>
<td>20 – 25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>- &quot;Managed elections&quot;, all encompassing before 1912, still practiced after 1912, especially in rural areas</td>
<td>- 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1878 – 1888</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>- All-encompassing system of &quot;managed&quot; elections and arranged alternation of oligarchical parties in government (&quot;turno pacifico&quot;)</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1885 – 1891</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1875 – 1894</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- Universal male suffrage after 1893 abruptly extended the franchise from 2.2 to 22 % of the population, but introduction of &quot;Plural voting&quot; at the same time impaired the effectiveness of the workers' vote</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1893 – 1889</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- Curia-based voting system until 1907</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1883 – 1897</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1878 – 1894</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1877 – 1895</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- &quot;Managed&quot; elections (&quot;trasformismo&quot;), particularly in the South</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1888 – 1903</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- Electoral fraud and corruption</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1883 – 1919</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- No parliament until 1906, and then relatively wide franchise, but significant impairment of the effectiveness of the workers' vote through a curia-based voting system</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1901 – 1919</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Enfranchisement during formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena
Notes

Values refer to elections for the lower legislative chamber; this also applies to the two examples of a presidential type of government, the United States and Argentina. Suffrage levels and practices regarding the effectiveness of the vote for presidential elections in these countries are comparable to the assessment made for legislative elections.

In obtaining a measurement for the inclusiveness of the franchise, the following procedure has been implemented: (1) The right to vote. The percentage of individuals given the right to vote in the entire population during the formative period of labor’s entry into the political arena is calculated. The calculation of the extent of voting rights extends from the point in time immediately preceding the “formative period” (or, the first point in time, where a sovereign state exists during the formative period) until the point in time that follows on the end of the formative period (in those cases, where formative period extends beyond 1914, 1915 marks the last available data point). Based on this figure, a preliminary score for the extent of enfranchisement is assigned. Universal male suffrage requires 20-25 % of the population to have the right to vote (Goldstein 1983). Score of 4: 20 % and more; 3: 15 - 20 %; 2: 10 - 15 %; 1: 0 - 10 %. (2) After accounting for the first dimension of enfranchisement, the second dimension of enfranchisement (i.e. the extent to which a workers’ vote is actually effective or meaningful) is considered. Depending on the relative weight of these factors, the preliminary score is adjusted accordingly. In this step, all forms of suffrage discrimination are taken into account: direct and formal, direct and informal, indirect. The weight of the score adjustment depends on the severity of the discrimination. See discussion in the text for details.

Data are derived from Goldstein (1983), unless otherwise noted. For Japan, New Zealand, United States, Australia and Canada, data are from Mackie and Rose (1982). For Argentina: Canton (1968).

