POLITICS AT THE INTERSECTION: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MINORITY WOMEN’S LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Researchers, organizations, and activists advocate increased political representation for both women and minority groups. But looking around the world, we know little about how politics at the intersection of these identities impacts the legislative representation of minority women. Aside from a limited number of studies based largely in the United States, empirical research on women in politics has failed to acknowledge differences among female legislative representatives. In this dissertation I collect data on the political representation of men and women from 461 racial, ethnic, and religious groups in 81 democratic and semi-democratic countries around the world. For each of the countries in my sample, I researched majority/minority dynamics and selected social groups that reflect the most salient divisions or social cleavages in each context. Ultimately, these data suggest that minority women are underrepresented in politics to a greater degree than both their male minority and majority female counterparts. Descriptive statistics also reveal that in most countries, gender inequalities in national politics are much greater than inequalities by race, ethnicity, or religion. In fact, as minority representation in national legislatures increases, the gender gap in representation between minority men and women also grows.
I also move beyond descriptive analysis to conduct the first large-scale, cross-national investigation of the factors that explain minority women’s political representation across different cultural, structural, and political contexts. First, I test whether traditional explanations for the differential presence of women and minorities in national politics also account for differences in minority women’s political representation. Using hierarchical linear modeling, I predict variation in absolute and relative measures of minority women’s representation. The results indicate that factors affecting the legislative outcomes of minorities such as group size, ethnic-religious fragmentation, and minority quotas better explain differences in minority women’s political representation than many of the factors related to women’s political success across countries. Contrary to expectations of social and political theorists, my analyses demonstrate that proportional representation electoral systems do not increase the political representation of minorities. But these electoral systems do benefit minority women relative to their male peers.

Next, I consider how policies designed to promote the legislative representation of women and minorities affect minority women. Using odds ratios, I explore how gender and minority quotas, as stand alone policies and in combination, affect the election of majority men, minority men, majority women, and minority women. Then, using multilevel modeling, I investigate which kinds of quotas are most beneficial for minority women. I find that tandem quotas—the simultaneous presence of national-level gender and minority quotas—create strategic opportunities for minority women to gain political power. However, not all combinations of quotas benefit minority women. When gender and minority quotas are regulated at different levels and do not interact with one another,
these policies may promote the representation of minority men and majority women, leaving minority women by the wayside. Brief case studies of quota policies in Burundi and Romania extend these insights further.

In the final analyses of the dissertation, I investigate the political representation of Muslim women. More than a third of Muslims in the world are now living as minorities. And, prior research suggests that Islam may serve as a significant obstacle to the political representation of Muslim women. But, the findings in this dissertation suggest that Muslim minority women are no differentially represented than women from other minority groups. In fact, in Western countries and in countries with high levels of government respect for religious freedoms, Muslim women are particularly well represented relative to their male peers. However, institutional differences are not the only factors affecting Muslim women’s political representation. I find some evidence that different cultural beliefs about women and women’s roles across ethnic groups may be more significant obstacles to Muslim women’s political representation than religion. Case research on the Netherlands and Belgium also illustrates that political context may play an important role in shaping patterns of representation for Muslims. Fear of terrorism, rising Islamophobia, and anti-immigrant politics may lead some parties to recruit secular, Westernized Muslim female candidates.

Overall, minority women face substantial barriers to political representation. In many countries in the world, both majority women and minority men are successful at gaining seats in national legislatures, but minority women are not. Often, mechanisms that help women and minorities to gain political power do not operate in the same way for minority women. But, this dissertation also illustrates that in some contexts, minority
women’s dual identities may advantage them relative to their minority male or majority female peers. Future research should consider not only how to empower women and minorities, but also how to advance the political representation of individuals at the intersection of these social categories.
Dedicated to Mom, Dad, Jason & Kat
in acknowledgement of your love, support, and patience
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, scholars have successfully identified political, structural, and cultural factors that influence women’s political representation across a wide range of countries (e.g., Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2001). But feminist scholarship emphasizes that women are far from a monolithic group. Differences such as race, ethnicity, religion, language, and sexuality not only impact women’s identities and interests, but form intersecting social hierarchies that shape women’s access to power (Collins 2000). For instance, women facing the double barrier of being both female and a minority may face more significant obstacles to entering politics than both their male and majority group counterparts.¹

To date, however, we know little about the factors that facilitate the political representation of minority women worldwide. Indeed, aside from a small number of studies in Western countries like the U.S. and Canada (e.g., Bedolla, Tate, and Wong 2005; Black 2000; Smooth 2001), the political representation of minority women has received little empirical attention. We are unaware to what extent women’s political

¹ The term “minority” is applied both to numerical minorities—groups that make up less than a majority of the populace—as well as disadvantaged groups—those that have experienced social, economic or political marginalization, either by law or by custom. But, groups that are socially, economically, and/or politically dominant, but make up a numerical minority, are not considered minorities.
gains in recent decades have reached women from racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups. Further, the developing literature on minority women’s legislative representation in the U.S. provides little consensus about what factors might best facilitate the political representation of minority women. Overall, we do not understand how the intersecting identities of minority women influence their legislative representation across different political, structural, and cultural contexts.

Incorporating minority women into politics may be necessary to ensure that minority women’s interests are represented. Recent scholarship suggests that minority women have distinct policy interests and priorities that may not be effectively represented by either majority women or minority men (e.g., Barrett 1997; Bratton, Haynie and Reingold 2006). If minority women are excluded from politics, policies designed to benefit women or minority groups may fail to address minority women’s interests (Crenshaw 1994). That is, minority women, who could hypothetically benefit from policies targeted to assist either minority groups or women, “may in reality benefit from neither” (Hancock 2007:66). Empowering male minorities without including women may even lead to policies that contribute to gender stratification within marginalized groups (Okin 1999).

Minority women’s inclusion in political institutions should produce a range of benefits. For example, recent research suggests that minority women may be even more effective advocates for the rights and interests of minority groups than minority men (Fraga et al. 2005). Increasing the political representation of minority women may also have important symbolic effects. Research suggests that for marginalized groups, legislative representation may positively affect the self-esteem and aspirations of group
members (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Guinier 1989; High-Pippert and Comer 1998; Johnson, Kabuchu, and Kayonga 2003). Greater political representation of marginalized groups may also alter perceptions about those groups in wider society. As Paxton (1997:442) explains, “[P]olitical position carries highly visible status and prestige.” And the presence of subordinated groups in these positions enhances the view that these groups are “fit to rule” (Mansbridge 1999). The inclusion of minority women into national level politics may therefore affect minority women’s self-worth and aspirations, as well as wider beliefs in the population about minority women.

Despite the importance of ensuring that minority women are included in politics, comparative research has yet to investigate the dynamics of minority women’s political representation. One principle obstacle to this research is the lack of cross-national data. Organizations collecting data on women in parliaments worldwide aggregate women’s representation as a group. And to date, there is no complete resource for cross-national data on the political representation of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

In this dissertation, I fill this void by collecting data on the representation of women from 461 ethnic, racial, and religious groups across 81 countries to fulfill three broad research objectives. First, I assess the minority representation of women descriptively, asking whether increases in women’s political representation across the globe have been limited to women in majority ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Second, I extend current cross-national research on women in parliament. Specifically, I consider how factors such as the political and electoral system and the larger historical and sociopolitical context facilitate or hinder the political representation of female minorities. And third, I investigate new explanations for variation in women’s political
representation that may be more important when considering the legislative outcomes of minority women. For example, I suggest that the simultaneous use of gender and ethnic quotas—policies that require that a certain percentage of candidates or legislators must be women or members of ethnic groups—may create strategic opportunities for minority women in politics. I also direct special attention to the political representation of Muslim women, a group that faces numerous barriers to political representation worldwide. To fulfill these objectives, I employ a combination of in-depth case research, descriptive analyses, and multilevel statistical models.

In this chapter, I discuss the broad theoretical underpinnings of the research that follows. I begin by summarizing theoretical research on the political representation of marginalized groups. I then focus more explicitly on the experiences of minority women by introducing and discussing theories of intersectionality (Collins 2000; Glenn 1999; Weber 2001). Specifically, I consider how minority women face marginalization both in movements combating sexism and in those struggling against racism and other forms of prejudice. I also explain the importance of ensuring that minority women achieve a political voice, especially when the rights of women and the rights of minority groups come into conflict. I conclude by summarizing the remaining chapters of the dissertation.

In the next section, I introduce existing theoretical research on the political representation of women and minority groups (e.g., Kymlicka 1995; Phillips 1995; Williams 1998; Young 1990). This research considers from a theoretical perspective the promises and pitfalls of calling for political representation based on social characteristics or group affiliation, rather than only qualifications and policy positions. In addition to discussing the importance of ensuring that women and minorities are represented in the
political arena, I briefly consider the limitations of a “politics of presence” (Phillips 1995:1). Particularly, I pay attention to how failing to acknowledge variation within minority groups “can recreate oppressive segregations” (Young 1997:350).

THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MARGINALIZED GROUPS

Despite the removal of legal barriers to the political involvement of women and minorities across many countries around the world, these groups often remain substantially underrepresented in politics. For instance, in the United States, non-Hispanic white males are only about one-third of the population, but they hold almost three-quarters of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. As of 2005, members of minority groups did not occupy a single seat in the national legislatures in Armenia, Chile, or Lesotho (USDS 2005). And globally, women occupy, on average, less than 17% of national legislative seats (IPU 2008).

Political and social theorists have responded to these persistent inequalities by articulating the demand for group-based political representation (Kymlicka 1993, 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1991, 1995; Sapiro 1981; Williams 1998; Young 1990). Instead of focusing on the representation of policy opinions or attitudes, scholars are debating the merits of “the politics of presence” (Phillips 1995:1), group-differentiated rights (Kymlicka 1995), and descriptive representation (e.g., Chaney and Fevre 2002; Goodin 2004; Kittilson 2006), each of which focuses on who is represented. The most contentious of these concepts is descriptive or ‘mirror’ representation—when a body of legislators reflects the demographic characteristics and experiences of the constituents they represent (Pitkin [1967] 1972).
Advocates of a politics of presence assert that due to a shared history of oppression and a similar social position, members of subordinated groups are more likely to represent the interests of group members (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Williams 1998). As Kymlicka (1995:139) aptly summarizes, “there are limits to the extent to which we can put ourselves in other people’s shoes, even if we sincerely try to do so, and limits to the extent to which most people sincerely try to do so.” Descriptive representation may improve the representation of minority interests by facilitating communication between legislators and constituents, by increasing the electoral participation of marginalized groups, and by enhancing the quality of legislative deliberation, especially under conditions of “uncrystallized interests” (Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004; Mansbridge 1999). But, even if the underrepresentation of women and minorities does not cause states to legislate in the male majority interest (MacKinnon 1989), descriptive representation may still enhance the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry (Guinier 1994; Kymlicka 1993; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995).

Despite general agreement that the representation of women and minority groups is both important and beneficial, scholars challenge the politics of presence on a number of grounds. First, group-based or descriptive representation may promote essentialism, the assumption that group members have a fundamental common identity that cannot be shared by individuals who are not a part of the group (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 1997). As Phillips (1995:101) explains, “The easy equation of more minority representatives with better representation of minority interests only makes sense against a
homogenous community of interests.” Yet attitudes, interests, and the salience of group identity often vary widely across minority group members.

Failing to acknowledge variation within minority groups is especially problematic in that it “can recreate oppressive segregations” (Young 1997:350). For example, the assumption that women form a single group with common oppressions often means that the experience of white middle-class heterosexual women is generalized as representative of all women (Young 1994:715). Similarly, as discussed below, feminist critiques of multiculturalism assert that group-based rights for minority ethnic groups may sometimes further undermine the status of women (Okin 1999, 2005).

One way of addressing the problem of essentialism is assuring that women and minority groups are represented beyond just token levels. Electing a greater number of legislators from marginalized groups increases the chances that a greater diversity of interests is represented within each marginalized group (Paxton and Hughes 2007). In the case of women, Jane Mansbridge (1999:647-8) argues, “Proportional descriptive representation would undoubtedly reflect an even wider range of views among women, producing a more nuanced sensitivity to differences within that group.” And more generally, “Representative diversity (and the critical mass of important subgroups within that diversity) in any descriptive group greatly increases the chances of diverse perspectives being represented in deliberation (p. 647, fn 24).

But if legislatures must mirror some of the characteristics of their constituents for fair representation to take place, where do we draw the line? All but the most radical democratic theorists agree that not every characteristic or experience of the citizenry could or should be represented among legislators (Grofman 1982; Pitkin [1967] 1972).
Even Will Kymlicka (1995:139), a proponent of group-based political representation, states that “the general idea of mirror representation is untenable.” He continues:

If men cannot represent women, can white women represent women of colour? Within the category of women of colour, can Asian women represent African-Caribbean women? Can middle-class heterosexual able-bodied Asian women represent poor, disabled, or lesbian Asian women? Taken to its conclusion, the principle of mirror representation seems to undermine the very possibility of representation itself.

Thus, any well-founded theory of group rights or descriptive representation must articulate which groups should be represented and at what levels.

So, which groups should receive group-based or descriptive representation? Iris Marion Young (1997:373,371) calls for the “representation of social positions structured by gender, race, nation, class, age, and so on,” arguing that “every structured social group should be represented.” Yet, not all theorists cast such a wide net. Melissa Williams (1998:15-16) lays out more specific criteria, arguing that marginalized groups merit group based representation if group membership is not voluntary or mutable, if negative meanings are assigned to the group identity by the broader society, and if social and political inequality follows the boundaries of group membership. Kymlicka (1995:145) outlines two different justifications for group-based representation: if group members are “subject to systematic disadvantage in the political process” or if they “have a claim to self government.”

None of these evaluations, however, explicitly accounts for the representation of those who are doubly disadvantaged by multiple marginalized identities. In this dissertation, I argue that it is important to ensure not only that women and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities are present in representative political institutions, but that we
should also not overlook individuals at the intersection of these social groups. Efforts to increase the political representation of marginalized groups should consider how to ensure that “minorities within minorities” are not forgotten (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005).

**COMPLEXITIES AT THE INTERSECTION: TOWARDS A VOICE FOR MINORITY WOMEN**

Given that existing theoretical research on women and minorities often ignores the special circumstances faced by minority women, I next introduce feminist theories of intersectionality, which articulate a framework for understanding the experiences of minority women. Black and multiracial feminist theory is at the forefront of this research, arguing that gender and race are socially constructed categories that contain inherent power differences (Collins 2000; Glenn 1999; Weber 2001). Black feminist theory maintains that the experiences of gender and race cannot be understood separately. Instead, “race constructs the way Black women experience gender; gender constructs the way Black women experience race” (Mansbridge and Tate 1992:488). Empirically, theories of intersectionality suggest that the experience of minority women cannot be understood by adding up the results of separate analyses of minority status and gender. Minority women’s experience, characterized by both “double barriers” and strategic opportunities, requires special attention (Collins 2000; Fraga et al. 2005; Weber 2001).

In the political arena, intersectionality research has shown that minority women are “situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political agendas” (Crenshaw 1994:99). Thus, minority women are often faced with the
choice between movements that combat sexism and movements that challenge racial, 
ethnic, or religious oppression (Simien 2006). For example, in 1869, Black women in the 
United States had to decide whether to get in line behind the 15th Amendment to the 
Constitution, which enfranchised Black males while continuing to exclude women from 
voting rights (Terborg-Penn 1998). Even when the interests of women’s and civil rights 
movements do not explicitly collide, Black women are often marginalized. For example, 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Black women were excluded from the 
mainstream women’s suffrage movement, especially in the South where White women 
 favored policies of segregation (Giddings 1996; hooks 1981).

Tensions between movements to advance women and minorities are not limited to 
the United States. Numerous scholars have written about the conflicts between feminism 
and anti-colonial or nationalist movements (e.g., Cockburn 1998; Moghadam 1994, 
Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999). As minority groups press for greater rights within 
states, for greater autonomy, or even for a state of their own, feminism may be subverted 
“for the greater good.” Further, anti-colonial and nationalist movements are frequently 
gendered in ways that idealize women’s motherhood role. As a result, when movements 
win concessions or governmental control, women from newly empowered groups often 
continue to face discrimination or marginalization based on their gender.

Similarly, a great deal of research highlights the marginalization of women of 
color in both domestic and international women’s movements (Antrobus 2000; Chafetz 
and Dworkin 1986; Friedman 2003; Moghadam 2005). Early women’s movements 
across the world were dominated by white, upper-class women from Western countries 
(Chafetz and Dworkin 1986). Thus, women’s movements in many countries have been
attacked as bourgeoisie or imperialist. Even after the second wave of feminism, when the diversity of international women’s organizations increased substantially, divisions and conflict between White Western women and women of color from the Global South continued (Antrobus 2000). For instance, during the UN Global Conferences for women, women of the global South accused Western feminists of ignoring their regional concerns. Overall, the marginalization of minority women within movements to combat oppression suggests that including minority men or majority women in policymaking positions may not effectively advance the interests or positions of minority women.

The complex and contradictory position of minority women in public policy has also come to the fore in recent debates on the tensions between multiculturalism and feminism in liberal societies (Friedman 2003; Kukathas 2001; Kymlicka 1999; Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999, 2005; Spinner-Halev 2001; Tripp 2002). This literature addresses how courts, legislatures, and other institutions should balance the rights of women with the rights of minority groups (Okin 1999). Specifically, religious and cultural minority groups who lobby for group-based rights often seek greater control over personal or family laws (Friedman 2003). And because family laws—those involving marriage, divorce, child custody, the division of property and inheritance—often have larger implications for the lives of women in these minority communities, the rights and welfare of minority women have become a topic of fierce debate.

When faced with choice between protecting the individual rights of women and protecting the cultural rights of minority groups, scholars take different sides (Deveaux 2000; Kukathas 2001; Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999; Spinner-Halev 2001; Tripp 2002). Some researchers stand with women, emphasizing the malleability of culture (e.g.,
Deveaux 2000; Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999; Tripp 2002). As Aili Tripp (2002: 436) explains, “Cultural integrity has never hinged on any one ritual or practice, most certainly not on ones that hurt women.” Alternatively, some researchers argue that, especially in the case of oppressed minorities, cultural autonomy is paramount (Kukathas 2001; Spinner-Halev 2001). In short, “avoiding the injustice of imposing reform on oppressed groups is often more important than avoiding the injustice of discrimination against women” (Spinner-Halev 2001:86).

Despite these disagreements over the ordering of rights, political theorists generally agree that minority women must have the opportunity to speak for themselves. For example, feminist scholar Monique Deveaux (2005:341) states that “mediating disputes about the value and status of cultural practices will require that women members of cultural groups have a direct say in these matters through…the inclusion of women in formal decision-making processes.” From a much different standpoint, Jeff Spinner-Halev (2001:113) comes to a similar conclusion that women from oppressed groups “must have a say in their own liberation.” Calls for the political inclusion of minority women are also echoed in case studies that highlight the tensions between gender and multiculturalism (e.g., Tripp 2002; Yeatman 1993). For instance, when evaluating the problem of rape or domestic violence within Aboriginal communities in Australia, Anna Yeatman (1993) argues that we must ensure that “those who would contest our representations…are present to undertake the contestation” (Yeatman 1993:241, cited in Phillips 1995:9-10).

The above research suggests that minority women face marginalization and oppression even within movements designed to advance the position of women and
minorities. As a result, progress for women and minority groups may actually come at a significant cost to minority women. In some cases, conflict between minority women’s multiple interests cannot be avoided. But at minimum, as government leaders and policymakers try to balance the benefits and costs of policies targeting women and minorities, minority women must be included in the debate. If only women benefiting from the privilege of majority status are represented in the policymaking arena, policy interventions targeted towards women as a group may ineffectively serve the special needs of minority women. Similarly, if minority group rights are articulated by only male voices, the culture that is receiving protection or advancement may be anti-feminist (Okin 1999). Taken together, these statements suggest the importance of ensuring the political representation of minority women.

Overall, intersectionality is a useful paradigm for understanding the complexities of minority women’s identities and experiences. And, as discussed above, intersectionality research suggests the importance of ensuring that minority women’s voices are heard. Yet, lingering questions remain regarding whether political intersectionality research is useful, or even possible, in comparative or cross-national quantitative research. In the next section, I consider the possibilities and challenges to adapting intersectionality to cross-national empirical research on minority women in politics.
BUT CAN WE COMPARE? INTERSECTIONALITY IN A CROSS-NATIONAL FRAMEWORK

To date, research on intersectionality in electoral politics has largely been limited to studies in the United States and other Western industrialized countries (Takash 1993; Black 2000, Smooth 2001; Bedolla, Tate, and Wong 2005; Estherchild and King 2006; Scola 2006). Most of this research focuses on a single group such as Black women, Latinas, or Native American women (e.g., Smooth 2006; Fraga et al. 2005; Prindeville and Bretting 1998). As Julia Jordan-Zachery (2007:261) argues, “The context of the lived experience of black women, or any other marginalized group, provides us with a deeper understanding of both structural and political intersectionality.”

However, given the universality of intersecting social structures and identities, the theories and methods of the intersectional paradigm could apply to research across a broad range of disadvantaged groups (Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007). Indeed, the multiple oppressions faced by minority women have long been articulated by feminists worldwide. Terms such as “double burden,” “double whammy,” “double jeopardy,” and “double minority” are not limited to the American context (Black 2000:147). The concept of multiple oppressions has even been integrated into United Nations resolutions on human rights (Yuval-Davis 2006).²

Furthermore, although existing intersectionality research often focuses on the political experiences of a singular group of minority women, much of this research is already comparative, looking for similarities and differences across interstices within

² For example, in a 2002 resolution on the human rights of women, the United Nations, “recognized the importance of examining the intersection of multiple forms of discrimination, including their root causes from a gender perspective” (Resolution E/CN.4/2002/L.59; cited from Yuval-Davis 2006:194).
marginalized groups. For example, Lisa Montoya, Carol Hardy-Fanta, and Sonia Garcia (2000) compare the rates of political participation for bilingual and Spanish-speaking Latinas and Latinos of different nationalities in the United States, elucidating intersections of nationality, ethnicity, language and gender. Some intersectional research draws comparisons across distinct minority groups or across majority-minority divides. Jerome Black (2000), for example, explores the intersections of race, ethnicity, class, and gender by comparing the characteristics of “visible minority” women to majority groups in Canadian electoral politics.

In addition to drawing comparisons within and across minority groups, some intersectional research is comparative across place. For instance, Wendy Smooth and her colleagues investigate the legislative influence of African American women across state legislatures (Smooth 2001, 2006; Orey et al. 2006). This research finds that contextual factors that vary across states, such as the level of professionalization of a legislature, shape how race and gender intersect to affect Black women’s legislative influence (Smooth 2006). To date, however, research adopting an intersectional paradigm does not compare politics at the intersection across national borders.

The prospect of intersectionality research across countries raises a number of concerns. How can we compare, for example, the experiences of Tutsi women in Rwanda to the experiences of Maori women in New Zealand? Does studying Arab women in Israel have anything to teach us about the experiences of Kurdish women in Turkey or Hindu women in Bangladesh? Cross-national analyses of intersectionality may not help to elucidate the multidimensionality of minority women’s identities or lived experiences. But comparing the above groups may contribute to understanding how
structural and institutional factors shape political outcomes for individuals with intersectional identities. As S. Laurel Weldon (2006:236) explains, “comparative analysis is key to illuminating the range of variation in structures of gender, race, class, and other axes of domination, the ways these structures interact, and the wide array of strategies for resistance and reform.”

Cross-national research may be especially useful for research on “political intersectionality,” which demonstrates how political “strategies on one axis of inequality are mostly not neutral towards other axes” (Verloo 2006:213). In other words, a policy or strategy designed to remedy one social inequality may exacerbate inequalities along another dimension. For example, minority quotas may promote the political representation of minority men, reinforcing gender inequalities in political representation. Indeed, recent research suggests that across countries, policies designed to address gender and ethnic inequalities in national legislatures are grounded in different logics and take on different forms (Htun 2004b; Krook and OBrien 2007). But research has not yet examined how the adoption of these policies affects individuals at the intersection.

In summary, existing intersectionality research often focuses on single groups in a single socio-political context. But, the intersectionality framework has much to offer comparative political research of gender and minority status. Across the world, individuals are positioned at the intersection of two or more marginalized identities. Comparing and contrasting politics at the intersection across countries may help to illuminate how gender and minority status are mutually constructed, as well as the complexities of minority women’s political experiences and outcomes.
OUTLINE OF REMAINING CHAPTERS

This dissertation begins with the assertion that it is important to move beyond the representation of women in legislatures around the world to understand which women are represented. Thus, the collection of data on minority women’s political representation is itself an important outcome of this project. I focus on data collection and measurement in Chapter 2. In addition to describing how I collected data on minority women in legislatures worldwide, I discuss both conceptual and practical obstacles to cross-national research on minority women. For example, I consider challenges of sample section, asking how to identify “minorities” across countries. I also spend a substantial part of the chapter describing the methods employed throughout the dissertation. I explain the benefits of using multilevel analysis, but I also address additional specification issues related to hierarchical linear models such as variable centering.

In Chapter 3, I describe the political representation of minority women worldwide. Using newly collected data spanning ethnic, racial, and religious groups in 81 countries, I show how minority women are overwhelmingly underrepresented in the political arena. In addition to presenting information about the composition of the average national legislature around the world, I focus on questions of diversity. For instance, I consider whether male or female representatives as a group tend to better reflect the diversity of the populations they represent. But I also consider how minority women’s legislative representation varies across geographic regions. In this chapter, I also create the Minority Women Power Index (MWPI), which summarizes minority women’s political representation, adjusting for population size, in each of the countries in my sample.
But the proposed research also goes beyond the production and description of data to explain the representation of minority women around the world. In Chapter 4, I draw on the established body of research on women’s political representation and the budding comparative scholarship on the political representation of minority groups to consider how these ideas might inform minority women’s legislative representation. Using hierarchical linear modeling, I investigate how political, structural, and cultural factors affect minority women’s representation. In this chapter, I also consider factors related to minority representation. I evaluate how group size, ethnic and religious fragmentation, and minority quotas impact minority women’s political outcomes. I test the effects of all factors on absolute levels of minority women’s political representation, but also on their representation relative to male members of their group.

As discussed above, however, minority women’s political representation is likely not a simple function of adding theories of women’s representation to theories of minority representation. Indeed, intersectionality research suggests that strategies designed to advance the political representation of either women or minority groups may prove ineffective for minority women. Thus, in Chapter 5, I consider whether the benefits of gender and minority quotas—legislation mandating the inclusion of female or minority legislators—extend to minority women. But intersectionality research also demonstrates that the multiple identities of minority women may not always hinder them in the political arena. Instead, certain circumstances may present strategic opportunities for individuals positioned at the intersections of subordination (Fraga et al. 2005). Thus, I also test whether the conjunction of gender and minority group quotas create such advantages for minority women. In addition to the quantitative analyses, I provide short
case studies of the effects of quota policies in Burundi and Romania on minority women’s political outcomes.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I focus my analyses more explicitly on a particular group of women that face significant obstacles to political representation in many parts of the world—Muslim women. First, in Chapter 6, I analyze whether women from Muslim-majority groups in Western countries achieve higher levels of representation, relative to male members of their group, than outside of the West. I also consider whether governments with higher levels of respect for religious freedom have higher levels of Muslim women in their national legislatures. And, I evaluate whether women from North African, Turkish, or South Asian Muslim groups are differentially affected by institutional contexts that may be more open to Muslim women’s political representation.

In Chapter 7, I present case studies of the political representation of Moroccan and Turkish minority women in the Netherlands and Belgium, two countries that elected particularly high levels of Muslim women to their national legislatures following 9/11. I argue that rising fear of Muslim men coupled with anti-immigrant politics may paradoxically benefit women from Muslim groups. However, only Westernized and secular women are likely to take advantage of this specific political context.

I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 8 by integrating the findings from the previous chapters. I discuss the limitations of existing research on women and minority political representation for understanding the political outcomes of minority women. I also evaluate how research on minority women in politics informs and extends current theories of intersectionality. I give suggestions for public policy and close with directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2
DATA AND METHODS

At present, there is no blueprint for research on minority women’s political representation worldwide. Embarking on this project required me to consider a range of important issues related to both research design and data analysis. In this chapter, I discuss the data and methods employed throughout this dissertation, including how I addressed some of the challenges to cross-national research on minority women in politics.

I begin by discussing how countries and groups are selected, describing the data collection process, and explaining how important variables are coded. To illustrate the challenges to identifying minority groups across countries and how I meet these challenges, I provide coding examples throughout the text. Before moving on to methods, I provide a short case study of Lebanon, in which I describe the challenges to identifying and coding minority women’s representation as well as how I overcame these challenges.

After discussing sampling and data collection, I turn to the methods I employ for data analysis. Specifically, I introduce and discuss Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), which I use to analyze the data in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. For analyzing nested or clustered data, HLM provides a number of advantages over other quantitative methods. But, the
use of HLM also raises a number of important issues involving model specification (e.g., mean centering, random vs. fixed effects), which I address in turn.

Before moving forward, it is important to note that the data collected for this dissertation were very difficult to obtain. Careful research was necessary to inform which groups to include, reliable sources of data had to be identified, and in many cases, language barriers had to be crossed. But over a span of two years, I was able to obtain data on the political representation of men and women across more than 300 racial, ethnic, and religious groups in every region of the globe. These data will not only be useful to researchers studying women’s representation, but they provide a starting point for future cross-national research on the political representation of minority groups.

**SAMPLING**

*Countries*

My aim was to collect data on the composition of national legislatures from all democratic and semi-democratic countries that are recognized as independent and have at least ½ million population in 2005. Democratic and semi-democratic countries are identified using a combination of Freedom House and POLITY scores in the election year (Freedom House 2007; Marshall and Jaggers 2007). And, I consider countries independent if the United Nations recognizes their sovereignty. In total, I identified 122 countries. Of these, I was able to code information on minority women’s political representation for 82 countries.

For each of the 82 countries in the total sample, I was able to code the percentage of seats in the legislature that are majority women, minority women, majority men, and
minority men. For all countries, I was also able to identify the specific majority and minority groups to which women belong. For Kyrgyzstan and Papua New Guinea, however, there is incomplete data regarding the distribution of male representatives across all groups within minority and majority categories.\(^3\) The most extreme case of missing data occurred with Papua New Guinea, where because of the large number of ethnic groups in the country (>850), I was unable to obtain any information about the breakdown of male legislators. For this reason, Papua New Guinea is excluded from the analysis altogether, reducing the total sample of countries I analyze to 81. I analyze partial data for Kyrgyzstan.\(^4\)

One concern related to sampling is whether the 81 countries I analyze are representative of the full sample. For example, it is useful to consider to what extent the countries analyzed represent all geographic regions. Generally, aside from sub-Saharan Africa, the sample has good regional coverage. The 81 countries analyzed throughout this dissertation are located in the West (N=19 of 20), Eastern Europe (N=19 of 22), Latin America and the Caribbean (N=16 of 21), the Middle East (N=8 of 10), Asia (N=12 of 17), and sub-Saharan Africa (N=7 of 32).

However, geographic region is just one of the ways that the countries I analyze should vary. I also consider how sampled countries vary by women’s political

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\(^3\) I was able to complete the coding for these two cases because of the dearth of female legislators. Kyrgyzstan, for example, elected no female legislators in 2005. Thus, once I obtained aggregate information about minority representation in Kyrgyzstan, I was able to ascertain how seats were distributed across majority and minority men. But, ultimately, I did not find data on the specific distribution of male seats within majority and minority categories. Similarly, Papua New Guinea only elected 1 female legislator in the last two rounds of elections for the National Parliament.

\(^4\) Because analyzing only partial data for a country may bias within-country estimates, I re-estimate models excluding Kyrgyzstan altogether. Ultimately, how I code this case does not appear to substantively change the results discussed throughout the dissertation.
representation and by racial/ethnic/religious heterogeneity. Table 2.1 summarizes variation in the countries in my sample along these two dimensions. The most heterogeneous countries appear at the top of the table (no group makes up more than 50 percent of the population), and the most homogeneous countries are at the bottom (no minority group makes up 5 percent or more). Countries in between are considered bi-polar or multi-polar, depending on the number of groups that make up at least 5 percent of the population (Bangura 2005). From left to right appear countries with better than average levels, average levels, and lower than average of levels of women in the national legislature (IPU 2008). So, for example, due to significantly sized Black and Latino/a populations and an average level of women’s political representation, the United States appears in the second row (multi-polar) and center column (average women’s political representation). Throughout the table, countries that are included in the analyses appear in bold italic type.

Table 2.1 displays that of the countries I analyze there is considerable variation in the percent women serving in the national legislature. I successfully obtained data for 69 percent of countries with high levels of women, 74 percent of countries with average levels of women, and 59 percent of countries with low levels of women in the national legislature. Along the other dimension, however, the final countries included in the analysis are systematically more homogeneous, on average, than the total sample of countries. Still, I was able to obtain data for a majority of countries in all categories except the most heterogeneous. Of these countries, I was only able to obtain data for 18

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5Categories are determined by standard deviations above and below the mean.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>MEDIUM</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>% Sampled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLURAL</strong> (No Numerical Majority)</td>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong>, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
<td><strong>Bosnia-Herzegovina</strong>, <strong>Canada</strong>, Burkina Faso, <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zambia</td>
<td><strong>Benin</strong>, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MULTI-POLAR</strong> (More than 1 Minority &gt; 5%)</td>
<td><strong>Lithuania</strong>, Moldova, <strong>New Zealand</strong>, Switzerland</td>
<td>Bolivia, <strong>Ecuador</strong>, <strong>Latvia</strong>, <strong>Nicaragua</strong>, Niger, <strong>Panama</strong>, <strong>Peru</strong>, Singapore, <strong>United States</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bahrain</strong>, <strong>Botswana</strong>, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, <strong>Georgia</strong>, <strong>India</strong>, Iran, <strong>Jordan</strong>, <strong>Kuwait</strong>, <strong>Kyrgyzstan</strong>, <strong>Lebanon</strong>, Mali, <strong>Malaysia</strong>, Mexico, <strong>Montenegro</strong>, Nepal, <strong>Sri Lanka</strong>, Thailand</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BI-POLAR</strong> (Only 1 Minority &gt; 5%)</td>
<td><strong>Australia</strong>, <strong>Belgium</strong>, <strong>Bulgaria</strong>, <strong>Burundi</strong>, <strong>Costa Rica</strong>, East Timor, <strong>Finland</strong>, Guyana, <strong>Honduras</strong>, <strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bangladesh</strong>, <strong>Colombia</strong>, <strong>Cyprus</strong>, Dominican Republic, <strong>Estonia</strong>, <strong>Israel</strong>, <strong>Macedonia</strong>, <strong>Mauritius</strong>, <strong>Vietnam</strong>, <strong>Switzerland</strong>, United Kingdom, <strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
<td><strong>Albania</strong>, <strong>Brazil</strong>, <strong>Comoros</strong>, <strong>Fiji</strong>, <strong>Guatemala</strong>, <strong>Morocco</strong>, <strong>Romania</strong>, <strong>Turkey</strong>, Ukraine</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOMOGENEOUS</strong> (No Minority &gt; 5%)</td>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong>, <strong>Austria</strong>, <strong>Croatia</strong>, <strong>Czech Republic</strong>, Denmark, Germany, <strong>Netherlands</strong>, Norway</td>
<td><strong>Cape Verde</strong>, <strong>Chile</strong>, <strong>Croatia</strong>, <strong>Ecuador</strong>, El Salvador, France, <strong>Ireland</strong>, <strong>Jamaica</strong>, <strong>Philippines</strong>, <strong>Poland</strong>, <strong>Portugal</strong>, Republic of <strong>Korea</strong>, Slovenia</td>
<td><strong>Armenia</strong>, Hungary, <strong>Italy</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong>, Lesotho, <strong>Mongolia</strong>, <strong>Paraguay</strong>, <strong>Russia</strong>, <strong>Serbia</strong>, <strong>Solomon Islands</strong>, <strong>Uruguay</strong>, Yemen</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % Sampled | 69% | 74% | 59% | 66% |

Table 2.1: Women’s Political Representation and Ethnic-Religious Heterogeneity of the Full Population and the Countries Included in the Samples Analyzed
percent of the full sample. Overall, the findings from this dissertation do not explain minority women’s political representation in sub-Saharan Africa or generalize to countries without a single group in the numerical majority.

Groups

Identifying Majorities and Minorities

Beyond country selection, the next, and perhaps largest challenge of this dissertation, was to determine which groups should count as “minorities” in a given society. One clear obstacle to identifying minorities across countries is simply the magnitude of diversity that exists across the world. During the early 1990s, Fearon (2003) identified more than 822 distinct ethnic groups making up at least 1% of the population across 160 countries. The number of smaller groups is exponentially higher—Nietschmann (1987) estimates as many as 5,000 different communities worldwide that could claim to be “national peoples.” Papua New Guinea alone has more than 850 distinct indigenous groups, each making up less than 1% of the population. The racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic composition of societies also differs widely from one country to the next, even for neighboring states. Given this diversity, it should come as no surprise that sources of data on minority groups disagree, focusing on different social cleavages and aggregating data in different ways.

Even if scholars could agree on an exhaustive list of distinct racial, ethno-linguistic, and religious groups that captures the diversity of populations across countries, how does one determine which groups are the minorities? Minorities are typically defined as groups within countries that differ by race, ethnicity, religion, language, or
national origin from the dominant group or groups. But, not all social cleavages are equally relevant across time and space. In broad terms, some societies are largely organized along linguistic lines, while in other countries the most salient divisions are religious. In most countries, several axes of disadvantage contribute to the social and political marginalization of individuals. In a single country, the term “minority” could include indigenous peoples, racial minorities, as well as the descendents of specific immigrant populations.

Within these broad categorical distinctions, contextual factors determine which groups are considered “minorities.” For example, across much of the West, ethnic minority status is determined, in part, by patterns of immigration and the historical relationships between countries of residence and countries of origin (Bird 2004). Indeed, in many Western countries, immigrants from other Western countries are often not considered “minorities.” The salience of ethnic and religious divisions also changes significantly across time. For instance, although Irish Catholic immigrants faced widespread discrimination in the United States during the 19th and early 20th centuries, contemporary research often includes the descendents of Irish Catholic immigrants as part of the English-speaking, Christian, Caucasian majority. Overall, conceptualizations of ethnicity remain rooted to specific geographic and historical contexts (Bird 2004).

A further problem identifying “minorities” is that group size does not necessarily translate to group advantage or marginalization. While most small groups can be considered “minorities,” some small groups are socially, economically, or politically dominant. Two well-known historical examples include Whites of European descent in South Africa and Sunni Muslims in Iraq. Furthermore, in some countries, no single
group constitutes a majority. If groups are equally sized, majority/minority dynamics can be even more difficult to determine. Taken together, the above issues suggest that coding majority and minority groups across countries is no simple task.

Despite the challenges listed above, there is a vast array of available data and research that can inform decisions about which groups are “minorities.” Encyclopedic sources such as the CIA World Factbook provide preliminary information about the racial, ethnic, and religious make-up of different countries. These sources also provide brief historical accounts of social upheaval or armed conflict that may indicate key societal fault lines.

Human rights reporting has also increased dramatically in recent years. Human rights reports published by the U.S. Department of State, international organizations such as Amnesty International, and the United Nations define marginalized groups facing discrimination and other forms of abuse worldwide. The U.S. Department of State also now publishes information about religious freedom around the world in the *International Religious Freedom Report*. Used together, these reports are particularly helpful in identifying groups that face discrimination or marginalization in societies around the world.

A third source of information is case study and comparative research on social or political inequalities around the world. Research across a range of disciplines, including political science, sociology, anthropology, history, and linguistics provides information about which groups in a society could be classified as “minorities.” One particularly useful source of cross-national data is the Minorities at Risk project, which provides group-level data for disadvantaged groups across 115 countries. Overall, this dissertation
relies on the labor of a wide range of scholars and researchers who compiled and published hundreds of studies on minority groups in countries around the world.

Using these sources, I code majority and minority groups by going through the following three steps:

1) I first determine which social cleavages in a country are most important. I break down the population into categories based on the most important social cleavages in each country.

2) Next, I research other potential minorities in each country. As minorities are added to the list of groups, other categories are augmented to ensure that the groups are mutually exclusive.

3) I verify that groups that are numerically small are not, in fact, dominant groups. At the same time, I check that larger sized groups are not, in fact, marginalized or disadvantaged. In countries with no numerical majority, I pay particular attention to context in determining which groups were majorities and minorities.

Certainly, group size did factor into decisions about whether to code groups as majorities or minorities. Typically, most small groups are coded as minorities. Indeed, group size and majority status are highly correlated ($r = 0.9$). However, the status of particular groups and the social and political context primarily drove my decision-making. Take, for instance, the case of Afghanistan. Research suggests that the Uzbeks, while only roughly 9 percent of the population in Afghanistan, are a dominant group in Northern Afghanistan and could therefore be classified as a majority group.\(^6\) In contrast,

\(^6\) The Uzbeks have been one of the dominant political forces in Northern Afghanistan since the 1500s and were part of the Northern Alliance, which unseated the Taliban. While some Uzbek still live in rural
the Kuchis, who comprise a greater share of the population, are a nomadic people identified in most data sources as a vulnerable group. Thus, despite Uzbeks making up a larger share of the population than Kuchis, I code Uzbeks as majority and Kuchis as minority. (For more on the coding of Afghanistan, see Appendix A.) I provide a more detailed example of coding majority and minority status below in a short case study of Lebanon.

Because I relied on research to help me to identify important and politically salient minority groups, I sometimes had to create “other” or “remainder” categories. These categories are typically aggregates of groups that fit three criteria:

1) They must be particularly small in size, making up less than 1 percent of the population;

2) During the course of data collection, they were not identified as significant minorities in the country in any data sources; and

3) There is no evidence of political mobilization at the national level.

Individuals that cross racial or religious categories (e.g., biracial or multiracial individuals) also sometimes are included in the remainder.

Despite my efforts to carefully code majority and minority groups, it is possible that another researcher may have come to different conclusions regarding which groups are majorities and minorities. For example, in his comparative analysis of electoral systems and minority representation, Arend Lijphart (1986) identifies the Maronite Christians as a minority, while I code them as a majority group (see case study below).

herding communities, many are businessman or skilled artisans, making up an Afghani middle class. Given their history and the current political climate, I code the Uzbeks with the majority.
Acknowledging potential disagreements like these, I collected the original data in the most disaggregated format possible (often at the individual level) to allow future researchers to re-aggregate the data differently. I also constructed a detailed 130-page codebook with data sources and information about coding decisions. Sample pages from this codebook for the cases of Afghanistan, Estonia, and Italy are included in Appendix A.

Selecting Groups for Analyses

Across the 81 countries analyzed in my sample, I identified 461 majority and minority groups. However, for most countries in a sample, I also coded “other” or “remainder” categories. Including these groups in the descriptive and multivariate analysis is problematic. The advantage of carefully selecting “minorities” across countries is that analyzing the political representation of these groups speaks to majority/minority dynamics. And, including muddled “other” or “remainder” categories undermines this effort. Furthermore, group size is likely to be an important predictor throughout all analyses in this dissertation. Including aggregate categories, when the groups are not aggregated for theoretical reasons, could interfere with assessing the effects of group size on political representation. Thus, for most of the analyses employed in this dissertation, I exclude “other” or “remainder” groups, reducing the number of sampled groups to 396.7

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7 I only include other or remainder categories when assessing legislature proportionality—how closely the distribution of groups in the population matches the distribution of groups in the legislature. For these measures, it is important that 100 percent of the legislature and the population are included. See Chapters 3 and 5 for more discussion of measures of proportionality.
Another important consideration for the statistical analyses is whether to include small minority groups. Research on minority groups often focuses only on groups that comprise more than 1% of a country’s population (e.g., Fearon 2003). But, this approach may be less appropriate for research on minority women in politics. For instance, Romania has elected representatives of particularly small minority groups to 17 seats in its legislature. If these groups are excluded, Romania will not receive credit for the diversity of its representatives. But, more importantly, I am particularly interested in how many of these group representatives are women and why.

