'TO FIGHT OUR COUNTRY'S BATTLES': AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DURING THE INTERWAR ERA, 1919-1935

VOLUME I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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2001

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ABSTRACT

For the United States Marine Corps, participation in the World War, 1917-1918, was the single most important event in its development as an amphibious assault force during the interwar period between 1919 and 1941. While the Marine Corps experimented with what Marines called the "Advanced Base Force," built around the New Steel Navy during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, that service spent the bulk of its efforts as a constabulary force in the West Indies and Central America enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary with minimal consideration being given to its role in the nation's defense. This changed, however, during the World War, as the tactical, operational, and technical innovations that characterized this conflict had a direct and lasting impact on the institutional framework of the Marine Corps during the interwar era. Led by Major General John A. Lejeune and a small group of far-sighted officers at Headquarters, the Marine Corps not only survived the fiscal conservatism of this era but instead thrived and built upon its World War record as a combat-ready institution.

This dissertation illustrates the impact of the World War on not only the Corps' advanced base force doctrine but more so the "institutional" or "day to day" operations of the Marine Corps insofar as training, education, recruitment, and administration are concerned. The participation in and lessons of the World War served as the basis for all of the reforms undertaken in the Marine Corps from the beginning of demobilization in early 1919 under Major General Commandant George Bamett through the era of Major
General John H. Russell who served as the Major General Commandant from 1934 to 1936. The reforms enacted by General Barnett and his successors included the introduction of a permanent system of professional and vocational officer and enlisted education; training reforms; recruitment and retention of qualified manpower; and the slow, but steady acceptance of the landing mission as Marines returned from China in 1929, and Nicaragua in 1933 through the efforts of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. Taking the lead in all of these reforms were the innovations undertaken in the curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico during the 1920's and early 1930's. The innovations introduced at Quantico had a lasting impact on the mission and doctrine of the Marine Corps as it began to prepare for its greater test during World War II.

Lastly, this dissertation concludes that participation in the World War had a far-reaching effect on the Marine Corps and its institutions, its personnel, and its operational and tactical doctrine. Institutionally, participation in the war changed forever how the Marine Corps would educate and train its officers and enlisted men; recruit suitable young men as administrators, supply clerks, aviation and auto mechanics, and most importantly, as infantrymen for its combat forces. The dissertation concludes that the World War's legacy inculcated a generation of officers who eventually led the Marine Corps during World War II in the principles of land warfare.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the officers and enlisted men of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division, FMF, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina with whom I had the honor and privilege to serve with from September 1986 to May 1987. It was one indeed an honor and privilege to have served with you all in the field and in garrison; in good times and in bad. To you all I say thanks for the best time of my Marine Corps career and life. Semper Fidelis! You are surely the real Devil Dogs!
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A dissertation is the product of many not just one. Throughout the writing and research of this dissertation my advisor, Professor Allan R. Millett, Ph.D., provided wise and valuable advice on my approach to such an important era in Marine Corps history. Being a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, and a renowned scholar of Marine Corps history, his mentorship proved critical in shaping my love of this era in the Marine Corps. Professor Millett was always available to constructively criticize and suggest a better approach to examining the interwar era insofar as it affected the institutional development of the Marine Corps during the 1920's and 1930's. To this I am forever grateful and hope to one day repay his mentorship which has made the author a much better historian. In his own right, Professor Millett has built upon the foundation laid by other distinguished scholars in what seems a long time ago during my undergraduate and graduate years at John Carroll University. Professor Williamson Murray, Professor Emeritus, also of the History Department at the Ohio State University likewise deserves special mention here. Professor Murray's mentorship, advice, and scholarly criticism has left a deep, lasting impact on my writing and ability to critically examine military affairs during the interwar era. Both Professors Millett and Murray are
true pioneers in the study of the military revolution that the Marine Corps was so much a part of during the interwar era. I would also like to thank Professor John F. Guilmartin, Ph.D., Professor of History, for his excellent work throughout the years and on my present committee. I thoroughly enjoyed my course work with him and through him have learned a great deal on early military history. Also, I would like to thank Professor David L. Stebenne, Ph.D., a recent arrival at the History Department at the Ohio State University and a fine scholar who kindly agreed to serve on my dissertation committee. Also deserved of mention are Professors Eve Levin, Martha Garland, Alam Payind, Michael Hogan, Mark Grimsley, Donald Cooper, Samuel Chu, the late Alan K. Wildman, James C. Bartholemew, Kenneth J. Andrien, Leila J. Rupp, Christopher Reed, and Russell S. Hart.

As for those outside the Ohio State University community, special thanks goes out to Mr. Fred Graboske, Head Archivist at the History and Museums Division of the U.S. Marine Corps in Washington, D.C. Mr. Graboske was extremely helpful in pointing out sources and made other suggestions insofar as source material. I thank him for his patience, mentorship, and above all else, friendship during my time as student intern at the Marine Corps Historical Center; Mr. David C. Brown, formerly of the Breckinridge Library at the Marine Corps Combat Development Center at Quantico, V.A., and now at the Navy Historical Library. Without David's suggestions on sources and books, this dissertation may never have been written. David is a great friend and colleague whose friendship I have always valued; Mr. Trevor Plante at the National Archives, Washington, D.C., likewise proved to be very critical in the writing of this dissertation. Trevor went out of his way many times to assist this historian in his research. His suggestions in pointing out record groups and other new sources proved critical in the
writing of this entire dissertation; To my friend and former colleague Mrs. Amy (Cantin) Cohen at the Marine Corps Historical Center who likewise proved to be extremely helpful in the writing of this dissertation.; Also at the Marine Corps Historical Center special thanks go out to Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.), Director Emeritus; Mr. Charles Melson, Chief Historian, Charles R. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Jon H. Hoffman, USMC, Dr. David C. Crist, Dr. Jack Shulimson, Dr. V. Keith Fleming, Evelyn Engiander, Librarian; Ms. Judy Petsch, Christine Laba, Danny Crawford, Robert Acquilina, Anne Ferrante, Ms. Shelia Grambling, Jim Fairfax, and Lieutenant Colonel Leon Craig, USMC.

As for other sources, I would like to thank the staff at the Marine Corps Research Center, particularly the following individuals: Ms. A. Kerry Strong and her staff in the Archives section; Miss Janet Kennelly; Hilda Harris; Cathy Eaton, Vicki Doering; Belinda Kelly; Ms. H'Sook Park; the late Mrs. Lisa Anderson; Sandra Clark, and Mr. Irvin Sparks. Also, special mention goes out to the following Marines at the Marine Corps Research Center who oftentimes allowed this historian to work beyond regular hours: Sergeants Drew Mizez and David Fox; Corporals Bobby Greer and Frank Sekly; and Lance Corporal Robby Griffis.

Also deserving of thanks are the staff at the Southern Historical Collection, located at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., for their support work in locating and work with the Brigadier General William P. Upshur Papers. Also Jeffrey Barlow, Dean C. Allard, Gary Weir, Robert Cressman, and Richard Russell all at the Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

I would also like to thank the following individuals for their advice, suggestions, and encouragement: Generals Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.) and Charles C. Krulak.
USMC (Ret.); Colonels John E. Greenwood, USMC (Ret), Al Croft, USMC, (Ret.); and Robert V. White, USMC (Ret.); Lieutenant Colonels Steven F. Crittenden, USMC (Ret.). and Merrill L. "Skip" Bartlett, USMC (Ret.), the late Tom Bartlett of Leatherneck Magazine; Mrs. Nancy Lee Hoffman of Leatherneck; Mrs. Bonnie L. Martin and Mr. Adam Hawkins of the Marine Corps Association; Lieutenant General Ronald E. Christmas, Mr. Pyong Roe, Mrs. Susan Hodges, and Mary Beth King all of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

I would like to specifically thank my parents Leo and Frances H. Daugherty, and my sister Terry for all of their love, support and encouragement throughout this entire Ph.D. process. I could not have made it without their encouragement and support throughout the years. I can never repay you all for this. To my sister, I want to say thanks for all of your encouragement and faith in your big brother! The love you all have shown is gratifying. To Ms. Doris T. Chang, my fiance and partner for life, and for the many talks we have had on China during the 1920's which has furthered my enthusiasm for this era of Marine Corps history.

I would also like to thank my students at Park College, particularly those who took my History of the U.S. Marine Corps during the winter of 1999. You all proved to be excellent listeners and I am grateful for your critical comments and questions on this particular era of Marine Corps history. Special thanks goes out to Captain Steven Castro, First Sergeant Mark Johnson, Gysgt David Garland, Ssgt Kimberely Simms, Lcpl. Brandon Smith, and former Marine Sgt. Matt Legre. Also deserved of thanks are Mrs. Sharon Talbot, Mrs. Moynen Elliott, Maria Mazone, Joby Abernathley, Janet Gluchka, Carolyn Schoenstein, Erica Skrobot, Chris Burton, Marge Haffner, Kay
Freeman, Gail Summerhill, Linda Toy, and Laura Cooney, all staff members in the History Department at The Ohio State University.

No acknowledgment can be complete without mentioning several of my professors at John Carroll University who many years ago laid the foundation for my love of military history. To the late Rev. Donald W. Smythe, S.J., the debt can never be repaid for his mentorship and encouragement. He was the one that introduced me to the serious study of military history, and in particular the World War I era. His work with General John J. Pershing greatly influenced large portions of this dissertation, and for that I am forever grateful. I hope to one day repay his and Professor Millett's mentorship with students of my own. Also to the late Rev. Howard Kerner, S.J., Professors William J. Ulrich, George J. Prpic, Michael S. Pap, Rev. Howard J. Mitzel, S.J., Wallace Kosinski, and Marianne Morton all deserve special mention and thanks for all of your efforts and work.
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**PUBLICATIONS**

**Articles**


5. Leo J. Daugherty III, "And They Thought We Wouldn't Fight," *Leatherneck*, 80 (June 1997).


Monograph


Book


FIELDS OF STUDY

U.S. 20th Century Military History

U.S. 20th Century Diplomatic History

Central Asian/Russian History
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Retired Marine Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, one of the Marine Corps foremost pioneers of the techniques used in amphibious assaults during the late 1930's, recounted in his oral history that "World War I was the real watershed in fixing the picture of the Marines as first and foremost a fighting man. The triumphs of the meat grinders of Belleau Wood, Soissons, St. Mihiel, Blanc Mont Ridge, and the Meuse-Argonne were reflections of both professional steadiness and personal valor."\(^1\) Indeed, for the Marine Corps, its participation in the World War (1917-18) proved to be the most decisive and institutionally pivotal event in its history during the twentieth century. The Marine Brigade's participation in the fighting in France (as part of the American Expeditionary Forces [AEF]) introduced an entire generation of Marine Corps officers to the requirements and lessons of modern warfare. Through sheer persistence and much internal as well as external opposition, these same officers introduced and institutionalized many of the lessons learned in France into the Marine Corps's antiquated officer and enlisted training programs and curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools (MCS) during the interwar period (1919-41). The impact of the World War on the Marine Corps was significant. Not only were its lessons applied to the Marine Corps's curriculum and in training methodology during the interwar era by Marine officers, they

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\(^1\) Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, *First to Fight*, Unpublished Draft Manuscript, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, Personal Papers, Marine Corps University, MCU, Quantico, VA., PC#486, Box 1, Chapter 1, Folder 1, p. 67.
were also applied later on by the same individuals who went on to lead Marines during World War II on the battlefields of the Central Pacific, and in some cases, Korea. The lessons of the World War not only laid the foundation for Marines' training and learning; they were applied with deadly effect on the battlefields of the Central Pacific a generation later. Furthermore, the lessons of the World War laid the foundations for the professionalization of both the Marine Corps' officer and noncommissioned officer corps. While some Marine officers (such as Brigadier General Lester A. Dessez and Colonel Ellis B. Miller) dismissed the significance and lessons of that war as being "in the history books," that conflict changed forever the way Marines studied, exercised, and theorized on the nature and conduct of war.²

It is a fact that no less than five Marine commandants (John A. Lejeune, Wendell C. Neville, Thomas Holcomb, Clifton B. Cates, and Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.), as well as several pioneers of the corps landing operations and amphibious warfare doctrine (Robert H. Dunlap, Earl H. "Pete" Ellis, Graves B. Erskine, and Holland M. Smith) all received their "baptism" of fire in the "war to end all wars." But the impact of the war was not just on the higher echelons of the Marine Corps. It was through the efforts of these Marines that the lessons of the war found themselves incorporated into the curriculum and training of Marine officers at Quantico, Virginia, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, during the interwar period (1919-1940). The lessons of the war did not confine themselves to the classrooms at Quantico, or drill fields at Parris Island and San Diego. Through articles written by Marines such as Major General Lejeune, Brigadier Generals Dunlap and Dion Williams, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, and Majors Smith and Erskine, the lessons of the World War and their application to the Corps's

curriculum at the MCS and through its training program became institutionalized and propelled the Marine Corps into the modern era.

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of the World War on the postwar Marine Corps, and to point out that this conflict had a great influence on the institutional reforms undertaken by Major General John A. Lejeune, who served as Major General Commandant from 1920 to 1929. For it was the World War that redirected the Marine Corps's approach to preparing for war. This "redirection" impacted not only its institutional approach to the education and training of its officers and enlisted men but eventually to its wartime mission as an Advanced Base Expeditionary Force. More importantly, from the doctrinal point of view, participation in the World War gave Marines such as Generals Lejeune, Robert H. Dunlap, Dion Williams, Ben H. Fuller, and John H. Russell the intellectual basis upon which to reorient the Marine Corps toward the landing force mission. The World War introduced Marines to the mechanization of war, the importance of ordnance, the necessity of proper operational and tactical organization and planning, but to such issues as mobilization, administration, logistics and training. Indeed, had it not been for participation in the "Great War," all of the major components of a successful landing operation might never have been understood nor have come into existence. In effect, Marines would have been "in want of a nail" when it came to understanding modern warfare during the interwar era. As this study illustrates, without the participation of the Marines in the World War, Marines would have known very little about the importance of proper staff and operational planning, logistics, naval gunnery, the importance of artillery and aviation, administration of a large force, proper training and education. Participation by the Marine Brigade in the World War, and especially by many of the men who would later contribute to the study of landing operations, greatly assisted their understanding of modern combat principles. For a service that prior to the war remained fixated on what was essentially counterinsurgency
operations or "Small Wars," involvement in the war propelled the Marine Corps into the 20th century.

"The Lessons of the Past"

Like the era itself, this period in Marine Corps history has been neglected or, if not neglected, bypassed by most historians in favor of recounting the immediate pre-World War II era stretching from 1934 to 1941. While the development of amphibious assault is an important part of the Marine Corps' institutional development during the interwar era (1919-1941), it is only one component of a larger story that made possible its achievements during the Second World War. Little if any coverage has been given to the training, recruiting, and education of both officers and enlisted Marines during this period. While Allan R. Millett's *Semper Fidelis: A History of the U.S. Marine Corps* (1980/1991) is and will be for the foreseeable future the best overall history of the Marine Corps during this era, subjects such as training, curriculum, enlisted education, and manpower are touched upon but not given the attention they deserve. Princeton University professors Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Croll, in *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Practice in the Pacific* (1951), provide a scholarly examination of the development of amphibious warfare and its employment during World War II, but likewise fail to discuss such important issues as training and education during the interwar era. The late Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford's *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps* (1973), came close to describing these issues in his excellent though dated synopsis of the development of the Marine Corps's evolutionary role as an amphibious assault force. Clifford's *Progress and Purpose* was one of the first monographs produced by the History and Museums Division that took an in-depth look at the art of amphibious warfare as practiced by the Marines. Unfortunately, it is a chronological history that attempts to tell "the whole story" rather than concentrate on the institutional development of the Marine
Corps during the 1920's, and early 1930's. While other monographs produced by the History and Museums Division provide some background to this period in various topical subjects (such as headquarters reorganization, aviation, artillery and infantry units, and base histories), there have been no other works that discuss the Marine Corps as a whole during the interwar era. Professor Donald Bittner's *Curriculum Evolution: The Marine Corps Command and Staff College* (1988) likewise covers the evolutionary development of Marine officer education insofar as the Company and Field Officers Courses during the 1920's and 1930's is concerned but fails to cover the much neglected development of enlisted education and training that occurred during this era. This is particularly true with regards to Major General Lejeune's reorganization of the Quartermaster, Paymaster, and Clerical departments of the Marine Corps. As will be illustrated in this dissertation, all of the above-mentioned were vital components in Lejeune's modernization program during his tenure as the Major General Commandant. Bittner's monograph is likewise focused solely on the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico and fails to provide any discussion the integration of classroom studies and its implementation throughout the Marine Corps during the same period. Insofar as the Marine Corps' official histories of its experiences in World War II are concerned, they provide an excellent, though dated overview of the operational aspects of the war with little background on the pre-war influences in training and preparation for its ordeal during the fighting in the Pacific. Specifically, the first volume of the "red books" (*History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II*), entitled *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal* (1958), provides a fair, though largely dated account of the development of amphibious warfare doctrine and the Fleet Marine Force during the interwar period. One of its most noted shortcomings is its failure to provide any coverage on the training and education of Marines and Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters Marine Corps and the Reserves. This volume provides a only brief discussion of the inhibiting deployments
that affected the Marine Corps during this same period. Only in *The Central Pacific Drive* (Volume 3) and *Western Pacific Operations* (Volume 4), are subjects on strategy (i.e., War Plan Orange) and pre-war organization discussed in any great length, insofar as the preparation of the Marine Corps during the interwar period is concerned.

*Autobiographies and Biographies*

Insofar as for memoirs, reminiscences, and biographies by and on Marine officers are concerned, Major General John A. Lejeune's *Reminiscences of A Marine* (1930), is a good, though unfortunately incomplete memoir by the man who served as the Major General Commandant for nearly nine years during the interwar era. Lejeune's policies while Commandant had a significant impact on the Marine Corps for nearly two decades after his retirement in February 1929 through the reforms at the MCS, and in officer and enlisted training and promotion. Major General Lejeune concentrated the bulk of his recollections on his earlier career and service in the World War, while his chapter on his tenure as the head of the Marine Corps is both incomplete and disappointing since he only highlighted certain events that occurred without going into any great detail on the important issues, and controversies he faced while Commandant.

General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who entered the Marine Corps in 1909, on the other hand, provides a candid narrative on the Corps during the interwar era in his *Once a Marine* (1964). While his chapters on Hispaniola, Mail Guard duty, and service in China, serve as excellent insights into the activities of Marines during the 1920's, they are nonetheless basic and provide little detail as to how they affected the Marine Corps as a whole. As might be expected, the thrust of Vandegrift's book deals with his command of the 1st Marine Division, the period he served as Commandant of the Marine Corps (1944-48), and the controversy over defense unification. As for Major General Neville, very little exists outside of the official records found in Record Group 127 at the National Archives and in newspaper and magazine articles.
While Major General Fuller has left some traces of his time as the Major General Commandant in what constitute his personal papers (which consist primarily of orders and some scattering of official correspondence), very little else exists as to paint a clear picture of his Commandancy. In the case of Major General Russell, his articles in the Marine Corps Gazette and U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings, as well as those that he had written as a military analyst during World War II provide some insight into his thinking on military affairs during the era -- that served as the basis for his reforms while Commandant.

While General Holland M. Smith's Coral and Brass (1947) attempted to "set the record straight" about the pioneering efforts with amphibious warfare, and the problems Headquarters encountered from the other services during the 1920's and 1930's, Smith's attacks on the Army and Navy undermined the value of the book as an important source on the Marines during this period. Written in the immediate aftermath of World War II, Smith's book did much to "fan the flames" of the controversies that he himself was primarily responsible for -- the Marine-Navy relations in the interwar era and the Marine-Army relations during World War II. The only redeeming quality of Coral and Brass is that provides some basic insight into the Marine Corps during the interwar era and the problems it encountered in the acceptance of its amphibious warfare mission among the naval hierarchy during the 1920's and 1930's regarding the acceptance of its amphibious warfare mission.

As for biographies, Merrill L. Bartlett's Lejeune: A Marine's Life (1991) and Dirk Ballendorf's and Merrill L. Bartlett's Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet 1880-1923 (1997) provide some background on both Lejeune and Ellis, though both fail to provide an in-depth analysis of the Marine Corps during this interwar period. While Lejeune: A Marine's Life provides a fair coverage of the problems Lejeune faced as Major General Commandant, the author failed to expand upon Lejeune's policies and on
where he hoped to take the Corps during the 1920's. *Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet* is a fair biography on this controversial Marine who authored the landmark Operation Plan 712-D. While the biography is a "first," it is merely a compilation of the articles written on Ellis by Ballendorf and others. It fails to bring out anything new about his Marine Corps career. This book likewise fails to discuss the "state of the Marine Corps" during the interwar era.

Hans Schmidt's *Maverick Marine! General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History* (1987) and Ann C. Venzon's *General Smedley Darlington Butler, 1898-1931: The Letters Of A Leatherneck* (1992) provide ample coverage on the life and career of this controversial Marine officer. *Maverick Marine!* is perhaps the better of the two biographies, though it serves mainly as an indictment of U.S. military and foreign policy in Central America and China while at the same time exploring Butler's "conversion" as an anti-imperialist near the end of his controversial career. *General Smedley Darlington Butler* is a compilation of Butler's letters to his wife, General Lejeune, and other Marine officers and examines the state of the Corps during various episodes of his career as a Marine officer. While the author brings to the fore General Butler's thoughts on the various events he participated in, there is little in the way of substantial analysis, or new material offered to the reader.

Dr. Norman V. Cooper's *A Fighting General: The Biography of Holland M. "Howlin Mad" Smith* (1987) attempts to correct many of the inaccuracies of General Smith's *Coral and Brass*. Burke Davis's *Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller* (1962) was an attempt to examine the career of this controversial Marine field commander, but it is dated and is extremely biased toward its subject. In fact, *Marine!* will be superseded by a new Puller biography by Lieutenant Colonel Jon Hoffman, author of *Once A Legend: Red Mike Edson of the Marine Raiders* (1994). *Once A Legend* is itself one of the better biographies of a Marine general. It provides a detailed story of Major General
Edson and his career in the Marine Corps, with emphasis being given to his tour of duty in Nicaragua along the Rio Coco. Allan R. Millett's, *In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps 1917-1956* (1993) is the sole exception and stands alone as one of the single best biographies written on a Marine general during this critical era in Marine Corps history. Professor Millett's book is an excellent biography of General Gerald C. Thomas, a Marine who rose from the rank of sergeant to general, that provides a detailed discussion of the Marine Corps during the interwar era. This book serves as useful guide to gauge the reforms enacted by Lejeune and his successors during the interwar era and their impact on Thomas's career. Finally, Roger Willock's *Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late Roy S. Geiger* (1968, reprinted 1983) is a fine biography of a Marine officer and pioneer naval aviator. In sum, however, there has unfortunately been no other history or biography besides Millett's *Semper Fidelis* and *In Many a Strife* that have concentrated entirely on this critical era in Marine Corps history insofar as its institutional development is concerned. While Colonels Robert D. Heinl, Jr.'s *Soldiers From the Sea* (1962), Clyde Metcalf's *History of the United States Marine Corps* (1939), and General Edwin H. Simmons' *The U.S. Marines: The First Two Hundred Years* (1975) serve as good factual accounts of Marine Corps history they offer very little in the way of analysis or historical accuracy of the Marine Corps during the 1920's and 1930's.

"*The Lessons of War...*"

The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. It is an attempt to "fill in the gaps" missing in the history of the Marine Corps during this period and expand upon the work of both Millett and Clifford with regard to the Corps's institutional development during the interwar era. Secondly and most importantly, it is the author's intention to prove that the Corps's modernization during the 1920's and early 1930's occurred largely as a result of its involvement in the World War, particularly in regards to its recruitment and
retention of manpower; its educational system; and the realignment of Headquarters Marine Corps, which had its greatest impact on its overall day-to-day administration, and its operational and tactical functioning insofar as training is concerned. As will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the impact of the World War was both significant and at times detrimental toward the Marine Corps's goal of achieving a real wartime mission, and its evolution as an expeditionary force-in-readiness. Third, the dissertation will examine what this author labels as the positive "negatives" that emerged from the World War, which included a revamped curriculum at the MCS for both officers and staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officers, as well as an improved recruit and branch training system which better prepared both officers and enlisted Marines for the Corps's role as a landing force.

The years covered in this study include the period from the last year and a half of Major General George Barnett's Commandancy (1919-20) through that of Ben H. Fuller (1930-34), with some overlap into Major General John H. Russell's first year as Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps (1934-35). As I hope to illustrate, it was Major General Ben H. Fuller who initiated many of the programs and policies that his successor, Major General John H. Russell, has unfairly received a large share of credit. While the bulk of the study deals with the Commandancy of Major General John A. Lejeune, (1920-1929), my concluding chapter and analysis will demonstrate that it was during General Fuller's tenure as Major General Commandant that officials at Headquarters instituted many needed changes in the training and curriculum at the recruit depots, and at the MCS, as a result of the identification of problems in after-action and operational reports from the field. While many historians will disagree with this approach, it is my conclusion that amidst the budgetary and manpower problems that bedeviled all of the military services from 1929-1934, there was a "link" between what Lejeune set out to and Fuller was able to accomplish in preparing the Marine Corps for
war. For it is my opinion that Major General Fuller deserves some measure of credit for the Corps's assumption of the landing mission. Fuller accomplished far more with much less than did Lejeune, who had almost nine years to acquire a string of accomplishments amidst the growth of a deep period of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy and retrenchment in military spending. Fuller, like Lejeune, had to contend with an Executive and Legislative branch determined to cut military spending despite the instability that still shaped U.S.-Chinese affairs during the early 1930's, particularly after Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In a large sense, therefore, there existed a continuity between Lejeune and Fuller that contributed to the success of the reforms undertaken by General Russell.

As for the first theme of this study, the period following the World War has been, like the war itself, by-and-large neglected by most serious historians or dismissed as a period of military retrenchment where very little occurred in the way of military innovation. (The exception to this statement lies in Professor Millett's and Williamson Murray's masterful work on military innovation during the interwar era.) As this dissertation hopes to illustrate, the "second interwar period" that occurred between 1919 and 1941, was far from a period of retrenchment on the part of the Marine Corps. It was more of an era of trial and error that witnessed the modernization of the various institutions of the Marine Corps; this enabled it to fight as a modern military organization, armed with not only the lessons of the World War, but also with new

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tactical and operational concepts. In fact, when examined against the backdrop of the austere budgets and military retrenchment that existed in the United States during the interwar era, this period was one of the most productive periods in the history of the Marine Corps. With the absorption of the lessons learned during the World War into the MCS and its training infrastructure Commandants from Lejeune through Holcomb took what meager budgets the Navy gave the Marine Corps and in turn produced a warfighting doctrine that greatly contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers during World War II.

The second major theme of this dissertation concentrates on the impact of the Army's Field Service Regulations (FSR's) and Infantry Drill Regulations (IDR's), primarily the 1923 edition, which Marine officers studied and employed religiously for almost two decades after the World War. Despite the criticism by such officers as Colonel Ellis B. Miller and Majors Holland M. Smith and John Gray that the curriculum and training doctrine instituted in the Marine Corps after the World War was "too Army-oriented," it will shown that the Corps's company grade officers and enlisted men benefited greatly from these FSR's and IDR's in their understanding of modern combined arms warfare. This knowledge figured into the Corps's successful performance during the Second World War.

This is not a dissertation on "battles" but rather one on institutional readiness and the factors that enable a military organization able to fight wars. These factors relate to what Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray define as being the "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions of military effectiveness. The vertical dimensions of military effectiveness involve "the preparation for and conduct of war at the political, strategic,

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5 For the Marine Corps, the author considers the period from the end of the War with Spain -- and involvement in the World War (1898-1917), as the "first" Interwar" period during the twentieth century.
operational, and tactical levels." The *horizontal* dimensions of military effectiveness involve "the numerous, simultaneous, and inter-dependent tasks that military organizations must execute at each hierarchical level with differing levels of intensity in order to perform with proficiency. These tasks include manpower procurement, planning, training, logistics, intelligence, and technical adaptation as well as combat." 6

Woven together they form what Millett and Murray call "the determination of military effectiveness," as only a true aggregate can truly estimate or gauge effectiveness in military activity. Since the thrust of study examines how and why the Marine Corps chose to retain much of the institutional infrastructure organized during the World War, one can better understand the link with the World War and the institutional problems that hampered the Marine Corps's military effectiveness during the interwar period (particularly in the fields of training and education), and the way Headquarters set out to resolve them while working within the constraints of the budget cuts characteristic of this era. It was not until these problems had been resolved that the Marine Corps could begin to embrace landing operations as its *raison d'etat*. In a sense, Clausewitz's dictum that "means must be related to ends" seems to have characterized the reforms instituted by Headquarters during the interwar period. In fact, this concept of "means achieving ends" drove a whole series of reforms, particularly in methods of training and in the curriculum at the MCS, so order that the Marine Corps could advance to the next level or stage of institutional development as the Navy's landing force.

The third and last theme of this study is to examine the Marine Corps' structural and operational readiness during the interwar period. Political scientist Richard K. Betts defined structural readiness as being that which deals with 'mass'. Overall, "*structural readiness* deals with such factors as: force size, personnel under arms, basic training, the

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total number of personnel, the quality and quantity of their weapons." This author would also include military education (primarily officer education) and the professional development of its staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officers.7 Betts defines "operational readiness" as those aspects of a military force that affect the status of its personnel and equipment and the levels of its training. Operational readiness also deals with efficiency and is measured in terms of how soon an existing military organization can reach peak capability for combat. Both of these definitions correspond to Millett and Murray's definitions of horizontal and vertical effectiveness, and greatly influenced the Marine Corps in the interwar period as budget cut after budget cut severely affected its ability to carry out even a minor national emergency.

While Betts defines readiness based on the post-World War II definition of that term, this author prefer to use the word "preparedness" since it is used throughout the correspondence and personal papers of Marines during the interwar era. Furthermore, the actual definition of preparedness, which indicates, "how proficient a unit may fight, but not whether it will win," explains the occupation of Marine Corps officials during the interwar period: to prepare Marine Corps to fight wars.8 Thus, preparedness is perhaps the better of the two terms to be used since it more accurately describes the efforts of Headquarters during the post-World War era. Furthermore, preparedness is far a more accurate measurement of military effectiveness at all levels: strategic, political, operational, and tactical centered on proficiency in arms. As will be illustrated in the first half of this dissertation, from 1919 to 1929 the Marine Corps was not well prepared operationally or structurally either to seize or defend an advanced naval base. This situation was due to the fact that both political and institutional considerations inhibited

8Ibid, pp. 40-1.
preparedness. Whereas Lejeune and his successors recognized the shortcoming in such areas as training and education, none of the problems in these areas could be resolved until manpower and budget levels had been restored. Deployments to Haiti, the Dominican Republic, China, and Nicaragua, as well as guarding the U.S. Mails stripped the Marine Corps of both officers and emptied the classrooms at Quantico and Philadelphia. The drill fields at Parris Island and San Diego were also stripped of experienced personnel in order to fill the units on expeditionary duty. Only when Headquarters had sufficient manpower on hand stateside in mid-1929 could training once again resume full time. As Marines demonstrated in the 1920's and 1930's, expeditionary duty did not automatically equate with basic or advanced training or preparedness.9

Only after Marines of the 3d Brigade returned from China and a large part of the 2d Brigade from Nicaragua in 1929 did their officers seriously examine the Marine Corps advanced base and embryonic landing force doctrines in an era marked by draconian budgets and a hostile chief executive (Herbert Hoover) and War Department (General Douglas MacArthur). It was against the backdrop of this austere era that officers such as Major General Fuller, Brigadier Generals Robert H. Dunlap and James C. Breckinridge, Colonel E. B. Miller, and Major Charles D. Barrett that the Marine Corps was able to correct the problems identified in after-action reports from the field in Nicaragua, especially the poor tactical performance of company grade officers and enlisted men, unfamiliarity with basic weapons handling and employment, and the deterioration of marksmanship skills among Marines. These were problems, one might add, that could've further stymied the Corps' acceptance of the landing force mission. In fact, had these and other problems never been identified and rectified, Headquarters could not even have began to think in terms of resurrecting or reinvigorating the concept of a Marine Corps

9Ibid, pp. 110-1.
Expeditionary or Advanced Base Force as such a force had its core well trained infantrymen. As illustrated in Chapter Twelve, the problems faced by Headquarters included the need for revisions in its approach to training and the reexamination that took place at the MCS of the use of the Army's IDR's and FSR's in the early 1930's. Despite the opposition to the use of these Army regulations, the IDR's and FSR's proved to be invaluable in teaching Marines the skills of infantry combat, skills which were essential if Marines were to adopt landing operations as its main mission.

In the long run, it is the goal of this dissertation to illustrate the "linkage" between the Marine Corps's experience in the World War and its preparedness for landing operations at the strategic level through the reforms of the interwar era. In fact, all of the reforms, from Major General Lejeune's reorganization of the administrative and logistical services at Headquarters and the Quartermaster Department, to the classrooms at the MCS at Quantico, to the recruit depots of Parris Island and San Diego -- all had but one goal: to prepare Marines to participate in a future war. Furthermore, the later reforms initiated by Major Generals Neville and Fuller (in response to the tactical lessons gained in the jungles of Nicaragua) served to lay the foundation for the amphibious warfare role embraced by their successor, Major General John H. Russell. For without these institutional reforms, the Marine Corps would have been hard-pressed to justify its existence as a military force in the interwar era as its colonial infantry role faded.10

While the World War has all but faded from modern memory and is oftentimes a mere footnote in history, one needs only to remember that it sowed the seeds for an even greater conflict only twenty-one years later. Furthermore, as the U.S. military (including the Marine Corps) grapples today with the problems of roles and missions, ever-tightening budgets, and personnel problems in this post-Cold War era, one only needs to look at this "second" interwar era (1919-1935), in order to examine the challenges of "postwar" reform. Marine Corps officials during the interwar period faced many of the same problems and overcame many of them with even less resources than those possessed by their successors of today.

This dissertation is about that second interwar period, its trials and tribulations, its successes and many failures. This dissertation is about the lessons Headquarters inculcated from its first major modern war, and how it transplanted them into their school curriculum and tactical training. From the banks of the Potomac to the beaches of Culebra and Oahu, from the drill fields of Parris Island and San Diego, Marines like Lejeune and Fuller not only overcame these problems, but in the process laid the foundation for the Marine Corps' amphibious assault mission, which they practiced with great success during World War II. Indeed, the Marines who landed on the beaches and atolls of the Central Pacific owe a great debt to the work done by other Marines during the difficult years of the interwar period. The World War provided Marines with many valuable lessons that they inculcated into their training and curriculum that in the long run enabled the Marine Corps to fight our country's battles on land, in the air, and on the sea.
CHAPTER 2

. . . AND A FEW MARINES . . . ' THE U.S. MARINE CORPS AND THE LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR

Introduction

For the United States Marine Corps, as well as the U.S. Army, the World War was a validation "of traditional American fighting concepts." More importantly, however, participation in the World War forever changed how Marines trained and equipped for war. Indeed, for a service that had served primarily aboard the ships of the Navy before that conflict, and as a Imperial constabulary force, with a strength of some 13,000 officers and men during the prewar era, the wartime expansion of the Marine Corps left a lasting impact on its internal structure. Besides its expansion, the operational and tactical lessons Marine officers gained while serving in France had a deep, and lasting impact on its educational and training infrastructure that lasted well into the 1930's. This impact could be found not only in the curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools, established in 1919-20, at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, but in the Marine Corps's approach to training, administration, and in the postwar restructuring of its logistical infrastructure. While each one of these subjects will be treated individually in subsequent chapters, a brief overview of the "lessons learned" in France is necessary, in order to illustrate the impact that the war had on the Corps' postwar structure and institutions, and how

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Marines applied these lessons to its embryonic landing operations doctrine in the early 1930's, starting with the Fleet Exercises or "FLEXES," in the early 1920's.

Mobilization

In any assessment of the performance of the Marine Corps during the World War, it is necessary to briefly examine the mobilization and procurement of enlisted men and officers who would lead the Marines into battle in 1918, since it was essentially the same method that the Corps used during the Second World War. On the eve of the United States' entrance into the World War on April 3, 1917, the Marine Corps, which was then in the midst of an expansion, due to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, numbered 693 officers and 17,400 enlisted men. Upon the declaration of war by Congress, many young men from all parts of the country rushed to Marine recruiting offices hoping to be the "First to Fight." (Table 2.1) Unlike past wars in which the Marine Corps found itself involved, where Headquarters would quickly organize the various Marine detachments aboard the Navy's ships, and those guarding naval yards into hastily formed provisional brigades, mobilization during the World War proved different, and far more complicated than past experiences. The very nature of the war, and the United States' lack of preparedness for a war of attrition, necessitated a lengthy preparation period of recruitment, training, and outfitting of an expeditionary force for duty in France. While the Marine Corps had no problem in recruiting, the problems it encountered centered not on 'where it would obtain the necessary manpower', but on how many men it would be allowed to recruit, how and where it would train them, and what missions the Marine Corps would perform in the war.

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In fact, for Major General Barnett and other planners at Headquarters, the actual number of Marines it would have to raise and train depended largely on the "mission" or "missions" assigned to it during the war. General Barnett noted that immediately upon the declaration of war by the U.S. Congress, "The Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Operations had stated to the Committee on Naval Affairs . . . that, in their opinion, 30,000 marines were sufficient for naval purposes . . ." General Barnett stressed to the Representatives, in testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee, that if the Marine Corps were to serve as an adjunct to the Army in the "land fighting," then it should be increased to 75,000 officers and enlisted men.\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of Officers</th>
<th>No. of Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 1916</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>14,981 Permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 1917</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>17,400 Permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 1917</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>30,000 Temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1918</td>
<td>3,017</td>
<td>75,000 Temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 1918</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>27,400 Permanent (^4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1
Authorized Strength of the U.S. Marine Corps, 1916-1919

General Barnett added the stipulation that any increases in the authorized strength of the Marine Corps were for "naval service," and not for duty in France. This all changed, however, when General John J. Pershing, the commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), under pressure from the War and Navy Departments, eventually requested a regiment of Marines for duty in connection with the European war. The Major General Commandant then suggested that, if permitted, the Marine Corps could train a force of 75,000 officers and men for duty in France, as well as

\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
carrying out its traditional functions. Since there was neither a "real naval mission," as Major General John A. Lejeune later recalled, nor a need for the advanced base force, it became obvious that the only possible theater of operations for the Marine Corps would, in fact, be France.  

While Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and General John J. Pershing demurred as to the acceptance of Barnett's offer to send a regiment of Marines to France, the Commandant persisted in his efforts, and by mid-June 1917, the Fifth Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Charles A. Doyen, had been organized at Quantico, where it shortly thereafter departed for France. The Fifth Marines, organized primarily from Marines scattered about the United States, and on expeditionary duty in Haiti, as well as from additional officers and men recruited "fresh from college," hastily assembled at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and sailed for France. Upon arrival at St. Nazaire, France, AEF officials placed the 5th Marines under the operational control of the U.S. Army's First Division. Meanwhile, a second regiment, the Sixth, began to organize at the newly-established Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, thirty-five miles south of Washington, D.C. Unlike the Fifth Marines, which had been comprised primarily of veteran leathernecks, the newly-organized Sixth Marines, commanded by Colonel Albertus W. Catlin, while "sprinkled" with veteran Marine officers and noncommissioned officers, consisted primarily of newly-recruited officers and enlisted men. As more men entered the Marine Corps, Headquarters organized two other outfits, the Seventh and Eighth Marine regiments, and respectively assigned each of them a separate mission of guarding U.S. interests in Cuba and along the United States-Mexican border.

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Besides the influx of manpower, Headquarters took steps to enlarge the housing facilities at the two recruit depots at Parris Island, SC, and Mare Island, Ca., which at the time "were sufficient for only 1,000 and 350 men, respectively." By the time of the Armistice in November 1918, Parris Island had expanded to the point that it could accommodate up to 6,000 men at any one time. In addition to the two recruit depots, Headquarters likewise established two temporary recruit depots at the Philadelphia and Norfolk Navy Yards which could train an additional 2,500 and 500 men respectively until Parris Island could accommodate more men.6

Besides the expansion of existing facilities, the Quartermaster Department simultaneously expanded in order to meet the increasing demands placed upon it. In order to equip such an expanded force, the Depot of Supplies, which served as the Marine Corps's main supply facility, was "greatly enlarged to meet the extraordinary demands," placed upon it. Additionally, in order to avoid the confusion with the expeditionary forces deployed in Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Headquarters established a similar supply depot in Charleston, South Carolina, and "at points in the United States where deemed necessary" to support Marines not heading for France.7 In short, as the Marine Corps expanded, so to did its support establishment, in order to efficiently prepare the Marine forces heading for France, those on expeditionary duty in the Caribbean, as well as those Marine units that remained in the United States on garrison duty.

7Ibid.
Officer Recruitment and Training

While the Marine Corps hurriedly expanded its infra-structure to meet the demands of war, its first priority was to fill the ranks of its officer corps with a sufficient number of qualified college graduates, warrant officers, and qualified noncommissioned officers. (Table 2.2) As both Major Generals Barnett and Lejeune noted in their memoirs, the "unusually large number of young men of excellent education and fine attainments who had enlisted in the Marine Corps at the outbreak of war" caused Headquarters to cease the appointment of men directly from civilian life, and instead fill all future vacancies, excluding the graduates from the U.S. Naval Academy, by the promotion of meritorious noncommissioned officers. 8 As General Lejeune noted, this expedited the problem of recruiting and training such a large number of men in a relatively short period of time as officers. 9 The men who received direct commissions from civilian life proceeded to both Marine Barracks, Mare Island and San Diego; Parris Island, and the Marine Corps Rifle Range at Winthrop, Maryland, prior to the consolidation of all officer training at Quantico where they received basic instruction in the duties of a Marine officer. The first permanent officer camp to be held at Quantico commenced in August 1917 with 345 candidates and graduated its first class in October of that same year.

As for the appointment of qualified enlisted men from the ranks, Marine Corps Order No. 25 (Series 1917), instructed commanding officers of every post to convene a board of three officers in order to nominate a certain number of enlisted men from the

ranks for commissioning as second lieutenants. Once the board had met, and reports on
the qualified candidates completed, they were sent to Headquarters, where another
specially-appointed board selected those Marines according to their respective standings
for possible commissioning as officers. The first group of six hundred enlisted men
selected, reported to the first training camp in April 1918, with 391 of them eventually
being commissioned. In addition to the Officers' Training Camp established at Quantico,
Headquarters ordered the establishment of a similar camp in France, where after a similar
course of instruction, 164 former noncommissioned officers, and qualified enlisted men
of the Fourth Brigade had been appointed as Marine Corps Reserve second lieutenants.
Among these noncommissioned officers in France was Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas, who
eventually retired from the Marines in 1956 as a four-star general.\textsuperscript{10} The appointment
of qualified warrant officers and enlisted men during the World War established a
precedent that the Marine Corps followed during World War II, when it promoted a
number of qualified enlisted men to the officer ranks, in order to have at hand a number
of well-trained platoon leaders to meet the demands of war in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{11}

As for the total noncommissioned officers appointed to the officer ranks in this
manner, the Marine Corps commissioned 1,058 officers through the three Officers'
Training Camps held from April 15, 1918 through July 1919. These former enlisted
Marines provided the Marine Brigade with a ready source of well-qualified company-
level combat leadership during the first six months of the World War.\textsuperscript{12} Fortunately, this
drain on experienced non-commissioned officers had little effect on the tactical

\textsuperscript{10}See Allan R. Millett, \textit{In Many A Strife. General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S.
cited as Millett, \textit{In Many A Strife}.

\textsuperscript{11}See Kenneth W. Condit, Gerald Diamond, and Edwin T. Turnblad, \textit{Marine Corps
Ground Training in World War II}. (Washington, D.C., Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC,

\textsuperscript{12}McClellan, \textit{Marines in the World War}, pp. 22-3.
performance of Marine squads and platoons during the World War, due largely in part to the fact that U.S. participation in the World War lasted only nineteen months. The brevity of U.S. participation in the war thus avoided the problems associated with the heavy attrition rate that the Marine Corps (and the Army) faced in the latter stages of World War II, and during the Vietnam War in the ranks of its junior officers, when the loss of so many junior officers siphoned off qualified noncommissioned officers to fill the ranks, which in turn affected combat leadership on the squad, platoon and company levels. While there exists little evidence to suggest that the appointment of qualified noncommissioned officers during the World War had some negative impact on Marine Corps battlefield performance in the World War, the fact remains that had the war dragged on into 1919, the drain on qualified noncommissioned officers certainly would have affected the Marine Brigade's tactical performance due to the shortage of experienced sergeants and corporals.  

One last method of officer recruitment included the induction of members of the Student Army Training Corps. The Secretary of War authorized the Provost Marshal General on September 12, 1918, to "allot 1,500 of the registrants authorized for induction into the Student Army Training Corps to the Marine sections under that organization." On September 23, 1918, the Navy Department authorized Headquarters Marine Corps to establish a "Marine Section" with the Student Army Training Corps, and set the quota of candidates anywhere from 100 to 190 men. Commensurate with the

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establishment of a Marine representation on selected college campuses, Headquarters
detailed a Marine officer and noncommissioned officer to each of the twelve colleges and
universities participating in the program. The two regular Marines were "charged with
the duties of administration, instruction, and discipline" of the Marine "volunteers."\textsuperscript{14}
While this method of officer recruitment came much too late to impact on the fighting in
the World War, it nonetheless established a precedent Headquarters used during the
1930's, with the establishment of the Naval Reserve Officer's Training Corps to recruit
qualified individuals as Marine officers.

As for the structure and training of the candidates commissioned during the war, the
training was both thorough and demanding. Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig
recalled that each officer's training camp "was commanded by an officer of adequate
rank, with the students divided into companies with a major in command as chief
instructor and captains and lieutenants to assist him." The officer candidates were given a
"very rigid course of instruction and intensive training," which included: infantry drill
regulations, manual of interior guard duty, bayonet training, bombing, minor tactics,
military engineering, military topography, administration, military law, gas warfare, sea
duty, and marksmanship training.\textsuperscript{15} Many of these officer candidates, among them Craig
and Graves B. Erskine, had already had a degree of military training either from service
in a reserve officer's training camp or, as in the case of Erskine, as a Louisiana National
Guardsman.\textsuperscript{16} In fact, both Craig and Erskine had already been familiar with the Army

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid, p. 22; The Oral History Transcript of Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig,
USMC, interviewed by Major L. E. Tatem. (Washington, D.C., Historical Division,
\textsuperscript{16}Craig Oral History, p. 1; See Major Jolene L. Hollingshead, USMC, "What Made
Student Paper, (Masters of Military Studies, Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
Quantico, VA., April 1995), pp. 24-5. Hereafter cited as Hollingshead, "The Big E."
system of drill and manual of arms used by the instructional staffs at Quantico, and found themselves in charge of a platoon of officer candidates, were they taught their fellow Marines close and extended order drill.

As for the quality of instruction, however, both Craig and Erskine found the training both very basic, and designed to train officers in only the rudiments of what they would later be required to know as platoon commanders during the war. In fact, to many officers who passed through Quantico during the war, Marine officer training, "too closely resembled recruit training without sufficient development of leadership qualities and tactics."17 Lieutenant General Craig recalled, for instance, that the majority of the training he and his fellow candidates received was very basic, and centered primarily around trench warfare, bayonet practice, and physical exercise, carried out by European instructors, primarily veteran British and Canadian noncommissioned officers. General Graves B. Erskine, who like Craig had been appointed directly from civilian life, and had served in the Louisiana National Guard during the border incidents with Mexico in 1916, was even more blunt in his opinion of Marine officer training during this period when he stated that, he was not "too impressed with the course of instruction at Quantico."

Erskine's dislike of the content of Marine Corps officer training, in fact, reached the point that he sought to resign his commission rather than remain at Quantico. In a heated meeting with his commanding officer while undergoing officer training that summer of 1917, Erskine pointedly told his commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. Rixley, "I haven't learned a damn thing since I've been here," such was his disappointment with Marine training up to that time.18 In fact, Erskine's experience during the World War, later affected his overall judgment of the quality of the Marine

Corps Schools system for the remainder of his career, when he remarked later that if
given the choice, he would rather attend an Army vice a Marine school. Erskine insisted
that both the content and instructorship of Army Schools were infinitely far better than
those run by the Marine Corps, and that they better prepared an infantry officer to lead
men in combat.19

Major General Robert T. Blake, who entered the Marine Corps from the University
of California after receiving an appointment directly from civilian life in May 1917,
recalled that when he arrived to undergo officer training at Quantico, the conditions
there were "very primitive, principally boot camp drill. We had some class work. We did
some mapping, but it was nothing like they get now." General Blake stated that it was
not the fault of Headquarters, since "they didn't know," nor possessed the proper
facilities to prepare the officers for the rigors of combat.20 General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
Jr., who served in the World War as a platoon commander with the 5th Marine
Regiment, reinforced Blake's opinion of Marine officer training during these early days
of the U.S. entrance in the World War, when he recalled that the training at Quantico
had failed to prepare him and his fellow officers for the rigors of combat and was, in fact,
very basic in content. Shepherd remembered, that this state of unpreparedness continued
even as Marines trained in France, prior to their commitment to combat in the spring of
1918. The general remembered: "None of us had had combat training at all. All we knew
was squads left, squads right and extended order formations," due largely to the fact that
up to that time Marines depended upon P.S. Bond's Techniques of Modern Tactics (3d
Edition, 1916), and the Navy's Landing Force Manual to instruct its officers in basic

20Oral History Transcript of Major General Robert T. Blake, USMC, (Ret.),
Interviewed by Benis M. Frank, (Washington, D.C., Historical Division, HQMC, 1973),
tactics.\textsuperscript{21} This changed, however, as Marines prepared for service in France and adopted the U.S. Army's drill manual and training regulations.