Values refer to the formative time period of the respective labor party. I included all the figures during this time period as well as the one immediately preceding and the one immediately following it. In those cases, where formative period began before the achievement of statehood or de facto autonomy, the figure is based on the values given ever since the achievement of statehood or de facto autonomy: In Germany, therefore, the value stated refers to the time period after 1871; in New Zealand, the entire formative period is covered, since parliamentary institutions for the entire country where established before independence in 1907; In Australia, the figure refers to federal elections after independence in 1901, while provincial elections before that time were based on an equally inclusive franchise.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formative Period</th>
<th>First organizational manifestation linked to later party formation</th>
<th>Institutionalization of dominant organizational form (Systemness)</th>
<th>Establishment of dominant ideological form (Social integration)</th>
<th>Electoral representation or other public reification (External institutionalization)</th>
<th>Type of party formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1863 – 1891</td>
<td>1863 Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV)</td>
<td>1890 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)</td>
<td>1891 Erfurt Program</td>
<td>1890: 10.1 % 1891: 19.7 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1871 – 1888</td>
<td>1871 Danish Section of the First International</td>
<td>1888 Social Democratic League</td>
<td>1888 Copenhagen program</td>
<td>1891: 9 seats 1901: 17.1 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1883 – 1897</td>
<td>1883 Stockholm Chamber of Labor (SAP)</td>
<td>1887 Stockholm Congress</td>
<td>1887: 14.6 % 1911: 28.5 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (Belgian variant)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1885 – 1891</td>
<td>1885 Kristiania (Oslo) Social Democratic Association</td>
<td>1887 United Norwegian Labor Party (DNA)</td>
<td>1891 Party program</td>
<td>1906: 16.0 % 1909: 21.5 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (Belgian variant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1875 – 1894</td>
<td>1875 Chambre du Travail in Brussels and other cities</td>
<td>1885 Piir Ouvrier Belge (POB)</td>
<td>1884 Chart de Quaregnon</td>
<td>1894: 13.2 % 1896: 21.0 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (Belgian variant)</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1878 – 1894</td>
<td>1878 Social Democratic Association (SDN)</td>
<td>1885 Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP)</td>
<td>1894 Zwolle Congress</td>
<td>1895: 11.2 % 1899: 13.9 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1883 – 1889</td>
<td>1883 Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV), Vienna branch</td>
<td>1889 Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichische (SDAPÖ)</td>
<td>1889 Hamfeld party congress statement of principles</td>
<td>1901: 14.0 % 1907: 21.0 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1877 – 1905</td>
<td>1877 Figi di Lavoro</td>
<td>1885 Italian Socialist Party (PSI)</td>
<td>1892 Genoa Congress</td>
<td>1900: 13.0 % 1904: 21.3 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1882 – 1896</td>
<td>1882 Buenos Aires Club Aleman Vowar</td>
<td>1896 Partido Socialista Obrero Argentina (PSOA)</td>
<td>1896 First Party Convention: statutes, principles and ‘minimum program’</td>
<td>1900: 11.24 % 1924: 14.55 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>1878 – 1888</td>
<td>1878 Grupo socialistista madrileño</td>
<td>1879 Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE)</td>
<td>1888 Party Program</td>
<td>1917 Leadership in general strike</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1888 – 1903</td>
<td>1888 General Workers’ Society of Hungary (AMESZ)</td>
<td>1890 Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP)</td>
<td>1903 Party Program</td>
<td>1918: Involvement in revolution and national and military councils</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1879 – 1903</td>
<td>1879 Federation du parti des travailleurs socialistes de France</td>
<td>1900 Section Francaise de l’Internatinoal Ouvrieres (SFIO)</td>
<td>1903 Paris Congress</td>
<td>1900: 12.3 % 1910: 13.1 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1870 – 1904</td>
<td>1870 Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP)</td>
<td>1888 Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP)</td>
<td>1904 Aarau Program</td>
<td>1902: 12.6 % 1905: 14.7 %</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary (German variant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1893 – 1918</td>
<td>1893 Independent Labor Party</td>
<td>1900 Labor Party (possibility of individual membership beginning 1918)</td>
<td>1918 Party Constitution and Program (Labor and the New Social Order)</td>
<td>1918: 21.4 % 1922: 29.7 %</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1900 – 1918</td>
<td>1900 Socialist Party</td>
<td>1916 Labour Party</td>
<td>1916 Party Declaration</td>
<td>1919: 24.2 % 1922: 25.5 %</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1876 – 1901</td>
<td>1868 Social Party</td>
<td>1901 Socialist Party of America</td>
<td>1901 Indianapolis party platform (evolutionary)</td>
<td>No external manifestation</td>
<td>Non-formation and moderate syndicalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1894 – 1919</td>
<td>1894 Socialist Labor Party, Toronto section</td>
<td>No systemness</td>
<td>No dominant ideological form</td>
<td>No external manifestation</td>
<td>Non-formation and moderate syndicalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1901 – 1919</td>
<td>1898 Shaka (Stu) Kenkyû-ku (Society for the Study of Socialism)</td>
<td>No ‘systemness’</td>
<td>No dominant ideological form</td>
<td>No external manifestation</td>
<td>Non-formation and insurrectionism (anarchism-syndicalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1883 – 1917</td>
<td>1903 Emancipation of Labor</td>
<td>1903 Mensheviks of second congress</td>
<td>No ‘systemness’</td>
<td>1905 Involvement in Revolution 1917 Menshevik involvement in February Revolution, Petrograd Soviet and Provisional Government</td>
<td>Non-formation and insurrectionism (bolchevism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Social Democratic party formation during labor’s formative stage in the political arena

