CITIES AND THE “MULTICULTURAL STATE”: IMMIGRATION, MULTI-ETHNIC NEIGHBORHOODS, AND THE SOCIO-SPATIAL NEGOTIATION OF POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Immigration is widely acknowledged to be a major social issue in Western European countries. In this context, the Netherlands was one of the few countries to commit itself to the ideal of a ‘multicultural state’. While this policy ideal was intended to maintain the coherence of the increasingly multi-ethnic state, alleviate growing fear and suspicion of immigrants among sections of Dutch society, and overcome growing ethnic segregation in major cities, its implementation has produced a number of contradictions, however. There has been both a massive political shift in favor of anti-immigrant parties, and increases in segregation in the big cities. In this context the Netherlands has recently reconsidered its multicultural programs. While assimilation is gaining ground as the dominant discourse of immigrant integration in a number of liberal states, the Netherlands has experienced the most profound change away from multiculturalism. Dutch cities therefore could be considered laboratories for the analysis of changes in the way state actors and residents across the world are negotiating immigrant incorporation.

This dissertation explores how policies aimed at immigrant integration developed, were implemented and how they were negotiated when implemented in specific multi-ethnic neighborhoods and its effects for neighborhoods, cities and the nation. Using a mixed-methods approach - with a qualitative focus – this research contributes to
our understanding of the multicultural city. Central to the research is the governmentality approach, providing a framework through which to analyze the uneven geographies of policy implementation.

Several findings from my research stand out. First, an analysis of state policy documents shows that integration is demanded only of ‘ethnic minorities’ who are perceived to be a threat for social stability of the nation-state. Secondly, local political and economic context shapes the way negotiation strategies are being developed. In Rotterdam Delfshaven multi-ethnic bonds were created through informal networks, while in Amsterdam Zuidoost immigrant residents used formal ways to secure the inclusion of immigrant residents in neighborhood decision-making processes. Finally, the micro-scale segregated use of squares does create familiarity and acceptance, and in so doing can contribute to changes in attitude and behavior towards immigrants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

In tackling ‘the social question’ in the past the Netherlands was as energetic then, as it is passive now in its response to the trailing behind of complete generations of ethnic minorities, as well as to the formation of an ethnic underclass. Why do we believe we can afford to witness the failure of generations of immigrants and to ignore an untapped reservoir of talent? And where do we find the confidence to believe that everything will work out in the end? Societal stability is severely threatened.1

This is how opinion-maker and intellectual Paul Scheffer2 opened his article ‘Het Multiculturele Drama’ (The Multicultural Tragedy) in one of the national newspapers, NRC Handelsblad of January 29, 2000. In this article Scheffer criticized the state’s promotion of multiculturalism and blamed politicians and policy professionals for their lack of interest in the ‘real’ problems of the countries’ largest cities. Cities, so he argued, are places where the ‘multicultural tragedy’ reveals itself, where despite of a state commitment to multiculturalism, socio-spatial exclusion of ethnic minorities and social tensions are on the rise. In other words, he observed the development of an underclass of

1 My translation.
2 With the publication of this article Scheffer acquired national fame as a critic of multiculturalism. In June of 2003 he was appointed distinguished professor on Grootstedelijke problematiek (problems of big cities) at the University of Amsterdam for his role in initiating and contributing to the debate about the multicultural society.
ethnic minorities in cities. He found this situation unacceptable and pressed for institutional reform of the governance of immigrant integration in the Netherlands. The critique was not exclusively targeted at politicians and policy makers but also at Dutch society at large. It was, so he argued, the proliferation of a ‘Dutch culture of tolerance’ that had created an untruthful reality, a fake cosmopolitanism, underneath which was buried a culture of fear, anger and dissatisfaction with both immigrants and politics. As a consequence, the multicultural society was only an illusion, hiding a careless and distant society that was itself clueless and incapable of communicating what it meant to be Dutch (Scheffer, 2000).

The skepticism of state efforts to promote multiculturalism, as voiced by Scheffer, was shared by a small group of intellectuals and politicians and increasingly by a large section of the Dutch society (De Volkskrant, 2002; NRC Handelsblad, 2000). The increased skepticism and societal discomfort could be understood as the product of two key paradoxes that characterized state efforts to promote multiculturalism: (1) While multicultural policies were intended to promote social inclusion, there is evidence that cities in which they were implemented have simultaneously experienced social exclusion and spatial segregation (O+S, 1999); (2) Multicultural policies were framed in terms of equal rights, full acceptance, and integration in Dutch society (Minister voor Grote Steden en Integratiebeleid [Minister of Big Cities and Integration Policy], 2001; 2002). Yet, the presence of immigrants – especially Muslim immigrants – in urban space increasingly elicits concern and sometimes fear amongst many sectors of the Dutch population. Especially since the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and most recently London as well as the recent murder of Theo van Gogh, a famous Dutch filmmaker in
Amsterdam by a radicalized Muslim. Furthermore, in 2003 this paradoxical situation caused a political backlash against immigrants represented by the success of Pim Fortuyn, a politician who gained massive popular support with a program that promised to stop immigration.

The issue of immigrant integration is now at the center of political and societal debates in the Netherlands. The ‘multicultural policy ideal’ (MPI), that formed the dominant state discourse prior to the political backlash against immigrants of 2003 is now being replaced with assimilation\(^3\) as the dominant approach to immigrant integration. The development of this new state discourse on immigrant integration has caused integration to take on a compulsory character, quite contrary to previous years when immigrants were not held responsible for their failing integration. Furthermore, criticizing immigrant integration is now no longer taboo. Politician Geert Wilders, for example, recently produced *Fitna*, a controversial anti-Islam movie that caused a lot of outrage in Muslim communities around the world\(^4\). It now seems as if all Dutch citizens have a public opinion on the issue, rather than only expressing their views at family gatherings or among friends.

What happened to multiculturalism? Why now? And what are the implications for the everyday lives of ethnic minorities in multicultural urban neighborhoods?

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\(^3\) ‘Assimilation’ is the best way to describe those new efforts towards fostering immigrant integration in the Netherlands. State officials however will avoid using the word ‘assimilation’ and instead speak of ‘integration’.

\(^4\) The movie was also condemned by Dutch political leaders, including the Dutch prime minister, and a large section of the Dutch population as they disagreed with the way it portrayed Islam and Muslims.
1.2 Integration, multiculturalism and assimilation

Throughout this dissertation I will use the terms integration, multiculturalism and assimilation. In the literature immigrant integration refers to the process by which immigrants are included in the receiving society. Immigrant integration is the term used in state programs in different countries. Nonetheless, the reception of immigrants and the ways in which state programs aim to incorporate newcomers into society varies widely between countries and over time – as will be shown by providing a genealogy of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands (see chapter 5). According to Hiebert (2000) three types of responses to immigrant integration are typical (see also chapter 2): isolation, assimilation and pluralism/multiculturalism. In this dissertation I discuss assimilationist and multicultural models of immigrant integration. Multiculturalism as it is used in the literature can be defined as:

… the philosophy and policies related to a particular mode of immigrant incorporation as well as to the rights of minority groups in society to state recognition and protection. Multiculturalism in this sense is not just about inclusion, nor is it merely an acceptance of difference, rather it actively ‘achieves’ diversity, it ‘expands the range of imagined life experiences for the members of society’s core groups. Through this expansion of imagination, diverse ways of being in the world are recognized as legitimate, and the qualities of ‘out-group’ members are not stigmatized or relegated to the private sphere, but rather reconstitute the notion of civil competence within the public sphere (Mitchell, 2004: 642).

In other words, multiculturalism is the “belief that different cultural or ethnic groups have a right to remain distinct” (Jackson, 2000: 528), without losing connections to the larger society (see Young, 2000). Dutch multiculturalism – as laid down in policies – refers to this right of ethnic and cultural minority groups to maintain their own identities as a means through which immigrant integration could be achieved.
Assimilation, on the other hand, refers to the process by which immigrants give up their cultural difference in the public sphere and adapt to what are perceived to be established norms and values of the country of settlement. In other words, it does not allow for the co-existence of many forms of cultural expression, but expects immigrants to conform to predefined norms and values of the receiving society. Hence, it can be questioned if assimilation allows for the full acceptance of many poor, immigrant and minority groups (see Mitchell, 2004).

1.3 Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh and the rise of anti-multiculturalism

The Netherlands is not the only country that has recently reconsidered its multicultural programs. It seems that in recent years, with the shift towards neoliberalism and along with this the emphasis on self-responsibility, state-sponsored multicultural programs in many countries have begun to be cut. As these programs, which were first introduced in the 1970s and continued into the early 1990s, are in seeming decline, the discourse and practices related to immigrant integration are in a process of transformation (Alba and Nee, 2003; Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Kymlicka, 2003; 2007; Mitchell, 2004a). While the MPI is waning, because it is increasingly perceived as failing (Brubaker, 2003; Joppke and Morawska, 2003), assimilation is being strongly promoted as an alternative for immigrant integration into Dutch society (Mitchell, 2004a).

Programs of multiculturalism actively facilitated and promoted pluralism in the public sphere, but new programs of assimilation, characterized by a renewed focus on the so-called core values of society, values that are believed to be lost under previous state
efforts, now attempt to assign expressions of difference to the private sphere (Brubaker, 2003).

Assimilation is gaining ground, but the way this transition occurs will clearly differ across national contexts. Nonetheless, although there will be differences between countries, there is a striking similarity in the ways these transformations are framed. A new governmentality (see chapter 4) has become dominant and is now driving these transformations. Rather than the state taking an active role in assisting immigrants and other dependents in societal incorporation, the state is now retreating and increasingly demands citizens to be active, to take more active roles in local politics, and to take responsibility for their own success in life (Kearns, 1995; McCann, 2001; Mitchell, 2004a; Raco and Flint, 2001; Rose, 1999). Programs, such as immigrant integration, for which the state previously took responsibility, are now increasingly “removed, subcontracted or devolved to the community level” (Mitchell, 2004a: 643; see also Larner 2002; Larner and Walters, 2004; Raco and Flint, 2001).

While assimilation is gaining ground as the dominant discourse of immigrant incorporation in a number of liberal states (Joppke and Morawska, 2003), Dutch cities could be considered laboratories for the analysis of changes in the way state actors and residents across the world are beginning to negotiate immigrant incorporation. Of all countries, the Netherlands has probably experienced the most profound recent transformation away from a strong policy commitment to multiculturalism (Entzinger, 2003: 72). A recent study conducted by an American research institute comparing the perceptions of Muslims in various Western nations, concluded that, of all nations included in the survey, the Dutch were the most distrustful of Muslim immigrants (De
Volkskrant, 2005). Two stories, which I will now turn to, have been of great importance for understanding how an increasingly stronger discourse of assimilation\(^4\) has gained ground. The first story outlines how the death of a populist politician – Pim Fortuyn – has contributed to major transformations in Dutch immigration policy. The second is set at a later historical moment when policies had already begun to change. The murder of Theo van Gogh polarized Dutch society between (radical) Muslims and others. Furthermore, its effect was one of justifying the need for a more compulsory and ‘no-nonsense’ immigrant integration program.

1.3.1 Pim Fortuyn and the new ‘transparency’ in the Netherlands

On May 6\(^{th}\) 2002, nine days before the national elections Pim Fortuyn, a charismatic and openly gay Dutch politician, was assassinated. According to the polls, his party, promoting a strong anti-immigrant agenda, was about to win enough seats to become the largest party in the country\(^6\). While walking back to his car after a radio interview, Fortuyn was shot 6 times in the head and chest by an animal-rights activist. The motives of the suspect for shooting Fortuyn were mystifying and sparked mass grief and shame among the Dutch public. Fortuyn’s political agenda voiced highly controversial issues, such as immigration – in particular what he believed to be the failure of integration of Muslim immigrants in Dutch society – and sexuality. According to

\(^4\) Assimilation has always been present, yet implicit, in policy efforts (see for example Rath (1991)).
\(^6\) The Dutch parliament has 150 seats that are to be filled. In the elections of 2002 Lijst Pim Fortuyn [List Pim Fortuyn] (LPF), Pim Fortuyn’s political party, received 17% of the votes in the election, equaling about 26 of the seats in the Dutch parliament. This would have made them the largest party because there are a lot of parties competing for those seats. The Dutch government is based on the formation of coalitions – usually between the largest parties, but sometimes between the biggest party and some smaller parties. This then forms the coalition cabinet. If Fortuyn’s party had won most votes, then his party could have put forward the prime minister, which would most likely have been Pim Fortuyn himself.
Fortuyn a culture of tolerance, propagated by the sitting establishment, had ignored these issues. A large group of dissatisfied voters were attracted to Fortuyn’s political program, while at the same time his ideas created a strong disgust by others.

Earlier in the year, for example, Fortuyn was thrown out of Leefbaar Nederland (Liveability Netherlands), the political party that had first chosen him as a candidate for the elections. The reason was his call for the repeal of the first article of the constitution, which forbids discrimination. He spoke of Islam as the ‘alien’ other (Isin, 2002), arguing that Islam is a “backward culture,” and implying indirectly that Christianity is the “better” culture. In terms of policy, Fortuyn argued for a return to ‘core values’ and for immigrants to take on ‘Dutch norms and values,’ characterized by its Christian foundations.

From the 1980s onwards there has been a widely-held belief that multiculturalism would enrich Dutch society. Hence, politicians who pointed to the limited integration of migrants were portrayed as discriminatory. However, unlike some other countries in Europe – e.g., France or Austria – anti-immigrant ideas always remained on the margins of public debate. Extremist political parties, for example, never received massive support of the Dutch public and were often marginalized within parliament by other political parties who strongly opposed to extremist ideas. This changed when Fortuyn, taking advantage of the increased discomfort with Muslim immigrants, and rising social tensions after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, politicized the question of migration.

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Footnote 7: Fortuyn stated this in an article in a major Dutch newspaper. Other things he mentioned in this interview with the newspaper were: the Netherlands is full, preferably zero immigration, all borders closed, no-one enters the country without an iris scan, no Muslim immigrants, Muslims are a dangerous minority in society, deport Dutch Antillean criminals even though they have a Dutch passport. And a typical observation by Fortuyn: “Moroccans don’t mug Moroccans, did you ever notice that?”
This particular moment caused a relatively rapid change in the public’s perception towards immigrants.

Fortuyn’s legacy has freed immigrant integration from being taboo and the pendulum of public discourse has swung quite considerably in the opposite direction. Now everyone has a public opinion about immigrant integration. Increasingly, feelings of dissatisfaction have gained ground within Dutch society and now threaten to create a new intolerance towards ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims. Declining economic and social security is only further exacerbating people’s dissatisfaction and leading to the open scapegoating of ethnic minorities.

But it was more than just his anti-immigrant statements that created mass support for Fortuyn. He represented wealth and success by showing off his expensive tailored suits, his summer residence in Italy, his chauffeur, and butler. He represented a lifestyle that many people could only dream of and made it accessible – vicariously at least – to the larger public. By bringing controversial and taboo issues out in the open and by exploiting his image, Fortuyn enhanced his reputation and rather than retiring from politics after his dismissal from Leefbaar Nederland, he entered the election campaign at the head of a list of candidates under the name *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (List Pim Fortuyn). And in less than three months he was leading in the polls.

Fortuyn, despite his anti-immigrant political agenda, did not want to be associated with other populist European leaders.\(^8\) He called for the *integration* of immigrants in Dutch society, rather than their repatriation. After the assassination, thousands of people gathered in his hometown of Rotterdam to mourn him and protest the shooting. Fortuyn

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\(^8\) For example Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Jörg Haider in Austria or Umberto Bossi in Italy.
became the hero of the people of Rotterdam and of many in the Netherlands. Nine days after the murder, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) came in second in the national elections, and took power in a short-lived coalition cabinet in July 2002. However, without a strong leader like Fortuyn and the lack of experience of many of the elected LPF politicians, the party was prone to internal conflict which caused the new cabinet to resign on October 16th. While in the subsequent elections the support for LPF significantly declined, the events of the previous few months had opened up debates about immigration and integration in the Netherlands. A number of policies, proposed by Fortuyn and LPF, were adopted in the policy programs of the newly elected center-right coalition government that stayed in office from May 2003 to June 2006. For example, limiting so-called ‘import marriages’ by raising the minimum age for brides from Morocco and Turkey (in order to reduce the number of forced marriages) to 21, compulsory integration programs for new immigrants where they learn about the history and customs of the Dutch society, and required language courses to ensure that new immigrants as well as former guest workers become proficient in the Dutch language. Furthermore, under the short-term

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9 In November of 2004, almost two years after his assassination, Pim Fortuyn was voted “the Greatest Netherlander of all times”
10 Voters for the LPF were not solely native Dutch voters, but also of immigrants. Especially those immigrants who are considered ‘integrated’ and have settled and made a career in the Netherlands. These immigrants do not want to associate themselves with more recent immigrant groups, even if these immigrants are from the same country of origin. But often they are blamed for problems caused by a small group of immigrants. By voting for LPF they might have believed that they would have more chance of becoming accepted as ‘full citizens’. Furthermore, most support from Fortuyn came from the suburbs and smaller towns where ethnic diversity is minimal, but where there is a great fear of the influx of migrants in the years to come.
11 This was a coalition cabinet of CDA (Christian democratic party), VVD (liberal democratic party) and D66 (democratic party). On June 30, 2006 the cabinet resigned caused by a crisis caused by the malfunctioning of the Minister of Integration surrounding the passport of politician and former refugee Ayaan Hirsi Ali. A new coalition cabinet of CDA, PvdA (labor party) and CU (Christian party) was established in 2007 after new elections.
coalition power of LPF integration policy was transferred from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of Justice.

While campaigning for the national elections, Fortuyn was also asked by *Leefbaar Rotterdam* (Liveable Rotterdam, abbreviated in LR), a local party, to run in the municipal elections. This local party was not affiliated with Liveable Netherlands that had dismissed Fortuyn. The victory of LR in the municipal elections in February 2002 was a first indication of the popularity of Fortuyn. With immigration also the central issue for his political campaign at the municipal level, Fortuyn caused a major rupture in Rotterdam’s city politics. LR displaced the PvdA (labor party) who had held power in Rotterdam – alone or in coalitions – since World War II. The new municipal coalition – consisting of LR, CDA (Christian Democratic Party) and the VVD (liberal democratic party) – strongly influenced by LR, proposed major policy changes in an action program for its four years of governance (2002-2006). A number of radical plans were proposed by the new municipal coalition thereby initiating the debate about the multicultural society and immigrant integration at the scale of the nation-state (see chapter 6).

If nothing else, Fortuyn’s legacy has made immigration negotiable, and has led the Netherlands to a leading position in terms of the new direction of immigrant integration policy in Europe. However, in light of these events, xenophobia and violence against minority – particular Muslim – groups are a growing problem in the Netherlands. New Fortuyns are likely to step up as there still exists a substantial block of opinion in
the Netherlands and other EU countries, one that would never accept immigrants as fellow citizens\textsuperscript{12}.

\subsection*{1.3.1 The tragedy of a famous Dutch filmmaker}

Ethnic diversity is currently one of the most contentious issues in Dutch politics. Not only did Fortuyn play a major role in placing immigration and immigrant integration at the top of the political agenda, but his ideas have also penetrated into the program of the center-right government, which came to power in the wake of the LPF’s short-lived coalition government in 2003. In this context of institutional reform, the murder of Theo van Gogh has only contributed to justifying the need for state programs of compulsory integration and the increased monitoring of Muslim immigrants. Van Gogh, a famous Dutch filmmaker and critic of Islam, was killed on November 2, 2004 by a radical Muslim. Furthermore, the stability of the Dutch state was tested as people feared revenge from \textit{autochtonen} against Muslim immigrants. A number of violent retaliations against Muslim targets were recorded, but after a few weeks the situation returned to normal. Nonetheless, in the minds of many people, the murder formed proof that Muslim immigrants are not to be trusted, despite the fact that the murderer appeared to be part of a radical group of Muslims, not to be associated with the majority of the Muslim

\textsuperscript{12}Geert Wilders is an example of a politician who is now trying to take the role of Fortuyn in the Netherlands. He was expelled from the VVD in 2004 because of his anti-immigrant statements. Similar to Fortuyn, he started his own political party \textit{Partij voor de Vrijheid} (Party for Freedom) For a short while, polls indicated that support for Wilders was rising and after Van Gogh’s murder, Wilders received a number of death threats and as a result now lives at a secret location and its constantly protected by security guards when appearing in public. Yet, this has not stopped him from continuing his anti-immigrant agenda. In fact, in 2006 Wilders’ Party for Freedom won 9 of the 150 seats in the Dutch parliament with an anti-Islam political program. Furthermore, in April of 2008 he broadcasted his anti-Islam movie \textit{Fitna} that caused outrage by many people in The Netherlands and across the world.
community in the Netherlands. Within an already established anti-immigrant environment this murder caused a sudden explosion of social tensions in Dutch society, all under the glare of global media attention.

What exactly happened and what were the motives of the murderer? On November 2nd 2004, Van Gogh was cycling to his office in the city center of Amsterdam, where he was working on the movie 0605 about the murder of Pim Fortuyn, when he was overtaken by a man who after briefly following him suddenly shot him (De Volkskrant, 2004a). Van Gogh tried to escape but the man continued shooting and then stabbed him with a knife. The shooter left a letter, stuck to Van Gogh’s body, and walked away. This gruesome murder left the country in shock as Van Gogh’s assassin was a young male of Moroccan descent.

Who was Theo van Gogh and why did he become the victim of such a brutal murder? Van Gogh was a well-known filmmaker who made a career out of being provocative, not only when it came to Islam. He was known to be a critic, to be controversial, and not to be afraid to disagree with people and insult people. Van Gogh was renowned for his strong rhetoric, not only against Islam. This was his way of bringing taboo issues out in the open. But in contrast to Fortuyn, Van Gogh was an individualist, not a man of the people.

A couple of months before his murder, Van Gogh had co-directed the documentary Submission, about the repression of women under Islam. He and Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a Dutch politician for the VVD, refugee from Somalia, and ex-Muslim –

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13 The letter found at Van Gogh’s body was an open letter to Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a politician for the VVD party and former refugee from Somalia who turned against Islam.
intended to highlight these practices in order to stop them. Many Muslims were offended by the film and so was Van Gogh’s murderer. One of the main reasons for many Muslims to be offended by the documentary was because it portrayed a woman’s mutilated body, scarred by verses of the Koran tattooed on her body by her husband. Many believed that it was absolutely unnecessary to portray Islam in this way to get these problems out in the open. Both Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh received death threats following the broadcasting of the documentary. While Hirsi Ali was given additional security, Van Gogh was not.

Following the murder, and the information in the letter’s threat addressed to Hirsi Ali, the politician has lived at secret locations, stayed out of the public eye, and even after moving to the US to work for a conservative think-tank she is still surrounded by security guards when appearing in public.

Shortly after the murder the mayors of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague issued increased police control for a number of (Muslim) immigrant neighborhoods in their cities. The motive for the increased surveillance was to prevent violent confrontations between Dutch residents and Muslim immigrants in these neighborhoods (De Volkskrant, 2004b). Somewhat problematic is the fact that all these neighborhoods are Muslim strongholds. Increased surveillance was not only enforced to protecting Muslim immigrants from retaliation, it also offered the police opportunities to further regulate and control their movements. This aspect should not be ignored as politicians immediately linked the murderer to Al-Qaida and fundamentalist Muslims. That same night 20,000 people gathered at Dam Square – the central square in Amsterdam – to

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14 The neighborhoods under additional surveillance are: Westelijke Tuinsteden and Zeeburg in Amsterdam, Delfshaven and Noord in Rotterdam (both neighborhoods are part of this dissertation research), and Schilderswijk in The Hague.
protest against the murder. Muslims and non-Muslims showed their disapproval of the murder. In order to avoid retaliation against Muslims, Muslim organizations immediately began to mobilize as many Moroccans as possible for the demonstration, and immediately condemned the murder.

However, the vigilance could not completely prevent retaliation and emotional responses. For example, a Dutch minister considered the murder as ‘the beginning of the holy Islamic war in the Netherlands’ (De Volkskrant, 2004c), and another minister called for the closure of mosques preaching radical Islam. But it was only later that it was discovered that the murderer actually had connections to radical Islam and had experienced a radicalization in the past years. Mohammed B (Van Gogh’s assassin) after being sentenced to life in prison made a statement in court in which he said that he had acted out of faith, that he had no other choice but to murder van Gogh because he offended Islamic law.

Slowly daily life started taking over again, and the situation calmed. Nonetheless, the feeling that social collision is inevitable continues to be present amongst subsections of the Dutch population. A new violent act could lead to an eruption of existing tensions. While discontent with multicultural policy began to appear already in the early 1990s, especially following critiques of the model by Frits Bolkestein – a Dutch politician, currently active for the EU – it was the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 that brought the final rupture of the Dutch multicultural model. Following September 11th, immigrant youth provoked violence by celebrating the attacks, some mosques were set on fire, but foremost it was from this moment onwards that the debate on immigrant integration took a different road. Many believe that a multicultural model left immigrants
on their own, ignoring them in the name of tolerance, and that this ignorance permitted the rise of radical Islam in the Netherlands. There was the idea that for too long immigrants are isolated in Dutch society, and that under the idea of multiculturalism there were no clear rules about what is accepted in the Netherlands, and what is not. In the post 9/11 context Muslim immigrants are increasingly addressed in terms of their loyalty to democratic values.

The legacy of Fortuyn has been very influential in reforming state integration policy, but it seems that the assassination of Theo van Gogh only further justified the need for compulsory integration programs that aim to assimilate immigrants in Dutch society. The problem with this new policy direction, I believe, is its essentialist foundations. It does not recognize the shifting nature of what it means to be Dutch. In the global media the Dutch case has recently received a lot of attention, particularly because the Netherlands for long has internationally been recognized for its tolerance. The actuality of the topic and this international attention makes it even more worthwhile to study the Dutch case. These murders have demonstrated that there are tensions in Dutch society between immigrants and autochtonen (see definitions in next section) that at any moment can explode. Furthermore, it has brought out into the open the limits of the internationally celebrated Dutch tolerance. It has contributed to hiding existing tensions in society and starting dialogue between groups, thereby confronting differences. It is these tensions that now seem to threaten the stability of the Dutch state.
1.4 Immigration and Cities: the Case of the Netherlands

In order to shed light on what I would like to call the ‘immigrant problem’, it is important to begin to understand the Dutch context that created the conditions for this problem to develop. Societies in the Western world face major challenges in incorporating large numbers of newcomers in their societies. Different countries have chosen different models for incorporating newcomers into their societies. While the US, Canada and Australia are classical immigration countries and have a lot of experience with immigrant incorporation, European nations have only much more recently faced the challenge of incorporating immigrants. The Netherlands is one such country that increasingly has become multicultural and is experiencing problems with immigrant integration.

Trying to write about the Dutch case in a foreign language (i.e., English) inevitably brings along all kinds of problems with translation and connotation of words. Many words that are commonly used in the debate on immigrant integration are difficult to translate and when translated it is in many instances still difficult for an outsider to fully grasp the connotations and associations of certain words. Therefore, let me clarify a couple of words central to the debates on immigrant integration (see table 1.1). It is first important to understand the distinction between ‘allochtonen’ and ‘autochtonen’. This is a key distinction in the Dutch public debate. In official statistics, allochtonen refer to those persons who are born abroad or of whom at least one parent was born abroad. In other words, this can refer to a person from Australia, Iraq or Germany. A distinction is often made between first generation (a person is born abroad) and second generation (one
or both of your parents are born abroad). *Autochtonen*, on the other hand, refer to those persons whose parents are born in the Netherlands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>In the Dutch context an immigrant is a person who is born abroad or of whom at least one parent was born abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Autochtonen</em></td>
<td>Persons of whom both parents are born in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allochtonen</em></td>
<td>Persons who are born abroad or of whom at least one parent was born abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities</td>
<td>A policy term to refer to <em>allochtonen</em> immigrants with a weak socio-economic position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western <em>allochtonen</em></td>
<td>Immigrants born in – or born out of a parent born in – an industrialized country. E.g. US, Japan, Indonesia, Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western <em>allochtonen</em></td>
<td>Immigrants born in – or born out of a parent born in – a non-industrialized country. E.g. Turkey, Morocco, Surinam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The terms I use in this dissertation:**

**Problems**

All terms are problematic in their own way. The term *allochtonen*, for example, is currently the object of critique by academics, policy-makers and politicians for creating sharp divisions between groups, in particular between *autochtonen* and ethnic minorities, with whom the term *allochtoon* in practice is often equated. The categories Western and Non-western *allochtonen* are also highly problematic because they classify countries like Japan as Western. This term, however is used to make a distinction between groups of immigrants who are considered ‘unproblematic’ or ‘integrated’ (Western) and immigrants who are considered ‘problematic’ and ‘unintegrated’ (Non-Western).

**Use**

All terms will come back in the dissertation, because they are common in the discourse, in interview responses, in policy documents and in the media. I will use the terms as they are used in documents, interviews and other texts and when it is my own use – for example in critically reflecting on how terms are used – I prefer to speak of immigrants rather than *allochtonen* and I will use the term ethnic minorities to specifically refer to those (groups of) immigrants whose integration is considered problematic.

Table 1.1 Summary table of terms used in debates on immigrant integration

In the public debate, however, *allochtonen* is often used to refer to ‘ethnic minorities’. ‘Ethnic minorities’ is a policy term and is not used in official statistics of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Policy-makers use the term ‘ethnic minorities’ to refer to persons who are not only *allochtoon* but also have a weak socio-economic
This applies to everyone born in Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, Dutch Antilles, Aruba, Greece, Italy, former Yugoslavia, Portugal, Spain, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Indonesia, refugees, and their children. But it is not uncommon to find that the category of ethnic minorities becomes equated with the official statistical category of *Non-Western allochtonen*. Official statistics distinguish between ‘Western’ and ‘Non-Western’ *allochtonen*, where non-Western refers to all persons born in – or born out of a parent born in – a non-Western nation. The debate about ethnic minorities is almost always framed in terms of ‘integration’. It should be no surprise therefore that integration policy is specifically targeted at Non-Western *allochtonen* and not at all *allochtonen*. The need for integration policy is never questioned, debate centers on the question of what exactly its goal entails and how it can best be achieved. In the post-9/11-context the integration of Muslim immigrants has appeared as a new focus of integration policy.

Since the 1950s the Netherlands has seen three distinctive waves of immigration – from the former colonies (Indonesia, Surinam, Dutch Antilles and Aruba), guest workers and their families (Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco), and since the early 1990s asylum seekers (various sources including Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan) – yet it was not until 1983, in the so-called *Minderhedenbeleid* (Minority Policy), that the state officially recognized that immigration was permanent and increasing\(^\text{15}\). In 1995, reflecting the increasing diversity of *allochtonen*, and responding to increasing tensions in Dutch society, a new *Integratiebeleid* (Integration Policy) was implemented. This is founded on the belief that a multicultural society involves: peaceful coexistence with “the

\(^{15}\) In 2004 in response to increased restrictions on immigration, a generally less welcoming climate for immigrants, and a slacking economy, migration exceeded immigration. It is not clear as of yet whether this is an ongoing trend.
responsibilities of individuals, businesses, and social institutions to create a place for all residents” (Minister voor Grote Steden en Integratiebeleid [Minister of Big Cities and Integration Policy, 2002]; equal rights and opportunities for immigrants in social spheres; and encouragement of active participation of ethnic minority groups in local politics and decision-making. The purpose was to maintain a coherent national community that is opposed to unequal opportunity, racism and spatial marginalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of origin</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010 (estimate)</th>
<th>2020 (estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles/Aruba</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western nations</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-Western allochtonen</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>2,425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.2 Number of non-western allochtonen (1990-2020) in 1000s and in percentage of the total population

According to official statistics, 19.1% of the Dutch population is allochtoon (CBS, 2004). In other words, of the 16.3 million inhabitants 3.1 million are born abroad or have a parent that was born abroad. Yet, often a distinction is being made between Western and non-Western allochtonen. Currently, 10% of the population consists of non-Western allochtonen and it is estimated that this will rise to 14.1% in 2020 (Table 1.2). And, while in recent years the countries of origin of immigrants has become increasingly diverse, the Turkish population currently makes up the largest group of allochtonen, with
a population of 341,000, followed by the Surinamese (321,000) and Moroccans (295,000).

Furthermore, the percentage of *allochtonen* from other non-Western nations is estimated to be increasing most rapidly, thereby contributing to the ethnic diversity of the Dutch population in future years. At the same time the share of the second generation *allochtonen* is expected to increase by 2020 (table 1.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of origin</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles/Aruba</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western nations</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-Western <em>allochtonen</em></td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.3 Share of second generation of non-Western *allochtonen*, 2002 and 2020 (%)

The fact that 19.1% of the Dutch population is *allochtoon* does not provide any insight in the dispersal of *allochtonen* over the country. *Allochtonen* do not live evenly dispersed over the country<sup>16</sup>. Quite the contrary, where in most municipalities the share of immigrants is relatively small, the country’s largest cities are the home of large numbers of *allochtonen*. In fact, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam close to 50% of the population is *allochtoon* (table 1.4; see also Marcuse & Van Kempen, 2000; Musterd & Deurloo,

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<sup>16</sup> There is a policy in the Netherlands that applies to asylum seekers only, where asylum seekers once granted a residence permit for the Netherlands are dispersed over the country. The idea behind this policy is that each municipality shares in the burden of accommodating newcomers. It intends to release pressure on the countries’ largest cities. However, the problem is that in many cases, soon after initial settlement in the housing provided for the asylum seeker by the state, they still move to the cities, where they often have acquaintances as well as better employment prospects.
2002), and of the population below the age of 18 which is *allochtoon* this number is even larger. In these cities immigrants are becoming increasingly segregated along lines of ethnicity and class (Bolt, Hooimeijer & Van Kempen, 2002; O+S, 2000; Mollenkopf, 2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total inhabitants</th>
<th>Autochtonen (%)</th>
<th>Allochtonen</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Non-Western</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>16,258</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amsterdam</strong></td>
<td>739</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rotterdam</strong></td>
<td>599</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Hague</strong></td>
<td>269</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utrecht</strong></td>
<td>270</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.4 Population of the four largest cities in the Netherlands according to origin, January 1, 2004

One reason for this increased concentration and segregation is that settlement of minorities in the city has gone along with the suburbanization of *autochtonen*. It is only more recently that a new trend is being observed where *allochtonen* once they are improving their socio-economic position are also moving out towards the suburbs. In addition, table 1.3 also shows that while the % of *allochtonen* is larger in Amsterdam, the share of non-Western immigrants in the total population is slightly larger in Rotterdam. The reason behind this difference is that Amsterdam is also highly attractive location for foreign companies and expatriates of Western nations and Japan. But the most important conclusion from table 1.3 is that immigration in the Netherlands is an urban problem (and as I will later in this dissertation demonstrate urban problems become framed as problems
of immigration), and therefore cities shed especially clear light on the problems of moving from policy ideals (from multiculturalism to assimilation) to actually implementing such policies in specific places.

1.5 Immigration and policy research

The ongoing transformation of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands is also reflected in policy research. As part of the MPI, research efforts focused on the various ways through which multiculturalism could be incorporated into cities. For example, at the request of the Dutch parliament in 2001, a scientific advisory commission of the Department of Housing, Planning and the Environment was asked to investigate the demand for multicultural housing in cities. The report lists various multicultural projects such as a Moroccan fountain, ethnic architecture, and other ethnic community spaces, and gave advice on incorporating ethnic diversity in the built environment (Vromraad, 2002). But various other initiatives reflected the acceptance of diversity in the public sphere: minority advisory councils to advise local and national governments on minority issues, support for migrant organizations, and proposals for multicultural neighborhoods and multicultural public space. A critical infrastructure of professionals, politicians, and consultants was set in place to support multicultural programs. But in recent years, as I mentioned before, this support of multiculturalism was replaced by assimilation as the dominant approach to immigrant incorporation and this is reflected in research. Where in previous years the analysis of perception of *autochtonen* on immigrant integration was taboo, more recently this has become the object of research. For example, *Het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau* [Social and Cultural Planning Office] (SCP) that
publishes annual reports on the social and cultural developments in Dutch society as well as a regular *Rapportage Minderheden* (Report on Minorities), now also includes an analysis of how integration is perceived by society and what people expect in terms of immigrant incorporation in the near future. In addition, increasingly researchers and policy-makers seem to conclude that migrant organizations have not so much contributed to integration but instead produced segregation. Multicultural projects are no longer promoted or funded by the state, new restrictions for mosques are applied, and to stress the revanchist (Smith, 1996) or more repressive nature of policies of assimilation the Office of Integration is moved from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of Justice.

While on the one hand ethnic diversity is on the rise in Dutch cities, on the other hand competition between cities for investment has increased. Globalization debates have extensively discussed the role of the national state in a globalizing world. Some argue that the nation-state is loosing power, whereas others see its continued if changing importance. While I am supportive of the last argument, it cannot be ignored that increasing global economic competition, along with an increasingly ethnically diverse population is putting pressure on the Dutch welfare state. In recent years many social programs have been cancelled or privatized. Hence, social security is declining. Yet, unemployment amongst ethnic minorities is significantly larger and as a consequence many of them rely on the welfare state. This changing nature of the Dutch welfare state and its role in producing tensions in the multicultural city cannot be ignored. It is one of the main foci of this dissertation.

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17 For example compare *Rapportage Minderheden 1995* and *Rapportage Minderheden 2003* of the SCP.
1.6 Socio-spatial negotiation of policy in multicultural cities

1.6.1 Goals of research

The research I conducted in the Netherlands from September 2003 to August 2004 analyzed the relations between the state – as implementer of policy – and immigrants, specifically how policies aimed at multiculturalism and integration are negotiated (i.e. understood, evaluated, engaged with or argued against, and (re)shaped by neighborhood residents through their interaction with agents of state institutions). Central to the dissertation is how this process of negotiation is contextualized by and also contributes to geographically varied local manifestations of overarching policy frameworks.

Immigrant integration is often included under the broad spectrum of urban policies in the Netherlands. But within urban policy there are various aspects of immigrant integration policy, for example employment, education, housing and cultural policies. In this study I focus on urban renewal policies as one particular aspect through which immigrant integration is taking shape. Within urban renewal policies a distinction is made between on the one hand ‘physical’ renewal – this involves the improvement of the built environment, of neighborhood housing and public space – and on the other hand ‘socio-economic’ renewal. Socio-economic renewal involves the improvement of social and economic opportunities in neighborhoods through for example supporting immigrant entrepreneurship, education initiatives, arts projects, debt relief programs or social work programs. Central to urban renewal policy in the Netherlands, is the idea that through social mixing immigrant integration will be facilitated. The intended outcome of these
policies is that by attracting a middle class to disadvantaged neighborhoods\textsuperscript{18}, the built environment as well as the socio-economic situation of the disadvantaged populations in these neighborhoods will be improved. There is a strong belief in the Netherlands that through urban renewal policies immigrants can be disciplined and the crumbling of social cohesion in the Netherlands can be avoided. Hence, the spatial effects (intended and unintended) of integration policy and the negotiations that emerge around the policy are central to this research.

\textit{1.6.2 Contemporary perspectives in research on identity and place and the governance of ethnic diversity in contemporary multicultural cities}

In the literature three broad categorizations can be distinguished that relate to the relations between the state and immigrants, specifically how policies aimed at multiculturalism and integration are negotiated through urban space by immigrants. In order to produce a more salient theoretical understanding of the multicultural city these literatures in their combination can overcome the limitations of each approach separately, and as such can shed light on the development of multicultural spaces in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, specifically.

The first category deals with questions of ethnic diversity and space. Recently, geographers and urban studies researchers have begun to investigate in more depth how multicultural policies are produced by and productive of urban space. For example, geographers study multiculturalism as an aspect of the production of place (Jacobs \& Fincher, 1998, Musterd et al., 1998) and as an approach to neighborhood revitalization.

\textsuperscript{18} The policy-term ‘disadvantaged neighborhoods’ can be understood as a concealed term for ‘immigrant neighborhoods’.
These approaches build upon an existing geographical knowledge of racialized urban spaces (Anderson, 1988; Jacobs, 1998; Lefebvre, 1991, 1996; McCann, 1999; Ruddick, 1996). In a study that intends to theorize how multi-ethnic cities can best function in the wake of ethnic violence in Europe, Amin (2002) argues that social integration need not only occur through top-down state intervention. Rather, he argues that neighborhood groups working together at the local scale through bottom-up integration, creates multi-ethnic understanding. But while social inclusion is often a political ideal, geographers have also noted that many aspects of urban space are highly exclusionary, regulating behaviors and constraining access especially for women and members of minority groups, including immigrants (Ruddick, 1996). Researchers influenced by geographical approaches have studied the various ways in which these exclusionary practices occur, for example through camera surveillance (Cuthbert, 1995; Koskela, 2000), design and planning (Fyfe, 1998; Fyfe & Bannister, 1998; Lefebvre, 1991, 1996), and the privatization of urban space (Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 1992; Mitchell, 1995). Therefore, as Amin (2002, p. 967) argues the city’s urban spaces are not “natural servants of multicultural engagement”. Instead, space is often territorialized by particular groups, thereby excluding others.

In the context of these exclusions, the continuing investigation of how immigrants, negotiate their identity in the neighborhood, the city, and the nation is crucial to the understanding of contemporary urban space (Mitchell, 2000; Ruddick, 1996). This work draws upon the various strategies that marginalized groups have used to counter injustices and exclusions in urban space. For example, domestic workers in Asia are seen to ‘take space’ by gathering as a group in a public place, and thereby contesting the
normative understanding of those spaces (Yeoh & Huang, 1998; Law, 2002). Muslim women’s use of a headscarf in French cities is understood as a spatialized act of resistance (El-Hamel, 2002). These geographical studies have been successful in bringing a spatial component to multiculturalism and in identifying the complexities of inclusion and exclusion manifested in urban space. Nonetheless, these studies frequently conceptualize the state as a coherent body instead of a series of practices that vary geographically and are continually in a process of flux.

The second category deals with the relation between the state and immigrants. Multiculturalism in these studies is one particular way of thinking about and practicing immigrant integration. Most studies on multiculturalism define the term as a collection of social practices and policies intended to remedy the problems of social exclusion (Kymlicka, 1998; Parekh, 1999, 2000; Taylor, 1994; Tempelman, 1999). Only few studies have linked multiculturalism to urban space.

Besides focusing on cities and neighborhoods where multiculturalism has become the everyday reality, it is also important to link these studies to political-economic and cultural forces at higher scales. European states, among others, are currently experiencing growing immigration (Black, 1996; Brubaker, 1998; Castles & Miller, 1998; Geddes, 2000). This poses a series of questions for nation-states on how to incorporate immigrants – who are often culturally different – without breaking down the coherence of the nation. A problem is the frequent exclusion of immigrants from participation in certain political and social spheres (Body-Gendrot, 2000; Garbaye, 2002). At the same time, while state policies aim to facilitate the inclusion of immigrants in society, immigrants tend to operate in a transnational field by maintaining connections to their home countries (Le
Galès, 2003; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998) and by establishing connections with transnational communities in other cities and countries. In light of this, researchers have engaged in comparative studies of national states in order to understand how they have dealt with the problem of fragmentation. For example many scholars have attempted to delineate the institutional context in which immigration policies are formulated and through which immigrants exercise their rights (Black, 1996; Body-Gendrot, 1995, 2000; Brubaker, 1998; Castles, 1992; Kofman, 2002). The driving argument in this literature is that if Western nations claim to be democratic they cannot allow a significant fraction of their populations to remain outside the polity. Therefore, they must seek to find solutions to the question of how immigrants can be included as citizens (Brubaker, 1989, 1998). These attempts to create solutions are frequently most evident in urban areas (Waldinger, 2001) since, as Rogers (2000) notes, in Western Europe, countries are often monocultural while their cities are multicultural.

One aim of European immigration policies tends to be the distribution of immigrants across urban space in order to avoid their concentration in certain neighborhoods (Smakman and Musterd, 1999; Uitermark, 2003). Other policies have focused on local institutional structures and how these create opportunities and limitations for immigrant participation in community and politics (Garbaye, 2002; Kraal, 2001; Moore, 2001). Scholars have analyzed the affects of this institutional framework through studies on immigrant entrepreneurship (Pecoud, 2000; Kloosterman & Van der Leun, 1999), on immigrant representation in city councils (Garbaye, 2002), and on immigrant investment and resulting urban transformation (Beaverstock & Smith, 1996). For example Pecoud (2000) shows that while the German state was initially suspicious of
Turkish entrepreneurship, especially because it often connected the Turkish immigrant more closely to Turkey, the state now emphasizes the importance of these entrepreneurial activities for the integration of the Turkish community in the city. Garbaye’s (2002) comparative study of Birmingham and Lille shows that different national policies on migration result in different levels of migrant participation in city councils. These questions are also studied in non-European contexts. Mitchell (1993; see also 1998) for example has shown that the Canadian state acts in contradiction with its policies, by promoting immigration of wealthy Chinese in light of the investment they bring to cities.

Contemporary interactions between the state and immigrants raise fundamental questions about the geography of policy implementation, particularly in the context of multi-ethnic and immigrant urban neighborhoods. These questions build upon, but also extend our concerns beyond the issues discussed above and necessitate a focus on what roles immigrants play in shaping public policy, everyday life, and urban neighborhood space as they arrive and become embedded in Western cities.

The third category concerns the ‘governmentality approach’. This approach provides useful insights in the workings of government. Contrary to most studies on governance that treat the state as a coherent body, this approach understands the state as a series of practices. Hence, it provides a more critical understanding of how the government operates and specifically how the implementation of particular government policies occurs (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991; O’Malley et al, 1997; Rose, 1996, 1999). The concept of governmentality provides a way to understand how the state attempts to solve social problems while maintaining a focus on the continual, complex, and contradictory interactions between government and the governed. Governmentality is
central to the larger theoretical framework of this study of policy implementation in urban multi-ethnic neighborhoods, which will be addressed in chapters 2 and 3.

To summarize, this research connects and contributes to three bodies of literature by: (1) connecting analyses of multiculturalism and urban space to the state and particularly the implementation of multicultural policies ideals in concrete geographical settings; (2) by extending the literature on the state and immigration by focusing on active citizenship as one way the state tackles problems of immigration and integration; (3) by problematizing state power through notions of governmentality. In order to understand how the multicultural city is shaped, research needs to shed light on the various ways in which immigrants shape their everyday lives in the city and how diversity is negotiated between various actors in the city and state – politicians, policy-makers, community workers, educators, migrant organizations, residents, etc.

In this regard, three questions guide the research:

1. What are the Dutch multicultural policies, what is the history of their development, what aspects of society are they intended to regulate, and through which institutions are they being implemented?

2. How does the implementation of national multicultural policies affect socio-spatial interaction in urban neighborhoods with large immigrant populations and how and why are these effects different between neighborhoods and between cities?

3. How is the implementation of the policies negotiated in multi-ethnic neighborhoods, and what are the implications for politics, decision-making,
governance, and social interaction in neighborhoods and at the scale of the city as a whole?

1.7 Research design

This research employs a case study approach. According to Baarda & De Goede (1994) the goal of a case study is to describe a (social) system or (social) process. While findings from case studies cannot be generalized to different places and times, comparative research – by selecting a number of cases – allows us to make some more general statements about a particular process. In order to come to understand how ethnic diversity is negotiated and how these processes of negotiation differ in different places, this study is set up as a multiple case study. It draws on two comparative case studies in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

1.7.1 Neighborhoods and symbolic spaces as the sites for the negotiations of policy

Since immigrants to the Netherlands are concentrated in the countries’ largest cities, a number of institutions and infrastructures for immigrant integration evolved in these cities and in specific neighborhoods. Hence, a study of immigrant integration should focus on urban neighborhoods. I will investigate the proposed research questions through a comparative study of four neighborhoods in two cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The case studies highlight the geographically specific consequences of the implementation of shifting policy discourses: (1) through a comparison of two neighborhoods that have embraced multiculturalism as a way to re-image the
neighborhoods; and (2) through a comparison of the effects of the construction of symbolic multicultural spaces – two squares – on the neighborhoods. Each case study has three related units of analysis: a spatial unit (the neighborhood); an institutional unit (integration policy); and a theoretical unit (the concept of the multicultural city).

The selection of neighborhoods occurred on the basis of the following three selection criteria: (1) a census definition of neighborhoods with most immigrants; (2) neighborhoods where integration policy has been implemented\(^\text{19}\); and (3) comparability in terms of how policy is being negotiated (i.e., understood, evaluated, engaged with or argued against, and (re)shaped by neighborhood residents through their interaction with agents of state institutions).

The first case study compares *Amsterdam Zuidoost* (Southeast) and *Rotterdam Delfshaven*, and specifically two neighborhoods within these districts: *Bijlmermeer* in Amsterdam and *Spangen* in Delfshaven. Over 60% of the population in both districts is immigrant, a total population of 83,500 in Zuidoost and 72,500 in Delfshaven\(^\text{20}\) (see table 1.5).

Built in the late 1960s on the outskirts of Amsterdam based upon Le Corbusier’s ideas of city and country, Zuidoost became known as Amsterdam’s only ‘ghetto’ in the early 1990s. Suburbanization had left the new flats empty, meaning they where a logical place to house new immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, who had left the country after its independence in 1975. Through the 1990s, the neighborhood declined

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\(^{19}\) Specifically, interventions in neighborhood spaces. The neighborhoods selected are all so-called ‘disadvantaged neighborhoods’ where the state promotes the construction of up-market residential space and the cleaning-up of public spaces in order to attract a ‘better’ mix of people.  

\(^{20}\) I recognize that immigrant populations will vary in their composition between the selected neighborhoods. In Zuidoost the majority is from Surinam, in Delfshaven it is Turkish.
economically, socially, and physically. Besides immigrants from Surinam and the Antilles, the neighborhood has become the first entry for immigrants from all over the world. Rotterdam Delfshaven, in contrast, is an inner city historic district. Immigration to this district started in the 1960s as guest workers, mainly from Morocco and Turkey, settled there to work in the nearby Rotterdam port. As in Amsterdam, the concurrent suburbanization of the resident native population resulted in increased concentration of ethnic groups in this district. Currently, Delfshaven not only has a significant Moroccan and Turkish population, but also residents from Cape Verde, Surinam, and smaller numbers of immigrants from all over the world. In the 1990s Delfshaven also became the center of criminal and drug related activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City district</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Allochtoon %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam Zuidoost</td>
<td>83,492</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bijlmermeer</em></td>
<td>48,080</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam de Baarsjes</td>
<td>34,343</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam Delfshaven</td>
<td>72,507</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Spangen</em></td>
<td>10,196</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam Noord</td>
<td>51,169</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.5 Population of the four selected neighborhoods in 2003

To counter the decay, the national government, local authorities, and housing corporations in both cities decided to work together to launch the country’s largest urban renewal projects, geared towards creating multicultural districts. The plan for Zuidoost envisions ethnic diversity as a tool to regenerate the district by promoting certain forms of architecture, ethnic markets, and foods, which are expected to attract spending power, as well as high-income residents to the neighborhood – especially since the district
borders a rapidly growing business center. The central strategy of the urban renewal project in Delfshaven focuses on creating a multicultural district for the different resident ethnic groups. The major difference between the neighborhoods – besides their geographical location with respect to the city center of Amsterdam and Rotterdam – is that whereas in Zuidoost over 50% of the housing stock is being demolished or renewed in Delfshaven many housing blocks are still awaiting demolition and the focus is more on improving the safety of public spaces in the neighborhood. Furthermore, while Zuidoost is intensively studied (see for example Bruijne & Van Hoogstraten, 2002) both nationally and internationally\textsuperscript{21}, academic attention to Delfshaven is less developed. Finally local policy makers of both neighborhoods have visited each other to learn about the various projects in both neighborhoods.

The second case study compares Mercatorplein (Mercator square) in city district De Baarsjes in Amsterdam and Noordplein (North Square) in district Noord (North) in Rotterdam. Over 50% of the population in these neighborhoods is immigrant. De Baarsjes is located in the inner city of Amsterdam, and has a large population from Turkey and Morocco. In 1995 the main square of the neighborhood, was re-developed as part of a larger neighborhood revitalization program. Planners decided to create a symbolically multicultural square in the heart of the neighborhood, in order to bring the ethnically diverse population closer together, “and create a dynamic urban neighborhood based on the local multicultural society” (Gemeente Amsterdam: Stadsdeel de Baarsjes [Municipality of Amsterdam, City District de Baarsjes, 1992]. A related goal was to

\textsuperscript{21} Every year scholars from all over the world visit Bijlmermeer to learn from the experiences with urban renewal in this neighborhood.
reassert the square as the heart of the neighborhood, as it had been before the neighborhood became the center of Amsterdam’s drug market in the late 1980s. The ideal of multiculturalism is signified by a large globe inlayed on the bricks in the center of the square. District Noord in Rotterdam, a small inner city neighborhood, is the location of a Moroccan fountain. The fountain was located in the neighborhood with the idea of creating a multicultural environment as part of Rotterdam’s role as Culture Capital of Europe in 2001. Similar to De Baarsjes, this neighborhood has a large Turkish and Moroccan population. A large number of Moroccans living in this district are Berbers.

The purpose of the fountain was to foster awareness and understanding of cultural diversity in the neighborhood, while providing a focal point for neighborhood revitalization. It is intended as a contribution of the Moroccan population to the neighborhood and Rotterdam. Both squares represent the grounding of the multicultural policy ideal in the urban built environment and each case acts as a symbolic focal point for negotiation over policy implementation more generally.

These comparative case studies highlight the geographically specific outcomes as well as the commonalities between the neighborhoods. Thus, a comparison of neighborhoods illuminates how multicultural policies shape and are shaped by their particular socio-spatial setting. It addresses how the implementation of urban social policies that were developed in reference to an overarching national policy ideal produces varying social processes and urban landscapes. Combined, these four case studies contribute to current understandings of the geography of urban change and urban policy, particularly in relation to the role of immigrants in Western cities.
1.8 Research methods

In the social sciences there are various ways to conduct research. The first important distinction is that between quantitative or qualitative research. For this study – drawing on comparative case studies – the research methodology is qualitatively driven and combines both quantitative and qualitative data. Qualitative methodologies understand the social world as something that is always dynamic and changing, rather than the existence of a world prior to research that can be measured and known. In other words: “qualitative methods presume the world to be an assemblage of competing social constructions, representations, and performances” (Smith, 2001: 25). Qualitative methods seek to describe patterns of relationships that facilitate the analysis of socio-spatial interactions and social power. They involve iterative research procedures – succession of question and answer cycles – so that inferences drawn from the data can be seen to be valid “in that they are probable, reasonable, and likely to be true” (Huberman and Miles, 1994: 431).

The choice for quantitative or qualitative research methods depends on the kinds of questions the research asks, and the particular ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the research. Qualitative research fits with a poststructural perspective, as a poststructural perspective prioritizes local and situated knowledges over grand theory (Dwyer and Limb, 2001). The goal of this research is not to produce a representative sample or generalizeable data. Instead, a qualitative methodology understands the social world as something that is always dynamic and changing, instead of a world existing prior to knowledge that can therefore be measured and known. There is extensive debate
about the use of qualitative research methods, especially amongst feminist geographers, but there is not enough space in this dissertation to fully discuss these debates.²²

Feminist geographers have brought attention to questions of representation and power relations involved in research encounters. It is important to recognize that the researcher has influence on how the research takes place. Hence, the relation between researcher and informant is not an equal one (Bennett, 2002). The researcher interprets the words of the informants, but scholars now increasingly understand this process of interpretation as “a dialogue between one’s data – other places and people – and the researcher who is embedded within a particular intellectual and institutional context” (Duncan & Ley, 1993: 3). Interviewing people in a multicultural context, where informants are not fluent in Dutch and the researcher is not fluent in the informants’ native language could contribute to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. My particular background shapes the ways I ask questions and frame the research. However, using semi-structured interviews also allowed participants to move our conversations in particular directions and at all times they had the power to refuse answering questions.

This dissertation research draws on a mixed methodology but is foremost qualitatively driven. First I collected various public documents on immigrant integration and policy implementation. One can think of bills, statutes, policy reports, neighborhood revitalization plans, descriptive statistical information, academic journals, and newspaper articles. The collection of descriptive statistical information is of great importance, because it is through maps and numbers that problems are rendered visible and through

²² See for example the work of Shurmer-Smith (2002), Dwyer & Limb (2001) and Duncan & Ley (1993) for critical discussions of qualitative methods.
which categories of the governed are constructed (Dean, 1999). Based on categorizations it is for example decided which neighborhoods qualify for urban renewal funds. An overview of this information gives insight into how the definition of the problem has shifted and what areas are currently targeted and with what effects.

Secondly, I conducted 86 interviews with informants of relevant (semi-) public and private organizations and neighborhood residents (see table 1.6). These included informants working for the Department of Justice, the Department of Housing, Planning and the Environment, and state advisory commissions in The Hague, politicians, policymakers, urban planners, representatives of housing corporations, representatives of anti-discrimination boards, representatives of migrant organizations, architects, social workers, police officers, consultants, organizations of entrepreneurs, representatives of mosques, activists, and neighborhood residents in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and a number of semi-public organizations involved with questions of multiculturalism and immigrant integration.

A fully structured questionnaire would not have allowed the flexibility to attend to relevant data and connections that come up in the conversation. In order to maintain a sort of consistency in my data collection I used a comparable format for each interview. Using this format – with a set of standard questions and interview topics – it remains possible to identify the common concerns among the various groups interviewed and to identify the relationships and the differences between groups in terms of their interactions with multicultural policy23, to analyze the reasons why different groups have different or common opinions, and to identity how concerns differ geographically from city to city.

23 Useful discussions of this form of analysis are provided by Agar & Hobbs, 1985; Spradley, 1979.)
and from neighborhood to neighborhood. As my questions were open ended my informants were able to introduce topics that they considered relevant. I considered this of great value, because it allowed my informants to focus my attention on topics that I could not have known about based on research of documents and first observations in the neighborhood.

In order to have a free-flowing conversation there was not a specific order in the questions I asked. After a short introduction of myself – as a researcher affiliated with the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies –, and my research project, I started off with a first question or the conversation started as my informant responded to my introduction.

The first subjects were recruited through contacts established during fieldwork in summer of 2002 with community workers and academics that I met in Amsterdam. Secondly, my networks at the University of Amsterdam, and particularly the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), brought me into contact with senior policy advisors on immigrant integration policy at the national state, and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. They provided me with the contact information of potential informants. I then used snowball sampling to identify additional subjects. The advantage of this method is that informants are more responsive, because they were referred to by a friend, colleague or acquaintance. My experience was that most people responded and were willing to participate in an interview or referred me to a colleague if they were not an expert on the topic. In most cases referrals were given by providing me with the contact information of other potential informants and an approval to use their name when contacting this person. Sometimes I was invited to community meetings where I was then introduced to residents, community workers and other policy advisors.
## Case studies

### Types of people interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Interviewed Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Netherlands**                               | 1 architect of Netherlands Architecture Institute  
3 policy advisor of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment  
1 advisor of think tank on Housing and Spatial Planning |
| **Amsterdam – urban and social policy**       | 5 policy advisors of City of Amsterdam (Dep’t of Social Development, Dep’t of Housing, Dep’t of Spatial Planning, Development Company of City of Amsterdam)  
2 policy advisors of housing corporations |
| **Amsterdam Southeast district**              | 3 (ex-) politicians (2 PvdA, 1 Groen Links [Green Left])  
2 policy advisors (Social Economic Renewal Bijlmermeer and district Dep’t of Social Development)  
2 community workers  
2 consultants  
1 representative of business organization Zuidoost  
3 representatives of migrant organizations  
6 (immigrant) residents |
| **Amsterdam De Baarsjes district**            | 3 (ex-) politicians (2 of PvdA, 1 of VVD)  
1 policy advisor (district Dep’t of Social Affairs)  
1 police officer  
1 representative Beheerorganisatie Mercatorplein [Mercatorplein maintenance organization]  
2 entrepreneurs  
4 representatives of migrant organizations  
5 (immigrant) residents |
| **Rotterdam – urban and social policy**       | 2 (ex-) politicians (1 Groen Links, 1 LR)  
5 policy advisors of City of Rotterdam (Dep’t of City Planning and Social Housing, Dep’t of Governance, Dep’t of Youth, Education and Society)  
2 consultants  
1 director and 1 policy advisor of 2 housing corporations |
| **Rotterdam Delfshaven district**             | 1 politician (PvdA)  
4 community workers  
1 consultant  
1 entrepreneur  
2 representatives of migrant organizations  
6 (immigrant) residents |
| **Rotterdam Noord district**                  | 3 politicians (2 PvdA, 1 Groen Links)  
1 policy advisor for hot-spot policy  
3 representatives of migrant organizations  
5 (immigrant) residents |
| **Total**                                     | 86 interviews |

Table 1.6 Summary table of people interviewed

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24 This is only a list of formal interviews, not including the many more informal conversations I’ve had with residents while engaged in participant observation
At the same time, there is a danger with snowball sampling in getting caught up in too small of a network. When after only a couple of interviews I got referred back to the same circle of people – which did happen within the municipality of Amsterdam – I started searching for possible informants outside of the small circuit and contacted them by phone or email. It was more difficult to recruit potential informants without a referral. Some people never responded, others told me they were too busy, but in the end I succeeded in getting a couple of interviews. Through these interviews I got new referrals for additional interviews. The senior policy advisors brought me into contact with politicians, policy advisors at the district level or of housing corporations, community workers and a few migrant organizations. These, in their turn, brought me into contact with other organizations, consultants, and neighborhood residents. Also, policy advisors at the district level and community workers informed me about upcoming neighborhood meetings. At the smaller neighborhood meetings I introduced myself to the group, whereas at the other meetings I sat in the audience and took notes. At the end of the meetings I talked to policy advisors, community workers, representatives of migrant organizations and residents. After some of these conversations – when I thought a follow-up would be useful – I asked residents and representatives of migrant organizations for a formal interview. This is how I managed to get formal interviews with, for example, an African priest, two neighborhood residents and the organization United Different Voices in Amsterdam Zuidoost and two residents, an entrepreneur and two community workers in Delfshaven. The other residents I formally interviewed were referred to me by policy advisors, community workers and representatives of migrant organizations.
As the residents I formally interviewed were all referred to me, these were all residents who were active in the neighborhood. While the residents I spoke to were of different ethnic backgrounds – representing the multi-ethnicity of the neighborhoods I studied – I cannot claim these residents to be representative for the neighborhood. Having said this, it was useful talking to these residents because of their visions about policy implementation and their active roles in processes of negotiation. In order to get a broader sense of viewpoints, I engaged in more informal conversations with residents during participant observation.