Despite the Marine Corps's adoption of the AEF's drill regulations, both Shepherd and Erskine indicated that the changes in Marine training did not occur immediately at Quantico. In fact, the differences in the Marine Corps's and Army's approach to training early on in the war gave some validity to General Pershing's initial objections in accepting Marines for service overseas.\textsuperscript{22} The AEF commander insisted that the differences in Marine and Army training, as well as the tactical and logistical problems between the two services, limited the Leatherneck's ability to fight in land warfare.\textsuperscript{23} This situation, in fact, changed, as Marine officers, upon arrival in France, attended Army, French, and British schools in order to become more familiar with basic infantry tactics, trench fighting, and staff work. Once in France, Marine captains and lieutenants attended both the French Platoon Leaders' Schools, as well as the U.S. Army's First Corps School, located near Gondrecourt, in order to learn basic tactics, machine gun employment, use of the bayonet, and trench warfare. General Shepherd, who attended both of these schools, remembered that they proved to be extremely useful in teaching Marine officers basic infantry tactics. Shepherd specifically recalled that the Marine officers who attended the French schools left with the spirit of the "offensive," or, "\textit{En Avant}."\textsuperscript{24}

The comments made by Craig, Erskine, and Shepherd underscored the Marine Corps unpreparedness for waging modern war in 1917, as well as its totally inadequate tactical


\textsuperscript{22}Ibid; Barnett, "\textit{Soldier and Sailor Too!}" Ch. 25, pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{23}Barnett, "\textit{Soldier and Sailor Too,}" Ch. 25, pp. 6-7; See Millett, \textit{Semper Fidelis}, pp. 292-3.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Shepherd Oral History}, pp. 320-1.
instruction for officers destined for France, though the Army was just as guilty in its failure to train its junior officers in the use of combined arms. This failure to adequately prepare its junior combat leaders in the use of combined arms underscored how little AEF officials understood the dynamics of the battlefield in 1918. Pershing's insistence on open warfare "should have put a premium on junior officer leadership, unit cohesion, and morale." Due to the personnel policies of the AEF [and Marine Corps], and the "rush" to get American forces in the field in France, Army and Marine leaders gave insufficient attention in preparing its company-grade officers, as well as its noncommissioned officers in leading smaller tactical units into battle.25 This unpreparedness insofar as its tactical leadership during the war was not lost on either Major Generals Barnett and Lejeune, whose post-World War reform programs at the newly-established Marine Corps Schools, aimed at the revision and expansion of the curriculum in training Marine Corps officers and noncommissioned officers, in specially-organized "schools" during the 1920's, in order to better prepare them for modern combat.

Graduates of the Naval Academy ............................. 6
Former Officers of the Marine Corps ......................... 1
Former Graduates of the Naval Academy .................... 1
Warrant Officers and Paymaster's Clerks of the Marine Corps 89
Meritorious Noncommissioned Officers of the Marine Corps 122
Reserve Officers and National Naval Volunteers ............. 36
Graduates of Military Colleges ............................... 284
Other Civilians with prior military or naval experience or training 136
Other Civilians passing the competitive examinations held July 10, 1917 8626

Table 2.2
U.S. Marine Corps Officer Appointments April-October 1917

26McClellan, Marines in the World War, p. 21.
Enlisted Recruitment and Training

Even prior to the U.S. declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1918, the Marine Corps was in the midst of a minor expansion, due to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. When Congress declared war, the initial euphoria prompted many young men to flock to Marine recruiting offices. Many of these future leathernecks, of whom a large percentage were college graduates, had been primarily motivated by the Marine Corps's skillfully crafted slogan of "First to Fight." Whatever their motivation for joining the Marine Corps during the immediate period following the declaration of war by Congress in April 1917, the vast majority of them were, as General Barnett noted in his memoirs, "volunteers."27 Expanded first to 30,000, and later an authorized strength of 75,000 officers and enlisted men, the fact remains that the Marine Corps had little trouble in attracting sufficient men to fill its ranks. The majority of them never went "over there," and instead remained stateside on guard duty, assigned to sea-going detachments, or served in Hispaniola. In fact, only one-third of the 75,000 Marines, or 28,140 officers and enlisted Marines served with the American Expeditionary Forces in France, with only 24,000 of them engaged in or near combat, while 1,963 served either in the Dominican Republic, 885 in Haiti (885). The remaining 37,403 Marines recruited served as part of the Advanced Base Force or in an administrative or training capacity.28 More important, however, is the fact that up until an August 8, 1918 Executive Order, which required the Marine Corps to suspend voluntary enlistments for the duration of the war, and accept 5,000 men for the months of October through December 1918, and

27Barnett, "Soldier and Sailor Too," Ch. 26, p. 3.
28In fact, only 24,555 of this overall total served in a direct "combat" role with the AEF. See McClellan, Marines in the World War, pp. 10, 17, and 37 respectively.
January 1919, and 1,500 per month thereafter. This contradicts General Barnett's claim that these men were "volunteers."\textsuperscript{29}(Table 2.3)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Enlisted Men</td>
<td>6,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Enlisted Men</td>
<td>65,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Reservists</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Enlisted Strength</strong></td>
<td>72,639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3
Enlisted Marine Strength as of December 1918

The important point here is that during the World War, the Marine Corps established a precedent in its approach to not only enlistment, but in the acceptance of draftees, "volunteers," as General Barnett labeled them. More importantly, however, is the fact that the Marine Corps' training infrastructure demonstrated its flexibility in order to meet the demands of wartime expansion, and could thus turn its recruit depots into what Barnett termed "soldier factories" and still produce "a well-trained infantryman."\textsuperscript{31}

Insofar as training had been concerned, the two recruit depots of Parris Island, and Mare Island, as well as the Norfolk, Brooklyn, and Philadelphia Navy Yards trained an estimated 60,603 recruits from the outbreak of war in April 1917, until the Armistice in November 1918. Recruit training consisted of an eight-to twelve week training cycle that included close and extended order drill, calisthenics, bayonet training, and rifle marksmanship. It was during the World War, in fact, that Marine recruit training assumed many of the characteristics that has made it legendary in the annals of American military

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid, p. 14; Barnett, "Soldier and Sailor Too," Ch. 26, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{30}McClelan, Marines in the World War, p. 13.
history. Part of this legend centered itself around the training a Marine received during his eight weeks on either Parris Island or at Mare Island. Private Delbert Philo, who trained at Parris Island, recalled that the day consisted of an endless cycle of close order drill, police duty (cleaning), and more drill.32 Due to the fact that Parris Island was still in the construction phase of development, the conditions there were, as future Marine Generals Ion M. Bethel and Christian F. Schilt recalled, "very primitive."33 General Gerald Thomas added that the training was "pretty grim." Nonetheless, by war's end, Parris Island had trained over 46,202 recruits, among them the future Secretary of the Navy during the John A. Lejeune era, Edwin Denby.34 (Table 2.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depot Recruits</th>
<th>In Training</th>
<th>Maximum Number of Recruits at one time</th>
<th>Total Handled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr 1917</td>
<td>Nov. 1918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parris Island</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>4,104</td>
<td>13,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mare Island</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>2,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>5,247</td>
<td>15,756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4
Number of Recruits Trained at Parris Island, South Carolina, and Mare Island, California, 1917-1918

35McClellan, Marines in the World War, p. 25.
Headquarters divided "boot camp," into three phases which lasted eight weeks. During the first three weeks, or first phase, recruits did close order drill, physical exercise, swimming, bayonet training, hand-to-hand combat, wall-scaling, and rope climbing. The second phase, or the fourth and fifth weeks, consisted of more close order drill, boxing and wrestling, interior guard duties, and extended order drill. The last phase, weeks six through eight, were spent on the rifle range. When not drilling, recruits built barracks, and other facilities, as well as hauled and crushed oyster shells used in the construction of roads and walkways. As for the living conditions, Major General Melvin L. Krulewitch, recalled that they were hard enough that, "even the French Foreign Legion and other military units couldn't compare to the early Marine Corps training we had there." Due to the rapid expansion of the Marine Corps, and the lack of facilities on Parris Island, recruits lived in large tents, slept on cots with bedding infested with bugs (primarily sand fleas or "cooties"), and ate greasy, oftentimes unpalatable food. The Spartan conditions coupled with the hard training on Parris Island, caused Private Philo to write home that, "... we don't do much loafing. It sure hardens a man up." Another recruit was more succinct when he wrote that "The first day I was at camp I was afraid I was going to die. The next two weeks my sole fear was that I wasn't going to die. And after that I knew I'd never die because I'd become so hard that nothing could kill me."36

The importance placed here on Marine recruit training cannot be overemphasized, since the World War institutionalized Marine recruit training. Furthermore, the rapid expansion that Parris Island underwent, established the precedent Headquarters later used during the build up immediately after the United States entered World War II. Besides the expansion of both the infrastructure, and methods of training recruits that occurred at Parris Island (and to a lesser degree at Mare Island), one of the enduring

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legacies of recruit training at Parris Island, in particular, during the World War, was the expanded use of noncommissioned officers as instructors. Over time, though not during the World War, these noncommissioned officers henceforth became known and referred to as "drill instructors" or "DI's." Supervised by two officers (normally a captain and lieutenant), the "DI's," most of whom were veterans of the fighting in Hispaniola and Central America, soon took on a role "junior only to God."³⁷ The fact remains, however, that the "DI's," who have over the years been the subject of more mythology than reality, were at the same time both teachers, as well as disciplinarians, and had as their main responsibility the "mental" preparation of their platoons for the rigors of combat. In short, the most important role the drill instructors performed during the World War was to not only inculcate the recruits under their care with an instantaneous obedience to orders, but to impart in them an "espirit d' corps," that to this day remains the foundation of Marine recruit training.

In sum, the World War established the pattern for both Marine officer and recruit training. The recruits and officer candidates who endured the "filthy and dirty" conditions that existed at both Quantico and Parris Island, underwent possibly "a more physically demanding or hostile setting" than those who trained there during World War II. Nonetheless, the training the Marines received at both bases during the war and enabled them to endure the rigors of combat in such places as Belleau Wood and Scissons.

*Training For Combat*

After recruits successfully completed the initial period of basic training, the new Marines proceeded to the newly-established Marine Barracks at Quantico, Virginia, where they received an intensive period of infantry training in trench warfare, sniping, scouting, bayonet and gas warfare, classes in hand and rifle grenades (bombing), and

³⁷Alvarez, *Where It All Begins*, p. 16.
familiarization with the automatic rifle. Headquarters sought to make the training "approach as nearly as possible what the men would be subject to in actual service." The infantry training Marines received at Quantico was both intensive and thorough, given the limited facilities at Quantico at that time. In fact, this lack of proper training facilities on the part of the Marine Corps (and Army for that matter), led to not the inability to properly prepare Marines for combat in France, but contributed to the major tactical and operational problems Marines had in the handling and employment of automatic weapons, mortars, and machine guns, after their commitment to battle in the summer of 1918. The failure on the part of the Overseas Department to properly prepare Marines for combat during the World War, in fact, greatly influenced both Major Generals Barnett's and Lejeune's postwar emphasis on officer and enlisted training and education, particularly on the latter's desire to establish an Infantry Officers' School at Quantico. It also caused the wholesale adoption by the Marine Corps Schools of the Army's Infantry Drill Regulations (IDR's), and Field Service Regulations (FSR's), which remained an important component of Marine officer education during the interwar era. The adoption of the Army's IDR's and FSR's, in time led to a serious debate as to the roles and missions of the Marine Corps during the late 1920's and early 1930's at the Marine Corps Schools, between the proponents of the constabulary mission, the officers who favored an orientation toward land warfare, and those who favored the study of landing operations during the 1930's.  

Many of the problems later encountered by Marines during the fighting in 1918, centered around the handling of platoon and company weapons. While over eighty-five percent of the Marines at both the recruit depots had received anywhere from eight to

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38See Colonel E. B. Miller ltr. to Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, dtd. 16 August 1932, Subj.: "Field Officers Schools, Marine Corps 1932/33. (Quantico, VA., Marine Corps University Archives, Historical Amphibious Files, MCU, MCCDC).
twelve hours of basic infantry training in what Marines call the "School of the Soldier," Headquarters deemed this insufficient to meet the rigors of combat in France. Upon their arrival at Quantico, the tactical department, later renamed the Overseas Department, organized the newly-arrived Marines into companies of four platoons each, where they received an additional period of training prior to reporting to a unit preparing either for service overseas, or with the Advanced Base Brigade. Once again, in addition to the intensive training in trench warfare, given by French, British, and Canadian officers and noncommissioned officers, Marines were, according to Major General Barnett, required to requalify "as marksmen or better." In order to best prepare Marines for service overseas in France, leathernecks fired not only the standard Marine rifle qualification course, but also that of the Army and Navy as well, which included night firing. In fact, Barnett emphasized this latter point when he wrote that Marines did a fair amount of training at night, designed primarily to "not only to harden them but to teach them to find their way at night."  

Later on in the war at "Chateau-Thierry," a specially-constructed French village, each Marine battalion destined for France "had to construct trenches, dugouts, hospital stations, etc., and in fact do all the work that it was necessary to do at the front." In keeping with General John J. Pershing's emphasis on training for open vice trench warfare, Marines practiced assaulting "German" trenches, machine gun positions, and fortified emplacements. In order to simulate battlefield sounds and add a bit of realism to the training, combat engineers electronically connected automobile horns which blew incessantly until the attacking troops "shot up " the horns and silenced them, which in turn indicated that the position had been "taken." When assaulting enemy trench lines, silhouettes of German soldiers would "spring" up at the Marines who either bayoneted or

clubbed them with the butts of their rifles. In short, prior to leaving for France, Marines received a concise, though brief familiarization with battlefield procedures necessary for combat in France.\textsuperscript{40}

Upon arrival in France, and when not unloading supplies at Brest, and the other French ports, Marines continued to train for war, primarily at the Gondrecourt and Bourmount training areas. Here, French and U.S. Army instructors taught the leathernecks the use of rifle grenades, hand grenades, automatic rifles, rifle drills, bayonet training, trench construction, close order combat formations, occupation and defense of sectors, and use of aeroplane signals. Marine officers and noncommissioned officers likewise attended platoon and section commanders', as well as noncommissioned officers' schools. In addition to individual and unit training, Marines likewise participated in maneuvers using open warfare methods, patrolling, security, ambushes, and combined arms.\textsuperscript{41}

Despite the training in joint or combined warfare, the different branches trained independent of each other in adherence to French tactical doctrine. While the infantry conducted extensive training in open and trench warfare, artillerymen remained in the rear practicing fire support using 75mm howitzers. Marine officers meanwhile conducted map exercises without troops, practiced command and control methods such as communications and support procedures requirements, as well as studying after action reports of the fighting.

Even with the Marine Corps's emphasis on marksmanship, problems nonetheless existed in the preparation of the leathernecks (and doughboys) for combat. While French instructors remained impressed with the Marine Corps' emphasis on marksmanship, they


nonetheless reported to their superiors that the Americans had problems in the use of hand grenades, and automatic weapons. In a memorandum to his superiors, French General Henri Petain, reported that insofar as use of the rifle, automatic arms, the bayonet, and the grenade:

The American soldier is drilled in the use of the rifle and the bayonet. The value of automatic weapons and of the grenade is not fully appreciated. These are points which should be developed, at the same time being very careful not to diminish the partiality of the American soldiers for sniping (in which they easily excel) and for the bayonet.42

Interestingly, the problems Marines encountered in the use of automatic weapons pointed to not only to the tactical problems they encountered during the World War (such as formations and basic squad tactics), but one that returned with a vengeance while the leathernexels fought the sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua in the late 1920's. These problems pointed to the later inattention paid by both recruit depot officials and Headquarters toward the importance and necessity for familiarizing Marine recruits on the use and function of automatic rifles, and in weapons training in general during the interwar era. This tactical "dysfunction" likewise pointed to the failure on the part of Headquarters to incorporate the lessons learned in the value of automatic rifles from the World War experience. As Headquarters officials discovered, Marines by-and-large entered combat in Nicaragua with an inability to "handle infantry weapons, including automatic rifles, Thompson submachine guns, hand and rifle grenades." What is even more significant is that Marine commanders in Nicaragua discovered, much to their amazement, that this lack of weapons knowledge extended not only among Marines in

their first enlistment's, but with veterans normally assigned to "duties of a non-military nature." Eventually, Headquarters took steps to correct this deficiency, partly on the urging of Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, when it authorized the establishment of an Infantry Weapons School at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California in 1930. The poor tactical performance in Nicaragua indicated that Marines either took for granted their ability to handle weapons, or as is more likely the case, that the cut in training time which occurred at the recruit depots spent on weapons handling in the mid-1920's, eventually had a detrimental effect upon basic Marine infantry training. This in itself underscored the problem identified as early as the World War by General Petain, one in which Headquarters never adequately addressed, or simply chose to ignore due to both shortages in manpower, and budget cuts which hindered Marine basic training during the interwar era.43

**Tactical Dysfunction and the Lessons of War**

The problems Marines (and soldiers) had with automatic rifles and other weapons during the World War pointed to one "tactical dysfunction" that occurred in its preparations for combat in France, that Marines carried with them into the interwar era. These problems, in fact, can be traced, to a large degree, to the AEF's operational and tactical unpreparedness, when it first entered combat in the late spring of 1918. Whereas General Pershing had constantly emphasized the primacy of the rifle in the AEF's (and Marine Corps') training program, artillery and the machine gun ruled 'No Man's Land' in 1918. Major General John A. Lejeune, who would become the Marine Corps's

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43Colonel, Louis McCarthy Little, Director, Division of Operations and Training, Memorandum to Major General Commandant, dtd. 14 June 1929, Subj.: "Proposed 'Infantry Weapons School' for the Recruit Depot, San Diego, California, accompanied by a Requisition for Considerable Grenades and Pyrotechnics for use in a School and also at the Reserve Training Camp this Summer." (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, A/I Office, General Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No. 1520-30-20, Box 116, "NCO and Officer's Schools").
thirteenth Commandant (1920-1929), recognized this fact when he observed that artillery, and more importantly combined arms, were the keys to victory. Lejeune's recognition of the primacy of combined arms is important, and in a sense, validated the tactical doctrine Marine officers studied at the various schools they attended in the prewar years. Influenced by Major P. S. Bond's belief that "There must always be the closest cooperation between the artillery and other arms," Lejeune merely reiterated the Army major's dictum when he himself emphasized the necessity of close cooperation between attacking infantry and artillery.44

Major General Lejeune supported Bond's assertion that artillery, and in a larger sense, direct and indirect fire support, were critical elements of any assault or concentration of main effort against interlocking or fortified positions. Lejeune disputed Pershing's insistence on the primacy of the infantryman armed with a rifle and bayonet, and asserted that without proper artillery support, infantry assaults were suicidal. When commenting on the Marine actions at Belleau Wood in June 1918, the 2d Infantry Division commander noted that:

Each time little progress was made and it became apparent that the reckless courage of the foot soldier with his rifle and bayonet could not overcome machine-guns in rocky nests. . . Again, was decisively shown the great importance of artillery to infantry. Infantry alone without material, makes little or no progress. If the enemy combines personnel and material, we must do the same or lose the game.45


45Trask, Coalition Warmaking.
While Lejeune maintained this belief in the primacy of combined arms, he later reversed himself after the World War, and became a strong advocate of the primacy of infantry, that is, the rifle and the bayonet. This reversal is evidenced in a postwar Marine Corps Order (No. 39, Series 1921). General Lejeune, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, stressed to his officers that:

Infantry is the foundation on which the military structure is built (sic). It is the first duty of every Marine officer, therefore to make himself a good infantryman. This does not mean that it is necessary for officers to devote all of their time to the study of infantry tactics. During the years of peace officers have at their disposal ample time in which to become proficient in all branches of the profession of arms.\(^46\)

While the Commandant mentioned that the study of "all branches of the profession of arms" was important, he nonetheless placed greater stress on the words "infantry" and "good infantryman." Furthermore, given the tactical problems that later occurred in Nicaragua, it is apparent that Marine officers all but neglected the study of combined arms, particularly the use of automatic weapons, as well as the use of indirect and direct fire weapons such as mortars, and other means of fire support during an assault. While the leathernicks lacked the mobility to provide such fire support, it nonetheless points to the obvious fact that some of the lessons Marines learned in France during the World War, were soon forgotten in the immediate aftermath of that conflict, much to the detriment of Marine tactical performance later on in the jungles of Nicaragua.

Much like the AEF during the World War, the Marines "did not take steps to maximize" its infantry tactics in the "coordination and integration of the infantry and

artillery" it had at its disposal.\footnote{Nenninger, "Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF," pp. 178-9.} In short, Marines had to learn the hard way, with many of them later on becoming casualties before Headquarters and Brigade officials in Nicaragua mandated changes in both recruit and brigade training, prior to the assignment of an individual Marine to a field unit. This inability to use automatic weapons effectively in combat is all the more surprising when one considers the fact that by October 1918, doughboys and Marines had overcome many of their original problems in the use of automatic weapons and grenades, particularly while on the offensive. An after-action report of a brigade of to the U.S. Army's 30th U.S. Division suggested that AEF officials began to appreciate the value of automatic rifles and rifle grenades as an offensive rather than as defensive weapons. Nonetheless, the problems in the use of automatic weapons and grenades continued despite attempts by AEF officials to correct them as they appeared in combat.\footnote{See Memo 230-32.15, 30th Division, A.E.F., 18 October 1918, in United States Army in the World War 1917-1919, Volume 7, Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington, D.C., Center for Military History, 1990), pp. 560-2.}

The inability of doughboys and Marines to handle combined arms likewise extended to other individual weapons. In a memorandum issued after the Battle of Soissons (18 July-5 August 1918), 2d Division officers became increasingly alarmed over the inability of its men to handle 3-inch Stokes mortars, machine guns, and automatic rifles. The memorandum, issued by 2d Division headquarters, once again emphasized that battalion commanders paid too little attention to basic tactical fundamentals. Division officials cited this as one of the main reasons for the high casualty rates that could have otherwise been avoided, had these principles been adhered to in the first place.

The first problem identified in the memorandum concerned itself with the type of formations used during the offensive to overcome enemy machine gun nests. Platoon commanders used a variety of formations, mostly single line formations on a front of
approximately six hundred meters. These formations tended to become "mixed in" with the succeeding assault waves, with the attacking troops offering themselves as perfect targets to enemy gunners. Attacks across a wide frontage likewise prevented platoon commanders from exercising command and control of their men in the attack. Thus, attacks became unwieldy and uncoordinated, with formations of all sizes and shapes attacking with little thought being given to fire and maneuver. In order to exercise better command and control of existing formations, the memorandum encouraged Marine platoon and company commanders to form their men into in-depth platoon formations, since these formations had a much better chance in overcoming enemy emplacements as opposed to an advance across a single front.49

As for use of fire superiority, the memorandum noted: "Many organizations failed to use the fire of rifles and auto-rifles to assist the advance. Organizations which used fire to cover the advance made more rapid progress with fewer casualties than those who depended on shock action alone." In direct correlation to the unwieldy, single frontage attack, advancing Marines oftentimes halted to fire a few shots which in turn made them more susceptible to enemy fire. In several instances, formations that attacked in-depth incurred fewer casualties, due to the fact that they were able to deliver more firepower, which in turn prevented the Germans from effectively halting their advance.

As for the use of automatic rifles, it appears that it was more a matter of the weapon involved as opposed to the favoring of individual marksmanship. During the World War, Marines and soldiers oftentimes discarded the much hated M1918 Chauchat French automatic rifle in favor of the trustworthy, and more familiar .1903 Springfield rifle, used by both the leathernecks and doughboys. While Browning Automatic Rifles began to be

issued to AEF troops, including the Marines in the early autumn of 1918, there were simply not enough to go around, with the result that division and brigade officials issued doughboys and leathernecks Chauchats. Despite the fact that the Chauchats were lighter than the much-preferred Lewis machine guns (18.5 lbs as opposed to 27 lbs.), they oftentimes misfired or simply jammed, due largely to the conversion from the standard French 8mm ammunition to the U.S. Army's .30-06 caliber round, as well as to the field conditions in the trenches (mud, dirt, and water). Besides the problems with ammunition, the Chauchat was mechanically unreliable, and oftentimes broke down after only a few firings.

Doughboys and leathernecks, like their French counterparts, likewise had problems in combat with the Chauchat, insofar as actually firing it while advancing forward. Instructed to fire the Chauchat from the hip with the left foot forward, which in many instances prevented the weapon from jamming, American troops many times ignored these instructions and continued to fire it as if it were a rifle. Normally, troops were able to fire only two bursts in this manner before the weapon jammed or ran out of ammunition. Referred to as the "Shosho" by American troops, the Chauchat was universally hated by all who used it. Soldiers and Marines, in fact, both "swore by it and swore at it."50 Sergeant William Bihary, a machine gunner with the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, was even more blunt in his remarks when he recalled that not only did the leathernecks dislike the heavier Hotchkiss machine guns, but insofar as the Chauchat had been concerned they "hated that goddamn thing," and instead preferred the heavier, though more manageable, and much-revered Lewis machine guns, which AEF officials had taken from the Marines in order to give to the British.51 The dislike of the Chauchat

by Marines and soldiers, coupled with the weapon's unreliability caused Division officials to order that "the men must be prevented from discarding the Chauchat to pick up rifles of the dead and wounded." They insisted that "the Chauchat will be found useful when the objective is reached and consolidation begins." Nonetheless, 1st and 2d Division officials reported that after the Battle of Soissons, large piles of discarded equipment littered the battlefield, mostly automatic rifles and machine guns. General Headquarters urged commanding officers to ensure better care and retention of all weapons that their troops carried into battle.

Besides the propensity of the Chauchat to malfunction in combat, part of the problems Marines and soldiers had with the use of automatic rifles centered on the fact that AEF officials stressed its use as a "defensive" weapon, and not as an "offensive" weapon. A memorandum from Headquarters, 1st U.S. Division, emphasized, in fact, that the Chauchat "is a defensive weapon," due to its great power with a range of two to three hundred meters. The memorandum noted the fact that this in itself limited its potential as an "offensive weapon," due to the fact that beyond three hundred meters, its value greatly diminished in effectively engaging targets. Division officials admitted that the reason for this dislike of the Chauchat and use of automatic rifles in general by the soldiers and Marines, was due in large part to the deficiency in their training in its use. The memorandum encouraged commanding officers of all units "to instruct their men not only in the use of their weapons, but also in the application of different types of weapons," such as automatic rifles and machine guns. This memorandum suggested that besides the "technological dysfunction" that occurred with the Chauchat and other

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52 "Notes on Recent Operations," p. 2.
weapons, there existed a "tactical dysfunction" as well among American officers, who lacked the operational expertise in the employment of such weapons in combat, that only time and experience could correct.

While there was agreement among Division officials in both memorandums that a "greater application of fire would have resulted in far less casualties," Marine Brigade officials in particular reemphasized the use of the rifle "as the chief weapon of the infantry soldier." This in turn prompted Army and Marine officials to draw the wrong lesson that more emphasis needed to be placed on musketry training instead of on the use of automatic rifles. [Emphasis mine] The lackluster support for use of automatic rifles in combat extended to the Commander-in-Chief himself-General Pershing, who time and again urged more emphasis be placed on individual marksmanship rather than on an increased volume of fire. General Pershing's emphasis on individual marksmanship can, in fact, be seen in a memorandum issued on August 5, 1918, by his Chief of Staff, Colonel James W. McAndrew, who wrote that whenever possible, commanders were to insure that, "The training of individuals and groups in the use of their weapons will be freshened by suitable courses. A high standard of marksmanship with rifle, pistol, and automatic weapons will be reached and maintained." Colonel McAndrew emphasized, however, that "Riflemen will not be permitted to neglect the longer ranges (500 and 600 yards). In a similar report, General Pershing barely mentioned the use and training with automatic weapons, or combined arms before and during an attack. Instead, the AEF Commander-in-Chief reemphasized the use of the rifle, and exhorted his field commanders to maintain the doughboy's rifle marksmanship skills. In turn, this neglect

of even the basic of infantry skills with automatic and combined arms apparently trickled down to the Marine Brigade. This had the inevitable result that the wrong lessons were drawn by Lejeune and others as they examined the lessons of the World War.

Marines experienced problems with other arms as well while in France. Both memorandums likewise encouraged the increased use of hand and rifle grenades. As occurred during the fighting in Soissons, Marines often entered the fight "without grenades," with the conclusion by Division officials that "they could have been used to advantage if they had been available" to the attacking troops in the first place. The memorandum encouraged that henceforth, each Marine and soldier be given two hand grenades prior to the assault, in order to destroy isolated machine guns or machine gun nests, which Marines oftentimes by-passed in order to hasten their advance forward.

As for the use of machine guns, AEF officials seemed perplexed that so "little use was made of" them in order to assist the attacking troops in getting forward. This was due to the improper use of machine guns for defensive purposes, and the inability of the machine gun commanders to advance alongside the infantry. The memorandum stated that little use was "made of overhead fire," with the machine guns simply moving forward instead of in "bounds with a part of the guns always in position to assist by fire the advance of the remainder." This failure to use machine guns is noteworthy, in that AEF officers had been updated as to the German stormtroop tactics, and their use of machine guns in assisting advancing troops forward, and knew very well of the potential of a large volume of concentrated fire support. The findings, based on the British and French reports of the German Michael Offensive (21 March 1918), and re-published in a May 1918 War Department Training Bulletin, once again emphasized the importance of

combined arms in this war. In a direct reference to Lejeune's insistence on better combined arms training, Brigade and Division officials pointed out that this factor alone suggested that there was "an urgent necessity for the combined training of infantry battalions and machine gun companies for offensive action."

In addition to the improper use of machine guns in the attack, Division officials cited the "habitual" assignment of machine gun companies to infantry battalions regardless of the tactical situations. This in turn often left flanks exposed without proper machine gun protection due to the fact that division commanders often placed machine gun companies in divisional reserve. In turn, battalion commanders oftentimes divided machine gun companies up among the various rifle companies, which "invariably resulted in heavy casualties among machine gun personnel and great loss of guns with practically no use being made of the gun." Division officials stressed in this memorandum, "that the tactical control of machine gun companies assigned to infantry battalions should remain in the hands of the battalion commander, and this control be exercised through the machine gun company commander."

**Indirect and Direct Support Weapons**

In addition to the improper use of machine guns, battalion commanders made little use of either Stokes Mortars or 1-pounder (37mm) man-packed light howitzer. While noting the fact that both mortars and light field guns lacked mobility, the memorandum pointed out that regimental commanders failed to recognize their value in supporting a battalion in the attack. In effect, they failed to take advantage of either light field guns or

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55 See War Department, "Notes on Recent Fighting: March and April 1918," Document No. 805, War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, (Washington, D.C., War Plans Division, May 1918 as found in the Major General Smedley D. Butler, USMC, Papers, Marine Corps University Archives, MCU, MCCDC, Quantico, VA., Box 7, Folder 2), pp. 7-8.

56 Ibid.
mortars in close support of the infantry, by firing both direct and indirect support. This inability to properly use supporting fire likewise affected use of artillery during an attack. Once again, another problem insofar as the Marine Corps' unpreparedness for war appeared, though it can be asserted that it was through no fault of the Marines, in that they did not possess either the correct calibers or quantity of heavy field guns required for what had proved to be an artillery war. The lack of adequate field guns, in fact, led to a minor controversy between the Army and the Marines, as General Barnett noted in a postwar memorandum of the efforts of Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, and his organization of a Marine artillery regiment to serve alongside the Fourth Brigade.

The failure to use what "Marine" artillery existed was due once again to the Marine Corps' lack of modern field guns and its reliance on the Navy for heavy field guns. General Barnett, in fact, in a memorandum on Marine artillery during the World War, recalled that General Pershing initially requested that the Secretary of the Navy organize two batteries of naval guns for service with the AEF. These guns, 14-inch and 7-inch, and manned by sailors and Marines respectively, were to be mounted on specially-built tractors, and shipped to France. Either due to the lack of interoperability and potential logistical problems that might occur with these naval guns and those of the field artillery of the Army, Major General Peyton C. March, the Army's Chief of Staff, eventually declined "to take this regiment" to France. General March, nonetheless requested that the guns, crewed by soldiers, and not sailors or Marines be sent to France. Sensing an "amalgamation-type" feud between the War and Navy Departments, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, in accordance with Barnett's disapproval of such a move "declined to let the guns go without the men." In a direct reference to March's actions, Barnett voiced the opinion that these guns, as well as the services of a Marine artillery regiment "would have been of extreme value to the A.E.F., and this particularly so
because General Pershing had requested them." As it occurred during the World War, the Fourth Marine Brigade came to depend upon the U.S. Army's Second Field Artillery Brigade for artillery support, which consisted of two light artillery regiments (12th and 15th) of 75mm howitzers, and one regiment of heavy artillery (17th) 155mm guns. The primary mission assigned to artillery during the war was to provide fire support for the advancing infantry. The importance given to infantry-artillery coordination by General Pershing, and later by General Lejeune after the war, can be seen in the ratio of artillery support to infantry used by the AEF which was normally two and a half times as many artillery regiments for every infantry regiment in the attack. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, particularly at Blanc Mont, there were thirty light batteries and eighteen heavy batteries (of six guns each) for every four infantry regiments. The preponderance of light to heavy artillery during this offensive was due to the fact that the artillery was to provide close fire support for the attacking infantry in the reduction of enemy trenches and machine gun positions.

While division and brigade officials praised the mobility of artillery during the advance at Blanc Mont, particularly that of the 155mm howitzer batteries, which were found to be "capable of following the advance," despite their weight and rather crude means of transport, these same officers cited the failure of battery and regimental commanders to coordinate supporting fires during an attack. In fact, the study pointed out that battery commanders oftentimes were late in providing fire support, due largely to the fact that they were unable to quickly calculate the range of fire. Artillery

commanders likewise tended to plot their fires by use of maps, as opposed to the more effective use of observation by fire. This in turn pointed to a failure of both intelligence gathering, and communication with front observation units. As Major General Lejeune stressed in his original attack order prior to the assault on Blanc Mont, it was "deemed it highly advisable that the artillery have sufficient time to prepare and organize their positions and have a look at the terrain during daylight hours, before the attack started."\(^{59}\) As it turned out, artillery fire was oftentimes late, poorly adjusted, and in some cases nonexistent, as it became apparent that battery commanders had either failed to conduct pre-assault registering of artillery fire, or had failed to coordinate their fires with that of the attacking troops. Above all else, the poor artillery fire given to Marines and soldiers, pointed to a failure in not only pre-assault staff planning but in the use of observed fire. In order to redress the situation as the attack started, battery commanders used pre-registered bracketing methods to insure forward artillery support.

In order to prevent a further breakdown in artillery support, the 2d Division memorandum stressed that "Observed fire must be constantly sought." In addition to better command and control, AEF officials likewise pointed to the fact that artillery commanders needed to adjust their fire for closer support of the infantry in firing on definite objectives, as opposed to the more preferred method of barrage fire. This again pointed to a lack of combined arms training on the part of Marine and Army gunners, as well as a lack of coordination among the staff prior to a major assault.\(^{60}\) By war's end, however, Army gunners became more adept in both the preparation, and employment of artillery fire in support of an combined arms, infantry-led attack. This adeptness was apparent by the time of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive (September-November 1918), where AEF gunners now assigned 1 battery per 100 yards which, in addition to the

\(^{59}\)Ibid, p. 3.

\(^{60}\)"Notes on Recent Operations," pp.3-5.
presence of an increasing number of tanks, permitted greater support to the attacking infantry.\textsuperscript{61}

The use of close-in artillery support was not lost on Marines, who applied the lessons of the war, particularly artillery support during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, to its infant landing doctrine during the 1930's. In a study completed at the Field Officers' Course during the 1930-1931 academic year, Marines drew on their experiences in the World War in order to determine the amount, and area to be covered by artillery fire. The study concluded that based on the amount of artillery used in an attack by the French in late 1917, which called for the assignment of four guns per thousand meters, "the allotment of artillery for a landing operation should correspond more nearly to that considered necessary in 1917 before the introduction and general use of tanks in land warfare." Furthermore, by using the method of a "creeping barrage," artillery would then be used to cover the advance of the attacking infantry, at a distance of one hundred fifty to two hundred yards. The operation would be repeated, with the artillery fire moving forward at a fixed or sustained rate of fire (as in a rolling barrage), or by successive concentrations on the various enemy positions. This process would be repeated until the infantry reached the enemy's positions. Applied later on to the use of naval gunfire, a ship's fire would continue until the enemy's fixed defenses at the water's edge had either been neutralized or destroyed.\textsuperscript{62}

In order to achieve better coordination between the various components in the division and brigade, division and brigade officials stressed better communication between the different arms. The memorandum encouraged regimental and battalions officials greater use of both field telephone and radios. As for the use of signal lamps, the

\textsuperscript{61}NA., "General Discussion of A Landing Operation," A Report, dtd. 1930-31, (Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA., Field Officer's School, dtd. 1931 in the Historical Amphibious Files, No. 540, No. 5, at Quantico, VA., MCU Archives, MCCDC), pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
memorandum suggested that better use could have been made of these devices, as the terrain greatly favored their employment during an attack. Lastly, the lack of effective coordination pointed to the need for better battlefield intelligence, and pre-assault reconnaissance.

As for the impact of artillery use on the Marine Corps during the World War, it was crucial as that service sought to "redefine" its role and mission as an expeditionary force-in-readiness during the immediate aftermath of the war. Likewise, Marine artillery officers served throughout the AEF assigned to Army artillery batteries, battalions, and regiments. Most notable among them was Colonel Dunlap, who commanded the 2d Artillery Brigade's 17th Regiment during the last month of the war, and later authored a major study on the use of artillery during the World War in the immediate period after the armistice. In the report Dunlap concluded that in any future war artillery would play a vital role in any military operation.

Colonel Dunlap's report first and foremost discussed at great length the Army's refusal to use Marine Corps' 10th Regiment (Artillery) during the war. Dunlap noted that this was due largely to the fact that the types and calibers of guns used by the Marine Corps were incompatible with those used by the Army. He was even more critical of his own service which he stated lacked not only a dedicated artillery organization, but modern field pieces and tables of organization. Besides the call for the permanent establishment of two regiments dedicated solely to field artillery, Dunlap likewise cited the fact that while the Marine Corps trained signalmen, infantrymen, and machine gunners, it had no provisions to train artillerymen. Here, Dunlap urged Headquarters to not only organize a dedicated training program for both officers and enlisted men in the use of field artillery, but to create an office at Headquarters that could coordinate and measure the "performance" of artillery throughout the Marine Corps. Dunlap maintained in his report that insofar as artillery had been concerned, the World War opened new
possibilities for the expansion of its advanced base concept, due largely to the different caliber's, types, and uses of artillery in the war by both the Allies and Central Powers alike. Furthermore, as the postwar history of the 10th Marines illustrated, the impact of Dunlap's report was significant, as Headquarters dedicated what little resources it had in the refinement and expansion of its ability to provide adequate artillery support to Marines of the newly-created Marine Corps East Coast Expeditionary Force during the early 1920's. Furthermore, as both Dunlap's and the Field Officer's School studies pointed out, the World War, contrary to the belief held by many junior Marine officers, including Colonel Ellis B. Miller, a future amphibious warfare proponent, held many important lessons. Dunlap and the Field Officer's study maintained, in fact, that the war held several key lessons in the formulation of a viable and workable landing doctrine.

**Front Line or Combat Intelligence Operations**

During the World War, Marine battalion and brigade-level intelligence gathering came into its own, modeled chiefly on that of the British model. Prior to the commitment of the AEF to battle, General Pershing's G-2, Brigadier General Dennis Nolan, conducted a study of both the French and British military intelligence organizations, and ultimately opted for the latter, based on its emphasis on human intelligence, and enemy order of battle development. This was the same system adopted by the 4th Marine Brigade.

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Successful military operations are dependent on timely, accurate intelligence. From the very start of the war, the AEF, and the Marine Corps in particular, paid special attention to what is known as the "intelligence cycle" of collection, evaluation, and dissemination. This was a process carried out by both Marine officers and non-commissioned officers during the World War, and remained an important, though in time neglected aspect of Marine Corps training during the post-World War era. Like everything else, the Marine Corps, as well as the U.S. Army, had to create an "intelligence capability," in order to facilitate its ability to plan and execute major military operations. Thus, while AEF adopted the British procedures and methods of intelligence gathering and analysis, it modeled its staff sections based on the French organization that called for four bureaus or "G" sections, which included: Personnel (G-1); Intelligence (G-2); Operations (G-3); Supply or Logistics (G-4). Within a short period of time, all units, from corps to battalions adopted this French structure. Hence, the origins of the Marine Corps battalion-level intelligence section known as the "S-2."

With the organizational restructuring that took place inside the Marine Corps as it prepared for combat in France, and the increased importance of the battalion and regiment in Marine operational planning, "battalion S2s" became the "foundation" of the overall intelligence picture, as well that of the "entire combat intelligence system." The intelligence section or S-2 soon became the "eyes and ears," of the brigade, regimental, and battalion commanders. Because the largest Marine Corps units sent to France were two brigades, the bulk of this section will examine how it structured its

First Steps," For a perspective on Marine intelligence during the World War see Major M. H. Silverthorn, USMC, "A Summary of the Operations of the Intelligence Section of the 2d Division During the World War with Critical Analysis Thereof," Marine Corps Schools, dtd. 8 April 1936. (Quantico, V.A., Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, Reference Section, File No. 5450-10, Microfilm Roll 20-84, Drawer 2). Hereafter cited as Silverthorn, "Intelligence Section 2d Division."

brigade, regimental, and battalion intelligence sections, and its impact on the overall effectiveness of Marine units in combat.

During the World War, the focus of Marine intelligence activities centered around the regimental and battalion levels. Major Merwin H. Silverthorn wrote that "The brigade intelligence section was not considered to be of much importance inasmuch as the Brigade adjutant was made responsible for the intelligence of the brigade."\(^{67}\) Due to the fact that brigade level intelligence had no enlisted or support personnel, with only another officer detailed as an assistant, brigade-level intelligence activities became more dependent on both the regimental and battalion level S-2's, and acted more as a liaison between division and regiment. During the World War, the Marine Brigade's adjutant and de facto intelligence officer was Major Earl H. "Pete" Ellis, whose primary function was to act as a operational planner, with intelligence being only a small portion of his day-to-day concerns.\(^{68}\) Insofar as his function as an intelligence officer had been concerned, Ellis' main task was to submit intelligence reports, which consisted, for the most part of enemy activity, mostly troop movements, artillery emplacements, and aviation activities. Despite this mostly routine activity, Ellis nonetheless stressed the need for proper intelligence gathering, and its importance in incorporating it into planning military operations. As military intelligence sections had an overriding tendency to merely "gather" pertinent information on an enemy force, Major Ellis wrote after the war, that the main function of the regimental and battalion intelligence sections was the proper analysis and dissemination of information, and to place it as quickly as possible into the "hands of the person who can use it to best advantage."\(^{69}\)

\(^{67}\)Silverthorn, "Intelligence Section, 2d Division," p. 5.
The persons "who could use it to best advantage" were both the regimental and battalion commanders. For it was both the regiment and battalion that served as the primary maneuver elements during the World War. As for the infantry regiment, the regimental intelligence section consisted of one officer who served as the intelligence officer, and eight enlisted men, used as front-line observers and intelligence agents. The regimental intelligence section served as the main link between the battalions and brigade headquarters, and one of the main "collection" points as information proceeded "up the chain of command." The Regimental Intelligence Officer had as his responsibility, "the instruction, training, and efficiency of the regimental intelligence personnel." Insofar as the responsibilities of the section itself, regimental intelligence personnel were to, "collect, verify, and coordinate all information concerning the enemy; furnish correction of the battle map; make abstracts from patrol and reconnaissance reports; and receive reports from observers in observation post; reports on the condition of, and the findings in enemy trenches; identification and interrogation of enemy prisoners of war; and visit and observe front line observation posts." 70

For Marines and doughboys, however, the battalion intelligence officer served as the most important element in the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of raw intelligence information. In fact, "The Battalion S2s were the foundation of . . ." the intelligence network. In a large sense, the battalion intelligence section served as the linchpin that made "the whole system work." 71 To this end, Marine Brigade officials organized the battalion intelligence section according to the standard AEF pattern of anywhere from twenty-nine to thirty-one men, which included one intelligence officer, who was normally a first lieutenant or captain, and twenty-eight to thirty enlisted men, broken down into four sections: Headquarters; Scouts, Snipers, and an Observation

70Silverthron, "Intelligence Section, 2d Division," pp. 7-8.
71Bigelow, "The First Steps," p. 27.
section. Normally, the scouts, snipers, and observation sections worked together. The mission and duties of the Battalion intelligence section was similar to those prescribed for the Regimental intelligence section. (Table 2.5)

**Headquarters Section:** 1 Intelligence Officer, normally a Captain or First Lieutenant.

**Scout Section:** 3 noncommissioned officers and 12 privates.

**Observation Section:** 1 noncommissioned officer and 10 privates.

**Sniping Section:** 2 noncommissioned officers for duty as Snipers.

**Table 2.5**

U.S. Marine Battalion Intelligence Section Organization February 1918

In addition to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of local intelligence, as well as forwarding intelligence data to the Regimental intelligence officer, the battalion intelligence section assisted battalion commanders with the topographical sketching, terrain analysis, aerial photographic interpretation, and trench raiding. In fact, two of the most important sections of the battalion intelligence section were the Scout and Observation Sections, the so-called "eyes and ears" of the battalion commander. These sections, headed by a noncommissioned officer, and comprised of Marines with "exceptional field skills, "or at least the intelligence to develop them," underwent a vigorous training program based partially on infantry skills, such as patrolling, hand-to-hand combat, night compass reading, as well as map reading, and topographic sketching,

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72 Captain Bigelow states that the standard U.S. Army battalion S-2 section consisted of thirty one men (one officer and thirty enlisted men), while Major Silverthorn wrote that the Marine battalion S-2 section consisted of one officer and twenty-eight enlisted men. The difference being the Marine inclusion of a sniper section of two noncommissioned officers. See Bigelow, "The First Steps," p. 27; Silverthorn, "Intelligence Section, 2d Division," p. 5.

73 Silverthorn, "Intelligence Section, 2d Division," p. 5.
and had as their job forward observation and enemy trench raiding. While the AEF had a
special school at Langres to train officers and noncommissioned officers in such skills,
Sergeant Gerald Thomas, who had been assigned to the S-2 of the 1st Battalion, 6th
Marines, and a member of one of these Scout and Observation group known otherwise
as "suicide squads," indicated that much of what the Marines learned was primarily on
the job training and self-study. Sergeant Thomas recalled, in fact, that "a month of
training gave us a reasonable degree of proficiency."74

Sergeants, such as Gerald Thomas, played a critical role in the intelligence section.
As was the case with the Army during the World War, the noncommissioned officer in
the Marine Corps moved into the growing field of military specialists. This included the
intelligence field. While a senior sergeant served as the noncommissioned officer in
charge, he was also normally "second in command of the S-2 section," and many times
acted as the "acting intelligence officer" in the absence of the intelligence officer. This
senior sergeant "...recorded and collected enemy information, examined captured
documents and prisoners, kept the section's records, and did much of the report
writing."75 Because this senior noncommissioned officer performed a crucial role in the
intelligence process, intelligence officers needed to "make sure that his NCOIC could do
the job." Other noncommissioned officers performed similarly important roles. The
sergeants in charge of the scout and observation groups, likewise performed equally
important roles within the battalion intelligence section. In fact, many of these
noncommissioned officers, like Sergeant Thomas, "filled traditional NCO roles, with
training being both realistic and thorough."

The importance the Marine Corps attached to the requirements for qualified non-
commissioned and enlisted personnel attached to the battalion intelligence section can be

75 Bigelow, "The First Steps," p. 28.
seen in the postwar organization of the Battalion intelligence section, which retained the standard AEF battalion-level intelligence organizational structure, with its emphasis on trained enlisted men (Table 2.6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Intelligence Officer:</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Scout:</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts (4):</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts (28):</td>
<td>Privates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Observer</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observers: (2)</td>
<td>Corporals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observers: (12)</td>
<td>Privates First Class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6
Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Intelligence Section Organization, 1920

In sum, the Marine Corps found the U.S. Army's brigade through battalion-level intelligence organization, best suited to its tactical and organizational requirements during the World War. What is even more important, is the fact that Headquarters retained this organizational structure for battalion intelligence in the post World War era, with much of its postwar emphasis on officer and noncommissioned education directed toward tactical intelligence gathering and evaluation.