Notes: Determination of party type based on founding document named in table and actual practice of the party. External institutionalization can occur through achieving at least 10 % of the vote in two consecutive elections, or through significant participation in extra-parliamentary events. See table 10 for sources of election data.
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<td>36.6</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1918-1930 25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>21.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1913-1921 24.9</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>1900-1930 24.2</td>
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<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>1913-1930 21.3</td>
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<td>No data</td>
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<td>13.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>1888-1930 18.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1893-1930 14.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1912-1930 10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1892-1930 2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1900-1930 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Election results of social democratic parties
Notes: (*) Last column indicates average after completion of internal dimensions of party formation (systemness and social integration through dominant ideological model) and at least higher electoral inclusion. In cases of non-formation, average is calculated beginning with the first electoral participation during formative stage. Data for Denmark before 1901 are only rough estimates and remain incomplete. The data before 1901 are therefore excluded from the calculation of the average support after completion of party formation. For sources of election data see table 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average electoral support</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Industrial worker share of population</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Electoral support / Industrialization Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1908-1930</td>
<td>46.28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31.18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1907-1930</td>
<td>35.17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1908-1930</td>
<td>31.83</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25.56</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1888-1930</td>
<td>29.64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.09</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1913-1921</td>
<td>24.87</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1900-1930</td>
<td>24.20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27.52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1918-1930</td>
<td>25.78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30.07</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1891-1930</td>
<td>31.17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40.42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1894-1930</td>
<td>30.08</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43.37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1918-1930</td>
<td>30.44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1913-1930</td>
<td>21.32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35.64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1893-1930</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31.87</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1912-1930</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1888-1930</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1892-1930</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31.02</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1900-1930</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28.98</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Ratio of electoral support and industrialization after party formation and at least ‘higher’ electoral inclusion of workers

Notes: Figures for electoral support refer to election returns in parliamentary elections, except for the United States: presidential elections. Electoral support / Industrialization ratio calculated for each case beginning at the point in time, when party formation was complete, and at least higher enfranchisement was present. Evaluation of different performance levels based on comparison across cases: overperformers have a ratio above 1, adequate performers a ratio in between 0.5 and 1, underperformers in between 0.1 and 0.5, lack of public reification requires a value below 0.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1891-1900</th>
<th>1901-1910</th>
<th>1911-1920</th>
<th>1921-1930</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>375,931</td>
<td>1,026,771</td>
<td>2,523,247</td>
<td>3,069,740</td>
<td>2,135,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>521,000</td>
<td>999,552</td>
<td>883,519</td>
<td>835,563</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>334,127</td>
<td>609,269</td>
<td>563,412</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>44,100</td>
<td>74,821</td>
<td>100,812</td>
<td>185,319</td>
<td>117,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28,070</td>
<td>80,814</td>
<td>145,125</td>
<td>107,695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>51,938</td>
<td>71,907</td>
<td>89,843</td>
<td>74,197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>22,419</td>
<td>74,016</td>
<td>62,222</td>
<td>55,998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>31,344</td>
<td>117,984</td>
<td></td>
<td>48,672</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>23,238</td>
<td>39,665</td>
<td>72,343</td>
<td>47,820</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>37,625</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>17,561</td>
<td>34,477</td>
<td>37,713</td>
<td>30,663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>7,304</td>
<td>26,671</td>
<td>44,520</td>
<td>25,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,633</td>
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</table>

Table 14: Social democratic party membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Industrialization rank</th>
<th>Overall membership</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Ratio Members / Number of industrial workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1919-1930</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>563 412</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1903-1930</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>107 695</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1903-1930</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55 998</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1900-1930</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 135 009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1900-1930</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>117 859</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1905-1930</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>835 563</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1902-1930</td>
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<td>30 663</td>
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<td>0.0382</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1900-1930</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25 424</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1897-1920</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47 820</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1905-1930</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>74 197</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0106</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1904-1912</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48 672</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1900-1914</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2 633</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1905-1911</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32 100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 Ratio of party membership and industrialization