Thirdly, I engaged in participant observation in public spaces in the neighborhoods (see chapter 8), at community centers, and at neighborhoods (see table 1.7). I participated in various community meetings and meetings of neighborhood organizations. For example, I got to sit in on a think-tank on neighborhood renewal in Amsterdam Southeast. This think-tank consisted of a select group of active neighborhood residents, an architect, and two representatives of the Office of Multiculturalism and Participation (MP-Bureau). During these meetings I observed and took notes. During the small meetings and the informal conversations following these meetings there was not always time to take notes. In these instances I would take very short notes and then, when I arrived home, write these out.

Finally I took field notes, about what the sites look like and the social interactions that are taking place in those spaces. These notes provided a context for discussions that came up in the interviews (Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000).

Because the data for this study was collected in four neighborhoods, and from various policy officials working for the state or state organizations, in a period of 1 year,
it was not possible to fully become an ‘insider’ in each of the communities. Therefore, while some of my data is ethnographic I cannot claim to know all ins and outs of the neighborhoods where I conducted my research.

Table 1.7 Overview of participant participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>When</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Citizen participation parliamentary research on success of failure immigrant integration</td>
<td>6 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Observations in neighborhood</td>
<td>September 2003–August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Information meetings for neighborhood residents about the urban renewal of their neighborhood (meeting in English and Dutch)</td>
<td>16 October 2003, 18 February 2004 (English), 26 June 2004 (outdoor in neighborhood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Neighborhood tour with neighborhood volunteers</td>
<td>9 June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Neighborhood walk with United Different Voices</td>
<td>9 June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Church service of Ghanaian church</td>
<td>18 July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Council Meetings – Commission Social Development</td>
<td>17 September 2003, 10 June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijlmermeer</td>
<td>Kwakoe festival</td>
<td>24 July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spangen</td>
<td>Meetings neighborhood organization Utopia</td>
<td>October 2003–August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spangen</td>
<td>Council meetings Delfshaven district</td>
<td>5 February 2004, 4 June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spangen</td>
<td>Neighborhood tour with community worker</td>
<td>22 March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercatorplein</td>
<td>Observations at square</td>
<td>September 2003–August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercatorplein</td>
<td>Council meetings De Baarsjes district</td>
<td>23 September 2003, 27 January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noordplein</td>
<td>Observations at square</td>
<td>October 2003–August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noordplein</td>
<td>Council meetings Noord district</td>
<td>18 March 2004, 22 April 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In confirmation with OSU regulations, I am using pseudonyms for all my informants in order to secure their anonymity as participants in this research. Everytime I
quote one of my informants I will mention their pseudonym, their relationship to policy and place (e.g. senior planning official), and their ethnicity (Dutch, Surinamese, Moroccan, etc.) as this can be important for understanding differences and similarities in attitudes and opinions in the multicultural context that is the focus of this research. I am aware that defining my informants on the basis of their ethnicity is problematic, but for consistency and clarity this seems the most effective way to work with my data. Only when I refer to public figures whose statements are widely quoted in national newspapers, such as Pim Fortuyn or Theo van Gogh, I am using real names and not pseudonyms.

1.9 The position of the researcher

The fieldwork for this study took place in the period from September 2003 until August 2004. During my field research I was affiliated with the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam and following my field research, in June 2005 – I took a post-doc position at IMES. I have been in the Netherlands ever since and have been picking up information since then. My networks at IMES helped me to identify the first informants and the affiliation was helpful when establishing first contacts. Also, my colleagues at IMES directed me to key publications and research groups on issues of immigrant integration.

During my research I had to think about my influence as a researcher on the study. Although I am a Dutch citizen, my position in the fieldwork was ambivalent. Because I had been living abroad – in the United States – for three years I was both an insider and outsider. I am an insider, because I am Dutch. My knowledge of the language, culture and
cities in some instances helped me to get very detailed information. But I was also an insider in conversations with migrants, because I was also migrant, in the United States. While my socio-economic status in many cases did not match that of the people I interviewed, we did share some similar emotions of ‘missing home’ and misunderstandings in the receiving countries, for them the Netherlands and for me the United States.

In other situations I was, however, an outsider. First, because I had lived abroad for three years and as a result I did not experience growing tensions in the city. There was a fear and skepticism among the people I interviewed, that the outcomes of my project would not benefit Dutch policymakers, institutions, and neighborhood residents. After I explained to them that for a long time I have had an interest in questions of immigration in Europe and the effects of increasing ethnic diversity on urban (social) change and that it was at the Ohio State University where I was given the opportunity to study these issues (and thus a choice was easily made) policy makers and residents generally understood and opened up to me.

Second, because I am a Dutch citizen some informants tended to skip over some of the history of immigrant integration in the Netherlands, assuming that I was aware of this or could find the sources to read what happened. Being a woman also made me an outsider when attempting to interview Turkish and Moroccan males at Mercatorplein in Amsterdam and Noordplein in Rotterdam. It was difficult to get into contact with the men. Some of the men did not speak Dutch (when this happened I went on to talk to another person), older men often walked away when I approached them – I sensed because they found it inappropriate to talk to a woman knowing that they were observed
by other men – and the young Moroccan men (age ranging from 18-30) approached me but with the goal of asking me out and acting “cool” towards their friends. I did not encounter the same problem with other men and women that I met at the square and who most of the time were by themselves instead of in a group.

In order to come to understand why these men used Mercatorplein as what seemed to be a ‘meeting place’ I changed strategies. Instead of directly approaching the men at the square, I first went to talk to a representative of a neighborhood migrant organization or a social worker who also provided me with information about the use(s) of the squares and the image of the squares in city and nation. After gaining their trust I would usually get the contact information (a phone number or email address) of one or a couple of potential informants. I would then contact the person(s) referring to the person who provided me with their contact information – the snowball-sampling method (see page 40) – and this way I would often get an interview. When I met the person for an interview I would first introduce myself and explain to them that I was conducting a study on Mercatorplein/Noordplein and that I was interest to hearing their opinions about the square. By first giving them the opportunity to talk about what could be improved at the square they usually opened up a bit more about their own use of the square. Also, in order to provide a comfortable environment I asked the person where he wanted to meet. Most of these interviews were conducted at either a migrant organization or the local community center. Gaining trust of these men remained complicated.

Finally, I am an outsider in the immigrant communities. Therefore, I might not have been given insight in all the details of their daily lives, although I occasionally did
get invited to participate in community events. For example, I was invited to attend a
service at a Ghanaian church in Amsterdam.

Interviewing different strata of people I encountered different problems. When
interviewing professionals – policy-makers, politicians, governors, etc. – I noticed that it
was difficult to get them to talk critically about policy or their relations with various
organizations, unless their unit was going through a major reorganization, as was the case
in Amsterdam. In order to get to the information I needed I sometimes used information
that I gathered in other interviews (for example, another policy advisor explained to me
that…) or in academic papers or newspaper articles (I read so and so, what do you think
about this?). Furthermore, I noticed that policy-makers referred me to people in a very
small circle, and so it was important to widen my circle of potential informants. The
difficulty with interviewing neighborhood residents was to get beyond the initial
complaints about the neighborhood such as traffic, street cleaning garbage disposal and
complaints about the presence of immigrants (by autochtonen). I am not claiming that
these topics are not important, but my goal was to get past these complaints and get a
more detailed vision about the negotiation of policy implementation in the neighborhood.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Figure 1.1 provides a schematic overview of the structure of this dissertation.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 together form the conceptual framework of this dissertation. In
chapter 2 I discuss different models of immigrant integration – particularly assimilationist
and pluralist models, as these are central to this dissertation –, the way philosophers and
political science scholars conceptualize contemporary multicultural societies, and
transnationalism as influencing immigrant identities and the way they become embedded in the country of settlement. Chapter 3 discusses theoretical contributions on how immigrant identity is constructed in and through urban (transnational) space as well as recent theoretical work on ‘the multicultural city’. Governmentality will be discussed in chapter 4 as a central element of the theoretical approach of this dissertation. In this chapter I will also provide the conceptual framework for the dissertation.

Chapters 5 and 6 provide a broad overview of the Dutch urban policy context. In chapter 5 I discuss how policies aimed at immigrant integration evolved at the scale of the nation-state from the 1960s until 2004, and how increasingly focus shifted to the urban as where problems of immigrant integration concentrated and had to be solved. In chapter 5 and 6, I specifically discuss the specific context in which immigrant integration policies were developed and implemented in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Chapter 7 and 8 are ethnographic studies of how multicultural policy negotiation takes place on the ground, in multi-ethnic neighborhoods. In chapter 7 I compare a multi-ethnic neighborhood in Amsterdam and one in Rotterdam, whereas in chapter 8 I compare two squares – one in Amsterdam and one in Rotterdam – to come to understand how multicultural policy implementation is negotiated in and through urban space. In the conclusion – chapter 9 – I provide an answer to the three research questions (see page 31).
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<th>Overview of State Policies and Dutch Urban Policy Context</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Tensions in the multicultural city</td>
<td>Conceptual Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 - Immigration and the State: Regulating Flows and Transnational Connections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 - Cities and Difference: Immigrants, Place and Politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 - Governmentality: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis for Investigating Social Policy in the Multicultural City</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 - State Discourses of Multiculturalism: A genealogy of Dutch policies for Immigrant Integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6 - Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Geographic, Economic, Historical, and Policy Context</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 7 - Negotiating Multiculturalism as Urban Renewal Strategy in Amsterdam and Rotterdam</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 8 - The Symbolic Spaces of the Multicultural City: The Public Square, Contested Meaning, and the Politics of Difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9 - Conclusion: The Socio-Spatial Negotiation of Policy in Multi-Ethnic Neighborhoods of the Multicultural City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.1 Schematic overview of dissertation structure
CHAPTER 2

IMMIGRATION AND THE STATE: REGULATING FLOWS AND
TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

2.1 Introduction

European states have, from the 1970s, experienced growing immigration (Black, 1996; Brubaker, 1998; Castles & Miller, 1998; Geddes, 2000). Global attention to the political upheaval and ‘clash of civilizations’ following the murders of Fortuyn (May 6, 2002) and Van Gogh (November 2, 2004), the post 9/11 anti (Muslim) immigrant social climate, limited job opportunities for immigrants, and the introduction of stricter and more repressive national immigration policy created an unattractive environment for new immigrants. This policy has also affected the attractiveness of the country to foreign investors who are hesitant to invest in a country that is experiencing political upheaval and social conflict. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether this is a permanent trend or only a temporal upheaval, as European economies, including the Dutch economy, continue to provide economic opportunities for migrants from less developed countries as well as relative political stability.
Initially, immigrants to Western European states arrived from former colonies or were attracted as guest workers, but more recently the source and destination of migrants have multiplied, and immigration is now more global in scope than at any time in the past (Castles and Miller, 1998). Immigrants now arrive from all corners of the world for economic or political reasons or as part of family reunification programs or marriages\textsuperscript{25}. Despite the rise of immigration during the 1970s it still took European states\textsuperscript{26} a long time to recognize that immigration was permanent and that countries had become \textit{de facto} immigration societies – in the sense that an increasing number of their citizens are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Until that time, the ‘immigration society’ was perceived to be characteristic of countries like the US, Canada and Australia, not so much of European states. In fact, it was not until 1983, in the so-called \textit{Minderhedenbeleid} (Minority Policy)\textsuperscript{27}, that the Dutch state officially recognized that immigration was permanent, thus recognizing guest workers were to stay in Holland and could not be forced to return to their home countries (WRR, 2001).

With this recognition, the Dutch state began to perceive it as their task to regulate immigration. Regulating immigrant flows is not the only task for the state, however. In fact, more important is the roles that states have taken on to facilitate immigrants’ incorporation in society without damaging the foundations of the nation-state. Immigration and increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of society therefore poses a series of questions for states, not only on how to avoid uncontrollable immigration – the

\textsuperscript{25} Immigration from Morocco and Turkey has continued through family reunification and marriages.
\textsuperscript{26} I do not claim here that ‘the state’ is an object or a coherent body. Instead, I understand ‘the state’ to consist of a series of practices and institutions with potentially conflicting or contradicting agendas. For a more detailed description of my approach to the state see chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{27} See chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this policy.
role of the state as gatekeeper – but also on how to maintain the coherence of the nation-state. Over the years, the Dutch state, through the establishment of various institutional bodies and services, has seen its task to intervene in the process of immigrant integration in order to avoid the creation of a racialized underclass, to secure social stability, and to reduce the dependency of immigrants on the Dutch welfare state. Nonetheless, the particular role of the Dutch state will differ from practices in other countries (see table 2.1).

This chapter focuses on the relationship between immigration and the state, through a discussion of different theoretical perspectives on the ways immigrants become embedded in host societies: through what struggles, through which representations and with what discrepancies regarding how state bodies define immigrant incorporation and identifications of home, city and nation of transnational subjects. The first section discusses a number of different models on how states approach immigrant integration. The models serve as starting points for how social policy should be constructed. A lot of scholarly work has focused on comparing these national models in order to shed light on the implications of different models for the incorporation of immigrants. The second section discusses philosophical debates on how societies could best deal with difference and the various flaws of existing models. Finally, the third section discusses how transnational flows and connections affect state efforts at immigrant incorporation.

2.2 Models of immigrant incorporation

One of the key problems of immigration policy that emphasizes the integration of new groups into receiving societies is that immigration breaks down the coherence of the
nation because immigrants are frequently excluded from participation in political,
economic and social spheres (Body-Gendrot, 2000, 2002; Garbaye, 2002) and tend to
maintain connections to their home countries (Le Galès, 2003; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998).
Also, immigrants bring along with them ethnic and religious practices that might be
unwelcome by the host population. Besides complicating immigration policy, increasing
ethnic and cultural diversity of society raises questions about citizenship (Kymlicka,
2004). Some authors argue that immigration threatens „national citizenship’ while others
believe that it is a challenge for the state to actively construct and sustain national

A significant body of work within the field of immigration and ethnic and racial
studies is concerned with studying state approaches to immigrant integration. A number
of scholars are involved in cross-national comparison of institutional models of
immigrant integration in order to come to understand how different states have dealt with
the problem of fragmentation and the implications of policy for immigrants and society at
large (Abu-Laban & Garber, 2005; Black, 1996; Brubaker, 1998; 2003; Castles & Miller,
1998; Joppke, 1999; Joppke and Morawska, 2003). Others have looked at the possibilities
of transferring a model used in one country to another context (e.g. Castles, 1992) or how
immigration became constructed as a policy problem in different national settings (Abu-
Laban & Garber, 2005; Wood & Gilbert, 2005). Also, many scholars have attempted to
delineate the institutional context in which immigration policies are formulated and

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28 According to Lee (2000: 401) integration is “a permanent but constantly changing process involving the
social construction of geographies through which identities and social relations are formed, contested and
transformed and social and environmental life can proceed.” In the context of policy I therefore understand
integration as the overall term for different policy choices, for example multiculturalism or assimilation.
The content of integration policies is constantly (re)negotiated and has different and changing geographical
implications.
through which immigrants exercise their rights (Black, 1996; Body-Gendrot, 1998; Brubaker, 1998; Castles, 1992; Kofman, 2002).

Most of this work starts from the assumption that there are a number of different and contrasting institutional approaches to tackling immigrant integration. It is widely recognized that countries respond differently to the existence of ethno-cultural diversity. A case in point is France where it is common to draw a clear-cut distinction between religion and private life on the one hand and politics and public life on the other hand (Banton, 2001; Favell, 2001; Feldblum, 1999). Or Canada, where cultural identity is respected and protected, while at the same time common values are upheld (Frisken and Wallace, 2003; Wood and Gilbert, 2005). Other countries, for example, incorporate elements of the French model and the Canadian model in their immigrant integration policies. In any case, these different models play an important role in selecting international case studies. Table 2.1 briefly summarizes the models that are usually recognized as distinct and contrasting. The Netherlands is not mentioned in this model, because in its approach to immigrant incorporation it draws on elements of different models.

The models as presented in the table are ideal-types, because in reality national models of integration are the outcome of complex ideological, historical and institutional contingencies (Favell, 1998; Garbaye, 2002). Therefore, states’ commitment to multiculturalism will differ. In fact, countries do not often follow one single immigration policy that is equally applied to all groups. Instead, multiple policies are created that use elements of different models to be applied to different groups or individuals. The particular direction chosen, however, does play an important role for how immigrants are
treated and perceived. Are they accepted as equals or are immigrants expected to put aside their differences and adjust to the norms and values of the receiving country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional models</th>
<th>Example Country</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolation29</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Immigrants remain separate from dominant population, no inter-mixing. Difficult for immigrants to acquire full rights and, especially, citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-nationalistic model</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Citizenship is only granted to those who can prove a blood relation to the nation of settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>France, US</td>
<td>Conformation to predefined national culture. Full legal rights and citizenship are granted in stages, following the individuals increasing assimilation. No minority status or minority policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Canada, Australia, Britain</td>
<td>Quick access to citizenship, co-existence of different forms of cultural expression. Policies to improve the position of minorities. Diversity as strength. Belief that different cultural or ethnic groups have the right to remain distinct.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.1 Institutional approaches to immigrant incorporation

The particular institutional framework chosen is also important for the development of governmental institutions and the organization of policy (top-down, bottom-up or a mixed approach). And finally, models of immigrant integration are also themselves open to multiple interpretations, because there are different choices states can make in terms of the accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity. The models that concern me most are those of assimilation and pluralism, in particular multiculturalism as a pluralist model of

29 This institutional model was characteristic of the way many Western European countries approached guest workers. The general belief was that guest workers should remain separate from the dominant population in order to secure their return after their contracts had ended. The Dutch state actively supported the formation of migrant organizations as they believed that these organizations served a key role for guest workers to remain connected to the homeland, and in so doing facilitating the return of guest workers to their homelands.
immigrant integration, because Dutch policies aimed at immigrant incorporation are founded on these models.

2.3 Assimilationist models

Assimilation is often defined as “the process by which nations or communities and the sub-nations or minorities within them intermix and became more similar” (Ogden, 2000: 41). In practice, assimilation in many cases is not so much a two-way but a one-way process through which immigrants have to adjust to the norms and values of the receiving society. According to Newfield & Gordon (1996: 80) ideologies of assimilation have three main features, all of which are rejected by pluralist ideologies: (1) adherence to core norms and values; (2) a rejection of racialized group consciousness; and (3) a denial of cultural equity among groups. Newfield & Gordon thus suggest that assimilation entails a ranking of cultures or ethnicities. In other words, seemingly neutral institutions in practice benefit from the interests of dominant groups. France is probably the nation with the strongest commitment to assimilation, but as Body-Gendrot (2002) and Garbaye (2002) demonstrate, this complicates the political participation of minorities and overcoming socio-economic marginalization. Assimilation prevents the development of minority organizations and minority services because immigrants are not granted minority status but are recognized as French citizens. That this can cause problems became visible last year with the riots of immigrant youth in the banlieus of French cities.
2.4 Pluralist models

An alternative model is that of countries that overtly acknowledge or even promote ethnic and religious identities. Such pluralist models have, until recently, formed the foundation for policy in countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands. In these countries inclusion in the political arena is “not conditional upon assimilation and new citizens are allowed to retain their cultural identities and express them and the interests related to them in the public sphere, including core institutions such as the school system, the military, and the media” (Koopmans and Statham, 2001: 75). For example, ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands have established Muslim, Hindu and Chinese schools, whereas in the UK Sikh police officers are allowed to wear their turbans. Multiculturalism arises mainly from the tradition of cultural pluralism (Newfield & Gordon, 1996: 80). The pluralist model evolved out of the idea that assimilationist integration strategies are increasingly untenable as a result of growing ethnic and cultural diversity and seems to represent a pragmatic answer to these processes (Kymlicka, 1995; Soysal, 1994). Hence, multiculturalism is frequently determined as the opposite of the ideology of assimilation (Newfield & Gordon, 1996: 80).

Despite the choice for a pluralist model of immigrant incorporations in a number of European countries, state institutionalized multiculturalism was never promoted as much as it is in Canada and Australia. In Canada, for example, the commitment to multiculturalism is expressed in federal legislation that holds that:

Canada is a multicultural country in which the cultures of diverse ethnic groups are respected and protected even as immigrants are helped to become full participants in Canadian society (Frisken and Wallace, 2003: 157).
The precise workings of multiculturalism are not set out in legislation, however. They need to be negotiated and translated into policies. In the absence of such clear definitions of the meaning and purpose of multiculturalism, there is lack of consensus on how to aid the process of immigrant adjustment among Canadians (Frisken and Wallace, 2003: 157). Despite the lack of consensus, the fact that Canada is a country of immigration remains uncontested (Kymlicka, 2003). This is in sharp contrast with European states that have embraced pluralist models, but from the late 1990s onwards are confronted by a backlash against multiculturalism (Mitchell, 2004). This is represented in increasing xenophobia, the rise of anti-immigrant political parties, as well as rising threat of ‘civilizational clash’ seen in the Netherlands, in France, in Britain, where a growing section of the population feels that the admittance of many immigrants was a mistake (Kymlicka, 2004: 203), and in Denmark with the controversy and riots surrounding the cartoons of Mohammed. Whereas in Canada immigration is perceived more in terms of a positive contribution to society, other countries, particularly in Europe but also the US, conceptualize immigration – especially of low-skill immigrants – as a threat to the stability of society. As a result, the immigrant community in the US in spring of 2006 took the streets to protest against anti-immigration laws and the proposed guest worker program of George Bush.

In recent years, a number of writers have identified a backlash against multiculturalism in the Western world (Brubaker, 2001; Mitchell, 2004). Scholars, opinion-makers and politicians have started questioning commonly held views of multiculturalism, arguing that multicultural policies contribute to new forms of exclusion from the institutional-political arena (Uitermark et al, 2005) but also from urban public
Critics of multiculturalism therefore address the paradoxical outcomes or perverse effects of state programs of multiculturalism, e.g. increasing concentration and segregation of ethnic minorities in cities and increasing fear of encountering (Muslim) immigrants in the streets. On the one hand, liberal critiques of multiculturalism have put their finger on the internal contradictions intrinsically linked to the notion of cultural recognition. Multiculturalism is often framed in terms of the equal access to resources and the ‘recognition’ of all cultures as equal, but critics of multiculturalism claim that it is only possible to ‘tolerate’ other cultures. According to Uitermark et al (2005) the problem with cultural recognition lies fundamentally in its unilaterality: the demand is for the state and the mainstream society to recognize minority cultures, while less attention is paid to a reciprocal obligation of minority groups to recognize the ways of the majority (for a critical discussion of the liberal critiques of multiculturalism, see Joppke, 2004).

Other, more radical critiques of multiculturalism have focused on the institutionalization of multicultural approaches, claiming that attempts to institutionalize ethnic diversity are commonly used by governments as simply ad hoc responses to tensions and real or imagined threats (see, for instance, Back et al., 2002; Kundnani, 2002). Most of these attempts start from the assumption that one or a few ethnic leaders can represent the ethnic community. This is problematic, because by assuming that ethnic communities can speak with one voice and thus emphasizing differences between ethnic groups and ethnic groups and the host population, the diversity within ethnic groups goes unrecognized (Vertovec, 1996; Grillo, 1998). The problem with the multicultural model is that it does not leave sufficient space for the development of ‘other’ identities. Ethnic
identities could potentially be incorporated in a way that meets the demands of dominant groups and does not require much adjustment of the dominant groups to the new reality of diversity. Hence, while ethnic identities (group identities) are recognized, this model tends to consolidate its isolated position. Confronted by some of the problems identified in the critiques of multiculturalism, it then makes sense that multicultural policies are now increasingly replaced by alternative models. What is striking though is the return to assimilationist policies in a number of countries in recent years. Increasingly, these newly introduced assimilationist policies are characterized by immigrants being held responsible for their own successful integration in society. This return to or introduction of assimilation must be understood as a cultural manifestation of a neoliberal, individual responsibility ethos that is increasingly penetrating in the Western world. Failure to meet the program’s expectations then legitimates the exclusion of minorities from society (Mitchell, 2004: 645).

Some Asian countries – Singapore and Malaysia, for example – have also chosen pluralist models of multiculturalism to manage ethnic and culturally diverse populations (Bunnell, 2002a; 2002b; Huat, 2003; Juan, forthcoming; Yeoh, 2003). The multicultural model of Singapore is very different from the Canadian, Australian and European models. What distinguishes the Singaporean model is that a distinction is made between on the one hand Chinese, Malay and Indian citizens and, on the other hand, the low-skilled foreign workers (i.e. immigrants from Thailand or the Philippines) – ‘non-talent’ – who are permanent outsiders in Singapore society and do not have the same rights as citizens of Singapore even though they make up 20% of the population of Singapore. It
must therefore be recognized that the institutional geography of state pluralist policies around the world is highly uneven.

Sin (2003) discusses the role of housing policies in Singapore as a means for ethnic regrouping. He explains that from 1989 onwards a quota system was implemented that “applies to the sale of new and resale flats, setting a maximum limit on the percentages of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others living in each neighborhood and block in every public housing estate and new town in Singapore” (Sin, 2003: 530). Such direct measures at regulating population compositions in neighborhoods have been proposed in the Netherlands, particularly by the city of Rotterdam, but the Dutch state is not much in favor of such policy measures and only has allowed income restrictions on neighborhoods that are on the verge of becoming ghettos (see chapter 6). In European and North American contexts typically more indirect policies are chosen. Mixed housing policies are probably the best example. These policies are widely applied but scholars, politicians and opinion-makers debate their effectiveness. Some are strong proponents, while others doubt the effectiveness of these policies (Amin, 2002; Musterd, 2003; powell, 2002; Uitermark, 2003; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2004; Veldboer et al, 2002).

European countries, as discussed above, more recently have started to recognize their status as immigration societies. For the establishment of policy, these countries have looked at the experiences of the US and Canada. In the Netherlands for example, based on the situation in US cities, governments fear the development of ghettos, where ethnic minority groups would come to live separated from society (see SCP, 1995). This has inspired both studies that measure segregation in European cities and also mixed income housing policies. These studies show that while segregation is relatively low in
comparison to American cities, ethnic groups are becoming increasingly concentrated along lines of ethnicity and class (Bolt et al, 2002; Bureau O+S, 1999; Fainstein, 1997; Helleman & Wassenberg, 2001; Kesteloot & Cortie, 1998; Mollenkopf, 2000; Musterd & Deurloo, 2002; Van Kempen & Van Weesep, 1998; Van Kempen, 2000).

2.4.1 Cities, space, and pluralist immigration policies

Many scholars of immigration are concerned with injustice caused by certain institutional models, and aim to minimize the negative effects through developing policy strategies. Scholars are particularly concerned with preventing and tackling social exclusion (in the European context) or the development of an underclass (in the North American context). The driving argument in the literature is that if Western nations claim to be democratic they cannot allow a significant fraction of their populations to remain outside the polity. Therefore, they must seek to find solutions to the question of how immigrants can be included as citizens (Brubaker, 1989, 1998). These attempts to create solutions are frequently most evident in urban areas (Waldinger, 2001) because immigrants tend to concentrate in cities. Hence diversity is concentrated in cities and, as such, solutions for living with difference need to be tackled mostly in cities. But, while cities are becoming increasingly multi-ethnic, Hiebert (2000: 375) argues that not many studies have looked at the cultural dynamics of living in multi-ethnic cities or their implications for urban policy.

Social exclusion refers to the situation in which certain members of society are, or become, separated from much that comprises the normal ‘round’ of living and working within that society (Philo, 2000; 751). This does not only mean exclusion from socio-economic opportunities, but also from social relations and particular spaces (e.g. malls). The concept of social exclusion is now widely used in a European policy context.
This dissertation joins a number of authors who have argued for ‘bringing cities back in’ as context for studying immigrant incorporation and as arena for policy development (Alexander, 2003; Amin, 2001; Brettell, 2003; Rogers, 1998; Smakman and Musterd, 2001). Alexander (2003) points to this gap in the literature. He points out that cities increasingly diverge from national policies in order to deal with a growing migrant population and their differential needs. In fact, cities with large immigrant populations try out their own policies. The literature has focused on national policies and their impacts on immigrants and immigrant communities locally, but there is little attention to the connection between national, urban and local scales in the construction, implementation and negotiation of public policy. Thus, as Alexander (2003: 411) argues, what is lacking is a theoretical framework for enabling comparison of migrant policies at the local level, across different cities and policy domains.

It is useful and necessary to study the differences between institutional models of immigrant integration, but there are also problems with comparative studies. Most important is the largely a-spatial understanding of immigrant integration in these literatures. They fail to incorporate the geography of immigrant integration and the spaces of policy negotiation in urban neighborhoods. In so doing, these studies do not contribute to our understanding of how policy is (re)shaped by actions and socio-spatial practices in concrete spaces in cities and neighborhoods. The national state uses local spaces as sites of policy implementation, since these are the spaces where immigrants live and through which they are connected to the larger society. But, at the same time these local settings are sites of negotiation, as immigrants shape the geographies of their neighborhoods through their daily interactions, in the context of larger policy
frameworks. Secondly, the literature on immigrant incorporation does not address the complex relationships between different state bodies, in particular between state, urban and local institutions. These models are either applied nationally or locally, but not much attention is paid to the other scales of analysis. They focus on what policy should look like, and while they address differences between countries, they are not helpful in understanding differences between different cities and neighborhoods within one country. Finally, what is lacking in these works is the voice of migrants and their position towards the host society: what are their needs and what is their role in shaping policy and everyday practices in their neighborhoods of residence?

2.5 Philosophical engagements with difference

In the previous section I discussed the importance of models of immigrant incorporation for understanding how ethnic diversity is governed and through which institutions, as well as the uneven institutional geography of pluralist models of immigrant integration across the world. Models of immigrant incorporation are founded on philosophical ideas on how to manage multicultural societies. These ideas are not static but subject to evaluation and change. There is no single definition of multiculturalism. Nonetheless, the way multiculturalism is defined will have effects on what policies and institutions will be developed. In this section I will discuss philosophical debates on how to live with difference. These debates are important as their ideas can contribute to transforming state ideals on how to deal with difference.

I particularly would like to focus on Bhikhu Parekh’s normative conceptualization of the multicultural society, as he aims to understand ethnic difference, or the
multicultural society, in Britain. His work is particularly useful because it not only seeks to recognize ethnic diversity but because it also tries to move beyond traditional multiculturalism by emphasizing the multifaceted and dynamic nature of cultural identifications. For a study that looks at the negotiation of policies in urban neighborhoods, this approach is particularly insightful. Allen and Cars (2001: 2195) demonstrate the use of his philosophical insights for justifying neighborhood governance in promoting social cohesion within culturally diverse small areas.

The policy ideal of multiculturalism and integration is fundamentally geographical, because it is intended to break down the barriers of socio-spatial segregation. Nonetheless, most studies on multiculturalism, developed in political science, philosophy and sociology, are concerned primarily with defining the term at an abstract level. This, of course, is a worthwhile endeavor since ‘multiculturalism’ is a slippery, often vacuous, but also politically powerful concept. Gordon and Newfield (1996: 1) recognize this problem of defining the term in the US context as it appears more frequently in current social and cultural debates:

It acknowledges cultural diversity, but what else does it do? For some, it means renewed demands for assimilation in disguise. For others, it means a rejection of all the good things about “Western culture” that made America great. For still others, it is a simple descriptive fact about U.S. society that could serve as an everyday term for the interaction among country’s five major “racial” or “panethnic” groupings: African Americans, American Indians, Asian Americans, European Americans, and Latino Americans.

From the late 1980s onwards multiculturalism increasingly became incorporated as a term, yet without resolving the controversy over its meanings and effects. Contemporary theorists attempt to define the term as a collection of social practices and policies
intended to remedy the problems of social exclusion (Kymlicka, 1998; Parekh, 1999, 2000; Taylor, 1994; Tempelman, 1999). The notion of multiculturalism implies that different cultural or ethnic groups have a right to remain distinct rather than assimilating to mainstream norms. Studies of multiculturalism and multicultural policies are often limited to the spheres of education and the arts (Gordon & Newfield, 1996), but more critical theories strive to encompass the practices and institutions of the whole of society. This poses a dilemma between extending equal rights to all citizens versus addressing the particular needs of minorities. Also, there is a risk in depoliticizing or commodifying the term, reducing it to the ‘united colors of capitalism’ (Mitchell, 1993).

Multiculturalism as an ideal dates back to the 1970s (Gordon & Newfield, 1996) and cannot be seen apart from the proliferation of various social movements that were striving for equal rights during that time, like women’s, gay and lesbian and black power movements. These movements demanded equal rights and recognition in society. The gay community, for example, claimed areas of the city. To this day we can see in cities around the world, gay neighborhoods or, in the words of Castells (1983: 162), a “city within a city”. But these groups were also successful in struggling for affirmative action and various other policies aimed at overcoming their marginalized position in society and providing chances for personal development. Multiculturalism recognizes group difference, but in so doing many critics of multicultural policy argue that it singles out particular groups as minorities and does not recognize within group differences, and identities that cross group boundaries. The case of Singapore, discussed in the previous section, demonstrates this outcome of multicultural policy.
In responding to the perceived failures of traditional multiculturalism, many authors have committed themselves to the search for novel approaches to institutionally manage ethnic diversity. Parekh (2000: 13), for example, understands the multicultural society as “consisting of several cultures or cultural communities with their own distinct systems of meaning and significance and views on man and the world”. This recognition of separate cultural communities in society is also grounds for critiquing theories of multiculturalism. Critics argue that theories of multiculturalism treat ethnic culture as something static, rather than socially constructed. But Parekh argues that the presence of all these different groups and their differences cannot be theorized from existing political doctrines, as these are biased towards a particular cultural perspective – that of the host population – and therefore won’t do justice to others. Because of conflicting demands it is therefore necessary that a new political structure is put in place that can do justice to these seemingly incompatible demands. This new political structure should “foster a strong sense of unity and common belonging among its citizens” (ibid: 196) in order for society to act as a community to the outside world and in order to be able to make binding decisions and to resolve conflicts. And secondly, while fostering unity it should not ignore the demands of diversity. For Parekh multiculturalism is all about negotiation between different cultural groups:

Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities. The norms governing their respective claims… cannot be derived from one culture alone but through an open and equal dialogue between them (Parekh, 2000: 13).
For Parekh not all conflicts need to be resolved; instead, he distinguishes between conflicts that need to be resolved and conflicts with which we can live. He thus promotes a dynamic vision of multiculturalism, where it emerges from the constant encounters, formal and informal and in public or private spaces between different cultures. These encounters cause cultural traditions to be transformed in something different, beyond imagination. As Allen & Cars (2001: 2203) argue, following Parekh’s line of though, governance of neighborhoods should be designed bottom-up so that the specific groups in the area are involved and are given an active role in the construction of neighborhood policy. While this is a nice thought, we should not ignore the different interests involved in neighborhood governance. Theorists tend to assume that citizens are always capable of governing and have the time to be actively involved. The practice in cities shows that increasingly expert-knowledge of consultants and other professionals are used for the construction of policy (Larner, 2002; Rose, 1999). But, I agree with them that there is a danger that top-down governance is derived from the monocultural assumptions of the host culture, as the policy positions at higher ranks are mostly filled by members of the host culture.

While normative models understand a true multicultural society as a more just society, my research is not claiming, \textit {a priori}, that multiculturalism is good or bad. Instead, what is more important at this point is to use the work of Parekh, amongst others, to understand the foundations of contemporary multicultural policies. This dissertation aims to look specifically at the negotiation of these policies on the ground in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{31} Mouffe (2005) would disagree with Parekh, because she would argue that getting rid of conflict from society is dangerous. She argues that “envisioning the aim of politics in terms of consensus and reconciliation is not only conceptually mistaken, it is also fraught with political dangers” (4). In other words, she envisions agonism as productive.}
neighborhoods of two Dutch cities and its implications for public policy and the production of urban space. In other words it focuses on “apparently mundane practices and ‘messy actualities’” (Larner and Walters, 2004; McCann, 2008)\textsuperscript{32}.

The idea of multiculturalism has been heavily critiqued in recent years. Critics argue that multiculturalism could result in groups remaining separate, rather than creating bridges, even though Parekh’s work demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, he argues quite the contrary, that multiculturalism is all about negotiation between groups. As Young (2000) argues, with the idea of differential solidarity, segregation in itself is not necessarily a problem, as long as there are bridges between communities so that active negotiation is maintained and as long as there is equal access to jobs, education and housing. In this context, dealing with some of the problems of multiculturalism, an increasing number of scholars are now speaking of interculturalism as a better philosophical model. Interculturalism does not imply different groups living next to each other, but the intermixing and interaction of different cultures (Amin, 2003). The term multiculturalism assumes cultures as being static, where cultures aim to maintain their identities. Interculturalism on the other hand understands culture as always in flux, and thus incorporating experiences in the country of settlement in combination with those of the homeland. The way immigrants are received in the settling country influences their identity. This is also an interesting concept in the contexts of transnationalism, as it recognizes that the immigrants’ relationship to the homeland will change as a consequence of his/her experiences in the country of settlement.

\textsuperscript{32} More on this in chapter 4.
2.6 Transnationalism

Most studies discussed so far have focused on the nation-state as the prime scale of analysis and *a-priori* assume a role for the state in managing the incorporation of immigrants. But while state institutions play an important role in regulating migration and managing immigrant incorporation, these studies tend to play down the significance of transnational networks of immigrants on attempts to shape immigrant conduct as well as the agency of immigrants in shaping their everyday lives. Increasingly, immigrants shape their everyday lives in a transnational field. Transnational relations are increasingly important in shaping identities and everyday life of immigrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The maintenance of connections to the home countries (Le Galès, 2003; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998) in combination with the frequent exclusion of immigrants from participation in political and social spheres (Body-Gendrot, 2000; Garbaye, 2002) form two key problems of immigration policy that emphasize the integration of new groups into receiving countries. In this section I will turn to studies on transnationalism, particularly to how this concept relates to international migration and immigrant incorporation.

Transnationalism can be defined as:

An ongoing series of cross-border movements in which immigrants develop and maintain numerous economic, political, social and cultural links in more than one nation (Mitchell, 2000: 853).

The concept of transnationalism has its origin in studies of anthropology, and was developed in order to address the economic, social, economic and political involvement of immigrants across national boundaries (Appadurai and Breckenridge, 1998; Basch *et*
al, 1994; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Rouse, 1991, 1992). Until then, the movement across borders had been characterized in theories of migration and immigration as either a permanent change or only as a temporary movement followed by the eventual return home, and not in terms of the ongoing connectedness to two or more locations.

From the mid-1990s onwards, in response to the observed speed and density of border crossings between nation states (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Yeoh et al., 2003), the interest in the concept by social scientists – including geographers – rapidly expanded and has significantly contributed to our insights in the interconnectedness of people, places and things in a globalizing world, and the spaces of transnationalism (Featherstone et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2004; Ley, 1995, 2004; Mitchell, 1997; Smith, 2001; Vertovec, 1999; Voigt-Graf, 2004). These studies theorize migrants’ daily lives as taking place across borders, and recognizes their embeddedness in global economic and political structures. In fact, transnational space is understood as both multi-dimensional and multiply-inhabited (Crang et al., 2003; Smith, 2001). As an area of studies it no longer solely emerged from migration studies, but also from the fields of work on the globalization-urbanization nexus and of transnational corporations.

Many scholars of transnationalism linked this new type of migration process – of the multiplicity of connections of transnational migrants in both the home and host societies (Basch et al., 1996) – to changes in the nature of capitalism (see Blanc et al., 1995; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). Production is increasingly organized at a global scale and this has affected the flows of immigrants across national borders, and has caused

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33 According to Van Amersfoort (2001: 17) transnationalism shows a lot of resemblances with the way scholars use the concept of diaspora, even though diaspora emphasizes more the political dimension of border crossing relations. The concept of transnationalism is then only broader defined as including economic and social-cultural relations.
migrants to develop new strategies that allow them to operate in a social field that crosses borders of nation states (Mitchell, 2000). Improved means of communication and travel have facilitated the possibilities for the constitution and reconstitution of social relations at a distance or what Harvey (1990) has called ‘time-space compression’. Even when situated in different localities, relations can be established and maintained. In recent years, for example, there has been an expansion of budget airlines – Onür Air is such a budget airline offering cheap flights from Amsterdam to various destinations in Turkey – causing prices for air travel to fall, thereby facilitating the travel between host and home countries. Also, these technologies facilitate the maintenance of cultural traditions and political aspirations focused on the country of origin (Van Amersfoort, 2001: 5). Nonetheless, transnational subjects, notwithstanding their ability to maintain border crossing social, economic and political ties, are still classed, raced and gendered bodies in specific places. Many people do not have access to a phone, a computer and Internet, and many people do not have the means for travelling to distant places. Massey (1993) refers to this differential access of different social groups and individuals to technologies, information flows and interconnections as the power geometry of time-space compression.

The reality of migrants living their lives in more than one nation and the maintenance of social relations have major implications for both immigrants and their host societies (Mitchell, 2000). Migrant laborers transfer large sums of money back to the home countries for example in the form of remittances to friends and relatives or by building a house in the country of origin. In fact, social, financial, political and economic links with the homeland are often encouraged by the governments of sending countries,
who view their émigrés as important sources of remittances, investment capital, and votes (Itzigsohn, 2000). In order to encourage labor migrants to invest their earned money in the economy of the host society, states sometimes grant property rights, health and welfare benefits, voting rights, and even dual citizenship to tie migrants to the country (Guarnizo, 1994). In the Netherlands immigrants are given local voting rights after four years of residence. Dual citizenship, however, is restricted, because politicians are of the opinion that it hinders integration in Dutch society.

In order to secure economic growth, states have an interest in limiting the transfer of money of immigrants across states. There is often a strong belief that once immigrants become incorporated in the host society, their ties to the home country will become weaker. What studies of transnationalism suggest, however is that while immigrants are still involved in various activities in their home countries, this does not mean that they are not embedded in the country of settlement.

The significance of transmigrants to their country of origin in many ways rests on the extent of their incorporation into the national economy and political processes of their country of settlement (Basch et al, 1994: 3).

Nonetheless, living across borders, does complicate efforts to feel at home in the host society.

By living their lives across borders, transmigrants find themselves confronted with and engaged in the nation building processes of two or more nation-states. Their identities and practices are configured by hegemonic categories, such as race and ethnicity, that are deeply imbedded in the nation building processes of these nation states (Basch et al, 1994: 34).

From this starting-point it follows that a lot of attention was dedicated to the influence of social categorizing in both the countries of origin and the receiving states. They focus on
the formation of identities, which is significantly influenced by social categorization in both the country of origin and the country of residence.

Yeoh and Chang (2001), while studying the significance of transnational flows for Singapore that functions as a key node in social, economic and technological networks of the global economy, distinguish four different categories of transnational migrants: the transnational business class, a highly mobile, highly educated and entrepreneurial elite; low-waged immigrants filling unskilled or semi-skilled jobs in the service industry; expressive specialists, representing artists and other creative minds; and world tourists attracted by the cosmopolitan ambience of the city. This distinction is important because it demonstrates that high-skilled laborers and creative minds are welcomed with generous laws and policies in terms of health and welfare benefits, and dual citizenship. Ong (1999) refers to these migrants as ‘flexible citizens’ who can move around the globe without being hindered by border controls. They are believed to be able to contribute to new innovations from which cities can benefit economically, and through which cities can strengthen its ‘globalness’ (Yeoh and Chang, 2001; see also Mitchell 2001 on transnational businessmen in Vancouver and Canadian immigration policy).

But, while these groups and tourists have no trouble crossing borders, border patrols are at the same time intensified to avoid the settlement of unwanted immigrants, poor and often low-skilled laborers. This is visible not only in Singapore, but also on US and European borders where every year numerous migrants lose their lives while trying to cross borders in search for better economic opportunities. This also shows the hopelessness of many migrants from poor countries to move to those places where they
believe they have more economic opportunities. Globalization of the economy is contributing to these movements.

Nagel (2002) discusses dominant discourses particularly with respect to immigrant incorporation. According to Nagel “claims about immigrant transnationalism resemble contemporary and historical polemics on the non-assimilation of immigrants” (971). She claims that studies of transnationalism do not sufficiently pay attention to the desire of many immigrants, even when they maintain identities and traditions of their home countries, to be included in mainstream society of the receiving country. The difficulty is that because of transnational movements there no longer exists a sharp segmentation between host and sending societies. Migrants move around, participate in social and political life of more than one nation, thereby frequently problematizing their ‘belonging’. But these tensions, as also identified by Nagel, pose various questions for the state on how to manage national stability and how to incorporate these new identities in the dominant national identity.

Unlike studies of globalization, that have often argued that nation-states are losing power to new supra-national institutions or to local groups striving for autonomy, studies of transnationalism tend to agree that the state, despite the increasing importance and density of cross-border relations and movements still remains the most important in structuring the rights of migrants and their participation in host society institutions (Nagel, 2004; Smith, 2001). Transnationalism in fact poses a series of new questions for the state in both receiving and sending countries.
The state is not preeminent, nor has it lost its general viability; rather there is an insistent tension between the project of the modern nation-state and its ideological control over the circulation of both its citizens and their capital in diaspora (Mitchell, 1997: 105; see also Blanc et al, 1995).

For example, in sending countries on how to secure the continuity of remittances as this has become an important source of income, and in receiving countries on how to get immigrants to spend their money in the economy instead of transferring it back to the home country as well as encouraging the social and political participation of migrants in the host society. Transnational movements require a different role for the state, not only in incorporating newcomers but also managing transnational flows of goods and capital. The nation-state and transnational practices then are mutually constitutive rather than mutually exclusive social constructs:

Despite tensions and disjunctures taking place between oppressive structures and border-crossing flows, the nation-state – along with its juridical-legislative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, economic entities, modes of governmentality and war making capacities – continues to define, discipline, control, and regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement or in residence (Ong, 1999: 15).

2.6.1 Critiques of studies of transnationalism

The outcome of these various influences is a complex field in which scholars approach transnationalism in different ways. Because of this, the field has been subject to various critiques. Geographers have critiqued studies of transnationalism for ignoring the significance of space in the constitution of different forms of transnationalism (Crang et al, 2003; Jackson et al, 2004; Mitchell, 1997; Voigt-Graf, 2004). While a lot of studies focus on the mobility of migrants, what is ignored in many accounts is the materiality of transnational practices. This work, therefore must be linked to studies on the spatial
construction of social relations, which will be discussed in the next chapter. More recent work on transnationalism no longer conceives nations, regions, and places as fixed containers of political and cultural activity, but as key sites in sets of flows and networks (Featherstone et al, 2007). While studies of transnationalism challenge nation-centred frames of social, cultural and political relations, locality is of great importance. Despite being transnational, transmigrants are still embedded in space and cannot escape local context.

Also, Crang et al (2003) are concerned with the lack of empirical grounding of studies of transnationalism, and the focus in most studies of transnationalism on identifying transnational migrants and diasporic communities. This emphasis should not be surprising, given that this approach evolved from anthropology. The problem with identifying groups in this way is that it ignores the complexity of transnational migrants. As Smith (2005) indicates, within transnational communities there are large differences in terms of gender, race, class, motivation for migration, region of origin, etc. The African community in Amsterdam Southeast, for example, has over a 100 churches. The reason for this great number is the presence of various different tribes. Also, urban neighborhoods are often multicultural. Therefore, in order to study the production of space – how multi-ethnicity is challenging existing usages of urban space – it is of crucial importance to recognize the presence and interaction of a complex network of transnational relations. Furthermore, transnationalism is no longer limited to only the social worlds of migrants or ethnically identified migrant communities, but in fact affects more and more people who in their daily lives experience different forms of transnationality (Crang et al, 2003; Smith, 2005).
In the next chapter I will discuss theories that address questions of identity and difference in its relation to urban space. In it, I will return to theorizations on transnationalism, but particularly in reference to how they relate to urban space.
CHAPTER 3
CITIES AND DIFFERENCE: IMMIGRANTS, PLACE AND POLITICS

3.1 Introduction

While the process of urbanization is not new, the scale and pace of contemporary urbanization is unprecedented, and it is linked with processes of globalization. This explains the interest of urban scholars in the “urbanization-globalization nexus” (McCann, 2002, 2004). One key aspect of these processes is the rise of international migration, especially towards cities in the Western world. Cities – and certain neighborhoods – have increasingly become gateways for newcomers, offering hope, promise, progress and opportunities (Lees, 2004; Price and Benton-Short, 2008).

While the scale of this phenomenon is increasing, it is not, in itself, new. In the 15th century many peasants found shelter in cities, fleeing the controls of their feudal landlords. Later, in the 19th century great numbers of people exchanged their lives in the countryside for the city where they found employment in the rapidly expanding industrial economy.
Cities have always acted as the loci of difference. People with different and often conflicting beliefs and lifestyles have lived and worked together in cities. One of the characteristics of cities is that people can live in relative anonymity. Jane Jacobs in her famous book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) has referred to this anonymity as the living together of strangers. Urban living provided a sense of freedom that did not exist in small towns and villages. Characteristic of difference in cities today is the increasing *ethnic diversity* of its population due to ongoing international migration.

As immigrant gateways, cities are now at the center of debates about multiculturalism. Even when national policies have attempted to disperse newcomers more evenly across a country, immigrants tend to relocate to the largest cities when they can. Hence, cities are increasingly defined as multicultural. The concept of the ‘multicultural city’ brings together issues of managing and facilitating diversity, while at the same time securing urban economic prosperity. The visible presence of ethnic minorities in urban public spaces – whether in Singapore (Yeoh and Huang, 1998; Chang, 2000), Amsterdam (Mollenkopf, 1998), Paris (Body-Gendrot, 2003) or elsewhere – and their inclusion in everyday life are perceived to be major challenges for cities and national governments, who must at the same time secure the cities’ competitiveness in an increasingly global world. Newcomers to the city are in the process of shaping their

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34 I am not arguing that cities are ‘actors’. Many scholars have treated cities as actors, sometimes consciously, but often unconsciously. But as Peter Marcuse (2005) argues the use of a definition of cities as actors has political implications. For example, by understanding cities as actors it is assumed that the city acts, and hence that there exist harmony about policies that cities put forward or about construction or future plans. In reality, there are specific groups within cities that are influential in shaping politics and policies of the city. Yet, while influential, the usages of city space proposed by these influential actors might conflict with that of other groups residing in the city. In other words, there is conflict. And, where conflict exists there is negotiation. My understanding of ‘city’ recognizes the various interests within the city, power relations within the city, the connectedness of cities to the global economy, and the existence of multiple realities in cities.
everyday lives in the city through negotiation. In efforts to create a ‘home’ in the city, newcomers are involved in negotiating policies and plans directed at the social and physical renewal of neighborhoods. By ‘negotiate’ I mean how new policies are understood, evaluated, engaged with or argued against, and (re)shaped by neighborhood residents through their interactions with agents of state institutions. Tensions between the host population and newcomers are especially at issue in neighborhoods where the concentration of immigrants is rapidly rising. Governors and authorities have the task of negotiating socio-spatial tensions and differences while also fostering economic growth, all in order to secure the well-being of the city’s population and of society at large. These conflicts and negotiations over use of, practices in, and claims to space have to occur somewhere in urban space – for example in neighborhoods, streets, parks, squares or community buildings – or in the micro-spaces of schools, institutions and clubs. Urban neighborhoods, as spaces of identity formation, play key roles as sites of host-immigrant encounters (even when those encounters are anonymous and do not involve verbal interaction). While, on the one hand these spaces are critical in shaping multiculturalism, on the other hand their anonymity can also elicit fear and feelings of insecurity. In both instances – positive and negative – these urban spaces are critical in shaping everyday life and the physical appearance of the multicultural city.

In this chapter I discuss theoretical contributions from the fields of social-cultural and political geography and urban studies more generally. In order to come to understand the socio-spatial negotiations of policy in multi-ethnic neighborhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, I draw on theoretical insights on how immigrant identity is constructed in and through urban (transnational) space and what a truly multicultural city should look like.
First, I will discuss the recent work on transnational urbanism and cosmopolitanism. This literature focuses on the interconnectedness of people and the importance of transnational networks and cosmopolitan lifestyles for transferring urban ideas and practices and in shaping the everyday life of citizens in the multicultural city. Secondly, I discuss the emerging body of literature on ‘the multicultural city’. What these studies demonstrate is that the concept of ‘the multicultural city’ becomes the focus and frame for politics around questions of social inclusion, immigration, neighborhood identity, urban (re)development, social service provision, and educational equity. Finally, I discuss the geographical literature on identity and space. Urban spaces are key sites through which immigrants become embedded in society, through which they negotiate their identity, and though which the identity of the larger society is constructed. This body of literature raises questions about democracy, inclusion and representation in the city.

3.2 Transnational and Cosmopolitan urbanism

Cities are themselves highly diverse. In fact, each city has its own particular history, ethnic and cultural mixes, economic and institutional structure, and modes of political regulation of urban space. These differences are the product of relations that extend widely, beyond the city (Massey, 2004). Local, national, transnational and global social and political relations all contribute to the socio-spatial organization of everyday life in multicultural cities. Therefore, each particular geographical context is connected and produced by different places, people and things, and thus generates its own transnational geographies.
From the 1970s onwards, there has been a strong tradition in urban studies of conceptualizing cities and urban life as produced by and productive of the circulation of capital and flows of power and knowledge (Castells, 1977, 2000; Harvey, 1973, 1982, 1993; Sassen, 1991; Saunders, 1986; Zukin, 1980). These studies address the development of the global economy and how this impacts cities. While these studies have been of great importance to the field of urban studies, Michael Peter Smith (2001) – in his book *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization* – is extremely critical of existing conceptualizations on the globalization-urbanization nexus, especially of the global cities discourse. In order to construct his concept of ‘transnational urbanism’ he places heavy emphasis on the ‘weaknesses’ of this literature. These studies, so he argues, are one-sided because of its overly economistic focus, have neglected the political and cultural domains, and have undertheorized the role of human agency and everyday life. Also, he does not believe in the global city is an ‘object’ appropriate for grounding urban research (see also McCann, 2002, 2004; Robinson, 2005), but only in “an interplay of differently articulated networks, practices, and power relations” (Smith, 2001: 49).

Smith is not so much interested in studying larger structures, but in the power and agency of transnational social actors. He is particularly interested in the networks of these actors that operate at many spatial scales at the same time. In other words the social, cultural, economic and political relations of transnational subjects can be local, national

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35 In my opinion, Smith’s critiques are unfair and do not do justice to the accomplishments of political theory. Smith’s critiques are based on quite crude and harsh characterizations of political economy studies. He caricatures these studies – particularly of David Harvey and Saskia Sassen – as examples of binary thinking, where the global stands for the economic (economic transformations in the production of material commodities) and the local for the cultural (of local culture and sites for social change and resistance). In so doing, Smith simplifies and generalizes these studies. Nonetheless, his theoretical conceptualization of ‘transnational urbanism’ is useful for understanding how immigrants construct their identity and everyday life in the cities and neighborhoods of Dutch cities.
and transnational at the same time. For example, a Moroccan immigrant in Amsterdam can be connected to the local Moroccan community, to relatives and friends in his home village in Morocco, a cousin in Paris, and maybe a friend in the United States at the same time. Transnational networks, therefore, must not only be understood in terms of abstract flows, but also as material practices of real people. Therefore, “the multiple spaces to which transnational subjects might be connected should be taken into account in our analyses of the localization of global processes” (ibid: 51). This is important, because migrants’ identities are shaped through these connections, and therefore will affect how immigrants make themselves visible in the city and neighborhoods where they settle. At the same time, because transnational connections will differ between migrants and migrant communities, this will also contribute to different outcomes of immigrant incorporation in different cities.

Smith develops the concept of transnational urbanism to capture processes of globalization and transnationalism and how these impact the ‘urban’.

I use the term [transnational urbanism] as a marker of the criss-crossing transnational circuits of communication and cross-cutting local, translocal, and transnational social practices that “come together” in particular places at particular times and enter into the contested politics of place-making, the social construction of power differentials, and the making of individual, group, national and transnational identities, and their corresponding fields of difference (ibid, 2001: 5).

Transnational urbanism is a conceptual tool for understanding the actions and the effects of socially and spatially situated subjects – “i.e. as members of families, participants in political networks, occupants of classed, gendered and racialised bodies, located in particular nationalist projects, state formations and border crossings” (Smith, 2005: 236).
The concept is useful because it not only focuses on transnational subjects as active agents in producing social change, but it also situates these subjects in a larger political-economic context. For Smith, transnational urbanism is a cultural and not strictly a geographic metaphor.

As I note in chapter 2, time-space compression has facilitated the maintenance of connections to the home countries. Transnational social actors are materially connected to the economic opportunities, political structures, and cultural practices found in cities at some point in their transnational communication circuit. In cities there are a series of technologies available that increasingly bring transnational subjects in connection with cosmopolitan ideas, images, technologies and socio-cultural practices. This situation requires a redefinition of the ‘urban’, because the urban now stretches widely beyond the city to include far away transnational subjects, who might live in a small village in China or Turkey (Amin, 1997; Massey, 1994; Smith, 2001). But not only are urban practices introduced into these villages, the socio-cultural and political practices of people in these villages are in return also actively shaping the everyday urban reality in Western cities.

The availability of new means of communication and transportation has brought far away places closer together. As a consequence, struggles over urban space are increasingly linked to the social and political practices of transnational subjects. For example, in 2000, a Turkish soccer team (Galatasaray) won a major European competition. Immediately after the game, Turkish residents of Amsterdam gathered at Mercatorplein to celebrate. With Turkish flags and Turkish songs they claimed the square. Since then, the square has become a gathering place for Turkish people for
celebrations. What this example illustrates is that events in the home country impact socio-spatial relations of cities and neighborhoods where migrants have settled.

Other studies of transnationalism discuss the conflicts that have arisen over the introduction of architectural design by migrants that conflict with perceptions of what is ‘proper design and beautiful’ in the host county (Ley, 1995; Mitchell, 1997). Mitchell focuses on the conflicts that have arisen over the so-called “monster” houses built in wealthy neighborhoods of Vancouver by transnational migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan. These studies, however, focused mainly on the transnational elites, the so-called “flexible citizens” (Ong, 1999), and not so much on migrants of lower social classes, who are most prominent in this dissertation.

3.2.1 Cosmopolitan urbanism

Along with the interest in globalization, transnationalism and transnational urbanism, there is recently also a growing interest in studies of cosmopolitanism (Binnie et al, 2006; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Harvey, 2000; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002; Yeoh, 2004). Processes of globalization, migration and the condition of multiculturalism have contributed to the term’s popularity in contemporary literatures. As Yeoh (2004: 2431) has argued, “increasing ethnic diversity increasingly challenges notions of the national self.” The differentiated nature of migration by gender, race, class, region, religion, political and economic circumstances of migration, even within a single migrating nationality or within a single transnational city at the same time, is challenging existing

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36 Immanuel Kant was one of the first to conceptualize cosmopolitanism. Ever since, the term has been used in variegated ways and has been contested (Binnie et al 2006).
conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism. While it is not the goal of this section to provide an exhaustive overview of the literature on cosmopolitanism, I will address some critical issues as they relate to ethnicity and class.