One alternative would be to aggregate all the groups with particularly small populations. But aggregating small groups when not theoretically appropriate is also problematic. It is important to be able to distinguish between the election of five representatives from a single minority group and the election of one representative from each of five different minority groups. Thus, I chose not to aggregate small minority groups when not theoretically justified.

On the other hand, analyzing the full dataset of all groups of all sizes in all countries is also problematic. There are close to 200 minority and “other” groups that are totally unrepresented in the national legislatures of the 81 countries in my sample. That is, no men or women from these groups achieved representation. Including all of these cases would result in dependent variables that would be, at best, highly skewed and, at

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8 Certainly, not all data can or should be fully disaggregated. For instance, I could analyze Latinos in the US from different regional backgrounds. Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexicans, for example, all have distinct national origins and cultures. In the United States, however, these groups are commonly lumped together. Thus, for the purpose of these analyses, I use an aggregate category of “Hispanic” or Latino/Latina. However, sometimes minority groups are very different from one another and treated differently by dominant groups. In this case, aggregation may be much less appropriate.
worst, rife with missing data. Indeed, more than two-fifths of the groups analyzed would have zeros or missing values for the dependent variables.

Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, rather than selecting on group size or including all groups, the multilevel models analyze only groups that have gained political representation in the national legislature. Thus, if a man and/or a woman from a group hold at least one seat in the legislature, I include that group in the analyses. Ultimately, I predict variation in women’s political representation across 308 majority and minority groups represented in the national legislatures of the countries in my sample. Of these, 223 are racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups.

There are several advantages to the selection rules I employ. Theoretically, selecting the sample in this way focuses the analyses on factors that help or hinder minority women in places where minorities can feasibly gain representation. If neither men nor women from a group are able to gain representation, the political dynamics of group representation speaks more to minority exclusion than intersectionality. Another benefit to this approach is that it facilitates easier comparison across results. For many of the analyses in this dissertation, I evaluate minority women’s political experiences relative to male members of their group. So, if a group is wholly unrepresented, the dependent variable would be missing for that group. Although I could potentially include groups without representation when modeling a different dependent variable, analyzing all models with the same sample of groups ensures that differences in results are not a function differences in the samples analyzed.

To summarize:
I attempted to collect data for 122 independent democratic and semi-democratic countries with at least a half a million population in 2005.

Excluding Papua New Guinea, I ultimately collected data on 461 groups in 81 countries. This sample of groups is used to calculate indices of proportionality (see Chapters 3 and 5).

396 of those groups were identified as majority or minority groups (not “other” or “remainder” groups). These groups are used to calculate most descriptive measures of representation.

308 groups of the 396 are represented in national legislatures. These groups are analyzed in the multilevel models.

223 groups of the 308 are minority groups in 67 countries. Some multilevel models are limited to only these groups.

So far, I have discussed how countries and groups were sampled and how they were selected into the analyses. In the next section, I explain the data collection process. I also briefly discuss how I coded some of the important covariates analyzed throughout the dissertation.

DATA COLLECTION

Composition of National Legislatures

The primary goal of the data collection was to obtain accurate data on the composition of the national legislatures for all countries in my sample. For each legislature’s most recent election, I obtained individual-level information such as
legislator names, political party, constituency, gender, and minority status whenever possible.\textsuperscript{9} The central source of the data is parliamentary websites, which provide at minimum legislator names, parties, and constituencies, but sometimes gender and minority status as well. Supplementary data sources include human rights reports, election websites, \textit{Who’s Who in Leadership}, regional news outlets, and recent scholarship on minority representation. To ensure that the individual data is complete and accurate, I cross-checked data on minority status and gender with two sources of aggregate data: the IPU, which provides information on female parliamentary representation, and the U.S. Department of State’s \textit{Human Rights Report} (2001-2008), which often lists information on minority representation.

A significant roadblock in this research is that for a number of countries, English-language skills are insufficient to collect the necessary data. I was successful collecting data from countries in which the dominant language is not English, such as Armenia, Burundi, Iceland, and Peru. However, parliamentary websites and regional news sources with the relevant information are sometimes only available in other languages, e.g., Arabic, French, Spanish, or Russian. Therefore, I hired graduate assistants with foreign language skills to assist in data collection. In total, I hired 17 research assistants to collect information on the gender and minority status of national legislators in 14 languages: Arabic, Bulgarian, Dutch, French, German, Hindi, Kiswahili, Mandarin Chinese, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Turkish. These assistants also helped to contact numerous country and regional experts at universities

\textsuperscript{9} In some cases, only aggregate information was available.
around the world, which helped me both to select which groups were “minorities” and to find sources of data (see Acknowledgements).

Data collection began in December 2005 and continued through December 2007. But, it is important to note that the composition of legislatures in 2005 reflects the results of elections that took place as early as 2001. For one country, Russia, I was unable to obtain current data but did obtain data for the prior election in 1999. Overall, the data do not represent a perfect cross-section in time. To account for potential effects of time on these results, I tested the effects of election year in auxiliary models. The variable never reached statistical significance, and its inclusion does not influence the results reported in any substantive way.

It is also noteworthy that for several of the countries in the sample, I was able to collect multiple years of election data (e.g., Costa Rica, New Zealand, and the United States). I always analyze the earliest time point available to increase the similarity in election years tested. It is still noteworthy, however, that there is some evidence of change in the political representation of minorities and minority women across elections. Thus, scholars should consider pursuing longitudinal analyses of minority representation.

*Group Size*

After collecting data on the composition of national legislatures, the next obstacle is coding group size. Collecting accurate and consistent population data faces numerous challenges. Some governments may not collect data on race or ethnicity, or even outlaw the identification of individuals by ethnicity altogether (e.g., France). Even in countries with a regular and sophisticated population census, individuals from some groups are
difficult to identify. Across Europe, for example, Romani populations are often underestimated in official statistics. In Austria, statistics on minorities are difficult to obtain because almost all of the country’s citizens identify as “Austrian” (USDS 2007a). In other cases, census data are quickly outdated by the differential fertility rates of majority and minority groups.

Second, differences in the collection and aggregation of population data may also create considerable gaps between concepts and measures. In some cases, for example, statistics may be available regarding the number of “foreign-born” individuals, but discrimination against these individuals varies by national origin. Or, data may be available regarding the percentage of the population that is Muslim, Hindu, and Christian, but conflicts largely arise between members of different sects within the same religious tradition. In other cases, highly specific and disaggregated data may be available. But because single individuals may cross multiple categories of difference, disaggregated data may not combine in straightforward ways.

To collect information on group size, I started with cross-national data sources such as the CIA Factbook and encyclopedias, which often report official statistics from country censuses. In many cases, however, I also went directly to the country censuses so that I could aggregate the data to reflect the majority and minority categories I selected. I also drew from recent published research on minority groups, which often provides population estimates for groups lacking official population statistics. Lastly, I selectively used data from the Joshua Project, an online source of data on ethnicity and religion worldwide that is hosted by the U.S. Center for World Mission. For groups with disputed population statistics, I collected upper and lower estimates and used the average
of these values. Still, it is important to acknowledge that group size is likely to be estimated with a greater degree of measurement error than other variables.

*Other Independent Variables*

To predict variation in majority and minority women’s political representation, I collected independent variables from a range of sources, including the World Bank, United Nations, and datasets produced by other researchers (e.g., The Database of Political Institutions, POLITY IV, Penn World Tables, Minorities at Risk) (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002; Keefer 2002; Marshall and Jaggers 2007; Minorities at Risk Project 2005). Specific source information for covariates is provided throughout the empirical chapters. But for key covariates, I provide means, standard deviations, and other summary statistics in Appendix B (Table B.1).

**CASE STUDY: LEBANON**

In this section, I discuss the political representation of minority women in Lebanon, a case that demonstrates the challenges of identifying minority groups but also how these challenges may be overcome. Lebanon is politically organized along religious and sectarian lines under a system called confessionalism. Following the provisions of the Taif Agreement, which was negotiated to end decades of civil war in Lebanon, Christians and Muslims are each entitled to 50% of seats in the country’s National Assembly. Christian and Muslim sects also share political leadership: the President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister is Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the National Assembly is Shi’a Muslim (USDS 2007a). In addition to these three sects, the government
officially recognizes 15 other religious sects—11 Christian, 3 Muslim, and 1 Jewish—ranging in size from 5-6% to less than 1% of the population. However, the absolute and relative size of all religious groups in Lebanon is widely disputed. Due to political sensitivities, a national census has not been conducted since 1932, prior to Lebanese independence (USDS 2007b).

Maronite Christians, estimated to be the third largest sect in Lebanon, have historically been politically dominant (CIA 2008). France separated Lebanon from Syria in part to create a state in the Middle East with a dominant Christian majority, and Lebanon continues to have the largest population of Christians in the region. During French administration of Lebanon in the early 20th Century, Maronite Christians were allocated the majority of political positions, including the presidency and command over the military. Following the Taif Agreement, some of the political power afforded to Maronite Christians during French colonialism was shifted to Muslims. But Maronites continue to benefit from the constitutionally-guaranteed division of political positions.

Different Muslim sects have distinct political histories in Lebanon. During French colonization and the transition to nationhood, Sunni Muslims—the second largest sect in Lebanon—actively fought for resources and patronage. Thus, historically, leaders from the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim sects together formed the central governing structure of the country (Ajami 1986). Shi’a Muslims, on the other hand, are numerically the largest of Lebanese religious sects, but historically, they have been marginalized. When Lebanon emerged as a new country, “The Shia had long been impoverished, uneducated, isolated, and politically quiescent;” thus, “the Shia…were accorded almost no political relevance by leaders of the other sects” (Corstange 2001:11).
Although Shi’a Muslims fought for and gained greater representation over time, power-sharing in Lebanon today still reflects many of the social and institutional inequalities of yesterday.

Focusing on religious divisions alone may mask other important cleavages. For example, in addition to religious differences, several distinct ethnic groups are present in Lebanon, including Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, Kurds, and Persians. But these groups are largely positioned in Lebanese society based on religion, rather than ethnicity. For example, Kurds in Lebanon are identified almost exclusively as Sunni Muslims. One exception to the dominance of sectarian divisions in Lebanon involves the Palestinian refugee population. In 2005, the UN Relief and Works Agency registered 402,582 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, approximately 10% of the country’s population. The vast majority of Palestinian refugees are Sunni Muslim, but they are denied citizenship and face numerous social and economic restrictions.

So, who are the “minorities” in Lebanon? Without regard to historical context, identifying the minority in Lebanon is quite difficult. Taking a cursory look at demographic data, it is clear that Muslims make up a majority of the country and the region. Thus, one could argue that Christians are the minority. Broken down by sect, however, no single group constitutes a majority of Lebanon’s population. Large sects such as the Maronites, Sunnis and Shi’a could be considered the majority, while smaller sects like the Druze and Protestants the minority.

Once accounting for Lebanon’s history, however, neither of these initial options seems acceptable. Based on the sociopolitical context in Lebanon, Maronite Christians and non-Palestinian Sunni Muslims appear to be the dominant groups, while all other
religious sects, as well as Palestinian Sunni Muslims, are the “minorities.” Given these coding decisions, I can now consider the distribution of male and female seats across majority and minority groups.

Table 2.2 presents population estimates and political representation by religious group and by gender for Lebanon’s 2005 National Assembly. Because no official demographic data has been collected in Lebanon since 1932, I report the range of population estimates identified by different sources. Maronite Christians held the greatest share of seats of any sect, 27%, while Shi’a and Sunni groups each held about 21% of seats in the National Assembly. Overall, therefore, Shi’a Muslims are underrepresented compared to their share of the population, while Sunnis and Maronite Christians are both slightly overrepresented. Some religious sects received no representation at all. Only 11 of the 18 officially recognized sects in Lebanon were elected to the National Assembly in 2005.

Only 6 women were elected to Lebanon’s National Assembly in 2005, just 4.7% of seats. Interestingly, all the women elected were members of the historically dominant groups. Four of the women elected were Maronite Christians, and two were Sunni Muslims. Neither Shi’a Muslim women nor any women representing small Christian or Muslim sects were elected in 2005. The representation of both Muslim and Christian women in Lebanon suggests that broad religious differences alone cannot account for patterns of women’s political representation. Instead, the power structure in Lebanon appears to shape the demand for women from different sects. In a country in which women hold only a few seats, those seats are occupied by women from dominant groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Population¹</th>
<th>Political Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>All %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Islam</td>
<td>25-30%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’a Islam</td>
<td>41-49%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>4-7%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismaili</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite Christian</td>
<td>16-25%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>3-5%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian²</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Since no official data on the religious composition of Lebanon has been collected since 1932, these numbers reflect the range of unofficial estimates from the CIA and the World Bank, supplemented by additional sources.

²Including Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic, Copts, Roman Catholic, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox

Table 2.2. Unofficial Population Estimates and 2005 Election Results for Lebanon’s Chamber of Deputies by Religious Sect and Gender
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

To begin to analyze the data on minority women’s political representation, I start with descriptive statistics. I employ a wide range of descriptive measures to investigate the representation of women, minorities, and minority women worldwide. Some are useful for drawing comparisons across divisions of gender. Others are better for comparisons across race, ethnicity, or religious lines. Some measures are more general, considering overall proportionality. Others are highly specific, quantifying levels of representation for minority women only. Most of these descriptive analyses are presented in the next chapter, but descriptive measures are used in Chapter 5. The specifics of the descriptive analyses are discussed in the sections or chapters where these analyses are employed.

One of the goals of this dissertation, however, is to move beyond description to prediction. In order to assess what factors produce variation in minority women’s political outcomes, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). In the remaining parts of this chapter, I discuss the benefits of HLM as well as statistical issues related to these models.

HIERARCHICHAL LINEAR MODELING

Hierarchical linear modeling analyzes data at multiple levels of analysis, data that is nested. Nested data often involves research on individuals at the lowest level of analysis—level one—and those individuals are clustered into groups at a second level of analysis—level two. In this dissertation, however, I analyze data on groups (level-one) that are nested within countries (level-two). To minimize confusion about which level of
analysis I am referring to throughout this section, I standardize my language. When I discuss group-level equations or effects, I am referencing level-one effects. When discussing higher levels of analysis, I use the term “cluster” instead of “group.”

_Benefits of Multilevel Modeling_

Research suggests at least three advantages to multilevel models over simple regression (Hox 2002; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Park and Lake 2006). Perhaps the greatest advantage to multilevel models is that they allow the estimation of correct standard errors for clustered data. Unlike multilevel analysis, OLS regression assumes that all level-one observations are independent, not accounting, therefore, for the similarity of observations within level-two units (here, the similarity of groups within countries). As a result, in the presence of clustered data, OLS regression underestimates standard errors, contributing to inflated test statistics and inaccurate conclusions about the explanatory power of model predictors. Multilevel models resolve this problem by estimating one or more random components at level two, the cluster level. By including these random effects, multilevel models are able to correctly estimate standard errors for clustered data. Overall, the differences between OLS models and multilevel models are greatest when level-one observations are more highly correlated.

A second main advantage of using multilevel models is that these models limit aggregation bias (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998). Aggregation bias arises when aggregating data produces significantly different results than data analyzed at the original level of observation. Consider a hypothetical example. In Country A, women from two minority groups gain 5 percent of seats each in the national legislature, while in Country B,
women from one minority group gained 10 percent of seats, while women from another minority group failed to gain even a single seat. In an aggregated country-level analysis, Country A and Country B would appear exactly the same. But in a multilevel analysis, variation at both the group- and country-levels inform model estimates, and aggregating variables is only necessary when theoretically justified.¹⁰

A third advantage to multilevel models is that they allow straightforward estimation of cross-level interactions (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In social research, the effects at one level of observation are likely to affect processes at another level. Research in the political arena should be no different. Country-level characteristics are likely to affect how group-level factors such as size and minority status predict political outcomes for women worldwide. Overall, given the nature of the data collected in this dissertation, multilevel modeling appears to be an appropriate tool for analysis.

It is important to recognize, however, that multilevel modeling involves several additional statistical considerations beyond simple multivariate regression models. For example, because of the complexity of multilevel models, it is particularly important to limit the inclusion of unnecessary predictors. Indeed, multilevel models are often not fully specified, as the inclusion of large numbers of variables may complicate both estimation and interpretation (Hox 2002). Decisions must also be made regarding, for example, when to introduce random components and how to center level-one variables. In the sections below, I address these and other issues related to model specification and estimation.

¹⁰It is noteworthy that this dissertation seeks to show the bias resulting from aggregating data on the political representation of majority and minority groups.
Model Specification

In the sections below, I describe how I arrived at the models that are reported in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. I begin with the unconditional model, which includes no predictors at either level-one (group level) or level-two (country level). In this first section, I also introduce the intra-class correlation (ICC) coefficient, which I employ to consider what share of variation in women’s political representation is within and between countries. In the second section, I explain how I determine the value added by including new predictors. This is important because HLM models produce a large number of residual variances, none of which “can be interpreted as the amount of explained variance” (Hox 2002:49). In the third section below, I discuss differences in model specification based on the inclusion of fixed or random effects. Fourth, I consider models that include cross-level interactions and methodological issues related to these models. Finally, I consider issues of centering—how the metric used for level-one covariates is important to both estimation and interpretation. In each section, related theoretical issues are discussed and sample equations are provided.

The Unconditional Model and Intra-Class Correlation

Methodologists note that multilevel models are necessary only when the data being analyzed provide sufficient variation at each level (Heck and Thomas 2000). One step in determining whether sufficient variation exists is to consider the extent to which variation in the dependent variable exists within level-two units (within countries) relative to variation between level-2 units (between countries). To calculate within- and between-country variation, I start with the simplest model, the one-way ANOVA with
random effects, also called the unconditional model. The unconditional model has no predictors, and the equations are as follows:

Level 1: \[ WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + r_{ij} \]

Level 2: \[ B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0i} \]

\( WPR \) represents the percent women in the national legislature for group \( j \) in country \( i \), \( B_{0i} \) represents the mean percent women for each country, \( \gamma_{00} \) is the grand mean across all countries, \( r_{ij} \) is the distance of a group’s percentage in the legislature from the mean of the country, and \( u_{0i} \) is a country-level residual term.

Estimated parameters from the unconditional model are used to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which here is the proportion of total variance in women’s political representation that is between countries. The equation for the ICC is as follows:

\[ ICC = \tau / (\tau + \delta^2) \]

where \( \tau \) is the variance between countries, or \( \text{Var}(u) \), and \( \delta^2 \) is the within-country variance, \( \text{Var}(r) \). An ICC of zero indicates that all observations at level-one are independent, while if all values are exactly the same within each level-two unit, the ICC would equal 1. Another way to interpret the ICC is as the anticipated correlation in women’s representation between two groups that are randomly chosen from the same country. A high ICC may also indicate similarity of environments faced by groups living in the same country. So, if women from different groups face similar challenges to representation within a country, their levels of representation would be more similar to one another, and the ICC would increase. (Hox 2002; Park and Lake 2006)
I calculate the ICC for the two samples I analyze throughout the dissertation (see above for further discussion of sampling). Overall, I expect the sample of only minority groups to have less variation within countries, producing a much higher ICC than the sample with both majority and minority groups. Indeed, this is what I find. For the minority-only sample, the ICC is 0.377, meaning that almost 38 percent of the variance in minority women’s political representation is between countries. For the sample including both majority and minority groups, the ICC is 0.041. So, 96 percent of the variance in women’s political representation at the group level is within countries. Or, interpreted differently, the correlation in women’s representation between two groups randomly chosen from the same country is only 0.04. However, much of within-country variation in women’s levels of representation may arise from factors such as group size or majority/minority status. Thus, the next step is to add predictors to the model.

Adding Predictors to the Model

In this section, I move beyond the unconditional model to consider the effects of adding single predictors. Adding predictors should be done selectively, since methodologists argue that multilevel models should be as limited as possible (Hox 2002; Raudenbush and Sampson 1999). Indeed, trying to analyze complete models with a large amount of variables can create computational problems, reduce the precision of model estimates, and make effects more difficult to interpret (Hox 2002; Raudenbush and Sampson 1999). The models described in this section allow researchers to test the value added by including either level-one or level-two predictors.
When a single level-one predictor is added to the unconditional model, the new model is a one-way ANCOVA. As an example, I consider the effects of majority status on women’s share of seats in the national legislature. The equations for the one-way ANCOVA model are as follows:

Level 1: \[ WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + B_{1i} (\text{MajorityStatus}) + r_{ij} \]

Level 2: \[ B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0i} \]
\[ B_{1i} = \gamma_{10} \]

In this model, the slope of majority status is fixed across the sample. Or in other words, the effect of majority status on women’s political representation is set to be equivalent across all countries. By fixing the slope of majority status, HLM does not use computational power to estimate a unique effect of majority status for each country.

With the results from the one-way ANCOVA, I am able to recalculate the intra-class correlations, now accounting for majority status. The new ICC is 0.135, indicating that when adjusting for majority status, 13.5 percent of the variance in majority and minority women’s political representation is between countries. Overall, the inclusion of majority status significantly changed the ICC, suggesting that majority status explains a substantial amount of within-country variance in women’s political representation. The amount of variability explained by level-one coefficients can be calculated as follows:

\[ (\delta^2_{\text{UnCond}} - \delta^2_{\text{ANCOVA}}) / \delta^2_{\text{UnCond}} \]

I find that majority status accounts for 61 percent of the variability within-countries, above and beyond what is explained by the unconditional model.
Methodologists also argue that level-two predictors should be added selectively (Hox 2002). As a rule of thumb, only about one level-two predictor should be included for every ten observations. Similar to the process for measuring the impact of level-one predictors, I can estimate a means-as-outcomes model to test whether level-two predictors explain a significant amount of level-two variance. For example, in the following sample equations, I test a means-as-outcomes model including a dummy variable for whether the group lives in a Western country:

Level 1: \[ WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + r_{ij} \]

Level 2: \[ B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{West}_i) + u_{0i} \]

The output from the means-as-outcomes model can be compared to the unconditional model to assess the value of level-two predictors. The equation for calculating the variance explained by level-two covariates is as follows:

\[ \frac{(\tau_{\text{UnCond}} - \tau_{\text{means}})}{\tau_{\text{UnCond}}} \]

So, for example, I am able to calculate that in the full sample, the Western dummy variable explains close to 4 percent of the between-country variance in women’s political representation. Still, variables included as single predictors may operate differently once other variables are included in the model. Therefore, I next consider more advanced models that include both level-one and level-two predictors.

Two-Level Random Intercept and Random Coefficient Models

The most basic multilevel models that include both level-one and level-two predictors are random intercept models. Two-level random intercept models combine the
level-one effects of an ANCOVA with the level-two effects of the means-as-outcomes models. These models continue to include a random term $u_{0i}$, which acts as a control for the clustering of group-level observations by country. But, the slopes of level-one covariates remain fixed. What follows are the equations for a random intercept model including majority status as a fixed effect and a Western dummy variable predicting mean country levels of women’s political representation:

\[
\text{Level 1: } \quad WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + B_{ui} (\text{MajorityStatus}) + r_{ij}
\]

\[
\text{Level 2: } \quad B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (West_{i}) + u_{0i}
\]

\[
B_{ui} = \gamma_{10}
\]

An alternative way to model these same variables is with a random coefficients model. As the equation below demonstrates, random coefficients models are similar to random intercept models but estimate a residual, $u_{1i}$, for the country-level effect of majority status. That is, both the slope and intercept of majority status are allowed to vary for each country. The equations are as follows:

\[
\text{Level 1: } \quad WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + B_{ui} (\text{MajorityStatus}) + r_{ij}
\]

\[
\text{Level 2: } \quad B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (West_{i}) + u_{0i}
\]

\[
B_{ui} = \gamma_{10} + u_{1i}
\]

Overall, therefore, the difference between random intercept and random coefficient models is the inclusion of random level-one effects.

Whether to treat each level-one slope as a random or fixed parameter depends on two factors: theory and the amount of variance across level-two units (Heck and Thomas 2000). Theoretically, fixed and random effects are different. Fixed effects, like those
estimated in simple regression analysis, assume that the effect of a predictor is constant across level-two units. Thus, fixed effects estimate the average effect of a variable across the sample. Random effects, in contrast, allow the average slope of a predictor to vary across level-two units. Therefore, in cases where variation in the effect of a variable across level-two units is a central feature of the investigation, random effects are theoretically preferable.

In addition to theory, statistics can also help the researcher determine whether to introduce random effects. Specifically, the positive difference in the deviance (-2*log-likelihood) of the models with and without the random coefficient follows a $\chi^2$ distribution, where the degrees of freedom are calculated as the difference in the number of estimated parameters between the two models. If the test statistic is not statistically significant, estimating the additional random parameters may simply add unnecessary complexity to the model. For illustrative purposes, a likelihood ratio test suggests that allowing variation in the slopes of majority status significantly improves model fit (p<0.000).

Overall, random effects are often theoretically preferable to fixed effects. Researchers often prefer to allow all effects in their models to vary as much as possible. However, fixed parameters are typically estimated with greater precision than random parameters (Hox 2002). And despite the theoretical appeal of random parameters, multilevel models often cannot estimate more than a random intercept and another random predictor (Porter 2005). Therefore, methodologists stress that variance components should be added selectively (Hox 2002). In this dissertation, I only estimate random parameters when 1) their inclusion is strongly justified by research questions I
am investigating and 2) when statistics indicate that they significantly improve the fit of the model.

For the purposes of this dissertation, I am principally interested in variation in the slope of majority status across countries. Theoretically, I expect the effect of majority status on women’s political representation to vary across countries, and in some models, I predict that variation. So, in all multilevel models estimating an effect of majority status, I include majority status as a random coefficient. Group size, in contrast, is largely included as a control variable, and is therefore often included as a fixed effect. However, in models with minority groups only, I often test whether country-level effects vary by group size, and in these instances, I estimate group size as a random coefficient.

Interactive Effects: Intercepts and Slopes as Outcomes

The final model specification I discuss here predicts both slopes and intercepts to test the interaction between level-one and level-two variables. Since modeling cross-level interactions is one of the central advantages of multilevel modeling, it is particularly important to understand how these models function. To provide an example, I model main and interaction effects of Majority Status and residence in a Western country on women’s political representation. The equations are as follows:

Level 1: \[ WPR_{ij} = B_{0j} + B_{1j}(MajorityStatus_i) + r_{ij} \]

Level 2: \[ B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(West) + u_{0i} \]
\[ B_{1i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}(West) + u_{1i} \]
At level one, $B_{0j}$ is the mean level of women’s political representation for minority groups (MajorityStatus='0') for country $i$, $B_{1j}$ is the main effect of majority status on women’s representation, and $r_{ij}$ is the residual for group $j$ in country $i$. At level 2, $\gamma_{00}$ is the mean level of minority women’s political representation, controlling for whether a country is Western, and $\gamma_{01}$ is the main effect of the Western dummy variable. $\gamma_{10}$ is the average slope for majority status, controlling for whether a country is Western. And, $\gamma_{11}$ is the interaction effect between the West and majority status. Finally, $u_{0i}$ is the random effect for each country for the Y intercept, and $u_{1i}$ is the random effect for the slope of majority status for each country.

Methodologists warn, however, that employing interaction effects can be tricky when those interactions cross levels of analysis (Hox 2002). So, it is also important to assess the effect of including an interaction term by comparing the variance explained by the means-and-slopes-as-outcomes model to the random coefficients model:

$$\frac{(\tau_{00\_randomcoef} - \tau_{00\_meansandslopes})/\tau_{00\_randomcoef}}{r_{00\_randomcoef}}$$

So, for example, I am able to calculate that including an interaction effect between the West and majority status explains an additional 2 percent in the between-country variability in women’s political representation, above the 4 percent explained by including the main effect of Western residence.

**Mean Centering**

Beyond the inclusion of predictors and random components, another important issue when employing multilevel models is the scaling of level-one covariates (Hofmann and Gavin 1998; Kreft et al. 1995; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Raudenbush 1989;
This is because HLM models use the level-one parameters as outcome variables in the level-two analysis. Without scaling, the level-one intercepts are interpreted as the expected outcome of Y when the value of the predictor is zero. But if the level-one predictor has no meaningful value at zero, the parameter estimates used to estimate the level-two model also lose their meaning. For example, throughout the empirical chapters, I model each group’s share of the population as a level-one predictor. But, no group included in this study makes up zero percent of the population. Theoretically, therefore, it is inappropriate to include group size as a level-one predictor without re-scaling the variable.

In HLM, independent variables may be re-scaled by centering on either the grand or group mean. Grand mean centering occurs when the values of the covariate are centered on the mean for the entire sample. Sample equations for an ANCOVA model including group size as grand mean centered are as follows:

Level 1: \[ WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + B_{1i} (\text{GroupSize}_{ij} - \overline{\text{GroupSize}}) + r_{ij} \]

Level 2: \[ B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0i} \]

\[ B_{1i} = \gamma_{10} , \]

where \( \text{GroupSize} \) is the size of group \( j \) in country \( i \), and \( \overline{\text{GroupSize}} \) is the average group size across all groups.

Methodologists note that grand mean centering produces a model that is statistically equivalent to using raw measures (i.e., in terms of model deviance and residual errors), but transforms certain parameters to make them easier to interpret (Hox 2002). Beyond interpretation, grand mean centering also provides distinct statistical
advantages (Hox 2002; Kreft et al. 1995). For example, grand mean centering explanatory variables often improves the speed at which estimates are calculated. In fact, when predictors vary widely in their means and variances, grand mean centering may be necessary to reach convergence (Hox 2002). In short, grand mean centering, when theoretically appropriate, is often a good practice in multilevel modeling.

Group mean centering, on the other hand, occurs when values of level-one observations are subtracted from the mean value for each level-two unit. Sample equations for the above model, but with group mean centering, are as follows:

Level 1: \[ WPR_{ij} = B_{0i} + B_{1i} (GroupSize_{ij} - \overline{GroupSize}_{i}) + r_{ij} \]

Level 2: \[ B_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0i} \]
\[ B_{1i} = \gamma_{10} , \]

where \( GroupSize_{ij} \) is the average group size in country \( i \). In contrast to grand mean centering, group mean centering produces a model that is no longer statistically equivalent to the raw metric. This is because across level-two units, different values are used to transform the raw scores (Hox 2002). Research suggests that group mean centering can lead to less effective modeling than including raw scores, since all information about between-cluster variation is removed from the variable (Kreft et al. 1995; Kreft and de Leeuw 1998). Overall, therefore, methodologists tend to suggest that group-mean centering should only be used when strongly justified by social theory (Kreft et al. 1995; Hox 2002). Following the recommendations of this research, I grand-mean center all level-one predictors without natural and interpretable zero points.
The centering of level-two variables is less important in the estimation of multilevel models. However, theoretical reasons to center level-two variables remain. For example, at the country level, logged GDP per capita has no meaningful zero point. Thus, in all models throughout the dissertation, I center GDP around the grand mean. I also mean-center other variables such as women’s economic activity, which could plausibly have zero values, but in reality, do not.

*Other Statistical Issues Related to HLM Models*

**Missing Data**

I estimate all multilevel models using HLM 6.04, which is unable to estimate results with missing data at level-two. However, several of the country-level predictors I employ in this study have missing data for at least some countries. For example, I have data on level of democracy for only 73 out of the 81 countries I analyze. To generate estimates in the presence of these missing data, I use multiple imputation, one of the two best procedures for handling missing data (Allison 2002).

Although HLM cannot directly estimate models with missing data, the program does have routines for estimating multiply imputed datasets. Therefore, I use multiple imputation routines in SAS 9.1 to generate 5 level-two datasets (seed number=2564). HLM then generates five sets of results, averages the coefficients, and uses the variability across imputations to adjust the standard errors upward.
Sample Size

Multilevel models are commonly analyzed using maximum likelihood estimation methods, which operate under the assumption of large sample sizes. Therefore, as a rule of thumb, some scholarship suggests that researchers should aim for samples of at least thirty at both level-one and level-two (Kreft 1996). However, some models require more level-two units. For example, Hox (2002:175) argues that if there is strong interest in cross-level interactions, the number of level-two units should be larger—about fifty level-two clusters with twenty level-one units nested in each cluster. And if the random components of the model are particularly important, the number of clusters should be even higher—about 10 level-one units per cluster with at least 100 clusters. But, these are just benchmarks. Multilevel models can be estimated with as few as 1 level-one unit, provided that the average number of level-one units is higher (Porter 2005). Generally, ensuring a larger number of level-two units is more important for ensuring both accuracy and high power (Hox 2002; Snijders 2005).

In the analyses reported throughout this dissertation, I analyze samples of 67 to 81 countries, a reasonable number of level-two units. However, there are a fairly small number of groups, on average, within each country (4 to 5). A small number of level-one units per cluster is not a problem for testing fixed regression coefficients. But, a small number of level-one units within each cluster does limit the power for testing random slope variances at the country level (between-country variances of effects of group-level variables) (Snijders 2005). Overall, therefore, I use caution when estimating means-and-slopes-as-outcomes models. Further, I use restricted maximum likelihood estimator
(REML), which is considered superior to the full information maximum likelihood estimator for smaller numbers of groups (Wang, Carpenter, and Kepler 2006).\textsuperscript{11}

**Unbalanced Sampling**

Beyond sample size, another important issue related to sampling is that neither the level-one nor the level-two units were randomly selected. This is problematic because of the way that HLM calculates model estimates. In particular, HLM uses Generalized Least Squares (GLS) to calculate the country-level parameters. With GLS, countries with more precise group-level estimates of the dependent variable are given more weight in the analysis. This is certainly appropriate in the context of school research, where the number of students sampled from school to school should not be informative for predicting achievement. Weighting analyses more for the schools with more precise estimates makes sense. In the analyses presented here, however, it may be problematic that countries with a large number of distinct minority groups may be more influential in the analyses than countries with only two or three minority groups.

To address this potential problem, I take a tripartite approach. First, I re-analyze the HLM models including a country-level control for the number of minority groups present in each country, reporting any significant differences. Second, I exclude four countries from the HLM models that have an especially large number of groups (i.e., more than 10). These countries are Canada, India, Russia, and Sweden. And third, I re-

\textsuperscript{11} Experts in multilevel modeling recommend nonparametric residual bootstrapping to deal with small sample sizes (Wang, Carpenter, and Kepler 2006). I plan to investigate this technique in future analyses.
calculate all reported models using OLS regression and correcting the standard errors for clustering.

Overall, the first two sets of auxiliary analyses—controlling for the number of groups per country and excluding countries with a large number of groups—do not produce results that are substantively different from the results reported throughout this dissertation. However, using OLS regression does generate results that are often different from the results reported in the empirical chapters. This is not particularly surprising, since the models in this dissertation often estimate random coefficients at level-one that are not estimated in the OLS regression models. Generally, in models estimated with OLS regression, the effect sizes are slightly larger, and more variables reach statistical significance. Since the other auxiliary analyses do not generate results that are substantively different than the results reported in this dissertation, and since random effects are often theoretically appropriate, I argue that HLM is the appropriate method for use in this dissertation.

Normality

The maximum likelihood methods for estimating multilevel models also assume that the distributions of level-one and level-two residuals are normal. If the normality assumption is violated, variance components and standard errors of parameters may be downwardly biased (Wang, Carpenter, and Kepler 2006). Normality of the residuals is investigated by outputting the level-one and level-two residual files to SAS and generating diagnostics to test for non-normality. Because of the large number of groups that have no women represented in parliament, it is perhaps not surprising that for models
predicting the share of minority women in the legislature, there is some evidence of non-normality in the residuals. Therefore, in auxiliary analyses, I re-analyze the reported models after logging the dependent variable. Any significant differences in the conclusions drawn from these models are reported in footnotes throughout the empirical chapters.\textsuperscript{12}

**Multicollinearity and Influential Outliers**

HLM 6.04 does not calculate diagnostics to identify problems such as multicollinearity. However, multicollinearity can cause serious problems when estimating multilevel models. For instance, multicollinearity between level-one covariates may downwardly bias variance and covariance estimates, and the standard errors associated with the affected level-one covariates may be biased according to the magnitude of the correlation between the predictors (Shieh and Fouladi 2003). Therefore, I investigate potential problems associated with multicollinearity in all reported models.

To avoid problems associated with multicollinearity, I first consider theoretical reasons why two variables may be collinear and am careful not to overload the model. For example, in auxiliary models, I tested the effects of the Human Development Index (HDI) on minority women’s political representation. Since the HDI accounts for variation in economic development, I excluded GDP from these models. I investigated the zero-order correlations to look for variables that may introduce multicollinearity

\textsuperscript{12} Methodologists also advocate nonparametric residual bootstrapping to deal with non-normality problems (Wang, Carpenter, and Kepler 2006). Again, I plan to investigate this technique in future analyses.
problems when included together (see Table 2.A in the Appendix). I also pay particular attention to potential evidence of multicollinearity in the estimates, for example, inflated coefficients pushed in opposite directions. Beyond these efforts, I combine level-one and level-two datasets and calculate diagnostics such as variance inflation factors (VIFs) using SAS 9.1. Any problems arising from these analyses are addressed throughout the results sections in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

I also take steps to avoid influential outliers. When constructing descriptive measures, I looked for values that were wildly different from all other values of the same variable. For example, when constructing odds ratios, I found that the distribution of majority/minority seats was generating extreme values that strongly influenced the regional averages. As a result, I exclude Peru from these analyses. For the multivariate analyses, I also consider potential problems arising from influential outliers using partial plots. The countries that have the highest levels of minority women in politics—Burundi and Ethiopia—were identified as potential outliers. I estimated auxiliary models excluding these cases and report differences throughout the empirical chapters.

**CASE STUDIES**

Beyond the hierarchical linear models presented here, I also employ case studies in parts of the dissertation to illustrate findings in the quantitative analysis or address forces that cannot be explored quantitatively. Case studies are particularly useful for intersectionality research, since quantitative research designs are sometimes limited in their ability to capture the *mutually constructed* nature of intersectional identities. Researchers argue that methodological techniques that separate out the effects of race and
gender, or that simply add these effects together, are theoretically inappropriate for the study of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1994). Since I cannot fully avoid these criticisms given the nature of my research design, I also employ case studies to supplement the quantitative analyses.
CHAPTER 3
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

As discussed in Chapter 2, investigating minority women’s political representation across countries is not a straightforward task. Not a single existing study quantitatively investigates cross-national variation in minority women’s representation. Thus, there are no measures that have been widely accepted as the best measures of minority women’s political incorporation. Unlike studying women, who make up a fairly consistent share of the population across countries, there is considerable variation in the size of minority female populations worldwide. Furthermore, analyzing groups at the intersection of disadvantage creates additional obstacles to straightforward analysis. Should minority women’s political representation be assessed relative to minority men, to majority women, or only to their share of the population?

In this chapter, I investigate a range of measures that capture variation in the distribution of gender and majority/minority status in national legislatures around the world. I consider absolute levels of representation as well as minority women’s success relative to other groups. I discuss raw measures as well as measures that account for differences in population. To demonstrate the differences in these measures, I explore variation primarily by geographic region. But, I also calculate zero-order correlations comparing the different measures.
DATA AND METHODS

Unlike the multilevel analyses in the subsequent chapters, the descriptive analyses discussed in this chapter consider variation across the full set of majority and minority groups in 81 countries. I explore this data with four different kinds of measures. First, I consider variation in the share of seats in the national legislature occupied by majority men, minority men, majority women, and minority women. Using these measures, I calculate the typical composition of national legislatures across my sample, quantifying minority women’s average levels of representation relative to other groups. I also use these values to compare the relative political success of minority men and minority women in different countries.

These percentages are less useful, however, when drawing comparisons between majority and minority women, groups with substantially different population sizes. Therefore, I next calculate women’s share of group seats—women’s share of seats occupied by majority groups and women’s share of seats occupied by minority groups. These measures are consistent with existing U.S. based research on minority women’s political outcomes (e.g., Scola 2006). In addition to taking account of country-level differences in these values, I discuss regional variation.

I next investigate political inequalities as a function of both gender and majority/minority status. Using the Gallagher Index of Proportionality, I consider how closely the distribution of sex and minority status in the legislature matches the distribution of groups in the population. To compare legislatures to populations, I use a transformed version of the Gallagher Index of Proportionality (GIP):
\[ GIP = 100 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (P_i - S_i)^2}, \]

where \( P \) is group \( i \)'s share of the population and \( S \) is group \( i \)'s share of seats in the national legislature, calculated for a total number of \( n \) groups in each country. Higher values of the GIP are associated with higher levels of proportionality—smaller differences between the distribution of the population and the distribution of seats in the legislature.\(^\text{13} \) In contrast to all other analyses in this dissertation, the GIP is calculated using all groups in a country, even the other/remainder categories.\(^\text{14} \) (See Chapter 2 under Sample for a description of these groups.)

I calculate the GIP for each country overall. Higher values of the GIP are associated with higher levels of proportionality. I also calculate the ratio of proportionality among female representatives compared to proportionality among male representatives. Scores over 1 indicate that women in a country are more proportionally represented than males, while scores under 1 indicate that male representatives more closely reflect the distribution of different groups in the population than female legislators. Thus, I am able to assess whether male or female legislators better reflect the diversity that exists in each country.

\(^\text{13} \) In the original GIP, higher values are associated with greater disproportionality. I subtract the GIP values from 100 so that higher values indicated greater proportionality in national legislatures.

\(^\text{14} \) I include these remainder groups in the GIP for two reasons. Theoretically, the GIP assesses the distribution of seats in the legislature to the population. Therefore, it is useful to consider the entirety of each country’s population in the measure. Second, analyzing 100 percent of the population for all countries makes the measure more consistent across countries. Moreover, since the GIP does not account for majority/minority status (that is, disproportionality may arise from the underrepresentation or overrepresentation of any group), including somewhat muddled categories in the GIP is less problematic than in other analyses that are estimating the effects of majority/minority status. In auxiliary analyses, I also calculated the GIP with a sample excluding the other/remainder categories. Including or excluding these groups does not alter the substantive conclusions reported below.
Still, disproportionality in the legislature may arise from the overrepresentation of majority or minority groups. Therefore, I calculate a final index measuring minority women’s political representation, adjusting for their share of the population. I call this measure the Minority Women Power Index (MWPI), and it is calculated as follows:

$$\text{MWPI} = \frac{\%\text{MWIP}}{(\text{MinPop}/2) \times (\text{SexRatio}_{F:M})} \times 100,$$

where $\%\text{MWIP}$ is the percentage of the national legislature filled by minority women, $\text{MinPop}$ is minority groups’ share of the general population, and $\text{SexRatio}_{F:M}$ is the female-to-male sex ratio.\(^{15}\) A MWIP of 100 indicates that minority women are represented in the legislature in the same proportion than they are represented in the general population. A value of ‘0’ means that there are no minority women in the national legislature. Values in between are interpreted as the percentage of the way towards proportional representation minority women have reached in a particular country. So, a MWPI of 50.0 indicates that minority women are half of the way towards representation in the legislature at levels equal to their share of the population. Although rare, values over 100 indicate that minority women are overrepresented compared to their share of the population. Overall, the Minority Women Power Index is a specific measure of minority women’s political representation, but it still accounts for the distribution of sex and majority/minority status in the population.

All measures discussed throughout this chapter are available by country in Table 3.1 below.

