THE QUESTION OF COMMUNITY:

THE 1910 STREET CAR STRIKE OF COLUMBUS, OHIO

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

by

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1970

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The majority of the research for this thesis was conducted for a seminar on the Ohio National Guard under the direction of Dr. Allan R. Millett of the Ohio State University. Although the emphasis and substance of the paper has changed somewhat since then, the constructive advice offered by Dr. Millett has been most helpful. The writer's background of study in the progressive era and whatever insights have been gained therefrom are almost solely due to the tutelage of Dr. K. Austin Kerr, to whom thanks are also offered.

David R. Larson, chief of the archives and manuscripts division of the Ohio Historical Society, deserves the writer's most grateful appreciation for encouraging her to pursue the Master's program and enabling her to do so by granting her time off from her duties at the Society. The cooperation and understanding of the manuscripts department staff is also heartily appreciated.

Of the many persons who aided the writer's search for source material, the entire staff of the Ohio Historical Society was most helpful. Thanks are also due to the Columbus Transit Company and the Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company for permission to use selected portions of the records of the Columbus Railway and Light Company in their possession.
Finally, the writer acknowledges the typing assistance of Robert M. Watson, grand vizier and faithful companion of the Lentz household. The advice, encouragement, consultation, and long-suffering ability to digest BBF hamburgers instead of suppers, of the writer's husband, Edward R. Lentz, have of course been of inestimable value and are most directly responsible for the completion of this work. Whatever errors or miscalculations appear in this paper are the sole responsibility of the writer, those who assisted her, the Ohio Historical Society, and last but not least the Ohio State University.
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INTRODUCTION

The period between 1900 and 1910 has been described as the progressive era in American history. Its recurrent themes include the interrelated processes of industrialization and urbanization, and the reform attempts to which they gave rise. This period has fascinated, perplexed, and challenged the imagination and scholarship of innumerable historians and social scientists, partly because of its complexity and partly because many of the problems arising from it have yet to be satisfactorily solved. While these studies have produced both historical and contemporary insights into the nature of human interaction in the urban-industrial milieu, the conflicting theories created by them have been as numerous as the varieties of interaction they explore.

This thesis proposes yet another avenue of investigation. It arises from the proposition that the total is more than the sum of its parts. In relation to human interaction in the urban-industrial milieu, it revolves around the theory that the interaction of groups with specific interests gives rise to a larger, independent interest group—the community as a whole—whose actions are predicated on the pragmatics of orderly coexistence. The "community interest" should here be distinguished from the
"public interest." While the former varies from issue to issue and time to time, the latter has been espoused in such a variety of ways, and is so prone to misinterpretation according to an individual's personal values, as to have become rather a meaningless analytic tool. The community interest does not describe an abstract policy, but instead attempts to denote an area of compromise in a given situation. The extent of that compromise is the measure of meaningful interaction between the various parts of the community which are directly or tangentially involved in a given question.

This study attempts to analyze and describe a strike of the Columbus, Ohio, street car motormen and conductors in 1910. It thus deals with only one question, at one given point in time, in one community. Yet it is illustrative of a dimension of human behavior--interaction itself--which will hopefully provoke larger and more intensive investigations. The street car strike of 1910 thus exists as an entity in itself, as an integral part of the dynamics of one community, and as a potential part in the much larger realm of human interaction in the urban-industrial milieu which characterized so much of the progressive era.
THE CITY

In 1910 Columbus, Ohio contained over 175,000 residents within the city limits. The Chamber of Commerce claimed that the total urban population, including suburbs, easily approached two hundred thousand. The city had grown rapidly since 1860, when it had held less than twenty thousand people. The railroads had arrived in town in 1850, prompting a commercial and industrial exploitation which took advantage of the city's central location to widen markets for local goods and services.\(^1\)

In spite of fifty years of increasing industrialization, Columbus' population had remained culturally homogenous to a large degree. In 1904, the Board of Trade stated, with somewhat more assurance than was usually evident in booster parlance, that the city was an ideal place for industry to settle because the "quality of labor procurable in this city is the most reliable in the country [and furnishes] the greatest proportion of intelligent, contented, industrious, reasonable, and skillful artisans."\(^2\) The absence of serious labor disputes was popularly attributed to local enlightenment and to the absence of large

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\(^2\) Columbus Board of Trade, *Columbus, Ohio*, 1904, p. 18.
unassimilated racial and ethnic groups. The Germans, who comprised fully half the population before 1850, enjoyed community status commensurate with their long residence and prominence in the business community. In fact, until late in the nineteenth century, the German brewers formed the nucleus of Columbus' social elite. Their gradual loss of status after the 1880's is a measure of the rise of large-scale manufacturing and the increasing influence of coal and railroads in the city's economy. Irish, Italians and Slavs comprised only a small portion of Columbus' population; and the small Negro community was all but invisible.³

While foreign migrants flocked to Cleveland and Toledo, and while Cincinnati experienced a heavy rise in both its ethnic and Black population, Columbus drew instead from its surrounding farming communities and from the coal fields of the Appalachians. Its labor supply was thus primarily white, native stock. These men were largely unskilled and posed little challenge to the city's established artisans, but they did provide a steady source of inexpensive labor for growing manufacturing interests. The relative ease of their assimilation into the urban

³ For a full description of demographic distribution, see Forrest L. Blanchard, An Introduction to the Economic and Social Geography of Columbus, Ohio, unpublished Master's Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1922.
environment was seen as a major factor in Columbus' social stability by business and civic groups alike.⁴

Urban geographical boundaries expanded with the rise in population and the need for large tracts of land for manufacturing plants. The fashionable residential centers near Statehouse Square gradually disappeared and re-formed to the East and North along East Broad Street, in the "Indianola Highlands" north east of the Ohio State University, and in the suburban villages of Bexley, Grandview, and Arlington. The intervening areas, and those to the South and West, filled with middle and lower-income dwellings and commercial and industrial sites. The intermixture of business and residential areas, a product of the old "walking city,"⁵ increased only in locations devoted to a specific heavy industry with a cohesive labor force which was often ethnic in origin. The company town of San Margarita on the west bank of the Scioto River, for example, was close to the Marble Cliff Quarry Company, and housed its Italian workers. To the South, below the traditional German section of Columbus, a Slavic enclave grew up in tenements adjacent to the metal working plants.

Both these sections were located farther from the core

⁴ Columbus, Ohio, pp. 11-13.

⁵ Sam Bass Warner uses this phrase in Streetcar Suburbs, 1969.
city than most upper-income areas. A more centrally located though similar district existed near the Jeffrey Manufacturing Company in the northeast quadrant of the old walking city.\(^6\)

For the most part, however, residential construction expanded away from the central business and industrial districts, and was furthered by ambitious tract developments as well as individual building. In 1910 a developer advertised Oakland Park as the middle-income answer to Indianola Highlands, while the edges of the Highlands area itself and other well-to-do sections were being surrounded and crowded by lot subdivisions for two-family houses.\(^7\)

The new areas within Columbus' expanding urban boundaries thus resembled pockets of varying income levels distributed at random around the core city, which itself was subdividing and adjusting to accommodate an increase of inhabitants as well as business and industry. While these pockets of development increased economic stratification within each immediate neighborhood, few areas presented enough of a unified pattern to isolate large economic groups in distinct sectors of the city. Columbus remained fairly homogenous, then, in residential distribution as

\(^6\) See footnote No. 3.

\(^7\) Real estate advertisements in the Ohio State Journal and the Columbus Dispatch throughout 1910 amply describe individual and tract development along these lines.
well as in population origin. 8

The rapid expansion of the city and the piecemeal
distribution patterns within areas of new development were
both cause and effect of a revolution in urban transporta-
tion. 9 Street cars first appeared in Columbus in 1863.
By 1890, the city had its first electric street railway
line. In 1910, a single company, with electric car lines
spanning the entire urban area, maintained a monopoly
franchise in Columbus. The fare: five cents anywhere in
the city, or seven tickets for a quarter. For a nickel,
a man could live two or three miles from work and travel
there in less time than he could have walked from his old
in-town residence half a mile away. 10 The effect of this
rapid and relatively inexpensive transportation on resi-
dents who could not afford their own buggies (or, later,
automobiles) was inestimable. The entire city became
accessible to those who previously had been limited to
their own neighborhoods for work, recreation, and resi-
dence. And the city grew accordingly.

8 Roderick D. McKenzie, The Neighborhood: A Study of
Local Life in the City of Columbus, Ohio, 1923, p. 163,
Map of Population Mobility.

9 Warner's Streetcar Suburbs is the most complete state-
ment and analysis of this thesis to date.

10 Speed estimates range from five to fifteen miles per
hour, based on elapsed time between runs.
From 1863 to 1910, reliance on street car transportation increased with each new urban expansion. Minor carmen's strikes in 1890 and 1892 had scarcely disrupted the transportation service, partially because they were directed at specific companies in a competitive market. In neither case had any violence occurred, nor had the Columbus police force proved unequal to the task of maintaining a medicum of order.\textsuperscript{11} Although Columbus citizens supported any movement for lower fares, by 1910 the Columbus Railway and Light Company was itself planning to initiate a reduction to eight tickets for twenty-five cents during the next year.\textsuperscript{12} There was little spirited agitation for public ownership or the three cent fare, and the company seemed secure in both its public and private position as a profit-sharing service corporation.\textsuperscript{13}

Columbus itself seemed secure, in fact. It was a growing town with an increasingly solid economic base, devoid of serious racial or ethnic tensions, with a largely native-born labor force which had produced no major labor-management disputes in thirty-three years. Even then, when local disruptions had occurred during the 1877

\textsuperscript{11} Opha Moore, *History of Franklin County, Ohio*, 1930, Vol I, p. 226; and *Ohio State Journal*, July 29, 1910, p. 2, hereafter referred to as OSJ.