*Notes:* Industrialization rank is based on share of industrial workers in economically active population (see table 13). Ratio of ‘party membership’ / ‘Number of industrial workers’ is based on absolute number of industrial workers during the time period for which party membership data are available (see table 7).
### Table 16: Stages, agents and mechanisms of labor inclusion in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Major agent(s) of inclusion</th>
<th>Mechanisms of inclusion</th>
<th>Major contenders advocating independent organization of labor in the political arena</th>
<th>Relevant historiographical debates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Before 'formative period'  
(1866) | 'Jacksonian democracy'  
1820–1854 | Jacksonian Democratic Party | * Democratic institutional reforms  
* Local patronage (emerging political machines, based on residential and ethnic-cultural identities)  
* Electoral appeals to 'common man' ('producers'), evoking socio-economic cleavage, combined with appeals along ethnocultural dividing lines (emerging cross-class ethnocultural coalitions)  
* Significant policy concessions to labor, at the state, local, and federal levels | * Workingmen’s parties at local and state levels (mid 1820s to around 1832; mid to late 1830s) | * Exaggeration of Democrats’ role as the advocate of the 'common man'? Democrats’ agenda sincere or strategic?  
* Extent of ethnocultural vs. economic voting and the relative salience of these cleavages for party identification  
* Labor inclusion through Democratic Party, or through both major parties? |
| 'Formative period'  
(1865–1921) | 'Jascksonian democracy'  
1820–1854 | Republican and Democratic parties | * Electoral appeals to encompassing cross-class coalitions along ethnocultural cleavages and sectional non-class economic policy appeals  
* Local ethno-cultural political machines and local patronage (embedded in national parties)  
* Particularistic policy concessions at the federal, state, and local levels | * Labor and Labor-Farmer parties, local, state, federal: Labor Reform Party, 1870–1872; local and state labor parties, late 19th century; Greenback-Labor Party, locally and nationally, late 1870s to early 1890s; United Labor Party, locally and nationally, late 1890s; Union Labor Party, late 1890s; Populists, early 1890s)  
* Socialist parties (Since 1868) | * Continuing debate about the relevance of ethnocultural vs. economic voting and the roots of party identification.  
* How decisive was the role of the AFL and its national leadership for the dominant strategy adopted by US organized labor? (for the entire 'formative period') |
| 'Progressive era'  
(1896–1929) | * Initiative for institutional reforms, curtailing the influence of political machines, parties, party bosses and corporations  
* Electoral appeals and cooperation with labor elites  
* Progressive policies at the national, the local, and most importantly at the state level | * Socialists (Social Party, 1868; Socialist Labor Party 1876–1900s; Social Democracy of America, 1896–1901; Socialist Party of America, since 1901)  
* Communists (since 1919)  
* Labor and labor-farmer parties at local, state, and federal levels (Local and state: early 1900s, late 1910s, early 1920s; National Labor Party 1919, Progressive Party, mid 1920s) | * Generally, is progressivism a useful characterization of a political movement that existed in this time period?  
* Who were the progressives, and to what extent were industrial workers involved, both as leaders and supporters?  
* To what extent did progressives’ substantive policies and institutional reforms benefit workers, and where they intended to be labor-friendly? |
| After 'formative period'  
(1921–) | Great Depression and 'New Dealer era'  
1929–1938 | Presidential and federal executive  
Local party machines | * Support for progressive policies  
* Cooperation with labor leaders  
* Creation of 'expert' governance as a means to adjudicate social conflict (amounting to intense cooperation in the context of economic planning and conflict arbitration during WWI) | * Socialist parties  
* Communists  
* Labor and Labor-farmer parties | * With respect to the relation between policy and political elites on the one hand, and labor inclusion on the other, this is the least controversial period in the history of labor inclusion |
| | Democratic party  
Local party machines | * Encompassing (reformist social democratic) labor legislation, establishment of welfare state, and extensive public works programs  
* Patronage from the federal level  
* Cooperation with labor leaders  
* Legislative initiative and support for New Deal policies  
* Electoral appeal | * Socialist parties  
* Communists  
* Labor and Labor-farmer parties |  

Table 16: Stages, agents and mechanisms of labor inclusion in the United States
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pre-1919 organizational roots</th>
<th>Institutionalization of dominant organizational form (Systemness)</th>
<th>Establishment of dominant ideological form (Social integration)</th>
<th>Electoral representation or public reification (External institutionalization)</th>
<th>Degree of labor inclusion after 1919</th>
<th>Type of party formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| United States | 1868 Social Party  
1876 Socialist Labor Party  
1898 Social Democratic Party | 1901 Socialist Party of America | 1898 Chicago Declaration of Principles of the Social Democratic Party (evolutionary) | No external institutionalization | Highest (continued non-formation predicted) | Continued non-formation and moderate syndicalism |
| Canada      | 1894 Socialist Labor Party, Toronto section  
1904 Socialist Party of Canada (SPC)  
1911 Social Democratic Party of Canada (SDPC) | 1932 Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) | 1932 Regina Manifesto | 1945: 15.6 %  
1949: 13.4 % | Higher (evolutionary social democratic party predicted) | Evolutionary social democratic |
| Russia      | 1883 Emancipation of Labor  
1903 Mensheviks from Second RSDRP Congress | No systemness | No dominant ideological form | No external institutionalization | Below lowest (impossibility of party formation expected) | Party formation outside of possibility space |
| Japan       | 1901 Japanese Social Democratic Party  
1907 Japanese Socialist Party | 1932 Socialist Masses Party | 1932 July Congress Agenda | (1936: 3.9 %)  
(1937: 7.9 %) | 1925-1937: Low (Quasi-revolutionary party predicted) | 1925-1937 Quasi-revolutionary social democratic (but only limited external institutionalization)  
1937-1945: Authoritarian corporatist inclusion (party formation outside of possibility space) |