Gas Warfare

Besides attending schools which taught them intelligence gathering and evaluation, infantry skills such as use of automatic rifles, grenades, and patrolling, and staff work, Marine officers and noncommissioned officers attended special Gas Schools, conducted by the Army, the British, and the French. The three Marine units which formed the Fourth Marine Brigade, received extensive training in gas warfare. In fact, the first Marine combat deaths in the World War, which occurred southeast of Verdun in April

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1918, can be attributed to the effects of a gas attack. It was here that elements of the 74th Company, 6th Marines came under attack by a German gas bombardment, with the result that three hundred members of the company became casualties, while thirty-three members of that same outfit died as a consequence of this attack. In a subsequent investigation as to the reasons the company suffered so many losses, Brigade officials attributed the severity of the attack on not only the inexperience of the leathernocks in dealing with gas, but with the suddenness of the attack that caught many of the sleeping leathernocks without the use of protective masks. In response to this attack, and the serious nature of gas warfare AEF officials issued General Order 79, that mandated the assignment of gas officers for not only armies and corps, but for divisions and regiments. Shortly thereafter, General Headquarters (AEF) extended this to the battalion level. Those qualified men, who had been selected to become gas officers and noncommissioned officers because of their education and experience, upon graduation from the AEF's Gas Defense School, had as their primary duties, "the supervision of training in the use of gas masks, gas proof shelters, alarm systems, and related defensive measures."

As for specific functions, gas officers were to insure that the regiment and battalions used protective measures through vigorous inspections and instruction, as well as the maintenance of a close liaison with Signal officers charged with the upkeep of meteorological data. Gas noncommissioned officers, meanwhile, were to inspect all defensive equipment and antigas procedures at least twice a week prior to the commencement of an offensive. The noncommissioned officers likewise reported weather, terrain conditions, and reviewed all new gas tactics and material. Both the gas officer and

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noncommissioned officers, in turn, reported all pertinent information to both the company and battalion commanders.\textsuperscript{78} While the Marine Brigade adhered as close as possible to the AEF's table of organization, insofar as the number of gas officers and enlisted men per unit had been concerned, it differed slightly with the designation one officer and one noncommissioned officer per regiment, one officer and three noncommissioned officer per battalion, and two noncommissioned officers who carried out the same function as their Army counterparts.\textsuperscript{79}

During subsequent combat operations, Marines successfully employed their training with gas warfare during actions at St. Mihiel (12-17 September 1918), and later during the Meuse-Argonne campaign (September-November 1918). Furthermore, Marine interest in gas warfare continued during the postwar era, with leatherneck officers assigned to the Army's Chemical Warfare School, at the Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, as well as the Marine Corps Schools offering classes and lectures on gas warfare as part of both the Field Officers' and Company Officers' School at Quantico, during the interwar era. Regimental and battalion-level organization likewise carried gas officers and noncommissioned officers in their respective tables of organization during the postwar era. Furthermore, Headquarters included the use of non-toxic "tear gas" during exercises on Culebra during the winter maneuvers of 1924, a fact that pointed to the Marine Corps's continued interest in gas warfare, despite the cutbacks in the number of men assigned to fill such quotas.


\textsuperscript{79}See Major General George Barnett, "Table No. 6., U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment, September 1, 1918," (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, Reference Section, Folder: "U.S. Marine Corps Organization & Staff Development, Original Records").
This interest in gas and chemical warfare did not remain solely with the Army and Marines. The Navy, through the Bureau of Medicine, likewise expressed interest in gas warfare and made a conscientious effort to study the effects and treatment of chemical weapons during the interwar era, in order to better treat Marines and soldiers caught in gas attacks by hospital corpsmen during a gas or chemical attack. Starting in 1920, the Navy's Hospital Corps Handbook devoted an entire section to the care of gas victims, due to the fact that Navy corpsmen, "are subject to detail with the Marine Corps in operations ashore," and shared similar responsibilities with Army Hospital Corps personnel, when both services operated together. By the mid-1920's, the Navy had developed a range of treatments for the victims of gas and chemical attacks (irritants, blistering agents, and attacks to the nervous system). While these treatments remained very basic, they nonetheless represented the growing importance Navy Department officials attached to the possibility of a future war fought with chemical weapons, as well as to the need to have access to the knowledge gained from research conducted by the Army Medical Corps in treating soldiers affected by gas attacks.  

units in Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), had used the Jeffrey "Quad" four-wheeled truck, which could operate on or off the main roads, or whatever constituted roads in the two countries. While these trucks had limitations (such as its weight and solid rubber tires which oftentimes sank into the soft Haitian soil), they nonetheless remained in Marine Corps service prior to and during the World War. During the World War, however, Marines received their first "Liberty" and four-wheeled drive (FWD) trucks, which in time became the standard trucks used by the Marine Corps up to the eve of World War II. By the end of the World War, the Marines had over 950 motor vehicles of all types (trucks, automobiles, and motorcycles) in service.81

In addition to this emphasis on mechanization, Marine officers and enlisted men attended the Army's Motor Transport Training School, located at Camp Holabird, Maryland, until the establishment of a vocational motor training course at Quantico in 1919.82 As was true with the other organizational and technological innovations introduced in the Marine Corps as a result of its participation in the World War, the introduction of motor vehicles in the Marine Corps contributed to the professional development of Marine enlisted men. This in time led to the professionalization of its noncommissioned officer corps during the interwar years, as enlisted men became more tactically and technically proficient in combat, combat support, and combat service support operations.

One last aspect of mechanization that led to the tactical and technological development of both its officer and enlisted corps was the use of tanks. While Marines had used the King armored car in Haiti, involvement in the World War brought Marine infantry

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commanders into direct contact with the light tank, and its use as an infantry support weapon. Introduced in 1916 by the British, tanks, in fact, had become an integral, though still largely unreliable part of allied infantry assaults by the time the United States entered the World War a year later. With the creation of the U.S. Army's Tank Corps in late 1917, the tank soon became an important adjunct to the infantry. As envisioned by one Army tank pioneer, Captain George S. Patton, Jr., tanks, primarily the light French-built M1917 Renault, took on the role as infantry support weapons. In fact, Captain Patton, in a fifty-eight page report, outlined not only the organization of the Army's infant tank corps, but emphasized that the tank was first and foremost, an infantry support weapon, a fact not lost on Marine officers. Besides assigned the task of clearing wire obstacles, the tank was to "suppress enemy crew-served weapons, helping in the mopping up of objective areas, and preventing counterattacks by advancing forward of the most advanced infantry positions, and exploiting the attack supported by reserve infantry, seeking every opportunity to become pursuit cavalry."83 While Marines possessed no tanks of their own, they nonetheless watched with "keen interest" the vital support offered by tanks to attacking infantry. In fact, the first instance of Marine use of tanks during an assault occurred during the fighting at Soissons (18-July-5 August 1918), when elements of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines assaulted the German positions with the assistance of French light tanks, and a heavy, well-coordinated "rolling" artillery barrage that successfully neutralized the effects of the interlocked German machine gun nests. As Marines, doughboys, and French soldiers advanced in unison with light tanks, the artillery quickly "displaced forward and many guns could be seen firing from the open fields over which [allied] troops had just passed."84 Marine Private Carl A. Brannen

84 NA., History of the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines. (Quantico, Marine Barracks,
recalled that during this particular battle, tanks "were leading with our lines right behind them," with the result that, "... The Germans turned loose everything they had." Private Brannen remembered that by the time Marines and doughboys reached the enemy trench line, "all our tanks had been crippled or stopped and all the men around me shot up."85

During the fighting at Blanc Mont (October 2-10, 1918), the 3d Battalion's 5th Marines, as well as the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines advanced along the so-called "Eschen Hook," while elements of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines protected the flanks of the U.S. 2d Division. With the assistance of the French 21st Infantry Division, the allies attacked German positions at Marie-a-Py along with elements of the 17th Company, 1st Bn, 5th Marines, as well as a force of several light tanks, a 37mm gun, and a machine gun platoon. Leading the attack were twelve tanks assigned to the assault elements of the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, while an additional twelve tanks remained in reserve, assigned to protect the flanks with elements of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. As for the results of this second major use of tanks by the leathernecks, a postwar German account of the Battle of Blanc Mont noted that the Marines attacked tenaciously with several tanks, this despite the fact that the Renault light tanks "assigned to the Battalion did not come up in time to go over the top," with the leathernecks.86 A similar German report on this same battle noted that tanks were now present with every American attack, acting in unison with the infantry.

86 See Ernest Otto, Battle at Blanc Mont (October 2 to October 10, 1918). (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1930), pp. 24-6; For an excellent account of this assault see Major Ernest C. Williams, USMC, "Operation Report Covering Period From September 29 to
This interest in tanks by the Marines continued well after the war had ended. Despite the fact that the Marine Corps did not organize its first tank platoon until October 30, 1923, "instruction in tanks was included in the initial curriculum of the Marine Corps' Field Officers' School at Quantico," as early as 1920. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the Marines possessed no tanks of their own, there was a consensus among Marines who had served in France that "knowledge of tanks was necessary, if only to be prepared for possible future employment of the Marine Corps with the Army." 87 Furthermore, these same Marine officers envisioned the usefulness of the tank in the defense of advanced naval base, as well as an offensive weapon in the "seizure" of an advanced base. Insofar as an "offensive" role for the tank, however, the technology of the tanks, the lack of adequate landing craft, and tactics of the time negated its usefulness in this role. Only until improved tank designs, as well as improved landing craft had been developed to transport the tanks ashore could Marines conceptualize the use of tanks in an offensive or "amphibious" role. As budget cuts sapped the Marine Corps of both men and money to develop new weapons, further development of a suitable tank and landing craft would not occur until the early 1940's. 88

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In a postwar synopsis of the use of tanks in the World War, Marine Major George H. Osterhout pointed out that tanks, most notably the French light tanks, maneuvering in either sections, columns, or deployed in close liaison with the infantry, advancing either in front of them, or sometimes in the rear, offered attacking infantry greater use of firepower, in unison with machine guns and artillery. Osterhout noted that this use of tanks in support of infantry was in direct contrast to the British practice of having attacking infantry attacking in front of tanks or, in other words, troops in support of tanks, as opposed to the close infantry-tank liaison method employed by the French. (Emphasis Mine) In spite of the fact that the British had successfully employed more of a "combined arms team" in the way of aircraft, tanks, artillery, and machine guns with the advancing infantry during the Battle of Cambrai in 1917, they had clung to the idea of having troops moving ahead of the tanks, thus negating their value as an infantry support weapon. Furthermore, despite the successful integration of combined arms by Australian General Sir John Monash throughout 1918 on the Western Front, Marine armored doctrine retained its French influence throughout the 1920's and 1930's, with the opinion that the tank was a mobile pillbox whose chief function was the support of advancing infantry.  

Even with the deactivation of the first Marine tank platoon in the late 1920's, due more to budget and manpower cutbacks, interest in tank warfare continued. Marine officers who attended the Ecole Superieure d' Guerre during the 1920's and 1930's (Majors O.P. Smith and Charles D. Barrett, as well as Captain Lester A. Dessez), received a good dosage of French operational and tactical doctrine that included the combined use of tanks and infantry in the attack. This fact alone reinforces the idea that Marine battle-

field experience in the World War remained relevant in the curriculum and training doctrine at the Marine Corps Schools during the 1920's and 1930's, and would influence an entire generation of Marine officers who would not only fight in the Second World War, but also in Korea.

In fact, one can see a direct "link" between the World War, and Marine battlefield use of tanks as infantry support weapons during the Second World War, in the comments made by then-Major Oliver P. Smith, on his coursework at Ecole Superieure d'Guerre during the 1934 through 1936 term. In drawing a parallel to the use of tanks in the World War, Major Smith wrote that the French:

> contemplate using the Renault [light tank] as an accompanying tank preceding the attacking infantry at about 200 yards . . . Protection of the infantry against automatic weapons, which have not been neutralized by the fast tanks while en route to the visible horizon, is left to the slow accompanying tanks . . . In the defensive, the use of tanks is contemplated in the counterattack, and in the attack of enemy tanks which succeed in penetrating into the position.⁹⁰

Major Smith's comments confirm the influence of French mechanized doctrine on the Marine Corps' use of tanks during World War II. When translated into U.S. tank types of the 1920s and 1930s, Marines envisioned the use of the infantry-accompanying light tank (Renaults), in what the French labeled the chars d'accompagnement, in a general advance. Meanwhile, for a more concentrated use of tanks along a main line of resistance, the leathernecks employed what the French termed the chars d'manoeuvre d'ensemble with a heavier tank (e.g., six-ton M1917).⁹¹ Marines employed the chars

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⁹⁰Major Oliver P. Smith, "Report on the Ecole Superieure De Guerre, Years 1934 to 1936." (Quantico, VA., Marine Corps Research Center, MCU, MCCDC, Quantico, Microfilm Drawer, No. 2), pp. 53-5.
⁹¹See Burns, "Marine Corps Tank Units, 1923-1945," pp. 70-89; Hoffman and Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm, pp. pp. 185-213; Richard Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces:
*d*manoeuvre *d*ensemble*, or, as translated by the French as a "leading tank-intended for concentrated employment of maneuver along the main line of effort of a supported large infantry unit," during the fighting on Peleliu in September 1944, when Marine armor succeeded in turning back a determined Japanese tank assault that had managed to penetrate Marine front line defenses for several critical hours.

* In sum, despite the fact that the Marines possessed no tanks of their own during the World War, farsighted Marine officers saw the potential of tanks as an important element of any base seizure and defense force. Even though the Navy lacked sufficient transports, or landing craft to transport the tanks that the Marines obtained in the 1920's, Marines nonetheless included tanks in the two FLEXES of the 1920's (1924 and 1925), as well as in its postwar planning, and reorganization. The influence from the World War centered around tanks was most evident with the activation of its first tank platoon in 1923. Like everything else, however, manpower and budget cuts severely hampered this early effort towards force mechanization, and would have to await better days when it could afford not only tanks, but the supporting infrastructure necessary to keep them in the field. Thus, the Marine Corps' experience in the World War with tanks and infantry acting in unison clearly influenced its tactical doctrine which Marine officers in turn wrote into its infant landing operations doctrine. Despite the lack of either a suitable light or medium tank, as well as landing craft to transport the tank ashore during a landing, Marine officers persisted in their efforts during the post-World War era, up to and during World War II, in order to develop and refine the tank-infantry doctrine it had acquired in France in 1918.92

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92 See *Oral History Transcript of General Lemeul C. Shepherd, USMC, (Retired)*. Interviewed by Benis M. Frank. (Washington, DC, Historical Division, HQMC, 1967), pp. 378-81; also Oral History *Transcript of General Merrill B. Twining, USMC,*
Aviation

The last though possibly most important lesson learned by the Marines during the World War, centered on the development of its infant aviation component. During the World War, Headquarters organized four Marine land squadrons for service in France. Trained by both the French, the Royal Air Force, and Royal Naval Air Service, Marine aviators, led by Majors Alfred A. Cunningham, and Bernard L. "Banny" Smith, soon found themselves supporting the U.S. Navy's bombing campaign aimed at the German submarine pens at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges, along the Belgian coastline. Marine aviators, formed into the Northern Bombing Group, and comprised of four Marine squadrons of eighteen DH-4 planes each, and assigned to the "Day Wing,"

"accomplished a great deal." In addition to the bombing campaign aimed at the German submarine bases, Marine pilots performed a "first" of sorts, when it successfully resupplied a besieged regiment of French troops near Stadenburg. In perhaps one of the most spectacular feats of the war, "Marine Corps pilots loaded up with food and flew low over this isolated regiment and successfully dropped 2,600 pounds of food to them in the face of heavy fire from artillery, machine guns, and rifles." For two days, Marine pilots braved enemy fire in order to assist the beleaguered French troops until reinforcements were able to break-through the German lines and extricate the regiment. Other Marine aviators in France flew alongside the Royal Air Force's pursuit and bombing squadrons, and the French Flying Corps, where they flew pursuit, bombing, and observation missions.

(Retired). Interviewed by Betis M. Frank. (Washington, DC, History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1975), pp. 26-7, 70-71, and 93-4 respectively.


In addition to the four squadrons sent to France, individual Marine pilots flew British aircraft until the end of the war. Here, Marines strafed enemy ground troops, flew behind enemy lines on bombing raids, and acted as flying observation posts for artillery bombardments.\(^{95}\) In addition to the Marine squadrons sent to France, other Marine squadrons patrolled the Caribbean Sea and Florida coastlines, as well as off the Azores, in search of enemy submarines. At bases near Miami, Florida, and Lake Charles, Louisiana, Marine and Navy pilots protected U.S. Navy ships and commercial vessels carrying war materials to France. Other Marines assigned to the First Aeronautic Company, comprised primarily of flying boats, and seaplanes flew anti-submarine patrols off Naval Base 13, on Point Deluged, in the Azores. (Table 2.7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Raids with French and British</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Independent Raids</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pounds of Bombs Dropped</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Food-Dropping Raids</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pounds of Food Dropped</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Planes Shot Down</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots and Observers Cited for Decorations (less the Medal of Honor)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Medals of Honor Awarded to Pilots and Observers</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.7**

**Marine Aviation Accomplishments During the World War 1917-1919**

What is even more important insofar as the contribution to the Marine Corps' post-World War institutional development was the rapid expansion of aviation, not only in terms of the number of pilots recruited, and numbers of aircraft acquired, but in the number of enlisted ground crewmen it took in during the war. Upon the declaration of war,

\(^{95}\)Ibid, p. 72.

\(^{96}\)Cunningham, "Value of Aviation," p. 226.
the enlisted strength of Marine Aviation stood at thirty enlisted men. By war's end in November 1918, there were 2,180 enlisted men on duty with the various Marine squadrons in France, the United States, and in the Azores, who served in various capacities such as mechanics, radio technicians, parachute riggers, armoires, balloon specialists, administrative, and pay clerks.

Marine noncommissioned officers likewise trained as pilots and observers, and flew combat missions. Pursuant to Major General Barnett's policy of selection from within the ranks of the Marine Corps, qualified enlisted men, normally those who had two years' of college, weighed between 135 and 165 pounds, were between the ages of 19 to 39 years of age, and had "superior physiques," were given the rank of gunnery sergeant, and attended a ten-week course at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, after which those who had met the academic criteria were sent to the Marine Flying Field, in Miami, Florida, where they received an intensive package in basic flight instruction, acrobatics, gunnery, reconnaissance work, formation flying, bombing, gunnery, and aerial photography. Upon successful completion of the flying portion of the course, Headquarters commissioned these enlisted aviators as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps.97 As was the case with intelligence, gas warfare, motor transportation, supply, and administration, the expansion of the Marine Corps's aviation force during the World War served as the basis for the continued professionalization of not only the Marine non-commissioned officer corps, but also of its junior enlisted men. Trained in both Army and Navy schools, Marine ground crewmen attended these and other formal schools that normally ran eight weeks in order to learn their new skills.98 As for Marine officers, Marine aviation stood at four officers at the outbreak of war. By the time of the Armistice on 11 November 1918, there were two hundred fifty Marine

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97McClellan, Marines in the World War, p. 74.
98Ibid, pp. 73-4.
officers on duty with Marine Aviation, serving not only as pilots, but as maintenance
officers, meteorological officers, intelligence, and administrative officers.

According to Major Cunningham, Marine aviators demonstrated their usefulness
during the World War. Nonetheless, while Marines often point to this introduction of
aviation into the Marine Corps' war effort, this is not the birth of the Marine air-ground
team. In fact, if anything, the war demonstrated the Marine Corps' inability to perform
close air support, or strafing attacks in support of Marine infantry attacks. As
Cunningham noted, Marine aviators spent the majority of time either dropping bombs on
submarine bases, food to beleaguered troops, in pursuit missions with the British,
antisubmarine duty, and aerial photographic and observation duty as artillery spotters. In
fact, Major Cunningham, noted in a postwar article, that while Marine pilots served with
ground troops, they spent "an entirely unnecessary amount of flying . . . with no specific
object in view, except the practice the pilot gets in handling his plane." Marine pilots, in
short, spent more time training and carrying out missions that had little or nothing to do
with supporting ground troops. 99 For their part, Marine ground commanders neither
recognized the value of aviation in support of ground operations, or were "unfriendly" to
aviation, and thus doubted "its full value." Cunningham argued that had Marine
commanders been aware of the full potential of aviation, aviators could have "materially"
shortened each campaign. The veteran Marine aviator blamed this condition on the fact
that Marine aviators "were not allowed to serve with the Fourth Brigade," and thus
negated its chance to carry out what the true mission of Marine aviation, which was in,
". . . assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out its mission." 100

As a postscript, Major Cunningham noted that in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
Marine pilots "have located bands of cacaos [and cavilers], dispersed them with machine

100 Ibid, p. 222.
gun fire," as well as experimenting with a crude form of close-in air support in the form of glide bombing, aerial photography and mapping, as well as transportation of supplies, men, and the wounded. These were all skills, one might add, that Marine pilots first became aware of while serving in France during the World War. In short, based on its service in the World War, Marine aviators performed yeoman service in Hispaniola, and later in Nicaragua, where this type of air support was oftentimes critical to success on the battlefield.

In sum, Marine aviation, when coupled with the other tactical lessons of the World War was the "last piece of the puzzle," that propelled the Marine Corps into the twentieth century as a modern armed force. While aviation still had a ways to go, insofar as being able to provide close air support to troops on the ground, the lessons of the World War laid the foundation for the successes Marine aviators enjoyed later in the 1930's, and more specifically, during World War II. As technology and manpower became more readily available, Marine aviators continued their efforts toward the creation of truly "Marine" aviation force, while at the same time, maintaining its "link" with naval aviation. This evolutionary process began even as Marines returned home from the battlefields of France.

**Summary**

The World War was the defining moment of the Marine Corps in the twentieth century. While only 28,000 leathernapes served in France, the war had a tremendous impact on the institutional infrastructure of the Marine Corps that lasts to this very day. From the drill fields of Paris Island and Mare Island, to the classrooms and field exercises at Quantico, Marines sweated, drilled, and studied Army Ia's and FSR's as they prepared to go "overthere" throughout the remainder of 1917, and early 1918. While only two brigades of Marines served in France, the Marine Corps' involvement in the World War left an indelible stamp on its tactical and operational performance, one in which veteran
leathernecks such as John A. Lejeune, Robert Dunlap, Holland M. Smith, Thomas Holcomb, Earl H. Ellis, Roy D. Geiger, Gerald C. Thomas, and others carried with them throughout their careers during the interwar era and beyond. In addition to the operational and tactical lessons of the war, participation in the World War pointed to the importance of proper staff work, training, administration, logistical, and combat service support operations such as ordnance and mechanization. Here, leatherneck officers, such as Clayton B. Vogel, Bennett J. Puryear, Jr., Seth Williams, Russell B. Putnam, James T. Buttrick, and William P. Upshur, to name but a few, became familiar with staff work, administrative matters, and logistics. For their part, Marine enlisted men attended formal schools, handled intelligence, gas, and supply sections with an increasing sophistication, while other Marines, including a limited number of "Marinettes" or Women Marines (Reserve), restructured the corps's antiquated administrative and pay systems, and brought them in line with modern business methods and practices. In time, all of these reforms, from aviation mechanics to supply, pay, ordnance, and administrative clerks, led to not only a better administered Marine Corps, but to the development of not only a professional noncommissioned officer corps, and an improved enlisted force, one in which the Marine Corps would be able to fight "our country's battles."

Participation in the World War by Marines likewise led to the sweeping institutional reforms brought about during the tenure of Major General John A. Lejeune. These reforms included the enlistment and retention of both officers and enlisted men; an improved and expanded professional school system organized at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia for both officers, and enlisted men; the creation of a viable Marine Reserve; an expanded and improved aviation force; much needed reforms in its antiquated supply and administrative methods; improved training methods at the recruit depots; and finally, the reorientation toward a new mission as the Navy's landing force. As Marines discovered up their return from France, the character and nature of war had
changed forever. While officers such as Colonel Smedley Butler, expressed a desire to return to "real soldiering," in the tropics, Marines no longer talked patronizingly of the "good ole days," when they had chased bandits in Hispaniola and Central America.

Instead, focus at Headquarters and the Marine Corps Schools now centered on the Marine Corps' experience in the World War. The focus on the experiences in the World War by Major General Lejeune and his fellow Marine officers at Headquarters in the immediate postwar era, in turn fueled not only the Marine Corps' force and institutional modernization, but eventually its mission reorientation. Thus, for the next decade, the "lessons learned" on the battlefield of France served as the basis for the institutional reforms that began during the Lejeune Commandancy and ended as the Marine Corps prepared to go to war again in 1941 under Major General Thomas Holcomó, a protege of the 2d Division commander, and a firm believer and practitioner of the same skills learned on the battlefields of France in 1918.
CHAPTER 3
FROM THE TRENCHES OF FRANCE TO THE BANKS OF THE POTOMAC: DEMOBILIZATION AND RETRENCHMENT 1919-1925

Introduction

The participation by the United States Marine Corps in the World War was the most significant "turning point" in its institutional history in the twentieth century. To some this statement may be a radical departure from the accepted orthodoxy that it was from its participation in World War II that the modern "Marine Corps" emerged.¹ While this might be true from a technological viewpoint, it was, in fact, by its participation in the World War as a part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), that the Corps' senior and junior leadership became aware of the increasing complexity and lethality of modern land warfare. Led by Major General John A. Lejeune, a graduate of both the U.S. Naval Academy and the Army War College, the participation of the Marine Brigade (the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments) in the fighting from 5 June 1918 to the armistice in November 1918, brought the Marine Corps' to the attention of the American public. Through the mistake of an Army censor, the American public became aware of that service's exploits through the newspapers during the Battle for Belleau Wood (5-26 June 1918), where legend has it that the Marine Corps alone turned back the last desperate "lunge" by German General Erich Ludendorff's vaunted stormtroops. While Marines

played a significant part in halting that attack and war, they did so in conjunction with
the U.S. Army. Nonetheless, the Marines came away from the war having acquired the
foundations for a modern military organization. This was due largely in part to the
mobilization and expansion of that service's institutional infrastructure for the war it had
been totally unprepared to fight. At the war's conclusion, both Major Generals
Commandant George Barnett and John Lejeune sought to build upon that success at the
conclusion of this conflict through the institution of a whole series of reforms at
Headquarters, and throughout the Marine Corps in general.

As this chapter will demonstrate, the immediate postwar period was one of intense
activity at Headquarters in its attempt to absorb the lessons of the recently concluded
war, and translate its wartime success into credible, and necessary reforms. Even more
important was the determination by both Barnett and Lejeune that unlike its past wars,
the Marine Corps would not return to its pre-war insignificance. If anything, both
Barnett and Lejeune succeeded, as difficult as it was at times, in keeping the Marine
Corps in the forefront of the American people as the nation's "expeditionary force in
readiness," albeit at a cost to its professed plans for modernization and war
preparedness.

Demobilization and Retrenchment
1919-1921

In any assessment of the Marine Corps performance during the World War, one has to
only look at what Major General John A. Lejeune wrote in a memorial at the time of the
Marine Corps' 146th birthday in 1921. In this testimonial to the Marine Corps' performance in the recently concluded war, Lejeune wrote: "The term Marine has come
to signify all that is highest in military efficiency and soldiery virtue."2 President

2Krukak Oral History, Folder I, Ch. I, p. 67.
Woodrow Wilson echoed Lejeune's sentiments in the war when, in a letter to Major General Commandant George Barnett, he wrote: "We are intensely proud of their whole record, and are glad to have had the world see how irresistible they are in their might when a cause for which America holds dear is at stake. The whole nation has a reason to be proud of them."\(^3\) Apart from the publicity it received, the participation by the Marines as part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), contributed greatly to the ongoing process of professionalization and efficiency in the Marine Corps that had started back in 1892, under Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood. Participation in the World War, nonetheless, had its greatest impact in the continued evolution of the advanced base force concept, an improved method of officer promotion and selection, staff and war planning, its organization, and in officer and enlisted training. All of these factors contributed significantly to its ability at a level sufficient to carry out its traditional duties duty at sea, on expeditionary service abroad, and throughout the interwar period, and into the early days of World War II.

General Lejeune's assumption of the Commandancy in 1920, came during a period he later termed the "consequent let-down which invariably follows the return of a military organization to peacetime conditions."\(^4\) This period witnessed the departure of the many officers commissioned for the emergency as well as the inevitable demotions in rank and grade that followed the sudden expansion in the Corps' size. While Lejeune had hoped to retain many of these same "splendid" officers and men in the ranks of the Corps, the Major General Commandant spent the first months of his commandancy conducting an intensive recruiting campaign, as well as in the establishment of guidelines

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\(^3\)President Woodrow Wilson ltr. to Major General Commandant George Barnett dtd. 14 August 1919, Major General George Barnett, USMC Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), PC# 247, Box 1, General Correspondence Folder, dtd. 1919-1959).


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that encouraged veteran Marines to reenlist as well as members from the other services, most notably the U.S. Army. Despite the problems associated with the rapid demobilization of the Marine Corps in the months immediately following the World War, the Corps emerged from the war much stronger institutionally and doctrinally than it had in any of its previous wars. This can be seen in its methods of enlisted training, that had demonstrated the soundness of Major General Commandant William P. Biddle's earlier decision regarding the concentration of enlisted recruit training at two main depots (Parris Island, S.C., and Mare Island, Ca.) in 1911, but also in the selection and training of its officers at the corps' newly-established barracks at Quantico, Virginia in 1917. As the war demonstrated, the Marine Corps proved its flexibility as a military force in a wide range of services at sea and ashore with both the Army and Navy. Coupled with its emphasis on training for combat, the Marines laid the foundations of its officer and enlisted education system at Quantico, which soon became the "hub" or "crossroads" for all Marine Corps training and doctrine in the period immediately following the war.

Doctrinally, the Marine Corps emerged from a war that introduced an entire generation of future Marine Corps officers, who would not only be instrumental in the writing and development of amphibious warfare doctrine in the late 1920's and 1930's.
but would lead Marines in battle during World War II and Korea. What is even more important is the fact that the war introduced these same officers to the significance of combined arms operations. In fact, in a war that witnessed the advent of the tank, the airplane, gas and chemical warfare, as well as infiltration tactics, participation in the World War "opened the door" to the possibilities held out by the lessons learned in the trenches of France in regard to the further development of the advanced base force, and the early concepts of amphibious assault. This last fact can be seen in the operational reports of the fleet exercises held from 1922-24, when Marine officers oftentimes referred to their experiences in the World War, insofar as preparing defenses and assaulting prepared positions.

For Marine officers, the World War offered many lessons in waging modern war, and the problems associated with raising, training, equipping, and administering a large force for combat. Similarly, the tactical, operational and organizational lessons learned during the war, provided fresh impetus toward reviving the Advanced Base Force concept, which had languished since 1914. Only Rear Admiral William S. Sims' proposed amphibious operation against the Central Power's naval installations on the Sabbioncelli Peninsula in the Adriatic, which had been submitted at the time of the German "Michael" Offensive in March 1918 to the Supreme War Council in Paris, offered the war's only chance of employment for the Advanced Base Force in the actual fighting which, in fact, spent the bulk of the war along the Texas-Mexican border, and in Cuba guarding U.S. interests against possible sabotage. While the Allies shelved Sims's plan, the participation by the 4th Marine Brigade in combat, nonetheless gave fresh impetus to the question regarding the postwar mission and roles of the Marine Corps.

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8See Craig Oral History, pp. 5-6; McClellan, Marines in the World War, pp. 10, 19, and 37.
9Admiral William S. Sims had proposed that a force of 20,000 Marines be organized into a division-sized force in order to launch a series of raids along the Adriatic Coastline.
Demobilization and Realignmen

When asked by the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee in late 1920 to describe the "importance of maintaining organized expeditionary forces of Marines, the size of these forces, and their location," Major General Lejeune replied that in answering such a question, "cannot come to a sound conclusion, or render a correct decision, without first making what is known as an estimate of the situation; and that the first and most important requirement of an estimate of the situation is an accurate and clear statement of the mission, as it is called by military men, of the force concerned, or the organization concerned." Throughout this and subsequent testimony, Lejeune consistently reiterated the fact to the members of the House Naval Affairs Committee that because the Marine Corps is an adjunct of the fleet it must be kept in a constant state of readiness, the Commandant indirectly implied that the Corps would have to be maintained at an adequate strength in order to carry out its assigned missions.  

During the immediate postwar period, the task facing Major General Commandant George Barnett and his four successors centered on the issues of recruitment and retention of a sufficient level of manpower, training, and in the maintenance of readiness.


or preparedness. In fact, during the entire interwar period, Headquarters struggled with a turbulent manpower situation, low officer morale, and a high tempo of deployments and expeditionary duty, a hostile War Department, and an ambivalent naval hierarchy. Both Barnett and Lejeune repeatedly testified before Congress, that the loss of trained manpower inhibited the Marine Corps from "reenergizing" the moribund advanced base force into a fully-fledged expeditionary force. As both men later discovered, it would prove difficult, though not impossible to capitalize on the Marine Corps successes during World War I, and take it to the next step of military preparedness without first addressing the issue of manpower.

Of all the problems facing the Major General Commandant George Barnett in the immediate aftermath of World War I, manpower loomed as the most critical issue facing the postwar Corps. In repeated testimony before Congress, Barnett stressed the continuing need for a stabilized manpower figure while at the same time asserted to the legislators that demobilization was, in fact, proceeding ahead of schedule. In fact, as soon as the armistice had been declared, Headquarters immediately put plans into effect providing for the, "release from service at the earliest possible date of duration-of-war Marines and reservists." Part of this, published in Marine Corps Orders No.56, and issued on 20 November 1918, provided for the separation of these two categories of Marines who had "wished to complete their education, or who had urgent family and business interests demanding immediate and personal attention." 11

When it became apparent that demobilization was cutting into the abilities of the Marine Corps to meet all of its commitments at home and abroad, Headquarters issued on 1 May 1919, another order limiting the discharge or separation of men from its ranks claiming economic hardship or financial dependency reasons. After passage of the Naval

Appropriations Act on 11 July 1919, and the reduction of the Marine Corps to an authorized strength of 27,400 officers and men, Headquarters issued Marine Corps Order No. 42 on 12 July 1919, which established demobilization centers and further instructions regarding the detailed instructions for complete demobilization. With the issuance of this last order, and by the time of the arrival of both the Fourth and Fifth Brigades in the United States in June and July of that same year, the demobilization process had been "effected in a remarkably short time," in both a satisfactory and expeditious manner that pleased both Headquarters and the Marines themselves.\textsuperscript{12} (Table 3.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Fourth Brigade</th>
<th>6,667 enlisted men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Fifth Brigade</td>
<td>6,671 enlisted men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 3.1}  
\textit{Demobilization of the 4th and 5th Brigades}

Even while this reduction in war strength went forward, both Headquarters and the Corps' supporters on the House Subcommittee on Naval Affairs, sought to reduce the impact of demobilization by pressing for an increased level of permanent strength, in order to meet all of the Corps and Navy's commitments. In fact, even as Headquarters switched over from recruiting and training Marines for service in France due to demobilization, Major General Barnett and his staff (Brigadier General Charles Long, Assistant to the Commandant; George Richards, the Paymaster; Charles L. McCawley, the Quartermaster; and Lieutenant Colonel William B. Lemly, Assistant Quartermaster), appeared successively before the Naval Affairs Committee in a series of hearings

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid, p. 81.
regarding the Corps postwar strength, and projected manpower needs. In regards to the postwar strength of the Corps, Brigadier General Charles Long stressed in a letter to Major General Lejeune, then commanding the U.S. 2d Division, then on occupation duty in Germany, that Major General Barnett had requested a permanent increase to 33,000 though, "the Secretary [Josephus Daniels] has approved 26,000 and we hope that they will allow 33,000."\textsuperscript{14} Long assured Lejeune that the Fourth and Fifth Brigades would not be touched insofar as manpower had been concerned, and that his force would be kept at a sufficient level to deal with any emergency in "case they are needed over there."

In another letter to Lejeune, addressing the same problem, the Adjutant and Inspector, Brigadier General Charles Lauchheimer, discussed the Commandant's desire to maintain the Corps at a strength of 33,000 officers and men, one-fifth the size of the Navy, as had been the official policy before the World War. In the letter, Lauchheimer stressed that even if the House Naval Affairs Committee rejected this figure, the Marine Corps could accept a figure of 26,300 officers and enlisted men as proposed by Secretary Daniels: The Adjutant further wrote that:


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid; Brigadier General Charles A. Lauchheimer ltr. to Major General John A. Lejeune, dtd.. 10 January 1919, JAL Papers, LIC, Box 3, Reel 3, \textit{loc. cit.} .

According to Major General Barnett, the size of the Marine Corps, from a 11 November 1918 figure of 72,920 men quickly shrunk to a force of 17,400 officers and
enlisted men, making it necessary during the next session of Congress, "for me, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, to present my views as to the number of officers and men I thought necessary to perform the duties required of the Corps in peacetime." 16 The Major General Commandant continued:

After very many conferences, it was finally decided by Congress that the Marine Corps should consist of 1,093 officers and 27,400 enlisted men, and arrangements were promptly made for recruiting the Corps up to this strength, and numerous recruiting offices were established throughout the country. The strength gradually grew, but it did not get up to the required number of enlisted men, before Congress passed an appropriations act only authorizing pay for 20,000 men. 17

With the resumption of voluntary enlistments on 4 December 1918, Headquarters attempted a variety of methods in the recruitment and retention of duration-of-war Marines, former Marines, and other ex-servicemen [from the Army and Navy], as it attempted to solve its manpower problems. As Barnett wrote in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1919, the Marine Corps had been authorized to enlist what it called "special temporary limited service" recruits. While these "were enlisted for a period of four years, they were given to understand that they would be discharged upon their return to the United States in the fall of this year (1919), when the purpose for which they enlisted [the occupation of Germany] will have been accomplished."

Headquarters suspended this type of enlistment after only one month-on 10 June 1919. Passage of the Naval Appropriations Act of 11 July 1919, authorized the transfer to the regular Marine Corps of Marine Corps Reservists, and also the extension of the

17Ibid.
enlistments of those duration-of-war Marines. Barnett claimed that this was far more successful in stabilizing the Corps' manpower situation than the temporary enlisted recruits had been.\(^{18}\)(Appendix # A)

Despite the impact that demobilization had on the Corps strength and ability to provide an adequate expeditionary force, the recruiting efforts in the period 1919-1920, actually stabilized and showed a slight increase in enlisted strength.\(^{19}\)(Table 3.2.)

Furthermore, under terms of the Naval Appropriations Act of 11 July 1919, the Marine Corps' strength had been authorized to stand at 1,093 officers and 27,400 enlisted men. In a move to attract potential recruits, Headquarters successfully obtained Executive authority from the President to offer two, three, or four-year enlistments. While the latter two went far in addressing the drain on manpower, the two-year enlistment was merely a short term measure enacted in order to address a long term problem though, as figures indicate, the two-year enlistment was far more attractive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlistment Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-Year Enlistments</td>
<td>7,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Year Enlistments</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Year Enlistments</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2
Summary of Enlistments 1919-1920

The temporary measures adopted by Headquarters did, in fact, stabilize the Corps' strength, though did not address the longer term problems of recruiting additional manpower. As the figures for December 1919-January 1920 indicate, the percentages of reenlistments for December 1919 and January 1920, were twenty-four and twenty-eight

\(^{18}\)Annual Report for 1920, pp. 1063-4.

\(^{19}\)Ibid.

percent respectively, due largely to the 2-year enlistments offered by the 
Corps.21(Appendix # B) Enlistments for the period February through April 1920, in 
fact, increased a further ten percent, due once again to the introduction of two-year 
enlistments.22 In terms of stabilization, however, the three-year enlistments proved the 
weaker of the three types of enlistment contracts, while the four-year contracts instituted 
shortly before Barnett's resignation actually showed signs of a slight 
increase.(Appendix # C)

Besides attracting new men to its ranks, another source of potential Marine Corps 
recruits was, of course, from the vast pool of former Army and Navy men that had been 
separated at the conclusion of the World War. Indeed, as Barnett indicated in his last 
report as Major General Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy for 1920, the Marine 
Corps had been able to recruit 1,456 ex-soldiers, and 196 ex-Navy men to the enlisted 
ranks.23 In fact, in order to bring the Corps strength within the Congressionally-
mandated figure that set the Corps's average strength at 20,000 for Fiscal Year 1921, 
and thus stabilize its manpower situation, Headquarters stopped all recruiting "except for 
the acceptance of men who had served in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps." Later on, 
however, Headquarters limited enlistments only to former Marines. Both Generals 
Barnett and later John A. Lejeune, had hoped that the policy of attracting former 
servicemen to the ranks of the Corps would not only bring in men possessing military 
experience, and thus reduce first term attrition rates characteristic of newer, raw 
recruits, but would also be a step toward economizing and streamlining the training 
budget. While the Corps was able to attract some former soldiers and sailors to its ranks, 
Headquarters soon amended this policy and restricted enlistment to those who had

21Ibid, p. 112.
6.
served in the Corps during the World War, when it appeared that soldiers proved for the most part to be unable to adjust to Marine Corps life. This last point is indicated in a letter dated 2 August 1920 from the Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune to Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, who at the time was the commanding general of the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, where he discusses the policy of enlisting former soldiers and sailors to the Corps:

[2 August 1920]

My Dear General:

I desire to encourage the reenlistment in the Marine Corps of men who have served in the Army or the Navy. There are about 5000000 of these men now in civil life, a large proportion of whom saw active service during the World War. These men constitute a very desirable class from which to draw men to fill our ranks.

I am therefore, writing you to ask you to see that all of these enlisted men who join your post are given a warm welcome by the Non-Commissioned officers and other Marines and that, under no circumstances, should they be discriminated against.

From my experience in the service, I have learned that ex-Army or ex-Navy men do not get along very well aboard ship until they have had several months service in the Marine Corps and have become real Marines.

I would suggest, therefore, that no men of these classes be assigned to sea duty until they have seen at least three months service in the Marine Corps.

With my warmest regards and very best wishes, I am,

Sincerely Your,
John A. Lejeune
Major General Commandant

24Major General John A. Lejeune ltr. to Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, dtd. 2 August 1920, in the Major General Smedley D. Butler, USMC Papers, Box 8, January-June 1920, Folder 5, (Quantico, VA., Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University Archives, Marine Corps University [MCU], Marine Corps Combat Development Center).
Upon his assumption of the post as the Major General Commandant, Lejeune's first task was to initiate an intensive recruiting campaign. Commensurate with this campaign was the resumption of active recruiting in April 1921. Headquarters not only opened up a number of new recruiting offices, but also increased the number and quality of men on recruiting duty in order to attract new applicants to the Marine Corps after September 1921 when active recruiting resumed. Prior to this, however, Headquarters had to reduce the number of Marines on recruiting duty from 800 to 430, as well as a consolidation and reduction in the number of recruiting offices in order to economize. Surprisingly, Lejeune's efforts paid off, with savings estimated for 1921 alone being $150,000. The effects of these efforts as well as of the renewed vigorous recruiting policy were immediate, in that by December 1921, the Corps' strength stood at 20,596 officers and enlisted men.

The reorganization of the recruiting services had a great deal to do with the increase in the Corps strength for 1921 and 1922. As evidenced in Major General Lejeune's annual reports for 1921 and 1922, the reorganization of the recruiting service reflected the beginnings of a professionalized and schooled pool of recruiters. These Marine recruiters, who worked under the impact of the United States's postwar retrenchment from world affairs, as well as the effects of the Washington Naval Conference of 1920-21, which created a "treaty" Navy, and a vastly reduced Marine Corps, shifted the focus of enticement from travel and lots of action to one of salesmanship, notably in the forms of education and athletics, with emphasis on football and baseball.

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26 Lejeune, Reminiscences, p. 464; Fleming, et.al., Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, pp. 31-6.
As First Sergeant George W. Kase, whom had served on recruiting duty at the time recalled, the reorganization of the recruiting services brought many combat-experienced Marine commissioned and noncommissioned officers into the field as recruiters.\textsuperscript{27} In order to emphasize Major General Lejeune's campaign on education (the newly-established Marine Corps Institute), and the institution of "a comprehensive athletic policy" (not to mention the construction by Brigadier General Butler of a large football stadium at Quantico in 1920-21), Headquarters required all recruiters to take a course in salesmanship (from the Marine Corps Institute) while officers, First Sergeant Case recalled, up to and including the rank of Captain. "obliged to enroll in single entry bookkeeping."

The seriousness attached to Major General Lejeune's emphasis on recruiting and the improvement in the recruiting service is further reflected in his testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee prior to the passage of the 1922 Appropriations Bill. During testimony before this committee, Lejeune informed the legislators that in the attempt to bring the Corps up to the authorized figure of 27,400 officers and enlisted men:

An active campaign was at once begun, including the reorganization of the recruiting service. Every man on recruiting duty was held individually responsible for results, and those who failed to obtain the required results were relieved from recruiting duty and their places filled by new men. The result was an immediate improvement, 1162 men being recruited in August, 1468 in September, 1612 in October, and 1760 in November, and 2561 in December.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27}First Sergeant George W. Kase, USMC, "Autobiography," Unpublished Manuscript found in the George W. Kase Papers, 1881-1954, , (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, MCHC, PC # 85, Box No. 2A15), p. 88.
\textsuperscript{28}Lejeune, "Extracts from Testimony," p. 95.
Not only did Headquarters reorganize and expand the recruiting service, it also placed a continued emphasis on its economizing campaign. By closing a number of small recruiting offices in private office buildings, and relocating them in public buildings, the Marine Corps was able to reduce the $45,000 per annum to a little over $5,000 per annum in General Lejeune's drive for economy.29 This drive to economize likewise affected the location of other Marine Corps activities connected with the recruiting effort. In 1924, the Recruiting Service as well as the Corps' Publicity Bureau were likewise moved from New York City to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, which was Federal property and thus "rent free," all a part of Lejeune's drive to economize.30

Throughout the remainder of General Lejeune's first tour as Major General Commandant (1920-1925), the Marine Corps consistently fell short of both its authorized strength of 27,400 and even the minimum strength of 21,000. As the figures for 1922 indicate, the Corps's strength dropped to 19,582 enlisted Marines, due largely in part to "a strict policy of economy pursued throughout the service," as well as a "large number of discharges upon expiration of enlistment," made up primarily of Marines who had volunteered for a two-year tour of duty.31 Major Adolph B. Miller, the Recruiting Officer in Charge for the Marine Corps's Central Recruiting Division's Kansas Office, perhaps summarized it best when he wrote that the reasons for a drop in enlistments were due to the economy and the larger wages offered by the civilian sector as opposed to the Marine Corps. In a letter to the head of the Central Recruiting Division dated 18 February 1920, Miller reemphasized the reasons for the drop on

29Lejeune, Reminiscences, pp. 474-5.
30Ibid.
enlisted on the backs of a good economy and the intense competition with the other services, notably the U.S. Army:

It is the opinion of the undersigned [Maj Miller] that the decided slump in recruiting for February is due primarily to labor conditions. An ordinary field laborer at the present time is paid a large wage, and the employment is plentiful. The local Red Cross Labor Agency has many positions to offer, but there are not enough applicants to fill the demand. The same conditions exist at several other labor agencies where the demand for labor is much greater than the supply. . . .

. . . . Another condition which exists is the intensive competition which is made against us by the Army. The Army had 158 men as recruiters in this District, and even with this large number of men, they are experiencing the same difficulty that we are. . . .[32]

Another reason for the decline in enlistments was the Marine Corps's insistence on recruiting older, more mature men to its ranks. Here, Lejeune had hoped to curb the growing number of unauthorized absences (UA's), and desertions that had caused a serious drain on its operational readiness and its ability to deploy. This in itself caused major problems for the Marines. As the Major General Commandant reported to the Secretary of the Navy for 1922, one of the major reasons why the Marines had been unable to fill its ranks was due to the standards of recruitment being placed on potential applicants. Not only did Headquarters increase the minimum age of enlistment from eighteen to twenty-one years of age, it also imposed higher mental, moral, and physical standards on men wanting to join the Marine Corps.

Despite these and other manpower problems, the Recruiting Bureau opened a number of offices throughout the country in areas described as "outlying" cities and

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[32] Colonel A. B. Miller ltr. to Commanding Officer, Central Recruiting Region District, dtd. 18 February 1920, Subj.: "Recruiting," Colonel A. B. Miller, USMC, Personal Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, MCHC, PC # 196, Box 5, Folder: General Correspondence).
towns (in the South and West), as well as the establishment of traveling recruiting teams that operated from tents with offers of educational, travel, and adventure. Lejeune also sought to retain the services of the Marines then in the Corps due for discharge by offering reenlistment bonuses and promotion well as other inducements. One Marine, Sergeant William A. Bihary, who had enlisted in the Corps in 1915, and had served in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, as well as in all of the battles during the World War, remembered receiving a letter "from Marine Hdqrs Washington asking me to reenlist in 1920. Four years was more than enough for me."\textsuperscript{33} The Recruiting Service also placed recruiting adds in newspapers, on billboards along highways, and inside street cars. Recruiters likewise passed out material in post offices, as well as visiting high schools in order to attract a higher caliber of volunteer. One last measure by Headquarters, was to organize a troupe of vaudeville performers called the "Roving Marines," who were active duty Marines that sang, played musical instruments and gave lectures on life in the Marine Corps.