\(^{15}\) The MWPI adjusts for the sex ratio of the total population. It is possible that the sex ratio for majority groups is different than the sex ratio for minority groups. However, disaggregated population information broken down by majority/minority status and sex is not consistently available across countries. Therefore, I use the overall sex ratio as a proxy for the sex ratio for minorities in a particular country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of All Seats</th>
<th>% of Group Seats</th>
<th>Index of Proportionality</th>
<th>Minority Women Power Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6.0 18.9</td>
<td>24.2 28.3</td>
<td>85.1 1.1</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0 7.5</td>
<td>59.5 1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>. 35.2</td>
<td>85.1 1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.0 0.0</td>
<td>. 5.3</td>
<td>55.3 1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.0 0.7</td>
<td>0.0 24.8</td>
<td>74.5 1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100.0 32.4</td>
<td>82.4 1.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0 0.0</td>
<td>51.2 .</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.0 2.3</td>
<td>0.0 15.4</td>
<td>64.7 1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>2.0 2.0</td>
<td>50.0 34.0</td>
<td>86.7 0.9</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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Table 3.1: Percent Minority Women and Minority Men in Legislature, Women’s Share of Minority and Majority Seats, and Index of Proportionality for 81 Countries
Table 3.1 continued

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RESULTS

Gender and Minority Status in National Legislatures

I begin the descriptive analyses by assessing the distribution of seats in the national legislature across majority men, minority men, majority women, and minority women. Figure 3.1 compares the composition of the average national legislature to the distribution of sex and majority/minority status in the general population for the 81 countries in my sample. The inequalities are striking. Adjusted for the sex ratio,
majority men are only 40 percent of the typical population, but they hold 72 percent of seats in the average legislature.

Surprisingly, minority men are overrepresented compared to their share of the population, although much less so than majority men. Minority men typically make up around 11 percent of legislative seats, while men from minority groups make up about 9 percent of the average legislature. Still, there is considerable variation in the political representation of minority men around the world. For instance, in 13 countries in my

Figure 3.1 Composition of the Average Population and Legislature, 81 Countries
sample, no minority men were elected in the year I analyze. At the other end of the spectrum, in ethnically heterogeneous countries like Benin and Bosnia-Herzegovina, men from groups identified as “minorities” actually make up a majority of the seats in the legislature.

Women from both minority and majority groups are numerically underrepresented in national legislatures. Majority women make up roughly 42 percent of the typical population in my sample, but hold almost one third that many seats—15 percent. The degree of underrepresentation for minority women is even more severe. Minority women, while 9 percent of the population, hold less than 2 percent of seats in national legislatures, on average. This low average is fueled in part by a substantial number of countries with no minority women serving in the legislature. In recent elections in 22 countries, one or more male minorities were elected to the national legislatures at the same time that minority women were wholly excluded from power. Only in Austria and Norway did the opposite occur, where minority women obtained representation in the absence of any minority men.

Overall, these values suggest that the bulk of political underrepresentation worldwide occurs along divisions of gender, rather than minority status. However, minority women appear to be doubly disadvantaged, as they are underrepresented compared to both their minority male and majority female counterparts. In most

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16 As displayed in Table 3.1, these countries are Argentina, Armenia, Cape Verde, Chili, Comoros, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Ireland, Paraguay, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, and Yemen.

17 This occurred in Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Solomon Islands, and Uruguay.
countries of the world, minority women’s election occurs in small numbers or not at all.

Women’s Representation: Comparing Majority to Minority Groups

Although majority women outnumber minority women in politics, research suggests that in the U.S., minority women outperform majority women in their share of group seats (e.g., Darcy and Hadley 1988; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Montoya, Hardy-Fanta, and Garcia 2000; Scola 2006). In this section, I assess whether that same pattern occurs worldwide. On the one hand, minority women appear to slightly outperform majority women as a percentage of group seats. On average, women hold 19.2 percent of minority group seats, while majority women hold 17.4 percent of majority seats. On the other hand, looking by country, majority women outperform minority women in 41 countries, while minority women only outperform majority women in 24 countries. And upon closer examination, the margin of advantage of minority women is greatest in countries like Austria, Colombia, Finland, Peru, and Slovenia, where minorities hold only a small share of legislative seats. Thus, minority women only perform particularly well as women when minorities are not well represented.

I present average statistics for both majority and minority women by region in Figure 3.2. Both majority and minority women are better represented as a share of their group in the West than in other regions of the world. But, only in the West do minority women outperform majority women. The margin of difference between majority and minority women is fairly large—40 percent of minority seats in the West are occupied by women, 14 percent more than majority women’s share of majority seats. Minority women also outperform majority women, as a percentage of group seats, in Africa.
Alternatively, the largest margin of advantage for majority women appears in Eastern Europe, where majority women’s hold 6 percent more of group seats, on average, than minority women. Latin America has a smaller gap—only 3 percent. And, in the Middle East, women from majority and minority groups are elected at similar levels.

In summary, these descriptive statistics suggest that minority women are not better represented than majority women as a percentage of group seats. But, in countries with small minority populations and in Western countries, minority women’s political representation does outpace majority women’s representation as their share of group seats. I revisit differences in women’s share of group seats in Chapter 4, when I consider what factors might predict cross-national differences in these measures.

![Figure 3.2: Percent Women of Majority and Minority Seats by Region, 81 Countries](image-url)
**Proportionality**

Thus far, I have presented descriptive measures that measure inequalities by gender and minority status separately. A different approach is to consider how these inequalities combine. In this section, I weigh how the seats in the legislature are distributed relative to the share of different groups in the general population. To do so, I employ the Gallagher Index of Proportionality (GIP). The GIP accounts for malapportionment in legislatures arising from the underrepresentation of both women and minorities. Further, the GIP can be interpreted as a summary measure of descriptive representation—the degree to which women, minorities, and other important social groups in the population are represented in the legislature (Paxton and Hughes 2007).

According to the GIP, the countries with the most proportional legislatures are Sweden, Serbia, Finland, Norway, and Costa Rica. On the other end of the spectrum, the most disproportional legislatures were elected in Yemen, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Comoros. It is noteworthy that these values are fairly similar to the ranking of countries by women’s political representation. This is because, as discussed above, most of the disproportionality in legislatures arises from gender disparities in representation. Indeed, with a GIP of 85.1, Argentina demonstrates that even countries with no minorities serving in the legislature can still have high levels of proportionality if 1) the share of women in the legislature is high and 2) the share of minorities in the population is low.

Another way to look at proportionality is to consider the relative levels of proportionality among female and male representatives. Proportionality for all representatives, among men, and among women are averaged by region and displayed in Figure 3.3. Overall, the most proportional legislatures are in the West. And, women are
most proportionally represented in the West. But, men are most proportionally represented in Asia. Not surprisingly, women are not proportionally represented in the Middle East. But men are not far behind women, likely because of the underrepresentation of Shi’a Muslims in many Middle Eastern countries. Levels of proportionality among men and women are very close to one another in Eastern Europe, where the margin of difference between the two groups is only 0.5.

There is also significant variation in proportionality among men and women at the country level. Women are much more proportionally represented than men in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, Jamaica, the United States, and Serbia. Alternatively, men are much more proportionally represented than women in countries such as Fiji, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Brazil, and Costa Rica. The ratio of female to male proportionality is reported by country in Table 3.1.

![Figure 3.3: Gallagher Index of Proportionality by Region for All Legislators, Among Female Legislators, and Among Male Legislators, 80 Countries](image_url)
The main limitation of the GIP, however, is that the measure is agnostic about whether disproportionality is generated from over- or under-representation. That is, the representation of minority men by 5 percent over their share of the population will generate just as much disproportionality as their underrepresentation by 5 percent. Therefore, I calculate a final measure, the Minority Women’s Power Index (MWPI), which focuses more explicitly on minority women’s representation, but still accounts for minority women’s share of the general population.

Minority Women’s Power Index

The Minority Women’s Power Index (MWPI) takes the total percentage of minority women in parliament and divides that percentage by their share in the population, adjusted by the sex ratio. Figure 3.4 maps the MWPI scores for countries in my sample geographically. Countries with no minority women are shaded using gray diagonal lines, while countries with minority women in the national legislature are shaded in solid gray. Darker shades of gray are associated with higher MWPI scores, with scores of 50 and above shaded in black. Countries in white are missing from the analysis, and countries with dotted shading are excluded from the analysis based on level of democracy, country size, or sovereignty. Overall, Figure 3.4 demonstrates substantial variation in minority women’s power both within and across regions of the world.

The MWPI indicates that in only 3 countries in the entire world are minority women overrepresented compared to their share of the population: Burundi, Ethiopia, and Finland. In another four countries, minority women are represented at levels 50 percent of their share of the population or higher: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Netherlands,
Figure 3.4: Minority Women in Power Index by Country
and Norway. The lion’s share of countries, in contrast, includes minority women in much smaller numbers than their share of the population.

Regionally, Africa has the highest average MWPI scores (58.4), followed by the West (24.4). Thus, in the West, minority women are, on average, about one-quarter of the way towards proportional representation. Comparing average MWPI scores, Asia (13.9), Eastern Europe (11.3), and Latin America (9.1) fall in the middle. The Middle East (3.6) has by far the lowest MWPI score—on average, minority women in Middle Eastern countries are only 3.6 percent of the way towards proportional representation.

**Regional Summary**

Table 3.2 summarizes the multiple indicators of representation discussed throughout this chapter by world region. This summary is useful in that these measures taken together paint a clearer picture of the political representation of women, minorities, and minority women than any single measure. Table 3.2 indicates that countries in the West have fairly low levels of minority representation in absolute terms but perform well on every other measure. This pattern suggests that in the West, minority groups make up a smaller share of the population than in other regions. But, these small groups are relatively well represented. Indeed, proportionality among both male and female representatives is high relative to other regions. Majority and minority women also perform well relative to male members of their groups in Western countries. The Middle East, in contrast, is on the other end of the spectrum. Middle Eastern countries elect fairly high numbers of minority men to the national legislature in absolute terms, but the region performs poorly on all other indicators of fair representation.
Table 3.2: Comparing Measures of Representation Across Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Minority Men’s % of Seats</th>
<th>Minority Women’s % of Seats</th>
<th>Women’s Share of Majority Seats</th>
<th>Women’s Share of Minority Seats</th>
<th>Proportionality Among Women</th>
<th>Proportionality Among Men</th>
<th>Minority Women Power Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On average, countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America fall somewhere in the between these two extremes. In Asia, minority men appear to be represented at substantial levels, but women’s representation remains low. Still, minority women in Asia are represented in national legislatures at levels closer to their share of the population, on average, than most other regions. The pattern is quite different in Eastern Europe, where both women and minorities are represented at moderate levels, but minority women’s representation lags behind. Latin America, while less successful than the West at generating proportionality and high levels of minority women’s representation, follows a similar pattern of low absolute numbers of minority men and women alongside better performance on the other indicators.

Finally, although there are only a small number of African countries in my sample, it is notable that African countries do fairly well on all measures except for proportionality among women. This finding demonstrates one of the limitations of the GIP, since a significant portion of the disproportionality among female legislators in
Africa arises from the overrepresentation of minority women (e.g., Burundi and Ethiopia). In the next chapter, I return to the effects of region on minority women’s representation using multivariate analyses that control for important factors such as group size.

*Comparing Measures of Representation: Zero-Order Correlations*

Before moving on the multivariate analyses, however, it is important to consider how different measures of representation relate to one another. Therefore, I present the zero-order correlations of these measures in Table 3.3. Overall, the strongest correlations in the table are between the same measures for different groups. For instance, minority women’s and minority men’s share of seats in the legislature are highly correlated ($r = 0.52$), as are male and female proportionality scores ($r = 0.65$). Majority and minority women’s share of seats are also strongly related ($r = 0.53$). However, there are several other notable results.

First, the MWPI has a stronger relationship in the zero-order with majority women’s share of seats ($r = 0.35$) than with the share of the legislature occupied by minority men ($r = 0.24$). Therefore, majority women’s political experiences are in some ways more informative for predicting minority women’s success than values related to minority men’s political representation. Majority women’s political outcomes are even as closely related to minority women’s overall legislative success as other measures of minority women’s representation. Specifically, minority women’s share of seats in the legislature is similarly correlated to majority and minority women’s share of group seats ($r = 0.29$ and $0.28$, respectively).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percent Minority Men</th>
<th>Percent Minority Women</th>
<th>Women's % of Majority Seats</th>
<th>Women's % of Minority Seats</th>
<th>GIP Among Women</th>
<th>GIP Among Men</th>
<th>Minority Women in Power Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Men</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
<td>-0.10 *</td>
<td>-0.26 *</td>
<td>-0.29 **</td>
<td>-0.33 **</td>
<td>0.24 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Women</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.29 **</td>
<td>0.28 *</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.82 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's % of Majority Seats</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.29 **</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.53 ***</td>
<td>0.29 **</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.35 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's % of Minority Seats</td>
<td>-0.26 *</td>
<td>0.28 *</td>
<td>0.53 ***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.47 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIP Among Women</td>
<td>-0.29 **</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.29 **</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.65 ***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIP Among Men</td>
<td>-0.33 **</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.65 ***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWPI</td>
<td>0.24 *</td>
<td>0.82 ***</td>
<td>0.35 **</td>
<td>0.47 ***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Table 3.3: Zero-Order Correlations of Measures of Representation
That minority men and women’s political representation is not necessarily a straightforward relationship is evident in the negative correlation between minority men’s share of seats in the legislature and minority women’s share of minority seats ($r = -0.26$). As minority men’s political representation increases, minority women’s share of group seats declines. Thus, increasing minority men’s representation is associated with higher representation for minority women, but as the share of minority men increases, minority women’s success relative to male members of their group decreases.

Aside from proportionality among male representatives, only majority women’s share of group seats is correlated with proportionality among female representatives. Greater minority male representation, alternatively, does not generate proportionality among males. That greater representation for minority men and women does not generate higher levels of proportionality is not particularly surprising, however, since high minority representation also generates disproportionality.

**CONCLUSION**

The descriptive analyses discussed throughout this chapter provide preliminary evidence that minority women are “doubly disadvantaged” in politics around the world. Both majority and minority women face obstacles that generate significant gender inequalities in political representation. While minority men are overrepresented compared to their share of the population, minority women are substantially underrepresented in national legislatures—at levels much worse than majority women. Strikingly, in almost one-quarter of my sample, minority women are excluded from
representation in countries where majority women and minority men both hold seats in the legislature.

Although still noteworthy, the disadvantages faced by minority women are less pronounced when comparing their political outcomes to those of majority women. Of countries where minorities and women are represented in the national legislature, minority women even hold a slightly large share of group seats, on average. However, minority women are most successful obtaining a sizeable share of group seats when there are fewer minorities elected. This finding illustrates the complex nature of politics at the intersection. On the one hand, as a minority group is represented at levels more like the majority, minority women continue to face obstacles to representation based on their gender. But, when minority groups face discrimination, minority women’s identities as women may potentially help them to gain representation. I return to this issue using multivariate analysis in the following chapter.

Lastly, the descriptive analyses discussed in this chapter suggest significant country and regional variation in the patterns of minority women’s representation worldwide. This is important, since I spend the next three chapters trying to model this variation. I begin this process in Chapter 4 by investigating whether and how the traditional model of women’s political incorporation predicts variation in minority women’s political outcomes.
CHAPTER 4
MINORITY WOMEN’S ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE LEVELS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION WORLDWIDE

Around the world, more and more women are ascending to the highest levels of political decision-making. In countries as diverse as Cuba, Belgium, and Mozambique, women today hold more than one-third of parliamentary seats (IPU 2008). Women are doing even better in places like Rwanda and Sweden, where the gender composition of the national legislature is approaching parity. Over the last few decades, women’s representation in national legislatures has risen in all regions of the globe, at all levels of development, and in all types of political systems. Despite women’s far-reaching success, however, we are unaware to what extent women’s political gains have reached women from racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups.

On the one hand, women facing the “double barrier” of being both female and a minority may encounter more significant obstacles to political success than both their male and majority group counterparts (Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey 1993; Moncrief, Thompson, and Schuhmann 1991). On the other hand, in some political contexts, minority women’s dual identities may make them particularly attractive candidates compared to majority women or minority men (Fraga et al. 2005). In the previous Chapter, I showed that there is substantial cross-national variation in both the absolute levels of minority women’s legislative representation, as well as in the relative share of
minority group seats occupied by women. But, we still know little about what factors account for variation in minority women’s political outcomes across countries.

The developing literature on minority women’s legislative representation provides little consensus about what factors might matter most for minority women. Some research in the U.S. suggests that the legislative success of Latinas more closely follows the pattern of White women’s political representation than the pattern for Latinos (e.g., Fraga et al. 2003; cited from Scola 2006). At the same time, other studies link minority women’s outcomes to their male counterparts (e.g. Barrett 1995). And still other research finds that many of the structural and institutional factors that benefit majority women and minority men do not translate into political gains for women of color (Darcy et al. 1993; Moncrief et al. 1991; Scola 2006).

In this chapter, I add a cross-national perspective to this debate, providing the first ever empirical investigation of the factors that predict minority women’s political representation across countries. I first consider whether the factors known to impact women’s political representation across countries also predict cross-national variation in minority women’s absolute levels of representation—the share of seats in the national legislature they occupy. In the second part of the analyses, I draw from single-country research on the legislative experiences of minority men and women to test the effects of additional factors that may better predict minority women’s legislative success across countries. Finally, I investigate variation in minority women’s political representation relative to male members of their group. Before turning to the empirical analyses, however, I discuss three bodies of literature that inform this study: cross-national research on women’s political representation, single-country studies of the political
representation of minorities, and the developing U.S.-based research on minority women’s legislative outcomes.

WOMEN’S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION WORLDWIDE

Theories of intersectionality suggest that minority women’s political representation will not be a simple function of the political representation of women and the representation of minorities. However, minority women are still likely to face obstacles to representation based on their dual identities as women and minorities. Thus, one place to start when trying to understand the political representation of minority women across countries is with existing models of women’s political representation overall. This research is informative not only because minority women are a sub-set of “women” in general, but because this literature is considerably more developed in the global arena than research on minority representation or minority women’s political representation.

Variation in women’s participation in national-level politics results from differences in both the ‘supply’ of and the ‘demand’ for female candidates (Norris 1997; Randall 1987; Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Supply-side factors are those that determine the pool of women who are willing to run for political office, but also factors such as education and economic resources that may help women to win elections. Demand-side factors, on the other hand, are those that differentially pull women from the candidate pool into elective office. So, even if two countries both have large numbers of women ready, willing, and able to compete against men, differences in party or voter demand may lead to dissimilar political outcomes.
Social Structure

The ‘supply’ of women able to successfully compete for high-level political office is thought to be a product of socioeconomic or structural factors. Specifically, women are thought to need economic and educational resources in order to succeed in politics. Supply-side arguments are grounded in gender stratification theories, which suggest that women’s presence in highly valued positions in the labor force is a precursor to political equality (Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1984).

Despite strong theoretical arguments that supply-side factors should impact women’s political incorporation, empirical evidence in support of structural arguments is mixed at best. Research in single countries tends to provide the strongest evidence that factors such as women’s education and professional experience benefit women politically (Paxton et al. 2007). Across countries, however, only one study has found a statistically significant effect of women’s educational attainment on women’s political representation (Rule 1987).\footnote{It is unlikely that the statistical insignificance of educational variables will change. In an increasing number of countries, women’s educational outcomes are improving, sometimes even surpassing men. But these gains are not necessarily translating to economic or political power. In Mauritius, for example, there are no gender gaps in education, but Mauritius has the second lowest number of women in parliament of all Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries (only Swaziland is lower) (Bunwaree 2003).} Further, research only finds that female labor force participation rates are an important determinant of female legislative representation about half the time (Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Moore and Shackman 1996; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; and Rule 1987 find an effect; but Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; and Paxton 1997 do not find an effect).

The inconsistency of structural variables in cross-national research is often attributed to context. Specifically, the socioeconomic factors that may help women gain
power in one country may be just too different from the factors that help women in another country (Hughes forthcoming; Hughes and Paxton 2007). For instance, in the United States, where the vast majority of politicians started out in law or business, a larger presence of women in these careers is associated with more women in state-level politics (Arceneaux 2001; Norrander and Wilcox 2005; Oxley and Fox 2004). But in lesser developed contexts, a few years of education may provide sufficient credentials for women to run for political office (Johnson, Kabuchu, and Kayonga 2003). No single measure of educational or economic attainment may therefore explain women’s political success across these diverse socioeconomic environments (Paxton et al. 2007).

But, the inconsistency of structural variables in previous research may also result from within-country differences in the mechanisms that facilitate women’s election. Specifically, minority women may draw upon different resources to succeed in politics than women from majority groups. In the United States, for instance, research suggests that church and community associations may be more important for minority and lower-class women than for upper-class White women (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Takash 1997). At the same time, structural factors that may help majority women to succeed in politics may not facilitate the election of minority women.¹⁹ For instance, women’s labor force participation may be a weaker predictor of the political representation of minority women than of majority women. Therefore,

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¹⁹ In a related literature, Read and Oselin (2008) find that the link between women’s higher education and economic empowerment is weaker for Arab American women than for other American women. For Arab American women, higher education is viewed as a means to ensure that women are able to properly socialize children, rather than as a means towards economic empowerment. I suggest that a similar disconnect may characterize the relationship between minority women’s economic and political outcomes.
differences in paths majority and minority women take to political power may also help to explain the inconsistency of structural factors in research to date.

Politics

In addition to supply-side factors, institutional differences in political systems also create a different ‘demand’ for women (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). The ‘demand’ for women in politics is often conceptualized as a product of political factors. Political parties and electoral systems are structured in ways that may enhance or limit the ability of women to compete for power (Caul 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005). Overall, scholars have examined the effects of a wide range of demand-side factors on women’s political empowerment, including types and features of electoral systems, party ideology, legislative effectiveness, democracy and democratization, gender quotas, women’s historical political experiences, and women’s inclusion in party elites (e.g., Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Paxton 1997; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Reynolds 1999).

One of the most consistent and well-documented findings in cross-national research on women’s political representation is that a country’s choice of electoral system strongly affects the numbers of women elected to political office (Paxton et al. 2006). Most electoral systems generally fall into two categories—plurality-majority systems and proportional representation (PR) systems. In plurality-majority systems (used in the United States and the United Kingdom and also known as majoritarian systems), voters typically cast a ballot for a single representative, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins. In contrast, in most PR electoral systems, political parties publish lists of
candidates, and voters cast ballots for the parties associated with a candidate list. Parties are then allotted seats in parliament in proportion to the number of votes they receive.

Research consistently finds that PR systems facilitate women’s election in much higher numbers than plurality-majority systems (Hughes 2007; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Matland 1993; Norris 1985, 1997; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1981; Paxton 1997; Paxton et al. 2006; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). In PR systems, parties are more conscious of balancing their tickets to attract support from different constituencies. So, to obtain greater support from female voters, a party may decide to include women on its party list. Once one party in a system begins including women, competitive pressure can lead other parties in a PR system to also include women (Matland and Studlar 1996). Moreover, in PR systems, powerful men may remain on party lists, so female candidates may be less threatening than in plurality-majority systems, where parties typically nominate a single candidate per district.

Despite strong evidence that PR electoral systems increase women’s legislative representation, PR systems may not benefit all women. Indeed, although PR electoral systems consistently increase women’s numbers in the national legislatures of advanced industrial democracies, at least two studies suggest that PR systems do not benefit women at lower levels of economic development (Hughes forthcoming; Matland 1998). Analyzing separate samples of 24 OECD countries and 16 lesser-developed democracies, Richard Matland finds that PR has a strong, positive effect on women’s share of legislative seats across OECD countries. But for lesser developed countries, the effect of PR systems is substantially reduced and statistically insignificant. Similarly, in separate analyses of 36 high-income, 86 middle-income, and 63 low-income countries, Hughes
(forthcoming) finds that PR systems have positive significant effects only among high-income countries.

Although not yet tested in cross-national research, it is also possible that the benefits of PR electoral systems do not accrue to women from all kinds of groups within countries. As discussed in the next section, there is no cross-national statistical evidence showing that PR systems increase the political representation of minority groups. If PR systems benefit women, but not minorities, minority women may be unlikely to reap any rewards from PR. Even if PR systems do increase minority representation, as theory suggests, parties trying to attract minority voters may simply recruit male minority candidates. Overall, the bulk of evidence suggests that minority women should be more adequately represented in national legislatures with PR systems, but it is also possible that PR systems only benefit majority women in economically developed countries.

Another political factor that has received a good deal of attention in cross-national research is the effect of democracy. Theoretically, women’s political equality is often justified on the grounds of democratic justice and the fair representation of interests (e.g., Phillips 1991, 1995). It follows, then, that women should be represented at higher levels in countries where democratic processes are more firmly entrenched—where justice and the representation of interests are valued more highly. But, research in Eastern Europe and Africa finds that transitions to democracy are often accompanied by a significant decline in women’s political representation (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Waylen 1994; Yoon 2001). Furthermore, large cross-national studies have consistently found level of democracy to be statistically insignificant (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Paxton et al. 2006; Reynolds 1999) or even to have a negative effect
on women’s political representation (Paxton 1997). It is still possible, however, that different levels of democracy in a country may facilitate the political representation of different kinds of women.

A third important political factor impacting women’s political incorporation is the use of gender quotas—legislation or party rules requiring that a certain share of candidates or legislators is women. Gender quotas have been increasingly employed across the world to increase women’s representation and are receiving a great deal of scholarly attention (e.g. Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2005). (See Chapter 5 for an in-depth examination of the effects of quota policies on majority and minority women’s political representation.) To date, however, only one published cross-national study has quantitatively demonstrated a positive effect of quotas on women’s political representation (Tripp and Kang 2008). And whether gender quotas benefit both women from majority and minority groups remains an open question.

Culture

Ideological beliefs form a third important explanation for levels of female participation in parliament. Ideology is thought to influence both the supply of female candidates as well as the likelihood that prospective female candidates will be pulled into

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20 One reason that democracies may not have more women in power than non-democracies is that in less democratic contexts, women may be placed into power by elites, allowing them to sidestep structural or cultural barriers to their inclusion (Matland and Montgomery 2003). Put another way, women may profit politically from the absence of democratic competition if political leaders see some benefit to including women. For example, leaders may place women in power in response to pressure from domestic or international women’s movements. Further, communist systems continue to use formal or informal gender quotas, leading to high numbers of women in the legislature, even though the legislature itself is ineffective (Norris and Inglehart 2001). These issues are not a focus of this particular dissertation, since I analyze women’s political representation in only democracies and semi-democracies.
public office. Recent studies utilizing a measure of national gender ideology from the *World Values Survey* suggest that ideology may have stronger effects on female parliamentary representation than political or structural forces (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Although a favorable political system may be present alongside an adequate supply of qualified female candidates, cultural norms may still hinder women’s opportunities to participate in politics (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003).

Unfortunately, however, specific measures of gender ideology related to women’s political representation are not available for all countries and time periods. Thus, sociological research on women’s political representation often models the effects of cultural differences across countries by including dummies for region and dominant religion (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Norris 1997; Paxton 1997; Paxton et al. 2006; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987). Controlling for structural and political factors, Scandinavian countries tend to outpace the rest of the world in women’s parliamentary representation, while regions like the Middle East and Asia tend to fall behind other world regions (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997). Research conducted on women’s political representation in the 1980s and 1990s tends to find that predominantly Muslim and Catholic countries have fewer numbers of women in politics than predominantly Protestant countries (e.g., Kenworthy and Malami 1999). In recent years, however, Catholic countries have been closing the gap, while Orthodox countries appear to be falling behind Protestant countries in women’s representation (Hughes forthcoming; Kunovich and Paxton 2005).
Yet, our assessments about what cultures have more or less women in politics are based on aggregate statistics of the political representation of women as a group. When focusing explicitly on the political outcomes of racial, ethnic, or religious minority women, the effects of region and religion may be quite different. In parts of Africa and Eastern Europe, for example, a history of ethnic conflict in the region may encourage states to share power across a more diverse group of male and female representatives. And in Latin America, recent indigenous movements that brought an increasing number of minorities to power may have also increased the share of minority women present in the national legislature, relative to other regions. On the other hand, normative ideals in the long established democracies of the West may facilitate the inclusion of women from a broader range of groups than in other regions of the world. Still another possibility is that minority women could be equally disadvantaged in countries all around the world.

Turning to religion, considering the political representation of women from different groups raises the question of whether there are group-level differences in women’s political representation by religion. If Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy are associated with distinct cultural beliefs that hinder women’s political incorporation, women from predominantly Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox minority groups should be underrepresented in national legislatures compared to Protestant minority women. If no such group differences are present, however, it suggests that the negative effects of the dominance of certain religions in cross-national research should not be attributed to religion.
THEORIES OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND APPLICATION TO MINORITY WOMEN

In contrast to the established body of work investigating women’s political representation across countries, few comparative studies have considered the political representation of minority groups. Some comparative research has investigated the obstacles to proper measurement when analyzing the political representation of minority groups that vary widely in size (e.g., Bangura 2005). Other research on minority representation has investigated the effects of electoral arrangements or political reforms targeted towards minority groups (e.g., Friedman 2005). And, one comparative study in the U.S. and New Zealand considers the impact of minority representation in both countries (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004). Overall, however, the vast majority of what we know about minority political representation is based on single-country studies (e.g., Alionescu 2004; Black and Lakhani 1997; Messina 1989) or studies of cities with large minority populations (e.g., Behr 2000; Garbaye 2000).

Despite the general lack of cross-national statistical research on minority representation, scholars have successfully identified a number of factors expected to influence the political representation of minority groups (e.g., Bird 2004). Specifically, existing research suggests that political and cultural rights, group capacity, and political institutions should influence the legislative outcomes of minority groups.
Political and Cultural Rights

Although women’s equal citizenship is today largely taken for granted across the world (Paxton et al. 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), some minority groups continue to face significant restrictions to citizenship and/or political participation. In Lebanon, for example, Palestinian refugees make up approximately 10 percent of the population but are denied citizenship, refused access to certain educational and social services, and limited in their choice of profession. Public policies that substantially limit the citizenship or political participation of a minority group should eliminate, or at best depress, minority political representation.

Beyond formal political rights, attitudes about assimilation or cultural pluralism are also likely to affect minority political participation. As Karen Bird (2004:9) summarizes, “In countries…where ethnic minorities are recognized as possessing a distinct culture and set of interests, they should be more likely to mobilize and achieve political representation as a group.” In contrast, where minorities are expected to assimilate with the majority culture, there may be less recognition that minority groups have distinct interests that may not be represented adequately by politicians from majority groups. France, for example, has a strong culture of assimilation, such that immigrants are expected to give up their cultural and linguistic heritage to become full members of French society. And until 2007, not a single minority representative had ever been elected from the mainland.\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) The French National Assembly includes 577 seats. Since 1986, 7 of those seats have been elected to represent France’s overseas collectives, including French Polynesia (2), Wallis and Futuna (1), St. Pierre and Miquelon (1), Mayotte (1), and New Caledonia (2). None of the 570 “mainland” seats have ever included minorities. And, in 2002, no minority women were elected from the overseas constituencies.
It is also important to note that in some countries, groups may choose not to participate in the national political system (Beck and Mijeski 2001). In Cyprus, for example, 30 percent of seats in the parliament are reserved for Turkish Cypriots, who make up roughly 18 percent of the country’s population (IPU 2008). But the Turkish-Cypriot community, which resides in Northern Cyprus, recognizes itself as a separate country and refuses to participate in elections for the Cypriot National Assembly. Thus, 30 percent of the seats in the Turkish parliament remain vacant. In general, the refusal of minorities to participate in the politics of the country in which they reside may influence patterns of minority representation around the world.

Unlike other factors discussed in this chapter, it is difficult to find a reason why the political and cultural rights of minority groups would differentially affect the political representation of male and female minorities. If a group is denied citizenship or refused access to educational and economic resources, both women and men from that group are likely to face political marginalization and exclusion. Or, if minorities are seeking political autonomy and therefore opt out of political participation, there is little reason to expect that women would be any more likely than men to break ranks and run for public office. In sum, political and cultural rights are likely to affect male and female minority representation in a similar way.

Group Capacity

Research on minority political representation also suggests that an important predictor of legislative success may be a minority group’s capacity for political action (Bird 2004). Similar to the concept of resource mobilization in social movement research
factors such as group size, the salience of group identity, and the availability of group resources are expected to structure whether and how minority groups secure political power across countries (Bird 2004). All things being equal, minority groups that are larger, more cohesive, and more geographically concentrated are expected to perform better in the political arena. Alternatively, minority groups that struggle with poor educational, occupational and health outcomes “are less likely to enjoy the resources necessary to achieve political representation” (Bird 2004:10).

On the one hand, group capacity may affect the political representation of minority men and women in a similar way. It certainly makes sense that minority women from larger groups with more resources are likely to gain seats in the legislature at levels higher than women from smaller minority groups with fewer resources. Indeed, U.S.-based research suggests that although Black female legislators with significant experience are able to attract voters from both sexes and all racial/ethnic groups, Black female candidates receive the most electoral support from Black women (Philpot and Walton 2007). So, in absolute numbers minority women’s political representation may rise with group size.

However, research based in the United States suggests that minority women may have the greatest success gaining seats in legislatures when minority representation is low (Scola 2006). Specifically, women’s share of group seats in U.S. state legislatures is inversely related to the number of seats held by that group (Scola 2006). That is, in U.S. states where minorities are better represented, women hold a lower share of minority
seats (Scola 2006). Descriptive statistics presented in the previous chapter suggest this same pattern may hold across countries—minority women appear to make up the greatest share of minority seats when levels of minority representation are low. When considering the effects of group capacity, therefore, it is important to consider how success in minority women’s political representation is being measured (share of seats in legislature vs. share of group’s seats).

*Political Institutions*

Scholarship on the political representation of minorities also emphasizes the role of the political system in shaping the access of minorities to positions of power (Bird 2004; Lijphart 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Similar to demand-side arguments about women in politics, this research argues that, across countries, PR electoral systems should increase minority representation. For example, the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2005) reports that representatives of minority cultures or groups are more likely to be elected in party-list PR systems. And, Karen Bird (2004) theorizes that proportional representation systems with preference voting (where voters may change the order of candidates on party lists) may benefit

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22 Interestingly, Scola (2006) points out that this pattern is the same with White women—where White representation is low, White women’s share of seats increases. And, “in legislatures where racial and ethnic proportions are roughly parallel, both groups of women hold a corresponding proportion of seats” (Scola 2006:46).

23 Most research on this topic suggests that party-list proportional representation (PL-PR) systems should be most beneficial to minorities. But according to the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2005), only 2 of the 45 countries in my sample that have electoral systems in the PR family do not have party-list PR systems. These are Ireland, which has a single-transferable vote (STV) system, and Panama, where only about two thirds of representatives are elected using party-list PR (PL-PR). Some research suggests that STV systems, which allow preferential voting similar to open-list PL-PR systems, may help geographically dispersed minorities to elect candidates (Zimmerman 1994). Thus, I chose to test the effects of PR overall rather than just PL-PR.
ethnic minorities most. In these systems, parties should be more likely to include minority candidates to appeal to minority voters, and the potential for ethnic communities to influence minority representation through preference voting should encourage minority mobilization (Bird 2004).

However, research also suggests that all minorities may not benefit from PR systems (e.g., Moser 2008; Shugart 1994). Small minorities, even if they are successful at forming their own parties, may find it difficult to achieve the minimum number of votes for representation (Shugart 1994). Thus, benefits to minorities under PR systems may be a function of group size. Scholarship also suggests that in some cases, non-PR methods may actually lead to the over-representation of minority ethnic groups (Lijphart 1986). Thus, the highest levels of minority representation may occur in plurality-majority systems. Overall, cross-national research has not yet tested whether PR systems do, in fact, improve the political representation of minority groups.

Another feature of political systems thought to influence minority representation across countries is district magnitude—the number of seats from a legislature that are elected in each district (Rule and Zimmerman 1994). PR systems use multi-member districts, where more than one candidate is elected from the same district (district magnitude > 1). In contrast, most plurality-majority systems use single-member districts, where candidates face off in a head-to-head competition, and each district elects a single representative (district magnitude = 1). But, some plurality-majority systems do use multi-member districts, called block voting or at-large voting.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} At-large voting was historically common in U.S. cities, where all parts of a city would vote to fill all seats on the city council. In recent years, at-large voting has increasingly fallen out of favor, but some cities like Seattle still employ the electoral practice.
Theoretically, a higher district magnitude should increase the legislative representation of women and minorities much in the same way that PR systems operate. That is, having to run multiple candidates in the same district should encourage parties to include more diverse candidates that appeal to different segments of the electorate. However, multi-member districts may also dilute the voting power of spatially concentrated minority groups, preventing the election of minority representatives (Gay 2001). In the United States, for example, minorities are better represented in single-member districts than in multi-member districts (e.g., Persons 1992). Therefore, if minority groups make up a significant share of the population and are spatially concentrated, multi-member districts may not increase minority representation.

Finally, recent research notes that women are not the only groups to benefit from quotas in politics. While gender quotas are the most common form of political quota, countries in all regions of the world formally guarantee the political representation of one or more minority groups (Alionescu 2004; Htun 2004b; Krook and O’Brien 2007). Afghanistan, Croatia, Fiji, India, Jordan, Mauritius, New Zealand, Singapore, and Venezuela are just some of the countries with national-level minority quotas. Quotas ensuring minority representation most often take the form of reserved seats (Htun 2004b), where seats are set aside for minority groups and are filled through separate electoral

25 The effects of single member districts on minority representation in the United States may be a special case. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the amendments and court decisions that followed, have led to the dismantling of multi-member districts in parts of the country with significant minority populations. At the same time, districts were re-drawn to ensure that protected minorities (Blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and Native Americans) made up a majority of the voting population in one or more districts. The largest increase in these majority-minority districts occurred in 1990, when the total number of districts nationwide with Black or Latino/a majorities doubled, facilitating wide-spread increases in the numbers of minority representatives (Gay 2001). Overall, therefore, it may not be single member districts alone, but the conscious creation of single-member districts with a majority of minority voters, that increases minority representation.
districts or candidate lists. But, no quantitative study has yet to consider the impact of minority quotas on the political representation of minorities.

With limited cross-national research on minority representation and no cross-national scholarship on the political representation of minority women, it is difficult to assess how institutional factors like PR, district magnitude, and minority quotas will shape minority women’s electoral outcomes. Especially if PR systems and high district magnitudes benefit female political representation but reduce minority representation, I am only able to speculate regarding which electoral arrangements are best for minority women. However, recently published scholarship has begun to investigate the effects of institutional factors on minority women’s political outcomes within countries. These studies may provide a starting point for thinking about minority women’s political representation.

POLITICAL RESEARCH ON MINORITY WOMEN

Although there is no cross-national research on minority women’s political representation, there is a growing body of single-country studies on minority women in politics. The vast majority of this research focuses on minority women’s political experiences and outcomes in the United States.\textsuperscript{26} A few studies, however, focus on minority women’s political aspirations and electoral outcomes in other countries,

\textsuperscript{26} Most studies focus on Black women (Barrett 1995, 2001; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold 2006; Braxton 1994; Orey et al. 2006; Philpot and Walton 2007; Prestage 1991; Smooth 2001, 2006; Williams 2001) and Latinas (Bedolla, Montfori, and Pantoja 2006; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Fraga et al. 2006; Sierra and Sosa-Riddell 1994; Takash 1997). But, a smaller number of scholars have also reported on the political experiences of Asian and Pacific Islander women (Chu 1989) and American Indian women (McCoy 1992; Prindiville and Gomez 1999). Some research also crosses racial and ethnic groups to study all minority women in politics in the U.S. (Bedolla, Tate, and Wong 2005; Cohen 2003; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2006; Herrick and Welch 1992; Scola 2006; Welch and Herrick 1992).
including Canada (Black 2000, 2003), France (Bird 2001), India (Jenkins 1999), and New Zealand (Ralston 1993).

Much of U.S.-based research on minority women’s political representation reports on or investigates the “puzzle of minority women’s success”—the finding that women of color make up a higher proportion of their racial or ethnic group’s seats than majority group women (Scola 2006:43; see also Carroll and Strimpling 1983; Darcy and Hadley 1988; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Montoya, Hardy-Fanta, and Garcia 2000; Pachon and DeSipio 1992; Prestage 1991; Tate 2003). As of 2004, women of color held 33 percent of the seats occupied by persons of color in state legislatures, while White women only occupied 21 percent of seats held by Whites (Scola 2006).27 Research in the U.S. and Canada also suggests that minority female legislators may be more educated or qualified than their male and majority female counterparts (Black 2000; Carroll and Strimpling 1983). And, at least in some contexts, minority women may be even more effective advocates for progressive causes and minority interests than minority men (Fraga et al. 2005; Orey et al. 2006). Generally, this scholarship suggests there is more to the story of minority women’s political representation than discussion of the “double barriers” of gender and minority status.

Perhaps the most common research question in studies of minority women in politics is whether minority women’s political priorities, experiences, and outcomes are more closely tied to minority men or majority women. Most of this research, which

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27 Notably, Beth Scola (2006) demonstrates that there is significant variation across states in women’s success relative to their racial or ethnic group. In 13 states, the proportion of white women to whites was greater than the proportion of women to minorities, while in 37 states, minority women were faring better than white women as a percentage of their group’s seats. But, she is unsuccessful at predicting this variation and concludes by calling for scholars to work towards building intersectional models of women’s political representation.
investigates a range of racial and ethnic groups, finds that “race trumps gender” (e.g., Bird 2001; Gay and Tate 1998; Mansbridge and Tate 1992; McCoy 1992). For example, in a study of Latino and Latina legislators in California, Cruz Takash (1997) finds that Latina officials prioritize issues of importance to the Latino community. Melanie McCoy (1992:64) similarly finds among Native Americans that “tribal leaders, regardless of gender, seem to give priority to issues which concern the survival of their people.” And, surveying Blacks in the 1980s and 1990s, Claudine Gay and Katherine Tate (1998) find that Black women’s identification with their race more powerfully affects their political attitudes than their gender identification.

Evidence that women’s political experiences are linked more closely to male members of their group than women from other groups is also found outside of the United States. For example, Bird (2001) likens the situation of Muslim girls in France to Black women in the U.S. “who have in many instances chosen solidarity with Black men over feminist causes, in large part because they feel that the structural oppression of Black people is more omnipresent than the oppression of women, either White or Black.” In Kenya, a women’s activist makes a similar argument about economic disadvantage:

I think that when we talk about the position of women in Africa and see how miserable it is, quite often we forget that these miserable women are married to miserable men. They are oppressed together, and it is only a small group of elite middle-class Africans who can say that they have made it. (Hultman 1992; cited from Gordon 1995:883)

Generally, it is reasonable to expect that around the world, minority women’s political outcomes may be more strongly predicted by factors related to their status as minorities than their status as women.
It is important to recognize, however, that minority women are still connected to women’s issues and positions. Indeed, although issues of women’s liberation are less politically salient for Black women than issues related to racial discrimination, research suggests that Black women are just as likely to join women’s groups (organizations and caucuses) and even more likely to identify as feminists than White women (Baxter and Lansing 1983; Gay and Tate 1998; Mansbridge and Tate 1992; Prestage 1991). And, some studies suggest that gender is just as important as race in predicting minority women’s public office-holding (e.g., Prindeville and Gomez 1999).

Research also suggests that at least some of the structural and institutional factors that benefit majority women also benefit minority women. For example, African American female state legislators are more likely to have worked in education before beginning their political careers than minority men, but no more likely to have an educational background than White women (Barrett 1995). And, research on electoral system effects on minority women’s political representation suggest that although minority men benefit from single-member districts, both White women and women of color may perform better in multi-member districts (e.g., Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey 1993; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994).

In summary, the above research generally does not suggest new predictors that may help to predict variation in minority women’s political outcomes across countries. However, this scholarship does lead to three expectations. First, it is possible that minority women may be significantly better represented as a share of their group’s seats
than majority women. Second, variables related to minority status may better predict variation in minority women’s political outcomes than variables related to gender. And third, the use of multimember districts, while less important for the political representation of minority men, may increase the legislative representation of minority women.

DATA AND METHODS

Sampling

In this chapter, I analyze two separate samples. First, I consider differences in majority and minority women’s representation across a sample of 308 groups represented in the national legislatures of 81 countries. Including both groups together helps to expose whether factors that predict variation in women’s representation operate similarly for majority and minority women. However, it may be more theoretically appropriate to model these groups separately. Thus, I also analyze a limited sample of 223 minority groups in 67 countries.