\textsuperscript{12} OSJ, June 24, 1910, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
railroad strike, the National Guard had been called to the city more in anticipation of trouble than because of actual confrontation. 14

The events of 1910 destroyed this local somnolence completely. A paralyzing car workers' strike, which lasted from July 24 to October 18, was preceded by two minor confrontations in the spring. Carmen and strikebreakers clashed repeatedly, exchanging barrages of rocks, bricks, rotten eggs, and gunfire. Car barns, cars and tracks were dynamited. Nightly rioting exhausted a demoralized and undermanned police force. The National Guard was twice called to the capital city, and remained nearly two months in all. In the aftermath Columbus could no longer view itself with complacency. The November elections, in which the Socialist party amassed twelve thousand votes (twelve times greater than in 1908), were ample indication that all was not well in the town that had boasted of its ideal labor force only six years earlier. 15

14 History of Franklin County, p. 218.
Columbus' continuous economic growth and the relative homogeneity of the city's laborers had hidden, if not retarded, labor unrest. Unionization had been peaceful for the most part, and though homogeneity among the ranks of workingmen may have increased the effectiveness of the labor movement, it was popularly attributed to have reduced the number of outbreaks of violence and strikes as well. The most powerful groups were the local artisans' unions, which capitalized on their skills and social distinction from unskilled workers to form the equivalent of social and fraternal organizations rather than bargaining agencies. The Columbus Trades and Labor Assembly was their consolidated body. It worked closely with the Chamber of Commerce in a mutual effort to extoll the virtues of Columbus labor, and relied primarily upon this association and the relative independence of its members to secure social recognition and political power as well as economic gains for its members.\(^\text{16}\)

The Columbus Federation of Labor, on the other hand, enlisted unskilled as well as skilled workers within its ranks. A newer and more militant group, it was the local

\(^{16}\) Columbus Trades and Labor Assembly, \textit{Columbus Trades and Labor Assembly (Yearbook)}, 1895.
arm of the American Federation of Labor, which had been founded in Columbus in 1886. While member unions of the AFL encouraged arbitration of labor disputes if at all possible, they were not adverse to strikes once negotiations stagnated or failed. This attitude, coupled with an aggressive unionization policy in unorganized occupations, made the AFL and its local branch much more active in confrontation techniques than the Trades and Labor Assembly. It was to this group that the newly organized carmen's union belonged.¹⁷

The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees had been founded at the instigation of a Columbus man, William D. Mahon, subsequent to the abortive local strike of 1892. Despite Mahon's local connections, a local chapter was not organized until 1910.

The street car industry in Columbus lagged far behind most others in unionization (there were over eighty locals of other unions in town when it organized in 1910) primarily because it drew its operators from the large ranks of men in the city without particular skills. The entrance requirements were not high, the working conditions and pay were low, and the turnover was astronomical. In 1881, "Columbus drivers were working 103 hours a week for $8.98, ¹⁷The most complete history of this union and its relations with the AFL is Emerson P. Schmidt's Industrial Relations in Urban Transportation, 1937.
or 8 cents and hour."\textsuperscript{18} By 1910 the standards had risen to 19 or 20 cents an hour, and a regular operative's work week averaged sixty to sixty-five hours.\textsuperscript{19} Those men who did not receive regular car runs, however, worked on a "call" basis that did not guarantee hourly or even daily compensation. There was no remuneration for the time spent on call waiting for work. Almost half the employees of the Columbus street car company worked on the call system.\textsuperscript{20}

Faithful service was rewarded by steady car runs, which were assigned to men on the basis of length of employment. The men so favored did not, however, receive the trust of their employers. Because car operatives collected receipts with no official company supervision, few safeguards existed for either the company or the operatives. Some men were required to post bonds to secure employment. The check used most regularly by the Columbus company, though, was the detective system, in which riders were paid to report on any irregular activities by the workers. No hearings were required to dismiss an employee for alleged dishonesty.\textsuperscript{21} The detective system was not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Industrial Relations, pp. 102-103.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{20} OSJ, June 22, 1910, pp. 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Industrial Relations, pp. 71-120; OSJ, June 25, 1910, pp. 1, 5.
\end{itemize}
unique to Columbus. Neither was the ratio of dismissals for reported dishonesty. Emerson Schmidt, in his 1937 study of the street car industry, *Industrial Relations in Urban Transportation*, noted that in 1904 the New York City lines dismissed 3,017 men of 3,491 for that particular reason.  

Aside from friction generated by detectives and dismissals, the character of streetcar work did nothing to enhance the operative's position. Many men regarded the work as interim employment until they found better positions elsewhere. The turnover of employees in Detroit, for example, was typical of the industry in general. "Of 1,534 platform men who in 1908 had been with the Detroit United Railway Company for two months or longer, 61 per cent had served from two months to five years. Only 13 per cent of all the employees had been with the company for ten years or longer."  

The percentage of men under forty years of age in the industry was equally high. Of these, most were recent arrivals from rural communities. While the connection between horse cars and drivers with farm experience was logical, the numbers of unskilled, rural employees scarcely decreased with electrification.

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22 *Industrial Relations*, p. 77.

23 *Industrial Relations*, p. 84.

24 Ibid.
Even in Philadelphia at the turn of the century, the majority of streetcar motormen had previously been either farmers or horse car drivers.\textsuperscript{25}

Unionization, then, was difficult for a number of reasons. While the work was relatively easy to learn, pay was commensurately low. There was a high turnover among employees due to dismissals and voluntary resignations. Most operatives regarded employment as temporary. Union organizers thus sought not only to increase pay and improve working conditions, but to promote job stability by training their members to meet raised standards. The major problem faced by these organizers was the facility with which car companies could recruit other employees; and they unofficially viewed the closed shop as the only means to secure the stability they sought.\textsuperscript{26}

Securing any concessions at all from the Columbus car company proved a challenge in itself, however. After a successful strike in 1890 which had earned employees a pay raise but had not centered around the issue of organization, William Mahon led another strike in 1892 after he organized the employees of the Columbus Railway Company. This effort met with total defeat for the unionists. Mahon turned his attention to organizing a national union, and

\textsuperscript{25} Industrial Relations, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{26} Industrial Relations, pp. 71-120.
shortly thereafter moved to Detroit to assume the presidency of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees. Neither local carmen nor the national union seriously attempted to organize the streetcar industry in Columbus for eighteen years after the 1892 defeat.  

Pay raises were again the first issue of discontent in 1910. Early in the year, a group of thirty-five employees met to select a committee to talk to the railway company's manager, E. K. Stewart, about a wage increase. They selected seven of their number, who met with the manager and were rebuffed. All thirty-five men were dismissed from the company's employ. This action precipitated a call to the Amalgamated union in Detroit for an organizer to visit Columbus. Fred Fay, one of the Amalgamated's experienced trouble-shooters, arrived in February with an assistant and helped the men set up Local 538. By March approximately half the company's employees had joined the new organization.  

Manager Stewart understandably viewed this situation with alarm. Unions were anathema to the company which, in common with other street car franchises throughout the country, relied on a rapid turnover of men to reduce operating expenses. The cost of training a new operative for
a week or ten days (during which time he received no compensation) was in no way equal to the cost of retaining experienced men who were entitled to higher pay and benefits including free uniforms and the company's profit sharing plan.

The company also prided itself on its good record in labor relations, and assumed that the previous eighteen years without strikes were directly due to its employment policies. The unionization effort appeared an unjust, malicious attempt to create trouble by outsiders who were more interested in securing additional power for the national union than in the actual welfare of the company's men. Stewart's reaction was thus a mixture of righteous indignation and acute hostility.29

The company occupied a more tenuous position than other Columbus corporations, however, and Stewart's dismissal of the thirty-five men did not create universal approval in the business community. The Columbus Railway and Light Company existed in a narrow balance between private and public ownership. Though privately owned, it maintained its monopoly franchise on streetcar service and electricity through agreement with the local government. It was a merger of six city lines which in turn had evolved from a total of fourteen. While the city accepted this

29 OSJ, June 22, 1910, pp. 1-2; June 24, 1910, pp. 1-2.
merger to ensure better and more efficient service, there were viable alternatives to the private monopoly of municipal service industries. These options remained very much in the public eye during the years immediately before and after 1910. Public ownership of utilities or franchise-controlled competition, the alternative possibilities, had been successful in other cities. While private monopoly seemed the best compromise between efficient public service and private enterprise, the debate had by no means ended in 1910. The community had a stake in the company's success because of the very nature of the services it performed; but the stake was more in the services than in the company itself.30

The "Merger", as the company was called, had heretofore been successful in maintaining good external as well as internal relations. Its president, Robert E. Sheldon, owned a dry goods store, was president of the Citizen's Savings Bank, and was a director of the Ohio Trust Company as well as presiding officer of the car company. Stewart himself, as first vice-president and general manager, had been active in banking and transportation schemes for years and was allied with the Hoster brewing interests through marriage. While twenty-five per cent of the

30 For a discussion of the success of all these methods, see the Federal Electric Railways Commission's Report to the President, 1920.
company's stock was held by a firm in Philadelphia, The Clark Syndicate, Columbus residents owned the rest.\(^{31}\)

After the Panic of 1907, however, the streetcar company's profits shrank from the combined pressures of rising costs and expenditures for line expansion and transition to electricity, inflation in general, and over-extended financing. Its profit-sharing system with the employees, in which the men's yearly wages were equated as stock, had yielded so few returns to the workers that they viewed the scheme as a mere rationalization to keep wages down. The company maintained that the men, like the stockholders, would have to wait for their pay raises (in the form of dividends) until the company increased its profits. The men felt that at only twenty cents per hour, they were in a much greater financial crisis than those who could afford to buy shares of stock; and that they should not be forced to wait for a "living wage". While few local stockholders shared this opinion, they, too, were discontented with the low returns on their investments.\(^{32}\)

Labor discontent and unionization, with the implied threat of a strike, alarmed the general community as well as the company itself because of Columbus' dependence on

\(^{31}\) Webster P. Huntington, The Men Behind the Guns in the Making of Greater Columbus, 1906, pp. 8, 28; OSJ, June 25, 1910, pp. 1, 5.