In order to "hold the line," insofar as permanent personnel had been concerned, Headquarters issued an order in 1925 that restricted first term enlistments to those men who were either native born or naturalized aliens. There were, of course exceptions to every rule which permitted those naturalized ex-Army and Ex-Navy men who "have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States," to enlist providing they met the other qualifications.\textsuperscript{34} During Fiscal Years 1924-25, the Marine Corps accepted sixty of these legal aliens for enlistment with a further twenty-three aliens accepted for first term enlistment. As the Major General Commandant pointed out,


recruiting quotas in Buffalo, Detroit, New York, and Boston suffered as a result of this policy, though eventually they "were able in the majority of instances to obtain their quotas."

One further change occurred in the period 1921-1925 that had a direct impact upon the Marine Corps's strength, and that of course was the abolition of the two-year enlistments in favor of three-and four-year tours of service. This policy was one of Major General Lejeune's first priorities in attempting to stabilize the Corps's strength. Lejeune reasoned that by the time a recruit had been sufficiently trained to carry out the duties of a Marine, the time would arrive for his separation from active service, which would mean he would have to either reenlist or, another young man would have to be enlisted in order to balance the loss. In both cases, the Marine Corps would have to dig into its limited appropriations for training and other incurred expenses during the tour of duty. In short, the four-year contract was not only economically sound, but it was from a preparedness point of view, an ideal length of service. With Marines still in Haiti, the Dominican Republic (till 1924), and China (1923), not to mention the guarding of the U. S. Mails, which placed an even further strain on manpower, as well as the creation of the East Coast Expeditionary Force, and participation in the annual fleet exercises, having a Marine for four as opposed to two years was not only practical, but it was operationally the only real solution to the constant shortage of trained manpower.

As Lejeune wrote in his memoirs, his main task as the Major General Commandant was to prevent an "undue reduction" of Marine Corps personnel. Through his network of supporters in Congress, and the maintenance of a close working relationship with both the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees, as well as with the key personalities connected with those legislative bodies (i.e. Thomas Butler), the Major General Commandant was able to ward off deep cuts in the strength of the Marine
Corps, despite the austere military budgets that characterized interwar era. General Lejeune's reappointment as Major General Commandant in January 1925, is testimony to both his amicable relationship with those two legislative bodies (unlike his predecessor-Major General Barnett), as well as the conviction that the former 2d Division commander had the full support of senior Navy and Marine officers.

Major General Lejeune's Policies
1924-1925

The Major General Commandant's tasks during his second tour as head of the Marine Corps remained manpower and the adoption of a system of officer selection, as well as the creation and maintenance of a newly-constituted Marine Corps Reserve—the last two issues being addressed toward the end of his first tour as commandant. In both a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb in January 1925, and in a subsequent memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy later that same year, Lejeune outlined his goals for the Corps during the next four years: Manpower, a viable Marine Corps Reserve, and promotion of officers by selection.

In a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb, a trusted friend and former staff officer, Lejeune wrote shortly after his reappointment as Major General Commandant of the upcoming legislative calendar, and what he had hoped to accomplish during the next four years as Commandant. The goals included a stabilized manpower situation, the creation of a strong Marine Corps Reserve, and officer promotion by selection. After thanking Holcomb for his letter of congratulations upon his reappointment as head of the Corps, Lejeune concentrated the bulk of the letter on the current Omnibus Bill attached to the Naval Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1926, and the key provisions affecting the Marine Corps:

35Lejeune, Reminiscences, p. 476.
The legislative situation is that everything has been held up in the Senate pending the passage of the Naval Appropriation Bill. This bill is now in conference, and we hope that it will finally be passed today [28 January 1925]. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs already passed the House, and the Chairman believes that he will be able to secure their passage. I have decided, in view of the desirability of aiding in the passage of this bill, not to ask for any amendment of the promotion of elimination plan, but to accept it in the House. A number to the Omnibus Bill, however, have been recommended by the Navy Department, including two for the Marine Corps--one providing chief warrant rank for our warrant officers, and the other, two additional Major Generals, one for the line and one for the staff, making four in all besides the Major General Commandant. This will not increase the total number of general officers. I cannot tell whether or not this amendment will be adopted until the Senate Committee has made its report.\(^{36}\)

In the letter concerning the creation of a more effective Marine Corps Reserve, the Major General Commandant stressed to Holcomb the importance of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Bill (1925), that at the time was pending before the U.S. Senate. Lejeune emphasized to Holcomb that by the passage of the Omnibus Bill, and its authorization to create a viable Marine Corps Reserve, it would create a pool of trained manpower to augment the active duty strength of the Corps in times of war or national emergency:

The Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Bill is now before the Senate, with a fair chance of getting through. It contains a much needed reorganization of the Reserve, and has an especially desirable feature in that it makes special provision for the enrollment in the Reserve of men who have served one or more enlistments, and granting them sufficient compensation to make it feasible, I believe, to persuade a very large portion of them to enroll. If it succeeds in the purpose intended, this would give us eight to ten thousand trained men in the Reserve who could be called back to the Corps in the event of a serious emergency.\(^{37}\)


\(^{37}\)Ibid.
Even with the passage of the Reserve Bill as well as other pieces of legislation that attempted to bring the Marine Corps up to its authorized strength, the Corps suffered a continuing drain on trained manpower due both to a dwindling number of qualified recruits and a tight fiscal policy, facts not lost on the Major General Commandant. In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated 13 October 1925, in fact, Lejeune repeatedly pointed this out:

**Memorandum For The Secretary of the Navy**

October 13, 1925

1. The Marine Corps has conformed wholeheartedly to the Administration's policy of economy, having expended last year fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000) less than during the fiscal year of five years before, without any decrease in the number of officers and men in the service, and with an increase of efficiency.

2. The economies were effected through the cooperation of our officers. The Major General Commandant, in his campaign for economy, constantly stressed that if the Marine Corps voluntarily reduced its expenditures, it would in all probability save itself from reduction in numbers with consequent loss of morale and efficiency.

3. Last year, the Corps was singled out for reduction in enlistment. Neither the Army nor the Navy was reduced in numbers. The blow was a hefty one, and it has been difficult to explain it away, especially as it resulted in the disbandment of the Sixth Regiment of Marines, one of our two famous war regiments, and the depletion of its already too small Expeditionary Force.

4. Should a further reduction in its enlisted strength be made this year, it would so discourage our officers and men, and so deplete our Expeditionary Force that the usefulness of the Corps would be seriously impaired. Especially would its morale suffer if it should again be singled out for such reduction.
5. The revised estimates for the Marine Corps, which are now before the Bureau of the Budget for consideration, while $500,000 less than the amount appropriated for the current fiscal year will, nevertheless, by rigid economy be sufficient to maintain the same number of officers and men as are now authorized, and it is strongly urged that these estimates be approved.  

John A. Lejeune  
Major General Commandant

In short, despite the Major General Commandant's attempts at cutting the Marine Corps already tight budget, as well as the consolidation of its recruiting efforts and the creation of a viable Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine Corps strength continued to dip below the 19,500-man mark. This shortfall in manpower and money was not lost on Lejeune as he sought to redirect the Marine Corps' efforts towards a new mission, while at the same time maintaining the Corps's preparedness by a well-led, and well-trained enlisted force. In fact, as Lejeune himself noted, the reduction in personnel, due both to the failure to recruit suitable recruits, and a Congressionally-mandated cutback in the Corps's authorized strength to 18,000 made it "more and more difficult for the Marine Corps in the carrying out of its mission."

The Officer Corps

While both Barnett and Lejeune struggled to maintain the Marine Corps' enlisted strength at or about the authorized level, it would be in the retention or, as in some cases, the separation of those officers recruited before and during the war, as well as those former noncommissioned officers commissioned during the World War to fill the billets as platoon and company commanders as the fighting intensified after June 1918.

Between June 1917 and final demobilization in August-September 1919, the Marine Corps commissioned approximately 2,272 officers with the majority of them coming

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38 Memorandum from Major General John A. Lejeune to Secretary of the Navy, dtd. 13 October 1925, Copy found in JAL Papers, LOC, Reel 13, Container 4, Correspondence 1919-29, Headquarters Marine Corps notation of A-27-njw, loc.cit.
from the noncommissioned ranks and direct civilian appointments. After having received a rigid course though basic of instruction and intensive training in the duties of a Marine officer [including duties while at sea] at Quantico, these newly-appointed officers were assigned by Headquarters to their respective units and/or occupations. Besides drawing officer candidates from its own and civilian ranks, the Secretary of War authorized on 31 August 1918, a total of 1,500 student cadets to enroll in the Student Army Training Corps (the forerunner to the Reserve Officers Training Corps-ROTC), to be allotted to the Marine sections under that organization. Headquarters then assigned a Marine officer and noncommissioned officer to each of the colleges participating in this program. These cadets would then proceed to a Marine recruit depot where they would receive a regular course in training in Marine Corps methods and procedures, both "essential to the making of a Marine officer of the highest type." Due to the suddenness of the war's ending, however, there were no graduates from these Marine sections "as they were ordered abandoned shortly after the armistice."

The significance of the Marine Corps's recruitment, training, and education of its officer corps during the World War is important when one considers the fact that this was almost the same pattern Headquarters used during the late 1930s and into the first two years of World War II.

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The Postwar Period 1919–1927

While Headquarters dealt with an ever-shrinking manpower pool, an even larger problem revolved around the status and uncertainty among those officers (and enlisted men) who had decided to make the Marine Corps a career. As Major General Lejeune later wrote, "there was much unrest among the officers owing to their uncertain status". From the Armistice through the remainder of Major General Barnett's commandancy (to 30 June 1920), Headquarters strove to hold the authorized strength of the officer corps at 1,093. By the time of Lejeune's ascendancy to the Commandancy, the actual strength of the Marine officer corps stood at 961. Throughout 1919 and into 1920, as Marines returned from occupation duty in Germany and expeditionary duty in Hispaniola, Headquarters sought to resolve the retention problem of those officers who served during the World War; those who desired augmentation with the regular officer corps; and the discharge of those either desiring separation or found unsuitable, due to health or other reasons for further service.

Major General Barnett's convening of an Officer Retention Board, chaired by Colonel John H. Russell, which had been charged with the selection and retention of those officers who had wished to remain in the Marine Corps at the war's conclusion, was a weak attempt at resolving the issues of retention and officer strength during 1919. The Officer Retention Board, seen by many as an attempt by Headquarters, primarily General Barnett, to reward those Marine officers who did not serve in France, served to fuel the "anti-Barnett" movement on Capitol Hill and among a few Marine officers, most notably Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. The Officer Retention Board, referred unofficially as the Russell Board, assessed the education, social acceptability, potential

fitness for further military education and rank of the officers' names before them, sought to retain those officers whom Colonel Russell "reputedly" advised it to consider "whom they would invite into their quarters and whom their daughters might marry." Russell's alleged comments smacked of an arbitrariness and "capriciousness," that seemed, in the eyes of Secretary of the Navy Daniels, the Butlers, and their supporters, to underscore their belief of the scorn Barnett held for those who had seen combat in France and in the tropics, as opposed to the "headquarters types" whom the Major General Commandant had been busily attempting to promote and decorate with honors they rightfully or wrongfully deserved during the World War. To the Butler's in particular, these actions by Barnett not only justified the denial of his legislative program for the Corps, but his removal as Major General Commandant. Furthermore, the hostility between the head of the Navy Department and of the Marine Corps, and its effect upon the vacancies that existed in the officer corps officers, came to a head in a letter dated 19 June 1920, when Daniels informed Major General Barnett that in view of his relinquishment of the commandancy, "Your letter concerning the permanent promotion and appointment of officers to fill vacancies due to the permanent increase of the Marine Corps, will not be acted upon at this time, but will be deferred until your successor is in office."43

The findings of the Russell Board, as might be expected, caused an uproar that remained unresolved until Barnett's successor, Major General Lejeune, reconvened another officer retention board—this time headed by one of Lejeune's favorites—Major General Wendell C. Neville. This board functioned to reassess the qualifications of those men, primarily the former non-commissioned officers, selected for retention and

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42 Bartlett, Lejeune, p. 129.
43 See Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels ltr. to Major General George Barnett, did. 19 June 1920, Major General George Barnett, USMC Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, MCHC, PC#247, Box 1, General Correspondence, 1919-1929).
placement on the lineal list for advancement, as well as those officers who desired to remain on active duty.

Besides enlisted strength, which would remain a constant problem during the interwar period for Lejeune and his predecessors, no other problem seemed as vexing and frustrating as did the retention and promotion of officers by selection. In his first report to the Secretary of the Navy (1920), Lejeune reported that the actual strength of the officer corps stood at 529 permanent officers, with 564 vacancies. Of the temporary officers, there were 399 on duty at the time of this report, making for a combined total of 928 officers. In order to address this shortage of officers, the Major General Commandant wrote that "a board of officers has been convened to make selections from the temporary officers now in the service, former officers of the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve who served during the war, and warrant officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps who served as commissioned officers during the war, to fill these vacancies, and to establish the order of precedence of the officers selected to receive permanent appointments." Lejeune's convening of the Neville Board was both a means of addressing the shortage in qualified, combat-experienced officers, and a means of rewarding those men who had served in the World War.

By taking into consideration their service in the World War, the Neville Board attempted to do what the Russell Board failed to do, and that, of course, was to retain those officers, primarily combat veterans of the World War, who desired to make the Marine Corps a career. Brigadier General Smedley Butler, whose eyes had been fixated upon the commandancy since the cabal to remove Major General Barnett, argued that these former noncommissioned officers formed the "backbone of the corps;" since he himself was one such "combat veteran," he felt that it was only fair that these men be rewarded with retention and advancement. On the other hand, Colonel Harry Lee, commanding officer of the veteran 6th Marine Regiment, who also sat on the board
believed that those former sergeants who had proven themselves in combat should be retained. In short, whereas the Russell Board looked at an officer's educational and social attributes, the Neville Board leaned toward those whom possessed combat experience and decorations. Ultimately, the Neville Board likewise failed to resolve the problem of an equal balance in the officer corps because it favored former enlisted men. The Naval Appropriations Act for 1921 (4 June 1920), backed by Representative Thomas Butler, now Chairman of the powerful House Naval Affairs Committee, and signed into law by Secretary of the Navy Denby, provided for the retention of those company grade officers, "who had held temporary or Reserve commissions during the World War," with the provision that these same men were eligible for the estimated five hundred vacancies in the "permanent rank structure." In fact, General Lejeune, wrote in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1921:

The permanent law on the subject of filling vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant in the Marine Corps provides that some of such vacancies may be filled by the advancement of meritorious noncommissioned officers. This authority has heretofore been availed of, and many commissioned officers have risen from the ranks. The policy and practice adopted keep the door to commissioned rank wide open to enlisted men of the Marine Corps, as Congress intended.\(^{44}\)

In fact, as the Major General Commandant reported, of the "1,118 applicants considered, the [Neville] Board recommended 692 for permanent commissions. Of this number 489 had served as enlisted men in the Marine Corps." The breakdown in grades included (Table 3.3):

\(^{44}\)Bartlett, Lejeune, p. 152; Annual Report for 1921, p. 49.
Captains .......................... 122
First Lieutenants .................... 187
Second Lieutenants ................... 180

Total .......................... 48945

Table 3.3
The Neville Board
Former Enlisted Marines Selected
For Permanent Commissions

One sticking point remained, however, and that of course was over the lineal list that established where an officer stood in regards to his peers of equal rank. This list was a tool used for promotion, which at this time was by seniority. The Navy's Judge Advocate General ruled that "any officer, regardless of when he received a regular commission during the war, did not have to be maintained at his temporary (or present) rank in 1929." In effect, those temporary commissioned officers who were captains could revert back to first or second lieutenants, and thus be placed lower on the lineal list. In effect, this meant that given the Corps system of promotion by seniority, those officers retained by the Neville Board could expect to make major by the time they reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty-four.46

Nonetheless, the results of the Neville Board seemed for the moment to resolve the Corps shortage in company grade officers. Given the ongoing expeditions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the need for combat-experienced officers, Headquarters could be pleased that the Marine Corps would not be deprived of this experience nor manpower. Still, however, the Corps remained approximately one hundred and fifty

45 Annual Report for 1921, p. 49.
46 In this particular instance, historian Allan R. Millett refers specifically to the case of Lieutenant Gerald C. Thomas, who was retained by the Neville Board. See Millett, In Many A Strife, p. 83.
officers short of its desired goal of 1,093 officers. As Lejeune wrote, "a few of these vacancies will be filled by graduates of the Naval Academy, others by meritorious non-commissioned officers, and it is possible some will be filled from civilian life by graduates of distinguished military colleges."47 Despite the temporary resolution of the shortages in company grade officers, the larger problem of officer promotion remained as the main impediment to an efficient, well-trained and well-lead Marine Corps.

While the Neville Board temporarily resolved the retention problem, it led to another one in the form of what has been described as the "World War I hump." This "hump" occurred as a result of the back-dated commissions awarded by the Neville Board which awarded the longer-service sergeants promoted during the World War seniority in grade, and thereby pushed those Marines commissioned in the latter stages of the war or during the demobilization period far down on the lineal or seniority list. In the case of Second Lieutenant Gerald C. Thomas, this meant that his "lineal" number as far as promotion was concerned was 600 numbers down a "World War I hump" of 748 officers. Hence, given the rate of promotions according to seniority system, officers such as Lieutenant Thomas and others would have had little chance to advance in rank beyond that of major prior to their retirement from the service.48 In order to remedy this situation Major General Lejeune undertook the first steps toward the adoption of a better method of officer promotion and retention.

Promotion By Selection: Phase One

While the bulk of Lejeune's efforts while serving as the Major General Commandant remained focused on the Corps' enlisted and officer strength, the one goal that would elude him would be the adoption of a promotion-by-selection process in both the officer

48 Millett, In Many A Strife, p. 83.
and staff noncommissioned ranks. In his desire to increase the Corps' efficiency and adaptability to new missions, the Major General Commandant sought to retire or separate those men who by age, physical infirmity, or other reasons could not meet the exacting standards he had outlined during the first few months of his commandancy. In fact, Lejeune's attempts at adopting just such a system for the Marine Corps pre-dates his ascendancy to the head of the Marine Corps to his first tour of duty as commanding officer of the Marine Barracks in Washington, D.C. (1905-1907), when then Major General Commandant George F. Elliott had asked him to appear before the Congress as a spokesman for the needed personnel changes in the Corps. Lejeune, then a major, carefully outlined his own beliefs on retention and promotion of officers that he later as head of the Marine Corps introduced without success. In testifying before Congress, Major Lejeune suggested "that majors and company grade officers, (since they led men into combat, were not mounted, and often over fifty years of age) should be younger men and that the relative proportion of senior grade officers be increased to make room for exceptionally qualified junior officers."\(^49\) He testified as to how room could be made in the ranks of the Corps, with the suggestion for example, that "all inefficient, unfit, or morally unqualified officers [who] were a burden to the Corps should be placed immediately on the inactive list."\(^50\) Short of Congress's approval of this more draconian measure of elimination of the unfit Lejeune recommended that officers be held to the 1892 law implementing rigid examination in-grade for all officers in order to be considered for promotion to the next. Lejeune felt that insistence on rigid examinations for all officers would "insure proper leadership and allow of retirement of officers passed over for promotion." Congress, and indeed all of the Marine officer corps, would not


\(^{50}\)Ibid.
have agreed to this at the time of its suggestion. An idea that had been too progressive even for the age of progressivism, it nonetheless indicated Lejeune's desire to bring the Marine Corps officer corps into the twentieth century.

Later in 1916, while serving as an assistant to Major General Commandant George Barnett, Lejeune once again witnessed the benefits and need for a system of promotion by selection as the Marine Corps, by the terms of the 1916 Naval Appropriations Bill expanded from an authorized 13,000 to 15,000 enlisted Marines with like increases in the ranks of the commissioned officer ranks. Lejeune later wrote that not only did the Marine Corps miss a golden opportunity to reform its promotion system since the bill established a "simplified form of promotion by selection and the elimination of those not promoted, for the line of the Navy," but that he:

... always regretted that the Marine Corps was not included in its scope, as I am profoundly convinced that such a system of promotion is the only sound system, and that promotion by seniority without elimination will ultimately result in a materially lower degree of efficiency, due to a lack of incentive, too great age in grade, and the retention on the active list of inferior officers.

Lejeune's insistence on adoption of such a system of officer advancement with the goal being a more efficiently-led and trained force that would be capable of absorbing new ideas and technologies that would firmly establish the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force-in-readiness became the basis for the remainder of his tenure as the Major General Commandant. General Lejeune, however, was not the only senior Marine that had been an advocate of promotion by selection. General Lejeune's predecessor, Major General Barnett, had also been an advocate of the adoption of a system of promotion-by-selection. In fact, in testimony before the House and Senate Naval Affairs

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52 Ibid, p. 229.
committees, as well as in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, Barnett indirectly accused Congress of stonewalling his attempts at modernization and adoption of just such a system of officer advancement. In his last report as Commandant, Barnett reiterated his attempted change in the present selection process:

The undersigned has on several occasions recommended that promotion by selection be authorized by law for the Marine Corps, but the Committee on Naval Affairs did not see fit to adopt these recommendations. I again urge that promotion by selection be applied to the Marine Corps, and have made recommendations outlining the manner in which the selection should be made.\(^{53}\)

Barnett’s removal from office, however, prevented any meaningful reform in the methods Headquarters determined an officer’s qualifications for the next higher grade, and it was left to his successor to push for promotion by selection and the abolition of the seniority system. Despite the fact that Major General Lejeune fared a little better, he too failed to move the opposition in both the Marine Corps and in the Congress. Lejeune nonetheless brought the problem of promotion-by-selection into the open and onto the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. In the end, however, it would be one of General Barnett’s proteges, John H. Russell, who succeeded in implementing promotion by selection. Russell’s introduction of a similar promotion-by-selection system that caused the same rancor and discontent among the serving officers, reminiscent one might add, of the debates which permeated the Corps’ senior ranks during Lejeune’s failed attempts at implementation of a similar policy.

The controversies that raged over both the Russell and Neville boards highlighted a problem that ran deeper than officer retention. This problem, of course, was in clearing

the way for the advancement of officers younger, more dynamic, and more receptive to the programs and policies that Lejeune believed necessary for the Marine Corps' institutional survival. Among these ideas was the reactivation and expansion of the Advanced Base Force, the introduction and expansion of a sound, progressive professional military education system, and the development of an actual wartime mission for the Marine Corps in support of the fleets. Lejeune believed that the Marine Corps's efforts should be directed toward preparing for another land war like the one recently concluded as an adjunct to the Army or, as it turned out, a conflict involving the fleet with Japan. Lejeune's insistence on attracting potential officer candidates and retaining qualified junior officers to the Corps likewise centered on his ability to offer them more than just travel and a chance to play football. Furthermore, in order to be competitive with the civilian sectors, the Marine Corps, like any other business, would have to offer more in the way of a stable career with chances of advancement and better pay. Hence, his reasons for promotion by selection, and its role in the Corps's intellectual ferment during the late 1920's and 1930's.

The Major General Commandant's desire to adopt promotion-by-selection had been based on what he termed "the voluntary cooperation of subordinates . . . [and the] . . . laying down of a doctrine that the true test of the existence of a high state of discipline in a military organization is found and [that] satisfactory performance of duty under all service conditions . . . " His first step in adopting such a measure was enforcement of a rigorous and "effective system of examination." In presenting this plan before the members of the House Naval Affairs Committee during the hearings for the Fiscal 1922 Naval Appropriations Bill, Lejeune still had as his main objective the adoption of a system of promotion by selection that went further than the examining boards and examinations that:

While this system has many advantages, it at the same time has corresponding
disadvantages. In the main, the officers advanced under this system are highly qualified for their duties, but there is a class of officers of mediocre ability who, by reason of some limitations of character or of accomplishment or by lack of marked efficiency in the performance of the more exacting duties, are usually continued in the performance of the minor duties, in which they are able to establish fair records. They do not, therefore, have on their official records any sufficient unfavorable data which would justify an examining board in recommending against their promotion. These officers are, however, by general reputation usually well known to the service, where their general inability to meet the normal demands of their rank is well recognized. This disadvantage in regard to promotion is inherent in the present system and has been recognized by the Army and the Navy, for which special provision has been made.54

The actual Promotion Bill, as proposed by Major General Lejeune and introduced on the floor of the House by Representative Butler on 22 December 1922 had four key provisions that remained at the heart of Lejeune's promotion legislation. These provisions included:

Sect. 1. Be it enacted that by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that no officer of the Marine Corps below the grade or rank of colonel shall be promoted or advanced in grade or rank on the active list unless the examining board shall certify that there is sufficient evidence before the Board to satisfy the board that the officer is fully qualified professionally for the next higher grade.

Sect 2. That the examining board shall consist of seven or more officers of the Marine Corps, any officer whose case is before it may be not professionally qualified without the right to be present or to challenge members of the said board.

Sect 3. That any officer of the Marine Corps who fails to qualify professionally upon examination for promotion or advancement shall be reexamined as soon as may be expedient after the expiration of one year if he again becomes due for promotion . . . [and that] . . . if any such officer of less than ten years' service, exclusive of service as a midshipman or cadet at the United States Naval Academy or the United States Military

Academy, fails to qualify upon reexamination, he shall be honorably discharged from the Marine Corps with one year's pay. That if any officer of more than ten years' service, who fails to qualify upon reexamination he shall not be discharged from the Marine Corps but shall thereafter be ineligible for promotion or advancement . . . and that any such officer shall be retired with a percentage of the pay received by him at the date of retirement equal to 2 1/2 percentum for each year, . . . and attaining the ages in the various grades and ranks as follows: Lieutenant Colonel, fifty years; major and company officers, forty-five years.

Sect. 6. That any officer of the grade or rank of colonel whose name is not borne on one of the eligible lists for appointment as brigadier general or head of a staff department shall, if more than fifty-six years of age, be retired with a percentage of the pay received by him at the date of retirement.\textsuperscript{55}

In short, Lejeune's goal was to remove those officers found ineligible by the examination boards as opposed allowing them to remain on the muster rolls of the Marine Corps. Failing this, Lejeune's hope was to at least strengthen the existing law by getting rid of those officers he believed were incapable of performing their duties in a satisfactory manner.

Lejeune's recommendations, attached to the Naval Appropriations Bill, sailed through the House Naval Affairs Committee and the full Congress, but ran into sharp opposition on the floor of the Senate. In testifying before that same body's Naval Affairs Committee, the Major General Commandant insisted that "of all the armed services, only the Marine Corps remained tied to such an inefficient system." The senators questioned Lejeune, however, as to the equity of such a system that appeared to punish those men who had spent their lives in service to the country and corps. Despite Lejeune's insistence that adoption of a system of promotion-by-selection would retain those men with ten or more years and allow them to retire with full benefits, a point he reiterated throughout the hearings, the legislators remained unconvinced and allowed the bill to die on the

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid}, pp. 365-6.
floor of the Senate, the second attempt at adopting promotion by selection having failed not due to political intrigue but what Lejeune termed the "disenchantment and malaise pervading the body politic"( and one might also add the country as a whole). The failure to secure passage of this bill in the Senate added to Lejeune's frustration in stabilizing the Corps' officer and enlisted ranks. If one read between the lines of Lejeune's postwar memoirs, one can sense the frustration he felt in his attempt to secure promotion by selection. While Lejeune did not stake the bulk of his energies on the proposal it was a central piece of legislation that the Major General Commandant had hoped to base his efforts at redirecting the Corps' wartime role as an adjunct to the fleets. Failure to secure passage of promotion by selection meant that the Corps would be saddled with an antiquated officer advancement system that had seen better days. It also meant that officers who might oppose his program of creating an expeditionary force-in-readiness could delay or kill implementation of his modernization and plans at redirecting the Marine Corps towards a real wartime mission. This then remained his justification for reforming the officer promotion system.

As for reaction inside the Marine Corps regarding changes in the promotion system, opinions generally favored retention of promotion by seniority. An unnamed brigadier general, who disagreed with Lejeune, wrote:

Taking everything into consideration, it is my opinion that the best interests of the service will result from having promotion based on seniority, qualified by the fairest possible method of elimination of the unfit, and by a system whereby officers (except as hereafter noted) who are not promoted to the various grades before reaching specified ages for each grade are forcibly retired upon coming due for promotion to the grade concerned.56

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This unnamed general believed that the current system of promotion by examination based upon seniority was both "fair to both the service and the individual officer" since it required every officer who came before the two promotion boards to demonstrate his fitness for further service and that it permitted a more equitable form of redress for the individual officer if found unfit for the next higher grade.\(^{57}\)

Two unnamed colonels likewise opposed Major General Lejeune's promotion-by-selection. Of the two, one put forward a possible solution to this problem, suggesting that "the best interests of the service would be advanced by determining the number of vacancies required each year in each grade, in order to insure the desired flow of promotion. If these vacancies could not be brought about by natural causes, such as retirements, resignations, deaths, etc., that the necessary number of vacancies be created by the selection out of the least desirable officers in the grade or grades concerned." The other colonel suggested that first and second lieutenants should be promoted based on length of service and that an officer's fitness should be based on his entire record, that included his standing in the various schools (Army and Marine Corps) and his leadership abilities. If the officer had not attended the Army and Marine Corps Schools, he should be afforded the opportunity to do so. These factors alone should determine promotion and retention -- not promotion by a board comprised of strangers who are unaware of the individual's abilities. In short, both men saw promotion by selection as being riddled with political and official influence, a charge which repeatedly cropped up during the debate over the proposed changes in the promotion system.

Unlike their seniors, two anonymous majors saw some merit in the Major General Commandant's proposal, though one warned against the inherent 'evils' resulting from discontent, favoritism and self-seeking individuals. The other major believed that

\(^{57}\)Ibid, p. 185-8.
promotion by selection would: (a) Provide a flow of promotions; (b) Provide a means of rewarding an officer who has shown marked ability; (c) That officers will reach the higher grades at an earlier age and that they will, therefore, serve longer in these grades; (d) Provides a means of disposing of the unfit." The inherent danger, however, by a switch from promotion by seniority to that of selection was the fact that the Corps would be "filled with disappointed, discouraged, and—what is worse—disgruntled officers who could not give their best . . ." Other arguments from a captain and first lieutenant stated that while promotion by selection had its merits, "the present method of promotion by seniority would best serve the interest of the service . . ." 58

Despite the negative reaction to his proposals to change the Corps's current promotion system, Major General Lejeune remained firm in his conviction that by changing the current method of officer advancement and retention, the Marines would be better off in the long run, since it would allow a younger, more talented, and one might add, more receptive officer corps to move in the direction that the Major General Commandant had hoped to take the Corps. That direction, of course, was toward an expeditionary force-in-readiness trained in the use of modern arms according to the principles of warfare learned in the trenches of France and not in the jungles of Hispaniola and Nicaragua. Promotion by selection, however, would not be introduced into the Corps until 1935, and only then by Major General Commandant John H. Russell, the same individual who presided over the board that first wrestled with officer retention in the immediate aftermath of the World War.

Major General Lejeune's frustration in not accomplishing this one piece of legislation set the tone for the remainder of his commandancy. Despite the political goodwill he had been able to foster on Capitol Hill with both the House and Senate

Naval Affairs Committees, the failure to achieve promotion by selection for the Marine Corps as part of the Naval Appropriations Act of 1922 pointed toward the 'lean' years that set in as the terms of the 1921 Washington Naval Conference began to take effect. As the U.S. Navy began to scale back construction of its major warships, the ripple effect it had on the Marine Corps became readily apparent as the terms of the treaty and the continuing postwar isolationist sentiment gripped the country. Lejeune nonetheless persisted in his efforts to prevent drastic reductions from taking place with the authorized strength of the Corps, this due, the Major General Commandant rightfully asserted, to the "good will of the members of Congress towards the Marine Corps," that prevented "a reduction in its enlisted strength."

Again, promotion by selection remained as elusive as ever, despite the best efforts by Lejeune. His determination to abolish the seniority system of advancement in the Corps is seen in his voluminous correspondence throughout 1927 to Brigadier General Smedley Butler, who at the time commanded the 3d Brigade of Marines in China. As Lejeune repeated in letter after letter to Butler, he believed that in order for the Marine Corps to become more "efficient," promotion-by-selection was an absolute necessity in eliminating those officers found physically, morally, or mentally unfit for further service. On this point, he would not compromise. Despite the overwhelming objections to adopting promotion-by-selection instead of by seniority (Butler himself estimated that seventy-one percent in his own command shared these objections), Lejeune maintained that this was an issue that had ramifications beyond the present, and of which there was to be no compromise. In one letter to Butler the Major General Commandant wrote:

My only object is to submit to Congress a bill which will be a cure for the disease which is beginning to afflict the Corps and which will gradually grow more serious with the passing of years. I will not submit a palliative, or a measure for the temporary relief of certain blocks of people, but I do want to make a bill which will effect a permanent cure and one which will build
up steadily a higher standard of efficiency and conduct for the officers. The
disease which I mention has several causes, one of which is the increasing
age of our officers in the lower grades. At the present time the Second
Lieutenants are being promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant at the age
of 30, and the First Lieutenants to Captain at about 35; and promotions
in all other grades are several years behind promotions in all other grades
are several years behind promotions will grow greater each year, and
finally our First Lieutenants will attain the grades of Captain when they are
between 40 and 45, and our Captains will be over 50 before they reach
the grade of Major.59

The Commandant in fact, stated that under the present system of promotion by
seniority, there was no provision for the elimination of substandard officers. This, he
believed, would not only lower the standard of Marine officers, but would "diminish the
efficiency of the Corps." Lejeune attempted and failed during the remainder of his
commandancy to accomplish the enactment of promotion-by-selection into law.
Notwithstanding his belief that such legislation would have had a marked effect on the
Corps's overall efficiency, the Major General Commandant was correct in his assertion
that such favorable legislation would have a "heritage to the future" and lead to the
efficiency of the Marine Corps. By the adoption of a system of promotion-by-selection,
Lejeune had hoped to promote those officers that would carry the Marine Corps beyond
the World War generation; he had hoped for a new role and mission--one much different
from that which the Corps carried to France in 1917. The failure by Congress to enact
such legislation for the Marine Corps in the early 1920's delayed, but did not hinder the
development of its landing operation doctrine. It did, however, put a damper on the
remainder of Lejeune's tenure as Commandant, and contributed to his decision to retire
in 1929 when he could have very well had another tour as head of the Marine Corps.

59Major General John A. Lejeune itr. to Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, dtd. 20
May 1927, Major General Smedley D. Butler, USMC Papers. (Quantico, VA., MCU
Archives, MCU, MCCDC, Folder 1, General Correspondence, Box 10), p. 1.
Summary

Even without promotion by selection, the Major General Commandant turned to change the Marine Corps in other, more practical ways, though he would not give up his efforts to persuade Congress that advancement by merit had far more benefits than the critics of such a system claimed. Yes, it was cold-hearted and in some cases harsh, but its introduction had more to do with the new Corps' mission and overall preparedness that Lejeune had outlined before becoming Commandant. Despite the failure to achieve promotion by selection, Lejeune did manage to introduce many far-reaching changes in regard to addressing the Marine Corps's preparedness. This included the reorganization of Headquarters Marine Corps, the creation of a Division of Operations and Training, as well as a viable Marine Corps Reserve. While these three achievements could not overcome his failure to convince a skeptical House Naval Affairs Committee of the importance attached to his promotion and selection bill, Lejeune was far more successful that his predecessors in placing the Marine Corps on a firm, modern administrative foundation as a professional military organization. Indeed, the reforms Lejeune enacted had been based largely in part on his, and the Marine Corps's experiences in the World War, all of which had been designed to redirect its efforts toward supporting the Navy in time of war as a landing force.
CHAPTER 4
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN A. LEJEUNE'S REORGANIZATION
AND REFORM POLICIES, 1920-1925

Introduction
The World War introduced Marines to modern administrative methods, particularly with the organization of both a field operations staff, a training and planning staff, as well as an aviation department. While much of this can be attributed to the fact that many Marine officers served on Army staffs during the war, it also pointed to the improved managerial methods that originated with the revolution in business administration (which also helped propel the rise of industrial and banking management). In fact, Headquarters, began to function along the lines of a small corporate staff. While Marines served as staff members on both the brigade and regimental levels in the pre-war era, Marine staffs at that time had no set organization and no clear delineation of duties and functions. The World War changed this state of affairs.

During the World War, Marine officers became intimately familiar with the functions and benefits of a properly organized military staff, as well as both the French "G" and British "R" staff organizations. After the war Marines retained the Army staff system, having realized that the three-to-four man administrative staff of the Major General Commandant could no longer handle the day-to-day affairs of an organization that grown tenfold within two years. While Major General Barnett spent the remainder of his Commandancy dealing with manpower and administrative matters related to
demobilization, it was left to his successor to realign Headquarters and the Marine Corps itself along modern administrative lines, as well as deal with the problems of expansion during a major war, and all of the problems associated with mobilization.

Reorganization of Headquarters Marine Corps

One of the most significant changes made by Major General Lejeune upon his assumption of the Commandancy of the Marine Corps that succeeded in passing Congress in 1920 was the reorganization of Headquarters Marine Corps, patterned after the organization of the War Department General Staff (his reorganization succeeded in passing Congress in 1920). Lejeune's term as commanding general of the Army's 2d Division (that included the 4th Marine Brigade) convinced him that if the Marine Corps was to become a modern force in readiness, it would require both an efficient and well-trained staff schooled in the techniques of land warfare as well as one familiar with naval affairs and techniques. The staff he had inherited from his predecessor was both inadequate and ill-equipped to handle the complexities of modern warfare. As events turned out, reorganization of Headquarters Marine Corps was the Major General Commandant's first order of business upon becoming Commandant in July 1920.

Prior to the World War, the officers assigned to Headquarters could hardly be called a "general staff." Due to both the size of the Marine Corps and its officer corps, the assemblage around the Major General Commandant consisted of his assistant and three aides, the quartermaster and his assistants, and the paymaster and his assistants. As events later demonstrated, this small staff, while sufficient for a Marine Corps of 13,000 officers and men proved totally inadequate to meet the demands placed upon Headquarters during the months immediately following the U.S.'s declaration of war on the Central Powers on 6 April 1917. In fact, as Marine planners later admitted, "There were no definite plans for the procurement of personnel or material except a general policy to expand as much as possible and get into the war wherever there was an
opportunity. . . .\textsuperscript{1} The failure to anticipate its involvement in the World War, and its hastily improvised attempts in the aftermath of President Wilson's declaration of war to assess the requirements necessary to prepare the Marines training at Parris Island, and Quantico for trench warfare in Europe, was due not only to the Marine Corps's lack of a real wartime mission but also to the inadequacies of the overall U.S. preparedness for any war up to that time. Indeed, as the U.S.'s record had demonstrated during the War with Spain in 1898, preparedness was not a hallmark of U.S. forces up to that time.\textsuperscript{2}

Major General Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters was actually an outgrowth of legislation that had been proposed regarding the military staff in 1913, but had failed to reach the floor of the Congress. This legislation, proposed by Major General Commandant William P. Biddle, called for an "amalgamation of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department with the line and the detail of line officers to perform adjutant and inspector duties on four-year tours." His thinking was that Marine officers, particularly those of higher rank (Captain through Colonel) "should be experienced in both staff and line duties." Thus, the legislation would have eliminated the distinction between line and staff officers, insofar as separate promotion lists were concerned. Furthermore, the legislation defined not only what constituted a staff officer, but outlined a staff officer's duties. General Biddle believed that because the staff departments were military in nature, Marine officers would gain valuable experience in all aspects of Marine Corps administration. Nonetheless, reorganization would have to await the Marine Corps's involvement in the World War.\textsuperscript{3}

This early attempt at staff reorganization did not confine itself to Headquarters and, in fact, contributed to the growth of the Marine field staff. The field staff, prior to 1913,

\textsuperscript{1} Condit, et al., \textit{Marine Corps Staff Organization}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{2} Richard K. Betts, \textit{Military Readiness}, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid; Condit, et al., \textit{Marine Corps Staff Organization}, pp. 9.
consisted of the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster. The Marine Corps employed this staff organization in its expeditionary forces that ranged in size from an independent battalion to that of an brigade. In both its regiments and battalion organizations, the only "staff" was usually the adjutant. By 1916, however, the staff of an Marine expeditionary force had begun to expand. The staffs of the 1st and 2d Marine Brigades now included intelligence officers "while the 1st Brigade staff contained a signal officer and the 2d Brigade staff had a chief of staff."

During the World War, exposure to both the British and French staff systems led to the adoption in the American Expeditionary Forces of the "G" system, patterned after the composition of the French general staff system. This system is still used by the U.S. Armed Forces today. It used enumerated departments to denote staff functions: G-1 was the Personnel and Administration department; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Operations; G-4, Supply and Logistics; and G-5, Training. Eventually, the G-3 absorbed the duties of the G-5 which became responsible for both operations and training. There was also a special staff of technical and administrative officers who assisted in the execution of the plans and orders formulated by the various departments (e.g., Paymaster, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal, and Medical). Despite the fact that the largest unit organized by Marines were brigades, "individual Marines learned the functioning of the staff at division level through assignments to Army units (Marines in this category included Majors Holland M. Smith and Earl H. Ellis). Other Marines served on the staff of the Naval Planning Group established by Admiral William S. Sims in London (among the most important was Major Robert H. Dunlap). It was the Army staff system that Marines carried over with them at the conclusion of the war and which became the basis for the further development of the Marine Corps staff system during the postwar period.

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, p. 11.
On 19 December 1918, in the immediate aftermath of the World War, Major General Barnett, created the Planning Section in order to rectify the problem of unpreparedness in war planning. This section was manned by three officers, and placed under the authority of the Office of the Commandant, and placed under the direct supervision of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. The new Planning Section had the responsibility of "... all matters pertaining to plans for operations and training, intelligence, ordnance, ordnance supplies and equipment." What is new here is the inclusion of intelligence and ordnance, two sections that previously had been separate functions and under different authority. This new department likewise saw the addition of more warrant officers and enlisted men, and for the first time, civilian personnel. Along with the increase in enlisted personnel was the creation of a rank structure to go along with Headquarters assignments.

Later on, as part of Lejeune's reform package to modernize the administrative and training procedures in the Marine Corps, the Major General Commandant expanded the Planning Section into the Division of Operations and Training. This new division was composed of the Operations, Training, Military Education, Military Intelligence, and Aviation sections. The new Division of Operations and Training performed functions "similar to those of the General Staff of the Army and ... Office of the Chief of Naval Operations." While not broken down into the "G" sections, the new division assumed similar roles and functions. The creation of the Division of Operations and Training, however, lacked two important areas that Major General Lejeune subsequently corrected in the months to follow. These two areas included the absence of a personnel section on either the Corps-level or regimental systems and a clarification over the dual command over Marine Aviation which had remained under the direct authority of both the Major

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6Ibid.
7Ibid, p. 12.
General Commandant's office and the Chief of Naval Operations. Despite the fact that in July 1919 Congress had authorized a Marine Corps of 27,400 officers and men, the lack of both funding and available manpower reduced most Marine units to skeletal organizations. The Corps could barely meet its present commitments, much less any new ones. As for aviation, when Headquarters established the Aviation Section, Marine Air was then under the direct control of the Director of Naval Aviation (later the Bureau of Aeronautics or BuAir) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The new Marine Aviation Section was charged with the supervision of its own training, recruiting, personnel and logistical matters, while the Navy retained control over aircraft and aircraft requisitioning. In effect, the new arrangement in effect moved the Marine Aviation Section under the direct supervision of the Major General Commandant. Later on, as is described in the next chapter, this arrangement gave Marines more direct control over the future direction over its own aviation, and enabled it to avoid the growing controversy between the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation in the mid-1920's.

The most important function assigned to the Division of Operations and Training was that of preparing war plans, though a shortage of trained personnel caused Marine war planning to get off to a slow start. For the most part, Marine war planning remained normally charged to a single officer; in one case it was charged to the intelligence section. (It was in this capacity that Major Earl H. "Pete" Ellis wrote his masterpiece Operation Plan 712-D [1921]). As a result of this lack of a proper war planning agency, Headquarters authorized the creation of a War Plans Committee and placed it under the direct responsibility of the Commandant. This new committee not only gave the Marines a vehicle by which to plan for future military operations; it also lent authority to the
Marine Corps' insistence on a role in joint war planning and a definite role in any future war.  

In addition to the creation of the Division of Operations and Training, Major General Lejeune sought to correct the earlier deficiencies of managing personnel, recruiting and education with the addition of these same sections in December 1920. The heads of each of these new sections reporting directly to the Major General Commandant. As a result, the Commandant was able to free himself of the routine, day-to-day administration of the Corps and concentrate on major issues and concerns such as budgetary issues and war preparedness. (Table 4.1) Later on (on 1 July 1925), in response to the requirements for an expanded Marine Corps Reserve, Headquarters added a Reserve Section to this staff arrangement, and placed it directly under the command of the Director of Reserves in the Office of the Major General Commandant.

Broken down into their separate sections, each new department was charged with specific functions that theoretically contributed to the overall preparedness of the Marine Corps for war. As Major General Lejeune outlined in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1922, each of these sections was to contribute to the overall preparedness of the Marine Corps:

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8ibid.
Operations and Training Division

Operations:  This section concerned itself with the preparation of tables of organization for all organized units of the Marine Corps, as well showing the strengths and distribution of these same units; Mobilization and operational plans for the defense of areas garrisoned by Marines; the formulation of war plans in conjunction and in liaison with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint War Board.

Training: The training of Marines in the United States and at all posts and navy yards, as well as in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This section established procedures for both officer and enlisted training at the Recruit Depots and officer training at Quantico and at the Philadelphia Navy Yard; as well as the adoption and publication of training circulars.

Intelligence: The Intelligence section concerned itself with the issuing of periodic reports of those areas and on information of military value to the Marine Corps and where Marine forces may be called upon to serve. Close liaison was to be maintained with the Office of Naval Intelligence and with that of the Military Intelligence Section of the War Department General Staff.

Aviation: The responsibilities of this section included the supervision of recruiting, training, personnel, and logistical matters pertaining to aviation under the Office of the Commandant and the Director of Aviation in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Material: This section had been charged with the determination and estimation to the various Marine Corps organizations of the amounts and classes of equipment and ordnance (based on the established tables of organization by HQMC) to be issued and/or purchased by the Quartermaster Department.

Table 4.1 (CONTINUED)
HQMC Reorganization and Function as of 1 December 1920
Table 4.1 (CONTINUED)

Independent Sections:

**Personnel:** The Personnel Section had been charged with the procurement of officers; assignment of officers and men to various stations and duties; furloughs, leaves of absence, medical surveys, and transportation on board naval transports.

**Recruiting:** The Recruiting Section took charge of recruiting and the recruiting service.

**Education:** The Education Section was responsible for all non-military education, including the Marine Corps Institute and post schools. Specifically this section was to supervise the work of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, namely the Field Officers' School, the Company Officers' School, the Basic Course School for instruction of all newly appointed appointed second lieutenants, and the Correspondence School for Field Officers.\(^9\)

As noted above, the Reserve Section would not be added until July 1925, while the Aviation Section remained under the dual control of both the Office of the Commandant and the Director of Naval Aviation in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not until 1935 that the Aviation Section would be removed from under the Division of Operations and Training, and given autonomy as a separate division under the Office of the Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

A further reorganization of the Marine staff occurred in 1922 with the designation of an "executive staff" that was similar to that of the Army's "general staff with troops" entity created as a result of the Army's Reorganization Act of 4 June 1920. The duties of this executive staff included the rendering of:

\[\ldots\text{ professional aid and assistance to the general officers over them; to act as their agents in harmonizing the plans, duties, and operations of the various organizations and services under their jurisdiction, in preparing general in-}\]

structions for the execution of the plans of the commanding generals, and in supervising the execution of such instructions.\textsuperscript{10}

The Marine Corps defined the executive staff as "that body of assistants to the Commanding General of a Force or Independent Brigade of Marines which coordinates the work of the Administrative, Technical, and Supply Staffs, and of the Troops; and which composes and issues the detailed orders by which the decisions of the Commanding General are communicated to the troops."\textsuperscript{11} The first appearance of the executive staff in Marine Corps tables of organization occurred in 1922. The new tables of organization specified that an independent Marine brigade rated a staff, modeled closely on that of the Army's "G" system with a B-1, Personnel; B-2, Intelligence; B-3, Operations and Training; and B-4, Supply. When a Marine brigade became part of a larger unit, however, the commanding officer combined personnel and supply into one section. Marine infantry regiments, as part of the brigade, adopted a similar organization though dropped the "B" designation and replaced it with that of the "R." Battalions retained similar departments without the numerical designation and did not have a designated supply officer, a measure corrected in 1925, when Headquarters authorized the creation of a separate supply officer billet for battalions. The four section executive staff became official with the publication of the tables of organization in 1925. As for staffing these various billets, Major General Lejeune sought to appoint both Staff and Line officers whom brought with them their different experiences and ideas "fresh from duty with troops serving at sea, at home and abroad."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10}Condit, et.al., \textit{Marine Corps Staff Organization}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12}Lejeune, \textit{Reminiscences}, p. 470.
Summary

The reorganization of Headquarters along modern military lines enabled Major General Lejeune to carry forth a much needed package of reforms to modernize the command and control of the Marine Corps in garrison and in the field. It assisted the Major General Commandant and his successors to address the deficiencies in preparedness that characterized the Marine Corps on the eve of its entry into the World War, and enabled them to make the Corps an important player in the postwar war planning for the war against Japan (War Plan Orange). This staff organization gave impetus to the creation of a modern expeditionary force schooled, equipped, and organized along the U.S. Army's tables of organization, which enabled it to capitalize on its experience in the World War and later use this knowledge to the formulation and creation of the doctrine of amphibious assault in the mid-1930s. It also allowed for the inculcation of the lessons learned in the application of combined arms during the World War which Marines later applied on the Pacific atolls during World War II.
CHAPTER 5

"FOUNDATIONS OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCES:
ORGANIZATION OF THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY AND
ADVANCED BASE FORCE, 1919-1924"

Introduction

Even while Marines fought with the AEF in France, other Marines attached to the Advanced Base Brigade served along the U.S.-Mexican border in Texas and in Cuba guarding U.S. interests against enemy saboteurs. As demobilization took its toll on the Corps's manpower, both Major Generals Barnett and Lejeune struggled to revitalize the moribund Advanced Base Force that had last exercised with the fleet during the 1914 Winter Maneuvers on Culebra. As this chapter will demonstrate, they met with limited success. Both mail guard duty (1921) and expeditionary duty to China (1923), stripped the newly-established Marine Corps East Coast Expeditionary Force of both manpower, and emptied the classrooms at Quantico in both the Field Officers' and Company Officers' courses. These deployments taxed the Marine Corps' preparedness for even a minor emergency. Despite these deployments, Marines continued debate its role and mission inside the Navy, and what emerged during the 1920's was the beginning of a long debate inside the Marine Corps itself as to whether it would be a land force, and fight alongside the Army, or a naval expeditionary force, functioning as a base seizure force. In any event, the World War was a significant factor that would shape this debate, particularly in terms of its tables of organization and the creation of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, and in the creation of a viable Marine Corps Reserve.
The East Coast Expeditionary Force and  
Force Preparedness 1919-1924

As the Marine Corps demobilized in the aftermath of the World War, officials at Headquarters shifted their attention away briefly from war preparation toward the issues of manpower, officer retention and promotion, and headquarters reorganization. For both Major Generals Barnett and Lejeune, however, the larger, and perhaps more fundamental issue that confronted them in the immediate postwar period was the role and mission that the Marine Corps would play in national defense, and how the Corps's experience in the World War would affect this mission. The postwar, post-Wilson era brought with it an air of uncertainty to a force that had spent the past twenty years serving as a constabulary force, as the country retreated into a self-imposed isolationism. In short, it appeared to many inside and outside the Navy Department that the Marine Corps was without a mission. Yet, even as the Marines demobilized, thoughtful men such as George Barnett, John A. Lejeune, Major Earl H. Ellis, and others saw some benefit to the Corps's involvement in the World War, and thus began to shape its postwar force based on this experience.