Dependent Variables

In addition to using two separate samples, I also analyze two different dependent variables: 1) levels of women’s political representation in the national legislature and 2) women’s share of minority group seats, logged to reduce skew. Analyzing levels of

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28 I explored women’s share of group seats descriptively in the previous chapter. However, average statistics may mask meaningful variation across minority groups within countries. Furthermore, in this chapter I am able to assess whether minority women are better represented as a share of their group’s seats after controlling for important factors such as group size.
women’s representation helps to identify factors that increase women’s *absolute* numbers in the national legislature. In contrast, models predicting models predicting women’s share of group seats assesses minority women’s success *relative* to minority men.

An important difference between these two dependent variables is their relationship to minority men’s political representation. Remember from Chapter 3 that the number of minority men serving in the national legislature is positively correlated with levels of minority women’s representation. But, having more minority men in the legislature is negatively correlated with women’s share of group seats. That is, minority women appear to benefit from having more minority men in parliament, but as the number of minority men grows, so does the gender gap in minority representation. Analyzing women’s share of minority group seats will therefore help to identify factors that aid the election of women from groups with few men in parliament, either because of small group size or discrimination.

*Independent Variables*

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the variables used to predict minority women’s legislative outcomes at the group and country levels, respectively. First, I consider the effects of political, structural, and cultural predictors on majority and minority women’s legislative outcomes. At the group level, I consider the effects of majority status and group size. At the national level, I test the effects of PR electoral systems, level of democracy, national-level gender quotas, GDP per capita, women’s economic activity, region and dominant religion.
### Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's % of Seats</td>
<td>% of total seats in national legislature held by women, measured at the group level (0-43.5)</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's % of Groups Seats</td>
<td>% of group seats in national legislature held by women, measured at the group level, logged (0-0.69)</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Size</td>
<td>Group's % of the population (0-100)</td>
<td>CIA Factbook (2007), census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quota</td>
<td>Dummy--Group is affected by a minority quota in the election year</td>
<td>Htun (2004); USDS (2004, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Group</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the group's members are Catholic</td>
<td>census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Group</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the group's members are Muslim</td>
<td>census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Group</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the group's members are Orthodox</td>
<td>census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Group</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the group's members are Indigenous</td>
<td>census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Group</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the group's members are Hindu, Buddhist, or Jewish</td>
<td>census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Group</td>
<td>Dummy--Members of the group follow different religious traditions, such that there is no dominant religion</td>
<td>census data and country research reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Group-Level Variables and Data Sources for Hierarchical Linear Models
### Women in Politics Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Level of Democracy (-10 to 10)</td>
<td>POLITY IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>Dummy--National-level gender quota in election year, including party requirements and reserved seats</td>
<td>IDEA (2008); Krook (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Real GDP per capita, logged to reduce skew, in 2000</td>
<td>Penn World Tables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active</td>
<td>Percent of women in a country who are economically active, 1996 (17.5 to 52.6)</td>
<td>UNDP 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in the West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in Eastern Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in Latin America or the Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in Asia or the Pacific Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in the Middle East or North Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the citizens of the country are Catholic</td>
<td>World Almanac 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the citizens of the country are Muslim</td>
<td>World Almanac 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the citizens of the country are Orthodox</td>
<td>World Almanac 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Dummy--A majority of the citizens of the country are not Catholic, Muslim, or Orthodox</td>
<td>World Almanac 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Minority Status Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Religious Fragmentation</td>
<td>Ethnic and religious fragmentation (0.06 to 1.42)</td>
<td>Anckar 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Minority Men in Parliament</td>
<td>Percentage of total legislative seats occupied by minority men (0 to 52%)</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean District Magnitude</td>
<td>Mean district magnitude calculated as the weighted average of the number of representatives elected by constituency size (0.8 to 150)</td>
<td>Keefer 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Country-Level Variables and Data Sources for Hierarchical Linear Models
Then, I draw on the literature on minority political representation to consider the impact of additional variables on minority women’s legislative outcomes. Specifically, I test the effects of ethnic-religious fragmentation in the population, minority quotas, mean district magnitude, and the percentage of minority men in the national legislature. Although I include no independent variables related to the political and cultural rights of minority groups, I account for the most extreme forms of political exclusion in the analyses by only analyzing minority groups that obtain seats in the legislature. (For more on this choice, see Chapter 2.)

**Analytic Strategy**

In this chapter, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to consider the effects of both country- and group-level covariates on majority and minority women’s political representation. In the first set of analyses, I consider whether the political, cultural, and structural factors that impact women’s legislative representation overall also matter for minority women. I test effects across the full sample of 308 groups in 81 countries. All group-level variables are entered as fixed effects except for majority status, the slope of which is allowed to vary across countries. (See Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion of multilevel modeling, issues in model specification, and sample equations.)

In the second set of models, I analyze variation in minority women’s political representation across a sample of 223 minority groups with seats in the national legislatures of 67 countries. In these models, I consider new predictors related to minority status that may impact minority women’s legislative outcomes. The only new group-level variable, minority quotas, is modeled as a random effect.
In a third set of models, I analyze the second dependent variable—the percentage of group seats that are held by women. I test models for both the full sample of groups as well as the limited sample of minority women only. I consider the effects of traditional variables used in research on women’s political representation as well as the new variables related to minority status. In contrast to prior models, however, majority status is modeled as a fixed effect. Tests suggest that when modeling minority women’s share of seats relative to male group members, there is no statistical benefit to modeling majority status as a random effect across countries. (For how these tests are conducted, see Chapter 2.)

This chapter also references three additional tables located in the dissertation appendix. Appendix Table C.1 presents the results of analyses that replicate the first set of results (testing interactions between majority status and the country-level covariates) for a sample of minority women only. Appendix Table C.2 considers whether these effects vary by group size. And, Appendix Table C.3 analyzes whether a minority group’s dominant religion explains variation in women’s political outcomes.

**RESULTS**

*Majority vs. Minority Women (Absolute Levels of Representation)*

I begin by analyzing women’s absolute levels of representation in the legislature and testing differences across the full set of countries. The first set of results, reported in Table 4.3, present estimates from multilevel models testing the effects of political and structural factors on women’s share of legislative seats. In particular, these models test whether political and structural factors affect majority and minority women differently.
Model 1 includes group size, majority status, as well as the country-level political variables: PR electoral systems, level of democracy, and national-level gender quotas. All effects are modeled as main effects. That is, I control for majority status, but I do not test yet whether variables operate differently for majority and minority women. Consider first the effects of the two group-level covariates. As expected, both effects are positive and statistically significant. Women from larger social groups are represented in legislatures at higher levels than women from smaller groups. Specifically, an 11 percent increase in group size corresponds to a 1 percent increase in women’s political representation. Majority status has a much stronger effect. Controlling for group size, majority status increases women’s share of seats in the national legislature by almost 9 percent, on average.

Of the political variables, some of the effects in Model 1 operate as expected. Gender quotas, for example, significantly increase women’s political representation. Women from groups in countries with gender quotas are represented at levels 0.9 percent higher, on average, than women in countries without such policies.29 Also not particularly surprising is that the effect of democracy is not statistically significant, as measures of democracy rarely have significant positive effects on women’s political representation in cross-national research (e.g., Kenworthy and Malami 1999; but see Hughes forthcoming; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2008).30 However, it is somewhat

29 Although this may not seem like a large effect, it is important to remember that women’s representation is measured at the group level. The average number of groups per country in my sample is between 4 and 5. If four groups in a country all receive a 0.9 percent bump in representation, then gender quotas would have increased women’s representation by almost 4 percent at the country level.

30 However, it is noteworthy that in this model, democracy is on the border of statistical significance (p=0.106).
surprising that PR electoral systems do not appear to increase women’s political representation at the group level. Why PR is statistically insignificant becomes clearer in Model 2, when I introduce interactions between the political variables and majority status.

In Model 2, I test whether country-level political predictors significantly affect the slope of majority status on women’s representation. Or, put another way, I consider whether PR, democracy, and gender quotas operate differently for majority women than they do for majority women. In models that test cross-level interactions, the main effects at level 2 are interpreted as the effect when all level-one predictors are zero or at the grand mean, depending on how variables are centered (Hox 2002). Thus, in Model 2, main effects are the average effects of covariates for minority groups of average size.

First, the interaction effect for majority status and PR is strong and highly significant, while the main effect for minority women is not significantly different from zero. The significant interaction term indicates that the effect of majority status on women’s representation is stronger in countries with PR electoral systems than in countries with plurality-majority or mixed systems. At the same time, the statistical insignificance of the main effect of PR suggests that these broad differences in electoral systems do not predict variation in levels of minority women’s representation across countries. In short, the positive effect of PR electoral systems on women’s representation appears to almost exclusively benefit majority women. Even though theory strongly suggests that PR systems should benefit minority women, this initial empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Variables</th>
<th>Structural Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1*</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.23 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size^b</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
<td>0.08 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Status</td>
<td>8.64 ***</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>0.89 *</td>
<td>0.85 ^t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita^b</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Econ. Active^b</td>
<td>0.05 *</td>
<td>0.04 ^t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Interacations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>5.87 **</td>
<td>6.00 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.73 *</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gender Quotas</td>
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<td>3.43</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita^b</td>
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<td>3.68 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Women Econ. Active^b</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N--Countries          | 81                  | 81                    | 81                   | 81                   |
N--Groups             | 308                 | 308                   | 308                  | 308                  |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10; standard errors are in parentheses.

^aIncludes Majority Status as a random coefficient

^bDenotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered

Table 4.3: Hierarchical Linear Model of Women’s Share of Seats in the National Legislature with Political and Structural Predictors, All Groups
The introduction of the interaction terms produces another interesting result—a significant effect of democracy. Similar to the effects of PR, level of democracy predicts variation in majority women’s legislative representation, but not variation in minority women’s political outcomes. Moving from a democracy score of ‘7’, the average democracy score in my sample, to the highest level of democracy, a score of ‘10’, corresponds to roughly a 2 percent increase in majority women’s political representation. In contrast to the effects of PR and democracy, however, the interaction between gender quotas and majority status is not statistically significant, while the main effect is positive and significant. With only political variables included, gender quotas still appear to benefit both majority and minority women’s political representation by about 0.9 percent per group.

Next, in Model 3, I test the effects of both political and structural predictors without interactions. Although economic development has no significant effect on women’s share of seats in the legislature, women’s labor force participation is positively associated with women’s political representation. But, the effect size is quite small. To increase women’s political representation by just 1 percent requires roughly a 20 percent increase in the percentage of women that are economically active. It is also notable that including structural predictors strengthens the effect of gender quotas. Specifically, the effect size of national-level gender quotas increases by about one-third compared to Model 1, when only political predictors are included.

Perhaps more interesting are the interaction effects reported in Model 4. Specifically, economic development predicts variation in majority women’s legislative representation. Thus, majority women appear to benefit more than minority women from
economic development. In contrast, the main effect of GDP suggests that economic development does not predict variation in minority women’s legislative outcomes. Furthermore, with economic development in the model, the interaction between majority status and democracy is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the prior significance of democracy may be spurious. However, it is also possible that both the effects of democracy and GDP on majority women’s representation may be capturing the particularly high levels of majority women’s legislative representation in the West (especially in Scandinavia). If so, the effect of economic development on the slope of majority status should disappear once I account for regional differences across countries.

Table 4.4 reports the results of models testing the effects of regional differences on majority and minority women’s legislative outcomes. The first column of results, Model 5, tests the effects of non-Western regions along with the effects of group size, majority status, and political and structural variables on women’s political representation. Without considering interactive effects, Model 5 indicates that women from groups living in Latin America and the Middle East are represented in national legislatures at levels 1.4 and 1.6 percent less, on average, than groups in the West. Given prior research, it is not surprising that majority and minority women in the Middle East are substantially

31 As shown in Appendix B, democracy and economic development are positively correlated at r = 0.6.

32 It is important to note that in both interaction models thus far, predicting the effect of majority status on women’s political representation wipes out majority status’s main effect. Thus, it is possible that the differences in majority and minority women’s legislative outcomes are fully explained by disparate effects of electoral systems and economic development. However, I may also be overtaxing the data by including unnecessary interactions. So, in auxiliary analyses, I estimate a reduced model, including only the interactions with democracy and GDP. In this model, the effects of all variables remain roughly the same except for majority status, which is again statistically significant. Thus, accounting for the benefits to majority women accrued through electoral systems and economic development, majority women still occupy, on average, 4.5 percent more seats in national legislatures than minority women.
### Regional Models

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
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<td>s.e.</td>
<td>sig.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.09 (0.01) ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority Status</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-1.39 (0.78) †</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-1.56 (0.86) †</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
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</tr>
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<td>West</td>
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<td><strong>Political and Structural Variables</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Econ. Active&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Majority Interactions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>-5.75 (3.13) †</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-5.18 (3.51)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-12.36 (3.70) **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-8.06 (3.67) *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-8.81 (4.97) †</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>6.10 (2.06) ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.77 (1.41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N--Countries** 81 81 81  
**N--Groups** 308 308 308

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
<sup>a</sup>Includes Majority Status as a random coefficient
<sup>b</sup>Denotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered

---

Table 4.4: Hierarchical Linear Model of Women’s Share of Seats in the National Legislature with Political, Structural, and Regional Effects, All Groups
underrepresented in politics. But, the negative effect of Latin America is unexpected since the Americas have higher levels of women’s representation, on average, than any other world region except for Western Europe (IPU 2008). Yet, the high level of women’s legislative representation in Latin America is due in large part to gender quotas. Indeed, the average percentage of women in the national legislature in Latin American countries without quotas is 13.8, below the world average, while the average for countries in Latin America with gender quotas is 20.0 percent.

Regardless, the negative effect of Latin America disappears in Model 6, when I consider whether the effect of majority status on women’s political representation varies by region. These analyses suggest that majoritarian women are represented at much higher levels in Western countries. Again, women are underrepresented to the highest degree in the Middle East, where majority women occupy 12 percent fewer seats in the national legislature than in Western countries. Women in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe are also significantly underrepresented compared to the West (9, 8, and 6 percent less, respectively). Looking at the main effects, however, there appear to be few regional differences in representation of minority women across countries. Indeed, in Model 6, there are no significant main effects of region except for Africa, which is largely undersampled in this study (see Chapter 2). Overall, region explains much more of the variation in majority women’s legislative representation than in the political outcomes of minority women.

---

33 One reason why majority women’s political representation may be higher in the West is that Western societies, on average, may have more majority women. In other words, Western countries may be less heterogeneous than countries outside of the West. And, controlling for group size may be insufficient to account for the effect of the overall structure of the society on majority and minority women’s political outcomes. Therefore, in auxiliary analyses, I tested additional controls for ethnic, religious, and ethnic-religious fragmentation. These variables did not change the effect size or significance levels of any of the variables reported in Model 6.
Since the largest differences are between the West and most other regions, I also estimate a more parsimonious model including only a regional dummy for the West. Model 7 indicates that majority women from the West are represented at levels significantly higher than majority women from other countries. Specifically, majority women’s share of legislative seats is about 7 percent higher in the West than in other regions of the world. Still, there are no significant regional differences in minority women’s representation in national legislatures.

Across the three regional models, there are also notable changes in the other covariates. For instance, when predicting the slope of majority status with region in the model, the interaction effect of GDP and majority status is no longer statistically significant. As suggested above, therefore, the prior significant effects of democracy and economic development on the slope of majority status may be spurious. It is also important to note that in models with regional controls, women’s economic activity is no longer statistically significant. On the one hand, the regional variables could be capturing regional variation in women’s labor force participation, masking the structural effect. On the other hand, the significant effect of women’s labor force participation may be spurious, since prior models did not control for cultural differences across the world. Women are least economically active in the Middle East, a region in which people tend to assess women’s political participation more negatively than in other parts of the world.

---

34 Notably, the inclusion of regional variables affects the estimation of majority status. When all non-Western regional dummies are interacted with majority status, the main effect of majority status increases. But, when just the West is included, the effect of majority status declines. These patterns make sense given that majority women are represented at significantly higher levels in the West.

35 The average percent women economically active by region is as follows: Eastern Europe (44.4%), the West (42.5%), Africa (38.7%), Asia (35.9%), Latin America (30.8%), and the Middle East (25.4%).
(e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003). It is useful, therefore, to include other measures of culture to determine whether the effects of women’s economic activity are washed away by the inclusion of cultural variables.

So, in Table 4.5, I test the effects of the dominant religion in a country, another common proxy for cultural differences in cross-national research on women’s political representation (e.g., Paxton 1997; Paxton et al. 2006). Without interactions (Model 8), none of the religion variables reach statistical significance. But in Model 9, when I interact the religious dummy variables with majority status, the effects of religion operate much like the effects of region. There are significant differences in majority women’s political representation by dominant religion, but religious differences (at least at the country level) do not predict variation in minority women’s share of seats in the legislature.

With religion included in the model, women’s labor force participation is again statistically significant. Thus, the religious models provide some evidence that women’s economic activity may have independent effects on majority and minority women’s political representation. Still, the effect size of women’s economic activity remains very small. Only large swings in women’s labor force participation influence women’s success in national-level politics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 8*</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 8*</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
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<td></td>
<td>est.</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>sig.</td>
<td>est.</td>
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<td>1.55 (0.78)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.01) ***</td>
<td>0.08 (0.01) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size^b</td>
<td>8.69 (1.35) ***</td>
<td>7.48 (3.02) *</td>
<td>8.69 (1.35) ***</td>
<td>7.48 (3.02) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.66)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.68)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.66)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.68)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-1.23 (0.90)</td>
<td>-0.95 (0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
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<td>-0.72 (0.78)</td>
<td>-0.87 (0.76)</td>
<td>-0.72 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0.11 (0.89)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.89)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
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<td>0.77 (0.61)</td>
<td>0.64 (0.59)</td>
<td>0.77 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Controls</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
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<td>0.27 (0.42)</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
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<td>1.25 (0.55) *</td>
<td>1.24 (0.56) *</td>
<td>1.25 (0.55) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita^b</td>
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<td>-0.47 (0.30)</td>
<td>-0.44 (0.31)</td>
<td>-0.47 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Econ. Active^b</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)</td>
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<td>West</td>
<td>1.12 (0.65)</td>
<td>6.25 (2.89)</td>
<td>1.12 (0.65)</td>
<td>6.25 (2.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Interactions</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-4.11 (3.01)</td>
<td>-4.11 (3.01)</td>
<td>-4.11 (3.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
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<td>-6.88 (3.83)</td>
<td>-6.88 (3.83)</td>
<td>-6.88 (3.83)</td>
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<td>-5.11 (3.75)</td>
<td>-5.11 (3.75)</td>
<td>-5.11 (3.75)</td>
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<td>-8.81 (4.73)</td>
<td>-8.81 (4.73)</td>
<td>-8.81 (4.73)</td>
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<td>-2.75 (3.15)</td>
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<td>West</td>
<td>6.25 (2.89)</td>
<td>6.25 (2.89)</td>
<td>6.25 (2.89)</td>
<td>6.25 (2.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>7.10 (2.08) ***</td>
<td>7.10 (2.08) ***</td>
<td>7.10 (2.08) ***</td>
<td>7.10 (2.08) ***</td>
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<td>GDP per capita^b</td>
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<td>0.97 (1.44)</td>
<td>0.97 (1.44)</td>
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</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ¹p<.10

^aIncludes Majority Status as a random coefficient

^bDenotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered

Table 4.5: Hierarchical Linear Model of Women’s Share of Seats in the
National Legislature with Political, Structural, and Religion Effects, All Groups

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In summary, the models predicting majority and minority women’s political representation suggest that very different factors predict majority and minority women’s legislative outcomes. Some factors, such as gender quotas and women’s economic activity, appear to influence the political outcomes of both majority and minority women. But, most of the predictors that are important in cross-national research on women’s political representation—electoral systems, region, and religion—do not predict variation in minority women’s absolute levels of representation.

**Minority Women Only (Absolute Levels of Representation)**

In the next stage of this chapter’s analyses, I consider the effects of variables related to minority status on minority women’s legislative outcomes. Thus, these models predict variation in women’s political representation across the limited sample of 223 minority groups, rather than the full set of 308 majority and minority groups, as analyzed above. And since the sample is limited to minority groups only, these models include no cross-level interactions. All models include the political and structural predictors estimated prior with the exception of democracy, which I exclude for parsimony. I also control for whether the country is Western. These results of these models are presented in Table 4.6.

First, in Model 10, I consider the effects of overall ethnic-religious structure of the country by testing a measure of ethnic-religious fragmentation. I find that, indeed, greater diversity in the population is associated with greater diversity in the legislature,

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36 In auxiliary analyses, I estimate all models in Table 4.5 with democracy included. Democracy never has a statistically significant effect, and its inclusion does not affect either the effect size or the significance level of other variables in the model.
### Minority Status Variables

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0.58&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quotas</td>
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<td>1.74 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Minority Men in Leg.&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
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### Traditional Variables

<table>
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<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>0.05 ***</td>
<td>0.07 ***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
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<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>1.01 *</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.89&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.10 *</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.21&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Econ Active&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.04 &lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.05 *</td>
<td>0.01&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.20&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.00 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N--Countries**: 67 67 67 67 67 67 67

**N--Groups**: 223 223 223 223 223 223 223

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10; standard errors appear in parentheses

<sup>a</sup>Includes Minority Quotas as a random coefficient

<sup>b</sup>Denotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered

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Table 4.6: Hierarchical Linear Models of Minority Women’s Political Representation,

Minority Status Variables

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123
above and beyond the effects of group size. Specifically, a one-unit increase in ethnic-religious fragmentation is associated with a 1.2 percent gain in minority women’s share of seats in the national legislature. But, the effects of the traditional predictors remain consistent with the results reported thus far.

Model 11 considers the effects of minority quotas—whether seats in the national legislature are allotted for minority representatives. Across all minority groups represented in the legislatures of 67 countries, groups affected by minority quotas elect more women by a margin of 1.7 percent. When minority quotas are included, however, all other effects in the model are substantially reduced, and neither gender quotas nor women’s economic activity remain statistically significant. This may be a side effect of allowing the slope of minority quotas to vary across countries. When minority quotas are entered as a fixed effect, gender quotas, GDP, and women’s economic activity are all statistically significant. However, I argue that it is more theoretically appropriate to allow the effect of minority quotas to vary across countries, especially since the policies themselves vary widely. Furthermore, statistical tests suggest an improvement to the model by including a random effect for minority quotas.

Next, Model 12 tests the effects of mean district magnitude on minority women’s political representation. Controlling for PR, mean district magnitude has no significant effect on the share of legislative seats held by minority women. Thus far, therefore, it appears that minority women’s absolute levels of participation in national legislatures are not affected by electoral system factors that tend to predict variation in the political representation of women overall.
The final new variable related to minority status that I test is minority men’s share of seats in the national legislature. As expected, I find that minority women do benefit from the inclusion of more minority men in the legislature. Specifically, increasing minority men’s political representation just 1 percent above the world average increases minority women’s legislative representation at the group level by more than 3 percent. However, minority men’s representation in the legislature may be capturing some of the same variation as ethnic-religious fragmentation. Thus, I estimate a final model that includes all four new measures.

Model 15 presents the results of the combined model. Once ethnic-religious fragmentation and minority men’s share of legislative seats are both included in the model, only ethnic-religious fragmentation remains a significant predictor of minority women’s political outcomes. And in the combined model, the effect of ethnic-religious fragmentation is cut in half. A one-unit increase in ethnic-religious fragmentation is only associated with a 0.6 percent increase in minority women’s share of legislative seats. In the combined model, mean district magnitude reaches statistical significance, but the effect size is very small. Controlling for other factors, an increase in mean district magnitude of 50 is only associated with 0.25 percent increase in minority women’s

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38 Because minority men are often represented in legislatures in proportions much closer to their share of the population than minority women, it may be important to include a measure of the overall ethnic-religious structure of the state in order to truly assess the effects of minority men’s representation on minority women’s representation. Ethnic-religious fragmentation and the percentage of minority men in the legislature are correlated at 0.4.

39 With eight level-two predictors, there is one more predictor than recommended for models analyzing this sample size. Therefore, I also estimate a fixed-effects model, which tends to produce more reliable coefficient estimates. All of the significant effects reported in Model 15 remain significant in a fixed effects model. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) indicate no evidence of inflation as a result of multicollinearity.
political representation. Thus, district magnitude has negligible effects on minority women’s absolute levels of legislative representation. Overall, the variables estimated in Model 15 explain approximately 15 percent of the within-country variance and 70 percent of the between-country variance in minority women’s legislative representation, above what is explained by the unconditional model.

*Women’s Share of Minority Group Seats (Relative Levels of Representation)*

All of the models presented thus far predict the absolute levels of women serving in the national legislature. In Table 4.7, in contrast, I estimate models using an alternative dependent variable, the percentage of group seats held by women. Thus, these models consider what factors benefit women’s representation as a share of their groups, or their success relative to male group members. This table is also different in that I analyze both the full sample of majority and minority women and the limited sample of minority women only.

First, I estimate the effects of the traditional model of women’s political representation on women’s share of group seats for both majority and minority women (Model 16). Interestingly, neither majority status nor group size predicts variation in women’s share of group seats. Therefore, the puzzle of minority women’s success in the U.S.—their higher share of group seats compared to majority women—is not reflected across countries. However, PR electoral systems do increase women’s share of group seats. Women in the West are also better represented, relative to their group’s share of seats, than women in other parts of the world.
Table 4.7: Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Women’s Share of Group
Model 17 next considers the same variables, but explores variation only across only the limited sample of minority groups in 67 countries. The model for minority women operates much like the model for women overall—PR and the West both have positive significant effects on minority women’s share of their group’s seats. Thus, for the first time, the results suggest that PR systems may actually benefit minority women in politics. Although countries with PR systems do not elect more minority women than countries with plurality-majority or mixed systems, PR systems do increase the political representation of minority women relative to male members of their groups. In auxiliary models, religion does not explain variation in minority women’s political representation, relative to male members of their group.

The final model I estimate, Model 18, adds predictors related to minority status. The results suggest that these variables not only better predict variation in minority women’s absolute levels of representation, but in their relative levels as well. Indeed, minority quotas, mean district magnitude, and the share of minority men in the legislature all significantly affect women’s share of minority group seats. Of the variables related to minority status, only ethnic-religious fragmentation fails to explain any variation in minority women’s political outcomes relative to male members of their group.

In addition to increasing minority women’s absolute levels of representation, both minority quotas and higher mean district magnitudes increase minority women in politics relative to male group members. Controlling for other factors, minority quotas significantly increase the share of minority group seats held by women by about 8 percent. Thus, it appears that both minority men and women tend to benefit from minority group quotas. Mean district magnitude has a positive effect on minority
women’s political representation. And, the size of the effect is stronger when predicting minority women’s relative share of group seats. Indeed, an increase in mean district magnitude of 50 corresponds to a 7 percent increase in minority women’s share of group seats. Thus, the effects of district magnitude are much like the effects of PR—both benefit minority women most relative to minority male representation.

Finally, the results in Model 18 are consistent with the descriptive analyses in Chapter 3 in finding that the share of minority men in the legislature is negatively associated with women’s share of group seats. And, the effect size is strong. Holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in minority men’s political representation is associated with a 29 percent decrease in minority women’s share of group seats. Thus, similar to across U.S. states, minority women have the greatest success as a percentage of their group when minority representation is low (Scola 2006). Overall, this final model explains 85 percent of the variance between countries in the percentage of minority group seats occupied by women.

Appendix Tables and Figures Involving the Traditional Model of Women’s Political Representation Applied to Minority Women

Since the traditional model of women’s political representation across countries performs poorly when applied to minority women, it may be inappropriate to model the political outcomes of majority and minority women together. Analyzing the two groups together may mask important effects on minority women’s political representation. Therefore, I include a table in the dissertation Appendix that reports the results of models from Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 analyzed for minority women only (see Table C.1).
include the table in the Appendix largely because these models do not lead to any conclusions that are substantively different than the results reported above.

In additional analyses, I also estimated models considering whether the country-level effects estimated thus far operate differently for minority groups of varied sizes. Specifically, I estimate six auxiliary models including interaction terms between group size and each of the following country-level covariates: PR, democracy, gender quotas, economic development, women’s economic activity, and the West. The results of all group size interaction models are also reported in the dissertation Appendix (see Table C.2).

These interaction models were motivated primarily by the concern that PR systems may only benefit minority women from larger minority groups. However, the interaction between PR and group size is not statistically significant. Instead, the interaction models for the West and women’s economic activity produced significant results. Overall, countries in the West and those with higher levels of women’s economic activity have higher levels of minority women in politics, but women from larger groups benefit more from the Western residence and higher labor force participation rates than women from smaller minority groups.

Figure C.1 displays the predicted levels of minority women’s political representation by group size for groups living in and out of the West. Because group size is grand mean centered, I calculate the effects of group size on minority women’s political representation starting at 5 percent below the average minority group size and continuing up to 5 percent above the average group size (average group size in my sample is 6 percent of the population). At the world average, minority groups outside of
the West have 2.4 percent women in the national legislature, while minority groups in the West have 3.4 percent women—a 1 percent gap. For groups 5 percent above average size, the margin between groups in and out of the West is slightly larger, 1.7 percent (non-West: 3.2%, West: 4.9%).

In a final Appendix table (Table C.3), I consider whether religious differences at the group level explain differences in minority women’s political representation. At first glance, Model C.10 suggests that group-level religion may not be any better of a predictor of minority women’s political outcomes than country-level religion. However, Catholic groups are on the margin of statistical significance, and rotating the reference group, it appears that women from minority groups that are predominantly Catholic may be better represented than women from groups with other dominant religions. This finding is reflected in Model C.11, where I consider the representation of Catholic minority women relative to all others. Women from Catholic minority groups are represented at levels about 1 percent higher, on average, than women from groups with other dominant religions. Auxiliary models reveal no significant differences at the group level when predicting minority women’s representation relative to male group members of their group.

DISCUSSION

All of these tables of results together are at least somewhat overwhelming. There are two different samples, two different dependent variables, main effects and interaction models, and both conventional and new variables included among these results. Thus, in this section, I summarize the empirical findings of this chapter, looking across all models.
The results are also summarized in Table 4.8. Positive effects are denoted by a ‘+’, negative effects by ‘−’, and no significant effect by ‘0’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Absolute</th>
<th>Relative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Status</td>
<td>+ (Strong effect; varies by region and PR)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Electoral System</td>
<td>0 (+ for majority women)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Economic Activity</td>
<td>+ (↑ with group size)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>+ (↑ with group size, Stronger for majority)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0 (But + group effect of Catholicism)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Religious Fragmentation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean District Magnitude</td>
<td>+ (Very small effect)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quotas</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Minority Men in Legislature</td>
<td>0 (+ without including Fragmentation)</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: Summary of Effects on Absolute Levels of Minority Women’s Representation in the Legislature and Their Representation Relative to Male Group Members
Group Capacity

First, this study provides clear and convincing evidence that majority women are represented at significantly higher levels in national legislatures than minority women, even controlling for group size. Majority women’s margin of advantage ranges from 3 to 11 percent, depending on what other predictors are included in the model. But, most models estimate an effect size of around 8-9 percent. As a share of their group, however, majority women and minority women are not represented any differently.

In comparison to majority status, the slope of which is allowed to vary across countries, the fixed effects of group size are much more stable. Still, including variables related to minority status cuts the effect of group size by at least one-third. Similar to majority status, though, group size has a significant positive effect on women’s absolute levels of representation, but no effect on women’s success relative to male members of their group.

Political Factors

Countries with PR electoral systems do not elect more minority women to national legislatures than countries with plurality-majority systems. As a matter of numbers, PR systems overwhelmingly benefit women from majority groups, even controlling for group size. Also, the effects of group size on minority women’s share of legislative seats are no different across electoral systems. However, PR systems do increase the share of minority seats occupied by women. So, when political parties run minority candidates in PR systems, they tend to select female minorities in higher
numbers—relative to their male counterparts—than political parties in plurality-majority systems.

Indirectly, these analyses suggest that PR systems do not benefit minority men. The logic is as follows. If PR systems increase minority men’s election, and if minority men’s election is positively associated with the election of minority women, we should observe a significant positive effect of PR systems on minority women’s numbers. But, PR systems only help women as a share of their group, numbers that tend to be highest when minority men’s representation is lower. Thus, the results suggest that contrary to theory, PR systems do not increase the political representation of minority groups across countries. Indeed, zero-order correlations indicate a negative relationship between PR systems and the percent minority men serving in parliament.40

Overall, the patterns in minority men and women’s legislative representation may reflect differences in the candidate recruitment processes under different electoral systems. The benefit to minority women in PR systems may be a function of political parties attempting to balance party lists. Specifically, a political party seeking to represent the interests of both women and minorities may try to appeal to both groups simultaneously by selecting minority female candidates. Or, having a large number of majority women represented in PR systems may increase the likelihood that more women are among the minorities recruited as candidates.

Alternatively, parties in plurality-majority systems must recruit candidates to compete in specific electoral districts. And in districts with large minority populations,

40 In auxiliary analysis, I used basic multivariate regression to model the effect of PR on minority men’s share of seats in the national legislature, controlling for ethnic-religious fragmentation. Consistent with the above argument, PR electoral systems have a significant negative effect on minority men’s share of seats in national legislatures.
minority candidates may be more likely to be elected. The results presented here suggest that minority women are likely to benefit when minority men are elected in higher numbers to political office. But, plurality-majority electoral systems may also be more likely to reproduce the gender inequalities found among majority representatives. On balance, PR and plurality-majority systems may therefore produce similar levels of minority women’s legislative representation through much different processes. Consistent with this perspective, Figure 4.1 illustrates that, on average, majority women are better represented in PR systems, minority men are better represented in plurality-majority systems, and minority women are similarly represented in both systems.

Figure 4.1: The Political Representation of Majority and Minority Men and Women by Electoral System
Gender quotas, in contrast, appear to increase the absolute numbers of both
majority and minority women in national legislatures, but not minority women’s success
relative to minority men. Furthermore, the statistical significance of gender quotas varies
across models. One reason for the inconsistency of the gender quota effect is that in
addition to national-level gender quotas, countries also adopt party-level measures to
advance women’s representation. Failing to measure party-level quotas places some
countries with gender quotas in the reference category. Certainly, however, these
analyses suggest that greater examination of the effects of gender quotas on minority
women’s political representation is warranted. And, in the next chapter, I consider the
effects of quotas on minority women’s legislative representation more closely.

In contrast to the other political factors, however, democracy has no appreciable
effects on the political representation of minority women. Among democratic and semi-
democratic countries in this sample, level of democracy does not affect women’s
representation in any measurable way.

Structural Factors

In this chapter, I also consider the effects of economic development and women’s
economic activity. On average, there is a negative association between economic
development and minority women’s levels of representation. However, GDP almost
never has a statistically significant effect. Economic development continues to be useful
for cross-national modeling only as a statistical control.

In contrast, women’s economic activity may explain some of the variance in
minority women’s political outcomes. Women’s rates of economic activity significantly
predict minority women’s absolute levels of representation in most models, and the effect is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of variables. However, the effect size of women’s economic activity is always small. Thus, women’s labor force experience may only matter for minority women’s political representation at the extremes. Countries that wholly exclude women from the labor force are likely to have few minority women in politics. Furthermore, having more women economically active does not improve minority women’s political outcomes relative to male members of their group.

Region and Religion

Broad cultural differences—at least measured in this way—do not appear to influence minority women’s legislative outcomes. However, the dynamics of majority and minority women’s political representation do appear to differ in the West compared to the rest of the world. First, majority women are represented at much higher levels in the West, relative to other world regions. But, minority women’s political representation is also higher in the West in absolute terms, when accounting for differences in the effects of group size. Indeed, the positive effect of living in the West for minority women increases with group size. At the same time, minority women are also better represented in the West as a share of their group’s seats. Overall, living in the West appears to increase the political representation of both majority and minority women.

Religion, in contrast to region, appears to explain little to no variation in minority women’s legislative outcomes. A country’s dominant religion makes no difference for the numbers of minority women elected. At the group level, it is possible that women from Catholic minorities may outperform most other groups in their levels of
representation. However, this effect is somewhat of a puzzle. There are no existing theories that suggest that minority Catholic women should be performing well in politics. Overall, without theory behind this finding, it is difficult to assert with any certainty that religion has any effect on minority women’s political representation whatsoever.

Minority Variables

Finally, I investigated four new variables related to minority status: ethnic-religious fragmentation, minority quotas, mean district magnitude, and minority men’s share of the national legislature. First, levels of ethnic-religious fragmentation in a country affect minority women’s share of seats in the national legislature, controlling for the effects of group size. Greater diversity in the population is associated with greater diversity in the legislature. However, there is no statistical relationship between minority women’s political representation and minority women’s share of group seats. Like group size, majority status, and women’s economic outcomes, therefore, the effects of fragmentation affect minority women’s absolute levels of representation, but not their success relative to men.

Minority quotas are the only variable explored thus far to have a strong, positive, and statistically significant effect on both the absolute and relative levels of minority women’s representation. Again, these analyses suggest that further research on the effects of quotas is warranted. Thus, in the next chapter, I examine the relationship between quotas and minority women’s political representation more closely.

The effects of mean district magnitude are somewhat similar to the effects of PR. Mean district magnitude predicts variation in absolute levels of minority women’s
representation, but controlling for other factors, the effect size is not far from zero. In fact, on its own, mean district magnitude predicts less than 0.3 percent of the variation in absolute levels of minority women in the legislature, above what is explained by the unconditional model. For minority women’s relative levels of political representation, however, the effect of mean district magnitude is slightly stronger. However, quite significant changes in the mean district magnitude are necessary to generate appreciable changes in minority women’s relative share of group seats.

Finally, I consider the relationship between minority men and women’s legislative outcomes. I find that, controlling for ethnic and religious variation in the general population, there is no significant effect of minority men’s share of legislative seats on minority women’s absolute numbers. However, the results do indicate a positive association between minority men’s and women’s levels of representation. Alternatively, when considering minority women’s outcomes relative to male members of their group, increasing minority men’s political representation has a negative effect. These results show that when analyzing variation in minority women’s political experiences across countries, it is important to consider carefully what constitutes electoral success—better numbers overall or better numbers relative to male minorities.

CONCLUSION

This chapter presents the first ever large-scale, cross-national investigation of the factors that explain minority women’s political representation across different cultural, structural, and political contexts. This research exposes the complexities of political research at the intersections of gender and minority status. On the one hand, minority
women’s political fates appear to be tied more directly to the experiences of their male minority counterparts than to the fates of majority women. Indeed, the vast majority of factors that predict variation in women’s political representation do not explain minority women’s political outcomes. In contrast, factors related to minority representation better predict minority women’s fortunes, both in absolute terms and relative to their male peers.

However, my findings also suggest that gender discrimination in politics remains a significant barrier limiting the representation of minority women. As minority groups are represented at levels closer to the levels of representation enjoyed by majority groups, gender inequalities in representation grow. I speculate that when minority groups are especially small or face barriers to success in national-level politics, dominant groups may recruit both male and female minorities as tokens. Minority women’s ability to attract both female and minority voters may make them attractive candidates when minority seats are few and far between. Or, it is possible that dominant groups consider minority women to be less threatening to majority power than minority men, resulting in higher levels of minority women’s representation relative to their male counterparts. But when minority groups are larger, better organized politically, and more successful at competing for seats in the legislature, gender inequalities in majority politics are reproduced among minority representatives.

A second important implication of this chapter’s results is that one set of factors tends to produce more minority women in politics in *absolute* terms, while a different set of factors increase minority women’s political representation *relative to male group members*. Specifically, group size, ethnic-religious fragmentation, gender quotas, and
female labor force participation are all positively related to minority women’s absolute numbers in national legislatures. Alternatively, proportional representation electoral systems, high mean district magnitudes, residence in a Western country, and fewer minority men in the legislature all benefit women relative to male members of their group. Only minority quotas substantially increase both the absolute and relative numbers of minority women in national politics.

Over the next two chapters, I explore women’s absolute levels of representation and their success relative to male group members in turn. First, in Chapter 5, I delve more deeply into the effects of gender and minority quotas on minority women’s absolute levels of political representation. In addition to considering the effects of party-level gender quotas, which I have not analyzed thus far, I investigate how gender and minority quotas interact to influence the legislative outcomes of minority women. Then, in Chapter 6, I again analyze the political outcomes of minority women relative to male members of their group. Specifically, I focus on variation in the political representation of women from Muslim backgrounds.
CHAPTER 5

REGULATING DIVERSITY: QUOTAS AND THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND MINORITY WOMEN

Over the past 150 years, legal barriers to the political involvement of women and minorities were largely dismantled. Most societies now accept a broader vision of who is fit for public service than in times past. For instance, almost all countries today elect female and minority representatives to their national legislatures. Yet for many marginalized groups, decades or even centuries of repression are not easily overcome. Women, minorities, and minority women worldwide remain substantially underrepresented in high-level political positions. Indeed, on average, men from majority groups make up less than 40 percent of the general population but hold 73 percent of seats in the national legislature (see Chapter 3).

To rectify persisting inequalities, most of the world’s countries now use some form of political quota—a law or policy requiring that candidates or legislators include women, racial or ethnic minorities, or members of another targeted group (Paxton and Hughes 2007). Countries like Argentina, France, and Iraq, for example, have national-level quotas requiring all political parties to include women. Countries such as Colombia

41 Throughout this chapter, I use the terminology of “gender quotas” and “minority quotas.” It has been noted that gender quotas should more appropriately be called “sex quotas,” since they regulate the sex of representatives (Krook 2006). However, I continue to use the term gender quota to maintain consistency with past research. “Minority quotas” are any policies that regulate the representation of any racial, ethnic, or religious group. Again, this terminology is imperfect. For a handful of countries in my sample, “minority quotas” actually regulate the ethnic or religious composition of the entire legislature and thus apply to both majority and minority groups (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina).
and New Zealand, in contrast, mandate the political representation of indigenous groups. And, in places such as Afghanistan, Burundi, and Slovenia, a combination of policies regulates representation by both gender and ethnicity.

One potential problem with quotas, however, is that they may essentialize the identities and interests of targeted groups (Guinier 1994; Kymlicka 1993; Mansbridge 1999, 2005; Phillips 1995; Young 1994, 1997). In other words, quotas may emphasize the similarity of group members, failing to recognize that women and other minorities vary in ways that have profound effects on individual levels of power and experiences of oppression (Bacchi 1996; Collins 2000; Mohanty 1995). Policies that do not account for important within-group differences may reinforce within-group inequalities (Mouffe 1993; Phillips 1993; Young 1997). Specifically, gender quotas may benefit only women from dominant groups, and quotas designed to increase minority representation may disproportionately benefit male group members.

In some countries, quotas are specifically designed to account for stratification within marginalized groups. In India, for example, a quota of 33 percent women requires Muslim women and women from Scheduled Tribes and Castes to be represented in local-level assemblies. But, to date, only three countries have such nested quota policies at the national level. In contrast, more than 60 countries regulate representation for women or minorities, but not both (Htun 2004b; IDEA 2008). Even when both women and minorities secure quotas, policies affecting women and those affecting minorities often

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42 Scheduled Tribes (indigenous minorities) and Scheduled Castes (former “untouchables”), also known respectively as Adivasis and Dalits, are marginalized groups officially recognized by the Indian Constitution. The government acknowledges that these groups, which make up about one-quarter of the Indian population, may require assistance to overcome past discrimination.
take on different forms and are regulated differently (Htun 2004b; Krook and O’Brien 2007). In Slovenia, for example, minimal representation in the National Assembly is constitutionally guaranteed for both the Italian and Hungarian minority communities, while gender quotas have only been adopted by political parties, often as soft targets that can be ignored (IDEA 2008; USDS 2004).43

Minority women, in particular, may be disadvantaged by separate efforts to advance women and minority political representation. Political intersectionality research documents how legislation designed to serve the interests of “women” may ignore the special needs or interests of racial and ethnic minority women (Crenshaw 1994). Similarly, laws or policies that advance “minorities” are often negotiated by male elites, leading to policies that disregard or even oppress minority women (Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999). It follows that the benefits of gender and minority quotas may not extend to increased political representation for minority women.

