The Problem of Values In Educational Theory

---

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Raymond James Ramsden, B.A., M.A.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Ohio State University

1941

Approved by:

[Signature]

Adviser
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ............................................. 1

Chapter I. Statement of the Problem

Men commonly postulate two types of values .... 10
Two sources of moral values ...................... 13
Values and standards conflict ................... 15
Consequences of compartmentalized values and
standards .............................................. 17
Illustrations of the conflict of values and
value standards ..................................... 13
Illustrations of the conflict of values within
a standard ............................................ 20

Chapter II. The Historical Background of the Transcendentalist position

The roots of transcendentalism lie in animism . 24
The conditions of Greek life fostered the de-
velopment of mind and intelligence .......... 26
The rise of the sophists ......................... 27
The Socratic theory of knowledge ............. 31
Plato elevated values to a transcendental
world .................................................. 32
Reasons why the sophistic theory of relativity
failed to develop ................................... 36
Why Aristotle's achievements in the natural sciences are not important today .......... 40

The influence of Plato and Aristotle upon medieval and modern value standards .......... 41

Chapter III. The Influence of Empiricism Upon Renaissance Transcendentalism

The influence of the new science upon the prevalent conceptions of the relation of matter and spirit ......................... 43

The development of the substantive mind theory by Descartes ......................... 50

The influence of the empiricists upon the substantive mind theory ..................... 53

The outstanding characteristic of empiricism is its method ............................ 55

The influence of empiricism upon conceptions of the nature of the good life ........ 60

Summary of important tendencies in empirical thought .................................. 63

Kant's epistemology ...................... 70

Kant's ethical formalism .................. 73

Summary ................................... 75

Chapter IV. Implications of Field Physics for the Transcendentalist Position

How the field functions .................. 79

Organisms as fields ........................ 83

The implications of the field theory are not fully realized in all areas .............. 87

The field theory permits the application of scientific method to the qualitative as well as to the quantitative aspects of experience ................................. 90
The importance of the field theory for revised conceptions of the nature of mind and consciousness ........................................ 93

Implications of revised conceptions for the nature of space and time ......................... 100

The implications for the nature and meaning of truth ............................................. 101

The pragmatic conception of truth ................................................................. 104

The field theory does not permit the charge against the instrumentalist of solipsism and subjectivism ................................. 107

The nature of values .................................................. 112

The implications of the field theory for religion ................................................. 117

The nature of moral conduct ................................................................. 119

The field theory is not implicative of moral anarchy ............................................. 122

The field theory emphasizes the importance of action, function, method rather than the attainment or pursuit of fixed goals .......... 123

---

**Chapter V. Transcendentalism In Education**

The classicists are transcendentalists ............ 126

Plato's ideal social order ........................................ 127

A return to the classics stands as the remedy for present educational and social confusions ........................................... 130

Hutchins minimizes the importance of vocational education ........................................... 136

Mortimer Adler's recommendations in regard to the classics ........................................... 137

F.S. Breed's concept of the nature of truth and the function of the school .................... 139

Summary of the classicist position ............. 140
A resort to metaphysics for the over-arching values is not the way to resolve present confusions .............................................141

The progressive educator cannot accept, with the classicists, hypostatized values ..........145

The objectives of education as formulated by the classicists are unacceptable to the progressive educator .............................................146

The profitable study of the classics requires an orientation and genuine interest ...............149

The classics should be read and evaluated in terms of our present social aims and modern scientific knowledge .............................................152

Vocational education is not to be disparaged ......154

The classicists nowhere face the instrumentalists' criticisms of their basic assumptions .........155

The classicists should meet the criticisms of the instrumentalists .............................................157

Recapitulation .............................................153

Chapter VI. Democracy As the Over-Arching Value Standard

The nature of "democracy"

The relation of the concept of liberty to democracy .............................................164

A modern concept of democracy ......................170

General implications for teaching of the acceptance of democratic values ......................174

Suggestions for relating American history to the study of democracy as a way of life ..........178

Suggestions regarding the teaching of ancient, medieval and modern history .................194

Suggestions regarding the teaching of American literature .............................................193
INTRODUCTION

When two people meet and find themselves faced with a dearth of conversational topics there is one which usually brings an easy and ready response: the weather. At the present time another topic of conversation is used with the same result: the war. Many who take this topic seriously rightly end up by speculating as to what hope, if any, remains for the salvation of the race.

In certain important respects men appear at present far from the realization of any utopian scheme of social organization. In fact, they appear to be in danger of "striking out." In some countries, as we all well know, the national philosophy glorifies war and hate. To some people it seems that men have a large enough task in extending their control over an immoral and unpurposeful environment without fighting among themselves. There are already enough tears in the world. We do not ordinarily realize how often our ideals and hopes are thwarted, because of our ability to readjust to new situations, to see the bright side of life. Occasionally we become aware of this fact. John Dewey has written, "The pathos of unfulfilled expectation, the tragedy of defeated pur-

-1-
poses and ideals, the catastrophies of accident, are the commonplaces of all comment on the human scene." The poet Shelley expressed the same sentiment in more artistic language when he wrote:

"We look before and after
    And pine for what is not:
    Our sincerest laughter
    With some pain is fraught;
    Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought."

If the human venture is in danger of defeat, or at least a sharp setback at the present time, it is because men have failed to establish satisfactory human relationships. It is not because they have failed to establish satisfactory relationships with the rest of nature. This is only to say that our present pressing social problems (all of which in a last analysis are individual problems), are the end-product of the "cultural lag."

Why the cultural lag? Why must men fight? Why cannot men live together in peace and harmony, and actualize the ideals which we are content to say "recede as we approach them"? The answers to these questions can be given in various ways. The writer proposes

to show that the fault lies in the fact that men guide their lives according to compartmentalized and conflicting values and value standards. As a result they are at a loss to understand themselves.

Every man at times longs for a brotherhood of all men. At other times he may heartily wish every member of a certain sect, or race, or nationality out of existence. Every man longs at times for a rich full life for himself and for all. He identifies his own good with the good of the whole and he is willing to make sacrifices of personal freedom in order that the ideal of cooperative living, "one for all and all for one" may be realized. At other times he is a defeatist. He finds the world inherently sour, and he decides to give up the struggle and to hope for better things in the world to come. Or, as a result of this conclusion, he may take an aggressive and defiant attitude toward his fellow beings, and refuse to identify his own best interests with those of others. His philosophy becomes then not "one hand for oneself and one for the ship," as Count Felix von Luckner once expressed it, but "me first--and may the devil take the hindmost." Every man at times gives reign to his impulses of generosity, tolerance, sympathy, fraternity. At other times he is wilfully unkind, inconsiderate, selfish, and bigoted. The average person is readily swayed by the stimuli bombarding him from every side seeking his support to this or that belief. Our
impulses plainly conflict: there is little we can do about that. But we can make an effort to be intellectually and overtly consistent. The writer feels that if all men could so clarify their thinking that they would see the value in consistency in thought and action to a single over-arching standard or frame of reference, and would construct that standard on the basis of the data which modern science reveals as pointing the way to the good life for man, that many present-day social injustices could be remedied.

When men, acting either as individuals or as social groups, pay loyalty to conflicting values and value standards, the following important results accrue: (1) energy which might be used in the actualization of one set of values is dissipated; and (2) the clarification of the nature of the good life as it is suggested by the sciences is not achieved, for men vicariously find the good life elsewhere. Few would care to argue that consistency to a single over-arching ideal is not to be preferred to several which conflict in their implications for conduct. It would seem, then, that the first thing a man struggling for intellectual integrity should do should be to clarify his thinking in such a way that the value standards to which he pays allegiance stand out in their separateness. Secondly, he should decide which standard he wished to accept. He may accept authoritarianism (which if he does, will necessitate his making one con-
cession after another to the exigencies of practical living), or he may decide to stand on his own intellectual feet, so to speak, and seek data in the sciences for the construction of a standard for testing the value of alternative courses of action open to him. Thirdly, once the standard is constructed or adopted, he should seek hereafter to consciously evaluate his actions in terms of that standard. When impulses conflict (as, for instance, when parents must decide whether they can afford a larger family; or, to take a broader but still personal problem, whether they should accept actively the roles of interventionists or non-interventionists in the present war) the courses of action open do not bear their value on their face. They acquire a positive or negative value only when they are put over against a standard or frame of reference, in an effort to determine which will help to actualize the ideals or values which the standard represents. To the degree that the individual is conscious of the values of a situation for the actualization of an ideal, to that degree is he a moral individual.

Men seldom are fully aware of the fact that their values and standards conflict. The standards which men hold are all so well entrenched in our institutions that conflicts, when recognized, are taken for granted. Let us consider some authoritarian standards, for example. Some hold today, as Thrasymachus did centuries ago when
he argued with Socrates, that might makes right, and justice is the interest of the stronger. They assert that they are justified in holding this belief because a study of the *evolutionary process* reveals that certain survival values are found in the use of force, and cunning, and callousness to the welfare of others; and they exercise these values in their business relations. Others, to use another example, hold that accidents, "natural evils" such as floods and earthquakes (disease as a natural evil seems to be passing out of the picture), and even extraordinary personal accomplishments, are the result of the will of God. This may be called the transcendental standard, and is supported by fundamentalist sects. On the other hand there is the non-authoritarian civic standard, called democracy, which stands for the belief that man is the maker of his own destiny, that values are not cut and dried, neither presented to him nor discovered by him. We resort to the civic standard more than we know; for it represents the ideal of an ever greater measure of general welfare in the here and now; and we resort to it whenever it is necessary to resolve a conflict in which a choice must be made between giving the right of way to a private and fallacious interest or to the social interest. Man is essentially a social animal, and the show must go on, regardless of whether one thinks of this life as a transitory life or not. An individual may utilize all these standards, and
others, without being aware that they conflict.

The authoritarian and the democratic value standards have evolved naturally. The former has a long history. Its origin in animism antedates the earliest written records, and many factors contributed to its development in the course of subsequent history, which are discussed in this dissertation. It is based on the postulation of a bifurcation in experience, the bifurcation between matter and spirit, which eventually gave rise to other dualisms, such as a transcendent world and a natural world, a mental realm and a physical realm, a nature somehow fixed and somehow changing.

The democratic standard, while it is as old as the time when men first sought to live together cooperatively, was not articulated as a standard until the turn of the last century. It had its gradual development in what may perhaps be called the abortive attempts of the early modern ethical thinkers in the empirical, the scientific tradition, to escape from the framework of transcendentalism. This development is briefly traced in the dissertation. The conclusions of modern scientists lend weight to the belief that all values arise out of ordinary experience and are values because they promote the development of democratic living. Chapter four discusses these all-important conclusions and points out their implications for the transcendentalist position.

If we assume that the present conflict of standards
requires attention, and that loyalty to the civic standard is desirable, we are faced with the problem of achieving a reconstruction of beliefs on a wide scale. This suggests reconstruction through education. Unanimity of opinion seems to exist among educators in the belief that loyalty to a single over-arching standard of value is desirable, but it ceases when attention is turned to the problem of which standard is to be accepted. The writer has discussed this conflict in Chapter five, where the educational theory of the "classicists," who would accept as authoritative the truths and values believed to be revealed in the classics, is examined. In Chapter six the civic, i.e., the democratic standard is examined as to its nature, an effort is made to show what the democratic teacher can do to help his pupils to grasp its significance and to live democratically, and secondly, to show some of its implications for a revised curricular program.

The progressive educators, accepting gratefully what modern science has to offer in the way of insight into the nature of what the over-all standard should be, attempt to reconstruct the experiences of their pupils by providing for the creation of habits and dispositions which will bring about more harmonious living. They seek to establish habits of tolerance and willingness to compromise, without which a peaceful solution of differences of opinion at all levels of social living is impossible.
They emphasize the development of intelligence with a view to bringing about a greater control by man over his environment, and especially over himself. They strive to develop personality, to develop the interests and special abilities of every student in order that he may live the richest, fullest, happiest life of which he is capable. They recognize that this is a long-time process and that the school as an institution reflecting the influence of a transcendental standard hampers their work. Part of their task involves the effort to reconstruct the entire school program. The writer discusses some present-day efforts to revise the curriculum as a single example of what can be done in this direction.

It is by working with children, whose habits are still plastic, who have a great measure of enthusiasm for ideals, and who have the stamina needed to actualize "the better possibilities of events" in the face of present discouraging social problems that we get the best leverage for reconstructing the social order in such a way that living will be made richer for all. If the teacher can succeed in establishing democratic attitudes and sentiments, and a consciousness of the desirability of accepting democracy as the over-arching standard, his function as an educator will be fulfilled.
Chapter One

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Men commonly postulate two types of values.

The issue with which this thesis is concerned may be stated as follows: do all of the values which men hold arise out of ordinary experience, or are some of them, at least, fixed in nature, inherent in the structure of the universe? The answer to this question, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, was predominately in favor of the latter belief, although at the present time a considerable body of opinion holds to the belief that they differ in no way in their origin from such human constructions as inventions, rules of discourse, or codes of ethics established by business men.

No ordinary individual would say that an architect, when he draws up a set of plans for a house, must make the plan or pattern conform to a pre-established pattern, one fixed in nature. No one would say that our modern traffic codes, or our laws against price fixing are drawn from nature. It would be difficult to find
anyone who would maintain that the content of the barber's, or the baker's, or the doctor's or lawyer's codes of ethics existed before the necessity of drawing up such codes existed. Their prices, their standards of cleanliness, their various degrees of feeling of social responsibility are determined by reference to what the situation requires in order that they may function effectively; and as social conditions change, their standards change too.

In spite of the fact that people determine such values in terms of consequences, many people consider the situation different when the more abstract values, such as beauty, truth, justice, honesty, perseverance, humility, integrity, chastity, reliability, etc., are concerned. These "enduring" values, they say, are fixed in nature, eternally applicable, ubiquitous, and incapable of being changed or ignored by man. To tamper with them is to invite disaster. The thesis here maintained is that such "enduring" values are no more fixed in nature, and sacrosanct, beyond the ability of men to revise them according to their changing needs, than the ordinary values which have been mentioned. Can a serpent be beautiful? Is it always wrong to tell a lie? Do one and one always make two? Should one who steals always be punished? Many will answer these questions categorically, and accept for the first, in the affirmative. If it can be shown that all values have their locus in everyday
experience, if they arise out of the circumstances and necessities of everyday living, such people, if there be any among the readers of this dissertation, will be forced to revise their answers.

That the belief of the man in the street today is still that values and moral laws are given to him, are inherent in the structure of things, is quite evident; for an examination of his actual behavior indicates that he acts as though they are fixed, and absolute, and eternal. Consider, for example, the belief that the truly ethical person is one who always tells the truth. Most men, it is claimed by the adherents of this belief, never attain to perfection in their pursuit of the truth ideal, but that is due to their inherent weakness, their susceptibility to temptation. Or consider the common beliefs that beauty resides in an object, such as a painting, or a sunset; that the monogamous relationship is ordained by God, and is therefore the best; that true love is eternal; that hard work and sacrifice and the bearing of many burdens are man's natural lot.

Not all values which are supposed to be fixed in nature are of the high moral quality that the values which have been mentioned represent to the popular mind. The evolutionary theory, which has given credence to the view that only the fittest in nature can expect to survive, has resulted in the identification of brute force or strength, and cunning with the eternal and ubiquitous values. These values have been held dearly—and are so
held by many today—by those who have succeeded in activities where competition has been keen. Consider the attitude of "big business" toward its smaller but more numerous competitors in the twenties, for example. One may well ask which set of values appears to be prescribed by nature—humility, honesty, cooperativeness, self-sacrifice; or arrogance, cunning, selfishness or rapaciousness—are the "true" values in the face of this internal conflict.

Two sources of moral values.

Two common sources of fixed values are Christian ethics and the Platonic philosophy. In the first case, values are believed to be the result of the will of God. In the second case, they are considered to be another sort of reality, existing apart from the world of matter and space and motion in which we live. In the first case, they were originally revealed to us by God acting through certain of the well-known Biblical characters. In the second case we learn about them through a process of intuition or absorption, or, according to some, through pure Reason. Plato's theory of the nature and source of values was formulated several hundred years before Christian ethics reached the form in which we know it today, and the latter was heavily influenced by certain elements of Platonic doctrine as well as by Stoicism, a philosophy which was expounded at approximately the same time.
as Christianity began to take shape as a distinctive but unarticulated moral doctrine. The average man knows only the religious source of transcendental values, and he is convinced that such moral rules as "Thou shalt not steal," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" are as much a part of the fixed and unchangeable structure of reality as he considers to be the law of gravitation, or the law regarding the rate of speed of falling bodies.

The belief that all values arise out of ordinary experience may not have as many adherents as has the belief that they are transcendentally derived, but the arguments which its proponents marshall have behind them the bulk of the findings of scientific research which has been carried on in the past three centuries. The view is simply that values are human devices, modes of action expressed as rules of conduct which are valuable because they promote the end of organized living. They have no worth in themselves; they do not exist as entities which float about through space nor as essences apart from the nature we know. Man's duty is not considered to be to conform to divinely revealed or intuited moral laws, but rather to promote conduct in accordance with an ideal set

1 "Christianity invites comparison with Stoicism, and indeed with pagan ethical philosophy generally, if we except the hedonistic schools. ... The Stoic doctrine of the worthlessness of ordinary human virtue, and the stern paradox that offenders are equally, in so far as all are absolutely, guilty, find their counterparts in Christianity," etc. Sidgwick, Henry, Outlines of the History of Ethics, London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1931, pp. 114, 116 et. seq.
by man, which has its roots and its flower in the here
and now. The empiricist, as the man who holds this posi-
tion is called, believes that the supernatural world and
religions based upon supernaturalistic creeds can be ex-
plained by a study of human history; and that moral val-
ues which have their locus in another world, or which
are considered fixed in nature, need not, should not be
used as guides for action in the world in which we live.

Values and standards conflict.

The ordinary man holds to a twofold standard of val-
ues—an absolutistic standard and the pragmatic standard.
He holds these standards often without being aware of the
fact that they conflict. While he is pragmatic in his
determination of the values which serve as guides to ef-
fective action in many instances (that is, he is concerned
with the type of consequences which will ensue in the here
and now), at other times he allows his conduct to be gov-
erned by values transcendentally derived, or fixed in na-
ture, which he has accepted on authority. Consider, for
example, the case of the civic-minded legislator who votes
for the installation of a traffic light at an intersection
which has become busy or late, but who also refuses to
vote for a birth control clinic in his community on the
grounds that it would be a violation of one of his reli-
gious principles, hence the will of God. Here we have a
conflict of a pragmatic and an absolutistic standard. Most men give lip-service to the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," while many of them are anything but pacifists, and would resort to the use of the method of intelligence only when coercive measures designed to protect their own interests have failed. Here we have a conflict of values. To illustrate further, most people know that according to the Bible "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than it is for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven" and they are in agreement that whatever the Bible says holds significance for good conduct; but how many do not aspire to be at least moderately well to do, in spite of the fact that they hope some day to enter the kingdom of heaven? Here again is a conflict of standards.

The average individual compartmentalizes his values and his value standards. It is by compartmentalizing them that he apparently succeeds in giving loyalty to conflicting values and value standards without ever being aware of the fact that his actions and his thoughts are often inconsistent. He is unable, as a rule, to solve conflicts when he does become aware of them because the standards themselves may be at stake. How does one go about intelligently resolving the conflict that occurs between common sense and religion on the matter of birth control? If a Quaker refuses to bear arms, if a Mennonite refuses to send his children to school, which stand-
ard—the religious standard or the civic standard—is to be given the right of way? Or can the two be somehow amalgamated?

Consequences of compartmentalizing values and standards.

People are on the whole pragmatic in the execution of their everyday, humdrum affairs. If they were not, no individual or social group could long endure. When men act and plan, there are few times when they feel they can afford not to pay attention to the consequences of their actions. Our goals and standards have their roots and fruit in the toil and moil of everyday living. A changing social scene requires changed social relationships, and people meet the exigencies and necessities of new circumstances by regulating the behavior of the individual in various ways—for instance by law, by appeal to custom and social sanction. They fail to be pragmatic, however, when they take certain values, truths, standards, ideals as valid guides for conduct without first submitting them to intellectual scrutiny to determine whether they function in this particular circumstance to further or hinder their over-arching ideal.

Because they compartmentalize their values in such a way that they at one time act pragmatically and at another time take their values ready-made and categorically, experience shows that they often deflect and dissipate their energy in the pursuit of antithetical values,
so that neither is actualized as quickly and effectively as it would be if concerted action could be achieved in the pursuit of either one or the other. Nor are the implications of either standard made clear to themselves. If people would make an overt attempt to actively accept as their over-arching value standard the development of the potentialities of every individual in terms of shared interests (a view which many call our value standard of democracy), would seek to understand its implications for richer living for all, would seek to make it clear to themselves and would take the pragmatic, the scientific attitude toward grounds for acceptance of any tentatively held value and thereby cast absolutism to the winds, the consequences which would accrue in terms of the more rapid actualization of many needed social reforms would no doubt be tremendous.

Illustrations of the conflict of values and value standards.

To illustrate further how values and standards may conflict in the course of ordinary living, the following examples are offered which are drawn from life. When farmer Brown, for instance, attends church services on Sunday he is met with everything from a cantata in Latin to a sermon which is specific in its denunciation of many activities in which he can hardly help but participate if he is to make his way in the world. He is told to ig-
more evil, to count his blessings, to "lay not up treasures upon earth where moth and rust doth corrupt and thieves break through and steal." He may participate heartily in the singing of hymns which, while beautiful and inspiring and carrying a great emotional appeal, often emphasize dependence and servility, and state the locus of ideals in the beautiful isle of somewhere. Consider such hymns as "Lead Kindly Light," "Rock of Ages," "Jesus Savior of My Soul," "Nearer My God to Thee," "Sweet Hour of Prayer."

On Monday farmer Brown returns to his herds and his plough, where for the next five or six days he must devote his thoughts and energies to the task of wrestling a living from a grudging environment and his grudging fellow men. The price of hogs on the Chicago market, which made little difference to him yesterday as he sat absorbed in the service, becomes a matter of grave concern. Likewise he does concern himself seriously with the matters of birth and marriage and death which are of minor importance when compared with the values about which he may have heard yesterday, which may be his at some future date if he lives the right kind of life in the here and now. He may worry about the best time to sell his wool, for a difference of a cent a pound means enough to purchase for his daughter some new expensive trinket which custom—another standard of values—is demanding.

If farmer Brown is more consistent in his views
than many men he may be at least dimly aware of the conflict and wonder about it. He may count his blessings a little oftener. Very few go so far as to accept one source of value to the exclusion of the other and thereby become either churchmen or godless men. This conflict between supernaturalism and naturalism which is here illustrated is one of the most widespread at the present time and one of the most devastating in terms of the amount of energy consumed in the pursuit of antithetical goals. It is the conflict between loyalty to values and ideals which are rooted and will flower in the world of the here and now, and loyalty to the values and ideals of a transcendental world which may be realized at some future date.

Illustrations of the conflict of values within a standard.

Let us push the example a little further. Let us suppose that farmer Brown prides himself on his long line of American ancestors and takes seriously his responsibilities as a citizen in a threatened democracy. He understands that democracy must mean cooperation. In view of the changes in living patterns which have occurred as the result of a modern technology, he may see the distinction between a nationalistic attitude and an internationalistic attitude and claim to be in favor of free trade, on the grounds that the changing times demand new ways of thinking and acting. He may feel that as Ameri-
cans we cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world and thrive, either culturally or economically.
When he is informed, however, that the government intends to make larger purchases of Argentine beef, so that we may in turn sell the Argentines radios and a multitude of other manufactured products which they are unable to produce for themselves, he may turn upon the administration which he helped elect to office because the sale of Argentine beef at the army camp ninety miles away seems to him to represent an open disregard for his own interests and the interest of all farmers who raise beef cattle. At one time he identifies his own good with the social good, but when the shoe begins to pinch he reverts to his ancestors' and his own older concept of democracy as rugged individualism: his government must serve his own interest before the interest of foreigners or "Wall Street," hundreds or thousands of miles away.

If he is making out tolerably well, in spite of Secretary Wallace's foreign trade policy, by dint of hard work and long hours and frugal spending, and is satisfied with his lot, he is upset when a WPA project is started in his community and his hired man is hired away from him at twice the wage he can afford to pay to do work that is less fatiguing and offers shorter hours besides. He is astonished at first when he learns of the effort of the administration to pay him for not growing crops—a practice which seems to him to strike at the very founda-
tion upon which our economy has been built. He resents the aerial mapping of his farm, and the county agent telling him how many acres of wheat, oats, or corn he may grow. While he hopes some day to be able to step out from behind the plough he resents any effort on the part of the government to hasten the process. His philosophy is one of rugged individualism, in spite of his attempts to view the social and economic scene in a larger perspective and to be internationally minded.

The last few examples illustrate the conflict of values as they take place even when an over-arching ideal is consciously adopted and held to consistently. Will the democratic ideal of cooperation in the sharing of common interests be best achieved by identifying one's own best interests with the best interests of society as a whole, or with the best interests of one's family group, conceived as set over against society? What is the democratic ideal--what is democracy? Do the answers to these questions exist somewhere in nature to be revealed to us after a thorough study of the problem, or are they created by humans as they interact with their environment? May a man pursue one line of action at one time and the opposite line of action at another and still be consistent? For example, can farmer Brown legitimately write to his senator and congressman and complain about the government's foreign policy and hold up the ideal of an integrated, international community as the goal of democ-
racy? Insight may be derived from a reading of the following chapters which will make the answering of these and similar questions possible.

In view of the fact that the average man holds to the opinion that his values are other-worldly in their origin, a view which conflicts with certain other ideals and values which he holds are empirically derived—that is, derived from ordinary experience—it will be helpful to grasp the backgrounds of each of these positions so that the question of values may be answered and many of the conflicts and confusions which exist today may be resolved. The history of the transcendentalist position will now be briefly traced.
Chapter Two

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TRANSCENDENTALIST POSITION

The roots of transcendentalism lie in animism.

The roots of transcendentalism can be traced back to the early conjectures of man about the world around him. The distinction between this world, the world of objects in space, and a transcendental realm had its origin and growth out of animism. McDougall writes:

"It would seem that from a very remote period men of almost all races have entertained the belief that the living man differs from the corpse in that his body contains some more subtle thing or principle which determines its purposive movements, its growth and self repair, and to which is due his capacity for sensation, thought, and feeling. For the belief in some such animating principle, or soul, is held by almost every existing race of men, no matter how lowly their grade of culture nor how limited their mental powers; and we find evidence of a similar belief among the earliest human records."

1

Our predecessors of twenty-five thousand years ago

and earlier no doubt believed that even inanimate objects were in greater or less degree self-willed, and acted and reacted toward other objects in much the same way as they themselves reacted. The essence of animism survives to this day—as, for example, when children beat their toys to make them "behave." In the course of time, as man became more critical of the forces operating on and about him, he learned to make a distinction between animate and inanimate objects. At first he no doubt explained all phenomena which he observed in terms of their good and evil designs in relation to his own purposes, but as he learned to associate the flow and overflow of streams with heavy rains and the melting of snow, the falling branch with the heavy wind, such objects became for him inanimate or non-purposive in themselves. The animate was associated with that which appeared to have a purpose or will of its own. By observing the facts that breathing accompanied the living animal, and that at death the animal became inanimate and lost his breath, he probably in time made a distinction between soul or spirit (spiritus—breath) and by noting that in his dreams he was apparently carried away to new and remarkable realms it is natural to suppose that he connected the departure of the spirit at death with its arrival in the dream world. He postulated the gods as the overseers of the dream world and as the purpoers behind natural phenomena such as the lightning, the winds,
the fire, the mountains, the dawn, the causes for which eluded his understanding. Mythologies, and separate kinds of realities arose, which by the time of the pre-Socratic philosophers had become as substantial, as real for them, as the material world which everyone naively assumed to exist just as it appeared to exist. Spirit, or soul, or mind, became identified with the qualities of behavior which necessarily resided in a realm different from the realm of matter, which was considered as mass and motion.

The conditions of Greek life fostered the development of mind and intelligence.

A study of Greek history shows that men became more and more concerned with the nature of mental life. The process was a slow one, and the history of it is the history of Greek science, philosophy, and art. The causes and effects of its development for Plato's philosophy, which looms important for our purposes, can only be briefly mentioned here.

The causes underlying the spectacular growth of Greek concern for the development of the intellect and the analysis of the things of the spirit are to be found in the topographical location of Greece and a combination of contingent environmental factors which produced conflicts within the Greek culture itself and between its culture and the cultures of other nations. After the
Persian Wars especially (500-479 B.C.), Greek commerce
developed rapidly and Athens, because of its favorable
location as an intercepter of any trade east or west of
the Aegean, became the commercial and intellectual cen-
ter of the Mediterranean world. Because ideas as well
as goods were exchanged in Greece, and new ideas pro-
duced new beliefs and ways of acting, Grecian culture
ceased to be recapitulative, like the Chinese, the Mesop-
ottamian and the Egyptian cultures, and became the intel-
lectual leader of the world.

The rise of the sophists.