The East Coast Expeditionary Force, 1919-22

While Major General Barnett continued to stress the strong ties between the Marine Corps and the Navy (the Corps's duty was to "fill all naval needs and requirements"), his attempts to reconstitute the neglected Advanced Base Force (which had spent the entire World War in Cuba and on the US-Mexican border near Galveston, Texas) fell far short of steering the Marine Corps toward a real wartime mission. Despite Barnett's request for an increase in the authorized strength of the Marine Corps to the Chief of Naval Operations so that it could take on the expeditionary mission, it was left to his successor-General Lejeune, to revitalize the Advanced Base Force and redirect its wartime mission
as a mobile expeditionary force-in-readiness. In testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee on 13 March 1920, Major General Lejeune (then Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico) outlined to the legislators his views of the mission and functions of the Marine Corps in future military-naval campaigns. When asked by the Chairman of the committee about the importance of maintaining organized expeditionary forces of Marines, the size of these forces and where they would be located, the former commanding general of the U.S. 2d Division responded that until the issue over the mission of the Marine Corps could be firmly established, issues such as manpower and permanent basing could not be determined. Lejeune then laid out before the legislators his views that eventually became the focal points of his nine-year tenure as the Major General Commandant.

What is important in Lejeune's testimony are his repeated references to the Corps' ties with the Navy. Lejeune, himself a Naval Academy graduate, believed that the Corps future was, in fact, tied with the Navy. In both testimony and in practice Lejeune set out to strengthen those bonds, despite the fact that the Marine Corps had fought on land as an adjunct of the Army during the World War. The desire to strengthen its inter-service bonds with its more senior sister service was both pragmatic and necessary based on by law and tradition. When asked to comment on the future mission of the Marine Corps in the postwar era, Lejeune told the representatives that:

The general board of the Navy has for 20 years been making a study of all important naval questions and, among others, the mission of the various branches of the Navy, including the Marine Corps. It has formulated a mission for the Marine Corps in the event of war. Its recommendation as to the

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mission of the Marine Corps has been approved by the Navy Department, and, therefore, constitutes the policy of the commander-in-chief with reference to the use of the Marine Corps in the event of war. Briefly, that mission may be stated as follows: the Marine Corps will supply expeditionary forces for service with the fleets in time of war.²

Responding to a comment that during the World War the Marines had fought as an adjunct to the Army and thus did not participate with the fleet in any major action, Lejeune responded:

its failure to do so was due to the fact that we entered the war after the enemy fleet, except submarines, had been swept from the seas. Consequently, there was no naval mission for the Marine Corps, and, unless it had served with the Army in France, the Marine Corps could not have taken part in the great war.³

Notwithstanding Admiral William S. Sims' proposed amphibious raids along the Adriatic coastline and the Advanced Base Force that had spent the war in the U.S., Lejeune was, for the most part, correct in his statement.⁴ Yet, even though the Adriatic mission never came into fruition, the latter mission pointed in the direction toward which the Marine Corps might head, and that of course was as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness that would be positioned at locations advantageous to rapid deployment with the major fleets of the Navy. Furthermore, in light of the postwar rush to demobilize and cutback in the number of ships under construction (by terms of the National Defense Act of 1916), the general cautioned the legislators not to cut too deep in the fleet's warfighting strength:

²Ibid.
³Ibid.
A certain part of the naval force must be kept in active commission. Just what the part is, and how large, is a matter to be decided by the experts and by Congress, but its readiness for war is of vital importance. There is always the danger that the next war may burst upon us just as suddenly as did the last war on England and France when the readiness of the British fleet for immediate service saved England from invasion. As these expeditionary forces of Marines are intended for service with the fleets, they must be kept in a similar state of readiness.5

Just how Barnett, and later, Lejeune, would keep the Marine Corps in this desired state of preparedness would become the focus of their commandancies, though the bulk of the task fell to Lejeune and his fellow officers in revitalizing and maintaining an expeditionary force which had become skeletal — under-manned and under-equipped. With Barnett's ouster in July 1920, and Lejeune's assumption of the helm at Headquarters, the prospects for the accomplishment of this task looked bleak. Only with the skill and energy of a revitalized Marine Corps, an officer corps educated and trained along modern lines, and a forward-looking mission, could the new Major General Commandant hope to overcome the pervasive problems of adjustment in an era when military spending and military service in general, would be looked down upon as an unwanted luxury instead of a much-needed necessity. Major General Lejeune's tasks were, indeed, formidable. Faced not only with a budget-minded Congress, an isolationist public as well as an enlisted and officer strength that had been barely able to carry out the Corps's already outstanding commitments in Haiti and China, the Major General Commandant nonetheless set out to build his expeditionary force in readiness, (albeit a small one). In the process of doing so, he began the long and often tortuous process of redirecting the Marine Corps's efforts away from its colonial forces heritage to that of a modern military force.

Major General Lejeune's efforts toward revitalizing the Advanced Base Force occurred during the first months of his Commandancy when he noted in his annual report

5Lejeune Testimony, did. 13 March 1920, loc. cit.
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that steps were "being taken to reorganize the expeditionary and advanced base forces."

The first steps Headquarters took toward this revitalization included the stationing of the 5th Marines at Quantico, and the reorganization and refitting of both the 6th Marines and 6th Machine Gun Battalion into a newly-constituted 4th Brigade, organized along the same pattern of its World War configuration though considerably reduced in strength. Headquarters likewise reorganized the Third Brigade centered around the 1st Marines, which contained a signal, engineer, searchlight, and an antitank battalion, and the Tenth Marines which had both light and heavy artillery.6 In February 1922, the Commandant went one step further toward the achievement of the Marine Corps as a force in readiness when he informed the General Board of the Navy, "that there were tremendous advantages to be realized by having a highly mobile Marine Corps force that could conduct offensive land operations against a hostile naval base," and strongly urged the members of the board "that there be sufficient personnel and equipment maintained in complete readiness for such a venture."7 As a result of this testimony Headquarters, in early 1923, dropped the designation "Advanced Base Force" and changed it to that of the East Coast Expeditionary Force with Marine Barracks, Quantico becoming its permanent home and headquarters. The change in names, however, was merely administrative, since the force retained the basic mission of its predecessor -- to serve with the Fleet in time of war, and to seize and defense such bases as may be deemed necessary for the successful prosecution of a naval campaign. Unlike its predecessor, the term "East Coast Expeditionary Force" applied to all Marine units -- "permanent or

temporary" -- which Headquarters made available to the Fleet. In 1925, Headquarters organized a similar force, comprised of West Coast-based units and stationed at the new Marine Corps Barracks, San Diego, California. Headquarters named this outfit as the "West Coast Expeditionary Force."

The redesignation of the Advanced Base Force to that of East and West Coast Expeditionary forces was not, however, a cosmetic change. Whereas the former force had been charged primarily with base defense and seizure of undefended naval bases, the role envisioned for latter force was the conduct of "offensive land operations" against 'hostile' naval bases and territory. 8 In fact, in a memorandum to the General Board of the Navy dated 11 February 1922, which argued against further cutbacks in the Marine Corps's seize and strength, Lejeune urged the board members that the Corps's strength should be "determined by its peacetime duties and wartime missions." 9 He then outlined the Marine Corps duties and missions emphasizing the Corps primary wartime mission:

The primary war mission of the Marine Corps is to supply a mobile force to accompany the Fleet for operations on shore in support of the Fleet. This force should be of such size, organization, armament and equipment as may be required by the plan of naval operations. Also it should be further utilized in conjunction with Army organization on shore, when the active naval operations reach such a stage as to permit its temporary detachment from the Navy. 10

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9See Lejeune Memorandum, dtd. 11 February 1922.


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In the same memorandum, the Major General Commandant reemphasized the Marine Corps traditional missions as "a mobile force in training for use on expeditionary duty abroad for the purpose of carrying out the foreign policy of our Government, or for emergency use at home."

The refocusing of the Marine Corps expeditionary nature from that of base defense and base seizure to that of conducting major offensive land operations in conjunction with the fleet, is one major result of the Corps's experience in the World War. Furthermore, the end of the World War and emergence of Japan as a major naval power in the Pacific Ocean area brought home the realization that any future war would be in conjunction with both the Navy and Army in Asian waters. This point was made by the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, and the threats posed to U.S. possessions in the Pacific, particularly on Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, Midway, and the Territory of Hawaii, and the Panama Canal.

The dates for the activation of the East Coast Expeditionary Force range from 1920 to the spring of 1922, raising the question as to when the force had been activated by Headquarters. A semi-official history of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment cites 1920 as the actual activation date, along with units of the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments (infantry), the 10th Marine Regiment (artillery), and other auxiliary troops such as aviation, signals, engineer and gas warfare troops. Other sources, however, including reports of the Major General Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy, make no reference to the force until the reenactments of the battles of Chancellorsville in 1921, Gettysburg in 1922, and the fleet exercises that the Navy held off the Panama Canal later that same year.

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With demobilization and personnel problems, as well as the continued expeditions to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, it is unlikely that either Major Generals Barnett or Lejeune would have diverted sufficient manpower to the creation of a force in-being which would have had little in the way of funds in order to carry out training or maneuvers. Furthermore, Lejeune's intention of having this force augmented by "the other posts and stations along the east coast" would have gone unfilled due to the constraints on funds and manpower. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Marine East Coast Expeditionary Force came into being before 1922.

The envisioned force that Lejeune had called for in his testimony while commanding general of Marine Barracks, Quantico differed radically from that what Headquarters organized in 1922 and, in fact, resembled the one envisioned by Major General George Barnett. This appears to be one of the more fundamental problems in ascribing the spawning of the amphibious mission to General Lejeune. Furthermore, the Marine Corps East Coast Expeditionary Force was not the force that Marine officers such as Major Dion Williams had lectured on to the faculty and students of the Naval War College in 1912, calling for a \textit{permanently organized and maintained} advanced base force as opposed to the traditional organization of an expeditionary regiment or brigade formed from the various posts and ships' detachments.\textsuperscript{12}

Again, much of what Lejeune had wanted to do in the way of creating an permanent Advanced Base Force had, in fact, been proposed by his predecessor, Major General George Barnett. Despite the controversies over promotions and the cabal that eventually forced him from office, Barnett has, in my opinion, received inadequate credit for the concept of the East Coast Expeditionary Force, an organization that historians have

\textsuperscript{12}See Dion Williams, "\textit{The Naval Advanced Base}," a lecture delivered on 26 July 1912 to the students and faculty of the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., reprinted Williams, \textit{The Naval Advanced Base}. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1912). Naval War College Historical Collection, NWC, Newport, R.I.
ascribed to Major General Lejeune. The truth lies in the simple fact that it was Barnett who first called for the creation of a permanently-based expeditionary force for service with the fleet at Quantico -- not Lejeune. In fact, in the above-mentioned memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations, Barnett clearly outlined what came about in terms of the Marine Corps East Coast Expeditionary Force's organization and mission. Specifically, Major General Barnett defended his request for more manpower, and a definite wartime mission based on his idea of the Marine Corps "fulfilling all the duties it may be called upon to perform." Among these duties the Major General Commandant listed:

(a) To support and assist the Navy by serving
   (1) On Naval Vessels.
   (2) At Naval Stations, bases, and yards
(b) To be prepared to perform small land operations in conjunction with the Navy, the Army, or alone.
(c) To furnish forces of occupation for certain countries under American control and officers for the constabulary detachments of such countries.
(d) To furnish legation guards where needed.\(^{13}\)

Major General Barnett added that "The prosecution of these tasks involves the creation and maintenance of an organized force, which provides" for, "... [an] ... advanced base force ready for immediate service with the fleet; and an expeditionary force ready for prompt service on call ..." In terms of manpower, the Major General Commandant estimated that the strength of this Advanced Base or Expeditionary Force would be somewhere around 5,000 to 6,000 officers and enlisted men.\(^{14}\) (Table 5.1)

\(^{13}\) *Barnett to CNO, did. September 1919, loc. cit., p. 2.*

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
**Expeditionary Force:**

Force Headquarters  
Regiment of Technical Units  
(a) 1st Regiment Headquarters and Band  
(b) Mine Battalion  
(c) Signal Company  
(d) Engineer Company  
(e) Searchlight Company  
(f) Anti-Aircraft Gun Company  
(g) Armored Car Detachment  
(h) Fire Control Detachment  
(i) Supply Company  

1 Brigade of Infantry: 149 Officers  
3,010 Enlisted Men  

1 Regiment of Artillery 56 Officers  
1,020 Enlisted Men\(^\text{15}\)

**Table 5.1**  
**Proposed Marine Corps Expeditionary Force 1919**

While the Expeditionary Force's main base was to be Quantico, Major General Barnett based his request for an increase in manpower based on the Navy's expressed desire to have "a skeleton brigade of 1700 men" based on the West Coast (at San Diego); where they would be available for expeditionary duty for Central America.\(^\text{16}\)

Unlike Lejeune's later testimony before the General Board's Policy Committee on 5 January 1925, which specifically addressed the Marine Corps' role during a naval campaign, Barnett's memorandum is absent of any reference to either "preparedness" or "wartime service." As Marines did before and after him, the Major General Commandant instead used the term "expeditionary" in justifying more men and money. Nonetheless, the point is clear: Barnett did advocate a real mission for the Marine Corps though this became obscured in the often bitter controversies surrounding his last year and a half as Commandant. He deserves some of the credit for resurrecting the

\(^{15}\text{Ibid.}\)  
\(^{16}\text{Ibid.}\)
Advanced Base Force and laying the foundation for the Marine Corps' participation in the fleet exercises of the 1920's.

One last problem Marines encountered as they attempted to resurrect the Advanced Base Force was the reluctance on the part of the Navy. Both Generals Holland M. Smith and Merrill B. Twining accused the Navy of disinterest in the Advanced Base Force mission and an institutional jealousy of the Marines, points that have some validity given the postwar naval disarmament and the lack of understanding of what a landing operation actually entailed. General Holland M. Smith, certainly no admirer of the Navy brass, and a man who had been intimately connected with the development of amphibious warfare doctrine during this era, decried the naval opposition as being "a peculiar form of snobbery regarding the Marines common in the Navy at that period and occasionally surviving until the beginning of World War II."17 There was, indeed, some truth to Smith's charge of snobbery and resentfulness among the Navy's senior leadership, a fact that surfaced many times into the open during the exercises of the interwar period and during World War II. It must be kept in mind, however, that it was the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert E. Coontz, who became a leading advocate in the Navy Department of the inclusion of the Marines in war planning and as a participant in an Orange War.18 While there were notable critics, such as Admiral

18Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert E. Coontz, ltr. to All Bureaus and Major General Commandant, dtd. 1 July 1920, Subj: "Projected Aviation Activities for the
William S. Sims, who insisted that Navy bluejackets could perform better than Marines, there is sufficient blame to go around insofar as the acceptance of the advanced base mission is concerned by senior Marine officers during this period. In fact, the Marines were as resistant in taking on the advance base mission as the Navy was to provide them with the means to do so. While Generals Smith and Twining speak of the snobbery that existed with Navy officers, the former's explosive temperament often made a bad situation worse. Admiral Coontz, Major General Lejeune, and their successors faced serious problems as they struggled with manpower, officer promotion and selection, budgetary considerations, and a deployment schedule that scuttled any chance of forming a trained expeditionary force in readiness in the 1920's. Despite the failure to create such a force, however, its intellectual seeds had, in fact, been planted a decade before by several key Marine officers. To them would go the credit for the creation of a force in readiness and the birth of a revolutionary new doctrine -- the amphibious assault.

The Marine officers most responsible for this "intellectual revolution" included Major General Eli K. Cole, Brigadier Generals Dion Williams and Robert H. "Hal" Duniap, and perhaps the most notable of them all-Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. "Pete" Ellis, who served as an instructor at the Naval War College (1912-13). In a branch of the service not usually known for its intellectual prowess prior to the World War, these men provided Major General Lejeune with the seeds of which eventually culminated in the creation of the Fleet Marine Force (codified in 1933 by then Major General John H.


19Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, USN, admitted on more than one occasion that his mastery of close order drill while at the Naval Academy "more than qualified him to lead troops ashore," a point that General Holland M. Smith liked to often quote. See Smith, Coral and Brass, pp. 52-8.
Russell) and the "christening" of the Marine Corps's mission as an amphibious assault force at the conclusion of World War II. The above-mentioned officers, who had entered the Marine Corps towards the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century during the leadership of Major General Charles Heywood (1891-1903) and other more junior officers who entered the corps later, all struggled to "carve out" for the Marines a complimentary mission as an adjunct force in the new steel navy. These same officers were the guiding intellectual force whose ideas carried Marines across the beaches of the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean before and during World War II.

The two-regiment advanced base force that officers such as Major General Eli K Cole, and Brigadier General's Williams and Dunlap had proposed came into existence prior to the start of the 1913-1914 Winter Exercises off Culebra, Puerto Rico. This force remained together until the eve of the World War, with its headquarters based at the League Island Navy Yard, Philadelphia, PA. With the declaration of war by the United States against the Central Powers and the need for manpower, the Advanced Base Force's equipment was put into storage and its manpower transferred to the units assembling at Quantico for service overseas with recently commissioned officers and enlisted men filling the ranks of those men who had deployed overseas.20

While the Marine contribution (combat and non-combat related) to the AEF during the war totaled approximately 26,731 officers and men, an additional 46,189 Marines served in various other duties, including an estimated 37,032 officers and enlisted men who were assigned to the Advanced Base Brigade and who remained at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, along the Texas-Mexican border, and in Cuba during the World

War. 21 Like most Marines who rushed to enlist during those first few months of the war, these others believed that they would serve in France. This was, however, not the case and as the numbers above demonstrate, only one-fourth of the Marine Corps actually served in France; the vast majority serving in traditional Marine-naval service. 22 As was the case with the 7th Marines, whom had been assigned to Cuba, those serving in Texas were sent there

Not to suppress dissident natives but were ordered to counteract the activities of agents of Germany and other Central Powers. It was hoped that the presence of American military units would of itself counterbalance propaganda and attempt at sabotage. A prime objective of this deployment was to bring about a stabilizing and calming effect over the local police. 23

While Marines of the 7th Regiment served in Cuba, the bulk of the Advanced Base Force during the World War served along the Texas-Mexican border guarding against German or Mexican subversion and enemy saboteurs and insuring the continued flow of Mexican oil to the Allies. 24 The 8th Marine Regiment, organized at Quantico on 9 October 1917, under the command of Colonel Emile P. Moses, consisted of approximately 1000 officers and enlisted men, and had been organized along the traditional Marine expeditionary structure of individual companies forming battalions and brigades. In time, Headquarters designated the 8th Marine Regiment as part of the Advance Base Force.

Both the 7th and 8th Marines had been instructed by Major General Barnett to "institute a comprehensive system of training in field exercises, particularly recon-

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21 Craig Oral History Transcript, pp. 12-6.
naissance, patrolling, military sketching, etc. "25 In other words, the Marines were to "show the flag" under the guise of training exercises. Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, then a newly-commissioned second lieutenant assigned to the 8th Marines, recalled that

Great secrecy surrounded the destination of the 8th Marines as we headed south; and as soon as we headed south, we all realized that were not going to France, which we doubted in any respect because we were a peace strength organization. We wound up in Galveston, Texas finally . . . we stayed in Galveston about a year and a half. And during that time, we carried out intensive training almost every day, including Saturday . . . 26

Marines conducted daytime and nighttime field problems, patrolled the border areas (Texas) and sugar cane fields (Cuba), hiked, and honed their marksmanship skills waiting and wondering if they too would be serving in France. An additional force of 360 officers and 7,598 Marines remained at the League Island Navy Yard as part of the Advanced Base Force that was to serve as the expeditionary arm of the fleet. An additional "two thousand . . . (Marines) . . . paced the decks of twenty-nine American battleships and cruisers" assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.27 In short, while the Marines were able to field a small force with the AEF for duty in France, the majority of them performed their traditional functions with little interruption until the postwar demobilization severely affected their ability to field a force for expeditionary and advanced base duty. General Barnett emphasized this last fact in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy in October 1919 when he wrote, " . . . Since the signing of the armistice and the consequent demobilization and discharge of duration-of-war men and reservists, the personnel of the advanced base force has been greatly reduced, but the

25ibid.
27McClellan, Marines in the World War, p. 18.
advanced base material and a skeleton organization have been retained, and the units of this force will be reorganized as the men become available." 28 In fact, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert E. Coontz recommended to Major General Barnett that "the Marine Corps plan to provide a West Coast Expeditionary Force between six and eight thousand men ready to reembark in forty-eight hours for a campaign against the Marshalls and Caroline Islands" in conjunction with the Joint Army-Navy's Board's plans for a possible war with Japan (known collectively as War Plan Orange). While in agreement with Coontz's recommendation, General Barnett argued that the Marine Corps did not have sufficient men to form even one of the projected expeditionary forces, due largely to its ongoing commitments in Hispaniola, and to its traditional duties ashore and at sea with the Navy. Barnett was able to convince both Secretary of the Navy Daniels and the Joint Board that if the authorized strength of the Marine Corps could be increased to 27,400 officers and enlisted men, "rather than the 14,849 he had funds for," the Marines could provide an adequately-sized advanced base and still carry out its traditional functions." 29 Nonetheless, despite Barnett's advocacy for the permanent establishment of the Advanced Base Force, the reality of demobilization and austere budgets left the creation of that force to his successor. The creation of a permanent Marine expeditionary force and the formulation of a supporting doctrine was left to Major General Lejeune and his staff, most notably a brilliant though oftentimes erratic staff officer by the name of Major Earl H. "Pete" Ellis.

Major Earl Hancock Ellis enlisted in the Marine Corps in September 1900 and served briefly in the ranks as an enlisted Marine prior to his commissioning as a second lieutenant in December 1901. Having graduated from high school with honors but lacking a college degree or a commission from the Naval Academy, Ellis, nonetheless demonstrated early on in his career an intellectual grasp that would leave its mark on the interwar Marine Corps.  

Major Ellis' first association with the subject of an advanced base force occurred serving in the Philippine Islands where he had been placed in command of a company assigned to emplace naval guns, searchlights, minefields, and other associated equipment on Grande Island at the mouth of Subic Bay. Described in his fitness reports as an "efficient and zealous officer," Ellis soon attracted the attention of Major John A. Lejeune, then commanding an expeditionary regiment sent to fortify Olongapo during one of the many war scares in 1907. Ellis's continued professional interest in those activities associated with the advanced base force concept likewise attracted the attention of his commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, who noted that the young officer's "active, intelligent, and careful work in the Advanced Base cannot be too highly commended..."  

Having been advanced to the rank of captain in 1908, and following an tour of duty at Headquarters Marine Corps (1908-1911), Ellis soon found himself off to the summer course at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, encouraged in part by the Major General Commandant William P. Biddle (1911-1914). Possessing a strong intellect, Ellis so impressed the commanding officer of the college, Admiral William L.

32Ballendorf and Bartlett, Pete Ellis, p. 46.
Rodgers, that the latter asked to retain him as well as another Marine officer-Randolph C. Berkeley for the 1911-1912 academic year. While at the Naval War College, Ellis's intellectual genius soon stood out by the authoring of several papers that dealt with the Advanced Base Force: "Naval Bases-Their Location, Resources, and Security;" "The Denial of Bases;" "The Security of Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Operations;" and "The Advanced Base Force." After remaining at Newport for another year as an instructor (1912-1913), his next assignment was with the newly-created Advanced Base Force then stationed at the League Island Navy Yard. There, Ellis arrived just in time to accompany the force on its first exercise with the fleet on Culebra, Puerto Rico during the Fleet's Winter exercises in January 1914. Subsequently, Ellis served as an intelligence officer, assigned to the Advanced Base Force headquarters, where he reportedly had a considerable amount of input into the planning of the maneuvers.\(^{33}\)

During the actual maneuvers, Captain Ellis conducted a reconnaissance of Culebra, making special note of the artillery positions and campsites. Brigadier General Barnett, who was Ellis' superior during the Advanced Base Force exercise on Culebra, praised his subordinate's work in a post-exercise fitness report, writing that "[Ellis] performed in an excellent manner, and will no doubt add very greatly to the success of the expedition to Culebra. Considering the short time he had to make the reconnaissance [of Culebra], his work is quite remarkable."\(^{34}\) General Barnett's praise of Ellis took on added importance when the former became the twelfth Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps. Recognizing the junior officer's (Ellis was 34 years old at this time) intellectual grasp of the Corps's Advanced Base Force mission, both Generals Barnett and later Lejeune did everything in their power to protect and extend Ellis's career, this despite his bouts with alcoholism and depression. This patronage would become a key factor after the World

\(^{33}\)Ibid.
\(^{34}\)Ibid.
War when both Barnett and Lejeune struggled to not only maintain the Marine Corps at proper manning levels but also to define that service's roles and missions as an integral part of the Navy. Ellis's abilities as a planner and theoretician as well as his fanatical belief that Japan would indeed be the next enemy carved out for the corps its raison d'être as a military force for the next three decades. Furthermore, Ellis's writings (while at the Naval War College and later at the Division of Operations and Training) became the basis for Lejeune's program of reform of the officer corps and the curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools (MCS) at Quantico. His studies, as well as the subsequent writing of the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934, became the basis upon which the Corps built its amphibious warfare doctrine. Ellis's writings achieved the status of official policy and doctrine, this despite the fact that he did not live to see the Corps mature into an amphibious assault force. The basis for the force that both Ellis and Dion Williams desired was, of course, the pre-World War Advanced Base Force of both fixed and mobile regiments. Having benefited from studies dating back to 1901, as well as the impetus from Captain Fullam's call for a permanent Marine expeditionary force, it is not surprising that the force envisioned and originally drawn up and organized by both men closely resembled the other's.

As above-mentioned, Major Williams' force of two regiments had been organized along the pattern established by a Naval War College study on personnel required for an Advanced Base Force. In a lecture delivered at the Naval War College on 14 January 1927, Colonel Robert H. Dunlap reiterated both Williams' and Ellis' prerequisites for a naval advanced base force in that there should be sufficient personnel:

1. To man the fortifications and accessories intended to resist attack from the sea.
2. To form a mobile force sufficient for the protection from attack by land. This force will, where possible, repulse any attempts by the enemy to land and if this be impossible endeavor to make the landing as costly as possible. To meet these requirements a fleet should be provided with two A.B. outfits,
one to reinforce the other when necessary or for the purpose of acquiring an addition of bases.\textsuperscript{35}

The estimated strength of this force was set at 2,093 officers and enlisted men "divided in proper proportion." Interestingly, Williams' estimates envisioned a force of 2,624 officers and enlisted men while Ellis' force came closer with a requirement of 2,400 officers and enlisted men.\textsuperscript{36} Where the divergence in plans takes place can be seen in both the Naval War College's and Williams' studies which had called for the creation of an advanced base force broken down into two separate forces -- a "fixed" or permanent base defense force and a ready mobile force to be used in the protection of the former's rear and flank areas. Ellis, on the other hand, called instead for the creation of units within the force dedicated "for a special type of operations as certain force will economically fit more than one set of conditions."\textsuperscript{37} Captain Ellis likewise warned against the breaking up or disturbing of such larger units since it could serve to disrupt the normal "arrangements for command." Supporting Ellis was another Lejeune protege.


and proponent of the Advanced Base Force mission, Colonel Robert H. "Hal" Dunlap. Dunlap's career paralleled that of both Williams and Ellis, and included assignments to the Advanced Base School and the Naval War College. During the World War, Dunlap served on Admiral Sims's staff, and assisted in the planning of a proposed amphibious operations along the Adriatic coastline in 1918. He also commanded the 17th U.S. Army Field Artillery Regiment in France during the last month of the World War. Colonel Dunlap possessed an intellect as sharp and as farsighted as that of Williams and Ellis, and had lectured and written extensively on the advanced base mission while at the Naval War College. In all of these lectures, he had "encouraged Headquarters [Marine Corps] to embrace the base seizure and defense mission." 38

Colonel Dunlap's study, The Naval Advanced Base, which was a compilation of lectures developed from a series of lectures given by Williams, Ellis, and himself, focused on both definition of an advanced naval base and the size and composition of the force necessary to defend and/or seize such a position during a naval campaign. In 1911, while Dunlap was an instructor at the Naval War College, he argued that in any naval campaign, it might be necessary to "... secure, when necessary, and then in the shortest possible time, a refuge for the train, thus leaving the fleet unhampered to seek the enemy." 39 While Dunlap's study suggested the necessity of a forcible base seizure, he went on to argue along the traditional lines that the landing would be a benign entry upon an uninhabited or undefended island that would then be developed as an advanced base, defended by a "fixed" and "mobile" force. Dunlap, like Ellis, wrote that such a base seizure would require a force between five to ten thousand Marines. In any event, Both Dunlap's and Ellis' advanced base force would require sufficient firepower for both the

39 Major Robert H. Dunlap, "The Naval Advanced Base," A Lecture delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1 July 1911, (Newport, RI, Naval War College Historical Collection, Archives of the U.S. Naval War College, Section 1, No. 72), p. 6.
defending and attacking force. This fact alone suggests that these early advocates for the creation of a base seizure force envisioned the necessity of landing a force ashore in a benign environment in order to establish an advanced base that would serve as fleet base in time of war. This base would be defended by a well-entrenched defense force and reinforced by a mobile expeditionary force. It was Earl H. Ellis who broke away from traditional thought and expounded upon the theme of base seizure against a defended advanced base held by an enemy force. Given the size and tactical organization of the Marine Corps prior to the World War, however, it seems unlikely that it could have successfully carried out an advanced base operation under fire without having incurred serious losses. Lacking sufficient training and the necessary firepower to land an expeditionary force ashore against a well-defended beachhead, the exercises the Marines held at Culebra in the winter of 1913-1914, were both unrealistic and conducted under artificial conditions that often "glossed over" mistakes and important lessons. Despite these mistakes, however, the British failure at Gallipoli in 1915, and Marine participation in the World War, served as the catalyst for the Marine Corps' future work in the development of amphibious base seizure, since the lessons learned from both events highlighted the fact that any attacking force would require firepower and mobility. These ideas were developed by Williams, Dunlap, and Ellis while at the Naval War College prior to the World War. They point to the fact that no one person can be considered as the "father of amphibious warfare," since, as we have seen above, the Corps' amphibious warfare doctrine had many proponents during the interwar era; each contributed in his own way to the theoretical background of what became the Fleet Marine Force in 1933.

Despite the fact that both Williams's and Ellis's studies called for the permanent garrisoning of this force at some "convenient and appropriate station," where access to the fleet was nearby, the latter's study called for not only the concentration of this force with the representative fleet, but also for the co-location of this force which would
permit "quick mobilization." Ellis also argued that the force should be afforded with adequate training facilities. He also wrote that this force should be stationed with all Marine Corps Schools in order that the men assigned to such duty could benefit from the latter, a point reinforced later by Robert Dunlap in his critique and recommendations after the 1925 Oahu maneuvers. In fact, at the conclusion of the World War, the Advanced Base Force, then headquartered at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, had moved to "Quantico . . . because of its greater facilities and better training areas . . .," and one might add, the home of the Marine Corps Schools.

While this move was undertaken more as a result of both budgetary and demobilization considerations, it could not have been lost on Ellis (now a major and a "favorite" of the base's commanding general, Major General Lejeune) that the Marine Corps now possessed the ideal location for the garrisoning of an expeditionary force. Thus, it was no accident that Quantico became not only the home of the East Coast Expeditionary Force during the 1920's and early 1930's, but also the site of the experimentation in advanced base force and later amphibious warfare developments. With the requisite force now collocated with both the Field Officer's and Company Officers courses, Marine theoreticians and training specialists had a force, even if that force were a skeletal one, present in order to conduct both theoretical and practical experimentation in force structure, operational and tactical concepts, and landing operations training.

Major General Lejeune's efforts at organizing an Advanced Base Force began taking shape shortly after he became the Major General Commandant in the late summer and early fall of 1920. At this time, elements of the 1st Marine Regiment transferred from the Philadelphia Navy Yard to Quantico "where training and schooling in the advanced base techniques continued."\textsuperscript{40} Becoming part of the 3d Brigade, the regiment began to take

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\textsuperscript{40}Lejeune, CMC Annual Report for 1920, p. 1069.
shape as a fully-fledged Advanced Base Force which consisted of four battalions organized into a "fixed" defense force of searchlight, engineer, signal, and antiaircraft, far short of what Barnett had envisioned, and spent the remainder of 1921 and all of 1922 engaged in extensive training. Due to the continuing shortage in manpower, due mainly to the Marine Corps's expeditionary commitments to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Headquarters disbanded the 3d Brigade, leaving only elements of the 5th and 10th Marines available for advanced base duty. Nonetheless, the Marines continued to participate in the annual exercises with the fleet, the first exercise taking place in the winter of 1923. These exercises continued through the Oahu maneuvers of 1925, when manpower constraints and budgetary shortfalls derailed the momentum the Marines were able to gain in refining the advanced base concepts. In fact, budgetary and manpower constraints curtailed the Corps's participation in these annual fleet exercises until 1931, when Marines were again free of both their China and Nicaraguan commitments.

While falling short in maintaining sufficient manpower and adequate budgets, Major General Lejeune did succeed in securing a wartime role for the Marine Corps from both the Joint Army-Navy Board (1920) and later from the Navy (1922), through the codification of its Advanced Base Force. In Lejeune was able to solidify the Marine Corps's position within the Navy through his intense lobbying efforts before the House Naval Affairs Committee, and with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. His lobbying efforts payed off with the issuance on 1 December 1922, of the Navy's Advanced Base Force policy. This policy specified that the general naval policy of the United States required the maintenance of:

. . . . a Marine Corps of such strength that it will be able to adequately support support the Navy by furnishing detachments to vessels of the Fleet in full commission, guards for shore stations, garrisons for outlying positions; and by the main-
tenance of an Expeditionary Force.\textsuperscript{41}

The Major General Commandant further advanced his vision of an Marine expeditionary force in a report dated 5 January 1925, where he wrote that "the Marine Corps could only execute such a policy if and when Congress granted him permission to institute a series of reforms such as officer retention and promotion by selection, a flexible and more permanent organization, unity of command, and the ability of the Marine Corps to participate in the annual maneuvers of the Fleet overseas; and by continuous training at the bases for such Marine Expeditionary Forces at Quantico, Va., and San Diego, Ca."\textsuperscript{42} General Lejeune likewise foresaw the possibility that prior to any advanced base mission, the Marine Corps might be required to capture an enemy base or deny the enemy "suitable sites for the location of such bases," thus making it absolutely necessary that the Marine Expeditionary Forces be "organized, equipped, and trained with this purpose in view.\textsuperscript{43}

Despite Lejeune's admission that the base seizure missions were part of the Advanced Base Force mission, and that Marine Expeditionary Forces be equipped and trained for such base seizure missions, there was little difference in the advanced base force mission of 1922 from its pre-World War predecessor. Given the reluctance of the senior leadership of the Corps to give up its traditional duties at sea and ashore, its ongoing commitments in Hispaniola and China (1923), as well as the country's self-imposed

\textsuperscript{41}As quoted by Major General John A. Lejeune, For A Report to the Special Board on Policy, General Board of the Navy, "Advanced Bases Including Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces for Shore Operations Essential to the Prosecution of the Naval Campaign," dtd. 5 January 1925, (Washington D.C., History and Museums Division, History and Museums Division, Reference Section, Advanced Base Force Folder, No. 1, 1900-1940), p. 1.
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
isolationism and austere military budgets there is little wonder why Headquarters made little movement toward organizing a permanent expeditionary force at Quantico.

There was, in fact, little differences between the pre-war advanced base force with that of the East Coast Expeditionary Force. The only difference that separated the two forces was that the East Coast Expeditionary Force had considerably more firepower and a recognized mission in national defense. Nonetheless, there was a painful recognition among senior Marine leaders that until the budgetary and manpower were overcome, little progress could be made in building an expeditionary force in readiness; this point Major General Lejeune reiterated repeatedly in testimony before Congress throughout his tenure as the Corps's senior leader.

Despite the shortfall in both manpower and funds Lejeune concentrated his efforts at two vitally important areas as he moved the Marine Corps toward an even greater preparedness than did his predecessors during the interwar period. These areas of course were in the fields of the Marine Corps Reserves and aviation.

The Marine Corps Reserves

The World War provided the impetus for the creation of a permanent Marine Corps Reserve. Prior to the Marine Corps' involvement in that conflict, there was no Marine Reserve in existence; the bulk of men such as Second Lieutenant Edward A. Craig, Graves B. Erskine, and others had been recruited from the various state naval militia units and the Army National Guard. For the Marine Corps, the term "reserve," had, in fact, originated from a legal category provided by the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916, which allowed the Marine Corps to exceed its regular and wartime manpower ceilings. In order to meet the immediate emergency, Headquarters established the category of "duration of war" and accommodated the thousands of young men who flooded into recruiting offices hoping to serve in Europe. The intent was that as soon as the war concluded, these men would be immediately discharged either upon request or
through demobilization. However, as Major General Lejeune repeatedly pointed out to congressional committees and staff members, they would provide a readily trained pool of experienced Marines if war once again broke out somewhere.

From the correspondence that came out of Headquarters, it appears that the Marine Corps adopted the term "reserve" with the intention that many of these "duration of war" Marines and former naval militiamen could remain, by the terms of Naval Appropriations Act of 29 August 1916 and the Navy Department’s General Order 231, issued two days later on 31 August, in an inactive status regardless of budgetary and manpower considerations. When this did not occur, the Major General Commandant sought to resurrect the Reserves through legislation, as he was pressed by even deeper cuts in manpower and training budgets, and by commitments in Hispaniola, China, and in guarding the U.S. Mail. The Reserves would allow for a sufficient number of Marines for either expeditionary duty or wartime contingencies (i.e., War Plan Orange).

According to Lieutenant General Craig, creating a viable Marine Corps Reserve was one of Major General Lejeune's primary goals during his tenure as Commandant, though, as the records indicate, the move toward a more permanent reserve began during the waning days of the Barnett commandancy. In a staff memorandum to General Barnett, the effectiveness and necessity of a strong Marine Corps Reserve had been pointed out to the Commandant. This memorandum recapitulated the "very efficient and useful service" the reserves had provided for the small active Marine Corps. Among the reasons cited for the necessity of a viable reserve force, the memorandum pointed to the simple fact that recruitment for the reserves had allowed the Marine Corps to keep its recruiting offices open even after recruiters had filled the Regular quotas to the


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authorized strength. In effect, "size and composition of the Reserves were moot questions." As above-mentioned, Headquarters desired to retain those men who had desired to retain an affiliation with the Marine Corps and not simply those who had fallen on hard times. As a rule recruiters stressed "quality rather than quantity," though this too was often ignored in order to fill quotas. Furthermore, as budgets tightened and the with the occurrence of demobilization, which reduced the manpower and number ships afloat and under construction (and hence the an accompanying Marine detachment), and the economic boom that soon consumed the minds of those young men who might have considered enlisting in the military, both active and reserve strength began to drastically fall. At one point, in order to meet the Corps' authorized strength, General Barnett petitioned Secretary Daniels for permission to recall 1,000 Marine Reservists, a request the navy secretary promptly denied.

The overall effect of Daniels' refusal to use the reserves was, as one could imagine, devastating to Barnett's and later Lejeune's plans to revitalize the Marine Corps and, more specifically, provide an expeditionary force for both coasts in order to participate with the fleets in any Pacific Ocean war scenario. By 21 September 1921, the Marine Corps Reserve (inactive) had on its rolls 555 officers and 4,068 enlisted men, many of whose enlistments were about to expire. In fact, a Headquarters memorandum stated that:

\[\ldots\] one-half of the enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve will be discharged upon expiration of enrollments by April 1, 1922 unless new enrollments or reenrollments offset the losses, which is not expected unless a drive for new recruits is made. There have been 88 enrollments during the present calendar year.

\[\text{\textit{Marine Corps Reserve: A History, p. 22.}}\]
\[\text{\textit{Ibid.}}\]
While part of the problem for this lack of enlistments in either the active or regular forces remained in the unattractiveness of military life and the low pay as compared to a civilian employer, Headquarters can take some of the blame since its administration and lack of organization of the Reserve program lacked guidance and direction. While Major General Lejeune had hoped to build a viable Reserve force, the simple fact remained that recruiters placed more emphasis on attracting volunteers for the active force. Headquarters did not have an office dedicated to reserve affairs until 1925, five years into Lejeune's commandancy. Headquarters lumped Regular and Reserve affairs together with the latter receiving the lesser amount of emphasis and funding; the result was an under-officered and under-manned enlisted reserve force that was incapable of augmenting the Regulars in the unlikely event war in the immediate future.

Another problem in building a strong Marine Corps Reserve was the continued "existence of Marine Corps companies attached to the Naval Militia." The fact that members of this reserve force could enroll both in the Naval Militia and Marine Corps Reserve frustrated attempts by Headquarters to consolidate all Marine reservists under its command. In short, the Naval Militia's dual enlistment policy meant that by 30 June 1922, the Marine Corps could claim only 446 officers and 110 enlisted men on its reserve musters, with six officers undergoing training at Quantico. Headquarters estimated that since the Armistice of 11 November 1918, eighty-seven percent of its officers and ninety percent of its enlisted men had been discharged, leaving by the end of fiscal 1922 (then 30 June) an end strength that barely met the requirements in time of war. This figure alone pointed toward the need for a viable Marine Corps Reserve.

It was at this point that Lejeune attempted to correct the problems of low enlistment in the Reserves. As the reports below indicate, the downward trend began to slowly
reverse itself when Headquarters reported that the Reserves had 136 officers and 443 enlisted men on its muster rolls at the end of Fiscal Year 1923. By the following year, there was a gain of 1 officer and 61 enlisted men, which brought the total strength of the Reserves to 137 officers and 502 enlisted men.48 Through an intense lobbying campaign by Major General Lejeune and other officials at Headquarters, Congress passed on 28 February 1925 an "Act to Provide for the Creation, Organization, Administration, and Maintenance of Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve." This act had an immediate, favorable impact on the growth of the Marine Corps Reserve, and Lejeune's efforts toward the creation of a viable pool of manpower were eventually vindicated as the Marine Corps headed into war fifteen years later. The beneficial results that the Reserve Act would have on the Corps can be seen in a letter Lejeune addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb, where he stated quite frankly that the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Bill before the Senate:

... contains a much-needed reorganization of the Reserve, and has an especially desirable feature in that it makes special provision for the enrollment in the Reserve of men who have served one or more enlistments, and granting them sufficient compensation to make it feasible, I believe, to persuade a very large portion of them to enroll. If it succeeds in the purpose intended, this would give us eight to ten thousand trained men in the Reserve who could be called back to the Corps in the event of a serious emergency.49

The Act, which became effective 1 July 1925 divided the Marine Corps Reserve into two distinct categories -- The Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR) and the Volunteer Marine Corps, Reserve (VMCR). The act likewise abolished the separate Marine Corps Reserves. The new law, unlike its predecessor which passed in 1916, put the new

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49See Lejeune to Holcomb, dtd. 28 June 1925, loc.cit. p. 2.
Reserve structure on an co-equal basis with its active duty counterpart. Specifically, the Act provided for:

(a) The commissioning of officers during the pleasure of the President instead of for a period of four years.
(b) The authority to commission a limited number of officers in grades up to brigadier general.
(c) The appointment of 25 men to the Naval Academy each year from the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve.
(d) The payment of drill pay for actual services rendered on a basis similar to that provided for the National Guard, in lieu of retainer pay.
(e) A liberal uniform allowance for the Fleet Reserve.
(f) Transfer to an honorary retired list without pay upon reaching the age of 64, after completing 25 years of service or if found physically unqualified.
(g) Reservation of the benefits of continuous service to men enlisting in the Reserve within 3 months of discharge from the Navy and the Marine Corps.
(h) Safeguarding of the interest of transferred members of the Fleet Naval Reserve and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.
(i) Authorization of military leave for officers and employees of the United States during absence while performing military duty.
(j) Establishment of classes of Reserves including a Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve.
(k) Authorization of subsistence for weekend cruises; and:
(l) Extension of the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act to members of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve injured in the line of duty.\textsuperscript{50}

The Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR) became, in effect, the "backbone" of the Marine Corps' Reserve structure. Divided into companies of 2 officers and 45 enlisted men each, the FMCR afforded qualified men to retain their affiliation with the Marine Corps while getting paid for performing military duty.

Theoretically, the most important aspect of this bill was the creation of a pool of manpower that Headquarters could draw upon when war came. While the FMCR allowed those who desired to actively participate with the Regular Marine Corps, the

\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Marine Corps Reserve: A History}, pp. 25-6.

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VMCR, which was largely a paper organization, provided a limited number of officers and enlisted men to the active duty Marine Corps when openings occurred or a particular military occupation skill was in demand. The act provided for the administration of the reserves by demarcating the country into four Reserve Districts which Headquarters tied directly to a Regular Marine recruiting region and which contained both FMCR and VMCR units. The commanding officer of each recruiting division had co-equal command responsibilities in each of the four Reserve districts. Broken down by geographic region, the Reserve districts included:

(a) The Eastern Reserve Area- with its headquarters at Philadelphia; the 7th Regiment, with headquarters at New York City; the 8th Regiment (less one battalion), with headquarters at Philadelphia; and an Marine Observation Plane Squadron (V.O.); and a casual company, both with headquarters at Philadelphia.

(b) Southern Reserve Area- with its headquarters at New Orleans; the 3d Battalion of the 8th Regiment; a Fighter plane Squadron (V.F.); and a casual company, all with headquarters at New Orleans.

(c) Central Reserve Area- with its headquarters at Chicago; the 9th Regiment; an Observation Plane Squadron (V.O.), and a casual company, all with headquarters at Chicago.

(d) Western Reserve Area- with headquarters at San Francisco; the 3d Regiment; an Observation Squadron (V.O.), and a casual company, all with headquarters at San Francisco. (See Map #1)

A point further clarified by the Reserve Bill was the status of the FMCR. Unlike the VMCR, which could be called out only during time of war or national emergency, the FMCR could be used to augment the Regular Marine Corps. Members of the FMCR

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attended regularly-scheduled drills (weekly or monthly), and an annual two-week summer camp. In order to better administer the Reserves the act provided for the assignment of two regular officers to each regiment, one a commanding officer and the other a staff officer. One last provision of this bill that greatly assisted in the establishment of the Marine Corps Reserves was the creation of the Office of Reserve Affairs, concentrated in a single agency. Under the direction of the Major General Commandant, this office prepared and distributed the Reserves' budget, procured equipment, established instruction and training, and handled disciplinary procedures.\textsuperscript{52} The officer in charge of the Reserves, usually a Major General, though more often or not was a brigadier general, had direct access to the Commandant for \textit{all} Reserve affairs. This latter provision did not come into effect until 1928 with the appointment of Major General Ben H. Fuller as Officer in Charge, Marine Corps Reserve.