\(^{32}\) OSJ, June 25, 1910, pp. 1, 5.
street car transport as well as the further stress on the company's finances. Those who did not own stock would be just as affected as those who did, as a strike would not only eliminate dividends but would ruin the chance of a reduction in car fare planned for 1911. The major concern, however, was that service would be disrupted. Columbus citizens were thus prepared to exert all the pressure they could to avert a strike, on Stewart as well as on the unionists.

When the newly organized unionists began agitating for wage increases and reinstatement of the thirty-five discharged men, Joseph Bishop of the State Board of Arbitration stepped in as mediator between the company and its employees. On April 6, he secured an agreement which ensured a pay raise to twenty-one and a half cents per hour, guaranteed an open shop and no discrimination against union members, affirmed the right of employees to confer with management, and provided for the reinstatement of the thirty-five men. While this settlement appeared to relieve the tension, real or imagined discrimination by the company officers and foremen kept the unionists on the defensive. Less than a month later, on April 29,

33 (Columbus Railway and Light Company), Condensed History of the Strike in Columbus, Ohio, of a Minority of the Employees of the Columbus Railway and Light Company, 1910, p. 2. This booklet, while biased, is valuable in that it reproduces all the documents of agreement involved.
they declared that the April 6 agreement had been broken by the company and voted to strike.\textsuperscript{34}

At this time, Bishop's efforts were superceded by a civic arbitration committee formed at the instigation of Washington Gladden, pastor of the First Congregational Church and a national leader in the "Social Gospel" movement. The two other members of the committee were Charles Pretzman, president of the Chamber of Commerce, and William Oxley Thompson, president of the Ohio State University. After only a week of negotiations, the committee succeeded in getting both parties to agree to the April compromise again, with the added "interpretation" that the company would omit questions about union membership from their employment applications and that four men of the original thirty-five who had not been reassigned to their former runs would be paid on a basis commensurate with their positions.\textsuperscript{35}

Neither the men nor the company were content with the existing situation, however. Stewart alleged that the union had not been discriminated against and was merely agitating for a closed shop. The men pointed to the June 17 dismissal of their financial secretary, M. B. Cranmer, for dishonesty, as evidence that the company had not been

\textsuperscript{34} Condensed History, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
negotiating in good faith. This last action, following other dismissals in May and June, precipitated a call for another strike on June 21, with the exact date of the walk-out to be left to the discretion of the union's executive committee. Fred Fay, the organizer of the national Amalgamated, returned to Columbus the same day.36

The city's efforts to avert a strike continued, and on June 23 the Chamber of Commerce petitioned for a compulsory hearing before the State Board of Arbitration. While the Board had never before used its power to convene a compulsory hearing, all efforts to get the two parties to agree to such a hearing had failed. Stewart maintained that the company would not agree to abide by the findings ahead of time. The men argued that any hearings at all would be futile unless the company agreed to do so. Nevertheless, hearings began on July 5.37

The union, anxious to preserve as much favorable community feeling as possible, decided not to strike until the findings of the Board were released. Throughout the time from July 5 to July 23, when the hearings adjourned, local citizens led by the Chamber of Commerce tried unsuccessfully to get Stewart to agree to abide by the findings, while the company and the union exchanged a series of

36 OSJ, June 22, 1910, pp. 1-2.
37 Condensed History, pp. 4-6; OSJ, July 6, 1910, p. 1.
virulent attacks and rebuttals in the local press.\textsuperscript{38}

Intense feelings on both sides grew. The company imported new operatives and hired "special police" and detectives by the hundreds. Long-service carmen were forced to train the new operatives in spite of their boasts of strikebreaking in other cities. The Milo car barn was fortified and outfitted with room and board facilities for a large force of men. The union attempted to retaliate with an order by city council (the majority of which had been elected on Mayor Marshall's reform ticket in 1909) that no men could operate cars alone unless they had at least ten days' prior experience in the city; but the company lawyers secured an injunction against the order, and eventually won this particular case in court.\textsuperscript{39}

The city's Industrial Exposition, a booster project organized by the Chamber of Commerce, took place from June 21 to July 4 as scheduled in spite of repeated alarms that the carmen would strike. But the Chamber, anticipating the State Fair only a few months away, did not decrease its efforts to secure Stewart's concession once the exposition closed.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} OSJ, June 21 - July 24, 1910. The impending strike and arbitration proceedings made the front page every day. The most virulent attacks and counterattacks between Stewart and the union were recorded between June 22 and June 25.

\textsuperscript{39} OSJ, June 21 - July 24, 1910.

\textsuperscript{40} OSJ, July 6 - July 22, 1910.
Other representatives of the Columbus citizenry remained active as well. Governor Judson Harmon was pressured by both the Columbus Chamber, the mayor, and the unionists to call a special session of the legislature to consider a bill endorsing compulsory enforcement of arbitration findings. Harmon, however, resisted these demands throughout this early part of the crisis and indeed throughout the entire strike. He evidently felt that no legislation could be enacted quickly enough to affect the Columbus situation, and that such action, even if carried out, would set an example for further demands on the state body by local authorities, although he refused to comment at length upon this decision.  

To compound existing problems, Mayor George Marshall made no secret of his sympathy with the union. He had been elected in 1909 on a reform ticket that endorsed municipal ownership of public utilities as one of several points including a "civic betterment" program, eradication of gambling and prostitution, and elimination of vice from city offices. Of these programs, municipal ownership was the most controversial, and his war with Stewart and the Rail-Light company was public knowledge. He had also

41 The most concise analysis of Harmon's position this writer found were two letters of Elbert F. Baldwin, New York, to Washington Gladden, Columbus, October 24 and November 1, 1910, in the Gladden Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Box 18.
undertaken a wholesale reorganization of the police department, and his demotion of the former chief to private had unnerved some moderates. The new chief, Carter, was acknowledged to be strictly Marshall's man; and the mayor took almost single-handed control of the department. One of the reasons he was able to do so was his open sympathy with the working class, with which most patrolmen identified. The force was small, however, and the combination of inadequate numbers plus support for the objectives of the street car unionists led many members of the general public to doubt Marshall's capability to maintain order or even good faith with the interests striving to prevent the strike from occurring. Marshall's newspaper debates with Stewart were scarcely less colorful than the company-union attacks, for example.  

In spite of all attempts to ensure agreement to the findings of the Board of Arbitration, by July 23 the hearings and their results were nothing but a prelude to confrontation. The hearings had postponed the strike, but did not consider the central question which evolved while they were in session. The Board's sole purpose was to examine the specific complaints the union had lodged

against the company in its June 21 declaration. A month later, Stewart's repeated refusals to accept the Board's decision as final had brought an entirely different question to the fore.

Early in July, Stewart began to publicly state that the reason for his position vis-à-vis the hearings was one of union recognition. He would always be willing to negotiate with his men, but could not tolerate negotiations with the union, as this would imply that the union was sanctioned by the company. Such precedent would lead to pressure for a closed shop.43 The closed shop was a direct threat to the right to work as well as a threat to established employer-employee relationships. As general manager, Stewart would not countenance the idea that management included the voice of labor. Referring to the efforts of the Board of Arbitration, he was reported to say, "I will fight these men [the unionists] to a finish.... no board will run this company except the board of directors."44

Such outspoken statements led the arbitrators to protest privately to Robert E. Sheldon, the company's president. The Ohio State Journal's comment on July 10 amply illustrated the frustration these men, and all those

43 OSJ, July 24, 1910, pp. 1-2.
44 OSJ, June 23, 1910, p. 1.
involved in the arbitration effort, must have felt: "It must be apparent to any fairminded person that the company is determined to wage war at a time when the state board, the chamber of commerce, the car men's union, the business men and all good citizens are doing everything in their power to promote peace."45 Nevertheless, Sheldon and the other directors of the company continued to give Stewart a free hand in the affair.

In this context, the findings and recommendations of the Board were almost totally irrelevant. It found both sides at fault to a degree. The company had failed to eliminate questions concerning union membership from the application blanks in use; it had discharged some union men, and had not discharged some nonunion men, unjustly. The union, however, had not shown conclusively that a substantial amount of discriminatory treatment had been accorded its members by the foremen and inspectors of the company. After three weeks of hearings, the Board "from its investigations [was] of the opinion that the differences existing between the Company and its union employees [were such as could] and should be adjusted by peaceful methods."46

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45 OSJ, July 10, 1910, pp. 1, 3, Main Section.
46 Condensed History, p. 8; OSJ, July 24, 1910, p. 1.
In spite of this observation, the union men deliberated only one hour after the findings were publicized before calling their long-delayed strike for four in the morning on July 24.47

47 OSJ, July 24, 1910, pp. 1-2.
THE STRIKE, PART I

It became obvious well before the State Board of Arbitration concluded its hearings that, short of the compulsory settlement act Governor Harmon refused to endorse, a strike would occur. Repeated minor outbreaks of trouble, usually between the imported carmen and detectives of the company, and union men and sympathizers, punctuated the entire month of July. These incidents accentuated the impasse between the company and its organized employees, and led to repeated alarms that the strike would be called before the hearings ended. Columbus citizens clung to the hope of peaceful settlement, but daily anticipated the fulfillment of their worst fears.