Cosmopolitanism has come to mean different things to different people. One definition is that of cosmopolitanism as a new form of global democratization. Here cosmopolitanism refers to a new form of citizenship that is no longer centered in the nation-state. Associated with this definition is also the view that cosmopolitanism is “a stance towards diversity itself… an orientation, a willingness to engage with the ‘Other’” (Hannerz, 1990: 239). I’d like to suggest here that this is an idealist and normative understanding of cosmopolitanism. The idea that people are willing to engage with the ‘Other’ and to revise their perspectives based on what they learn from other cultures, is restricted to probably only a small group of people, and not necessarily to the elite cosmopolitan consumer (the patrons of, for example, ethnic restaurants, theater, festivals, etc.). This also raises the question of what we mean by the ‘Other’. Is it ‘Other’ in relation to the self or does it refer to all immigrants? In that case it is an exclusionary term that does not recognize migrants as full citizens.

A second definition of cosmopolitanism is one that defines it as a form of consumption. By commodifying certain elements of immigrant cultures that are considered ‘exotic’, cosmopolitan consumption has proved useful to capitalism in its expansion of new markets. It is often associated with elite, Western culture (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002: 7). Rather than learning from and truly engaging with difference, cosmopolitan consumption entails the consumption of those cultural elements and commodities of the non-cosmopolitan Other that are considered ‘exotic’. The Other, on
the other hand, is not considered a consumer and is not considered cosmopolitan despite their transnational lifestyles and their everyday engagement with difference.

Cosmopolitan consumption, then, is associated with cultural capital, with being ‘educated and sophisticated’. It is fashionable and trendy, ‘the’ thing to do, to see, or in which to participate.

This idea of the cosmopolitan as an elite global citizen is also being critiqued for ignoring the cosmopolitan nature of practices of the cosmopolitan Other – migrants and working-class ethnic groups (e.g. Featherstone, 2002; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002; Weber, 1999). In the literature cosmopolitanism is often defined as a set of skills and competencies and is therefore intrinsically classed.

… it is bound up with notions of knowledge, cultural capital and education: being worldly, being able to navigate between and within cultures, requires confidence, skill and money (Binnie et al, 2006: 8).

Therefore, cosmopolitanism is most often associated with transnational elites, who are the sort of flexible citizens who are deterritorialized and have global connections (Ley, 2008; Ong, 1997). Working class migrant groups who are mostly oriented towards the own ethnic group, then, cannot be considered cosmopolitan (Hannerz, 1990). I agree with Featherstone (2002: 2) that we should move beyond this argument, that “we should not just focus on the cosmopolitan experiences of global elites, or the artists, intellectuals, and tourists of the West, but focus on the working-class cosmopolitan migrants who can be seen as equally able to generate cosmopolitan perceptions” (Featherstone 2002: 2). Working-class migrants are also cosmopolitan in the sense that they maintain cross-border transnational networks that connect them to their home countries as well as to
diaspora communities elsewhere in the world. Robbins (1998) calls this ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’, recognizing the existence of cosmopolitanism among a wide variety of non-elites, especially immigrants. Drawing on these perspectives, cosmopolitanism can be understood as multiple, and should not be restricted to solely the upper class and Western culture, but also allow ‘other’ voices to play a role in the production of cosmopolitan spaces.

Finally, cosmopolitanism has also been associated with cities (Featherstone, 2002). For long cities have been the places for the mixing of difference. Cities are where people, commodities, ideas, and cultures from all over the world meet and interact. Therefore, cosmopolitan urbanism refers to the politics surrounding difference in the production of cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan spaces. But within cities it is only certain places that become associated with cosmopolitanism, generally not the spaces of immigrant residence37, even though as Tuan (1996) argues ‘it is in these enclaves [of beleaguered communities] where no ordinary tourists would want to go, that we are most likely to find cultural exotica’ (187). This, however, is not the exotica the cosmopolitan consumer is interested in, yet in terms of ‘true cosmopolitanism,’ i.e., openness towards difference, there is a good chance this is present in the everyday life of the residents of these non-cosmopolitan neighborhoods. It is precisely these neighborhoods that are the focus of this study. They are where the cosmopolitan others live. They are neighborhoods that have a great potential for cultural consumption but are considered dangerous, filthy and poor.

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37 With probably the exception of ‘Chinatowns’ and certain themed enclaves. Location of the immigrant neighborhood within the city is also important for rendering a place cosmopolitan.
In this dissertation I want to discuss how cosmopolitan Others have played a role in negotiating urban policies and shaping urban space. Cosmopolitan ideas and transnational networks will be important for the strategies migrants choose. The neighborhoods of the cosmopolitan other are where urban policies aimed at immigrant integration are implemented. Hence, these neighborhoods play key roles in shaping governance, politics and space of the multicultural city and nation-state. It is in these neighborhoods where radicalization of young Muslims and the development of new intercultural relations and understanding can occur simultaneously.

3.3 The multicultural city

As discussed in chapter 2, most studies on multiculturalism can be found in the fields of political science, education, philosophy and sociology (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2000; Taylor, 1994; Young, 1990). These a-spatial studies are mostly concerned with defining the term and theorizing difference, but generally at an abstract level. Multiculturalism as I understand it, is a label for a series of practices, strategies and tactics to manage ethnic diversity that contributes to the particular shape of the multicultural city and hence explain differences between different cities. While theorizing difference at an abstract level is, of course, a worthwhile endeavor since multiculturalism is a slippery, often vacuous, but also politically powerful concept, little concrete research has been undertaken and limited attention has been given to the outcomes of multicultural policy implementations on socio-spatial relations in multi-ethnic urban neighborhoods. According to Amin and Thrift (2002: 291) “the significance of place remains only secondary” in these studies. Also many studies see multiculturalism in the first place as a
responsibility of the nation-state, as a particular philosophy on how to manage difference at that scale. This is striking considering that most immigrants have settled in cities, and therefore it will be in cities and neighborhoods where difference will be negotiated.

I am interested in unpacking the relationships between multi-ethnicity, urban space, and policy (specifically of immigrant integration policy). This interest is contextualized by a literature that has only emerged recently. In this literature, geographers, urban studies researchers and planners have begun to study questions of multiculturalism in relation to urban space and policy (Allen and Cars, 2001; Amin, 2002, 2003; Dunn et al, 2001; Jacobs and Fincher, 1998; Sandercock, 1998, 2003). The rising interest in questions of what the multicultural city ideally should look like – of how to live with difference – is not surprising given that urban geographers in the past two decades have become more sensitive to identities in relation to place (Cresswell, 1996; Keith and Pile, 1993; Massey, 1994; Ruddick, 1996; Staeheli, 1996). Normative studies of the multicultural city provide a transgressive way of thinking of how current planning practices and policies should be changed in order to work towards the ideal situation of a just and equal society. Furthermore, recent race riots in Britain, the rise of anti-immigrant parties in many European states and the growing fear of terrorist acts by Muslim extremists have caused questions of how to live with difference to become increasingly timely and important. In this section, I will bring together contributions of authors who have talked about the ‘multicultural city’ in ways that recognize the importance of space and spatiality.

Multiculturalism is the “new urban condition”; multicultural cities are the sites where cultures from all over the world are “being de- and re-territorialized, where living
together has become part of the everyday life (Sandercock, 2003: 92). More than 100 different nationalities live together in multicultural cities and an increasing share of the total population of European cities is foreign born (see table 3.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>% foreign born population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Price and Benton-Short (2008)

Table 3.1 Foreign born population (%) in selected European cities

In other words, the multicultural city is ‘actually existing’. Immigrant groups increasingly demand rights to the city, rights to a voice, rights to participation, and rights to co-existence in the physical spaces of the city. Difference, therefore, in all its cultural, social and spatial manifestations, “is a challenge to the current ways of thinking of the city-building professions, to city dwellers, and to ideas of urban governance and urban politics” (Sandercock, 2003: 4). Multicultural cities are the sites where difference is struggled over and negotiated.

The multicultural (multiethnic, multiracial) city is continually creating these sites of struggle. They are part of the landscape of postmodernity, which is a landscape marked by difference. Negotiating these spaces, claiming them, making them safe, imprinting new identities on them, is today a central socio-cultural and political dynamic of cities, a dynamic in which the planning system is deeply implicated (Sandercock, 2003: 21 original emphasis).
Both Holston (1998) and Amin (2002) situate these struggles in and over the multicultural city. For Holston (1998) the multicultural city is a city characterized by what he calls ‘warzones’ or ‘sites of insurgent citizenship’.

Citizenship changes as new members emerge to advance their claims, expanding its realm, and as new forms of segregation and violence counter these advances, eroding it. The sites of insurgent citizenship are found at the intersection of these processes of expansion and erosion (Holston, 1998: 48).

In the Netherlands, the struggles over belonging that Holston points to as key sites for the development of new forms of urban citizenship can be found in those neighborhoods that have experienced a rapid social and ethnic transformation of the population composition. These sites of insurgent citizenship are not static, but will vary over time. For example, Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam is currently a site of insurgent citizenship, where difference is struggled over, where immigrant residents feel excluded from participation in local politics and the labor market, where social problems accumulate and where residents often feel they are victims of police control.

Amin (2002) on the other hand takes the 2001 race riots in the English cities of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford as starting point for discussing some possibilities for combating persistent racism and to live with difference and encourage intercultural understanding and dialogue in a multicultural society. Amin (ibid: 13) proposes that living with diversity can only be realized in “the city’s micro-publics of banal multicultures”. These are the sites where people of different cultural backgrounds are thrown together in new settings which disrupt familiar patterns and create the possibility of establishing new connections. In other words, his argument is that difference must be struggled over in places where dialogue and negotiation cannot be avoided, such as
schools, youth centers, community gardens, the shop floor, and community centers. The micro-publics then play a key role in fostering intercultural understanding. According to Amin (ibid), only through lived experience – for example through experiencing that your neighbor is not that different and experiencing that your neighbor also wants to live in a clean and safe street – can changes in attitude and behavior be realized. At the same time, however, measures need to be taken by state institutions to combat racism and to foster living together with difference. What these measures will be depends on: the depth of racism, differentials in inequality and deprivation, discourses of immigration and minority rights, and patterns of cultural contact (ibid: 967). By focusing on the no doubt important negotiation of difference in the micro-publics of the everyday life, Amin refrains from connecting these sights to national policy frameworks and the larger political economy.

Where Holston situates the struggles over difference as a starting point for research, Amin views micro-publics as the sites where new ways of living together can be created. Like the work of Amin (2002) the multicultural city as theoretical concept is mostly used normatively (Amin and Thrift, 2002; Sandercock 1998, 2003). It is defined as a utopia that we can only work towards but will never achieve (see also Lefebvre 1991). Sandercock (2003: 207) who dreams of the “carnival of the multicultural city” defines it normatively as:

A city in which there is genuine acceptance of, connection with, and respect and space for the ‘stranger’ (outsider, foreigner…), in which there exists the possibility of working together on matters of common destiny, forging new hybrid cultures and communities (Sandercock, 2003: 1).
Scholars following this line of thought use this ideal situation of a socially just and inclusive city to investigate injustices in the current system and to develop alternative strategies that contribute towards the ideal.

Sandercock (2003) envisions the issue of ethno-cultural differences one of the most challenging issues at this moment in history, and she fears that this is probably the most potentially destabilizing factor in Europe. In order to open an avenue for change – particularly in her own field of urban planning – she envisions the multicultural city as normative ideal. This allows her to critically evaluate current planning practices and to suggest a “Radical Postmodern Planning Practice” (ibid: 34: original emphasis). She imagines this new planning imagination for the 21st century to consist of 5 qualities: (1) planners must recognize that planning is never apolitical, and that the creation of the multicultural city must, therefore, “always be a partnership between citizens, city governments, and the city-building professions” (212); (2) a more therapeutic approach to urban conflicts that recognizes and copes with feelings and emotions of those affected by for example urban renewal and the recognition of different values and memories inscribed in landscapes; greater flexibility, (3) open-mindedness and willingness to take risks; (4) creativity by introducing new forms of expression and new ways of thinking into planning practices; and (5) of maintaining a critical sensibility. Most importantly, planning processes must be responsive to cultural pluralism as the reality of contemporary urban life. Modernist planning practices, which according to Sandercock currently dominate planning practices, are characterized by institutionalized racism, the dominance of ‘white’ planners and ideas, and of rational thought. The new radical
postmodern planning practice rests on a “belief in the virtues of a participatory, inclusive and always agonistic democratic process” (ibid: 34).

The normative work on the multicultural city is characterized by a postmodernist focus that emphasizes difference, emotions and local knowledge. In order to counter injustices that immigrants face, scholars like Amin (2002), Amin and Thrift (2002), and Sandercock, (1998; 2003) draw on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1995) and Young (1990) on radical democracy. The idea of an agonistic democratic process is that there will always be conflict in political life and that conflict, rather than the suppression of conflict should be central to politics. It will, radical democrats argue, never be possible to identify final, rational and neutral decision procedures, because of the plurality of values in a culturally plural urban society. Working towards the multicultural city then:

… involves nothing less than expanding the spaces of democracy through participation at the local level, and a model of agonistic democracy in which there is no closure to the multicultural urban and political project; that is, no permanent state of integration and harmony towards which we are moving, but an always contested engagement with and continually redefined notion of the common good and shared destiny of citizens of the city (Sandercock, 2003: 151: original emphasis).

It is recognized that there is not a homogeneous public, but that there will always be contestation. Not only must all citizens be encouraged to participate in the public sphere, but their voices must be heard even if they clash with others. Amin and Thrift (2002) envision the urban public sphere of the multicultural city as one
… stripped of pretences of whiteness and secular or rationalist universality, filled with the promise but also the uncertainty of visceral engagement, lightly touched by the ethos of hospitality and given over to the practices of a variegated public. No engineering of identity or ethnic certitude, no fixed model of civic participation or citizenship, no ideal mode of deliberation and social engagement, no blueprint of multicultural harmony, only the vitality of a pragmatic and ethnically engaged public (Amin and Thrift, 2002: 294).

The multicultural city is therefore always a work in progress, where immigrants are encouraged to participate in the political arena and where the host society is open for change, for the development of new notions of a common identity. The ideal is to create a society where host society and immigrants live and work together across cultural divides, without having to give up their own identity.

A truly multicultural society not only encourages and supports community organizations within immigrant groups, but also works to incorporate immigrants into wider, cross-cultural activities and organizations (Sandercock, 2003: 136).

These normative studies on the multicultural city propose a radical transformation of planning and policy processes. Nonetheless, while this work critiques current planning and policies practices and proposes alternative practices, it draws minimally on concrete empirical research in neighborhoods, at the sites of insurgent citizenship, to understand how policies and planning practices are negotiated. The work of Fincher and Jacobs (1998) is an exception. Their empirical research demonstrates that local authorities tend to enhance and celebrate certain expressions of difference, while at the same time limiting others. Also, Jacobs (1998) demonstrates the conflicts over urban space in Australia, where for example important sites of Aboriginal culture and history are being redesigned without taking into account the value of this land for the Aboriginal populations. What is celebrated and what is not varies over time and differs in different
places. The way Fincher and Jacobs (1998: 2) see it, the struggle for the multicultural city illustrates “the ways oppressed groups can, through a politics of identity and a politics of place, reclaim rights, resist, and subvert” injustices and oppression in the city. For example, by resisting construction plans or in the case of the Aboriginals, to continue using the transformed urban spaces as a site of worship and inscribing their own symbols and markers in this space.

Whereas traditional approaches on ethnicity and multiculturalism have over-emphasized the national scale and were largely a-spatial, more recent work on the multicultural city tends to overemphasize the local and the everyday. Where Sandercock (2003) critiques the work of global cities theorists for being too focused on economic processes, the ‘spatial’ literature on the multicultural city can be criticized for being too narrowly focuses on the socio-cultural factors and their importance in (re-)shaping the contemporary city. We do not only need to take into account how difference is negotiated in the city, but also how these processes are mediated by government programs and larger political-economic processes.

Nonetheless, this normative scholarship on the multicultural city does point to the problems of current planning practices. It demonstrates that many planners operate from the idea that society can be managed by design. In this dissertation I address different planning practices aimed at creating multicultural public spaces and neighborhoods. This literature points to a critical evaluation of these practices. Also, while these studies of the multicultural cities point to current injustices and inequalities that immigrants experience in cities, only few of these studies have engaged in empirical research in neighborhoods where planning is put into practice and where policies aimed at immigrant integration are
negotiated. In what follows, I will, therefore, deepen the perspectives on the multicultural
city through my study of multi-ethnic neighborhoods as sites of implementation of
policies aimed at immigrant integration.

3.4 Place and identity

In recent years, a significant number of studies on urban space in critical human
geography have begun to understand society and space as mutually constitutive. Space in
these studies is understood not only as a product of social relations, but also as an active
agent in producing and reproducing these relations. In other words, both space and
society are conceptualized as part of a dialectical relationship. The understanding of
space as socially produced is perhaps most influenced by the French Marxist philosopher
Henri Lefebvre\(^{38}\) (Lefebvre, 1991). His writings have been a source of inspiration for a
number of geographers interested in the spatiality of urban life as they offer a
conceptualization that moves beyond understandings of space as an empty, bounded
container consisting of objects and their arrangements. In so doing this approach reveals
the political nature of spaces, and spaces as sites for social change. Lefebvre’s definition
of space as social space and his investigation of the social construction and conventions

\(^{38}\) Lefebvre’s project, however, was more than just a theoretical undertaking, but in effect also highly
politically motivated. Lefebvre was not only a respected scholar, but also a devoted political activist who
took a political stance on many occasions and was active in a number of movements (Shields, 1999). For
instance, he managed to get environmental concerns on the agenda of the French Left. Yet, while Lefebvre
would be active on many occasions, he was silent about what were considered to be the most important
political changes of his time: the May 1968 protests; the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9; and the
breakup of the USSR in 1991 (Shields, 1999), such that it is now said that Lefebvre was both a political
activist and not. Overall, the combination of his activist career with his intellectual interest in Marxist
thought and philosophy, and his strong critique of anti-humanism, shaped Lefebvre’s interests. Specifically,
he developed a humanistic interest in questions of alienation, dialectical materialism, exploitation, social
change, and their relations to the everyday lives of people.
of space have been his most influential contribution across intellectual disciplines (Shields, 1999).

Space for Lefebvre is not objective, neutral, and empty – a collection of things or an aggregate of data. Instead, his project involved a shift in the object of interest from what he calls “things in space” (space as an empty container or object of study) to the actual “production of space” (space as a process) (Lefebvre, 1991: 37)\(^3\). Lefebvre thus seeks to move beyond “philosophical debates on the nature of space, beyond human geography, planning and architecture, which considered people and things merely ‘in’ space” (Shields, 1999: 146), to provide a complex theory of the social character of space and the spatial character of social action. He first defines what space is not. Social space is:

… constituted neither by a collection of things or an aggregate of (sensory) data, nor by a void packed like a parcel with various contents, and that it is irreducible to a ‘form’ imposed upon phenomena, upon things, upon actual materiality (Lefebvre, 1991: 27).

Rather, his project developed an understanding of the social production of space, and hence the intrinsic relationship between society and space.

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\(^3\) Lefebvre’s interest in space and the city through which to study the aforementioned problems, evolved from his engagement in two different projects. In the first place his experience with Surrealists and Situationists who were involved in a project to map the potential of urban areas as sites that would support the unleashing of various forms of desire, liminality and emotion. These interests were further sparked when Lefebvre started working as a commentator on the changing realities of the planning of new towns and suburbs of major European cities (Shields, 1999, Soja, 1989). It is through these experiences that he sees that space was not just a neutral, objective and empty container in which interaction takes place, and in which to identify particular spatial arrangements. Instead, he came to understand that space functions as social space, as an essential component in the production and reproduction of capitalist social relations (Shields, 1999). By theorizing space as a product of social relations, space becomes an essential component in the production of the everyday lives of people. Overall, by recognizing the social character of space, Lefebvre intended to open up the possibility to think about space and society, and specifically space and social change. Lefebvre thus assigns space an important role in the search for social change.
This pre-existence of space conditions the subject’s presence, action and discourse, his competence and performance; yet the subject’s presence, action and discourse, at the same time as they presuppose this space, also negate it (Lefebvre, 1991: 57).

The production of space is, then, “both an achievement and an ongoing practice” (Shields, 1999: 155). Therefore, places are always subject to change, the practices and meanings associated with change are always subject to negotiation between different users and interests. Hence, power and politics play key roles in the production of space.

Nevertheless, understanding Lefebvre’s conceptualization of the spatiality of capitalist society is not an easy task. While his writings on the spatiality of social life have inspired geographers, they allow for many different readings (Johnston et al, 2000). These interpretations have been the source of debates in geography about Lefebvre’s theorization of space (Gregory, 1994; Harvey, 1989; Merrifield, 1993, 1995; Soja 1989). Edward Soja has perhaps been most supportive of and motivated by Lefebvre’s work. David Harvey on the other hand, while acknowledging the importance of the work of Lefebvre, is at the same time critical of the dialectical relationships proposed by Lefebvre between the representations of space, spaces of representation and spatial practices. According to Harvey this understanding is “much too vague”. Others have argued that: “Lefebvre’s approach is a highly speculative one that is cut off from the substantive force and sheer complexity of human history” (Gregory, 1994: 359). Yet it cannot be ignored that the Lefebvrian notion of space as socially produced has influenced the understanding of critical human geographers and has permeated studies on public space.

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40 Lefebvre developed a triad of dialectic relationships between society and space. ‘Spatial practices’ refer to the daily traveling through space, involving for example our routes to work or school. ‘Representations of space’ involve the dominant discourse of planners, architects and politicians of what space should look like. Finally, ‘spaces of representation’ involves the ‘ideal’ use of space (see McCann, 1999).
A social constructionist perspective on space enables critical urban and cultural geographers to get into questions about the power and politics of urban space. It is now commonly understood that the particular form of the city, for example the segregated city, affects the way social life is organized. On the other hand, it is recognized that discriminatory practices contribute to segregation. This focus on the spatiality of urban life has rendered a study of (urban) public spaces important, as places where identities are negotiated and (re)shaped as sites of struggle and resistance (Allen and Pryke, 1994; Brenner, 1998; Fyfe, 1996; Massey, 1992; McCann, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Roberts and Schein, 1995; Ruddick, 1996). It has resulted in a number of studies in urban and cultural geography on issues of privatization, inclusion and exclusion, contested meaning, and resistance in relation to public spaces. These critical scholars are concerned with issues of justices pertaining to the city, and hence address issues of injustice as they relate to urban public spaces. This perspective also relates to host-immigrant relationships. Urban public space is a key site of host-immigrant encounter. Unfortunately, many people have a rather skeptical view of these encounters: debates about the immigration-public space nexus are often riddled with issues of fear and concern for security (Body-Gendrot, 2001 Davis, 1992, Dikeç, 2001; 2002; Urban Studies, 2001). Without trivializing these fears and concerns, I argue that this view is one-sided as public space can also be the site of meetings, exchanges, opportunities, and the active negotiation of policy (Amin et al, 2000; Fincher and Jacobs, 1998; Lees, 2004; Young, 1990; Wilson, 1991).

In public spaces – ideally speaking, at least – individuals belonging to widely divergent professions and social classes, ethnic groups and nationalities, cultures and subcultures are confronted with each other. Public spaces, to be sure, like streets, squares
and parks, are normally accessibly by each and everyone, although actual accessibility may vary from place to place and from time to time, not to mention age and gender differentials and differences between able and disabled people. A number of studies point at exclusions of particular groups from public space, especially of immigrants and other ethnic minority populations (McCann, 1999; Ruddick, 1996), the homeless (Mitchell, 1995; Wolch, 1990), women (Koskela, 2000), children (Collins and Kearns, 2001), and the otherwise excluded. In fact, a central concern of studies on public space is with the mutual constitution of identity and place, and particularly with questions of how participation in and access to public space is constrained by “gendered and racialized identities” (Ruddick, 1996: 133), but also by class identities. It follows from this work that public spaces in fact are not always inclusive – even though the word “public” implies this openness and accessibility for all – but are often territorialized by particular groups and deeply implicated in the process of othering\(^41\), such that,

> [t]he way in which certain others are represented in public spaces is not simply a byproduct of other structures of inequality; it is deeply constitutive of our sense of community – who is allowed in, who is excluded, and what roles should be ascribed to ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Ruddick, 1996: 133).

Public space is always contested (Mitchell, 2000; Ruddick, 1996) and is not the site of single or fixed identities (Massey, 1999). Hence, a major contribution of these studies is the recognition that public spaces are active mediums through which to construct and challenge identities. Social identity is constructed in and through public space, and therefore spaces differentiate from others (Ruddick, 1996). In fact, as Ruddick

\(^41\) I am not arguing that othering is only practiced by the host population. In fact, as this project demonstrates, ethnic minority groups are themselves also actively involved in this process of othering and in the territorialization of public spaces. For example, because of the presence of Turkish males on the benches at Mercatorplein others, particularly Muslim women are not using that space.
demonstrates with her case study of a shooting in Toronto, “public spaces can become a medium through which regional, national, and even international identities are constructed and contested” (Ruddick, 1996: 147). The fact that a shooting involved an immigrant turned a local happening into a national debate about managing immigration, while a similar event in another public setting involving an *autochtoon* person never made it to the national news. Hence, action in one public space can have implications for other scales, and as such have the potential of jumping scales (Mitchell, 1995). Local, city, national or international processes can all come together and interact in one place, in their particular combination shaping the urban landscape. The precise constitution of the population in neighborhoods, the scale at which the space operates (neighborhood, city, nation, global or all together) is important for how identities are constructed and reconstructed.

Public spaces in the city, depending on their location, are used for different identity struggles. In Amsterdam, Dam Square is the central square of the city. Everyone entering the city by train or bus will walk in the direction of the square and on a summer day the square is crowded with tourists who use the square as a meeting place or place to rest. But, Dam Square is also the location of large outdoor concerts and mass demonstrations that have a local, national or international message. Mercatorplein on the other hand (see map 8.2[^12]), is a square located in the western part of the city, outside of the city center. Despite the size of the square – comparable to that of Dam Square – it is not the site for mass demonstrations. It is not linked to the political center of the city (the palace at Dam Square), and it is not the center of population flows to the city. But, this is

[^12]: See chapter 8 for a detailed description.
not to argue that a square like Mercatorplein could never be the site of national or even international discussions. Following the shooting of a Moroccan man, the neighborhood became the site of a national debate about treatment of migrant, particularly Muslim, youth by the police.

What practices are considered legitimate or illegitimate will differ in different places, but are subject to continuous negotiation. Power relations play a key role in these negotiations and in defining who is an insider or an outsider. As Massey (1995) has argued, power relations contribute to the constitution of identities. The denial of citizenship is often experienced most directly through the exclusion from public spaces. But what Mitchell (1995, 2003) argues is that to be visible in public is the strongest exercise of, or claim to, the rights of citizenship (Mitchell, 1995), as witnessed in mass protests, festivals or simply by wearing a headscarf. Public spaces are sites that can bring people together (e.g. festivals, demonstrations, leisure) but at the same time because public spaces are often territorialized, and hence subject to intense surveillance, some individuals or groups may not feel as welcome. It is often assumed that public spaces are the sites where diversity is negotiated. Therefore, city planners have been interested in remodeling public spaces as multicultural spaces, symbolizing the various ethnicities in city or neighborhood or planning for the co-existence of different uses of a public space.

But a strong focus on the built environment is not changing societal practices:

In the hands of urban planners and designers, the public domain is all too easily reduced to improvements to public spaces, with modest achievements in race and ethnic relations (Amin, 2002: 968).
Amin (2002) is skeptical of the role of public spaces as sites for the creation of multicultural understanding, because while a lot is invested in stones, not much is done to improve the socio-economic situation. In fact, he argues that micro-publics of schools, community buildings or community garden projects, where different ethnic groups have to work together and to communicate, are better locations for beginning to learn how to live with difference. I want to maintain that public space is a very important space where marginalized groups can make their presence visible (Bodaar & Rath, 2005; Lees, 1998).

Under certain conditions, public spaces could evolve into public domains, i.e. places where people actually do interact with each other, as sites of negotiation. But, as many scholars have emphasized, cities are a world of strangers. That is why city dwellers develop strategies to be seen and to be ignored, and to meet and to avoid each other, and public spaces are consequently sites of harmony and sites of struggle at the same time. In an attempt to foster the accessibility and livability of public spaces, city dwellers create smaller, controllable social worlds by, for instance, appropriating particular public spaces and displaying their own symbols. These processes affecting the design, legibility, assessment and use of public space may be ethnically specific.

Another concern that is central to studies of public space relates to issues of justice and democracy. This explains why these studies are sensitive to the privatization and increased surveillance of public spaces. Along these lines, critical human geographers have argued that public space – as understood in terms of the ideal of inclusiveness and unmediated interaction – is increasingly threatened (Koskela, 2000; Flusty, 2000; Mitchell, 1995; Rogers, 1998; Zukin, 1995). From these studies it follows that public spaces are increasingly incorporated in capitalist spaces, where city
governments and urban elites collaborate on the development of commercial public spaces (Flusty, 2000; Mitchell, 1995; Zukin, 1995), and thus lay out the rules for acceptable behavior, practices in these now ‘semi-public’ spaces. This commercialization – and often privatization – of public spaces leads to the suppression of difference, for example by excluding the homeless from public space, and results in the homogenization of the landscape (Cuthbert, 1995; Davis, 1992; Koskela, 2000; Lefebvre, 1996; Mitchell, 1995; Zukin, 1991). Urban geographers are specifically interested in the power and politics of public spaces (McCann, 1999). This work engages in important questions about authority, of who holds the authority to define the city and who gets excluded or marginalized in the process?

While much of the literature involves case studies in the United States, developments of privatization and securitization of public spaces are not seen so much in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of European cities. Here, the streetscapes demonstrate evidence of increasing diversity. Nonetheless, immigrants’ use of public space may differ from that of the mainstream and may be perceived and experienced as being different. As for the latter, youngsters loitering around on street corners are commonplace in most cities, but locals may respond differently when these youngsters are of ethnic minority background. For instance, North-African youth in Belgium, France or the Netherlands, or Pakistani or Bangladeshi youth in Britain, or other groups at the bottom end of the pecking order are often the object of moral panics over perceived threats of disorder and crime. Their use of public space triggers fear and people act accordingly. However, changing order and action in public space is not always associated with fear. In various European cities, immigrants have contributed to the revitalization of public parks (Van...
Liempt, 2001). Immigrants use the park as a place for picnicking and barbequing and are therefore concerned with the maintenance of parks. Furthermore, new immigrant businesses and their signs, the transformation of buildings into mosques or temples, the colors, the smells, and the physical presence of different ethnic groups can contribute to a bustling street life. These neighborhoods are mostly located out of the commercial district and the fact that foreign signs, symbols, smells and the presence of immigrants on the street are characteristic of these public spaces, might result in other groups avoiding these particular public spaces of the city.

In conceptualizing the role of different actors and organizations involved in the transformation of contemporary urban spaces, and the fortification of cities, these studies tend to understand the state as an actor. The state, in these stories, negotiates with private interests and forms coalitions. For example, McInroy (2000: 43) highlights the discursive and policy practices utilized by the city and the designer of a park. Here, the city is a body that possesses power that can be exercised over others, in this case the power to decide on the redevelopment of a park. The multiple and often contradicting practices of the state are not the focus of these studies. In the next chapter I will discuss the governmentality approach, which I find useful for understanding how policies are negotiated in neighborhoods and how outcomes of similar policies will differ in different cities.

As I mentioned before, public space is in reality often not a very democratic place. In most studies groups, are identified – and are in fact the main concern of the articles – that are being marginalized: the homeless, drug addicts, immigrants, urban poor, disabled and women. Being unwanted, particularly the poor, the homeless, the drug
addicts and immigrants are made invisible in the city. In French cities for example
immigrants are living in the peripheral housing states, thereby being marginalized from
participation in urban life and stereotyped in terms of their residential location, hence
affecting their chances of jobs and upward mobility (see Body-Gendrot, 2002). In US
cities the concentration of minority groups is more concentrated in the inner city. But,
while ‘the excluded’ are made invisible, it follows from these studies that increasingly
urban elites live separated in fortified, and highly secured enclaves (Caldeira, 1992;
Davis, 1992). Yet, by understanding space as a social product, critical human
geographers have especially focused on how the surveillance of public spaces is resisted,
for example by skate-boarding or bubble-blowing (Flusty, 1994), through graffiti on
privately owned buildings or in public spaces (Cresswell, 1996), and by taking the street
of immigrant domestic workers in Singapore (Chang; 2000; Yeoh and Huang, 1998).
Various strategies are employed to reclaim the streets or to personalize space in order to
make it less anonymous.

Yeoh and Huang (1998) discuss how immigrant domestic workers – a
marginalized group in society – negotiate their presence in the city. What this study
demonstrates is that these domestic workers are not “passive recipients of dominant
practices and ideas, but are capable of different styles and strategies in the use,
colonization and even contestation of public domains” (583). On Sunday afternoons, for
example, when many domestic workers are off work, they gather in public spaces in
Singapore. The women take over shopping centers and parks, causing Singaporeans to

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43 Michael Moore in ‘Bowling for Columbine’ portrays how fear is constructed in the US and the irony of
the increasing yearning of the rich for “unassailable high-tech castles” (Davis, 1992: 173).
feel less welcome in these public spaces. This is just one example of many different tactics and strategies the women use to negotiate their presence and shape their identity in the city. This particular form of resistance – the colonization of public spaces by immigrants – can cause conflicts between host and immigrant groups, especially when there are multiple claims to the space. This could be even more threatening when immigrants also claim power in the design of public space.

Manifestations of diversity in public space are contingent on urban conditions, but urban conditions in turn are constantly changing due to the dynamics of ethnic diversity consequent to immigration. This immigration—public space nexus is therefore historically and locally specific. For example, concentrations of Muslim immigrants, the buildings of mosques and their cultural expression in the physical landscape are currently not very welcome in Western cities, particularly in the post 9/11-context and in the Netherlands following the murder of maverick filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Ten years from now these conditions might have changed, and people might be more lenient towards Muslims. This is already visible in Birmingham where in the context of the imaging of Birmingham as a multicultural city, the building of mosques in the landscape becomes less contested (Gale and Naylor, 2002).

So far I have mainly discussed social relations in public space, but I have not yet discussed architecture and the meanings inscribed in the built environment. Critical human geographers have also studied how meaning is inscribed and contested in buildings and monuments (Bunnell, 1999; Domosh, 1988; Goss, 1998; Lees, 2001; McNeill, 2005). Goss (1998) opens the way for geographical studies of architecture to understand architecture itself as a social product. Rather than seeing buildings,
monuments and other physical structures solely as objects in public space, architecture is a product of power relations. Therefore, meanings and histories are inscribed in buildings and actively contested through social interaction with these buildings. From these studies it follows that particular stories are inscribed in monuments and buildings. Stories that tend to reproduce dominant ideologies and powers in the landscape (Lees, 2001; Osborne, 1998). This is an important finding that implies that a study of state-immigrant relations needs to be sensitive to racisms inscribed in the built environments of cities. For example, a monument of a Dutch explorer might represent this person as a hero, while in the eyes of an immigrant this same explorer might be an oppressor or murderer. But, what these studies suggest is that these meanings inscribed in buildings are all but stable – they are subject to continuous contestation:

Symbolic spaces are not static, but dynamic sites of meaning and depositories for successive generations ‘ideological bric-a-brac’ (Osborne, 1998: 453).

Therefore, symbolic spaces represent particular truths, the truths of those in power, who are always subject to change. There are always certain groups or individuals who have more power than others in deciding on the production of the multicultural city. It is those truths that then are reconstructed through the use of the monument and/or its surrounding public spaces. In the case of Noordplein in Rotterdam or Mercatorplein in Amsterdam this argument implies that the meaning of ‘multiculturalism’ as inscribed into the architecture of the neighborhood – in Rotterdam with a Moroccan fountain and in Amsterdam with a globe inscribed in the square – is always subject to contestation.

At the same time, immigrants themselves are introducing new meanings in the landscape by introducing new architectural styles. The building of houses with pagoda-
shaped roofs or of prayer houses with minarets and domes, impact on the streetscape in a spectacular way. Changes in the built environment are often highly contested, if only because of its symbolism and because of the fact that they represent lasting changes. The heated debates in Europe or Australia about the establishment of purpose-built mosques (Dunn, 2001; Gale and Naylor, 2002) or in Canada about so-called ‘monster’ houses (Ley, 1995; Mitchell, 1997) show the deeper impact of changes in the urban streetscape.

On the other hand, the establishment of ethnic shopping malls or ethnic commercial precincts, such as Little Turkey or Chinatown is often less contested, while often being actively encouraged by city governments, tourist boards and private corporations (Rath, 2005; Shaw et al., 2004) in the name of urban revitalization.

In this chapter I have discussed literatures that center on cities and urban spaces as key sites in the negotiation of identity and difference. Multicultural policy negotiation must take place somewhere. This literature understands urban neighborhoods and public spaces as key sites of identity formation and difference as lived and negotiated. Also, this literature is important as it conceptualizes immigrants as active agents in producing social change, while at the same time situating subjects in a larger political-economic context. Migrants are not passive actors, but are also producers of urban life, cosmopolitan ideas and lifestyles. Finally, it also addresses the meanings inscribed in public space and how these can be challenged. While this literature is very insightful in situating the sites of negotiation and the contested meanings of urban spaces, it does not provide much insight into how policy gets constructed and changed through negotiation on the ground, in multi-ethnic neighborhood. In the next chapter I will therefore turn to studies of governmentality in order to come to understand how policy operates.
CHAPTER 4
GOVERNMENTALITY: TOWARD A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS FOR INVESTIGATING SOCIAL POLICY IN THE MULTICULTURAL CITY

4.1 Introduction

Not only have many immigrants arrived in the Netherlands, they also create their own environments. For example, Turkish immigrants start building mosques to practice their religion, a Moroccan immigrant decides to open a butcher’s shop that sells halal meet, a Surinamese immigrant organizes a *twa twa* (singing-bird) competition in the local park, Turkish migrants celebrate the victory of the national soccer team on a public square, many Muslim women wear a *hijab*, some Muslim men decide to keep wearing the *jellaba*, and many migrants continue to speak the language of their home countries when they are with relatives, friends and others who speak the language. Migrants, therefore, are not powerless actors but actively involved in the production of urban space. These efforts of migrants to make themselves feel at home, by inscribing meaning and value to urban spaces, might be considered alien, and sometimes even threatening, by the host population and might then be struggled over. What is important to take from the above examples is that mundane practices of immigrants play an important role in shaping the multicultural city, and that it is not only state institutions, private individuals, and
community organizations that are involved in governing but that immigrants are also governing themselves by deciding for example what to say, how to act and what to wear.

In order to understand how state policies on immigrant integration developed and transformed in the Netherlands and how a particular set of institutions and policies were implemented to manage diversity in the urban context, structural analyses of governance provide insufficient tools. There is an extensive and valuable literature on governance in geography and urban studies, yet the way most of these studies of governance have conceptualized the state – as one coherent body or actor – has eluded a more critical understanding of the workings of the state itself and the power of ‘mundane practices’ (Larner and Walters, 2004). In this chapter I argue that a post-structural approach to governance, the so-called ‘governmentality approach’, provides some important methodological instruments for analyzing the spatial politics of immigrant integration in Dutch cities.

4.1.1 The governmentality approach

Before I start a more detailed discussion of governmentality and how it is useful for this study, I will first define a few terms. ‘Governmentality’, a concept developed by Michel Foucault (1991) and expanded upon and popularized by scholars who developed the governmentality approach (i.e., Burchall et al, 1991; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999), can be defined as the connection of government with thought (Dean, 1999). It is a way of thinking about government and the practices of government, but it also incorporates a conceptualization of how people internalize social norms and shape their conduct accordingly. Foucault (1989) defined ‘government’ as an historical, changing ensemble
of practices that is neither identical to political sovereignty nor an inherent property of the state. Government refers to all efforts to govern others, but also the various ways in which society teaches and forces us to govern ourselves (Rose, 1999). To analyze government is then

… to analyze those mechanisms that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups (Dean, 1999: 12).

Studies of governmentality recognize that political power is not located in a single location – the state – but works through a multitude of agencies and techniques, some of which are only loosely connected to the bureaucracies and representatives of formal state organizations or departments. These studies understand the state as a series of practices, as only one element in “multiple circuits of power” (Rose, 1999: 17). Studies of governmentality thus point towards a rethinking of state power, away from conceptualizations that understand it only or largely as top-down, coercive, and associated with force. Instead, power in contemporary society should be understood as being exercised in diverse ways, through shifting alliances between various authorities working on projects that aim to govern various aspects of social life, economic activity and individual conduct (Rose and Miller, 1992). My use of ‘negotiation’ in this dissertation, by which I mean how new policies are understood, evaluated, engaged with or argued against, and (re)shaped by neighborhood residents through their interaction with agents of state institutions, indicates this understanding of power.

Through his empirical studies, Foucault sought to demonstrate that power does not flow from and is not held in centers. Instead, power is produced in local settings and
is always provisional. Power, in other words is not necessarily repressive, but enabling and creative.

It is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed through a net-like organization (Foucault, 1980: 98).

Relations of power therefore do not originate in a sovereign state. Yet, institutions, as Foucault (1990: 98) stressed can become ‘local centers’ of power-knowledge and, as such, have an autonomous role to play in the production of discourse. Forms of power outside of the state apparatus therefore can be said to “often sustain the state more effectively than its own institutions, enlarging and maximizing its effectiveness” (Foucault, 1980: 73). For example, when migrant organizations or social workers encourage immigrants to learn Dutch, this will be more effective than when politicians speak to migrants about the importance of learning the language. But whereas power is not held in the hands of a person, organization or the state, this is not to argue that power differentials are non-existent in society. Quite the contrary, a Foucauldian analysis of power recognizes that some powers at particular moments in history are more dominant than others and that power is disciplinary. As a consequence, particular discourses come to dominate and shape the material world. Finally, Foucault stresses the starting point for an analysis of power is local. It is at the local scale that multiple mechanisms of power coexist, with their own histories and tactics and techniques, and where one can find how “… these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonized, utilized, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination” (Foucault, 1980: 99)
Power plays an important role in shaping discourses. Discourse in a Foucauldian sense can be defined as “systems of thought composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds in which they speak” (Lessa, 2006). Studies of governmentality seek to understand how current truths are constructed, what power relations they carry, and how discourses become challenged and replaced. Foucault attacks grand theory and vital truths, and aims to give free play to difference, to local and specific knowledge, and to rupture, contingency and discontinuity (Foucault, 1980: 67). Therefore, discourses are also constructed locally. Also, multiple discourses on how to govern immigrant integration can exist at the same time, yet certain discourses become dominant at particular moments in history. It is therefore interesting to analyze how it is that certain discourses become dominant and not others. Discourses are powerful, because they determine how we think about ‘problems’, how we can make them governable and through what means. A Foucauldian understanding of power and discourse allows me to analyze how immigrants in the Netherlands became governable, through which techniques, based on what rationalities, with what consequences, and how discourses on how to govern immigrants changed over time. Also, this will allow me to investigate the forces that shape the spatiality of multiculturalism in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

In order to understand the struggles that shape the multicultural city, studies of governmentality can provide some useful tools. In the act of deconstructing the state as a coherent body, a governmentality approach points to the local centers of power where discourses are shaped, transformed and overthrown. It stresses the tactics, techniques and technologies that shape sites like the neighborhood, the community center, the square, the
school or the firm as spaces of power (Larner and Williams, 2004; Rose and Miller, 1992). Thereby it needs to be recognized that these sites shape and are shaped by integration policy, and thus play important roles in the production of the multicultural city.

This chapter will first discuss the development of governmentality by Foucault, as a way of conceptualizing the state. Second, it will discuss how Foucault’s notion of governmentality has been appropriated by scholars in the social and political sciences and sets out the broader governmentality approach. The third section discusses how geographers have recently begun to appropriate governmentality in order to shed light on questions of government. Then, it will turn to developing an approach for understanding the multicultural city through the notion of governmentality. Finally, the chapter sets out the conceptual approach for this dissertation.

4.2 Foucault and Governmentality

The notion of governmentality is derived from Foucault’s later work on the practices of government. Over time Foucault’s emphasis shifted from investigations of the practices of institutions to those of government (Gordon, 1991). Yet, this notion of governmentality is not what Foucault is most credited for today. Today, Foucault is mostly known for his work on power-knowledge, genealogy, archeology and discourse. The notion of governmentality has remained marginal to his complete oeuvre (Atkinson, 2003) and is difficult to interpret because of the open-endedness of this work. Nonetheless, despite the relative marginality of governmentality to his work there has, from the 1990s onwards, been an expanding literature in political theory, sociology and
more recently in geography and urban studies that draws on and has expanded on
Foucault’s work on governmentality. Scholars with an interest in urban governance,
urban policy and the implications of neoliberal programs on cities, are increasingly drawn
to this work (e.g. Larner & Williams, 2004; MacLeod et al, 2003; Mitchell, 2004). But,
before discussing this more recent work on governmentality in more detail this section
will first address why Foucault developed this particular understanding of government,
and how it differs from Marxist conceptualizations of the state.

4.2.1 Conceptualizing the state and government

The state has generally not been given priority in the work of post-structural
scholars. In its efforts to stress difference and heterogeneity, this work tends to prioritize
the local, the individual, and individual agency in the construction of the everyday life.
This contrasts with Marxist analyses that do focus extensively on the relationship
between state and society, and the state and capital. It is not surprising, therefore, that
Marxist scholars critiqued the work of Foucault on the grounds that the attentiveness to
the specifics of power relations failed to shed light on broader social structures (Gordon,
1991: 4). Foucault’s development of governmentality was intended to provide a response
to these Marxist critiques. Foucault identified two main problems with Marxist analyses
of the state. First, these approaches centralize power in the state. The state in Marxist
theory is understood as a coherent body, with the tendency to control, regulate and
manage, thereby reducing the state to a certain number of functions and conceptualizing
it in negative terms, as an oppressor.
A governmentality perspective, on the other hand, understands government as a series of practices that involves various agencies and techniques not necessarily belonging to the state. In other words the state has no essential character, but is a particular way through which the operation of government has evolved historically, a particular way through which certain technologies become instituted for a period of time. As Foucault has argued:

…the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than most of us think (Foucault, 1991: 103).

In their seminal article, Rose and Miller (1992) describe this particular understanding of the state as follows:

To the extent that the modern state ‘rules’, it does so on the basis of an elaborate network of relations formed amongst the complex of institutions, organizations and apparatuses that make it up, and between state and non-state institutions (176).

A second ground on which Foucault critiqued Marxist approaches is that these approaches did not recognize different forms of rule and its consequences as they developed historically. For Foucault, the nature of the institution of the state is a function of changes in the practices of government. The reason for tracing the historical evolution of government for Foucault was to be able to shed light on the particularities of government – its techniques, tactics, strategies and goals. With his work on the birth of the prison, Foucault illustrated that it was during the sixteenth century when government characterized by a sovereign power began to be replaced by the governing of the self, or
what he calls the governing of the ‘conduct of conduct’. This last notion refers to all efforts to govern others, whether these are employees, children, inhabitants of a country, etc., but also the various ways in which society teaches and forces us to control or govern ourselves (Rose, 1999: 3). In other words, what Foucault observed in his studies was a shift in the character of governmental power from a central state apparatus or sovereign monarchy, to modern liberal-democratic states characterized by a complex of institutions and procedures of rule.

During this transformation, state power was reformed from a top-down fashion to a more complex form of exercise of power that operates between the government and the governed in more complex, not necessarily top-down ways. The outcome of these transformations is that state power is no longer restricted to fighting war or developing laws, but instead manifests itself in mundane bureaucratic practices, through a complex infrastructure of state and non-state institutions and bodies. For example, through mental institutions social workers, consultants, doctors, parents and school teachers. These operate outside politics, but the activities and calculations of these people and institutions, but are still managed by state bureaucracies. This is what Miller and Rose (1990) refer to as ‘action at a distance’. Along with this is the expansion of the state apparatuses – bureaucracies – through which state power operates. Therefore, as Miller and Rose (1990) argue the notion of governmentality:

… focuses attention on the diversity of regulatory procedures which seek to effect government, and the importance of indirect mechanisms that link conduct of individuals and organizations to political objectives through ‘action at distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 1).

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44 Miller and Rose (1990) borrow this term from Latour.
Contemporary forms of government depend on the capacities of individuals or groups to regulate their own conduct. This has resulted in the expansion of expertise or expert knowledge – for example on how to educate a child, manage an economy or household or treat a disease or illness – that provides assistance to individuals and groups to inform them on how to act as a ‘good’ citizen. Of course, what is considered appropriate conduct or appropriate practices of child caring and education will change over time.

From the 18th century onwards the population increasingly becomes the object of governmental techniques, both close and at a distance. An example of a governmental technique that is close is of a mother telling a child how to behave properly or a teacher telling students how to act in class. Government at a distance, on the other hand, refers to techniques and practices that have been developed, such as statistical techniques for administering a population of a defined territory. The development of what Miller and Rose (1990) term ‘intellectual technologies’ (or expertise), is needed in order for aspects of daily existence to become suitable for calculation. Ultimately the goal of this form of government is to secure the well-being, health, and wealth of the people of a nation or territory. In other words, practices of administration, supervision, and calculation – that take place at a distance and do not directly impact the individual – in the end would need to the benefit of all.

In order to govern a population, it first needs to be defined by identifying who belongs to it. In other words, it is necessary to define the boundaries of a nation.

For example, currently there is a lot of debate in the countries of the EU and in the US – in light of recent terrorist attacks – about the extent to which security measures can be increased without undermining the liberties and freedom of individual citizens. The question is how far people are willing to go in terms of camera protection, iris-scans on passports, random checks on streets, etc., and where the break line is where increased security is no longer to the benefit of all.
Governing at a distance becomes possible through the development of various forms of calculation, for example through statistical methods. In order to manage or control a geographically dispersed population an infrastructure is developed that enables a “regulated autonomy” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 180) of people and locales. Through the organization of an infrastructure of, for example doctors, social workers, planners, parents, managers, etc., the idea of autonomy is maintained while risks of disruptions of the social order are minimized. Therefore, for this study it is important to identify the infrastructure that aims to shape ‘desirable’ immigrant conduct, to counter the threat of social disruption and increased societal unrest.

Government in modern liberal societies refers to the government of the self, the government of others and the government of the state. This is what Foucault calls government as the ‘conduct of conduct’, that is “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991: 2). Hence, changes in practices of government should be emphasized in analyses, rather than focusing on the institutions themselves.

4.2.2 Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality

Following from the above, Foucault was interested in government as an activity or practice. Building on previous work in Discipline and Punish, Foucault first introduced and defined the term in his lecture on ‘Governmentality’, as part of a lecture series on “Security, Territory, and Population.” In this lecture series Foucault traced the historical development of a specific form of power that we have come to understand as government (Foucault, 1991: 102). Governmentality according to Foucault is:
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault, 1979, quoted in Atkinson, 2003: 104).

Foucault sought to redirect attention away from the actions of representatives of capital and the state who are commonly understood to exercise power. Instead, his work focuses on the local settings in which power actually makes itself present:

I would say that we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilizations of their localized systems, and towards strategic apparatuses…. And instead base our analysis on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination (Foucault, 1980: 102).

Studies of governmentality therefore start from understanding how new discourses for governing society are constructed locally, how practices generate norms, and how certain forms of power come together to shape discourse.

4.2.3 Rationalities of government

From a governmentality perspective the state can be understood in terms of a series of strategies and practices that are not possible without particular rationalities. Foucault speaks of rationalities of government to refer to a particular system of thinking about the nature of government – that is who can govern, what governing is, and what or who is governed. Rationalities are then capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable to both its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced (Gordon, 1991: 3). Allen (2003) has written very nicely on what Foucault
means by government, and how this form of government differs from repression.

According to Allen (ibid), government for Foucault “is something that infuses the
conduct of individuals across a wide range of activities and senses of self: as a member of
a household or family, as a worker, a citizen and so forth (80). In other words,
government extends deep into the lives of a population, to the extent that people are no
longer aware of its effects. Central to studies of governmentality is the intent to unravel
these effects of power, and to analyze practices.

The goal of government is to employ certain strategies, to arrange things in a
particular way, through a particular series of means, in order to reach a desired end.
Government operates indirectly, allowing people to govern themselves within a larger
discursive context that defines which conduct is perceived as acceptable. Governmental
rationality then “rests upon the continuous and relatively stable presence of a series of
ideals, expectations, received ‘truths’, standards and frameworks which provoke
individuals to govern their lives in particular ways.” (Allen, 2003: 82) Over time, the
question of how to govern a population leads to the rise of new techniques for governing,
such as statistics or mapping as major technologies of government. Statistics make it
possible to quantify specific phenomena of a population. The ultimate goal of governing
a population is to create the best living conditions for all. But as Foucault has argued,
increasing complexity of society has made discipline of increasing importance.
Individuals need to be able to discipline themselves in all kinds of ways in order to
function within society. And, as is now so visible under neo-liberal and/or ‘revanchist’
agendas that flourish worldwide, when individuals fail to discipline themselves or fail to
live by societal norms they can be excluded from society (see for example Mitchell,
2004). For example, immigrants in the Netherlands must pass a Dutch language course, because otherwise they will suffer cuts to their welfare payments or Muslim women who wear a burqa (complete coverage) may be excluded on the job market.

Despite the open-endedness of Foucault’s work on governmentality, and his limited explicit writings on this idea, researchers in the social sciences, particularly in sociology, especially in the context of recent institutional changes as part of neo-liberal programs implemented in various Western nations, have elaborated on the concept. Their goal is to shed light on this governmental transformation and to understand the workings and contradictions of neo-liberal programs, and more generally of neoliberalism as a distinct governmental rationality. Some have even argued that studies of governmentality have now become a new sub-discipline in the social sciences, that of the ‘governmentality school’ (Dean, 1999). Researchers of this ‘governmentality school’ have not only appropriated the term but also expanded on it. I will argue that while governmentality scholars have been successful in identifying a new way of understanding the state, they have been less successful in spatializing notions of governmentality, i.e., in accounting for the geography of government.

### 4.3 The Governmentality Approach

The main authors associated with the governmentality approach are Nikolas Rose, Mitchell Dean and Peter Miller. They participate in small conferences and groups for publicizing their materials. Nonetheless, their work is not homogeneous and does not represent a closed set of thought (Rose, 1999: 9). These studies, however, share a common concern for critically examining “the role that knowledge production has played
in the formation of modern governmental practices” (Rose-Redwood, 2006: 469).

Furthermore, Rose points out that the concepts and approaches of governmentality have been found useful by scholars who do not label their studies as being ‘governmentality’. For this reason I prefer to speak of governmentality as an approach instead of as a school of thought. In this section I discuss the work of a number of authors who have laid the foundations for the governmentality approach.

First, I would like to discuss the work of Rose and Miller (1992: 177-178) who distinguish three important characteristics of a governmentality approach:

1) ‘Realism’.
The goal of studies of governmentality is not to try to provide an understanding of some ‘true’ nature of social life, characteristic of historical sociologies of the state. Instead the focus is on how historically authorities ask themselves what their interests and motives were, since these will differ over time. A few examples of questions being asked are: what power do we possess?, to what extend should this power be exercised?, what are its effects?, and what do we need to do in order to govern? For this dissertation I have studied the mentalities of authorities through an analysis of government documents and interviews with policy makers.

2) *Language.*
Central to studies of governmentality is an interest in discourse. Of central concern is the discursive field within which government makes itself present. The significance of
discourse is not derived from a concern with an Althusserian notion of ideology.

According to Althusser (1971: 165):

> What is represented in ideology is not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real realities in which they live.

In other words, for Althusser language reproduces the ideology of the ruling class, and therefore is not seen as a mechanism through which government is shaped. In contrast, from the perspective of a governmentality approach, language plays a facilitating and constituting role in governing. In other words, language is performative. Language sheds light on the particular systems of thought underlying governmental programs or the identification of a problem, as well as the particular actions taken to solve the identified problem. Furthermore, through adopting shared vocabularies between various agents across space and time, loose and mobile networks might be established that come to influence particular governmental programs. Discourse is central to the approach, because discourse shapes which ways of intervention are possible and desirable.

Furthermore, discourse is itself essential for achieving certain goals. In order to govern, a problem first needs to be identified. For example, to govern immigrant conduct what is needed first is to define who are considered immigrants. In the Netherlands the term *allochtonen*[^47] is used to define immigrants. This term includes both first and second generation immigrants. As a consequence, individuals who were born in the Netherlands, but of whom one or both parents were born abroad are considered subjects for monitoring and policies aimed at integration. This in contrast to the US, where only the first

[^47]: See definition of *allochtonen* in chapter 1.
generation is considered immigrant. In other words, the language we use affects the way data is collected and statistics are created. It also influences what institutions will be created to play a role in shaping the conduct of immigrants and what policies will be developed to manage immigrant integration. Another example is that only once it is recognized that immigration is mainly an urban problem can new programs new programs and institutions centered on cities be instituted. An important question in studies of governmentality therefore is how identities are created, and the implications of these categorizations, recognizing that these categories are prone to change over time and in space.

3) Knowledge.

Knowledge here does not simply refer to ‘ideas’. Instead it refers to the techniques that make the governing of modern society possible. One can think of knowledgeable persons, think tanks, theories, projects, experiments and techniques. The development of these techniques plays a central role in the transformation in ways of governing. Innovations have made it possible to govern from a distance, while at the same time increasingly direct control is delegated to so-called experts. In terms of the government of immigrant conduct this implies that professionals at the central state are formulating policy based on the knowledge provided by experts in the field, scholars, opinion-makers, social workers, consultants, and other professionals in neighborhoods (see Larner and Walters, 2004; Rose, 1999). Experts develop ideas and technologies for the administration and management of conduct, to make sure that the objects of government act on standards or conceptions of what is good, healthy, normal, efficient, and profitable. Claims to
knowledge or expertise are always subject to contestation, but yet a particular set of expertise can become dominant at a particular time and/or territory. For example, a recent policy transformation in Rotterdam – a consequence of the electoral victory of Leefbaar Rotterdam, a political party with an anti-immigrant agenda that won the local elections of 2002 (see chapter 6), thereby bringing an end to the power of the Labour Party that had lasted since WWII – has led to the radical transformation of policy, especially with respect to immigrant integration. In other words, the transformation in the council led to the introduction of new expertise on how to tackle problems of immigrant concentration in a number of so-called disadvantaged neighborhoods in the city.

Governmentality refers to a particular way of thinking and acting that underlies all attempts to secure the health, wealth and well-being of the people of a nation/territory. The whole idea of government is that, through intervention the conduct, ideas and beliefs of its objects can be shaped in desired ways. Studies of governmentality address political power in terms of rationalities of government and technologies of government. It is through these rationalities and technologies that programs of government can be put into effect. Different authors have defined the terms in slightly different ways, but the definitions by Rose and Miller are probably most commonly used. These scholars have defined political rationalities as:

The changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).
Government is always linked to certain problematizations, in other words it is linked to a certain discontent with a particular situation of the present that it tries to fix or cure, a real situation is measured against a certain ideal situation that is to be achieved. Political rationalities then provide the legitimacy for the implementation of particular government programs. Particular government rationalities frame the discursive field through which citizens can see themselves and provides understandings for how citizens come to ‘govern’ themselves. Governmental technologies on the other hand are defined as:

The complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions (ibid: 175).

The existence of a particular governmental rationality will enable the use of certain technologies, as well as the development of them. The technologies are then the means or tools with which authorities can put their proposed plans to effect, such as forms of notation, calculation, assessment or maps, surveys, building designs, etc. However, the choice for a particular set of technologies to solve one problem could create problems for solving another, or might in reality not be working in the way it was imagined theoretically.

Studies of governmentality are empirical more so than theoretical. But, these studies are not empirical in the sense that they focus on unraveling causal relations. On the contrary, genealogies of government seek to discover the questions or problems that underlie the formulation of particular policy programs, strategies, tactics and techniques (Rose, 1999: 55-57). There are always tensions between different truths, and over time new ways of speaking truths are being developed, and along with this, different
infrastructures, technologies and tactics for enforcing these truths. The governmentality approach can shed light on how identities get constructed and on the implications of a particular system of knowledge for the population. It allows for the evaluation of implemented strategies, and for coming to understand why certain strategies were chosen (over others), as well as for investigating the effects of certain proposed solutions.

The strength of the governmentality approach is then the detailed description of existing developments and the analysis of so-called ‘conditions of possibility’. In other words investigating the commonplace conditions for governing, the mechanisms by which authorities seek to govern (Rose and Miller, 1992). But once again, for these scholars the state has no essential necessity or functionality (Rose and Miller, 1992: 177).