The growth in commerce and the accelerated rate of
exchange of ideas was responsible for the growth in Greece
of three factors which influenced the trend of thought in
the direction of an ever greater concern for the intel-
lect: (1) the growth of skepticism regarding the Greek
way of life, particularly its dependency upon mythology,
(2) the rise of a class of professional philosopher-teach-
ers known as the sophists, and (3) the rise of a large
leisure class. The sophists, as a group, arose out of
the necessity for a new type of education which would
meet the changing and growing needs of the time. Early
Greek education reflected a concern for the values which
arose out of mythology and early institutional life, of

1 Davidson, Thomas, Aristotle and Ancient Educational
which the development and preservation of the state was of primary importance, especially in Sparta. Morality was based on custom and tradition. To be a good fighter, to have a splendid physique, to understand the ways of the gods was the early Greek ideal. With the development of commerce and an acceleration in the rate of exchange of ideas a demand for a knowledge of practical subjects grew up, and this demand was met by the sophists. They were "students of affairs" who had often traveled extensively and had a wide knowledge concerning current learning as it applied to conceptions of natural forces and phenomena, political life, social institutions and popular questions of the day. They offered instruction on any subject—for example accounting, astronomy, music, philosophy—for which there was a demand. They gave instruction especially in rhetoric, without which the young Athenian could not hope to distinguish himself in the forum, and they became very facile in their use of words. The growing leisure class, whose members had the time and money to indulge themselves with the intricacies of philosophical puzzles and the practice of the arts, and who naturally looked down upon the physical world of matter and motion, since this was the realm of duty for the slaves, constituted a ready body of students to which

2 Ibid., P. 19.
the sophists catered.

With the existence of a growing leisure class, and a group of professional teachers ready to serve, and a dichotomy established between the intellectual realm and the sphere of skills and trades practiced by the middle classes and the slaves, it was only natural that the trend toward concern for the development of the mind should continue. Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and later Socrates, who were among the leading philosophers during the first few decades following the Persian Wars, reflect the drift toward a greater consideration of the nature of the spiritual life. The growing knowledge of the time made the old mythologies, around which the spiritual life had long centered, no longer credible to many serious thinkers. Parmenides said, "To be and to think are the same thing." Anaxagoras said, "All things were confused; then Mind came and reduced them to order." Socrates said, "Know thyself."

The impact of new knowledge which flowed into Greece from every country of the known world had acted to destroy the faith of the Greeks in their old gods, and it led them to challenge many of the customs and traditions which had long been considered inviolable. When the pursuit of these customs and traditions ceased to be practical they were no longer considered sacrosanct. In fact, the soph-

ists went to an extreme of practicality: morality became with them literally whatever one could get away with. When a sophist coached a young Athenian to carry a point in the forum he was concerned only to see that the argument sounded valid, and that his pupil won. The desire of the sophists to help the young orator to win his intellectual tilts in the forum, to prove his points whether they were backed by sustaining evidence or not, led some of them eventually to espouse the doctrine that all knowledge is relative. Protagoras, an outstanding sophist, declared, "Man is the measure of all things." This statement expressed the attitude of the modern pragmatist, though, as will be shown (Chapter IV), the pragmatist has a very different conception of the nature of man than Protagoras had. The pragmatist believes that there is no objective basis for knowledge, in the sense that facts, or judgments about conduct, are discovered or created by the mind which is inside someone's head; although this is probably what Protagoras believed. So completely was the position that morality is relative to specific times and places developed that F. C. S. Schiller, a contemporary philosopher wrote (misunderstanding pragmatism in an important respect) that pragmatism is nothing more than neo-Protagoreanism.


The Socratic theory of knowledge.

Not all of the Greek thinkers were convinced that morality amounted only to private opinion. Amid the intellectual confusion created by the sophists the names of Socrates and Plato stand out as representatives of the group which was not convinced. Socrates was the first to state the basic conflict clearly. As against the view that personal or majority opinion constituted knowledge, he maintained that knowledge had universal validity, and that it was to be arrived at by careful thinking and critical analysis. By making just such a critical analysis of the assumptions, implications and consequences of some stated opinion he would expose the absurdity or the validity of that opinion. Since knowledge had universal validity and was to be arrived at only by a diligent application of reason, it carried a compulsory moral import, and the man worth while became the man who had attained to the greatest knowledge of universal truths.

Socrates was not popular with the rulers in Athens because he was indefatigable in tracking down the hidden assumptions of his sophistic opponents, and by argument, revealing the shallowness of their thinking. His theory was essentially autocratic, and the Athenians were democrats. In the Greek democracy what was right was determined by majority opinion. If Socrates' theory of the nature of knowledge were carried to its logical implica-
tions, only the wisest man would be fit to rule the state. Because of his unpopular political view and his scorn for the sophists Socrates was condemned to death. In defending himself against the charges of his prosecutors, Socrates says:

"There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!—and they if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected—which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic they have drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians."

Plato elevated values to a transcendental world.

----------------------
Plato, a disciple of Socrates, took the next step that was needed to guarantee morality against the relativistic, personal status which the sophists wished to give it. To put it simply, he placed the virtues as he conceived them in a transcendent realm which, by definition, was unimpeachable by the limited knowledge of men. Whereas Socrates claimed that virtues such as patriotism, courage, justice existed apart from the opinions of men he did not go so far as to give them a definite locus in a transcendental world, a world outside space and time. This is precisely what Plato did. In the more technical language of philosophy, he hypostatized his values. The realm of essences, or pure ideas, was the real world, said Plato, and knowledge of these ideas, for example the ideas of justice, truth, harmony, beauty, charity, the ideal state, is to be elicited by means of a mystical contemplation upon them. To the extent that one could lose himself in the contemplation of these external essences, to that extent one was living the highest kind of life of which he was capable. Plato writes:

"He attains to the purest knowledge of (absolute truth, justice, beauty, goodness) who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; and he who has got rid, so far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from
acquiring truth and knowledge—who if not he, is likely to attain true being?"

Of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily? ... There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colorless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home."

Not everyone was capable of attaining knowledge. The successful contemplation of the realm of essences was open only to a comparative few who had the leisure and the intellectual ability ("souls capable of receiving the food proper to it") necessary to engage in this type of strenuous, concentrated contemplation. This is revealed perhaps most clearly in Plato's most widely known work, the Republic. In this ideal state, Plato would initiate a process of biological and intellectual selection which would go on from birth, by which the members of the separate social classes would be sifted

---

1 Plato, Phaedo. Loc. cit., p. 159.
out. For purposes of government only the keenest minds would constitute the ruling class; and they would look to see that every man less intelligent than himself found the place in society for which he was best fitted. The ideal state would be an autocracy rather than a democracy (because of his scorn for democracy Plato spent several years in exile). The universe for Plato was a closed, not a changing or emerging system, and intelligence was fixed. The ideal society was one in which every man knew his station and performed its duties to the best of his ability.

The point to be stressed here is simple, but it is very important for the subject at hand. Though not without difficulty, Plato not only "hypostatized" the highly prized values of his culture, such as happiness, goodness, justice, honesty, by putting them in a super-natural realm, but he also made the transcendental realm, or the realm of essences, the real world. The world of mind and the world of matter were entirely separate, as he conceived them, and concern for the material world, the world of particular objects existing in space and time which was an imperfect representation of the world of ideas hence was considered by Plato a matter of secondary importance. He thus administered the coup de grace to the position that values were naturally, or empirically derived.
Reasons why the sophistic theory of relativity failed to develop.

There were two primary reasons why Plato's transcendental philosophy continued to develop to a point where it shared honors only with the philosophy of Aristotle, Plato's most distinguished successor, in its influence upon subsequent European thought; while the sophistic assertion that values have their source in private experience failed to catch hold among the greater intellects of the time.

In the first place, Plato's theory naturally found favor with the aristocrats, the people who had the literary influence, the time and the money to afford the pursuit of the eternal verities. Since the highest good was considered by all people to be the cultivation of the intellect it was only natural that Platonists and sophists alike should show a disdain for the material world with which modern science so successfully deals at the present time. This same disdain for the material and physical (with emphasis on the mental and spiritual) is reflected in our own society today; for example, in the preference shown by many people for the "cultural" subjects in a school program as against such subjects as the vocational subjects of manual arts, auto mechanics, and agriculture; in the belief that the drawing up of the plans for the building of a bridge is a more valuable activity than the actual building of the bridge itself; or in the be-
belief that the life of a painter, or sculptor, or writer, or any "creative artist" is somehow more "intrinsically worth while" than that of a common laborer or office worker.

In discussing the influence of the hierarchical class structure upon the direction in which intelligence was turned in Greek times, John Dewey writes:

"The religious and poetic beliefs, acquiring a definite social and political value and function, are in the keeping of a higher class directly associated with the ruling elements in the society. The workers and craftsmen who possess the prosaic matter of fact knowledge are likely to occupy a low social status, and their kind of knowledge is affected by the social disesteem entertained for the manual worker who engages in activities useful to the body. It doubtless was this fact in Greece which in spite of the keenness of observation, the extraordinary power of logical reasoning and the great freedom of speculation attained by the Athenian, postponed the general and systematic employment of the experimental method. Since the industrial craftsman was only just above the slave in social rank, his type of knowledge and the method upon which it depended lacked prestige and authority."

The second reason why the Greeks became more and more concerned with other-worldly matters is that the material world as they knew it held no problems for them. Matter, as it was conceived in the Grecian and post-Grecian periods, was divested of most of its qualities, which were attributed to the mind. The earlier Greek

philosophers, such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximines, and Democritus were concerned chiefly with the structure of the world of matter. But because they lacked the scientific instruments which we have today—such as the telescope, the microscope, and apparatus for measuring and comparing quantitatively the phenomena which they observed in the material world—their reasoning, while in many cases ingenious, was usually incorrect, and in some cases absurd, judged in terms of what we now know about the structure of the physical universe. The philosophy of Democritus represents the natural termination of the early Greek investigations into the nature of the world of matter, and here we find that matter is conceived as qualitatively simple. "In reality," Democritus said, "there is nothing but atoms and space." Motions, sensations (such as heat, light, color, sounds)—all experience—was explained in terms of the mechanistically related, varying relations and vibrations of marble-like atoms. B.A.G. Fuller, in describing Democritus' viewpoint, writes:

"Reality (for Democritus) is a self-originated, self-maintaining mechanism, which draws its entire motive power for its endless output from its own fall, and falls by its own weight through infinite space and everlasting time."

2 Ibid., p. 39.
With all sensations and relations explained in a mechanistic fashion, with matter robbed of most of its qualities and with the new economic and political problems which were occupying the Greeks at the close of Democritus' era, questions concerning the nature of the physical world became of less importance to the Greek thinkers; and they remained so until they were revived by Aristotle approximately three centuries later.

Because, then, the intellectuals of the time who were members of the leisure class looked down upon the investigation of the material world as beneath their dignity, and because the material world seemed fairly simple to understand when a few basic insights as to the way in which atoms arranged themselves in space were achieved, it was only natural that the immaterial world should be considered the only proper subject for dignified investigation. Under the circumstances, the conservative thinkers of the time had little choice but to make the world of the mind, or the spirit, or the realm of ideas an entity in its own right; and by definition the non-quantitative experiences were made immutable and eternal, and placed above the ability of such men as the sophists with their relative knowledge to tamper with them. It was in this manner that the cherished values of a culture were translated into diaphanous entities and made members or essences of a realm apart from experience as we ordinarily think of experience today—placed where their investiga-
tion in a way in which objects which constitute the material world can be investigated could not take place. Plato extended the horizon of life from a realm bounded by what we can touch, and see, and handle, to a realm which is totally different in its nature—the realm of timeless, abstract reality. For Plato the material world, the temporal world in which we live became only the imperfect image of the eternal world of ideas, of values, truths, and ideals.

Why Aristotle's achievements in the natural sciences are not important today.

The use of the experimental method of modern science, which was in its rudimentary stages in Plato's day, brought few results of enduring importance even from Aristotle, the outstanding scientist of antiquity and Plato's most distinguished follower. Aristotle is commonly reputed to have been the best educated man of any age. His failure to make any contribution of lasting importance in the areas of the natural sciences is due to the fact that he lacked the instruments, the tools, the attitude of scientific inquiry and any accumulated reserve of scientific knowledge which would enable him to make the measurements, the comparisons, the minute investigations which are necessary if an exact account of the na-

---

ture and structure of matter is to be attained. Because of these limitations his theories as to the method of circulation of the blood, the nature of reproduction, of growth and decay, for example, lead him endlessly astray, and we find that his most significant contributions deal with the nature and function of the mind and the mental processes, and their relation to the eternal verities. His books on ethics, politics, and particularly logic are considered the most important works; his logic especially has had a great deal of influence upon the course of subsequent thinking in that area.

The influence of Plato and Aristotle upon medieval and modern value standards.

It may be said that Plato's answer to the arguments of the sophists represents the first definite, coherent, consciously articulated answer to the question of the source of moral values that man has formulated. While Plato contributed importantly to our present-day scientific mentality by emphasizing the importance of one of its fundamental assumptions; namely, the use of the mathematical method in the understanding of theory, for our purpose, his influence on the history of morals is more important. There are two ways in which Plato has influenced the course of moral action, and these will now be briefly traced.

As has already been mentioned (p.4), the Platonic
philosophy has come down to us in Christian theory, where it contributed especially to its opposition between the spirit and the flesh. During the Middle Ages the strict asceticism which characterized the highly religious individual was a direct outgrowth of this bifurcation. And strangely enough, we find the Christian virtues and pagan knowledge—the knowledge of trades and skills and the elementary knowledge about the physical world which was largely contributed by Aristotle—in comfortable, even comforting relationship at this time. It was not until the beginning of the fifteenth century, when a revival of commerce, an influx of new ideas from the East, and an increased interest in science put an end to the medieval period that the two worlds of spirit and flesh began seriously to conflict, and to thereby create a problem of major importance for the intellectuals of the time. The two worlds of spirit and flesh, mind and matter, have been conflicting in the popular mind ever since.

The second way in which Platonic transcendentalism has influenced contemporary thought is through the support which it has given to the scholastic idea;--the belief that the cultured man is one who by studying the classics and accumulating a great body of facts has attained somehow superior insight into the nature of the good life. During the Middle Ages Aristotle's treatises

on the natural sciences were taken to be as authoritative and complete as were his and Plato's works on the nature of the ideal social structure, hence there was little or no necessity for the learned men to concern themselves with the material world. The social theories of these ancient writers were fairly well worked out in a general way. For example, medieval society was organized in a strict hierarchical form, a type of organization implied in the Republic. There were the laboratores (workers), bellatores (soldiers), and oratores (clergy), the last topping the list; and though small in number, holding almost unlimited sway. Medieval society was a society in which every man knew his station and its duties and was expected to perform them to the best of his ability. The oratores, as the scholars of the time, occupied themselves with a study of the Greek and the Roman writers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, and remained as aloof from the world of flesh and blood as possible. It is commonly known that the mortal world was considered as a mortal coil, and in order to better escape its influence upon their spiritual, their better natures, they mortified the flesh by abstinences, flagellatory practices, isolation even from each other.

With the close of the Middle Ages the social structure changed somewhat, due to the growth of the new in-

---

dustrial classes, but Platonism as an over-arching philosophy of life, with its transcendentalism the value standard, did not lose its hold either on the clergy or upon the masses. As it became possible for a man to better his social status, due to the breakdown of the old patterns, the ideal of every man was to become a scholar -- a man of leisure and a man of culture who could afford to study the classical treasures which contained all that had been said and all there was to be said about the only thing that mattered, the nature of the good life.

Two factors not so directly attributable to the Platonic philosophy helped to entrench the scholarship ideal. During the Middle Ages Latin was the universally used written language throughout Europe, and the gentleman, the scholar, found a knowledge of Latin an indispensable prerequisite to culture. The present tendency among certain people to revere the ancient languages, especially Latin, in spite of their inability to put them in most cases to any practical use, may be called a cultural hangover from this period in European history. The other factor which is important in an analysis of why the scholarship ideal was adopted by the growing leisure class and later by the common man is the increasing difficulty which was experienced in keeping medieval and ancient knowledge intact in the face of the impact of the new ideas which demanded more and more attention. A complicated and subtle technique for the study of the new
ideas and synthesis with the old, based on the Aristotelian logical forms was developed which is known as scholasticism. It was a method for analyzing propositions which abounded in fine metaphysical distinctions and subtleties, and no doubt more than one man lost the issue in fitting the proposition into its proper Aristotelian categories. If a gentleman was to become educated he naturally had to familiarize himself with the intricacies of the reasoning process as it was developed by Aristotle and later by these neo-Aristotelians. Anyone who could not carry on an intelligent argument in casuistry was without the pale, so far as scholarship was concerned.

The scholar, at first an individual dominated by the desire to obtain true knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the Platonic essences, has in the course of time, in popular conception, become a man who still has a better grasp than the ordinary person of the true structure of reality. He is one who has mastered a great many facts, and through a process partly of mental mastication and partly of intuition has attained superior insight into the true, enduring values. In setting for themselves this ideal many people divorce themselves from the problems of life and take up residence in a world apart from

---

1 "The purpose of scholasticism was to bring reason to the support of faith; to strengthen the religious life and the Church by the development of intellectual power." Monroe, Paul, Op. cit., p. 129.
this world where they study values for their own sake and make little or no apparent effort to actualize them.

Thus Platonism, in giving us the scholarship ideal, and in giving us a realm apart from ordinary experience as the locus of our values which is expressed either in the religious doctrines of the various denominations or in the scholarship ideal, has tremendously influenced the thought and action patterns which a great many people attempt to live by at the present time.

Plato's practical influence shows itself in many other ways, of course, besides the two ways mentioned. For example, his theories have had a direct bearing on education, which are still prevalent. This is especially true as it relates to the content of the curriculum in the secondary school. Because the good life was not to be found in absorption in any of the activities of this world, the subjects of study were not chosen with a view to their practical nature, but with a view to their value as mental disciplines. The aim was the development of the power of thought. Likewise his theories have exerted a direct influence upon educational method. In this case the objective was the subjugation of the body so that the needs of the soul might be better served. The amount of suffering which the rigid disciplinary method has caused through the years, in terms of warped personalities and punishments needlessly inflicted, is incalculable.

In any case Plato's influence is on the side of a
class society, hierarchical and authoritarian in its structure. The Platonic philosophy is on the side of the man partial to rigid discipline, callous to many human values and contemptuous of consequences. Plato's philosophy is a philosophy of "right for right's sake." Above all, we owe to Plato the widespread belief that values stem from another world, that they are fixed and eternal—a belief which has done more to deflect the natural energies of men from the actualization of values which he cherished and which arise in this world, than probably any other single force.
Chapter Three

THE INFLUENCE OF EMPIRICISM UPON RENAISSANCE TRANSCENDENTALISM

The influence of the new science upon the prevalent conceptions of the relation of matter and spirit.

The Renaissance brought a revived interest in the nature of the physical world--an interest which had died with Aristotle. This new interest was expressed in the work of such men as Occam, Roger Bacon, Telesio, Tycho Brahe, Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton. It had definite repercussions on men's beliefs concerning the origin of their values as well as their concepts of the nature of the physical universe. With this revived interest came a new note in philosophy, expressed by such empiricists

\[1\] Joseph B. Burgess writes, "Aristotelian astronomy and teleological physics were so firmly ingrained in the thinking of sixteenth century Europe that no single theory, especially one which thoroughly contradicted the accepted view, could hope to gain much foothold. ... The church, as the dominant force during the medieval period, was able to establish what authority it saw fit, and the union of Catholic theology and Aristotelian science remained intact as a dual barrier to new thought until its hold was eventually loosened during the later Renaissance and early modern period." In-
as the two Mills, Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; and this new interest, by the end of the nineteenth century, made articulate once again the belief that values arise out of our own experience in dealing with the physical world. Scientific method, at first applied only in the fields of physics, chemistry and astronomy, was gradually applied to more fields of inquiry. Its use by Darwin in the field of biology, which resulted in 1859 in the famous Origin of Species, is one example of the success with which it was applied to an area of knowledge which heretofore had been held sacrosanct, and sufficiently explained in its functions by revelation or scripture.

The effect of the new interest in science was to make the cleavage between the realms of matter and spirit as sharp as possible. For the scientist dealt only with those things which he could hear, and see, and touch; with objects that could be definitely located in space and time. The scientist dealt with the world of atoms which were the solid, indestructible building blocks of the universe; and he did not, could not concern himself with the nature of the non-qualitative aspects of experience, the realm of values, the spiritual world. Dealings with the immaterial world were left to the theologians and the philosophers.

The early modern philosophers, such as the empiri-
cists already mentioned, and Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant, may be said to have been men who were not tied so closely to theology and scholasticism as to be immune to the achievements of the scientists, but who were more under the influence of transcendentalism than the scientists. The theories of these philosophers, each of which represents a milestone in the history of human thought, may be said to be the history of the attempt to resolve the conflict between the two opposing worlds by showing how they were related, or interacted.

The development of the substantive mind theory by Descartes.

Since matter was generally conceived to be subject to causal laws, and occupied space, and since it was always perceived by the mind, it became necessary to understand better the nature and method of function of the mind itself. As a result of the re-analysis of the nature of the non-material, mind, as we shall soon see, came to be definitely conceived as a substance, and with a locus somewhere inside the head. The increased concern for the nature of mind reflected the increased concern for the nature and function of matter, and it was only a re-emphasis of the old dualism which arose out of animism and which was articulated by Plato. Its function continued to be, as always, the apprehension of the eternal values and truths of the transcendental realm which could be
used to control our attempts at a reconstruction of the material world. Concern with the Platonic realm of essences was displaced with a concern for the nature of God. Three separate substances were analyzed out of experience—matter, mind, and God. The concept of God, in replacing the idea of the realm of essences, served as one of the links between modern philosophy and the philosophy of the ancients and the Middle Ages.

The philosophy of Descartes probably best expresses the thought of the beginning of the modern period. Here we find the fundamental concepts, both old and new, which formed the subject matter for the discussion of most of the succeeding philosophers down to the end of the nineteenth century. The world of matter, with its motions and its measurable relationships was considered purely mechanistic in structure and function. In conjunction with the material world, but apart from it, was the realm of the mind or the soul, with its free will, its thoughts and sensations. God, the uncreated, the eternal, was the creator and mover of these two mutually exclusive realms. The examination of these three realms of being and of their relations to one another constitutes Descartes' system.

From his philosophy three contemporary positions

2 Ibid., p. xxxi.
have sprung—pantheism, materialism, and idealism—which represent the attempt to explain the relationship of God and matter and mind. Spinoza the pantheist made matter and mind aspects or attributes in the mind of God; Hobbes, the materialist, like the modern behaviorists, make the realm of thought a function of the body. Berkeley, the father of modern idealism, absorbed matter into spirit and made matter a thought in the mind of God.

It is Descartes' conception of substance which has had the profoundest influence upon subsequent philosophical thinking, and which has influenced to a great extent the average man's conception of the nature of mind and body. Descartes believed that a necessary foundation was needed in which the changes which are observed to take place in the material and the mental world could occur. Wax, for example, changes in appearance and to the touch when it is warmed or cooled, or moulded: we cannot know the intrinsic nature of the wax by observing its changing sense qualities. Likewise the sensations and the emotions which we ourselves experience must be experienced by, or be the product of something that endures; and this for Descartes was the self, the mind, or the soul. Although subsequent philosophers, particularly Berkeley and Hume between them, did away with the con-

---

1 Descartes, Rene, "Meditations on First Philosophy," Meditation II. In Descartes Selections, cp. cit., p. 104 et. seq.
2 "Berkeley argued that we have no knowledge of a mysterious matter (italics mine), an inert support of
cept of substance by showing that we have no basis for a belief in such substrata, the idea has persisted so that body, as matter, and mind, as spirit, are actually existent entities. Ralph M. Eaton writes:

"The criticism of the concept of substance forms a dominant theme in the philosophy that followed Descartes. But this criticism did not dislodge the idea. Any concept so congruent with natural ways of speech and thought is not easily dislodged. It remained an unquestioned belief in the general mind, despite the protests of philosophers, that matter is a substantial thing with physical qualities, and mind a substantial thing with mental qualities."

The influence of the empiricists on the substantive mind theory.

John Locke (1632-1704), the first outstanding empiricist, unintentionally challenged the dual substance theory. He maintained that the "secondary" qualities of objects--those which we call colors, sounds, tastes, smells--were not really qualities of objects at all, but only arrangements of the "primary" qualities of objects--solidity, extension, figure, position, and motion--

qualities. It is merely an abstract thought and, therefore, can have no claim upon the allegiance of right thinking," Burgess, J.B., Op.cit., pp. 316-17. See also p. 54 for a further clarification of Berkeley's contribution to the destruction of the validity of the concept of substance.

which produce the former in us as effects. Knowledge about objects in themselves was impossible, because the mind could never get beyond its own ideas: knowledge became for Locke not the intuition of abstract truths, but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas.

Berkeley (1685-1753), his successor, reasoned that even the primary qualities of material objects were ideas in our minds, and that therefore to suppose the existence of an unknowable material substance which did not underlie anything was absurd. Berkeley, as has been said, is responsible for the idealist's position that the world is a world of ideas, with ourselves a part of the all-inclusive mind of God. Berkeley's philosophy, while it successfully undermined the belief in a material substance, is an illustration of the belief in the existence of a mental substance at its best. Consider the following passage:

"Besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises diverse operations—as willing, imagining, remembering—about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely..."

1 Ibid., p. 182.
distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived—for the existence of an idea consists in its being perceived."

David Hume (1711-1776) completed the task started by Locke when he pointed out that we have no reasonable basis for believing that a mental substratum underlies our sensations and perceptions. Hume wrote:

"I would fain ask those philosophers who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a color; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe that none will assert that substance is either a color or sound or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions, none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."

The outstanding characteristic of empiricism is its method.

-----------------------------
1 Ibid., Sec. 2.
We have seen that the idea of a Divine Being was accepted by the early modern philosophers as a substitute for the Platonic realm of essences (p. 51). We have seen that the dualism between body and mind was sharpened rather than mitigated by early scientific inquiry, so that the qualitative aspects of experience were set off sharply from the quantitative aspects, and the philosophers became concerned chiefly with working out the relationship between the two, and the relationship of each to the mind of God. We have seen that the dual realms were believed by Descartes to have substantive bases which were fixed by God, and we have observed that in spite of the refutations of substantive dualism by the empirical philosophers, the theory has persisted in the popular mind. How are we to account for the increasing emphasis of the empiricists upon the challenge to dualism?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that their method of approach to the analysis of experience was the method of approach of the scientist to his problem, which was always located in the realm of quantitative experience. It was at first no doubt crudely used and unconsciously pursued, but it was nevertheless different from the scholastic method which was so well developed before the Renaissance. This is true in the philosophy of Descartes. Here we find a concern for both methods—the scientific method being used in his investi-
gations into the areas of the natural sciences (of which there were many) and the scholastic method being used in the formulation of over-arching truths about the relationship of the material and spiritual worlds to God. In comparing Bacon, the scientist, with Descartes, the philosopher, Eaton writes:

"Bacon would have classed Descartes among those thinkers who 'fly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms; while Descartes was of the opinion that Bacon's instances and experiments, though valuable, played a subordinate part in science, whose true aim was 'to arrive at a knowledge of things a priori from the knowledge of the order of nature which controls them.'" 1

Because the empirical, the scientific method was used so successfully in the realm of the natural sciences, it gradually was articulated, and became a procedure of a specific kind, which varied completely with the scholastic method. Every student of the natural sciences is now acquainted with the general steps which the scientist takes as he works through a problem: (1) collection of data, (2) analysis of data, (3) formulation of a hypothesis or tentative solution, (4) testing of hypothesis, (5) conclusion. Starting with the study of mathe-

-------------------
matics, then carried on through the use of exact mathematical treatments in the analysis of natural phenomena, this method was applied to the thought process itself by the empirical philosophers, as we have seen, although they were not aware of it as a distinctive method of approach. It reached its most significant development in the philosophy of pragmatism, which did not develop until the end of the nineteenth century.

The feature which spells the difference between the empirical approach and the rationalistic, or the scholastic approach, is the method of determining the validity of a proposition whose truth is to be tested; that is, the validity of a hypothesis. The scholastics and the philosophers who followed in the main in the same tradition during and after the Renaissance, particularly Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, tested the validity of a hypothesis, or a new fact, by placing it over against a body of fixed and established truths. The scientists and the empiricists, however, tested the validity of a proposition by reference to its consequences in the material world. The standard in the natural sciences thus was dependability in reference to what was predicted or expected; while in the area of the social sciences it eventually came to be the concept which stood for a course of action which helped to actualize a humanly constructed ideal (although not before philosophers in the empirical tradition lost themselves in hedonism and utilitarianism,
as we shall see). By using the scientific approach, the empiricists were not bound, therefore, by the necessity of making their conclusions fit into a fixed and pre-established pattern. For example, if new scientific evidence indicated that the earth was round rather than flat, or that all objects fell at an equally increasing rate of speed regardless of their weight, they were free to do so. If they had been bound by scholasticism, or rationalism, with the belief that such matters had been determined once and for all by Aristotle and Ptolemy, they would have been forced to fit this evidence somehow into the older Aristotelian or Ptolemaic scheme of things.

An understanding of the development of the scientific method of determining the validity of a proposition or hypothesis which gradually achieved articulation as the result of the efforts of the early modern scientists and its effect upon the then currently held value standards, is the important insight which is to be gleaned from a reading of this chapter. The successes of the scientists in terms of realizing their objectives which came with its use sharpened the conflict between their area of specialization (the field of matter, or atoms in space and in motion), and the field of mind. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, the empiricists, who maintained a scientific attitude of mind in that they sought the origin of all knowledge first of all in ordinary experience, bankrupted the rationalistic position, as has just been shown. As the use of the
scientific method and its ever-critical attitude of mind spread to the social sciences (that is, in the early modern period about which we are speaking, to ethics and politics) it also led away from uncritical reliance on fixed standards. Because no standard or frame of reference was set up or postulated by the outstanding thinkers by which to judge the relative merits of courses of action open to them, to definitely take the place of the transcendental standards which they tended to disregard (such as emphasis upon the attainment of a future life, or the contemplation of Platonic essences), we shall now see that these empiricists themselves were led into a kind of self-imposed bankruptcy in these areas; for their reasoning led them to hedonism, which is the belief that pleasure is the highest good of men, and to utilitarianism, which is the opinion that the highest good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

The influence of empiricism upon conceptions of the nature of the good life.