Both local and state authorities had prepared for the emergency before July 24. The mayor put all police on active duty the day the Board's findings were released, took official command of the department, and declared that the force had perfected its strike procedures. At the same time, he talked with the governor about calling in the National Guard "if necessary". Adjutant General Charles C. Weybrecht had previously determined which regiments to call should they be needed. Although Governor Harmon was vacationing in Michigan when the actual strike began, his secretary, George Long, worked closely with
Weybrecht in keeping the governor informed by both letter and telephone.\footnote{48 OSJ, July 6 - 24, 1910; Judson C. Harmon Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Box 3.}

Mayor Marshall and Safety Director Edward McCune issued a joint statement on July 24 citing the "hoodlum element" as the greatest prospective source of trouble and reminding all citizens that "draastic measures will be used to disperse any mob that may gather. Let no man if he is injured when the mob is dispersed, say that he was an innocent bystander."\footnote{49 OSJ, July 24, 1910, pp. 1-2.} The first part of Marshall's plan was to establish automobile patrols along street car lines instead of manning each car with police. He felt that his force was too small to handle the latter strategy, which General Manager Stewart demanded. The second part of the plan was to call for the National Guard if his men could not control the town through use of his patrol strategy.\footnote{50 Ibid.}

The strike began early Sunday morning with little trouble at all. Organizer Fay, Business Agent Miller, the other officers, and the lawyers for the union all concurred in their plans for a peaceful demonstration. The strikers would picket the car barns, petition their supporters to boycott the streetcars and raise money by selling union
buttons and cards to sympathizers throughout town. Despite these plans, the ill feelings which had grown since June between unionists and the non-union and imported carmen were scarcely containable. By the day the strike began, approximately six hundred men had joined the union. They numbered only half of the company's original force. While the same amount of men chose to remain with the company, their ranks were bolstered by an estimated 300 strikebreakers who were to be paid almost thirty dollars a week, in comparison with the normal wage of twelve dollars and fifty cents. Of these three hundred men, one third were "amateurs", or men with no previous strikebreaking experience. The other two hundred were "professionals", largely recruited through the Central Employment Agency and the Coach Detective Agency of Cleveland. Others came from as far away as Chicago. In addition to these men, the company hired the John J. Mahoney Detective Agency, a Columbus firm, to supply detectives and "special police". The Cleveland men, under the direction of John F. Brady, were given the same special police powers by the company. These powers included the right to carry weapons, to use them in defense of company property, and to make arrests. They were granted by the company alone, however,

51 Ibid.
and were not endorsed by the Columbus police.\textsuperscript{52}

Tension mounted all day Sunday, with only a few disturbances between company men and strikers and strike sympathizers. Stewart ran eighty-four of the normal one hundred and twenty-two Sunday cars, planned to increase that percentage Monday because of the lack of violence, and determined to run the cars at night as well.\textsuperscript{53}

The one hundred and seventy-five policemen, including twenty special patrolmen sworn in Sunday, seemed able to keep order with their automobile patrol system. They maintained control through Monday's daylight hours. The car runs at night, however, sparked major disturbances throughout the city, particularly on the west side. Crowds barricaded tracks, hurled rocks and bricks through car windows, and were met with gunfire from the company police riding the cars. Despite the difficulty of identifying and apprehending rioters in the dimly-lit streets, the police were able to arrest seventy-six persons Monday night alone. Although things remained quiet during daylight runs on Tuesday, worse violence broke out that night again. Two west siders were struck by bullets as the company men fired indiscriminately into crowds along their

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.; for a lurid but detailed account of the methods and morals of strikebreaking, see Edward Levinson's biography of Pearl L. Bergoff, \textit{I Break Strikes!}, 1935.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{OSJ}, July 25, 1910, p. 1.
runs. Ten other injuries were reported in the melee.\footnote{54}

After these two consecutive nights of rioting, Mayor Marshall determined to call for help from the National Guard. Although Governor Harmon was in Michigan, Adjutant General Weybrecht and Harmon's secretary, George Long, met with Marshall Wednesday, secured Harmon's approval by telephone, and alerted the entire First Brigade. Marshall made the request only after conferring with Franklin County Sheriff Albert E. Sartain, who assured him that his seven deputies could not materially aid the city police.\footnote{55}

Brigadier General William V. McMaken of Toledo, commander of the First Brigade, happened to be in Columbus earlier in July and had been asked to remain pending the outcome of the street car dispute. He was thus available to confer with Marshall, Weybrecht, and Long, and planned out the Guard's strategy in advance of the troops' arrival on Thursday and Friday, July 28 and 29. The arrangements were substantially similar to those of the police themselves: troops would bolster police patrols around the city, attempting to discourage crowds from gathering by their very presence as well as their actions in response to specific incidents. Marshall ordered all night street car runs to halt pending the arrival of the troops, and

\footnote{54} OSJ, July 26, 27, 1910. All first page.

\footnote{55} OSJ, July 27, 28, 1910. All first page.
closed all city saloons as an added precaution. Rioting abated Wednesday night and virtually ceased on Thursday as the Guard units began filtering into town. Thursday night, when all was quiet, Marshall sent his police home to sleep.56

On Friday, however, as the last units of National Guardsmen arrived, Governor Harmon returned from his vacation and ordered the troops to remain in camp unless called out to handle specific emergencies. After Marshall received thirty-nine riot calls between six o'clock and ten o'clock Friday evening (the worst riots yet), he successfully persuaded the governor to rescind his order. The only area in town that did not experience riots was an east side district patrolled against orders by Colonel Catrow of the Third Regiment.

Friday night's disturbances amply illustrated the extent of the unrest in Columbus. The police had only fifteen automobiles for patrol purposes, with from two to seven men in each, and seventeen reserve patrolmen with no means of transport. At least ten distinct mobs, fluctuating between 100 and 600 people each, roamed the streets in markedly different areas of town, including the far west and south sides and the northeastern suburb of Linden. At one point in the evening, five riots were reported to

the central police station in the same minute. Approximately seventy per cent of the company's two hundred-odd cars had been damaged before Friday's riots. When the last car returned to its barn shortly after ten that night, the toll was much higher. That only ten persons were arrested during the four hours of trouble, while crowds easily totalling three thousand roamed the city's streets, seems a measure of the strain imposed on an overtaxed and undermanned police force when compared to the seventy-six arrests made the first night of rioting. In that instance, the disturbances had centered in one general area instead of ten.\(^5\)

From July 30 to August 7, when the troops were disbanded, the violence in Columbus gradually abated. Although no peace efforts by Harmon, Marshall, Pretzman, or the community at large were effective, relative calm seemed to prevail. The National Guard patrolled the streets with reinforcements from the Second Brigade, bringing the total number of troops in Columbus from two thousand to nearly five thousand. General Charles Dick, division commander of the Ohio National Guard and senior United States Senator from Ohio, arrived to take command over McMaken and General John C. Speaks, who took charge

\(^5\) OSJ, July 30, 1910, pp. 1-3. See map for general riot areas.
of the Second Brigade. The city-wide patrols included the use of machine guns mounted on automobiles, whose threat proved especially effective in dispersing crowds along the North Fourth Street run.\footnote{OSJ, July 31 - August 8, 1910. All articles begin on first page.} \footnote{Ibid.}

The quiet, however, was strained. While troop patrols discouraged large crowds from gathering, isolated incidents persisted throughout the city. An effigy of E. K. Stewart hung from the Goodale Street Bridge was perhaps the highlight of what Governor Harmon called "this guerilla warfare". The accidental shooting of seventeen-year-old Bessie Newbrough by a guardsman on duty near Schiller Park nearly sparked a full-scale riot. A major confrontation was only avoided by the Guard's quick arrest of the man and the presence of a regiment of troops encamped in Schiller Park itself.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the meantime, union officials repeated their pledge to Mayor Marshall that they would lend all support to efforts to keep the peace, while one hundred and fifty more strikebreakers arrived from Cincinnati. Other labor and trade unions in Columbus pledged support for a boycott of all individuals riding the streetcars and all businesses whose employees or owners did the same. The town's merchants, alarmed at the possible ramifications of such
action, formed a committee to join with the officers of the Chamber of Commerce to discuss means of ending the strike and urged enforcement of the arbitration board's findings in conjunction with Mayor Marshall.\footnote{OSJ, August 2, 1910, p. 1.}

The union continued its fund-raising efforts by selling buttons and cards, and found a lucrative market in the guardsmen. The Columbus Federation of Labor sponsored a mass meeting on the south and west sides of the Statehouse grounds on Sunday, July 31. At this meeting resolutions urging settlement of the dispute were passed unanimously. The speakers included representatives of the United Mine Workers and the local machinists' and ironworkers' unions, as well as Fred Fay of the Amalgamated and City Attorney George W. Bope. Mayor Marshall attended, as did many of the guardsmen camped on the north and east sides of the grounds.\footnote{OSJ, August 1, 1910, p. 1.}

Though the mayor and Safety Director McCune felt uneasy at the thought of the troops disbanding, increasing quiet encouraged General Dick to leave the city and authorize a gradual withdrawal, beginning with McMaken's men. The Chamber of Commerce directors made no direct request that the Guard remain, but issued a "law and order" resolution the same day (August 3) that Marshall repeated his
warnings to would-be rioters. At the same time, both Marshall and Sheriff Sartain energetically canvassed for special police and deputies to bolster the local forces. By August 7, when the last of General Speaks' troops left the city, Marshall had secured seventy-eight special police and Sartain's deputies were augmented by ninety volunteers, primarily night watchmen from the city's factories. Members of the Chamber of Commerce averred their willingness to serve as well. Sartain welcomed them but rebuffed union men who asked to be assigned the same duties.62

With this added strength, Sartain and Marshall began to feel they could cope with the situation once the National Guard left. Local merchants regained confidence as the boycott movement foundered, and renewed efforts to secure a settlement seemed to promise better results. When the last troops left, Columbus citizens voiced their confidence that the worst was over, and waited.63