The main contribution of this approach is that it has developed an insightful methodology to identify, contextualize, and describe small but important transformations in government. It allows the researcher to identify breaking points, a particular series of small changes that eventually leads to the development of a new discourse. In addition, this approach is valuable because it emphasizes difference and detail. While I do believe that it is important not to ignore larger structures, not all change is fully explained by larger structures. For example, the current reframing of immigrant integration policy in the Netherlands cannot be completely understood as the outcome of larger socio-economic transformations (e.g. globalization) and events with global impact (e.g., September 11th, terror attacks in Madrid or London).
4.4 Four dimensions of an analytics of government

As mentioned above the governmentality approach is characterized by its empirical nature. It foremost provides a method for studying the way government operates. In his book *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, Mitchell Dean (1999: 29-34) has probably most clearly identified this methodology. Dean argues that an analytics of government or a study of governmentality should pay attention to four dimensions. Each dimension is different, such that each can be separated, while at the same time each individual dimension presupposes the other (*ibid*: 30). I find Dean’s methodology for a study of governmentality very useful as a framework for the research of this dissertation. While Dean’s four dimensions in essence are not geographic, they provide many opportunities for understanding how policies of immigrant integration are shaped spatially in the Netherlands. The four dimensions are:

1) The visibility of government.

This dimension refers specifically to how we govern through visual means. This first element intends to investigate the instruments that are used to identify a particular problem, such as maps, statistics, geographic information systems, etc. Decisions are made based on the visual representations of the world that these instruments provide, on a particular social construction of society. These visual means classify the world into categories, thereby stressing certain elements rather than others. For example, in order to problematize immigration it needs to be counted. This way the problem gets defined and made amenable for government. Also, if we were to map ethnic groups and crime rates, and were to find that crime rates are higher in areas with high concentrations of
immigrants, then we might conclude that immigrants are criminals. This ignores other factors that contribute to high crime rates and might further enhance existing stereotypes. Therefore, we might implement policies in these neighborhoods such ascurfews, increased policing, etc. However, such an approach could ignore the complexity of the social problems, socio-spatial interactions, situation of the neighborhoods in terms of its housing stock, jobs and location within the city, as well as the diversity of ethnic groups within these neighborhoods. In practice, however, for policy purposes maps play an important role in shaping and creating policies.

Maps are particular representations of the world, looking at a particular phenomenon in isolation, rather than in terms of its linkages.

Maps can be regarded as codified images of all kinds by which humans formally articulate, represent or construct their spatial knowledge of the world (Woodward, 2000: 64).

In the past three decades geographers have questioned the seemingly ‘objective’ representation of maps to shift attention to the functioning of maps as “expressions of political and economic power” (Woodward, 2000: 67). Maps actively construct knowledge and can be a powerful means to promote certain truths, to shape subjects and to produce identities (see Crampton & Krygier, 2006; Harley, 1988, 1989; Pickles, 1991, 1995, 2004; Wood, 1978, 1992) In fact, visual representations define what the problems are that the state needs to address – for example immigrant conduct. What an analytics of government can study is how immigrant categories are constructed. How, for example, are immigrant groups categorized differently in statistics, and what then are the implications if these categories are visualized on a map? This is important to identify,
because it will have consequences for how policies are targeted at specific groups rather than at others. Another example of the visibility of government is that of the collection of statistical information. This information forms the basis on which multicultural policies are developed. It is through statistics that the number or percentage of immigrant groups, and their particular constitutions become visual. So, our contemporary world is constructed on the basis of statistics – the governing of a population (Dean, 1999) – and it is on this basis that decisions are made. Or in Dean’s words:

It makes it possible to picture who and what is to be governed, how relations of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how different locales and agents are to be connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objectives are to be sought (ibid: 30).

Particular forms of visibility are necessary to make the multicultural state work – or to make integration possible. In light of the state implementation of multicultural policies it becomes important to look at how immigrants are represented in statistics. Which groups does the government identify as the targets of integration policies? Which groups are identified as separate categories and why? Who are left out and why (for example migrants from other Western European or EU countries or the US)? What are the consequences of this representation? And finally, how do these categories come to define which neighborhoods become targets for multicultural policy implementation?

Also, this aspect of visibility could be understood more spatially by investigating not only which objects or conducts are allowed to be visible, but also where these are allowed to be visible. Necessarily this will also direct the researcher to the objects or conduct that are made invisible or marginalized under a particular governmental rationality. For example, one can think of how practices of Islam are hidden or
marginalized in the landscape or which aspects of Islam are purposely made present in the landscape of contemporary European cities. For example, Gerard Jonker, a Dutch politician in Rotterdam decided to disapprove of the architectural plan for a new mosque, because of the height of the minarets. The height of the minarets had to be reduced in order to make the mosque less visible in the urban landscape. His argument was that Muslim immigrants in Rotterdam had no right to such a visible marker in the landscape, because of their marginal socio-economic position in the city. Also, to him a mosque for ‘integrated’ Muslims would not be built in traditional design, but in a modern, Western design, reflecting the adjustment of Muslims to Rotterdam. He thus envisioned integration as a one-way process, for which immigrants are responsible.

The mosque is a sort of pride, showing that we are doing great. But unemployment levels, family reunification numbers demonstrate that they are not doing so great. The mosque then is a sort of walkway between parts of Morocco, the Middle East and here. If the situation was that ok we’re putting this thing [mosque] down, but then we are finding a job, learning the language, marrying someone from here instead of getting a bride from Morocco, well if we could make such an agreement… There must be something to be proud of [with regard to the performance of the group], which at the moment there is too little off (Gerard Jonker, Dutch, politician Rotterdam).

Mosques are often hidden behind flats and parking garages, and as such not very visible in the landscape. As such it almost seems that there is a goal of hiding those attributes that have to do with Islam, by locating the mosque out of sight. On the other hand, multicultural policies specifically aim to promote ethnic markets and festivals that represent the positive aspects of diversity – diversity as celebration – and as a result the market is located in sight and active promotion is used to direct people to the market and

\[48\] Once built, this mosque will be the largest in Europe.
festival sites. For example, each year approximately 100,000 people visit Rotterdam to watch the summer carnival, an expression of Caribbean and South American culture. Brown (2000) illustrates the visibility aspect in relation to gay spaces, and shows how many gay venues in Auckland, New Zealand are hidden in small alleys, in basements, and have no signs on the doors that identify the function of the place. What this leads to is a question about what the particular organization of a space tells us about the relations and practices of governors and governed.

2) The technical aspect of government.

This refers to the tools – e.g. particular language, procedures, instruments and tactics – through which authority is established and government is instantiated. Government in other words is a technique, and thereby contests other models of government that tend to understand government as an expression of values, ideologies or worldviews (Dean, 1999: 31). If the goal of government is to achieve certain ends, it can only do so through the application of certain technological means. The means available to authorities limit what it can do, and which technological means are available for solving a problem. For example, in order to govern immigrant integration it is necessary to use a certain model of immigrant integration as well as instruments to realize the set goals. If the policy goal is to achieve the integration of immigrants into Dutch society, then a particular set of instruments and technologies will be used to achieve this goal. For example, the means that are made available for providing language courses for immigrants, for providing information on garbage collection or social benefits in multiple languages, for improving
the housing situation of immigrants, or for subsidizing activities of migrant organizations. This aspect of government emphasizes the practical features of government, which might include ways of recording, collecting, representing, storing and transporting information. One could ask, for example, what is the particular vocabulary that is used to promote multicultural policies or to redevelop a neighborhood, how has this changed over time, and with what consequences? What techniques are used to redevelop neighborhoods and squares as multicultural spaces? Why is the choice made for a particular architectural design, and what functions does this design allow or disallow? And, how is urban design used as a technique for shaping the conduct of immigrants? Nonetheless, as Isin (2002) has argued, the focus should not just be on only the techniques, but also on how subjects constitute themselves differently from the images that are assigned to them, and thus an analytics of government should look out for these moments of negotiation.

3) Government as a rational and thoughtful activity.

An analytics of government is concerned with the forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of governing, or what Dean calls the “episteme of government” (Dean, 1999: 31). Government is based on a particular rationale. In fact, “one of the features of government is that authorities and agencies must ask questions of themselves, must employ plans, forms of knowledge and know-how, and must adopt visions and objectives of what they seek to achieve.” (ibid: 32) We should therefore analyze how particular practices of government give rise to specific truths as well as how thoughts are translated into governing strategies and actions. An analysis of documents of different
governmental regimes could help to understand how exclusions and particular visual and/or statistical categorizations are (re)produced or (re)invented over the years. Other questions could be: What truths have state policies of multiculturalism created? Are these anticipated truths or do they contradict? How do authorities think they can govern immigrant conduct? What kind of strategies does the state use to achieve this? What do authorities know about immigrants and their differences and/or similarities? Central to this element of government as rational and thoughtful activity is the connection of government with thought, or in other words ‘governmentality’.

Studies of governmentality engage in the analysis of regimes of government. A study of policies of immigrant integration will then illustrate how and why the governing of immigrant conduct has changed over time – how discourses have shifted – as ideals of government are being problematized and new knowledge is being developed. Thought is always material as it takes place somewhere and sometime. What is characteristic of government is that it always has a programmatic character because authorities and agencies must justify their plans. In other words, they must think about what it is that they intend to achieve and be able to clearly state their objectives.

Governments must be understood as particular ways of viewing things, rather than others, which calls for the formation of particular state institutions, infrastructures and geographies and a particular way of organizing and training. It is precisely these elements that at times become problematized and (re)shaped in new governmentalities – or what are believed to be ‘better’ or more efficient ways of governing. What is characteristic of studies of governmentality then, as Dean (1999) notes, is that it attends to “all the more or less explicit, purposive attempts to organize and reorganize institutional spaces, their
routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of actors in specific ways (32).” Moon and Brown (2000) and MacKinnon (2000) for example illustrate changes in government rationalities in light of the National Health Service Reforms in Britain (Moon and Brown, 2000) and of decentralization of governance to regional authorities in the Scottish Highlands (MacKinnon, 2000). These show how certain routines of government are replaced by new ones – for example of increasing monitoring by the central state – which illustrate a moment of changing government rationalities with the purpose of making government more efficient and less costly. A similar change of government rationalities has occurred with regard to the governance of immigrant integration in the Netherlands. Here, the responsibility for immigrant integration was transferred from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of Justice in order to give integration a more mandatory character.

4) The formation of identity.

According to Dean (1999: 32) government programs are geared towards shaping particular individual and group identities. This element points to the formation of subjects through state programs and allows us to analyze how subjects come to define themselves as individuals or groups, through specific practices and techniques and in conflict with that ascribed by the state. Identities are negotiated on the ground – in neighborhoods, at schools, etc. – as groups tend to identify themselves in relation to others. Due to these processes of negotiation on the ground, governmental programs aimed at shaping particular individual or group identities might not always have the expected outcomes.
<table>
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<th>Four dimensions</th>
<th>Objects analyzed</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Questions that can be asked</th>
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| Visibility of government | - Maps                                                                          | - The definition of *allochtoon*, including both first and second generation immigrants. | - How are immigrant categories constructed?  
- Which groups are identified as targets for immigrant integration policies and why?  
- Who are left out and why?  
- What are the consequences of this representation?  
- How do the categories and definitions that we construct to identify a group or a problem shape policy programs/actions?  
- In what ways are immigrants and immigrant culture allowed to be visible?  
- What does a particular organization of space tell us about the relations and practices of governors and governed? |
|                        | - Statistics (graphs, tables, charts)                                            | - The design of Mercatorplein as multicultural square (see chapter 5)     |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        | - Architectural design                                                          | - The design and location of a mosque                                    |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        | - Urban space                                                                   | - Urban renewal as strategy to shape immigrant conduct                            |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        |                                                                                   |                                                                           |                                                                                                                                            |
| Technical aspects of government | - Financial means                                                               | - Limiting influx of low incomes by setting minimum income requirements (see chapter 7 on Rotterdam) | - How can the concentration of immigrants in certain neighborhoods be limited within what is legally allowed?  
- What means can be raised for funding urban renewal projects in order to realize its goals?  
- What compromises need to be made?  
- What vocabulary is used to promote multicultural policy, to redevelop neighborhoods and to create multicultural spaces? |
|                        | - Technologies                                                                   | - Urban design as technique for shaping immigrant conduct                |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        | - Vocabulary                                                                     | - Defining “mixed neighborhoods” as policy goal in order to allocate funds to disadvantaged neighborhoods |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        | - Instruments                                                                    | - Mandatory integration courses                                           |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        | - Procedures                                                                     |                                                                           |                                                                                                                                            |
| Government as rational and thoughtful activity | - Logic or mentality behind state policies and plans | - Whether politicians choose for assimilation, multiculturalism or another model of immigrant incorporation. | - What truths are created through state policies of multiculturalism?  
- Are these anticipated truths or do they contradict?  
- How does the state think immigrants can be made governable?  
- What do authorities know about immigrants and their differences and/or similarities on the basis of which decisions are made?  
- How are thoughts translated into governing strategies and actions?  
- What do state agencies try to achieve with multicultural policies?  
- On what knowledge are policies aimed at multiculturalism constructed? |
|                        |                                                                                   | - Analyzing why certain plans and visions are adopted and what they seek to achieve. |                                                                                                                                            |
| The formation of identity | - Mundane practices of immigrants                                                | - Wearing the headscarf                                                   | - What forms of conduct are expected of immigrants?  
- What is expected of authorities (politicians, social workers, migrant organizations)?  
- What are the rights and duties of immigrants?  
- How do immigrants come to know themselves as part of a nation?  
- How are certain practices of immigrants problematized and reformed?  
- How are immigrants made into active citizens and what and who do they have to adjust to?  
- How are identities negotiated through neighborhood spaces? |
|                        | - Construction of citizens                                                        | - Building a mosque                                                       |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        | - Conduct of conduct                                                             | - Practicing Islam                                                        |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        |                                                                                   | - Must Muslim immigrants shake hands with others as this is considered polite in Dutch society, even though it is forbidden for some Muslims. |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        |                                                                                   | - The use of urban public space                                           |                                                                                                                                            |
|                        |                                                                                   | - The construction of meaning in urban space                              |                                                                                                                                            |

Table 4.1 Summary table of an analytics of government
The formation of identity then refers to the specific conduct that is expected of a particular group – for example Muslim immigrants – but at the same time how this is negotiated such that societal values are reconstituted and a slightly different conduct is accepted. For example, in many European countries the headscarf is a much debated issue. But whereas in France a law was passed that prohibits the wearing of the headscarf in schools and limits it in government buildings, in the Netherlands the headscarf is increasingly incorporated in everyday life. In fact, companies, e.g. grocery stores, have started to design special headscarves for their employees.

What is expected from both the governed as well as the governors? For example, the state is expected to regulate immigration as well as secure the coherence of the nation-state. At the same time immigrants – the ones that are governed – are expected to integrate in Dutch society, through active participation. How does this take place in the neighborhood, how are identities negotiated through neighborhood spaces? What conduct is expected of immigrants, and what techniques are used to govern immigrant conduct?

Citizens are active agents in the construction of their identities, rather than passive recipients of state programs. But they are not the only active agents: the state also plays a key role in the way citizens come to know themselves as a coherent nation (Brown and Boyle, 2000: 89). This fourth element thus ties into questions of citizenship, how citizens are constructed and construct themselves, what roles they are assigned and assign themselves, and how these can be conflicting and thus are negotiated in space.

Government programs and practices presuppose certain identities. And therefore, it will be important to analyze the different identities that are performed by a variety of people, of state employees, activists or neighborhood residents. What do planners for
example expect of a newly developed neighborhood, and what, on the other hand, do residents understand multicultural to mean? What forms of conduct are expected and how do people become active citizens, what are the rights and duties expected from them? These are all questions that tie into citizenship. Transformation of particular government regimes can take place along each of these four dimensions, where a transformation on one dimension likely affects the other (Dean, 1999). For example, if we decide that the third generation must also be taken into account in our definition of *allochtonen*, this means different data will be collected to visualize the problem, new technologies and tactics will be developed to govern the problem, and it will also affect how ‘immigrants’ think about themselves and construct their identities in the neighborhood, city and nation.

4.5 Critical notes on the governmentality approach

While this work on governmentality is insightful and provides some tools for understanding the discursive production of the multicultural city, it also has a number of problems. First, most of these studies draw on texts and research findings from other scholars, and not on grounded empirical research conducted by the authors themselves. See for example Nikolas Rose’s (1999) genealogical study of freedom. Its contribution would be more significant and more applicable had it been framed in concrete research. Geographers engaged in studies of governmentality have also tended to focus on written documents and resources, rather than engaging in concrete field studies. The exception is probably Gibson (2001) who in a study of two regions in Australia indicates the importance of focus group research for a more insightful, multi-faceted and ethnographic understanding of difference.
Secondly, these studies lack an interest in spatial questions (see also Gordon, 2001 or Dean, 1999). For example, Rose (1999: 31-40) does pay attention to space, but his conceptualization of space is one of space as a metaphor or as an object, rather than understanding spatiality, the mutual constitution of space and society. One section in the first chapter discusses ‘governable spaces’, as delimited spaces subject to government. However, these governable spaces could be populations, nations, individuals, economies, schools, and therefore are not necessary linked to territory. In order to govern it is necessary to erect boundaries in order to render visible the space over which government is exercised, but this does not render the approach spatial. The particular organization of society will also play a role in forming and transforming the spaces of government.

A third problem with studies of governmentality, I believe, is that they do not provide an agenda or direction for change or resistance. Many geographers, including myself, are interested in understanding how injustices can be solved. Studies of governmentality can provide insights into how injustices have developed, but not so much about how to change them. An exception is maybe Rose (1999) who does point to a potential direction for change, identifying key actors in facilitating change. Rose’s work is influential within the larger body of work on governmentality that addresses the modern manifestation of government in areas as diverse as insurance, health care, welfare, poverty, employment and crime. Using the example of the government of madness, Rose demonstrates that those agents that intervene in the government of a problem are not simply authorities (politicians, psychologists, school teachers, etc.), but actually a range of actors (individuals, communities, non-profit organizations, subjects). He thereby demonstrates that these actors usually play key roles in configuring the ways
problems are governed. In order to understand current governmental practices, Rose therefore proposes an analysis of the forms of contestation in order to come to understand how something new is created. A study of governmentality must search for ruptures in existing discourses that provide openings for change, for the modification of existing discourses. He proposes to listen to subalterns or minority forces as laboratories for political transformation, and therefore socio-spatial transformation. The focus of Rose’s work is on showing the means through which power is exercised, the multitude of practices and techniques involved. While this is important, much less attention is given to what power relationships are actually involved when people are pressured to govern themselves (Allen, 2003: 145).

Finally, the governmentality literature has a strong focus on the national and local scales (see for example Bunnell, 2002; Raco, 2003; Rose, 1999; Uitermark, 2005). Recently, Larner and Walters (2004) in an edited collection called *Global Governmentality* have argued for the extension of the reach of these studies to the global sphere, incorporating the complexity and multi-scalar nature of everyday life. A problem of focusing at the scale of the nation-state is that these studies are less attentive to decisions made at an international or global space. Hence, these studies fail to acknowledge that as part of a global world an increasing number of decisions are made at scales other than that of the nation, thereby influencing what is possible, how one governs in the nation. In the context of studying immigrant integration policies in the context of the Netherlands, it is important to at least recognize the importance of transnational practices, and think about how to incorporate these within a national framework. Transnational practices play a role in shaping the multicultural city and as such should
not be ignored. In this respect, Larner and Walters (2005) make a convincing argument for applying governmentality at the global scale. They introduce the notion of ‘global governmentality’ as a heading for studies that “problematize the constitution and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states” (2).

4.6 Geographers and Governmentality

In geography the interest in governmentality is more recent, but a growing number of geographers are beginning to explore Foucault’s work on governmentality. In this section I will give an overview of how geographers have critically engaged this work.

Various geographers within the fields of political geography, urban geography, cultural geography, historical geography and cartography have started to explore the relevance of governmentality (Atkinson, 2003; Barnett, 2001, 2005; Brown and Boyle, 2000; Bunnell, 2002; Hannah, 2000; Gibson, 2001; Larner and Walters, 2004; MacKinnon, 2000; McCann, 2008; Mitchell, 2004; Moon and Brown, 2000; Murdoch and Ward, 1997; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Raco, 2003; Raco and Imrie, 2000; Sparke, 2006; Uitermark, 2005). Political geographers were among the first to engage with studies of governmentality. A number of these studies focus on territory and population and how geographical knowledge production and the ordering of territorial space were central to the formation of modern government (see for example Ó Tuathail, 1996). More recently a body of literature in political geography is developing that draws on governmentality to focus on relations between globalization and governance. These studies bring political economy approaches and governmentality in conversation so as to understand how
neoliberalism works (see Larner and Walters, 2004; MacKinnon, 2000; Raco, 2003; Sparke, 2006).

Some of these studies are being critiqued for being too state-centered, while governmentality specifically seeks to go beyond approaches that center power in the state. While these studies have produced considerable insights, I agree with Rose-Redwood (2006) that analyses of governmentality should also explore how various non-state actors have utilized technologies of government in myriad ways. Also, I argue that we must look at how practices and strategies of people and groups (re)shape government rationalities and techniques.

An example of a study that tends to view governmentality as a “technique of state power” (Rose-Redwood, 2006: 476) is Raco’s analysis. Raco claims that:

with nation-states facing growing pressures on their traditional mechanisms of control, the Foucauldian focus on nation-state power would appear to be increasingly limited in its analytical value. However, the principles of government that Foucault laid down in his analysis of governmentality are still practiced by liberal governments. As social, political and economic processes have become increasingly complex in recent decades, so the requirement for states to develop efficient and effective techniques for ‘governing at a distance’ take on greater salience (Raco, 2003: 78).

Raco (2003) analyzes the emerging discourses and practices of devolution in Scotland. Another problem with his work is that he tends to treat the terms ‘government’ and the ‘state’ as if they were interchangeable (see Rose-Redwood, 2006: 476).

Other political geographers have also focused on governmentality as it relates to the state. Moon and Brown (1999) for example discuss the spatializing language that was used in the presentation of UK healthcare policy reform in the mid-1990s. Specifically they discuss the language that was used to transfer national healthcare as a responsibility
of the national state to the regional and local levels. Also, the analysis of Murdoch and Ward (1997) of the statistical construction of the ‘national farm,’ as an object of government in nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain, remains state-centered. Governmentality, they state, “refers to the methods employed as the state both represents and intervenes in the domains it seeks to govern, and how territorial integration is thereby achieved” (Murdoch and Ward, 1997: 308).

Murdoch and Ward focus primarily on state projects at the national scale, whereas Raco (2003), Moon and Brown (1999) MacKinnon (2000) focus on how national projects shape local governance structures. MacKinnon (2000:293) argues that the relocation of state activities from the national to the local state is a product of “neoliberalism as a distinct political rationality. Like the other studies, MacKinnon focuses primarily on the ‘internal’ workings of state apparatuses. Nonetheless, in contrast to the other studies, he does recognize the importance of non-state actors. MacKinnon (2000: 293) draws on governmentality because where political economy approaches argue that local governance must be seen as a product of national state restructuring, governmentality provides insights in “the precise mechanisms which give central state authorities the reach and capability to monitor and steer the activities of local institutions.” He suggests that the strength of governmentality studies is their detailed analysis of how government operates, but he maintains that these studies do not adequately account for the ‘social and economic bases of state power’ (MacKinnon, 2000: 297; see also Rose-Redwood, 2006: 477). I agree with MacKinnon that studies of governmentality are, in themselves, not sufficient, but I will return to this point.
Larner and Walters (2004) would also agree with MacKinnon’s point. These scholars have analyzed the governmentalities of neoliberalism. Larner and Walters recognize the importance of studies of governmentality in impacting studies of power and governance in modern society, but criticize this body of literature for its focus on “political, social and economic life ‘inside’ nation-states” (1) Their contribution is to extend studies of governmentality to the global scale. The define ‘global governmentality’ as “a heading for studies that problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states” (ibid: 2). While the work is insightful, particularly because the global has become increasingly central to the “way in which political, economic and social relations are thought about and acted upon” (ibid: 5), my study focuses primarily on the various ways national and local policies of immigrant integration are negotiated in neighborhoods where these policies are implemented, and how this (re)shapes government rationalities. My approach differs from those of MacKinnon, Raco and Moon and Brown in that it also recognizes the importance of various non-state actors.

Where political geographers have contributed to the governmentality literature, in recent years it is also beginning to impact urban geography, cultural geography, historical geography and cartography (Brown and Boyle, 2000; Bunnell, 2002; Flint, 2002; MacLeod et al, 2003; Mitchell, 2004; Uitermark, 2004). I only briefly want to discuss a couple of studies in the field of urban geography and cultural studies here, since these have most linkages to the work in this dissertation. MacLeod et al (2003) have drawn on governmentality to come to understand the complex transformation of cities, and the different urban realities produced in different places in the globalized world.
Characteristic for many of these studies is also that they focus on governmentality as it relates to the state. Brown and Boyle (2000), on the other hand, have drawn on governmentality in order to understand how the state shapes our understanding of citizens of a particular nation, based on a series of norms and values that are understood as shared and commonly agreed upon. While state-centered, this is important for understanding how immigrant integration policies are constructed based on existing norms and values about ‘being a good citizen’. Bunnell (2002), for his part, shows how rural migrants in Kuala Lumpur contest efforts of government to shape their conduct. The influx of migrants to Kuala Lumpur challenges current government rationality that understands ‘village/Kampung’ values as inappropriate in the light of its goal of modernization.

Uitermark (2005), on the other hand, analyses urban policy in the Netherlands and argues for the local scale as the level where ideas for new policy interventions develop. He argues that the local scale should be prioritized as the site where discourses are shaped, where problems to be framed in policy programs are formulated, and where these programs subsequently are implemented and in return negotiated\footnote{I added negotiated, because as Rose and Miller (1992) have argued, things, persons or events do not necessarily cooperate or act the way government programs have intended. In their words: “Things, persons or events always appear to escape those bodies of knowledge that inform governmental programmes, refusing to respond according to the programmatic logic that seeks to govern them (Rose and Miller, 1992: 190).”}. Nonetheless, this study focuses mainly on the state. While it is suggested that what is needed is a focus on the microphysics of power in disadvantaged neighborhoods (which I agree with), not much attention is being paid to neighborhood spaces as the sites where policies are negotiated and where the multicultural city is being created. This focus is needed in order to fully appreciate the interaction between policy representatives – formal institutions –
and policy objects – neighborhood residents – and the kind of power-knowledge that arises from these interactions. This is the kind of interaction that this work attempts to contribute to, by bringing in the voices of the people, and by formulating a politics of difference through which we can begin to understand the multicultural city.

Finally, Katharyne Mitchell (2004) analyzes how it is that since the 1980s states that have followed a trajectory towards multiculturalism are currently experiencing a revival of assimilationist logic for immigrant integration, thereby defining multicultural programs as ultimately failing. She points out that increasingly responsibility for immigrant integration is shifted from the institutions of the state to the local level, specifically to the community and individuals. This, she argues, is characteristic of new neo-liberal governmental rationality. According to this logic individuals are expected to govern themselves within the values of the host society. Failure to do so then implies the right to exclude individuals from rights to citizenship, welfare, and from society more generally.

4.6.1 Conversation between political economy approaches and governmentality

Many studies of governmentality aim to reconcile Marxian political economy studies and political economy approaches (Blomley and Sommers, 1999; Larner and Walters, 2004; MacKinnon, 2000; Rose-Redwood, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Uitermark, 2005). Governmentality studies are considered too empirical, whereas the political economy approaches tend to provide insufficient insight into how technologies of government get developed. Despite the foundational differences between Marxist studies and governmentality, these scholars explore the productive tensions between these
approaches. Sparke (2006: 16) for example argues that analyses of neoliberalism can be nuanced by an analysis of the “context-contingent connections between neoliberal governance and neoliberal governmentality” (Sparke, 2006: 16). And Blomley and Sommers (1999) argue for connecting governmentality with Marxist urban theory and demonstrate the importance of non-state actors in employing technologies of government to suit their own ends.

Nonetheless, not all scholars see value in bringing together the two approaches. Barnett (2004), for example argues that most accounts on neoliberal governmentality that try to bring together Marxian/regulationist approaches with governmentality are both too economistic and too statist (understanding governmentality solely as a technique of state power). While a few studies can be characterized this way, I would argue that bringing the two approaches into conversation is far more valuable, despite its foundational differences, than Barnett portrays it to be. As Sparke (2006: 2) has argued, there is some truth in this critique when applied to the “decontextualized and depoliticized accounts of ‘advanced liberalism’ offered by writers such as Rose (1999)”, but this critique does not fairly apply to the work of, for example, Wendy Larner. She argues that “without the analyses of the ‘messy actualities’ of particular neo-liberal projects, those working within this analytic run the risk of precisely the problem they wish to avoid – that of producing generalized accounts of historical epochs” (Larner, 2004: 14). For a more detailed discussion of the productive tensions between more materialist economic analyses and governmentality see Sparke (2006).

I think that reconciling Marxian and governmentality approaches is a valuable exercise. Also, I agree with Rose-Redwood (2006) that studies of governmentality in
itself are too limited. They need to be connected with other bodies of literature in order to focus attention to the connection between different spatial scales and global economic and political processes that also impact cities and populations. Furthermore, it needs to be connected to other literatures in order to spatialize governmentality approaches. In the next section I will develop a conceptual framework for studying the negotiation of policy geared towards the integration of immigrants in multi-ethnic neighborhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

4.7 The State, the Multicultural City, and the Socio-Spatial Negotiation of Policy: A Critical Framework for Analysis

Figure 4.2 provides a schematic overview of the conceptual framework of this dissertation. It briefly summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the different bodies of literature that have been discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The theoretical approach that follows from the different bodies of literature combines its strengths. The strengths of one approach can contribute to overcoming weaknesses of another approach. Together, the theoretical approach will contribute to understanding the negotiation of immigrant integration policies in urban neighborhoods of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
### Table 4.2 Conceptual Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL/CULTURAL AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY</th>
<th>INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES</th>
<th>SOCIOLOGY/URBAN GEOGRAPHY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Place and identity</td>
<td>• Theories of immigrant incorporation</td>
<td>• Governmentality Approach</td>
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<td>Strengths</td>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>Strengths</td>
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<td>• Provides insights in spatiality of</td>
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<td>• Conceptualization of</td>
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<td>identity construction in</td>
<td>among assimilation, integration and multiculturalism</td>
<td>the state as assemblage</td>
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<td>urban space.</td>
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<td>representations of urban space.</td>
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<td>• State conceptualized frequently in</td>
<td>immigrant incorporation.</td>
<td>• Aspatial – space as an</td>
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<td>object.</td>
<td>this approach is almost always applied in the</td>
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<td>• Anglo-American focus.</td>
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<td>Weaknesses</td>
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<td>strategies of immigrants.</td>
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<td>people, places and things.</td>
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<td>• Little agency. Forms of</td>
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<td>• Attention to connections</td>
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<td>• Conceptualization of</td>
<td>literature. Overcoming shortcomings of literature</td>
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<td>multiculturalism as commodity.</td>
<td>by combining them with others. Contribute to</td>
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<td>understandings of social identity and space.</td>
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<td>place and identity and immigration to bring in</td>
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<td>• Addresses questions of citizenship</td>
<td>policy negotiations, role of immigrants as actors</td>
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<td>and rights to urban space.</td>
<td>in transformation of policy/institutions/governing</td>
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<td>• Attention to agency.</td>
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<td>Governmentality Approach.</td>
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<td>construction of governmentalities.</td>
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The governmentality approach that was discussed in this chapter is central to the theoretical approach of this dissertation. This approach offers an analytical framework for analyzing the uneven geographies of policy implementation aimed at the management of ethnic diversity in Amsterdam. As described in this chapter it offers a way of thinking about how government operates. In other words, it provides a toolbox for understanding how immigrant subjects are constructed as targets of policy programs, what policies aimed at immigrant integration hope to accomplish, how this is achieved (through what rationalities, tactics, means, and technologies), based on what knowledge, and how established truths are challenged. This approach is not only useful for deciphering discourses about immigrant integration, but also because it understands power to be everywhere. Therefore, migrants are not powerless actors, but are involved in shaping and transforming policies. Yet, this is not to say that they can directly change society.

Certain overarching discourses are dominant at particular moments in history. Furthermore, ‘government’ is not centralized in the state, but also means that people, social workers and consultants are involved in governing conduct.

While studies of governmentality contribute to existing studies about the state and urban governance, it needs to be connected to other bodies of literature in order to understand the uneven geography of policy implementation. Why do similar policies play out differently in Amsterdam and Rotterdam? One limitation of the governmentality approach is that it is largely a-spatial. Therefore, in order to understand how identities are constructed in and through urban space and how policies might be resisted or protested against, the governmentality approach must be connected to studies of place and identity. Studies of governmentality in turn contribute to this literature by conceptualizing the state
as a set of practices instead of as a coherent structure. Studies of governmentality, furthermore, do not really attend to the connections between different spatial scales and to larger political and economic forces in shaping policy discourses and state power. Immigrants, however, increasingly operate in a transnational field. This affects how immigrants situate themselves in the host society as well as to economic opportunities and political processes. Studies of transnationalism pay attention to the connections between different spatial scales, and should therefore be included in the conceptual framework. Also, studies on immigrant incorporation shed light on the particular truths or philosophies on which policies aimed at immigrant integration are constructed. One goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate how a governmentality approach can shed light on how the multicultural city is governed, through which ‘regulatory mechanisms’, and how government ambitions are changing in light of global and local events.

Together this framework brings various tools to bear on our understanding of how policies aimed at immigrant integration are being negotiated to produce geographically differentiated outcomes in different cities. This framework informs governance and decision-making in multicultural cities. By combining different bodies of literature I aim to contribute to studies on the multicultural city. While a few authors have begun to explore the field, a geographical understanding of the workings of the multicultural city is still limited. My approach will contribute to this body of literature. Not only will this study offer policy recommendations, it will also provide a more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms that shape the multicultural city.
5.1 Introduction

A distinction I would like to make is between on the one hand *everyday* multiculturalism – multiculturalism as it is lived through everyday practices in neighborhoods and urban public spaces – and on the other hand *multiculturalism as an ideology or state discourse* – multiculturalism as debated in the public sphere (by political and intellectual elites) and framed in policy programs. In this chapter I provide an overview of how discourses of multiculturalism became institutionalized and (re)shaped in Dutch policy in the period 1970-2004. This will be followed by a discussion of how questions of immigrant integration became framed as specifically urban questions. I will also discuss the particular state institutions that were the conduits of multicultural policy in cities and urban neighborhoods.

5.2.1 1950s and 1960s: assimilation of ‘Rijksgenoten’ and recruitment of guest workers

In the 1950s, following the independence of Indonesia, a large number of Indonesian-Dutch\(^{50}\) as well as Dutch citizens who had worked for the Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia migrated or returned to the Netherlands. It was clear that these new residents were going to stay and therefore local and state policies aimed at assimilating them.\(^{51}\) The Indonesian situation was the first signal of increased immigration to the Netherlands and from the 1960s onwards the number of immigrants rapidly increased, with a particular impact on cities, where most migrants settled. Due to a labor shortage in the booming industrial economy, manual laborers were recruited, initially from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia) and later from Turkey and Morocco. While the large influx of labor migrants caused various problems in cities, i.e., overcrowded guesthouses and apartments, tensions between the host population and immigrants, and dangerous work conditions, no policies were created at the national scale. While the Indonesian immigrants stayed and (assimilation) policy was therefore formulated, these labor migrants were only supposed to stay temporarily, and therefore the government left it up to local authorities to figure out how to incorporate their ‘temporary guests’. Initially, it was the responsibility of companies to arrange housing for...

\(^{50}\) Born out of mixed families (half Indonesian, half Dutch) and were forced to leave the country after independence.

\(^{51}\) Assimilation did not apply to a group of Moluccan migrants from Indonesia. Because this group chose the side of the Dutch in the war for independence, they were expelled once Indonesia gained independence. The Dutch state, however, did not want them either. Nonetheless it did provide shelter for these migrants. They were housed in camps. No agreement was reached with the Indonesian government for their return and so they ended up staying in the Netherlands. Special neighborhoods were built for the Moluccans, where they could live together. As a consequence they lived quite separated from Dutch society. Moluccans have long been treated as sub-class citizens in the Netherlands.
the guest workers. However, not all companies succeeded in doing so. Also, besides the labor migrants that were officially recruited in the home countries, some migrants followed on their own, hoping to find a job. They did not have an employer providing accommodation for them, but had to find their own. Private landlords responded to this situation by demanding high rents for small rooms and sometimes by exploiting the guest workers who were in desperate need of accommodation but did not have access to the regular housing market or housing provided by an employer. It was not uncommon to find 20 people sharing one room. In *De Tafel van Spruit* (the Table of Spruit), Piet Spruit – a resident of the *Afrikaanderwijk* in Rotterdam – shares his memories of the influx of guest workers to the neighborhood, the conditions in which they had to live and how the guest workers were received. One of the things he remembered and shared with the authors of the book was the exploitation of guest workers by private landlords, in this particular example a Turkish landlord who exploited his fellow citizens.

At the start of the 1970s a Turkish entrepreneur started purchasing property in the Paarlstraat [in *Afrikaanderwijk* in Rotterdam]. He put twenty, twenty five Turkish guest workers in one room. Those on nightshift changed beds with those on dayshift. The beds were slept in day and night and sometimes they even slept with two or three people in a single bed (Piet Spruit in Dekker & Senstius, 2001: 8).

During this period, cities started managing labor contracts, labor conditions in the factories, and attempted to provide housing and healthcare in order to improve the situation of labor migrants and to prevent situations as described by Piet Spruit. Also, in the 1950s and 1960s action committees, voluntary organizations and churches played an important role in supporting foreign workers.
I argue therefore that during the initial arrival of immigrants to the Netherlands, only limited action was taken by the national state – mostly geared towards the assimilation of migrants and repatriats from Indonesia – to accommodate them. Instead, the first strategies to accommodate immigrants and to improve their work and living situation were taken by local authorities, in particular cities. During this period no special institutions or policies were created geared at incorporating immigrants in society. Measures were only ever local and ad-hoc.

5.2.2 1970s: The first foundations of multicultural policy to manage (temporary) immigrant incorporation

Throughout the 1970s policy advisors and politicians believed that immigration was only a temporary phenomenon. Officially, guest workers were only to stay for a couple of years and once their contracts expired, they were expected to return to their home countries. This belief, I would argue, framed the first set of Dutch immigrant policies. The so-called categorical policy meant that under the umbrella of immigrant policy categories of immigrants were distinguished for whom specific policy measures were developed. A broad distinction could be made between policies for so-called Rijksgenoten (migrants from the former Dutch colonies, e.g. Indonesia and Surinam) and those for Buitenlandse Werknemers (foreign workers). The Rijksgenoten were to stay permanently (immigrants from Indonesia could not return to their home countries as they had been forced to leave the country after its independence) and therefore the policy developed for this group of immigrants was to demand assimilation into Dutch society. In policy terms this meant that institutions of the national state now started to take limited
responsibility for the assimilation of *Rijksgenoten* and for providing them with equal opportunities. Nonetheless, most responsibility remained with local authorities. Only by the mid-1970s, when the care provided by local welfare organizations proved insufficient, was a stronger commitment demanded from the national state. It is unclear how this change was implemented, however. Policy aimed at *Buitenlandse Werknemers*, on the other hand focused on maintaining group bonds and cultural identity, in order to facilitate a return to the home country, rather than on any incorporation in Dutch society (Verwey-Jonker, 2003). Policy was furthermore aimed at controlling labor migration, encouraging return and regulating family reunification. A major problem with the categorical policies that I identified in the documents was its fragmentation. Different departments were responsible for small aspects of the policy, but central coordination was absent.

The policy aimed at foreign workers was laid down in the *Buitenlandse Werknemers* bill of 1970. This is an important document, because it finally put immigration officially on the political agenda. Also, this document introduced the expression ‘integration with preservation of one’s identity’, which became central to Dutch policy aimed at immigrant integration in the 1980s and formed the basis of multiculturalism as the official stance towards immigrant incorporation. Foreign workers were encouraged to organize along ethnic lines, because in so doing they would maintain their cultural ties and identity. The Dutch government at the time believed that this would facilitate their return to the home country and avoid social isolation (Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers [Bill on Foreign Workers], 1970: 10). In order to preserve the cultural and ethnic identity of the immigrant community public grants were designed to subsidize immigrant organizations (Poppelaars, 2007: 4). Multicultural policy therefore was
founded on the belief that migrants would stay only temporarily. For this reason I would argue that there was no priority in the 1970s to develop a concept of a multi-ethnic society, and no need to demand assimilation of foreign workers. In fact, the Bill states twice that ‘Nederland is geen immigratieland’ [The Netherlands is not a country of immigration] (Van Amersfoort, 2001: 19). This is quite ironic as immigrants kept arriving, even when the demand for guest workers on the Dutch labor market dried up with the oil crisis of 1973. After 1973 the recruitment of guest workers was stopped, but instead of returning to their home countries many guest workers decided to stay and to bring their families to the Netherlands. Immigration thus continued, but family reunification was its new impetus.

Van Amersfoort (2001) convincingly argues that the Bill lacked vision and did not pay much attention to rising tensions in inner city neighborhoods between the host population and guest workers. It was blind to see that many guest workers were staying past their contracts and had no intentions to return home. Even though work conditions were tough and settling in a hostile environment was difficult, the situation was often still much better than in the country of origin. In 1972 tensions between the host population and guest workers exploded in Rotterdam. Homes of guest workers were attacked by *autochtone* neighborhood residents who blamed guest workers for the rapid downgrading of their neighborhood. The race riot in Rotterdam was an incident, but very important for politicians to realize that tensions were real and threatening society.

Then, from the mid-1970s onwards, with the decline of the manufacturing industries, many guest workers were made redundant. Many ended up staying in the Netherlands and becoming dependent on welfare benefits. Despite the changing character
of migration, the focus in policy remained on the temporary character of immigration and a limited role for the national state in incorporating migrants.

In 1979 the *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid* (WRR) [Scientific Council for State Policy], a think tank of the state, published a report *Etnische minderheden* [Ethnic minorities] in which it advised the government to stop its categorical policies and develop a more general minority policy. The WRR feared that if the categorical policy was to be continued, a society would develop where ethnic and socio-economic divisions were exacerbated and that an ethnic underclass would emerge (WRR, 1979: 161). According to the WRR, minority policy would be more effective than the categorical policy in promoting the social, economic and political participation of minorities in Dutch society.

In response to the WRR report, the government in March of 1980 for the first time acknowledged the permanent presence of immigrants in Dutch society and the necessity to pursue a coherent policy for minorities (Fermin, 1997). This was the official start of Minority Policy.

### 5.2.3 1980s: The official grounding of national multicultural policy

In the 1980s the character of migration started changing. Former guest workers started to bring their families into the country and a new wave of immigration followed from the former colony of Suriname and from the Dutch Antilles. It took a couple of years before the policy was laid out in an official Bill and was ready for implementation. The first official national policy towards immigrant incorporation was formulated in
1983, in the so-called *Minderhedennota* [Minority Bill]. The Bill recognized that immigrants were to stay, and therefore had to be incorporated into society.

Minority policy is geared towards creating a society in which members of minority groups each individually and as a group have an equal position and equal opportunities to develop their talents (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1981: 35).

From this moment onwards, immigrants were considered ‘ethnic minorities’ instead of guest workers or foreigners (Rath, 1991), thus recognizing that immigrants needed special care and assistance to improve their socio-economic position in Dutch society. I would argue that this construction is highly problematic, because by labeling immigrants as ‘ethnic minorities’ they are ‘othered’, classified as a group with problems.

On the one hand ethnic minorities were allowed to retain their own culture and to manage their own institutions, because it was expected by the Dutch government that this would facilitate their integration into Dutch society. On the other hand, the Dutch government also expected immigrants to make an effort to familiarize themselves with Dutch society and to learn the Dutch language (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1983: 11).

What this demonstrates is that minority policy identified groups based on their disadvantaged position in Dutch society. Migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, Moluccans, Roma and immigrants from ‘non-western’ nations were all classified as ethnic minorities and therefore subject to minority policy. Immigrants from North-West Europe, the US, Australia, Japan and Indonesia did not have a disadvantaged position in Dutch society and therefore were not targeted by minority policy. An important goal of minority policy was to counter marginalization and particularly to improve the position of
ethnic minorities in three areas: employment, education and housing. The state continued the subsidizing of categorical facilities and self-organizations. That is why institutional arrangements were created that ran parallel to mainstream arrangements. A good example of this is the establishment of faith-based schools for Hindus and Muslims. Also, a number of participatory boards were created – separate boards for different minority groups, e.g. Surinamese, Moroccan and Turkish boards – for members of each minority group to represent the voice of their communities in the development of state policies. Hence, minority groups were in a short time incorporated into the collective bargaining culture of Dutch democracy (Prins, 1997).

With the minority policy, the Dutch state officially recognized the existence of a ‘multicultural society’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1983; WRR, 2001) and took the ideal of multiculturalism as the guiding principle for the development of social policy. Furthermore, with the introduction of Minderhedenbeleid, the governing of immigrant integration became increasingly centralized by the national state. From this moment onwards, policies aimed at immigrants were coordinated by the Minister of the Interior. Finally, in order to secure the coherence of the nation-state further immigration to the Netherlands was discouraged.

An interesting question is why multiculturalism was the guiding principle for developing policies aimed at immigrant integration? This must be understood in the particular historical context of the development of Dutch society. In fact, institutionalized multiculturalism had characterized Dutch society prior to the influx of guest workers and migrants from the former colonies in the form of ‘pillarization.’ Prior to 1917 the Netherlands was characterized by great religious diversity. There was an ongoing
struggle between denominational and secular forces, but also an internal struggle between Protestants and Catholics (Uitermark, 2003: 98). No one political party or political force succeeded in gaining an absolute majority in the government. As a consequence, a lot of small parties had to govern together and were therefore forced to negotiate and to make compromises.

The pillarized society developed after 1917 when ideological, religious and cultural differences no longer led to endless struggles, but were pacified by encouraging each party to develop their own organizational infrastructure, a so-called pillar. Each pillar (e.g. Catholics, Jews, Protestants, socialists, humanists or liberals) started developing its own facilities such as schools, hospitals, sports clubs, trade unions, political parties and even radio and television broadcasting organizations, largely paid for by the state. The state itself took a neutral stance so that it could treat all groups in exactly the same way. Because of pillarization, educational establishments catering to one societal group in the Netherlands are still treated equally to those with a mandate to serve the entire population. For today’s immigrants this means that they can establish publicly-funded faith-based schools.

This pillarization of Dutch society has been of great influence on the development of urban policy and immigrant integration policies. Ter Horst and Van de Ven (1995, 1997, 1998) emphasize that since 1917, each ‘pillar,’ had the right to facilities managed either by themselves or by the state. From a planning perspective it was therefore important for the state to cluster separate pillars spatially in order to reduce the costs for

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52 This formed the basis for what in the 1990s was called the Dutch ‘poldermodel’. Economic success in the 1990s was based on compromises and extensive negotiations between parties.
providing separate facilities to each group. In other words, the outcome of pillarization was the spatial segregation of separate pillars. Within this system elite leaders of all pillars played a very important role. They represented their people and met regularly to discuss issues that concerned all and to build coalitions that were needed for majority decision making (Entzinger, 2006: 3).

In the 1960s, pillarization started to lose ground due to secularization and emancipation, but until that time ‘living apart together’ had characterized Dutch society. However, when the question of how to incorporate immigrants into Dutch society arose in the 1980s, many politicians and policy makers believed that it could be addressed in the same way as it had been for the different religious and ideological groups in the past. Therefore it made sense to opt for a multicultural model that encouraged integration with the maintenance of ethnic or cultural identity, and emphasized combating social deprivation, equal treatment and emancipation.

As in the pillarized society, ethnic elites were given a key role in managing the process of integration. Policy makers responsible for immigrant integration thought that these elites represented their communities – thereby ignoring differences within ethnic groups – and that their successful integration would make it easier for their rank and file to identify with Dutch society. But where the religious and ideological groups in the original pillarized society shared histories, this was not the case for ethnic minorities. Also, what I found was completely ignored, was that stressing ethnic differences could potentially result in the perpetuation of those differences and could become an obstacle for the social participation of migrants. In this Dutch context, Entzinger (2006) speaks of
multiculturalism as “a form of exclusion, because “they [immigrants] can never become like us.”

The Dutch government was nonetheless very eager for immigrant integration to succeed and to avoid the formation of an ethnic underclass. Because of this the government [the Lubbers administration] asked the WRR in 1987 to evaluate the Minority Policy. Vermeulen and Penninx (1994) have strikingly characterized this as ‘democratic impatience’. Because politicians want to see results of policy implementation within the four year period for which they have been elected. In so doing, however, they have tended to overlook that the process of immigrant integration is a long term process and cannot be ‘fixed’ within one political cycle. Evaluation of policy was difficult, however, because concrete policy goals were never specified. What did fail was the goal of reducing the flow of new immigrants. From the late 1980s onwards, more and more asylum seekers began to find their way to the Netherlands. This new group of immigrants consisted mainly of political refugees and economic migrants from all over the world in search for better opportunities. As a consequence the background of migrants became increasingly diverse.

In 1989 the WRR published its report Allochtonenbeleid [Allochtonen policy]. The WRR concluded that immigrant integration had not been successful. Also, they replaced the concept of ‘ethnic minorities’ by ‘allochtonen’. The concept allochtonen refers to those persons who are born abroad or of whom at least one parent is born abroad (see chapter 1). In other words, this can refer to a person from for example the United States, Morocco or Iraq. It refers to all immigrants and second generation immigrants without reference to their socio-economic status. The term ‘ethnic minorities’, on the
other hand, refers to persons who are not only *allochtoon*, but also have a weak socio-economic position. The WRR introduced the term *allochtonen* because they were of the opinion that only those individuals that needed state support should receive it.

The problem with the minority policy, according to the WRR, was that it portrayed all immigrants as disadvantaged. It therefore ignored that on an individual basis there were also many immigrants who were successful and did not need state support. The WRR therefore broke with the focus on groups and categories and put more emphasis on the individual responsibilities and obligations of ‘*allochtone*’ citizens instead. Furthermore, it proposed a more neoliberal stance on citizenship by which immigrants become active citizens (Kearns, 1992; Mitchell, 2004a; 2004b; Rose, 2000), who search for jobs and through work and education develop inter-ethnic relations and integrate in society. In fact, they criticized the ‘caring’ state for making immigrants dependent on its welfare facilities (Verwey-Jonker, 2003).

Nonetheless, I find the term *allochtonen* to be problematic in its own way. While it was intended as a more neutral term, applying to *individuals rather than groups*, in practice it is mostly used to refer to *groups* who’s integration is considered problematic.

Researchers were also asked to give expert advice and recommendations about how to remove the bottle-necks for processes of integration and emancipation – not only for the good of the people involved, but also for reasons of management and control. For a growing underclass would mean more people becoming dependent on welfare, hence a heavy weight on the state budget, whereas feelings of frustration could grow into a potential threat to the stability of society at large (Prins, 1997: 116). According to Prins
the large governmental investments in social research projects testify to a strong belief in social engineering of Dutch society.

5.2.4 1990s: First ruptures in multicultural policy

Despite suggestions for improvement of policies aimed at allochtonen – not all allochtonen, but only those in disadvantaged socio-economic conditions – by the WRR and other think tanks and researchers, the government continued its minority policy (Allochtonenbeleid: kabinetsstandpunt [Allochtonen policy: statement of the cabinet], 1990). Nonetheless, from the 1990s onwards there were the first signs of a departure from official multiculturalism. Institutionalized multiculturalism, for example, was no longer a policy goal. Also, from the 1990s onwards the political debate increasingly shifted from parliament to the media. In fact, there was increasing criticism from certain politicians and intellectuals that state policies had made immigrants increasingly dependent on state support and had allowed them to retreat within their own communities instead of integrating in Dutch society. This skepticism must be understood in the context of economic crisis in the early 1990s where unemployment was rising and state budgets were cut. The critics argued that being a Dutch citizen not only implied rights but also obligations (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Mitchell, 2004; Rose, 1999).

In 1991 Frits Bolkestein (a prominent Dutch politician from the VVD) caused a major uproar by stating in the national newspaper, de Volkskrant that “the integration of minorities must be tackled ‘with courage’” (Bolkestein, 1991a). His statements were targeted at the Muslim communities in the Netherlands as he considered Christianity and Islam to be incompatible. According to Prins (1997: 4), Bolkestein emphasized “a strong
defense of European society and her values – for example the universal values of separation of church and state, freedom of speech and the principle of non-discrimination – against Islam where these values had not been developed”. Therefore, he was of the opinion that Muslim immigrants living in the Netherlands had to be told that they could not undermine the foundations of western liberalism.

According to Prins (2002: 5-7) Bolkestein’s criticisms represented the formation of a new public discourse, which she labels ‘new realism.’ She convincingly distinguishes four characteristics of this new discourse. In the first place, Bolkestein presented himself as someone “who’s willing to face the facts and who openly speaks of ‘truths’ that were hidden in the existing discourse” (ibid: 5). Criticizing the immigrant integration was taboo in the Netherlands. Bolkestein spoke of the ‘courage’ and ‘creativity’ that were needed to solve the problem of immigrant integration, and how there was no space for ‘taboos’ or ‘open-endedness’ (Bolkestein, 1991a). Also, he was admired by his supporters for putting the perceived failings of immigrant integration on the political agenda.

Secondly, he presented himself as a spokesperson of the ordinary person, that is the non-(Muslim) immigrant population. He suggested that a lot of people were discontent, and knew on the basis of their everyday experience, especially in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of the big cities, what was really going on. However, they were afraid to voice their concern in public. Bolkestein was of the opinion that the voices of these people deserved to be represented. “Voters find that political parties do not take their experiences seriously” (Bolkestein, 1991b). At the same time he wanted to represent
the complaints of ‘ordinary people’ in order to avoid inter-ethnic conflict, as a result of neglecting existing feelings of discontent.

A third characteristic of the new realism is that realism is generally regarded by the Dutch to be a part of their national identity (Prins, 2002: 7). Vuijsje (1986) has argued that this realism disappeared after WWII, because of the feelings of guilt of the Dutch for the Jews who lost their lives in the war. Ever since, the Dutch have become extremely careful not to be blamed of racism when they treat people differently because of their ethnic background. For this reason, while the Dutch are very open and up front about many things, criticizing immigrant integration became a major taboo. Bolkestein with his statements intended to break this taboo. The outcome according to Prins, however, is that now everyone seems to be watching immigrants and the success and failure of immigrant integration. It is no longer taboo talking about immigrants, especially about the problems of immigrant integration.

Finally, the new realism of Bolkestein was intended to oppose the political ‘left.’ He and his supporters wanted “to break with the power of the progressive elites, who with their ‘politically correct’ statements about Fascism, racism and intolerance, hijacked the political domain” (Prins, 2002: 7).

Bolkestein was the first to disrupt received wisdoms about the Dutch public’s perception of ethnic minorities and related state policies. While many in the Netherlands agreed that a stronger commitment to integration was necessary, they were angry about the way he created partitions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and particularly between Western civilization and Islam. Also many people felt that Bolkestein’s focus on breaking taboos and by putting everything out in the open, only addressed the negative feelings about
minorities that existed among the (Dutch) public (Bagci, 1991; Rabbae, 1991). They were afraid of an immigrant backlash being created by this new realism. While a fierce public debate evolved, and the state responded by organizing a ‘national minorities debate,’ Bolkestein did not manage to gain massive public support. Nonetheless, his criticisms were the start of policy changes.

In the mid-1990s when the public debate about ethnic minorities, and above all their perceived lack of integration in Dutch society, became more heated, the multicultural model became increasingly disputed. Ethnic minorities continued to lag behind in education and unemployment increased, especially among low-skilled migrants. According to the government:

The situation [of ethnic minorities] for the future is extremely alarming. Reasons for this alarming situation are the stagnating economic development, the ongoing immigration, and the severe effects of this on societal support for integration policy (Antwoord Contourennota [Reply to the Contour Bill] 1994).

Taking this into account as well as the increasing diversity of the immigrant population, and responding to rising tensions in Dutch society Minderhedenbeleid was replaced by a new Integratiebeleid [Integration policy] in 1994. The new Integratiebeleid emphasized citizenship as “a mutual process of acceptance” (Contourennota Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden [Contour Bill Integration Policy Ethnic Minorities], 2004: 6) as a responsibility of each individual (irrespective of whether someone is an allochtoon or not). During this period the question of integration became understood as “a matter of lacking societal cohesion and solidarity.” (Fermin, 1997: 214)

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53 It was not until 2002, when Pim Fortuyn with similar arguments, succeeded in gaining massive support from the public.
In this new model less emphasis is put on promoting and facilitating multiculturalism. Instead, more emphasis is put on the need of integration, in particular through increased participation in education and labor (Entzinger, 2003: 72). The Dutch government now took the position that ethnic minorities should not only be given a chance to integrate, but that it could also be demanded that immigrants take the opportunities provided to them. In fact, according to this policy a multicultural society involves: peaceful coexistence – “the responsibility of individuals, businesses, and social institutions to create a place for all residents” (Ministerie van Grotesteden- en Integratiebeleid [Ministry of Big Cities and Integration Policy], 2002); equal rights and opportunities for immigrants in social spheres; and encouragement of active participation of ethnic minority groups in local politics and decision-making. And, finally, from the late 1990s onwards immigrant organizations no longer received public grants if their activities did not contribute to the increased participation of their individual members in Dutch society (Poppelaars, 2007: 4; TCOI, 2004: 471-516). So since the mid-1990s, immigrants were increasingly held personally responsible for their successful integration in Dutch society (Mitchell, 2004).

While immigrant was a problem of the big cities from the very start, it took a long time before this was also officially recognized by the state (for a more detailed overview see next section). In fact, only from 1998 onwards more priority was given to limiting and preventing further ethnic concentration in certain neighborhoods of big cities and to the task of cities to manage growing ethnic diversity. In 1998 a new Minister was appointed for Grote Steden en Integratiebeleid [Big Cities and Integration Policy]. It was a newly created position born out of the growing concern with ethnic concentration in
Dutch cities and fear of the development of ghettos (as in American cities). The new minister – Roger van Boxtel – was responsible for coordinating the policy, which involved actions from different state departments (e.g. urban renewal was the responsibility of the Department of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, whereas public safety was the duty of the Department of the Interior]. In the Bill *Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken* [Getting opportunities, taking opportunities] of 1998, the new goals were defined. *Grote Steden en Integratiebeleid* had to be successful in: improving the physical infrastructure in cities through urban renewal of disadvantaged neighborhoods (i.e., more expensive housing had to be built in order to encourage mixed-income neighborhoods), improving safety and livability in urban neighborhoods, and preventing marginalization, segregation and crime. While *Grote Steden en Integratiebeleid* was developed because of the recognition that problems with immigrant integration were specifically problems of cities, I would argue that at the same time urban problems were also seen as problems of immigration.

Also, the policy proposed a decentralization of power from the national state to the local level. Local authorities were made responsible for realizing the policy goals with financial support from the state (so-called *Grote Steden Beleid Fondsen* [Big Cities funds]). In addition, more emphasis was placed on the diversity between and within ethnic groups, and integration was now believed to be a mutual process of adjustment, of migrants and the host population. Furthermore, Van Boxtel also paid attention to the sentiments of a section of the host population who had experienced a rapid transformation of the ethnic and social composition of their neighborhoods. According to him there had been “too little emphasis on the efforts of the non-immigrant population to deal with the
effects of migrants”. As a result, more attention had to be given to *autochtone* residents who had seen the social and ethnic composition of their neighborhoods change in a short period of time.

In 1998, Paul Scheffer, a Dutch intellectual, wrote a long opinion article about the ‘multicultural tragedy’ in a Dutch newspaper. He warned of the development of an “ethnic underclass” in Dutch (big) cities, an underclass of immigrants who do not identify with Dutch society and values. This growing “ethnic underclass”, so he argued, is threatening the stability of Dutch society.

For long there is a focus in Dutch society on achieving equal opportunities and emancipation… integration across classes… but why isn’t there a debate about the lagging behind of large groups of immigrants and the development of an ethnic underclass (unemployment, poverty, school drop-outs, and crime are growing amongst minorities) (Scheffer, 1998).