The Reserve Act had an immediate, beneficial impact upon the Corps's strength: 100 officers and 2,671 enlisted men joined the Marine Corps Reserves (both FMCR and VMCR).\textsuperscript{53} For the FMCR, the results were immediate, evidenced by the authorization for Headquarters to organize three rifle companies in Saginaw, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; and Brooklyn, New York; positive results were additionally suggested by requests from other officers to begin organizing their own companies. For the VMCR, the bill provided an opportunity for those Marines (officer and enlisted) in good standing to enroll in the VMCR for four years with the inducement of $25 per annum. While they were to perform no drills or active duty, Headquarters required them to report any change of address in case of mobilization. If at a later date they chose to return to the Regular Marine Corps, there would be no break in service or benefits. In short, Headquarters would retain these discharged Marines at least in an inactive status while at

\textsuperscript{52}Marine Corps Reserve: \textit{A History}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid, p. 25.
the same time building up a reserve of trained manpower in case of war. Major General Lejeune emphasized this latter point when he wrote that, "Under this new reserve bill the corps has the opportunity to build up a real reserve, so that in the event of an emergency, we shall be able to get the necessary officers and men to put the Marine Corps on an emergency footing." The Commandant had hoped that with the passage of this bill the "corps should be able to have a reserve of 10,000 men of this class in a few years."

One critical omission in this reserve bill was, however, the ability of Headquarters to test the call up system by a series of mobilization drills. Having names on muster rolls is one thing; having a means of testing its viability is another -- a notable omission to an otherwise fine piece of legislation. Whether or not Lejeune and his successors ever thought about this is unknown, but what is known is that the country's isolationist stance negated any serious attempt at testing this new system which, even if not needed at the time, would provide the basis for expansion when war came. In testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee in February 1921, prior to the beginning of Fiscal Year 1922, Lejeune reiterated the importance of building up a reserve force of sufficient size and how that force would be used in case of war. He stressed to the representatives on the committee the simple fact that the Marine Corps did not have enough men, active or reserve, to carry out even the minimum requirements of a naval campaign. In fact, he emphasized the point that in order to meet present requirements, he was already stripping navy yards and stations of their Marine guards and intended to use any increase in the reserves to augment these posts. Nonetheless, from both Lejeune's testimony and his annual reports, one can see that no substantial increase took place in the reserves until the passage of the Reserve Act on 28 February 1925.

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54 *CMC Annual Report for 1925*, p. 1224.
55 Ibid.
In sum, only through Major General Lejeune's persistence in his attempt to build a credible Reserve did the Marine Corps begin to reverse the decline in available, trained manpower. While the Commandant succeeded in securing passage of this act from a friendly Congress, this did not ensure the creation of a combat ready reserve force. In fact, many Reserve units existed only on paper with the emphasis in recruiting remaining on the active forces. Nonetheless, as Headquarters began paying more attention to the needs of the Reserves, such as through the establishment of an Reserve Section at Headquarters, the downward spiral seemed to have been at least temporarily halted. Despite this, however, the Reserves remained at the bottom of the list when it came to appropriations requests, and as the budgets grew tighter, they had minimal financial assets available to conduct the type of training necessary to hone combat skills or keep abreast of military developments.

To his credit, Major General Lejeune managed to establish the Reserves on both a permanent and legal basis with a real wartime mission. Legislatively, the Major General Commandant reported in his annual report of 30 September 1925:

Under this new Reserve bill, the Corps has the opportunity to build up a real Reserve so that in the event of an emergency we shall be able to get the necessary officers and men to put the Marine Corps on an emergency footing. With this in view, enrollment for the Reserves commenced . . .

Regarding a wartime mission, Lejeune noted in his report of 24 September 1926 that the Marine Corps Reserve was to provide:

a trained force of officers and men available to serve as reinforcements to the Regular Marine Corps in time of War or national emergency. To make

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56Ibid, p. 1224.
it possible to carry out this mission, it is absolutely necessary that there be in the Marine Corps prior to the emergency an adequate and well trained Reserve.57

As the 1920s progressed, Major General Lejeune's legislative efforts began paying off with annual increase of ten percent up through 1929. Table 5.2. illustrates this latter point for the years 1927 and 1928 respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FMCR</th>
<th>VMCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927 . . . .</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>3,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 . . . .</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>3,495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2
Marine Corps Reserves, 1927-28

Despite this growth, however, the Reserves remained low on Headquarters' priority list, as the Regular Marine Corps consumed most of the budgets for the remainder of the decade and into the 1930's. Brigadier General Dion Williams identified one other problem which had a direct impact on the organization of a strong Marine Corps Reserve; this concerned training and the maintenance of combat skills. As Williams noted in an article in the Marine Corps Gazette (December 1925):

When the men are discharged and transferred to the reserve they are thoroughly trained and ready for service, but as time passes they will naturally become somewhat rusty in their drills and less capable of taking up again their duties in the various arms of the service in which they have served during their active service. To meet this condition it is proposed to encourage the organization of companies and battalions, and ultimately regiments, of reserves who will by regular drills and training periods keep up their knowledge of the different

57Lejeune, CMC Annual Report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1926. p. 1228.
duties. This presents a large problem in training which will have to be met if the reserve system is to fully meet its objects.\textsuperscript{59}

Williams' article raised perhaps the more important organization and training issues, ones with which Major General Lejeune was hardly concerned and which he rarely mentioned in his annual reports or concerned himself with as he struggled to keep the Corps afloat in the mid-1920's. Creating a reserve system is one thing; training and maintaining the skills of those Marines is another, more important issue. Headquarters confronted this problem as it struggled to maintain both an active and reserve force in face of the tightening budgets that characterized the mid-to late-1920s. Through sheer persistence by Major General Lejeune and the recently-founded Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association or MCROA, founded in 1926 by Congressman Melvin J. Maas, himself a Marine Reserve officer, the Marine Corps Reserve system prospered and grew, albeit it at a snail's pace during the 1920's and 1930's. As for the institution of a viable Reserve training program, it was only through the efforts of MCROA and officers such as Congressman Maas and Brigadier General Williams and Congressman Maas, that Headquarters began to allot funds and resources for a realistic training program for the FMCR as well in securing appropriations for this training program from Congress. In time, the Marine Reserves began receiving increased funding on an annual basis from a Congress that had become more inclined to cut rather than increase military spending.\textsuperscript{60} As the Reserves grew in size and appropriations increased, both the FMCR and VMCR became crucial to the combat efficiency and effectiveness of the Regular Marine Corps. The reorganized Marine Reserves in the 1920's included infantry companies, artillery batteries, and the newest addition -- aviation squadrons. In time, Marine reservists

\textsuperscript{59}Brigadier General Dion Williams, "Marine Corps Training," \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, 10 (December 1925), p. 145.

trained and sweated alongside their regular counterparts at Quantico, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, and eventually Marine Barracks, New River, North Carolina (later Camp Lejeune). Furthermore, with the introduction of improved and standardized training methods, as well as financial incentives, some Marine reservists became as proficient in the use of combined arms and air combat as did Regular Marines.
CHAPTER 6

"THE AMPHIBIOUS EAGLES: AVIATION COMES OF AGE
1919-1925"

Introduction

Marine Aviation came into its own during the interwar era, largely as a result of its "baptism" of fire during the World War. Under the leadership of Majors Alfred A. Cunningham and Bernard L. Smith, Marine aviators made a small but noteworthy contribution to the allied air effort during the war. While Marine pilots scanned the ocean in search of enemy submarines off the Azores, other leatherneck flyers bombed German submarine pens along the Atlantic coast, resupplied troops by air, fought German pilots in aerial combat, and strafed enemy troop positions over the charred battlefields of Belgium and France. At the conclusion of the war, however, like its counterpart on the ground, aviation likewise suffered from demobilization. Nonetheless, aviators did not look back at past accomplishments but instead looked ahead to a future to the day when Marine aviation would have a permanent role in the mission of the Marine Corps. During Major General Lejeune's two tours as Commandant, aviation would indeed become a permanent part of the East Coast Expeditionary Force, and as an equal partner on the budding combined arms team, then in its embryonic stage of development. This chapter will briefly examine the struggle endured by aviators in the immediate postwar era as they attempted to convince not only a skeptical Navy leadership, but also their own senior leaders of the inherent value of Marine aviation as both funds and manpower dried up in the postwar rush to demobilize.
Aviation

The last segment of Major General Lejeune's program of increasing the readiness of the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force during his first term as the Major General Commandant concerned itself with the role of Marine Aviation. Aviation, like the Marine Corps Reserve, came into its own during the World War. Marine pilots and ground crewmen, as part of both the Northern Bombing Group (formed in June 1918) and the First Marine Aeronautic Company (formed in October 1917), participated along with naval aviators in France and England in daytime anti-submarine patrols in the English Channel, along the Atlantic coastline, and off the Azores. Though they arrived in France as the fighting reached its climax in mid-June 1918, Marine aviators of the Northern Bombing Group acquitted themselves well in joint operations with the British and French, conducting reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and resupply operations. These aviators "produced some notable Marine achievements," despite the fact that they had been in France only five months before the Armistice.1

Despite the rush to demobilize, Marine aviation continued to grow. By April 1919 the strength of Marine aviation included 120 active pilots and 1,200 enlisted personnel, a notable achievement when one considers that, prior to the war, there were 5 officers and 30 enlisted men.2 Demobilization did have an impact on the strength of Marine aviation as pilots left the Corps at the conclusion of hostilities. Major General Lejeune, a strong advocate of Marine aviation who had hoped to build a strong nucleus of experienced Marine aviators, attempted to attract potential candidates from the ranks of the newly-commissioned lieutenants. In Marine Corps Order No. 8, Series 1921, Marine aviation

2Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 23.
had been authorized to have six field officers, sixteen captains, and seventy-nine
lieutenant, all of whom were to be qualified pilots. With only a third of the authorized
strength on duty (thirty-five officers), Lejeune sought to fill sixty-six vacancies through a
series of inducements aimed primarily at attracting suitable flying candidates from the
ranks of first and second lieutenants. By 1922, the situation had changed only slightly;
with forty-five officers on duty with Marine air squadrons (still far below the numbers
authorized or desired).\(^3\)

Despite the shortage and temporary loss of qualified applicants caused by the rush to
demobilize, Marine aviators had nonetheless firmly established themselves as an integral
part of the Marine Corps. Headquarters managed, despite the cutbacks that affected the
Marine Corps as a whole in terms of both manpower and training, to maintain its air arm
even though it failed to meet even its minimal authorized strength. On 25 September
1919, Headquarters closed the Marine flying field at Miami and transferred its two
remaining squadrons to Parris Island and Quantico in an attempt to consolidate its air
activities with that of other Marine activities. In addressing the shortages of trained pilots
(and experienced ground crews) and in consolidating its air assets at home and abroad,
Headquarters thus began shaping the postwar structure of Marine Corps aviation with a
view toward the Corps' expeditionary missions in Hispaniola and Central America, but in
order to better integrate Marine air with that of the Commandant's expeditionary force-
in- readiness which included this new part of the Marine Corps. The organizational and

\(^3\)Johnson and Cosmas, *Marine Aviation: The Early Years*, p. 35; Lejeune, Annual
Report for 1922, pp. 828-9; See na., Memorandum for Colonel Mueller," dtd. 31 March
1952," p. 1; Lieutenant Colonel T. C. Turner, Officer in Charge, Aviation, ltr. to Major
General Commandant, dtd. 10 October 1921, Subj: "Tables of Organization for Marine
Corps Aviation," both in the Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Cunningham, USMC Papers,
(Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, PC#459, Box 3B32,
Aviation: Organization Folder, dtd. 1914-1940, now located Quantico, VA., MCU
Archives, MCCDC).
manpower changes made in this "formative period" (immediately after Lejeune assumed the helm as Major General Commandant) shaped Marine Corps aviation for the next two decades.⁴

In its attempts to coordinate and administer its air arm, Headquarters appointed Major Alfred A. Cunningham, the senior Marine aviator and one of the pioneers of Marine air as the Officer-in-Charge of the Marine section of naval aviation. He served in this capacity until the end of 1920. During this period Marine aviation was administered by the Director of Naval Aviation (later the Bureau of Aviation or BuAir) and thus served "two masters," the first being the Office of the Major General Commandant and the other the Chief of Naval Operations. The Marine section of naval aviation supervised recruiting, training, and personnel matters that pertained to aviation and had "cognizance over requests from Marine aviation units for both aviation and Marine Corps supplies and materials."⁵ It was nominally responsible to the Major General Commandant, but remained directly under the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, who oversaw all Marine activities on land and in the air. From its very inception, Marine aviation remained under this dual system of command with the Marine section of naval aviation and served as a:

... closely connecting link between the Major General Commandant's office, and the Director of Naval Aviation regarding purely aviation matters and handles all Marine Corps matter which refer to aviation. This arrangement

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is working very satisfactorily and it is recommended that it remain in force in the new proposed Bureau of Aviation . . . 6

Because Marine aviation remained closely linked with that of Naval Aviation in terms of providing aircraft, supplies, and training facilities, the duality of its command arrangement was both logical and necessary in the development of amphibious assault. As has been mentioned above, Major General Lejeune and other Marine officers recognized the need for the Corps as a whole to identify itself more closely to that of the Navy. This identification came naturally in the development of naval aviation before, during and after the World War. Thus, the appointment of a Marine Corps officer to the Bureau of Aviation, while not a recognition of independence by the naval hierarchy, remained a significant step, toward the evolution of the Corps as an important element in the projection of naval power. In a move that allowed the newly-created Bureau of Naval Aviation to retain control over Marine aviation while allowing Marines to train and administer its own aviation force, the director of Naval Aviation recommended that "one member of the Planning Board of the new Bureau [Air] be a Marine officer." This recognition was significant but unfortunately did not filter over to development of amphibious warfare, and in particular over the command relationships during an amphibious operation. 7

Headquarters' emphasis on reorganizing itself as a whole in order to facilitate its continued modernization during the postwar period likewise affected Marine Aviation. Commensurate with the reorganization of the Marine Corps's ground tables of organization (based on that of the U.S. Army), Lejeune approved air tables of organization that "provided for aircraft 'wings', each if which was to be composed of

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6Ibid.
7Ibid, pp. 6-7.
two to four squadrons, which in turn were divided into flights.\(^8\) This reorganization of Marine aviation formed existing personnel and aircraft into four squadrons, with two based in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and the other two based at Quantico and the Marine Flying Field at Parris Island. With this realignment of Marine aviation came the redesignation of units and the transfer of men and equipment to fulfill operational requirements and deployments. Such was the case with the aviation units based at Parris Island, which Headquarters shortly thereafter transferred to the island of Guam. Many times these changes came as a result of the "growing specialization and sophistication in military aviation."\(^9\) Along with the obvious benefits of more manpower and operational efficiency the reorganization and redesignation of Marine Aviation brought with it the material advantages of greater financial resources and assurances that, while manpower and funds may be cut, they would never be totally abolished. The reorganization of Marine Aviation promulgated by Major General Lejeune on 30 October 1920 afforded the Marine Corps a much more flexible, tactically and operationally sound adjunct to the ground element, and established a definite table of organization that could be expanded upon in time of war.

**Marine Aviation Leadership**

The most significant reorganization of Marine Aviation, however, occurred within its leadership. As a result of the reorganization undertaken by Major General Lejeune and the creation of the Division of Operations and Training in the fall of 1920, the aviation section was to oversee the day-to-day administration of personnel and training and direct the joint training of aviation and ground forces. With Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters and the placement of the Aviation Section under the direct supervision of the Office of the Commandant, it was been hoped that closer ties between Marine

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\(^8\)Ibid, pp. 8-9.
\(^9\)Johnson and Cosmas, *Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years*, p. 32.
Aviation and the ground elements would occur, though this remained as elusive a goal as did the relationship between the Staff and Line prior to the World War. In fact, the "effectiveness of the arrangement depended heavily on the interest in Aviation of the Directors of Operations and Training," and with none forthcoming, the relationship between the Corps' air and ground elements remained professional though tense as both competed for the same scarce personnel (primarily officers) and money.\(^\text{10}\)

To head this new section at Headquarters, the Major General Commandant selected Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Turner, who like Major Cunningham had been involved with Marine aviation since its inception in 1912. Notwithstanding the personal rivalry between the two Marine aviators, Lejeune's appointment of Turner (a friend and senior to Cunningham in rank) as head of the Aviation Section on 1 December 1919 reflected the growing importance the Commandant attached to this new arm in the Marine Corps, and its importance to the Corps' mission as an advanced base expeditionary force.

The significance Lejeune, Lieutenant Colonel Turner, and Major Cunningham placed upon aviation is perhaps best summarized in an article written by Cunningham in which he attempted to not only justify this new arm in the Marine Corps but also, like those advocates in the Army Air Service (soon to be Corps), sought to direct it toward a specific mission. Cunningham's article, "Value of Aviation to the Marine Corps," published in the Marine Corps Gazette, outlined what later became the primary role of Marine pilots: to support for troops on the ground. The "father" of Marine Corps aviation specifically identified those areas where air assets could be best employed:

(a) Locating large bodies of the enemy and communicate instantly with headquarters their approximate strength, location, disposition, and actions.
(b) Photographs enemy defenses, proposed battle terrain, or any other

\(^{10}\)Ibid, p. 30.
object or area of reasonable size within fifty miles, can be taken, processed, and delivered to troops in a timely manner for them to be used in the offense or defense.

(c) As aerial reconnaissance assets operating continuously and in constant contact with headquarters.

(d) By bombing and strafing enemy troops in order to prevent or break up an attack.

(e) Bombing and strafing of enemy troop concentrations in the rear, as well as civilians in order to demoralize them; enemy ammunition and supply depots.

(f) Any railways, bridges, and roads to and from the enemy's front lines or make them impassable.

(g) Transporting friendly troops and officers to critical areas in an emergency.

(h) Aircraft can operate in those areas otherwise believed to be impenetrable.

(i) Planes can keep headquarters informed of friendly troop dispositions,

(j) Protecting troops from observation and harassment by enemy planes.

(k) Observation for artillery spotting and in locating difficult targets; shell bursts and types of shells to be utilized; photographing of targets and battle damage assessment. Correction of fire; and night firing by dropping flares.¹¹

Many of the roles outlined by Major Cunningham regarding Marine aviation were already being performed by Marine pilots prior to the war, during the World War, and immediately after the armistice in Hispaniola. However, some of his ideas, such as troop transport and effective air-to-ground/ground-to-air communications, had to wait several years for the technological advancements that slowly gave aircraft the above-desired capabilities toward the end of the 1920's and into the 1930's.

Major Cunningham likewise outlined the naval aspect of where Marine aviation could augment the Navy's air arm. These included: (1) offshore patrolling to prevent surprise raids by enemy light forces; (2) anti-submarine patrolling; (3) charting mine fields, countermining, and mine sweeping; (4) communication platforms for shore-to-ship

and; (5) photographing, bombing, and torpedoing enemy craft and bases within reach.\textsuperscript{12}

One last aspect in the use of aircraft is one in which Marines were already enjoying considerable success even as Cunningham put pen to paper; and that of course was in combating guerrillas in Hispaniola. Cunningham reiterated the Commandant's sentiments when he described the support Marine aviators provided their own and native forces in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Marine aircraft had been providing other means of support besides acting as a flying machine gun platforms. The Marine aircraft squadron in Haiti conducted an aerial survey and mapping of that country's coastline and interior of the country which benefited Marines generations later. As far as the Dominican Republic was concerned, both Lejeune and Cunningham (who had been reassigned to the Dominican Republic in December 1920) specifically mentioned the fact that Marine air units were undertaking "offensive air operations in conjunction and in cooperation with operating forces on the land."\textsuperscript{13} This use of airpower by Marines became standard practice over time.

Furthermore, the intervention in the Caribbean and Central America after the World War provided a test bed for a generation of senior Marine aviators who would lead the Marine Corps into the Second World War. This applies particularly with regards to the concepts of close air support, ground-to-air communications, aerial resupply and evacuation, with perhaps the most important being the construction of temporary airstrips located in impenetrable jungles. Despite the rapid demobilization of Marine forces at the conclusion of the World War and the attempted repudiation of the Wilson era of intervention in these regions, the maintenance of forces in Hispaniola and Central America provided Marines with the opportunity to train and experiment under combat conditions, particularly in the areas of infantry tactics and the coordinated operation of

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid, pp. 230-1; Lejeune, \textit{CMC Annual Report for 1920}, p. 1062.
air and ground units. Furthermore, until the Marines withdrew from the Caribbean and Central America (from Nicaragua in 1933 and Haiti in 1934), senior Marine officers including Major General Lejeune, Brigadier General Butler, Major Cunningham, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley saw the advantages in these interventions. These advantages were ones in which peacetime rarely offered, and those were, of course, the opportunity to train and test new weapons and operational concepts under field conditions. In the 1920's and into the 1930's, article after article in the *Marine Corps Gazette* and lectures in the classrooms at Quantico revealed an extremely vocal constituency of Marine officers who saw the Marine Corps as an expeditionary constabulary force. This vision was often referred to as the "Brigadier General L.W.T. Waller-Smedley D. Butler" or "Butler-L. B. Puller" school of thought. The main proponents of this school included the likes of Generals L.W.T. Waller, Smedley Butler, Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, Samuel M. Harrington, and Colonel Harold H. Utley, who saw the Corps's future tied to combating guerrillas as a constabulary force. These and other officers saw involvement in the World War as an aberration, not to be repeated again. Many in this school saw aircraft as having a vital combat and humanitarian role; as Major Cunningham wrote, "We must not overlook the valuable assistance aviation can render in this kind of fighting or fail to realize its many helpful possibilities in the occupation of such territories whether fighting is in progress or not."\(^{14}\) Lieutenant Colonel Turner merely reiterated his predecessor's vision of the role of Marine air when he stated that Marine aviators rendered "vital assistance to the well-being of the troops and the population," in these "small wars" in which Marines found themselves frequently employed in during the 1920's and 1930's.\(^ {15}\)

\(^{15}\)Ibid: Johnson and Cosmas, *Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years*, pp. 49-54.
Despite their advocacy of using Marine air assets in the counterguerrilla role, Major Cunningham remained a staunch advocate in the use aviation in support of advanced base and expeditionary operations. In testimony before a group of senior naval officers regarding the further development of naval aviation, Cunningham stressed the point that Marine aviation existed solely to "furnish the air force required for operating with the advanced base and expeditionary forces and to furnish the air defense for naval bases, the land defense of which is assigned to the Marine Corps."16 In this same testimony, Cunningham once again emphasized the close relationship between Marines on the ground and in the air by urging the stationing of Marine Aviation forces along with Marine advanced base outfits. He pushed for "an air force in connection with the land force defending that place, so they would be entirely familiar with the surrounding country and so they would have practice in carrying out in peace time operations and training at that particular place in cooperation with the troops on the ground." Cunningham also stressed that this last fact necessitated the tactical as opposed to the technical training of Marine aviators. This he stated included:

... training by organizations to cooperate in problems met with in advanced base and expeditionary force duty, spotting for fixed guns, training troops they are going to work with, and in the problems these troops will have to work out. To sum it up, it requires very little technical training, that they don't get in the Navy schools. It requires some tactical training, which should be done in connection with the force or rather under the supervision of the commander of the forces they are intended to operate with.17

Cunningham's testimony clearly illustrates the development of Marine air during the interwar period, which was more the proverbial "seat of the pants flying" which pioneered many of the techniques of close air support later taught Marine officers in the

classrooms at Quantico and in the field in such places as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Such was the case in the development of glide bombing, an innovative practice of pinpoint aerial bombing that Marine aviators pioneered during their long stay in the Dominican Republic. While Marine pilots during the World War concentrated on anti-submarine patrolling, reconnaissance, and daylight bombing operations, it was in Hispaniola and Central America that the principles of close air support came into being. In fact, it was in the Dominican Republic that First Lieutenant Lawson H. M. Sanderson became the first Marine pilot in the Marine Corps to experiment with dive-bombing or, more appropriately, glide bombing. While engaging rebel forces in the Dominican Republic, Lieutenant Sanderson experimented with aerial bombing by pointing the nose of his aircraft (the rather cumbersome DH-4B) at the target, "entering into a steep dive of about 45 degrees," and then releasing the bomb from the pilot's position at an altitude of about 250 feet. Lieutenant Sanderson found this method of bombing more accurate; and one that offered Marine ground commanders immediate forward fire support.

Marine aviators cannot, however, lay full claim to the pioneering of close air support. During the World War, U. S. Army Air Corps pilots at Ellington Field, Texas, first practiced what was then called "low level bombing." Here, they practiced dropping their bomb loads attached to the wings of their aircraft controlled by wires that led to the pilot's cockpit. By 1919, this form of aerial bombing had become somewhat standardized in Army tactical training with Army pilots practicing gunnery, low-level bombing, and reconnaissance, as well as "spending many hours with tactics and maneuvers." Furthermore, Army attack and pursuit units" trained for low level

bombing and machine gun attacks on ground targets . . . aerial combat, patrol work, and protection of bomber and observation aircraft. Observation units prepared for work with infantry, cavalry, and artillery.\textsuperscript{20} Army schools likewise trained their Marine counterparts during this same period. Marine Major Ross Rowell, while a student at Kelly Field, Texas, participated in dive bombing exercises then directed by Army Major Lewis H. Brereton. Impressed with the accuracy of dive bombing Rowell later recounted:

I immediately visualized the certain naval employment of such tactics where accuracy against small moving targets is paramount. Also it seemed to me that it would be an excellent form of tactics for use in guerrilla warfare.\textsuperscript{21}

So impressed was Rowell that when he assumed command of Observation Squadron One (VO-1M) in 1924, he immediately instituted among his pilots a thorough training program in dive bombing as well as having his ground crews install Army bomb racks on the wings of the squadron's DH-4B's. Later, in Nicaragua, Rowell and fellow aviators would provide critical close air support in fighting Nicaraguan rebels (led by the seasoned guerrilla leader Augusto Caesar Sandino) by employing tactics learned from the Army in the early 1920s. Yet, one must be careful in attempting to draw parallels between the Marine Corps and the Army's concept of close air support, or in the development of its air arm. The Army's concept of "low-level" bombing differentiated substantially from Marine glide bombing, in that it concentrated on an area or group of targets; while the Marine Corps' technique of glide bombing (which later became known as close air support) meant one bomb for one target. In addition act, as one can see in the memoirs of Lieutenant General Claire Lee Chennault, the Army Air Corps slowly moved away from low level bombing in the late 1920's and 1930's, while the Marine

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{21}Johnson and Cosmas, \textit{Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years}, p. 53.
Corps during the same period further refined its concepts of close air support based upon its lessons in the Caribbean and Nicaragua. Furthermore, Marine aviation's role was "tactical" as opposed to the strategic bombing role which Army officials had hoped to assign Army aviation. This point was emphasized by Major Edwin H. Brainard, another Marine aviation pioneer and advocate of the role aircraft in ground support. In September 1926, he addressed a group of Marine student officers at Quantico:

All our training and war plans are based on the idea that the Marine Corps will act as an advanced base force to seize and hold an advance base from which the Navy can operate against the enemy. ... In any war with a major force our fleet is going to be fully occupied and the advanced base force will have to ... use its own aviation for its information, protection from attack from the air and assistance in holding the base after seizure. I do not believe that the commander-in-chief is going to detach any first line carrier for this duty and for that reason Marine Corps Aviation is of paramount importance in the force. It also seems self-evident that there would be far better cooperation and results if the Marine force had Marine aviators rather than some Naval unit temporarily attached.

From the evidence available, Major Brainard appears to be the first senior Marine to stress the importance of Marine aviation and ground units working in close unison with each other. Countering Army aviation's ever-increasing emphasis on strategic bombing and its desire to separate itself from the Army and form into an independent service, Brainard reiterated a hallmark of Marine air: "To obtain maximum results, aviation and the troops with which it operates should be closely associated and know each other's work ... Marine Aviation is not being developed as a separate branch of the service that considers itself too good to do anything else. Unlike the Army Air Service, we do not aspire or want to be separated from the line or to be considered as anything but regular

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23Johnson and Cosmas, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, p. 35.
Marines." In line with its cherished goal of a separate service and mission the Army Air Corps slowly began to de-emphasize its low-level bombing role in favor of developing its strategic bomber force, a move that had disastrous results for Army infantrymen during World War II, particularly during the North African campaign in 1942-1943. Thus, early in the development of Marine aviation Brainard and not Cunningham, as some historians point out, established the main difference between the development of the Marine Corps' concept of close air support and the Army's tactic of low-level bombing. Marine pilots were Marines first, and because they first trained as infantry officers, were more cognizant of their main mission -- to support Marines on the ground, working as a integrated team. However, it is at this point that one must be extremely careful in associating the word "team" with that of what later became known as the Marine air-ground task force, or MAGTF. The concepts of close air support would not be fully realized by Marine and Army aviators until late1944 in the Southwestern and Central Pacific areas as well as in France. As a point of fact, the Marine air-ground team did not come into being until after World War II, and not fully realized until a decade later in Vietnam (1965-1973). Nonetheless, Marine aviators in Nicaragua during the mid-to-late 1920's employed many of the tactics that their successors would later study and apply in supporting Marines in ground offensive operations.

Despite the beneficial lessons Marine aviators were learning in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti, their units experienced the same problems that affected the Marine infantry and seagoing forces; it was difficult to retain qualified pilots and ground crews in

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the aftermath of demobilization and budget cuts. When Lejeune became Commandant in July 1920 the strength of Marine Corps aviation stood at 67 officers and 856 enlisted men, with 7 Marine officers undergoing pilot training at Pensacola, and 433 enlisted men attending the Aviation Mechanic's School at the Navy's Great Lakes Naval Training Center.25 Despite the increased numbers of men enrolled in aviation or aviation-related training Marine air units incurred the same drain on available manpower with deployments to the Caribbean and later China. In fact, this depletion prompted Lieutenant Colonel Turner to reduce the squadrons in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti from one squadron to one flight each; pilots, groundcrewm en, and aircraft were reassigned to the Quantico Flying Field in compliance with the new tables of air organization that had been issued by the Major General Commandant's office. Nevertheless, the bulk of Marine air strength remained stationed at Quantico did manage to participate in all of the major (and minor) fleet and field exercises during this same period. Shortly after their transfer from the Marine Flying Field in Miami, Headquarters redesignated the air units based at Quantico as the 1st Aviation Group, comprised of functionally specialized squadrons —one of observation planes, a squadron of fighter (or "pursuit") planes, and one kite balloon squadron (used for reconnaissance and artillery observation). This group trained and participated in the annual summer maneuvers and fleet exercises that winter.26 As shortages in both manpower and

26See Colonel T.C. Turner, Officer in Charge, Marine Corps Aviation ltr. to Major General Commandant, Subj: "Request for Increase in Complement-Aviation," dtd. 8 November 1929; Also Memorandum for the Major General Commandant, dtd. 13 December 1928, Subj: Request for Additional Enlisted Men for Aviation," p. 58; Chief of Naval Operations to All Bureaus and Officers, Aviation Units, and Stations Concerned, dtd. 9 April 1927, Subj: "Assignment of Naval Aircraft, Naval Vessels, and Aviation Details to the Naval Aeronautic Organization-Fiscal Year 1927 to 30 June 1928," pp. 43-4; (All located in the Cunningham Papers, Box 3B32, Organization Folder, 1914-40, loc. cit).
equipment bedeviled Marine air squadrons in the immediate postwar period, the Marine Corps was able to only keep one or two of its three divisions in an active status. When Marines began withdrawing from the Dominican Republic, the availability of more men permitted Headquarters to create Service Squadron 1, which contained Marines engaged in such tasks as driving trucks, parachute riggers, mechanics, other ground crew specialists, and administrative personnel.27

Throughout the 1920's, the authorized strength of Marine aviation remained constant, with approximately 100 officers and 1,020 enlisted men. As the figures below indicate, however, the actual strength fell far below that number.(Table 6.1) Saddled with a quota of 1,093 officers, Headquarters looked for alternative solutions to meet the demand for qualified naval aviators. One remedy to the problem was to train qualified enlisted men as pilots and co-pilots. It was through this means that the Marine Corps gradually expanded its force of pilots. When war came with its inevitable expansion, these enlisted aviators would be given "commissions as officers in order to assume command positions commensurate with their experience and training."28

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27See Memorandum from the Major General Commandant to Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, dt. 7 August 1924, Subj: "Complement of the First Aviation Group," p. 10; also The Major General Commandant lr. to Chief of Naval Operations, dt. 20 July 1922, Subj: "Aeronautic Organization of the Marine Corps," (both in the Cunningham Papers, Organization Folder, 1914-1940, loc. cit).

28Johnson and Cosmas, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, p. 37.
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Table 6.1
Strength of Marine Aviation
1919-25

The second 'potential' source for trained aviators came from the newly-established Marine Aviation Reserve. During the World War the bulk of the 155 Marine aviators were Marine reservists. At the conclusion of the war many of these men opted for demobilization, with only a few requesting augmentation with the Regular Marine Corps. By 31 March 1919, there were only eleven first lieutenants and sixty-three second lieutenants remaining on the muster rolls of the Marine Reserve Flying Corps. Two of these men were Second Lieutenants William W. Torrey and L. H. M. Sanderson, both of whom would reach the general officer ranks in the 1930's and be among those whom would lead the Corps into World War II. The strength of the Marine Reserve Flying Corps would never exceed forty-one pilots until Congress passed the Reserve Act in February 1925.30

29Figures collated from Director, Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAir), Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Navy for the Years 1919-1932. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1919-32).
With scant resources divided between the Regulars and the Reserves, due mainly to the limited appropriations and budget cuts, there is little wonder that tensions existed between the two Marine establishments. Friction developed between the two organizations as both the reserves and regular flew the same aircraft and used the latter's shop facilities (with the result that the former opted to train at night and thus over a period of time became proficient in night flying and operations).\(^{31}\) The passage of the Reserve Act placed Marine Reserve Aviation on a permanent basis with the assignment of actual wartime missions. These missions included aerial bombing; aerial patrol; aerial reconnaissance; aerial scouting; photography and mapping; artillery spotting; producing smoke screens; and offensive air operations against ground targets. The act likewise authorized the creation of four Reserve areas (Table 6.2)

(a) The Eastern Reserve Area: Observation Squadron 6-M, Division 2  
(b) Central Reserve Area: Observation Squadron 6-M, Division 3  
(c) Southern Reserve Area: Fighting Squadron 5-M, Division 2  
(d) Western Reserve Area: Observation Squadron 8-M, Division 2\(^{32}\)

**Table 6.2**

**Marine Air Reserve Distribution-1925**

The appointment of Captain Thomas Shearer as the head of the reserve section of Marine Aviation highlighted this increased emphasis on the Marine Aviation Reserve. While Shearer's assumption of this post was administrative in nature, it did stress the importance Headquarters attached to the future of the Reserves in general. One other significant step toward the recognition of the Reserves as an integral part of the Marine Corps was General Lejeune's modification of the Marine Corps' air tables of organization, which specified that for each active squadron there would be one or more

\(^{31}\) Ibid, pp. 51-2.  
\(^{32}\) Ibid, p. 52.
inactive squadrons to be comprised of reservists. These inactive squadrons, while kept on the books as a skeletal organization, nonetheless proved to be ideal for mobilization plans since reservists could be quickly integrated into the Regular establishment. The increasing importance Headquarters attached to the reserves is further reflected in the infighting between Lejeune's office and Bureau of Aeronautics during the late 1920's. When Rear Admiral William A. Moffett refused to authorize drill pay for Marine Reserve aviators, the Commandant, fearing an attempt to scuttle all that he had worked for as far as building a viable reserve program for the Marine Corps, "dropped in" on a senator on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee and secured not only drill pay for the reservists but also another site for an air reserve unit.

Applicants selected as Marine Air Reserves were primarily college students who, after passing the mental and physical requirements for Marine officers, reported for duty at either San Diego or Pensacola for flight instruction. After completion of flight training they reported the next year for a year's active duty where they received advanced training with either the East or West Coast Expeditionary Forces. Enlisted reservists trained as ground crewmen, primarily as mechanics and support personnel. Pilots trained at either Naval or Army air fields while enlisted crewmen attended the Navy's main training center, located at Great Lakes Training Center, Illinois. There they studied avionics, radio and other technical subjects. In addition to learning to fly land and sea planes, several Marine officers and enlisted personnel received training in lighter-than-air airships at Pensacola.

In addition to their adherence to both Naval and Army aviation procedures and manuals, Marine aviators spent an increasing amount of time preparing for "tactical

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33 Ibid, p. 51.
34 Ibid, p. 53.
problems with troops on the ground."\textsuperscript{35} In fact, it might be stated that during this early period aviators from all three services shared a common training and interoperability, a feature that disappeared in the late 1920's and 1930's as Marine and Naval Aviation emphasized tactical training while Army aviation increasingly emphasized bomber and pursuit training during the late 1920's and 1930's.\textsuperscript{36} Despite this later difference, however, a friendly rivalry developed between Marine and Army aviators, particularly during the annual air competition matches which tested gunnery and flying skills. In one of these contests, held in early 1926 at the Air Corps's Langley Field, Virginia, squadrons from the Army, National Guard, and Marine Corps competed in a program that covered eight events including pursuit; machine gunnery of towed targets; bombing at low, intermediate, and high altitudes; and bombing from lighter-than-air airships. While Marine pilot First Lieutenant Lawson H. Sanderson placed first in the pursuit category, he scored only 706 in the machine gunning of towed targets and low altitude bombing, so the Army's top pilot, Second Lieutenant Louis M. Merrick, topped the veteran Marine with a score of 730. In all, the Army took seven of the eight categories during this field meet, quite an accomplishment when one considers the fact that Lieutenant Sanderson was not only a combat veteran but also instrumental in developing low level bombing tactics for the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{37} These early experiments with close air support and pursuit tactics demonstrated that Marines were not necessarily thinking solely in terms of close air support missions of ground operations, but more along the lines of the World War experience as a pursuit force. They also demonstrated that Marine pilots had some ways to go before it could claim mastery of low-level bombing, though as Nicaragua

\textsuperscript{35} Maurer, \textit{Aviation in the U.S. Army}, p. 76; Smith, "Aviation Organization in the Marine Corps," pp. 7-8; Johnson and Cosmas, \textit{Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years}, p. 35.  
\textsuperscript{36} Maurer, \textit{Aviation in U.S. Army}, pp. 74-7; Johnson and Cosmas, \textit{Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years}, p. 53.  
\textsuperscript{37} Maurer, \textit{Aviation in the U.S. Army}, p. 78.
illustrated, it would catch on very fast and made the most efficient (and practical) use of its aviation force. Marine pilots soon gained excellent operational experience in applying everything they had learned from the Army in the skies over the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. In doing so, Marine pilots provided what became the basis for close air support to Marine infantry then engaged in a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign against bandeleros, cacos, and sandinista guerrillas.

**Marine Air Reorganization**

By far, however, the most important changes affecting Marine Corps aviation took place during Major General Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters on 1 December 1920. With the creation of the Division of Training and Operations, the administrative control of the Marine aviation section transferred from that of the Office of the Major General Commandant to that of the Assistant Commandant. This reorganization gave the Assistant Commandant authority over procurement of aviation material (planes, spare parts, etc.), training, reporting, qualification and perhaps the most important control over air and ground force cooperation.\(^\text{38}\) An even far more significant administrative change occurred in November 1925, when Major Brainard recommended that the Marine aviation section be removed from the Division of Operations and Training, and made an independent branch remaining under the supervision of the Assistant to the Commandant.\(^\text{39}\)

The reorganization's creation between the air and ground was not an afterthought. Unlike the Army's development of aviation, the Marine Corps never lost sight of the fact that Marine air existed for one purpose: to support Marines in operations ashore. Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham emphasized this point when he stressed the necessity of

\(^{38}\)Smith, *"Aviation Organization in the Marine Corps,"* p. 7.

\(^{39}\)See Condit, et.al., *Marine Corps Staff Organization*, p. 12.
training Marine aviators with the forces with which they would operate with in the field, and in time became the primary mission for Marine aviation:

. . . the naval policy regarding Marine aviation should definitely assign to it the mission of furnishing the air force necessary for the advanced-base and expeditionary operations and defense of naval bases which are defended on land by Marines. It is more or less of a colonial mission, outside the United States.\(^{40}\)

Despite these kinds of pronouncement by Cunningham and others, there was much required before the Marine air-ground team could become a reality. This was due both to opposition from the ground side as well as from the existing aircraft and the technology of the day. Major Cunningham reiterated this same point in his September 1920 Marine Corps Gazette article when he wrote "that the only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations." In other words, Marine aviation existed for but one purpose, and that was to support Marines in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, and in conducting expeditionary missions ashore. Major Edwin H. Brainard, who succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Turner as head of Marine Aviation in March 1925, not only shared Cunningham's emphasis on support of Marines in "Small Wars," but further stressed the role of aviation could play with the advanced base mission.\(^{41}\) Yet this is where the ambiguity comes in; Cunningham called for the use of Marine air in isolating the landing areas, conducting reconnaissance, preventing the enemy from reinforcing his depleted forces, and harassing enemy troops so "as to make the task of landing much

\(^{40}\)Major Alfred A. Cunningham Testimony Before the Board for the Development of Naval Aviation Policy, dtd. 7 April 1919 (Cunningham Papers, "Early Aviation Folder, 1912-1919, Box 3B32," loc. cit.) p. 2.

easier and safer.\textsuperscript{42} Nowhere in Cunningham's article do the words "close air support" appear. Cunningham, often referred to as the "father of Marine Corps Air" was, however, closer to the mark when he elaborated on the potential of Marine aviation in supporting expeditionary troops in the Caribbean and Nicaragua in the 1920's. While Cunningham's vision had to await better communications (improved radios) between the air and ground and sturdier aircraft built for close air support, Cunningham nonetheless laid out the missions and role of Marine aviation long before close air support became a reality. "Potential" is the key word here, since neither Marine aircraft nor training centered entirely on providing close air support for the infantry during this early period of Marine aviation.

Besides the need for improved operational techniques and technological means, the very concept of the infantry requiring support from the air had to win acceptance from the ground side of the Marine Corps. In fact, outside of the Major General Commandant, Cunningham, and the other senior Marine aviators, the concept of "close air support" had to be 'sold' to a skeptical audience of Navy and Marine officers. For his part, Admiral Robert E. Coontz, the Chief of Naval Operations, who was a strong proponent of naval aviation and who in particular saw close air support as a separate and distinct mission for Marine Aviation, issued a memorandum to all Navy Bureaus and the Major General Commandant aimed at convincing the skeptics inside the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation community that planes could "quickly locate the enemy and communicate his strength, location, [and] disposition." The memorandum encouraged Marine aviators to illustrate the value of aviation to the infantry by demonstrating to their ground counterparts that the airplane could perform reconnaissance, aerial photography, artillery spotting, since these would be "indispensable in future wars.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42}Cunningham, "Value of Marine Aviation," p. 222.
\textsuperscript{43}See Admiral R. E. Coontz, Letter from Chief of Naval Operations to All Bureaus and
The memorandum, issued 1 July 1920 by Admiral Coontz, outlined in great detail the role aviation was to play in support of Marines on the ground, as well as a part of a combined arms team:

The most important work ahead of Marine aviators is to prove to the ground troops that they can be of real service to them in carrying out their war duties. This can only be done by actually operating with them. This will demonstrate how much each can depend on the other, test out present equipment, show clearly the defects and suggest necessary developments. Active steps will be taken to train the personnel for the following duties and to perfect present equipment and develop new equipment necessary to properly do the work.44

In addressing the role of aviation in the combined arms team, the memorandum outlined the interplay of aircraft with the infantry, artillery, signals and communications. It also, for the first time, emphasized the use of Marine aircraft which would fly from the deck of an offshore ship in order to provide support for the advanced base force and the fleet itself. As Coontz wrote, "In addition to the above all Marine pilots will be trained to fly from and land on platforms representing ship's decks and should, when occasion permits, be temporarily assigned to ships so that when they are needed they will be available and trained up to date."45 This last statement is in itself a recognition that Marine air was inseparable from that of naval aviation, a fact Coontz, Cunningham, Turner, and Brainard went out of their way on many occasions to stress, despite the fact that Marine aviators attended Army schools and adopted many tactics and techniques from the senior service.

Marine aviators needed little convincing of their role as an adjunct to Marines on the ground, though this would not be fully realized until the 1940's. The fact that Admiral

44Ibid.
45Ibid, p. 34.
Coontz had to issue a memorandum encouraging of officers to "sell" aviation is interesting and leads one to conclude that their was internal opposition, at least in Navy and Marine quarters, as to the direction that the respective air services should take. Furthermore, it points to the impact on naval aviation (particularly Marine Aviation) caused by the Army debate over the future of its airpower. The implications of this debate were not lost on Coontz or Lejeune. This debate over which direction Army (and naval) aviation should take likewise reached the smaller Marine Corps air community when Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell USA, flew to the Quantico Flying Field on 9 March 1922, and spoke to the Marine aviators there on strategic bombing and the operational value of airplanes in war. 46 Brigadier General Frank Schwable recounted later that Mitchell's advocacy of strategic bombing and the bomber vs. pursuit pilot's debate had very little impact on the Marine aviation community, due largely in part to the size of the Marines' air arm. He added that because the Army had two distinctly different aviation forces (Bombers and Pursuit), a rivalry naturally developed between them. In the Marine Corps, aviators were "in one another's lap all the time," with no chance of any such rivalry developing. 47 Despite this, however, there was some interest generated by the creation of a separate air force tasked with a single mission. With Marine aviation already stretched to the limit on men and equipment, the creation of a separate Marine bombing force would have not only doomed the actual organization of such a force; it would have likewise meant possible absorption by the Army or Navy, exactly what the Major General Commandant hoped to avoid.

Two further administrative changes which strengthened the tie between Marine and Naval Aviation occurred during this postwar reorganization of Marine Air. These

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47 Ibid.
changes included the recommendation that Marine Corps aviation be permanently added in the Naval Aeronautic Organization for 1925, an administrative change that remains firmly in place to this day. The second change was the standardization and use of the same nomenclature and procedures. This included the redesignation of the units of a squadron from flights to divisions.

The organization of the Second Aviation Group followed two years after the establishment of the First Aviation Group after Marines began to withdraw from the Dominican Republic in 1924. With this withdrawal, Marine air enjoyed a flood of manpower that enabled the creation of new units such as Service Squadron One at Quantico, and allowed the organization and transfer of the recently returned Observation Squadron One (USMC) to the West Coast. Headquarters assigned the Second Aviation Group, which consisted of an observation squadron, a fighting squadron, as well as a headquarters squadron to the West Coast Expeditionary Force in 1925; this move gave further credibility to Major General Lejeune's reorientation of the Marine Corps toward an expeditionary force in readiness. Headquarters redesignated the 1st and 2d Aviation Groups as Aircraft Squadron, East Coast Expeditionary Force, and Aircraft Squadron, West Coast Expeditionary Force respectively. This administrative change placed these aircraft squadrons directly under the "supervision of the commanders of the respective Expeditionary Forces for purposes of training, administration, and operations." 48

After the redesignation of the Second Aviation Group at San Diego, a controversy over command and control of this organization arose between the commanding general of the West Coast Expeditionary Force and the commanding officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego. Keeping within the parameters that governed the control of operations, training, and administration of Marine aviation assets at Quantico with the

48Johnson and Cosmas, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, p. 35.
East Coast Expeditionary Force, Marine aviators wanted a similar arrangement on the West Coast; they wanted a Marine general commanding Marine aviation assets and not the naval officer in charge of the base. The Chief of Naval Operation ruled on 2 September 1926, that because the Marine Corps housed its aircraft and used naval maintenance facilities, the group would remain under the cognizance of the commander, Naval Air Station, "until such time as the Marine Base could accommodate [its] aviation units and personnel."49 This conflict forced a redesignation of the two existing Marine Air Groups with the First Group becoming Aircraft Squadrons, East Coast Expeditionary Forces, and the Second Aviation Group, becoming known as Aircraft Squadrons, West Coast Expeditionary Force.

Operational commitments and deployments nonetheless cut into training when the respective squadrons deployed to China and Nicaragua in the mid-1920's. Besides these deployments overseas with Marine ground forces, Scouting Squadron 1, which had been stationed at Parris Island, became the first Marine squadron to deploy as an active air wing aboard a naval installation (in 1921). Observation Squadron 2 remained in Haiti, where it conducted an aerial survey of the interior and coastline of that country even as it provided support for the Marines and the native gendarmerie. Later, from 1927 to 1932, Marine aviation units played a vital role during the counterinsurgency campaign in Nicaragua. In doing so, they laid the foundation for the doctrine that became known as close air support.

Pilots, Ground Crewmen, and Infrastructure

Despite the reorganization that took place in Marine air and influx of men and machines caused by the Marines' return from expeditionary duty in the Dominican Republic in 1924, there existed still a shortage of trained pilots and enlisted ground crewmen. As former Major General Louis Woods recalled from his early association with aviation, the majority of Marine pilots came from the incoming officer candidates and newly commissioned second lieutenants. When this didn't work the general stated, "We did a lot of work to get pilots. We wrote letters. We looked over all the records and those we thought had the age and the background for aviation we tried to get . . . ."50 With the increased demand for Marine pilots in Nicaragua during the mid-1920's, Colonel Turner staged a series of "dog-and-pony shows" to attract young officers to the aviation field. He had two Marine pilots fly to the Company Officer's School at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, where they gave lectures on aviation and rides on airplanes in order to "sell" aviation to these young officers. Apparently this worked; applicants for flight training increased shortly after the departure of the Marine aviators. This recruiting attempt was, at best, novel as aviation continued to receive low priority among the mainly ground-dominated senior Marine hierarchy. Brigadier General Frank H. Schwable recalled that while attending the Basic School at Quantico only two of his instructors (Ray Hopper and Pete Schrider) were aviators, and students received only two lectures on Marine aviation. General Schwable said that he could not recall Hopper and Schrider "recruiting us if you want to call it that." 51 In fact, Schwable recounted that even while he was a student at the U.S. Naval Academy (1925-29), there was little attempt to attract the graduates to naval (or Marine) aviation.