62 OSJ, August 3 - 8, 1910. All articles begin on first page.

63 See "Letters from our Readers," OSJ, August 7, 8, 9, 1910.
Washington Gladden entitled his sermon on Sunday, August 7 "The Path to Peace." He blamed the "unrighteousness" caused by unequal prosperity for labor unrest, and cited the current trouble as symptomatic of deeper social disorder. His message was, in effect, that the dichotomy between labor and management produced envy, fear, hatred and repression. These responses should be supplanted by a religion of brotherhood in which all men worked together for the civic interest with mutual respect and benefit from the common effort. 64 Gladden's own efforts, however, achieved little success in the interim period. The "peace committee" he, Thompson, and Pretzman comprised met with continued rebuffs from the company and gradually abated its attempts to secure a mutual agreement. Though Columbus remained quiet, the spirit of "unrighteousness" and tension did not disappear. 65 Other peace attempts met with similar failure. The Chamber of Commerce tried to get the union to agree to a proposal which involved full

64 OSJ, August 8, 1910, p. 5.

65 The last recorded peace proposal of Gladden's committee was submitted to the company on August 4. It was rejected. The next day, the union rejected an alternative company proposal that did not include recognition. These efforts appear to have been the final serious exchange between the disputants.
reinstatement of the strikers with no union recognition. When rebuffed, it proposed that the men simply agree not to wear union buttons on the job. It was again rebuffed. At the same time, the Columbus City Council tried a new approach. It demanded compulsory arbitration and settlement, and threatened to withhold funds for police strike expenses if its demands were not met. Neither Harmon nor Stewart so much as recognized this demand. The council, over half of which had come into office with Marshall, made no further threats against the mayor's requests for funds.66

By August 10, isolated incidents were again increasing. A car was seized and set in motion after its operatives had been forcibly removed. A strike sympathizer threw acid on an Oak Street line conductor and seriously impaired the man's eyesight. A motorman on the Mount Vernon Avenue line was shot in the leg during a "small" disturbance in which several others were injured by rocks. The car crews again fired into the crowds, but police made no arrests. The company, while officially complying with Marshall's directive that no carmen be allowed to carry weapons, issued eight hundred posters advertising a two-hundred dollar reward for "information leading to the arrest and conviction of any who throw stones or in any

66 OSJ, August 10, 1910, p. 1.
manner destroy railway property." A group of Oak Street citizens formed a "vigilance committee" to patrol their neighborhood. While no large crowds had formed, reciprocal shootings, stonings and barricades on the streetcar lines increased.67 By August 11, Columbus citizens were again thoroughly alarmed. The Chamber of Commerce stated that it would make no further efforts at arbitration until order was restored. A mass meeting of 2,000 called by the union endorsed a resolution to ask Governor Harmon to call a special session of the legislature to pass a bill authorizing municipal ownership of the street railways, and also reiterated the union's stand against violence. In response to growing public pressure, the mayor called a meeting to consider placing police on duty in the streetcars. Those present included McCune; W. F. Hoffman, president of the sinking fund trustees; David T. Logan, president of the city council; John J. Pugh, city librarian; Samuel G. Osborne, police judge; Frank W. Phillips, police clerk; and Harry S. Holton, service director. These men largely represented the cadre of liberal reformers ushered in with the Marshall administration in 1909, and were in sympathy with the mayor's views on the strike and how to handle it. Nevertheless, Logan and Osborne were especially sensitive to the rising civic frustration in Columbus, and the others

67 OSJ, August 11, 1911, pp. 1-2.
agreed that since the mayor's patrol system had not succeeded in quelling the disturbances, the alternate plan of riding the cars should be tried.\footnote{68}

Accordingly, Marshall met with his force on August 12 and informed them of the change in tactics. The results were disastrous. Thirty-three regular patrolmen refused to ride the cars, and were dismissed from the force.

About twenty special patrolmen followed them. These men constituted about one-fourth of the entire police force. They included men of long-standing service as well as men with poorer service records and temporary volunteers.

Their dismissal, and the order to ride the cars itself, completely demoralized the rest of the men. According to accounts in both the Columbus \underline{\textit{Dispatch}} and the \underline{\textit{Ohio State Journal}}, the reasons for their mutiny centered less around fear for personal safety than around distaste for identifying themselves with the strikebreakers. The police had repeatedly been subjected to insults by Stewart, and attributed much of the city's disorders to the strikebreakers' indiscriminate use of firearms and clubs.

The order to ride the cars with these outsiders was, in addition, a direct contradiction of Marshall's earlier pledge to his men. While most chose to perform their assigned duties, their overwhelming sympathy lay with the mutineers.

\footnote{68 \textit{OSJ}, August 12, 1910, pp. 1-2.}
Marshall saw no alternative but to fire those who refused to obey his order, but in so doing he only added to the discontent among the remaining men.69

Although the mayor professed that putting police on the cars would help curb the strikebreakers as well as the union sympathizers, the night of August 12 saw the worst riots yet. John F. Brady, leader of the imported carmen, shot two women and a girl in a bizarre escapade that later involved an automobile chase along the tracks of the Norfolk and Western Railroad. The police arrested seventeen rioters, but were unable to control the crowds because they were blockaded in the streetcars. Marshall called on Sheriff Sartain for help, but was unable to locate him for two hours. After making contact with the elusive lawman, the mayor was only given two deputies for city use because rioting outside the city limits was taxing Sartain's force of volunteers to the utmost. Rioters dynamited a car on Pennsylvania Avenue and another on the Parsons Avenue line. It was the first use of dynamite during a large scale disturbance, and the first that resulted in material damage.70

Saturday August 13, was no better. More dynamitings wrecked another streetcar and damaged one car barn.

69 OSJ, August 13, 1910, pp. 1-3, August 14, 15, 1910, pp. 1-2; Columbus Dispatch, August 12, 1910, p. 1.
70 OSJ, August 13, 1910, pp. 1-3.
Fourteen persons were injured in exchanges of gunfire, stones, bricks, clubs and rotten eggs throughout all areas of the city with the worst riots occurring in the northeast, along Leonard and Mount Vernon Avenues. 71

As a result of these two nights of chaos, most voices of public opinion attacked Marshall, the police, and the unionists, completing a reversal of sentiment begun about a week before. Though Stewart imported more strikebreakers and hired the Pinkerton Detective Agency to ferret out the stone throwers, the local citizenry devoted its attention entirely to demands for order rather than arbitration for the first time since the strike began. The South Side Business and Improvement Association adopted resolutions calling for Marshall's suspension, an action indirectly endorsed by the Ohio State Journal:

"What this city needs and cries aloud for is a mayor who has no sympathies or predilections when it comes to law and order....Mayor Marshall was elected on a law enforcement platform of his own making. If he cannot or will not keep the faith with the people, if he cannot or will not crush the vicious element now terrorizing this good city, let us have some one in his place who can and will. And let us have him right away." 72

Despite these cries for law and order, Marshall's call for two thousand volunteers got no results at all;

71 OSJ, August 14, 1910, pp. 1-2.
72 OSJ, August 13, 1910, p. 4.
and Sartain fared little better with only twelve volunteers as local disaffection with the law enforcement agencies grew.\textsuperscript{73}

On Sunday, daylight mobs roamed Columbus for the first time. The rioting broke out in the northern and southern sections, then spread throughout the city. Twenty-five separate incidents were reported, with two riots near Schiller Park and one on Mount Vernon Avenue being the most serious. The crowds at the park alone numbered fifteen hundred people.\textsuperscript{74}

The daylight disorders evidently spurred Governor Harmon into action. He called in the National Guard again, this time without consulting Mayor Marshall or even notifying him beforehand. His statement, issued Monday, cited the inability of local police to keep order, the laxity of local law enforcement agencies in not calling for help sooner, and the responsibility of all citizens to lend aid to the Guard as well as the police, for

"...The public interest now wholly overshadows the private controversy which is the occasion of the grave danger that, if permitted to continue, would threaten the foundations of the government, and the first care of all citizens must be to maintain law and order, because otherwise no man can enjoy his individual rights, whatever they may be."\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} OSJ, August 15, 1910, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} OSJ, August 16, 1910, p. 1.
Again the Guard entered Columbus, but again, as had been the case previously, Harmon ordered the troops to remain in quarters unless called for a specific emergency by the police. While Marshall was denied control over use of the troops as he had had before, General Speaks, who commanded, assured the citizenry that the militia "will take precedence over the police only in a big, violent riot."  

Marshall publicly denied a statement in the Columbus News that he had told the governor to go to hell, and inaugurated a new plan to preserve the peace. About one third of his police donned plainclothes, and wandered around the city infiltrating mobs to identify and arrest stone throwers. The presence of the Guard undoubtedly had a chastening effect as well. In any event, while individual incidents continued, the civil forces gradually exerted enough pressure to minimize the size and number of the crowds.  