Scheffer’s position was that integration policies that sought to maintain ethnic and cultural identity were farcical and should not be promoted by the state, because they widened social divisions instead of reducing them. Like Bolkestein, Scheffer addressed the fake tolerance “underneath which there are many hidden threats and problems” (Scheffer, 1998). In order to evaluate the effects of policy, Scheffer asked for a parliamentary research to evaluate the proceedings of integration policy. The essay created a fierce public debate, as it spoke to the feelings of a large section of the Dutch population towards immigrant integration. Furthermore, it was of great importance for changes that took place from 2001 onwards.
5.2.5 2000s: Increasing critiques of multiculturalism

The 1980s and 1990s were the heyday of Dutch multiculturalism. In the early 2000s, however, the situation of ethnic minorities had not improved significantly. Multicultural policies had framed the incorporation of immigrants into Dutch society as primarily a socio-economic and educational problem that had to be solved through the efforts of the state and state institutions. Immigrants’ educational deficiencies, limited knowledge of the Dutch language and of Dutch society were seen as the roots of these problems, but so was the subordination of immigrants – especially of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers – by the wider society and institutions. Incorporation in Dutch society was perceived as a long process (comparable to that which was engaged in by Catholics, Protestants and the working class in previous generations) that would take some time. As such, ethnic and religious segregation was not perceived as problematic.

This perspective changed from the 2000s onwards. The ‘multicultural drama’ as described by Scheffer had to be tackled immediately according to a number of politicians and academics. In so doing both rights and obligations evolved as key concepts among the critics of multiculturalism, reflecting a larger shift towards neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). This implied that both the problems migrants were experiencing (segregation, lacking education, unemployment) as well as the problems they were believed to cause (crime, riots, fundamentalism) had to be addressed. Urban problems therefore, became increasingly equated with problems of immigration. And, more specifically, the failing of immigrant integration became framed as a problem relating most prominently to Muslim immigrants as we will see in chapter 6 and 7, further
justified by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and voiced by politicians like Fortuyn, Bolkestein and more recently Wilders and Verdonk.

In 2002 this unease with immigrants and the perceived failing of multiculturalism caused a political backlash against immigration – in particular Muslim immigrants – that resulted in a major policy shift (see chapter 1). A growing section of the Dutch population was uncomfortable with the presence of ethnic minorities, especially Muslims, in urban spaces. These fears, created by the terrorist acts of September 11th 2001, resulted in a political backlash against immigrants in the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn was projected to win the national elections with a political program that entailed the forced assimilation of immigrants and a stop on further immigration. Fortuyn succeeded in mobilizing the latent feelings of dissatisfaction that existed amongst large sections of the Dutch population (see also chapter 1). Bolkestein and Scheffer never managed to speak to the masses, their criticisms stayed mainly within intellectual circles. Despite Fortuyn’s death, immigrant integration continued to be a matter for public debate. Under the ‘mask’ of tolerance, questioning the integration of immigrants for long had been taboo. In fact, this would have been perceived as an act of discrimination. The so-called culture of tolerance was characteristic of the way politics was taking place in the Netherlands. It had two sides. On the one hand it masked tensions as people were not permitted to speak badly of immigrants in public, but on the other hand it also meant that there existed no clear notion of the Dutch identity, of common reference points and clear rules. This last element, as is now commonly believed, could lead to negligence by for example the integration of immigrants.
Multiculturalism became the new taboo. The ascendancy of Fortuyn has sped up a process of ‘toughening’ in which ethnic minorities were increasingly scrutinized (see Prins and Slijper 2002). Not only did Fortuyn’s party, LPF, push for a toughening of immigration and immigrant integration policy in the short period they were part of the coalition cabinet (*Balkenende I*, coalition of CDA, LPF and VVD), but this was also taken on by the subsequent coalition cabinet (*Balkenende II*, coalition of CDA, VVD and D66), especially by politicians of the VVD. The problems of and with immigrants – their perceived failing integration – were no longer solely seen as a socio-economic problem, but also as a socio-cultural problem, arising from differences in culture, religion, norms and values.

The newly elected Dutch government officially moved away from the ideal of multiculturalism:

From day one this cabinet has started a major shift in integration policy. This shift has been worked out in a response of the cabinet on the report of the Parliamentary Commission Blok. The renewed integration policy of the cabinet contains a break with multiculturalism. The cabinet emphasizes the need to maintain the coherence of society without aiming at forcing assimilation of minorities (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [The Dutch House of Representatives] 2005, 30 304 Jaarnota Integratiebeleid 2005 [Annual Bill on Integration Policy 2005], vergaderjaar 2005-2006).

While it is stated that assimilation of minorities will not be forced, I would argue that a series of programs have been introduced that have a strong assimilationist agenda and illustrate the toughening of policies to scrutinize immigrants. One example is the

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54 Soon after the initiation of the new cabinet in September of 2002 a parliamentary commission was installed to investigate the success and/or failure of state integration policy from the 1970s until 2002. Immigrant integration – due to the efforts of Pim Fortuyn – appeared as the number 1 political priority in the national elections of 2002. To put action to words, the first action of the newly elected government was an evaluation of past integration policy in order to formulate a new integration policy for the next years.
introduction of so-called *inburgeringsbeleid* [naturalization policy] by the government, a trajectory that must be completed by all new immigrants and immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands for many years [read ethnic minorities whose integration is seen as problematic]. It entails a language test – every migrant should have a basic knowledge of the Dutch language\textsuperscript{55} - and lessons about Dutch culture and history. Other examples are the relocation of the Office of Integration from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of Justice following the elections of 2002. In the post-9/11 context immigration, in particular of Muslim immigrants, had become defined as a security issue. This explains why Integration was moved to the Department of Justice.

More so than ever before, communities and individuals themselves were held responsible for their integration into Dutch society. This corresponds with the findings of Katharyne Mitchell (2004, 645), who argues that new (neoliberal) governmentalities have developed, by which:

Those who choose *not* to assimilate are represented as individuals unwilling to participate in civic life who can, as a result, be excluded from society without incurring damage to the core ideals of a universalist liberal project (Mitchell 2004: 645, her emphasis).

It were no longer (state) institutions that were primarily responsible for immigrants’ success in Dutch society. Hence, failure became increasingly conceptualized in terms of individual characteristics, rather than as the outcomes of institutionalized racism, segregation or marginalization in the host society.

\textsuperscript{55} The idea is that immigrants must learn the Dutch language at special language centers in their country of origin. Once they have passed the test they can move to the Netherlands (this policy aims to reduce family reunification through marriage).
With the new policy direction, responsibility for immigrant integration not only shifted to the Department of Justice – representing the new emphasis on ‘homeland security’ – but was also increasingly decentralized to local councils and governing boards of local schools. At the same time budgets were cut, causing many *inburgeringsprogramma*’s [naturalization programs] to be put on hold. Also, the organizing of immigrants along ethnic or religious lines was now met with mistrust, as a sign that immigrants did not want to participate and chose isolation. It was now expected that migrant organizations should organize activities that aim at fostering interaction and co-operation with other groups. If activities did not reach these goals, then migrant organizations’ subsidies would be cut.

The development of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands has become a very lucrative industry. Millions of Euros are circulating in the economy of immigrant integration. For that reason it seems important for many to emphasize the problems with immigrant integration instead of also pointing to the many success stories. These do not appear in any of the documents, while statistical data does show that the number of immigrants with a university degree is rising, that more immigrants are politically active, and that an improvement of socio-economic status also causes many immigrants to move to the suburbs. I will discuss some of these success stories in chapters 7 and 8.

Also, the backlash against multiculturalism in policy is not specific to the Netherlands. It is also stimulated by what is going on outside of the Dutch borders: 9/11, race riots in Britain, debates about wearing the headscarf in France, Danish cartoons, new waves of immigration, and perceived economic insecurity in the context of ongoing globalization. Vertovec and Wessendorf (2008) speak of a “confused multiculturalism”,

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referring to a public that, on the one hand, is of the opinion that there are limits to multiculturalism, but whose openness or acceptance of multiculturalism is high. The public is ok with a multicultural society, but is afraid of growing numbers of immigrants, religion, and unfamiliar practices.

5.3 Spatial policy and immigrant integration

In the previous sections I have described the history of policies aimed at immigrant incorporation in the Netherlands. As I discussed, problems with immigrant integration were mainly experienced in the big cities, where immigrants have concentrated. In fact, from the very start immigrant incorporation was a problem of big cities. Policies aimed at dispersing migrants from Indonesia and Surinam and later asylum seekers equally across the country never succeeded. Immigrants moved to the cities anyway. In this section I will discuss the history of urban policies aimed at managing immigrant incorporation in Dutch cities. I argue that while local authorities already signaled problems, it took national policy a long time to attend to the problems of integration in the daily life of cities.

5.3.1 1960s – 1970s: ‘building for the neighborhood’

In the 1960s and 1970s the ethnic composition of cities changed rapidly, but no additional funds were made available by the state to accommodate the new immigrants. Local authorities were aware of the problems with immigrant incorporation, but they ran
into limits of state policies. No additional funds were provided by the state\(^{56}\) to address the problems that were identified in cities. Hence, cities started searching for instruments to address the problems associated with the spatial concentration of immigrants and various social problems. For example, after its first race riot (see chapter 6) the city of Rotterdam asked permission of the Dutch state to limit the percentage of immigrants per neighborhood to a maximum of 5\% (Veenman, 2001). A juridical sentence prevented this, as it was argued that these measures were discriminating and conflicted with the International Agreements of Human Rights.

In 1973, the four big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) wrote a pamphlet – *the big city as a problem area* – with the purpose of influencing the content of the Third Policy document on spatial policy and demanding additional funds to tackle “urban problems”. The municipalities were concerned with state plans to support suburbanization to newly built communities outside of the cities, and the loss of middle class households that suburbanization would entail. They were afraid that socio-economic problems would increasingly concentrate in cities, and that inter-ethnic tensions would increase. In other words, urban problems became increasingly equated with problems of immigration.

The government responded by introducing its first urban renewal program with the goal of improving the quality of the housing stock, which had been neglected for many years (Ministerie VROM [Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment], 1997: 12). Similar policies existed in the UK and the United States at the

\(^{56}\) As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, 90\% of the budget of municipalities came from the state. Hence, municipalities had to justify their spending.
time, but what distinguished the Dutch urban renewal policy from its counterparts was its scale and its length. Characteristic of the Dutch urban renewal policy was its grounding on the ideology that socio-economic problems could be countered through interventions in the built environment (ibid). It was an instrument to tackle social unrest in the city. Many urban neighborhoods were revitalized and the ‘classical’ urban renewal policy – replacing private rental housing by modern social housing – lasted into the 1990s. For a long time Rotterdam was the exemplar of this type of urban renewal. Dilapidated buildings were demolished and replaced with new social housing. Characteristic of this housing was that it looked the same everywhere.

Urban renewal programs were sold as “building for the neighborhood”, but I agree with Uitermark (2003) that in reality it meant building for autochtone residents. While it greatly improved the housing situation for many it did not improve the housing situation of immigrants who did not have access to social housing. In the meanwhile the number of immigrants continued to increase. In 1978 Amsterdam already had 11,491 Moroccans and 9,278 Turkish residents. Rotterdam had 9,225 Moroccans and 29,123 Turkish residents (Jansen, 2000: 69). And from the mid-1970s onwards both cities had also received many migrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles.

5.3.2 1980s: growing concern with the housing conditions of immigrants

As was discussed earlier in this chapter, many guest workers ended up staying in the Netherlands. However, the state took no responsibility to provide housing for guest workers and their families (Verwey-Jonker, 2003). This changed in 1983 with the implementation of the first Minority Policy. A small division within the Department of
Housing was established with the task of improving the housing situation of immigrants in the Netherlands. In fact, in the *Circulair Huisvesting Minderheden* [Letter on the Housing of Minorities] (1983) it was stated that minorities were to be given better opportunities to rent housing in better quality neighborhoods and in the social housing sector. As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, immigrants did not have the same access to the housing market as Dutch residents. Guest workers were not allowed to apply for social housing, as they were only to stay temporarily, and immigrants from the former colonies, who were allowed access to social housing, ended up at the bottom of the waiting list and had to wait for years. Because immigrants tended to have low incomes, they increasingly concentrated in inner city neighborhoods with cheap and low quality housing.

One of the outcomes of the first Minority Policy was that from the mid-1980s onwards immigrants were granted access to social housing. As more and more immigrant families moved into social housing, their housing situation improved. However, an unintended outcome was the increasing concentration of immigrants. As *autochtonen* suburbanized, immigrant families replaced them. While the goal of improving the housing situation of immigrants was accomplished, local authorities were increasingly concerned with the concentration of immigrants in certain neighborhoods of the city.

5.3.3 1990s: Social mixing as a policy ideal

The concern about segregation and the development of ghettos increased in political and societal debates in the 1990s (Kleinhans *et al.*, 2000: 10). Because of these circumstances,

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57 Most of the housing in Rotterdam and Amsterdam at the time was social housing.
concerns, the state increasingly emphasized the social dimension of spatial planning and housing policy (Kleinhans et al, 2000; Reijndorp, 1996; Vermeijden, 1997). In order to counter class segregation at the urban scale, urban policy experts increasingly pushed for social mixing through the building more expensive housing in disadvantaged neighborhoods. These debates resulted in the framing of immigrant integration as an urban problem with the implementation of a new policy on urban renewal (‘urban renewal, new style’) and the creation of the Ministerie voor Grote Steden en Integratiebeleid [Department of Big Cities and Integration Policy] (see above).

It was stated in the bill Stedelijke Vernieuwing [Urban Renewal] that in order to secure a “healthy future for the city”, the housing stock and population composition had to be differentiated (Ministerie VROM, 1997: 5). Underlying the urban renewal agenda was a clear policy rationale of immigrant integration:

Urban renewal can contribute to differentiating neighborhoods with a high concentration of minorities, thereby stabilizing these neighborhoods and having a positive effect on the image of the neighborhood (Ministerie VROM, 1997: 44).

Hence, besides understanding immigrant integration as an urban problem, this quote also illuminates that urban problems are a problem of immigration. The concentration of ethnic minorities in neighborhoods is perceived as destabilizing neighborhoods. And, as the following quote demonstrates, ethnic minorities are blamed for urban problems.

… policy can contribute to tackling problems that are connected to the position of ethnic minorities in cities (Ministerie VROM, 1997: 44).

The new urban renewal policy therefore had different goals compared to urban renewal in the 1960s. There was not only the goal of immigrant incorporation, but urban renewal
now also involved more than solely improving the quality of the housing. In fact, there was also a strong focus on improving the quality of the living environment: improving squares, parks, streets and addressing crime and other socio-economic problems. Nonetheless, most of the funding – raised through public-private partnerships (state, municipalities, housing corporations and private parties) - was used for building housing for the middle classes. Only a small share of the budget was available for socio-economic renewal. Therefore, once again there was a strong belief that through interventions in the built environment society could be managed.

An important focus of Grotestedenbeleid was to realize neighborhoods that “offer safe, healthy and social living conditions instead of disadvantaged conditions” (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2004: 19). There seemed to be a concern that spatial concentration of low income families would form a treat to the social well-being of these residents as well as to the country at large (the threat of the formation of a structural underclass). While the policy takes class as a central problem, in practice immigrants are disproportionally represented among the lowest social classes in these neighborhoods and therefore disproportionally affected by urban renewal.

With the Rapportage Integratiebeleid [Report on Integration Policy] (2002), state policy for the first time explicitly spoke not only about the ambition to reduce the concentration of socio-economically deprived allochtonen in urban neighborhoods, but also of deprived allochtonen as a threat for the stability of the nation state.

Because socio-economically deprived allochtonen in disadvantaged neighborhoods are overrepresented in criminal acts and nuisance and the integration in these neighborhoods is difficult to achieve, policy that aims at encouraging dispersal particularly targets these allochtone groups in these neighborhoods (TK, 2002-2003, 28162, nr. 3, p. 3).
In the above quote, urban problems are clearly ascribed to a specific group of *allochtonen*. This policy specifically targeted socio-economically deprived *allochtonen*, leaving it unclear, however, how this is defined in everyday practice on the street and in neighborhoods. What this furthermore demonstrates is that urban renewal policy from its very start has served as an instrument to try to tackle social unrest (striking dock workers, rebelling youth). Hence, the population composition of neighborhoods from the start played a very important role in urban renewal policies. It was intended to tie middle class families to the city and to avoid the concentration of disadvantaged groups. Nonetheless, major protests occurred in neighborhoods where part of the population was forced to leave and find housing elsewhere in the city.

Clearly, integration policy has become increasingly spatialized. The problem of integration is associated with certain urban neighborhoods, particularly neighborhoods with large immigrant populations, like *Bijlmermeer*, a neighborhood in the southeast district of Amsterdam suffering from a dilapidated built environment, drugs, crime and socio-economic marginalization of a disproportional number of its residents. Or neighborhoods on the western periphery of the city, where there are increasing signs of radicalization of Muslim youth. In order to avoid further downgrading of these neighborhoods, urban renewal, geared towards attracting the middle and upper classes to disadvantaged neighborhoods, or the dispersal of low-income groups over city regions, is seen as a solution. Marketing diversity can be seen as one strategy to attract new groups, thereby turning the problem (immigrants) into an asset (diversity) (Bodaar, 2006: 177).

Social mixing becomes an important topic in the 1990s, despite criticism of state attempts to manage society through interventions in the built environment. The empirical
case studies discussed in the following chapters are two different moments in terms of integration policy. When they were first designed – in the early or late 1990s – multiculturalism was still the dominant policy discourse. It was in this context that symbolic projects aimed at socio-cultural integration were designed and urban renewal emphasized various elements of multiculturalism. However, at the time of the fieldwork – 2002 to 2004 – multiculturalism was increasingly critiqued and destabilized as a discourse. This affected interactions at and use of urban neighborhoods and squares, as will become clear.
CHAPTER 6
AMSTERDAM AND ROTTERDAM: GEOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC,
HISTORICAL, AND POLICY CONTEXT

6.1 Introduction

Cities in the Netherlands, as well as elsewhere in the Western world, are experiencing growing ethnic and cultural diversity. This chapter discusses the urban context of integration policies in the Netherlands. First, I will provide an overview of Amsterdam and Rotterdam within the larger Dutch urban framework. Secondly, I discuss four defining moments in the relationship between these two cities and state integration policy. I argue that Rotterdam’s concerns with immigrant integration and the development of an ethnic underclass have been central to redefining national policy. Amsterdam, on the other hand, has used more subtle tactics to facilitate immigrant integration.

6.2 Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands

The Dutch urban system is characterized by a number of relatively small cities. While The Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, there are no cities with a population of over 1 million residents.
The four largest cities of the country – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht – are all located in the western part of the country, and together form a large, urbanized area known as the *Randstad* (see figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 The Randstad Region in the Netherlands

The Randstad is the largest urban area of the Netherlands with a total population of 6.5 million (CBS, 2003) (the population of the Netherlands was just over 16 million in 2004 (CBS, 2008)). The urban region is the economic, cultural and political center of the Netherlands. Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands and currently has a population of 739,000 (O+S, 2004), making it the largest city in the country. With 599,000 inhabitants, Rotterdam is the second largest city in the country (COS, 2004) (see table 6.1)
Table 6.1 Total inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam 1990-2004

For a long time, the administrative structure of the Netherlands was characterized by a strong centralization of power at the national level. From the 1970s onwards, however, power has been increasingly decentralized to city and sub-city authorities. This decentralization was partly a response to changing economic circumstances as well as the result of various protest movements in the 1960s and 1970s that struggled for more power at the neighborhood level. The different ways decentralization is organized at the local level is important for understanding the different local implementation and development of spatial policies aimed at immigrant integration, and the geographically differentiated outcomes of policy implementation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Both Amsterdam and Rotterdam are divided into city districts. The municipality of Amsterdam consists of 15 city districts, and the municipality of Rotterdam of 11 city districts (see figure 6.2 and 6.3)

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58 In Rotterdam the seaport, industrial areas, the village of Pernis – a village in between the harbors too small to be separate city district – and the city center are centrally governed.
Figure 6.2 Amsterdam’s 15 city districts

Figure 6.3 Rotterdam’s 11 city districts
The city districts in Amsterdam have slightly more responsibilities than the city districts in Rotterdam. While the public administration models of both cities look very similar (see table 6.2.), in practice more activities are transferred to the city districts in Amsterdam. For example, garbage collection or the development of properties. This difference was also mentioned in one of my interviews with Freek van Dam, an ex-politician of De Baarsjes in Amsterdam who experienced the differences in organization between the two cities when he was hired as policy advisor for the mayor in Rotterdam, after having worked as district politician in Amsterdam for many years.

City districts in Amsterdam have much more responsibility. They have their own political organization, their own street cleaning and maintenance, their own education department. Ok, it also often goes wrong here, because they operate at a scale that is too small, but you are at least forced to work together. In Rotterdam they have a budget, but they are forced to buy their services off the city, for example for street cleaning. So you purchase a certain amount of cleaning, but then you have no idea what kind of material and workers you get. You have no say in this. In Amsterdam, each district has its own cleaners and material. That way you can directly approach the personnel and call upon them if you need extra service in a particular area of the district (Freek van Dam, Dutch, ex-politician).

Despite decentralization, 80% of the cities’ budgets are still redistributed directly to the city from the national state. While this involves state funds, cities over the years have been granted more responsibility to decide how to spend this money. They publicize a budget each year, in which cities show how they will spend their money. Only for specific state funded programs – such as the urban renewal program – cities have to submit plans to the state in order to qualify for additional funding.
### Administrative structure

#### City Administration:

**Tasks:**
- Mayor – appointed by the Crown.
- 7 Aldermen – elected for 4 years by population.
- City council – elected for 4 years by population.
- Budget in 2004: 4.4 billion Euros
- Establishing the budget of the city and distributing state funds equally over districts.
- Police
- Public security
- Everything that concerns the city at large: e.g. policy development, maintenance of main roads, social security, and public transportation.

#### City Districts Administration:

**Tasks:**
- 15 city districts*
- District mayor, aldermen (4 in Bijlmermeer and 3 in Baarsjes due to different size of the population) and district council – elected for four years by district population.
- management of public space (garbage collection, fixing roads, cleaning streets, parks, sportsfields, graveyards, etc.) – governs its own maintenance organization
- Zoning
- Services to population: passports, driving licences, construction permits, permits for bars, restaurants, nightclubs
- Policy development (everything that concerns the city district, also urban renewal plans)

### Rotterdam

**Tasks:**
- Mayor – appointed by the Crown.
- 7 Aldermen – elected for 4 years by population.
- City council – elected for 4 years by population.
- Budget in 2004: 5 billion Euros
- Establishing the budget of the city and distributing state funds equally over districts
- Police
- Public security
- Everything that concerns the city at large: e.g. policy development, maintenance of main roads, social security, and public transportation
- Housing and Zoning

#### City Districts

**Tasks:**
- 11 city districts **
- 3 district managers, a secretary*** and a district council – elected for four years by district population
- management of public space (garbage collection, fixing roads, cleaning streets, parks, sportsfields, graveyards, etc.), but service must be bought from central city cleaning organization.
- Services to population: passports, driving licences, construction permits, permits for bars, restaurants, nightclubs
- Policy development (social and educational policies)

* Including city district Westpoort which continues to be governed by the city, because it is largely an industrial area with few residents.

** The city center of Rotterdam, the industrial areas and the annexed village of Pernis are governed by the city, because of the economic interest of the city center and industrial areas for the city and the limited number of residents in Pernis.

*** The secretary is the head of the civil servants who work for the district as well as the secretary for the district managers and district council.

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Table 6.2 Administrative structure of Rotterdam and Amsterdam
6.2.1 Economic structure and employment

Amsterdam has always been a major cultural and financial center in the Netherlands. Financial services, commerce and related activities, and tourism are the main economic activities in Amsterdam today (Slijper, 2002; see also table 6.3.). Also, the main international airport is located here, providing an important source for employment and functioning as an important gateway to Amsterdam. Finally, Amsterdam’s large historical city center makes it an attractive city for visitors and migrants from both developed as well as less developed countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry (and agriculture)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing and Press</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and distributive trade</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel and catering industry</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and telecom</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks and insurance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business services</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government, public sector</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, university</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, welfare, environment</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services, culture, sports, recreation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (368,370)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kamer van Koophandel, 2002

Table 6.3 Share of employment by sector in the Amsterdam municipality (%), 2001

Rotterdam, contrary to Amsterdam, is an industrial city in transition. Starting in the 19th century the city began industrializing around its seaport, and following WWII the expansion of the seaport became the priority of the city. In 1964 Rotterdam became the
largest seaport in the world. Some people believe that this *only* happened because Rotterdam was bombed during WWII. The bombardment of 1940 – as part of the German attack on the Netherlands to break the resilience of Dutch troops in other parts of the country – destroyed Rotterdam’s historic city center. Peter van Dijk, a community worker in Spangen, when guiding me through Delfshaven and showing me the old harbor, was one the people in Rotterdam who told me about the eagerness of residents and local government during WWII to rebuild the city and its economy to demonstrate that they had not been defeated.

Rotterdam probably would never have been the largest seaport in the world had it not been bombarded. The bombardment is still a sensitive topic for those residents who experience it. They have done whatever was in their power to put the city back on the map. They worked really hard to reach this goal (Peter van Dijk, Dutch, community worker).

Amsterdam never experienced the same destruction due to WWII. The focus on the seaport also caused Rotterdam to develop a one-sided economy. When deindustrialization started in the 1970s – reaching its peak in the late 1980s – Rotterdam, like many other industrial cities in Europe and North America, was hit hard. Industries moved operations abroad or introduced new technologies that replaced labor. As a consequence, a lot of jobs were lost. Local authorities in Rotterdam aim to transform the city’s economy to become more service oriented (see table 6.4).

Table 6.4 shows that the total number of jobs have increased in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, but more jobs have been created in Amsterdam compared to Rotterdam. Both cities experienced a decline in the number of jobs in the manufacturing sector. Nonetheless, Rotterdam continues to have more jobs in the manufacturing sector
compared to Amsterdam. Due to its port function, Rotterdam has a significant share of jobs in the transportation and communication sector. Whereas the number of jobs in this sector is rising in Amsterdam, it is being reduced in Rotterdam. An explanation for the decline of jobs in this sector might be the introduction of computer-steered technologies to organize the transshipment of containers in Rotterdam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Fishing</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining industry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public utilities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering industry</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business services</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, recreation and other services</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total % (and total number)</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(374,800)</td>
<td>(464,530)</td>
<td>(292,180)</td>
<td>(337,680)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, 2008

Table 6.4 Number of jobs in different economic sectors (%)

In 2003 55% of Rotterdam’s households had an income of less than € 22,000 (which corresponds to an income in the lowest 40% of the income distribution), compared to 48% of all households in Amsterdam (COS Rotterdam, 2008). Also, Amsterdam has more households with an income in the top 20% of the income
distribution: 19% in Amsterdam, compared to 15% in Rotterdam. Amsterdam’s population, therefore is wealthier than the population in Rotterdam. Statistics on the number of households with an income below the poverty line, however, show that in Rotterdam 15% and in Amsterdam 16% of all households has an income below the poverty line (COS Rotterdam, 2003). In other words, while Amsterdam has more households with a high income, there are still a large number of households who live in poverty. This poverty tends to concentrate among immigrants (Body-Gendrot, 2002; Rijkschroeff et al, 2003; Veldboer et al, 2002). Data on the average household incomes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam do indeed demonstrate that the average household income (standardized for household size) is slightly below that of Amsterdam: €18,200 in Rotterdam versus €19,400 in Amsterdam in 2003 (COS Rotterdam, 2008). Unemployment levels, however, are very similar between the two cities: 16% in Amsterdam and 17% in Rotterdam in 2003 (COS Rotterdam, 2008).

6.2.2 Housing market

In the late 1960s, with the onset of suburbanization in the Netherlands, the middle class moved away from the city. Urban renewal that started in Rotterdam in 1974 created a large social rental sector in the city and contributed to the city’s one-sided housing market, which is marked by an abundance of relatively inexpensive, small housing. It focused on creating housing for the working class, but caused middle class residents to move out of the city. In 2003, over 75% of the housing stock in Rotterdam had a value of less than € 100,000. In Amsterdam less than 40% of the housing stock had a value of less than € 100,000 (CBS, 2008). Amsterdam has remained more attractive as a city to live in
for the middle class. In fact, Amsterdam’s historical city center is still very popular as a place to live, and also attracts millions of tourists every year. Rotterdam’s historic inner city was bombed during WWII. Only fragments of the inner city remain.

In Amsterdam there continues to be a lot of pressure on the housing market. The demand for housing is larger than the supply of housing and this causes illegal subleasing to be a flourishing business in the city. Where this mainly involves students and young professionals in Amsterdam, in Rotterdam illegal subleasing is less common. Both cities continue to have a large social housing sector, although in recent years more owner occupied housing is built and part of the rental stock is being converted into social housing (see tables 6.5 and 6.6). Amsterdam differs from the national average in that most of the housing stock consists of rental housing, and only 19% of the housing is owner-occupied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Owner-occupied</th>
<th>Private rental</th>
<th>Social rental</th>
<th>Total number (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>373,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>284,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>216,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>111,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6,649,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aalbers et al, 2003: 23

Table 6.5 Housing stock in Dutch cities by tenure (%), 2001
6.2.3 Immigrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam

As was discussed in chapter 3, most immigrants have settled in cities. Of all immigrants 40% live in the four big cities, while only 13% of the total population of the Netherlands lives in these cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (average)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.6 The share of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (%)

Table 6.6 shows the increasing share of ethnic minorities (this does not include people who are born or of whom one or both parents are born in an industrialized country, see chapter 1 for definition) in Amsterdam and Rotterdam as well as their concentration in the country’s largest cities. In 1995 already one-third of the cities’ populations consisted of ethnic minorities. When taking the broader concept of *allochtoon* (every person who is born abroad or of whom one or both parents are born abroad), in 2004 already 45% of the population of Rotterdam (COS, 2004) and 48% of the population of Amsterdam (O+S, 2004) was *allochtoon*.
Table 6.7 Concentration of _allochtonen_ in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th></th>
<th>Rotterdam</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles and Aruba</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verdes</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western <em>allochtonen</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-western <em>allochtonen</em></td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, 2008

While both cities have a similar share of immigrants in their population, the composition of the population differs in terms of ethnic background (see table 6.7). Amsterdam has a larger share of immigrants from Ghana and Morocco, whereas more immigrants from Turkey and Cape Verde settled in Rotterdam. Another difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam is that Amsterdam has a larger share of ‘Western immigrants’\(^{59}\) (immigrants from Europe, US, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, New Zealand and Canada) in its population.

In the period 1997 to 2003 the share of non-western immigrants, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants increased in both cities. In the statistical category of non-western immigrants are a large number of asylum seekers who started arriving in the Netherlands from the 1990s onwards. Where the share of the population from Surinam stayed the same in the population of Amsterdam, the share of this ethnic group increased in Rotterdam.

\(^{59}\) Statistical classification, not my term.
What is really important here is that the way the statistics on immigrants are collected has consequences for the way the integration of immigrants is framed in policy programs and for the instruments chosen to manage immigrant integration in Dutch cities (Dean, 1999). The particular way in which statistical data is collected – i.e. including Indonesians and Japanese in the statistical category of ‘Western allochtonen’ – demonstrates that what is at stake is not integration per se, but about the integration of those groups of immigrants whose integration is considered problematic. Integration is not about integrating immigrants from industrialized countries and relatively well to do groups (e.g. from Indonesia). In fact, the Japanese community in the Netherlands is not at all integrated and lives in relative isolation, but since this group is economically self-sufficient and is not visible in crime statistics, school drop-outs and is not claiming welfare, they are not considered a problem group that needs to be monitored and governed. The statistical category of ‘non-western allochtonen’ then lumps together all immigrant groups who are considered problematic.

Both in Amsterdam and Rotterdam immigrants tend to concentrate in certain districts and neighborhoods of the city. Figure 6.4 shows the concentration of immigrants in city districts of Amsterdam. What this map shows is that most immigrants in Amsterdam concentrate in neighborhoods west, east and to the southeast of the city center. The highest concentration of immigrants can be found in district Southeast and in Bos and Lommer (the district north of De Baarsjes). In the 1990s ethnic minorities increasingly moved towards the post-war housing estates on the western and southeastern sites of the city. The Moroccan and Turkish population concentrates in the neighborhoods west and east of the city center, whereas immigrants from Surinam, the Dutch Antilles
and Africa concentrate in the Southeast district of the city. The city center and the neighborhoods south of the city center continue to be the domain of the *autochtone* Dutch population and immigrants from industrialized countries. The middle classes and upper classes concentrate in these areas. The neighborhoods on the east and western sides of the city were built for the working class who were employed in the nearby seaport.


Figure 6.4 Concentration of immigrants in city districts of Amsterdam in 2004 (%)
In Rotterdam, the immigrant population was always more concentrated in the inner city neighborhoods (City center, Delfshaven, Noord), and only more recently there has been a shift of immigrant concentrations to the south of the river Maas (Charlois, Feijenoord). Whereas in Amsterdam the peripheral neighborhoods have large immigrant populations, in Rotterdam immigrants have clustered in the inner city neighborhoods. In Rotterdam the highest concentration of immigrants can be found in the districts Delfshaven, Charlois and Feijenoord, north and south of the river.

Source: COS Rotterdam, 2008

Figure 6.5 Concentration of immigrants in the city districts of Rotterdam in 2004

6.3 Genealogy of differences and similarities of urban policies aimed at immigrant integration in Rotterdam and Amsterdam

6.3.1 1960-1980: The arrival and accommodation of guest workers

In this chapter I am not taking historical waves of immigration into account. I only refer to those groups that settled in Rotterdam and Amsterdam following WWII. While a large number of immigrants from the former Dutch Indies settled in the
Netherlands following the independence of Indonesia, few of them settled in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. Even though these migrants arrived in the port of Rotterdam, many of them settled in The Hague and elsewhere in the Netherlands (Veenman, 2001). It was not until the 1960s that immigrants started arriving and changing the ethnic population composition of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Due to labor shortages in the expanding industries of Amsterdam and Rotterdam (as well as elsewhere in the Netherlands), companies started recruiting foreign guest laborers to fill the low-skilled jobs. The temporary guest worker was seen as the solution to labor market shortage (Penninx et al, 1993). In the early 1960s both Amsterdam and Rotterdam started recruiting laborers from Spain and to a lesser extent from Italy. Once industrialization started taking off in these countries and economic opportunities improved, this source of guest laborers dried up. Increasingly, laborers from Spain and Italy were replaced by Yugoslavians, many of who worked in the metal industry in Rotterdam and the surrounding region (Veenman, 2001). This was followed by the recruitment of guest workers from Turkey and Morocco. In Amsterdam most laborers were attracted from Morocco, whereas Rotterdam recruited most of its laborers from Turkey. This difference can to this day still be traced in the composition of the migrant population in both cities.

As was discussed in chapter 5 the guest workers were expected to stay only temporarily. For this reason, national authorities did not perceive the influx of immigrants to be a problem that needed to be managed. It was not considered necessary to incorporate guest workers into Dutch society by, for example, offering them Dutch language courses and informing them about their rights and responsibilities. They were
to return to their home countries once their contracts had expired, after all. Politicians, policy-makers and community workers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, however, were concerned with the social and living conditions of guest workers, and aimed at improving this situation. This first phase of local authority intervention (1960-1978) can be labeled as that of ‘accommodating policy’, because local authorities during this time first and foremost supported immigrants to stay connected to their own communities (in order to facilitate their return) and aimed at improving the living situation of guest workers. With funds from the national state for subsidizing community work, the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam encouraged immigrant groups to set up migrant organizations and sustained these organizations through subsidies (Uitermark et al., 2005; Veerman, 2001). Emphasis, therefore, both nationally and locally, was not placed on integration, but on the return of guest workers.

At the same time there was a growing concern with the living conditions of guest workers as well as with the concentration of immigrants in certain neighborhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Increasingly, therefore, the presence of guest workers, and particularly their concentration in certain urban neighborhoods was made visible (Dean, 1999) – through maps and statistics – by politicians and policy advisors in the big cities as a policy problem. As cheap housing was available in the old working class neighborhoods of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, most immigrants settled here (Aalbers et al., 2003: 19). The changing ethnic composition of some inner city neighborhoods caused tensions to rise between the host population and guest workers. While in Amsterdam no major riots between host and immigrant populations were reported, tensions between the host population and guest workers escalated in 1972 in the Afrikaanderwijk in the
Charlois district of Rotterdam (see the dark green area on map 6.2). After a couple of fights between the host population and Turkish guest workers, a group of residents entered a guesthouse where Turkish guest workers lived and completely demolished it, so that the building was no longer inhabitable and thus could not be rented out by the Turkish landlord to Turkish guest workers. This was the start of of three days of riots targeted at guest workers in the Afrikaanderwijk. In De tafel van Spruit [the table of Spruit] two journalists are presenting the personal stories of residents who lived in the Afrikaanderwijk, in order to trace how a sense of living together evolved in a neighborhood where now over 50% of residents is immigrant. Piet Spruit is one of the neighborhood residents interviewed. In this fragment Piet is recalling a conversation he had with his brother in 1972 on the day of the riots. Autochtone residents grouped together to push the guest workers out.

Jan said to his brother: ‘Piet, I am fed up with these buitenlanders [foreigners]. It must stop now. My wife cannot even walk on the street safely anymore, nor do my children. Will you join tonight at the Turkenpanden [buildings where the Turkish live]? We are with a big group and we are going to empty these buildings… Piet: ‘My son told me they [daughter and wife] are now afraid to walk through the Paarlstraat. You blood starts boiling when you hear that.’… well you are young and short-tempered and so you join. (Fragment from Dekker, J. and B. Senstius (2001) De Tafel van Spruit: een multicultural safari in Rotterdam [The Table of Spruit: a multicultural safari in Rotterdam]: 10)

The residents felt threatened by the Turkish guest workers and left alone by local authorities and the police who did not do anything to stop the influx of more guest workers. After this riot in the Paarlstraat riots moved to other streets and lasted for three days. A second catalyst, as Piet Spruit explains for the riots was that young Dutch residents felt they were treated unequally on the housing market.
‘I understand that riots escalated to nearby streets. Recently married couples were forced to live with their mothers for four or five years. They could not find an apartment, while guest workers were moving into apartment after apartment. Slumlords saw profit in renting apartments to guest workers. This way they made lots of money: for every guest worker they earned 100 guilders a week (ibid: 10).

The problematic relationship between Dutch and immigrant residents in a number of low-income neighborhoods of Rotterdam caused the city administration of Rotterdam to start searching for instruments – governmental technologies – to actively disperse immigrants over the various neighborhoods. Managing the population composition of neighborhoods had long concerned local and national authorities, but this time it involved the *ethnic composition* of the neighborhood (Uitermark, 2003). The purpose of the city was “to reduce influx of immigrants into the low income districts” (Veenman, 2001: 10) and to avoid the population balance being disturbed as ‘too many’ immigrants moved in. The city proposed to limit the number of immigrants in any given neighborhood to a maximum of 5%. The political administrative structure in the Netherlands required the city of Rotterdam to ask permission of the national state. This was not approved. In fact, the allocation on the basis of ethnicity was declared unlawful by the national government, because it discriminated on the basis of ethnicity/country of origin (GSIB2004/61969, 2004). This required a major adjustment by the city’s politicians who had made the dispersal of migrants central to their platforms. Following the rejection of the policy plan by the state a number of studies were conducted on patterns of segregation and on possible policy instruments (see a series of studies by Mik *et al.*, 1980). There was a need to search for new governing technologies to still realize the ideal of dispersal of immigrants across the city. These were not found. The policy document *Migranten in*
Rotterdam [Migrants in Rotterdam] (1978: 23) for example stated that there are indirect instruments to change the settlement pattern, but that their outcomes are limited. Private landlords were blamed for frustrating policy efforts, because it was in their interest to rent out properties to migrants and to earn as much money as they could of immigrants, even when this was not good for the neighborhood. For example, when the quality of housing deteriorated as too many people lived in one building or when this caused young people being pushed out of the neighborhood.

In Amsterdam tensions also existed between the host population and immigrants, but they did not result in a clash. Politicians in Amsterdam were not openly concerned so much with the dispersal of immigrants, yet the urban renewal of inner city neighborhoods – that started in the early 1970s in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam – has been used effectively (chapter 7 and 8) as an instrument for changing the population composition of neighborhoods. That social mixing, in practice implied ethnic mixing was never openly stated. Managing the population composition of neighborhoods played a central role in urban renewal policies from its very start (see also Uitermark, 2003). Urban renewal involved the demolition or renovation of private rental housing and their conversion to social housing. The demolition of housing led to protests by the autochtone residents who feared displacement and demanded that they could return to their homes after the renewal operation. By recognizing the demands of local residents, and providing them opportunities for participation and negotiation, urban renewal started operating under the rubric of ‘building for the neighborhood’. Nonetheless, not all residents could return after the renewal operation. A choice was therefore made for allocation on the basis of years of residence. Five years was taken as a starting point, and while technically immigrants
could qualify for a new home, in practice they had not lived in the neighborhood long enough to qualify for a new home. The (unintended) effect of the indicator, therefore, was to maximize the number of non-immigrants in the neighborhood. I support Uitermark’s (2003) argument that the title ‘building for the neighborhood’ is misleading because the policy really was about building homes for the Dutch population, and avoiding the concentration of immigrants. Hence already in the 1970s urban renewal was a strategy of local authorities to avoid the suburbanization of the *autochtone* middle class.

In 1973 the recruitment of guest workers was suddenly halted when the Dutch economy started to experience the first signs of economic recession. Since then the Netherlands has had a restrictive policy on labor migration. This recession followed the oil crisis of 1973, and sped up the ongoing restructuring of the Dutch economy. Many guest workers lost their jobs and were unable to find a new job as these required skills the low-skilled guest workers did not possess. Even so, many guest workers decided to stay in the Netherlands. In the contracts the Dutch government signed with the countries from which they recruited laborers was stated that guest workers had the right to stay in the Netherlands and that after two years they could bring their families over. For this reason the Dutch state could not force its guest workers to return to their home countries. Especially Turkish and Moroccan guest workers took advantage of this right. The cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were the first to recognize that the guest workers were not leaving. In fact, guest workers started to bring their families to the country.

At the same time, a new wave of migration started – immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles arrived. With the influx of new immigrants and the family reunification of guest workers, Amsterdam and Rotterdam had difficulties providing
housing for these groups. In Amsterdam, for example, new migrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles ended up in the high-rise estates of Bijlmermeer (see Aalbers et al., 2003; chapter 7), that suffered from high vacancy rates because Amsterdam’s population preferred living in the newly built suburban estates. With the settlement of large numbers of immigrants in Bijlmermeer, more and more autochtone residents moved out of the neighborhood. As a consequence, immigrants increasingly concentrated in certain neighborhoods in the city, despite efforts of local authorities to avoid their concentration.

Due to the economic recessions of 1973 and 1979 unemployment amongst immigrants increased quickly in both Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Both cities were hit hard by recession in the 1970s lasting into the 1980s. Unemployment in the Netherlands during this period rose from 1.5% in 1971 to 5% in 1976, to 9% in 1980, and to 17% in 1983 (Pool, 2003: 6). Unemployment was very unequally divided amongst population groups. Unemployment amongst different immigrant groups was much higher than the national average. In Rotterdam unemployment amongst immigrants rose from 0% before the recession, to about 8% in 1980, 25% in 1985 and to a record high of 28% in 1995 (Veenman, 2001: 4). In 1980, 30% of immigrants were unemployed, 23% of Antilleans, 21% of Surinamese and 14% of foreign workers (Pool, 2003: 6). Even when economic growth returned in the 1990s, unemployment continued rising in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The unemployment levels were especially high in the neighborhoods where most immigrants lived (Pool, 2003). As a consequence of unemployment, immigrants increasingly became dependent on the welfare state and were increasingly excluded from economic participation in society (Body-Gendrot, 2000, 2002; Garbaye, 2002).
6.3.2 1980-1990: Migration and Economic Restructuring

The second phase in terms of policy interventions in Amsterdam and Rotterdam is the period between 1980 and 1990. This is the period of so-called *achterstandsbeleid* [anti-deprivation policy], when local authorities sought to improve the socio-economic status of immigrants. In both Amsterdam and Rotterdam this policy developed around the same time. In Rotterdam anti-deprivation policy was introduced with the policy document *Migranten in Rotterdam* (1978). This policy developed as a response to the rapid increase of immigrants, and the declining socio-economic position of the immigrant community, particularly caused by the gradually rising unemployment amongst immigrants. The changing definition of policy was mainly caused by the realization of local authorities that immigrants were to stay permanently. This combination of factors – the permanence of immigrants, a weak socio-economic position, and an increasing concentration of immigrants in certain neighborhoods – prompted local authorities to start addressing immigrant-related problems more vigorously (Veenman, 2001). While the Dutch government had not yet recognized the permanence of immigrants, and did not pay much attention to the socio-economic situation of immigrants, local authorities in Amsterdam and Rotterdam developed anti-deprivation policies aimed at making immigrants aware that if they were to stay they had to start adjusting to Dutch society. Immigrants were still given sufficient opportunity to retain and celebrate their own culture and identity – a remnant of previous policy – but “they also had to start integrating into Dutch society socially, economically and politically” (Veenman, 2001: 10).
In Rotterdam this meant that the city discontinued group-specific policies, and started following more generalized policy tailored to all disadvantaged people. Services that were accessible to residents of Rotterdam were now also made accessible for immigrants: unemployment benefits, job training, special education programs, and subsidies for self-organizations. In 1981, however, it became clear that the policy had not been successful in reducing unemployment amongst immigrants. In response, the city itself became active in providing employment for immigrants and introducing anti-discrimination measures. During this time Rotterdam kept stressing the importance of immigrant-specific policies (Veenman, 2001: 11).

In Amsterdam a slightly different policy direction was taken. Where Rotterdam had already developed the beginning of a more stringent immigrant integration policy, Amsterdam began implementing its so-called target-group policy. This is a clear example of multicultural policy as it was specifically aimed at improving the socio-economic situation of ethnic minorities (immigrants from Surinam, Turkey, Morocco, Southern Europe and other non-industrialized countries were targeted based on their specific needs). One of the policies aimed at emancipating and incorporating ethnic minorities by “countering discrimination, supporting minority organization for different nationalities and involving the latter in the process of policy formation” (Rossi et al, 2004: 10). The aim of these policies was to incorporate ethnic minorities within the local governance structure, in a multicultural governance structure at the local level. A number of advisory councils were established by local authorities for different minority groups: a Moroccan and Turkish council as well as three councils for the ‘other’ minority groups. The councils consisted of “representatives of individual minority organizations, including
political associations, mosques, cultural centers, and sports clubs” (ibid: 10). Many of these organizations also received subsidies for organizing activities for their communities. The councils themselves were also supported by employees of the city as well as financially. The idea was that the councils would advise local authorities on immigrant-related issues, including the perspective of immigrants on important city-wide issues and debates. It also provided a means for the city government to shape immigrant conduct as well as to increasingly make immigrant communities responsible for their own integration. The advisory councils, however, were highly problematic because members of the council supported their own interests or of a small group instead of the interests of their ethnic communities. Also, by constructing the councils based on groups – Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and other – the local government ignored the in-group diversity. Furthermore, it made ethnic groups visible as coherent communities instead of diverse communities with different interests and in so doing contributed to the stigmatization of immigrant communities.

Both in Rotterdam and Amsterdam the state intervened in the life of immigrants in order to improve their socio-economic situation. Local authorities were worried that the economic base of the city would deteriorate and that solidarity among Rotterdam’s population would decline (Veenman, 2001). As a consequence, the dependence of immigrants on state institutions – for example unemployment benefits and child support – increased, and immigrants started to better find their ways to subsidies and benefits provided by the state.

In the 1980s both cities also paid specific attention to improving the quality of housing and promoting a more equal distribution of immigrants over the city as well as to
lure middle class families back to the city. A continuation of urban renewal policy is deemed necessary in order to avoid the further concentration of low income families and immigrants in the city. Also by the end of the 1980s the fear of a further increase of unemployment among immigrants appeared as it became clear that the second generation were not performing much better than the first generation.

6.3.3 1990-2001: The development of the ‘Multicultural City’

During this period cities were given more autonomy and responsibility, through a decentralization of state power. Started in the late 1980s, but continuing into this new phase, a neo-liberalization of the local urban politics is initiated (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Responsibility, self-reliance, taking and creating opportunities became the central guiding principles for urban policy (Mitchell, 2004). Politicians increasingly were of the opinion that for too long the state had taken care of the population, and in the process had curtailed the creativity and initiative of people, as they came to rely on the state (Veenman, 2001; Rossi et al, 2004). During this new period residents of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were expected to become active citizens (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989; Veenman, 2001). In this decade both cities followed national state directions of policy that were less focused on immigrant groups, but more tailored towards individuals, thereby recognizing the increasing diversity of backgrounds of immigrants settling in the Netherlands. The increasing diversity of immigrants was caused by the increasing numbers of asylum seekers settling in the Netherlands from the late 1980s onwards as well as the recognition that there is a lot of diversity within ethnic groups in terms of for example beliefs, lifestyles, attitudes and socio-economic status.
In Rotterdam so-called ‘Burgerschapsbeleid’ [Citizenship policy] was introduced in the early 1990s with the goal of making more progress in combating socio-economic deprivation of immigrants than previous policies. According to politicians and policy makers at the time this was to be achieved by demanding a greater responsibility of immigrants – as individuals instead of as groups – for their successful integration into society (Mitchell, 2004). I would argue that this policy transformation reflected a shift towards a more neoliberal approach to governing where the focus shifted from rights of immigrants in Dutch society towards obligations of immigrants toward society. The requirement that immigrants fully integrate into society was only established in law in 1998, but already implemented in Rotterdam. National and local authorities no longer exclusively took responsibility for solving the socio-economic problems of immigrants. Immigrants were now also given more responsibility in managing their own success. Nonetheless, the citizenship policy was not effective for long. Shortly after it was implemented Rotterdam took a different turn and increasingly embedded integration policy in general policies. Nonetheless, policy makers kept claiming the right to make ‘special arrangements’ for immigrants when necessary. For example, by supporting social activities of migrant organizations aimed at the emancipation of women and children or by creating brochures about important subsidies and welfare benefits in multiple languages. When the economic situation in the Netherlands improved in the early 1990s ethnic minorities also benefitted. From the mid-1990s onwards the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities in the cities started to improve.

In Amsterdam the role of the advisory councils became increasingly marginal during the 1990s, while at the same time novel views about cultural diversity and
institutional organization developed (Rossi et al, 2004). Multiculturalism became increasingly outdated and similar to the situation in Rotterdam it was believed to cause problems of integration of Amsterdam’s minorities as well as their stigmatization to persist. The City of Amsterdam evaluated its minority advisory councils and had to draw the conclusions that the councils “did not have much impact on policy because of the lack of quality of their advice” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989: 46). With these findings – multiculturalism causing exclusion rather than inclusion and the advisory councils lacking quality and expertise to truly advise the city council on diversity issues – minority organizations, political parties, and civil servants started developing a new approach towards managing immigrant integration in Amsterdam. Specifically, it was considered in what form minority advisory councils could have more impact on policy. Several debates were organized in the city to test ideas, and finally this resulted in a new policy direction: ‘Diversiteitsbeleid’ [Diversity Policy]. In Rotterdam a similar direction was taken so that diversiteitsbeleid was introduced in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1998. This reflected changes at the national scale, where with the introduction of Grote Stedenbeleid the foundations were laid for diversiteitsbeleid. On the ground, in Amsterdam, an important foundation for diversiteitsbeleid was laid out in district Southeast (see chapter 7) – not going unnoticed by policy makers at the national state level. In the memorandum “De kracht van een diverse stad” (the power of a diverse city) the alderman for minority policy in Amsterdam made a clear break with minderhedenbeleid [minority policy – a group oriented approach] and set out the guidelines of the new diversiteitsbeleid. As is stated in the policy document diversiteitsbeleid “does not only want to address problems” it also “aims to create
opportunities (ibid: 3). Innovative was also its more general character, as it was not limited to migrants but the cities also felt that this type of policy needed to be developed for women, young people and the handicapped. Characteristic of diversiteitsbeleid therefore was that it no longer focused on disadvantaged populations, but that it emphasized the positive aspects of diversity and of individual strengths and qualities. Diversity was now taken on by the city governments as a quality of the city and part of the everyday life in the city. For example in Amsterdam:

Diversity has been characteristic of Amsterdam for many centuries, and therefore the new image of the city is one of many cultures, ethnicities and religions (ibid: 6).

And

Because of its diversity Amsterdam is a lively, bubbling, international oriented city (ibid: 6).

Both Rotterdam and Amsterdam by the late 1990s started to actively engage in projects to promote their city and use the multiculturalism of their cities as an important tool for attracting investment. Rotterdam, for example actively focused on its multicultural population in its program for the European Capital of Culture, 2001 status. The city used the slogan “Rotterdam Veelkleurige Stad” (Rotterdam Multi-Colored City). In the same period Amsterdam introduced the slogan “Stad van Diversiteit” (City of Diversity). While at the same time programs of immigrant integration at the level of the national state and locally were toughening, demanding more responsibility of immigrants, these cities employed the existing ethnic diversity to sell the city. A toughening of policy therefore went along with the celebration of ethnic diversity for economic purposes on the global market.
While on the one hand selling the city in terms of its diversity at the same time both cities – Amsterdam more so than Rotterdam – continued to focus on ethnic minorities. Rotterdam, in the process of creating a new image and economic base for the city, prioritized spectacular projects and reimagining projects over immigrant integration. Nonetheless, both city governments were aware that tensions continued to exist between host and immigrant populations, and that Moroccan youth were overrepresented in crime statistics. In fact, the multicultural city was constantly creating new sites of struggle (Amin, 2002; Holston, 1998; Sandercock, 2003). And as Fincher and Jacobs (1998) have argued this struggle for the multicultural city manifests itself in resistance, claiming rights and claiming space. While institutions of the local government continued to work on improving this situation, another goal was to take better advantage of the talents and capital of the multicultural population. Diversiteitsbeleid as it was laid out in Amsterdam proposed action on four fronts (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1998): 1) city policies should better reflect the multicultural composition of the population (its employees must come to reflect the multicultural society); 2) diversity should be reflected in the workplace; 3) encouraging participation of immigrants and preventing negative images, prejudices and exclusion; and 4) stimulating the development of a societal movement that focuses on the positive stimulation of diversity.

The shift to diversiteitsbeleid, I would argue, was made possible by the improvement of the situation of immigrants: a fall in unemployment rates and better educational achievements of the second generation (Veenman, 2001: 14). But the start of diversiteitsbeleid also meant a redefinition of subsidies to migrant organizations. The Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie Integratiebeleid [Parliamentary Research
Commission on Integration Policy] showed that with the shift to *diversiteitsbeleid* the way migrant organizations were subsidized changed thereby limiting the role of migrant organizations in Dutch society, as one of their informants explained:

> We were of the opinion that people had to be educated and that they had to learn different skills. We were told, however, that we should not worry and that everything would be alright. But it was never solved. In the 1990s the role of self-organizations was reduced by the state and politicians (Moroccan guest worker, interviewed for research *Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie Integratiebeleid*, 2003).

The migrant organization this person was active in lost a large part of their subsidies. With the new policy, subsidies to migrant organizations were only granted if organizations set clearly defined objectives and could demonstrate the achieved results. Only activities that contributed to the integration, participation and emancipation of migrants to society were granted subsidies. Migrant organizations who had been subsidized for many years now had to justify their activities, which required more skills of the organizations, which most of them – including the Moroccan guest worker quoted above – did not possess.

This shift in granting subsidies is an indication of a subtle shift towards a more assimilation-oriented model of immigrant integration underneath a discourse that on the surfaces embraced difference. Throughout the 1990s both Rotterdam and Amsterdam designed multicultural urban spaces (see chapter 8).

### 6.3.4 Post-2001: Ruptures in the Multicultural City

The post-2001 era formed a clear breaking point in terms of the approach to immigrant integration in the Netherlands, marking a clear cut away from multicultural
approaches to immigrant integration to a more assimilation-oriented approach. Rotterdam played an important role in institutionalizing this new policy discourse on immigrant integration. As we’ll see the city’s problems of crime, one-sidedness of the housing market, and high levels of unemployment were linked to the settlement of disadvantaged migrant populations. In order to find solutions to the problems the city experienced, Rotterdam’s coalition government – composed of aldermen of Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR), CDA and the VVD – once again asked permission for the dispersal of disadvantaged populations – i.e., immigrants – over the city and region as well as to introduce a minimum income requirement for settlement in particular neighborhoods of the city (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003). There was a strong belief that the implementation of these governmental technologies would solve the problems in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

By re-introducing the debate about the dispersal of populations (in 1972 there was a similar debate) and by demanding attention to the situation of Rotterdam’s disadvantaged neighborhoods, Rotterdam put itself at the center of debates about the governing of diversity in cities. While the debate was already ongoing – stimulated by Pim Fortuyn – in the form of a parliamentary debate on the success or failure of government practices to foster immigrant integration (see chapter 5), this further strengthened the new approach of ‘forced’ integration.

Following the events of September 11th, increasing tensions and societal unrest manifested itself in the Netherlands, especially directed towards Muslim immigrants (see chapter 1). Their presence in urban space, as well as their perceived lack of integration into Dutch society, increasingly became associated with fear, and a potential threat to the security of the nation. In Rotterdam, immigrants accounted for the majority of people
moving to the city, and as a result not only did they become more visible in daily urban life, but urban problems associated with the quality of housing, safety, and quality of life increasingly became associated with immigrants.

In March of 2002, local elections were held in the Netherlands, causing a major political transformation in the city of Rotterdam. LR, led by Pim Fortuyn, won one-third of the votes, or 17 of the 45 seats in the city council, and became the largest party in Rotterdam (see chapter 1 for a detailed description of Fortuyn and his political ideas). LR, in contrast to the other political parties, managed to speak to the concerns of a large section of Rotterdam’s population regarding: the perceived lack of integration of immigrants, the perceived lack of security in the city, its deteriorating physical infrastructure, the alienation of citizens from politics because of the focus on cultural prestige projects instead of on the problems in neighborhoods. Consequently there was a major shift in the power balance between local parties (Kooijman and Wigmans, 2003: 304). It ended the hegemony of the PvdA that had been the largest party in the city since the Second World War.

The fact that this transformation occurred in Rotterdam rather than in Amsterdam must be understood in terms of the unhappiness of residents with the housing and living conditions in Rotterdam. When I asked the question of what caused the radical political transformation in Rotterdam and why it did not happen in Rotterdam to politicians, policy makers, community workers and consultants, my informants all shared the view that the poor condition of the city’s housing stock, the neglect of public spaces, a lack of safety, and the rapid influx of immigrants since the mid-1990s (when a new model of housing distribution was introduced that allowed immigrants easier access to better quality
housing in neighborhoods that were formerly strong *autochtone* strongholds) in the city, were important reasons for the dissatisfaction of a large section of Rotterdam’s population. As we’ll see in chapter 7, this view was shared by residents of Spangen.

Voters of Rotterdam felt that previous governments had not sufficiently succeeded in creating a safe, liveable and cohesive city. A large section of the population, furthermore, felt that (Muslim) immigrants were to blame for this situation. These unsatisfied residents of Rotterdam formed the constituency for Fortuyn who linked the lack of safety and the neglect of public spaces in the city to the presence of immigrants and the different lifestyles and codes of behavior of immigrant populations. With the installation of LR and the legacy of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands at large, multiculturalism was blown off the table and a more assimilationist approach on immigrant integration quickly was institutionalized in Rotterdam and at the national level. Within this new situation (Muslim) immigrants were held responsible for the urban problems of Rotterdam.

Newfield and Gordon (1996) identify three characteristics of assimilation: 1) adherence to core norms and values; 2) a rejection of racialized group consciousness; and 3) a denial of cultural equity among groups (80). These three aspects became central to the new policy discourse on immigrant integration in Rotterdam from 2003 onwards, where immigrants were now expected to adhere to core norms and values, by relegating difference and cultural identity as a matter of the private sphere and by blaming (Muslim) immigrants for the urban problems in the city.

Politicians in Amsterdam were more hesitant to take on this more repressive approach, as they were confident that their approach that stimulated dialogue between
groups was successful, and as policy makers explained to me because they did not want to create divides between ethnic groups.

In the autumn of 2003, Rotterdam initiated a national debate on immigrant integration, proposing a halt to the settlement of asylum seekers and others who earn less than 120% of the minimum income, claiming that the city’s urban problems were disproportionate in comparison with other cities. The debate followed the publication of a population prognosis for Rotterdam in 2017 by the city’s Center of Research and Statistics (COS, 2003). According to this report, without any major policy transformation, the number of immigrants from non-industrialized countries would increase faster than any other group in the city. Not only was the number of ethnic minorities predicted to increase significantly in the next fifteen years, at the same time it was predicted that the outflow of middle classes from the city would continue. In other words, this report shows that Rotterdam in 2017 would be poorer and increasingly immigrant. In Amsterdam this had been the underlying philosophy for large scale urban renewal programs in Bijlmermeer and in the Western parts of the city as well as for the conversion of rental housing into owner-occupied housing in order to tie the middle class to the city. According to the report between 1997 and 2002 the disadvantaged population of Rotterdam had increased with 25%, whereas the other groups were declining by 7.4% (COS, 2004) (see table 6.8).
Table 6.8 Population growth between 1997 and 2002 due to the growth of ‘target’ groups.