Table 17 – Social democratic party formation after 1919 in earlier non-formation cases

Notes: See table 11 for details.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Form of Governance</th>
<th>Event Triggering the New Era</th>
<th>Changes Within Eras</th>
<th>Overall Labor Inclusion</th>
<th>Labor Inclusion on Six Constituent Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861 – 1905</td>
<td>Autocracy without constitutional basis</td>
<td>1861: Enabling of industrialization through abolition of serfdom</td>
<td>1861-1878: Limited liberal reforms 1878-1905: Time of reaction</td>
<td>Lowest (1.0)</td>
<td>Lowest on all dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905 (October) – 1907 (June)</td>
<td>Semi-constitutional autocracy</td>
<td>1905: October Manifesto by Tsar Nicholas II announces constitution and liberal reforms</td>
<td>Gradual abandonment of 'low' inclusion</td>
<td>Low (1.5)</td>
<td>Low on Enfranchisement, political liberties, and behavior of the executive Lowest on responsible government, electoral inclusion through competing parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 (June) – 1917 (February)</td>
<td>Autocracy with effectively suspended constitution</td>
<td>June 1907: Stolypin electoral reforms as the institutionalization of counter reaction to prior limited liberalization</td>
<td>1907-1908: Crackdown on labor activities 1908-1911: Minimal toleration for some labor activities 1911-1917: Reaffirmation of strictly lowest inclusion</td>
<td>Lowest (1.0)</td>
<td>Lowest on all dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917 (February) – 1917 (October)</td>
<td>Provisional liberal institutions</td>
<td>February 1917: Popular revolution establishes provisional government and provisional liberal institutions</td>
<td>Prospect of permanent liberal institutions and higher inclusion</td>
<td>Political liberties guaranteed and respected by provisional executive Promise of responsible government and enfranchisement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1917 (October)</td>
<td>Gradual establishment of totalitarian regime</td>
<td>October 1917: Bolshevik seizure of power provides the basis for gradual establishment of totalitarian regime</td>
<td>Party formation outside possibility space</td>
<td>State incorporation strategy and complete abandonment of inclusion through political liberties through a more effective repressive apparatus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Evolution of labor inclusion in Russia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formative Period</th>
<th>1840s-1850s</th>
<th>1850s-1860s</th>
<th>1860s-1870s</th>
<th>1870s-1880s</th>
<th>1880s-1890s</th>
<th>1890s-1900s</th>
<th>1900s-1910s</th>
<th>1910s-1920s</th>
<th>Average working-class growth and industrialization speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1883-1919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1882-1896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1890-1908</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53.07%</td>
<td>56.81%</td>
<td>48.43%</td>
<td>40.60%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1863-1889</td>
<td>79.51%</td>
<td>52.02%</td>
<td>57.03%</td>
<td>36.80%</td>
<td>43.01%</td>
<td>53.07%</td>
<td>48.43%</td>
<td>40.60%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1883-1897</td>
<td>36.22%</td>
<td>52.02%</td>
<td>57.03%</td>
<td>36.80%</td>
<td>43.01%</td>
<td>53.07%</td>
<td>48.43%</td>
<td>40.60%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1868-1919</td>
<td>55.56%</td>
<td>52.38%</td>
<td>54.76%</td>
<td>31.33%</td>
<td>32.19%</td>
<td>23.32%</td>
<td>40.60%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1885-1891</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.52%</td>
<td>1.23%</td>
<td>26.02%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.52%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1868-1903</td>
<td>70.00%</td>
<td>5.89%</td>
<td>26.19%</td>
<td>40.77%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35.71%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1898-1919</td>
<td>54.98%</td>
<td>81.25%</td>
<td>46.45%</td>
<td>34.78%</td>
<td>22.71%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.65%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1863-1891</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.38%</td>
<td>35.80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.59%</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1877-1895</td>
<td>27.70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.47%</td>
<td>2.82%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.70%</td>
<td>Rapid*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1878-1888</td>
<td>24.39%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>64.02%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.39%</td>
<td>Rapid*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1870-1904</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.48%</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.48%</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1878-1894</td>
<td>8.97%</td>
<td>22.13%</td>
<td>21.91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.02%</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1900-1918</td>
<td>47.56%</td>
<td>23.14%</td>
<td>-5.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.78%</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1875-1894</td>
<td>17.01%</td>
<td>7.50%</td>
<td>12.22%</td>
<td>24.89%</td>
<td>15.53%</td>
<td>-5.45%</td>
<td>18.55%</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1871-1888</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>23.91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.95%</td>
<td>Gradual*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1879-1905</td>
<td>8.27%</td>
<td>11.69%</td>
<td>26.09%</td>
<td>10.03%</td>
<td>16.17%</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>13.73%</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1894-1919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.11%</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.11%</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1893-1918</td>
<td>47.43%</td>
<td>13.84%</td>
<td>9.08%</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
<td>14.41%</td>
<td>18.01%</td>
<td>13.57%</td>
<td>-2.84%</td>
<td>10.79% Gradual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19 – The pace of industrialization and the growth of the industrial working-class during labor’s formative stage in the political arena