At the same time, Stewart increased night service in defiance of Marshall's request to stop car runs after dark. Marshall removed his men from the cars after seven o'clock, but Stewart hired special operatives from the Coach

76 Ibid.  
77 OSJ, August 16 - 19, 1910. All first page.
Detective Agency to guard them, and met with almost no major trouble.\textsuperscript{78}

The relative calm after August 18 brought forth a new series of proposals and demands. Washington Gladden and a majority of the city councilmen censured the company's autocratic handling of its part in the strike. Councilman Thomas M. Sherman, in the most articulate pro-Marshall statement issued during this period, declared that the company was working to have the mayor removed because of his endorsement of lower fares and higher taxes for the franchise, and that "the time has come when this strike has become a fight to determine whether the street railway is to rule the city or the city the railway...."\textsuperscript{79}

These comments were largely subsumed by criticism of the local authorities; however the strike, the violence, and the mayor's conduct began to be discussed in the past tense as outbreaks decreased and Columbusites adjusted to the passive presence of the National Guard. While Stewart stubbornly refused to arbitrate and the union stubbornly continued its strike, the \textit{Ohio State Journal} relegated coverage of the strike to the second page on August 24. It was the first time no front page mention of strike activities had been made in a month.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{OSJ}, August 16, 1910, p. 1.
Columbus bankers took perhaps the most aggressive step during this second interim by declaring that, as far as they were concerned, the strike was over. Meanwhile Guardsmen saw their first duty since returning to Columbus when they investigated a bogus report that fifteen sticks of dynamite had been placed on the car tracks on West Broad Street. The troops began disbanding the next day, on August 29.\footnote{OSJ, August 29, 1910, pp. 1-2.}

That night the last major disruption of the strike occurred on Leonard Avenue, which had been the site of persistent disturbances throughout the summer. Guardsmen, police and deputy sheriffs all rushed to the corner of Leonard and Galloway, where a crowd had gathered following an attempt to dynamite a streetcar. Around two thousand people milled about with little direction. When police and troops arrived, the crowd refused to disperse and was chased back into its homes by guardsmen and patrolmen, who made liberal use of clubs and firearms. Thirty-nine were arrested in the melee, but no serious injuries were reported and the combined forces cleared the streets in record time.\footnote{OSJ, August 30, 1910, pp. 1-2.}

On August 30, three more cars were dynamited, injuring four passengers and one pedestrian. In the general
outcry, even Stewart agreed with the police that the strikers themselves would not have been responsible for the explosions, and attributed them to union sympathizers among the "hoodlum element". The explosions, however, served further to alienate the non-labor community from the strike. Editorials and letters to the press unanimously demanded "law and order" and an end to "terrorism". There was no further mention of arbitration. 82

The union, however, remained committed to the strike, and succeeded in enlisting the support of the Columbus Federation of Labor. Though Stewart declared that the company would "never" arbitrate, a combined meeting of the CFL on August 30 issued a statement that:

"At a congress of labor unions, delegates from all labor unions in the city unanimously elected a committee of ten....to make an effort to settle the strike and in the event of being unsuccessful, they were empowered and authorized to call a sympathetic strike of not only organized workingmen, but also of all unorganized workers in the community." 83

Upon presenting a petition requesting the governor to intercede and use his power to force arbitration, the unionists waited. Harmon's reply was simply that "I have no intention of interfering until lawlessness has been crushed." 84

82 OSJ, August 31, 1910, pp. 1, 2, 4.
83 OSJ, August 31, 1910, pp. 1-2.
84 OSJ, September 2, 1910, pp. 1-2.
Despite the reduction in mass disruptions, the Chamber of Commerce, local businessmen, and state officials regarded the dynamitings as a more vicious threat to the community's safety and reputation. With the advent of the State Fair in September, their concern about Columbus' image reached its peak. More guardsmen were called to the city; Pretzman issued statements to newspapers throughout Ohio that the propaganda that Columbus was unsafe for decent people was an insidious lie; and the attorneys for the Railway and Light Company secured an injunction barring picketing and soliciting in Union Station. The Chamber also advertised standing rewards for the arrest and conviction of stone throwers (two hundred and fifty dollars), shooters (five hundred dollars) and dynamiters (one thousand dollars).  

Labor Day, September 5, was somewhat of cause célèbre for the unionists in 1910. Their parade, in which seven thousand workingmen marched, was attended by a crowd estimated at fifty thousand that later adjourned to Schiller Park for an afternoon of speeches and picknicking. Ex-judge M. B. Earnhart, secretary-treasurer G. W. Savage of the UMW, and Fred Fay addressed the assemblage. All urged

85 OSJ, September 4, 1910, Main Section, pp. 1-2, Editorial Section, p. 1.
votes in the November elections for labor sympathizers. At the same time, most sources outside the union concurred that the strike was broken. While the police began pulling in dynamiting suspects for questioning and imposed strict censorship on all their activities, Marshall made a last appeal to Harmon to call a special session of the legislature. As before, the appeal was denied.

On October 18 after nearly three months of striking, the union called a halt to its boycott and admitted defeat, citing the financial burden and the hardships of approaching cold weather as the major factors in its decision. Some men returned to work for the company, which had threatened but never enforced a lockout of all the strikers. Others migrated to Cleveland to work on the street cars there, and still others found alternative employment in other Columbus companies. Of an estimated five hundred and seventy men who had actively participated in the strike, "only 40 or 50" had deserted it during the dispute.

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86 OSJ, September 7, 1910, pp. 1-2.
87 OSJ, September 13, 1910, pp. 1-2.
88 OSJ, October 19, 1910, pp. 1-2.
The official end of the street car strike on October 18 was anti-climactic. Even the unionists had known for over a month that their effort had been broken. By the time they were ready to admit defeat, Columbus was ready to breathe a sigh of relief and to forget the original reasons for the summer's unrest, if not to forget the unrest itself.

In fact, the union's part in the matter largely had been ignored for weeks. Columbus business interests and civic officials continued their efforts to effect a peaceful settlement throughout most of the strike, but were increasingly alienated from their original quest for arbitration. Recurrent violence finally led the Chamber of Commerce to advocate "law and order" above a just settlement of the dispute. Civic groups, the press, and most of the vocal citizenry were not far behind. Washington Gladden, who continually spoke out for labor, stood as a lone figure in his defense of unionization and repeated reminders that strikes were a product of an unjust social and economic system.89

As public attention turned to peace rather than

89 Lineas St(reck), New York, to (George) Gladden, Columbus, August 1, 1910, Gladden Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Box 18.
peaceful settlement, Mayor Marshall, rather than the union itself, became the target of most criticism. The union repeatedly disavowed violence, disassociated itself from the disturbances, and expended its energies in nonviolent picketing, leafleting, and attempting to secure arbitration. Its official stand, and the fact that very few of its members were ever identified as participants in the riots, thus raised no public hue and cry. Marshall's position was far more vulnerable and controversial. General Manager Stewart attacked him continually for his labor sympathies and prosecution of the company's "special police" and strikebreakers, whom Marshall considered to be troublemakers of the first order. But his inability to control Columbus and maintain peace received the most attention. Whether attributed to the mayor's union sympathies, poor management of the police and poor tactics, or neglect of the community interest, the majority opinion clearly held Marshall responsible for the recurring violence. Governor Harmon's decision to call in the National Guard in August was but the most blatant indication of Marshall's inability to retain the trust of Columbusites.

As the strike wore on and the trouble continued, Marshall lost the faith of strikers and sympathizers as well. His censorship of police investigation of the dynamite explosions, use of plainclothesmen to detect rioters,
and endorsement of the vigorous tactics used to break up the Leonard Avenue riot August 29, bred distrust that he really was a friend of the workingman. That these efforts were largely unrelated to Marshall's convictions about labor and unionism meant little to men who felt increasingly isolated from the rest of their community. It must have been a bitter feeling indeed to see their movement and purpose ignored by the townspeople who had once lent their aid to the men's attempts to secure a just settlement of their grievances.\(^{90}\)

Whether the rioters themselves, numbering as many as three to four thousand in a single night, were strikers, sympathizers, mere onlookers or disruptors bent on their own purposes, cannot be definitely determined by the existing evidence. The union's adamant stand against violence lends credence to the belief held by Marshall and others that very few strikers actively participated in the riots. The pro-union, anti-company sentiment of the crowds was, however, very obvious. Their attacks were exclusively directed against the cars, tracks, car barns, and strike-breakers of the Railway and Light Company. In almost three months of disturbances, there were no reports recording any destruction or looting of other property.\(^{91}\)

\(^{90}\) Washington Gladden, p. 341.

\(^{91}\) OSJ, July 24 - October 13, 1910.
Although the guardsmen on duty in Columbus were called "scab" and hissed by a few juveniles on their arrival in town, they seem to have largely been either accepted or ignored by the populace when in camp and respected, or at least avoided, when on patrol. Even Bessie Newbrough's accidental shooting did not create an untenable situation.\footnote{52} Some hostility was undoubtedly generated by the strike-breakers, who were far less discriminate in their choice of targets than the mobs. The Mayor of Linden, for example, complained at least twice that Carmen on the Linden line attacked pedestrians with no provocation in an attempt to create trouble.\footnote{53} The crowds, then, directed their actions almost exclusively toward the company's property and imported men. In this respect, whatever "hoodlum element" there was present was kept under control by the majority of participants, who channeled their obvious pro-union sentiments into a single line of attack.\footnote{54}

These crowds, primarily composed of union sympathizers (and undoubtedly, a large number of mere onlookers), came from the lower income residential districts of town and generally participated in riots in or adjacent to their home areas. They were workingmen, whether laborers,\footnote{52} See footnote No. 59.\footnote{53} \textit{OSJ}, August 31, 1910, p. 2.\footnote{54} \textit{OSJ}, July 24 - October 18, 1910.
small businessmen, or members of the lower-income white collar occupations (clerks, shop assistants, and so on). The list of names and addresses of those arrested for rioting, and the widespread location of the disturbances, clearly indicates one major center of discontent between Summit Avenue on the west, the Milo district above the railyards on the north, Champion Avenue on the east, and Long Street on the south. Other outbreaks occurred in virtually every other low-income residential area in the city, however. These included the Fourth Street-Fifth Avenue nexus which connected along High Street with another center between High and Pennsylvania on Goodale; the river bottoms along West Broad Street; the brewery and industrial districts near Schiller Park and Innis Avenue in the southern sector of the city; and the strip of low income housing along Parsons Avenue from "Steeleton" north to Main Street. The only other distinct trouble area lay apart from the city in the northeastern suburb of Linden. 95

The strike did not produce any visible leaders in these disturbances but rather seemed to generate a spirit of mutual concern among workingmen throughout the city, whether it took the form of riots against company property and personnel or financial and moral support by other labor unions.