I find this table as constructed by COS (2003) to support the new policy direction of the city of Rotterdam highly problematic, because it classifies all ‘non-western’ immigrants as target groups. There are large numbers of immigrants who are successful. Classifying the ‘problem’ of Rotterdam in these terms is dangerous, because it stigmatizes groups and does not recognize differences within groups. Instead of focusing on groups – which initially can be an effective means for ethnic communities to claim a position within society – the focus should be on individuals that are in need of state support in order to improve their socio-economic conditions and integration in Dutch society.

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Groups that are targeted for anti-deprivation policy or other policies to improve their socio-economic situation. It generally refers to people with an income less than 120 per cent of the minimum income. A lot of immigrants fall in this category.
Table 6.8 is also problematic because it does indicate the share of target groups in Delfshaven as well as the growth of target groups in neighborhoods that were previously predominantly *autochtone*. Following the predictions for 2017, Rotterdam will not only be poorer in 2017, but at the neighborhood scale this means that a number of districts in Rotterdam will see their ethnic minority population increase to 60-80% (Ergun and Bik, 2003). Due to the way the statistics were collected, the discussion was not framed in socio-economic terms, but politicians of LR turned it into a discussion about ethnicity, where ethnic minorities per se became associated with a lack of socio-economic development, lack of proficiency in the Dutch language, and with cultures and religion that are far removed from what is considered ‘normal’ or standard in Rotterdam (see Dean, 1999 on visibility of government). What I found was a disparity between policymakers and politicians on the one hand, who were much more nuanced in defining the problem, and the politicians of LR on the other hand, who responded to the identified problem by proposing an “*allochtonenstop*” (ban on immigrants settling in the city) and the dispersal of immigrants over the larger Rotterdam region.

While the discussion was appropriated by politicians of LR and turned into a problem of immigration, it was first initiated by a politician of the PvdA who experienced the rapid demographic transformation of Charlois district in the last decade and was alarmed by predictions of increased concentrations of ethnic minorities up to 80% in 2017 (table 6.9). In less than a decade Charlois had transformed from a middle class, *autochtone* neighborhood to a low income, immigrant neighborhood.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City district</th>
<th>Distribution of target groups</th>
<th>Share in population</th>
<th>Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City center</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delfshaven</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overschie</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noord</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilligersberg-Schiebroek</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kralingen-Crooswijk</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prins Alexander</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feijenoord</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijsselmonde</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlois</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernis</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoogvliet</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoek van Holland</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other areas</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COS (2003) Distribution of target groups by city districts (Rotterdam total = 100%), their share in the population (total city district = 100%) and growth percentage compared to 1997 in city district

Table 6.9. Increasing share of target groups in district population

Based on these predictions, the politician wanted to initiate a new national debate about the concentration of impoverished immigrants in the big cities in order to come up with new solutions for the problems in Charlois, and neighborhoods elsewhere experiencing similar problems. In the past, the topic had always been debated along ethnic dividing lines, where *allochtoon* became associated with poverty, crime, fear, and problems – and thus as bad – and *autochtoon* was perceived as good, educated, and thus of value to the city. This politician wanted to move away from the racial discourse, to open a more fruitful discussion by dealing with the real issue:
What I tried to do is to show that it is a concentration of marginalization in socio-economic terms and that in the big cities it mainly hits people of non-Dutch origin. So poverty, deprivation, lack of safety, poor quality of life, unemployment, etc, especially in cities has a color, but that is not to say that everyone with a color is poor. But that is what Dutch people generally have done. What I try to say is that the concentration of poverty in the big cities predominantly strikes people with a different skin color and that as government, and as Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), you have to ask yourself whether you can handle the demand for care of these people. Because in the end, as government, at the moment that people show that they can’t take care of themselves, you have a duty to do something about it. Not only in terms of repressive measures when dealing with violence or exploitation, but also preventive, to enable people to provide for themselves (Marcel van Buuren, Dutch, district politician Charlois).

Besides the risks of increasing segregation and the disconnection with the larger society, this politician was of the opinion that the concentration of these deprived populations required increased government effort, because if nothing was to be done the situation of these people would further deteriorate and this would be a risk for society. He proposed therefore to allocate more funds to anti-deprivation policy – a policy geared towards improving the socio-economic conditions of marginalized groups.

Responding to these debates, the city council developed a program of action for the period of 2002-2006 Rotterdam zet door61. On December 1, 2003 this report was sent to the Minister of Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu [Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment] (VROM) and of Integratiebeleid [Integration Policy] in order to encourage them to explore the implementation of a number of policies: (1) the reduction of the influx of disadvantaged populations to the city by requiring new inhabitants to at least earn an income of 120% of the minimum wage; (2) the dispersal of disadvantaged populations over the city, the region and the Netherlands; (3) an exemption

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61 ‘Rotterdam zet door. Op weg naar een stad in balans’ (Rotterdam persists. On the way to a balanced city)
for Rotterdam from their requirement to house their quota of asylum seekers\textsuperscript{62}, because not only had Rotterdam met the criteria for the housing of asylum seekers over the years, but also, it was argued, the city has seen the indirect settlement of asylum seekers from other municipalities in the Netherlands; (4) availability of funds for the development of a number of economic improvement zones, in order to bring investment to disadvantaged neighborhoods, for education, and for integration programs; and (5) stop on construction of low income housing. This way the city aimed to diversify its one-sided housing stock to tie middle class residents to the city.

6.3.5 Debates about dispersal of disadvantaged populations

The debate about the dispersal of disadvantaged populations – if applied, affecting mostly ethnic minorities as they were overrepresented in the category of disadvantaged populations – started in Rotterdam in 1972, and has since returned every decade. In 1972 the idea was to introduce a regulation in the housing distribution of allowing no more than 5\% ethnic minorities in neighborhoods in order to avoid concentration. In 1980, at the height of a more multicultural stance on integration, the discussion was framed in terms of ‘positive’ dispersal, where people from particular ethnic groups should concentrate in certain parts of the city in order for ethnic clusters to develop. The most recent dispersal discussion ties in with the idea of social mixing or mixed housing, where

\textsuperscript{62} In the Netherlands the housing of asylum seekers is equally spread over the country. The number of asylum seekers that will be placed depends on the population of the town. In this system, asylum seekers cannot choose where they want to live, but they are assigned a house somewhere in the country. The problem with this policy is that many asylum seekers shortly after they have moved to their assigned place of residence move again, mostly to the big cities where they have friends, relatives, other networks, and where there are more prospects to find a job. Because of the relatively cheap housing available in Rotterdam, this city especially has appealed to these groups.
it is believed that mixed income neighborhoods contribute to integration and improved socio-economic status of the poor. This idea of social mixing as an instrument for social uplifting has been critiqued by scholars (e.g. Uitermark, 2003; Kleinhans et al, 2001). Whereas in the past the state decided that dispersal policy was against the law because it discriminated on the basis of socio-economic status and/or race, this time the state was willing to make an exception to the *Huisvestingswet* (settlement law) to allow dispersal under certain strictly defined conditions.

The state has given Rotterdam permission to diverge from the *Huisvestingswet* in a few problem neighborhoods, but this special exception could also be requested by other cities that experience similar problems. In these particular neighborhoods the settlement of disadvantaged population can be regulated by requiring new residents to have a pre-defined minimum income, by demanding new residents to be economically tied to the city – Amsterdam has used this for many years – and finally through positive balloting, which means prioritizing residents with a high income over others. While the state recognized the problems of Rotterdam, it also explicitly stated that the problems of Rotterdam also existed in the other three big cities in the Netherlands. Yet, the state institutionalized a new direction on immigrant integration, where the problems of Rotterdam only further justified a more stringent integration policy. In the media the political transformation in Rotterdam becomes associated with the ‘new realism’ (see chapter 5). The slogans introduced by politicians of LR, like *allochtonenstop* (no more immigrants), *minarettenstop* (no more minarets), *hek om de stad* (fence around the city) are slogans that politicians at the national scales have used (NRC Handelsblad, 2004).
6.3.6 Amsterdam’s response to a ‘toughening’ of national policy and proposed changes by Rotterdam

Amsterdam did not experience a marked political transformation in 2002. In fact, the PvdA returned in the coalition. Where in Rotterdam under the influence of LR, integration became openly debated in the public sphere and policies aimed at immigrant integration took a radical turn, Amsterdam continued its diversity policy and distanced itself from the wider political debate. In 2003 the city council decided to abolish its minority advisory councils (Rossi et al, 2004), because of their minimal contribution to policy. The city now took the approach that everybody can make a contribution to the city. In other words “everybody is entitled to participate, not as a member of a group, but as an individual with a multifaceted identity” (Gemeente Amsterdam [City of Amsterdam], 1998: 8). Yet, not everybody is yet capable of fully participating. But in order to work towards this ideal situation the major purpose of diversity policy was to bring groups of people into contact with each other. This resonates with the argument suggested by Amin (2002) and Fraser (1995) to create everyday encounters where differences can be negotiated. It was believed that “through interaction on a personal level, (mutual) prejudices and interpretations could be tested and adjusted.” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1998: 11) Stigmatized groups must be put in a positive light. This contrasts sharply with the direction taken in Rotterdam, where immigrants were increasingly stigmatized by new policy incentives.

The advisory councils were being replaced by forums of experts who do not have connections with migrant organizations and therefore are believed to be able to deliver high-quality and objective advice. A second advisory council consists of experts who are
understood to represent different ethnic groups and have access to a wide network of migrant organizations (Rossi et al., 2004: 11). Emphasis therefore has shifted to quality and to project-based operations. In Amsterdam, therefore, increasingly local authorities have started to draw on expert knowledge for shaping policies aimed at immigrant integration and managing a multicultural society. Whereas in other Dutch cities right-wing and conservative parties have transformed the local political climate, in Amsterdam there continued to be opportunities for encouraging inter-cultural dialogue.

This is not to argue that the backlash against multiculturalism left Amsterdam completely unaffected. Local minority policy over the years had been revolutionized in Amsterdam, yet it did not meet much resistance. Furthermore, policy frameworks created at the national level had to be followed at the local level. As a consequence, immigrants in Amsterdam were also demanded more responsibility for their own integration, and also – as part of the program of the Minister of Integration – had to participate in integration courses.

While politicians of Amsterdam critiqued Rotterdam’s dispersal policy, the city itself more silently worked with indirect measures to reduce the concentrations of ethnic minorities. For example through the large scale urban renewal of neighborhoods where ethnic minorities live concentrated. While the goal of the program is the diversification of the housing stock in these neighborhoods where a large section of the housing stock is characterized by often large, relatively cheap housing, to attract middle incomes and to provide middle class households to make a housing career within the neighborhood, this strategy in practice leads to the displacement of some of the poorest populations.
Rotterdam has played a key role in the public debate on immigrant integration in the Netherlands and in redefining policies aimed at immigrant incorporation. Whereas in the previous period cultural difference was celebrated and encouraged, during this period social-cultural differences become increasingly defined as the causes of the failing integration. Amsterdam, however, continued diversity policy whereas in Rotterdam the city government opted for a more repressive approach.

6.4 Roadmap for ethnographies on multicultural policy negotiation

In chapter 5 and 6 I have discussed the evolution of Dutch policies aimed at immigrant integration as well as the specific urban contexts in which policies were developed and implemented. Within an overarching national multicultural policy framework, different policy directions were taken in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In chapter 7 and 8 I will turn to two comparative ethnographic studies of multicultural policy negotiation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Chapter 7 compares Amsterdam Bijlmermeer and Rotterdam Spangen, two disadvantaged multi-ethnic neighborhoods that became known as most dangerous in the country and were selected for the implementation of urban renewal policy. Nonetheless, while in Amsterdam Bijlmermeer a large-scale urban renewal program was started, in Rotterdam it did not get off the ground until 2004 as the city prioritized image-building projects for the city over neighborhood improvement. Chapter 8 compares two symbolic squares – Mercatorplein in Amsterdam and Noordplein in Rotterdam – that were both redeveloped as multicultural squares. At Mercatorplein a multicultural square was planned – with the goal of facilitating socio-spatial interaction – whereas at Noordplein a Moroccan fountain
was built with the goal of recognizing the presence and contribution of Moroccan immigrants and their culture in Rotterdam. This ethnographic comparison is important because it demonstrates how multiculturalism is negotiated on the ground, and how this affects socio-spatial interaction in the neighborhood, how and why affects are different between neighborhoods and cities, and its implications for politics, decision-making, governance, and social interaction in neighborhoods and at the scale of the city as a whole.

Table 6.10 is a schematic overview of the comparability of the different case studies. It is impossible to find case studies that are exactly comparable in terms of ethnic population composition, histories and economic situation. For this reason I selected neighborhoods that were as much comparable as possible in terms of share of immigrants, their time of settlement, and policy implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Comparability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National multicultural/integration policies take different shape in Amsterdam and Rotterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Amsterdam Bijlmermeer and Rotterdam Spangen | - In both cities neighborhoods with highest % immigrants, above 70%;  
- First immigrants arrived in the late 1960s, but neighborhoods continued to be immigrant gateways;  
- Concentration of poverty, unemployment, problems with crime and drugs: image of most dangerous neighborhoods in country;  
- Multicultural policy networks through formal networks (Bijlmermeer) and informal networks (Spangen) |
| Amsterdam Mercatorplein and Rotterdam Noordplein | - Implementation of multicultural policy with goal of creating “multicultural squares”;  
- In both neighborhoods % immigrants are above 40% and largest immigrant groups are from Morocco and Turkey;  
- Large neighborhood squares in inner city districts;  
- Socio-spatial interaction at the squares |

Table 6.10 Case studies Amsterdam and Rotterdam
CHAPTER 7
NEGOTIATING MULTICULTURALISM AS URBAN RENEWAL STRATEGY
IN AMSTERDAM AND ROTTERDAM

7.1 Introduction

The neighborhood provides a research vehicle to connect theoretical debates to lived experience, to engage directly with issues of participation, citizenship, division, exclusion and cohesion and with policies formulated by governments and other bodies nationally and internationally (Kennett and Forrest 2006, 713).

Multicultural cities are the reality of the 21st century. Dilemmas of difference are a challenge to the current ways of thinking of city builders to city dwellers and to ideas of urban governance and urban politics (Sandercock, 2003: 4). Struggles over belonging especially manifest themselves in neighborhoods where difference is experienced and where it directly impacts the everyday life of city dwellers. Struggles about the right to the city are negotiated in neighborhoods.

... new voices and demands for rights – rights to the city, right to a voice, to participation, and to co-existence in the actual physical spaces of the city – have become louder, more insistent, even as (or because) populist and fundamentalist opposition mobilizes against them. City governments in Europe, North America and Australia have become more and more involved in addressing these new realities in their neighborhoods, through accommodation of repression, or often both (Sandercock, 2004: 4).
In this chapter I discuss how urban renewal policies – as particular forms of multicultural policies – are negotiated in the neighborhoods where they were implemented and how the outcomes of these negotiations differ in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. A comparison is made between two neighborhoods: Bijlmermeer in the Southeast district of Amsterdam and Spangen in the Delfshaven district of Rotterdam. These two neighborhoods were chosen because they were the neighborhoods with most immigrants in each city, and because multicultural policy was implemented in each. In 2003 over 70% of all residents in both neighborhoods were immigrants. In Bijlmermeer residents from Surinam, the Antilles and Ghana make up the largest ethnic groups, in Spangen residents from Turkey and Morocco are the largest ethnic groups, closely followed by residents from Surinam and Cape Verde. Both neighborhoods are typical immigrant gateways (Price & Benton-Short, 2008), neighborhoods that are the first place of settlement for many new (il)legal immigrants to the city. In recent years influxes of immigrants from Africa (Bijlmermeer) and Eastern Europe (Delfshaven) have contributed to the already existing diversity of the neighborhood population.

The ethnic composition of both neighborhoods started changing in the 1970s. However, the neighborhoods differ in that in Bijlmermeer immigration consisted of migrants from the former colonies (from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles) whereas in Spangen immigrants settling in the neighborhood were mainly guest workers from Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy), Turkey and Morocco. As ethnic difference has become part of the everyday life in these neighborhoods since the 1970s, new forms of

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63 Most immigrants to The Netherlands from Cape Verde have settled in Rotterdam.
living together have developed, from which important lessons can be learned for future policies and practices.

Apart of the difference in migrant groups – former colonies versus labor migrants – the neighborhoods also differ in terms of their location in the city. Bijlmermeer is situated in the Southeast district of Amsterdam on the periphery of the city (see figure 7.1 and 7.2. Southeast district is T on map 7.1 and Bijlmermeer is the area marked in black on figure 7.2). The district is separated from the rest of the city, because the land in between belongs to other municipalities that have not been incorporated by the city of Amsterdam. Spangen, on the other hand, is an inner city neighborhood in the Delfshaven district of Rotterdam to the west of the city center. Where high-rise towers and abundant green spaces characterized Bijlmermeer prior to the radical urban renewal operation, Spangen is characterized by four-story apartments and a lack of green spaces. Finally, whereas both neighborhoods were chosen because they were the sites of major urban renewal plans, only in Amsterdam did large scale urban renewal occur. In Rotterdam plans were never realized as the city had different priorities. Thus, there are similarities and differences between the two places, offering rich opportunities for comparison.

7.2 Methodological strategy

In order to understand how Bijlmermeer and Spangen as multi-ethnic neighborhoods of the multicultural city function as strategic sites for policy negotiation between state and non-state actors, I used a mixed methods approach. First, descriptive statistical information about the neighborhood, policy documents, statutes, minutes of council meetings, and newspaper articles were collected and analyzed. Then, semi-

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structured interviews were conducted with local politicians, city planners, policy advisors, social workers, representatives of migrant organizations, residents and police officers. In total 19 interviews were conducted for the case study of Bijlmermeer (Amsterdam) and another 15 interviews were based on the Spangen (Rotterdam) case study (see table 1.5).

The field research also involved data collection through participant observation in the neighborhood. I engaged in informal conversations with residents I encountered at neighborhood meetings and by participating in a multicultural community project in both Bijlmermeer and Spangen. The project in Bijlmermeer involved a group of 10 residents who together with an architect and a policy advisor were involved in the redevelopment of a small section of Bijlmermeer. In Spangen it involved a group of 7 residents who were creating a multicultural communal garden. I participated in both these community projects as a researcher. These informal conversations along with my observations of what the sites looked like and the social interactions taking place at those sites were written down in a fieldwork diary (see Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000).

7.3 Case study 1 Bijlmermeer: a truly multicultural neighborhood?

_De Bijlmer_ is an area with great potential. The multicultural character and the interplay of cultures, nationalities and religions that is connected to this, offer the neighborhood an opportunity to become a multicultural center of the increasingly international Dutch society (Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer [Steering Committee Renewal Bijlmermeer], 1991: 2).

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64 Bijlmer is a commonly-used abbreviation of Bijlmermeer
In 1991 Bijlmermeer was at the start of a major urban renewal operation that would affect the lives of all its residents. From its inception, there was a very strong belief by urban planners and politicians that the multicultural character of the neighborhood had to be taken into account in the promotional strategy for the neighborhood. At this time, multiculturalism was already believed to be the future reality of many urban neighborhoods in the Netherlands. The urban renewal operation of Bijlmermeer therefore provided the opportunity to overcome problems and to turn the Southeast district into the leading example of a multicultural neighborhood in the Netherlands. By focusing on the positive aspects of ethno-cultural diversity, urban planners, consultants and politicians believed that an autochtone middle class could be attracted to the revitalized neighborhood, thereby transforming an ethnic neighborhood into a truly multicultural neighborhood.

Bijlmermeer is one of Europe’s leading examples of a high-rise housing estate. The neighborhood is located in the Southeast district of the city (see figure 7.1, area T and 7.2) with a population of approximately 82,000 residents, of which 46,000 live in Bijlmermeer (Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek [Department of Research and Statistics], 2004a, 2004b). Over 70% of the population of Bijlmermeer is of non-Dutch origin: 30% of the population are Surinamese, 5% Antillean, 10% Ghanaian, and the other 25% have origins elsewhere in the world, together making up its highly multicultural population of 130 different nationalities. Bijlmermeer was constructed between 1960 and the mid-1970s, and over the years has become associated with various social problems, such as poverty, crime, and social isolation. In this respect, the experience of Bijlmermeer is not
so different from other large housing estates in Europe that have experienced similar problems of deprivation (Aalbers et al., 2003; Helleman and Wassenberg, 2004).

Figure 7.1 City districts of Amsterdam

Rather than being a cosmopolitan space, appealing to a wide audience, Bijlmermeer is viewed by the media and people who do not live in the neighborhood as a non-cosmopolitan space (Bodaar, 2006; 2008). With cosmopolitanism I mean “a specific attitude towards difference and thus the possession of a set of skills that allow individuals to negotiate and understand cultural diversity” (Binnie et al., 2006: 4). Furthermore, I also understand it here as a feature of cities and some urban neighborhoods, as these can be characterized by multiple cultures, religions and lifestyles (see also chapter 2). Viewing Bijlmermeer as a non-cosmopolitan space is failing to recognize the inherently
cosmopolitan and transnational lifestyles of its multicultural residents, who are negotiating difference on a daily basis through neighborhood interactions as well as in their connectedness to transnational networks (Bodaar, 2006: 178). Its location on the periphery of the city, its poor and ethnic population – in 2001 45% of all households had a minimum income – and the social problems in the neighborhood have rendered it a place to avoid for visitors and people in search of a house rather than a place to live and visit for its multicultural character.

Figure 7.2 Bijlmermeer in the Southeast district of Amsterdam

A large scale and ambitious urban renewal program – that started in 1992 and will be finished in 2010 – aims to change the ethnic and socio-economic population composition of the neighborhood. Furthermore, it aims to re-image the district as cosmopolitan by drawing on its diversity (Stadsdeel Zuidoost [Southeast district], 2002).
Could cosmopolitanism serve to make this space less threatening for current residents, visitors and potential residents, as it did in Manchester’s Gay Village where the description of the area as ‘cosmopolitan’ made it more accessible for a straight population (Binnie and Skeggs, 2004)? Before exploring this issue and the question of how this urban renewal policy is negotiated in Bijlmermeer, some insight into the historical development of the neighborhood is needed in order to understand its current problems and the reasons for intervention.

7.3.1 The only ghetto in the Netherlands

How did a neighborhood that was built only four decades ago fall into a spiral of decline so quickly? In order to answer this question we first need to look back at the original plans for Bijlmermeer. The neighborhood was designed according to Corbusian principles. These architects and city planners propagated the functional separation of living, working and recreation (Mentzel, 1990; Helleman and Wassenberg, 2004). In the Netherlands these ideas were central to city planning in the 1950s and 1960s. Underlying them was the idea that social life in neighborhoods could be managed through physical planning. The plans for Bijlmermeer were very ambitious. Planners believed that Bijlmermeer would become the ‘City of Tomorrow’—a modern, innovative place for the middle class. The neighborhood was built to accommodate 90% of the residents in uniform high-rise blocks with large-scale green, open spaces between them. Roads and railways were elevated so that the ground level became the domain of pedestrians and cyclists (Aalbers et al, 2003; Helleman and Wassenberg, 2004). Offices were located on the other side of the railroad tracks. The high-rises were characterized by large semi-
public corridors connected to the parking garages, the idea being that people would meet and interact as they moved through these spaces (see figure 7.3). The idea of collectivity was central to the design, thereby ignoring – or perhaps attempting to stem the tide of – increasing individualism in society.

Photograph by author, May 2004

Figure 7.3 Public corridor in a high-rise in Bijlmermeer

Bijlmermeer never became the ‘City of Tomorrow’. According to Helleman and Wassenberg (2004: 5-6) three related of problems caused the failure of the high-rise neighborhood. First, the plans never fully realized because of financial problems. The apartments were built but the amenities that were promised to the residents – stores, metro-line and spaces for sports and recreation – were never delivered or only arrived years later. Second, the high-rises had to compete with the new single-family homes in new suburbs that became available at the same time (residents of the old inner city
neighborhoods increasingly preferred the new suburban homes over the new high-rises in Rotterdam, see chapter 5). To avoid vacancies, the apartments were rented to starters on the housing market (i.e. students and young families), and when many Surinamese families moved to the Netherlands following the independence of Surinam in 1975, the availability of apartments in Bijlmermeer attracted them to this neighborhood.

Immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles were soon followed by other immigrants, causing Bijlmermeer to become an immigrant gateway, adding to the multicultural ‘flavor’ of the district.

Nonetheless, by 1985 there was a vacancy rate of 25%. A final set of issues that contributed to livability problems related to the management of buildings and public and semi-public spaces. The dark parking garages, corridors, abundant green spaces and tunnels were perceived as unsafe by residents. They were increasingly taken over by the homeless, drug addicts, drug dealers and criminals. No one took responsibility for the public and semi-public spaces, and as my informants told me many residents disposed their garbage in the quickest manner, by throwing it from their balconies. Residents who had the opportunity to move out of the neighborhood left, causing those who were poor or otherwise disadvantaged to stay behind. Doctors, food deliverers, and service people refused to work in the neighborhood at night for fear of being robbed or assaulted. Today design failures are believed to have contributed to the social problems of Bijlmermeer (Helleman and Wassenberg, 2004).

A further problem was the socio-economic marginalization of Bijlmermeer’s residents. In the 1980s and 1990s the residents of Bijlmermeer were increasingly isolated from opportunities in the urban economy. The lack of skills, experience and alienation
from the political system excluded many residents from Dutch society. High
unemployment, debt problems and other social problems led to the further deterioration
of the neighborhood. Until the mid-1990s less than 5% of the total population worked in
the adjacent business center, which provided employment for over 65,000 people at the
time. While residents were increasingly excluded from the formal economy and a
significant group lived in Bijlmermeer as illegal immigrants and therefore could not
operate in the formal economy, the informal economy flourished (e.g. illegal taxis and
illegal restaurants and prostitution in the high-rises). Bijlmermeer became a more single-
class, low-income and unemployed, ethnically diverse but increasingly immigrant
enclave (Bair and Hulsbergen, 1993). Something had to be done and, because the
problem involved mainly an ethnic minority population, district and city politicians and
policy advisors believed that intervention was necessary in order to secure social
cohesion.

7.3.2 “The Colorful Perspective of District Zuidoost”

After a series of renovations and small improvements to the high-rises, in 1992
the state, the city of Amsterdam, the Southeast district council and a housing corporation
finally decided on the large-scale urban renewal of Bijlmermeer (Finale Plan van Aanpak
[Final Work Plan], 1992). This plan was also strongly supported by neighboring
businesses that were affected by the negative image of Bijlmermeer. The urban renewal
operation involves the demolition of over 13,000 homes, approximately 50% of all high-

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65 Interview director of the business organization in Bijlmermeer.
66 Promotional brochure of City District Zuidoost (2002)
rises, between 1992 and 2010. These are to be replaced with 15,000 homes in low-rise or four-story blocks (see figure 7.4). Also, the semi-public dark parking garages and anonymous corridors are being torn down or converted into private spaces.

Figure 7.4 Working on urban renewal in Bijlmermeer

Before the urban renewal operation, 92% of the apartments in Bijlmermeer were social housing. By 2010 social housing in the neighborhood will be reduced to 55% (Kwekkeboom, 2002), reflecting the ambition of the city to attract middle-class residents and to allow residential mobility of residents. In other words, when residents increase their income and become middle class, they should be able to purchase a larger house *in the neighborhood* rather than moving elsewhere. It seems that the overall purpose of the project, however, is also one of civilizing the immigrant population in the neighborhood, providing ‘good’ examples on how to live, on how to be a good citizen. This resonates with Bunnell’s (2002) study. He demonstrates that while the state supported rural-urban
migration of Malays in order to eradicate what they considered inappropriate urban
conduct among Malays in Malaysia, at the same time Kampung norms and forms become
increasingly embedded in and inscribed in the urban landscape.

In total, €1.6 billion (US$ 2.5 billion) will be invested in the revitalization of
Bijlmermeer. The physical renewal – demolition and rebuilding of housing – is financed
by the national state (*Grote Stedenbeleid* [Big Cities Policy]), the city of Amsterdam,
district Southeast, housing corporations and property developers. On a much smaller
scale projects aimed at socio-economic renewal have been supported. In the period 1996-
2000 €36.6 million (US$ 57.7 million) were available for projects aimed at socio-
economic renewal (*Finale Plan van Aanpak* [Final Work Plan], 1992). Most of this
budget consisted of funds from the Urban Program of the EU and the Dutch Big Cities
Policy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The plans are very ambitious. In 2010 the neighborhood should have become
what it was intended to be when it was designed in the 1960s, the ‘City of Tomorrow’.
As stated in a promotional brochure of the Southeast district, aimed at marketing the
district to potential new middle class residents and attracting new businesses, “everybody
involved is committed to making the Southeast district today’s city of tomorrow instead
of yesterday’s city of tomorrow” (promotional brochure, Stadsdeel Zuidoost, 2002). The
promotional strategy for the neighborhood centers on highlighting its ethnic diversity,
reflected in the slogan “Het Kleurrijke Perspectief op Amsterdam Zuidoost” [The
Colorful Perspective on Southeast], reflecting the city’s diversity policy. Whereas ethnic

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67 Similar to the philosophy behind the renewal of Mercatorplein where the square also had to reflect the
original ideas of the neighborhood architects who built the square in the 1920s.
diversity of the district was previously equated with social deprivation, the promotional strategy now focuses on the strengths of the existing diversity. In fact the goal was also to add on to the existing multicultural life in the neighborhood to create a multicultural attraction for the city and region (Finale Plan van Aanpak, 1992).

At the same time, Bijlmermeer had to “become an attractive neighborhood for both autochtonen as well as allochtonen.” (ARS-Advies, 2001: 4). Since Dutch policy aimed for integration of immigrants, mono-cultural neighborhoods of immigrants were considered undesirable. Instead, I would argue that dispersing immigrants across neighborhoods and intermixing them with autochtonen characterized multicultural policy in the Netherlands whereby intermixing was seen as necessary for the process of integration. For Bijlmermeer this implied that more middle class autochtonen had to be attracted to the neighborhood to ‘dilute’ concentrations of allochtonen. This is one of the outcomes of the way government is made visible (Dean, 1999).

Because the revitalization of Bijlmermeer is such a long-term project there has been time to learn from mistakes. At the start of the operation priority was given to the revitalization of the built environment. However, around 2000 attention shifted more to socio-economic renewal. It was recognized that without more commitment to improving the socio-economic status of Bijlmermeer’s residents, social problems would persist and threaten the urban renewal operation (OTB, 2001) For the period 2000 – 2004, 63.5 million Euros were set aside for socio-economic renewal projects. It has proven to be difficult to measure the outcomes of the socio-economic projects, however. Most of these

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68The concentration of Japanese immigrants in a few neighborhoods of Amsterdam is not considered problematic.
projects take several years before results become visible and it has taken time to get them off the ground as a result of the many different institutions involved in their implementation.

7.3.3 ‘White’ governors and ‘black’ residents: negotiating urban renewal of Bijlmermeer

70% ‘black’, but completely represented by ‘whites,’ who are not even from here. I always used to say, the city district is governed by a number of public servants who only know Bijlmer as the gravel-path between Bijlmer station and their office. They arrive here by train at exactly 8.30am, they work and then leave again at 5.05pm. Nonetheless they decided what was needed in Bijlmer.

(Glenn Pinas, Surinamese, initiator of Zwart Beraad)

The Dutch way of physical planning has proven to be an instrument to integrate foreigners in the Dutch society, with respect for their roots.

(Gerard Smit, Dutch, senior planning official city of Amsterdam).

A couple of years after the start of the urban renewal operation allochtone69 residents and allochtone politicians of district Southeast became increasingly dissatisfied with the urban renewal process. The reason for this dissatisfaction was that they were not consulted or represented in key decisions regarding the urban renewal process. A major problem they observed in the district was that while its population had become the most multicultural in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, those who were responsible for the development and implementation of urban renewal programs – planners, policy-makers, politicians, consultants, architects, and representatives of neighborhood organizations – were predominantly autochtone. The autochtone professionals who decided how to change Bijlmermeer did not live in the neighborhood, but only worked there. The feeling

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69 Allochtone is a conjugation of allochtonen. See chapter 1 for a definition.
of political exclusion culminated in an ethnic clash between *autochtone* professionals and a large section of the immigrant population – especially with the Surinamese and Antillean communities. The tensions escalated surrounding the distribution of URBAN-funds – EU funds for socio-economic renewal in European cities – when it became evident that the four teams responsible for the distribution of URBAN-funds consisted of *autochtonen* only. In the eyes of politically engaged Surinamese and Antillean residents this was one of many examples that demonstrated that *autochtone* professionals were in power in the district, even though the *autochtone* population was in the minority. The revitalization of the neighborhood was geared towards attracting middle class *autochtone* residents, thereby reducing the concentration of immigrants. This is what many immigrant residents told to me when I asked them their opinion on the urban renewal operation. So did John Euson an Antillean resident of Bijlmermeer and director of a business association in the area.

… saving Bijlmermeer meant intervening in the physical environment such that it became more attractive for the middle class, the white middle class who work here (John Euson, Antillean, director business association Bijlmermeer).

The ambition of social mixing by *autochtone* professionals could also be seen as a strategy to secure the stability of the nation-state (see chapter 5). Similar feelings towards urban renewal as a strategy to attract an *autochtone* middle-class were also heard in the African community in Bijlmermeer. Anderson Nwosu, a priest of an African church in Bijlmermeer explained to me that he feared the displacement of his community as well as the disruption of the social infrastructure. When I asked him what he believed was the goal of urban renewal, he explained to me:
The purpose of the renewal was to change the demography of Southeast. Predictions stated that by 2020 the migrant community would have increased so much that it would outnumber the indigenous. And so they said, ‘no we don’t want that and so let’s scatter them all over the place.’ The buildings are new, only 30 years, so the policy is just to change the demographics... 80% of the new houses are for sale, 20% for rent, and even these places we can’t afford. I find it a bit disturbing as a migrant myself, because they will uproot 80,000 people who have developed a cultural connection and network (Anderson Nwosu, Ghanaian, priest of African church Bijlmermeer)

Ghanaians have developed strong ties with Bijlmermeer, they see it as their home. According to Jonathan Appiah, chair of a Ghanaian migrant organization that provides basic computer skills and various other activities to Africans in Southeast, explained to me how much he feels at home in Bijlmermeer. “Bijlmermeer is Africa, the Bijlmer is Africa”. Michelle Oyesanya (Ghanaian, resident) who used to live in one of the high rises and at the time of the interview was recently rehoused in a neighborhood adjacent to Bijlmermeer in a single family house with garden, associates life in Bijlmermeer with Ghana because of the existence of a large and close community: “if you live in Bijlmer it is more or less like you live in Ghana.” Michelle managed to rent a house in the Southeast district, adjacent to Bijlmermeer which allowed her to maintain connections with the African community. The fear of losing this sense of community and losing the networks that help them organize their everyday lives in the Netherlands, caused many Africans I interviewed (formal or informal) to feel threatened by the urban renewal program. 

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70 Because there are many illegal immigrants from Africa living in Bijlmermeer, they have developed a large and efficient informal infrastructure. They help each other to find jobs, provide illegal taxis, and provide shelter. I was told by all Ghanaians I interviewed that they provided shelter for their “Ghanaian brothers” who arrived in the Netherlands for short periods of time and sometimes for extended periods to share the costs for the apartment.
The clash surrounding the distribution of URBAN-funds – a group of immigrant residents demanded that some of the funds were used for supporting socio-economic initiatives of their communities – was an important moment in the creation of a multicultural neighborhood and city. It resulted in allochto ne residents demanding a voice in formal institutions and decision-making processes in the Southeast district, especially regarding the renewal of Bijlmermeer. A group of Surinamese and Antillean men started coming together on a regular basis to discuss the problems of their underrepresentation in the urban renewal process. In 1996 they founded Zwart Beraad (Black Consultation), with the goal of demanding a voice in the decision-making processes in the neighborhood and in attempts to build cultural bridges (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996) among different ethnic communities in the neighborhood.

We do not intend to pin down ethnic groups to their culture. Instead, we rather strive for encounter, exchange, interaction and the fusion of cultures (Zwart Beraad and Allochtonen Breed Overleg (ABO) [Black Consultation and Allochtonen Wide Consultation], 1997: 10).

The outcome of the meetings of Zwart Beraad was a document “‘Zwart-Wit’ nader beschouwd: een aanzet tot multiculturalisatie en aandeelhouderschap van de Bijlmer” [‘Black –White’ considered closely: a start towards multiculturalisation and ownership of Bijlmermeer]71 (Zwart Beraad and ABO, 1997) addressed to the district council.

In this document Zwart Beraad launched a plan for creating a truly multicultural neighborhood, where all ethnic groups are given a voice in decision-making processes and are empowered to be capable of participating. In this document they argued that,

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71 For this document Zwart Beraad worked together with the Allochtonen Breed Overleg, which represented all allochtonen in the neighborhood.
despite attempts to counter social problems and segregation, a social division along ethnic lines was developing (Zwart Beraad and ABO, 1997: 2). One of their main critiques of the urban renewal of Bijlmermeer was that while high-rises were to be demolished and replaced by new low-rise or four-story apartment blocks, no connection was made with socio-economic renewal. This was problematic because physical change could maybe help to counter segregation, but it would not solve the socio-economic problems of the residents, in particular of its immigrant residents. Zwart Beraad recognized the need for special education trajectories, employment, inexpensive offices for small businesses, support for single mothers, to mention a few things. Furthermore, they felt that URBAN funds had to be used for funding projects that would not only benefit *autochtone* residents and *autochtone* politicians’, but that would respond to the needs of the different ethnic groups in the district. Finally, Zwart Beraad demanded measures by the district council that demonstrated the ambition to create a “harmonious multicultural society” (Zwart Beraad and ABO, 1997: 4).

The document served as a starting point for negotiations with the city council. These negotiations were successful and Zwart Beraad succeeded in initiating a major transformation in the operation of the district organization. As part of state Integration Policy, immigrants were held responsible for their own emancipation and were expected to participate in mainstream institutions (see also Entzinger, 2003; Mitchell 2004). Ethnic tensions and actions by Zwart Beraad caused district politicians to realize that different instruments had to be developed to enable *allochtone* residents to raise their voice in the urban renewal process and for them to participate in mainstream institutions. A major transformation in the governing mentality of the Southeast district organization was
needed for it to become inclusive and to develop a representative multicultural organization.

From 1998 onwards, the city council introduced a series of instruments and measures to encourage diversity in the organization, especially in the top positions, and to encourage the participation of ethnic groups in the urban renewal process and district politics. NGOs and ethnic organizations were given a voice in the allocation of subsidies and the composition of the local council and administration started to better reflect the demographic composition of Southeast district. The district council agreed to hire *allochtonen* in top management functions within the district.

In 1998 a new district mayor, Hannah Belliot, was appointed. By appointing a Surinamese woman the PvdA – labor party – believed that ethnic tensions in Southeast could be solved. In the four years Hannah Belliot governed the district she succeeded in controlling ethnic tensions and to win trust of immigrant residents in particular. Between 1998 and 2002 a Surinamese consultant and a Pakistani consultant from Birmingham were hired to introduce multiculturalism in the urban renewal process. Slowly, more positions within the district were opened up for *allochtonen* and so the district organization and the local council began to reflect the diversity of the district population. District Southeast is now the most multicultural local council and district organization in the country.

In 1997 the *Multiculturalisatie en Participatie Bureau* (Multiculturalisation and Participation Office) (MP Office) was created. Thereby a division was created within the
district organization in order to monitor the progress of multiculturalisation in the district and develop instruments and strategies to empower *allochtonen* and to encourage them to participate in neighborhood organizations and debates. This was one of the suggestions of Zwart Beraad. The employees of the MP Office are of different ethnic backgrounds, which caused the office to be easily accessible to many residents of Bijlmermeer (see also Frisken and Wallace, 2003, which offers a similar discussion in the Canadian context).

The job of the MP Office is:

… initiating, stimulating, developing, coordinating, supporting and guiding projects aimed at emancipation, multiculturalisation and participation of the residents of the Southeast District and specifically those of Bijlmermeer (In Goossens & Van der Zant, 1999: 4).

The MP Office aimed to inform all residents – also those who do not speak Dutch – about the urban renewal plans, their likely impacts, and to help residents participate in neighborhood meetings. It was also charged with finding new, suitable housing for residents whose apartments were listed for demolition (Evaluation MP Office, 2003; interview Sarita, employee of MP Office). For example, it was noticed that Ghanaian residents had great interest in thinking about and discussing urban renewal in Bijlmermeer (OTB, 2001: 86). Because most Ghanaians did not speak Dutch, the MP Office in cooperation with the housing corporation arranged information sessions in English. Furthermore, they tried to increase social cohesion in the neighborhood and to increase social support for non-Dutch residents. Through small work groups, residents of different ethnic backgrounds were being involved in the planning process for different sections of Bijlmermeer. In the past, the methods of encouraging participation and stimulating emancipation were geared towards approaching an *autochtone* population.
The MP Office succeeded in introducing new strategies in order to get immigrant residents involved in the urban renewal process.

The MP Office soon reached its goals: the district organization better reflected the composition of the district population and different ethnic groups were involved in socio-economic renewal projects and participated in meetings regarding the revitalization of their neighborhood sections. Therefore, its existence was increasingly questioned. This became most explicit in 2003 when a district politician, advised by her policy advisors, proposed to close the MP Office. Wendy Owen a senior policy advisor of district Zuidoost, responsible for coordinating the districts’ social policies, explained to me that due to its success the office was no longer needed. Its work could be incorporated within
other divisions of the district. Furthermore, she explained to me her discontent with the way the MP Office was trying to legitimize their existence.

There’s different organizations, and especially the MP Office, it seems to be their job to distribute crap. The work they do is ok, but these statements [claiming that many residents have been pushed out of the neighborhood]; this is just their way to try to legitimize their existence (Wendy Owen, Surinamese, senior policy advisor).

Finally, in 2006 the MP Office was merged with the local community development organization in the district. Multiculturalism was institutionalized, so district politicians argued, and therefore the MP Office was no longer needed to monitor the process. Where the MP Office was critical of the developments in Bijlmermeer, Wendy Owen mostly praised the Southeast district as the example of a multicultural neighborhood, where the diversity of its population was also reflected in the district administration.

This is the most multicultural city district. Service provision is much better here than elsewhere because people understand each other. Surinamese, Antillean, Ethiopian, Ghanaian civil servants, they all work here. This has not been achieved anywhere else. What you see in other city districts is that there are a couple of Turkish and Moroccan employees working at the service counter because it is convenient for residents to be assisted in their own language, but if you look in the pores of the organization you won’t find allochtonen at the management level. We are still the only district with a “black” mayor (Wendy Owen, Surinamese, senior policy advisor).

The MP Office claimed that urban renewal has pushed out many poor, immigrant residents of Bijlmermeer \(^7\) to nearby neighborhoods in Southeast district, causing social problems to be shifted to nearby neighborhoods. John Chan (Surinamese, senior policy advisor), working on stimulating the participation of immigrants in urban renewal of

\(^7\) Interview Sarita, employee of the MP Office
Bijlmermeer, told me he was very concerned about the displacement of poor families to neighborhoods outside of Bijlmermeer.

Residents have moved from Bijlmermeer to Holendrecht [another neighborhood within the Southeast district] because of the availability of social housing in Holendrecht. Let’s be honest, this happened and the effect is that the neighborhood has been downgraded (John Chan, Surinamese, senior policy advisor).

Charissa Webster (Antillean, policy advisor local housing corporation) who at the time of the interview was responsible for supporting residents whose apartments were planned to be demolished in finding new, suitable housing, explained to me that “only ‘good’ residents” were selected for the newly built homes. People who caused a nuisance in the two years prior to re-housing did not qualify for new housing and had to search for housing elsewhere in Southeast district or in other districts of Amsterdam. While it is difficult to identify the displacement of the poor from official statistics, Bijlmermeer has continued to be a popular place to live for people from Surinam, The Dutch Antilles and Ghana, and that ambitions to attract an autochtone middle class have not been as successful as expected. In fact, the number of native Dutch continues to decline. It is predicted that by 2015 only 19% of all residents will be native Dutch (OTB, 2003: 7). That Bijlmermeer is not very popular among the native Dutch was also highlighted by a survey conducted by research institute OTB of the University of Delft contracted by the Southeast district, asking residents of Bijlmermeer whether or not they wanted to stay in the neighborhood. 65% of the Ghanaian and Surinamese residents interviewed and 60% of the Antillean residents said that they wanted to stay in Bijlmermeer, compared to only

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74 Interview Tamara, employee of a housing corporation
31% of the native Dutch residents (OTB, 2001: 81). Surinamese and Antillean middle class residents who had previously moved to the suburbs, but had decided to return to Bijlmermeer after identifying new opportunities in the neighborhood have taken their place. The urban renewal operation of Bijlmermeer, therefore, has been successful in bringing back an allochtone middle class to the neighborhood. I am not arguing that no autochtone middle class families moved to Bijlmermeer, but that their numbers were very limited compared to the allochtone middle class buying property in the revitalized neighborhoods of Bijlmermeer.

The district organization and district council have become more multicultural, but it is specifically the allochtone middle class that is now gaining more power in the district. The number of middle class homeowners in Bijlmermeer is rising and class differentials within the multicultural society of Bijlmermeer have become more manifest. In fact, in neighborhoods where owner occupied housing is mixed with social rental housing, residents of the owner-occupied housing are interested in physically separating themselves from the “poor”, as was explained to me by Tamara de Jong, a manager of one of the housing corporations with property in Amsterdam Zuidoost.

What we observe is the development of a division between owner-occupiers and those who rent. We have owner-occupiers who propose to build a fence between the rental and owner-occupied homes. This has nothing to do with color, but with social-economic position. In Bijlmermeer where the residents of the owner-occupied housing are just as ethnically mixed as anywhere else in the neighborhood, we notice that socio-economic position is a much bigger dividing line than color or background (Tamara, Surinamese, manager of a housing corporation).

When owning property, residents develop a strong interest in securing the value of their homes.
It was never expected that an *allochtone* middle class would be attracted back to the city through urban renewal. The greater diversity in the housing stock has attracted many families who had previously left Bijlmermeer in search of better quality housing. They have been attracted back by strong social ties to the neighborhood and by the availability of appropriate housing. Having social ties in the neighborhood, however does not imply social interaction with the lower social classes in the neighborhood, contrary to what politicians and policy-makers intended.

Geeta Ramdas, a Surinamese resident and participant in a think thank on the urban renewal of a section of Bijlmermeer was very skeptical when I asked her about the interaction between residents in the new social housing and owner occupied housing.

Over there you see the new owner occupied housing. It is crude to say but it is an enclave of high-income whites in what really is a ghetto of immigrants. People shut themselves out. No one benefits from this (Geeta Ramdas, Surinamese, resident).

There are various middle class groups in the neighborhood who separate themselves from others based on class. Geeta, however, specifically talks about it in terms of a specific group of *autochtone* residents.

Ethnic diversity has become an everyday lived reality in Bijlmermeer. Where in the Netherlands the debate about immigrant integration was ‘toughened’, diversity has flourished in Bijlmermeer.

### 7.3.4 A market for diversity

The residents from Surinam, the Antilles and Africa succeeded in creating a district organization that was more representative of the local population. Furthermore, in
order to change the negative image of Bijlmermeer a culturally diverse group of residents started the organization “United Different Voices” (UDF). This organization ran fieldtrips through the neighborhood, showing scholars, students, local business people, and other visitors around the sites where urban renewal was in progress as well as the ethnic and cultural diversity of the neighborhood. They were introduced to ethnic organizations, churches and ethnic stores, and participated in cultural activities such as cooking Surinamese food or African music and dance.

Figure 7.6 A multicultural festival (Kwakoe) in Bijlmermeer

These fieldtrips were mainly attended by *autochtone*, elite cosmopolitan consumers who experienced the ‘exotic’ for an afternoon or a day, after which they returned to their homes (Bodaar, 2006: 183). Some visitors wrote their experiences on the
message board of the UDF website. It follows from these messages that visitors were mainly attracted by the exotic: ‘smells and colors, ‘foreign food products’, ‘it is as if you are in a different country’, and ‘only colored people’ (United Different Voices, 2004) (see figure 7.6).

Because of the success of this organization the city district has incorporated it into a new tourism office. For the organization this meant that they now had to start operating in a more professional manner – according to formal procedures and processes of the city district, rather than receiving an allowance for conducting their activities – in order to realize district politicians’ ambitions to make Bijlmermeer a tourist destination within the city. The incorporation of NGOs into state bodies is not limited to Bijlmermeer but is characteristic of neoliberal forms of government more generally (see Larner and Walters, 2004 and many essays in Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

7.3.5 Removing cheap stones and exchanging them for expensive stones

Residents consider themselves not only citizens of Amsterdam, but increasingly as ‘Southeasters’.

(Stadsdeel Zuidoost, 2002)

The case study of Bijlmermeer has demonstrated that creating a more ethnically and socially diverse neighborhood in order to facilitate immigrant integration is not achieved by focusing solely on interventions in the built environment. By building more expensive housing, middle class residents were attracted to Bijlmermeer, and will continue to be attracted in the final stages of the urban renewal project. While planners envisioned the
arrival of an *autochtone* middle class, such as employees of the neighboring business
district, in fact an *allochtone* middle class was attracted.

What the case study demonstrates is that social-economic status is the most
important factor for distinction, even within a multicultural society. Bijlmermeer has
become gentrified with an *allochtone* middle class (see also Uitermark *et al*, 2007 on
Rotterdam). This *allochtone* middle class – whose members often share the ethnicity of
the lower social classes in the neighborhoods and often only recently stepped out of
poverty – now try to physically separate themselves from the lower social classes in order
to secure the value of their property. The goal of creating interaction between different
social groups at the neighborhood level was therefore not achieved (Duyvendak, 2001).
While part of the *allochtone* middle class returned because of their social ties with the
neighborhood, this is not to say that this encourages bonding with the lower social classes
but a continuation of exiting social networks (which might very well be crossing class
divides). Therefore, if it was not achieved via the social mixing of people with the same
ethnic background, then what are the chances of its success when it involves the social
mixing of an *autochtone* middle class with an ethnic underclass? Nonetheless, social
mixing might be achieved in schools, through education and social activities organized by
sports clubs, migrant organizations and the city district (see also Amin, 2002)

The urban renewal operation of Bijlmermeer has succeeded in that a greater class
diversification has been realized. However, the goal of creating a more ethnically diverse
neighborhood has failed. Despite improvements in the built environment, Bijlmermeer
will continue to be an immigrant gateway, as newcomers will be supported by their ethnic
communities who already live here. Once the urban renewal operation is completed a few
high-rises will remain and will be occupied mainly by a relatively poor population. In order to avoid a new spiral of decline it is important to invest heavily in socio-economic renewal. In recent years it is increasingly recognized that youth workers, community organizations, the police, schools and private businesses must work together in Bijlmermeer to also counter social problems, crime and safety. Only then can Bijlmermeer become the example of a truly multicultural society, where bridges are being built between ethnic groups.

7.4 Spangen: Integration through neglect

The good thing about Spangen is that there is no dominant group. 15% of residents are Dutch, one-fifth Turkish, one-fifth Moroccan, one-fifth Surinamese and then you have residents from the Antilles and Cape Verde. All large groups, but the neighborhood is very multicultural, there is not one dominant group (John, community worker).

Where in Bijlmermeer a large scale urban renewal operation was initiated in 1991, in Spangen plans were also made for a major revitalization of the neighborhood during this time, however it took until 2003 until the plans began to be executed. The plans of the early 1990s were set aside for budgetary reasons. Strangely enough, at the same time budgets were redirected towards improving the image of Rotterdam. One imaging strategy was to re-brand Rotterdam into the city of modern architecture. For this purpose a new neighborhood – Kop van Zuid [South point] – was built in the city’s docklands. It is characterized by large skyscrapers, converted warehouses, restaurants and theaters. The goal was to attract a “modern” middle and upper class to the city as well as to entice international visitors. Furthermore, many investments were geared towards cultural
projects for Rotterdam’s reign as European Capital of Culture in 1999. Since reimagining the city was the first priority of local authorities, prevalent urban social problems and the dilapidation of the housing stock in some inner city neighborhoods, such as Spangen, were neglected.

Partly as a result, Spangen became one of the most notorious neighborhoods in the Netherlands. Drug dealers and sex workers became commonplace in its streets. At the same time, the neighborhood became associated with various social problems, such as poverty, crime, social isolation and a negative image. The quality of the built environment also rapidly declined and slumlords proliferated. These owners had no interest in investing in the property. Buildings were boarded up by local authorities and public space was poorly maintained. It was not uncommon to find used needles and empty bottles on the street. There were, in other words, many reasons for a major revitalization of the neighborhood. Nonetheless, city and district politicians and planners never succeeded in developing one coherent plan, despite the neighborhood’s central location in relation to the reimagined city center.

Spangen is an inner city neighborhood located in the Delfshaven district of the city of Rotterdam, west of the city center (see figure 7.7). It is situated between the railroad tracks north and west, which served for the transport of raw materials and finished products to and from the harbor, and the river Schie on the east side (see figure 7.8). The district has a population of 73,000 residents, of which 9,000 live in Spangen (BIRD, 2007). Compared to Bijlmermeer, Spangen is a small neighborhood. 84% of its
residents in 2003 were of non-Dutch origin\textsuperscript{75}: 19% of the population is Turkish, 19% Moroccan, 16% Surinamese, 11% Cape Veredian, 10% Antilllean and the other 9% have origins elsewhere in the world. Like Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam, Spangen is the most multicultural neighborhood in its city and one in which the native Dutch population is in the minority.

\textsuperscript{75}This number is probably higher because it does not take into account illegal immigrants who live in Spangen.
Spangen was built between 1918 and 1920 as a working-class neighborhood, but by the mid-1980s it had transformed from a quiet residential neighborhood to the most infamous neighborhood in the country. As the neighborhood was deteriorating more and more immigrants moved in, attracted by the inexpensive housing. Due to an accumulation of social problems, and the deterioration of the built environment and public spaces, Spangen increasingly became a place to avoid by people from other areas of Rotterdam and potential visitors. Nonetheless, despite these problems residents have been able to develop strong multicultural bonds in order to live together in difference.

In 2003 – near the beginning of my fieldwork – the revitalization of the neighborhood began. Only then did local authorities realize that something had to be done to improve the living conditions of residents of Spangen. The revitalization aims at social mixing through diversification of the housing stock and improving the safety in the neighborhood (KEI Kenniscentrum Stedelijke Vernieuwing [Kei Knowledge Center on Urban Renewal], 2008). Unlike the plans for Bijlmermeer, the multicultural composition
of the population was not incorporated in the plans. In fact, revitalization plans, that attract *autochtone* middle class residents interested in living in the inner city (Smith, 19996) now threaten to break down multicultural relations that had developed between residents in their struggle against nuisance of sex workers and drug dealers. But, before discussing how problems could accumulate and how residents have dealt with local authorities in order to counter social problems in their neighborhood, some insight in the historical development of Spangen is needed in order to understand its current problems and the motivations for intervention in 2003.

7.4.1 How an autochtone working class neighborhood became a disadvantaged multi-ethnic neighborhood

As a neighborhood, Spangen has a much longer history than Bijlmermeer. But whereas in Bijlmermeer problems started shortly after the first high-rises were built, it was over 40 years before the first signs of deprivation started showing in Spangen. How then could it happen that this stable working-class neighborhood could be transformed into a ‘no-go’ area in less than two decades?

Spangen was built in 1918 when an extension of the city was needed to accommodate the influx of laborers from the countryside who moved to the city to work in Rotterdam’s port. Spangen was built as a neighborhood for the upper working class. The architectural plan was characterized by four-story housing blocks with communal gardens and roads that were built in a symmetrical, star-shaped pattern. The most renowned artists and architects of that time contributed to the design of the neighborhood. Their plans were strongly shaped by the guiding state philosophy, which aimed to uplift
the working class through ‘modern and good’ housing. This demonstrates that already at the beginning of the twentieth century there was a strong belief in shaping social conduct through urban design in urban planning in the Netherlands. One of the most famous housing blocks in Spangen\textsuperscript{76} neighborhood was built in the shape of a castle but with a gallery on the first floor and a lot of small apartments with a communal garden (see figure 7.9). This was a new concept in the Netherlands at that time. The building not only housed many families in small apartments, the communal garden provided a healthy green space in the city and was believed to facilitate social interaction between residents.

\textbf{Figure 7.9 Architectural style of Spangen}

Until the 1960s Spangen was occupied by an upper working class of public servants, teachers and craftsmen. Twenty years later the social and ethnic composition of the neighborhood had completely changed. As the social-economic status of residents of

\textsuperscript{76}This housing block on the Justus van Effenstraat is world famous and a national monument.
Spangen had improved significantly – the working class population had increasingly become a middle class population – the quality of the housing no longer satisfied the demands of its residents. The architects who had designed the neighborhood in the 1920s incorporated what they believed were the needs of the ‘worker’ at that time, but had no accurate vision of the future. Hence, by the 1960s, the small apartments no longer satisfied the demands of the new middle classes. The quality of housing in Spangen was poor, and not very well maintained, especially compared to the newly built housing in the suburbs. As a consequence, a major suburbanization of residents began. When residents moved out, they were increasingly replaced by the poor, amongst them many immigrants, who relied on the least expensive housing in the city. As demand for housing in Spangen declined, it started to become one of the least attractive neighborhoods in the city to live in. While Spangen continues to be famous for its architectural design, what is most striking is that it has become one of the poorest neighborhoods in the country.

The first migrants to Spangen – in the 1960s – were guest workers from Spain, Portugal and Greece, many of whom returned to their home countries once their contracts ended. In the 1970s guest workers from Turkey and Morocco started settling in Spangen, followed by migrants from Surinam, the Antilles and the Cape Verdes. From the late 1980s onwards they were followed by immigrants from Africa and Eastern Europe. In less than two decades Spangen had transformed from an *autochtone* working class neighborhood to a multi-ethnic immigrant gateway. Because of the rapid transformation of the social and ethnic population composition of the neighborhood, social networks were fragile and poorly developed. A major problem that started developing was the socio-economic marginalization of residents of Spangen. Unemployment was rising as
industrial jobs were disappearing, and due to a lack of skills they were increasingly excluded from opportunities in the urban economy. As a consequence, Spangen became a more single-class, low-income and unemployed, ethnically diverse, and increasingly immigrant enclave. The neighborhood was increasingly avoided and stigmatized by other residents of Rotterdam. Residents of Spangen who had the opportunity moved out of the neighborhood. As a consequence, the turnover rate was very high.

Another reason for the rapid deterioration of the neighborhood was that the mayor of Rotterdam decided to board up apartments that were uninhabitable according to existing standards of housing quality (see figure 7.10). In doing so, the city of Rotterdam contributed to the decay of the neighborhood. The partly boarded up buildings attracted drug addicts and drug dealers. Also, sex workers appeared in the streets, most of whom were women sold sex to finance their drug addiction. Where Noord district in Rotterdam (see chapter 8) served as an entry point and storage room for drugs, Spangen was the neighborhood where the drugs (mainly heroin) were being sold and consumed. This attracted many illegal activities and caused property crime rates to rise as drug addicts sought to fund their addiction. Also, some residents of Spangen got involved in the drug scene. Wendell Barak, a resident, for example got involved in the drug scene as a teenager, selling drugs and eventually becoming addicted to heroin. Now that he is clean he is trying to prevent the local youth of making the same mistakes. Nonetheless, he is quite pessimistic as long as nothing is done to stop the trade.

The drug addicts are caught, but not much is done to stop the trade. A great number of people who live here are somehow involved in the drugs scene, both intentional and unintentional (Wendell Barak, Surinamese, neighborhood resident).
Figure 7.10 Boarded up housing blocks in Spangen

7.4.2 “We want to live here. We won’t move!”

At a certain point we [residents of Spangen] had enough [of the drug dealing] and then we protested. We protested against the coming and going of drug tourists. Only then did politicians wake up! (Souad El Joghrafi, Moroccan, resident)

In 1994 the situation in Spangen reached alarming levels when Perron Nul – a shelter for the homeless and drug addicts in the city center where heroin addicts could consume their drugs and where they could get methadone – was closed. From that moment onwards more drug addicts and dealers moved to Spangen. My informants told me that the presence of drug dealers also attracted drug runners from other European countries who visited Spangen to purchase drugs to be sold in their home countries.