So far the impact of science upon the Greek conception of the transcendental realm has been traced. The development of scientific materialism at the expense of a paramount concern for the transcendental world could not fail but have a direct effect upon men's ideas of the nature of the good life. What did the empirical philosophers conceive the good life to be as they turned more and more away from their belief in fixed truths and
values and became more concerned with the world of the here and now?

Because the industrial revolution facilitated the rise of a large propertied class it precipitated new moral problems; and this, with the gradual decline of the influence of the church, made it necessary to make a new search for the foundations of authority for the moral life. The result is best expressed in the ethical and political theories of Thomas Hobbes (1538-1679) who belongs to the seventeenth century with Descartes and Locke. His theories have had an important part in the formation of our own political beliefs.

Hobbes found the basis for morality in the "natural 1 rights" of man. Morality rested for him upon a social contract in which the natural rights were given freedom of expression. This theory like all theories was not without its antecedents; and in this case, as might be expected, the natural right theory can be traced back through the Stoics to the sophists, especially to Protagoras and Glaucous, who believed that in the absence of any objective standard for morality, moral conduct could only be rooted in convention as established by law. Although Hobbes maintained that the natural rights were located in the individual, and were to function in

the here and now, he believed that these rights were somehow objective in nature, somehow in the nature of things and conformed to a universal Reason. Here we observe the thread which connects his theory with transcendentalism. Because these natural rights were determined through a social contract it became the duty of every individual to see to it that he conformed to the principles governing social living, once they were set up. Morality for Hobbes consisted in the recognition rather than in participation in the formulation of governing principles, hence it was essentially absolutistic. Hobbes provided in his theory for an absolute ruler who would see to it that the governing principles, once established, were carried out.

Hobbes's theory was absolutistic, as characterizes all theories which have their source of values beyond concrete experience, for another reason: his low opinion of the basic worth of the individual which reflects the deistic or Christian attitude of his century. "Man's life in a state of nature," Hobbes said, "is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." With little value placed upon the individual, it was only natural that the successful execution of the natural rights should be emphasized by Hobbes, rather than their realization in

---

terms of the effect this would have in promoting happy, successful personal and social living. This conception of the individual is a conception which carries over to the present day, and reflects the traditional theological conception of man as unworthy in the eye of God to participate in the joys which were his before the fall. The individual, according to Hobbes, is inherently selfish and egoistic, and the result is that the altruistic ideals and the ideals of cooperative living must be forced upon him if the natural rights are to be actualized.

Hobbes's theory of the function of the state as essentially the exercise of police power for the protection of the social contract influenced the political philosophy of Locke; and Locke's theories, through Rousseau, exerted an indirect though powerful influence upon Jefferson; so that the conception of government which he held carried over to the conception of government held by the founders of our Constitution, and is still held by many people at the present time.

The subsequent history of ethics of the early modern period as reflected in the empiricists is an attempt to locate the basis for the good life. Joseph Butler (1692-1752), who follows upon Hobbes, expressed a wholesome reaction to the latter's philosophy and was concerned

---

to show that man is not inherently wicked. He was the first modern philosopher to appeal to conscience as the basis for moral judgments rather than to a universal Reason, but he paid homage to the rationalistic, the transcendentalist position by claiming that conscience revealed insight which stemmed from values ultimately fixed in nature. Butler writes:

"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them, and pronounces determinedly some actions to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially asserts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly."

Hume, who by his critical analysis of experience so effectively destroyed the validity of the dual substance theory, who brought the empiricism of the eighteenth century to its climax, made moral action a matter of utility: he believed that knowledge of the true nature of the moral life could be attained neither by the method of empiricism nor by a resort to Reason, and believed that all men can do is to practically adjust themselves to their environment. He made a further examina-

tion of conscience; and whereas Butler placed insights on the basis of intuition, he made them of the same status as feelings. This allies him with the "moral sense" philosophers of the time--particularly Shaftesbury and Hutcheson--who were very close to Platonism in their belief that values were intuited, preexistent, and self-evident. But because he rejected the belief that the moral sense is itself an intuition of right and wrong, but preferred to call it a sentiment, he came close to the utilitarianism of Bentham and J.S. Mill, his successors, who may be said to represent the culmination of ethical thought based on the old empiricism.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), a minor philosopher whose ethical theory follows upon that of Hume, maintained that the good for man was that which gave him pleasure, while the bad was that which gave him pain, and that the aim of legislation should be the increase of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. All pleasures were considered by Bentham to be on the same qualitative level, and the natural implication of his position would be that every individual would seek the baser rather than the refined pleasures. Bentham tried to escape this position


by maintaining that pleasures could be measured, and that those which did not cloy were the pleasures which represented the true values in life.

John Stuart Mill escaped the conclusions reached by Bentham by identifying pleasure with happiness; and he maintained the utilitarian doctrine that one's best interests were to be found in promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He attempted to make the transition from egoism, or the pure concern for self, to altruism, which represents the identification of one's best interests with the interests of all. The writer believes that while Mill was right in maintaining that people should seek the good of the whole, he was wrong in his assumption that, even if they identify their best interests with the good of the group, they will pursue it. Mill eventually realized this fact and sought the basis for his theory of morality as consisting of the promotion of general happiness in an "internal sanction"--a concept which ends ultimately in the principle of conscience as the guide. He considered this internal sanction to be "a certain primitive feeling of duty,"

-----------------------
3 Ibid., p.218.
1 Bentham recommended the following memoriter rhyme to his readers, which expresses the essence of his hedonism:

"Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure--Such works in pleasure and in pain endure.
Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end:
If it be public, let them wide extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view:
If pains must come, let them extend to few."
which many would identify today with our distinction-making ability. This sense of duty Mill regarded as an element of natural social feeling. Conscience as an internal sanction, while it differed from Bentham's theory in that it did not intuit right and wrong, and differed from Hume's analysis in that it was more than a purely individualistic emotion of approval or disapproval, made men's obligation to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number a universal obligation, even though the moral good was formulated in terms of consequences. Mill writes:

"The ultimate sanction ... of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, the same as of all other moral standards—the conscientious feelings of mankind. Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appears to; but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one. On them morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings exist, a fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the great power with which they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are proved by experience. ..." 1

"Assuming (the feeling of duty) to be innate, it is an open question to what objects it naturally attaches itself: for

-------------------

the philosophic supporters of that theory are now agreed that the intuitive perception is of principles of morality, and not of the details. If there be anything innate in the matter, I see no reason why the feeling which is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures and pains of others. If there is any principle of morals which is intuitively obligatory I should say it must be that. If so, the intuitive ethics would coincide with the utilitarian, and there would be no further quarrel between them. Even as it is, the intuitive moralists, though they believe that there are other intuitive moral obligations, do already believe this to be one; for they unanimously hold that a large portion of morality turns upon the consideration due to the interests of our fellow creatures. Therefore, if the belief in the transcendental origin of moral obligation gives any additional efficacy to the internal sanction, it appears to me that the utilitarian principle has already the benefit of it."

Summary of important tendencies in empirical thought.

To summarize briefly what has been said about the tendencies in the thought of the outstanding early empiricists, the following generalizations are important. First, the decline in faith in a divine Being as the locus of values, and the decline of faith in the belief in an external, substantive realm such as the Platonic realm of essences, was accompanied with an increased emphasis upon the belief that the good, wherever its locus, was the good for man in the here and now. Secondly, tenta-

2 Loc. cit.
tive efforts were made to define the good as the modern empiricist does today, in terms of consequences—as in the case of the "natural rights" theory, and when Hume identified the good with utility; or as in the case of Bentham and Mill who sought to define the good in terms first of pleasure, and then in terms of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. We observe in this brief depiction of the history of early modern ethics, in the tendency to shy away from the fixed values and truths of the theologists and the "innate ideas" of the rationalists, the same tendency which was observed in the depiction of the impact of the empiricists upon the epistemological problem (or the problem of explaining the relationship between mind and body), which showed itself in its rejection of fixed substances.

In every case, however—and this is the important point—in the absence of any postulated, objective standard of value, the empiricists were forced as a last resort to appeal to values which were fixed in nature. The strength of dualism was so great that it could not be shaken off in the areas of ethics and politics. It remained for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophers in the empirical tradition with a new conception of the nature of the universe to develop an ethical theory which would locate the source of values clearly and definitely in the world of concrete, ordinary experience.
Kant's epistemology.

One more philosophical position is worthy of attention before we pass on to an examination of the philosophy of present-day empiricism (or pragmatism, or instrumentalism, as it is also called) with the end in view of determining its effect upon the belief that our values are fixed in nature and that they come from outside experience. That position is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who, in the face of the metaphysical and ethical skepticism left by Hume, achieved, to use his own metaphor, "a Copernican revolution in philosophy" in his attempt to put the world to rights.

The theory of Kant is one of the most abstruse in the history of philosophy, and consequently it does not lend itself easily to a brief summary such as is only possible here. Since the present purpose is to present only Kant's ethical theory, the writer and the reader may well feel relieved of the necessity of delving into the fine-spun metaphysical and logical distinctions which are made in such books as the Critique of Pure Reason or the Critique of Judgment. Only enough will be said about Kant's theory of mind to enable the reader to understand in a general way how he "saved" philosophy after Hume had effectively destroyed the concept of the mind itself, by

pointing out, in his criticism of the concept of an enduring self, that we have no adequate basis for believing that a self, or a mental entity or receptacle exists, upon or in which our sensations and ideas are deposited. If we liken our ideas to beads, with the mind the string upon which they are strung, we may say that all Hume left was the beads; for the string itself is no more than another idea.

What was the nature of Kant’s "Copernican revolution in philosophy" by which he restored it to intellectual respectability? Copernicus had ventured the hypothesis that the earth revolved around the sun rather than that the sun revolved around the earth. Kant ventured the theory that the world of ordinary experience shaped itself to the mind rather than that (as all other philosophers had assumed) the mind shaped itself to the world. The mind, Kant maintained, has to do certain things to experience before we can have any experience at all. The mind, which can be divided according to its functions, works upon the "raw material of sensation" to produce what we take to be the external world, with all its characteristics of solidity, extension, motion, smell, tastes, etc. Each sensation, each relation between objects is not registered upon the mind, but projected, so to speak, from the mind as the product of one of its twelve cate-

---

1 See Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature. Book 1, Part 4, Sec. 6. _op. cit._, p. 349 et. seq.
gories. The space and time within which we observe objects to exist are themselves categories, and do not exist objectively apart from the mind.

The "raw material of sensation" is in itself unknowable because we cannot know an object except after it has been affected by the mind. The structure of the mind is fixed in nature, and we can not by any act of will alter the way in which sensations appear to us. The possibilities in nature are limited; for example, there can never be a round-square, or a dog that is a cat. In this respect Kant wholly accepts the categorical Aristotelian logic based on atomic physics. Everything must be either this or that; there can be no middle ground.

The rigid Cartesian distinction between mind and matter thus became meaningless for Kant, for matter is what it is only because it is, so to speak, a product of the mind. Mind itself is not a substance as Descartes conceived it to be, nor as Hume thought of it— an entity in which ideas resided just as beads are strung on a string— for substance, like space and time, and causality is only another of the categories of the mind. As T. M. Greene says, the mind or the self (as Descartes called it) was not "a self-subsistent psychic entity, destined for immortality," but was "strictly correlative to the knowing process, and invoked merely to render this process intelligible."
Kant's ethical formalism.

What are the implications of this theory of the nature and function of mind for Kant's moral theory? Kant's epistemology limited scientific knowledge to the world of phenomena or experience as then defined, and hence did not give any insight into the nature of moral worth, which has its locus in men's minds, and represents, in essence, the tone and quality of his life. We have every reason to believe, however, Kant maintained, that it exists. There is one universal and indubitable way in which it reveals itself, and that he called the moral imperative, the intuitive feeling that we have that we ought or ought not to do a certain act. This feeling of ought is categorical, or imperative, because man has a dual nature: we are both rational and sensual beings, but reason ought to be supreme before sense. The good life thus consists in adherence to certain forms of behavior rather than in the achievement of certain values; and because Kant defined the moral life in such terms he is an extreme ethical formalist—that is, one who pursues the good for its own sake, once it is determined, without regard to the consequences which ensue. The theory of a moral law

1 Greene, T.M., Editor, Kant Selections. Id. cit., p.xlii.  
2 Kant, Theory of Ethics, Book I, Sec. 6, Supra, p.296.  
3 Ibid., Sec. 7. p. 323 et seq.
completely unconditioned by any sensual goals represents the pursuit of rationality for its own sake. Thus conduct prescribed by the moral law is right because it is right, and not because it obtains a good for mankind. Once a good was determined it became the duty of an individual to pursue it "though the heavens fall."

While in Kant's case the true values were determined by the individual after he had asked himself if he could 1 "will them to be a law universal," since pure reason, reason divorced from desires and the evidence of the senses is used in formulating them, Kant left us with no satisfactory way of determining what a universally approved value would be. Kant made values subservient to reason whereas the present-day instrumentalist feels that reason should be considered subservient to values. This is the basis for the "right for right's sake" doctrine, and it represents the extreme to which transcendentalism can go in the case of a conflict with ordinary experience where values appear to shift according to the situation. If people could know the right, and the right remained fixed, the consequences of the right for right's sake doctrine would not be so dire; but if no consensus of opinion can be reached on the basis of pure reason as to what the elements in the good life are, it becomes a club in the hands of those who are able to win their

1 Ibid., Sec. 2 and sec. 6, p. 231 and p. 302.
way by force, and it ties in with the "might makes right" theory.

Consider, for example, the policy of the German Army in the last war. Its slogan was "Deutschland Über Alles"—in other words, might makes right, and right for right's sake. Or, who on the basis of the theory that that line of conduct is right which we would wish to be universally pursued, is right today, the democrats or the fascists? Both believe that their particular form of government and philosophy is the best. Reason does not show its hand on this issue—unless it backs both sides and contradicts itself.

Kant's exaltation of pure reason and his distrust of the senses and common desires of the individual can perhaps be explained in part by the fact that his family were Pietists—a very strict sect of German Protestants similar in their beliefs to our own Puritans and Quakers. They emphasized the sinfulness of the flesh and gave a high place to reason in religion and the right of private interpretation. They considered the moral life as a spiritual struggle. With this background it was only natural that Kant should distrust many of his natural impulses and raise pure reason to the status of overseer.

Summary.

Chapter three briefly depicts the trend of the development of thought in the areas of epistemology and
ethics during the Renaissance and for approximately two centuries after, particularly as it was influenced by the impact of scientific method. The growth of the sciences and the industrial revolution made the cleavage between transcendentalism (or concern for the nature and values of the other world) and empiricism (concern for the values of this world) more apparent. This bifurcation between the two realms of quantitatively determinable matter and the qualitative, non-quantitative, ineluctable spiritual matter was made most explicit in the philosophy of Descartes. While Locke, and especially Berkeley and Hume, by taking the empirical, the scientific approach to the problems arising from this bifurcation, effectively destroyed the theory of mind-substance and material substance, which constituted the underpinning of Cartesianism, and the unconsciously assumed underpinning of all dualism, the belief in substantive dualism persisted—even grew—in the general mind.

In the field of ethics, such empiricists as Hobbes, Butler, Hume, Bentham and J.S. Mill who sought the nature of the good life and hence the locus of values became more concerned with individual welfare as the chief goal, and became concerned therefore with consequences, with utility in promoting human welfare as the criterion for determining the good. They did not recognize the real significance of this slowly developing point of view, however. In view of the fact that they found no objective
standard or ideal they made first pleasure, then happiness the goal of good conduct. To seek pleasure is to be essentially self-centered and egoistic; to seek the greatest good of the greatest number implies a lack of consideration for an undefined minority. A particular activity was useful because it contributed to this end. In a last analysis they were always forced to place the locus of values not in the material world of atoms in space but in the only other place they knew—a transcendental realm wherein they were permanently fixed, and were intuited by reason or conscience.

Kant, the only rationalist besides Descartes who is briefly discussed, shows in his ethical philosophy the extreme formalism to which the transcendentalist position, divorced from traditional theological dogmas, led itself when he identifies the good life with concern for right action, intuited by pure reason, divorced from any concern for consequences in the here and now, and divorced from the possibility of realizing many ordinary values.

The impact of early science and the resulting development of scientific method, which led to the sharpest kind of separation between the world of matter and the world of mind, thus resulted in the field of ethics, the field with which we are concerned, in utilitarianism on the one hand and the strictest formalism on the other. Aside from minor variations in these theories, this is
the position in which philosophy found itself at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Chapter Four

IMPLICATIONS OF FIELD PHYSICS FOR THE
TRANSCENDENTALIST POSITION

All students are aware of the fact that the last few years have witnessed some radical revisions in the minds of scientists regarding the nature of the universe. All have no doubt connected Einstein's theory of relativity with such a revision. The implications of the relativity theory for the concepts of matter, mind, and experience are such as to make a reference to a transcendental world, or to values fixed in nature meaningless from this point of view. This will be shown in the course of the discussion. A brief account of certain aspects of the relativity theory which are relevant to the problem at hand will first be presented to furnish a background.

How the field functions.

The Newtonian physicist took as the basic unit of matter the solid, indestructible atom. Certain modern physicists, chemists, and biologists take as the basic
experiential unit not matter as atoms from which the mental or spiritual or immaterial potentialities of experience have been excluded by definition, but the versatile, pulsating "field," which is electrical energy, inclusive of all potential sense qualities. The field is an organization of electrons and protons clustering about a neutron in any of various configurations. Each pattern, or unit, exerts a gravitational field, and the fields, as they interact, redistribute their electrons and protons to produce new energy configurations or fields of force. This redistribution takes place much as the pattern of iron filings placed upon a flat paper held over the two poles of a horseshoe magnet will rearrange themselves when a second magnet is brought into the field. The quality of each electron is determined by its position in a larger constellation; and here lies the essential difference between Newtonian atomism and the field theory. Because of the fact that the qualities or characteristics of the electron are not fixed, because their characteristics change as they pass into and out of close interaction with other fields, the hard, indestructible Newtonian atom, occupying a bit of space, conceived only as giving up or taking on electrons as it enters into

1 "When atoms unite into molecules, or into solid bodies, their orbits will undoubtedly be very largely readjusted under the mutual influence of the two or more nuclei (neutrons) which are now acting simultaneously upon them." Millikan, R.A., The Electron. University of Chicago Press, 1917. Second Edition, p.230.
contact with other atoms to form the various elements and compounds, becomes unsuitable as a basis for the explanation for the characteristics of nature. Not the atom, but the field becomes the basis.

According to the relativity theory, all fields are interrelated, and all objects of experience are composed of electrons, protons and neutrons in more or less dense configurational patterns. Although it may be correctly said that new patterns are created as the fields of force rearrange themselves—as, for example, when the proper amounts of hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water, a compound with qualities different from either hydrogen or oxygen alone—an element of "staticity" remains in that the same fundamental energy units are involved. Any attempt to know the nature of the fields in themselves is doomed to failure, for they can be known only by their qualities which are exemplified in an experiential matrix—that is, when an organism or living body is present as part of the field; in which case the qualities experienced are always colored by the organism itself.

Out of the interaction of fields configurational patterns arise which are known as objects, and in some cases as organisms. Each object, or each organism, rep-

1 "The continuity of nature arises from extension. Every event extends over other events, and every event is extended over by other events. ... Thus in the special case of durations ... every duration is a part of other
resents a concentration of energy units or fields of force mutually inclusive of other fields of force, and by discriminative attention they can be isolated from the total matrix, to stand as fields complete in themselves—as when a tree is isolated for attention from the larger field of which it is also always a part. But because it is a fact that all fields are interrelated and dependent upon this interrelatedness for whatever characteristics they possess, this is the basis for the belief that the individual, or the self, or any object of perception, (as a field) cannot be isolated from the total experiential matrix and given the status of a substance, or an entity existing apart from all other entities, as the dualists suppose; or the status of a subsistent, where, in either case, it exercises an arbitrary control over the field from which it was isolated.

In a real sense no two objects are ever really the same from moment to moment, because energy patterns are in continuous flux; and since all energy patterns or fields are interconnected, nothing can ever happen to one object without a reaction of some sort, however minute, taking place in all other fields. It becomes impractical to trace their reactions beyond a certain point, however. The silt washed off an Ohio farmer's field and carried into the Gulf of Mexico may affect the ability of his

-----------------------------

land to grow good corn, but its effect on the water level in the Yangtze river is so small as to be utterly insignificant, although theoretically some change exists.

**Organisms as fields.**

It may be said that the basic characteristics of matter as concentrated energy patterns are: (1) either to dissipate itself into motion and in the process reduce itself into a simpler field (as when stones disintegrate into soil); or (2) to store up more energy as motion in a potential form, as when water, accumulating in ever larger streams gains in its ability to rotate dynamos; or bogs, through millions of years, become ultimately coal beds or petroleum reserves. Upon the basis of these observations W.P. Montague has constructed a theory explaining the origin and nature of life which does not seem to be incompatible with the conclusions of such scientists as H.F. Osborn, H.S. Jennings, and J. Loeb. The simplest types of living organisms, such as diatoms, have the characteristic or the ability of storing up motion as potential energy which is also observable as a characteristic of inanimate matter, so that "we find a material system, a type of carbon-compound called protoplasm, that is capable not only of storing in potential form and specific pattern the energies that impinge upon it, but also of propagating them or imposing them by a kind of
induction on new matter."

Protoplasms tend to increase its complexity and richness or organization, and, as a result, it evolves new and higher types of itself, and develops the capacity of preserving and reproducing its past history. As the complexity of organization increases, organisms acquire the ability to absorb and accumulate other fields or energies bound up with matter as food and later to "absorb the energies of mechanical contacts, light, and sound," and of "those molecular contacts which when dissolved in liquid constitute taste and when in volatile or gaseous form constitute smell." The developing nervous system "receives and retains the impinging energies in such a way as to preserve their individual specificities; and second and relatedly, it preserves the energy-traces distinct from one another and distinct in their entirety from the growth system of the organism. While the plant uses up the free energies which it receives in the process of structural growth the animal uses its own free energies to build up "a cerebral memory-system which enjoys a certain autonomy and insulation, so that it does not go into structure, but into function or behavior." Because of the animal's ability to differentiate the energies with which it comes in contact, a private history

-------------------
2 Ibid., p. 436.
3 Ibid., p. 436.
which guides its behavior is gradually formed, and the individual becomes an active as well as a passive agent, an actor as well as a spectator in life. Montague, in discussing the emergence of humans as unique energy patterns, writes:

"We are not to construe the emergence of animal life from mere life as indicating a descent of animals from plants. The chlorophyll mechanism is the brother or cousin rather than the ancestor of the nervous system. The brute and the vegetable are, as Bergson has pointed out, divergent alternative developments from undifferentiated protists, who were the common ancestors both of the protozoa and the protophytes. But, whereas the chlorophyll receptor merely provides a new and richer means of extending that anabolism or structure-building (which is the generic character of mere life as such) by utilizing sunlight as well as food, the acquirement of a nervous system results in a new and higher level of life, on which, over and above the capacity to build a body in the ancestral form, there is the added capacity to build a private and individual history and an internal and individual replica of the objects in the outside world. This secondary organism is both the cause and the effect of the self-directive and increasingly adaptive motions by which life begins its conquest of the extra-organic environment."

1

"It is when the potential energies constituting the memory system or secondary organism become sufficiently strong to be capable of functioning autonomously and independent of the sensory solicitations of the environment that the individual becomes freed from the here and now of his body,

4 Ibid., p. 437.
1 Ibid., p. 437.
and life becomes spirit."

In other words, whenever men reach a point in their development where their ideals are actualized, where activity is consciously pointed toward purposeful ends, where they succeed in harnessing the immoral, unpurposeful energies of nature to the development of a richer personal living (which is best achieved by pursuing ideals which stand for richer personal living for all), the spiritual life may be said to be functioning. This is the case, for example, when the members of a family work together to make life richer for the group, and where such institutions as government, school, insurance companies, fraternal societies, function to help the group to escape the limitations put upon their activities by the environment. To live spiritually means to develop one's intelligence, to grow, to escape to ever larger frames of reference, to actualize ideals of associated living and thus to make life richer. The soul builds for itself ever more stately mansions. Felix Adler, the founder of the Ethical Culture Society, expressed the same idea when he wrote that men should work to impose the spiritual ideal (the ideal of associated, democratic living) upon the material substratum (the life of sheer impulses, in all their

1 Ibid., p. 433.
promiscuity and variety). John Dewey writes:

"Growth has not been confined to conscience and character... It extends also to discovery, learning and knowledge, to creation in the arts, to furtherance of ties that hold man together in mutual aid and affection."

2

It is growth in this sense that constitutes the development or the emergence of the spiritual life.

The implications of the field theory are not fully realized in all areas.

The articulation of the relativity theory by Einstein and his co-workers, such as Leopold Infeld, Michelson, and Morley was an event of extreme importance for all those who were sincerely interested in profiting in their respective areas of interest by a better understanding of the structure and function of the universe. It corroborated the opinion of the empiricists that absolutes and transcendentals were human constructs, and gave scientific unification to a theory which made possible the escape from all the problems to which substantive dualism, arising out of animism and supported by Newtonian physics, gave rise. The reasoning of such

------------------------
empiricists as Locke, Berkeley and Hume about the illogicality of a belief in substances as corroborated by definite scientific evidence; and though many people— including among them eminent scientists— still cling at times to a belief in a supernatural being and a transcendent realm, faith in the conclusions of the dualists becomes ever harder to support.

For those in the areas of general philosophy and education this is true. Practically all the changes and developments in theory in these fields in recent years can be accounted for by the impact of scientific method and the field theory upon older, established assumptions of the biologists, physicists, chemists, psychologists, and philosophers which are traceable to the dualisms to which Newtonian physics gave support, which, it has been shown, arose out of animism.

The impact of the relativity theory and the concept of the field has not been felt with equal force by all people in any particular area, and the result has been that conflicts in theory have arisen among those who claim to be united under one banner. This is true in the areas of general philosophy and education. The theorists step ahead and revise old conceptions and standards while the followers lag behind, and do not keep pace with develop-

1 "In the symposium Science and Religion, Sir Arthur S. Eddington, Professors J. S. Haldane, Julian Huxley, B. Malinowski, and Sir J. Arthur Thomson are unanimous in defense of the religious attitude and the right to believe in the God which it implies." Quoted from M.
ments in theory. Furthermore, many people who are developing the implications of field physics, by whatever name, in their own areas have not kept pace with the new developments in other areas. Conflicts and misunderstandings which existed before the advent of field physics and its implications, which might now perhaps be resolved, are continued, while the criticism of "misinterpretation" is heard frequently from all sides.

Examples of such conflicts are the traditional disputes between the rationalists and the empiricists (whose present-day descendents are called realists and instrumentalists, or pragmatists, respectively) and the disputes between the classicists and the progressive educators, which stem respectively from these basic philosophical positions. Disputes between the rationalists and the empiricists would go by the board if the implications of scientific method and the relativity theory for traditional concepts of the nature of reality, and for a modern theory of the nature of experience were fully appreciated, and old habits and ways of thinking could be thrown aside, so that the new theories could be universally put into practice. John Dewey writes:

"Pre-scientific ideas and beliefs in morals and politics are ... so deeply engrained in

tradition and habit and institutions, that the impact of scientific method is feared as something profoundly hostile to mankind's deepest interests and values. On the side of philosophical formulation, highly influential schools of thought are devoted to maintaining the domain of values, ideas and ideals as something wholly apart from any possibility of application of scientific methods. Earlier philosophic conceptions of the necessary separation between reason and experience, theory and practice, higher and lower activities, are used to justify the necessity of the division."

The field theory permits the application of scientific method to the qualitative as well as the quantitative aspects of experience.

The implications of a revolutionary theory for a revised interpretation of the nature and structure and function of the universe are not always readily apparent. This was true of the Copernican viewpoint in relation to the Ptolemaic theory, and of Newtonian physics in relation to transcendentalism. It made little difference to the fifteenth century sailor whether the Ptolemaic theory or the heliocentric theory was correct; or whether the earth was round or flat, because the sun, regardless, always could be seen to be in its accustomed place in the sky at the accustomed time; and as for falling off the earth, as he pushed further out--the earth was just wider than people thought it was. Such theories were by-products or results of the use of scientific

-------------
1 Dewey, John, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York,
method, and their value lay in the fact that they explained certain phenomena more clearly and simply than they were under the Ptolemaic system. As E.A. Burtt says, Copernicus would have been in sympathy with the Spanish prince who remarked, "If I had been present when the universe was made, I should have seen to it that it was made more simply."

The first important result of the influence of the Copernican theory, the terrestrial dynamics of Galileo, Kepler's laws of planetary motion, and the articulation of the atomic hypothesis was the impetus which they gave to further scientific investigation. The second result, which appeared long after these theories were formulated, was the relegation of man to a less important place in the universe. For when general acceptance of the Copernican viewpoint did come eventually, it

"seemed at first merely to overthrow the authority of Ptolemy; in reality it swept man out of his proud position as the central figure and end of the universe, and made him a tiny speck on a third-rate planet revolving about a tenth-rate sun drifting in an endless cosmic ocean."

The same reluctance of many people to accept the conclusions and implications of the field theory is ap-

Henry Holt and Co., c1938, pp. 77-78.
parent today. How does its method extend beyond the method of the early empiricists, and what may we expect to be the long-time results when its implications are fully realized?