51 Schwable *Oral History Transcript*, p. 22.
Another method of securing more pilots (and getting around the provisions of the Naval Appropriations Act of 4 June 1920, which limited the number of commissioned officers in the Marine Corps) was to recruit and train enlisted aviators. It was through this means that the Marine Corps (and Navy), "slowly increased its force of pilots." Headquarters hoped that during wartime expansion these enlisted pilots could augment its force of officer-pilots and become commissioned officers (if so qualified), assuming key billets as both experienced and trained aviators. These men, usually sergeants or staff noncommissioned officers (gunnery, technical or first sergeants) and referred to as naval aviation pilots (NAP's), trained at the Pensacola Naval Air Station and were given their wings upon graduation from flight training. The exceptions to this were, of course, First Sergeant Benjamin J. Belcher and Sergeants Abbot and Paschal, the first NAP's, who were given their wings as naval aviators without having first attended flight school at Pensacola nor having received any formalized training. By and large, NAP's were usually skilled mechanics who became adept flyers without the requisite education background.\textsuperscript{52}

One last potential source of suitable Marine aviators was, of course, the newly-reorganized Marine Corps Aviation Reserve. As a result of the reorganization of Marine aviation units and the deliberate creation of one or two inactive squadrons, "the way had been paved for the entrance of Reserve personnel into Marine aviation on a fairly permanent and significant basis." In fact,

In many ways, the Regular reorganization was the real foundation for the modern Marine Corps Air Reserve. For each active squadron allowed by the T/O on each coast, there were one or more inactive squadrons. In theory, these inactive squadrons were ideally suited to serve as skeleton formations to be filled by reservists, who could be quickly integrated into the Regular Establishment.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52}Johnson and Cosmas, \textit{Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years}, pp. 37-8.
\textsuperscript{53}na., \textit{The Marine Corps Reserve: A History}, p. 52.

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These Marine Air Reserve candidates, enlisting as privates, Class VI, VMCR, and after were promoted to private first class and were kept in an inactive aviation duty status until given primary flight training at the nearest Naval Reserve Air Station. This training normally lasted for 45 days. After receiving ten hours of instruction in the nomenclature and operation of an airplane, the student pilots then received thirty hours of flight training which culminated in a qualification solo flight in a primary type plane. The instruction of these pilot trainees was normally given by a Marine aviator as well as by the three enlisted men (normally reservists themselves) who assisted in the maintenance and upkeep of the aircraft. Upon the successful completion of this training, the candidates were then sent to the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, where they received further training in the forms of classroom instruction and one hundred hours of additional flying in "seaplanes, ground and aerial machinegun work, bombing exercises, and navigational flights." Completing this further instruction at Pensacola, the candidates then underwent a rigid examination of their flying and classroom knowledge in order to determine their eligibility as naval aviators. After successfully passing these tests, the newly-designated second lieutenants, Class V, VMCR reservists reported to an active duty Marine Corps Aviation Squadron for a period ranging from one to two years. Upon the completion of this duty, the officers then transferred to an inactive duty status, attached to the closest Reserve Aviation unit.54

Despite the fact that budget cuts, overseas deployments, and manpower shortages continued to affect the operational readiness of the Marine Corps during Lejeune's first tour of duty as Major General Commandant, Marine aviation grew slowly and steadily during the mid-to-late 1920's. By the granting of age waivers and deferments to prospective aviators, as well as the commissioning of NAP's and Marine Reserve Air officers,

54Ibid, p. 54.
Headquarters was able to maintain a strong nucleus of aviators and a strong non-flying support infrastructure which, it was hoped, would be able to expand in time of war.

During Lejeune's first tour of duty as Major General Commandant, Marine aviation underwent a complete reorganization starting with the approval of the Air Tables of Organization passed on 30 July 1922 (these were amended three years later on 28 June 1925). Marine Aviation had, for the most part, survived the more drastic cutbacks, due largely to the patronage of Lejeune but more so to the leadership of Colonels Turner and Brainard. The reassignment and eventual retirement of Major Cunningham came as a relief to many inside the Marine Corps, in that apart from the personal dislike that the Major General Commandant, had for his first air chief, Marine Air was then been placed in the able hands of first Colonel's Turner (1920-25 and 1929-31), and later Brainard (1925-1929), both competent and able administrators, and aviators in their own right. The patronage of the Major General Commandant enabled Marine Air to expand by 1925 into seven squadrons, ranging from Quantico and Pensacola on the East Coast to as far south as Haiti in the Caribbean and as far west at San Diego and the island of Guam. (Table 6.3) Marine aviators actively mapped and surveyed the Haitian countryside, and practiced annual gunnery and bombing exercises with both Army and Naval aviators. Furthermore, in time, Marine aviation became one of the Corps' best public relations assets, flying in air shows such as in Cleveland, Ohio and St. Louis, Missouri -- where Marine aviators engaged in mock air battles and thrilling crowds with daring aerial acrobatics.

What cannot be lost is the fact that Marine aviation became an important element in Major General Lejeune's attempts to reconfigure the Marine Corps into an expeditionary force-in-readiness. By linking the ground-based expeditionary force with that of a companion aviation group, Marine air was there from the start -- almost. The only qualification here is that both doctrinally and technically Marine pilots and ground
officers were still unclear as to how aviation could support ground operations in combat. This would come later, in Nicaragua, during the second half of Lejeune's nine years as Commandant. While Lieutenant Sanderson and others experimented with glide or dive bombing techniques, Marine aviators still carried out low-level bombing missions (in the fleet exercises held in 1923 and 1924 in Panama and Culebra and on Oahu in 1925), in aircraft that were of World War vintage, particularly the venerable DH-4's, which lacked both air-to-ground communications and suitable bomb racks for ordnance delivery. Unlike the U.S. Army's aviation program, Marine aviation had been spared the bitter intraservice controversies over roles and missions and over the creation of an independent air service, controversies which engulfed Army Aviation. Marine air retained its vital links with its ground counterpart and forged stronger ties with naval aviation in the fleet exercises on Culebra (1924) and Oahu (1925). Marine pilots never lost sight of the fact that they were first Marines, and thus concentrated their efforts in forging a doctrine that linked them with their counterparts on the ground.

**First Aviation Group,**
**Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA.,**
3 Squadrons and 1 Balloon Squadron
a. Observation Plane Squadron 3 (VO3M): Two Active Divisions, One Inactive Division.
b. Fighting Plane Squadron (VF1M): Two Active Divisions, One Inactive Division.
c. Service Squadron 1: One Active Division, Two Inactive Divisions.
d. Kite Balloon Squadron 1 (ZK1M): Consists of One Division (four sections), One Active Section, Three Inactive Sections.

**Second Aviation Group,**
**Naval Air Station, San Diego, CA.,**
a. Observation Squadron 1 (VO1M): One Active Division, Two Inactive Divisions.

**Table 6.3 (CONTINUED)**
**Marine Corps Air Organization 1925**
Table 6.3 (CONTINUED)

**Port Au Prince, Haiti,**
a. Observation Squadron 1 (VO!M): One Active Division, Two Inactive

**Sumay, Territory of Guam,**
a. Observation Squadron 1 (VS1M): One Active Division, Two Inactive Divisions.

Marine aviators nonetheless benefited from their association with both Army and Naval aviation. Army schools provided two generations of Marine pilots with the facilities, equipment, and perhaps most important, doctrinal and tactical instruction in all of the different aspects of aviation that Marines later modified and applied to their own aviation doctrine. The Marines' relationship with the Army assisted in the forging of an even closer working relationship with Marine infantry and artillery in the development of amphibious warfare in the 1930's and into World War II. Their association with Army Aviation likewise provided Marine aviators with an extremely important source of new training methods, techniques, and technological advancements given the budget constraints placed on the Corps throughout the 1920's that would have denied them access to these vital assets. While the Marine Corps' evolving operational concept of close air support differed substantially from the Army's technique of low-level bombing, Marine training at the Army's Pursuit Schools (located at Ellington and Kelly Fields in Texas and at Selfridge Field, Michigan) proved invaluable during the counterguerrilla campaigns in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. Despite the benefits Marine aviation gained from its association and training with the Army, it maintained close links with its sister branch, naval aviation, and in so doing, was able to retain its air

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component in the face of budget cuts and the ever present threats of merger with the Navy or with Army aviation. By retaining its links with naval aviation, Marine pilots benefited from the development of projecting air power from the sea, beginning with the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers off the newly-commissioned aircraft carrier USS Langley and during the exercises off Panama prior to its massive deployments to Nicaragua in 1925 and China in 1927.56 Marine aviation nonetheless had many more trials and tribulations ahead before its doctrine of close air support would become the primary function of Marine air.

**Summary**

In the face of further military retrenchment and a deepened sense of national isolationism that was characteristic of the United States during the interwar period, it was hard to imagine that within twenty years the Marine Corps would mature into a potent air-ground team; in 1925, as manpower and equipment shortages were the rule and not the exception. Yet it was during the formative period from 1920 to 1926 that innovations in doctrine and technology and an aggressive recruitment policy staved off absorption into the Army and/or disbandment from an economy-minded Congress. It was only through the policies and reforms undertaken by General Lejeune, and the able leadership of Colonels Turner and Brainard that Marine air not only survived but prospered during the 1920's. The solid foundation and policies which Lejeune enacted during his first term paid off as deployments to Nicaragua and China virtually stripped the Marine Corps of its two expeditionary forces, leaving only a skeletal forces at home and casting a dark cloud over what appeared to be a new beginning for the Marine Corps as an important adjunct to the Navy in and future war (particularly in the Pacific against  

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Japan). Despite these deployments, however, both Marine Air and the two expeditionary forces demonstrated that, given proper funding and manpower, the future of the Marine Corps looked bright.

Of major importance was Lejeune's continuing reminders his officers that, unlike the Army or Navy, the Marine Corps' existence as a military force depended on its preparedness for any contingency, whether that be a land campaign such as those during the World War, or the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases. Thus, the Major General Commandant and his staff set out during the remainder of his tenure as head of the Marine Corps to guide Marines through a period of naval and political retrenchment, all the while maintaining the Corps's ability to respond to any crisis or wartime mission. Lejeune's good relationships with the Army's and Navy's senior leadership, and the Marine Corps' participation with both branches in joint maneuvers (Hawai'i and Panama), enabled the Marine Corps to make the transition from a tradition-bound service to that of a modern combined arms force in readiness. In fact, from the evidence presented, it appears that despite the cutbacks that occurred in the Navy as a result of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921-22, and the decrease in overall spending for national defense during the late 1920's, the Marine Corps, unlike that of the other two services, used the period to strengthen its doctrinal and operational abilities (which were based on the evolving pre- and post-war doctrine of advanced base seizure and defense, and the lessons learned during the World War), and its maturing aviation force. While the Marine air-ground team did not emerge until late World War II, the antecedents of this concept had been laid by a handful of Marine aviators.
CHAPTER 7

NAVAL TREATIES, WAR PLANS, AND NAVAL EXERCISES
1921-1925

Introduction

As the United States military demobilized in the aftermath of the World War, military leaders such as Admiral Robert E. Coontz, Generals John J. Pershing, George Barnett, John A. Lejeune, and others pondered the ramifications of what disarmament and political isolationism meant to the preparedness of country's armed forces. Indeed, the postwar period immediately following the World War, brought to the fore a reevaluation of the United States' defense capabilities in light of the postwar world. As the guns fell silent on the Western Front Army and Navy leaders sat down to reevaluate the nation's military policies in order to meet the new strategic realities of isolationism and disarmament. A part of this reevaluation involved the examination of the shortcomings as well as the technological and doctrinal advances brought about by the United States' involvement in the late war.¹ From the outset of this evaluation, one of the first requirements war planners agreed upon was the possession of a credible military deterrent, one that would allow them to project power across vast distances with little or no warning.² The same planners who chartered the course of postwar U.S. military

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¹See Odom, *After the Trenches*, pp. 72-84.
policy in the aftermath of the World War realized that military readiness was the best way to deter involvement in a future war. These factors included economic, and other geo-strategic factors, and not on simply the proverbial "bean counting" of troops, guns, battleships, submarines, and airplanes. Despite the gradual dissipation of the country's potential military strength during the interwar era, the requirements for a strong military, and in particular a strong Navy increased even as the military became smaller. Apart from the need to protect the United States' expanding foreign markets during the 1920's, the threat of a potential war with Japan in the Pacific necessitated a Navy capable of projecting itself across the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean. As the Navy switched the propulsion of its ships from coal to oil-burning, part of this requirement involved the need for better access to the oilfields of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. At least from the surface, however, it appeared that naval disarmament served to hinder the U.S. Navy's ability to project even as new technology and ships such as aircraft carriers entered the fleet's inventory.

The relevancy of the gradual weakening of America's ability to project military power is even more important when one stops to consider the strategic ramifications of the postwar League of Nations mandate system, which gave Japan the former German colonies in the Palau, Carolines, and Marshall Islands, as well as the acquiescence of the United States to abrogate the Open Door Policy in China in favor of the Nine Power Treaty that opened the door to a future clash of interests between the two Pacific powers. While naval disarmament and diplomacy at first appeared to hinder the United States Navy's ability to project its power across the Pacific, the postwar era ushered in a technological and strategic revolution in U.S. Naval affairs. Part of this naval "revolution" affected the Marine Corps and its mission during the same era.

The unpreparedness attributed to the immediate postwar era likewise affected but did not hinder, the ability of the U.S. Marine Corps to prepare for any contingency, including a potential war with Japan. Inspite of the problems of manpower, austere budgets, and officer retention and promotion, however, the Marines under the able leadership of Major General John A. Lejeune and others, labored on during the interwar period, distracted only by deployments to Hispaniola, Nicaragua, and China, as well domestically to protect the U.S. Mails to further experiment with the possibility of conducting amphibious base seizures against an entrenched enemy. While the Marine Corps lacked the manpower and money, they nonetheless planted the intellectual and experimental seeds of amphibious assault during this same period of naval disarmament and retrenchment on the world scene.

The Washington Naval Conference and Treaty, 1921-1922

Given the country's desire to return to "normalcy" at the conclusion of the World War, it should've come as no surprise that the U.S. Senate rejected President Woodrow Wilson's ill-fated attempt at ratifying the Versailles Peace Treaty, which had its core the creation of a league or an association of nations. Led by Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.), William Borah (R-Idaho), and the other opponents of any post-war involvement by the United States in European affairs, both the Senate and House of Representatives not only succeeded in killing U.S. participation in the League of Nations, but ensured that Europe (and eventually the United States) would once again be drawn into another, this time even more costlier war in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Coupled with this desire to detach itself from the affairs of Europe, was the movement within the government as well as from the private sector that began clamoring for naval disarmament. Senator William Borah, a Progressive Republican, and fierce
opponent of Wilson's League of Nations, stated on the floor of the Senate that the problem was not armaments in general, but in the competition that resulted in the large naval building programs from such countries as Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. Senator Borah, in drawing an analogy between the naval race in the pre-war years between Britain and Germany as being one of the root causes of the conflict that followed, claimed that any building program by the United States or the other naval powers that appeared threatening or intimidating caused the other powers to increase their naval tonnage. In fact, Borah, and the other politicians who favored a reduction in naval arms (as well as military spending in general), argued if all the countries involved could agree on a reduction in spending of up to fifty percent over the next five years for new ship construction, there would be less of a chance of another war occurring. As a first step, the senator and his fellow disarmament advocates recommended that the United States take the lead with a show of good faith in unilaterally restraining its naval construction. Borah's resolution, as could be expected, "evoked passionate support" among the various religious denominations, peace groups, and women's organizations (whom had just recently gained the right to vote in 1919), whom deluged Congress with telegrams demanding naval limitations. Even some members of the U.S. Army [including Chief of Staff General John J. Pershing], whether for parochial or sentimental reasons, came out for some type of naval limitations.

Despite the call for naval disarmament, the naval building program that had been ongoing since 1916 continued unabated, based on the premise that Congress would delay

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4Ibid.
any moves toward a reduction in naval construction until either an agreement had been reached within regards to limiting naval construction or, a policy direction from the incoming administration of President-elect Warren G. Harding, insofar as a naval treaty had been concerned.

In keeping with these sentiments, the House Naval Affairs Committee (HNAC), slashed the Fiscal Year (FY) 1922 of $600 million to $395 million, with $95 million of that going toward construction, with no new funds for construction or for bases in the Western Pacific. The HNAC, likewise, proposed to freeze the $90 million earmarked for new construction until President-elect Harding had sent out invitations for a naval conference. While the HNAC cut naval appropriations, the big Navy advocates on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee (SNAC) added $100 million to the House Naval Appropriations. Not only did the bill enable the U.S. Navy to complete the 1916 and 1919 building programs, it likewise provided funds for two aircraft carriers, and for base construction in the Western Pacific. A combined effort of "Irreconcilables" and Progressives in the Senate (Borah [R-Idaho], and Robert La Follette [R-Wisconsin]), nonetheless, challenged the SNAC's proposed naval increases. Borah and his supporters of naval disarmament, in fact, sought to force the calling of a naval disarmament conference, and used various riders attached to the SNAC's bill as a means of killing its passage, a feat which the Idaho Republican succeeded in doing in a filibuster on the floor of the Senate.

As for President-elect Harding himself, it had outwardly appeared that he favored completion of the 1916 and 1919 programs though, as it eventually turned out, "he did not care enough about building a navy second to none to fight long or hard for it."  

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5Ibid, pp. 25-6.
6Ibid, p. 27.
7Ibid, p. 29.
Eventually, after much wrangling and maneuvering on the floors of the House and Senate, Senator Borah allowed the passage of the $100 million earmarked for further construction, while he and his supporters secured passage of their resolution calling for a conference on naval limitations.

The subsequent Washington Conference on Naval Arms Limitations (1921-22), was both a response to the pressure from those who favored naval arms limitations, as well as from those individuals and groups that saw reductions in naval arms as a means of further insulating or, as occurred, isolating the United States from the affairs of the world. These latter advocates sincerely believed that the absence of a strong Navy would reduce the temptation to involve the United States in another foreign war. While both groups were successful in the short term in accomplishing their goals, events later in China and Europe, demonstrated the shortsightedness and the lack of geo-strategic vision many American politicians and military men held during the interwar period. In fact, in the rush to return to 'normalcy' and disarm, the goals of the Washington Naval Conference became obscured with the diplomatic isolationism that characterized postwar American foreign policy. In fact, the withdrawal from the world scene, as well as the scrapping of the Navy's modernization plans, permitted the Japanese to violate not only the Nine Power Treaty that attempted to reaffirm the provisions of the Open Door Policy in China, but to first absorb and then fortify a series of Pacific islands in the 1930's, that resulted in an almost impregnable defensive zone that ultimately required the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct a long, and bloody march across the Southwest and Central Pacific areas during World War II. For the Navy and the Marine Corps, however, the road to the "island-hopping" campaigns and naval battles began not in the Pacific in 1941, but on the banks of the Potomac River on 12 November 1921.

The goal of the nations represented at the Washington Naval Conference was, as U.S. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes stated in his opening remarks, to "... limit
their naval weapons and scrap existing ships," based on both tonnage and armament having as the ultimate goal the scrapping of a total of sixty-six ships between the major naval powers of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and France. The agreement that the powers reached after days and weeks of diplomatic negotiation resulted in a ratio of 5:5:3:1.7:1.7\(^8\), as well as a ten-year holiday in capital ship construction.

For the Marine Corps the most important aspects of the treaty addressed the issues over naval bases and the fortifications. In response to Japan's acquiescence in accepting a reduction of its overall tonnage in ships, the United States and Great Britain agreed not to fortify their existing Pacific islands and fortresses. Specifically:

The United States particularly agreed not to fortify the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and the Aleutians. Great Britain agreed not to fortify Hong Kong, Borneo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts. Japan, in turn, agreed not to fortify Formosa or the former German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator, which had been mandated her, notably the Marianas (less Guam) and the Carolines.\(^7\)

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For the U.S. Navy, the Four Power Treaty, followed shortly thereafter with the Five-Power Treaty, and its further restrictions on nonfortification of these same islands "virtually ruled out the possibility of conducting offensive against Japan in her own waters," necessitated a rethinking of both its strategic precepts and operational concepts during the interwar period. An important by-product of the conference was the subsequent agreements between the Pacific powers (the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France and later Italy), known respectively as the Four-and Five-Power Pacific Pacts, that agreed upon not only a recognition of one another's rights [and territorial possessions] in the Pacific, but likewise agreed to supposedly resolve all territorial disputes by arbitration. The Four-Power Treaty, signed on 13 December 1921 likewise stipulated that:

if the rights of the four signatories were threatened by another power, they shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.\(^8\)

In short, the countries represented in this treaty pledged to "respect one another's insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific."

The Five Power Pact signed on 22 February 1922, which included all of the terms of the Four Power Pact with the added stipulations that the major Pacific powers would respect, "Dutch rights in the oil-rich East Indies," as well as consigning the Island of Yap, which had been coveted by both the Navy and commercial interests as a way station for a trans-Pacific cable over to Japan so long as the former respected the rights

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\(^8\)Bailey, *Diplomatic History*, p. 644.
of Americans and interests in the region. By the terms of Article XIX of the Five Power Treaty:

the United States, England, and Japan agreed not to fortify further or to build new naval bases in most of their insular possessions in the Pacific. More precisely, the American government promised not to augment the defenses of the Aleutians, Midway, Wake, Tutuila, Guam, and the Philippines, but it reserved the right to develop Hawaii and the islands adjacent to its continental shores, including Alaska and the Canal Zone. The British accepted the principle of nonfortification for all its parts of their Pacific empire except Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands along the Canadian coast. The Japanese—who were already barred from using for military purposes their mandates in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas—renounced their freedom to strengthen the Kuriles, the Bonins, the Ryukus, Formosa, and the Pescadores. The home islands and southern Sakhalin were not covered by Article XIX.11

Within a period of two months, the United States had not only agreed to scrap or halt construction of some thirty battleships, but had guaranteed Japanese domination of the mid-routes to Guam, and more importantly, to the Philippine Islands. Furthermore, the three treaties signed in Washington, further strengthened the isolationists and guaranteed U.S. naval inferiority up to the eve of World War II. In fact, it was the nonfortification clauses of both the Four and Five Power treaties that had the greatest effects on U.S. naval and military strategy in the interwar period, as well as directly affecting the Marine Corps, and its gradual evolution as an amphibious assault force in the mid-to-late 1930's. While the Naval Limitations Treaty guaranteed an Anglo-American naval superiority over Japan, the nonfortification clauses left a number of U.S. and British possessions "inadequately protected," and gave Japan not only greater security, but the impetus to challenge the United States [and Britain] over the claim to domination of the Pacific Ocean area.12

12Braithed, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1909-22, p. 573; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 215
The Treaties and the Marine Corps

In spite of the resultant reduction in naval tonnage and manpower, the treaties signed in Washington, D.C., affected but did not drastically curtail the Marine Corps's missions and roles during the first three years of their implementation. In fact, one could say that for the Marine Corps at least through the mid-1920s, the lobbying and budgetary restraints emplaced by General Lejeune all but saved the Marine Corps from financial and institutional oblivion. Prior to the Fiscal Year 1922 Naval Appropriations Bill reaching the floor of the House of Representatives, Lejeune succeeded in reaching an eleventh hour agreement with the House Appropriations Committee chairman Congressman Martin B. Madden who, after expressing his "confidence in the Marine Corps," agreed to accept any reasonable proposal in end strength offered by the Major General Commandant. After making what Lejeune termed "a careful analysis of the personnel situation," he then submitted a revised reduction figure from 22,000 to 19,500 men, as opposed to the more drastically arrived at figure of 13,000 officers and enlisted men. Lejeune's persuasive manner in his negotiations with Congress [as well as his own budget cutting measures], paid large dividends for in the subsequent "fight that ensued on the floor of the House over Naval Appropriations," as both the Navy and the Marine Corps came out slightly ahead with the Navy permitted to have an enlisted end-strength of 87,000, while the Marine Corps remained at 19,500 officers and enlisted men. As Lejeune later related to his sister Augustine in a letter dated 18 April 1922, the Marine Corps "... escaped a gun and stands well with all factions in the House of Representatives. I hope we may do as well in the Senate." In the subsequent debate

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13Lejeune, Reminiscences, p. 476.
with both the SNAC, as well as with the full Senate, the Marine Corps did, in fact, "do well," without any cutbacks of its personnel or funding.\textsuperscript{15} This, however, would not last as deployments, normal attrition and lower enlistments, as well as an even more conservative-minded financially-austere Congress, introduced deeper cuts in the late 1920s that severely hampered the Marine Corps ability to carry out all of its assigned functions. Thus, despite all of Lejeune’s lobbying efforts to stave off any deep cuts, the Marine Corps was left with little to spare in regards to Lejeune’s creation of a viable Marine Corps Expeditionary Force.

The Washington Naval Conference nonetheless forced Headquarters to redirect its effort toward the development and refinement of a wartime role and mission with the fleet that was both evolutionary and revolutionary in nature. This role was, of course, as an assault-oriented expeditionary force, tasked with the mission of supporting the Navy during the execution of a naval campaign in the seizure and retention of advanced naval bases. It thus became the task of Lejeune and his fellow officers to build and train this force, as well as develop a doctrine that gave the Marine Corps a permanent role in any joint or combined operation with the Army and Navy.

It is here that the terms of both the Four-Power and Five-Power treaties, and the implications they held in the redefinition of the Marine Corps wartime roles and missions, warrant discussion since they directly affected the planning and doctrinal developments at Headquarters. As will be seen in this and subsequent chapters, the treaties inadvertently shaped the Marine Corps’ interwar organization, training programs, and officer and enlisted education. The two treaties agreed upon by the signatory nations at the Washington Conference had as much to do with strategy and future operational concepts as they did in naval disarmament.

\textsuperscript{15}Lejeune, \textit{Reminiscences}, p. 477.
To many observers of the Washington Conference, both the agreements on the limitation of capital ships and the nonfortification clauses of the Four-Power Treaty, created a serious and "dangerous gap between strategy and diplomacy," one that Secretary Hughes failed to see or if he did, neglected to press either of the parties attending the conference since it would have led to further negotiations and more concessions by the United States or a possible break up of the meeting itself with no agreement.\(^{16}\) Furthermore, the United States had not only acquiesced in Japanese naval domination of the western Pacific but gave her a free hand to intervene when she felt compelled in China. Despite the fact that the United States and Great Britain seemed to benefit from the fact they would be permitted to strengthen their outlying possessions in the Pacific while Japan had been allowed to strengthened the defenses of her homeland at the expense of a few capital ships and naval inferiority. The greater benefit garnished by Japan was in the fact that its Navy remained within easy striking distance of not only the former German possessions she now had mandates on, but also on those owned by the United States and Great Britain. In spite of the fact that the League of Nations had explicity forbidden the Japanese to fortify the mandated islands, which were "...now within her grasp," the Japanese Navy "...remained better able to strike at those possessions than their owners were to defend them. Fortified or not, Japan's island empire formed a protective screen of immense strategic value, as well as a multitude of potentially offensive submarine and air bases."\(^{17}\) Likewise, the Japanese military now had a "yellow" caution light to probe, and proceed ahead with its policy of subjugating the Asian mainland, first by economic, and later military means.

Secretary Hughes, nonetheless, had merely pursued at the Washington Conference, the only logical course that the United States could have followed, given American

ambivalence in opening up the coffers and supporting a massive ship building and fortifications program. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Senate's Majority Leader and ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, informed Secretary Hughes that support for both a massive naval program and fortification of the island possessions in question was simply not present in either houses of Congress. This decision in turn affected the Marine Corps in terms of both manpower and money, since the strength of the Marine Corps at the time had been based on one-fifth that of the Navy's operating strength, a point that Lejeune continually stressed in testimony before the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees. Weakened by both the executive and legislative branches as the clamor for further disarmament continued, both the Marine Corps, as well as the other services found it difficult if not impossible to talk about future wars when war itself had been "outlawed" and the possibility of the U.S. resorting to force to protect China or, any of the American Pacific possessions seemed remote at best. Even with the Four-Power Treaty, and its allowances for the U.S. to build fortifications on both the Philippines and Guam, both the Army and the Navy if not reluctant, remained complacent as to the preparation of these islands for a war that many had, in fact, reasoned was both unavoidable and inevitable between the United States and Japan. The reliance on half-measures, a feature that repeated itself time and again throughout the 1920's and 1930's, due largely to insufficient resources, and an over-reliance on war plans that assumed the war would be fought according to a prearranged script, all but insured Japan an easy go of it during the first months of the Pacific War in 1941. The belief that the Army would hold onto the Philippines while Guam and the other island possessions held out (Midway did, and Wake could have had the Navy began fortifying the island sooner), while the Navy steamed across the Pacific Ocean to do battle with the Japanese fleet was wishful thinking at best among the planners. American strategists, from the time of President Theodore Roosevelt onward, saw the Philippines as the
U.S.'s "Achilles Heel," and a great waste of material resources that could have been better used in building up the defenses and dry dock on Guam as well as the facilities at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii [T.H.]. 18 To have based a strategy on assumptions rather than a sound pragmatic analysis of the enemy's capabilities, and his most likely courses of action doomed U.S. actions in the 1920's and 1930's, as military planners struggled with the ominous warnings coming from Japan that threatened to upset the status quo in the Pacific. While it remains speculative at best, had Guam and the other islands of the South and Central Pacific Ocean Areas been fully fortified or, at least strengthened during the interwar era, it is unlikely that Japan would have been as bold as she subsequently was during the 1930's. In fact, "the Four Power Treaty, plus the Naval Treaty, practically guaranteed Japan against military interference by the United States, thus assuring her that she need have little fear of war with the United States or Great Britain; further, that the diplomatic intervention by these two Powers in Japan's Asiatic Policy was made to seem unlikely." 19 "Japan," as a latter Marine Corps study undertaken by the MCS's Field Officer's Course concluded, "was not driven out of Asia," with, in fact, "her position there being practically undisturbed," and possibly strengthened, as a result of the treaties signed in Washington, D.C. In fact, the disarmament and treaties signed in the early 1920's handed both Army and Navy planners the unenviable task of anticipating and preparing for a possible war with the Empire of the Rising Sun at some future date. As for the Marine Corps, and more specifically Major General Lejeune, who was about to embark on his second tour as the Major General Commandant, planning for war became tied up with the same problems of military budgets, preparedness, and


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service roles and missions that proved to be obstacles far more insurmountable than the negotiations over the Washington Naval Conference had proven.

For the Marine Corps, the Washington Naval Treaties had implications that directed the course of that service for the remainder of Lejeune's tenure [as well as those of his four successors]. During this period, Lejeune remained fixated on the problems of manpower, deployments and an ever-deepening congressional budget-cutting ax that disrupted his plans to train and equip an adequate expeditionary force to accompany the fleet in time of war. While the latter goal dominated his long-range plans for the Corps, the reality of the times dictated that the East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces had to make do with what they had.

Nonetheless, the Marine Corps Schools did examine the effects of the naval conference with several interesting observations, ones that set in motion, albeit slowly, the reemphasis on base seizure and base defense. For the Major General Commandant, "... the wartime mission of the Corps was to accompany the Fleet for operations ashore in support of the Fleet ... and termed this wartime role ... the real justification for the continued existence of the Marine Corps."20 This last observation, repeated time and again by Lejeune, in both speeches and testimony before military and civilian audiences alike, is one that deserves some discussion, since it set the tone for the remainder of his tenure as head of the Marine Corps, and one that guided his successors up to the reorganization of the East and West Coast Expeditionary forces into the Fleet Marine Force in 1934. Furthermore, if one were to examine the curriculum and lectures of the 1920's, one can see the slow, but steady movement toward the study of past and present maritime operations and strategy. This emphasis included primarily those operations that took place during the World War (i.e. Gallipoli, Ostend and Zeebrugge, and the German

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landing in Riga in 1917), and pointed to the impact that the World War had on future military operations. For Lejeune, the task became both one of how to shape its future mission around, and on the incorporation of these same lessons into the Corps' training and school system.\textsuperscript{21}

One of the most important conclusions Lejeune and his fellow Marine officers arrived at as a result of the Naval treaties was the realization for a restructuring of the Marine Corps, "based upon war needs."\textsuperscript{22} The force restructuring envisioned by the Major General Commandant had to take into consideration the fact that with the nonfortification clauses of the Four and Five-Power treaties:

\begin{quote}
The wide spread of ocean separating us [the United States] from two possible enemies indicates clearly that any great war we may engage in will extend over considerable distances, being comprised very largely of what we term overseas operations. Hence, the necessity for "outlying naval and commercial bases, suitably distributed and defended," is readily apparent.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

The fact that U.S. forces would have to fight over two vast oceans imposed two basic requirements on future maritime operations, both of which pointed toward the need for an advanced base force capable of seizing and holding these same bases against any determined enemy counterattack. These requirements included: (1) Our Fleet must fight, be maintained and supplied at a great distance from the home land; (2) The possibility of a lack of base facilities abroad requires a complete mobile base, until such time as suitable permanent bases can be established in the fleet zone.\textsuperscript{24} The study's main thrust centered, however, on the basic fact that "Where bases are to be seized for the fleet,

\textsuperscript{21}For an excellent example see both the General Graves B. Erskine, USMC Papers, loc. cit.; and the Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Utley, USMC, Papers, PC #127, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, MCHC)
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid, p. 8-a.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
there you will find the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. They constitute the Army of the fleet and upon their ability to land and seize base territory depends on the successful operation of the battle and scouting fleet." In short, there was a realization among members of both the Joint Army-Navy Board, as well as of the General Board that the mission of the Marine Corps was to, "support the operations of the Fleet in its effort to gain and maintain command of the sea."²⁵

Thus for Lejeune, the problem now became one of means and not ends. While he succeeded in securing for the Marine Corps a real wartime mission, one in which promised at least that the Marine Corps would remain a part of the fleet in time of war, the problems faced by the Major General Commandant centered along the lines of retaining sufficient manpower, as well as training and educating Marines in advanced base techniques, in order to facilitate at least a minimal amount of preparedness while still carrying out its traditional functions of providing ships detachments and supporting the shore establishment. As outlined to the Special Board on Policy regarding the use of a Marine Corps Expeditionary Force during the prosecution of a naval campaign on 5 January 1925,²⁶ Lejeune emphasized the fact that even though the Joint Board of the Army and Navy Board had tasked the Marine Corps with the responsibility of base seizure, the Marine Corps itself had to be "so organized, equipped and trained as to be

²⁵Ibid.
able and competent to perform these duties which may be assigned to it under its mission, as above stated, the Fleet may be seriously handicapped or may be prevented from the accomplishment of its mission in peace and war."

The Major General Commandant then outlined a series of specific tasks that needed to be accomplished in order to prepare the Marine Corps for war. These tasks included:

(a) Training of all Marine personnel to prepare them to meet the requirements of duty as stated.

(b) Service of a portion of the Marine Corps personnel as an integral part of the crews of the active ships of the Fleet to indoctrinate the whole Corps with naval ideas and customs and duties.

(c) The organization and training of two Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces in readiness for the various classes of naval expeditionary duty in the Atlantic or the Pacific, with provision for the rapid increase of such forces to the required war strength when war becomes imminent.

(d) Frequent exercises and maneuvers of these expeditionary forces with the Fleet to accustom them to embarking and disembarking personnel and material, and to joint land and sea operations under simulated war conditions.

(e) Plans for the procurement of personnel and material for the rapid increase in strength of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces when required by war emergencies.

(f) The maintenance of Marine Detachments at all posts of naval activity where their services are required, and the necessary training of these detachments to fit them for reinforcing the principal Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces, when required by war emergencies.

(g) The Marine Corps should be maintained with a full commissioned personnel, sufficient enlisted personnel to perform its assigned peace time duties and to provide the trained nucleus for the Expeditionary Forces that would be required in war, and also with a trained reserve of officers and enlisted men to rapidly bring these forces to the required war strength.

For Major General Lejeune, the crux of the problem in preparing the Marine Corps for war depended on a number of factors, some of which he attempted to address during the first four years as commandant and were ongoing, such as training of personnel; ships'

27 Ibid.
detachments and guards at the various Navy yards; while others hinged on congressional appropriations and allotments as well as cooperation with the Army and Navy in conducting joint maneuvers. Yet the central problem affecting all of them was over manpower. If one were to examine the implications of the above-mentioned tasks, each one of them required officers and enlisted men, neither of which the Marine Corps had in great numbers at the start of Lejeune's second tour as commandant. The Marine Corps, nonetheless continued to train, and by the mid-1920's, had been actively training and conducting annual exercises with both the Army and Navy, and was also in the process of organizing a much better reserve system, three factors alone that promised to increase the Corps' preparedness for war. Even more important, was the fact that the East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces had been organized and permanently garrisoned at two bases, Quantico, and San Diego, while Marines from both forces routinely participated in the annual fleet exercises off Culebra, Puerto Rico (1922-24), the Canal Zone, Panama (1924), and Oahu, Territory of Hawaii (1925). Besides participation in the annual fleet exercises, Marines participated in the reenactments of the four Civil War battles held at Gettysburg, Antietam, The Wilderness, and The Battle of New Market [held with the cadets of the Virginia Military Institute], which illustrated the impact of the World War on Marine operational doctrine and procedures. For all of Lejeune's desires to redirect the Marine Corps toward the expeditionary mission, however, he still faced internal and external obstacles from within and outside the Corps as to what the real mission of the Marine Corps should be, as well as his own reluctance to give up those traditional duties Marines performed aboard ships and ashore.

The Major General Commandant's goal of preparing the Marine Corps for the successful prosecution of a naval campaign had, in fact, been recognized by Navy officials in the aftermath of the Washington Naval Conference. This recognition, was more, in fact, of an acknowledgment on the Navy's part that any war in the Pacific would
be a strategic defensive-operationally offensive conflict, necessitating the ability to conduct limited land campaigns in order to seize advanced bases for fleet replenishment and force staging areas tied in with the United States' overall military strategy. This post-Washington Naval Treaty strategy remained both a reflection of the isolationist policies and inclinations of Congress, as well as the realization of maintaining a strong naval presence in those areas of vital economic concern to the United States, particularly in the Pacific Ocean area. In short, this strategy included:

(1) The creation, maintenance, and operation of a Navy second to none within the ratio for capital ships established by the Treaty for Limitations of Naval Armaments.
(2) To make war efficiency the object of all training, and to maintain that efficiency during the entire period of peace.
(3) To develop and organize a Navy for operations in any part of either ocean.
(4) To make strength of the Navy for battle of primary importance.
(5) To make strength of the Navy for exercising world-wide economic pressure next in importance.
(6) To encourage, and endeavor to lead in, the development of the art and material of naval warfare.
(7) To cultivate friendly and sympathetic relations with the whole world by foreign cruises.
(8) To support in every possible way American interests especially the expansion and development of American foreign commerce.
(9) To maintain a Marine Corps of such strength that it will be able adequately to support the Navy by furnishing detachments to vessels of the Fleet in full commission, guards for shore stations, garrisons for outlying positions; and the maintenance in readiness of an Expeditionary Force.
(10) To cooperate fully and loyally with all Departments of the Government.  

Thus, it became the task of Lejeune and his successors to build and "maintain" a force

of Marines capable of participating in a naval campaign. This in turn forced Headquarters to focus on not only the identification of where the Marine Corps might be employed in the prosecution of a naval campaign, but also of how the Navy intended to employ a Marine expeditionary force. Hence, the importance (and one might add necessity) of Lejeune's reorganization and expansion of Headquarters, the creation and expansion of both East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces, as well as the introduction of curriculum into the MCS system of not only advance base studies and problems, but of the necessity of adequate war plans and the testing of these same theories in practical exercises with both the fleets and the U.S. Army.

**Headquarters Marine Corps and War Planning, 1921-1926**

Preparation and planning for war was not new to Marines. The Marine Corps' first experience with war planning came in 1900, with the creation of the General Board of the Navy and the appointment of Colonel George C. Reid as the first Marine representative on a major council of war. While this in itself proved to a major victory for the Marine Corps, the inability of the Corps to secure itself a position on the Joint Army-Navy Board, was a major setback toward the assignment and recognition of a major wartime mission and role in any future war.³⁰ Since it was the Joint Board that "not only determined military strategy but outlined the specific role each service would play" in any future war, Marine officers concurred in their belief that until a Marine representative sat on this council of war, the position of the Marines remained tenuous at best. In fact, prior to his assumption as the Major General Commandant, Lejeune, in fact, advanced the necessity of a Marine representative on the Joint Board in a letter to the

Chief of Naval Operations. In making a case for the seating of a Marine officer on the Joint Board, Lejeune wrote:

It will undoubtedly be conceded that the proper functions of the Army are on land and those of the Navy on the sea . . . and it is conceived that the sole reason for the existence of a Joint Board is to decide the proper functioning and coordination of the Army and the Navy where the land and the sea meet . . . . It is just this terrain that is the legitimate field of operations for the Marine Corps . . . and it would seem only just that the Corps should have a vote, or at least a representative present, who can take part in discussion affecting the Corps. 31

Despite Lejeune's assertion that a Marine representative should be placed on the Joint Board, the fact remained that both the Navy's and Army's senior leadership opposed the seating of a Marine on this council. This opposition was due in large part to the persistent belief on the part of both the admirals and generals that Marine officers were "less competent to hold high positions than officers of their service and feared that the Corps would encroach on their jealously guarded prerogatives." 32 In fact, this belief among senior Army officers remained in place long after World War II. Due largely to the controversial publicity the Marine Corps received after the Battle of Belleau Wood during the World War, as well as to persistence of the cliché that the acronym 'USMC' meant "Useless Sons Made Comfortable," it seems inconceivable that Marine officers would've been admitted to this higher war council without further antagonizing the already strained relationship between the two services.

For the Navy's part, the lingering effects of the attempts to have Marines removed from ships (1890, 1907-8, and 1913) left a lasting legacy of distrust and suspicion between the two sea services that only the close cooperation during World War II erased. In fact, Admiral William S. Sims, President of the Naval War College at the

31 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
conclusion of the World War, remarked to a session of officers at the school that
"Marine officers are not qualified by precept and military education to command large
forces in war. They are suitable for minor operations but they cannot be entrusted with
major operations." While a subordinate officer respectfully reminded the admiral that
Marine officers commanded brigades and divisions during the recently concluded war,
the belief persisted among naval officers that Marines were incapable of higher
command.33 Sims' statement is all the more credulous when one considers that Colonel
Robert H. Dunlap ably served in the Planning Section with the admiral's Naval Planning
Group, based in London, England and prior to that, at the Naval War College, where
Sims' first met the brilliant Marine officer.34 In defense of Sims, however, it can be
argued that he had, in fact, been a protege of Fullam, and was undoubtedly influenced by
the movement to remove Marines from the Navy's ships during the late 1890s. Despite
Dunlap's service with Sims during the war and the argument that Marines, when given
the opportunity, could lead a larger force than a regiment in combat, it mattered little
when it came time to admit Marine officers to the higher councils of war. In fact, one
might argue, that it was an "apples and oranges" argument, since the former involved
leadership and tactical abilities, while the latter involved the ability to look at the
"broader aspects of war and politics" on a grand scale, something Marine officers had
not been known for prior to, and immediately after the World War. In short, tactical and
operational prowess did not, in the estimation of both the Army and Naval officers

Zenger Publishing/Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947, Reprinted as FMFRP 12-37; Quantico,
V.A., Marine Corps University, MCCDC, 1989), p. 53. Hereafter cited as Smith and
Finch, Coral and Brass.
34Rear Admiral William S. Sims ltr. to Major General Commandant, dtd. 25 February
1921, in the Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, USMC, Papers, (Washington, D.C.,
History and Museums Division, HQMC, PC#302, Box 2, Correspondence Folder, 1919-
59).
qualify Marines for assignment in the preparation of war plans. Lastly, one could argue the simple fact that during the immediate postwar period there were only a handful of Marine officers that justifiably could have sat on the Joint Board during the interwar period with the necessary skills as strategists, as well as tacticians.\textsuperscript{35}

Nonetheless, the door to Marine involvement in the planning process of the Joint Army-Navy Board opened slightly with the appointment of Major Holland M. Smith to the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board. Major Smith, who rose to prominence in the Marine Corps during the Second World War, had the reputation as both volatile and controversial (he later earned the nickname "Howlin Mad"). During the World War, Smith had served as the adjutant of the 4th Marine Brigade, and later as assistant operations officer of the I Corps, U.S. First Army. While he recognized the importance of working with his counterparts in the other services, his open contempt of both the Army's hostility toward Marines, and the snobbishness of most Navy officers, ingrained in this Marine a deep suspicion of both services, a factor that would lead to several unfortunate inter-service incidents during World War II, that further soured relations between the two land services for decades afterwards. Smith's appointment to the Joint Board's Planning Committee nonetheless gave the Marine Corps its first real opportunity to become a part of the war planning process of the Joint Board, as well as \textit{de facto} recognition of its advanced base force role.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35} In this category one could include Major General John A. Lejeune, Brigadier General's Robert H. Dunlap, Eli K. Cole, Dion Williams, John H. Russell, Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis, and Major Holland M. Smith. Other officers that deserve special note include Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb and Major Graves B. Erskine, and Captains Charlie D. Barrett and Gerald C. Thomas. Of those mentioned, only Ellis failed to become a general officer and this only due to his untimely death in 1923. See Allan R. Millett, \textit{Semper Fidelis}, pp. 267-86, and 319-43 respectively.

\textsuperscript{36}Infusino, "U.S. Marines and War Planning," pp. 10-12; Smith and Finch, \textit{Coral and Brass}, pp. 54-5.
This involvement in the war planning process by the Marine Corps centered itself around War Plan Orange, one of several color-coded plans devised by the Joint Army and Navy Board (1903), that revolved around a possible war between the United States and Japan. First devised by the Joint Board in November 1906, planners updated Orange periodically to reflect the state of preparedness for a potential war with the Japanese Empire. Involvement in the World War, and the amicable though suspicious relations between the U.S. and Japan during that same conflict caused that plan-like that of the others to lapse into obscurity—only to be rescued at the end of that conflict as Japan gained control of the former German possessions in the Pacific, and the terms and consequences of the Washington Naval Conference began to settle in among the senior U.S. Naval leadership. As a result of the Washington Naval Conference, both Army and Navy planners once again began work on a not so hypothetical enemy, inasmuch as a potential enemy, when the Joint Board submitted a revised War Plan Orange in 1924. As agreed to by both the Army and the Navy, any war with Japan would be an:

offensive war, primarily naval, directed toward the isolation and harassment of Japan, through control of her vital sea communications and through offensive sea and air operations against her naval forces and economic life; followed, if necessary, by such further action as may be required to win the battle.37

The Joint Army and Navy Board expected an Orange War to be both protracted, and encompass the entire length of the mid-Central Pacific Ocean Area. While the Navy had been expected to wrest control of the Central Pacific from the Japanese fleet, and secure those anchorages necessary for resupply and maintenance, the Army would provide the necessary men and equipment to seize and fortify the islands taken along the way. Given

the fact that the Army had already been tasked to fortify and defend the Philippines, as well as mobilize an estimated 50,000 troops for such a role with the Navy, one-third the size of the postwar U.S. Army, the plan fell victim to both the wishful thinking on the part of the planners, and the budgetary and isolationist-minded Executive and Legislative branches of government during the 1920's and 1930's.  

Unlike the other color-coded plans, which were "virtually meaningless because they bore so little relation to contemporary international political and military alignments," War Plan Orange remained the foundation upon which Navy and Army planners based their pre-World War II strategic assumptions upon; as well as being the basis for the subsequent island-to-island campaign against the Japanese which had occupied practically all the islands Marine and Navy planners wargamed, and wrote voluminous reports on during the interwar period. Nonetheless, the "color plans" dominated the interwar thinking and planning of the Joint Board and the Army and Navy staffs which turned out to be "of comparatively minor importance." Added to this was the simple fact that these "minor operations contemplated probably would have strained the resources of the skeleton Army [as well as that of both the Navy and Marines] of the years 1921-1940." In fact, only Orange received more than the normal share of attention during the interwar period, this due to the simple fact that the Japanese military posed by far, the greater threat during the interwar era than that of even the Germans in the pre-1917 period, with War Plan Black.

38Ibid, pp. 4-5.
The first serious War Plan Orange, however, fell victim to the same inter-service squabbling that torpedoed earlier war plans involving a war with Japan. One of the provisions in this revised War Plan Orange called for a command arrangement that had provided for a single, overall commander-in-chief who had a joint staff "to control each phase of the operations."41 The expeditionary force, sailing to the objective area, would be placed under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, with the commander of the subsequent operations designated by the President of the United States. Almost immediately both services, as might be expected, objected to this command arrangement, and wanted the idea of "mutual cooperation" inserted in its place. Finally, when the Secretaries of War and the Navy submitted a revised Orange Plan in 1928, there were provisions for a unified command. Still, however, the chiefs balked, and instead drew up their own plans, in addition to the official "joint" version, for a potential war with Japan.