On the other hand, the average quota policy may benefit minority women. Because women and minorities are significantly underrepresented in politics, any policy that increases their presence may boost the chance that a more heterogeneous group of women or minorities will be elected (Mansbridge 1999; Paxton and Hughes 2007). Along these lines, recent research based in India and Germany suggests that gender quotas may cause more women from lower classes (or castes) and with lower levels of education to enter politics (Geissel and Hust 2005). Gender quotas may similarly benefit

43 For example, in 1990, two of the nine political parties competing used soft targets of 30 percent female candidates, but neither party ultimately adhered to the quotas (Lokar 2004). During the 1996 election, a political party used a hard gender quota for the first time and included 42 percent women on its party list, but not even one woman was elected, and the quota was changed back to a soft target in 1997 (IDEA 2008). By 2004, two parties were using soft targets, another had adopted a firm party quota, and one party had promised to achieve parity by 2008 (Lokar 2004). But, all efforts to pass a national-level gender quota in Slovenia have failed.
women from racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups. However, empirical research has not yet considered the effects of quotas on minority women’s legislative outcomes.

Particular institutional arrangements may also create strategic opportunities for minority women. One such arrangement is the simultaneous presence of national-level gender and minority quotas, what I call “tandem quotas.” In the presence of tandem quotas, adding a single minority woman to the national legislature may help to satisfy both gender and minority quotas at the same time. Therefore, by recruiting and electing a sizeable number of minority female legislators, parties and governments can fulfill quota policies and maximize the amount of seats that can be filled by majority men. In short, because of minority women’s dual identities, tandem quotas may provide minority women with strategic opportunities for gaining political representation.

But, not all combinations of gender and minority quotas should produce these effects. “Mixed quotas,” a mixture of party-level gender quotas and national-level minority quotas, may not benefit minority women. Party-level gender quotas may be adopted by political parties that obtain few seats in the legislature, making it unlikely that those parties will ultimately elect minority women. It is also possible that the parties with which minorities in a country tend to align choose not use gender quotas. Thus, the parties that do use gender quotas will likely advance majority women’s representation without increasing minority women’s numbers. Overall, because mixed quotas are regulated at different levels and by different actors, the policies are unlikely to interact, and the strategic advantage to minority women may be lost. Unlike tandem quotas, mixed quotas may primarily advance the representation of majority women and minority men.
In this chapter I break new ground in quota research by considering how gender and minority quotas, and combinations of the two, affect diversity in national legislatures. I begin by assessing how closely legislatures with and without quota policies reflect the overall distribution of sex and majority/minority status (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion) in the general population. Then, I use odds ratios to consider more carefully how quotas differentially affect the odds of election for four groups: majority men, minority men, majority women, and minority women. In the final stage of the analysis, I investigate further how gender and minority quotas affect minority women using hierarchical linear modeling. Specifically, I analyze how the presence of gender and minority quotas—both as separate policies and in tandem—affects the election of women from over 300 majority and minority groups across 81 countries. Finally, I present short case studies of Burundi and Romania, two countries with “tandem quotas,” in order to explore in greater detail how these policies impact minority women’s political representation. Before turning to these analyses, however, I first articulate why quotas are adopted, discuss the range of quota policies used around the globe, and theorize how different quota policies might advance diversity in disparate ways.

**WHY COUNTRIES SHOULD ADOPT QUOTAS AND WHY THEY ACTUALLY DO**

Quota policies are generally designed to advance descriptive representation—the “numeric similarity between legislative bodies and the electorate they represent in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, or other demographic characteristics” (Paxton, Kunovich, and
Hughes 2007:265; Pitkin [1967] 1972).\textsuperscript{44} Put another way, descriptive representation is the idea that female legislators should represent women, minority representatives should represent minorities, and so on (Mansbridge 1999). Both theorists and empirical researchers have been critical of the link between descriptive and substantive representation, arguing that female and minority legislators are not necessarily better able to represent the interests and policy preferences of women and minorities (e.g., Diamond 1977; Swain 1993; Young 1997).\textsuperscript{45} Still, arguments for descriptive representation have continued to gain currency as more and more countries adopt policies to redress the political underrepresentation of marginalized groups (Squires 1996).

The case for greater descriptive representation is strongest when the exclusion of women and other minority groups from power causes states to legislate in the male majority interest (Carroll and Dodson 1991; MacKinnon 1989). However, demonstrating a measurable impact of the representation (or underrepresentation) of women and minorities is not as straightforward as one might think. Indeed, the effects of group status on legislative behavior and outcomes are complicated by confounding effects of political system, party, and constituency (Paxton et al. 2007). Furthermore, much of the research on the impact of minority underrepresentation is limited to the U.S. context (e.g., Barrett 1997; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Guinier 1989; Lublin 1997; Swain 1993; Tate 1999, 2001; Whitby 1997).

\textsuperscript{44} Although descriptive representation has gained legitimacy in recent decades, the concept itself is not new. Indeed, John Adams, James Wilson, and others believed that the legislature should be a representative sample of the electorate (Pitkin [1967] 1972).

\textsuperscript{45} Although Young (1997:354) advocates for increased political representation for women and minorities, she cautions that “a relation of identity or similarity with constituents says nothing about what the representative does.”
Still, a growing body of research has begun to show that women and minorities do have distinct interests and legislate differently. For instance, female legislators around the world articulate different policy priorities (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Thomas 1991; Wangnerud 2000), introduce different bills (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Kathlene 1995; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Srivastava 2000; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003), and vote differently (Swers 2002) than their male counterparts. And, recent research in India finds that states reserving a larger share of legislative seats for minorities allocate more welfare spending for minority groups (Pande 2003). Overall, scholars increasingly demonstrate that the identities and personal experiences of politicians impact how they legislate (Burden 2007).

Even if majorities and minorities legislate in exactly the same way, however, using quotas to increase the political representation of women and other minority groups may have important symbolic effects. For marginalized groups, representation may positively affect the self-esteem and aspirations of group members (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Guinier 1989; High-Pippert and Comer 1998). For example, girls represented by female legislators in the U.S. and those living in countries with more women in national-level politics report higher levels of political interest and knowledge (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). Increased political representation for women and minorities may also alter perceptions about those groups in wider society (Johnson, Kabuchu, and Kayonga 2003). As Jane Mansbridge (1999, 2005) argues, the presence of subordinated groups in high-level political positions enhances the view that these groups are “fit to rule.”
Using quotas to ensure the political representation of minority groups may also affect how citizens assess the government. Descriptive representation may enhance the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry (Baldez 2006; Guinier 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). And for members of marginalized groups, representation may facilitate higher levels of government approval. In the United States, for example, descriptive representation for Blacks leads to increased satisfaction and familiarity with political representatives, higher levels of political trust, and greater likelihood of direct contact between legislator and constituent (Gay 2001, 2002; Tate 1999). Furthermore, because the suppression of minority rights sometimes results in violence, effective political representation may help to prevent or alleviate social or political unrest (Bieber 2004; Reilly and Reynolds 1999). Especially in post-war contexts, the inclusion of women and minorities into the national legislature may be viewed as essential for stability and sustainable peace (Hughes forthcoming).

Although not often articulated in research on quotas, increasing the political representation of minority women may also have important practical and symbolic effects. Given their structural position, minority women have experiences and interests unlike their male minority and majority female peers (Collins 2000; Crenshaw 1994). Thus, if only majority women and minority males are represented in politics, the specific interests of minority women may not be represented. If governments are willing to help combat oppression against minority women, including minority women as representatives may open lines of communication and bring legitimacy and credibility to those efforts (Weldon 2006). And, new research suggests that in some contexts, minority women may

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46. The effect of descriptive representation was even stronger for Whites.
even be more effective advocates for the interests of minority communities than minority men (Fraga et al. 2005). Beyond effective representation, minority women’s exclusion from politics may also mean that minority women and girls will not benefit from any symbolic effects of representation. Overall, therefore, it is important to consider whether the positive effects of gender and minority quotas extend to minority women’s political fortunes.

As Jane Mansbridge (2005) notes, however, arguments for quotas are justified not only by the benefits of increased representation, but by the belief that some groups face or have faced discrimination that may exclude them from power. Discrimination may result from sexism or prejudice, for example, the belief that women or minorities are not equipped to serve as political leaders. But in many countries today, discrimination is often less overt, operating through stereotypes or social norms (Quillian 2006). For instance, although an increasing number of U.S. voters claim they would vote for a qualified female candidate, women are still perceived as less capable of handling military and security matters, which may inhibit their election in certain political contexts (Matland and King 2002; Paxton, Painter, and Hughes 2008; Swers 2002). Socialization of women and minorities may also contribute to disinterest or even disaffection with mainstream politics, reducing the numbers of female and minority candidates (e.g., Lawless and Fox 2005). Quotas may help to overcome these barriers by encouraging women and minorities to enter politics and increasing their political ambitions in the long term (Geissel and Hust 2005).

Quotas may also help marginalized groups overcome structural inequalities. For example, economic or social deprivation may limit the pool of minority candidates with
the resources to compete for political office. Furthermore, past discrimination may leave behind a legacy that is difficult to overturn through regular electoral mechanisms. If women and minorities faced discrimination in times past that resulted in a majority male legislature, inertia may contribute to the continued political exclusion of marginalized groups (Hughes and Paxton 2008). Overall, concerns about continued barriers to the election of women and minorities, combined with the above benefits of increasing the political representation of marginalized groups, are thought to help motivate countries and political parties to adopt quotas.

However, quotas are not always adopted for such noble reasons. Instead, research documents that quota adoption is often politically motivated (Krook and O’Brien 2007). Elites adopt gender quotas to compete for votes (Baldez 2004, Meier 2004), in response to international norms or pressure from international actors (Krook 2004; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; UNDP 2000), or to satisfy the demands of domestic movements (Krook 2004, 2006). It has even been suggested that in countries or parties adopting gender quotas, political leaders may be trying to consolidate power, since inexperienced female candidates may be easier to manipulate than their male peers. Gender quotas may also be adopted to help distract from other persisting inequalities such as the political underrepresentation of ethnic minorities (Paxton and Hughes 2007).

For minority groups, quota adoption is also highly political. Elites decide which groups should count as minorities, and of those, which groups are deserving of quotas. In Slovenia, for instance, the Constitution officially recognizes three minority communities—Hungarians, Italians, and Roma—but only the first two are constitutionally guaranteed special group-based rights such as bilingual education and
seats in parliament (Council of Europe and ERICarts Institute 2008). Furthermore, “new minority” groups (i.e., Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs), which make up as much as 7-9 percent of Slovenia’s current population, receive no special consideration under the law (Council of Europe and ERICarts Institute 2008). Overall, therefore, it is important to understand that the decision to adopt a quota may be highly political, lacking any real mandate to create a national legislature that broadly reflects the diversity in a country’s population.

VARIATION IN QUOTA POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LEGISLATIVE DIVERSITY

The actual effects of quotas on legislative diversity are likely to vary by the type of quota adopted. On a global scale, political quotas are quite diverse, shaping the political representation of a wide range of social groups. Quotas today advance representation by sex, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, caste, language, age, disability, profession, and location of residence (IDEA 2008; IPU 2008; Krook and O’Brien 2007). Gender quotas are the most common type of quota. By 2008, more than of 55 percent of democratic and semi-democratic countries had adopted gender quotas in some form. Minority quotas are also prevalent; over 20 countries today require that one or more minority representatives are included in the national legislature (IPU 2008; USDS 2004, 2006).

From one country to the next, quotas also vary in how they are regulated—some through constitutional provisions or electoral laws and others through party rules. About

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47 This figure and later estimates of “democratic and semi-democratic countries” refer to a sample of 122 countries with at least ½ million population in 2005.
forty percent of democratic and semi-democratic countries regulate the political representation of one or more groups at the national level, sometimes dubbed “legal quotas.” Some countries with legal quotas reserve seats in parliament, filling seats through special electoral roles, separate party lists, or separate mechanisms for direct appointment (Htun 2004b). In Uganda, for example, each district elects a female representative to a reserved seat from a separate woman-only party list (Tamale 2003). In other countries, however, national electoral laws regulate women’s representation through political parties by requiring all parties to field a certain percentage of female candidates. Argentina was the first country to adopt such a policy in 1991, and countries like Armenia, Belgium, Peru, and the Philippines have since followed suit (IDEA 2008; Jones 1996).

But, national- and party-level quota policies are not randomly distributed. Instead, the type of quota adopted differs by the type of group targeted, geographic region of the world, a country’s level of democracy, and type of electoral system (Dahlerup 2006, 2007; Htun 2004b). For instance, gender quotas more often regulate the sex of candidates in one or more political parties, while minority quotas tend to operate through reserved seats at the national level (Htun 2004b). Party-level quotas are particularly widespread in the West (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2006). Indeed, in the majority of Western democracies, one or more political parties employ a gender quota. Also, less democratic countries trend towards reserved seat quota systems. And, national-level quotas regulating parties are frequently adopted in proportional representation electoral systems (Dahlerup 2006). When assessing the effects of different quota policies,
therefore, it may be important to account for factors such as geographic region and a country’s electoral system.

The relative success of different quota policies in generating legislative diversity has been heavily debated in recent years. But, little consensus about the success of different quota policies has emerged. For example, recent research suggests that party quotas may be more sustainable than legal quotas because they represent a voluntary action (Nanivadekar 2006). But, this argument belies case evidence in which parties adopt, ignore, and drop gender quotas at will (e.g., Lokar 2004). An alternative argument, therefore, is that national-level measures more effectively increase the political representation of marginalized groups than party-level measures. National-level quotas either reserve seats, guaranteeing greater legislative diversity, or apply to all political parties in a country, which could improve the chances that a quota generates change. However, not all research finds that legal and party quotas generate effects that are significantly different from one another. Indeed, case research based in Africa finds that national- and party-level quotas are both successful in generating gains for women (Bauer 2008). Still other scholars suggest that the effects of different quota policies are so specific to the particular institutional configurations in which they are embedded that their effects do not generalize well across cases (e.g., Schmidt and Saunders 2004).

One reason it is so difficult to arrive at a consensus about the effects of different quota policies is that the vast majority of research on quota effects focuses on one or two countries at a time. Some research has begun to compare the effects of quotas across

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*Published case studies on quotas have focused on Afghanistan (Ballington and Dahlerup 2006), Argentina (Jones 1996, 1998), Belgium (Meier 2004), Brazil (Htun 2004a; Htun and Power 2006), Chile (Jones and Navia 1999), Costa Rica (Jones 2004), East Timor (Ballington and Dahlerup 2006), France*
countries within a single geographic region (Bauer 2008; Dahlerup 2006; Htun and Jones 2002). But, to date, only one published study empirically demonstrates that, across a worldwide sample, gender quotas increase women’s numbers in national legislatures (Tripp and Kang 2008). In short, it is difficult to assess the effects of different types of quota policies without more cross-national research.

When assessing the effects of quotas on legislative diversity, another limitation of existing empirical research is that it tends to ignore the political representation of minorities and minority women. For example, some critics allege that gender quotas allow elites to direct attention away from other political inequalities, such as the exclusion of minorities from power. Yet, no cross-national study has yet to empirically evaluate the effects of gender or minority quotas on minority representation. Similarly, theorists have long noted that group-based political representation may reinforce existing inequalities within marginalized groups (Guinier 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Mansbridge 1999, 2005; Phillips 1995; Young 1994, 1997). But even the highly contextualized case study research on gender quotas does not assess how quotas affect the election of minority women.

QUOTAS AND THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY WOMEN

In her research on gender quotas, Jane Mansbridge (1999:636) notes that “descriptive representation most closely approaches normative ideals when it reflects the
inner diversity of any descriptively denominated group.” However, as noted above, the extent to which different quota policies contribute to within-group diversity in national legislatures is still largely unclear. Specifically, empirical research has left unanswered at least three important questions. First, we are unaware whether gender or minority quotas effectively increase the political representation of minority women. Second, research has not yet considered which policies—party-level gender quotas, national-level gender quotas, or minority quotas—tend to benefit minority women the most. Third, for countries with both gender and minority quotas, we do not know whether minority women will benefit or suffer from the simultaneous presence of these policies. Below, I consider each of these questions in turn.

Do Gender or Minority Quotas Increase the Political Representation of Minority Women?

Whether gender and minority quotas increase the political representation of minority women is currently an open question. On the one hand, countries that adopt either gender or minority quotas may still have little to no representation of minority women. On the other hand, improving the odds of election for women or minorities may also aid the election of minority women (Mansbridge 1999; Paxton and Hughes 2007). Below, I consider in turn how gender quotas and minority quotas might affect the political representation of minority women.

First, as a stand alone policy, a gender quota may benefit only women from dominant groups. Research on intersectionality warns that any legislation targeting “women” may not effectively aid minority women (Crenshaw 1994). More directly,
political theorists who defend group-based representation caution that gender quotas will benefit highly educated, middle- to upper-class women from dominant racial, ethnic, or religious groups (Mansbridge 1999, 2005). And where women’s movements have pressed for quotas, concerns of this sort have been echoed by quota opponents. In India, for example, efforts to pass a gender quota at the national level have been continuously undermined by claims that the proposed gender quota legislation would only benefit elite Hindu women from upper castes.

However, at least one new comparative study suggests that quotas actually help to recruit non-elite women into politics. Brigitte Geissel and Evelin Hust (2005) find that German political parties with gender quotas are more likely to elect women of working class backgrounds and women without a university education (Geissel and Hust 2005). Similarly, local-level gender quotas in India are responsible for increasing the number of politicians from poorer and less educated households and lower castes (Geissel and Hust 2005). It follows that gender quotas may also benefit other non-elite women, including women from racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups. Overall, therefore, I suggest the following hypothesis:

H1: I expect gender quotas to increase the numbers of minority women in national legislatures, but to a lesser extent than for majority women.

Minority quotas may follow a similar pattern. Indeed, there are reasons to expect that special group rights for minorities may disproportionately benefit minority males. Throughout history, efforts by dominant groups to incorporate minorities into the political system have often served minority men. In the United States, for example, efforts at redistricting to improve the political representation of Blacks increased the
political representation of Black men more than Black women. Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, Black men in the U.S. were proportionally represented in state legislatures, but Black women remained politically underrepresented (Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey 1993). Further, minority quotas often regulate only a handful of legislative seats. If minorities are only allotted a handful of seats, male group members may be better positioned to take advantage of the quota than their female counterparts.

On the other hand, in many countries, minority women today are better positioned than in times past to benefit from policies targeting minority communities. Over the last few decades, the international women’s movement has become a much broader and more inclusive force for change, as women from a wider range of nationalities, identities, and backgrounds have taken on leadership and organizing roles (Weldon 2006). Recent research suggests that by defining norms, exerting pressure on states, interacting with local women’s movements, and providing resources and training to women, the activities of international organizations matter for the incorporation of women into national-level politics (Paxton et al. 2006). Taken together, these statements suggest that as the international women’s movement has grown more inclusive, the gains observed in women’s political representation overall may also extend to minority women. Thus, I suggest the following:

H2: I expect minority quotas to benefit the election of minority women.49

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49 Because I ultimately analyze minority and majority women’s share of seats in the legislature, I cannot use the multivariate analyses to explicitly test whether minority quotas benefit minority men more than minority women. However, I do consider this question using odds ratios.
Do Party-Level Gender Quotas, National-Level Gender Quotas, or Minority Quotas Benefit Minority Women Most?

Beyond assessing whether gender or minority quotas may increase the political representation of minority women, it is also useful to consider which quota policies may benefit minority women most. One study that may help to answer this question is the work of Mala Htun (2004b), who examines the structure of gender and minority quotas. Htun (2004b) argues that the tendency of minority representation to be regulated by reservations and women’s representation to be regulated through parties is appropriate given how these groups mobilize politically. Because gender is cross-cutting—that is, women tend to be present in all political parties—women’s representation is best advanced through measures that create space for them inside existing parties. The political identities of ethnic minorities, in contrast, are coinciding—they tend to align with particular parties or form their own parties. If a minority group tends to align with one political party, forcing all parties to include minority representatives may not create more effective representation for minority groups. Htun’s (2004b) argument follows that reserved seats, therefore, are a better strategy for increasing ethnic minority representation since they altogether circumvent the party system. Overall, when assessing which quotas are most appropriate, one must consider how a targeted group aligns with the party system (Htun 2004b).

However, Htun’s (2004b) work does not resolve which quotas are most appropriate for advancing the political representation of minority women, whose identities are neither cross-cutting nor coinciding, but intersectional. Most existing research on minority women’s political identities tends to find that race trumps gender
(Mansbridge and Tate 1992). Or put another way, minority women’s outcomes are more often tied to the fortunes of their male peers than to majority women (Kymlicka 1995). Consider, for example, the progression of universal suffrage in countries like Australia, where majority women had suffrage rights decades before minority women, who gained suffrage alongside their male counterparts. Political representation often follows a similar pattern—minority women are often elected to national legislatures for the first time years after minority men, but decades after majority women. In Canada, for example, the first woman was elected to the House of Commons in 1920, but the first African-Canadian woman was not elected until 1972, 9 years after the first African-Canadian man was elected. Similarly, the first Turkish female MP was elected to the national legislature in Germany in 1998, only four years after the first male Turkish MP, but almost fifty years after the first German woman. And in Ecuador, indigenous female candidates have only been fielded by the indigenous Pachakutik Movement despite a national-level gender quota requiring all parties to include women (Pacari 2002).

Overall, since the electoral fates of minority women are often tied to minority men, minority quotas may be more likely than gender quotas to benefit minority women. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3a: I anticipate that minority quotas will be more beneficial for minority women than gender quotas.

However, if gender presents a larger obstacle to political inclusion than race, ethnicity, or religion, minority women may be more likely to benefit from gender quotas than from minority quotas. Returning to the suffrage example, there are also countries where minority men had voting rights years before minority women, who ultimately
gained the franchise alongside their majority female counterparts (e.g., Kuwait and the United States). To illustrate this point further, I pose a hypothetical. If Lebanon—which elected only 6 women out of 128 seats in parliament in 2005—adopted a minority quota reserving 5 seats in the national legislature for the Druze religious minority, it is unlikely that Druze women would fill any of these seats. However, under the current system of religious confessionalism, a national-level gender quota would likely increase the number of women in parliament from a wide range of religious groups, including religious minorities. And, Lebanon is not an especially unique case. As documented in Chapter 4, we know that relative to their share of the population, the underrepresentation of women is more pronounced than the underrepresentation of minorities. Thus, I suggest the following alternative hypothesis:

H3b: Gender quotas should be more effective than minority quotas at increasing the political representation of minority women.  

However, not all gender quotas may be equally effective at increasing the political representation of minority women. In particular, party-level quotas alone may be less likely than national-level policies to benefit minority women. If minorities tend to align with particular parties (Htun 2004b), there is no guarantee that the political party that most often represents the interests of a minority community will adopt a gender quota. Indeed, there are no ethnic, religious, or indigenous political parties today that use party-level gender quotas. Furthermore, political parties adopting quotas, in theory, could

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50 In future analyses, I plan to test additional interactions between the quota variables and measures of women and minority status. Specifically, I expect the effect of minority quotas to be stronger for women in countries where women are less oppressed. Similarly, I expect the effect of gender quotas to be stronger for minority women in countries where minorities are less oppressed.
ensure the representation of minority women by consciously choosing candidates that “represent the most relevant heterogeneities within gender” (Mansbridge 2005:634). But, the incentives to do so are unclear (Mansbridge 2005). Therefore, I suggest the following:

H4: I expect that national-level gender quotas will generate higher levels of minority women’s political representation than party-level measures.

*How Does Combining Quotas Affect Minority Women’s Political Representation?*

Another important consideration, however, is what happens to the political fortunes of minority women when countries adopt measures to address political representation for both women and other minority groups. On the one hand, certain institutional combinations of quotas may create strategic opportunities for minority women. One such arrangement is the simultaneous presence of national-level gender and minority quotas, what I call “tandem quotas.” In the presence of tandem quotas, adding one minority women to the national legislature often satisfies both gender and minority quotas at the same time.\(^{51}\) Thus, in countries with tandem quotas, recruiting more minority women may help majority men to hold on to the maximum amount of seats.

Research has not explored the use of tandem quotas on minority women’s legislative representation at the national level. But, one early case study of women’s political representation in local-level politics in India documents the recruitment of a Muslim women over her husband “because she could take advantage of the effort to bring

\(^{51}\) In some cases, countries may reserve seats separately for women and minorities. In this case, there may be no strategic incentive to include minority women. How national-level policies come together to affect minority women is explored below in the case studies of Burundi and Romania.
in both women and Muslims” (Wolkowitz 1987:213). Generalizing this case suggests that in countries where both women and minorities are judged deserving of special electoral consideration, minority women may face fewer barriers to entering and succeeding in the political arena. In short, the presence of both gender and minority group quotas together may interact to increase minority women’s legislative representation. I suggest the following hypothesis:

H5: Tandem quotas will increase the political representation of minority women to a greater degree than either national-level gender quotas or minority quotas alone.

Still, even countries with both gender and minority quotas may have low levels of minority women in parliament if these policies do not interact with one another. That is, the combination of national-level minority quotas and gender quotas regulated at the party level, what I call “mixed quotas,” may increase the representation of minority men and majority women without extending any benefits to minority women. Mixed quotas may be less successful than tandem quotas at generating gains in minority women’s representation simply because national-level gender quotas are more effective at generating change for women than party-level measures. But mixed quotas may also be less effective than tandem quotas for other reasons. For example, mixed quotas suggest that women and minorities mobilized separately for change, and minority women are likely to be marginalized within both of these movements. Furthermore, the failure of women to gain national-level gender quotas may evidence resistance to women’s political representation, at least by certain political parties. In such a context, minority women
may be less likely to benefit from minority quotas. Therefore, I pose a sixth and final hypothesis:

\[ H6: \text{Mixed quotas will not increase the political representation of minority} \]

women relative to states with either minority quotas or party-level gender quotas.

**DATA AND METHODS**

*Measurement*

The measures used throughout the quantitative analyses are presented in Table 5.1. The dependent variable is the percentage women serving in the national legislature, measured at the group level. So, for example, in 2004 Black women in the United States held 2.8 percent of seats in Congress, so the dependent variable for Blacks in the U.S. is 2.8. This is the absolute measure of minority women’s representation employed in the previous chapter. Women’s percent of group seats is not analyzed here. (For more on the dependent variables analyzed in this dissertation, see Chapter 2.)

The major theoretical variables of interest measure whether groups and countries are impacted by gender and minority quotas. I consider only those policies that affect national legislatures, and I exclude quotas that promote representation solely by age, disability, or profession. I focus on two features of quotas: 1) which social groups are regulated and 2) whether the policies are regulated at the party level or the national level. In total, I employ four quota variables: national-level gender quotas, party-level gender quotas, minority quotas and any minority quota. Countries with national-level gender quotas have adopted electoral laws regulating women’s representation in all political parties in a country, or they reserve seats for women. Party-level gender quotas, in
contrast, occur when at least one party in a country has adopted a gender quota, but no national-level policy (constitutional or electoral law) regulates the gender of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's % of Seats, Group</td>
<td>% of seats in national legislature held by women, measured at the group level (0-100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Group-Level Independent Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quota</td>
<td>Dummy--Group is affected by a minority quota in the election year</td>
<td>Htun (2004); USDS (2004, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size</td>
<td>Group's % of the population (0-100)</td>
<td>CIA Factbook (2007), census data and research reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Country-Level Independent Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quotas</td>
<td>Dummy--National-level gender quota in election year, including party requirements and reserved seats</td>
<td>IDEA (2008); Krook (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quota</td>
<td>Dummy--One or more (but not all) political parties in the country uses a gender quota in election year</td>
<td>IDEA (2008); Krook (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Minority Quota</td>
<td>Dummy--One or more groups in the country are affected by a minority quota</td>
<td>Htun (2004); USDS (2004, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Dummy--Country is in the West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active</td>
<td>Percent of women in a country who are economically active, 1996 (17.5 to 52.6)</td>
<td>UNDP 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Real GDP per capita, logged to reduce skew, in 2000</td>
<td>Penn World Tables</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Measures and Data Sources for Multi-Level Analyses
representatives in the national legislature. Minority quotas are coded at the group level, and groups receive a “1” only if directly affected by quota legislation. Alternatively, the “any minority quota” variable is a country-level measure coded “1” if any group in a country is affected by a minority quota. I use this variable to consider how minority quotas affect women from groups not directly regulated by minority quotas.

As noted in Table 5.1, I also use five control variables: the group’s share of the population, the percent women economically active, logged GDP per capita, whether the country uses a proportional representation (PR) electoral system, and whether the country is Western. The effects of democracy are not tested in this chapter.\textsuperscript{52} Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for these measures are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. See Chapter 4 for additional theoretical discussion of these variables as well as for additional models testing how they affect majority and minority women’s political representation.

\textit{Descriptive Analyses}

The best test of the effect of quotas on legislative diversity would compare levels of diversity before and after quotas are adopted. However, historical data on legislator diversity is only available by gender. Therefore, I instead consider whether countries with quotas are more likely to elect national legislatures that represent the diversity of

\textsuperscript{52} In the previous chapter, I never find level of democracy to have a statistically significant effect on either majority or minority women’s political representation. Moreover, all countries included in this sample are at least semi-democratic, reducing the necessity to include level of democracy as a control. Also, in auxiliary models, I test the effect of democracy. Its inclusion or exclusion has no effects on the substantive results.
their populations than countries without quotas. To compare legislatures to populations, I use a transformed version of the Gallagher Index of Proportionality (GIP):

\[
GIP = 100 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (P_i - S_i)^2},
\]

where \(P\) is group \(i\)’s share of the population and \(S\) is group \(i\)’s share of seats in the national legislature, calculated for a total number of \(n\) groups in each country. Higher values of the GIP are associated with higher levels of proportionality—smaller differences between the distribution of the population and the distribution of seats in the legislature.\(^{53}\) (To see values of the GIP by country, see Chapter 3.) In contrast to all other analyses in this dissertation, the GIP is calculated using all groups in a country, even the other/remainder categories.\(^{54}\) (See Chapter 2 under Sample for a description of these groups.)

I calculate the average GIP for seven country samples: 1) no quotas, 2) any quotas, 3) only minority quotas, 4) only national-level gender quotas, 5) only party-level gender quotas, 6) mixed quotas (minority and party-level gender quotas), and 7) tandem quotas (minority quotas and national-level gender quotas). I use T-tests to compare

\(^{53}\) In the original GIP, higher values are associated with greater disproportionality. I subtract the GIP values from 100 so that higher values indicated greater proportionality in national legislatures.

\(^{54}\) I include these remainder groups in the GIP for two reasons. Theoretically, the GIP assesses the distribution of seats in the legislature to the population. Therefore, it is useful to consider the entirety of each country’s population in the measure. Second, analyzing 100 percent of the population for all countries makes the measure more consistent across countries. Moreover, since the GIP does not account for majority/minority status (that is, disproportionality may arise from the underrepresentation or overrepresentation of any group), including somewhat muddled categories in the GIP is less problematic than in other analyses that are estimating the effects of majority/minority status. In auxiliary analyses, I also calculated the GIP with a sample excluding the other/remainder categories. Including or excluding these groups does not alter the substantive conclusions reported below.
whether countries with various quota policies have average proportionality scores that are significantly different from countries with no quotas.

For the same samples of countries, I also calculate odds ratios (OR) to consider how quotas impact the odds that majority men, majority women, minority men, and minority women are elected to the national legislature. Odds ratios are calculated for all defined majority and minority groups as follows:

\[
OR = \frac{odds_{1st\ group}}{odds_{2nd\ group}} = \frac{p(1-p)}{q(1-q)},
\]

where \(p\) is the probability of the election of one group (e.g., majority men) and \(q\) is the probability of election of a second group (e.g., minority women). Probability of election for all groups is calculated as the number of group representatives elected divided by the number of individuals from that group in the population. Numbers over 1 indicate that accounting for population, the first group has higher odds of election than the second, while values under 1 mean that the first group has lower relative odds of election. So, for example, in the United States, 18 minority women (Black, Latina, and Asian) were elected in 2004 to the House of Representatives from a population of about 43 million \((p = 0.000000417)\). The same year, 319 majority men were elected from a total possible pool of about 102 million \((q = 0.000003122)\). Thus, in the U.S., a minority woman has about 0.13 times the odds of election of a majority man, about 1 in 7. “Other” or remainder categories are excluded from these calculations.

Because averages are particularly sensitive to values at the extremes, I investigated the GIP scores and odds ratios for influential outliers. Peru emerged as a potential outlier. The country has a large indigenous population (about 1/3 of the
populace), but in 2001, the country elected only one self-declared indigenous member (<1% of seats). This extreme imbalance led to highly skewed GIP and odds ratios. Thus, I exclude Peru from this part of the analysis.55

Hierarchical Linear Models

In the second part of this chapter’s empirical analyses, I again use multilevel modeling to investigate the political representation of majority and minority women. Remember from Chapter 2 that I analyze only those groups that successfully gained representation in the national legislature. I employ two separate samples. The full sample includes data on the political representation of 308 majority and minority groups represented in the national legislatures of 81 democratic and semi-democratic countries. The second sample includes only minority groups, cutting the sample size to 223 groups in 67 countries. This limited sample allows me to focus more directly on understanding the political experiences of minority women.

Using SAS 9.1, I check the robustness of my findings through the use of partial plots and a variety of other diagnostics (leverage (hat), Cook’s D, DFFits, DFBetas, etc.) for all of the variables in the final models (Bollen and Jackman 1990). Compiling these results led to the identification of several potential outliers (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi). These cases are removed from the analysis individually and in groups, and significant differences are footnoted throughout the results section. I find no evidence of

55 Peru may also be a good case to exclude because the situation changed dramatically since I collected the data employed here. Specifically, after the 2006 national elections, indigenous representation in the national legislature jumped to 21 percent.
problems arising from multicollinearity in the models reported. For additional information on the methods used for all multilevel models, see Chapter 2.

**Case Studies**

The quantitative analyses are useful for finding general patterns in the effects of quota policies across diverse social groups and social/political contexts. I augment this broad perspective with short case studies of Romania and Burundi. These cases provide a more in-depth look at two countries with tandem quotas. That is, both countries have national-level policies regulating gender and minority status in their national legislatures. However, across the two cases, the structure of the gender and minority quotas—and how they interact with one another—is quite different, resulting in widely divergent consequences for minority women’s legislative outcomes. Thus, these cases provide nuance to the quantitative analyses on the effects of tandem quotas on minority women’s political representation.

**RESULTS**

*Descriptive Statistics: Comparing Legislatures and Populations*

**Proportionality**

I first use the Gallagher Index of Proportionality (GIP) to evaluate descriptive representation in national legislatures of countries with no quotas and with different quota policies. Comparing the first two rows of the GIP in Table 5.2 suggests that countries with quotas elect more proportional legislatures than countries with no quotas. That is, legislatures affected by quotas more closely reflect the distribution of gender and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quota Type (Country N)</th>
<th>Index of Proportionality&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Min Wom: Maj Men</th>
<th>Min Wom: Maj Wom</th>
<th>Min Wom: Maj Men</th>
<th>Maj Wom: Maj Men</th>
<th>Min Men: Maj Men</th>
<th>Maj Wom: Min Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Quotas (23)</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>0.10 (10.3)</td>
<td>0.52 (1.9)</td>
<td>0.39 (2.6)</td>
<td>0.16 (6.4)</td>
<td>0.56 (1.8)</td>
<td>0.44 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Quotas (57)</td>
<td>72.4 **</td>
<td>0.17 (5.7)</td>
<td>0.54 (1.8)</td>
<td>0.50 (2.0)</td>
<td>0.28 (3.6)</td>
<td>0.52 (1.9)</td>
<td>1.08 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quotas (16)</td>
<td>72.2 *</td>
<td>0.13 (7.7)</td>
<td>0.27 (3.7)</td>
<td>0.51 (2.0)</td>
<td>0.30 (3.3)</td>
<td>0.33 (3.0)</td>
<td>0.91 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quotas (23)</td>
<td>73.8 **</td>
<td>0.13 (8.0)</td>
<td>0.30 (3.4)</td>
<td>0.58 (1.7)</td>
<td>0.32 (3.1)</td>
<td>0.30 (3.3)</td>
<td>1.10 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quotas (7)</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>0.18 (5.6)</td>
<td>0.98 (1.0)</td>
<td>0.23 (4.3)</td>
<td>0.18 (5.5)</td>
<td>0.98 (1.0)</td>
<td>0.20 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Quotas (6)&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>0.09 (10.9)</td>
<td>0.56 (1.8)</td>
<td>0.28 (3.6)</td>
<td>0.20 (5.1)</td>
<td>0.53 (1.9)</td>
<td>0.59 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandem Quotas (5)&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>0.65 (1.5)</td>
<td>1.94 (0.5)</td>
<td>0.28 (3.5)</td>
<td>0.29 (3.4)</td>
<td>1.56 (0.6)</td>
<td>0.20 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>The reciprocal of the calculated odds ratio appears in parentheses next to the original value.
<sup>b</sup>For t-tests, significance levels are marked as follows: *p<0.05, **p<0.001
<sup>c</sup>Mixed Quotas are a combination of party-level gender quotas and minority quotas.
<sup>d</sup>Tandem Quotas are a combination of national-level gender quotas and minority quotas.

Note: Total sample size is 80 instead of 81 countries because Peru is excluded as an outlier (see text for explanation).

Table 5.2: Gallagher Index of Proportionality and Odds Ratios for Countries with Various Quota Policies
minority status in their populations than countries with no quotas. On average, countries with quotas elect legislatures that are 12 percent more proportional than in countries with no quotas (significantly different at p<0.01).

According to the GIP, however, not all quotas are equally effective at generating proportionality. Countries with national- or party-level gender quotas have legislatures that are significantly more proportional than countries without quotas. Legislatures affected by national-level gender quotas have an average GIP of 72.2, significantly higher than in countries with no quotas. Countries with only party-level gender quotas have an even higher average GIP of 73.8, again a significant improvement over proportionality scores in countries without any quotas.\(^6\) However, we should not jump to the conclusion that party-level quotas are best for generating proportionality. As discussed above, party-level gender quotas are the most common quota choice of Western democracies, which have more proportional legislatures than most other regions of the world (see Chapter 4).

Comparing across countries, minority quotas appear to be much less effective at generating proportionality than gender quotas. The average GIP for countries with minority quotas is 70.0, 9 percent higher than countries with no quotas at all. But, the average difference between countries without quotas and those with minority quotas is not statistically significant. The lesser effectiveness of minority quotas at generating proportionality is not surprising when bearing in mind that gender inequalities in politics are much more pronounced than inequalities by majority/majority status (see Chapter

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\(^6\) T-tests reveal that the differences in average proportionality between countries with national-level and party-level gender quotas are not statistically significant.
Women make up more than half of the world’s population but in no country hold 50 percent or more of the seats in the national legislature. Minority groups, in contrast, often make up just a fraction of the population, and most countries today include at least some minority representatives.

Next, the average GIP scores suggest that mixed quotas—the combination of minority quotas and party-level gender quotas—are not more effective at generating proportionality than minority quotas alone. Indeed, the average level of proportionality found in legislatures with mixed quotas is almost identical to proportionality in legislatures with only minority quotas. Countries with tandem quotas, in contrast, have among the highest levels of proportionality in parliament. Countries with tandem quotas have legislatures that are, on average, 1 percent more proportional than countries with national-level gender quotas alone and 3 percent more proportional than countries with only minority quotas. These scores provide initial evidence that when policies designed to remedy inequalities for women and minorities operate at different levels (i.e., party and national), they may have much less success generating descriptive representation than when they both operate the same level (i.e., national and national).

But how quotas affect overall levels of diversity in a legislature is only part of the story. Not all groups may equally benefit from policies that generally create more proportional legislatures. The political advancement of one type of group (e.g., ethnic minorities) may be associated with greater inequality for other groups (e.g., women).

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57 Another explanation for the small effect of minority quotas on disproportionality is that minority quotas typically affect a fewer number of seats than other kinds of quotas. But since many minority groups are small, a few seats may be proportional representation.

58 However, with such a small number of countries with these policies (N=5), t-tests suggest that tandem quotas are not significantly more proportional than countries with no quotas.
Minority women, in particular, may also be less likely to see gains from either gender or minority quotas than majority women and minority men, respectively. Therefore, I also employ odds ratios to weigh how quotas affect the odds of election of four groups—minority women, majority women, minority men, and majority men.

**Odds Ratios**

The first column of odds ratios indicates that in a country with no quota, the odds that a minority woman is elected compared to a majority man are 0.10—one in ten. Or, taken as the reciprocal, the odds that a majority male is elected are, on average, more than ten times the odds that a minority woman is elected. The odds ratios also suggest that as expected, minority women in countries without quotas have much lower odds of election than both majority women and minority men. Further, taking into account each group’s share of the population, women in countries without quotas are generally underrepresented to a higher degree than minority groups. Indeed, without quotas, minority men have more than twice the average odds of election than majority women.

So, how do quotas change the odds? First, the third and fourth rows of Table 5.2 report odds ratios of countries with country- and party-level gender quotas. Perhaps not surprisingly, gender quotas increase the odds that women are elected. With either national- or party-level gender quotas, majority women’s odds of election relative to majority men are about 1 in 3, twice the odds without quotas. Majority women do even better compared to minority men. Indeed, with the help of gender quotas, majority women’s odds of election are roughly the same as those of minority men. Gender quotas also benefit minority women. In fact, with national- or party-level gender quotas,
minority women have the highest odds of election relative to their male peers. But, minority women are not the primary beneficiaries of gender quotas. In countries with gender quotas, the odds that majority women are elected relative to minority women are higher than in countries with no quotas or minority quotas. Overall, both majority and minority women benefit from gender quotas, but *majority* women benefit most.

The second row of Table 5.2 reports the odds ratios for countries with minority quotas. Although minority quotas appear not have strong effects on overall proportionality in a legislature, minority quotas still increase the odds that both minority men and women are elected. Indeed, in countries with minority quotas, both minority women and men have higher election odds than in countries with no quotas or gender quotas. For instance, with minority quotas the average odds of electing a minority man compared to a majority man are almost the same. With minority quotas, minority women also have the same odds of election, on average, than majority women.

However, the odds ratios also suggest that in countries that have mobilized to address political inequalities by race, ethnicity, or religion, gender inequalities remain. Indeed, minority men’s odds of election compared to majority women increase from 2:1 without quotas to a margin of 5:1 with minority quotas. Thus, minority quotas may advance the representation of minorities at some expense to the election of majority women. Minority quotas also appear to benefit minority men more than minority women. In fact, with minority quotas the odds of electing a minority man over a minority woman are almost twice those in countries with no quotas. In sum, minority quotas increase the odds of election for both minority men and women, but minority *men* are the leading beneficiaries.
Interestingly, the tendency of gender quotas to benefit majority women and of minority quotas to benefit minority men may increase where the policies appear together. That is, minority women do not appear to benefit from a combination of minority quotas and *party-level* gender quotas (mixed quotas). Minority men receive a slight odds advantage from this combination of policies, particularly relative to minority women. For instance, minority men’s odds of election compared to minority women increase from 3 to 1 without quotas to 4 to 1 with minority and party gender quotas. Majority women also benefit from this configuration of quota policies—closing the gender gap in representation. Compared to majority men, majority women have better election odds with mixed minority and party quotas than with no quotas at all (their odds are 25% better). But with mixed quotas, minority women are left by the wayside. Indeed, across all of the country samples (no quotas, minority quotas, etc.), minority women in countries with mixed quotas have the worst odds relative to majority men.