Notes: Table displays the growth in the number of workers compared to the previous decade (see table 7). Average growth and speed of industrialization is calculated for formative stage and the decade following immediately thereafter. The overall average working-class growth for all cases is 29.44%, thus representing the critical juncture between rapid and gradual patterns. Due to the lack of a data point for comparison, the classification for the following cases was derived from the standard literature on industrialization: Russia, Argentina. Classification for Denmark based on aftermath of formative period. Italy and Spain are at the threshold between the two categories. Given the strong regional concentration of industry in these two cases they are treated as rapid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Industrialization pattern</th>
<th>Socio-economic explanation</th>
<th>Status system explanation</th>
<th>Labor inclusion as an external constraint</th>
<th>Actual outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Moderate Reformist</td>
<td>Higher Evolutionary</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Weak Non-formation</td>
<td>Higher Evolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Weak Non-formation</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Moderate Reformist</td>
<td>Higher Evolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Weak Non-formation</td>
<td>Higher Evolutionary</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Moderate Reformist</td>
<td>Higher Evolutionary</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Weak Non-formation</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Weak Non-formation</td>
<td>Highest Moderate syndicalism</td>
<td>Moderate syndicalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Weak Non-formation</td>
<td>Higher Evolutionary</td>
<td>Moderate syndicalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Moderate Reformist</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Moderate Reformist</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Lowest Insurrectionism</td>
<td>Insurrectionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Strong Radical</td>
<td>Lowest Insurrectionism</td>
<td>Insurrectionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Moderate Reformist</td>
<td>Low Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Alternative theories and their predictions for social democratic party formation