95 See map for major riot areas.
The one activity which does not seem to have been generated by these "shared assumptions" of united concern was the dynamiting. Theories about the nature of the explosions ran the gamut from company and union plots to anarchists or outside opportunists bent on destroying the good name of Columbus. They occurred independently of the riots in all but one case, and were located both in and beyond the riot areas. The police questioned union men, known "hoodlums", and even rural residents in an intensive campaign to locate the source of the explosions, but released all their suspects and were unable to bring even one "terrorist" to trial. The identity of the perpetrators remained either an extraordinarily closely guarded secret by those who knew them, or was never common knowledge among strikers or sympathizers at all. Given the fact that the explosions, more than any other reason, turned the business and civic community against the strike, it seems likely that the dynamiters operated in almost complete independence from the union supporters who massed on the streets.96

October 18 by no means marked the end of the community spirit among Columbus workingmen. With the November congressional and gubernatorial elections less than a month

96 See OSJ, August 31, 1910, pp. 1-2, for most explicit statements on the various theories about the dynamitings.
away, labor sympathizers and civic reformers received a warm welcome from potential voters who were more interested in voicing their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the strike than in tallying up its cost. While Republican and Democratic candidates geared their Columbus campaigns around law, order, and the financial disaster of civil disturbances, the Socialist party's two candidates addressed themselves to the benefits of municipal ownership of public utilities. The results confounded professional prognosticators. Of the approximately forty thousand votes cast, the Socialists received twelve thousand. This vote represented over twelve times the number they received in 1908, when their strength was only nine hundred. J. L. Bachman, an attorney running for Congress, carried the First, Eighth, and Ninth Wards in the city, while Tom Clifford carried the Ninth and led Warren Harding, the Republican candidate for governor, in the Seventh and Eighth.97

Though most political interpreters assumed that this rebuke of the Republicans and Democrats did not indicate permanent Socialist strength, the municipal elections of 1911 showed the third party again polling close to twelve thousand votes. Alvah Eby, who ran for mayor, ran only

97 OSJ, November 10, 1910, p. 3; Columbus Dispatch, November 9, 1910, p. 3.
two thousand votes behind Mayor Marshall, while the Republican candidate, George Karb, profited from the split in the liberal ranks and easily outdistanced his two opponents. Though the Progressive reforms instituted in the 1912 constitutional convention sapped most of the Socialist strength in Columbus, Marshall again lost to Karb in 1913.98

The strike cost Columbus seventy-five thousand dollars, cost the state almost two hundred thousand dollars, and severely depleted the resources of the street car company, which was forced to re-organize as the Columbus Railway, Power and Light Company after an even more serious setback caused by the 1913 flood. Columbus never did receive its reduction in car fare.99 The cost to the city was far greater than the strain on its budget, however. It had been subjected to three months of tension and violence which destroyed confidence in its civic leaders and pride in the city itself, and brought latent rifts within the seemingly homogenous community into public view. The impact and importance of these dimensions remains to be examined.

99 See OSJ, October 19, 1910, p. 2, for financial breakdown of the strike.
THE QUESTION OF COMMUNITY

During the progressive era growing urbanization and industrialization forced many towns and cities to attempt reform or reorganization in their efforts to cope with municipal expansion and the concomitant increase in physical, social, spiritual, and logistical community needs. While often integrated, two classes of reform seem to have formed the nucleus of these efforts. One was social, concerning itself with the welfare and plight of the urban masses. The other was structural, centering its attention on the operation of municipal government. The interplay or lack of interplay between these two types of reform in the urban milieu has been the focus of studies ranging from examinations of specific cities and reformers to broader theoretical treatises on the nature of progressive reform itself. Of historians in the latter category who have attempted to provide a viable framework for understanding this period and the human behavior of the times, Richard Hofstadter, Gabriel Kolko, and Robert Wiebe have presented three distinctly different approaches. They represent the gamut of views which have been presented in

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the last few years to deal with the phenomenon of progressive reform. 101

All three historians, however, emphasize "order" as the goal of reform, whether it be pre-industrial, business, or bureaucratic. It is here that they coincide with students of specific towns and individual reformers. The desire for municipal order appears continually in all these analyses. Whether the advocates of reform were structuralists bent on injecting "efficiency" into city government or social reformers bent on improving the economic and spiritual lot of workingmen who were paid less than a living wage and then subjected to charity, "order" became their catch phrase and rallying cry.

This contemporary emphasis on "order" in urban life leads to two primary conclusions. The reformers of the early twentieth century perceived disorder in the cities, and assumed that the elimination of that disorder would benefit the community as a whole. Thus reform became linked with "community interest," and community perceptions of that interest came in turn to stimulate reform itself. These perceptions of "community" and "interest" provide vehicles for analysis of the progressive era that

have most often been broken down into studies of specific groups or actors in the city. The intensive study of a segment of society has led these works to offer insights largely unobtainable through more generalized works, yet at the same time has led to a natural emphasis on their specific subjects of study when attempting to relate their findings to the whole of society.

An equally useful method for study would seem to be an analysis of "community interest" as an independent entity instead of a tool used by specific groups within that community. If one defines "community" as the interaction of persons in a spatial relationship, the level of interaction becomes the key to discerning the extent of "community" in a given locale. A city, then, might contain a community as a whole, a set of communities within different segments of the population, or virtually no community at all. The latter would occur when each segment of the urban society interacted only with itself; in contemporary progressive parlance, such lack of interaction would imply "disorder."

Along these lines, contemporary emphasis on the need for order in urban society implies a perception of

102 This definition does not conform to sociological definitions. For ninety-four different sociological ones, see George A. Hillery, Jr., "Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement," in Rural Sociology, XX (June, 1955), pp. 111-124.
community predicated on interaction; a perception of community as a whole. This would not necessarily depend on a consensus within the whole, but rather on a viable level of communication at which compromise among sectors of the population could be effected, a level at which the pragmatics of coexistence could take place.

To return to the question of contemporary perception, an individual's or group's sense of identity and goals is largely predicated on the perception of their role in their environment. Analysis of the changing levels at which compromise, or interaction, takes place would serve as an indicator of individual or group identity. If a continuum between the denial and affirmation of one's goals (identity) is postulated, there would be a level below which one would not voluntarily compromise simply because it would negate one's own perception of one's role in society. On the other hand, interaction above a certain level would not be voluntarily tolerated by others within the community if the affirmation of one set of goals leads to the denial of another. The area between those two levels, averaged out between the various sectors of society, would be the area where community interaction, or coexistence, could take place. It would be, in other words, the area of community interest.
Musafer Sherif, a social psychologist, commented on his work with much the same phenomenon in 1966:

"...We found...that the more committed (ego-involved) the person is, the more consistent a pattern he exhibits in his acceptances and rejections on an issue. The less committed (ego-involved) he is, the more noncommittal are his reactions. On the basis of the evidence obtained, we represented his attitude as a pattern consisting of a latitude of acceptance, a latitude of rejection, and a latitude of noncommitment....The relative sizes of the person's latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment were proposed as operational indicators of the degree of the individual's involvement...."103

Sherif is now in the process of studying these latitudes in relation to groups, and has postulated that group behavior will evidence the same characteristics.

This socio-psychological emphasis on the role of noncommitment in human interaction on given issues parallels the discussion of levels of compromise above. The postulate that the area of interaction and thus the community interest comprises noncommitted behavior, however, is valid only in reference to specific groups. Taken as a whole, the coexistence factor in a community (i.e., the amount of interaction) is just as necessary to the maintenance of "order" as is the affirmation of identity and role to the differing sectors of that community. In other words, the areas that do not substantially affect an

individual's or group's specific interests either positively or negatively can substantially affect the community as a whole. The larger the area of compromise, the more orderly the community's coexistence.

The size of the area in which interaction (compromise) takes place is predicated on the specific issues at hand at any given point in time. Thus, while contemporary perception of community interest could remain fairly static on an abstract level, immediate concerns would alter the dimensions of compromise according to the amount of involvement they generated. All the potential actors or groups need not participate in issue interaction all the time. For example, a police strike would involve virtually all the groups in a community because police protection, and the absence of it, would seem essential to all of them. On the other hand, a musicians' walkout might only affect devotees of the art who wished to employ, or patronize employers of, the artists.

Within the ranks of the issue-involved members of the community, levels of compromise are determined by the extent their involvement denies or affirms their perception of role, or their identity. In the most blatant terms, the pragmatics of coexistence would be weighed against the specific goals of each involved segment of the community. There might be no compromise possible if the musicians,
for example, felt that the works they were asked to play denied their identity as artists, while their employers were convinced that only those specific works were pieces of art worthy of performance. A musician who hated Mozart might not be able to compromise with the Mozart Symphony Orchestra. On the other hand, a populace concerned with the maintenance of police protection would not have many specific goals beyond that protection. If the police and city officials engaged in a dispute over working conditions and pay, the pragmatics of keeping the force operating at all costs might well enlarge the compromise areas of both the local government and the police themselves. Within that area, interaction could adjust the demands of both sides.

Neither musicians nor police, however, provide very satisfactory vehicles for studying the community interest. The former involve only a minor portion of the community as a rule; the latter are so essential to the entire community that they virtually lose all their individual or group prerogatives. On the other hand, public transportation provides a very viable focus for this analysis. In the progressive period, the specific mode of this transport was the streetcar.