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*I was told by a former resident that this is what they painted on their housing in the Dirk Danestraat in the mid-1990s in order to get publicity and attention for their situation.
Souad, a Moroccan resident who moved from Morocco to Spangen in the early 1990s, was one of the protesters and now works as a volunteer in the community center. She told me that residents of Spangen felt increasingly unsafe and neglected by the police and city authorities. District and city politicians were aware that something needed to change in order to improve the situation in the neighborhood and developed a plan for its revitalization. These plans, however, were never realized, as it took more time than expected to expropriate the slumlords who had bought up a large section of the housing stock in Spangen. In fact, according to Vera van der Linden, a policy advisor for the city of Rotterdam, it was even a political choice not to intervene.

… so what you saw was that because so many apartments were in such a bad state, deterioration occurred even more rapidly. The apartments were all in the hands of slumlords who attracted people at the bottom of the housing market to the neighborhood, especially illegal immigrants and drug addicts… it was a political choice (Vera van der Linden, Dutch, policy advisor).

According to Vera van der Linden local authorities could have intervened by expropriating the housing from the slumlords much sooner, before they had lost all control over the situation, but at that time it was not in their interest. Ludo Maas (Dutch, retired planner for the city of Rotterdam) told me that a major problem in Rotterdam was that “city districts had limited power and aldermen of the city were involved in other projects, such as Rotterdam Capital of Culture and Kop van Zuid” (Ludo Maas)78. Activities aimed at creating an image for Rotterdam were prioritized. Also, compared to Amsterdam where city districts have a lot of autonomy in designing plans for neighborhood renewal, Delfshaven district did not have the authority to initiate the\n
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78 See chapter 6 for a schematic overview of the administrative structures in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
revitalization of the Spangen neighborhood. This was in the hands of the city council and the development agency of the city of Rotterdam.

By the mid-1990s, residents of Spangen were fed up with the problems in their neighborhood and with the lack of action by local authorities. Annie Verdoold\textsuperscript{79}, a neighborhood resident and now a well-known community activist, took the lead and became the spokesperson for worried residents. She managed to bring residents of Spangen together to protest against drug related problems, boarded up housing and the neglect of public space in the neighborhood. Local authorities, however, did not respond to these protests. In order to get attention to the problems in Spangen, a cross-section of residents – a majority of Dutch residents together with smaller groups with a wide range of cultural backgrounds –, encouraged by Verdoold, strengthened their protests by committing acts of civil disobedience. For one-and-a-half years they blocked the access road to Spangen and demolished cars with foreign (French, Belgian and German) license plates that were parked in the neighborhood. With this protest they demonstrated that it was not a problem of the neighborhood but of the city.

In the meanwhile Verdoold represented the voice of the residents to district and city authorities. By organizing residents around a shared problem Verdoold succeeded in creating social interaction between different ethnic groups in Spangen. This was endorsed by Ruben dos Santos in Spangen.

\textsuperscript{79} I am not using a pseudonym for Annie Verdoold because she is a public figure, like Fortuyn and Van Gogh and because I am not using direct quotes from a conversation with her.
The orientation towards action in Spangen is due to the fact that there was a shared problem [drugs]. Residents of different nationalities shared this problem and started working together to address the situation. This shared problem has created a bond between the residents. Today, everyone knows each other in Spangen (Ruben dos Santos, Cape Verdes, district politician).

The bonding of residents across cultural divides was mentioned by most of the residents I spoke to and formed an important reason for why they wanted to stay in the neighborhood. At the same time, many residents complained that they no longer know their neighbors and that social cohesion is threatened by newcomers. Even though a concrete action plan for Spangen has not been developed, residents have initiated different multicultural projects in the neighborhood, for example parks and communal gardens, that contributed to improving their everyday lives at least a little bit.

Through productive cooperation between residents, police, care institutions and the local government, problems in the neighborhood in recent years have diminished. Nonetheless, not much improvement has been made in the quality of the neighborhood’s living environment. In fact, by the end of the 1990s housing corporations started moving residents out, but without having approval for taking down the housing or a plan for new housing. When asked why the boarded up housing was not being torn down and replaced by new apartments, policy advisors of the city pointed to what they see as an uneven distribution of urban renewal funds by the state. Willem Brandsema, who worked as policy advisor to the mayor of Rotterdam, for example argued that:

Rotterdam receives less money for urban renewal compared to Amsterdam, while Amsterdam is in a much better state compared to Rotterdam (Willem Brandsema, Dutch, policy advisor).

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80 Interview Jeannette
The relationship between residents and the local authorities has continued to be very tense. I was told by the residents that I interviewed that after years of being neglected by local authorities, even despite protests, they have completely lost trust in their state. They told me they first want to see results before they will begin to regain trust in local authorities. Instead of waiting for action from local authorities, residents have worked together with community workers to start their own improvement projects. Residents of the Dirk Danestraat, one of the streets where a large number of apartments are boarded up, for example are developing a multicultural communal garden. The neighborhood group operates from a building that was listed for renovation in 1983. By the end of the 1980s nothing had happened and the building was sold to slumlords. In the late 1990s the building was partly boarded up and repossessed by the city (see figure 7.10). Nothing has happened since. In order to improve their living situation a group of 9 residents created an organization called Utopia. Utopia, created in 2000, has 15-20 members, mainly residents who live on the ground floor (there is no public access to the garden for residents of the upper floors) and is highly culturally mixed. The people I spoke to were Dutch, American, Yugoslavian, Iraqi and Turkish, both men and women, and communicated with each other in a variation of Dutch and English. Three of the initiators of Utopia are artists. The goal of the organization was to revitalize the community garden, to clean it up, make it accessible to residents of the upper floors and to then use the garden for different activities, such as for a barbecue or for parties of different immigrant groups. This in order to create social cohesion between residents of different cultural backgrounds by encouraging residents to share their cultural traits and habits. For this purpose, Utopia was offered two apartments in the building by
Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam [the development agency of Rotterdam], from where to coordinate their activities and where residents can meet when the weather does not allow for outdoor activities as well as professional support by Rotterdams Steunpunt Wonen [Rotterdam Support Point Living]. Nonetheless, this gesture did not change the attitude of residents towards local authorities.

I was told by Nadia Dragovic (Yugoslavian, artist and member Utopia) – and this was supported by the other members –, that they are frustrated, disappointed, helpless and not taking seriously in negotiations with Ontwikkelingsbedrijf, the municipality, the housing corporation and the property developer. In the four years they are working on the garden there is still no formal agreement with the different parties and no financial support to get it finished. Chris Brown (American, member Utopia) told me he was really “pissed off” and ready to involve the media to struggle for better living conditions, because while many political delegations visited Utopia and praised the initiative for “providing prospects in a poor neighborhood” and promised support, nothing of that is realized. Despite the lack of support from local authorities and housing corporations, this initiative demonstrated to me that strong bonds were created between residents of different ethnic backgrounds.

Another project initiated by residents involved creating a garden on the roof of a building block. It was supported by local authorities and financed with URBAN funds. For the period 1995-1999, Delfshaven district received €6.5 million Euros (10.2 million US$) of the EU URBAN program to support the economic and social recovery of urban

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81 This organization advises residents and resident organizations on housing and liveability and strives to support residents in such a way that they can attend to their interests and rights.
neighborhoods in crisis. These EU funds were coupled to funds of the Dutch state – Big Cities Funds – the municipality of Rotterdam and the city district. It was used for different social projects – the roof garden and a playground for children – but still not much was invested in improving the quality of the built environment.

7.4.3 Fortuyn and the introduction of “hot spot” policy

The cross-cultural relationships here [in Rotterdam Delfshaven] are much better and stronger than in, for example, Feyenoord or Charlois. This is because we’ve had the ethnic transformation a long time ago, whereas the neighborhoods with tensions are the neighborhoods in transition (Ruben dos Santos, Cape Verdes, district politician PvdA).

According to Ruben dos Santos Delfshaven district is no longer a ‘site of insurgent citizenship’ (Holston, 1998). There is a multi-ethnic population in Spangen that has lived there since the 1970s. As a consequence, residents of Spangen have already become familiarized with ethnic diversity in their everyday lives. Furthermore, because of a shared problem – that of drugs nuisance and general neglect of the built environment – the multi-ethnic residents of Spangen were able to look beyond their cultural differences and to develop cross-cultural relationships aimed at improving their neighborhood. Also, most immigrants that settled in Spangen in the 1970s have learnt to speak Dutch.

In areas where cross-cultural bonds are developing it is because people all speak the language [Dutch], and in areas where there is hardly any contact between groups it is because you are dealing with newcomers, people who do not master the language (Ruben dos Santos).
Communication is more difficult in the neighborhoods that more recently have experienced the influx of large numbers of immigrants. It must not be ignored, however, that Spangen continues to be an ‘immigrant gateway’ (Price and Benton-Short, 2008), but the newcomers arrive in a situation where multiculturalism has already been embedded in the everyday lives of neighborhood residents. This situation is very different in neighborhoods that more recently have experienced a rapid change in their neighborhood populations, from being autochtone strongholds to becoming multi-ethnic neighborhoods – for example the districts Feyenoord and Charlois on the South side of the city – where autochtone residents felt increasingly unsafe and left alone by Rotterdam’s politicians.

In 2000 – when local elections were held – Pim Fortuyn’s party Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) successfully responded to the feelings of dissatisfaction of this section of Rotterdam’s population. He linked these feelings to the fast increase of immigrants in neighborhoods of Rotterdam and the differences in lifestyles, norms and values between the host population and new (Muslim) immigrants. In Spangen, however, not many people voted for LR. Most residents of Spangen are immigrants and did not feel represented by Fortuyn’s political agenda. With LR in the governing coalition,

immigrant integration and security became key topics on the public policy agenda. From being a city committed to multiculturalism (see chapter 8), Rotterdam now demanded assimilation of its immigrants – even though it was officially termed ‘integration’. This transformation in the way immigrant incorporation is thought about had important impact on the ways immigrant conduct is being governed and on the techniques used for neighborhood improvement in Spangen and other neighborhoods in the city.

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82 This was a coalition of Leefbaar Rotterdam, CDA and the VVD.
In December of 2003 the city of Rotterdam presented its new policy in the bill “Rotterdam zet door: op weg naar een stad in balans” [Rotterdam persists: moving towards a balanced city] (see chapter 6). According to politicians, if nothing was done, Rotterdam would become flooded by immigrants from non-industrialized countries “who in terms of their socio-economic development, language, culture and religion would be far removed from the average population of Rotterdam” (Gemeente Rotterdam [City of Rotterdam], 2003: 3). The problem was not only perceived in terms of the lack of integration of immigrants from non-industrialized nations, but also the further concentration of this population in certain districts of Rotterdam (fear of segregation). City and district politicians believed that their influx would further speed up the outflux of *autochtone* families and the middle class more generally and that it would further complicate efforts aimed at integrating immigrants from non-industrialized nations. City politicians considered Rotterdam’ problems to exceed that of other cities, and wanted other state bodies to acknowledge this:

The city board is of the opinion that partner-state bodies now must finally acknowledge the excessiveness of problems in Rotterdam. Rotterdam cannot solve this on its own, but should be supported by other state bodies [they mean departments of the national state] (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003: 17).

This is an example of how the state – in this case policy advisors and politicians of the city of Rotterdam – constructed a problem to be solved in particular ways and categories of a population as a ‘problem’. This is an example of the governmentalization of the state (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991; Rose, 1999). Because problems were considered ‘excessive’ the new administration decided to develop a specific approach, based on the particular way in which the problem – the concentration of socio-economically
disadvantaged immigrants—was defined. Three central themes characterized the action plan: holding on to and attracting ‘desired’ residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods by encouraging home ownership, extending housing allocation criteria to attract smaller households and high incomes, addressing social problems, improving security, and diversifying housing stock; controlling the number of disadvantaged groups in the region, city and neighborhood; a better dispersal of disadvantaged populations over city and region. With this new policy funds were redirected to disadvantaged neighborhoods making urban renewal and improving security possible. The policy, however, had a strong repressive character, which most of the policy makers I spoke to did not agree with and where they could tried to work around. Freek van Dam (Dutch, ex-politician) an Amsterdammer who took a job as advisor of the major in Rotterdam told me he quit his job because he did not agree with the repressive direction that was chosen by Rotterdam’s city government:

In Spangen we worked on a project but in the end I left because I was fed up with the ‘beating’. Only repressive and not thinking why this was necessary. Then I tried to make clear that you can try to tackle problems at a large scale or very repressive through a maintenance organization, but you must continue to be human and as politicians show people that you support them (Freek van Dam, Dutch, ex-politician).

In order to improve neighborhood security and social cohesion a so-called hot spot policy was introduced as a specific technique resulting from the action plan. In order to visualize the problem of security a safety-index was developed to monitor how secure residents feel in the neighborhood. A hot spot was defined as an area of one or more streets characterized by impoverishment, crime, filth, and neglect (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003), in statistical terms this responded to those neighborhoods that scored a 4 or less on
the safety index (on a scale of 1-10). This way the problem of security was made
governable (Dean, 1999). Spangen was one of eight neighborhoods in Rotterdam that was
labeled a hot-spot (KEI Knowledge Center Urban Renewal, 2008). For each hot spot a
series of measures were taken at the same time to improve the situation. Agreements were
made about demolition/re-development, renovation, maintenance, tackling social
problems and nuisance, and it is in these neighborhoods where it was made possible to
prevent new residents with an income of less than 120% of the minimum income from
renting an apartment. This measure was introduced to first improve the socio-economic
situation of residents in the hot-spot neighborhoods. Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam
(Development Company Rotterdam)\textsuperscript{83}, Dienst Stedenbouw en Volkshuisvesting
[Department of Urban Development and Housing] (DS+V) in cooperation with city
district and specially assigned policy advisors to the hot spots, responsible for the
physical cleanup and addressing problems of illegal occupation and abuse of welfare. For
the hot-spot policy in Spangen in the period 2000-2008, the municipality set aside €25
million Euro, and another €50 million Euros is to be invested in the neighborhood by the
WBR, the municipal housing authority. After years of doing nothing, the city government
is finally taking action to revitalize the neighborhood.

\textsuperscript{83} This is a public development agency, part of the municipal organization.
While the hot-spot policy had a strong focus on improving neighborhood security in selected neighborhoods, social mixing seemed to be chosen as the key instrument for improving security, social cohesion and the economic situation in these neighborhoods. The new policy direction of the city of Rotterdam has resulted in more funds being directed to the city’s disadvantaged neighborhoods. While this is beneficial for the disadvantaged neighborhoods, I was told by district policy advisors of Delfshaven that they were dissatisfied with the way the multicultural society is portrayed by LR. Jan Maaskant (Dutch, senior policy advisor welfare district Delfshaven) for example, who said that LR “portrays the multicultural society as a problem, whereas “the multicultural society is a society that is pleasant to be part of”. Politicians of Delfshaven – the district with the highest concentration of immigrants in the city – disapprove of the policy to exclude residents with an income of less than 120 per cent of the minimum income from...
hot spot areas. As Jan Maaskant explained to me, they rather receive funds to tackle the problems in their local communities, with support of migrant organizations.

Of course we also have problems here. Unemployment is high among immigrants, their educational achievements are low, but one must realize that we are dealing with social problems that are created here and not in Turkey or Morocco. Does it [the problem] have a color? Yes. It is a fact that Moroccan, Turkish and Antillean residents are more likely to experience these problems than native Dutch residents. If you cannot solve this with policy then you must search for people within migrant communities to offer their knowledge and skills to come to a solution. In other words, you must support migrant organizations that are willing to help (Jan Maaskant, Dutch, senior policy advisor)

The implementation of hot-spot policy is another example of the philosophy that social mixing will solve problems in the neighborhood. It was decided that only housing in the middle and upper price ranges would be built in Delfshaven, in order to attract a middle class population, and thereby uplifting the neighborhood. Brochures of developers now portray the neighborhood as a “beautiful place”. According to Frans Werkman (Dutch, community worker Spangen) the new branding of the neighborhood is erasing the history of current neighborhood residents. “The way people have struggled here for years against drugs and crime is also a quality of the neighborhood” (Frans Werkman).

A process of gentrification is set in motion by offering potential buyers an apartment for free as long as they promised to invest at least €100,000. This experiment with so-called kluswoningen [apartments that are renovated by the new owners, who will also be the new residents] has attracted middle class residents to the neighborhood. Because of its success an additional 169 apartments were sold for €20,000 and the commitment of the new owners to renovate the interior and exterior of the house within a year.
This is a successful strategy for countering impoverishment in a disadvantaged neighborhood. Nonetheless, long term residents do not have much faith in the urban renewal operation as I was told by residents of Utopia, by Souad El-Joghrafi and by Wendell Barak who said to me: “Residents don’t expect much of the police and local authorities because they have ignored the neighborhood for years” (Wendell Barak, Surinamese, resident). In fact, residents, district politicians and community workers fear displacement of the poor residents from the neighborhood. Ahmed Gümus who owns a small cornerstore in Spangen said:

They want, if I understand it correctly, to attract a different kind of people. Now it is mainly minimum incomes, people at the margins of society. They want to vary this a bit more. I think this is good, but what are they going to do with all the people who live here and are at the margins of society? Where do they have to go? (Ahmed Gümus, Turkish, entrepreneur)
While this is a concern among residents, professionals most fear the breakdown of social networks.

In Delfshaven we only build housing in the middle and upper price ranges. We do realize, however, that this can harm the fragile social bonds that currently exist. I mean in some of the social housing complexes there are residents who we do not want to lose, because they are the anchor points of the existing social ties. When we decide to demolish their homes and to attract middle and upper classes, we will lose these people because they will not be able to afford the rent of the new homes (Ruben dos Santos, Cape Verdes, district politician PvdA).

And

[Spangen] was one of the degenerated sections that was left out of the major urban renewal operation in the 1980s. When 36 new households will move into such a large area you won’t notice. The idea is to counter social problems by building more expensive housing in disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, the success of this practice has never been proven. In fact, often DINKY’s move in to the new housing, who are much less focused on the neighborhood for their social contacts (Frans Werkman).

It remains to be seen whether the displacement of poor and immigrant residents from Spangen is a good thing. By displacing them to other parts of the city, a consequence could be that the socio-economic problems of this group of residents will not be addressed, that they will not feel welcome in the city, and as a result will not put effort into participating in the city and neighborhood even though this is increasingly demanded of citizens (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Mitchell. 2004)

The recognition of identity is essential for allochtonen to feel at home. Once people feel more at home here they will also take more responsibilities. Only then will they make the city into their living room (Hülya Dogan, Turkish, manager resident support and advising center).

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84 Double Income No Kids (Yet)
Hot spot policy is mainly organized by different departments of the city. It is therefore the city of Rotterdam that was responsible for the problems in Spangen. The goal of revitalization is once again that social mixing will solve problems in the neighborhood as immigrant residents will move into owner occupied housing.

7.4.4 Integration through neglect of disadvantaged neighborhoods

In the 1990s when Spangen became (inter)nationally known as one of the most, if not the most, dangerous neighborhoods in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, it took until 2003 before plans for socio-economic renewal and the renovation of the housing stock finally got off the ground. In the mid-1990s, Annie Verdoold managed to build bridges between residents by bringing them together to protest against the shared problems of drugs nuisance and the neglect of the built environment in Spangen. This informal organization contrasts with experiences in Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam, where immigrant populations organized themselves in formal institutions. The protest of residents in Spangen was not about representation in decision-making processes, but against a shared problem which was not addressed by local authorities. During this process residents of different cultures started working together and shared one voice to local authorities.

Residents in Spangen – supported by Verdoold – actively shaped their own multicultural city. As local authorities had other priorities, residents organized their own multicultural initiatives. The multicultural communal garden is a successful example. An ethnically diverse group worked together to clean up the garden and redesigned it as a way to improve the social cohesion between residents of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The success is partly the result of the three artists. In order to stimulate
social cohesion they played a key role in organizing a diverse range of activities in the
garden: arts and music workshops for children, a fashion show, maintaining a vegetable
garden, barbeques and dinners (one month Turkish, then Surinamese, etc.). I attended one
of the barbeques, which brought approximately 40 people together in the garden.
Children were playing together and the parents were sharing stories. But that is not all.
Where the artists played a key role in organizing activities, the organization also started
helping residents to teach Dutch and they brought residents together for another shared
goal: the renovation of their housing block. At one of the meetings with the housing
corporations members of Utopia pressed for the return of low income families after the
renewal of their housing block.

Despite the success of Utopia, I was also told by other informants that urban
renewal is breaking down the informal power of residents. The urban renewal operation
that started in 2003 is disrupting the multicultural social networks and the voice of
residents of Spangen to the city by the displacement of residents to other neighborhoods.
The question however is what will happen as an *autochtone* middle class – attracted by
the inexpensive, large apartments close to Rotterdam’s city center – is moving in. Will
social networks be maintained or will they be broken down by the influx of these new
residents? So far it seems that urban renewal in Rotterdam has not been a great success.
After the city of Rotterdam together with housing corporations and other investors started
investing in nine neighborhoods in 2003, more and more people have moved out of these
neighborhoods (AD Rotterdams Dagblad, 2008). The number of residents declined with
2,000. It is too soon to tell.
Nonetheless, according to Vera van Rossum, a policy advisor for the city of Rotterdam on Housing, a lot of costs could have been saved had plans for revitalization been carried out at an earlier stage.

The demolition of housing was already promised in 1985, but because of a lack of financial resources this was postponed. In the end this has cost the community much and much more by then choosing for small interventions, selling some apartments and renovating only a few blocks (Vera van Rossum, Dutch, policy advisor).

The practice in Rotterdam also raises another important question: Will interaction between different social classes and ethnic populations be accomplished and will socio-economic problems be solved or will they only be displaced to other parts of the city? Where did sex workers, drug addicts and drug dealers go?

7.5 A comparison of the case studies of Bijlmermeer and Spangen

The case studies of Bijlmermeer and Spangen illustrate that the geographies of multiculturalism are uneven. Different political ideologies, local histories, and particular forms of negotiation – formal and informal – cause policy implementation to play out differently in different neighborhoods. Where Amsterdam invested in neighborhoods and a better distribution of classes over the city, Rotterdam was more focused on creating an image for the city by investing in cultural and architectural prestige projects. Because of its external focus, problems of the multicultural society that manifested itself in the sites of ‘insurgent citizenship’ (Holston, 1998), a few disadvantaged neighborhoods did not become visible.
Furthermore, the case studies of Bijlmermeer and Spangen demonstrate that the implementation of urban renewal policy has changed the social and ethnic composition of both neighborhoods in different ways. In Bijlmermeer an *allochtone* middle class was attracted, whereas in Spangen an *autochtone* middle class started moving in to the neighborhood from 2003 onwards. In each case, the character and location of the neighborhood as well as the specific policies used to address their problems resulted in specific populations being attracted to them. The *allochtone* middle class who returned to Bijlmermeer were attracted by existing social networks while Bijlmermeer’s location on the periphery of the city made it less attractive for many other groups people who prefer to live closer to the city center. Spangen, on the other hand is a close to the city center with still relatively inexpensive housing. For this reason DINKYs are interested in buying property in this neighborhood. It provides them with an opportunity to live near the city center for not too much money, knowing that the value of their property most likely will increase in subsequent years. More so than Bijlmermeer, buying an apartment in Spangen is now a good investment as well as a good opportunity for middle class urban living. Spangen on the one hand is attracting an *autochtone* middle class to the neighborhood, but has also offered *allochtone* families who have experienced upward social mobility an opportunity to move to the neighborhood. I was told by three neighborhood residents that they had bought a house in the neighborhood to stay close to their family and friends.

Promoting homeownership is a good technique for improving the liveability of the neighborhood. As the case study of Bijlmermeer demonstrated, *allochtone* and *autochtone* homeowners want to separate themselves from their socio-economically disadvantaged co-ethnics in order to secure the value of their homes. Social-economic
class, therefore, seem more important in this context than ethnic ties or differences. Furthermore, the new middle class not only protect their status in their direct living environment, they will also represent their interests politically, in the district.

Nonetheless, this raises the question of what is good for society. Do these policies contribute to reducing poverty and social marginality and to a strengthened multicultural society? Building new housing as a strategy for neighborhood improvement does appeal to a new middle class. However, segregation is not avoided. New micro-level segregation might be created, poor immigrants might be pushed out to peripheral neighborhoods. In Amsterdam a trend can be observed by which inner city districts are becoming richer, whereas peripheral neighborhoods are becoming poorer and increasingly populated by immigrants.

The main question is whether multicultural policies help to solve real social problems, such as racism, poverty, unemployment and crime. In the period 1960-2004 these problems have not been solved. Social mixing can be a tool at the macro-level, but it has not been demonstrated that this helps to improve the situation of the lowest social-economic classes. Improving the situation of the poor through social mixing in itself is an illusion. Along with these policies, what is needed are a range of measures to improve the socio-economic situation of the poor.

In 2007 the new Minister of Housing, Neighborhoods and Integration set it as her policy goal for the next 4 years to turn 40 disadvantaged urban neighborhoods into ‘beautiful neighborhoods’. What my research demonstrates is that in order to realize this goal we should not fall in the same trap by starting with demolishing housing as first step to improve neighborhoods. The problem is that once new housing is built no money is
left to tackle the social and economic problems in the neighborhood. This time we should not start with demolishing housing, but by creating a better cooperation between state institutions and organizations (welfare, police, housing corporations, state departments, etc.). Physical renewal is not creating integration. What can create integration is complicated, but should start with mixed schools, access to jobs and through sports organizations.
CHAPTER 8

8.1 Introduction

“Clean, intact and safe.” These words, spoken by Secretary of State Remkes at the presentation of the document *Pleidooi voor de Openbare Ruimte* (Plea for the Public Space) in June of 2002, describe the new priorities of Dutch policy on urban public space. Prior to 2002, before September 11th and Pim Fortuyn’s electoral success, less emphasis was placed on security. Instead, government was practiced under the rationale that public spaces – parks and squares more so than streets\(^{85}\) -- were strategic sites for multicultural encounters that could contribute to the bridging of differences and the development of new forms of living with diversity. In the 1990s, therefore, various new tactics and strategies were designed by the government to facilitate multiculturalism in and through urban public spaces. Multicultural design, for example, was encouraged as part of urban renewal efforts under the auspices of city

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\(^{85}\) Lynn Lofland (1973, 1998) makes a useful distinction between “parochial space”, “public space”, and “private space”. Parochial spaces are the places where strangers interact, usually the world of the neighborhood as opposed to the totally private world of the household and streets as the completely public realms of strangers. For her, squares and parks have more potential for interaction than for example streets that are foremost spaces crossed while moving from one place to the other. The squares I researched can be understood as parochial spaces, neighborhood spaces with the potential for strangers to interact.
districts or as part of larger city marketing initiatives. Residents were also encouraged to submit proposals for multicultural projects.\textsuperscript{86}

In 2001, the topic was debated in Parliament. Lucy Bertram of the Social-Democrat Party (PvdA) asked the following question: why is it that if we recognize that Dutch society is multicultural\textsuperscript{87} there aren’t more initiatives for multicultural architecture and design and why is the Secretary of State not actively supporting such initiatives?\textsuperscript{88} In other words, for immigrants to maintain their identity (recognition of difference is characteristic for a pluralist model, see chapter 3), the cultural expression of their ethnic identities should be reflected in the built environment (see for a discussion on planning and multiculturalism Sandercock, 1998, 2003). To answer this question the advisory council of the \textit{Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu} [Department of Public Housing, Planning and the Environment] (VROM) was asked to report on how multiculturalism in the built environment could potentially be facilitated.

\textsuperscript{86} A detailed case of this demand on residents – the case of the Moroccan Fountain in Rotterdam – is discussed later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{87} In official Integration Policy from 1987 onwards it is stated that the Netherlands is ‘a multicultural society’. See chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{88} According to a member of the advisory council I interviewed, the Dutch parliament’s concern with creating a multicultural built environment must be understood in the context of the privatization of the housing market. As the state was retreating from the housing market in the 1990s, residents were given more responsibility and choice. Due to a booming economy at the time, many families were able to improve their housing situation. However, many ethnic minorities, considering their low socio-economic status, did not benefit equally from the liberalization of the housing market. Problems of segregation and questions of the integration of immigrants persisted. In the coalition agreement it was decided to write a new Bill on housing as the old Bill no longer reflected the evolving neo-liberal form of governance. The new Bill stressed the role of the consumer, but in doing so only spoke to the wealthy and predominantly \textit{autochton} consumer. The parliament was not satisfied with the report and asked for instruments to tackle ongoing housing segregation and to facilitate immigrant integration. Instead of rewriting the document, the theme of ‘multicultural housing’ was taken on as a way to overcome the critiques: multicultural housing as a strategy to overcome the white bias and to attract middle class residents to low income neighborhoods. It is debatable whether this multicultural focus – or cultural approach – is suitable for addressing the socio-economic problems of ethnic minority groups.

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and promoted. The advisory council based its advice on the investigation of a series of best practices from a number of Dutch cities (Vrom-raad, 2002).

… We [the advisory council] view multicultural construction as a particularization of the development towards a demand-oriented housing policy and suggest that we meet this demand. In this effort the council suggests a loose approach where building multicultural can also evolve apart from the many expectations and opinions about assimilation and integration… primarily what is needed is a strengthening of the position of *allochtonen*\(^89\) on the housing market (Vrom-raad, 2002: 3).

The choice for the theme of building multicultural is not at all surprising, because it matched well with the new focus in housing policy on individual consumers, choice and lifestyles (Ministerie VROM, 2000). The advisory commission was supportive of multicultural initiatives as part of consumer choice but also warned that these initiatives were not necessarily contributing to the improvement of the housing situation of ethnic minorities. The advice is phrased strategically, as the advisory report was presented to the Parliament shortly after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn. After September 11\(^{th}\), tensions between the host society and immigrants had increased while policy continued to emphasize the right of immigrants to maintain their cultural identity and encouraged the expression of cultural difference in public. Only from 2002 onwards politicians, policy advisors, scholars, and those involved in the public debate, along with critics of multiculturalism (e.g. Joppke, 2004), have recognized the perverse outcomes of these policies. Their optimistic, pluralist rhetoric has disregarded real tensions, conflicts

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\(^{89}\) In public policy discourse in the Netherlands a distinction is made between *allochtonen* and *autochtonen* (plural) or *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* (singular). *Allochtonen* refers to those persons who are born abroad or of whom at least one parent is born abroad, i.e., a person from Australia, Iraq or Morocco. Hence, this category involves not only first generation immigrants, but also the second generation. *Autochtonen* on the other hand refers to those persons of whom both parents are born in the Netherlands. See for a detailed definition chapter 1. In the public debate, however, *allochtonen* is often used to refer only to first and second-generation immigrants from non-Western nations, who are considered to be ‘unassimilated’. 297
and fears and has not been successful in overcoming the isolation and marginalization of ethnic minority groups in Dutch society. Multicultural policies contributed to the image of the Netherlands as being a tolerant nation, yet hidden underneath this multicultural mask were growing tensions and dissatisfaction with the political establishment. Pim Fortuyn’s success was based on bringing these tensions out in the open, although he was not the first one to openly critique existing policy. The government elected in 2002 continued on Fortuyn’s path by making it its mission to address the tensions. They tackled this by promising increased surveillance, revitalization of disadvantaged neighborhoods, increased street cleaning, maintenance of public space, and by rendering the expression of ethnic diversity a matter of the private sphere. Hence, the idea of multiculturalism in the built environment – and initiatives concerning the cultural expression of difference – disappeared from the policy agenda. To this day the advisory report has never been discussed in parliament. For the new government the word ‘multiculturalism’ is taboo, or at least no longer part of the policy vocabulary.

In this chapter, I argue that these efforts towards designing multicultural urban space cannot be understood outside of the larger debates about immigrant integration. The way public spaces are designed impacts interaction. However, as sites of host-immigrant encounters, interaction and meaning attached to these spaces are actively negotiated. In order to understand the geographically-specific outcomes of policy implementation – as shaped within an overarching national framework, yet locally adjusted and implemented – I will compare two squares: Mercatorplein in Amsterdam and Noordplein in Rotterdam. The squares are comparable in that they are inner city

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90 See chapters 1 and 5.
neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrants – mostly from Morocco and Turkey. In addition, both squares are relatively large in size considering their neighborhood functionality. Additionally as a final point, both squares (and their respective neighborhoods) were sites used in the implementation of multicultural policy ideals. More specifically, Mercatorplein was part of an urban renewal program for its surrounding neighborhood, and Noordplein was the site of a multicultural arts project, promoted by the city of Rotterdam as part of a larger project, preparing the city for its European Capital of Culture status in 1999. I will discuss how these plans were negotiated – on the ground, in public space – in order to understand their social-geographical implications. As these case studies illustrate, the initiatives of policy advisors and politicians often fail in the face of multi-ethnic users expressing their own ways of using public space. There are, then, other dynamics at work than those envisioned in policy documents.

8.2 Methodological strategy

In order to understand how symbolic spaces of the multicultural city function as a strategic site for policy negotiation between state and non-state actors, I used a mixed method approach. First, descriptive statistical information about the neighborhood, policy documents, statutes, minutes of council meetings, and newspaper articles were collected and analyzed. This step was followed by semi-structured interviews with representatives of migrant organizations, (ethnic) entrepreneurs, local politicians, residents, and police. In total 16 interviews were conducted with regard to the Mercatorplein (Amsterdam) case study and another 12 interviews based on the Noordplein (Rotterdam) case study.
The field research also involved data collection through participant observation\textsuperscript{91} at the squares and in the streets around the squares (see figure 8.1). I engaged in informal conversations with users of the squares by spending time sitting on one of the benches or shopping in one of the local stores or at a community center. These informal conversations along with my observations of what the sites looked like and the social interactions taking place at those sites where written down in a fieldwork diary (see Angrosino & Mays de Pérez, 2000). The work of Setha Low (2000), on the interplay of culture and space in shaping the contested meaning(s) of two squares in Costa Rica, has been very useful for developing ways to register observations about the use of the squares by people of different ethnic background, age and gender. Low (\textit{ibid}) engaged in participant observation at different dates, times and with varying weather conditions. She not only recorded this information, but she also: (1) counted the users of the park (within her visibility range) during pre-set time intervals, distinguishing between men and women and also classifying them in different age groups; (2) created movement maps to visualize how people cross the park (where people enter and leave the park); and (3) mapped the activities of park users in different areas of the park in so-called behavioral maps (e.g. young couple, men sleeping, police, clown, girl meets boy, man playing guitar, etc.) By counting and mapping out interactions and activities, Low succeeded in capturing the complex uses of and interactions in the plazas.

For participant observation at Mercatorplein and Noordplein I used a similar strategy (see appendix Appendix A for the forms used). While I visited Mercatorplein 30 times and Noordplein 25 times in the period from July 2003 to September 2004, I

\textsuperscript{91} For a more detailed discussion on participant participation see chapter 1.
recorded observations in the period from March 2004 to September 2004. Observations took place under different weather conditions and at different times of the day. Besides age and gender, I also classified users of the square in broadly defined ethnic groups\(^{92}\) (using broad categories of Dutch, Surinamese or Antillean, North African and Turkish, and others) based on physiognomy and language spoken. By creating one category “Mediterranean” it was not possible to distinguish in my observations separate uses of space by Moroccan and Turkish. This information was gathered through interviews. I also registered who was using which part of the square (male, female, young, old, different ethnic groups) and which activities the users were engaged in. I counted the population of the square using fifteen-minute time intervals, starting 15 minutes before the hour. I counted at three 15-minute time intervals, at 11 am, 3pm, and 8 pm. During these observations I positioned myself on one of the benches on the north side of the square from where I could observe the whole square.

As a white, educated woman engaging in participant observation at two squares that are intensively used and territorialized by Turkish and Moroccan men, I was clearly ‘out of place’ (Cresswell, 1996). In recent years, much has been written about the position of the researcher in the field (Moss, 1993, 2002; Rose, 1997). The work of Setha Low(2000), the edited collection by Dwyer and Limber (2001) and the Handbook of Qualitative Research were important for preparing my fieldwork. In order to avoid their...

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\(^{92}\) I am aware of the problems of classifying individuals into ethnic groups. First, there is the danger of classifying a person as belonging to a particular ethnic group, while this person does not consider her/himself to be part of that group. In order to minimize this problem I have defined the groups widely. Secondly, it is problematic to place people in categories based on physical features. But, in order to understand how different ethnic groups use the square such a classification was necessary.
attention and uninvited comments on my presence, I did not recruit people for interviews at the square, but engaged only in short, informal conversations.

8.3 Mercatorplein: Living Apart Together

On August 6th of 2004 Driss Arbib, a young man of Moroccan descent was shot dead by a police officer following a fight between Arbib and a group of men at Warung Swietie, a Surinamese diner on Mercatorplein. His death was a catalyst for Moroccan youths in Amsterdam to protest against what they argued was police violence targeted at Moroccan immigrants. Mercatorplein became the site for voicing their anger and grief. Ten days after the murder 1500 people – mostly Muslim youths – participated in a silent march organized by an ad-hoc group Tegen Politiegeweld en Moord (Against Police Violence and Murder). The murder of Arbib is for them yet more evidence that Muslim immigrants are not welcome in the Netherlands. I met Karima Benmoussa (Moroccan, PhD student), the organizer of the ad-hoc protest group at the university. When I asked her about the reason for starting the protest group at this particular moment, she explained to me that she was fed up with the way Moroccans were portrayed in the media and treated as subordinate citizens and that she was increasingly considering emigration.

I am not the only one. Especially in the last weeks there have been lots of Moroccans who claim they’d like to leave this country. They are sick of the stigmatization and lack of respect. Yet, they are also very scared this move would stereotype them as disloyal or unassimilated (Karima Benmoussa).

93 The action group was supported by the Komité van Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland (KMAN) [Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands].
This targeting of immigrant youth by the police, and the stereotyping of immigrants – particularly Muslims – as thieves or terrorists is not limited to the Netherlands (see for example Body-Gendrot, 2002)\(^94\). Shortly after the march ended a small group of approximately 40 teenagers started rioting. They demolished everything in their path, creating a trail of demolition at Mercatorplein and its side streets leading the police to intervene.

This rioting of immigrant male youths at Mercatorplein was not an isolated event, but stems from a longer history of neighborhood transformation. This case study demonstrates how intentions of policy – aimed at creating a multicultural square – relate to the everyday reality and use of public space.

8.3.1 Social and ethnic transformation of a neighborhood

Mercatorplein is located in the De Baarsjes district on the west side of the city (see figure 8.1, area J on the map, and the circle marked in the enlargement of area J (de Baarsjes) is the location of Mercatorplein). Mercatorplein and its surrounding streets were built between 1922 and 1927 as part of the ‘6000-homes plan’, an extension plan for the city of Amsterdam. Nowadays it is praised for its architectural qualities, being designed by architects of the so-called Amsterdamse School\(^95\). This architectural style has many commonalities with the monumental architecture as developed by Haussmann in Paris. Wide, long axes and identical facades characterize the urban structure. However,

\(^94\) This example is not intended to reinforce the stereotype that all Muslims are thieves or terrorists.
\(^95\) This architectural style developed in the Netherlands between 1910 and 1940 and was a response to rationalist ideas that were dominating architecture at the time. Architects of the Amsterdamse School emphasized the decoration of facades, design of corners, and accents on doors, portals and passageways. This architectural style has been very influential for city planning in Amsterdam.
where in Paris this architectural style was used to build housing for the elite, in Amsterdam it was employed to house the lower-middle class. The first residents of the Mercatorplein neighborhood were from towns and villages outside of Amsterdam who moved to the city to work as teachers, small entrepreneurs or public servants (Arnoldussen, 1998: 9).

From the late 1970s onwards, the socio-economic structure and population composition of the neighborhood started changing rapidly. Residents who had experienced significant upward social mobility began to demand higher standards with regard to the quality of their housing, and began moving out of the city to newly built
suburban towns. This process of suburbanization was not limited to De Baarsjes, but affected many other urban neighborhoods in Dutch cities and the Western world in general. As the neighborhood began losing its appeal to lower-middle class families, immigrant families – mainly from Turkey and Morocco – started moving in, attracted by low rents. The influx of immigrants encouraged ‘white flight’. Only those who could not afford to move, the poor and elderly, stayed behind, as was endorsed by John van Vliet.

We [district council] were held responsible for so many immigrants moving in to the neighborhood. Autochtone residents voted with their feet and left the neighborhood. And, well you know, the people moving in were people with lower incomes. So yes, we can actually say that by the 1980s the neighborhood was socially disrupted (John van Vliet, Dutch, district politician PvdA).

In less than a decade, the socio-economic and ethnic composition of the neighborhood changed dramatically. From an autochtone lower-middle class neighborhood it had transformed into a poor, disadvantaged neighborhood with a large concentration of immigrants. By 1991, ethnic minorities (persons who are not only allochtone but also have a weak socio-economic position) already made up 30% of the district population (O+S, 2005) which only continued to rise.

The socio-economic and ethnic transformation affected the entrepreneurial landscape in similar ways. Ethnic entrepreneurs, responding to the demand for ethnic products from a growing immigrant neighborhood population, increasingly replaced established entrepreneurs who had seen a large share of their clientele moving to the suburbs. Soon, the first ethnic greengrocers, bakeries, butchers, fast food and clothing

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96 In the Netherlands suburbanization was directed by the state. A number of new, so-called ‘growth towns’ were created in order to avoid uncontrolled suburban sprawl.
stores (selling traditional Moroccan and Turkish clothing) began to transform the streetscape from a ‘white’ to a ‘multicultural’ landscape.

The neighborhood thus not only experienced ‘white flight’, but also an apparent downgrading of the shopping facilities (more of the same products, less quality) as entrepreneurs went out of business or followed their customers to the suburbs. As the neighborhood began losing its appeal to lower-middle class families and established entrepreneurs, property owners and housing corporations began withdrawing their investments and letting the housing stock deteriorate. In a short period of time a series of urban problems began to manifest themselves in the neighborhood: the deterioration of the housing stock, the neglect of public space, a fragmentation of ownership\textsuperscript{97}, high crime rates, high unemployment\textsuperscript{98}, and a failing school system were but a few of the problems the neighborhood was experiencing (Kuiper Compagnons, 2005, Stichting Beheer Mercatorplein, 2005). The presence of groups of immigrant male youths elicited fear among a section of the neighborhood population. Nonetheless, a much larger problem were the drug dealers and alcohol abusers who became increasingly evident in Mercatorplein. Turkish drug gangs were fighting their turf wars at the square, and hundreds of drug addicts were attracted to the neighborhood to buy drugs. Also, a police officer and a district politician told me that there also appeared to be much suspected money-laundering in ethnic businesses at the square.

\textsuperscript{97} Not one private landlord was willing to invest, because they were unsure that their investment in upgrading would be matched by their neighbors – a classic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ in the urban development industry.
\textsuperscript{98} During this time many immigrants, who had arrived in the Netherlands as guest workers lost their jobs as the factories where they were employed were being shut down or moved operations abroad.
By the late 1980s Mercatorplein and its surrounding streets had become a no-go area. My informants told me that relatives and friends were afraid to come to the neighborhood for a visit. Freek van Dam (Dutch, ex-politician of De Baarsjes) told me that many elderly people were afraid to go out at night. More generally, the area was considered one of the least safe neighborhoods in the Netherlands. According to Chris de Vries (Dutch, police officer) and Freek van Dam the square was called ‘Little Istanbul’, referring to the rival Turkish criminal organizations involved in drugs-related crime in the neighborhood. Despite the accumulation of problems in the neighborhood from the mid-1980s onwards, the local state did not intervene. There were only limited resources available for urban renewal, and priority was given to neighborhoods that were built before World War I. It took until 1991 – when the city government officially designated De Baarsjes as a city district in the decentralization of government functions – before the local state intervened. In this year civil servants of De Baarsjes district took it upon themselves to counter the urban decay of the neighborhood. They successfully persuaded the city council to redistribute funds for urban renewal to the neighborhood in order to counter its deterioration.

8.3.2 The revitalization of Mercatorplein: negotiating physical policies dealing with urban space

In 1992 a Masterplan Mercatorplein was written (Stadsdeel de Baarsjes [City district de Baarsjes, 1992]). This document marked the beginning of a large-scale urban renewal operation that focused on the square and a few surrounding streets. The goal was:
To ensure that Mercatorplein and its surrounding streets in the future would once again be a neighborhood where people would like to live and shop, where entrepreneurs can run a healthy business, and where private landlords, housing corporation and others are willing to invest (Stadsdeel de Baarsjes, 1992: 8).

Insufficient funds were available to revitalize the whole district, but district politicians and responsible policy-makers I interviewed explained to me that they believed that investments directed at Mercatorplein would trigger investments in other areas of the district, and thus over time contribute to the revitalization of the whole district. They believed that revitalization could only be accomplished if all parties in the neighborhood were committed. “Besides the city district, residents, entrepreneurs, private landlords, housing corporations and others must all be eager to invest in the neighborhood” (Stadsdeel de Baarsjes, 1992: 10). As public funds were not sufficient, the remainder of the budget had to be financed by private investments. For this purpose a public-private partnership was created for financing the revitalization of the area.

*Masterplan Mercatorplein* aimed at creating a symbolic multicultural square in the center of the neighborhood in order to bring the ethnically diverse population of the district closer to integration. A square that would function as a meeting place (BRO⁹⁹, 1991: 10) or ‘living room’¹⁰⁰ for the multicultural population of the district. And, as Marjan Dekker (Dutch, consultant), who at the time was one of the project leaders for the renewal of Mercatorplein, explained “a place to stay instead of a place to quickly pass through.” In order to realize this goal:

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⁹⁹ BRO is a consultancy organization in the field of spatial planning, economic development and environment that was contracted by De Baarsjes district to develop a plan for the square.

¹⁰⁰ Interviews Marjan and John
… not only great and specific attention must be paid to the wishes of different groups of users, also caution is needed to ensure that the most dominant group of users won’t start to dominate the character of the square (BRO, 1991: 12: my emphasis).

The square already functioned as a meeting place for Turkish and Moroccan men as well as immigrant male youth. However, I was told by local entrepreneurs, (former) politicians, residents and the police that other neighborhood residents, particularly women and the elderly, did not feel very safe at the square. A further strengthening of the presence of this already dominant group of users, could potentially harm the ambitions of creating a truly multicultural square.

In order to realize this idea of the ‘living room’ the trees on the square were cut to create an open public space, and the tram and road were diverted to create a large pedestrian area (see figure 8.1). New trees were planted on the north side of the square, and a series of benches were placed at the square. The architects chose “benches that by their shape and the way that they are situated [would] elicit conversation between users” (Arnoldussen, 1998: 23). This is only one example of how the ambitions of creating inter-ethnic encounters, a functioning multiculturalism, were imposed on the square by design. The ideal of creating a symbolic multicultural square was also signified by inlaying a large globe on the bricks in the center of the square. The globe not only represented a Mercator projection, referring to Mercator who invented the projection of the earth on a flat surface, but according to planners and district politicians it also represented the multicultural character of the neighborhood: the presence of residents from all corners of the world, all living together in one neighborhood (Academie van Bouwkunst, 2002).
Another goal of the Masterplan Mercatorplein was to differentiate the housing stock. In other words, small apartments were joined up to create larger apartments and a greater diversity had to be accomplished both in terms of cheaper and more expensive units. An additional 50 apartments were to be converted from rental housing to owner-occupied housing (Stadsdeel de Baarsjes, 1992: 31). For the first time in the Netherlands this strategy – which is now common practice – was used in order to attract middle class residents to a neighborhood and to allow existing residents – in search of larger apartments and who would otherwise have moved to suburban towns – to remain in the neighborhood. The original plan was to convert all apartments on the north side of the

Figure 8.2 Mercatorplein in 1999
square into owner-occupied housing\textsuperscript{101}, but these plans met significant resistance from existing residents. They feared displacement and after a series of protests and negotiations with the representatives of the city district they managed to reduce the number of apartments being put up for sale.

The goal of attracting higher incomes to the neighborhood has been successful. Average incomes in the neighborhood continue to rise and the share of ethnic minorities is declining. In 2001 the share of ethnic minorities was 48.4\%, but by 2004 it had declined to 43.1\% (O+S, 2005). Property values in De Baarsjes increased more than any other city district in Amsterdam. While the process is still ongoing, it does indicate that the neighborhood is increasingly in demand by young, highly educated households who cannot afford housing prices in the city center. As a consequence the immigrant working class is slowly being pushed out of the neighborhood.

What you see in the last four or five years is that higher income groups, who first left the neighborhood, are now coming back. And we’re pushing the \textit{allochtonen}, those at the bottom of the housing market, over the ring road\textsuperscript{102} (Willem van der Wal, Duch, senior planning official for the city of Amsterdam).

While these newcomers do contribute to the physical and socio-economic uplifting in the neighborhood – by buying up property and renovating it, which I observed at the square and in the surrounding streets –, I also observed they do not spend much time at the square and in the neighborhood. This was confirmed in interviews with district politicians and policy makers who were thinking of strategies to make the square more attractive for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{101} Interview Marjan
\textsuperscript{102} The highway that circles around Amsterdam, the ring road A10, forms a clear mark in the landscape between the inner city and the outer neighborhoods of the city. The outer city districts (west of de Baarsjes) are increasingly concentration areas of poor Dutch and immigrant populations.}
the newcomers. In order for these new residents to spend more time and money in the neighborhood, local district policy-makers and politicians aim to attract trendy bars and restaurants to the neighborhood. Nonetheless, due to the image of the square in the media, the occasional protests and riots, it is difficult to attract investors who are willing to open a trendy restaurant or bar at the square. Therefore, the city district will need to provide financial incentives in order to realize its ambitions with the square. This is another indication that the square doesn’t truly function as a living room for the neighborhood.

While the neighborhood in the last five years has managed to become increasingly attractive for young couples, ethnic entrepreneurs continue to dominate the entrepreneurial landscape and the square continues to be a site for festivities and the gathering of immigrants.

The distribution of shops and community services was also carefully planned by the district (see table 8.1) in order to create movement from one side of the square to the other and thereby creating opportunities for social interaction and inter-ethnic encounters as well as improving business performance (Stadsdeel de Baarsjes, 1992: 24).

Community activities were located on the west side of the square for two reasons: (1) to create movement from one side of the square to the other as people would walk from the public library to the grocery store and vice versa and thereby opening up opportunities for intercultural encounters, and (2) in order to create a lively square, cafés and restaurants were planned on the sunny north and eastern sides of the square.

Multiculturalism thus became imposed on the neighborhood by design. Hence, the revitalization of Mercatorplein represents the grounding of the multicultural policy ideal
(see chapter 1) in the urban built environment and acts as a symbolic focal point for negotiation over policy implementation in general.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North side:</th>
<th>Catering industries and non-food. Catering industry with terraces and a grand-café or ice cream shop. “This way, the sunny side can be used to create a lively square.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East side:</td>
<td>Grocery store, bakery, cigar shop, liquor store, etc., and catering industry (bars and restaurants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West side:</td>
<td>Community and cultural services (A public library, community center, migrant organization) and commercial services (a bank or service center of an insurance company). “The library attracts many neighborhood residents, which will also emanate on the square, as people walking to and from the library will cross the square and in so doing create a certain liveliness at the square.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South side:</td>
<td>Commercial services. Due to the natural shade and the roof above the stores it is too dark here for bars and restaurants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stadsdeel de Baarsjes (Masterplan Mercatorplein) (1992: 24)

Table 8.1 Commercial preferences for the different sides of the square

The Masterplan Mercatorplein aimed to restore both the square and the surrounding housing in its original style. However, it also had a few socio-economic ambitions: businesses were to be given a new economic impulse, the crime rates had to be reduced, safety had to be restored and its negative image had to be countered. In order to improve the safety, and to show residents that the renewal operation was being taken seriously, a temporary police station was set up in the center of the square. Once the renewal of the housing around the square was finished, it was replaced by a permanent police station on the west side of the square. It looked out over the square such that police officers and neighborhood guards could observe and provide residents with a sense of safety. Despite the socio-economic ambitions, in practice only very limited funds were available for the socio-economic renewal of the neighborhood. Most of the urban renewal funds were geared towards interventions in the built environment. In fact, the plan states
a strong confidence in the idea that physical interventions would have positive outcomes for social questions and socio-cultural integration. In other words, the *Masterplan Mercatorplein* was founded on a strong belief that social issues can be managed through interventions in the built environment.

**8.3.3 Negotiating the multicultural square**

In 1998 the renewal operation was complete and the Queen of the Netherlands officially opened the renewed square. The fact that the Queen opened the square demonstrated the importance of countering the spiral of decline in the neighborhood. However, while a multicultural square was created through design it is just as important to study how the square is now being used. Does it really function as a multicultural square?

Figure 8.3 is a map of Mercatorplein based on field observations in 2003. As the map shows, the square is surrounded by 4-story buildings with shops on the ground floor and is bordered by two roads – the *Hoofdweg* and the *Jan Evertsenstraat*. There is a bus and tram stop on the *Jan Evertsenstraat*. The entrance to the underground parking garage is on the southeast corner of the square. A few bars and diners are located on the east side of the square: the local bar *Café Meulenstee, Brasserie Berlagerie*, and a Surinamese diner *Warung Swietie*. On a sunny day these diners and cafés at Mercatorplein have a permit to set up a small outdoor terrace in the months of March to November.
Figure 8.3 A schematic drawing of Mercatorplein (based on fieldnotes).
Masterplan Mercatorplein had envisioned the east side of the square as the site for restaurants and bars and after the renewal operation existing bars and diners did return, but no investors were found to open up new ones. There are new plans to relocate the Chinese restaurant, laundromat, and Surinamese hairdresser and to convert the commercial space into a grand café or restaurant, but investors have not yet been found.

Characteristic of the south side of the square is the presence of predominantly ethnic entrepreneurs. A Turkish bakery at the corner of the street, steakhouse/grillroom Yahalom, a Turkish diner Merel Se, an Afro-hairdresser, a Dutch hairdresser, a Turkish travel agency, and the south-tower at the corner of the street is a community center for refugees.

Another Turkish travel agency Ats Tours is located on the west side of the square. Other than that, this side of the square is – as planned – mainly used for community (cultural) services and commercial services: a community center for Turkish men, a police post, a public library, a health insurance service center, and a bank. In order to realize this goal the grocery store was relocated to the east side of the square. Now that safety has been restored in the neighborhood there are plans to close down the police post at the square.

Finally, the north side of the square is dominated by the large chain stores that can be found in almost every shopping center in town (Blokker, Intertoys, Pearl opticians). The bars and restaurants that were envisioned for this side of the square failed to materialize. A grand café in the tower went bankrupt only a couple of years after the renewal operation. The tower has been vacant ever since.
The square itself is a large, rectangular open space. It is slightly raised on the southeast side to accommodate the entrance to the parking garage. There are a series of benches on the north side of the square, under the trees, and surrounding the square. The benches are situated in such a way that people face each other (figure 8.4 and 8.5).

Figure 8.4 A man sitting on a bench at Mercatorplein

In the original architectural plan for the square by Berlage\textsuperscript{104} two kiosks were envisioned at each side of the square. In the early 1990s, as part of the revitalization plan for the square, one of the kiosks was built. In 2003 this kiosk was used as a kebab shop. Other elements at the square are a small water fountain, a couple of phone booths, a public rest room, and a taxi stop. A globe is inlaid in the bricks at the center of the square. Due to

\textsuperscript{104} Berlage was a prominent Dutch architect who designed the square and surrounding neighborhood in the late 1920s. His architectural style has strongly influenced city planning in Amsterdam.
the intensive use, the globe has started to crack and fade making it almost impossible to identify the different continents. Its symbolic function is slowly fading away.

![Photograph by author, September 2003](image)

Figure 8.5 The kebab shop at Mercatorplein

**Physical determinism**

In the 1990s policies were characterized by a strong believe in managing society through interventions in the built environment. Multicultural policies were no exception. According to John van Vliet, who at the time was involved in the renewal operation of Mercatorplein in the function of district politician for the PvdA, this is one of the reasons why he supported the plans. Looking back at the plans now, he realizes that the idea of revitalizing the square to encourage interaction between its multi-ethnic residents is an illusion. A truly multicultural square cannot be created by design alone.
A: Was the multicultural character of the neighborhood taken into account in revitalization plans for Mercatorplein?
J: Yes. We were convinced that it had to become a square for neighborhood residents, a place for them to spend time. Looking back at it now, the social-democratic party (PvdA) has always been powerful in thinking for people. It had the obligation of making people happy and so we felt that this square was pre-eminently suitable for making it a people’s square, the symbolic heart of the neighborhood. That was a heartfelt conviction.

A: Did these plans succeed?
J: No. Two elements contributed to its failure. First of all, a dilemma of the square is the fact that architecturally or in terms of its urban design it is a square that if you compare it to other architectural masterpieces it can easily compete. Therefore it has qualities that reach far beyond that of the neighborhood, but the residents don’t have these qualities, no it’s two elements. If you had such a square in the inner city than you have a square with ‘allure’, and then I can assure you that it will buzz and bubble. The location of Mercatorplein is not favorable, it is located in a working class neighborhood, and the residents that live here don’t have sufficient spending power to turn the square into a lively square… What you really need at this square are urban functions, but you won’t be able to attract these functions, because investors have no interest in investing in the neighborhood. … As a neighborhood square it has been successful, but that was not our goal. We really wanted to make Mercatorplein the buzzing heart of the neighborhood, but it was our mistake that we thought for the people (John van Vliet, my emphasis).

John van Vliet makes the distinction, because what he envisioned for Mercatorplein was an economic uplifting: high quality stores, restaurants and outdoor patios and I would argue more autochtone users of the square. What this example demonstrates is that local state bodies aimed to foster socio-cultural integration of immigrants by creating a multicultural square (or a space that would facilitate inter-ethnic encounters). However, much less emphasis was given to addressing the socio-economic problems of (immigrant) residents that would enable them to become active citizens and contribute to the creation of a lively multicultural square.
Living apart together

Observations at the square that I registered by taking field notes and observation forms (see table 1.6) demonstrate that Mercatorplein is predominantly a meeting place for men of Mediterranean origin (table 8.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Ethnicity/sex</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Surinam/Caribbean</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00am</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00pm</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.00pm</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2 Population counts at Mercatorplein

On three different days that users were counted, 49%, 54% and 56% of all users respectively, were classified as Mediterranean men. Of all males counted, 70% was classified as Mediterranean. The intensive use of the square by Mediterranean men can be interpreted as being part of ‘Mediterranean culture’, where the social life of men often

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105 I am aware of the problems with such a generalization.
takes place outdoors in public spaces, whereas the women’s lives are more restricted to the private space of the family and the home. What the table also shows is that Mediterranean women also outnumber European men.

The everyday use of the square is characterized by its element of segregated use. Each group has its own micro-space at the square. Moroccan and Turkish men as well as groups of immigrant male youths (mainly Turkish and Moroccan) use the north side of the square, underneath the trees, as a meeting place. Moroccan and Turkish women on the other hand concentrate on the south side of the square, where they sit on the bench in front of the grocery store or at the benches on the south side of the square from where they can watch their children play. Children play on the globe. Surinamese and autochtone residents, on a sunny day, can be found at the patios of the two cafés on the east side of the square (see figure 8.6).

Figure 8.6 Patrons of the bar and Surinamese diner at Mercatorplein
Not many women can be found on the north side of the square. On the other hand, on a sunny evening whole families gather on the south side of the square. These observations were echoed by Peter de Bruin (Dutch), manager at *Stichting Beheer Mercatorplein* – a public-private partnership between government, entrepreneurs, housing corporations and private landlords – that aimed to improve the liveability of Mercatorplein by for example organizing various activities at the square, attracting new businesses and securing the maintenance of the square.

The square is used by many groups of residents, of different ethnicities, but at the same time there’s a clear separation in the spaces used by particular groups. On a warm summer night you can see that one side of the square is taken over by Turkish males, the Moroccans sit on the other side, and the Dutch and Surinamese in their turn also occupy another section of the square. Dutch residents mainly stay at home as there is not so much a Dutch culture of going outside and meeting each other in the street. The Dutch do go out, but for a walk, they cross the square and walk back home, while the *allochtonen* on the other hand really come to the square to meet each other, to spend time. Everyone is doing their thing, they don’t talk (Peter de Bruin).

While Peter de Bruin notices that Moroccan and Turkish men use different sides of the squares, I was not able to make this distinction based on my fieldnotes. It was evident, however that Mediterranean men (Moroccan and Turkish) concentrated on the north side of the square, without having insight in the micropolitics within this area of the square.
‘Immigrant square’

You and I won’t spend time at the square. That is in fact the problem of the square. So who goes there? The average neighborhood resident, who is *allochtoon*, who enjoys sitting at the benches at night, very cosy, lot of fun, they chat with friends, don’t have enough money to go to a bar that’s why they meet each other at the square, and lots and lots of parties. For example two years ago for Galatasaray, a Turkish soccer club, and not too long ago when Morocco was in the finals of the African Cup, but unfortunately they lost. Could you imagine otherwise, what a party it would have been? (John van Vliet)

Mercatorplein is clearly an immigrant space (see figure 8.7). Most of my informants who worked for the city district as well as *autochtone* entrepreneurs endorsed this view of John van Vliet. For them, Mercatorplein would only be successful if the square attracted consumers and when multiculturalism also included *autochtone* middle class residents (this view corresponds with the view of policy-makers and politicians working on the urban renewal of Bijlmermeer).
The local, immigrant character of also occasionally causes the square to jump scales (Mitchell, 2000), when Muslim immigrants, demanding equal citizenship rights and recognition, use it as a site of protest. In this case, Mercatorplein becomes a medium through which regional, national, and even international identities are constructed and contested (Ruddick, 1996), through which immigrants subvert its meaning and claim rights to the city (Fincher and Jacobs, 1998; Lefebvre, 1991). Soon after the renewal of the square, immigrant male youths – of Moroccan, Surinamese, and Afro-Caribbean descent – returned to the square and are perceived by police, neighborhood guards and sections of the neighborhood population as intimidating.