Newtonian physics gives us insight only into the nature and function of those fields or energy patterns which we call the material world--insight which no one would think of considering as useless. The relativity theory, in its application to broader areas of experience, gives us insight into the nature and function of the mental, the spiritual, the aesthetic areas of experience which were excluded from the area of common-sense, scientific investigation by the earlier scientists. All experience becomes the legitimate field for inquiry, whereas under the old-time physics, certain areas were left to the gods. By thus extending the area and authority of scientific method the result will be not so much a further reconstruction of the material world, not so much a higher degree of rapport between man and nature, but a reconstruction of social relationships, more harmonious pursuit of goals arising out of ordinary experience. In other words the field theory, by permitting the free and open use of the test of successful consequences in determining the direction of activity, by permitting the construction of values in terms of consequences, will help

---------------------
men to revise their conduct in such a way that the present-day cultural lag will be diminished. Instead of getting our values from another world and permitting our actions to be governed out of all relation to consequences, people will use consequences as the only criterion for determining their over-arching values; and they will use the method of intelligence in making decisions regarding values rather than take them unthinkingly on the basis of pure authority.

The importance of the field theory for revised conceptions of the nature of mind and consciousness.

In order to understand better why values can no longer possibly be fixed in nature, and the grounds upon which the areas of aesthetic experience and mental experiences of all kinds are brought under the control of pragmatic method, it will be helpful to observe how many of the concepts which served to bifurcate experience, such as consciousness, mind, time and space, truth, value, are interpreted from the standpoint of the relativist. Since the basic dualism may be said to be between mind and matter it will be well to start with the implications of the field theory for a revised concept of the nature of mind.

Mind can no longer be conceived as a thing, an entity, a substance, something that is inherited at birth, in which sense qualities, such as colors, sounds, tastes, smells, reside. It is not that which does our thinking
for us. Mind is a function, a particular kind of behavior, a quality or trait within a field. When an individual, an organization of many interacting fields of force, comes into contact with other energy fields, a new energy pattern or field is formed. The qualities and the sense perceptions of this field are the result of the coalescence of other fields. Because the organism, as a modifier of the field has been itself modified by its interaction with other fields, it modifies the present field of which it is a part, so that whatever qualities it has are not public, or general, but always reflect the influence of the organism. Thus we speak not of the environment, but of an environment. The individual as an organism "colors" the field, or makes the field what it is, by reason of his past experiences.

This explains why some see an object as red, while others (if they have jaundice, for example) see it as yellow; why the sight of a certain item of food will suggest eating to some, while to others it will be repugnant. (It is reported, for instance, that oysters nauseated most of the Civil War veterans who were with Sherman on his march to the sea because they were for a time forced to eat so many of them). To one person, "A primrose by the river's brim a yellow primrose is to him, and nothing more;" while to another it may suggest paintings, the creator, sunsets, or any of a number of aesthetic experiences. Each person's past experiences have
modified his field. To still another person, a scientist, the primrose may suggest quality of the soil, characteristics of light rays, etc.

The suggesting, when it is of a kind which points the direction to further action, may be called mind-function. The oyster to some will suggest purchase, and eating; to others it will suggest a quick retreat. The primrose may suggest plucking and the search for a vase; to another it may suggest the easel and the paints in the farmhouse over the hill, or a book or an iron with which to press it, or any of a number of things. The selection and appropriation of an object with the end in view of using it to carry on further action may be called mind.

Consciousness can be distinguished from mind by saying that the former represents an almost automatic adjustment of an organism to its environment. The latter then represents a pointing which is colored or controlled or inhibited by previous activities. Sidney Hook writes:

"Consciousness functions on impulse, with little or no restraint or guidance because of past experiences. It is pure and immediate readjustment to a situation which will have consequences in the future. Mind functions when impulses are controlled, so as to affect the reaction pattern. Mind activity differs from that of consciousness in that it operates as a set of organized meanings that have been built up as a result of previous activities. To have a mind is to have a store of systematized meanings already at hand to develop or restrain the con-
sicious action which goes off like a shot at the perception of a meaning."

A good example of the function of consciousness, when such a distinction between consciousness and mind is made, is the case of a ball player who sees a "fly-ball." The ball in mid-air represents something-to-be-caught-to-be-thrown-to-the-home-plate-to-put-a-runner-out. The player adjusts himself to the situation almost automatically: he allows for windage, for the height of the ball, for the smoothness or roughness of the terrain he must cross to get to the ball, etc. Consciousness, no more than mind, is an entity, or a receptacle in which experience exists.

A more complicated example of the function of mind is as follows. Let us imagine that we see a shadowy figure ahead of us as we are picking our way on a dark and foggy night. As it looms larger we are unable to determine just what it is, but it occurs that since we do not know just where we are walking it may be a telephone pole; or again it may be a person waiting to accost us and relieve us of the considerable sum of money we happen to be carrying. As we approach closer, and observe that it remains motionless and extends up into the air we accept the first hypothesis as being the correct one. Our

tension immediately diminishes; we relax; and instead of preparing for quick flight or for a shout we think again about getting on our way. When we have accepted the first hypothesis we know immediately that our actions in the immediate future will be different from what they would be if we were forced to accept the second hypothesis as being correct. The pointing or leading quality of the experience was different.

If we are somewhat shaken by the experience we may give the object a closer examination and observe that it has the feel of wet, splintery wood, smells of creosote, and gives a ringing noise when we kick it. We can no longer be dubious of its identity. With the problem solved, we go on our way.

Before we identified the object of perception with the pole it suggested or "pointed" to two possible types of future action: if the object was a highwayman it meant a lusty shout and, according to the circumstances, either a rapid, piston-like movement of our feet which would carry us in the opposite direction, or a fight; if the object was only a pole, it meant that we should have to turn aside and again be on our way. The pointing or leading to ambiguous future action may be called mind: the pointing to the object as a pole, with the concomitant course of action which it suggested was correct pointing. Hence the hypothesis which we first formulated was true, while the second was false. More about
the nature of truth will be said later.

Mind leads to a closer adjustment of the individual as an organism to the environment. An electric fan, to use still another example, does not appear as a dangerous object—until we approach too close and get our knuckles rapped when we accidentally place our hand against the whirling blades. Because bruised and bleeding knuckles are far from pleasant, that experience leads to a different type of response when we next approach a fan. The fan is seen differently; it is seen as "dangerous" as well as "soothing."

"The perception foreshadows, or symbolizes, or points to what will happen 'if you don't watch out.' This peculiar function of things in pointing to the future is what is meant by mind."

"The function of pointing or leading is what is meant by mind. This function is not anything separate; it is something that things do. Through the medium of our responses future events or possibilities get themselves translated into present fact, and thus they become effective in the control of behavior."

It is the organism as a whole which responds to external stimuli; which take their own characteristics or qualities partly as the result of their interaction.

---

1 See pp. 101-106.
3 Ibid., p. 225.
as fields of force with a nervous system. For example, one may ask whether the pole which figured in our earlier speculations was a pole before we saw it or before we verified it. Most men would say that it certainly was. If we maintain that it was there all the time, with all its concreteness and meaning as "poleness," and assert that one's function is to absorb the meaning, we are maintaining a position of Platonic realism; for the object and its qualities then "transcend" conscious experience. On the basis of the field theory, all that exists apart from awareness is an energy pattern in a fairly stable form. As a possible object of knowledge it is only a concentration of protons and electrons. As an object of knowledge it has become significant for us in terms of the meanings we ascribe to it. For a lineman it has one meaning; for an artist another; and for the cautious pedestrian still another. The meaning does not reside within the object, nor is it within the organism; it is the product of their interaction.

One may presume that as the organisms in interaction with fields become less complex, meanings grow dimmer until they cease to exist. The man with the quick and facile mind, should his attention alight on the pole, will be off to a long string of generalizations and hypotheses about the pole. The moron will see in it only a problem. The dog sees it in still a different light. No meaning at all exists in the interaction of the pole
and the ground, although in the process of disintegration of the wood a furious chemical activity may be taking place among the molecules on the periphery of the pole.

The qualities of being "menacing," "wet," "splinterly," or "smelling like creosote," etc., which were the qualities of the field as it fluctuated; and, in the case of the fan, of being "dangerous," or "soothing," were neither in the objects nor in the individual. This is true of all sense perceptions. Colors, sounds, dull, weak, smooth, glassy, hot, etc., are all in this category.

"Perception is supposed to be a process by which the mind seeks to know what the object is like. But this assumption is precisely what the field concept rejects. Colors and sounds are just happenings; there is no more point in saying that they are true or otherwise than there would be in saying that an earthquake or cyclone is 'true.' There is no one standard, 'objective' color or size by which the perceptions of different observers are to be measured. Every sense quality belongs to a field, and it varies with variations in the field; in no case is a sense quality located in the mind."

---

1 Ibid., p. 218.
Implications of revised conceptions for the nature of space and time.

To say that the pole as an object of perception (if the writer may continue to use it as an example) is a synthesis of inconceivably small electrical particles in continuous flux is also misleading. It is more correct to say that it exists through a duration. For the pole disintegrates through natural processes and in time ceases to be a pole. To say that the pole, or any pattern, exists through a duration is not the same as to say that it exists in absolute space and time. Space and time and flux are for the physicist only relational patterns, just as are any other concepts. The Newtonian physicist believed that atoms existed in absolute time and space and he did not concern himself with the logical problems this conception created. Both, as they are conceived today, are only convenient ways of measuring the rapidity of change. An hour is no more a measure of an absolute piece of time any more than a dollar has behind it a cosmic dollar. As Everett Kircher says, "All things exist through duration and duration takes its very meaning from change, and transition, and transformation."

---

The implications for the nature and meaning of truth.

What are the implications of the field theory for the problem of the nature of truth? Since nothing is fixed in nature, since there are "no cosmic hitching posts," --or at least none of which we can be aware--there can be no fixed truths. (From the point of view of the assumptions made in this dissertation, there have never been any fixed truths; truths are always pragmatically arrived at, and what has been hypostatized in the past is the abstraction, truth. Whenever one seeks the meaning of a truth it must always be determined with reference to a particular situation or situations. The same is true of such concepts as beauty, justice, patriotism, etc.)

Let us examine a supposedly fixed truth in the area of the natural sciences with a view to determining its validity. Most people believe that there are no more and no less than twenty-four hours in a day, and that it takes just twenty-four hours for the earth to complete its orbit about the sun. This is a fact fixed in nature which was ordained when the earth was created and shall continue until the end of time. The belief that all planets, like the sun, had their eternal and unvarying orbits was spoken of as "the eternal harmony

------------------------
of the spheres" during the Renaissance. Accepting a unit of time as an arbitrarily chosen measuring device, scientists tell us that the days are getting longer at the rate of one second every one hundred and twenty thousand years. While this may be an infinitesimal variation in terms of the accepted standard, in terms of geologic time the rate of increase is quite rapid. The attainment of this information was possible only after modern instruments had been developed which would register so small a change.

Let us take another example of a truth from the sphere of logic. According to Aristotle the law of non-contradiction is one of the fixed truths. "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and place." Likewise the law of the excluded middle: "A is either A or non-A." Let us examine the proposition, "An animal is either a mammal, a bird, a fish, or a reptile." According to the Aristotelian logic of fixed classes all animals would have to fit categorically into one of these four classes because the classes were fixed in nature. In order to get an archaeopteryx into one of his classes Aristotle would either have to revise his conception of classes or set up a new one; for the archaeopteryx has characteristics of both bird and reptile. For the modern logician categor-

1 "The history of experimental science is to a large extent the history of its struggle to liberate itself from the Aristotelian conception of fixed essential kinds and natures." Hook, Sidney, "Baptism of Aris-
ies can be revised at will.

A third example of the implication of the field theory for a fixed truth can be drawn from the field of ethics. Many people believe, for example, that stealing under any circumstances is wrong. While there are no antecedently real and objective facts to support the assertion that stealing in rare cases is right, there likewise are no antecedently real and objective facts to support the assertion that stealing is always wrong (unless they be found in some authoritarian source such as the Bible or a legal code in which case they are hypothesized generalizations of experience). An appeal to consequences must be made to determine whether the belief is true or untrue. If the people who deny categorically that stealing is ever justified were to read Jean Valjean they may be led to change their belief. Valjean was forced either to steal or starve. He chose the former alternative, was caught, and justice was not tempered with mercy. Anyone who reads the story cannot help but feel that Valjean did the right thing under the circumstances and that he was unjustly punished.

In the great majority of cases the relativist and pragmatist would assert with the absolutist that stealing

----------------------

totle and Marx." Nation 146:415-17, April 9, 1938.

is wrong, but for different reasons. The absolutist affirms the truth of the statement because he knows intuitively that he is right, or because he has been told so on good authority. The pragmatist affirms the truth of the statement because he is cognizant of the consequences which ensue if stealing is approved. It is not with the fact that honesty (or beauty, health, courage, wisdom, etc.) are taken as immediately valid that the pragmatist finds fault, but with the dogmatic, unthinking manner in which it is accepted as a final good. The pragmatist wishes to see every value pay its own way whenever it is used by giving assurance in terms of the forseeable consequences that it directs activity in the direction where it will promote richer living for all.

The pragmatic conception of truth.

The pragmatist asserts that it is impossible to state a theory of The Truth. A statement is accepted as true only in a context, and the context is always relative to the individual. A true statement is not thereby private, for to make it so is to mistake the nature of the individual, to assume an individual is a substantial self existing in time and space and set off from the environment. The individual and the environment are abstractions arising out of the all-inclusive experiential matrix and not existences in their own right. A true statement, one which leads to success or satisfaction, is
defined exclusively in terms of predicted consequences. Sidney Hook says, "An idea is true if, as a result of acting it out—an experiment—we are able to verify certain specifiable consequences of believing it. Not any old consequence which may give us personal satisfaction but consequences that are anticipated in virtue of the specific plan to be followed and which in certain situations may be far from pleasant."  

We have seen that the function of pointing or leading is what is meant by mind. The pointing may lead to successful or unsuccessful consequences: that is, it leads to a condition in which the organism is either readjusted to its environment or else it continues in a state of maladjustment. When the outcome of the pointing is as expected, or successful, and results in the restoration of equilibrium with the environment, the proposition or judgment formulated, or the quality experienced, may be said to be true; when future experience indicates the pointing to have been misleading, so as to bring unexpected consequences, the proposition, or judgment, or hypothesis which spelled the character of the pointing was false. For instance, I may say, "I believe this razor blade is sharp." If, upon testing the validity of this belief by shaving with the blade I find that it performs in a manner consistent with the manner in which a sharp blade always

1 Hook, Sidney, Loc. cit., p. 76.
conforms, I know that my judgment was true. The "sharp-
ness" spelled "easy shave," and in so far as the blade
gave an easy shave the pointing was correct. If upon
testing my belief by shaving with the blade I find that
it scratches, pulls, etc., my proposition expressing a
pointing was incorrect. Or another example. If I say,
"One and one always make two," and I proceed to test this
assertion by adding one drop of water to one drop of water,
and find that I get one larger drop of water, I find that
I must class my expectation as untrue. A pointing, as
Hook has said, need not necessarily lead to satisfactory
consequences to be true. I may say "I believe I have the
measles." If, acting on this assumption I call in a
doctor and he verifies my hypothesis, the expected was
true although it was far from pleasant.

Learning becomes a process of formulating ideas,
concepts, or meanings which prove reliable when acted
upon. Whether the epidemic of infantile paralysis is
caused by the heat, whether gas is more expensive than
electricity for home cooking, whether the razor blade is
sharp, are all propositions which signify pointings which
must be tested out by experience. Truth becomes, then,
very relevant as it applies to hypothesis or judgments
which are to be tested. Intelligence signifies the use
of the whole process of formulating and testing meanings
which serves to help us to effectively direct and control
experience,
The field theory does not permit the charge against the instrumentalist of solipsism and subjectivism.

The charge that the instrumentalist's theory is solipsistic, and that it ends ultimately in subjectivism, arises from the fact that the instrumentalist makes truths and values and meanings dependent upon the individual. It would seem to the critics of this position that all existence, all experience is swallowed up in the all-engulfing mind of the individual. Not only is the relativity plainly stated, but the instrumentalist is furthermore very free in admitting that no antecedent, objective standards exist by which judgments can be verified or objects exist in their own right, which common sense implies. The critics feel the necessity of proving the existence of an outside world in order to refute this theory. Consider the following passage by a well-known contemporary writer:

"We cannot look at a thing before we have seen it or after we have seen it and note whether our seeing it has changed its appearance. ... It does not follow because an object's independence of our experiencing it cannot be proved by the Method of Difference that, therefore, it cannot be proved by some other method. Still less does it follow that the idealist's hypo-

1 Frederick S. Breed, a prominent educator, writes: "We have seen how creationism grows logically out of the subjectivism of the philosophy of the Progressives. Another and more serious outgrowth is its Solipsism. That it is solipsistic will probably be denied. ... Dewey admits the creationism. Why not admit the solipsism? In Education and the New Realism, New York, The Macmillan Co., c1939., p. 113.
thesis of the dependence of objects upon consciousness is implied by the fact that when objects are observed, consciousness is always present."

"The presence of consciousness together with the objects of which we are conscious is merely a tautology which leaves the dependence or independence of the objects an open question, to be decided by inference from their behavior while under observation."

The charge of solipsism and subjectivism can be refuted either by showing the inadequacy of the conception of the instrumentalist theory as it is conceived by its critics, or by rehearsing the instrumentalist theory itself as it applies to these positions. The writer will take the first course. It has already been suggested that the critics do not interpret the instrumentalist theory on the basis of field physics; they interpret it as it was formulated by James; and as Dr. H. G. Huxley has said, they write "as though Dewey had never lived and science has made no progress." Pragmatism is interpreted in terms of substantive dualism. The realists who number among the critics of instrumentalism, following in the rationalistic tradition, believe that "independent reals" must be postulated, as they must when the dualistic

---

2 Ibid., pp. 235-36.
4 In conference with the writer.
bifurcation of experience into mind and matter is made. The critics further illustrate their lack of comprehension of the implications of Einsteinian physics for a revised conception of the nature of reality when they speak of objects in consciousness (as in the above quotations) or when they maintain that experience is a purely human construct. F. S. Breed writes:

"Belief in the existence of objects of thought logically demands the acceptance of something not directly experienced by humans. It is directly known that something exists when it is humanly experienced; it is not directly known whether the same thing exists before or after this experience. Such radical empiricism is defended on the ground that it leaves no doors open for the entrance into our thinking of metaphysical faculties or agencies; mysterious entities, essences, or spooks. It is also defended as a wholesome application of the law of parsimony. On the other hand this assumption keeps the progressives (instrumentalist educators), as Santayana says, always within the narrow confines of a psychological universe of discourse. They never peer beyond the expanse of the Jamesian stream of consciousness.... The characteristics or unique 'traits' of that which is qualified, they think, are 'called into existence by inference'. Get it: 'called into existence.' The form which emerges when thinking occurs in connection with an amorphous existent is regarded as created by 'thought,' for otherwise content must be supposed to exist before being experienced, a conclusion contrary to their fundamental principle."

1

The instrumentalist admits the existence of fields

-----------------------------
apart from the perceiver—a point which his critics have difficulty in understanding—although they do not exist as objects in their own right. John Dewey writes:

"That stones, stars, trees, cats and dogs, etc., exist independently of the particular processes of a knower at a given time is as groundedly established fact of knowledge as anything can well be. For as sets of connected existential distinctions, they have emerged and been tested over and over again in the inquiries of individuals and of the race."

There has been much misunderstanding about this crucial point in the instrumentalist theory. The critics would place the "independent reals" outside experience, or in another kind of experience (i.e., a transcendental or a subsistential realm). The instrumentalist maintains that experience is all of one piece. Dewey makes the distinction between the "experienced-but-not-known" and "the known." When an individual and a field interact in such a manner that awareness is established, the energy field, sometimes called the datum, is the experienced-out-not-known. When that datum becomes so tied in with the energy system of the individual—when a coalescence of the energy fields has taken place—it becomes a "known," an object; a field with definite qualities and meanings.

3 Dewey, John, "Experience, Knowledge and Value." In
This process can take place by accident or it can be hastened by purposive action. The tying-in process takes place when hypotheses are erected about the nature of the datum under investigation and tested to determine which one fits in with what is expected in terms of our past experience and in terms of what we know of similar fields. (Even a datum must have some meaning, and whatever meaning is given to it is given in terms of past experience with nearly or distantly similar data). This functional behavior which seeks to add new knowledge to old ("the unknown can be known only in terms of the known") is identical with the "pointing" process which has already been examined, and called mind.

Thus, for example, one may be concentrating upon a problem when someone in the room makes a remark about a "car." For a moment the person concentrating does not "catch on." He may say, "Car... car... oh yes! We had a flat tire last night." The "car" was experienced-but-not-known until this "datum" became wrapped with meanings and set the thinker off on a consideration of past or future possible experiences with a particular car. If car, or tree, or star, or cat, or dog, or any object or quality, such as color, or sound, or smell, exists apart from experience as here defined the instrumentalist maintains that its postulation is unwarranted presupposition.

-----------------------------
Because the critics persist in thinking of experience as experience of a self as a substance existing in space and time, rather than as the product of an interaction of fields from which mind and body are analyzed as exemplifying particular kinds of behavior; because they continue to believe that objective and eternal truths exist apart from ordinary experience (in the face of the criticisms of the empiricists and the importance of explaining how they become truths in this world) instrumentalism is misinterpreted by its critics as leading to subjectivism and solipsism.

The nature of values.

Let us now examine the implications of the field theory for a revised conception of the nature and source of values. The preceding comments in this chapter have attempted to show the impracticability and impossibility of believing that they have their locus in a realm apart from experience, that they are fixed in nature, that they are intuited or discovered or selected or otherwise apprehended by the mind, and that such values as are here in mind differ in their origin from what may call the lesser values such as are expressed in proverbs and private codes of ethics. On the basis of the field theory, all values arise out of the interaction of an individual with an environment and point the direction for further action. Kircher says, "Values arise as does experience
out of the patterned dynamic pervasive of both individual and environment and are redefined by conscious elective and natural processes internal to those more inclusive patterns.¹ They stem from a consideration of subsequent benefit or harm—from an evaluation of consequences. Experience is inclusive of individual, social, and aesthetic values. When an individual finds a certain activity pattern which when pursued relieves a tension—or to say it in a different way, resolves a conflict which impedes further thought or action—that activity pattern becomes a value.

Many activity patterns which are expressed as values resolve conflicts internal to the energy system itself, functioning as an individual. Such values are expressed, for example, as rules of health which keep the organism in fit condition as a harmoniously functioning whole and can be called individual values. Other individual values are represented by activity patterns which resolve tensions which are expressed as individual interests: knowledge of hair cutting is a value to a barber while it would be comparatively useless to a grocer; or knowledge about and possession of a violin would be a value to a musician while it would be only a curiosity to a savage.

Other activity patterns which are expressed as values

resolve conflicts between the individual as a unified organism and other individuals, and these may be called social values. For instance, words--language--overcomes the difficulty of getting meanings across, and hence is a value; traffic lights overcome the difficulty of harmonious movement, and hence represent a value. Laws, regulations of all sorts constitute what may be called social values so long as they resolve the conflicts which they were originally constructed to resolve.

The difference between individual and social values as here described is in a real sense an arbitrary distinction, for what constitutes an individual value constitutes a social value, and vice versa. The best interests of the individual are always the best interests of society interpreted as the largest conceivable field of interacting organisms.

Aesthetic values differ from an ordinary value only in that one's experience of it is heightened by a greater or less degree of appreciation of its successful functioning in resolving the tension or conflict it was intended to resolve. Dewey gives the following example of an aesthetic appreciation which illustrates the fact that an aesthetic value is not found in the contemplation of an aesthetic object, but in the full realization of the end desired.

"A man may take a drink of water almost automatically to quench thirst."
If he is journeying in a barren land and forms an estimate of where he may find water and upon going to the spot quenches his thirst, he has a heightened quality of experience. Water is appreciated as he does not appreciate it when all he has to do is to turn a faucet and hold a tumbler under the stream that flows out. His experience has the representative quality of being an eventuation, a consummation."

Because in the past man found an aesthetic feeling of satisfaction in his realization of an end difficult of achievement which was experienced over and over by the race—as in the difficulty of simulating his concept of the Virgin on canvas;—or because he found certain emotional experiences to recur with a high degree of regularity—as when he gazed with awe at a beautiful sunset—he identified the object of the experience with the beautiful, or the good, or the true. Because these qualities could not be found on the canvas, or in the sunset (which disintegrates into atoms and molecules when we seek to analyze it) they were hypostatized, as has been shown. Concerning the way in which an aesthetic experience arises, particularly as it relates to experiences of intrinsic truth, goodness and beauty, Dewey writes:

"The actual basis (of our concepts of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful) is appreciation of concrete consummatory ends. In the case of intellec-

tual, aesthetic and moral experiences, the objective completion of certain unsettled existential conditions is brought about with such integrity that the final situation is possessed of peculiar excellence. There is the judgment 'This is true, beautiful, good' in an emphatic sense. Generalizations are finally framed on the ground of a number of concrete realizations. Being true, beautiful, or good, is recognized as a common character of subject-matters in spite of great differences in their actual constituents. They have, however, no meaning save as they indicate that certain subject-matters are outstanding consummatory completions of certain types of previously indeterminate situations by means of the execution of appropriate operations. Good, true, beautiful, are, in other words, abstract nouns designating characters which belong to three kinds of actually attained ends in their consummatory capacity."

"Classic theory transformed ends attained into ends-in-themselves. It did so by ignoring the concrete conditions and operations by means of which the fulfilments in question are brought about. The traits which marked subject-matters in virtue of their being successful resolutions of problems of intellectual inquiry, of artistic construction and of moral conduct, were isolated from the conditions which gave them their standing and significance. Being thus isolated, they were necessarily hypos tatized. In isolation from the means by which consequences are reached, they were taken to be external ideals and standards of the very operations of inquiry, artistic creation and moral endeavor, of which in fact they are generalized results."

1 Ibid., p. 177.
2 Ibid., pp. 177-78.
The implications of the field theory for religion.

What are the implications of the field theory for religion—especially for a concept of God? The modern instrumentalist is not hostile to religion or to a belief in God, so long as "religion" and "God" are not defined in supernaturalistic terms. Because the instrumentalist is interested in process, function, he prefers to talk about the religious attitude rather than about a religion, which connotes a body of fixed beliefs, conflicting with the fixed beliefs of other religions, usually concerned with values and ideals set in another world and revealed by authority—the type of belief he has pledged himself to avoid. The religious attitude may be characterized by saying that it is concerned with the realization of goals set up which promise to give us a greater measure of general welfare in the here and now. God, far from being a person who directs our destinies, is what Dewey somewhat dubiously calls "the active relation between the ideal and the actual." Man is without a sponsor in the universe, and whatever he makes of himself he will make through a concerted effort to reconstruct the environment so as to bring it into greater harmony

---

1 "I would not insist that the name God must be given. There are those who hold that the associations of the term with the supernatural are so numerous and close that any use of the word 'God' is sure to give rise to misconception and be taken as a concession to traditional ideas." A Common Faith, Op. cit., p. 51.
with his own interests. So far as man can see now this is an endless process. Masses of energy, of which men are among the most highly organized types, are to be brought by man into relationships which will better suit his own purposes. The religious man is one who will be "stirred emotionally by possibilities as yet unrealized;" he is one who "sees the better possibilities in things" as they are determined by reference to the democratic ideal. The universe is an emerging universe, and man's duty is to bring energy fields into greater consonance with his own purposes.

The universe, consisting of objects "experienced-out-not-known," of energy fields, is neither moral nor immoral but rather unmoral. Its forces work both for and against him, as when he is able to harness electrical energy to move mountains and as when a volcano, a flood or an earthquake destroy many lives and the work he has done. A "problem of evil" exists only when man has failed so to increase his influence over energy fields that they work against him rather than in harmony with him. Thus bubonic plague was at one time considered a natural evil; but because of certain discoveries of science and the extensive use of precautions against the spread of rats this terrible disease was stamped out.

Not all men are willing to turn their backs com-

---

1 Ibid., p. 57.
pletely upon the supernatural, as was shown to be the case with eminent scientists. This is especially difficult to do when individuals have established thought and action patterns based upon faith in the willingness and power of a God to intervene in the course of human affairs, but this must be done if one is to become intellectually consistent, just as one must discard the belief that the "higher" values have their locus in a transcendental realm. With just such a God in mind, M. C. Otto writes:

"Can science accept God? ... The answer should not be a matter for debate. It permits of only one answer. The answer is, No. Affirmative answers have often been made to it and still are being made, but they do not stand examination. Bluntly put, God and Science are irreconcilable opposites. ... Whatever may have been or may be the values associated with the belief, the attitude of mind demanded by belief in God is the exact contrary of the scientific attitude. To try to bring Science and God together is like trying to marry two people who refuse to be introduced to each other."

The nature of moral conduct.

Morality is usually considered as loyalty or consistency to some absolute standard or ideal. One usually considers himself moral if he stands loyal to some gen-

erally accepted rule of conduct (such as a commonly held commandment) while resisting the temptation to break it. This is far from the moral attitude as it is conceived by the instrumentalist. For, as opposed to the view that one resolutely turns his back upon natural desires while he inhibits his actions and casts his eyes backward upon the commandment which he believes he should obey unswervingly and implicitly, the instrumentalist takes it off its pedestal, so to speak, and considers it as representative of one possible line of action among many. He examines its content and evaluates the consequences which would probably ensue if he were to maintain it or break it. The evaluation of foreseeable consequences of doing or not doing in a particular manner constitutes the moral act. Dewey says:

"Conduct into which reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for only then does there enter the question of better or worse. ... Morals is at home wherever considerations of the worse and better are involved."