In contrast, tandem quotas are especially beneficial to minority women. For example, with tandem quotas minority women have the best odds of election relative to majority men, 0.65 times the odds. And for the first time, minority women in countries with tandem quotas have higher average odds of election than their majority female peers, almost twice the odds. Tandem quotas also benefit male members of minority groups. In fact, it is only in countries with tandem quotas that any group has higher average odds of election than majority men—minority men have 1.56 times the odds of election of majority men. Although tandem quotas benefit minority men and women to a larger extent than majority women, tandem quotas also improve the odds of electing a majority woman relative to a majority man. Indeed, with tandem quotas majority women
have about 0.29 the average odds of election of majority men, roughly the same odds as in countries with gender quotas. In sum, tandem quotas are especially beneficial for minority men and women, but they also improve the election odds of majority women over majority men.

Overall, the descriptive results presented in Table 5.2 suggest that quotas do impact the chances that women and minorities are elected. But, the kinds of policies adopted may have different consequences for within-group diversity. Minority women, in particular, may be quite differentially affected depending on the type or types of quotas adopted. Before drawing final conclusions, however, it is important to remember that quota policies are not randomly distributed. Thus, it is important to consider the effects of quota policies on minority women’s election controlling for other factors that influence the composition of national legislatures.

*Predicting Women’s Political Representation: Quota Effects on Majority and Minority Women*

Table 5.3 presents the results of the hierarchical linear models predicting the share of legislative seats held by both majority and minority women in 81 countries. The first column presents the results from Model 1, the baseline model. When only the group-level and country-level control variables are included, the results are similar to what is reported in Chapter 4. Women from groups in the West have significantly more women than those living in non-Western countries. Women also benefit politically from greater labor force participation. In contrast, economic development does not significantly affect women’s representation in national legislatures. PR electoral systems also benefit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td><strong>Quota Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Minority Quota</td>
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<td>1.81 ***</td>
<td>1.81 ***</td>
<td>1.82 ***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quota</td>
<td>1.07 *</td>
<td>1.02 *</td>
<td>1.06 *</td>
<td>1.08 *</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quota</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
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<td><strong>Cross-Level Interactions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quota * Majority</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quota * Majority</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.13 **</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(2.17)</td>
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<td><strong>Country-Level Covariates</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>1.01 **</td>
<td>1.02 **</td>
<td>1.02 **</td>
<td>1.07 **</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
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<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.28 *</td>
<td>1.51 **</td>
<td>1.51 **</td>
<td>1.52 **</td>
<td>1.52 **</td>
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<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
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<td>PR Electoral System</td>
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<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active(^a)</td>
<td>0.04 (^t)</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita(^a)</td>
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<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
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<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group-Level Covariates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size(^a)</td>
<td>0.08 ***</td>
<td>0.08 ***</td>
<td>0.08 ***</td>
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<td>0.08 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>8.97 ***</td>
<td>9.22 ***</td>
<td>8.90 ***</td>
<td>9.22 ***</td>
<td>7.13 ***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N -- Groups 308 308 308 308 308
N -- Countries 81 81 81 81 81

\(*\*p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, \(t\)p<.10; standard errors are in parentheses.\)
\(^a\) Denotes that the variable is Grand Mean Centered.
Note: "Natl Gender Quota"=National-Level Gender Quota; "PR"=Proportional Representation.

Table 5.3: Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Women’s Share of Legislative Seats
with National- and Party-Level Quotas across 308 Groups in 81 National Legislatures
women in this model, but we know from Chapter 4 that the positive effect only really benefits majority women.

At the group level, Model 1 indicates that, as expected, women from larger groups obtain more legislative seats. But the group size variable also quantifies women’s underrepresentation in politics. On average, a 20 percent increase in a group’s share of the population produces an increase in women’s legislative representation of only 1.6 percent. Even controlling for factors such as group size, women from majority groups are also represented at significantly higher levels than their minority counterparts—a margin of almost 9 percent. (See Chapter 4 for more discussion of the effects of minority status on women’s legislative representation.)

Model 2 adds in the effects of quota policies that are regulated at the national level. The results suggest that both gender and minority quotas positively affect women’s representation in national legislatures. Women from groups living under national-level gender quotas are represented at levels 1.07 percent higher than women in countries without such policies. The effect size is larger, 1.81, for women from groups affected by minority quotas. Thus, although minority men may be the primary beneficiaries from minority quotas, the multivariate analyses suggest that minority quotas significantly benefit minority women. However, the effects of gender and minority quotas may still differ for majority and minority women.

Presented in the next column of Table 5.3, Model 3 explicitly tests whether the effects of national-level gender quotas on women’s political representation vary by majority/minority status. The results from Model 3 contradict the findings from the average odds ratios. Specifically, the insignificant interaction term suggests that—
controlling for important country- and group-level factors—the effects of national-level
gender quotas are not significantly different for majority and minority women. In short,
national-level gender quotas benefit both majority and minority women similarly.

Models 5 and 6 add in the effects party-level gender quotas, testing both their
main effect on women’s representation and the interaction between party-level gender
quotas and majority status. Model 5 suggests that only national-level gender quotas
increase women’s representation, on average. Party-level gender quotas have no
significant effects on women’s political representation, when measured at the group level.
Although there is no significant main effect of party-level gender quotas on women’s
legislative outcomes across countries, Model 6 suggests that party-level gender quotas
have significantly different effects for majority and minority women. Indeed, the
interaction between party-level gender quotas and majority status is statistically
significant, and the effect size is large. Party-level gender quotas have little to no effect
on the political representation of minority women, but they do benefit majority women.
Specifically, with or without party-level gender quotas, women from minority groups
hold approximately 3.5 percent of seats (3.6 percent without quotas, 3.4 percent with
quotas). But for majority women, party-level gender quotas increase their share of seats
by about 6 percent.

Any Minority Quota

Table 5.4 reports the results of models considering the effects of a minority quota
for any group in the country on women’s political representation. In the previous
### Quota Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quota for Any Group</td>
<td>1.33 **</td>
<td>1.52 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quota</td>
<td>1.13 *</td>
<td>1.13 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Cross-Level Interactions

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quota * Majority</td>
<td>-6.71 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Country-Level Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.98 **</td>
<td>0.91 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.22 *</td>
<td>1.21 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Electoral System</td>
<td>0.69 ¹</td>
<td>0.70 ¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
<td>0.06 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Group-Level Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Size&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
<td>0.09 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>8.63 ***</td>
<td>10.23 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N -- Groups</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N -- Countries</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ¹p<.10; standard errors are in parentheses.
<sup>a</sup> Denotes that the variable is Grand Mean Centered.

Note: "Natl Gender Quota"=National-Level Gender Quota;
"PR"=Proportional Representation.

Table 5.4: Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Women’s Share of Legislative Seats with National- and Party-Level Quotas across 308 Groups in 81 National Legislatures
analysis, I considered the effect of quotas on groups specifically targeted by quota policies. Here, I test how the presence of minority quotas in a country affects the political representation of women from all groups. So, for example, New Zealand uses a quota to guarantee representation for the indigenous Maori people. In the prior analysis, only Maori would be coded as having a minority quota. In this section, all of New Zealand is coded as having a minority quota. Using this “Minority Quota for Any Group” measure, I am able to assess how having a minority quota in a country affects majority and minority women differently.

Model 6 reports the main effects of minority quotas measured at the country level. The effect of minority quotas remains positive and significant, but the effect size is reduced. Since minority quotas should primarily benefit women from minority groups, it is not surprising that the magnitude of the effect of a minority quota for any group is slightly smaller than the effect of a quota on women from targeted group. Still, on average, minority quotas significantly increase women’s representation.

Model 7 considers the interaction between minority quotas and majority status. In other words, I test whether the slope of the effect of majority status on women’s representation is significantly different in countries with minority quotas compared to the slope in countries with no such policies. The significant negative interaction term between minority quotas and majority status suggests that, indeed, the benefit of majority status for women’s representation is reduced in the presence of minority quotas.

A less rosy way of looking at it, however, is that minority quotas may lead to lower levels of majority women’s representation than in countries with no quotas. Using a predicted equation for Model 7, I calculate that minority quotas increase minority
women’s share of legislative seats from 3.3 percent to 4.8 percent. But for majority women, the effect is reversed. Majority women’s share of seats drops more than five percent from 22.6 percent without national-level quotas to 17.4 percent with minority quotas only. Thus, in contrast to national-level gender quotas which benefit both majority and minority women, only minority women benefit from minority quotas.

*The Effects of Mixed-Level and Tandem Quotas on Minority Women’s Political Representation*

Table 5.5, in contrast to the previous two tables, considers the political representation of *minority women only*. Moving to a more targeted analysis of minority women’s legislative outcomes serves two purposes. First, I am able to test the robustness of earlier findings regarding the effects of different quota policies on minority women’s representation. But also, I am able to take the analyses one step further to analyze how the policies addressing the political underrepresentation of women and minorities interact to influence the election of minority women.

The first column of Table 5.5, Model 8, displays the results of the baseline model predicting women’s share of legislative seats for minority groups only. Without including any quota variables, only group size and economic development are statistically significant. GDP has a marginally significant negative effect on minority women’s political representation, but the significance of GDP is sensitive to the inclusion of a wide range of covariates (e.g., democracy, multi-member districts, other regional variables). In all models, the effect of electoral system on minority women’s representation is not

---

59 All predicted equations reported calculate women’s political representation for the average sized group living in a non-Western with average economic development, average female economic activity, and no PR electoral system.
### Table 5.5: Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Women’s Share of Legislative Seats with National- and Party-Level Quotas across 223 Groups in 67 National Legislatures

#### Quota Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quota</td>
<td>1.80 ***</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.80 ***</td>
<td>2.30 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quota</td>
<td>0.91 *</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.80 †</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quota</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl Gender Quota * Minority Quota</td>
<td>3.87 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.82 †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quota * Minority Quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Country-Level Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.25 *</td>
<td>0.70 *</td>
<td>1.33 **</td>
<td>0.76 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Electoral System</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active (a)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05 *</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05 *</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP per capita (a)</td>
<td>-0.47 †</td>
<td>-0.43 †</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.44 †</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Group-Level Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Size (a)</td>
<td>0.06 ***</td>
<td>0.07 ***</td>
<td>0.05 ***</td>
<td>0.06 ***</td>
<td>0.05 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10; standard errors are in parentheses.
  
* Denotes that the variable is Grand Mean Centered.
significantly different from zero. In the baseline model, Western countries do not have significantly different levels of minority representation than countries in other regions. Once quota variables are introduced, however, we do see greater minority representation in the West than in other regions of the world.\footnote{The analyses from the previous chapter suggest that it is the inclusion of the minority quota variable that impacts findings related to the Western effect. In most models in Chapter 4, the West did not have significantly higher levels of minority women’s legislative representation (in \textit{absolute} terms). It was only when minority quotas were added to the model that the positive effect of the Western dummy on minority women’s representation reached statistical significance. (Remember, however, that the West always has significantly higher levels of minority women’s representation \textit{relative} to male members of their group.)}

Model 9 adds in the effects of minority and national-level gender quotas. Consistent with the results thus far, Model 9 suggests that both gender and minority quotas regulated at the national level benefit minority women. When only minority groups are analyzed, the effect of minority quotas on women’s political representation is roughly twice that of national-level gender quotas. Thus, national-level gender quotas do increase minority women’s share of seats in national legislatures, but minority quotas have an even stronger effect. (Thus, these results support Hypothesis H3a and refute H3b.)

Next, in Model 10 I analyze the effects of tandem quotas—the combination of national-level gender and minority quotas. The results support Hypothesis 5, that a combination of national-level policies regulating gender and minority status benefits minority women.\footnote{It is important to note that these results are sensitive to the inclusion of specific cases. Only five countries in the analysis have tandem quotas (Afghanistan, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jordan, and Romania) and including one or more of these cases does affect the results. Removing two of the following—Afghanistan, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina—at the same time reduces the effect of tandem quotas to zero. Alternatively, excluding Romania from the sample increases the tandem quota effect.} Using a predicted equation, I find that without any national- or party-level quotas, women from an average sized minority group hold 1.6 percent of seats in
the legislature. But with tandem quotas, minority women’s share of legislative seats increases by more than five times to 8.4 percent. In this model, the positive effect of national-level gender quotas and minority quotas both operate through tandem quotas. That is, neither minority quotas nor national-level gender quotas continue to have a significant main effect on minority women’s legislative outcomes. Still, compared to groups in countries with no quotas or only gender quotas, those affected by minority quotas have more than double the percentage of minority women in the national legislature.

Models 11 and 12 consider the effects of party-level gender quotas. Although the coefficient of party-level quotas is negative in Model 11, the effect is not significantly different from zero. However, the significant interaction term in Model 10 suggests that party-level gender quotas significantly reduce the positive effect of minority quotas on minority women’s political representation. With party-level gender quotas, women from groups affected by minority quotas are still better represented than in countries with no quotas at all. But consistent with the odds ratios, the results indicate that minority quotas alone produce higher levels of minority women’s representation than when present alongside party-level gender quotas.

Like tandem quotas, there are a small number of countries in my sample with mixed quotas (Croatia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, India, Slovenia, and Venezuela). Thus, this finding is somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of particular cases. However, it is only when several of these cases are excluded at once that the results are substantially different.
Case Studies: Romania and Burundi

Although the results above indicate that tandem quotas may have the strongest positive effects on minority women’s legislative representation, it is important to recognize that there is a good deal of variation in the kinds of tandem quotas that exist around the world. In this section, I discuss some of those differences, along with their effects on minority women’s political representation. I do so through the cases of Burundi and Romania.

Burundi and Romania are very different countries. Just a few of the differences between them include their size, geography, population composition, dominant religious and cultural traditions, and economic development. The political contexts in these two countries are also quite dissimilar. Following decades of communist rule, Romania today is a stable democracy with close ties to the West, joining both NATO and the EU in the last few years. In contrast, Burundi’s first democratically elected president was assassinated in the early 1990s, resulting in a 12-year civil war fought along ethnic lines. After international parties helped to negotiate a ceasefire in 2003, Burundi held regular elections in 2005. Table 5.6 compares these two countries using broad indicators of social, economic, and political difference. The table also summarizes each country’s policies regarding the political representation of women and minority groups and provides the share of legislative seats each occupies.

Table 5.6 indicates that despite their differences, Burundi and Romania have some things in common. Both have Proportional Representation party-list (PR-PL) electoral systems, which are particularly beneficial for women’s political representation (see Chapter 4). Romania and Burundi also have somewhat similar majority/minority
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pop Size (2007 est.)</th>
<th>Majority % of Pop</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Gender Quotas</th>
<th>% Wom in Legislature</th>
<th>Ethnic / Religious Quotas</th>
<th>% Min in Legislature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>22.2 million</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>$9,100</td>
<td>PR-PL</td>
<td>all parties must include women; dominant party has 30% quota</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Ethnic minority parties not reaching 5% vote threshold still afforded representation</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>8.4 million</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>$700</td>
<td>PR-PL</td>
<td>national-level; 30% reserved seats</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Mandated division of seats by ethnicity: 60-40%, except 3 reserved seats for indigenous minority</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sources: CIA Factbook (2007); IDEA (2007); US Department of State (2007)

Note: PR-PL='Proportional representation-party list system'; 'Wom'=Women; 'Min'=Minorities; 'Pop'=Population.

Table 5.6: Selected Country-Level Data for Romania and Burundi
structures. Both countries have a dominant majority group that makes up 85-90% of the country’s population (ethnic Romanians, and Hutus), as well as a significantly sized minority group that makes up at least 5% of the population (ethnic Hungarians and Tutsis). Each of the countries also has one or more small minority groups.

Furthermore, Burundi and Romania have both adopted national-level institutional rules governing the incorporation of women and minority groups—what I call “tandem quotas”. However, the specifics of the quota policies across the two countries are quite different. For example, Burundi uses reserved seat quotas that allocate 30% of seats to women (IDEA 2007). Romania, alternatively, does not reserve seats for women, but all political parties are required to include women on party lists. Further, in 2004, the largest political coalition in Romania, the Social Democrats, began requiring that at least 30% of its candidates be women. Women’s political representation is higher in Burundi (31%) than in Romania (11%).

Burundi and Romania also both have formal rules regarding the representation of minority groups. But, again, these policies are quite different. Burundi mandates a 60%-40% majority-minority split, in addition to reserving three seats for the Twa, or pygmies. All political parties compete for 101 seats, but following the elections additional members are co-opted to ensure that the quotas are met. In 2005, for example, 18 additional seats were co-opted after the election. In Romania, if a minority ethnic group’s political organization does not receive 5% of votes, the threshold required to earn seats outright, the ethnic group is still afforded a representative in parliament (USDS 2007b). Thus, Romania is one of the few countries to use minority quotas but not specifically reserve seats for minorities in the legislature.
Table 5.7 summarizes political representation by gender and ethnicity for Burundi and Romania. I consider the effects of quotas on the composition of the national legislature for each country in turn. First, the tandem quota employed in Burundi is exactly the kind of policy that should benefit minority women. Gender and ethnicity are both regulated at the national level through the same mechanism: co-opting seats. Because Tutsi or Twa women can meet both the ethnic and gender requirements while filling only a single seat, the election of these women means that more Hutu men can be included in the legislature while still meeting the quota. In fact, of the female members of Burundi’s National Assembly, 57% are minorities (Tutsi or Twa). Further, of the 18 co-opted positions, more than half are minority women.\textsuperscript{63} In this context, the dual identities of minority women benefit them politically.

However, the greater participation of Tutsi and Twa women may have helped to contribute to greater underrepresentation of Hutu, or majority, women. Hutu women make up over 40 percent of the population, but they only hold 14 percent of the seats in the Assembly. Therefore, where similar provisions regulating gender and ethnicity exist together, minority women’s advancement may come at the some expense to majority women. However, majority women’s share of seats in Rwanda (14 percent) is still very close to the average in my sample of 15 percent (see Chapter 3). Thus, it may be more accurate to assert that tandem quotas are less helpful to majority women than other kinds of quota policies, but they are not necessarily hurtful to majority women’s election.

\textsuperscript{63} Of the 101 elected positions, 11 (11%) female minorities and 24 (24%) male minorities were elected; 13 (13%) were females from the majority ethnic group, and 52 (51%) were males from the majority ethnic group. Of the 18 co-opted positions, 10 (55%) were female minorities, 4 (22%) were male minorities, 3 (17%) were females from the majority ethnic group, and 1 (6%) was a male from the majority ethnic group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th></th>
<th>N % Gr</th>
<th>% All</th>
<th>N % Gr</th>
<th>% All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>&lt;0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>&lt;0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>&lt;0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>&lt;0.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.3%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusyn</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th></th>
<th>N % Gr</th>
<th>% All</th>
<th>N % Gr</th>
<th>% All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twa</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population data are from the CIA World Factbook (2005), the Encyclopedia of Nations (2007), and Alionescu (2003).

Table 5.7: Political Representation by Gender and Ethnicity for Romania and Burundi, 2005.
In contrast to Burundi, the national-level gender and minority quotas in Romania do not interact with one another to benefit minority women. In Romania, all parties are required to include women on party lists, but the quota does not require that parties place women on party lists in winnable positions (i.e., there are no “placement mandates”). Without this requirement, parties can effectively ignore the national-level gender quota.

Of particular consequence to minority women is that parties that represent minority groups have ignored the gender quota legislation. For example, the largest minority group in Romania, the Hungarian minority, is politically organized as the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and in 2005, the party reached the 5% threshold required to achieve representation in the legislature. However, UDMR included no women in winnable positions on its party list. So, of the 22 seats occupied by the Hungarian minority, not a single seat is held by a woman.

The second challenge to the election of minority women in Romania is that minority parties affected by the minority quota are only allotted a single seat in the legislature, and that seat often goes to a minority man. Even if minority parties are following the quota and including women on their party lists, if women are not the party leader, they are unlikely to fill the single seat allotted to their party under the minority quota system. For instance, the Social Democratic Roma Party did not reach the 5% threshold, was allotted a seat in parliament, and the seat is occupied by a man. Only two of the 17 seats allocated to minority groups under Romania’s minority quota are held by women—the seats allocated to Albanians and Macedonians. Overall, the combination of

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64 For more on placement mandates and other features of gender quotas that affect quota impact, see Dahlerup (2006).
gender and ethnic provisions in Romania does not advance the political representation of women from the country’s two significant minority populations—the Hungarians and the Roma.

The general lesson from Romania is that not all countries with national-level policies regulating both gender and minority status will benefit minority women. In order to positively benefit minority women’s representation, national-level gender quotas must be effective. That is, quotas that are not strong enough to force parties to include female candidates in winnable list positions or districts are unlikely to benefit minority women. If Romania adopted a placement mandate requiring women to occupy every other seat on party lists—called a zipper system—minority women would have obtained 4 percent more seats in the 2005 election. But, the specific nature of the minority quota in Romania also does not advantage minority women. Even a zipper system would not necessarily facilitate the election of women from the smallest minority groups, since Romania’s quota only allot minority groups one seat each, and that seat could still be occupied by a male representative.

In sum, the cases of Burundi and Romania show how the specifics of the combinations of national-level gender and minority quotas matter for minority women’s legislative outcomes. Romania shows that the different logics and structures of gender and ethnic quotas can leave minority women behind, especially when either quota is ineffective. Alternatively, Burundi shows that the multiplicity of minority women’s identities may provide them with strategic advantages when tandem quotas are effective and the representation of both women and minorities is regulated through similar mechanisms.
DISCUSSION

In the sections above, I evaluated the effects of gender and minority quotas on the
political representation of women, minorities, and minority women using multiple
measures and strategies. I summarize the findings from this research in Table 5.8. For
each quota policy, I list groups that are primary beneficiaries, groups that typically are
not beneficiaries, and how the policy impacts overall levels of proportionality. When
findings only come from the descriptive analyses, I include an asterisk. So, for example,
the first row of the table indicates that both majority and minority women benefit from
national-level gender quotas, but descriptive analyses suggest that minority men may not
benefit from such policies. In contrast, party-level gender quotas only benefit majority
women. But, both national- and party-level gender quotas lead to significantly more
proportional legislatures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quota Type</th>
<th>Primary Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Not Beneficial For</th>
<th>Proportionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Gender Quotas</td>
<td>both majority and minority women</td>
<td>minority men*</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Gender Quotas</td>
<td>only majority women</td>
<td>minority men*</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Quotas</td>
<td>minority men and women, men* more</td>
<td>majority women</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Quotas</td>
<td>minority men* and majority women*</td>
<td>minority women (only vs. minority quotas)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandem Quotas</td>
<td>minorities, minority women more*, but only when both quotas are effective</td>
<td>majority men*</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates that the results are only based on the odds ratios and were not tested in the multivariate analyses.

Table 5.8: Summary of Effects of Quota Policies
Minority quotas, like national-level gender quotas, benefit more than one group. Specifically, minority quotas increase the political representation of both minority men and women. The odds ratios suggest that minority men potentially benefit from these policies slightly more than minority women. But, both descriptive and multivariate analyses show that minority quotas are associated with lower levels of majority women in national legislatures. The greater inclusion of minorities alongside lower levels of majority women’s representation results in legislatures with similar levels of proportionality as legislatures unaffected by quotas.

Mixed quotas appear to increase the tendency of minority quotas to benefit minority men and party-level gender quotas to benefit majority women. When these two policies appear together, minority women may be left behind. It is important to acknowledge that minority women are still positively impacted by mixed quotas relative to countries with no quotas at all. But, party-level gender quotas reduce the positive benefits of minority quotas on minority women’s representation. At the same time, the appearance of both quotas together appears to reduce the benefits of proportionality created by party-level gender quotas alone.

Finally, tandem quotas appear to be the policy most likely to help minority women in national-level politics. In countries like Burundi, the simultaneous presence of national-level gender and minority quotas creates strategic opportunities for minority women. Descriptive analyses suggest that these policies also lead to increased political representation for minority men. Majority women do not benefit as much as these two groups. But, the odds ratios suggest that majority women still do much better relative to majority men than in countries without any quotas. Tandem quotas also generate among
the highest levels of proportionality of any policy. Overall, tandem quotas may to be the only policy to effectively take a large share of seats from majority men.

CONCLUSION

The increasing adoption of quotas around the world is changing the face of national politics. Women, minorities, and minority women are entering national legislatures in numbers that usually could not have been achieved through regular electoral mechanisms. But, existing research has not considered how quotas affect individuals at the intersection of political disadvantage—minority women. We did not know whether quotas generally benefit minority women, which policies are most beneficial to this particular group, or quota policies combine to affect minority women’s political representation.

Overall, this chapter demonstrates that quotas do help minority women. Without the assistance of quotas, minority women’s representation is abysmally low. Their odds of election are 1 in 10 compared to majority men, 1 in 3 compared to minority men, and 1 in 2 compared to majority women. But, with the assistance of quotas, some or all of these odds improve. As stand alone policies, both national-level gender quotas and minority quotas significantly increase minority women’s political representation. But, the effects of minority quotas are slightly stronger than the effects of gender quotas.

In contrast, this chapter suggests that party-level gender quotas are not the best policies for advancing minority women in politics. On their own, party-level gender quotas do not significantly increase minority women’s legislative representation over countries with no quotas. If women’s movements are unsuccessful pressing for gender
quotas at the national level, movements for party-level gender quotas should consider party incentives for including diverse female candidates.

In combination, the positive effects of national-level quotas on minority women’s representation are even more powerful. In countries like Burundi, tandem quotas provide strategic opportunities for minority women to enter national-level politics. However, the case evidence shows that not all tandem quotas are created equal. In order for tandem quotas to benefit minority women, both policies must be effective, and they must interact with one another. The importance of this interaction is also underscored by the effects of mixed quotas. Indeed, when combined with minority quotas, party-level gender quotas appear to reduce the benefit of minority quotas for minority women. In general, therefore, disconnected efforts to increase the political representation of women and minorities may disadvantage minority women.

Today, majority men continue to hold onto power in most countries in part because countries tend to be affected by gender quotas or minority quotas rather than both. As a consequence, quotas tend to help either women or minorities to gain significant levels of representation. But, given the increasing popularity of quotas, it is possible that more and more countries will include measures to address the political representation of both women and minorities. How these policies interact with one another has serious implications for both overall levels of legislative diversity and the specific political fortunes of minority women.
CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MUSLIM WOMEN

Existing research suggests that Muslim women are substantially underrepresented in national-level politics (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton 1997). As of January 2008, women held less than 5 percent of parliamentary seats in nine Muslim-majority countries. And, the larger the Muslim population is, the lower the share of national legislative seats held by women (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Where Islam dominates the religious landscape, countries reach significant markers of women’s representation—first female national legislator, 10 percent, and 20 percent women in parliament—slower than in countries where Protestantism is in the majority (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006). Many conservative or fundamentalist Muslims also oppose women’s political rights and representation altogether. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Islam may be a significant political obstacle to women’s political empowerment.

Alternatively, some scholars argue that patriarchal culture, not Islam, is the primary obstacle to equality for Muslim women (Duval 1998; Kandiyoti 1992; Sabbagh

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65 In this study, “Muslim” legislators are defined largely by demographic origin. In other words, I consider the political representation of “ethnic Muslims”—men and women in the West who are members of Muslim-majority groups (e.g., Kurds, Tatars), rather than focusing on politicians who presently self-identify as Muslim (Sanders 1997:184-5). Legislators such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who was born in Somalia and raised Muslim but renounced Islam in 2002, are discussed in this chapter as Muslim politicians, based upon their origins and/or group-membership.
According to this perspective, the core geographic areas of Islamic civilization and classic patriarchy overlap, causing the two to be conflated (Kandiyoti 1992). These scholars argue that, in reality, Islam varies substantially across time and place and interacts with the diverse cultures it encounters to produce different outcomes for women (Bodman and Tohidi 1998; Kandiyoti 1992; Moghadam 2003). Research on Muslim immigrant groups often takes this view. Jawad (2003), for example, argues that the education of British Muslim women is constrained by social customs rather than Islamic principles. Similarly, Muslim women in United States and United Kingdom attribute patriarchal cultural practices to ethnicity, rather than to Islam (Haddad and Smith 1996; Werbner 1996).

If, as some scholars argue, Islam is not a significant barrier to the political representation of Muslim women, we should observe variation in Muslim women’s political representation across the world. Muslim immigrant women, in particular, are a useful group to examine. In response to new geographic and social locations, immigrant groups experience changing beliefs, practices, social organizations, and religious experiences (Knott 1986:171). It is possible, therefore, that Islam, as practiced outside of the Muslim world, could be more accepting of women’s political roles than Islam as practiced in Muslim-majority countries.

Western societies, in particular, may be more likely to elect Muslim women than other countries. The prevalence of secular and egalitarian values in many Western countries may provide Muslim women with greater political opportunities than elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, minority women are well represented in Western politics, and Muslim minority women may be no different. On
the other hand, Muslim women in Western countries may face similar barriers or even more significant obstacles to political representation than their peers in the Muslim world. Specific stereotypes associated with Muslim women—for example, that they are oppressed, passive, or male-dependent victims (Roald 2001)—may disadvantage them in Western politics. Further, in some conservative immigrant communities, Muslim women face both structural and cultural barriers. If political parties only set aside a few seats to represent the Muslim minority, it may be the men who snag these spots. As Anne Roald (2001:xii) notes in research on European Muslim women, “men are still the ones who are listened to in Muslim society and Muslim communities.”

Beyond barriers posed by patriarchal attitudes, institutional factors may also be responsible for women’s low levels of political success in the Muslim world. Specifically, the political representation of Muslim women may also be strongly affected by the relationship between religion and the state. When coupled with state authority, Islam may be used to justify women’s exclusion from power. And outside of the Muslim world, countries that do not respect religious freedom for minorities may be less likely to elect Muslim minority women. Furthermore, if Islam does present Muslim women barriers to representation based on religion, separation between church and state may provide Muslim women with a way through. Overall, therefore, governments that respect the free practice of religion, both in policy and in practice, may provide Muslim women with greater opportunities for political careers.

Still, not all Muslim women may take advantage of more open institutional or political contexts to pursue public office. Outside of the Muslim world, distinct colonial histories and patterns of immigration shape the religious views, norms, and structural
characteristics of different Muslim groups. On average, women from certain Muslim
groups may be less inclined towards egalitarian views of gender. For instance, research
on Muslims in the West suggests that Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Indian Muslims may be
more likely than other Western Muslims to subscribe to traditionalist views of Islam
(Klausen 2005b:95), which is associated with more restrictive views of women’s roles
(Ahmed 1992). Thus, even in countries that provide Muslim women with greater
opportunities for political representation, differences across Muslim groups may continue
to depress Muslim women’s political representation.

In this chapter, I employ new group-level data on women’s political
representation to explore the political representation of Muslim women. Using
Hierarchical Linear Modeling, I first test whether women from Muslim-majority groups
in Western countries achieve higher levels of representation, relative to male members of
their group, than outside of the West. Next, I consider whether institutional factors
predict the political outcomes of Muslim women. Specifically, I test whether the
integration of secular values into political institutions increases Muslim women’s share of
group seats. Finally, I consider differences in the political representation of Muslim
women from Middle Eastern, North African, Turkish, and South Asian backgrounds in
countries around the world.

Before turning to the quantitative analyses, however, I first discuss the
relationship between Islam and women’s representation. Then, I explain why Muslim
women may be differentially represented in the West relative to other parts of the world.
I explore how varied institutional environments might affect Muslim women’s
representation. And, I briefly survey research on relevant differences across Muslim-majority groups.

**ISLAM AND WOMEN’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

When assessing whether and how Islam may create barriers to women’s political representation, one place to start is with Islam itself. Does Islamic doctrine suggest that women should not participate in politics? The central religious text of Islam, the Koran, does not specifically address the issue of women in politics. But, Koranic verse is sometimes interpreted in ways that constrain women’s political participation and representation. For instance, some Muslims interpret verse that men are in charge of women (qiwama) as meaning that women can never lead men in any capacity, including in politics (Koran 4:34). Other Koranic verse addressing the proper behavior of the Prophet’s wives suggests that they should stay in the home (Koran 33: 30-33). Believers of Salafism or Wahhabism—a conservative form of Sunni Islam that is dominant in Saudi Arabia and has strong footholds in parts of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia—interpret this passage to suggest that women, overall, should endeavor to stay in their homes (Roald 2001). Salafi women are, in some cases, prohibited from driving or attending mosque, much less encouraged to run for public office.

Although women’s political leadership is not specifically addressed in the Koran, other Islamic texts suggest that the Prophet Muhammad expressly spoke out against

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66 The Koran does provide an account of one female leader, the queen of Sheba. But, the queen of Sheba is described in the Koran as a just and mighty ruler, and criticism of her is largely relegated to issues of her faith, rather than her adequacy as a political ruler (Spellberg 1992; Roald 2001).
women’s political leadership. Reports of the Prophet Muhammad’s words or actions that were later recorded are called Hadiths. These reports suggest that Muhammad warned, “Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity” or, by another account, “Never will succeed such a nation as makes a woman their ruler” (Bukhari, Vol 9, Bk 88, Ch 18, Hadith 119). According to Mernissi (1996:4), this particular Hadith is the “sledgehammer argument used by those who want to exclude women from politics…This Hadith is so important that it is practically impossible to discuss the question of women’s political rights without referring to it, debating it, and taking a position on it.”

In recent years, this particular Hadith has come under fire from Muslim scholars, who have reexamined and reinterpreted Islamic texts and history (Mernissi 1991, 1996; see also Ahmed 1992; Kamrava 2006; Wadud 1992). In particular, Mernissi (1991) argues that this Hadith was advanced for political reasons, more than 25 years after the death of the Prophet. At the time in which the Hadith was first voiced, the Prophet’s fourth wife ‘A’isha had just failed in her attempt to challenge the political succession of the fourth caliph in a battle that left some 15,000 dead. Abu Bakra, the man allegedly recalled the Prophet’s warning against female political leaders was in a precarious political position after refusing to take sides during the battle (Mernissi 1991). In short, Mernissi (1991) maintains that the words of the Prophet were manipulated for political reasons.

67 ‘A’isha is and was a highly controversial political figure. Her most ardent critics hold her responsible for both the first civil war in Islamic society, which facilitated the split between Sunni and Shi’ia Muslims, and for the centuries of political strife that followed (Mernissi 1991; Spellberg 1992).
Regardless of its origin or validity, this particular Hadith provides a basis for limiting Muslim women’s political rights and representation. Thus, some Muslims, especially Islamists, do believe women should not participate in politics. For example, the Islamic Liberation Party, which is present in both the Muslim world and the West, bars women from all governing positions (Roald 2001). It is also important to recognize that Islamists often justify women’s continued exclusion from politics using Islamic law or *sharia*, which draws not only on Islamic sources like the *Koran*, but also on consensus, reasoning, and precedent. In 2005, for instance, Kuwaiti Islamists attempted to block women from suffrage on the grounds that it violated *sharia*, a position that was validated by the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Hasan 2005).

However, even among Islamists, beliefs about women in politics are not uniform. Some Islamists interpret the *Koran* and Hadiths as barring women from politics entirely, while others suggest that Islam only prohibits women serving as caliph or head of state (Badawi 1995; Roald 2001). For example, in a survey of Islamists in Europe, Roald (2001:198) found that three-quarters of respondents believed that Muslim women can have high positions in society, while only 20 percent of the sample agreed that women could be state leaders. Still, as this statistic indicates, some Islamists do allow for women to serve in political leadership. For example, in 1978, influential Pakistani thinker and Islamist political leader Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi argued that under extraordinary circumstances, women’s leadership is acceptable under Islam (Roald 2001). More recently, Rashid al-Ghannushi, an Islamist political leader in Tunisia, suggested that a woman may serve as a national leader if she is best qualified to rule (Roald 2001).
Overall, research suggests that Islam has been, and continues to be used to legitimate the exclusion of women from politics. However, Islamic doctrine is interpreted in different ways in different times and places, even by Islamists. And even when the idea of women in politics faces vociferous ideological opposition, current statistics on women’s political representation around the world suggest that a sizeable gap remains between the traditional ideal of Muslim women’s political exclusion and the reality of women’s incorporation. In the next section, I consider whether the gap between traditional ideals and reality may be greater in the West than in other parts of the world.

LEVELS OF MUSLIM WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN THE WEST COMPARED TO THE MUSLIM WORLD

Muslim women’s representation, relative to their male counterparts, may be higher in the West than in the rest of the world. For one, Western countries may be, on average, more secular than countries outside of the West, providing a context in which faith and politics can be separated. In such a context, secular Muslim women may rise to power by distancing themselves from their religious background or beliefs. In short, Muslim female politicians who subscribe to the secular norms in Western society may bypass some of the barriers to running for office in the West faced by traditional Muslim women.

Scholars point to a range of indicators of secularization among Western Muslims, including evidence of secularity in Muslim politics (Cesari and McLoughlin 2005; Klausen 2005b; Nijsten 1996; Roy 2004). Jytte Klausen (2005b: 86-94) distinguishes between three Muslim groups that support Western secular norms: secular integrationists,
voluntarists, and anti-clericals. Secular integrationist and voluntarist Muslims both generally prefer state neutrality toward religion.\(^{68}\) Anti-clericals, on the other hand, oppose religious influence in political life altogether and often voice suspicion of religion in general. A fourth group, neo-orthodox, are less secular in their orientation, believing that Muslims should have the right to live under religious law if they so choose. Klausen (2005b) finds that among Muslim leaders in six Western European countries, only about one-quarter subscribe to neo-orthodoxy, and the higher that Muslim leaders reach in the national political system, the more likely they are to be secularists.

Beyond the separation of religion and politics, Muslims in Western countries may have different religious beliefs or values than their counterparts across the world—beliefs and values that may benefit Muslim women’s political representation. Many Western Muslims believe that Islam should be interpreted in light of the times and the societies in which Muslims live (Klausen 2005b; Roald 2001). In Sweden, for example, the term ‘blue-yellow’ Islam has developed to describe the “blending of Islam with essential Swedish qualities” (Klausen 2005b:97). And, across Europe, some Muslim leaders have promoted a distinct ‘Euro-Islam.’ For instance, one proponent of European Islam, Tariq Ramadan, argues that “European Muslims have a historic opportunity to develop a purer version of Islam freed of the ethnic practices and diversions that characterize religious exercise in the Muslim world” (Klausen 2005b:98). However, others believe that Islam

\(^{68}\) Secular integrationists desire parity for Muslims, believing that Islam (or, at least a mainstream version of Islam) should be integrated into the existing framework of church-state relations in Western countries. Voluntarists, alternatively, are more fearful of assimilation and are therefore more skeptical of any state regulation of Islam. Voluntarists, in contrast to secular integrationists, prefer state neutrality over equality or parity. (Klausen 2005b)
is itself flexible enough to fit with Western values, and a distinct ‘Euro-Islam’ is unnecessary (Klausen 2005b).

The religious beliefs and attitudes of Western Muslims may be particularly different with regard to traditional practices that oppress women. Indeed, the majority of Muslim political leaders, both men and women, believe that religious law must be reformed to account for women’s current status and roles (Klausen 2005b). Even women who otherwise expressed traditionalist views voiced their preference that Islam and European legal norms should be balanced in ways that protect women’s rights. Across the West, Muslim women and women’s groups have sought to promote women and women’s roles within an Islamic framework, working to “reconstruct the tradition from within” (Wadud 2006:112). And in some countries in Western Europe, Muslim women have even been leading men in prayer in Koran study groups and in informal mosque settings (Klausen 2005a).

Changing values among Western Muslim women may be the result of women’s improved position in the social structure. In the United States, for example, Arab-American women are more educated, have higher employment rates, and fewer children than their Arab counterparts (Read 2004). These differences may have important implications for women’s attitudes and beliefs. In the Netherlands, for instance, Muslim women who are highly educated and integrated into the workforce may be more likely to reinterpret their religious beliefs in ways that are more consistent with Dutch values (Bartelink 1994; cited in Nijsten 1996). But even women who do not benefit from Western education or employment may not internalize traditional values regarding women without question (Afshar 1994:128). As Cairnkar (1996) finds, “Even low-
educated Arab immigrants … manifest an incipient feminist critique of male dominance” (cited from Marshall and Read 2003). Overall, therefore, women from Muslim groups that immigrate to a more egalitarian and permissive culture in the West may pursue widely different political paths than their counterparts in more conservative or traditional societies.

On the other hand, for structural, cultural, and political reasons, the male-dominated elite present in some Muslim-majority societies may be reproduced across the Western world. (See Chapter 2 for a broader discussion of the impact of social structure, culture and politics on women’s political representation.) First, despite the evidence cited above, structural mechanisms that benefit Western women may not operate in the same way for Muslim women. In the United States, for instance, immigrant Muslim women who gain human and social capital through higher education are still less likely to pursue careers than other women with similar levels of education (Read and Oselin 2008). Similarly, research suggests that in the United Kingdom, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women face substantial barriers to employment, even with higher-level qualifications (Dale et al. 2002).

At the same time, factors that benefit women in the Muslim world may not carry over to the Western context. For example, women in the Muslim world sometimes gain political leadership positions through familial connections. A Muslim woman from a Western immigrant community is probably much less likely to be pulled into the national legislature because of her relationship to a powerful Muslim man. Further, some Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Pakistan) have national-level gender quotas guaranteeing women (most likely Muslim women) seats in
the national legislature. But, many Western countries reject such quotas as undemocratic. (See Chapters 4 and 5 for more on gender quotas.)

Muslim women in Western countries may also be constrained by traditional Muslim values. Research suggests that conservative or traditional Muslim women participate in politics in different ways than their more liberal and secular counterparts (Karam 1998; Roald 2001). In Egypt, for example, Islamist women did not consider low levels of women’s political participation and representation to be problematic. “As far as they were concerned, they were active and participating in the political process” (Karam 1998:157). Similarly, in Jordan, Islamist women regarded “female political empowerment in terms of political participation exclusively at the lower levels” (Roald 2001:186). If conservative beliefs regarding women’s public roles dominate, then Muslim women in the West may be much less likely than their male counterparts to pursue political careers.

Some indicators suggest that Muslim communities in the West are becoming more traditional or conservative. In France and the UK, for example, social workers suggest that social pressure to respect traditional values is increasing alongside endogamy, arranged marriages, and more women wearing the hijab (Roy 2004).69 Across the West, Muslim women are also victimized by patriarchal traditions such as forced marriage and honor killings (EUMC 2006).70 For instance, British authorities

69 It is important to note, however, that Roy (2004) interprets the increasing incidence of cases involving forced marriages, hijab, honor crimes, and rape as evidence that Muslim women and girls are increasingly escaping their traditional positions.

70 Because of Western immigration laws that prioritize family integration, forced marriage may even be relatively common. One exploratory study of teenage students in Belgium found that 16 percent of students knew of forced marriage “within their circle of acquaintance” and 7 percent reported of the
recently began to re-investigate 109 suspicious deaths that appear to have been family conspiracies to murder Muslim women (Nickerson 2006). In some cases, Western governments and courts even excuse physical and sexual abuse against Muslim women as common religious or ethnic practice.\footnote{For example, a Moroccan woman facing beatings and death threats from her husband was refused an early divorce because according to the German judge, the woman should have expected it. The judge read out passages from the \textit{Koran} to show that Muslim husbands have the “right to use corporal punishment.” Also in Germany, a Turkish immigrant was given the mildest possible sentence for stabbing his wife to death because the woman had violated his “male honor, derived from his Anatolian moral concepts.” (Bartsch et al. 2007)}

The above research suggests two conflicting hypotheses regarding Muslim women’s political representation in the West. On the one hand, Western institutions, parties, and values may facilitate greater political representation of Muslim women. On the other hand, Western countries may present similar, or even greater, obstacles to Muslim women’s political representation than countries elsewhere in the world. Overall, it is difficult to adjudicate between these two positions because research has not yet empirically investigated the political representation of Muslim women worldwide.