The street car industry was by nature a public utility, holding all the responsibilities of public service:
the lowest possible fares and the most efficient and widespread service for the greatest possible number of people. It was a marginal profit operation, however, demanding a large outlay of funds and depending upon voluminous public patronage for its returns. While competition often decimated these returns, the alternatives of privately or municipally owned monopoly franchises created additional problems. Municipal ownership violated the time-honored American ethic of private enterprise, and did not automatically guarantee efficient or profitable service. With many municipal governments operating from antiquated tax bases and dependent on state legislation for the means to create additional revenues or even for permission to own the traction lines, municipal operation was virtually out of the question. Detroit, for example, was unable to secure municipal ownership until 1922, over twenty years after it was advocated by Mayor Hazen S. Pingree.\textsuperscript{104} Private monopoly, on the other hand, was often predicated upon long-term franchises that set fares which were outdated years before the expiration of the franchise. The companies were often over-capitalized and run by absentee stockholders. In Columbus, for instance, The Clark Syndicate of Philadelphia held the largest block of shares.\textsuperscript{105} In

\textsuperscript{104} Reform in Detroit, pp. 123, 124.

\textsuperscript{105} See footnote No. 31.
addition, the very fact that the companies were private concerns implied a maximization of profits which at times engendered popular suspicion that the taxpayers were being bilked.  

In any case, marginal profit levels and the impetus to minimize overhead augmented labor-management friction that was largely absent from other utilities due to their comparatively small number of employees and the specialized nature of the services their workers performed. The addition of the labor factor in the case of the street car companies not only increased internal problems but provided a second facet of involvement externally. The communities the companies served would have an interest in the labor-management, as well as the public-private, aspects of their operation, as both would affect the character of the services performed.

The street car industry presents a viable focus for the analysis of community interaction and contemporary definition of community interests because it was, first, common to most urban areas as a public service; second, subject to dispute along organizational (structural) lines; and third, subject to dispute along social lines.

106 Hollis's discussion of Mayor Pingree's encounters with Tom Johnson in Reform in Detroit, Chapter 6, "The Mayor Leads a Nationwide Fight for Low Fares," (pp. 101-124) gives ample illustration of this popular distrust.
with reference to its role as an employer of labor. Detroit, Cincinnati, Toledo and Cleveland all experienced major civic battles over the franchise question, to name but four cities near Columbus. With respect to strikes, Columbus shares the honors with Philadelphia for the major labor disruptions in 1910. A list of the strikebreaking activities of one agency, that of Pearl L. Bergoff of New York, includes not only the Philadelphia strikes of 1909 and 1910, but also Pottsville, Pennsylvania and Trenton, New Jersey, in 1910; Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania in 1915 and 1916; New York in 1916; and New York and Brooklyn in 1920. In 1910, Pittsburgh's mayor deemed the street car problem so serious that he commissioned a special investigation. Ten years later, The Federal Electric Railways Commission reported to the President on the same subject. It noted that Pittsburgh's system, among those in one hundred and eighteen other cities, had been thrown into receivership. And so on. Clearly, the problems of the street car industry were of national concern.\(^{107}\)

At the same time, attempts to resolve problems and maximize operation of street railway systems on the municipal level were subject to local variables. They

illustrate the levels of community concern and interest in individual towns across the country, and thus provide ample opportunity for comparative study. The Columbus example in this respect becomes the basis of an analysis of one city's concept of community interest and part of a larger potential examination of the phenomenon of community interest in urbanizing America during the progressive era.

During the 1910 strike in Columbus the most obvious example of community interaction was the arbitration movement. Washington Gladden's Peace Committee, the Chamber of Commerce's instigation of compulsory state arbitration, and the union's continual willingness to negotiate and accept the terms of the arbitrators are but three indexes of the strength of this movement. In addition to these members of the community, the press, the mayor, city council, and even the governor united with the vocal population (as seen through letters to the various newspapers) in efforts to persuade Stewart and the company to negotiate. These efforts continued practically unabated through the first series of disturbances and the first encampment of the National Guard. One of the more interesting aspects of the movement was that appeals to Stewart, on the public level at least, were as often couched in terms of the responsibility of management to deal fairly
with labor as in terms of his obligation to the community to maintain car operation at all costs. Stewart's importation of professional strikebreakers to maintain that operation seemed to only augment the efforts to arbitrate. Thus the business and professional community as well as local and state government and the workingclass population, united together in an intense campaign to preserve order which implied union acceptance as, at minimum, the price Columbusesites were willing to pay for the maintenance of public transportation.

This was not necessarily because arbitration and union recognition were central to the individual or group interests present, but seems rather to have been due to the feeling that it was in the "community interest" to arbitrate in this particular situation. Business and industry may well have viewed unionism as a threat to their own particular interests and goals. Labor had no guarantee that arbitration, though it implied union recognition, would cease discrimination and lead to the shorter hours and higher pay it sought. The car-riding population could have ridden cars operated by "scabs" and could have been satisfied to back Stewart's efforts to break the strike. Local governments in other towns (notably New York) had themselves employed strikebreakers to keep public services running, or had used police to break
strikes.\textsuperscript{108} Investigation of the "ifs" seems pertinent here because all these alternatives happened in other towns during the progressive period. By the same token, the threatened union boycott and general strike of all Columbus laborers never materialized, whereas similar actions had occurred in other cities, notably Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{109} The mutiny of police in Columbus was duplicated in Indianapolis; in one Western town, even the National Guard aligned itself on the side of the strikers.\textsuperscript{110}

There were, then, multiple alternatives available to Columbusites, both before and during the strike. With respect to the immediate actors in the dispute, the union's level of compromise was very clear. It would not countenance non-recognition, yet was willing to compromise on all its other goals. Stewart remained completely outside the pale because of his absolute refusal to negotiate in good faith, which only was attributed to his fear of a closed shop well after the movement to arbitrate had begun. The other actors in the dispute included those engaged in active participation and those, the majority of the population, who merely had a stake in the outcome. Of the former group, Gladden's level of compromise was fair

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{I Break Strikes!}, pp. 121-123.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 89-104.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 23, 24.
treatment of the laborers. As a social reformer, his primary concern was predicated almost exclusively on this consideration. Marshall and the city council under his control were rather structuralists turned social reformers. Their compromise level of necessity included preserving the peace: union recognition and fair treatment seemed the most viable way to do so. The Chamber of Commerce was also anxious to preserve order as a necessary ingredient to the maximal operation of business. The governor could not tolerate disorder in his capital city. Beyond these actors, the majority of the population--business, professional, union labor, non-union labor--arranged itself in much the same way. Its concerns ranged from keeping order and keeping the cars running to union recognition or at least fair play for the laboring man.

These positions, with the exception of Stewart's, do not prohibit the range of alternatives discussed above when taken singly. As a unit, however, there seems to have been a marked area of interaction, or potential compromise. If one accepts compromise as the latitude of community interest, one can postulate an overlap within which differing definitions, or goals of order, will mesh. In the Columbus case, arbitration was the only action which, again with the exception of Stewart, did not deny the immediate goals of any of the actors. It was thus
the only viable action in the community interest as a whole.

On the other hand, as the strike wore on two factors increasingly altered the perception of the community interest. First, the move for arbitration did not produce results. Second, the violence persisted. As members of the community gradually realized that Stewart would not arbitrate at all, no matter what kind of pressure they were able to bring to bear, they searched for another viable alternative and found none. The united movement for arbitration faltered and died. At the same time, violence presented another area for community concern that grew increasingly urgent as it persisted over a long length of time. Here the latitude for community interest measurably widened. It included a range of alternatives which differing parts of the community could undertake with little risk of violating others. Even Stewart and the union agreed that the violence should be controlled, though each attributed its cause to the other and thus rationalized whatever part they themselves or their employees or sympathizers, respectively, might have played in the disruptions. The latitude of community interaction, within the perception of order as the community interest, permitted a concomitant level of disagreement as to method without producing disagreement about the specific goal itself.
The movement to eradicate violence, however, superimposed itself on the dying issue of arbitration. While the one did not negate the other, it did completely overpower it. Hence the union, which clung desperately to the idea that arbitration was the only means to achieve recognition, found itself speaking to a deaf audience on the one hand, while it united with the rest of the community in urging a cessation of violence. By the time it admitted defeat and called off the strike, arbitration and union recognition had become completely tangential to the more pressing perception of order as community interest.

After the strike, the union's defeat made the arbitration movement completely non-essential, while the discontent that had sparked the unionization movement in the first place remained unresolved. In this respect the 1910 elections, while illustrative of that discontent, show the divisiveness of partisan politics rather than an effort by any of the parties to find another common ground of compromise.

As mentioned above, the Columbus strike presents questions not only involving the problems of public transportation during the progressive era, but also touching on the nature of contemporary perception with regard to community and community interest as independent entities. It is a measure of the extent of the complexities of
urbanization that the Columbus attempts to find a viable method to achieve the community interest during this one event met with failure. Even at a time when "community" retained tangibility in contemporary perception, the qualities comprising it remained elusive, amorphous, and laced with the change its members sought to control.
NOTE ON SOURCES

Most of the data accumulated during the writer's research on the 1910 strike was obtained from the Ohio State Journal. Selected editions of the Columbus Dispatch were used to augment the information in the Journal when the writer deemed it necessary. Both papers have been microfilmed, and are available for use on film at the Ohio Historical Society. It should be noted, however, that the film is extremely poor, and that it is much more fruitful to use the original issues that the Society holds.

Of the manuscript sources consulted, the papers of Washington Gladden at the Ohio Historical Society were by far the most helpful. The Society plans to microfilm these papers and should have them available for use through interlibrary loan and sale as well as use in the Society itself by 1972. The manuscripts department of the Society is now searching for the papers of prominent Columbusers and state figures who played a part in the strike as part of its acquisitions program. Though no papers were found, other than those cited in the bibliography, in time for the writer to use them in her research, it is likely that the next few months will yield further original source materials. Future researchers should consult the Society for additional manuscripts which may have been acquisitioned subsequent to the date of this paper.
As a final note, the state and local records held by the archives department of the Ohio Historical Society have not been fully processed and may provide future source material. The Adjutant General's files, however, contain no substantial records pertaining to the 1910 strike.
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