To be moral fundamentally means to deliberate upon possible courses of action which present themselves at a time of conflict of impulses—as when a student debates whether he should study or engage in a little revelry;

or when a voter attempts to decide whether to support
the third term candidate or some other--with the view
to choosing the course of action which will help him to
attain what he holds to be a greater value. Any and
every act of choice made, outside those of pure impulse
or matter-of-fact habit, becomes a moral act.

The evaluation of the consequences of pursuing a
particular course of action requires an objectively
postulated standard for determining what is right and
wrong or good and bad, in the absence of any authori-
tarian or transcendental standard. This standard repre-
sents the greater, or the over-arching value, the attain-
ment of which is sought. This over-arching value or
standard, in our society, is termed democracy which in
part represents as ideals the development of individual
interests (or individual tensions, expressed in one as
an inclination to study music, in another as an inclina-
tion to be an auto mechanic, etc.) through cooperation
with other individuals in such a manner that their in-
terests also are developed. In other words, the over-
arching value is that which will help to promote as ef-
fectively as possible the general welfare. What the gen-
eral welfare is is determined by a study of the nature
of the organism itself, and the way in which it inter-
acts with its environment. This information is obtained
from the sciences. Democracy as a way of life represents
a type of living which best seems to supply the means for
a continuous satisfaction or release, and a continuous building up of tensions, which the field theory reveals as the most important characteristics of protoplasm.

The field theory is not implicative of moral anarchy.

The charge that instrumentalism implies moral anarchy, like the charge that it ends ultimately in solipsism because it implies that all meanings and values are relative to the individual is unsound because it assumes that the individual is a self-supporting entity, existing substantively apart from the environment, in which values are formed and in which they reside. Because individual and social good are identical, and values arise out of concern for the general welfare, a common over-arching ideal or value is reached which represents the supreme value standard of all. This is the value of democratic living, the democratic ideal, which governs all decisions regarding what is right and what is wrong. This is anything but moral anarchy. Any individual who deliberates and forms judgments on the basis of consequences which will promote his own physical and mental welfare easily sees that the common values, such as cleanliness, reflective thinking, honesty, sobriety, are as valid as they ever were. In fact he may come to appreciate their value, and the value of other concepts which promote harmonious living in a clearer light than one who takes
his values entirely on the basis of authority. The best refutation of this charge is an examination of the lives and achievements of pragmatists themselves. Far from being moral degenerates or radicals, they represent a type of integrated personality which is often the admiration of their critics.

The field theory emphasizes the importance of action, function, method rather than the attainment or pursuit of fixed goals.

The last, and perhaps the most important implication of the field theory for the problem of the nature and source of values which will be discussed here is the emphasis which falls upon method, or function, or intelligent behavior. This may be called a corollary of the belief that values are not fixed in nature, nor transcendentally derived. The important thing in life is not the pursuit of an antecedently fixed goal to the extent that it detracts from the significance and pleasures to be derived from immediate living, but the successful satisfaction of needs in the here and now. Life is to be lived for what it is as well as for what it may be. Each experience should pay for itself in immediate returns in the form of a heightened significance of the value of living and satisfying and creating tensions. Life becomes the attempt not to substitute future and supposedly better experiences for those we already have, but to heighten the sense of aesthetic appreciation which is
potentially available in any experience. When we are
cold and thirsty, a cup of good hot coffee will suffice.
When we have some engaging intellectual problem, such as
investigating and evaluating the significance of the fact
that organisms in general struggle to preserve themselves
at all costs, then the acquisition of material, the form-
ulation of hypotheses and the testing of conclusions
about this problem becomes the chief value.

Our concern should be with the immediate future
(remembering that the distant future and the past are
present also), and with that slight fraction of total ac-
tivity which starts from ourselves. As Dewey says, our
concern should be to "ascertain the meaning of present
activities and to secure, so far as possible, a present
activity with a unified meaning." Because the world
changes new conflicts, new tensions are constantly aris-
ing; and the resolution of these conflicts in a way which
will redound to the favor of the organism, will keep
the individual as an organism in a state of integration
with himself and his environment, constitutes the good
life. New relationships require new ways of acting, and
unless the new demands are met by an intelligent appraisal
of what is required to keep activity, interrupted by the
new demands, running smoothly, the result is a greater
maladjustment, greater tensions, than existed before.

p. 206.
The present "cultural lag" is the result of un moral action in that habit, rather than intelligent readjustment to changing needs, dominates the scene at certain crucial points. This condition must be changed if our social structure is to catch up with and keep in step with a continuously advancing technology.

For example, if we are to act morally in the future, instead of neglecting the fact that our natural resources are rapidly diminishing, as many do now, or maintaining unreflectively that all government control over farming is bad, or that preventative medicine is foolishness, we must take these judgments in hand and evaluate their significance in terms of their influence upon the quality of living as it is affected now and will be in the future. We cannot continue to ignore any social or individual problem or to act as though we know its importance, and know how to deal with it on the basis of a set of values already set up. Morality becomes a process of conflict solving; and to the degree that one becomes conscious of the forces and conflicts of which he is a vital part and sets out to solve them with the end in view of restoring normal activity in terms of the larger social demands, to that degree he is moral.
Chapter Five

TRANSCENDENTALISM IN EDUCATION

The classicists are transcendentalists.

The belief that the content of many of our over-
arching values is fixed in nature and lodged in a tran-
scendental realm, and made known by a process either of
intuition or reason, is not confined to the man on the
street. One influential group of educators maintains
at the present time that all significant values are tran-
cendentally derived in spite of the fact that both the
reasoning of such early empiricists as Berkeley and
Hume, and the implications of the field theory for a re-
vised concept of the nature of experience, makes this
position untenable. This group of educators is known as
the "classicists." The leaders of the movement which
it sponsors are President Robert M. Hutchins and Morti-
mer Adler of the University of Chicago, Richard McKeon,
and Stringfellow Barr of St. John's College at Annapolis,
Maryland, where their plan for higher education has been
put into effect.
The position is maintained that the ancient and medieval classical writings—particularly those of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas—contain all the truths, all the wisdom which has been discovered by man; and that the ideal curriculum would be one in which the classics would be carefully studied and the truths extracted and applied to eliminate the intellectual confusion which at present characterizes the social scene. Because education plays such an important role in any widespread, concerted attempt to reconstruct present conditions it will be instructive to examine their program, to see what it implies in the way of a new social order. Since their theories are based on the belief that the over-arching, the really significant and worth while values are fixed in nature and derived from a transcendental source, let us see in a general way what a society built consistently on this belief would be like.

Plato's ideal social order.

While the classicists nowhere state specifically that the ideal social order would be one similar to that envisioned by Plato in the Republic, they give every indication that a social order of this type represents, as it did for Plato, a desirable social ideal. Let us briefly examine the nature of Plato's ideal social order to see

---

1 See, for example, quotation concerning the value of Plato's Republic, p.133.
what it implies for the present-day ideal as it is con-
ceived by the classicists.

Plato enumerated three classes in society: the
philosophical or the ruling class, in which wisdom, or
knowledge of and devotion to the good is the highest
value; the military class, or the defenders of the state,
in which the highest virtue is courage; and the indus-
trial class, or the providers, devoted to trades and
crafts, in which the highest virtue is self-control or
temperance, involving a recognition of the superiority
of the guardians. These classes correspond to the three
faculties of the soul: the guarding or the ruling class
representing the intellect, whose virtue is prudence;
the military class representing the passions, whose vir-
tue is fortitude; and the industrial class representing
the appetitive instincts or impulses, whose virtue is
temperance. Since individuals do not possess these
virtues of the soul in the same degree, through a process
of elimination and education every individual was to be
selected for the class for which he appeared by nature to
be best fitted. Once he became a member of a class his
duty was to acquaint himself with the skills of his par-
ticular occupation; and he was not to try to rise above it.

The few picked members of the ruling class attained
to that status through a process of educational election
rather than by popular vote, thus they would be best
qualified to rule the state wisely. No common man with ulterior motives—such as one of our notorious politicians, like Pendergast or Huey Long—could ever win that high office. Careers were open only to real talent wherever it was found. It was through this method of election on the basis of ability that Plato hoped to keep the state at least partially democratic and to keep tyrants out of the high places. These guardians, once chosen, would have only the necessities and smallest luxuries of life. They would be concerned only with philosophical problems and the dispensation of wisdom to the masses. Their duty would be simply, as the wisest men, to rule over the people and to maintain freedom of opportunity.  

The warriors, or the soldiers, and the industrial classes would live normal lives. They could have all the luxuries and conveniences which the times offered. Plato would, however initiate certain laws regulating marriage and child bearing and the status of women which would affect the home considerably. Women were to be considered on a par with men in their ability to compete for the right to enter a higher class, and no prejudice was to be shown them in choice of occupation because of sex. All children were to be segregated from their parents at the age of ten years in order that the individual's ca-  

1 "The guardians will dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the state, making this their craft and engaging in no work which does not bear up- on this end." Plato, The Republic, Book VII, 395.
capacities would have a fair chance to reveal themselves.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of this class society is its emphasis upon the duty of every man to fulfill the requirements of his station once he had found his place in society. The successful performance of the occupation for which one was by nature best fitted was the purpose of each in life. By knowing his station and performing his duties the individual gave vitality and consistency to the ordered whole, the state as an organism. The individual existed to promote the welfare of the state, and not vice versa; and only the welfare of the whole organism, the state, was to be considered in a last analysis. The individual qua individual had no rights, only duties. Justice, "the doing and having that which is one's own," which is administered by the ruling class in the interest of maintaining freedom, helped each individual to find his rightful place in society. Justice for Plato was not equality, which was a French revolutionary conception, but rather a principle a little nearer to the idea, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

A return to the classics stands as the remedy for present educational and social confusions.

Hutchins, as one of the leading spokesmen for the classicists, writes that our present culture reflects a

------------------------
state of confusion and bewilderment. This confusion he believes, is due in large part to the confusion in education. Education had brought "the love of money, a misconception of democracy, a false notion of progress, a distorted idea of utility," and a resulting "anti-intellectualism." By anti-intellectualism Hutchins has reference to the prevalent philosophy in education in being concerned with the empirical aspects of experience, with the quest for new truth rather than the attainment and utilization of truths already discovered. Hutchins says that it is this very philosophy based upon the belief that truths are those activities and those values which work well in the here and now, which are considered as relative to the individual--here today and gone tomorrow--which has gained a foothold in the schools (through the use of the "experience" curriculum and the application of organismic psychology), which is responsible for the confusion of aims characterizing public education, and particularly higher education, today. Hutchins and his followers lay the blame for much of the present social confusion on a general desertion of the classics and the fixed truths, while Dewey and other pro-

2 T. S. Breed writes, "The acquisitions of the past are regarded by conservatives and liberals alike as stepping stones for the higher constructive ability of intellect, but conformity therewith is spurned by the radical Progressives as dire and dangerous." Education and the New Realism, p. 53.
gressives in education who all start with the instrumentalist position lay the blame partly on their presence in the schools as cultural hangovers.

The way out of our confusion, Hutchins says, is to be found by a return to the classics, which contain all the great truths which have been discovered. In the curriculum of the elementary school there would be an important place for Greek and Latin—presumably to discipline the mind, thus to enable it to be in a better position to apprehend the fixed truths;—and during the junior and senior years of high school and the first two years of college the program would be largely if not completely classical in its curriculum offerings.

"We have excluded body building and character building. We have excluded the social graces and the tricks of trades. We have suggested that the curriculum be composed principally of the permanent studies.... What are the permanent studies? ... They are in the first place those books which have through the centuries attained to the dimensions of classics. Many such books, I am afraid, are in the ancient and medieval period. But even these are contemporary. A classic is a book that is contemporary in every age. That is why it is a classic. The conversations of Socrates raise questions that are as urgent today as they were when Plato wrote. In fact they are more so, because the society in which Plato

---

1 In an address at St. Mary's of the Springs College at Columbus, Ohio, on December 2, 1940, Mortimer Adler declared, "I am in favor of placing Greek in the curriculum for study at the age of six."
lived did not need to have them raised as much as we do. We have forgotten how important they are."

To illustrate how a study of the classics would be of use to a student of high school or junior college age Hutchins writes:

"You will observe that the great books of the western world cover every department of knowledge. The Republic of Plato is basic to an understanding of the law; it is equally important as education for what is known as citizenship. The Physics of Aristotle, which deals with change and motion in nature, is fundamental to the natural sciences and medicine, and is equally important to all those who confront change and motion in nature, that is, to everybody. Four years spent partly in reading, discussing, and digesting books of such importance would, therefore, contribute equally to preparation for specialized study and to general education of a terminal value. Certainly four years is none too long for this experience. It is an experience which will ... serve as preparation for advanced study and as general education designed to help the student understand the world. It will also develop habits of reading and standards of taste and criticism that will enable the adult, after his formal education is over, to think and act intelligently about the thought and movements of contemporary life. It will help him to share in the intellectual activity of his time."

In other words, the four year course would give the student "a solid knowledge of the foundations of the

---

1 Hutchins, R.M., op. cit., p. 76.
2 Ibid., p. 81.
intellectual disciplines." 1 This four years would be followed at the option of the student by an advanced course in one of the three professions of metaphysics, social science, and natural science. The object of these courses is mental training. 2 Undoubtedly the flower of the faculties in metaphysics would serve as the advisers and rulers of the people, for, having the best trained minds, they would have the greatest insight into knowledge of the truth.

Like Dewey, Bode, and other instrumentalists, Hutchins recognizes the need now for an over-arching principle, or value standard, to which we can refer consistently. Our lack of such a standard, consistently held, in education and out, is the cause of our confusion. While Dewey would construct that standard out of ordinary experience, Hutchins believes it is to be found in a study of metaphysics, which is to say, a study of the transcendental realm which is only a dangerous imaginative figment to the modern physicist. Hutchins writes:

1 For example: "Grammar disciplines the mind and develops the logical faculty. It is good in itself and as an end to reading the classics." Ibid., p. 32.
2 "The object of higher education is the training of the mind. Or, to put it another way, the object of the college is the production of intelligent citizens." Hutchins, R.M., No Friendly Voice. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. 20.
3 Etymologically metaphysics means beyond physics (meta=beyond). The study of the mind and its contents was originally beyond the subject matter of physics, which dealt only with physical phenomena; i.e., the indestructible atom existing in absolute space and time.
"The chief characteristic of our higher learning is disorder ... because there is no ordering principle in it. Certainly the principle of freedom in the current sense of that word will not unify it. In the current sense it is an end in itself. But it must be clear that if each person has the right to make and achieve his own choices the result is anarchy and the dissolution of the whole."

"The aim of higher education is wisdom. Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes. Therefore metaphysics is the highest wisdom. ... Metaphysics as the highest science, ordered the thought of the Greek world as theology ordered that of the Middle Ages. One or the other must be called upon to order the thought of modern times. If we cannot appeal to theology we must turn to metaphysics. Both are almost totally missing today. And with them has gone any intelligible basis for the study of man in his relations with other men. The truths of ethics, for example, are now merely common-sense techniques about how to get along in the world. Morals degenerate into mores unless they have a higher meaning imparted to them by theology or metaphysics."

Besides revealing to the reader the nature and source of the value standard which Hutchins would have all educators adopt, the above quotations reveal several concepts which Hutchins holds, such as his concept of causation, his concept of the individual as being susceptible to moral anarchy, his belief in the necessity and existence of objective, fixed principles, etc.; all

2 Ibid., pp. 93-99.
of which indicate that he is still thinking in terms of the dualisms generated by animistic beliefs and confirmed by Newtonian physics, rather than in terms of the field theory.

Hutchins minimizes the importance of vocational education.

The way out of present disorder and confusion in the social scene as well as in the field of education is not to be found by an increased emphasis on vocational education, such as progressive educators are inclined to recommend. Hutchins deplors the present trend toward vocational education ("The study of man has sunk under waves of empiricism and rationalism"), although it is to be understood that vocational education, and other more earthly pursuits of man, have their place as activities of less importance in the hierarchy of truths. One might well ask of Hutchins what their "place" is, just how important they are, since he gives us no standard by which to judge their relative importance to what appears to be the higher value in the hierarchy of worthwhile activities, the contemplation of absolute truth, and, no doubt, other Platonic essences. Regarding the place of vocational education in his ideal plan Hutchins writes:

---------------------------------------
1 See, for example, the publication by the Educational Policies Commission, *Education and Economic Well-Being in American Democracy*. Washington, D.C., 1940.
"The common aim of all parts of a university may and should be the pursuit of truth for its own sake. But this common aim is not sufficiently precise to hold the university together while it is moving toward it. Real unity can be achieved only by a hierarchy of truths which show us which are fundamental and which significant, which subsidiary and which not."

"I yield to no one in my admiration for and belief in the accumulation of data, the collection of facts, and the advance of the empirical sciences. These taken together constitute one of the grand activities of modern times. It must be continued and encouraged. I wish merely to point out that this activity must be conducted in such a way as not to confuse or prevent that intellectual training and development which in my view are education. ... I know, of course, that thinking cannot proceed divorced from the facts and from experience. All questions of organization and management, however, are questions of emphasis. By emphasizing the intellectual content of education I do not mean to minimize the importance of the collection of data. I do mean to put it in its proper place. That place is, in any intelligent scheme of higher education, a subordinate one."

Mortimer Adler's recommendations in regard to the classics.

Mortimer Adler, the well-known classicist, expresses with Hutchins a deep concern for the apprehension and application of truths and values discovered by the Greeks. He also believes that the amelioration of present social

1 Ibid., p. 95.
2 Ibid., pp. 39-90.
confusion can be achieved by a return to the wisdom found in the classics. Adler writes:

"The modern mind recoils from the notion that principles which can analyze a contemporary problem may have been discovered before its circumstances arose. Yet everything that can be said clearly about motion pictures was said and well said long before motion pictures existed or were discussed. Nothing has been added in contemporary discussion—except scientific research which, of course, adds nothing in the way of ideas or principles—and much has been lost in the way of insight, clarity, and order.

"The classics contain the tradition of European wisdom on this problem (of the arts in society), as on every other. The classics are always contemporary because the wisdom they contain is traditional. One way of showing this is to use the classics as if they were a discussion of contemporary problems. In comparison with literature which is contemporary only in the sense of being current, the classics give those who will use them a perspective on present affairs, as well as a richness, simplicity and subtlety not found in thinking that is merely ad hoc. In the intellectual sphere, modernism is provincialism. The classics are a remedy for the besetting ill of our times. But unfortunately, those who have this ill-founded pride in the sufficiency of their own times, have it precisely because they dislike the only medicine which can cure them.

"In this, as in almost every other basic philosophical question, practical or speculative, Plato and Aristotle are the primary sources for its dialectical examination. With a few exceptions, the rest is commentary."

1 Adler, Mortimer. Art and Prudence. New York, Longmans,
F.S. Breed's concept of the nature of truth and the function of the school.

Frederick S. Breed, another educator at the University of Chicago with pronounced inclinations toward classicism, has made the following statements regarding the nature of truth and the school's function in regard to its discovery and dissemination:

"Ideas are true when they work, but when they work they do so because they conform to a definite order of things beyond them. Ideas thus become a priceless source of guidance, a means of adjustment or adaptation, in agreement with the biological conception of the relation between organism and environment. Education, then, is not a process of reconstructing the universe, but a process of teaching humans how to make their way in it. It is guidance through discovery."

1

"We shall not contend that either the values of truth or those of morality are determined "apart from human action." What we do contend is that the first step in the discovery of truth is a human action, a belief, the validation of which depends upon concurrence with reality. As suggested before, man proposes but nature disposes."

2

"The proposal to confine the school to the discovery and dissemination of truth, to give it both a conservative and a progressive function, and to make of the teacher a specialist in the values of our social inheritance rather than a leader of questionable social reforms, will be

Green and Co., 1937, viii-ix.
regarded by many educational progressives as renouncing a magnificent opportunity. The opportunity, nevertheless, had best be renounced."

1

Summary of the classicist position.

Sufficient evidence has probably been given to indicate the general position of the classicists in regard to their conception of the nature and source of values. From the direct and indirect references to Plato, and on the basis of generalizations easily formed as to the implications of such a philosophy for a social theory, we can easily see how the ideal social structure would be similar to that envisioned by Plato in the Republic. Consider the following passages especially: "The Republic of Plato is basic to an understanding of the law ... and equally important as education for what is known as citizenship" (p.133); "The Physics of Aristotle is fundamental to the natural sciences and medicine" (p.133); "Grammar disciplines the mind and develops the logical faculty" (p.134); "If each person has the right to make his own choices the result is anarchy and dissolution of the whole" (p.135); "Metaphysics is the highest wisdom" (p.135); "The truths of ethics are now merely common sense techniques about how to get along in the world" (as though all truths are not just that). "Morals degenerate

2 Ibid., p.96.
1 Ibid., pp.186-87.
into mores unless they have a higher meaning imparted by theology or metaphysics" (p.135); "The common aim ... should be the pursuit of truth for its own sake" (p.137); "The collection of data in a scheme of higher education is a subordinate (function)" (p.137); "In the intellectual sphere, modernism is provincialism" (p.138); "In almost every basic philosophical question ... Plato and Aristotle are the primary sources for its dialectical examination." (p.139); etc.

A resort to metaphysics for the over-arching values is not the way to resolve present confusions.

What is the instrumentalist's impression of the classicist position? The instrumentalist believes that the classicists are right in maintaining that the present social and educational scene is one of confusion and conflicts. Because of an unrecognized conflict of their value standards many people are like the horseman who rode off in all directions at once, in that their loyalties and activities tend to cancel one another out. They are right in stating that an appeal to a consistently held value standard will take us out of much of this confusion. Are they right, however, in maintaining that the value standard to be appealed to is to be found through a study of metaphysics? The futility of making such an appeal has probably been adequately illustrated. The interpretation of modern science presented in this
dissertation makes a resort to transcendentally derived truths, ideals, and values meaningless. Any attempt to escape the world of ordinary experience is doomed to failure before it starts.

The truths and values which the Greeks held, which are contained in the classics, and which the classicists would appeal to as guides for conduct at the present time are, like the transcendental world in which Plato said they have their locus, only hypostatizations--truths and values which originally arose out of ordinary experience and were projected by definition into another world where they remain fixed and absolute. Even if we grant that they have a high degree of validity in any culture, that does not mean that they can be depended upon to be valid as furnishing an intelligent basis for conduct in any particular instance. Let us take the Platonic conception of the nature of justice, for example, and determine whether or not it could be accepted as part of our over-arching value standard at the present time.

Plato defined justice as "the doing and having that which is one's own." Why did he define justice in this way rather than by saying, for example, that it is the interest of the stronger, or the weaker, or the right of every individual to develop himself as he sees fit? Plato lived in a stratified social structure, in which he was one of the elite. The principal classes were the slaves, the industrial classes, the soldiers, and the
noblemen. As a member of the upper class he had learned to disdain the material world. Dealings with the physical world were the occupations of the lower classes. The gentility cultivated the mind. He analyzed the human soul into three faculties, which we may say expressed themselves as impulses: the intellectual, the passionate or the aggressive and warlike, and the appetitive, or the lower impulses which serve only to sustain life. The state, as a concept as real as any individual who could be touched and seen, was also an organism, whose components or faculties consisted of the social classes. The individual possessed worth only as a member contributing to the welfare of the state. Since every individual varied in that the strength of one of the three faculties was dominant, it was the function of justice to see that those dominant impulses were given the right of way, in order that he might express most effectively that faculty of the state. By seeing that every individual found his class and learned his duties the state would function most harmoniously and effectively. Once an individual found his place in society by being eliminated in the educational competition to enter the philosopher class, he was to remain there and find his happiness in making his contribution to the good of the whole as effectively as he could.

This conception of justice would not be applicable
today even as an ideal for several reasons. In the first place modern science demands an altogether different interpretation of the nature of the individual. One's intelligence is not a fixed quantity, as Plato conceived it to be; hence individuals could not slip into the few pre-established categories he set up and be willing to stay there once and for all. All individuals do not mature in their abilities at the same rate, hence any group educational test would not guarantee that every individual could be appointed to the position for which he is best fitted. Secondly, the Platonic conception of a world otherwise static does not fit the facts. As the fields which constitute the environment change new adaptations are needed, so that the class structure itself would have to change. A change in the class structure is just what has happened since Plato's time. Thirdly, individual needs do not remain fixed; no individual is satisfied to be a carpenter or a hod carrier, or a soldier all of the time, and the individual would resent not being able to do at least amateur philosophizing. If this went far enough, as it probably would, he would resent being told what to do and would organize with others of his kind to usurp the power of intellectuals. The hierarchical social order of the Middle Ages, which bore a great resemblance to the social ideal which Plato describes, was broken up just because the lower classes eventually began to think for themselves; and having
greater economic power, gradually limited the power of the rulers, as in England.

Because nature is not as Plato conceived it to be, his conception of justice could not possibly work over an extended period of time. Nazism has been rightly pointed out as bearing many striking resemblances to the Platonic conception of the ideal social order; but because it is based fundamentally on a belief in the supremacy of the state and the limited, fixed, innate rights of the individual, and because the goal is viewed as a society static in nature, the movement as it stands now is ultimately doomed to failure.

*The progressive educator cannot accept with the classicists, hypothesized values.*

The progressive educator has no quarrel with the teaching of the classics, provided they are taught in a specified way, and taught only to those who by interest and insight are adapted to profit by a study of them. Nor would he take issue with the classicist over the statement that the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and other classical literature, contain many truths and much wisdom which arose out of cultural conflicts similar to our own, and which can be applied as possible solutions to our own conflicts. But when the classicist asserts that the truths revealed by the classics are to be studied for their own sake, and applied to the solution of pres-
ent-day conflicts or problems without first subjecting them to the scrutiny of intelligence to ascertain their usefulness in terms of consequences which will promote better living, as better living is defined by the sciences—he and the instrumentalist have reached the parting of the ways. This is, however, just what the classicist would have us do.

In other words, we have in the philosophy of Adler and Hutchins, a perfect example of that hypostatization which is most dangerous—the substitution of fixed ethical and legal codes, past thinking, for the use of intelligence itself. Hutchins and Adler would have us accept the values and truths arrived at empirically by the Greeks and hypostatized by Socrates and Plato and Aristotle into something objective and eternal, to which all future events in space and time were bound to conform. Hutchins's disdain for the ability of the sciences or the use of scientific method to contribute anything toward the attainment of a good education is another indication of his belief in the self-sufficiency of the past, and its ability to furnish the keys to the solution of present social problems.

The objectives of education as formulated by the classicists are unacceptable to the progressive educator.

If the progressive educator agreed with the classicists on the objective of education, on the definition
of wisdom, he could afford to be more sympathetic with the latter's educational philosophy. Wisdom, or the highest good, seems to consist, for Hutchins and Adler, in disciplining the mind—presumably to the mystical attainment of the fixed Platonic essences. As it was for Plato and Aristotle, so it seems also for Hutchins and Adler that the greatest happiness is attained in the rigid control of the natural impulses and in pure activity of speculative reason. The highest good is the contemplative grasp of truth. The satisfaction for its own sake of all the natural impulses in all their variety is not for the classicist. "Push-pin, peanuts, poetry and Platonic love" are not all on the same qualitative level but have an intrinsic unworthiness or worthiness of their own. Like the conscientious Christian, he eschews as much as possible the activities and values which have their locus and end in this world of flesh and blood and material entities.

It is difficult to see how any educator familiar with the recent trends in psychology—particularly organismic psychology, which is more or less tied in directly with field physics—can speak, as Hutchins and Adler do,

1 Hutchins writes, "The supreme function of the state is to promote in every possible way the moral, intellectual, and spiritual development of the people, for it is in this that the highest good consists." Vital Speeches, 5:536-9, July 15, 1939. Unless these terms are better defined the writer believes them to be meaningless.
of the necessity for or the desirability of training and disciplining the mind. Mind is evidently thought of here as substantive, as it was conceived by Plato; and the belief in the ability to train the mind is a product of faculty psychology, first articulated by John Locke and popular with educators until psychology became a science in its own right approximately half a century ago.

Wisdom, conceived as the outcome of mental discipline rather than the ability to function, to adapt future situations to one's own objectives and to adjust to present ones, is the natural result of concern for essences fixed in a transcendent realm. Wisdom as consisting in the contemplation of the good, the beautiful and the true in the abstract through a well-trained mind as well as the attainment of facts for their own sake, is traditionally synonymous with our idea of culture, or the living of the higher life. As such it is the ideal of the man on the street today. The parent still usually considers the mastery of objective facts in whatever form by his child—for example, that Caesar was killed in 44 B.C.—as in itself educative. The modern quiz programs, the common belief that one must read many books to be well informed, bear out this assertion. Wisdom is considered anything but the ability to solve conflicts successfully, to maintain an integrated personality, to adapt and to readapt to one's changing environment.
The profitable study of the classics requires an orientation and genuine interest.

The classics can be profitably taught, according to the progressive educator, if they are taught with a specific value standard in mind and at the right time in the intellectual development of the pupils. The correct orientation to the classics, as conceived by the writer, is one in which the ideas which they contain are viewed as hypotheses, as tentative solutions to conflicts in the culture in which they arose. Hutchins and Adler do not suggest any particular orientation. In the study of the classics they are studying their value standard itself. A naturalistic, empirical interpretation of the classics is to be given, and we are not to approach them as though they wore halos and are sacrosanct. Unless an orientation is made, all ideas expressed are on the same level of mediocrity in respect to their ability to help us solve present problems. Unless the reader supplements his study of a classic with a study of the environmental conditions and the culture in which it arose he has no way of distinguishing the helpful from the unhelpful, the insights valuable now from the insights valuable to a decadent or foreign culture. The mistakes of Greek and medieval social political and ethical theory are transmitted along with the insights which may be valuable in understanding and resolving conflicts in the present-day social scene. For one thing, to teach the classics without first adopt-
ing a frame of reference or value standard with which to evaluate the insights which they contain, as Hutchins and Adler would have us do, would be to accept the belief in a closed, a fixed universe, as well as the conflicts in ethical, social and political theory which exist in the writings of Plato and Aristotle and their successors. Having accepted the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, disregarding the question of interpretation and inconsistencies, we are obligated to accept the implications of our position. One implication of having accepted such a philosophy would be that we should look upon the ideal society as a class society, static in its nature, where every man should know his station and perform his duties. No premium would be placed upon the development of the potentialities of every individual except the intellectual, and then only the docile, the contemplative; no particular effort would be made to raise the intelligence or the quality of the experiences of the man on the street. Ethical, social, and political equality, even as ideals, would be fallacious concepts.