\textbf{RELIGION, INSTITUTIONS, AND MUSLIM WOMEN IN POLITICS}

Across the world, the official rules regulating the relationship between religion and state differ. And irrespective of policy, countries also vary substantially in the way that the government treats religion (Davis 2000; Ferrari 2005; Fetzer and Soper 2005; McLoughlin 2005; Rath, Groenendijk, and Penninx 1991). In this section, I discuss variation in government treatment of religion around the world and consider how this variation may shape the political fortunes of Muslim women. I also consider the practice within their own family (EUMC 2006:39). And in Germany, a government study of Turkish women found that 17 percent of the sample felt forced into their marriage (Council of Europe 2005).
potential effects of other institutional factors, such as a country’s choice of electoral system, on Muslim women.

First, as discussed above, the presence of secular institutions—where religion and state function autonomously—may benefit Muslim women in the West. Outside of the West, as well, the relationship between religion and the state may have profound effects on Muslim women’s political outcomes. In the Muslim world, the combination of religion and the state may be particularly disadvantageous to Muslim women. Many religiously based political parties in Muslim-majority countries denounce the political representation of women. Thus, in environments where all parties are religiously based, Muslim women are likely to be substantially underrepresented in politics.

Alternatively, removing religious values from the state may increase the political representation of Muslim women, even in countries with large Muslim populations. As discussed above, many countries in the world observe gaps between the ideal of Muslim women’s political exclusion and the reality of their participation. When religion is removed from state institutions, the potential for this gap to grow is higher. In other words, in more secular contexts, Islam is less likely to be used to block Muslim women from political careers.

In countries where Muslims are the minority, separation between church and state may also benefit Muslim women. Governments that have strong ties to other religions such as Protestantism or Catholicism may be less likely to see Muslim women as attractive candidates. Alternatively, secular governments may be more likely to recruit candidates from minority religions to demonstrate separation between religion and state.
The Indian government, for instance, has worked to ensure the inclusion of Muslims into politics to show that India is not a Hindu state.

However, secularity in institutions alone may not be enough to benefit Muslim women’s representation. Certainly, levels of tolerance of Muslim rights and practices vary substantially across countries. Especially across the West, Muslims sometimes experience significant obstacles to religious practice. For example, in 2002 in Spain, Muslim activists were arrested for praying in a cathedral in Cordoba that was formerly a mosque (Klausen 2005b). And in Denmark, control of all cemeteries by the Lutheran church provides no official protection for Danish Muslims who favor a traditional Islamic burial (Klausen 2005b). Strict institutional separation of religion and state may also create discrimination in practice (Amiraux 2005). For example, the headscarf law in France passed in 2004 is an impartial policy maintaining the separation of religion and state, but, in effect, the policy differentially impacts Muslim women. I suggest that the political representation of Muslim women is likely to be highest in countries where secularism is both an institutional and practical reality.

Before moving forward, it is notable that other institutional factors may be responsible for low levels of Muslim women’s political representation in Western countries. Specifically, Muslim-majority countries employ proportional representation electoral systems less often than countries with other dominant religions. As discussed in Chapter 4, PR electoral systems often benefit women in politics. And, there is reason to suspect that PR systems should Muslim women as well. When Kyrgyzstan—a country in which about 75% of the population identifies as Muslim—adopted a PR electoral system,

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72 Appendix Table B.1 shows that PR electoral systems and Muslim dominance are negatively correlated ($r = -0.34$).
system for the first time for elections in 2007, women’s representation rose dramatically
from 0% to 26% (IPU 2008). Muslim women living in countries with PR systems may
therefore be better represented than Muslim women in countries with plurality-majority
systems.

However, not all Muslim women may be equally likely to take advantage of
Western or secular contexts to enter politics. Muslims across the world represent
disparate communities that encompass a range of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and
norms. And these differences may have stronger effects on Muslim women’s political
fortunes than the regional or institutional contexts in which they live.

DIFFERENCES ACROSS MUSLIM GROUPS

Some Muslim groups are indigenous to the region in which they live. Arab
Muslims in the Middle East, Turkish Muslims in Turkey, Tatars in Eastern Europe,
Malay Muslims in Malaysia, and Berbers in North Africa are just a few of these groups.
Cultural differences across these groups may generate variation in Muslim women’s
political representation apart from the effects of institutional or political context.

But Muslims from these countries have also immigrated to other parts of the
world. Many Western countries, for example, have dominant North African, Turkish, or
South Asian communities. In Germany, for example, approximately 80 percent of the
Muslim population is Turkish. In other Western countries like Canada, there is no
dominant ethnic group or nationality. Even within dominant groups, there is a great deal
of diversity in Muslim populations. In the UK, for example, Muslims vary by country of
origin (e.g., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), language (e.g., Bengali, Urdu, Turkish, and
Farsi), and schools of thought (e.g., Deobandis, Barlewis, and Wahhabism) (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Jawad 2003).

I suggest here that women from Turkey may be better represented in certain political contexts than Muslim women from other groups. Turkey, where over 99 percent of the population is Muslim, has existed as a secular state since the 1920s when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk came to power as the country’s first President (CIA 2008). Therefore, Muslims of Turkish origin, in particular, may be more inclined towards secular attitudes (Klausen 2005b). Indeed, in her study of Muslim political leaders across 12 European countries, Klausen (2005b:96) found that Muslim political leaders of Turkish origin, “were markedly more inclined towards secularist view…” (Klausen 2005b:96). Roughly 70 percent of leaders with anti-clerical views were of Turkish origin. Because of these views, Turkish women may be more likely than women from other Muslim-majority groups to take advantage of religiously free societies and run for political office.

On the other end of the spectrum, government tolerance of religion may not benefit women from more traditional or neo-orthodox communities, who do not support the separation of faith and politics. Research suggests that Southeast Asian Muslims may be more inclined towards neo-orthodox political views. For example, one 2005 poll suggested that 40 percent of British Muslims—a majority of which are of Southeast Asian origin—favored some introduction of sharia in Britain (Hennessy and Kite 2006). And according to Klausen’s (2005b) study, almost half of the neo-orthodox Muslim leaders were Southeast Asian in their background. As a result, Muslim women from Indian, Bangladeshi, or Pakistani origins may be less likely than other groups to benefit from open institutional environments.
In the analyses below, I consider whether Muslim women from Turkish, Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian backgrounds differentially benefit from institutional contexts that are more favorable to Muslim women’s political incorporation. I focus on these groups in large part because they live in substantial numbers all over the world. Thus, they present ideal cases for testing the interactive effects between group characteristics and institutional contexts on women’s political outcomes.

DATA AND METHODS

In this chapter, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to investigate how the political representation of Muslim women varies between the West and the rest of the world, across countries with varying political institutions, and across Muslim women with origins in different parts of the world. I explore how country-level factors, such as government respect for religious freedom, affect women from Muslim groups. But at the same time, I am able to evaluate how group-level differences, including each group’s ethnicity or region of origin, influence Muslim women’s political outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 2, HLM also allows for easy testing of cross-level interactions. Thus, I am able to evaluate how country and group level factors interact to shape the relationship between Islam, gender, and politics.

For the quantitative stage of the analyses, I consider the broadest possible sample, including 308 racial, ethnic and religious groups represented across 80 countries.73 (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how groups were selected and how the data are aggregated.) Thus, Muslim women’s political representation in the West is compared not only to

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73 This analysis excludes the U.S. because this case is omitted from the International Religious Freedom Report data.
Muslim women across the world and majority group women in Western countries, but also to minority women facing obstacles that have little to do with religion (e.g., Tutsis in Burundi, African Americans in the United States, and Maori in New Zealand). In this way, I am able to assess whether Islam serves as a more significant obstacle to women’s political representation than barriers faced by women from other groups.

All variables used in the quantitative analyses are summarized in Table 6.1. The dependent variable in this chapter considers the political representation of women from Muslim groups relative to the representation of men from those groups. Specifically, I analyze the percentage of each group’s seats that are held by women, logged to reduce skew. Calculating the dependent variables in this way highlights the relationship between Islam and gender equality in politics across distinct groups and in different political contexts, rather than speaking to the circumstances under which Muslim groups achieve representation. In other words, these measures minimize variation in Muslim women’s representation arising from the differential representation of Muslim groups, both within and across countries.

At the country level, my main theoretical variable of interest is ‘Policy and Practice,’ a dummy variable capturing the relationship between religion and the state. The variable is only coded 1 if, according to the International Religious Freedom Reports (USDS 2001, 2003, 2005), both government policy and practice contribute to the relatively free practice of religion. In auxiliary analysis, I also tested an ordinal measure, where the free practice of religion is not protected by government policy or practice=‘0’, protections are in policy but not practice=‘1’, and protections are enshrined in both policy and practice=‘2’. Any significant differences arising from the coding of this particular
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>West</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group-Level Independent Variables</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish Muslim</td>
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<td>Middle Eastern Muslim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Legislature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Measures and Data Sources for Multi-Level Analyses

variable are footnoted in the results. As Table 4.3 indicates, I also include a number of national-level control variables in all models: national level gender quotas, proportional representation electoral systems, female labor force participation, and GDP per capita.
At the group level, I code both region of origin and majority religion for the entire sample. Region of origin variables include Maghrebi (North African) Muslim, Turkish Muslim, Middle Eastern Muslim, and Southeast Asian Muslim. Thus, I am able to assess whether Muslim women from different regional origins are represented at higher, similar, or lower levels than women from other groups.

In all analyses, I also include two group-level controls: whether the group has majority or minority status in a country (see Chapter 2 for discussion of how this variable is coded) and the group’s share of seats in the legislature.

RESULTS

Table 6.2 summarizes the results from the first set of multilevel analyses, testing whether women from Muslim groups are better represented in the West and across different institutional contexts. In the first column, Model 1 presents the baseline model without any interactions, testing the effects of Muslim group, PR electoral systems, Western residence, GDP per capita, level of democracy, the group’s share of seats in the legislature, and whether the group is a minority. Generally, the variables operate as expected. Remember from Chapter 4 that PR electoral systems and Western residence both have positive and significant effects on women’s political representation, while GDP per capita and level of democracy do not. Majority women are no better represented—as a share of their group’s seats—than minority women. The share of seats a group occupies in the legislature also has no significant impact on women’s share of group seats. The most important finding from Model 1 is that, at least across the 308 groups
Table 6.2: HLM Models Predicting Women’s Share of Group Seats, Muslim Interactions with Western Residence, PR Electoral Systems, Democracy, and Government Respect for Religion
analyzed here, women from Muslim-majority groups are represented at levels that are statistically no different than women from groups with other dominant religions.

In the second column, Model 2 tests whether Muslim groups are represented any differently in the West than in other parts of the world. The significant interaction term suggests that Muslim women in Western countries are, in fact, represented at higher levels than elsewhere in the world. Controlling for other factors, Western residence is associated with an 11 percent increase in women’s share of group seats. Western residence also continues to have a strong main effect on women’s share of group seats. Thus, Muslim women perform even better relative to male members of their group in the West than non-Muslim groups.

In Model 3, I test whether women from Muslim-majority groups are better represented, relative to male group members, in countries with PR electoral systems. I find that PR systems do not boost Muslim women’s representation more than other groups. But, the effect of PR systems is no weaker for Muslim women either. Overall, PR systems increase women’s share of group seats regardless of whether the group is Muslim or not.

The fourth column presents the results of a model interacting Muslim group with government respect for religious freedom. While having no significant main effect on women’s share of group seats, government respect for the free practice of religion significantly increases the representation of Muslim women. And, the effect is almost double the effect of Western residence. Specifically, living in a country with high levels
of government respect for religious freedom is associated with a 20 percent increase in Muslim women’s share of group seats.

In the final model of Table 6.2, I interact Muslim-majority group with both Western residence and government respect for religious freedom. That is, I predict the effect (slope) of a group being Muslim on women’s share of group seats with both country-level covariates. I find that when both interactions are included, only government respect for religious freedom remains statistically significant. Thus, the greater success of Muslim women in Western politics may be a function of greater religious tolerance by Western governments.

Next, In Table 6.3, Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 test whether the benefits of government religious tolerance vary by Muslim women’s country or region of origin. We know from the previous table that, in general, Muslim women are better represented when governments are more tolerant of religious freedom. But, this effect may not be consistent across all Muslim groups.

First, in Model 5, I test whether Middle Eastern Muslim women benefit from religious tolerance. Indeed, I find that residence in a country with high levels of respect for religious freedom increases Middle Eastern Muslim women’s representation by 36 percent. At the same time, the negative and significant main effect shows that Muslim Middle Eastern women are represented at levels 8 percent less in countries without high levels of respect for religious freedom, relative to their male counterparts, than women from other groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Gov't Respect for Religious Freedom</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Muslim</td>
<td>-0.08 t</td>
<td>-0.14 t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Muslim</td>
<td>-0.14 t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian Muslim</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.26 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North African Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Interactions with Religious Freedom** |         |         |         |         |
| Middle Eastern Muslim             | 0.36 ** |         |         |         |
|                                   | (0.13)  |         |         |         |
| Turkish Muslim                    | 0.47 ** |         |         |         |
|                                   | (0.15)  |         |         |         |
| South Asian Muslim                | 0.04    |         |         |         |
|                                   | (0.20)  |         |         |         |
| North African Muslim              | -0.03   |         |         |         |
|                                   | (0.20)  |         |         |         |

| **Controls**                      |         |         |         |         |
| Intercept                         | 0.05    | 0.04    | 0.04    | 0.04    |
|                                   | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  |
| Democracy                         | 0.00    | 0.00    | 0.00    | 0.00    |
|                                   | (0.00)  | (0.00)  | (0.00)  | (0.00)  |
| PR Electoral System               | 0.09 ** | 0.08 ** | 0.09 ** | 0.08 ** |
|                                   | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  | (0.03)  |
| West                              | 0.17 ***| 0.17 ***| 0.17 ***| 0.15 ***|
|                                   | (0.04)  | (0.04)  | (0.04)  | (0.04)  |
| GDP                               | 0.00    | 0.00    | 0.00    | 0.00    |
|                                   | (0.02)  | (0.02)  | (0.02)  | (0.02)  |
| % in Legislature                  | -0.08   | -0.08   | -0.09   | -0.09   |
|                                   | (0.07)  | (0.07)  | (0.07)  | (0.07)  |
| Majority Group                    | 0.08    | 0.09    | 0.09    | 0.10 t  |
|                                   | (0.06)  | (0.06)  | (0.06)  | (0.06)  |

| N—Groups                          | 308     | 308     | 308     | 308     |
| N—Countries                       | 81      | 81      | 81      | 81      |

Table 6.3: HLM Models Predicting Women’s Share of Group Seats, Differences in the Effect of Religious Freedom on Muslim Women’s Political Representation by Region of Origin
Interestingly, Model 6 indicates that Turkish women in countries with lower levels of respect for religious freedom have even lower levels of representation, relative to their male counterparts, than Muslim women from the Middle East. As a share of group seats, Turkish Muslim women are represented at levels 14 percent less, on average, than women from other groups. But, like for Middle Eastern Muslim women, residence in a country with high levels of respect for religious freedom is associated with substantial gains in women’s representation relative to their male peers.

In contrast, Muslim women with origins in Southeast Asia do not appear to politically benefit from living in a country with high levels of religious tolerance. Neither the main effect nor the interaction term for South Asian Muslim women is statistically significant. This finding provides some evidence that South Asian Muslim immigrants may be more conservative, traditional, or less likely to adopt secular values than Muslim women from other regions of the world.

Finally, immigrant women with origins in North Africa are represented in national legislatures at levels significantly higher than women with other backgrounds, at least relative to male members of their group. This effect is not contingent on living in a country with high levels of respect for religious freedom. However, it is important to understand that unlike the other groups, there are no North African Muslim women in the sample who are living in North Africa. Thus, this variable is likely capturing the success of North African Muslim immigrants in a small number of countries. Including the dummy for North African Muslims slightly reduces the effect of Western residence, and the effect of majority status becomes statistically significant. Once accounting for the
political success of North African Muslim women, therefore, majority women tend to hold a greater share of seats, on average, than minority women.

CONCLUSION

Overall, these results suggest that Islam may not necessarily present insurmountable obstacles to women’s political representation. Relative to male members of their group, Muslim women are not represented in national legislatures at levels that are any different from women from groups with other dominant religions. In fact, Muslim women may have even greater success in politics in the West, as a share of their group’s seats, than other groups. Specifically, the secular nature of Western political institutions may provide Muslim women with opportunities for political mobilization and representation. However, research on the political experiences of Muslims in Western countries in recent years suggests that the political success of Muslim women in the West may not be as simple or as rosy as suggested thus far. Thus, in the next chapter, I investigate Muslim women’s political incorporation in the West in greater detail.

Although this chapter moves research on Muslim women’s political representation forward by considering both country- and group-level influences, the values and religiosity of individual Muslim women also likely impacts their political fortunes. Even if the state respects diversity in religious practice, parties and voters may not consider the beliefs of more traditional Muslim women to be consistent with secular values. Thus, neo-orthodox Muslim women, regardless of their community of origin, are likely to be underrepresented in politics. I consider this issue in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7

POST-9/11 POLITICS AND MUSLIM WOMEN’S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE WEST

Since 2001, terrorism and military intervention have set the stage for broader ideological conflict between Western secular and fundamentalist Islamic values (Cesari 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Particularly visible and contentious conflicts between Muslims and Western governments have often involved the rights and status of Muslim women. For instance, in 2003, the French government sparked worldwide debate by initiating legislation that, in effect, barred Muslim girls from wearing traditional headscarves in public schools. And in November 2004, Dutch parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali was forced to go into hiding after writing the script for Submission, a film critical of the position of women in Islam. Across the West, the battleground of Muslim women’s rights is awash with incendiary political commentary, landmark court decisions, public protests, death threats, and even assassination.

Although volatile conflicts between Western secular and Islamic fundamentalist values are often about women, debates do not always include Muslim women’s voices. As discussed in Chapter 1, representing the rights of minority women in Western societies has historically been the purview of male elites, who may advocate for group rights or policies that are inimical to women’s interests (Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999). And, male religious or political leaders in the West may stand behind traditions that
undermine Muslim women’s rights. In Spain, for example, a popular imam counseled Muslim men how to beat their wives but escape attention from Western authorities (Hari 2007). Furthermore, male and female Muslim political leaders in Western countries sometimes espouse quite different political views, particularly when issues involve gender (Klausen 2005b). Sharp differences in Muslim men and women’s political beliefs and attitudes make the exclusive representation of “Muslim interests” by men especially problematic.

Particularly when political issues involve Islam, non-Muslim women may also make poor representatives of Muslim women’s interests. Women in Western countries often view Islam as a backward religion that subjugates women (Aly and Walker 2007), and non-Muslim women’s notions about Islam may affect their political positions. For example, many Western women view traditional Muslim headscarves and veils as symbols of gender-based oppression or even as threats to national security (Aly and Walker 2007; Roald 2001). Thus, women in several Western countries tend to support policies that restrict Muslim women’s traditional dress.\(^74\) In contrast, female Muslim political leaders in the West overwhelmingly see women’s Islamic dress as a human rights issue and support the right of Muslim women to wear what they choose (Klausen 2005b). Overall, neither Muslim men nor non-Muslim women may effectively represent the specific interests and positions of Muslim women.

\(^74\) Forms of traditional Islamic dress for women include the hijab (headscarf), the niqab (face veil), the jilbab (full-length coat covering clothing worn with headscarf or face veil), the chador (a black garment covering all of the head and body except for the face), and the burqa (a garment covering the whole body including the face). In some Western countries like France, opposition to traditional Islamic dress has focused mainly on the hijab. In other countries such as the Netherlands, forms of dress that cover women’s faces (i.e., the niqab and burqa) have been at the center of controversy.
Despite the importance of ensuring that Muslim women are included in political leadership, little is known about the political representation of Muslim women across Western countries. In the previous chapter, we learned that the West may provide opportunities for Muslim women to enter politics. But, even basic descriptive questions about variation in Muslim women’s representation across Western societies remain unanswered. Furthermore, some of the factors that may influence variation in Muslim women’s political representation in the West are not easily captured quantitatively.

For one, in the post-9/11 political context, Islamophobia and fear of terrorism may shape patterns of Muslim representation in Western countries. Specifically, where fear of young male militant Muslims is high, Western political parties may favor female representatives of Muslim groups. If Islamic fundamentalism is suspect, the election of secular women from Muslim origins may serve as powerful symbols of Western difference. That the election of these women engenders fierce opposition from Muslim extremists (e.g., Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands and Mounount Bousakla in Belgium) may further encourage parties and voters in Western countries to support them.

But in a highly charged Islamophobic context, not all parties are equally likely to support Muslim women. In recent years, conservative or nationalist voices have sought to restrict immigration, to limit the building of mosques, or even to imprison women for wearing the burqa. These parties are likely not to run Muslim candidates, male or female. However, anti-immigrant politics on the far right may encourage left-leaning political parties to field secular Muslim women as candidates. These parties, which may disagree with far-right exclusionary politics, may include secular female politicians to emphasize
the possibilities of Muslim integration. Including Muslim women allows fits with left-leaning attitudes towards diversity and the rights of women and minority groups.

The success of Muslim women in highly charged political contexts may also depend on structural and institutional factors. For instance, group size is likely to impact how Western polities respond to the threats posed by Muslims. If Muslim communities are particularly small, there is little incentive to include these groups into the political system. But, if Muslims make up a sizeable portion of the voting population, it is more likely that one or more political parties will field Muslim candidates to draw the Muslim vote. This process is also much more likely to occur in countries with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. Not only are PR systems more sensitive to changes in the political context, but we learned in Chapter 4 that women from small or marginalized minority groups are more successful gaining political representation in PR electoral systems.

Individual-level differences in Muslim women’s political attitudes and religious values may also play an important role in determining Muslim women’s levels of representation across the West. For several reasons, women from Muslim origins who are secular or even those who outright reject their religion are likely to be overrepresented among Muslim women in Western politics. Alternatively, research suggests that Muslim women with more conservative or traditional religious beliefs are less likely to pursue formal political representation (Karam 1998; Roald 2001). To date,
however, research has not considered the characteristics of Muslim women who have successfully attained high-level political office in the West.75

To investigate the effects of political context and individual-level factors on Muslim women’s representation in the West, I present two short case studies of Muslim women’s political representation in Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries have elected particularly high levels of Muslim women to national-level political office since 9/11. Both have sizeable Muslim populations and use PR electoral systems. With over-time election data, I evaluate how fear of terrorism and anti-Muslim or nationalist politics might have influenced the election of Muslim women from these two countries. I also focus on the public identities of Muslim female legislators to consider whether the success of Muslim women in some countries is linked to their de-emphasis, or even outright rejection, of Islam. Before turning to these cases, however, I provide a brief introduction to the size, nature, and politics of Muslim groups across the West and briefly theorize how the post-9/11 Western context may shape Muslim women’s representation.

MUSLIM POPULATIONS AND WESTERN POLITICS

More than a third of the world’s Muslims are now living as minorities, many in Western countries (Roy 2004). The size of Muslim populations in Western countries has grown substantially in recent years. In 1961, there were close to 400 Mosques in Western European countries, while in 1991, the number had grown to almost 5,000

75 Jytte Klausen (2005b) discusses the controversies involving women and Islam in Europe and presents findings from discussions with female Muslim politicians from six Western countries. But, Klausen (2005b) does not analyze the gender composition of Muslim legislators across these countries, nor does she investigate Muslim female politicians as a distinct group.
(Kettani 1996). As Table 7.1 indicates, close to 20 million individuals from Muslim-majority groups currently live in the West, although the size of the Muslim population in Western countries varies significantly. Muslims comprise the largest share of the population in France, Netherlands, and Denmark. Alternatively, in Ireland and New Zealand, less than 1 percent of the population is Muslim.

Muslims in the West represent disparate communities that encompass a range of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and norms. As discussed in the previous chapter, some countries have dominant North African, Turkish, or South Asian communities, while others have no dominant ethnic group or nationality. Even when most of the Muslims in a country come from a particular country or region, however, “cultures, traditions, gender systems, and political systems are distinctive…” (Brah 1992).

Western Muslims face a range of political obstacles. In many Western countries, large segments of the Muslim population are not citizens and do not have voting rights. For example, as of the mid-1990s, only about 40% of Muslims in the Western Europe were citizens (Kettani 1996). And in many Western countries, only 10 to 25 percent of Muslims have the right to vote (Klausen 2005a). Those that do have voting rights often do not vote together as a bloc (Roy 2004). Many Muslims—even those with more conservative beliefs—gravitate towards more leftist political parties because of their emphasis on minority rights (Klausen 2005b; Purdam 1996). For instance, in a 1999 survey of Turkish-born citizens in Germany, 74 percent reported plans to vote for a left or

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76 Population statistics for Muslims are imperfect. Some sources estimate that size of the populations in Western countries are lower than the numbers I report in table 7.1. For instance, Jawad (2003) suggests that between 6 and 10 million Muslims live in Western Europe. The figure above, however, suggests Western European countries have more than 12 million Muslims.
center-left political party (Messina 2004). However, many Muslims do support right-leaning parties, including, paradoxically, anti-immigrant parties (Klausen 2005b). Only a few Islamic political parties exist in the West, and none have successfully contested a national-level election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Size of Muslim Population</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>Dominant Groups (&gt;20%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>Algerian, Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>945,000</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>Turkish, Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>Moroccan, Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>310,800</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Turkish, Slavic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>Slavic, Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>Persian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>Pakistani, Bangladeshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>Moroccan, Albanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>667,803</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>347,000</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>158,000</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>825,000</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>African American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7.1: Size of Muslim Population, Percent Muslim, and Dominant Ethnic Groups in 18 Western Countries
Outside of political parties, Western Muslims also tend to lack national-level organization (Ferrari 2005; Roy 2004; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1996). National organizations capable of serving as state liaisons are important because they ensure at least the possibility of negotiating key issues such as religious burial or Islamic education with the state (Ferrari 2005; Klausen 2005b). Furthermore, the lack of national organization may leave Muslims at a disadvantage relative to other religions in the struggle for official recognition or financing (Ferrari 2005). In some countries, Muslims have achieved significant success organizing at the local level (di Friedberg 1996; Purdam 1996). But the geographic concentration of immigrant groups, as well as ethnic or sectarian differences, may prevent these successes from translating to the national arena (Bird 2004; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1996). Even when some national-level organization or machinery exists to represent Muslims, it may not represent the diversity of interests and positions of Muslims in that country (Amiraux 1996).

Interestingly, research also suggests that the size of the Muslim population and the presence of a dominant national or ethnic Muslim group may not necessarily translate to better political organization or political incorporation (Kettani 1996; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1996). In fact, as of the mid-1990s, one of the most inclusive and well organized Muslim polities in the West was in Australia, where Muslims make up just a fraction of the population and come from a variety of origins (Kettani 1996). Larger immigrant Muslim communities may face greater obstacles from the state, which may view Islam as a problem of immigrant workers or fear Muslim extremism (Kettani 1996).
In addition to the obstacles to Muslim political organization, Muslims face hostility and discrimination across the West. Although fears that Islam is a “violent and fanatical religion” are centuries old (Cesari 2005:39), the post-9/11 context in many Western countries has been marked by increased distrust and suspicion of Muslim communities (Amiraux 2005).77 Human rights organizations document rising Islamophobic attitudes and anti-Muslim activities in many Western countries (Allen and Nielson 2002; Cesari 2006; EUMC 2006). Verbal threats and harassment of Muslims, desecration of mosques and cemeteries, destruction of Muslim-owned property, and even violent attacks on Muslim men and women are occurring with increasing frequency (EUMC 2006). And among the general population, support for state accommodation of Muslims’ religious practice in schools declined (Fetzer and Soper 2005).

Overall, Muslims face a range of obstacles to political mobilization and representation in Western countries. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that Muslims are politically underrepresented in national-level Western politics. One study estimates that as of about 2004, Muslims held fewer than 30 of the some 5,500 seats in Western national legislatures (Klausen 2005a; IPU 2008).

However, research suggests that Muslim electoral participation and political representation are on the rise in many Western countries (Purdam 1996; Amiraux 2005). And in some Western countries, individuals from Muslim-majority countries and groups have achieved significant political success. In the Netherlands and Sweden, for example,

77 It is important to recognize that the terrorist attacks of September 11th had consequences for Western Muslims far beyond American borders. For example, in the years following 9/11, countries in the European Union arrested over 20 times the number of terrorist suspects arrested in the United States (Kempe 2003). Furthermore, since 9/11, European countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom have also experienced large-scale terrorist attacks (EUMC 2007). Overall, one statistic suggests that between 1 and 2 percent of all Muslims in Europe have been suspected of involvement in terrorist activities (Savage 2004).
Muslims have arrived as political refugees, obtained citizenship and won election to national office within a decade (Klausen 2005b:23). Further, some scholars argue that growing distrust of Muslims and the discrimination they have faced discrimination since 9/11 has fostered solidarity and spurred political action by Muslim men and women (e.g., Afshar, Aitken, and Franks 2006).

My own research suggests that since 9/11, Muslim political representation has increased precipitously across the West. Figure 4.1 presents the number of Muslim national legislators elected between 2000 and 2007 across 19 Western countries. The figure demonstrates that the number of seats held by Muslim legislators has almost quadrupled in six years. Still, the juxtaposition of rising Islamophobia and rising Muslim representation is puzzling. I explore how these two factors may interact in the next section, especially in regards to the political experiences of Muslim women.

Figure 7.1: Total Muslim National Legislators across 19 Western Countries, 2000-2007
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CONTEXT ON MUSLIM WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION

The events of September 11, 2001 had consequences far beyond America’s borders. Since 9/11, controversial depictions of Islam in Western movies and newspapers have sparked both peaceful Muslim protests and violent attacks. Governments and publics across Europe have debated whether Muslim girls should have the right to wear traditional headscarves to secular public schools. And in the face of both successful terrorist attacks and foiled plots by Muslim extremists, Western political parties and ruling governments have debated or taken measures to restrict immigration and regulate Muslim political and religious leaders (Cesari 2005; Choudhury 2007).

However, the above events have not unfolded in a uniform way across time and place. Not all Western countries have been directly victimized by terrorism. Attitudes towards Muslims and political issues involving Muslims vary from one nation to the next. And, the response of Western governments and politicians has differed by circumstance. Here, I argue that variation in political context may drive differential gains in Muslim women’s political representation.

Western countries that are more fearful of terrorism or Muslim extremism may be more likely to elect Muslim women, especially relative to male members of their group. Although Muslim women do participate in terrorist activities, the vast majority of Muslim terrorists are young men. Indeed, the terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and London’s subway on July 7, 2005 were all men. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Westerners are generally more fearful of Muslim men than Muslim women. For
instance, in a recent Gallup poll, 31 percent of Americans said they would feel nervous if they noticed a Muslim man on their airplane flight, while only 18 percent would be nervous about a Muslim woman flying with them (Saad 2006).

Attempts at immigration reform also suggest that fear of Muslims is largely fear of Muslim men. Since November 2001, for example, the United States has enforced a 20-day waiting period for all men aged 18 to 45 that arrive from a Muslim-majority country (Cesari 2005). And in Germany, a new registration and screening procedure was instituted that targeted Muslim men between the ages of 18 and 41 (Cesari 2005). Concerned about extremism and fearful of male terrorists, Western governments and political parties may be more likely to incorporate women as representatives of Muslim majority groups. That is, parties or voters who want to elect “safe” Muslim representatives may be more likely to support Muslim women.

However, the relationship between fear of Muslim extremism and Muslim women’s election is not likely to be simple and linear. Extreme fear may result in no Muslim political representation, rather than the election of Muslim women. Other factors may also mediate the effect of fear on Muslim women’s legislative outcomes. Specifically, I suggest that fear of Muslim extremists may increase Muslim women’s political representation in the presence of: 1) a sizeable Muslim population, 2) active anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim politics alongside strong leftist parties, and 3) a proportional representation (PR) electoral system.

First, I suggest that the size of the Muslim population in Western countries is likely to influence how governments and political parties respond to the perceived threat of Muslim extremism. In countries with small and heterogeneous Muslim populations,
Muslims may simply be excluded political representation altogether. But countries with significant numbers of Muslims have two incentives for Muslim inclusion: to reduce or minimize the radicalization of Muslims who lack basic representation and to win the votes of Muslim citizens. In short, countries with nontrivial numbers of Muslims are more likely to at least consider trying to incorporate Muslims into the political system.

Second, and perhaps counterintuitively, I argue that women from Muslim origins may benefit politically from the presence of strong anti-immigrant, or more specifically, anti-Muslim politics. Not all Western polities are likely to respond to the threats posed by Islamic extremism in the same way. But in some countries, fear of Muslim extremism has fueled the rise of political voices and parties that are anti-immigrant or even expressly anti-Muslim (Choudhury 2007). Generally, research suggests that the presence of competitive anti-immigrant parties will reduce the likelihood that parties will seek ethnic minority candidates (Bird 2004). However, in the face of discriminatory politics, Muslim communities may respond with increased political activity. Muslim candidates may be more likely to run for political office, and Muslim electorates may put more pressure on political parties to include Muslim representatives.

When Muslims are politically mobilized, they may be more effective gaining political representation through leftist political parties. Muslims generally support a broad range of political parties. But, more often than not, Muslim men and women tend to align with left-leaning parties (Klausen 2005a, 2005b; Roy 2004). In fact, the most religious of Muslim political leaders in the West identify as centrist or leftist in their politics (Klausen 2005b). As Roy (2004:33) notes:
it is the secular and permissive Left that is more inclined to see Muslims as a minority…and the conservative and Christian Right, which shares many of the same values (on family, drugs, sexuality, and so on), that is more reluctant to recognize Muslims as a legitimate minority.

On average, the Left is more likely than the Right to support expanding the rights of women and minorities. Therefore, leftist parties may be more likely to recruit Muslim women to run for office. Overall, the supply of female Muslim candidates as well demand for their inclusion is likely to be higher among leftist political parties.

Third, the effects of the political context on women’s political representation may vary by political system. Specifically, PR electoral systems may be more responsive to the changing political context than plurality-majority systems, facilitating the inclusion of Muslim women in the presence of significant Muslim populations and anti-Muslim politics. Under PR systems, voters cast ballots for lists of candidates that are constructed by political parties to attract voters. Thus, as demand for Muslim women’s representation rises, parties in PR systems may be more responsive and include female Muslim candidates on party lists. Under plurality-majority systems, in contrast, parties put forth single candidates to run in individual districts. And because of incumbency advantages, parties often choose to run candidates that were successful in past elections, rather than risk running new, untested candidates. Overall, therefore, the changing political context is more likely to affect the political representation of Muslim women in PR electoral systems. (See Chapter 4 for a broader discussion of the effects of electoral systems on women’s representation.)

Finally, I argue that anti-Muslim politics and PR electoral systems may interact in a specific way to facilitate Muslim women’s political representation. Research suggests
that if one party in a PR system begins including women as candidates, other parties in the system may be more likely to follow suit in a process called ‘contagion’ (Matland and Studlar 1996). Here, I propose a slightly different process, a process I call ‘counter-contagion’. The logic is as follows. Once anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim policies become political possibilities, leftist or centrist parties must respond. In the presence of far-right exclusionary politics, leftist parties may promote Muslim integration, and one way to do so, at least symbolically, is to include Muslim candidates on party lists. Indeed, non-traditional or secular female Muslim politicians may serve as powerful symbols of the possibility of Muslim integration or assimilation. And as discussed above, Muslim women may make better candidates than their male peers in the presence of Islamophobia.

**INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ACROSS MUSLIM WOMEN**

Traditional Muslim women may be much more likely to face political discrimination in Western societies than their more liberal or secular counterparts. Since 9/11, traditional Muslim women have been particular targets of Western ire (Afshar, Aitken, and Franks 2006). For example, since 2001, Muslim women wearing traditional Islamic dress have been denied access to schools, banks, and government buildings; fired from their jobs; fined; and even jailed. Attitudes towards Muslim women in Western countries may also hinder their political advancement. Muslim women are often perceived as passive, submissive, and undereducated—characteristics not typically valued in politicians. Thus, due to Western beliefs and stereotypes about Muslim women, they may face discrimination from parties and voters.
News reports suggest that traditional Muslim women may face significant political opposition in Western politics. Specifically, in Denmark in 2007, Asama Abdol-Hamid—a Palestinian-born Muslim who wears a traditional headscarf and does not shake hands with men—generated resistance and even hostility from many in the Danish parliament when she announced she would run for office in the next round of elections. Even though Abdol-Hamid voices a strong connection with Danish culture and expresses much more permissive social views than many conservative Muslims (for example, she supports government tolerance towards gays and lesbians), many politicians still voiced opposition to her candidacy. The most extreme response came from Danish People’s Party MPs, who compared her Islamic headscarf to a swastika and suggested that Abdol-Hamid had been “brainwashed” and required “psychiatric help” (Ritter 2007). Overall, this research suggests that even if Muslim women are gaining ground in Western politics, traditional or conservative Muslim women may continue to face discrimination and underrepresentation.

DATA AND METHODS

In contrast to the empirical research presented elsewhere in this dissertation, this chapter relies on longitudinal data. I collected data on the sex and ethnic background of Muslim representatives across 19 Western countries for the last national legislative election prior to 9/11, as well as data for two to three subsequent elections. I also investigated the background of individual female legislators across these countries. I used academic sources, candidate profiles, political websites, news stories, and public
photographs of Muslim female legislators to gather evidence of conservative or traditional beliefs or practices.

Because this is the first study to expressly consider variation in Muslim women’s political representation across Western countries, I begin with basic descriptive analyses. I consider the growth of Muslim political representatives in the West by sex since 2000. I also present basic descriptive figures showing variation in the election of Muslim women to national legislatures across Western countries. Generally, these analyses set the stage for a more in-depth analysis of Muslim women’s political representation in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In the latter part of the analyses, I present short case studies of recent National Assembly elections in the Netherlands and Belgium. Over time, I examine the effects of political context on the incorporation of Muslim women into national-level politics. I consider whether anti-immigrant politics and response by liberal parties appear to explain the gains in Muslim women’s representation observed in these countries since 2001. I also explore the effects of party ideology on within-country variation in Muslim women’s political representation. I end the analyses by briefly considering individual-level information about Belgian and Dutch female politicians to determine whether, as I expect, traditional or neo-orthodox Muslim women are underrepresented.

RESULTS

Descriptive Analyses

Before turning to the case studies, I first descriptively examine Muslim women’s political representation in the West. The figures presented in this section provide a view
of the overall representation of Muslim men and women in the West since 9/11. Further, these figures situate levels of Muslim women’s representation in the Netherlands and Belgium within the broader Western context.

First, as depicted above in Figure 4.1, Muslim political representation in Western countries has increased dramatically in the past few years. But it is useful to consider whether growth in Muslim legislative representation has differed by sex, and if so, how. Figure 7.2 displays the number of male and female Muslim national legislators across 19 Western countries between 2000 and 2007. Interestingly, it appears that Muslim women made significant gains in representation earlier than their male peers. While the number of male Muslim national legislators increased slowly until 2005, Muslim women made significant gains in 2003, when the number of Muslim women in national legislatures doubled from the previous year. In recent years, however, Muslim women’s political representation has leveled off, while male Muslims have been elected to more and more seats. In 2006, men held almost as many seats in Western national legislatures as held by both men and women combined just three years earlier. Overall, Figure 7.2 suggests that Muslim women experienced significant gains in representation immediately following 9/11.
Figure 7.2: Muslim National Legislators by Gender in 12 Western Countries, 2000–2001

Figure 7.3 presents variation in the political representation of men and women from Muslim-majority groups by country. Interestingly, since 2000, all twelve countries have elected similar numbers of male representatives from Muslim-majority groups. Women’s political representation, on the other hand, varies extensively across the sample. In the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, Muslim women actually

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78 As is the case throughout the dissertation, in countries with bicameral legislatures, only legislators in the lower house are counted. But it is important to note that Muslim women have also been elected in high numbers to upper houses in Western countries. Since 2000 in Belgium, for example, approximately nine of eleven senators (82%) from Muslim groups have been women. France elected two women with Muslim backgrounds to the Senate in 2005, but the country has yet to elect a Muslim representative to its 577-member National legislature (Klausen 2005b). It is also important to note that the Muslim elected to the US Congress is a US-born African American man. I include him in the figure even though he is not from a Muslim-majority group.
outnumber their male counterparts. But, Italy, Denmark, Greece, New Zealand, and the UK have yet to elect a Muslim woman to the national legislature. Several Western countries not depicted in Figure 7.3—Austria, Australia, France, Portugal, Spain—elected no known national legislators from Muslim-majority groups, male or female, over the time period.

It is notable that Canada is the only country with a plurality-majority system to elect a woman from a Muslim-majority group. The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, and Norway all use party-list proportional representation electoral systems. Thus, this figure provides initial support for my expectation that the dynamics likely to benefit Muslim women are much more likely in countries with PR electoral systems. But, further investigation of the factors contributing to Muslim women’s success in countries with PR systems is necessary. I focus my analysis on the Netherlands and Belgium, which have the highest levels of Muslim women’s political representation in the West.
Figure 7.3: Muslim National Legislators in Western Countries by Gender and by Country, 2001-07

Case Studies—The Netherlands and Belgium

Since 9/11, Muslim women’s political representation has increased precipitously in both the Netherlands and Belgium. Figure 7.4 displays the percentage of seats in the Dutch and Belgian House of Representatives occupied by Muslim women since 1999. Both countries experience significant growth in Muslim women’s representation over the period. But, changes in Muslim women’s representation have proceeded unevenly within and across countries, especially in relation to Muslim men. In the Netherlands, for example, Muslim women and men both held less than 2% of seats until 2003, when Muslim women’s political representation doubled. Since 2003, Muslim women have considerably outnumbered Muslim men in Dutch politics. Women in Belgium also
experienced a significant increase in political representation in 2003, but gains were not as dramatic as in the Netherlands, and the gender split among representatives is not as female dominated.

Since I expect party-level dynamics to play an important role in facilitating Muslim women’s political representation, I summarize information about the distribution of Muslim female representatives across political parties in Table 7.2. I focus on each country’s two most recent elections (2003 and 2006 for the Netherlands, 2003 and 2007 for Belgium). Also presented is information about each party’s average share of seats and the average percentage of party seats held by women.
Generally, Table 7.2 suggests an association between support for female candidates overall and support for Muslim women. Evidence for this perspective is slightly stronger in the Netherlands, where all four parties electing more than 40 percent women included women of Turkish or Moroccan origin. In Belgium, the association appears much weaker. Parties with the most female candidates do include Muslim women, and those parties with the fewest women tend to exclude Muslim women as well. But, in most Belgian parties, women hold between one-third and four-fifths of the parties’ seats, and for these parties, Muslim women’s political incorporation is a mixed bag.

Overall, these data suggest that party ideology and party support for women may be fueling gains in minority women’s political representation. But, based on the fact that these same parties did not include Muslim women as candidates just a few years earlier, I next present brief case studies of these two countries. Specifically, I explore the effects of political context on change in Muslim women’s political representation. And, I discuss the backgrounds of Muslim female legislators in both countries.

The Netherlands

Netherlands has the largest share of Muslims, as a percentage of its total population, of any Western country except France. Research suggests that slightly less than 6 percent of the Dutch population—more than 900,000 people—are Muslims (Statistics Netherlands 2007). More than three quarters of Dutch Muslims are Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Muslim men began immigrating to the Netherlands in large
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch Political Party</th>
<th>Avg. # Seats</th>
<th>% Women</th>
<th>% Muslim Women</th>
<th>Belgian Political Party</th>
<th>Avg. # Seats</th>
<th>% Women</th>
<th>% Muslim Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Green</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Left (GL)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Greens (Ecolo, GROEN!)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socialist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Socialist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (PvdA)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Flemish Socialist Party (SPA-Spirit)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (SP)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Socialist Party (PS)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats 66 (D66)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Dedecker List</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Party for Freedom &amp; Democracy (VVD)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Movement for Reform (MR)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian Democratic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Christian Democratic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Union (CU)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&amp;V) - New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Nationalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Vlaams Blok/Belang (Flemish Interest)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Freedom (GW/PvdV)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>National Front (FN)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Women's and Muslim Women's Average Levels of Political Representation by Political Party in the Belgian and Dutch Houses of Representatives, 2003-2007
numbers in the mid-1960s as part of government recruitment contracts for unskilled workers. After economic recession in the mid-1970s, however, the window for labor migrants closed, and a second wave of immigration began under new family reunification policies. These days, most immigrants are spouses of the second generation. Roughly three-quarters of such Turks and Moroccans marry someone newly emigrating from their country of origin (Hooghiemstra 2003).