*Notes:* See text for how predictions are derived. To make this comparative assessment possible, radical is treated as the equivalent of quasi-revolutionary social democracy, and reformist as the equivalent of evolutionary.
1. **TYPE or SPECIES does not suit the overall category of inclusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model chosen</th>
<th>Predicted model based on background of political inclusion</th>
<th>Sources of supoptimal elite choices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>- Political socialization (pronounced revolutionary pattern of earlier working-class involvement in politics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evolutionary (Higher inclusion)</td>
<td>- Unclear environment of inclusion ('right to vote' at the highest level. Electoral route therefore formally accessible, but practically closed due to practice of managed elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through Second International)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Quasi-revolutionary</td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through Second International, German and Austrian marxists, and German party as a model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Non-formation and integration path</td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (moderate syndicalism through American labor movement as a model, and direct involvement of AFL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. For quasi-revolutionary social democratic party type: Choice of Belgian extra-parliamentary instead of German parliamentary VARIANT could have led to greater mobilization success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent and nature of effect</th>
<th>Sources of supoptimal elite choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Failure to mobilize higher numbers of workers during formative stage. Results in limited electoral support from 1912-1930, a divided left, and mobilization of workers through alternative channels: initially anarchism-syndicalism, later Peronism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unclear environment of inclusion ('right to vote' at the highest level. Electoral route therefore formally accessible, but practically closed due to practice of managed elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through Second International, and German party as a model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social background (Particularly pronounced middle class leadership, division between socialist party and wider labor movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Failure to mobilize larger numbers of workers during formative stage. Results in fragmentation of labor movement, strong anarchist, later communist current, and factionalism during Second Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unclear environment of inclusion ('right to vote' at the highest level. Electoral route therefore formally accessible, but in fact closed due to managed elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through French marxists, and German party as a model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social background (particularly pronounced middle class leadership, division between socialist party and wider labor movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Failure to mobilize larger numbers of workers during formative stage. Results in fragmentation of labor movement, strong anarchist, later communist current, domination of social democrats by communists after 1940s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (case located at the bottom of the low inclusion category, in immediate proximity to the lowest category, where insurrectionist model is the optimal response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Initially minor, but large long-term effects Failure to mobilize larger numbers of workers during formative stage. Initially, before 1921, despite prior emergence of a strong anarchist, then anarcho-syndicalist, later communist, current, counteracted electorally by middle-class support for socialist party. During the rise of fascism, and after WW II, division of labor in the political arena.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through Second International, French and German marxists, German party as a model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social background (particularly pronounced middle class leadership, division between socialist party and wider labor movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unclear environment of inclusion ('right to vote' at the top within the lowest inclusion category, but electoral channel practically closed due to practice of managed elections. But much less pronounced than in Spain and Argentina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Somewhat smaller mobilization of workers and lower electoral support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through Second International, German marxists, and German party as a model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social background (particularly pronounced middle class leadership, division between socialist party and wider labor movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No permanent effect Potential effect counteracted by the late emergence of working class and the adjustment of the Austrian environment of labor inclusion to the German pattern of electoral inclusion through the electoral reforms of 1897 and 1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diffusion of external knowledge (vulgar marxism through German marxists, German party as a model, and Karl Kautsky in particular as author of the party program)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Bad fit of party models and degrees of inclusion as the external constraint. The agency of labor elites as an explanatory factor.
a) Status system approach

ENCOUNTERED ENVIRONMENT

Political factors
(System of status differentials)

DEFINING ELEMENTS OF VARYING MODELS OF LABOR POLITICS

Goals
Strategy (Means)
Organization

b) Socio-economic and social inclusion approaches

ENCOUNTERED ENVIRONMENT

Socio-economic factors
(Nature of industrialization or level of economic deprivation)

DEFINING ELEMENTS OF VARYING MODELS OF LABOR POLITICS

Goals
Strategy (Means)
Organization

c) Labor inclusion approach

ENCOUNTERED ENVIRONMENT

Socio-economic factors
(Industrialization and economic deprivation)

DEFINING ELEMENTS OF VARYING MODELS OF LABOR POLITICS

Goals
Strategy (Means)
Organization

Prerequisite

Figure 1: The role of political and socio-economic ‘alienation’
Figure 2: Context and logic for the emergence of different models of labor politics
Figure 3: Varying degrees of labor inclusion and the possibility of social democratic party formation
Electoral competition

Extra-parliamentary

Bolshevism

Anarchism-Syndicalism

Anarchist Cells

Anarchist

Hybrid – intermediate step

Anarchism-S

Syndicalism

Quasi-revolutionary

Evolutionary

Late

Modernization

Red-Green

Reformist

Pragmatic

Social Democracy

Controlled conflict through open and mass-based organization

Insurrectionism

Revolution through underground activities and mass mobilization

Moderate Syndicalism

Interest representation without establishment of

Producerist

Industrial

Craft

Group and interest representation

Electoral competition

FUNCTION

EMERGENCE

Formative stage

Transformation

Species

Type

Variant

Socialism

Reformed capitalism

No more fundamental objective

PARTY OBJECTIVE

CATEGORIES

Figure 4: Labor politics during the formative stage of labor’s entry into the political arena and the transformation of social democracy
Figure 5: Decision analysis for labor elites’ choices in different environments of labor inclusion

Notes: displays cost-benefit ratios of different models of labor politics across different environments of inclusion. Graphical representation based on analysis displayed in table 5.
Figure 6: Development of the economically active world population in different economic sectors

Notes: Figures based on estimations from Bairoch et al. (1968) and Bairoch (1971)