The ongoing tensions culminated in 1999 with a riot between attendees at a music festival, ‘Street Party West,’ and the police. Approximately 1,000 people, mainly youth, had gathered at the square to watch bands perform. However, as the square became more and more overcrowded, the police decided to end the festival early for safety reasons. The youths started rioting, encouraged by the band that was playing on stage. Riot police cleared the square. A second incident occurred four years later after the murder of Driss Arbib. While these incidents appear to be sporadic sparks of unrest and unrelated, the media continued to portray the square as a dangerous and violent place where ongoing tensions in a multi-ethnic neighborhood regularly explode. Local politicians, entrepreneurs and neighborhood residents I spoke to all told me that they are frustrated by the negative portrayal of their neighborhood due to a few serious incidents. In their eyes the quality of the neighborhood has increased significantly, being safer and with the drug problems being minimized:
The neighborhood is a lot safer, but every time a small riot occurs, the media blows it out of proportion. That really upsets us. We know better, but people from outside of Amsterdam, when they hear ‘Mercatorplein’ they immediately think of riots and tensions caused by a shooting (Tom Welten, Dutch, policy advisor De Baarsjes).

Mercatorplein always gets associated with negativity. I’ve blamed AT5106 for this, because you only see them at the square when something negative is happening or about to happen. If it is positive they don’t show, because then they’re too busy. But when the square was cleared by the riot police – after a youth festival ended in riots – they had five or six cameras at the square (Ahmed Harika, Turkish, entrepreneur and resident).

The media thus plays an important role in shaping the perception of Mercatorplein.

However, for neighborhood residents the portrayals of the square in the media do not represent their understanding of the square as a place that is safe and where residents with different ethnic backgrounds live peacefully together. The occasional riot and protest cannot be associated with the square and the neighborhood, but must be understood as an urban struggle of immigrants for recognition, acceptance and citizenship in Amsterdam and the Netherlands.

Furthermore, the negotiation of Mercatorplein as an ethnic square does not only manifest itself in negative ways. Festivities and celebrations also contribute to shaping the everyday use and symbolic meaning of the square (see figure 8.8). Turkish immigrants claim the square for celebrating soccer victories, as for example explained by Tom Welten.

106 AT5 is the local television station.
Well ‘living room’ of the neighborhood was chosen at the time, because it gave a very good picture. I don’t know if you’ve seen it, but Jelle Kuiper [superintendent of the police in Amsterdam] was on AT5 the other week. He said that for him Mercatorplein is the most beautiful square of the city, because when Turkiyemspor [An Amsterdam soccer team with immigrant – Turkish – ties] won and when Turkey won during the European Championships, he, in police uniform, was lifted on the shoulders of some Turks and carried around the square where thousands of people had gathered (Tom Welten, Dutch, policy advisor De Baarsjes).

The Turkish community in Amsterdam claims Mercatorplein for celebrating their Turkish identity. Yet, this Turkish identity is not fixed as such, and may change over time as was also explained to me by Mohammed Azaay (Moroccan, youth worker De Baarsjes)

It’s a square of parties for Turkish. That’s why it’s also called ‘Turkish square’. But it can also become a square of Moroccans or Surinamese when they have something to celebrate (Mohammed Azaay).

Figure 8.8 Turkish people celebrating a victory of the Turkish soccer team at Mercatorplein
Through these celebrations, ethnic groups also negotiate their presence in the city. As these examples illustrate, negotiating the social and ethnic transformation of the neighborhood takes on different forms. Some positive – through festival or neighborhood activities that bring different ethnic groups together – but at other times negative or aggressive, such as protests or riots. However, what they do all underline is that it is not a multicultural identity that is strengthened through protests, riots or celebration, but instead an individual ethnic or cultural identity, be it Muslim, Turkish Moroccan or otherwise.

8.3.4 A multicultural square?

Mercatorplein has become the site for Turkish celebrations, a meeting place for Moroccan and Turkish men, a playground for children, and a place for immigrant families to spend a warm summer evening. Furthermore, the quality of the square and the safety improved significantly after the renewal operation. The renewal of the square, therefore, can be seen as very successful: the square is more lively and residents feel safe. Having said this, the goal of creating a multicultural square, a living room for the neighborhood has not been completely accomplished. As we have seen patterns of interaction have remained separate – living apart together. While different ethnic groups are using the square, they create their own separate micro-spaces. These micro-spaces also include separate spaces for Muslim men and women. There is very limited intermixing between groups, which was stated as one of the ambitions of Masterplan Mercatorplein. Nonetheless, because the square is an open space, the users of the square – even though they are situated within their own micro-spaces at the square – are
confronted with the presence of others. With how they talk, what they wear, and what they do. While I cannot support this with my research findings, I think that this confrontation between groups without interaction is creating familiarity and understanding for the ethnic ‘other’.

The square does have a symbolic function, but this function is limited to the individual ethnic groups. Whereas a multicultural square was envisioned, it has in fact become a male, immigrant square. As an immigrant square it is successful as sometimes through celebrations and sometimes through protests, Mercatorplein functions as a site through which (Muslim) immigrants claim recognition and inclusion in Amsterdam and in the Netherlands. As a political site it is an important node for (Muslim) immigrants, also when racial issues are up for discussion.

The effect is that the square has an ‘immigrant purpose’ instead of bridging gaps or fostering integration between different groups. District politicians had envisioned the new middle class residents being attracted to the square as important group within the multicultural model, but this failed. Different groups – Moroccan and Turkish men, youth, children, women, *autochtoon* and *allochtoon* all use different areas of the square. The revitalization of the square thus has been successful in creating a more vibrant square where people meet, but the goal of integration has not been realized in the process.

Another goal of attracting new, middle class residents has also been successful but they do not spend their leisure time in the neighborhood. As a consequence, the revitalization of the square has not been sufficient to attract the young and highly educated and to foster integration across ethnicity and class groups. With the recent influx of *autochtone* middle class residents there is a growing demand for trendy bars,
restaurants and shops in the neighborhood. This could make people stay in the neighborhood, spend more money in the neighborhood and contribute to safety and cleanliness.

However, despite the square being intensively used and despite middle class – young and highly educated – residents being attracted to relocate to the area, the media continues to portray Mercatorplein as a forbidding place, a no-go area where it is unsafe and where public space is the territory of immigrants. This appalling image that persists in the media, despite developments that prove the contrary, turns away potential investors and visitors.

Did multicultural policy fail? It failed because of the emphasis of creating interaction – a multicultural square – by design and by defining success in terms of attracting middle class consumers. The focus of the Masterplan was on bricks and not so much on improving the socio-economic conditions of its residents. Nonetheless, the case study also demonstrates that policy cannot completely control the success or failure of a square, because the square is not an isolated space, but part of a larger socio-spatial and political context. The symbolic meaning of the square must therefore also be understood in the contexts of political transformations at the urban and national scales as well as shaped by the media. Political developments with regard to immigrant integration as well as how the square is portrayed in the media, play a key role in determining its success or failure in terms of multiculturalism. Even though policies implemented at the square – with the goal of creating a multicultural space – have good intentions, the changing perception of Muslims in the Netherlands (in particular after 2001) also contribute to the success or failure of the square. In the case of Mercatorplein this changed view of
Muslim immigrants – as non-integrated and potential terrorists – have played a much stronger role in shaping the symbolic function of the square. Instead of a multicultural square where different ethnic groups interact, it has become a square where Muslim immigrants claim their identity. The square could take on this symbolic function, because these immigrants are not provided other spaces where they can claim their identity. However, despite many failures, the spiral of decline has been countered, the safety is improving, and the square functions as an important meeting place for some groups.

8.4 Noordplein: who wants this fountain?

Shrab oe Shoef’ (meaning drink and admire). On October 15th of 1999, the Moroccan community has symbolically presented this fountain to Oude Noorden [Old North neighborhood]. The idea developed after a call by the City Council, directed at ethnic minorities in Rotterdam, to take a more active role in urban politics. It is not a coincidence that Oude Noorden was chosen as the site for the fountain, because the district is the home of a large Moroccan community. In Fès, in Morocco, the fountain was constructed by craftsmen and the parts were then put together and assembled in Rotterdam. The fountain has multiple meanings. It enriches the architecture of this multicultural city. It is a step toward finalizing the city of Rotterdam’s ambitions for its Culture Capital of 2001 status. The fountain symbolizes the acceptance of respect and acknowledgement for Moroccan art and culture in Rotterdam, and a feeling of belonging for Moroccans in Rotterdam (Inscription on fountain in Noordplein, my emphases).

The above text tells the story of the construction of a Moroccan fountain (see figure 8.9) at the main square of district Noord (North district) in Rotterdam. On October 15th of 1999 a Moroccan fountain was placed at the main square of district Noord (North district) in Rotterdam. Why a Moroccan fountain? Its construction must be understood in the context of the preparations for Rotterdam’s reign as European Capital of Culture in 2001. The slogan for the cultural year was ‘Rotterdam is a lot of cities,’ which clarifies
the context for the inscription’s reference to the city’s goal of shaping its immigrant population into active citizens. Rotterdam aimed to showcase its multicultural character, but needed input from its ethnic communities in order to realize this ambition. Yet, what the story on the plaque illuminates is that in the case of the Moroccan fountain this role of ‘active citizen’ was claimed by Moroccan elites, rather than a broad cross-section of the neighborhood’s Moroccan population. Indeed, the Moroccan population of Oude Noorden are mainly Berbers (a distinct minority group in Morocco) who migrated there from a few small villages in the Rif Mountains in Northern Morocco, and were not involved in the planning process. As a result, the role of active citizen was only taken on by Moroccan elites, who then got to decide what symbols of Moroccan culture were represented in Rotterdam’s public space.

Photograph by author, May 2004

Figure 8.9 The Moroccan Fountain at Noordplein
That the fountain did not have similar value for other Moroccan groups in Rotterdam was completely ignored. City planners assumed that the idea for a fountain would be welcomed by all Moroccans and would grant recognition to all. But by assuming that ethnic communities can speak with one voice and thus emphasizing differences between ethnic groups and the host population, the diversity within ethnic groups goes unrecognized (Vertovec, 1996; Grillo, 1998; Back et al, 2002; Kudnami, 2002). What is not addressed in the inscription are the negotiations that preceded the construction of the fountain at Noordplein and how the symbolism and meaning(s) of the square are shaped through everyday tactics and strategies of (Moroccan) neighborhood residents.

8.4.1 Neighborhood context

Noordplein is located in Noord district on the north side of the city center (figure 8.10). This district can be divided in six different neighborhoods (see figure 8.10). Noordplein is part of the neighborhood Oude Noorden, a neighborhood that was built in the 1930s. In contrast to the monumental architecture with wide long axes in De Baarsjes in Amsterdam, Noord district is characterized by high densities, narrow roads and few open spaces. In the 1960s the quality of a large section of the housing stock was in such a poor condition that it was demolished as part of a large scale urban renewal operation. New social housing replaced the demolished housing and a few blocks were never rebuilt in order to create a few more squares in the neighborhood. Noordplein was built in the 1930s to become the central market square of the neighborhood and district.
Currently, Noord district has a population of approximately 52,000 people, 18,000 of whom live in Oude Noorden. Contrasts between rich and poor and between Dutch and
non-Dutch residents characterize the neighborhood. While the more wealthy people live in monumental buildings on the canal, the low-income population lives in poor quality, small housing that was built in the period 1920-1940 as well as in the 1960s.

From the late 1970s onwards the socio-economic structure and population composition of the neighborhood started changing rapidly. Like De Baarsjes and other urban neighborhoods in Dutch cities, those residents who had experienced significant upward social mobility began moving out of the city to newly built suburban towns that better satisfied their housing demands. As the autochtoone lower-middle class families moved out, immigrant families started moving in, as Wim van Rijn, a Dutch politician of PvdA in district Noord explained.

In the 1970s and 1980s the upwardly mobile moved out to more spacious and expensive houses in newly built suburban towns on the fringes of the city. The poor stayed behind, while at the same time Moroccan families began to move in to the neighborhood. Most of the Moroccans moving in to Oude Noorden are Berbers who migrated to the Netherlands to work as guest workers and their families who had followed later as part of family reunification programs. The Berbers from the Rif Mountains are a minority group in Morocco, excluded from society through various policies. Many Berbers moved to Europe as guest workers, actively supported by the Moroccan state. [Berbers are] a special group because they were excluded from Moroccan society, strongly isolated through policies of the grandfather of the current king, who exported them to Europe. They were considered backwards and stupid (Wim van Rijn, Dutch, district politician PvdA).

As this quote illustrates, the new immigrant families that moved in to Oude Noorden were mainly Berbers from the same region in Morocco. While Berbers are Moroccan citizens, their exclusion from mainstream Moroccan society means that Berbers do not necessarily identify with mainstream Moroccan cultural expressions.
In less than a decade the socio-economic and ethnic composition of the neighborhood changed dramatically. While the canals remained the living area of the upper middle class, the other areas of the neighborhood had transformed into a poor, disadvantaged neighborhood with a large concentration of immigrants. By 1994, ethnic minorities made up 43% of the neighborhood population and 30% of the district population (COS, 2007). These proportions continued to rise. By 2004, ethnic minorities counted for 52% of the neighborhood population and 39% of the district population. The neighborhood is thus becoming more ethnic. In 2004, the native Dutch still make up the largest single population group in the neighborhood (37%), followed by the Moroccans (15%) and Turkish (13%) (COS, 2007).

In the 1980s Oude Noorden started experiencing rapid urban decline, which was explained to me by Ali Turan, a Turkish district politician of Groen Links in Noord district. The physical environment – public spaces and housing – was rapidly deteriorating. Along with the physical decline of the neighborhood was a culmination of socio-economic problems. Unemployment was above the city average, and groups of teenagers and young adults – among them many school dropouts and unemployed – were territorializing the few public spaces in the neighborhood. Due to a lack of other opportunities, as Wim van Rijn told me, some neighborhood residents got involved in the trafficking and distribution of drugs. As a consequence, in a few years time, Oude Noorden became an important junction in the transport and distribution of drugs. Moroccan criminal organizations trafficked drugs from Morocco to Oude Noorden. The neighborhood increasingly became a central distribution point for drugs.
… the runners guide the cars into the neighborhood to the buildings where the drugs can be divided and then they distribute it to small traders. This is how Oude Noorden became the supply room for drugs in Rotterdam (Wim van Rijn, Dutch, district politician).

But the distribution occurred behind closed doors. In contrast to Mercatorplein in Amsterdam, I was told by my informants at Noord district that it did not attract street-involved/homeless addicts to the neighborhood to buy drugs. According to Jan de Jong, a Dutch senior policy advisor for hot-spot policy in Noord district, it was in the interest of all involved to keep the addicts out and to sell the drugs elsewhere in the city, because the city government and police focused their intervention on those areas where drugs were sold in the street, the areas that attracted many drug addicts. While the police caught the small fish, the big fish were controlling the distribution from Oude Noorden. A second reason for why the drug trafficking was not a priority for the city government and police has to do with the fact that it involved the trafficking and distribution of soft drugs, mainly hashish which is considered a ‘soft,’ less harmful drug in the Netherlands.

The city government of Rotterdam did not invest much in the revitalization of its neighborhoods in the 1980s and 1990s (see chapter 7). Priority was given to spectacular prestige projects (see Harvey, 1989 on the production of spectacular places as an urban entrepreneurial strategy), such as Kop van Zuid – a new upper-class neighborhood in Rotterdam’s docklands and modern architecture in order to create a new image for the city that had to find new ways of imaging itself with the loss of industrial and harbor activities from the inner city. As a consequence many deprivated inner city

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107 While it is legal to buy a small amount of soft drugs for personal use, it is not allowed to trade soft drugs. In other words the transport of soft drugs to a coffee shop is illegal.
neighborhoods, that had experienced a rapid influx of ethnic minorities because of the availability of inexpensive housing, were left to deteriorate. Because of their neglect various problems started to accumulate here: it attracted crime, drug related activities and not much was done to tackle problems of unemployment and school drop-outs. My informants told me that many residents felt increasingly unsafe in their neighborhood. According to Jan de Jong, who as part of his work monitored crime in Noord, especially Moroccans were involved in criminal/illegal activities in the neighborhood, ranging from drug trafficking and trade, providing storage for drugs to illegal occupation of social housing and informal labor market activities.

8.4.2 The plan for a Moroccan fountain

By the end of the 1990s, Rotterdam started preparing for its European Capital of Culture status in 2001. The city had decided that this cultural year should showcase Rotterdam’s multicultural population. As part of this effort, the city started a program called ‘Veelkleurige Stad’ (Multicolored City). According to Peter de Wit, a former member of the city council who initiated this policy:

… the program Veelkleurige Stad was intended to increase the expression of cultural differences in public space, with the primary goal that people of diverse backgrounds, with a different cultural orientation would be able to identify themselves in the city and thus also contribute to the pride of the city and the fun of doing this [being active in showcasing their cultural identities, for example through festivals, food, monuments and other symbolic representations] (Peter de Wit).
It was therefore an explicit policy goal to encourage ethnic minorities in the city to make their identities visible in the city in order to create a common ‘multicultural’ urban identity. Furthermore, the Capital of Culture Year also provided a great incentive for cleaning up the city. Nonetheless, the city government did not take the opportunity to start a major revitalization operation aimed at improving neighborhoods, but instead encouraged small socio-cultural initiatives aimed at intercultural dialogue, thereby not addressing pressing socio-economic problems. This again resonates with Harvey’s (1989) arguments about the priorities of the entrepreneurial city. A characteristic for entrepreneurial forms of governance, he argues, is that they “focus much more closely on the political economy of place rather than of territory” (Harvey, 2001: 353). Spectacular projects are used as a strategy to create an attractive urban image, which if successful, can help “to create a sense of social solidarity, civic pride and loyalty to place…” (Harvey, 1989: 364). Selling the city, in the context of its Capital of Culture status had more priority than addressing socio-economic problems of the city’s population and improving the built environment of its rundown multi-ethnic neighborhoods.

8.4.3 Negotiating the Moroccan fountain

The Capital of Culture status of Rotterdam in 2001 brought in a lot of resources for the city. European subsidies for organizing a series of cultural events and activities, but also money spent by visitors to the city, and lots of publicity – extremely important for selling Rotterdam as an ‘attractive city’. The city council also put aside a significant budget for the construction of multicultural statues and symbols in public space. A call was made to ethnic minorities in the city to take a more active role in urban politics (see
fountain inscription) and to propose ideas to the city for multicultural projects in urban space to the city. City policy-makers responsible for the Veelkleurige Stad policy approached migrant organizations to submit proposals for multicultural initiatives (reflecting a particular ethnic identity), and placed the call on its website and in local newspapers.

The proposal for a ‘Moroccan fountain’ was submitted by Abderrahman Hassani Idrissi, a highly educated and well-known Moroccan spokesperson in the city and chair of various (Moroccan) organizations, e.g. the Institution for Foreign Workers in Rotterdam, and a good friend of the alderman responsible for Veelkleurige Stad. As chair of various organizations, Idrissi claims to speak for the Moroccan community in Rotterdam. Despite the call by the city to ethnic minorities to make their cultures more visible in the built environment, no other projects that involved ethnic architecture in public space were proposed. The reason for so few projects being submitted is first due to the fact that the call was probably never received by ethnic minorities in the city – they seldom read Dutch newspapers or search at the city’s website –, secondly, because these minority groups had no interest in representing a singular ethnic identity in urban space (which I was told by my informants of migrant organizations in Rotterdam), and thirdly because they did not have the skills to get a proposal sent to the local state.

The idea of creating a Moroccan fountain was immediately embraced by the city council and the responsible Commission SVVHA (Commission on Urban Renewal, Housing and Minority Policy):
200,000 Rotterdammers have non-Dutch roots. 125,000 are allochtonen. That’s why it is very important that elements of allochtonen culture are visible in the architectural image of Rotterdam. Visibility is of great importance [for recognition and acceptance] (Commission Svvha, November 17, 1998).

The politicians were determined to build the fountain, no matter where. In other words, it involved a strongly top-down way of governing. After the decision was made in the city council that this Moroccan fountain had to be built, responsible politicians of the 13 city districts in Rotterdam were asked if they had a suitable location for the fountain in their districts. The district council of Noord was the first to show interest in building a Moroccan fountain. They chose Noordplein as a suitable site for the Moroccan fountain. Then, the Steering Committee Oude Noorden received 200,000 Euros to work out the ideas into a concrete plan. The remaining costs for the construction of the fountain had to be raised by Moroccan organizations.

The construction of the Moroccan fountain must be understood as an attempt by district authorities to tell a positive story about the Moroccan community, thereby countering the prevailing discourses that stressed the problems caused by Moroccans in Noord and elsewhere in the city. While district authorities recognized that the fountain was not an initiative of the local Moroccan community, it was still believed that the fountain provided a means to emphasize the contributions Moroccans also make to the neighborhood and the city, thereby officially acknowledging their urban citizenship. As PvdA district politician Ruud van Dam explained:
It was an elite company that decided that something visibly Moroccan had to be built in the city. The next step was to find a city district interested in a Moroccan fountain. I wanted it, because I was eager to get some positive stories written about the Moroccan community, instead of only attention to the problems caused by Moroccans. The fountain is a symbol for this [positive perception] (Ruud van Dam).

Local politicians and planners assumed that everyone would like a fountain at the square. But they did not consider the cultural symbolism of the fountain and the accompanying (negative) feelings of neighborhood residents with regard to the ‘Moroccan’ fountain. The first to protest against the construction of the fountain were the *autochtone* residents.

A: Why didn’t they [*autochtone residents*] want it?
M: Well for them it is already very Moroccan in the neighborhood. They feel that the Moroccans want the whole square. We told them that we were proceeding with the fountain. So we made up a nice story, telling them that if you visit Morocco you will see many fountains. Then they agreed, but still they made clear that they didn’t want the fountain at the center of the square (Mohammed Houloui, Moroccan volunteer for Moroccan migrant organization in Oude Noorden).

The remaining *autochtone* residents had, from the 1980s onwards, experienced a rapid social and ethnic composition of the neighborhood. They were the ones left behind, who for various reasons never had the opportunity to move to the suburbs. As my informants at the city district explained to me, these residents already felt alienated from the neighborhood and strongly disconnected from their new Moroccan neighbors. A Moroccan fountain would, for them, only be another indication that the neighborhood was taken over by Moroccans. They already strongly believed that civil servants and politicians in the city and the district were privileging immigrants. The construction of the Moroccan fountain only strengthened this conviction. In their effort to counter the
plans, the *autochtone* residents started a protest against the construction in September 1999, and threatened to bomb the fountain if construction began. Also, their anger was directed at their Moroccan neighbors.

But their Moroccan – mainly Berber – neighbors did not know a fountain was going to be built in their neighborhood, and more importantly, once they found out, they also opposed the plans. In fact, Ruud van Dam noted that “it was not the fountain of the Berbers.” (Ruud) As Berbers, they did not perceive the fountain as a symbol for *their* identity. In fact, the Moroccan fountain did not represent their identity, but that of Moroccan domination. The Moroccan fountain thus had no support in the neighborhood. It was not initiated by and not welcomed by the local communities, not even by the Moroccan community at which it was targeted.

Nonetheless, despite protests of Dutch neighborhood residents and Moroccan residents – who in contrast to Spangen did not protest together –, who don’t feel their identity represented in the fountain, politicians pursued the project. The only compromise made – responding to neighborhood protests – was that the fountain was not placed at the center of the square, which was the original plan, but at a corner of the square (see map 8.5). As local governors feared that residents or other people opposing the Moroccan fountain might demolish the fountain, a large fence was placed around the square in the first week of its construction and the police guarded the fountain at night. This illustrates clearly that the fountain was not supported by neighborhood residents, but in fact was a prestige project of city governors and the Moroccan elite, who are disconnected from the needs and cultural imagination of the residents of the Oude Noorden.
If you say Moroccan, well then it says nothing. But someone from Casablanca, Fèis or Marrakech, that is a completely different person compared to someone from the Rif Mountains and so you have in this city the Moroccan elites who are highly educated and feel embarrassed by the ‘scum’ that lives here. They have lobbied in the city for a counteroffensive [focusing on successful Moroccans] and for a medina and this and that. And so you have Hassani Idrissi, who successfully persuaded the city council to build a Moroccan fountain, because that belongs to Moroccan culture, read Fèis. Then we told the city council that we would be willing to realize the Moroccan fountain here in Noord (Ruud van Dam).

The fountain was a one-time project that did not address the structural socio-economic problems and needs of the Moroccan community in the neighborhood. It only benefitted the reputation of one or maybe a few highly-educated Moroccan elites. This case study of the Moroccan fountain demonstrates the problems of negotiating policy plans and of implementing urban/multicultural policy. It raises questions about who is the state negotiating with and who does that group or individual actually represent? Because governing is not centered in the state but the work of many different individuals and organizations (Rose, 1999) this also complicates achieving certain goals of government. It is therefore important to think about who needs to have a say in the decision-making process? In what interest are people/organizations involved and who benefits from certain policy goals?

8.4.4 An empty square

While the local politicians and planners I spoke to assured me that anytime the fountain is broken it is immediately fixed, the fountain never worked during the period of my field research. Because the fountain is not located at the center of the square it is not very visible and is insignificant to the everyday interactions occurring at the square.
Map 8.5 is a map of Noordplein based on field observations. As the map shows, the square is cut on all sides by roads and only surrounded by buildings on three sides. The west side of the square is bordered by a road, next to which is a canal. The square itself is a rectangular open space. There is a series of benches on the southeast side of the square, surrounded by a few trees that do not provide much shelter. The benches are situated in such a way that people face each other. The Moroccan fountain is located on the south side of the square, next to a community building and underneath a couple of trees (see figure 8.12). The fountain is not visible by a pedestrian who walks towards the square coming from the shopping street. The community building blocks the view.

Noordplein is located just off the shopping street in the Noordmolenstraat. On the west and south side of the square are 4-story buildings with shops on the ground floor. There is a big kitchen supply store on the south side of the square. The retail space next to the kitchen supply store was empty at the time of the research. On the east side of the square there are apartments and a few local bars and kebab shops. A large 10-story apartment complex is situated on the north side of the square. This side of the square has solely a residential function.
Figure 8.12 A schematic drawing of Noordplein (based on field notes)
Observations at the square demonstrate that the square is not as intensively used as Mercatorplein (table 8.3).

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Weather condition: sunny, 25 degrees Celsius.

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Wednesday, August 31, 2004
Weather condition: cloudy, 18 degrees Celsius.

Table 8.3 Population counts at Noordplein

It is not very busy with people crossing the square, and even on a warm and sunny summer day not all benches were occupied. Even so, like Mercatorplein, Noordplein functions as a meeting place for Mediterranean men. The men sit at the benches reading the newspaper or talking to friends. On three different days that users were counted respectively 55%, 49% and 42% of all users were classified as Mediterranean men. Of all males counted 70% was classified as Mediterranean. Most Mediterranean men at the square were spending time in a small group of two to four men. The other groups counted
— women and European men — were mostly crossing the square, and only occasionally sitting down on one of the benches. For them the square seems to function as a place to pass through rather than to spend time.

These observations were echoed by Mustafa Benali, a Moroccan volunteer of a Moroccan migrant organization in Oude Noorden.

Many Moroccans sit on the benches at Noordplein. Especially during the summer, if they are not going on vacation, you can find them there every day (Mustafa Benali, volunteer Moroccan organization).

Ruud van Dam also mentioned the importance of the square as a meeting place for Moroccan men. In fact, he would like to strengthen the Moroccan ambiance of the square.

The square is used, especially by Moroccan men. Go see it for yourself. I would like to see the square being used more intensively, for all kinds of events, and if it was up to me it should be given a more Moroccan emphasis, reflecting the neighborhood population (Ruud van Dam, district politician).

During lunch time, the square is also frequented by employees from nearby offices and stores, who on a nice day walk to the square to eat their lunches at one of the benches, while reading the newspaper, chatting on the phone or talking to colleagues. After their lunch break they return to their offices. In all the interactions observed at the square it is particularly noteworthy that no one seemed to be paying attention to the fountain.
Whether or not the Moroccan fountain has met its goals of recognition, visibility and acceptance of Moroccans in Rotterdam has never been evaluated. In fact, in 2002 Pim Fortuyn’s party won the local elections and a new local coalition government was put in place (see also chapter 6). This coalition did not include the party of the alderman responsible for the construction of the square. The new coalition broke with the multicultural policy ideal (see chapter 1) and a new governmental regime, with new governmental techniques, based on different knowledge, was introduced (Dean, 1999). Integration – but with a clear assimilationist agenda – and neighborhood safety were the key priorities of the new coalition government. Neighborhoods that scored 3.9 or less (on a scale from 1-10) on the newly developed safety index\textsuperscript{108} were assigned a civil servant

\textsuperscript{108} The safety index measures neighborhood safety by combining opinions of residents about the safety in their neighborhood and factual data on various forms of crime (burglary, vandalism, murders, etc.)
with a budget and various instruments and powers to improve the neighborhood safety. The idea is that if the city is serious about tackling neighborhood safety, then a person should be hired who is given special powers that a normal civil servant does not have. The label illustrates the more repressive approach taken by the new coalition government.

Because Oude Noorden scored a 3 on the safety-index in 2002, a civil servant was appointed with the task of improving the perceived safety in the neighborhood. The target was to improve the safety-index score from 3 to 5.5 in four years. With a budget of 1 million Euros this civil servant introduced a series of measures: files of different welfare institutions were linked in order to track ineligible use of welfare resources, evictions were authorized when a resident was found to be involved in illegal activities, tracking illegal occupation of apartments followed by eviction of illegal renter and fines for those who sublet the apartment, camera surveillance, holding parents responsible for criminal acts of their children, etc.

A post-multiculturalist discourse (Uitermark et al, 2004) emphasizing mandatory integration (assimilating in Dutch society) and a focus on safety became the new starting points for policy. Within this framework multicultural initiatives were no longer supported and new techniques were introduced to make the operation of the new governmental regime possible. The safety-index is only one example of a visual means that makes it possible “to ‘picture’ who and what is to be governed, how relations of authority and obedience are constructed in space, how different locales and agents are to

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collected by the police, fire-brigade, city departments, etc. It consists of a survey amongst 13,000 residents of Rotterdam.
be connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objectives are to 
be sought” (Dean, 1999: 30).

8.4.5 The failure of top-down planning

The decision-making process for the construction of a Moroccan fountain at 
Noordplein is an example of strong top-down planning. Before the fountain was 
constructed, and even before it was decided where to build the fountain it was already 
decided that it was going to be built. The arguments of residents who were opposed to a 
Moroccan fountain in their neighborhood, were not taken into account. In fact, there was 
limited opportunity for negotiation because it was already decided that the fountain was 
going to be placed at Noordplein. A small group of autochtone residents attended the 
meeting organized by the city district at which the construction of the fountain was 
discussed and where residents were given the opportunity to voice their opinions and 
concerns. Their voices were heard, but then put aside. Only later – when the fountain was 
under construction – the Berber community, confronted by their autochtone neighbors 
found out about the fountain. Their organizations were not consulted in the process.
Through representatives of Moroccan organizations in the neighborhood they voiced their 
concerns to city governors and neighborhood residents. There were conversations of 
migrant representatives with district politicians and neighborhood residents. The 
autochtone residents negotiated by threatening city governors with demolishing the 
fountain.

This demonstrates that formal institutions, but also migrant organizations do not 
necessarily represent the wishes of neighborhood residents or ethnic minorities. In fact,
migrant organizations – for whom Hassani Idrissi was a spokesperson – increasingly formalize and become part of the existing governmental structures. Migrant organizations are forced to walk in line with city governors in order to qualify for subsidies, but thereby also tend to lose connections with the communities they represent. As this example of the fountain illustrates, the Berber population was not represented. This resonates with the argument that Elwood (2006) and Elwood & Leitner (2003) make that as part of neoliberal policy agendas, and the devolution of state responsibilities towards institutions of civil society (for example migrant organizations), community organizations increasingly become formalized. This also means that the state chooses certain organizations to represent a community, not recognizing the different interests. Urban planning has become increasingly complex as both public and private institutions provide the financial support for community action. However, in order to receive financial support, community organizations “draw on and reproduce the knowledge systems of the state” (Elwood & Leitner, 2003: 154). If these organizations do not follow state programs, they run the risk of their funding being cut.

The idea of constructing a Moroccan fountain was to acknowledge the presence of Moroccans in Rotterdam and their value for the city as well as to create a sense of cohesion in the city, creating a shared urban identity. While the intentions of governors were good, in practice the project has failed. It did not create a sense of cohesion, and as such did not contribute to solving problems in the neighborhood. Residents continued living apart together. A symbolic site was placed in the neighborhood based on the underlying deterministic idea that such a structure creates interaction between different population groups. The example of the Moroccan fountain demonstrates that this did not
occur. Furthermore, the Moroccan fountain has no connections to the everyday life and needs of neighborhood residents.

8.4.6 Comparing the implementation of multicultural policy at Mercatorplein and Noordplein

Mercatorplein and Noordplein are two squares that are situated in neighborhoods that have experienced a rapid ethnic and social transformation of their population composition, which is causing tensions between old and new residents in the neighborhood as well as among different groups of immigrants. The two case studies are also similar since, in both, a symbolic project was implemented in the neighborhood – as part of multicultural policy – in order to increase social cohesion and interaction. Also, decision-making in both cases was top-down, although in Amsterdam decision-making was much stronger and led by the local district government, whereas in Rotterdam the city government drove the process. The opinion of residents did not play a key role in the planning of a multicultural square or in the construction of a Moroccan fountain. Nonetheless, as both case studies illustrate, residents are not passive actors, but are actively involved in the negotiation of policy through: (1) their everyday use of the square (e.g. the territorialization of Mercatorplein by Turkish and Moroccan males); (2) active protests and threats (e.g. silent protest at Mercatorplein and threatening to blow up the fountain in Oude Noorden); and (3) riots. Symbolic strategies of avoidance or claiming space are of great importance for the everyday significance of these symbolic squares. More importantly, these strategies of negotiation contest dominant meanings inscribed in monuments or public space (Bunnell, 1999; Goss, 1998; Lees, 2001).
There are also a number of differences between the two case studies. In Amsterdam, the revitalization of Mercatorplein was a key part of a larger revitalization strategy for the neighborhood. It was the goal of district governors to uplift the neighborhood and address socio-economic problems through interventions in the physical environment. The construction of the Moroccan fountain in Rotterdam was a prestige project for the city with the upcoming Cultural Capital of Europe status of Rotterdam. It therefore had no intention to tackle the larger and more structural socio-economic problems of the neighborhood.

The idea for the Moroccan fountain came from a Moroccan, but in the end it turned out that he only represented a small group of Moroccan elites, not the Moroccan community. Nonetheless, Idrissi was himself convinced that the fountain would be welcomed in the Moroccan community:

The fountain represents the multicultural character of the neighborhood and creates an important symbol for the Moroccan community in the neighborhood (Idrissi in VROM-raad, 2001).

The idea for a multicultural square in Amsterdam came from (autochtone) governors, as for example Louise Weenink, who at the time was responsible for citizen participation and social cohesion at Mercatorplein:

I wanted it to be a square that can be used by everyone… so I looked at [revitalization plans for the square] from the perspective that if Turkish and Moroccan residents do not have much money to spend, they should still be able to sit down somewhere at the square, without having to go to a café to purchase a drink. They should be able to bring their own drink and to sit down at a bench. That’s why it is designed in this way (Louise Weenink).
What this illustrates is that “in the hands of urban planners and designers, the public
domain is all too easily reduced to improvements to public spaces, with modest
achievement in race and ethnic relations” (Amin, 2002: 968).

A new revitalization project for Mercatorplein is under way. While the idea of
Mercatorplein as ‘living room’ for the neighborhood is maintained, this goal is no longer
founded on a cultural component – a multicultural philosophy – but on an economic
component: getting the new, more wealthy residents of the neighborhood to spend more
time and money there. However, even if policy advisors of the city district succeed in
attracting new shops and bars and restaurants in order to have the new residents spend
their leisure time in the neighborhood, it still remains to be seen whether this will also
stimulate integration and inter-ethnic contacts.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has discussed the difficulties in institutionalizing multicultural policy through the neighborhood. It has demonstrated the negotiations, problems and mistakes of implementing multicultural policy and how local residents – in particular the poor – are often marginalized in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, these residents are never willing to just accept their marginalization. What it demonstrates is that immigrants are not passive actors in the neighborhood. In fact, in the multicultural neighborhoods and symbolic spaces studied immigrant residents actively negotiated their presence. For example by claiming public space for protest, leisure or celebration or through formal negotiations with city politicians for equal rights and representation in the city district, by challenging meanings ascribed to public space, and by collaborating with other residents to protest against drugs, crime, and general neglect of the neighborhood. As a consequence, the way multicultural policy plays out in different places differs depending on the specific local situation. Public spaces are therefore important mediums for constructing and challenging identities (Ruddick, 1996) – for example those developed for policy purposes – as well as for reinscribing and contesting meanings inscribed in
buildings and monuments (Bunnell, 1989; Domosh, 1988; Goss, 1998; Lees, 2001; McNeill, 2005).

Mundane practices of the multi-ethnic population in these neighborhoods play an important role in shaping the multicultural city. Immigrants, like state institutions, teachers and community organizations also govern themselves by choosing for example what to wear, what to say, how to act and where to go. For this reason, policy will always be negotiated and (re)shaped in the process. This, however, is not to say that implementing multicultural policy has no value, but it is important to critically evaluate its outcomes.

Multicultural policies as they developed in the Netherlands visualized socio-economic deprivation as a problem. As a consequence certain groups of immigrants – who were considered socio-economically deprived and whose integration more generally was considered problematic – became defined as ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities, therefore, became the object of governance. While the rationality behind multicultural policy was to improve the socio-economic situation of immigrants, without them having to assimilate in Dutch society, it created a strong emphasis on difference – of the particular ethnic group being different from others. For a long time multicultural policy focused on the group instead of on individuals. As a consequence ethnic groups were judged and evaluated on their difference, thereby widening the gap between autochtonen and ethnic minorities. Difference was tolerated, however without creating bridges and solidarity between ethnic and cultural groups (see Young, 2000). While many individuals improved their socio-economic status in the Netherlands, they continued to be labeled as
‗Other‘, as being part of an ethnic minority community. The multiplicities of identities went unrecognized.

From 2002 onwards, in line of the neoliberalization of the state (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Larner and Walters, 2004) and political events with national or global impact – 9/11, Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh – multiculturalism was suddenly replaced by assimilation. Multicultural policies were seen as failing to improve the situation of immigrants as well as host-immigrant relations. While politicians avoided the word ‘assimilation‘ in practice new policies emphasized the adherence of immigrants to core norms and values of Dutch society and increasingly rendered expressions of cultural difference a matter of the private sphere. Immigrant integration has increasingly become a one-way process of adjusting and of taking opportunities, not recognizing barriers and exclusions that many immigrants are experiencing when applying for jobs or because of poor education. Where cities in the 1990s increasingly started to celebrate diversity as an asset to the city, new policies tend to emphasize problems.

While tensions continue to exist, at the same time a lot of progress is made on the ground, in multi-ethnic neighborhoods, where multiculturalism has become part of everyday life. Nonetheless, this is not to say that actual interaction or mixing always occurs. The case study of Mercatorplein showed that while the goal was to create a multicultural square, different ethnic groups claim their own spaces at the square. Despite the segregated use of the square, groups are confronted with each other’s presence. At the same time, when multicultural policies are implemented in neighborhoods it proves to be difficult for planners and politicians to truly represent the community. It is dangerous to appoint spokespersons of a community, as it is proven at different occasions (with the
construction of a fountain in Rotterdam and the minority councils in Amsterdam) that these people do not necessarily represent the interests of the group. An important reason for this is that there is no such thing as the ethnic community.

For this dissertation I chose to conduct research in four disadvantaged multi-ethnic neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were chosen because of the concentration of immigrants in these neighborhoods and because they were all sites of multicultural policy implementation. Hence, I could study how multicultural policy implementation was negotiated in these multi-ethnic settings and how this created new forms of understanding in the neighborhood, city and country.

9.1 History of Dutch multicultural policies

Three questions guided my research. I will now address each in turn, thereby drawing on the analytics of government of Dean (1999) (see chapter 4 and table 4.1). The first question was:

What are the Dutch multicultural policies, what is the history of their development, what aspects of society are they intended to regulate, and through which institutions are they being implemented?

This question was answered mainly in chapters 5 and 6, which analyzed how policies aimed at immigrant integration developed at the nation state and at the local level (in cities and city districts). Multiculturalism, initially formed the particular approach to immigrant integration in the Netherlands (Garbaye, 2002; Hiebert, 2000; Pécoud, 2000). The multicultural policy ideal developed in the Netherlands decades before the immigration of guest workers and migration from the former colonies. In fact, the
pillarization of Dutch society is an example of the much earlier institutionalization of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Until the 1950s – when the pillarized society started disappearing – different religious and secular groups had their own institutions (for example schools, churches and sports clubs), lived in their own neighborhoods and had their own political parties. Even though society was characterized by segregation, elite leaders of the different pillars played important roles in negotiating differences in order to continue the stability of the nation. When in the 1980s it was finally recognized that guest workers and their families were to stay and that the Netherlands had become a country of immigration, this multicultural model was thought to be most appropriate to facilitate their incorporation in Dutch society.

As a rational and thoughtful activity government, however, proved contradictory. While the separate pillars had disappeared – and therefore multiculturalism – it was now expected of immigrants to develop their own institutions and organizations. While it was believed to facilitate the emancipation of immigrant groups and eventually their inclusion in society, quite the contrary was the outcome. Ethnic groups were increasingly excluded from society because too few connections were established between immigrants and the host society. In other words, quite the opposite of what Young (2000) has called ‘differentiated solidarity’ – where segregation is not a problem since the different communities are connected in an equal and participatory public sphere – was created in the Netherlands as part of a multicultural policy ideal. While the underlying philosophy of policies aimed at immigrant integration was multiculturalism, in reality multiculturalism – the process by which difference is negotiated in an open public sphere that treats each person and their opinions equally, and through which ideas of what it
means to be Dutch are shifted – did not exist. Immigrants were allowed to maintain their cultural identities, but in order for immigrants to come to know themselves as part of a nation (Dean, 1999) they had to become ‘Dutch’. Difference was tolerated, but conflicts were avoided out of fear of being portrayed as racist.

Hence, problems immigrants were experiencing in becoming part of the nation were long denied. A clear definition of what it means to be Dutch did not exist. This complicated the integration of immigrants, because it was unclear what it was they were expected to integrate into? This was a problem along with the late recognition that immigrants were to stay. Figure 9.1. critically portrays the Dutch multicultural society: a society where the norms and values of the native Dutch population are the rule and immigrants have to find their way in or around that hegemony. The religious and cultural practices of immigrants are tolerated, yet they are expected to adhere to Dutch norms and values.

Source: NRC Handelsblad 2000

Figure 9.1 The Dutch multicultural society
Within this multiculturalist policy framework specific policies were developed at the nation state level to support the organization of ethnic groups along ethnic lines, to provide education in the own language, to encourage political participation, and to improve their socio-economic situation. In 1983 the first official multicultural policy was implemented by the national state, when politicians recognized that immigrants needed assistance to facilitate their integration into Dutch society.

Once immigrant integration was framed as a problem that needed to be addressed by the state, it also became officially institutionalized. Special divisions within the state (national and municipal) were made responsible for immigrant integration. Also, a number of research institutes started working on questions of immigration and integration (for example the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam). In the beginning there was not much coordination between the different departments, but this changed over time.

In order to govern immigrant integration it also had to be made visible (Dean, 1999). This was done by creating the statistical term *allochtonen*, and specifically the category of ethnic minorities (immigrants from non-industrialized countries). This definition was based on the socio-economic position of immigrants in Dutch society. Immigrants from industrialized countries – from Northwestern Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – were considered integrated in socio-economic terms and therefore no policy had to be developed for these groups. I would argue, therefore, that Dutch governors were not focusing on integration per se, but instead only on the disciplining of those ‘groups’ of immigrants – which in itself is also highly problematic, because it ignores within group differences – whose integration was considered
problematic. In other words immigrant integration was about not making trouble – that is why the Japanese were not considered and ethnic minority group -, not being a burden on the state in terms of for example welfare dependency. Policies aimed at immigrant integration therefore were created specifically for ethnic minorities.

From the 1990s onwards, immigrant integration was increasingly framed as an urban problem, particularly one of the big cities, where most immigrants had settled. As a consequence a new institutional infrastructure was created. A *Ministerie voor Grootesteden- en Integratiebeleid* [Ministry of Big Cities and Integration Policy] was made responsible for the coordination of so-called *Grootestedenbeleid*, but municipalities had to initiate plans. This urban policy not only aimed at improving the quality of living in cities, but also to facilitate immigrant integration. The concentration of immigrants in certain urban neighborhoods was seen as a problem for their integration, and politicians and policy makers feared the development of ghettos, and for this reason social mixing of disadvantaged neighborhoods became the key instrument of *Grootestedenbeleid*. At the same time urban problems were increasingly framed as problems of immigration.

The rationality of the government regarding immigrant integration, however, is not only constructed by state institutions, but also by think-tanks – for example the Social and Cultural Planning Agency, the Spatial Planning Agency and the Central Bureau of Statistics – and various research institutes. They often construct their knowledge based on what they learn from practices abroad. This is how a fear of ghettos could develop in the Netherlands, and accordingly policies were developed in order to avoid this situation. Governing cannot be understood as solely taking place by state institutions. In fact, a whole range of think-thanks, consultants, architects, migrant organizations and other
parties have become involved in the governing of immigrant integration. In developing state policies it is therefore of great importance to be aware of who the different parties represent. At the same time, while on the one hand a lot of advising bodies are involved in policy development, another trend is of initiatives by voluntary organizations and neighborhoods to be incorporated by the state. The organizations, such as United Different Voices in Amsterdam Bijlmermeer, are then forced to professionalize.

In terms of defining the problem, policy advisors tended to define the number and concentration of ethnic minorities as ‘the problem’ rather than recognizing the deeper, structural and institutional causes of the marginalization of large sections of ethnic minorities. Hence, the idea developed that social mixing was a useful instrument for improving the livability of disadvantaged neighborhoods as well as the improvement of the socio-economic status of residents of immigrant residents because it would lead to the socio-spatial interaction of different social classes and different ethnic groups. As the ethnographic case study of Bijlmermeer illustrates, however, this socio-spatial interaction was difficult to achieve as individuals and groups tend to separate themselves on the basis of class. Residents experiencing upward social mobility or middle class residents moving to a disadvantaged neighborhood separate themselves from the poor, rather than contributing to an uplifting of the poor through social interaction. It must therefore be questioned whether social mixing in itself will contribute to multicultural engagement (Amin, 2002).

Mitchell (2004) has argued that policy discourses of multiculturalism are increasingly replaced by assimilation. In the context of increasing neoliberalization of states, and sped up by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the murder of Theo van Gogh and
politicians like Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, a sudden backlash against multiculturalism has occurred in the Netherlands. In fact, since 2002 it has been replaced by a more assimilationist stance on immigrant integration. Having said this, different policy directions have been taken in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Rotterdam has taken the lead in shifting to a more assimilationist approach. As a consequence a new set of policies and institutions have been created to manage immigrant integration. These institutions are characterized by a more repressive character: for example, moving immigrant integration from Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, introducing a mandatory integration course, mapping the safety-index in neighborhoods in Rotterdam and now also in Amsterdam, and finally a strong focus on active citizenship. On other words, the particular set of institutions and policies that developed to manage the incorporation of immigrants changed over time as priorities as well as the definitions of the ‘problem’ of immigrant integration changed. Policy transformation must therefore be understood in the context of global, European, national and local events that impact the perception of immigrants in the city, neighborhood and country.

9.2 The affect of multicultural policy implementation on socio-spatial interaction in multi-ethnic neighborhoods

The second research question is:

How does the implementation of national multicultural policies affect the socio-spatial interaction in urban neighborhoods with large immigrant populations and how and why are these effects different between neighborhoods and between cities?
The way I phrased the research question assumes that national multicultural policies are directly implemented in cities and that policy programs and instruments are comparable between cities. In practice, however, I observed that not only in the implementation effects are different, but that the process of development of multicultural policies – in particular urban renewal policies – differs among cities. Different political coalitions in different cities, particular historical, economic, social and cultural contexts as well as different population compositions all play a role in shaping policy. The instruments are similar, but when and how policies are implemented are different. In Rotterdam, for example, urban renewal did not come off the ground for a long time, because the city focused on spectacular projects to create a new image for the city.

What then are the implications for comparing cities and neighborhoods? Comparison is not possible because every neighborhood is unique and every municipal authority knows its own dynamic. At the same time comparison is possible because in both cases the state and local authorities have particular assumptions about the management of society. All case studies demonstrate the importance in Dutch urban planning and politics of the idea that society can be managed by adjusting the built environment. Also, the case studies demonstrate that the effect of these policies on the socio-spatial interaction between the native and immigrant population is minimal.

For this dissertation I have specifically looked at the implementation of two types of multicultural policy in 4 multi-ethnic neighborhoods: urban renewal policy with the goal of social mixing and multicultural policies aimed at redesigning urban public space to signify the presence of ethnic groups in the city and neighborhood. The case studies of Mercatorplein and Noordplein show that socio-spatial interaction is difficult to create
through design. Building a multicultural square and putting a Moroccan fountain at the squares is not sufficient for changing the behavior of its residents. In fact, Mercatorplein has continued a place where different ethnic groups continue to ‘live apart together’ (Body-Gendrot, 2002). The different groups use different areas of the square, without interacting. This is not to say that urban renewal of the square had no effects. In fact, while the intended outcome of creating a high profile multicultural square has not entirely succeeded, more people now use the square and the safety of the square has greatly improved. Noordplein is less intensively used, but is similar to Mercatorplein especially claimed by Moroccan and Turkish men. A major difference between multicultural policy implementation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam was the motivation of politicians and policy advisors. The creation of a fountain at Noordplein in Rotterdam was mainly a prestige project for reimaging the city for the upcoming Rotterdam Cultural Capital of Europe in 2001. Mercatorplein, on the other hand, was redesigned because politicians at that time truly believed that social life could be managed by design. The purpose here was to create socio-spatial interaction between residents. Unfortunately, this goal failed and Mercatorplein will be up for a facelift starting in 2009109.

The urban renewal operation in Amsterdam Bijlmermeer intended to uplift the neighborhood by building housing for the middle classes. Underlying this policy was the belief that differentiation of the housing stock would uplift the neighborhood and improve the situation for the poor and marginalized population in the neighborhood. This

109 On June 30, after having written the first draft of this dissertation a new design was presented for Mercatorplein, aimed at redesigning the square into “a cozy living room and trendy hotspot of the neighborhood” (Stadsdeel de Baarsjes, 2007b: 1). Multicultural interaction continues to be a central element of the plans, but the focus is now also to revitalize the neighborhood economy by attracting the new young professionals and middle class residents to the square.
policy has been successful as strategy to attract a middle class population. It turned out, however, that the new middle class residents were mostly *allochtonen*, thereby not reducing the concentration of immigrants in this neighborhood and more importantly that this *allochtone* middle class also tended to separate themselves physically from the poor. Hence, socio-spatial interaction was not realized. Having said this, socio-spatial interaction has occurred at the institutional level. Different ethnic groups are now represented in local politics.

Spatial policy aimed at changing the design of neighborhoods and urban public spaces is suitable for improving security, liveability and property values in the neighborhood. It is, however, not suitable as instrument for creating social interaction between immigrants and the native population. Changing the built environment through demolition and reconstruction has more direct, visible and measurable results. It is much more difficult to measure the achievements of programs aimed at socio-economic improvement. In order to truly improve neighborhoods and to achieve a truly multicultural society, where everyone has equal opportunities, a long term vision is required. A vision that takes social mixing through building for the middle class in poor neighborhoods only as a starting point for a much larger policy program. A program that over a period of a generation focuses on improving education (realizing mixed schools), internships, neighbor programs (by which for example an *autochtone* family ‘adopts’ the Moroccan son of the neighbors and vice versa, coaching projects to show poor (ethnic) youth positive examples, encouraging small entrepreneurship, theater, etc.) Social interaction is not realized spontaneously but must be facilitated partly using existing institutions.
Socio-spatial interaction must be realized in different settings. Amin (2004) therefore, rightly argues that social interaction between groups is not realize in urban public spaces, but must be encouraged at the micro-scale in schools, at the shop floor or in community gardens. It is in these settings where people will be drawn into interactions with people who they consider to be different. In urban public spaces there is no shared purpose for interaction. Only when there is a shared problem or interest – as in Spangen in Rotterdam – can cross-cultural relations develop. Here, the absence of actual policy implementation, as the city prioritized spectacular prestige projects aimed at reimagining the city, and therefore ignored its disadvantaged neighborhoods, forces people to work together to change their everyday lives.

The idea that society can be managed by design is increasingly questioned. Yet, planners and policy advisors continue to search for instruments to manage society. Increasingly, there is a search for best practices. Policy advisors visit other cities to learn of the best practices and who copy these practices to their own contexts. Transferring these practices to a different context has a great risk of failure, because of the different local circumstances. Therefore, what the case studies demonstrate is that planners and policy-makers must build more on knowledge that is available in neighborhoods by teachers, community workers, entrepreneurs and residents. A government that facilitates dialogue between groups instead of a government that tries to create the multicultural society by design.

In Rotterdam improving the image of the city was prioritized. In this context multiculturalism was promoted, but there was less interest for problems of immigrants and ethnic tensions in urban neighborhoods of the city. In Amsterdam, there was a strong
focus on the neighborhood. Image was not an issue. Millions of tourists visit Amsterdam each year and the middle class wants to live in the city. Despite differences, both cities are dealing with a similar problem: how to influence the conduct of immigrant populations?

9.3 Negotiating multicultural policy implementation

The last research question is:

How is the implementation of the policies negotiated in multi-ethnic neighborhoods, and what are the implications for politics, decision-making, governance, and social interaction at the neighborhood and at the scale of the city as a whole?

Multicultural policy implementation is negotiated differently in different neighborhoods and cities. In Bijlmermeer a group of immigrant residents felt their ideas for the neighborhood were going unrecognized in the urban renewal program. To change the situation they addressed this injustice through formal networks – by claiming time to speak in the district council and by writing a report about the underrepresentation in decision-making of the majority immigrant population. The implication of these negotiations was the creation of an Office of Multiculturalisation and Participation with the task of empowering immigrant residents in the neighborhood and informing them about urban renewal plans, and a transformation in the ethnic composition of the city council and city administration to come to represent the composition of the neighborhood. This is an example of in Amsterdam and in the Netherlands of how multiculturalism can work on the ground. The success of this negotiation is now visible
in the returning of an *allochtone* middle class to the neighborhood who are attracted by the multiculturalism of the neighborhood and the transnationality of its residents.

In Spangen, on the other hand, multicultural policy implementation did not get off the ground before 2002 because the city prioritized symbolic prestige projects aimed at reimagining Rotterdam in the world. Shared problems created social interaction between residents of different ethnicities in Spangen, organized by Annie Verdoold. In order to compensate for the lack of action by the city, neighborhood groups started various small scale neighborhood projects aimed at improving the living situation of all residents. Recent urban renewal plans are now attracting *autochtone* middle class residents to the neighborhood, while at the same time marginalized residents are being pushed out.

The case study of Mercatorplein showed different strategies of negotiating multicultural policy implementation: the claiming of space by Turkish and Moroccan men and male youth, the claiming of the square as a site of protest as a strategy of Muslim immigrants for making themselves visible in the city and claiming equal rights and treatment, the everyday segregated use of the square (or the avoidance of the square) and by claiming the square for celebrations of a particular ethnic group (the Turkish community in Amsterdam). What this demonstrates is that while designing a multicultural square might have failed, the square is an important site for the negotiation of difference in the neighborhood and the city. This resonates with the argument of Sandercock (2003) and Holston (1998) that the multicultural city constantly creates sites of struggle and that the struggle for the multicultural city involves the (re)claiming of rights, resistance and subversion (Fincher and Jacobs, 1998). Mercatorplein is an important site through which local, national and even transnational identities are
constructed and created (Ruddick, 1996). It is a neighborhood square, but also a transnational square, and it is a strategic site for negotiating ethnic identities in the city and the nation.

Finally, at Noordplein multicultural policy implementation was negotiated once the fountain was already placed at the square. Local residents – both *autochtoon* and Moroccan immigrants (Berbers) – disapproved of the fountain. As a consequence, the fountain that was supposed to bring people together caused people to ignore its presence. Even though residents were not involved in the decision-making process, their disapproval of the fountain causes it to become a loose element in the landscape. It is thus of great importance that in designing policy it is taken into account who is representing whom and for what reasons? For long multicultural policy emphasized the coherence of ethnic community, while this example demonstrates that such a coherent community does not exist.

For Amin (2002) policies aimed mixed neighborhoods do not accomplish integration. According to Amin mixed neighborhoods are in fact:

“… communities without community, each marked by multiple and hybrid affiliations of varying social and geographical reach, and intersecting momentarily (or not) with one another for common local resources and amenities… mixed neighborhoods need to be accepted as the spatially open, culturally heterogeneous, and socially variegated spaces that they are, not imagined as future cohesive or integrated communities. There are limits to how far community cohesion rooted in common values, a shared sense of place, and local networks of trust can become the basis of living with difference in such neighborhoods” (972).

Policies of social mixing, in order to create socio-spatial interaction between ethnic groups and different classes, are in themselves insufficient for the purpose of immigrant incorporation in society. In fact, it can cause the displacement of marginalized groups
from the neighborhood, thereby cutting important social networks. Amin (2002) argues instead that a shift must be made from immediate and simple solutions – politics in the Netherlands locally and nationally operates in four year cycles, causing politicians to opt for physical renewal instead of socio-economic programs that run for many years and of which outputs are difficult to measure – to a democratic politics where all citizens are viewed as equals. While a participatory and open-ended engagement based on the “vibrant clash of democratic political positions” (Mouffe, 2000: 104) is a normative ideal, I agree with Amin that we must work towards structural results. For Amin a democratic politics takes place:

in an open public realm where fixed cultural assumptions can be disrupted and identities can be shifted through cultural exchange. Also it recognizes that living with diversity is a matter of “constant negotiation, trial and error, and sustained effort, with possibilities crucially shaped by many strands that feed into the political culture of the public realm from the entanglements of local institutional conflict, civic mobilization, and interpersonal engagement, to national debates on who counts as a citizens, what constitutes the good society, and who can claim the nation. (972)

9.4 Recommendations for future research

This study could not have possibly covered the many issues surrounding multi-ethnicity and the negotiation of policy aimed at immigrant incorporation in urban neighborhoods. Many avenues of inquiry remain. One recommendation for future research is to expand the research to neighborhoods in different countries. The current study has only compared neighborhoods within Dutch cities, which provided a useful cross-urban comparative perspective. By expanding the research to neighborhoods in a number of different countries – that are subject to policy implementation aimed at immigrant incorporation and are characterized by a large share of immigrants in the
neighborhood population – a more in-depth understanding of the processes and mechanisms shaping the multicultural city can be obtained. It will contribute to our understanding of how difference is negotiated in different urban and national contexts, why practices are different in different countries, and in so doing inform policy practice across countries. Also it would contribute to understanding the larger political economic changes shaping everyday lives in multicultural cities.

A second recommendation is to use a gender analysis in order to begin to understand how (new) inequalities are produced and negotiated in the multicultural city. This would contribute to the understanding of how difference is negotiated in urban public spaces and how urban spaces are experienced differently by different (immigrant) groups.

A third recommendation is to study in more detail the segregated use of urban public spaces and its implications for living together in multicultural neighborhoods. This would contribute to our understanding of the role of socio-spatial interaction in shaping inter-ethnic relations.

A fourth and final recommendation for future research is to study the role of class in shaping the multicultural city. Increasingly, a middle class of ethnic minority groups is developing in European cities, but so far limited research has been conducted investigating the implications of this development for interethnic relations in the neighborhood, city and country.
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APPENDIX A

OBSERVATION FORMS MERCATORPLEIN AND NOORDPLEIN
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