The majority of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands are practicing Muslims. According to the Open Society Institute (OSI), only about 3 to 5 percent of these groups see themselves as non-religious (OSI 2007). And at the other end of the spectrum, over 60 percent of Moroccans and 30 percent of Turks pray five times a day. For both groups, marriage to a Muslim partner is also considered very important, potentially even more so than ethnic homogamy (OSI 2007).

Generally, Muslims face a range of obstacles in Dutch society. Muslims have comparatively higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of education than other groups. On average, Moroccan and Turkish men earn between 30 and 40 percent less than Dutch men, and four out of every ten Muslim women have only a primary education (Statistics Netherlands 2007). Furthermore, only approximately 50 percent of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands are citizens (Klausen 2005b). By other measures, however, Dutch Muslims are doing rather well. For example, Turkish Muslims vote in substantial numbers, higher even than Dutch nationals, and report high levels of confidence in political institutions (OSI 2007).

Research suggests that the relationship between church and state in the Netherlands may be favorable to the promotion of Muslim rights and policies. Until the
1960s, the dominant Dutch political cultural was “pillarization,” a form of consociational democracy in which society is separated into “highly autonomous vertical social segments,” or pillars, of which there were four: Catholics, Protestants, socialists and liberals (Rath, Groenendijk, and Penninx 1991; Saharso 2003:14). Pillarization suggests that the state should be neutral in its stance towards these pillars, which are “rival conceptions of the good” (Saharso 2003:14). Thus, in contrast to other secular models, pillarization allows for a highly visible and public role of religion, as long as the state demonstrates no favoritism.

During the 1980s, Netherlands also adopted a new constitution protecting the rights of religious minorities. Soon after, Dutch Muslims won several battles for equal religious protection. In 1987, for instance, the national legislature decided that the Muslim call to prayer should be treated the same under law as church bells (Rath, Groenendijk, and Pennint 1991). And two years later, laws against blasphemy were said to extend to the blasphemy of Allah as well (Rath, Groenendijk, and Pennint 1991). Also during the 1980s, legislation was reformed to offer Muslim employees, civil servants, and soldiers time off during Islamic holidays (Rath, Groenendijk, and Pennint 1991). Overall, compared to many other Western countries, Dutch Muslims have won significantly more battles for equal religious protection. However, as the above examples indicate, rights to Dutch Muslims have generally been extended one at a time.

Since 2001, however, the political context in the Netherlands has changed dramatically, suggesting that the success of Muslim women’s political representation there may not be a result of religious tolerance. Research suggests that the turning point in Dutch political culture was the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, a populist right-wing
politician who had been making political headway in the run-up to the 2002 elections with controversial rhetoric and positions regarding Islam. Fortuyn called Islam a “backward” religion, stated that he was “in favor of a Cold War with Islam,” and demanded that the Dutch borders be closed to new immigrants (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). Because of these controversial statements, Fortuyn became estranged from his political party and went out on his own, founding List Pim Fortuyn. Despite, or perhaps because of, the controversy swirling around him, Fortuyn was able to dominate media coverage and control the overall tone of the race. But, “One citizen so feared the rising star of Fortuyn and the danger [he] posed for vulnerable groups in society…” that he assassinated Fortuyn just nine days before the election (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003:42).

Fortuyn’s murder was the first political assassination to occur in the Netherlands in more than 300 years and generated shock waves across Dutch society (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). In the political fallout after Fortuyn’s murder, List Pim Fortuyn achieved record success for a new party, gaining 17 percent of the vote and the second most seats in parliament (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003; van Holsteyn 2007). Research suggests Fortuyn was able to capitalize on voters’ rising concerns about issues of asylum, immigration and integration after the September 11th attacks (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). But his assassination also dramatically increased the popularity of both Fortuyn and his party.79 After the 2002 elections, a new government formed that incorporated

79 One Dutch election study asked citizens to evaluate party leaders on a 100-point scale (higher scores are better) both before and after election. Among those interviewed before the assassination, Fortuyn’s average score was 33, 14 points lower than the lowest score recorded by any major party leader. After the assassination, however, his average score jumped to 59 points. (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003)
Fortuyn’s party into the ruling coalition. But without Fortuyn, the coalition collapsed in less than three months and new elections were called.

It is in this political context that ex-Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali became a candidate for parliament from the Liberal Party, on the condition that she “would be the party’s spokesman for the emancipation of women and the integration of immigrants (http://www.vvd.nl)” (cited from van Holsteyn 2007). Left and center-left political parties also recruited women of Turkish or Moroccan origin to prominent positions on their party lists, including Naima Azough (Green Left), Khadija Arib (Labour), and Fatma Koşer Kaya (Democrats 66). From 2002 to 2003, therefore, the number of Muslim women elected to the Tweede Kamer (lower house) doubled. In contrast, only one Muslim man was added to the parliament, Coskun Çörüz, from the Christian Democratic Appeal.

Tensions regarding immigration and integration further escalated in 2004, when Dutch-born Islamic extremist Mohammed Bouyeri murdered filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the streets of Amsterdam. Van Gogh was targeted for making Submission, a film that controversially portrays text of the Koran projected onto naked female bodies. Pinned to van Gogh’s body was a death threat against MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who wrote the script and provided voiceover for the film. Shortly thereafter, Hirsi Ali was forced to leave parliament to go into hiding. The murder affected other female politicians from Muslim origins as well. For example, after the Van Gogh murder, the deputy mayor of an Amsterdam borough, Fatima Elatik, received threats from a right-wing Dutch extremist and had to be assigned body guards (Max 2004).
Van Gogh’s murder became a lighting rod for discussion about Islam, integration, and immigration as “[m]any wondered how it was possible that a relatively well-educated and well-integrated Moroccan Muslim of the second generation had turned to an apocalyptic variety of Islamic radicalism” (OSI 2007:16). And, policymakers, who had once assumed that young Muslims would become more secular and less religious than their parents, no longer believed in Muslim integration (OSI 2007). Thus, between 2002 and 2006, the government pushed for more restrictive policies towards immigration and developed policies to force integration of new immigrants (OSI 2007). While these policies affect all minority groups, at least on paper, research suggests that Muslim groups have been differentially impacted (Choudhury 2007). For example, a new ‘integration test’ was introduced for applicants of ‘family reunification,’ that, in practice, has overwhelmingly been used to close Dutch borders to Turkish or Moroccan Muslims (Choudhury 2007).

Another measure under consideration by the Dutch government has been a national ban on burqas, first suggested by government officials in 2005. Because so few women in the Netherlands wear burqas, most sources suggest that the measure would be largely symbolic. But, the issue has garnered significant attention in national-level as well as regional politics (throughout the European Union). After the ban was suggested, a measure did passed in parliament in 2005, but opposition in the Dutch cabinet prevented the measure from becoming law. As the next national election neared in 2006,
however, government officials promised to go through with the burqa ban if re-elected (IPU 2008). 80

The 2006 elections also took place in the context of immigration controversy. In May of that year, a documentary aired publicizing that Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who still officially held a seat in parliament, had lied about her age and national origin when she arrived in the Netherlands seeking asylum (van Holsteyn 2007). The Minister for Immigration and Integration, who was campaigning for leadership of Hirsi Ali’s party at the time, swiftly voided her citizenship. Although the decision was ultimately revoked, the controversy regarding Hirsi Ali caused one party to resign from government, forcing new elections (IPU 2008; van Holsteyn 2007).

In 2006, political parties again recruited new female candidates from Moroccan and Turkish ancestry. A Muslim woman was newly elected from the left-leaning Socialist Party, and the center-left Labour Party increased the number of Muslim women MPs from 1 to 3. Muslim women that had first gained parliamentary seats in 2003 were also reelected. In total, women from Muslim-majority groups were elected to almost 5 percent of seats in the Tweed Kamer. Muslim men, again, made less remarkable gains. Only the Green Left—the most politically leftist of Dutch parties—added a Muslim male, Tofik Dibi, a 27-year old second-generation Moroccan. Interestingly, when interviewed, Dibi suggested that he was surprised when he was placed so high on his party’s list, as he had not taken his candidacy very seriously (www.spunk.nl).

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80 Research does suggest, however, that compared to the 2002 and 2003 elections, immigration and integration were not central issues during the campaign.
Overall, it is interesting to note that since 2000, none of the women elected to parliament from Muslim-majority groups are traditional or neo-orthodox Muslims. Although faith may be important to them in their personal lives, these women tend to emphasize their acceptance of Western cultural values and report less traditional or more critical views of Islam. However, there is evidence that at least some of these women may voice a greater commitment to Islam today because of the political climate. As Klausen (2005a) reports in her study of Muslim political leaders:

Two women of Turkish origin who held important positions respectively in the Swedish Social Democratic Party and its Dutch counterpart, expressed identical feelings of rising impatience and belated self-discovery. “When I hear them talk about Òthose people, meaning Muslims, I feel like standing up and saying, ‘Hello, I am one of those people,’” said one while pulling at her miniskirt.

Overall, however, this quotation demonstrates that these women are not necessarily being recruited because they are powerful leaders in the Muslim community. Indeed, female Muslim politicians themselves voice concern over the conservatism of the Muslim community and the male dominance of Dutch immigrant organizations (Klausen 2005a).

Belgium

Belgium is one of the smallest but also one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Located between France and the Netherlands, Belgium was historically ruled by both countries, and today, the country is federally divided along linguistic lines into French, Dutch, and, to a lesser extent, German speakers. About three quarters of the population is Roman Catholic (CIA 2008).

Belgium’s some 500,000 Muslims make up approximately 5 percent of the country population, 55 percent of which are naturalized citizens (OSI 2007). As in the
Netherlands, most Belgian Muslims, about 85 percent, are of Turkish or Moroccan ancestry. Also similar to Dutch Muslims, Turkish and Moroccan men began arriving in Belgium in the 1960s as guest workers, but many of them stayed in the West and were joined by their wives and families during subsequent waves of immigration.

Most Muslims in Belgium are concentrated in a few large cities. In fact, in some neighborhoods in Brussels, Moroccans and Turkish Belgians constitute 50 to 80 percent of the population (de Raedt 2004). Scholars note that this concentration may have prevented the “ghettoization” of Belgian Muslims that is characteristic of Muslim populations elsewhere in the West (de Raedt 2004; Korologos 2006). But notably, Muslim integration has also been fostered by the Belgian government. For instance, Belgium has recruited Muslims to serve in the police and to participate in other government functions (Korologos 2006).

However, like in the Netherlands, Muslims in Belgium do face significant barriers. The highest unemployment rates in Belgium are those for Turkish- and Moroccan-born Belgians and their offspring—45 percent for males and 56 percent for females—compared to 10 percent unemployment for those of Belgian origin (EUMC 2006). And Belgian Turks and Moroccans have much lower levels of educational attainment than other Belgians, regardless of whether they are first or second generation immigrants (OSI 2007).

Despite these obstacles, research suggests that because of the fragmented nature of the political system in Belgium, Muslims have more political clout than elsewhere in the West (Korologos 2006). As early as 1994, North African Muslims were joining the

81 Still, there is evidence that Muslims in Belgium are more likely than other Belgians “to live in segregated and disadvantaged neighborhoods” (OSI 2007:7).
Socialist Party in large numbers for many as the same reasons as Whites, such as “political ambition, economic interests (getting a job), social interests (getting council housing), and political convictions” (Lambert 1997; cited from Messina 2004:18). And since, Muslims have been elected to local, regional, and national office in Belgium. In the last regional elections, Muslims in Brussels, who make up almost one-quarter of the population, even won a proportional share of seats (Korologos 2006).

Like the Netherlands, the relationship between religion and the state in Belgium aims towards neutrality (Fadil 2005). But the state also takes an active role in religion, subsidizing clerical salaries as well as the construction and maintenance of churches, mosques, and other places of worship. Today, the government of Belgium pays the salaries of roughly 100 imams and 700 teachers of Islam (Klausen 2005b; OSI 2007). And, in the Flemish region of Belgium, the government has provided funding for the construction of new mosques. However, critics allege that the placement of imams and teachers of Islam on the government payroll suggest government attempts to “co-opt” Islam (Khan 2005).

In Belgium, concerns over Muslim extremism and anti-immigrant sentiments pre-date September 11th. During the 1990s, the Belgian government made efforts to facilitate the creation of a constituent assembly that would represent the interests of Muslims in negotiations with the national and federal governments. Yet, in 1999, over half of the members of the executive committee of the body were rejected by the Ministry of Justice, for “an excessively radical orientation” (Ferrari 2005:17; see also Fadil 2005; Foblets and
The same year, the right-wing, anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok Party received 10 percent of the vote in national legislative elections (Klausen 2005b). And in November 2000, the Vlaams Block received one-third of the votes in municipal elections in Antwerp, a city in which roughly 7 percent of the population is Muslim (OSI 2007).

Still, as in other European countries, Islamophobia has been on the rise in Belgium. Since 2001, the government has arrested and/or convicted suspects involved in the September 11th attacks in the United States, the March 11th Madrid bombings, and suicide bomber attacks in Iraq. And as a result, anti-Muslim sentiments have risen. By some accounts, “the only thing that seems to unite a divided Belgium…is a fear of immigration and Islam, not just as a radical fringe, but also as a religion (International Herald Tribune, October 9, 2007).” In the run-up to the 2003 elections, the right-wing, anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok Party campaigned in 2003 on ending immigration altogether and, by some accounts, “profited effortlessly from the overt anti-Islam mood since 9/11…as well as the xenophobic discourse in public opinion” (IPU 2008; Rihoux et al. 2004:953).

The success of anti-immigrant politics in the 1999 and 2000 elections, coupled with rising Islamophobia after 2001, set the stage for gains in Muslim women’s political representation in 2003. Two new female politicians of Moroccan decent—Anissa Temsamani and Nahima Lanjri—were elected to the lower house from the Socialist and Christian Democratic Flemish political parties. But, not reflected in Figure 7.4 are significant gains of women from Muslim-majority groups in the Senate. In addition to the 2 women from Muslim origins already serving in the Senate, 3 more were elected in

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82 It is also noteworthy that in 2004, the assembly was dissolved altogether before the legislative term had expired (Cesari 2004; Ferrari 2005).
2003 from left and center-left political parties. As a result of the 2003 elections, over 7 percent of seats in the Belgian Senate were occupied by women of Moroccan or Turkish origin. At the same time, not a single Moroccan or Turkish man was elected to the Senate.

Like the Netherlands, the women that were elected to the Belgian parliament in 2003 were secular and Westernized. None of the female politicians of Moroccan or Turkish descent wear traditional Islamic dress or voice traditional views. Some do not identify as Muslim at all. One Moroccan woman elected to the lower house in 2003, Mimount Bousakla, has been a fierce opponent of Islam. Like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Bousakla had to be put under police protection in 2004 after receiving death threats (Max 2004).

Unlike in Netherlands, however, the political context did not facilitate continued gains in Muslim women’s representation over time. As depicted in Figure 7.4, the same number of Muslim women was elected to the lower house in 2007 as 2003. And, none of the women from Muslim backgrounds newly elected in 2003 were returned to the Senate. Notably, however, anti-immigrant politics took a different direction in Belgium during the period than in the Netherlands. In November 2004, the Belgium Supreme Court declared the far-right Vlaams Blok illegal due to its racist nature, forcing the political party to disband (Klausen 2005b:122). Party leaders from the Vlaams Blok party regrouped, forming the Vlaams Belang Party. But, some Belgians turned against the party in June 2006, when an 18 year old man shot a Turkish woman and a 24-year old pregnant Mali woman in Antwerp. News accounts suggest that the community held the Vlaams Belang responsible, and in next municipal elections, the Socialist left gained power.
However, in the run-up to the 2007 election, the political context was still highly charged, especially with regard to the rights of Muslim women. Between 2003 and 2007, schools, public hospitals, civil service agencies, and entire cities banned various forms of Muslim women’s traditional dress (*hijab*, *niqab*, and *burqa*). Muslim teachers and other employees were fired, young Muslim girls were prevented from attending schools, and women wearing burqas were even been arrested. Those siding with Muslims on the issue were also attacked. For instance, in 2004, a Belgian factory supervisor received death threats after allowing a female worker to wear *hijab*.

Overall, it is difficult to tell why women from Muslim groups did not make substantial gains in the 2007 election. Given that a range of political parties had fielded female candidates of Muslim origins in 2003, party leaders may have perceived less strategic advantage to including these women on the ticket in 2007. Or, given some Belgian’s rising dissatisfaction with anti-immigrant politics, parties in the center and left may not have felt the need to distinguish themselves by including women of immigrant origins as candidates.

**Considering the Cases Together**

In summary, Muslim women’s political representation in Belgium and the Netherlands has increased dramatically since 9/11. Case evidence suggests that the inclusion of Muslim women into Dutch politics occurred in a turbulent climate of violence and assassination by Islamic extremists. In the face of these violent episodes, nationalist and anti-immigrant parties called for policies limiting the influx of new Muslims. Also a focal point of debate was Muslim women’s dress, as local and national
governments pursued policies restricting headscarves, face veils, and burqas. Especially in the Netherlands, political parties in the center and particularly on the left side of the political spectrum increasingly elected women of Moroccan and Turkish origin. Although gains in the political representation of women from Muslim groups dropped off in Belgium in 2007, women from these groups still outnumber men. However, only a certain kind of Muslim woman has been successful in Dutch and Belgian politics—secular, Westernized Muslim women who choose not to wear conservative Islamic dress.

CONCLUSION

The research in this chapter suggests that anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant politics in recent years may have contributed to rising political representation for Muslim women in some Western countries. Belgium and the Netherlands are two countries with fairly large Muslim populations, populations with egalitarian attitudes about gender and women’s roles, and proportional representation electoral systems. With this constellation of factors, far-right exclusionary politics may have spurred leftist political parties to recruit secular Muslim female candidates. I dub this process “counter-contagion.”

A second central implication of this research is that more traditional Muslim women, especially those choosing to wear Islamic dress, are unlikely to benefit from counter-contagion. Research suggests that “restrictive interpretations of Islam” may be the most significant internal barriers to Muslim women’s political representation in Western countries (Bullock 2005:555). But as Klausen (2005b) argues, Western political
parties also act as filters, often excluding Muslims with more traditional views to be excluded from the elite. Common Western stereotypes of Muslim women may make them less attractive candidates to leftist parties and voters.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I set out to describe and explain minority women’s representation in national legislatures around the world. Existing cross-national research on women’s representation has thus far failed to consider differences in the political representation of majority and minority women. Quantitative research on the political representation of minority groups has never been attempted across countries. And, only a handful of predominantly U.S.-based studies have explored the political representation of racial, ethnic, and religious minority women, even at a descriptive level. Consequently, we know little about politics at the intersection of gender and minority status across different social and political contexts. This project takes initial steps towards shedding light on this important but neglected area of study.

One principle contribution of this research is the collection of data. Organizations that publish data on women in parliaments worldwide aggregate women’s representation as a group. Thus, arguably the largest obstacle to research on minority women’s political representation has been a lack of reliable cross-national data. But, this project goes beyond data collection and descriptive analysis to try to understand what factors predict variation in minority women’s representation. Therefore, as a result of this research, we
know not only where minority women are excluded from power and where they are flourishing, but we can begin to understand why.

In this chapter, I summarize the central findings from prior chapters. I discuss the limitations of existing research on women and minority political representation for understanding the political outcomes of minority women. I evaluate how research on minority women in politics informs and extends current theories of intersectionality, and I consider the implications of my research for public policy. I close with suggestions for future research.

PATTERNS OF MINORITY WOMEN’S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Even in the 21st Century, minority women continue to face substantial barriers to political representation. In Chapter 3, I quantify the degree of underrepresentation of minority women in politics in a number of ways—compared to minority men, compared to majority women, and compared to their share of the population. By all these metrics, minority women under-perform. Compared to minority men, who hold 10.5 percent of seats in the average legislature, minority women hold 1.8 percent of seats. In the majority of countries in my sample, majority women perform better than minority women relative to male members of their groups. And on average, minority women are only 18 percent of the way towards representation in proportion to their share of the population. This abysmal statistic is driven in large part by the complete exclusion of minority women from political representation in many countries. Indeed, in 19 countries where both majority women and minority men are represented in the national legislature, minority women hold not a single seat.
However, the descriptive analyses also show that there is substantial country-level and regional variation in minority women’s political outcomes. By most measures, minority women’s political representation is highest in the West. However, Western societies tend to be more homogeneous, on average, than countries in other parts of the world. And generally, minority women perform better relative to male members of their group when minorities hold only a small number of seats. Still, it is noteworthy that in many Western countries, minority women hold, on average, 40 percent of their group’s seats in national legislatures. At the other end of the spectrum, it is perhaps not surprising that minority women are represented at the lowest levels in the Middle East. Minority women are unlikely to be elected in political contexts where women are largely excluded from the political arena. Indeed, one of the strongest correlations in this dissertation is between the absolute levels of minority women in the national legislature and majority women’s share of group seats.

Beyond the specific focus on minority women, this chapter also suggests that although minorities do face significant obstacles to political underrepresentation in some countries, the vast majority of political inequality worldwide occurs along gender lines. Despite the advances made by women in the political arena over the past few decades, both majority and minority women remain substantially underrepresented in the political arena. Certainly, minority status intersects with gender to further marginalize minority women in politics. But even in countries where minority men are particularly successful at gaining seats in the national legislature, minority women lag far behind.
EXTENDING CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH ON WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION

In Chapter 4, I took a first step towards explaining cross-national variation in minority women’s political representation. Not surprisingly, I find that majority status results in significantly higher levels of political representation for women. Even controlling group size, and important structural and political differences across states, majority women hold 8-9 percent more seats, on average, than women from minority groups. The advantage of majority women can be explained in part by different effects of electoral system and Western residence, which work to majority women’s advantage much more than for minority women.

One of the most surprising findings in this dissertation is that proportional representation electoral systems do not increase the numbers of minority women serving in national legislatures, even for minority groups of larger than average size. Proportional representation does increase minority women share of seats relative to male members of their group. But, this measure is highest when the representation of minority men is low. Thus, my research suggests that in contrast to theory, PR systems help women but not minorities to gain political representation. In PR systems, it is also possible that minority women can be especially attractive representatives of minority groups, as they may help balance party lists by sex and majority/minority status simultaneously.

Aside from PR, many of the variables important in cross-national research on women do not predict variation in minority women’s representation. Thus, like recent research on women’s political representation in less developed countries, I find that the
general model of women’s political representation may not apply to women from all kinds of groups and in all parts of the world. There is some evidence that large swings in women’s rates of economic activity do predict variation in minority women’s political representation. But, generally, variables related to the representation of minority groups are much stronger predictors of minority women’s political representation than variables related to women’s representation. Still, what is best for minority men politically is not necessarily what is best for minority women.

THE EFFECTS OF GENDER AND MINORITY QUOTAS

In Chapter 5, I focus on the effects of quotas—policies that mandate the inclusion of women and/or minorities in national legislatures. Most of the world’s countries have these policies. But, research to date has not considered whether quotas propagate or reduce inequalities within marginalized groups. That is, until now, empirical research has not evaluated whether policies designed to promote the political representation of women and minority groups help minority women. Using both odds ratios and hierarchical linear modeling, I find that gender quotas do help minority women get elected. However, minority women benefit much less from gender quotas than majority women, particularly when quotas are only legislated at the party level. Similarly, my results indicate that minority quotas increase minority women’s political representation. But, minority men are the primary beneficiaries of minority quotas. In fact, in countries with minority quotas, the odds of electing a minority man over a minority woman are almost twice those in countries with no quotas.
But one of the most important findings in this dissertation for extending theories of intersectionality and for thinking about public policy is that gender and minority quotas interact to influence the political outcomes of minority women. Tandem quotas—the simultaneous presence of national-level quotas for both women and minorities—increase minority women’s political representation at levels far greater than either policy alone. And, in absolute terms, the effect of tandem quotas is large. Controlling for other factors, tandem quotas more than quadruple the levels of minority women serving in the national legislature over countries without quotas. In contrast, mixed quotas—the simultaneous presence of party-level quotas and minority quotas—do not provide minority women with the same advantage. In fact, my results indicate that party-level gender quotas dampen the positive effect of minority quotas on minority women’s representation.

The implications of these results are twofold. First, from a theoretical standpoint, there is strong evidence that the concept of “strategic intersectionality” applies to cross-national research. Combining national-level policies that promote the representation of women and minorities makes minority women’s intersectional identities politically advantageous. Electing just one minority women can help to satisfy both gender and minority quotas simultaneously, leaving the most seats left over for occupation by majority men. In short, minority women perform best in situations where their election is advantageous to dominant groups. Second, from a policy standpoint, it is clear that national-level gender quotas are preferable to party-level gender quotas when the goal is promoting minority women’s representation. Although party-level gender quotas do help
to create more proportional legislatures, they do so primarily by increasing the political representation of majority women.

The analyses in Chapter 5 suggest that political mobilization to fight inequality along one dimension may contribute to marginalization along another. In particular, countries that use minority quotas may not take steps to ensure that women are adequately represented. Indeed, minority men’s odds of election compared to majority women increase from 2:1 without quotas to a margin of 5:1 with minority quotas. However, as stand alone policies, gender quotas are less problematic. In countries with only gender quotas, the odds that majority women and minority men are elected reach parity.

THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MUSLIM WOMEN

In Chapters 6 and 7, I focus the political experiences of Muslim women. Although women typically have lower levels of representation in Muslim-majority countries than in Protestant-majority countries, we do not know if Islam actually presents a significant barrier to women’s political representation. My results suggest that minority women from predominantly Muslim groups are represented at levels no different than minority women from groups with other dominant religious traditions. Furthermore, in certain institutional and political contexts in Western countries, Muslim women can actually perform quite well politically. In the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, for example, Muslim women even outnumber their male counterparts.

Institutional differences have strong effects on Muslim women’s political representation in Western countries. Muslim women’s representation is highest in
countries with high levels of government respect for the free practice of religion. In fact, higher levels of government respect for religion explain the higher representation of Muslim women in Western countries. I also test for differences across the representation of Muslim women from different ethnic groups. I find that Muslim women from North Africa tend to be represented at higher levels relative to their male counterparts than other groups of women. Further, women from the Middle East and Turkey are represented in national legislatures at levels much higher when governments respect the free practice of religion. However, Muslim women with origins in South Asia do not appear to benefit from this institutional context.

However, none of these factors explain why Muslim women’s political representation has increased significantly since September 11, 2001. Exploring Muslim women’s political representation in the Netherlands and Belgium suggests that in a turbulent climate of violence, political assassination, rising Islamophobia, and anti-immigrant politics, political parties in the center and particularly on the left side of the political spectrum may elect women from Muslim groups. However, this specific political context may not help Muslim women who espouse traditionalist or conservative Muslim values or wear traditional Islamic dress in public. Indeed, when women who wear traditional Islamic dress have run for political office in Western countries, they have faced significant opposition and even ridicule from parliamentarians. Overall, my research on Muslim women’s political representation suggests that gender, ethnicity, religion, and religiosity interact with one another and with the institutional and political context to produce divergent patterns of male and female Muslim representation.
MOVING FORWARD

This research is just a first step towards understanding the political outcomes of minority women worldwide. The data collected in this project could be used to investigate a wide range of research questions related to the intersection of gender and minority status in politics. For example, future research should evaluate the election of minority women at the party level. Not only may party ideology influence levels of minority women’s political representation, but it would be interesting to find out how the presence or success of ethnic political parties affects minority women politically.

Future research should also consider links between terrorism and the political representation of Muslim women. My dissertation provides some evidence that fear of terrorism may fuel the election of Muslim minority women in Western countries with PR systems. And, in other parts of the world, auxiliary analyses show a positive correlation between victimization by terrorists and the election of Muslim women. However, there are serious questions of causality that need careful investigation. On the one hand, in the face of terrorism, states may try to incorporate more moderate Muslim voices, which may mean including Muslim women. On the other hand, forces of modernization in countries with sizeable Muslim populations may simultaneously increase Muslim women’s political representation and fuel extremist backlash.

In the coming years, I also plan to extend the data collected in this dissertation in two ways. First, I hope to improve sample coverage in Africa. Although this data is difficult to obtain given the high degree of heterogeneity in most African countries, I am confident that some progress can be made toward this goal. Second, I plan to collect multiple years of election data for use in longitudinal analysis. As discussed in Chapter
2, I have already been able to collect data on minority women’s representation for multiple election years in several countries. I hope to do so for a larger sample of countries.

A great deal of ink has been spilled in recent years regarding the obstacles faced by women and other marginalized groups in the political arena. At the same time, scholars have documented widespread gains in women’s political representation in countries spanning the globe. But, the vast majority of this research ignores the special circumstances faced by minority women. My hope is that this dissertation draws attention to the widespread political underrepresentation of minority women and the prospects for comparative research on intersectionality. Researchers and policymakers should not continue to analyze the dynamics of women and minority representation without considering politics at the intersection of these identities.
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APPENDIX A

SAMPLE PAGES FROM DATA COLLECTION CODEBOOK: AFGHANISTAN, ESTONIA, AND ITALY
Afghanistan, 2005- House of the People (Wolesi Jirga)

IDs: 117_001 through 117_249

Election Information:
249 members (including 10 seats reserved for Kuchis including 3 women and 65 seats reserved for women) took office following elections on September 18th, 2005.

Background on Majority/Minority Groups:
According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2005 Human Rights Report cites that the Shi’a minority historically faced discrimination from the majority Sunni population. “During the year claims of social discrimination against Hazaras and other Shi’as continued. The Hazaras accused President Karzai, a Pashtun, of providing preferential treatment to Pashtuns and of ignoring minorities, especially Hazaras. In 2004 Pashtuns in Herat Province accused then governor Ismail Khan, a Tajik, of discrimination and abuses against their ethnic group. The nomadic Kuchis expressed concern that the voter registration process under-represented their population; however, the government and the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) worked to address their concerns.”

http://www.afghan-network.net/Ethnic-Groups/: This website about ethnicity in Afghanistan identifies 7 groups: Pashtuns (the dominant ethnic and linguistic population), Uzbeks and Turkmen, Tajiks (bulk of educated elite and have significant political influence), Hazaras (have always lived on the edge of economic survival and have faced discrimination mostly on religious grounds; around 9% of population), Nuristanis (claimed descendents of Alexander the Great), Aimaqs (1/2 million), and Balochis (nomadic group).

Country-data.com (1997) identifies 5 major ethnic groups (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen) as well as a number of other groups: Aimaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Wakhi, Farsiwan, Nuristani, Baluch, Brahui, Qizibash, Kabuli, and Jat. But the report also cautions that “Afghanistan’s ethnic mosaic has no precise boundaries; nor is its national culture uniform. Few of its ethnic groups are indigenous; few maintain racial homogeneity”

Overall, this research suggests that Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and historically, they were politically dominant. Tajiks and Uzbeks are part of the Northern Alliance, and Turkmens are often lumped in with the Uzbeks.

List of Minority Groups:
1. Kuchis (protected minority)
2. Arabs (majority are Persian)
3. Hazaras and Aimaqs—oppressed due to their mixed Persian/Mongolian identity
4. Non-Hazara Shi’a (80% Sunni Muslim)
5. Ismaili (less than 5% of the population, Shi’a Muslim)
6. Nuristani (forcibly converted to Islam at the turn of the 20th Century)
7. Other small ethnic groups (less than 5%) (Pashai, Baloch)

**Coding Parliamentary Data:**
Election results by province (with candidate gender information) are linked from: 

Official election results by province in English are available online at:  
[http://www.results.jemb.org/](http://www.results.jemb.org/). I used this site to finalize the list of elected candidates, including the gender and election results.

67 Kuchis (the nomadic people of Afghanistan), 7 of which are women, ran for 10 reserved Kuchi seats.


According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2005 Human Rights Report, “Of the 633 female candidates, 51 withdrew their candidacy, citing economic constraints as the cause for withdrawal. Despite these difficulties, citizens elected 17 women who would have won seats in the Wolesi Jirga even without the constitutional quota. A woman from Herat received the largest number of votes of any candidate in the province.”

Andrew Wilder (2005) compiled the ethnic / religious groups represented in the Wolesi Jirga: 118 Pashtun, 53 Tajik and Aimaq, 30 Hazara, 20 Uzbek, 11 Non-Hazara Shi’a (religious group), 5 Turkmen, 5 Arab, 3 Ismaili (religious group), 2 Pashai, 1 Baloch, and 1 Nuristani. In June 2007, I emailed Andrew Wilder to see if he would provide me with individual-level data, and he did so. He provided me with individual-level data on ethnicity and religion, which I merged with my candidate list.

**Problems:**
10 of the Pashtun members are elected as Kuchis. Don’t know if there are other Kuchis not elected in the reserved seats.

**Notes:**
A minimum of 68 women are guaranteed through the reservation of seats, and this number has been elected.

Be careful about population statistics for ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Because of the war with the USSR and the refugee situation, the numbers have changed
substantially over the years, and some estimates vary widely. Further, the country has not compiled a Census in decades.

... 

Estonia, 2007- Parliament (Riigikogu)

IDs: 043_102 through 043_203

Election Information:
101 members were elected March 4, 2007.

Background on Majority/Minority Groups:
According to the Encyclopedia of Nations, In 1998, Estonians made up about 65% of the population, Russians 28.1%, Ukrainians 2.5%, Belarusians 1.5%, Finns 1%, and others 1.6%. Non-Estonians were found chiefly in the northeastern industrial towns, while rural areas were 87% Estonian.”

According to Wikipedia, “Modern Estonia is, as a whole, multicultural, but geographically a largely ethnically homogeneous country. 13 of Estonia’s 15 counties are over 80 percent ethnic Estonian, the most homogeneous being Hiiumaa, where Estonians account for 98.4% of the population. In the counties of Harju (including the capital city, Tallinn) and Ida-Viru, however, Estonians make up 60% and 20% of the population, respectively. Ethnic Russians make up 25.7% of the total population, but account for 36% of the population in Harju county, and 70% of the population in Ida-Viru county.”

From a conference paper on Estonia (http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/): Until WWII, Jews, Latvians, Germans, Swedes and Russians were established as national minority groups, i.e., ethnic groups in Estonia whose numbers exceed 3,000. Today, there are primarily two groups in Estonia: Estonians and Fins. But we can include all the prior groups as well. In addition to these six groups (Jews, Latvians, Germans, Swedes, Fins, and Russians), we can add gypsies and Tatars. “In 1989 665 [gypsies] were registered in Estonia, but the Estonian Gipsy Society comprises 1,500. Tatars have lived in Estonia since the 1870s, and set up their organizations and religious groups in the 1920s. In 1989, 4,058 Tatars were counted in Estonia and in 1997 3,315.”

According to an article on minority composition and location over time in Estonia, “The spatial concentration of immigrants is high when measured at the level of Estonia’s 15 counties. More specifically, up to 80 percent of non-Estonians reside in only two counties: one-half live in Harju and another third in Ida-Viru County, where they constitute 41 percent and 79 percent of the population, respectively (see Figs. 4 and 5). This reflects the fact that the major industrial enterprises were located mainly in the towns of Ida-Viru County in northeastern Estonia and the capital city of Tallinn (in Harju County).”
List of Minority Groups:
1. Russians
2. Fins
3. Swedes
4. Germans
5. Latvians
6. Jews
7. Gypsies
8. Tatars

Coding Parliamentary Data:
A list of members is available online at:
http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=ems&page=view_pohiandmed&pid=70062&lang=en

According to Wikipedia, no parties that explicitly represent the Russian minority (Constitution Party, Russian Party in Estonia) obtained any seats in parliament.

According to the data obtained from the parliament website, 8 seats in the parliament represent Ida-Virumaa, a constituency that is predominantly Russian.

I emailed three female MPs who speak English: <name removed>, <name removed>, and <name removed>. I also emailed <name removed>, who heads a parliamentary group on National Minorities. I heard no response from these individuals.

I sent emails to three academics from Estonia that write about Estonian/Russian issues—<name removed>, <name removed>, and Veronika Kalmus.

According to Veronika Kalmus, “7 members are Russians (Vladimir Velman, Eldar Efendiyej, Igor Grazin, Valeri Korb, Tatjana Muravjova, Nelli Privalova, Olga Sotnik). Among them, 3 are women. Aleksei Lotman is a Jew. There are at least two gays in Riigikogu.”

Problems:
None.

Notes:
None.

...


**Election Information:**

630 members were elected April 9-10, 2006.

**Background on Majority/Minority Groups:**

According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2007 Human Rights Report, “the only legally defined minorities are linguistic—the French-speaking Valdostani and the German-speaking Altoatesini/Suditirolesi. … In a largely monolithic society, immigrants represented approximately 4 percent of the population, and fewer than half of these qualified as ethnic/racial minorities.”

Research suggests that Italy has a wide range of “historic linguistic communities” (Bagna 2006). These are indigenous communities that have lived in Italy for centuries, and their linguistic minority status receives protection under Italian law. See data collection folder for copy of this article, saved as “Bagna 2006.pdf”.

Sources on linguistic minorities lists at least seven distinct linguistic minority communities in Italy: Valdostanis (French-speaking), Altoatesinis (German-speaking), Molise Croats, Slovenians, ethnic Albanians, those that speak Griko (a variant of Greek), and a small community of Ladin-speakers. The two most prominent of these groups are the Valdostanis and Altoatesinis. Those that speak Catalan and Corsican could also be included here, these groups live in Sardinia, which is discussed below. See also: [http://www.yourguidetoitaly.com/linguistic-minorities-italy.html](http://www.yourguidetoitaly.com/linguistic-minorities-italy.html)


A copy is saved as Minorities in Italy.pdf in my data collection folder.

In recent years, Muslim immigrants have become an increasingly visible minority group in Italy. Islam continues to be excluded from “official religion” status. [http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-12/28/article03.shtml](http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-12/28/article03.shtml)

The Minorities At Risk dataset identifies some ethnonationalist activity by Sardinians. Sardinians live in a territorially distinct area, also use a different language (Sardo), and there has been some separatist activity in Sardinia in recent years (MAR 2008). “While there was limited organized protest and militant activity starting in the 1960s…., this never escalated beyond larger protests in the early 1990s…. There have been no recent political protests…. In 2002, Sardinian separatists claimed responsibility for 3 mail bombs that exploded in Milan, but no other violence has been reported in recent years.”

**List of Minorities:**

1. Valdostani
2. Altoatesini/Suditirolesi
3. Other indigenous linguistic minorities
4. Jews
5. Roma
6. Sardinians
7. Muslim Immigrants
8. Non-Muslim Immigrants

Coding Parliamentary Data:
According to the parliamentary website, there are five linguistic minorities 
(minoranze linguistiche) in the parliament. All five of them are men.

Of the 5 linguistic minorities currently serving in the Chamber, only one is French-
speaking—Roberto Rolando Nicco—while the rest are German-speaking.

According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2007 Human Rights Report, “Two
members of immigrant groups (of Moroccan and Palestinian origin) were elected to
the Chamber of Deputies.”

According to the parliamentary website, Ali detto Ali Rashid Khalil was born in
Amman, Jordan, and Khaled Fouad Allam was born in Tlemcen, Algeria.

I also identified 1 Jew in the Chamber of Deputies: Emanuele Fiano (male).

So, there appear to be 8 minorities in the Chamber of Deputies, but none of them are
women.

Problems:
None.

Notes:
Vladimir Luxuria (born Wladimiro Guadagno) is a transgendered politician in Italy,
the second in the world behind Georgina Beyer in New Zealand.

An Italian born Jewish woman who currently lives in Israel, Fiamma Nirenstein, was
elected to Parliament in 2008. Another Jew, Alessandro Rubin, was also elected in
2008.
APPENDIX B

ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN VARIABLES ANALYZED IN MULTILEVEL MODELS
### Table B.1: Zero-Order Correlations between Main Independent and Dependent Variables Analyzed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6

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<th>18</th>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables: 1. % Minority Worn in Leg=Percent minority women in national legislature; 2. Women % of Group Seats=Percent of group’s seats occupied by women, logged; 3. Majority=Majority group; 4. Group Size=Group’s share of population; 5. PR System=Proportional Representation electoral system; 6. Democracy=level of democracy (POLITY IV); 7. Natl Gender Quotas=National-level gender quotas (IDEA 2005); 8. GDP=Log GDP per capita, 2000 (Penn World Tables); 9. % Women Ec. Active=Percentage of women economically active (UNESCO); 10. West=Country is in the West; 11. Muslim=Majority of country is Muslim (World Almanac 1996); 12. Ethnic-Religious Frag.=Ethnic-Religious Fragmentation (Ankar 2000); 13. Minority Quotas=National-Level Minority Quota; 14. Mean District Magnitude=Representatives elected by constituency size (Keeler et al. 2002); 15. % Minority Men in Leg=Percent legislative seats occupied by minority men; 16. Party Gender Quotas=One or more parties in a system employs a gender quota (IDEA 2008); 17. Respect for Min Religion=Government respect for religious freedom (Finke and Grim 2007); 18. Muslim Group=Majority of group members are Muslim.
APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES FROM CHAPTER 4
Figure C.1: Predicted Levels of Minority Women’s Political Representation by Group Size for groups Living in the West and Those Living Outside of the West
### Table C.1: Random Intercept Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Minority Women’s Share of Seats in the National Legislature with Politics, Social Structure, Region, and Religion

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<th>Religion</th>
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<td>s.e.</td>
<td>sig.</td>
<td>est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.05 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.75)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.79)</td>
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<td>0.07 (0.01) ***</td>
<td>0.07 (0.01) ***</td>
<td>0.07 (0.01) ***</td>
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<td>0.06 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>0.83 (0.43) ^</td>
<td>0.95 (0.49) ^</td>
<td>1.05 (0.48) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structural Variables</td>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.29)</td>
<td>-0.50 (0.30) ^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Women Econ. Active</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02) ^</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>-0.40 (0.60)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-1.02 (0.80)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-0.78 (0.87)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.83 (1.04) ^</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.74 (0.65)</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
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<td>-0.01 (0.68)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-0.97 (0.92)</td>
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***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10

^Denotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered
## Group Size Interactions

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<tr>
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<th>Model D6</th>
<th>Model D7</th>
<th>Model D8</th>
<th>Model D9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PR Electoral System</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(^1)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active(^1)</td>
<td>0.01 (^1)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15 (^1)</td>
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### Main Effects

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<th>Model D9</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.55 (*)</td>
<td>0.55 (*)</td>
<td>0.68 (***)</td>
<td>0.70 (***)</td>
<td>0.55 (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Size(^1)</td>
<td>0.11 (*)</td>
<td>0.10 (**)</td>
<td>0.13 (***)</td>
<td>0.14 (***)</td>
<td>0.10 (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>PR Electoral System</td>
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<td>0.22 (^1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(^1)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Women Economically Active(^1)</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03 (^1)</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>West</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.93 (*)</td>
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<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
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\(^1\)Denotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered

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<th>N--Countries</th>
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***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, \(^{\text{p}<.10}; \text{standard errors appear in parentheses}\)

Table C.2: Hierarchical Linear Models of Minority Women’s Political Representation with Cross-Level Interactions, Predicting the Slope of Group Size
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<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Size(^1)</td>
<td>0.07 ***</td>
<td>0.20 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Electoral System</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(^1)</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Econ Active(^1)</td>
<td>0.04 (^t)</td>
<td>0.04 (^t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
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**Group-Level Religion**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.96 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
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<td>Mixed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
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**N—Countries**

<table>
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**N—Groups**

<table>
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</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, \(^t\)p<.10; standard errors appear in parentheses

\(^t\)Denotes that variable is Grand Mean Centered

Table C.3: Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Minority Women’s Political Representation Group-Level Religion