Much insight into the nature and possible solutions of present-day cultural conflicts is to be gleaned from a study of the classics when the material is read and evaluated with reference to some antecedently arrived at standard of value, so that the reader can recognize the mistakes as well as the valid insights contained therein,
and see them in relation to the conflicts in which they arose and in relation to present-day similar social conflicts. Few readers are prepared to deal with the classics in this manner. In recommending them as the constituents of a large part of general education, Hutchins and Adler would have adolescents approach them, as well as essential tool subjects not only without a suitable orientation, but also without even an interest in them. Their disciplinary value is so great as to over-ride the requirement of interest. Unlike the classicist, the progressive educator makes the possession of interest a desideratum for a study of the classics; for, recognizing the fact that the value of such a study does not lie in the absorption of values inherent in the subject matter, but in what it will do to help in the integration of his personality and in adjusting himself to and reconstructing his environment, he sees the value of interest which operates in helping the student to deal sympathetically with the material at hand. Unless the student is interested in the classics, and willing to study them, and possessed of the background necessary to understand them in their historical setting, they can be of negative value to him, just as much of the subject matter of traditional education has missed its mark and alienated rather than won students to the cause of higher education.

Not all, in fact, very few adolescents are by temperament and background and environment able to profit by
a prolonged and detailed study of the classics. For most people a functional knowledge of the world in which they live is best obtained by a first-hand study of themselves and their environment, and can not ordinarily be made by a historical approach through a study of our cultural antecedents, followed by a study of our own. The profitable study of the classics is reserved for students who have an interest in that particular field, who have a consistent, consciously held frame of reference by which to evaluate what they read, who have the historical perspective and the historical background necessary to understand how the classics originated, why they are classics, and how and when insights contained in them can be applied to the solution of contemporary problems. Consequently they can best be studied by persons with a fair degree of intellectual maturity.

The classics should be read and evaluated in terms of our present social aims and modern scientific knowledge.

It is through the process of evaluating or weighing the truths, values and ideals found in the classics in terms of their ability to function as guides for conduct at the present time—in terms of helping to actualize democratic ideals such as individual development through

---

1 The Ohio Teachers Bulletin, No. 2 recommends that education should begin with a study of the immediate experiences of the learner; and as he matures, the study of adjacent cultural groups, and finally those more distant in space and time, should be undertaken.
cooperative living—that we escape the absolutistic position taken by the classicists. First, we must be able to give content or definite meaning to the Platonic essences which have no content in themselves. For example, patriotism, truth, beauty, justice. If we accept as the definition for justice "the doing and having that which is one's own" we must determine what this means in terms of our present social ideal. For example, is it just to collectivize agriculture, to restrict a farmer against his will as to the number of acres he may put into corn? If freedom means rugged individualism, such an imposition is unjust. If freedom means ability to flourish under a system designed to promote the welfare of all, collectivization in this sense is justified. Secondly, we should be able to evaluate the truths formulated by the ancient writers in the light of the findings of modern science. For example, unless we ask ourselves if it is true that "mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men" we accept this reasoning and its implications, which are anything but democratic. Unless we examine and re-examine our goals, unless we subject our ideals and values to intellectual scrutiny, we fail in our function as rational beings. We permit the few men with minds to do our thinking for us, and we fail to use the method of personal scientific investigation which has made it possible to escape the frame of reference and the universe of discourse by which the Greek thinkers were bound. We
commit ourselves to a class society in which only a comparative few are free to develop their potentialities.

**Vocational education is not to be disparaged.**

We have seen that vocational education plays a minor role in Hutchin's educational theory. It should be remembered that this theory has not been put into practice on any widespread scale; and if it could be, the failure of the average person to profit by a general education consisting of large undiluted doses of the classics would, no doubt, soon become apparent. This would be cause to shunt him into a vocational or trade school in which "body building and the tricks of trades" would constitute the curriculum. No attempt would be made by the classicist to discover latent gifts in the average child, if the theory were rigidly carried out, because the child as a personality is comparatively unimportant. The progressive educator, however, beginning with the pupil and considering his development as a unique personality as the primary aim rather than the mastery of the "permanent studies" by an intellectual automaton, would go out of his way to discover a penchant for any particular occupational or intellectual pursuit; and by nourishing it, help the child to rise above the confines of his environment and the traditional and conflicting thought and action patterns which have narrowed the quality and scope of his appreciations.
Vocational education is not placed low in the scale of educational values by the progressive educator, as appears to be the case with the classicist. Rather, any occupation represents a starting point from which an individual can work to reconstruct society. Bricklaying theoretically bears as many potentialities for intellectual development and aesthetic appreciation as teaching. This the classicist does, no doubt, deny. It is difficult to see how truth for its own sake can be pursued so successfully by a bricklayer as by one who can devote his entire time to a study of the classics, in which it is claimed to be plainly revealed.

The classicists nowhere face the instrumentalists' criticisms of their basic assumptions.

What do the classicists have to say by way of criticism of the empiricists' challenge to their position and the naturalistic interpretations which they give to their transcendentally derived truths and values? Hutchins and Adler have very little to say. A search of periodical literature and of the books published by these men reveals little or no direct discussion of the criticisms which have been directed at their position by progressive educators. They appear to have made some broad generalizations regarding the weaknesses of progressive education and they have presented in its outlines an educational theory based upon the classics which the progressives
have filled in by developing the logical implications. Neither Hutchins nor Adler is able to cope easily and clearly with the philosophical problems upon which their theories rest, and their criticisms of progressive education consist of egregious errors of interpretation or exaggerations of weaknesses (such as over-emphasis on pupil freedom and concern for the pursuit of every passing interest) which administrators have now corrected or are correcting. In regard to Adler's impartial

---

A simple definition of realism, for example—one which the average man grasps with some degree of accuracy—is that it is a belief in the existence of independent reals, reals fixed in nature. Adler describes realism in the following manner: "The basic principle of realism in the theory of knowledge is that sensations and ideas are not that which we know primarily, but that by which we know what we know of that which we know. They constitute both the instrumentalities of knowledge and its content, but not its objects. Ideas are objects only secondarily in reflexive knowledge. We can understand that we understand, or in other words we can understand the primary object of knowledge, the thing, as something understood, the idea. As the instrumentalities of knowledge, ideas, refer the mind intentionally to that which it knows—the order of existing things. To identify the id quo and the id quod of knowledge is to identify the objects of knowledge with its content. This is the root of all subjective idealisms. ... The critical point can be expressed in another way in terms of the distinction between secundum quae and quoad nos. The thing as known is quoad nos. But knowledge is a proportion between intellect and thing, and the thing which measures the adequacy of the intellect in knowing is the thing secundum se. If the instrumentality of the idea as the medium of knowledge is ignored, no difference is possible between the thing as it is, secundum se, and the thing as it is known, quoad nos; and it is impossible to distinguish truth and falsity." Etc. Adler, Mortimer, What Man Has Made of Man. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, pp. 173-174.
and competent criticism of the empiricist position and
the soundness of his own, Sidney Hook writes:

"It is a strange but eloquent fact
that Adler ... has nowhere attempted to
come to grips with the thought of criti-
cal empirical philosophers. He has only
marginal comments to make on outstanding
empirical philosophers who have long
abandoned the Aristotelianism he has so
recently embraced, dragged its hidden
assumptions into the light, and submitted
them to devastating critiques. ...
There is a whole cluster of assumptions
that are coolly begged in the face of a
small library of critical literature which
deals with them: for example, that there
are self-evident, axiomatic truths of
reason and immediate, absolutely known
truths of perception; that a science
whose conclusions are not entailed by these
first truths can only give pseudo-knowl-
edge or opinion; that statements which
cannot possibly be tested by experience
(for example, on Transcendental, God,
substance, etc.) are significant; that
adequate premises for a rational study
of nature must express the essential
natures of things. According to Adler
man is essentially a rational animal.
According to modern science neither man
nor anything else is essentially this
or that. ... Adler's "essential" prem-
eses, forms, insights, are disguised def-
initions. ... The history of experimental
science is to a large extent the history
of its struggle to liberate itself from
the Aristotelian conception of fixed es-
sential kinds and natures."

1

The classicists should meet the criticisms of the in-
strumentalists.

We may say that Hutchins and Adler, as outstanding

1 Hook, Sidney, "Baptism of Aristotle and Marx." Loc.
cit., pp. 415-16.
classiciests, have constructed a theory of education upon a philosophical foundation which they appear to be either unprepared or incompetent to defend. Nor do they take sufficient account of the implications of modern science for educational theory, which is presented in that small library of critical literature which Hook mentions. They are entitled to construct a theory of values and to build an educational philosophy based upon it which differs from the theory expounded in this dissertation; but as Hook implies, they should first be able to meet the criticisms of their theory which their opponents, the instrumentalists and progressive educators, present. The instrumentalist constructs his own theory on the basis of the facts that realism, the philosophy underlying classicist educational theory, can be explained naturally; and that instrumentalism receives more support from scientific data than does realism.

Recapitulation.

The issue as originally stated was: do all of the values which men hold arise out of ordinary experience, or are some of them, at least, fixed in nature, inherent in the structure of the universe? We have seen that the average man believes that values are of two kinds: the common or the "lower" values which admittedly arise out of ordinary experience and expedite the process of living, and the "higher" values, which demand inchallenged
obedience by men, and are not to be tampered with. These values, clustering as they do mainly around two standards, the civic standard and the transcendental standard, conflict. The result is mainly a loss in our ability to achieve a greater measure of general welfare in the here and now which would be possible if all the thought and energies of men were devoted to the end of clarification and actualization of the civic standard, which may be called democracy.

The transcendental standard, and the common belief that some values are intrinsically different in their status and locus from others and demand uncritical allegiance in the process of living, has been shown to have a history that antedates the earliest written history. It originated in animism, was reinforced by mythology, became by definition real in its own right in the hands of Plato, and was further strengthened during the period of the Renaissance by scholasticism and later by the concept of substance as formulated by René Descartes, whose dualistic philosophy reflects the sharpened bifurcation between mind and matter created by early modern science.

The early modern scientists were successful in their fields of investigation because they practiced a unique method of inquiry. It was what we recognize today as a "common sense" investigation of natural phenomena. The scientific attitude spread to broader fields, to ethics and politics, with the result that the almost universal
belief and faith in the real existence of transcendental values which existed in Europe during the Middle Ages began to be less dogmatically accepted, until finally it was by some practically denied altogether. We see this gradual development in the ethical theories of Hobbes, Butler, Hume, Bentham, and J.S. Mill. Because of the absence of an objective standard, and their failure to construct a standard for the determination of values, the developing theory of these ethical writers culminated in hedonism and utilitarianism. The transcendentalist position, outside its unchallenged supremacy by the church, reached its most extreme form in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, in which a value signifying a course of action, once determined, is to be carried out without reference to consequences.

Some modern scientists have developed the relativity theory and the field concept, which lend their support to the validity of the belief that all values stem from ordinary experience. If the implications of the field theory for a revised interpretation of the nature of the self, the environment, mind, consciousness, truth, experience are accepted, it becomes impossible to hold consistently to a view of a bifurcated experience, with values qualitatively divided between the two into the lower and the higher, the changing and the unchanging, the invented and the discovered.

The classicalists recognize the fact that social
confusion exists in education and at the present time, and they are in agreement with the instrumentalists and the progressive educators on the belief that it is due to failure to adhere to a single over-arching standard for determining values. They would eliminate these confusions or conflicts by turning their backs, so to speak, upon the values which stem from ordinary experience and by concentrating upon the fixed truths and values as they are stated in the classics. They apparently take no account of the implications of modern science for their theory and they fail to face the criticisms which are made against their point of view by the instrumentalists.

In we start with the assumption (as we have) that the goal or standard is the development of the whole individual, rather than the development of the mind, and the pursuit of truth for its own sake; that the nature of that goal is to be formulated on the basis of a scientific study of the nature of human nature, and not upon the classics, we cannot help but conclude that the classi-
cists are on the wrong track.

The nature of this goal, which the instrumentalist and progressive educator holds, and the means of attain-
ing it in the schools will now be discussed more fully.
Chapter Six

DEMOCRACY AS THE OVER-ARCHING VALUE STANDARD

The nature of "democracy."

We have seen that the average person is confused in his conception of the nature and source of values. He believes that some values are fixed in nature, or that they come from a world outside man and are known through intuition or subtle reasoning, while he believes that other values and standards which he holds are as man-made as traffic lights or sewing machines. It has been pointed out that these values and value standards conflict. We have observed that the belief that values are fixed in nature, or that they have their locus in a world apart from man, is untenable in education and out if we accept the implications of modern science for a revised conception of the nature and structure of the universe. The sciences reveal the facts that nature is anything but fixed; that its pattern of future development is not already cut. It makes meaningless any attempt to resort
to a world apart from man for guidance. The time is now right to clarify the instrumentalist's own standard which has been mentioned from time to time—the standard of democracy—and to make it more meaningful, particularly as it applies to the teacher. It will be interesting and helpful to examine into the function of education in view of its acceptance as our over-arching ideal and value standard. The reader can then compare this standard with the standard of the classicists, and its implications for enriching human living. He can decide for himself whether the view presented in this paper is worthy of his support.

The over-arching standard which the writer proposes is grounded in concrete experiences and has its ends in the here and now. Democracy as a standard is not something new, but it has been held in common with other ideals, in more or less articulated form, ever since men began to live together in social groups. It can be easily traced as far back as the Greeks. But when we attempt to trace the history of democracy perhaps the most outstanding thing which we notice is that the standard has not always represented the values which modern writers conceive it now to represent. Greek democracy as political democracy was very well developed; but because the ends democracy was supposed to serve were so far from those which many modern writers believe democ-
racy should represent, there is a sense in which the Greeks were not democratic at all. The Greeks believed in limiting their democracy to freemen. The slaves, for example (there were 250,000 of them at one time, out of a total Athenian population of 400,000), were without the pale. In other words, they lacked the respect for each and every individual which is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a modern conception of democracy. We fought the Civil War to establish it.

Modern democracy, furthermore, has its roots in attitudes which lie deeper than the desire to establish mere political equality. The writer will now attempt briefly to trace the history of democracy as it expresses itself in attitudes which exemplify the concept today, by tracing the development of what may perhaps be called its main facet: the concept of liberty.

The relation of the concept of liberty to democracy.

Our modern concept of democracy is traditionally tied up with the concept of liberty, popularly conceived as the right to do as one chooses. This concept can be traced back to ancient times, where it was first conceived in its moral aspects as freedom of choice. The importance placed by the Greeks upon freedom of choice as

representing the free play of intelligence is well ex-
pressed in the funeral oration of Pericles. This con-
cept of freedom was further developed, defined, and giv-
en concrete expression in the law by the Romans as it be-
came necessary to control men's desires and arbitrary
actions to better promote the cause of successful co-
operative living within the Empire. Dewey writes:

"As civilization matured, definite civil agencies were instituted for 'try-
ing' men for modes of conduct so that if found guilty they might be punished. ... The fact of punishment called attention, as men became more inquiring, to the grounds of liability. Unless men were responsible for their acts, it was unjust to punish them, and if they could not help doing what they did, what was the justice in holding them responsible for their acts, and blaming and punishing them? Thus a certain philosophy of the nature of choice as freedom developed as an apologia for an essentially legal interest: liability to punishment. The outcome was the doctrine known as free-
dom of the will: the notion that a power called will lies back of choice as its author, and is the ground of liability and the essence of freedom. This will has the power of indifferent choice; that is, it is equally free to choose one way or another unmoved by any desire or impulse, just because of a causal force residing in will itself. So es-
tablished did this way of reviewing choice become, that it is still commonly sup-
posed that choice and the arbitrary free-
dom of will are one and the same thing."

2 Ibid., p.272.
Freedom as the power to act, to carry out choices as the "natural" right of each individual was first clearly articulated by Locke, the intellectual exponent of the Revolution of 1688. Since individuals are born free and equal, and governments are instituted to protect their natural rights, Locke said, governments lose claim to obedience when they invade and destroy those rights instead of exercising its proper function of safeguarding them. This conception of government well served the aims of our forefathers in their revolt against British rule, and it found an extended application in the French Revolution of 1789. The belief that government was subservient to the natural rights of the individual expressed the early American philosophy of freedom and individualism, which many still hold.

Locke's concept of freedom, one observes, was essentially political, while beginning with Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham the concept of freedom became closely tied up with economic freedom—a view which, combined with Locke's conception of the function of government, remains as the essence of freedom for many today.

It has become increasingly more evident that the latter concept of freedom, espoused particularly by present-day "rugged individualists," has produced widespread disparity and inequality rather than parity and equality

1 Ibid., p.
in the *economic* sphere, as well as in all other spheres of human endeavor. A philosophy of apologetics has arisen about this position in which it is said by some, usually the economically well-to-do, that individuals are not born free and equal, and that unequal economic status is an illustration of the truth of this fact. They extol the virtues of initiative, independence, choice and responsibility in the *economic* sphere while they fail to praise their use in connection with the acquisition of the *cultural* resources of civilization, in such areas as education, science, and art. It matters not to them whether such virtues are practiced by the common man in these areas, and the result is that the common man continues in the servility and regimentation which has always been his lot. Dewey writes:

"I am one who believes that we need more, not fewer 'rugged individuals,' and it is in the name of rugged individualism that I challenge the argument. Instead of independence, there exists parasitical dependence on a wide scale—witness the present need for the exercise of charity, private and public, on a vast scale. The current argument against the public dole on the ground that it pauperizes and demoralizes those who receive it has an ironical sound when it comes from those who would leave intact the conditions that cause the necessity for recourse to the method of support of millions at public expense. Servility and regimentation are the result of control by the few of access to means of productive labor on

---

p. 9 et seq.
the part of the many."

Not only the rich man, but the man on the street now holds a concept of freedom or democracy which has been here described as the combination of two basic attitudes: freedom meaning to _think_ as one pleases, which was developed by the Greeks and curtailed by the Romans out of the necessity for securing cooperation, and which gave rise to the concept of the freedom of the will; and freedom to _act_ as one pleases, which grew out of the philosophical principles formulated by John Locke. Democracy, as a compartmentalized political belief, also now denotes the right to vote. Such a conception of democracy holds that the function of government is limited as much as possible to police powers, and does not include the right to regulate the lives of individuals with the aim of acting as a positive agent for the promulgation of any social philosophy.

A different conception of the function of government and the nature of liberty, or democracy, has arisen during the past few decades which conflicts with the conceptions which have been presented. The new conception is reflected in certain of the Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, which, in effect, put the social welfare above the welfare of the individual. Liberty is conceived

---

as not only an individual, but also a matter of social concern. Liberty is conceived as a characteristic of that action or ideal which frees every man by regulating and limiting in some respects the freedom of the individual. Such a conception of freedom fits in with the naturalist's conception of the individual as being essentially social, inseparable from his environment rather than isolated from it, and standing as against other individuals and an objective world as a substance per se. Politically, this concept of liberty expresses the belief that government exists as a positive instrument for securing and extending the liberties of individuals. Dewey has observed that this conception is "perhaps foreshadowed in the clauses of our Constitution that confer upon Congress power to provide for 'public welfare' as well as for public safety," though he admits that all that probably was inferred by the framers of these clauses was not the many sweeping changes which many see in it today, but merely power to make appropriations for roads, rivers, and harbors.

Democracy as liberty or freedom connotes more than a political or economic concept, or liberal conception of government today, however, even though government is conceived as an active organ for bringing about

a greater degree of individual freedom. What its other characteristics are, as they have been worked out on the basis of data supplied by modern science, will now be shown.

A modern concept of democracy.

The democracy which the writer has in mind is a quality of living, an attitude, not an end fixed in advance. It is not a mere political concept, or a concept of government. Democracy is a way of life. It is acceptable as the over-arching value standard because it seems to contribute best to the "good life" for man. In it the individual is respected and the good of all is paramount. In its atmosphere, in its social relations, in its flexibility, it fosters and encourages human achievements and expresses a changing, growing society, one characterized by continued planning as versus a planned society. It is in keeping with the dynamic quality of life. It bases the good upon human wishes and challenges man to conceive and achieve a continually better life for all on equal terms.

Democracy may also be called a distinctive system of morality. As such it consists in the solution of conflicts, the freeing of impulses in such a way that shared interests will be developed. In evaluating consequences

---

in terms of the effect they will have on the development of cooperative living, one exercises the distinctively moral function. For it is through cooperative living that the individual can best attain his own fullest development. While the growth of the individual is the end and a sharing of social interests is the means, the former is achieved best when each individual possesses a broad humanitarian spirit. The increasing interdependence of men upon each other makes cooperative action, social sharing, a prerequisite to the successful achievement of ordinary activities and the actualization of men's potentialities. The solution of conflicts of impulses in terms of this social standard must take place on all levels of human activity; and theoretically every problem which the individual faces becomes a moral problem because it involves consequences which may either further the cause of social living or hamper it.

Democracy means not only a sharing of common interests wherever they may be found, but also a free sharing. Common interests are shared in fascist countries, but they are anything but democratic because they lack the element of free, voluntary participation. In a democracy, recognition is given to the facts that the individual as an energy system is dynamic, striving; and that he desires to determine his purposes for himself and the processes for achieving them. Democracy does not stand for any particular goal or scheme of things,
such as a theology represents. It stands for that attitude which serves to promote common interests wherever they are found. In discussing the relation of democracy to specific programs of action, and particularly the establishment of a "workers society" as part of an economic program, Professor B.H. Bode says:

"I am not saying that the experiment of a 'workers' society' should not be advocated as a political measure and given a trial. But that this should be made an integral part of the meaning of democracy I do not believe. No man knows enough to say that. The temptation to say it evaporates if we maintain a realizing sense that democracy is a thing of the spirit, and that God fulfills himself in many ways. This spiritual and experimental quality of democracy must be protected at all costs. To tie it up with a specific program for reconstruction is to pour out the baby with the bath."

Democratic living, for example, can well start with the family. The democratic individual will make a consideration for the welfare of others a matter of paramount importance. He realizes that he best develops his own interests by helping the other members of the family to realize their own. By cooperating in the commonest activities of everyday living, by recognizing the needs of the other members, a type of life is achieved in which

misunderstandings and selfishness are reduced to a minimum. The happy family is one characterized by mutual respect of abilities and needs, where those abilities and needs are met in a cooperative spirit. The same type of social concern should extend throughout other relationships as well, such as business, school, club, governmental relationships. The ideal is to promote the harmonious interaction and satisfaction of all interests among all people, so that the democratic attitude applies as thoroughly to the treatment of the problem of interventionism in the present war as to the problem of whether one should share one's thoughts and interests with his family or keep them to himself. The good of a whole group, however conceived, is desirable, in order that every individual may develop himself according to his abilities. What is good for any group is what is good for the larger group, so that the best interests of any individual are tied up with the best interests of the race. Democracy implies viewing every individual as an end rather than a means. As Felix Adler said, the ethical rule might well be, "Act so as to elicit the best in others and thereby in thyself." 1 Democracy may be defined as the pursuit of those attitudes and activities which aim to promote maximum opportunity for free participation in building up a common life.

General implications for teaching of the acceptance of democratic values.

With democracy as an over-arching value standard so defined and to be consistently adhered to, what are its implications for teachers and teaching? What does education have to do with the clarification and actualization of the democratic frame of reference and the formation of attitudes? Because the ultimate aim of education is intelligent self direction and self achieving in a world of plural and competing, and often conflicting values, its responsibility is a heavy one. The school should seek to clarify and actualize the democratic way of life. Some suggestions as to how this is to be accomplished will now be given.

In the first place, pupils at all levels should be helped to learn the value of cooperation. They should be taught attitudes of altruism and consideration for others rather than attitudes of egoism and concern only for self. The teacher should strive to build up sentiments, attitudes, dispositions, feelings which are democratic rather than autocratic in character. Young people should be educated into a sense of responsibility for the whole school life, and for the welfare of the larger community as well. The school should be the institution in which citizens of the future, who come with plastic minds, free from undemocratic habits and dispositions, will learn to live democratically by participating volun-
tarily in democratic activities within the school. This implies more than exhortation. It means helping pupils to achieve the ability to participate in experiences which will engrain democratic habits of thinking and acting. The cultivation of sentiments, attitudes, dispositions and feelings which are social in nature, and which promote the development of shared interests, should be carried on throughout the entire school program.

In the second place, since the development of individual interests rather than the development of the state, or development of the intellectual ability to intuit fixed truths and values is the goal, the teacher should seek to develop and exploit natural capacity. He should be sensitive to any particular interest which a pupil may manifest, and by working with it, help the pupil to develop abilities and acquire knowledges which will focus around that interest. If a pupil shows a particular interest in short story writing, the teacher should use that interest as a basis for broadening his knowledge of other fields and help him to acquire knowledges and skills which will fit him for a literary career commensurate with his abilities. If another pupil is interested in carpentry, that interest should be played upon and developed. A student is rarely stupid in every respect; some interest, some special ability can usually be found which can be used as the basis of operations
for further development of the child. Any interest which
a pupil expresses is in itself neither good nor bad.
The teacher should start with it, whatever it may be,
and exploit it in such a manner that it is directed to
a socially useful end. The story is told, for example,
of a child who ended in a juvenile court because he could
not resist setting fires. This interest in fires was
put to a constructive rather than a destructive use when
the child was put in charge of a furnace, which he tended
with all the skill at his command. Another story is told
of a man who as a boy was particularly interested in run-
ning water. Because this interest was developed by show-
ing the boy how water could be harnessed and put to
work, he developed an interest in water wheels which be-
came the basis of his life work. It is by thus build-
ing upon interests early expressed in the life of an in-
dividual that unique personalities, worth-while person-
alities are built, who find self-realization in fitting
their activities into a social whole and enrich it by
their special abilities and interests.

Thomas Gray wrote:

"Full many a gem of purest ray serene,
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear.
Full many a rose is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air."

---

1 Gray, Thomas, "Elegy Written In a Country Churchyard."
In Century Readings In English Literature. J.W. Cun-
"Full many a rose" in the shape of warped personalities exists today because children were not given a chance to develop their capacities. This is a condition which the teacher with the democratic point of view will certainly try to dispel.

The teacher should not only strive to implant democratic patterns of thought and action, but he should also seek to implant a knowledge of the democratic ideal itself. He should make the pupil aware of the fact that the democratic way of life is one way among many to which he can give his support. The democratic frame of reference can be shown to have a unique body of content. For example, democracy holds as a cherished belief the right of all to equal opportunities for development. Freedom in a democracy means not freedom to take orders implicitly, but the right to participate in social activities and the right to civic responsibility for the solution of social problems via the use of the method of intelligence. The democratic pattern of living can be shown to hold open for consideration any other pattern of living which an individual or group may choose to pursue, while this is not of such social theories as communism or fascism, and it stresses the use of intelligence, the behavioral characteristic most distinctive of man. The teacher should make his students conscious of the fact as early as possible that democracy is a distinctive way of life, which holds open all other patterns
of living.

These three functions—the building up of sentiments, attitudes, dispositions, feelings which are democratic in character, the exploitation of talent and its direction into socially useful channels, and the articulation and exploration of the democratic ideal itself—should be carried out in both the elementary and the secondary schools. The writer will now present some illustrative examples dealing with the way in which subject matter of the various areas as they are set up in the usual junior high school and secondary school curriculum can be reorganized, as one way in which these objectives may be in part actualized.

Suggestions for relating American history to the study of democracy as a way of life.

The field of American history can be made very fruitful in helping a student to understand the nature and function of democracy past and present, and in helping him to formulate a democratic ideal which will serve as a guide for conduct in the future. American history, as well as any other subject, justifies itself in the curriculum as an educational subject, something more than training in the development of techniques or skills, in proportion as it leads to the development of a way of life, a pattern for living. If the development of democracy and its implications for a revised interpretation of
its nature is to be taken as the purpose or theme of the course, how is the subject matter to be handled so as to actualize this end?

The teacher could proceed somewhat as follows: he could point out to secondary school students of American history that the first settlers came to our shores for various reasons, none of which were democratic. The settlers held as their over-all standard of values the standard of supernaturalism. Because it was absolutistic in its nature, the early communities could not tolerate dissenters, and the result was a social system as autocratic in its nature as the European societies from which it stemmed. The English social standard was brought to this continent intact. For example, the patroon system and the formation of great landed estates grew up in New York, and the South had its squires. The early catalogs of Harvard students listed the students' names socially rather than alphabetically. In summary, in the beginning our American predecessors were as autocratic, as undemocratic as were the people they left behind.

The influence of the American Revolution in severing our ties with old, foreign customs could be shown to be tremendous. At this time we begin to see a democracy distinctly American in its nature begin to emerge. People turned their eyes and hopes to the future. Jeffers-
son gave us the concept of democracy as being distinctly political. Man, it was stated, had certain inalienable rights which were to be protected against enroachment by any political power. Justice was considered to consist in the right of every man to build his own life in open competition with every other man.

Next the importance of the frontier in fixing beliefs and attitudes articulated in the constitution might be stressed. The hierarchical social structure brought over from England and France was ill-adapted for survival in the new world; for once a man began to feel the yoke of oppression about his neck he could pack his belongings, move farther west, and set up for himself, where he would be on an equal footing with every other man. The conditions of life favored the development of the characteristics of self sufficiency. Democracy was considered to consist in the right to vote in an election and the right to be left alone to work out one's own fate. The frontier was responsible for the development of the attitude of "rugged individualism" which we hear so much about today.

As the country became more densely settled the conditions made cooperative living more necessary and certain restraints and limitations not necessarily sanctioned by the standards of custom or supernaturalism then dominant had to be imposed. The powers of government were gradually extended and a new way of life developed. In most
cases, when the increasing complexity of living made the adoption of new standards necessary, the solutions to the new problems were made in a way which gave the democratic standard of free participation in cooperative activities the right of way. This was the case for example, when women eventually won the right of franchise, and when free public secondary education was established, in most cases the good of the whole was put before the good of the individual. When the Mormons wished to practice polygamy, a practice which did not appear to be compatible with the best interests of our country, the conflict was resolved by giving the democratic standard the right of way. Private rights to the ownership of land were sacrificed in the interests of the development of railroads and the greater public good.

The development of this attitude of sharing goes on today and it is motivated less by purely selfish interests than it was in the earlier years of our country's development. The growth of faith in the worth-whileness of social security furnishes an example. A dozen years ago most people would have scoffed at the idea. We have reached a stage in the development of our culture where our concept of liberty must be re-defined: it no longer connotes freedom from restraint, as it did for our grandfathers, but freedom to participate in the creation of a common life in which every man, by recognizing certain limitations upon his freedom made in the interests of others, will
achieve still greater freedom in the development of his own interests and capacities than would otherwise be possible.

No individual considers it an injustice not to be able to use a busy street for a sidewalk, or a sidewalk for a street. By limiting the freedom of each individual's activities, both pedestrian and driver attain a greater measure of freedom than they would otherwise have. The same applies to freedom conceived as rugged individualism in the economic world. Liberty to corner a market, or to hold the threat of the loss of a job over a perspiring workman, or to accumulate socially earned income for the purpose of putting it to private use is no longer liberty, but license. Liberty today means freedom to cooperate, to participate in the construction of enterprises which will redound to the good of all.

By presenting American history in this way a teacher could help his pupils to build a new world view. The teaching would not consist in the inculcation of subject matter in the presentation of facts for their own sake—such as that the battle of Bull Run was fought on the twenty-first of July, 1861, and ended in the rout of the Union Army—but would consist in "telling the story of democracy," in which a knowledge of certain facts was instrumental.

The selection of subject matter should be determined by the end in view.
In the case of the teaching of American history, as well as the teaching of any other subject, the pattern of procedure cannot be made too clear-cut in advance. The selection of the subject matter must always be made with a clear-cut objective in mind in order that we may know what is important and not important. What constitutes the "facts" in a particular case is an open question and subject to different interpretation. M.C. Otto writes:

"How are we to determine just what history teaches? Nothing is more notorious than the prevalence of fundamental differences of causal interpretation among historical experts themselves. In so limited a field as United States History Channing finds New England the dominant factor, Turner the westward-moving frontier, Beard the triumph of the property class, Bancroft the irresistible advance of divine purpose. Proving a proposition by generalizations from history is not like a demonstration in mathematics or an experiment in a laboratory. As clouds which are separate and distinct overhead become indistinguishable when they have drifted into a mass on the horizon, so the forces which played upon life as it was lived lose their individual identity when merged into an accumulated past. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate specific causal factors and to determine the part they played in the general result. The complexity of life and the mortality of events force us to rest the case upon a few facts selected from the mass of more or less relevant data and thus to base our conclusions upon highly simplified evidence."

1 Otto, M.C., Things and Ideals, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1924, p. 34.
So long, however, as the known forces are utilized to help us understand our present culture and to help to point the way to a reconstruction of the culture, any particular interpretation of the significance of the forces is justified.

Suggestions regarding the teaching of ancient, medieval and modern history.

How can the teacher of Ancient History point his subject matter so as to make it throw light upon the present culture and furnish data thereby which can be so manipulated that a new order will arise in the mind's eye which can be used as an ideal for a better culture, for a culture in which conflicts that exist at the present time will be resolved? By tracing the development of Greek culture the teacher could point out several things which would be helpful. He could show the importance of conflict in bringing about a new way of life. For example, the fact that Greece became the trading center of the Mediterranean world stimulated the interchange of ideas and brought about a demand for a new type of education which emphasized the practical subjects, such as arithmetic, astronomy, navigation, and many new skills. This need gave rise to the class of teachers known as the sophists, who were in part responsible for Plato's philosophy which definitely placed the "higher" values in a world beyond man. The implications of this view could be
stressed with a view to showing how the leisure class ideals have carried over into the present scene. This is shown, for example in the view which is still generally held that intellectual labor is somehow intrinsically more worthy than physical labor. This belief furnishes the motivation for many who lack the ability, to strive for "white collar jobs," when such occupations as they choose bear no relationship to their interests and abilities. The development of Greek democracy could be shown to have come about naturally because of circumstances which were favorable to its growth (viz. the small Greek city-states and the large amount of communal activity which took place); and a comparison of Greek democracy at its best with our own democracy should be made so that a new interpretation of the meaning of democracy might come about naturally for the students. The Greek ideal of self-cultivation could be shown to be invalid at the present time because the intuition of the "higher" values has become meaningless. The aim is to show how Greek culture compares with our own, and how we are in a position to improve it.

The teacher of medieval and modern history could show how the ideal of saintliness grew out of medieval conditions, and how it carries over into the contemporary

---

1 The students could be referred to Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class, which contains an excellent account of the origin of many of our present beliefs.
scene. It grew out of medieval Christian doctrine with its disesteeem for this world, its tendency to asceticism; and it is exemplified best today in certain religious ceremonies. He might also show how the early Greek ideal of self cultivation was revised with the formation of a new leisure class as the result of the industrial revolution, and how this ideal exerts an important influence today: for example, in the belief that a study of the classics is a good in itself because it constitutes severe mental discipline and results in increased powers of the mind. If the teacher had the time he might trace the development of the substantive mind theory in order to show how the present wide-spread belief that the mind consists of faculties (willing, perceiving, feeling, etc.) and that these faculties can be trained, arose.

The teacher might point out how the rise of the new science brought a devotion to Truth for its own sake, which gave us what we may call the scholarship ideal. He could point out the fact that in all these years in the pursuit of Truth, no one has yet found a Truth which is not relative to a particular situation and to a particular time and place. As someone has said, no one has been able even so much as to touch the hem of Truth's garment. The scholarship ideal carries over into the present scene in the belief that the accumulation of factual knowledge out of all relation to its use is a good in itself.

The teacher might also show how the theory of
evolution among other things has helped to instill the belief that values are fixed in nature, particularly the so-called survival value; and that this belief furnishes the philosophy of many "captains of industry" who have become so powerful that by means of their combines they severely restrict the economic freedom of others. In a modern democracy, where the welfare of the least individual is theoretically as important as the welfare of the greatest, the community should register its disapproval of all those whose selfish interests are realized at the expense of the common man.

When the topic of evolution comes up for discussion the teacher might also suggest that the conclusions of the evolutionists conflict with many fundamentalist theological tenets; for example, with the question as to the origin of man. One theory states that man is a product of nature, the other that man is in part, at least, beyond nature, or supernatural in his origin, and dependent on a higher power, who controls his destiny. One generalization which the student may make as he studies evolutionary theory, and the sciences, is that men are in a position now to control their own destinies, and that they should accept the responsibility for the control of that destiny by growing not in just any direction, but by directing the course of their actions in such a way that democratic living in the fullest sense of
the term will achieve greater and wider actualization.

All these values—such as democracy as a political belief, the leisure class, the scholarship ideal, the belief in the rightness of the theory of the survival of the fittest—are standards governing conduct at the present time. The teacher should help his students to examine these currently held values in terms of their origins, and in terms of their consequences as regards how they help to promote or hinder the cause of free, cooperative living. They will be found to be incompatible with democracy as it has herein been defined. If a teacher can help his students to get a clear picture of the forces which have worked and are still working to make the present American culture what it is, can show that many of the ideals and values now held are incompatible with each other and that they hinder the development of a way of life based on our present knowledge and needs; and finally, can get his pupils to act to reconstruct the culture in terms of the new and larger social ideal, he will have performed excellent service as an educator.

Suggestions regarding the teaching of American literature.

The English teacher should work with the same end in view: namely, to relate his subject matter to the democratic way of life in such a way that his pupils will get a better grasp upon its past development and be in a position to formulate for themselves goals which will
further the cause of democratic living. It goes almost without saying that a teacher in any area, attempting to relate his subject to the clarification of what democracy has meant and should mean, should teach democratically, and attempt in the process to fix in the individual democratic habits of thought and action which were earlier mentioned. This cannot be achieved by exhortation.

If the teacher is covering American literature he might touch upon the following points which are given as examples. First, he might show through a study of the early sermons how completely our American predecessors were dominated by supernaturalism. The sermons of Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards would furnish good material. Consider Edwards' sermon, "Sinners In the Hand of an Angry God." This God, who holds us over a fiery Hell, would not hesitate to drop us into the blast if we did not follow his commandments implicitly. This view could be compared with the view many hold today, to illustrate the declining power of supernaturalism upon the present scene. As men acquire more and more control over themselves and the environment the fear of supernatural reprisal for breaches in the established moral code becomes less. In regard to the changing attitude toward God Oliver Martin writes the following passage:

"It would be difficult to imagine Jonathan Edwards today in a modern pulpit giving one of his sermons--for example,
"Sinners In the Hand of an Angry God."
We do not believe in quite the same God as he did. His God could love us, but at the same time he could get quite angry. He was our Father in heaven, but like an old Prussian father he could wield the big stick if necessary. He was a jealous God, and he stood for no nonsense out of human beings who tried to become gods and usurp his place. It was then that his wrath fell upon them. By contrast our conception of God today, in so far as some people have one, is more nearly that of a dear old grandmother. He is not so much a jealous God as an indulgent one. For some he is the kind of God that warns us good naturedly to do his will. But if we don't—well, he won't get angry about it. He won't punish us. Perhaps he will even step in and help us regardless of what we do."

If this comparison of the changed conception of God were dropped among students coming from a supernaturalistic background the results might be tremendous in occasional instances where the first dawning of the meaning of relativity of standards to cultures, and the meaning of escape from supernaturalism took hold.

As another example of how American literature could be related to the clarification of democracy as a way of life, a study of Hawthorn's Scarlet Letter could be made fruitful. Hester Prynne's transgressions against the divinely ordained moral code demanded the fullest measure of atonement. Her own welfare or the welfare of

her illegitimate child was not considered when her punishment—that of wearing the scarlet letter—was fixed. No consideration was given her as an individual, no thought of the consequences in terms of a warped personality. If Hester Prynne had lived today her community would not have exacted the penalty which she bore: with due respect to herself as a person, and to her child's rights to develop into a normal individual, some method would have been arranged whereby she could have restored herself to a position of respect in society. People are not as shackled by customs and fixed patterns of actions and consequences as they used to be: more emphasis is being placed upon a respect for the welfare of the individual, and consequences following the breaking of a moral code are no longer considered as fixed, as they were in Hester Prynne's case. If the pupils could be helped to see this difference in emphasis in the nature of morality it would no doubt help them to realize the importance of determining the worth of a set of consequences which would probably ensue upon the actualization of a plan of action in terms of the effect it would have upon the development or restoration of personality.

The study of American literature would not by any means be confined to moralizing. By studying Mark Twain, Bret Harte, R.H. Dana and other American authors the students should be helped to become conscious of the fact that in reading the stories of these men one gets the
"feel" of American life as it has developed and is developing, a way of life which is unique, different from any other. In a reading of much of American literature we feel the force of the frontier on the development of American life. We can understand better the rise of self-sufficiency and independence which characterized early American living, and see how more and more attention had to be given to the development of the common good. We get a feeling of America's greatness, the immensity of its natural resources, and the hardihood of its people. These considerations are revealed in such tales as The Luck of Roaring Camp, Two Years Before The Mast, Peder Victorious, etc. If the teacher will point out that such stories give us an insight into the development of American life as it is today, and the student can tie this in with a knowledge of American history, music, and art, the student will have the appreciation of the value of American literature which the course was designed to implant. It will help the student to be aware of new contributions in these fields and contribute to the enrichment of living.

Suggestions regarding the teaching of the natural sciences.

The teacher of a natural science can do much to help his students gain an appreciation of the nature and origin of our present culture and to furnish insight which
will help them to reconstruct it in a way which will promise richer rewards in terms of more significant, happy human living. Let us see what the biology teacher can do, for example. One thing the biology teacher can do is to dispel the common belief that individuals are born inherently good or inherently bad. This latter view is, of course, the position of Christian theology. Much of our criminal law is based upon it. It forms the basis for the belief that the infliction of punishment is the best way to reform a criminal. The reader will recall that the belief that man is inherently bad formed the basis of Hobbes's ethical theory. The former view was held by Rousseau and Arnold. Wordsworth expresses this philosophy when he writes:

"Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home."

The biology teacher can show that protoplasm in its nakedness, so to speak, is neither good nor bad, and can suggest that good and bad are relative terms, and can be found only in terms of expediting the growth of more satisfactory human relationships.

The biologist could give a purely scientific account of the nature of the human organism and its origin, point

---

1 Wordsworth, William, "Intimations of Immortality." In Century Readings In English Literature, J.W. Cunliffe,
out how this conception conflicts with the theological views expressed in most sectarian creeds. He could point out the nature of habit formation and the role impulse plays in conduct. Any impulse is not good or bad in itself, but becomes so when evaluated in terms of democratic values. All conflicts end as conflicts of habits and impulses within individuals; there are no conflicts in the large. A discussion of the nature and role of intelligence in the solution of impulses would be in order. The body could be shown to run not as a machine, composed of separate parts, all cooperating in a healthy individual, but to function as a unit or whole.

The biologist could show that patterns of action, or patterns of development which the organism may take are not fixed in advance, that the organism lends itself to any of a number of ways of development. The future offers "ambiguous potentialities." He could show that intelligence is not fixed, and that this fact opens up a new range of possible ways of dealing with intellectually sluggish individuals. He could suggest that this has implications for the validity of the belief that a fixed society, a society of fixed classes constitutes the ideal social pattern. By obtaining an understanding of the nature of protoplasm a knowledge of the field theory could be developed which would be supplemented by

-----------------------
data from the other physical sciences; and its implications for the conception of mind and matter as fixed and inseparable in nature could be revealed. When an understanding of the influence of dualism itself on the present culture was attained the knowledge would undoubtedly influence the students' outlook on life.

Chief contribution of all science teachers may perhaps be said to be their ability to make the scientific method of approach to an explanation of natural phenomena stand out as unique and desirable. For by reference to it, man has succeeded in conquering the environment, and dispelling the superstitions and fears which have kept him from actualizing ideals and alleviating evils much sooner than he otherwise would. The establishment of faith in science and the scientific attitude, especially as it applies to the area of the social sciences, would be an accomplishment of major importance. By showing that the individual an an energy unit is capable, through the function of mind, to recreate nature in terms of his own purposes and ideals, by showing that we are living in an emerging universe, one in which man now stands unchallenged at the helm and can direct his own future destiny, the scientist can restore man to the place in the universe from which Newtonian physics swept him. The scientist can present a solid background upon which faith in democracy is based. His particular duty as a teacher is to see that its implications for democracy are understood.
and that it becomes apparent to the student that on the basis of scientific data, democracy as a way of life, as an ideal, represents a way of life which seems to spell the good life for man.

Suggestions regarding the teaching of home economics.

If the teaching of home economics, like the teaching of any other vocational subject, is to become more than the presentation of skills and techniques, it too must be shown to have some bearing on the formulation or clarification of a way of life. Home economics can be related to a consideration of our way of life in several ways. For example, by pointing out that in spite of the immensity of our natural resources, in spite of the large amount of unemployment, and in spite of all the knowledge of home economics experts, one third of our population is ill clothed, ill fed, and ill housed. If the teacher can get her pupils to look into these problems and to explore their causes in other fields, and to work at the formulation of a social philosophy which will have as its goal the equalization of opportunity, and the restoration to health and efficiency such underprivileged people, she will be more than a technician. She will be performing her true function as an educator.

The desirability of arousing aesthetic experiences in teaching.
To say that no values must be permanently fixed and accepted without first submitting them to intellectual scrutiny does not mean that life loses its savor or its meaning. It gains new meaning and significance because man is the creator who can construct a world dedicated to an actualization of the good life. There is another way in which it takes on meaning, and this is through the enhancement of present experience. In other words, life takes on more significance when man develops a sense of appreciation of the meaning of relationships where no appreciation existed before. Dewey says, "It is not mere enjoyment but enjoyment as consummation of previous processes and responses that constitutes appreciation."

The teacher can help to emphasize the aesthetic aspect of experience, and by doing so enhance the quality of living. The fine arts are an experimental way of securing the enhancement of appreciations. The poet, for example, does not express the thought of death by merely saying, "I am going to die." He may say, "No longer mourn for me when I am dead;" or, "I have a rendezvous with death." The shot fired by the immortal "unknown soldier" at Lexington was not the shot that precipitated the Revolutionary War for the artist; it was "the shot heard 'round the world." Patrick Henry did not say "I

---

will have liberty at any cost." He said, "Give me liberty or give me death!" By enhancing whatever is truly significant in an understanding of our culture with language appropriate to that significance, the artist "steps up" our appreciation of a fact.

The transmission of our distinctive American culture requires us to lean heavily upon the artist if we are to appreciate it in its fullness. The teachers of economics, of English literature, of history, can enhance appreciations by the use of artifice as well as the music teacher, or the poet, who specializes in this activity. The music teacher can do much in helping students to appreciate the uniqueness of our democratic culture. For example, only the Mississippi among all the great rivers of the world has been called "Old Man River."

"America the Beautiful" expresses the hugeness, the future, the topographical beauty of this land of ours in a way which is difficult to forget.

Art can be related to a way of life by showing conflicts set up in literary form. Literature is replete with expressions of conflicting world views. English literature is rich in the various ways in which it treats the problems of origin, death, immortality, love, the nature of God, etc. Economics suggests different interpretations of the worth of the individual. History gives conflicting interpretations of the meaning of liberty and freedom which have been expressed in story form. The
aim in every case is to show that in most conflicts moral standards are in question. If the art specialist, or the teacher with something of the artist in him can bring the confused standards into the light, and can help his students to solve their conflicts for themselves on the basis of modern scientific data, he will be performing an indispensable function. The democratic way of life is not cold and calculating, but it contains all the sensibility and warmth which has been expressed by any artist; only its objects are not far off. Sensibility and warmth are directed to immediate experience.

The aims summarized.

The aim in all courses is to get the pupils to think critically and independently about personal and social problems, large and small; to put their faith in the method of intelligence rather than in authority; to make the development of more and better democracy the over-arching ideal and standard, and to understand the origin and the scientific basis of faith in democracy; to see the subject matter of any particular course not as an isolated body of facts, but as connected with the subject matter of every course in such a way that it will furnish them with a world view; to make them culture transformers as well as transmitters, as Mark A. May says. 1

1 May, Mark A., "The Teacher As a Transmitter of Culture," Educational Administration and Supervision, March,
Or as Professor J.T. Salter has said, the aim is to develop in the students "the imagination and social sympathy necessary to be interested in something outside their own skin and bones;" which, to be sincere, requires a thorough knowledge of the fact that one's own best interests are connected with the best interests of society.

All socialization is education, but not all education is socialization. This is why a teacher who is content to pass on skills or techniques without relating them in some way to a way of life may be called only half a teacher. The ability to walk a tightrope, to play a Beethoven sonata, to win a speed test in typing or shorthand, to play an expert game of football or bridge, to cook, etc., does not constitute education. It is only when the skill or technique is supplemented with concern and insight into the consequences of its use for enriching all human living that its mastery constitutes a genuine educational experience.

The last, and perhaps the most important aim, if the aim can be so subdivided, is to instill in the pupil the recognition of the fact that there is no "aim" in a sense. Only the constant striving for better things is important. Once the method of living democratically is

adopted—sufficient the day unto itself so far as aims are concerned. In the earlier chapters the view that goals, values fixed in nature prior to our transitory existence here was criticized: the criticism here made is that man-made goals must not be projected so far in advance that they "become ideals that recede as we approach them." Democracy, as the goal, must remain so near that it never passes out of our grasp, so that it can be reinterpreted as the situation arises; as it was when it was re-conceived to be a way of life, a thing of the spirit rather than a compartmentalized political belief, and when it was found to be consistent with the use of force in certain cases when its security is called into question.

To say, "Sufficient the day unto itself" does not mean that planning is to be thrown to the winds. To the contrary. The point is that any value, empirically set up or transcendentally derived, is not to be pursued, or allowed to determine the worthwhileness of any action without first being subjected to scrutiny in the particular situation. To say that freedom of speech is a value is correct, but to take it without reference to consequences is dangerous. Liberty to speak one's mind freely amounts to license when the speaker is a Nazi, in the pay of the Gestapo, who seeks to undermine the value which gives him the right to speak. Ends and means must be sufficiently close together so that they can be revised according to the situation, in terms of a larger value.
The relation of subject matter to the student.

So far the discussion has been concerned with the reorganization of subject matter. Little has been said of its nature and function and its close relationship to the problems of the individual student. Subject matter, however reorganized, is not to be conceived as to be taught in the ordinary sense of the word--taught as though the insights which it furnishes into the nature and history of our culture and the democratic frame of reference are to be presented to pupils sitting quietly with their hands folded at the teacher's feet. A further analysis of the nature of subject matter will prove helpful in showing how its function in the examples given differs from its function in the traditional school.

In keeping with the revised conceptions of the nature of the individual and the nature of objectivity (no objective facts exist to be intuited or apprehended by the substantive mind of an enduring self), subject matter can no longer be considered as the facts, figures, and generalizations existing in textbooks or held as valued insights by the teacher. Subject matter is a term better defined by saying it is that material which ties in with the problems or conflicts of an individual, and satisfies his demand for information. John Dewey writes:

"It (subject matter) consists of the facts observed, revealed, or talked about, and the ideas suggested, in the
course of a development of a situation having a purpose."

1

Whatever becomes an object of study, that is, of inquiry and reflection designed to point the way to further action, becomes subject matter. Thus the textual facts which have constituted the subject matter for adults in the past are only materials to the student, to be resorted to when a personal problem arises which requires data which the materials furnish. For instance, if a student is concerned to know the reason why firecrackers are shot off on the fourth of July, or to know the meaning or significance of the uniforms which he sees the old soldiers wear in a parade, facts about the wars constitute subject matter for him because they help him in the solution of his problems. If he is presented with these same facts in November, when his interests lie elsewhere, what was subject matter in the first situation now constitutes only material to be learned. Not that these same facts could not constitute genuine subject matter in some other context. Interests are not fixed, nor do they appear only in relation to certain specific situations. The achievement of group interest is not a matter of working out an activity in which the separate special interests of each member of the group are united, but rather

of creating an interest, or directing attention to a common problem which leads to other problems and to textual materials for its solution. Interests are ephemeral; and as Dewey and William James have said, the teacher should "strike while the iron is hot." Interest always leads to the subject matter found in the traditional curriculum. The subject matter of the traditional curriculum seldom leads to the creation or satisfaction of genuine interests.

Other implications of the democratic objectives for educational procedures.

Chapter six thus far contains an analysis of the nature of the humanly constructed frame of reference of democracy. It has been suggested that the function of the school in the light of this standard is (1) to establish democratic habits, attitudes, sentiments and dispositions and (2) to provide a means for the clarification of conflicts within the culture— that is, a knowledge of the nature and significance of the democratic frame of reference itself. It has been stated that a subject is valuable not because it trains the mind, not because it gives the student a store of "facts," but because it clarifies our way of life. This requires a clarification of conflicts, and the conflicts are always expressed in the problems of the students. The achievement of this objective makes necessary a reorganization of subject matter,
and a revised conception of the meaning of subject matter and of its function.

While the two aims of the school as they have been set up cannot be pursued separately, the reorganization of subject matter with the view of clarifying conflicts which has so far been stressed may be said to emphasize the manner in which insight is to be supplied when it is needed by the students. Its primary value lies in helping a student to arrive at a knowledge of the conflicts in his culture and a knowledge of the democratic frame of reference. The creation of democratic thought and action patterns as they are reflected in habits, dispositions, etc., requires more than the ability to supply a certain kind of insight when the student is ready for it. It means the creation of a more democratic atmosphere than is ordinarily found in the traditional school. Some educators meet this challenge by curriculum revision extending beyond a reorganization of subject matter and a revised conception of its relationship to the student, which involves a changed conception of the entire school program. How they would revise the curriculum of the traditional school will be briefly shown.

Teachers in traditional schools may be handicapped in their efforts to actualize democratic objectives.

The over-arching ideals of the democratic school may be enumerated as follows: the development of personali-
ty, the development of associated living, and the reliance on the method of intelligence. Many feel that the rigid organization of the subject curriculum of the traditional school weakens its ability to supplement the teacher's efforts to bring about a realization of any of these ideals. One may say that as it has been exploited by teachers in the past, and by some teachers still, it is autocratic rather than democratic, that it inhibits the development of personality, has fostered a non-democratic form of associated living, and encourages intellectual sluggishness.

The aim of the traditional school has for the most part been the inculcation of fixed subject matter. The subject matter is scaled according to its supposed difficulty. As the traditional aim, it reflects the desire to maintain the culture in approximately the same form in which we inherited it. Two or three centuries or more ago this objective was more defensible than it is now, for the life of the average man was exceeded by far by that of his culture. Someone has written, and it is undoubtedly true, that our culture, and particularly our relations with our environment, have changed more in the past three centuries than they did in all the previous years of written history. Our changing human relation-

---

1 D.A. Laird points out that while, in 1550 in Europe, people lived as long as they do today, the average length of life was eighteen years; while in the United States today the average life-span is sixty-three. In
ships are proceeding at an accelerated rate. Because men
have been unable to revise their culture, their relation-
ships to each other, at the same rate as they have re-
vised their relationships to nature, the present "cultur-
al lag" has resulted, from which may be said to stem
such present problems as malnutrition, unemployment, and
the present war. So long as the schools continue to offer
facts out of all relationship to our present cultural
problems the cultural lag will continue.

Because the aim or ideal of the traditional school
has been the acquisition of facts for their own sake,
which is achieved by isolating them into various sharply
defined subject-matter fields and, for the most part,
memorized by students, little or no attention has been
given to the first ideal mentioned, the development of
personality. The addition of vocational subjects, such
as home making, industrial arts, and commercial work is
a step away from a curriculum dominated wholly by the
cultural ideal. Honors and social esteem still go to
the student who has mastered the greatest number of facts
in the shortest possible time. *Summa cum laude* often
goes to the student who has sacrificed his personality,
the development of many interests, in order that he may
out-memorize all other individuals in his academic group.
This situation is particularly the case on the secondary

*The Ladies Home Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 12, December,
1940.
school level. Those who by reason of nature and their environment most need help in developing such characteristics as poise, self-confidence, diction, personal neatness, often make up for these lacks by throwing themselves into their work with all the energy at their command, and they reap a dubious reward in the form of scholastic honors. Because the facts they learned mean little to them they are soon forgotten and many such scholars join the man on the street, whose consuming interest seems to be to protect what is lawfully his from the rest of society. In other words, the subject curriculum, with its emphasis upon the acquisition of unrelated facts, facts irrelevant to the needs and interests of the students, and its lack of emphasis upon the development of personality via democratic means, does not foster democratic attitudes. In fact, it often produces an autocratic individual, uninterested in social problems, quite unfit by reason of lack of insight and temperament for democratic living, and often warped as a personality.

The development of associated living in the traditional school--living in which democratic attitudes, sentiments and dispositions are fostered--has, until recently, been confined mostly to extra-curricular activities: that is to say, activities only indirectly connected with the purposes of the school. All the readers of this dissertation know that the average classroom is
meant for the business of "learning;" it is not meant for levity and a spontaneous interchange of experiences. In the average classroom "a word at the wrong time is like a rank weed in a garden of flowers." Teacher-pupil relationships must necessarily be stiff and formal because of the objective involved. In the sixth grade, for example, the ability to recognize the different kinds of Greek architecture, or to do a problem in long division (seldom if ever presented in more than its abstract form) is considered a serious matter, and nothing should interfere with the memorization of the facts or processes as quickly as possible. Associated living can take place at home, or on the way to and from school, or at recess—never in the classroom or in the halls. When informal periods are organized they often are so chaperoned by well-meaning teachers that spontaneity of expression and choice of topics for conversation is greatly limited. Recess is often a period for unsupervised play, where the bold take advantage of the timid and the weak, where undemocratic characters are formed which may last through life. Whatever genuine associative living goes on in the traditional school is mostly outside the classroom itself where subjects are taught and knowledge is supposed to be being attained. Among children, outside the classroom, right is often decided by might, and whatever democratic attitudes have been formed under the guidance of the teacher are quickly cancelled. In the traditional school
the real educational activity usually goes on outside the classroom.

The pupil who is fitted to the subject curriculum may have his intelligence dulled as well as sharpened. Emphasis is too often placed on conformity and pure memory work. Problems and answers are set for him while his own immediate problems go begging. The eighth grader, for example, is often still faced with the problem of making his capital R's look as they do in the little red book entitled "The Palmer Method of Business Writing," working with a steel pen; or the problem of diagramming sentences, while his real interests and needs, judged in terms of his environment and probable future are ignored. There may be little or no direct consideration for such problems as are furnished by his expanding sex interests, his emotional break with his dependence upon his family, his questionings about loyalties and allegiances of various sorts.

"For the student ... the important problems of living do not arise in the school at all. At least, they do not arise there as part of his required study. Problems he has, but they grow out of his relations with members of the family and school groups, with social, political, and economic institutions of the community--and in the main they are solved with little or no assistance from the school as an organized educational agency."

1 Albery, H.B., "Freedom In the Secondary Schools." In
The instrumentalist and progressive educator believes that the use of intelligence is brought into play only when some personal problem or conflict genuine in its felt significance for the future activities of an individual is involved. Such problems as he is commonly faced with in the traditional school, being artificial, require little thinking on his part. When the subject matter is cut out in advance and the real problems of the student arising out of his widening sphere of interests and new relationships are shunted aside as unfit for sympathetic discussion in the classroom, intellectual activity, like real associative living, is diverted to extra-curricular channels for which the traditional school may hold itself only indirectly responsible. Thus the agency which is best designed to establish the habit of reliance upon the method of intelligence is defeated in its attempt to actualize this democratic objective. The subject curriculum at its worst, with its state-approved textbooks, the hierarchical, autocratic administrative procedures and other accoutrements of the traditional school in their extreme form hang like a millstone about the democratic teacher's neck. In the areas of living outside the school, among children, conflicts are usually settled by an appeal to might; and as children grow up

---

the standards of custom, of supernaturalism, or established legal codes usurp reliance on the use of force as the value standard for conflict solving. The habit of intellectual scrutiny of implications of possible solutions to problems in terms of their effect upon the promotion of a greater measure of general welfare has not been developed, and thinking, especially about social values, takes place as a last resort.

The background of the subject curriculum.

The subject curriculum has an interesting history. It had its American origin in the early elementary school with the teaching of the three R's. Elementary education first received public support in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1647, and it was designed to help in the spread of Biblical knowledge in order that "that old deluder Satin" might better be defeated in his nefarious purposes. The Latin grammar schools served until approximately 1800 somewhat the same function in the hierarchy of schools as high schools do now; and their curriculums were purely college preparatory in nature, with the subjects sharply compartmentalized. As cities developed and new educational needs arose academies were established to meet the new educational requirements, and the elementary curricu-

---

lum was gradually broadened with the addition of such new subjects as geography, literature, history, music, drawing, etc. The early American high schools (the first appeared in Boston in 1821) grew in number with the concentration of population, and it was considered at first to be only an extension of the elementary school. With the establishment of free public support for secondary education (1872) they grew very rapidly in number while the academies, which had become largely college preparatory in nature, declined rapidly in influence. The high schools gradually took over the academies' function as a college preparatory institution. As the academies declined the school board members, who were usually the elect of the community, naturally fixed the curriculum to conform to college entrance requirements.

Our earlier American colleges were dominated by the ideals of scholarship and culture, as they are in lesser degree today; while our public secondary schools are still dominated by the entrance requirements of the colleges. This accounts for the fact that a candidate for entrance to a liberal arts institution is expected to

-----------------------
1 Mifflin Co., 1930, p.113.
-----------------------
1 "The academy in America in many cases originated for the distinct purpose of emphasizing the education of boys and girls who did not intend to enter college. It has ended by becoming the 'preparatory school' for excellence and in some cases itself developed into a college." Inglis, A.T., Principles of Secondary Education. Op. cit., p.305.
present so many units of the so-called cultural subjects, such as English, mathematics, and foreign language. The growth of the curriculum in terms of the number of subjects offered, which has been especially rapid since the turn of the century, thus supplemented the units of work prescribed by the colleges as entrance requirements, rather than served by reason of its growing unwieldiness to form the basis for a much needed new type of curricular organization. The growth of the unit concept was the natural result of the psychology prevalent in the 1890's ("faculty" psychology) which supported the belief that the object of the "cultural" subjects, at least, was the training of the mind. Our modern high schools have thus acquired the type of curriculum, with its compartmentalized subject matter, which it has today.

*Some present day attempts at curriculum revision.*

The practical organizational difficulties, as well as the changed conception of the objectives of education based on the implications of the relativity theory and organismic psychology are working to make a gradual change in curricular organization in some form in the public school imperative. Several plans have been suggested and tried in experimental schools and in some of the traditional schools, which range from conservative attempts at a reconstructed presentation of the subject matter which only blurs the subject lines to open attempts to construct
a curriculum which expresses a frank rejection of the validity of the subject approach.

The correlated curriculum stands nearest the subject curriculum in point of reform, and it represents an effort to relate such areas as American history and American literature, English history and English literature, science and mathematics chronologically, with a view to bringing out the close relationships of these areas. Correlation is feasible only with the limited number of subjects that lend themselves readily to this type of organization. A correlated course may take up one or two periods of the school day.

The fused curriculum, which works well in the intermediate and junior-high-school grades, contains a course in which a number of subjects are fused, with emphasis being drawn upon the replaced subject matter for content. A fusion of civics, geography and history, or zoology and botany into biology, or ancient, medieval and modern history into world history are examples. This is another step away from the traditional subject curriculum. The new courses often represent only a combination rather than a true synthesis of the subjects fused, and when this is the case the subject curriculum appears again, only in a different guise. The purpose of the

fusion is thus defeated. The correct approach in a fused course is to start with problems and conflicts in the present culture and to work back from them to the fields they cross. Fusion is limited almost exclusively to a combination of courses within the same field.

The broad fields curriculum represents an attempt to build educative experiences on the basis of "fields of living," or as L.T. Hopkins says, "a small number of major trunk lines which are constant for all pupils." The fields of living may be, for example, (a) man's social relationships, (b) man's relationships with the universe, (c) general arts. The school program is built around these three themes, with vocational or special subjects occupying different class periods built around the three main areas as isolated electives. The first field (man's social relationships) would include the social studies courses, the second field (man's relationships with the universe) the science courses, and the third field (general arts) the fine arts courses.

If the supervising teacher starts with the subject approach the purpose of this organization will be defeated, just as is the case with the fused curriculum.

If the teacher starts with the immediate problems of the children, and draws upon the subject matter of the various

1 Ibid., p. 53.
areas as necessary, in order to meet these problems, the program can be made significant. This type of organization also will work well at the junior high school level.

The core curriculum.

The core curriculum represents the type of organization which best seems to tie in with the assumptions of Gestalt and organismic psychology, the latter of which is an offspring of the relativity theory; and it gives the best approach to the problem of establishing democratic habits which are necessary to bring about an ever greater measure of general welfare. It presupposes certain specific types of learning experiences as basic for all pupils going through the school. The core has one trunk or field from which vocational or other courses may be branched rather than a system of fields of living. Like the other organizational types mentioned, its purposes can be defeated if the subject matter rather than the satisfaction of the needs of the students is emphasized. The core program also works well on the junior high school level and it extends upward through the twelfth grade, although at the upper levels it occupies increasingly smaller amounts of the school day. In the upper grades the vocational and the special interest courses gain in popularity because the needs and interests of the students have become more stable.

The term core has been applied to a single subject
field required throughout the high school: for example, to such a course as world history, or American problems. Its use in such a case is a misnomer. While no standard definition of a core exists, the term has come to mean a course in which a dependence upon two or more subject fields is expressed, and which occupies more than the popular forty to sixty minute period in the total curriculum (usually at least a third of the school day). Dr. H.B. Alberty gives the following definition of the term core which well expresses its purpose and points out its connection with Gestalt and modern organismic psychology:

"A course ... which deals with broad problems or topics without regard to subject-matter lines. It is designed to avoid the evils of compartmentalized subject matter by dealing with all the aspects or implications of a problem as a unified whole."

The core curriculum is based upon the revised conceptions of the nature of knowledge, of mind, of truth, of the nature of the individual and his relation to an environment, and the nature of the learning process, which the field theory implies. The basic educational purpose is seen as the promotion of individual growth in terms of a development of shared interests; growth of a kind which starts with the needs of the individual, and

results in an integrated personality, growth which keeps the pupil in a state of dynamic equilibrium with his changing environment. This is essentially the democratic aim. Professor Otto defines democracy as "an intelligent use of cooperative means for the progressive attainment of significant personalities." In the core curriculum pupil interest as representing personal problems to be solved is effectively stressed, rather than subject matter conceived as facts, generalizations, and information contained in textbooks. The democratic objective is achieved by creating a democratic student; and data, subject matter, is conceived as instrumental to that end. Likewise conflicts common to the communities or sub-cultures of which each pupil is a part, rather than problems isolated from the actual problems of all the pupils. The conflicts which any particular group of students face (which give rise to "needs" which are to be met) furnish the basis for the scope of the core work, while pupil interests, as reflected at the different grades or maturational levels, furnished the basis for its sequence.

The determination of scope and sequence in the core program.

The scope of a core is determined arbitrarily by the designation of personal and social conflicts which the

student is likely to face in the immediate situation or in the future, and they are classified as "social functions," "broad areas of human experience," "areas of living," etc. It may include all the experiences ordinarily had in the areas of natural science, English, the social studies, and general arts. The sequence of a core completes the framework by providing for a sequence of experiences in the various areas based on the needs and abilities of students as they express themselves at different maturational levels. With the problems which a particular pupil or group of pupils face kept in mind as furnishing the content of the "broad areas of living," if not the areas themselves (a child coming from a slum section in a city would face different problems than a suburban country child, for example), and the knowledges and abilities of each child taken into account as he goes 1 from grade to grade, the core program can be made really distinctive for each pupil. The pupil faces realistically his own problems and not those of others. He is not drilled like a soldier to attain a knowledge of facts which will be of little use to him later on, even if they are remembered. Nor is he expected to become a "little man" by sacrificing his unspoiled originality and un-

---

1 The Ohio State Bulletin No. 2 (see Bibliography) approaches the problem of the selection of units of experience not on the basis of the traditional grade levels, but rather in terms of "growing toward eight-year-oldness, ten-year-oldness, twelve-year-oldness." This
dulled sensitivity to aesthetic experiences. In the
core program the teacher has a chance to develop abili-
ties and interests which are democratic in their appli-
cation and nature more easily than he could working with-
in the confines of a traditional subject curriculum.

The core program has been used in many institutions
and its use is spreading. The core has been adopted as
an integral part of some state programs (Virginia, Mis-
sissippi, and California, for example) and in some city
school systems—Tulsa, Oklahoma, Santa Barbara, Califor-
nia, and Denver being the outstanding examples. As an
illustration of the framework of a representative core
program the reader is referred to the Virginia State Pro-
gram, in general use with some modifications. The
reader may also be referred to The Changing Curriculum
for a further summary discussion of various ways for
providing the framework, or the scope and sequence, of the
core course.

Outside the core period itself come the special
interest and the vocational courses, each in charge of
a specialist, which make up the remainder of the school

method of providing for a vertical sequence of experi-
ence is theoretically sound and should be favored as
against the traditional system of grades.

1 Virginia State Board of Education, Tentative Course
of Studies for the Virginia Elementary Schools. Rich-
mond, 19 .

2 N.E.A., Joint Committee on Curriculum, The Changing
day. As the pupil matures and his interests become more clearly defined, less time is needed for general cooperative activities, and specialization can take place. The core may take up half the school day in the junior high school grades, but its proportion of the total school program becomes gradually smaller until, by the eleventh or twelfth year it occupies only one or two hours, or no time at all.

A democratic program requires an intelligent and resourceful teacher.

Whatever the extent of curriculum revision, the gradual actualization of democratic aims will be achieved only in proportion as the person directing the learning situation understands the basic principles of progressive education, some of which have been discussed here, and attempts to control the learning situation by their use. The application of progressive principles and methods of teaching requires an intelligent and resourceful teacher. He should be thoroughly familiar with the basic theories of education and psychology; for unless he understands the importance of child development, the nature of the learning process, and is familiar with some of the techniques which can be employed to bring about the objective of a continuous reintegration of a pupil with his changing environment, he misses the significance of the progressive approach. He should know something of the
philosophy of instrumentalism, which furnishes the basis for much of modern progressive educational theory. Without a knowledge of the basic theories of progressive education and organicist psychology he can hardly understand the basis of child needs, and without a knowledge of the instrumentalist theory of the source of values, he can hardly place sufficient emphasis upon the cultivation of social values. He understands the advantages which are to be gained by organizing the curriculum around areas of living rather than around bodies of knowledge. A knowledge of the instrumentalist's conception of the nature of mind, and truth, and the thinking process helps him to formulate a revised conception of the nature of a learning unit, which lies at the heart of the educational process. The unit is not formulated in terms of a logically organized body of facts to be learned, but in terms of a complete experience which has implications for a better understanding of the meaning and value of democratic ideals. The teacher's role is not limited to the part he plays in the classroom, but it extends to the assumption of obligations to explore the backgrounds and personalities of his pupils. The curriculum becomes not just a study of subject matter in a regular class period (which part of the curriculum dealing with subject matter as earlier defined may more properly be called a course of study), but rather "all the experiences which pupils
have while under the direction of the school." Because experiences in school and out of school are not to be sharply separated (thus again making formal education a thing apart from actual living), a new concept of the school also emerges—the community school. The teacher, if he is to perform his function to the best of his ability, should then study the experiences which his pupils have out of school as well as in school, with a view to bringing about greater personality development in terms of shared interests.

The teacher views the subject matter which is to be "pointed" in such a way as to have a direct bearing on a way of life as instrumental to the pointing of the individual, who in the beginning is only a wriggling mass of protoplasm, toward achieving the status of a consciously functioning, democratically inclined organism. Whether the teacher works in the traditional curriculum, or in the core curriculum, or in one of what have herein been designated as the intermediate varieties, the start of the educational process is always with the immediate needs of the individual, and not with subject matter "cut and dried."

---

SUMMARY

The present confusion regarding social and educational objectives may be explained by the fact that men ordinarily pay allegiance to conflicting values and value standards. Some values are considered by men to be fixed in nature, with their locus beyond the world of changing, ordinary experience, beyond their ability to ignore or to revise them. Other values are recognized as common-sense techniques, formulated to expedite the process of living. The present confusion prevents the retention of integrated personalities, and it staves off the attainment of a mode of social living which data derived from a scientific study of the nature of human nature, and the nature of the universe at large, points to as representing the good life.

The belief that the "higher" values, such as honesty, loyalty, beauty, patriotism, humility, cunning, etc. (no strict unanimity of opinion exists as to what the "higher" values are), are fixed in nature, beyond the power of man to alter, or that they have their locus in a world apart from man, has a long and interesting history. It originates
in animism where a distinction between matter and spirit was first made. Dreams, and the phenomenon of breathing, ceasing as it did at death, suggested the existence of a world and an animating force in nature beyond the world of ordinary experience and beyond human control. Animism developed into mythology when phenomena which could not be explained naturally, i.e., be connected causally with other phenomena, were explained by putting them in the control of super-natural powers. At this stage not only such natural phenomena as lightning, the winds, fire, and the dawn, but also the values of a culture, such as bravery, fortitude, honor, honesty, justice were attributed to the gods.

Because of an unusual combination of circumstances, for example a topographical location favorable to the interception of commerce and an exchange of ideas, Greek culture ceased to be recapitulative, as were the Egyptian, the Mesopotamian and the Chinese cultures; and a critical attitude of mind never before displayed gradually developed. New needs, new values arose. A deprecation of the implicit faith in the gods of mythology was a result. A growing leisure class, with slaves to do all the physical labor, a growth of occupations requiring intellectual skill (such as money changing, navigation, linguistic ability) helped to bring about an ever-increasing emphasis on the desirability of the cultivation of the mind. The changing needs of the developing Greek culture
were met by the sophists, primarily a group of itinerant educators, often foreigners, who claimed to give knowledge on any subject, as well as to teach virtue. Because they were eminently practical men, some, notably Protagoras, maintained that all knowledge is relative to the individual. Protagoras said, "Man is the measure of all things."

Socrates and Plato, in opposition to such reasoning, asserted that the "higher" values as they knew them—such as beauty, truth, justice, patriotism—had a more stable basis than the sophists were willing to admit. They believed that they had their origin in a realm beyond man. Thus we have the Platonic "realm of essences," the "world of ideas." According to Plato, the material world produced only a manifestation of these intangible values; and the good life was one of renunciation of ordinary activities, in which one's time was better spent in the contemplation of the eternal essences.

Much of Plato's theory of value carried over into Christian ethics. During the Middle Ages its influence was especially strong, when it reinforced the dichotomy between the spirit and the flesh. His emphasis on a world of ideas and the desirability of mental culture has influenced our educational theories; and the whole modern picture reflects Plato's influence in so far as people believe in the training of the mind and affirm the desirability of becoming "cultured."
Early modern science, which had its roots in the new ideas which infiltrated into Europe from the East during the Middle Ages partly as the result of the crusades; and in the experiments of the alchemists, the astrologers and the necromancers, functioned to produce a reinforcement of Platonic and Aristotelian theories by indirectly giving rise to scholasticism. Another result was to sharpen the bifurcation of experience which already existed, the distinction between a world of mind, so much emphasized by the Greeks, and a world of matter. Matter came to be generally conceived as Newton considered it, as indestructible atoms, each a plenum, existing is space and time. Descartes is credited with making the distinction between mind and matter very sharp. He posited mental and material substances in which ideas and sense qualities, objectively perceived, could reside. From this view we get the common belief that mind is an entity, existing somehow within the head, in spite of the fact that the empirical philosophers of the early modern period effectively undermined this position.

The scientific or the empirical attitude, which had as its outstanding characteristic the assumption that all knowledge stems from experience, was reflected outside the developing natural sciences in the metaphysical theories of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Locke drove the opening wedge against the concept of substances, "dug about the
foundations of human knowledge" when he made the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. Berkeley pointed out the uselessness of positing a material substance or substratum for sense perceptions when he maintained the thesis that these are products of the mind. Hume exposed the uselessness of a mental substance or substratum when he made his observation that mind and substance likewise seemed to him to be only ideas, without any receptacle that could be known except as another idea, in which they could reside.

The impact of the scientific attitude upon early modern ethical and political theories is reflected in the works of these three men, and in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Joseph Butler, Jeremy Bentham, and J.S. Mill. Hobbes found the good life not in devotion to fixed truths or transcendental values, but in the exercise of certain "natural rights," rights fixed in nature. As the earliest modern ethical and political thinker he reflects the prevalent deistic temper of his time when he writes that man's life in a state of nature is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." He believed that morality rests upon the construction and acceptance of a social contract which will protect the natural rights of all. Butler believed that values were discoverable by an appeal to conscience rather than to Reason, or a moral sense. Hume reduced values to the status of feelings, and emphasized utility
in determining values. Bentham believed that values reduced themselves to pleasures. The good life was to be found in the pursuit of pleasures which longest endured. "Push-pin is as good as poetry." Mill believed that values were inseparably connected with happiness. A value represented a course of action which would promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. What that happiness was is determined by an "internal sanction," a principle which Mill talks of at times as being fixed in nature. Mill's philosophy is called utilitarianism, and it represents the culmination of a long series of observations by empirical philosophers in the field of ethics, all based on the assumption of a dualism in experience, a dualism between mind and matter.

The ethics of transcendentalism reached its high point of development in the early modern period at the hands of Immanuel Kant. The good, once intuited, and "tested" as to its validity by reference to the question as to whether we could wish that the action which it represents could be made a universal law, was to be pursued regardless of the consequences. This position in ethics is known as formalism. Kant sought to restore the dualism of experience to the intellectual respectability it held before the days of Hume by supposing that the world of ordinary experience is the product of the mind, which conformed in its own structure to a pattern fixed by some external power.
By the beginning of the twentieth century scientific method as a method of procedure in the investigation of phenomena had been clearly articulated, and it was applied by the pragmatists to an analysis of the thought process itself. Truth was considered relative to the individual, while morality, following J.S. Mill, was considered by the pragmatists as that which would help to actualize the good for man in the here and now. In the area of science the relativity theory, with the concept of the "field" was developed by Einstein and other physicists. The field theory supplemented and supported the belief of the empirical philosophers that there are no values or standards fixed in nature.

The field concept supplies the basis for a revised interpretation of the nature of matter and mind, which makes the bifurcation of experience into two separate realms meaningless. Rather than the indestructible Newtonian atom, the field of force potentially inclusive of all sense qualities furnishes the basis of the experiential matrix. Neither matter nor mind are real as substances. Mind, instead of being conceived as an entity existing within the head, is conceived to be a function, which leads to an adjustment of an individual to his changing environment. Truth represents correct or adequate adjustment: a true belief, or a true idea is one which works. A value expresses a type of action which promotes most satisfactory adjustment to the environment.
It is a quality of experience. Sense qualities, such as colors, sounds, odors, are neither in the object nor in the individual because neither object nor individual exists in its own right. An object of perception is isolated by discriminative attention out of the all-inclusive experiential matrix. Because the notion of mind is isolated out of the experiential matrix, and not vice versa, the critics of pragmatism are wrong when they say that pragmatism ends in subjectivism and moral anarchy. Because experience includes all there is, a resort to values beyond or outside experience is meaningless, and all values must be recognized for what they are: not courses of action divinely sanctioned, but courses of action constructed by man which expedite the process of living.

Because fields of force are in continuous flux, it becomes impossible to believe that values are "fixed in nature." Nor can there be fixed goals or ideals set up by a super-empirical agency which point the way to the good life or determine the destiny of man. The goals for living are set up by man himself. Significant living, judged in terms of what the scientists reveal in their data concerning the nature of human nature and the universe at large, becomes growth, the continuous reintegration of the individual with the changing environment of which he is a part; and growth in the direction of richer living for all. Only be working for richer living for all is the richest life for each individual achieved. A standard of value
must be constructed by man if he is to have a standard, and it should remain flexible and subject to revision as man reworks the environment, or new data from the sciences indicate a new direction which he should take in order to live the good life.

The present-day confusions in education and out have been recognized by the "classics" as well as the progressive educators. The classicists—notably Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer Adler of the University of Chicago—are convinced, as are the progressive educators, that these confusions are to be clarified only by the adoption of an over-arching value standard consistently adhered to. The classicists would discover that standard by resorting to a study of metaphysics. They recommend a thorough study of the classics (particularly the works of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas), for they believe that the eternal truths and values to which humans should pay allegiance are contained therein.

In their writings they imply a general acceptance of Plato's social theory as representing the ideal which modern educators should strive to actualize. In an examination of the writings of Hutchins and Adler, the writer has found no indication that they have considered the implications of the sciences for the present validity of that ideal. Such a social theory as they appear to support assumes that a society and the environment are static.
It implies that intelligence is fixed, that men can be fitted to society as metal is fitted to a mold. Man seems to exist primarily for the welfare of the state, rather than that the state, as a humanly constructed institution, exists by man's grace to promote the welfare of the individual.

The classicists believe that truth is to pursued for its own sake. They minimize the importance of vocational education in the general program of the schools. Many of the school subjects are considered valuable because they "train the mind"—presumably to prepare it for the apprehension, through intuition or reason, of the fixed truths. They state that science and "empirical knowledge," while it is important (supposedly because it helps us to get along in this transitory and imperfect world) should occupy a plane subordinate to the intellectual training which accrues from a study of metaphysics.

The progressive educator cannot accept, with the classicists, hypostatized values; values which have arisen out of ordinary experience and placed by definition in a transcendent world from which they exercise an arbitrary, unchallenged control over present conduct. While many truths and values are expressed in the classics, the progressive educator feels that none should be permitted to exercise authority over or give direction to present conduct without first being subjected to the scrutiny of
intelligence; which means that the course of action which a value represents must be tested as to its probable consequences before it is given the right of way. The progressive educator believes that there is a definite place for the study of the classics in the school, but he would teach them not because a knowledge of their content is a good in itself, but for the light it throws on the reconstruction of our present culture. The progressive educator would reconstruct our present culture: the classicist, it would seem, would prefer to turn his back upon it.

If one starts with the instrumentalist, the scientific approach, one feels that the classicists are right in emphasizing the need for an over-arching value standard, consistently adhered to, at the present time; but he will feel that they are wrong in stating that that standard is to be found through a study of metaphysics. That standard, he feels, must be constructed out of experience, and be of a nature which will have its fruit in experience, and not in an escape to another realm or super-empirical plane of living.

The over-arching value standard which the instrumentalist and progressive educator would construct which is to furnish the direction for action and the basis for determining values may be called democracy. The over-arching values of which it is composed are formulated on the basis of data derived from the sciences. Democracy
(1) gives the right of way to activities which promote cooperative living, (2) allows for the free participation of every individual in determining the direction for the reconstruction of the culture, and (3) stresses the importance of the use of intelligence. Cooperative living is stressed because science indicates that man is a social individual, and grows through an interaction with an environment, of which other individuals are an indispensable part. Free participation is stressed because it is the development of the individual which is conceived as the end: not the state, as in Germany, for instance, at the present time, where there is much cooperation and little free participation. The use of intelligence is stressed because the good life can be achieved more quickly through its use. A reconstruction of experience can take place in a purposive manner or it can take place by trial and error. Man, as a rational animal, is characterized by the ability to act purposefully, and in the proportion that he does so by extending his control over the fields of force which constitute his environment so as to make them function to actualize his ends, to that extent is he leading the good life.

If the reconstruction of experience is desired, and in such a way that it is made more meaningful to every individual and will keep the paths open to future reconstruction, the schools can play an important role. For
they work with the young, who are as yet "undebauched by learning," who are not yet bundles of fixed habits. The school is invaluable for two reasons: it can seek to establish habits, attitudes, sentiments, dispositions which are democratic in character, and it can work to make the student aware of the nature of the democratic frame of reference, and its significance for pointing the direction for the solution of present cultural conflicts. These objectives can only be achieved in the school in a democratic manner. This implies a reconstruction of the entire educative process, since the traditional school in large part (but not entirely) still represents a process based on dualisms which make the desired outcomes a knowledge of facts mastered out of any consideration for their chances of use, a docile personality, and an appreciation of the "higher" values, such as music, poetry, literature, which are conceived as goods in themselves.

The nature and function of subject matter must, for one thing, undergo a reconstruction of meaning. The facts to be learned, which constitute so much a part of the curriculum of the traditional school, are not to be conceived as valuable per se, but only as they contribute toward the solution of conflicts in our culture, which are always conflicts for individuals. A subject in a curriculum becomes educative, then, only when it contributes to an understanding of our culture, solves a problem, and leaves the paths open for further experiences. The teacher
should start with the problems of his pupils on whatever level they may be, for they represent conflicts. The teacher teaches pupils, not subject matter, which may more properly be called material to be memorized until it helps to satisfy the problems and interests of a student. Any subject which is taught in such a manner that it does not throw light on the nature and conflicts of our present culture, or give data which will serve as the basis for the formulation of an over-arching value standard, represents only the teaching of a skill.

If the equally important objective of establishing democratic habits of thought and action is to be achieved attention must be turned from the problem of how to supply insight when it is needed, which involves a reconstruction of the common conception of the nature and function of subject matter, to the problem of creating situations which will permit the formation of these habits. This involves, in the opinion of many, a revision of the whole educative process. The democratic teacher is often hampered in his work in the traditional school by the necessity of meeting fixed requirements which are associated with the subject curriculum, hence many would start a revision of the educative process by revising the curriculum in a way which goes beyond the reorganization of subject matter. The aim is to make it easier for a teacher to meet the problems of every pupil and to give
him greater freedom for personal expression than it has been for him in the past.

The curriculum of the traditional school, with its compartmentalized and logically organized subject matter, determined in large part by college entrance requirements, reflects the ideals and objectives of mental training and scholarship for its own sake, which arise out of the dualisms which this thesis has discussed. Its history in American schools extends back to the first which were established. The original elementary curriculum, which consisted of the three R's, was continually broadened, so that at the present time the further necessity of revising the curriculum in order to take care of all the new material which would find its way into the school in the form of additional subjects is apparent.

The correlated, the fused, the broad fields and the core curricula represent progressively more radical attempts at an organization of the curriculum designed to facilitate the actualization of democratic objectives. The last expresses a complete lack of faith in the straight subject approach in that it assumes a different framework of curricular organization, commonly called scope and sequence. The scope of the curriculum is determined with reference to "social functions," "broad areas of human experience," "areas of living," in which any given group of individuals will probably participate, while the
sequence is determined with reference to developing interests and abilities. The "core" itself, which varies in its daily duration with groups of students at different maturational levels, is supplemented with vocational and special interest courses. The core curriculum has gained wide recognition in the last few years.

Regardless of the extent of curriculum revision which is undertaken in an effort to meet democratic objectives—whether it confines itself to revised conceptions of subject matter and the function of the teacher or whether it extends to a reorganization of external forms themselves—the objectives cannot be met unless a teacher cognizant of modern developments in educational theory, which emphasize the importance of growth, activity, the satisfaction of the needs of the learner rather than the satisfaction of course requirements, is in control of the learning situation. An intelligent teacher, with his subject material well in hand, alert to the changes going on in his pupils, can actualize democratic objectives in any curriculum; and it is upon his shoulders that the successful reconstruction of future citizens in terms of the democratic objective ultimately rests.
Bibliography


Company, c1936.


Martin, Oliver, "Sin and Sinners." Journal of Liberal Religion 1:4, Spring, 1940.

May, Mark A., "The Teacher As a Transmitter of Culture." Educational Administration and Supervision, March, 1940.


Ohio State Board of Education, Teachers Bulletin No. 2. Columbus, 1940.


Virginia State Board of Education, Tentative Course of Studies for the Virginia Elementary Schools. Richmond, 19...


I, Raymond James Ramsden, was born in Beloit, Wisconsin, December 23, 1914. I received all my secondary school education in the public high school of the City of Mineral Point, Wisconsin; my undergraduate education at the State Teachers College, Platteville, Wisconsin, and the University of Wisconsin, from which I obtained the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1933 and the degree of Master of Arts in 1939. I have been in residence at the Ohio State University since 1939. In 1940 I received an appointment as University Scholar, which position I have held to the present time while completing the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.