Thus, with the Army objecting to serving under a naval commander and *vis a versa*, the door had been opened, if only slightly, for the Marines to fill in for the Army as the land component, tasked with the seizure and defense of any advanced naval bases during the *initial* phases of a land campaign proceeding a naval campaign. Major General Lejeune had, in fact, set the tone for this mission when he concluded that the Marine Corps' future lay with that of the Navy, and not as a separate land force. Pragmatic, as well as cognizant of the fact that the Marine Corps had neither the manpower nor desire for the role as a second land force, the Major General Commandant saw the Corps' future tied to that of the Navy's. Thus, when Lejeune stated that the "most important duty of the Marine Corps in peace was, the maintenance, equipping, and training of its expeditionary force so that it will be in instant readiness to support the fleet in the event

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41Hayes, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 5.
of war," he was merely acknowledging (and admitting), that the base seizure and assault mission held out the only true role for his Marines during a naval campaign.\textsuperscript{42}

**War Plan Orange**

It is at this point that a brief examination of War Plan Orange is required, since it will not only provide a better perspective in understanding Major Earl H. Ellis's operational plan that included a fair amount of material from this war plan. Furthermore, it will illustrate the difficulties that Lejeune, and his successors faced, in the wake of the austerity that all but effectively curtailed recruiting, modernization of equipment and training on even a modest scale and how these affected training, and the Marine Corps's overall preparedness during the interwar era.

Of all the conceivable enemies in the immediate postwar environment, both Army and Navy planners could find common agreement in assessing Japan as the most likely U.S. adversary. While some anglophobes saw the British Royal Navy as a potential adversary, it remained doubtful that this antagonism would lead to war. Furthermore, there was little sentiment for a war on either side of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{43} Indeed, when the conferees had departed Washington at the conclusion of the naval conference in February 1922, only Japan remained physically and materially strong enough to challenge the United States Navy in the Pacific. There existed between the United States and Japan, in fact, a number of "unresolved differences and a reservoir of misunderstanding and ill will that made the possibility of conflict much more likely in that area than in the


Atlantic." Furthermore, the end of the World War, as well as the Washington Naval Conference, and the treaties produced as a result of that conference, merely served to strengthen Japan's position in the Pacific. Thus, U.S. war planners concentrated the bulk of their efforts during the 1920's and 1930's planning for a war that appeared unavoidable. Hence, from 1919 to 1939, Japan became the focus of U.S. military planners [including the Marines] in the war plans, student papers, and wargames held at both the Army and Navy War Colleges, and at the Marine Corps Schools in the late 1920's and 1930's. At the base of these studies was War Plan Orange, a series of war plans drawn up by the War and Navy departments as well as by the Joint Board and the General Board of the Navy that contained the basic strategic concepts for a war against Japan. While the plan itself went through many variations and changes, usually adjusted and modified according to which direction the prevailing winds of American foreign policy had been blowing, the basic framework of the plan revolved around a naval campaign, largely Mahanian in nature, whereby the U.S. fleet would steam out of its bases along the west coast and Hawaii, fight its way across the Central Pacific, and relieve the beleaguered U.S. Army in the Philippines. While no actual landing was to take place in the Japanese Home Islands, U.S. forces would "isolate and harass" the island empire's sea lines of communications and supply lines, and force her to surrender. If in the unlikely possibility that Japan's will to resist had not been broken, U.S. forces would be in a position to "take such further action as may be required to win the war." For the carrying out of such a strategy, it became essential that the Army held out in the Philippines until the arrival of the fleet into Manila Bay. As envisioned, the Navy had the more critical role since it not only had to defeat the Japanese Navy, but had also been given the mission of seizing and defending advanced bases for supply and air bases. This

44Ibid.
was not, however, the only shortcoming of War Plan Orange, since there were others that tied directly into the basic formulation of the plan that planners (both Army and Navy) assumed would be corrected with proper funding and manpower.

The failure on the part of the Army to address the deficiencies in the Philippines had been matched by the Navy's failure to take seriously Guam's key position in the whole scheme of War Plan Orange. In fact, blame can be laid at the feet of the Navy since it had, as early as 1913, concluded that Guam, in the Marianas Islands, located midway between Honolulu and the Philippines was, in fact, the linchpin of any strategic plan calling for the successful reinforcement or defense of the Philippines. Naval strategy, likewise, began to reflect this view about the same time. Marines likewise saw the value of Guam as a possible site for an advanced naval base, and in one case, saw the island of Guam as more defensible than that of the Philippines. Marine Major Samuel W. Bogan, in an article written for the Marine Corps Gazette, on possible sites for advanced bases, argued that in a choice between the Philippines and Guam, the latter "should become the site for the permanent base," due to its position and terrain, which he considered more favorable to defense than the former. Despite Bogan's article and the defenses installed by Lejeune's Marines prior to the deadline set by the Washington naval treaties, little was done to prepare Guam prior to the Hepburn Board in 1937, which recommended that more be done in the way of building up that island's defenses in order to resist any possible invasion by an enemy amphibious attack.45 Earlier attempts had failed to

adequately prepare Guam or any other island in the mid-Pacific Ocean range for attacks by an enemy invasion force. Guam's defenses, like those of the Philippines, in fact, became a political "football" with the Navy on one side of the field with the Army on the other, with an increase in appropriations being the key to securing full cooperation by both services. Despite Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels' "approval of a Joint Board's general scheme for bases in the Pacific in August 1920," and the War Plans Division of the General Staff's detailed estimates for the island's defense, Army Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March, ordered the suspension of any planning for Guam, "until the President approved an expected report from former Army General Leonard Wood on the [state of the defenses in] the Philippines and until Congress established the Army's strength."46 Thus, the problem fell to the Navy Department, and subsequently that of the Marines, who were to "improvise such defenses of Guam, as was possible with the material at hand. In a report to Secretary Daniels on 27 July 1920, shortly after assuming the Commandancy, Major General Lejeune informed him that on Guam:

... the Marines had sixty-six 7-inch guns, sixteen 8-inch howitzers, 2,500 machine guns, and an assortment of other weapons from which the general proposed to replace the 4-inch and 5-inch guns of the advanced base outfit that had been hastily installed in 1913.47

Sensing the urgency of emplacing these new defenses, approved by both Daniels and the General Board with "exemplary promptness," Lejeune's Marines, "rushed preparations for an inner defense around Mount Tenjo and a second on Orote Peninsula capable of destroying Apra to enemy ships." By the time the nonfortification clauses of the Naval

47 Ibid.
treaties of 1922 began to take effect regarding the cessation of further military improvements on the island, "most of this project had been completed."48

Complimenting the emplacement of fixed naval defenses was the arrival of Marine Flight "L" aboard the USS Jason on 1 March 1921. In a message to the Governor of Guam, Admiral R. E. Coontz, requested that the governor should "afford the flight every reasonable facility for establishing itself on an operating military basis at the earliest practicable date."49 In the same memorandum, the Chief of Naval Operations instructed the Marines that upon arrival they were to proceed "immediately upon landing, to erect an air station on such sites as may be selected, and implement a rigorous training schedule that included,"

(a). Communications between planes, naval vessels and shore stations.
(b) Searching Operations.
(c) Gunnery
(d) Photography
(e) Distant Overseas flights, suitable vessels being held available for rescue work.50

Throughout the remainder of the 1920s, the Marines maintained one Scouting Squadron (VS1M) at Sumay, Guam, comprised of One Division (four planes) active, and allotted two divisions (inactive) for the island's air defenses. Headquarters likewise maintained a complement of Marines on the island, though usually no larger than a reinforced company, due largely to lagging enlistments, as well as commitments in China and Nicaragua.51

48Ibid.  
50Ibid.  
51Major General Commandant, Annual Report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1927.  

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Despite the flurry of activity to bolster Guam's defenses, repeated attempts to strengthen the island's defenses failed due largely to the budget cuts in men and material, as well as to the general conclusion by Marine officers as early as 1921, that both "Guam and probably the Philippines would fall to the enemy shortly after the outbreak of war, and that Marine Corps units in cooperation with Army troops, would face the task of seizing bases in the Marshalls, Carolines, Marianas, and Philippines."\(^{52}\) In short, with Japan's acquisition of the islands around Guam and the Philippines under the League of Nations mandates and by the terms of the Washington Naval treaties, both the Joint and General Boards had already written off the defense of both islands despite the pronouncements made by individuals from the War and Navy departments as well as from the individual service chiefs themselves. In fact, both the Navy and War Departments had long ago concluded that both islands were indefensible given their proximity to Japan vice that of the United States. As early as 1911, Alfred Thayer Mahan and a litany of naval officers had concluded that half-hearted measures in building up the defenses of Guam and the Philippines were just as dangerous as no fortifications at all, since they provided an extremely useful foundation for an enemy's defensive plans. Mahan believed that any half-hearted measures might, in fact, be used by the enemy (i.e. Japan) against any U.S. counterattack.\(^{53}\) Then-Major Robert Dunlap put forth the same argument in a 1912 lecture delivered at the Naval War College, when he stated that only if properly armed, reinforced, and supplied could Guam hold out against a superior enemy landing force. Dunlap, like that of both Mahan and the General Board, agreed


that half measures were far more dangerous than none at all since the retaking of the island would be "easier" in the long run.  

Despite the failure of both the Army General Staff and the Navy to come to terms regarding the defense of the Philippines and of Guam, planning for a possible war with Japan continued. War Plan Orange, in fact, would go through six revisions between 1924 and 1938, revised often in "response to military changes and sometimes as a result of Congressional sentiment, or because of the international situation." What complicated the planning for a war with Japan, was the fact that both the Army and Navy had their own separate Orange plans based on joint plans and complete with concentration tables, mobilization schedules and the like leading to the simple fact that "rarely have plans for a war been so comprehensive and detailed, so complete on every echelon, and so long in preparation." While national defense was the reason most cited for the existence of so many plans for war against Japan, the fact remained that the separate plans drawn up by each service had been designed to justify its budgets and manpower levels. For the Marine Corps this fact, as well as the necessity of "carving out a role and mission for itself" in the nation's defense, seemed to be the larger motive for Lejeune's pronouncements on retaining the Corps' ties to the Navy. Indeed, the Marine Corps salvation came not from its exploits as an constabulary force, but as a combat-ready expeditionary assault force tasked with the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases. This latter fact would be further refined to include only "seizure" as in a forcible

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lodgment on an hostile shore by the Commandant's brilliant, though erratic subordinate, Major Earl H. "Pete" Ellis.

**Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia**

**OPLAN 712-D: The Background**

The bulk of Major General Lejeune's efforts during the first four years of his commandancy, centered on the maintenance of a force that could serve as a basis for a greatly expanded force once war had been declared. While these efforts were ongoing into the first year of his first term as Major General Commandant, another Marine officer had been in the process of drawing up what became the blueprint for a Marine Corps' role in any war with Orange.

Major Earl Hancock Ellis, known in Marine Corps officer circles as "Pete" Ellis, had already established an above-average reputation in Marine Corps officer circles, stemming primarily from his brilliance as a staff planner and adjutant to Major General John A Lejeune, while the latter served as commanding general of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division during the World War. Major Ellis's repeated bouts with alcoholism, and a malady referred to in the early part of this century as neurasthenia had by 1920, overshadowed a career that had much promise in the way of contributing intellectually to the Marine Corps' budding doctrine of amphibious assault during the 1920's and 1930's.

It is at this point that one has to stop and consider the fact on whether or not Ellis' ideas were, in fact, his alone. While Headquarters used *Advanced Base Operations in*
Micronesia in order to establish the intellectual foundation for the force that Lejeune's successors built, particularly Major Generals Ben H. Fuller, John H. Russell, and Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, there is evidence to suggest that the enigmatic Marine officer's ideas weren't the only ones used in the Marine Corps' day-to-day operational considerations for an Orange War. While it remains true that Ellis contributed to the Marine Corps' conceptual growth as an advanced base force, he was only one of several key players in the formulation of this doctrine. Furthermore, only through the patronage of Major General Lejeune (and other senior Marine officers), and his rich intellect, was Ellis able to survive the many scandals and incidents that tainted an otherwise above-average career. In fact, it can be argued that given Ellis' chronic bouts with alcohol and severe depression, it seems unlikely that he would have advanced beyond the rank of a senior field grade (colonel) officer. Also, with the change from promotion by seniority to that of selection it is probable that Ellis would have been forced to retire. This in turn would have negated his impact on the development of amphibious warfare doctrine in the early to mid-1930's.57 Despite this, however, Major Ellis's brilliant OPLAN 712 D: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, approved in its entirety by Major General Lejeune, served as the foundation for all subsequent work by Marine planners in the not only the formulation of a war doctrine in conjunction with an Orange War, but in the organization and training of the East Coast Expeditionary Force during the 1920's, and the Fleet Marine Force during the mid-to-late 1930's.58

57See General Merrill B. Twining, USMC, Oral History Transcript. Interviewed by Benis M. Frank. (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1975). General Twining maintained that while Ellis "did a good job" in his study it was, in fact, Major General John H. Russell and Brigadier General Eli K. Cole that believed amphibious operations were possible. pp. 76-8 and 91-3 respectively; also see Ballendorf and Bartlett, Pete Ellis, pp. 54-9.
58Ballendorf and Bartlett, Pete Ellis, pp. 161-2; Millett, Semper Fidelis, p. 326.
In the formulation of OPLAN 712-D, Ellis assumed two basic points that quickly found ready acceptance at Headquarters. These two points included that in any naval campaign, the Marine Corps, because of its interoperability with the fleets, would serve as the assault troops during the initial stages of a base seizure mission. Secondly, and perhaps most important, was the fact that the Marine Corps had already been working on base seizure and defense prior to the World War, and thus made it the natural choice by the Joint Board to undertake this mission in a war with Orange (or 'Black', i.e. Germany).

Specifically, OPLAN-712-D, like Williams' The Naval Advanced Base, established tables of organization for the force to be employed, though unlike the latter specified such things as mobilization, time tables for arrival in the theater of operations from bases at Quantico and San Diego, as well as specifying the tactics the assault force would use throughout the campaign [both offensively and defensively]. Organizationally, Ellis' plan called for a landing regiment to be followed immediately by an occupation force of Marines or soldiers: (Table 7.1)

### Landing Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Headquarters Detachments</th>
<th>25 Officers and Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Regiments</td>
<td>6000 Officers and Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.1 (CONTINUED)**

Ellis' Proposed Landing Brigade and Regiment
Table 7.1 (CONTINUED)

**Landing Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>125 Officers and Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Company (Pioneers; 4 Radios)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Company (including Boatmen)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Company (12 37mm)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8 75mm)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine-Gun Company (30 guns)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Battalions Riflemen (500 each, minimum)</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,000 Officers and Men</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences in Ellis' plan, and that of Brigadier General Williams, was not only in the number of men per battalion and regiment\(^{59}\) (approximately 350 and 1,312 respectively), but in the actual size of the landing force involved (e.g., Ellis' call for a division vice Williams's brigade-level force). Ellis, in fact, had called for a minimum of two floating regiments per advanced base force, that had assigned to it a force reserve for the assault regiment. This in itself was revolutionary, since Marines only began thinking in terms of divisional strength during the World War, and only then a cursory interest by Major General Barnett. Major Ellis' plan, unlike that of Williams's plan had also targeted a specific group of islands: the Marshall Islands (Eniwetok, Roi-Namur, and Kwajalein), mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, and had meticulously

\(^{59}\) Major Earl H. Ellis, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (1921)*. Reprinted as FMRP-12-46. (Quantico, VA., Marine Corps University, MCCDC, 1992), p. 50.  
\(^{60}\) Brigadier General Williams called for two regiments, one "fixed" and the other "mobile," with the fixed and mobile regiments differing only in the equipment and firepower available. The strength of Williams' regiment was approximately 1,312 officers and men. See Williams, *The Naval Advanced Base*, p. 15.
outlined the size and type of force required to wrest those islands from the Japanese:

(Table 7.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>No. of Regiments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eniwetok</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wotje</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaluit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Special Objectives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>No. of Regiments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mille, Etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likeib, Etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmore, Etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Afloat</td>
<td>1^61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occupation Objectives**

Table 7.2

Island Objectives of Ellis's OPLAN 712-D

Ironically, while Ellis' calculations were right on the mark, insofar as predicting how a Pacific campaign might be waged, it is more likely that the Marine major may have simply copied the Navy's already extensive work on War Plan Orange, and had given it a Marine "twist" in order to justify the Corps' role in any naval campaign in the Pacific.\(^62\) Nonetheless, his later disappearance and suspicious death on Koror Island in Micronesia in 1923, led to Lejeune's acceptance of Ellis' plan, if only as a basis for further planning, and by doing so had elevated Ellis to "sainthood" in the eyes of at least those opposed to

\(^61\)Ellis, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia,* p.50.

the cutbacks after the Washington Naval Treaties, as well as in those officers who remained suspicious of Japan's desire to expand at the expense of China, and the United States.

Nonetheless, OPLAN 712-D remains as a testament to the environment in which the Marine Corps worked in during the 1920's and 1930's, this despite the budget cutbacks, and deployments that sapped available funds for training and equipment. Regardless of the fact that the Marine Corps could not exercise as much as it had wanted during the 1920's, due to budgetary constraints, it lacked of the necessary manpower to conduct such training due to its many missions. Ellis' *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* as well as Colonel Robert H. Dunlap's studies, nonetheless, served as the intellectual basis upon which Marine Corps conducted the theoretical and practical exercises during the interwar era. Thus, born out of institutional survivability, and doctrinal necessity, the ideas postulated by Ellis, as well as others provided the impetus upon which Marines during the 1930's, formulated a largely untested though ultimately successful warfighting doctrine that in its rudimentary form resembled both that of OPLAN 712-D, and the ideas put forward by other Marine officers during the first three decades of the 1900's.

It was the plan put forward by Ellis' plan, however, that most reflected the influence the World War had on his and the Marine Corps' thinking during the interwar period. With the World War still fresh in Ellis' "operationally-thinking" mind, the Marine major advanced ideas in the employment of weaponry and tactics that originated on the battlefields of France. This can be readily seen in his assertion that any assault would have to take place *after* the ships of the fleet bombarded the target area with naval gunfire, with the attack to be proceeded by machine gun, artillery, engineer units, as well as light tanks in order to "penetrate beach defenses and obstacles."

landing of such a force, "special landing craft or vehicles armed with machine guns and
light cannon," would be necessary in order to provide close-in fire support for the
attacking infantry. Ellis likewise reiterated the importance of aircraft for reconnaissance,
and bombing of essential enemy targets. Besides the assault troops and their equipment,
OPLAN-712 D also emphasized the need for specially trained personnel in ship-to-shore
and field communications, field engineering (different from combat engineers or
pioneers) that would build docks, roads, and shelter construction, and later on
airfields.64 In short, throughout Ellis' postulations on a landing operation in the Pacific,
one can see the impact of the World War on the postwar Marine Corps war planning,
particularly from the technological, operational, and tactical standpoints.

What made OPLAN 712-D all the more innovative, however, was the joint nature of
this plan. Ellis specifically outlined those requirements that the Navy and the Army
would have to provide for the Marine Corps, in order for the landing to have any chance
of success. These requirements included proper types and sufficient quantities of
transports, prepositioned and properly combat-loaded equipment, sufficient occupation
forces, transports, as well as "personnel and material best adapted to perform the normal
tasks must be provided." This latter point was all the more crucial when one considers
the fiasco at Gallipoli, and the earlier Marine advanced base exercise landings on
Culebra, Puerto Rico. Insofar as Gallipoli is concerned, Marine planners remained
cognizant of the fact that the Anglo-French forces had inadvertently packed the essential
equipment and supplies close to the bottom of the hold of the ship instead last and on
top, and thus readily available for disembarkation and easy access by the troops ashore.
This was, however, not just a British or French problem. In an earlier FLEX, the Marine

64 Ellis, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, pp. 8-1.
247
Corps committed the same error during the 1914 Winter Maneuvers off Culebra, Puerto Rico, a lesson driven home during the 1924 winter maneuvers on Culebra. 65

The Impact of the World War on Operational Planning

One last factor concerning OPLAN-712D that is often overlooked, is the fact that the ideas Ellis outlined here conformed with both the size and composition of the advanced base force, as advocated earlier by other Marines such as Dion Williams, Eli Cole, and Robert Dunlap, though differed fundamentally on the mission and employment of that force. Both Williams and Cole’s studies asserted that the advanced base force should be trained and organized to "defend" the advanced base, rather than seize the territory in question. In fact, in countenance to the accepted belief that Ellis advocated from the very beginning concerning the importance of an offensive-minded advanced base force, the Marine major agreed, in fact, with Williams’ principle thesis, that the main task of the advanced base force was first to seize, and then defend, that position against a possible counterattack. Ellis differed, however, on one key fact, and that was, of course, that it may be necessary at some point during the campaign to attack these small islands contemplated for use as naval bases from the sea. This is significant, since this was the first instance where it had been asserted that Marines would be used in an offensive role, rather than as a static defensive force manning fixed guns. Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that Ellis had merely reiterated Williams’ points in his earlier studies that the

advanced base force was just that, a "fixed" base force assigned to a static defensive role. What changed all this was Marine participation in the World War. With the experience of the World War behind them, Marines had been exposed to a vast array of modern weapons that changed forever the way they would prepare and fight wars, large or small. This change likewise affected Marine officer education, which for two decades inculcated the lessons of that war to whole generation of Marine company and field grade officers through its curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools. In fact, at the MCS, as occurred during the war itself, Marine officers were taught offensive war or, as it had been referred to in the World War, open warfare. The importance of Ellis' writings is the simple fact that it reflected this doctrinal shift in its advocacy of open or offensive war, versus that of defensive or static warfare. Like the senior Army leaders during the World War, Lejeune and other Marine leaders realized that war now consisted of fire and maneuver, and this in turn prompted the movement inside the Marine Corps away from a doctrine that had advocated a defensive, static role manning fixed gun positions in the Caribbean Sea or, on some Pacific island. In sum, Ellis' OPLAN-712D was a reiteration of open warfare applied to landing operations, since it advocated an offensively-oriented mission of seizure of an advanced base by a mobile expeditionary assault force.  

'The Ellis vs. Dunlap School of Thought'

It is at this point that one has to ask one further question, "Were Ellis's ideas original, or did he ' borrow' the ideas from his friend and fellow Marine officer-Major Robert Dunlap?" The answer lies in the fact that Dunlap had written, prior to Ellis's arrival as a student and later as an instructor, two papers at the Naval War College in 1911, and 1912 respectively, entitled "The Naval Advance Base," and "The Temporary

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Naval Advance Base, General Considerations," that clearly outlined the major points of seizing, defending, and utilizing an advanced base force during a naval campaign. The points made by Dunlap were, in fact, the very same ones that Ellis expounded upon in his "Naval Bases: Their Location, Resources, Denial, and Security" (1913), which stated that these advanced naval bases must include:

(a) Good anchorage protected from the elements.
(b) An entrance admitting of easy entrance or egress.
(c) Healthy Climate, good water, and abundant resources.
(d) Small range of tide and weak tidal currents.
(e) Must be capable of being rendered secure during the absence of the fleet by a reasonable force.
(f) It must be in close proximity to the probable scene of operations.
(g) A good anchorage for at least half the forces likely to be bases thereon.

Hence, in any examination of both Dunlap's "Temporary Naval Advance Base," and Ellis' "Naval Bases," it can be reasonably concluded that the latter's thoughts were not original and had, in fact, been largely influenced by both the former, as well as those of Major Williams' 1912 lecture—The Naval Advance Base. One cannot say the same about Ellis' later work—OPLAN 712 D, however, since the experience in the World War of both the Marines in land combat, the failed Anglo-French landings at Gallipoli in 1915, as well as the successful German 1917 landing in Riga, reminded its author that given the right factors of manpower, equipment, doctrine, and inter-service cooperation, an amphibious operation just might succeed if properly planned and executed. Furthermore, besides

67Ballendorf and Bartlett, Pete Ellis, p. 96.
68See Robert H. Dunlap, "The Temporary Naval Advanced Base," A Lecture delivered at the Naval War College, dtd July 1911, found in the Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, PC 486, Box 3, Folder, "Speeches and Reports;" also Newport, R.I., Naval War College Historical Collection, File XBA).
69In fact, in the Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, USMC Papers, there are copies of lectures presented on a wide-range of amphibious-related topics that both Marine and
the Marine Corps' involvement in the World War, and the postwar debate over roles and missions, the results of the Washington Naval Conference gave added impetus to Major General Lejeune, and his successors, to "carve out" for the Marines a role and mission that fitted into the scheme of a naval campaign within the parameters of a war with Orange.

Advanced Base Operations versus Amphibious Assaults

It is at this juncture that a clarification is needed of sorts to illustrate the differences between an advanced base operation and an amphibious assault in order to examine in more detail both Dunlap's and Ellis' theories regarding the creation of advanced base forces. In fact, in a close examination of both Dunlap's and Ellis' writings, one can see where Lejeune and his successors had hoped to take the Marine Corps, insofar as an a real wartime mission is concerned. Contrary to the established belief that at the conclusion of the World War, Major General Lejeune saw amphibious warfare as the Marine Corps' role in the nation's defense in order to justify its continued existence and maintenance as part of the naval service, the fact remains that amphibious warfare had been an important adjunct to navies, primarily to the British, Japanese, as well as to that of the U.S. Navy, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, Marines mistakenly point to the War with Spain, and the subsequent insertion of a Marine battalion at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in June 1898 as the birth of amphibious warfare. This is a myth that has persisted ever since, and is, to say the least, both inaccurate and incorrect. Contrary to the popular legend of the events leading to and the

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... naval officers presented to their respective classes at the Senior Field Officer's School at Quantico in the late 1920s. Subjects range from the British use of amphibious operations against Napoleon at Walcheren Island in 1813, Gallipoli in 1915, the Royal Marines at Ostend and Zeebrugge in 1918, and the German Operation at Riga in 1917. See "The Blocking of Zeebrugge," by LCDR. H. H. Frost, USN, and "Extracts from Seekrieglehren," by Capt. Otto Gross, Royal Navy, in Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Utley Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, PC#127, Box 4).
actual landing of Colonel Robert W. Huntington's Marine Battalion in Cuba, the operation there resembled the insertions by the Marines in the Solomon Islands in August 1942, during World War II, when they landed on the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, under almost similar conditions. Indeed, amphibious warfare had to await the technology, techniques, and doctrine that the Marine Corps Schools laboriously developed, exercised, and refined during the interwar era. In fact, the culmination of this effort was the first text on how to conduct amphibious operations, the *Tentative Landing Manual* (1934), produced at the Marine Corps by the same officers who served in France, and during the FLEXES in the 1920's. 70 Insofar as amphibious operations are concerned, the questions raised during the 1920's by officers such as Dunlap and Williams remained focused on the size, shape, and mission of the advanced base force to be used given the limited manpower and material then available. Furthermore, as the Marine Corps pondered these questions, one last question entered the debate as to how this force would be employed. For the next decade this became the center of the debate as the mission of this force would dictate both the size and shape of the intended advanced base force. This debate over employment of the advanced base force can be further broken down into what is termed as the Dunlap-Williams School of defensive seizure, versus that of the Ellis school of offensive seizure, and how these different "schools" envisioned the organization and role of an advanced base expeditionary or assault force. Ellis' experiences in the World War, versus that of Dunlap [who didn't reach French soil until October 1918]; and Williams [who never left Quantico], point toward the fact that Ellis realized that war, and the technology required to wage modern combat had dramatically altered the dynamics on the battlefield so much so that the static, defensive warfare as exemplified during the first three and a half years of the

World War had been rendered obsolete, and illustrated the importance of offensive war. In fact, if viewed from the context of the Marine Corps' recently concluded World War experience, the debate over base seizure versus that of occupation or insertion can be seen through the lenses of those who favored the occupation of forts such as Verdun and Metz [Dunlap-Williams]; versus those who favored an offensive base seizure and operationally-driven campaign of maneuver [Ellis].

The Dunlap-Williams School of the Advanced Base Defense Force

While Brigadier General Dion Williams' writings, and lectures on the advanced base force have been discussed above, it remains important to reiterate several key points that he, and Brigadier General Dunlap shared, insofar as base seizure and defense are concerned. These arguments are important since they shaped their argument over the direction the Marine Corps should undertake after the Washington Naval treaties not only reduced the number of capital ships, but forced a reevaluation of American basing in the mid-Pacific Ocean areas and their defenses.

To recapitulate, General Williams offered the tables of organization for a brigade to accompany the battle fleet and assist it by occupying poorly defended anchorages, emplacing weapons, and guarding against counterattacks. Simply put, Williams merely reiterated the necessity of the Marine Corps building itself into an expeditionary advanced base force, whose tasks were to seize and defend the unoccupied islands selected for fleet bases, versus that of dislodging an entrenched enemy.

As for Colonel Dunlap's ideas on the advanced base force, there are indications that the influence of the World War did, in fact, have an impact on his views on the direction

71For an analysis of the 1913-14 Advanced Base Exercise on Culebra see Cosmas and Shulumson, "The Culebra Maneuver," in Bartlett, et.al., Assault From the Sea, pp. 121-30. See also Dion Williams, "The Naval Advanced Base," op.cit., pp. 1-5.
in which the Marine Corps should proceed. The basis for this modification in Dunlap's approach to the creation of an viable advanced based force, and is reflected in his study on the failure of the Franco-British forces at Gallipoli in April 1915, and the lessons that Marines could be extracted and avoided as they themselves studied and undertook the advanced base force role now that it had been formally assigned to the Marine Corps by the Joint Board.72

First of all, Dunlap argued that prior to any landing, "The Marine Corps must be trained and equipped for landings on hostile shores, often on open beaches and resist serious opposition . . . [and] . . . Following this, it must be prepared to attack the defenses of the desired anchorage in reverse, and to defend this anchorage against counter-attacks, as a base for its own use or to prevent its use by the enemy." He also argued that the force attacking should be trained and equipped, according to established tables agreed upon prior to the commencement of the campaign. Keeping this last fact in mind Dunlap, like Ellis, tied the organization, equipping, and training of such an advanced base force to any "preliminary strategic studies . . . involving the determination of our most probable enemies, our strategic lines of approach into their home waters, our essential fleet bases and known, or likely, enemy bases."73 Most important, however, was the former's advocacy of pre-registered naval gunfire in support of a landing. In his 1912 study, Dunlap examined the Japanese fleet's bombardment of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) prior to its assault, and brought to the fore an important point concerning naval gunfire, lessons that Marines ironically overlooked in their work with naval gunfire later on in the 1930's, and that of course was the need for properly employed and equipped naval gunfire support during an amphibious assault. In

73Ibid, p. 238.
his assessment of the Japanese landings at Port Arthur, Dunlap maintained that even while Japanese 6-inch shells exploded on the ground and threw up dirt and rubble, and caused surface damage to many Russian gun positions, the guns nonetheless failed to penetrate them, thus leaving them and their defenders in place shaken, but not severely damaged nor paralyzed as to prevent their being aimed or used against the landing force. Thus, the overall effect of the Japanese naval gunfire had been minimized, and reduced to ineffectiveness. Marines would learn this lesson in November 1943 during the assault in the Gilbert Islands at Tarawa, when naval gunners mistakenly believed that the huge clouds of smoke and rubble served as an indication that Japanese beach defenses had been "obliterated." The U.S. Navy, using the wrong types of ammunition (high explosive versus that of high velocity), as well as poor naval gunfire coordination, left the assaulting Marines the task of neutralizing the defenses once they were ashore on Betio, the primary target of the Tarawa assault.

This last point regarding naval gunfire, however, is where Dunlap's concepts, and Ellis' *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* converge. Whereas Dunlap's *Temporary Advance Base*, saw the advanced base primarily as a refuge for the fleet with Marines defending it, Ellis' study dealt with first the seizure, and then the defense of such bases, and thus saw naval gunfire in a more offensive mode necessitating a much more refined definition of its role during an amphibious assault. Whereas Major Dunlap argued more for a defensive use of naval gunfire, Ellis broke the mold with his advocacy of pre-registered naval gunfire support, and naval superiority at the point of the landing. Ellis correctly assessed that the U.S. fleet would find it necessary to project itself across the Pacific, and wage war in waters that the Japanese Navy would surely dominate due to its proximity to its home ports, thus necessitating a force capable of reduction and establishment of a series of naval bases, both temporary and permanent during the course of a naval campaign. This same force of Marines would thus require the support of a
fleet capable of projecting itself into enemy waters, one well-armed in guns and torpedo carriers [i.e. battleships and aircraft carriers].

Going one step further, Ellis wrote that supporting ships providing close-in fire support, "should take position on the flanks of the landing force, so as to sweep the beach and the flanks of projecting spurs" in order that the landing force's approach to the beach goes on unhampered by enemy counter battery or counter landing fire. He continued:

Special fire objectives (counter-attack troops), batteries, machinegun nests, and obstacles) and fire zones for searching fire, ending with a box barrage, if practicable, should be assigned. A battle chart should be prepared for designating fire zones and special fire targets, or at least arrangements perfected whereby targets may be designated by transmitting bearings and ranges from prearranged reference points.

While both Marine advanced base advocates can lay special claim to identifying naval gunfire as an important adjunct to any landing, it was the influence of several Navy officers, particularly Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel, a student and later instructor at the Field Officer's Course who assisted in the writing those sections dealing with naval gunfire into the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934 that brought with them a better

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See Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, "Recommendations Relative to Organization of Marine Artillery, Based on Observations Made While a Member of the A.E.F. in France, 1917-1919, with Particular Reference to Their Application in Organizing and Training of Field Artillery Elements of the U.S. Marine Corps," in the Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, USMC Papers, (Washington, D.C., PC #302, Box 1, Folder, "General Correspondence"). Hereafter cited as Dunlap, "Recommendations."

Lieutenant [later Rear Admiral] Walter C. Ansel attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, VA., in June 1931. Assigned later as an instructor at Command and Staff, he served on the board of landing operations and small wars as well as having lectured on the importance of naval gunfire during an amphibious assault. See Lcdr. S. Travis Hayes, SC, USN, "Biographies of the 40 Navy Officers Who
understanding of naval gunfire, its strengths and weaknesses, insofar as supporting an opposed landing operation had been concerned. While both Dunlap and Ellis saw the necessity for the employment of naval gunfire, it nonetheless took a painstakingly long time for their writings to be incorporated, and understood by Marines in the planning and execution of an amphibious landing. While Dunlap's writings concentrated on the caliber and types of guns to be employed in a landing operation, Ellis' study dealt more specifically with the operational aspects of naval gunfire support, and thus can lay claim to the fact that any assault, large or small, offensive or defensive, would necessitate the proper and timely employment of naval gunfire from offshore ships.

Despite Ellis' work with the more "operational" aspects of an advanced base operation, it was Dunlap's study that put forward the idea that any seizure of an advanced base force depended first and foremost upon a force trained and organized for an Orange War, i.e., an island to island campaign in the Central Pacific, aimed directly at the Japanese mainland. Brigadier General Dunlap's ideas were not solely confined to his papers dealing specifically with the advanced base force. In a paper focusing on his experiences as commanding officer of the 17th Field Artillery Regiment, U.S. 2d Division, Dunlap reiterated the valuable lessons Marines should have taken away from its involvement in the World War, particularly in regard to the development an advanced base force. In this study, he wrote that "In order that the experience gained in these organizations may not be entirely lost, and in order that all times there be trained artillery ready when needed, I propose... [that]... one regiment [be] trained in the use of mountain howitzers, field howitzers and a Heavy Field gun, such as the 4.7 and in like manner, another regiment, trained in the use of the 8 inch howitzer, the 7 inch Naval Gun

and the larger caliber's of Advance Base gun would, I believe, prove a satisfactory solution to our difficulties." In short, the report clearly stated that training on such heavy guns offered themselves as an excellent way in preparing Marines in advanced base work.78

The importance in both Dunlap's and Ellis' studies lies not, however, in merely the restating of the basic concepts how an advanced base force should be organized, trained, and equipped, but more so in how the Marine Corps intended to employ such a force. This in itself touches upon war planning, and how Headquarters intended to resolve these issues as the Marine Corps entered the postwar era. Both men raised the inevitable question over missions and roles that Lejeune sought to resolve. In all of his writings Dunlap maintained his belief that prior to any campaign, Marines needed to organize, train, and plan for the day when based seizure and defense would be applied in actual combat. Furthermore, Dunlap, like Ellis, broke away from the accepted belief that Marines and sailors could be placed aboard ships annually and exercised during the winter maneuvers and then dispersed with the cycle repeating itself. Both studies, in fact, pointed out, that Marines needed to be trained on a regular basis for war in peace time, and that this training was a continuous process, and not a one time deal. Furthermore, Marine officers needed to study the experiences "gained by ourselves and others in campaigns of the past." Here, the seasoned Marine officer called for a revision of the curriculum at the MCS to place more emphasis on military history, and in particular those campaigns that involved a waterborne invasion.79

Dunlap did not confine his comments directed solely toward Marines. He also wrote that Marines needed to think and train in terms of what is known as "joint" operations. Whereas Brigadier General Williams based his writings on a Navy-Marine dominated campaign, Dunlap instead argued that both Army and Naval officers would be required to assist in "the exact and careful staff work preceding a landing on a hostile shore; continued resupply by the Navy of the forces so landed [whether they be Marine and/or Army]; evacuation of the wounded; and perhaps the most important, coordination of naval gunfire with the movements of troops on shore."  

In his article on the Gallipoli campaign, Dunlap argued that one of the main reasons it failed was due to the poor inter-service relations between the Royal Navy, and the landing force. The Royal Navy's decision to attempt the suppression of the guns inside the Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dardeneles without the support of the land forces, led to the Australians and New Zealanders being pinned down, and eventually forced to withdraw under withering artillery fire. He likewise argued that the failure at Gallipoli was not the fighting ability of the landing force but was, instead, the poor staff work and lack of coordination between the services that doomed the operation from the start. This lack of coordination was most evident in the poor logistical planning that dogged the operation even before the troops touched ashore (as well as once they were ashore). Dunlap wrote that Gallipoli could and should have succeeded, given the three to one advantage in manpower the allies possessed (a figure Marines concluded later on after studying Gallipoli as being necessary in order to assure success of a landing), the quality of the landing force, and the advantage in naval strength advantage possessed by the Anglo-French forces.

81 According to Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, Marine officers attending the field Officers' School at Quantico commencing with the 1932-33 school year received a copy of the official British history. Prof. Allan R. Millett added that beginning with the 1936 class,
Given Dunlap's earlier advocacy of an temporary advanced base as opposed to that of a permanent one, it is apparent that he like Ellis, saw the benefit in the training and equipping of a force for a rapid base seizure as opposed for merely occupation and defense thereof. Yet despite the writings and teaching by both Ellis and Dunlap, there still existed in the Marine Corps those officers who saw the its role as either that of a constabulary force or, as a seagoing force that retained its traditional, though out-dated mission of manning the warships of the Navy. This view, which was held by many senior Marine officers of the era, including Lejeune himself, is indicative of the problem that the Marine Corps had in not only defining its role in the nation's defense at the conclusion of the World War, but in its allocation of scarce resources, particularly manpower. In fact, one can see a sense of pride in Major General Lejeune's annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1925, when he reported that Marine detachments manned 33 of the Navy's sea-going ships, as well as standing guard at navy yards and installations, approximately twenty-one percent of the corp's strength. Like his officer corps, Lejeune did not want to give up any one particular mission, especially one tied directly to the

Marine instructors likewise handed out copies of the official Australian version of the Gallipoli campaign. See Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 44-5; Millett, 'In Many A Strife', pp. 128-9.

82 For Brigadier General Dunlap, a "permanent" advanced naval base was a base selected for its location to the intended theater of operations, its facilities which were permanent such as logistical and maintenance stores and shops, as well as its defensibility. A "temporary" base, on the other hand, was a temporary position located near the intended objective and defended by a mobile advanced base force that could quickly assume an offensive and/or defensive role, and is so located as to offer protection for the attacking fleet in order for that force to carry out its mission. See Major Robert H. Dunlap, "The Temporary Naval Advance Base. General Considerations," Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1912, Naval Historical Collection; Also see Dunlap, "The Naval Advance Base," a lecture delivered at a conference in 1911 at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., Naval Historical Collection, also in the Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, (Ret), Papers, PC #486. (Washington, D.C, History and Museums Division, HQMC, Box 3 "Lectures" Folder).

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Navy, since it meant more money and men even though it did little to prepare the Marine Corps for war. This points to not only the difficulty that Lejeune had in only "selling" his officer corps on the necessity of the expeditionary assault role, but toward the fact even the Commandant remained "fixated" on the past.\footnote{Brigadier General Rufus H. Lane, "The Mission and Doctrine of the Marine Corps," \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, 8 (March 1923), p. 7.} This dichotomy in which direction the Marine Corps should take, insofar as its mission and role inside the Navy, can be further seen in an article written by Brigadier General Rufus H. Lane, the Adjutant and Inspector General, who wrote in the March 1923 \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, on both the Corps's sea-going mission, and on the necessity of organizing a base seizure and defense force. In the article, Lane put forward the same, age-old arguments, both pro and con, in the use of Marine Corps as an advanced base force. Where Lane differed than most of his colleagues, however, can be seen in what was clearly a direct reference to the British landing force's failure at Gallipoli, and his support for Ellis' contention that in order to first establish this advanced base, an assault force must be in position to land and defend any initial lodgment on shore in order to deal with an enemy's shore batteries. Here, General Lane specifically wrote that:

\begin{quote}
In order to seize the ports selected for advance bases the necessary assaulting forces must be available. The artillery preparation for the assault on the land works would probably be furnished by the vessels of the fleet itself. The batteries of the ships, however, are axiomatically unable to reduce shore batteries which are skillfully defended, and even in case of reduction of such batteries by artillery fire, the vessels themselves would be incapable of occupying the shore positions and of defending them against attack by land forces of the enemy. Therefore, in order to seize and hold the selected advance bases, it is necessary that the fleet be provided with a capable force for the purposes of assault and of further operations on shore, including the cleaning up of adjacent nests of the enemy which might be used to harass our own forces.\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{quote}
He added:

It is obvious that the force provided for this purpose must be well trained in all branches of land and seacoast warfare, which include the locating and establishment of batteries, the location and construction of trenches and other works for defense against land attack, the planting of minefields in the locations most advantageous for obstruction of the direction of the enemy's vessels, the establishment of defending batteries for these mine fields, the installation of signaling and searchlight systems and the maintenance of offensive and defensive air forces . . .

Yet one has to ask the question was this a radical departure from past Marine Corps practices? The answer is definitely no, since General Lane merely echoed those requirements for the advanced base force agreed upon by other Marine officers in their respective studies. This pointed to the central theme of Lane's article, and one that formed the basis for the Marine Corps' role as an advanced base force, and later as a base seizure force: that any force had to be familiar with both land and sea combat. In the end, it was both Dunlap and Ellis that broke with the traditional advanced base school of thought, and ventured into uncharted lands with their advocacy of base seizure first and then occupation. Major General Lejeune touched on this latter point in his testimony before the HNAC in March 1920, when he outlined to the legislators his view of what role the Marine Corps would play during a naval campaign. Insofar as Brigadier General Lane's article is concerned, it merely points to the two schools of thought that converged in the 1920's centering on the Marine Corps' mission. Lane's article further underscored the difficulty Marine officers experienced in understanding what differentiated an amphibious assault from the establishment of an advanced base by an advanced base force. Furthermore, it was not until the fleet maneuvers of 1923, 1924, and 1925, had taken place that Marines began to understand the difficulties they faced in organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining an expeditionary assault force such as Major General Lejeune and others had advocated. In fact, if these exercises proved anything, it was that nothing could be proven in peace, and it would necessitate a war to
not only validate, but further refine those principles written and lectured on at the Naval War College and at the Marine Corps Schools during the interwar era.

Summary

Despite all of the studies on the advanced base force concept during the period prior to, and after the World War, the Marines found themselves "reinventing the wheel," as far as in creating, and maintaining an advanced base force for service with the fleets. Given the fact that the Marine Corps had been heading in the direction of creating a permanent advanced base force prior to its involvement in the World War, it remains incredulous to think that Marine leaders after the World War had to search for a mission and role in the nation's defense. This despite the fact, that even during the World War, the advanced base force remained intact, albeit spread out along the U.S.-Mexican border, and in Cuba, and on expeditionary duty in Hispaniola. With only one-quarter of the 75,000 Marines recruited during the World War actually seeing combat in France, the Marine Corps had the perfect-sized advanced base force though it still lacked a real wartime mission.

When the war ended in November 1918, the focus on manpower and demobilization caused a further lapse in the advanced base force only to be rescued in 1922, with the creation of the East Coast Expeditionary Force by Major General Lejeune, although it is apparent that the real impetus to resurrect the advanced base force had been an unfulfilled goal of Major General Barnett in 1919. Barnett's insistence that the advanced base force remain intact, even if in skeletal form served as a reminder that despite the war in Europe, he had hoped to maintain focus on the advanced base force concept. The war, demobilization, and finally a lack of funding prevented this from happening, and in the end, it was left to Major General Lejeune to "start again," and recreate and expand upon the advanced base concept that prior to the World War, had put the Marine Corps on a firm footing. In this, Lejeune had the help of Colonel
Robert H. Dunlap, Brigadier General Dion Williams, and Major Earl H. Ellis. General Williams's and Dunlap's studies, as well as the latter postwar after-action reports, along with Ellis' *OPLAN-712D*, suggests that there was, indeed, some attempt at reconciling the different schools of thought as to what constituted an advanced base versus landing force. Furthermore, the presence of so many studies, written before and after the World War, points to the fact that there was an ongoing interest in maintaining, and expanding the advanced base force in the Marine Corps before, during, and after that conflict. Likewise, this interest in advanced base operations served as an indicator of where Lejeune's focus remained during the early 1920's among some, but not all Marine Corps officers. Indications of this interest in amphibious and landing studies by Marines at the MCS was, in fact, obvious, as observed in the papers written there during the 1920's. Yet it would take money and training to come to an agreed upon solution. Furthermore, even as Lejeune stressed these two points to his officers, and to the members of the HNAC, the Commandant drew up an extensive training schedule that attempted to implement, even if half-hearted, his ideas on redirecting the efforts of the Marines toward supporting the fleet in time of war. Part of Lejeune's plans at "re-directing" the Corps toward the base seizure mission was in the implementation of a series of maneuvers designed to reinforce the lessons of the World War and of the pre-war advanced base exercises on Culebra.

For even as Marine officers such as Brigadier General Williams, Colonel Dunlap, and Lieutenant Colonel Ellis debated doctrinal and strategic matters, the newly-

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85See the Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Utley Papers, for a series of student papers completed on Gallipoli, the German Amphibious Operations in the Baltic in 1917, and the British Ostend and Zeebruge Raids in 1918, done at the Field Officer's School, at Quantico in the late 1920's; For a specific example of this interest see, "General Graves B. Erskine Papers, "Historical Example, A German Landing: The Capture of the Baltic Islands, Oesel, Moon, and Dago, October 1917," Erskine Papers, Box 13, loc. cit. 264
constituted East Coast Expeditionary Force began preparations for a series of Civil War reenactments, and fleet exercises or FLEXES that incorporated many of the operational and tactical lessons learned in the World War, as well as to the problems still awaiting Marine planners as they laid the foundation for what became in time its amphibious warfare doctrine in the mid-1930's.\textsuperscript{86}

CHAPTER 8

REENACTMENTS AND FLEET EXERCISES, 1921-1925

Introduction

While Headquarters continued to deal with the problems of manpower, budgets, and a wartime mission as part of a Navy that had been literally reduced with the stroke of a pen, it nonetheless continued to train. In fact, despite the lack of money and manpower, the Marine Corps maintained a busy training schedule on its own, and as a part of the various fleets. While the reenactment battles held from 1921 to 1924, reflected Major General Lejeune's desire to keep the Corps in the public spotlight, they had some practical military value, particularly in the handling of large bodies of troops, equipment, and in the tactical maneuvering of both men and equipment over open terrain. Despite these benefits, however, the exercises in The Wilderness, Gettysburg, Sharpsburg, Antietam, and New Market, pointed to the need for the institution of a serious program of training for a real wartime mission. Public relations aside, Headquarters never lost focus of the serious side of training, and in with this in mind became an active participant in the FLEXES held from January to March in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and at the Panama Canal. This chapter will examine the participation and lessons learned by the Marines, and Headquarters in particular, during both the Civil War reenactments and, more importantly, the annual fleet exercises held from 1921 to 1924.
Participation by the Marines in the annual FLEXES reflected the realization on the part of Headquarters, and Lejeune in particular, that the Marine Corps needed to focus on wars of the future and not on fighting battles of the past. While there were lessons to be learned and digested by both the students at the MCS, and men involved in the reenactments it was only through active participation with the fleet under real conditions that the Marine Corps ever hope to forge a real wartime mission as an adjunct to the Fleet as a base seizure and defense force. This was the real value of the FLEXES. In fact, the FLEXES held off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, through the landings on Culebra, Puerto Rico, and at Fort Randolph in Panama in January-February 1924, demonstrated not only the role in hemispheric defense that the Marine Corps would have in time of war, but more importantly to the seriousness that Headquarters attached to such exercises, with the exposure of the deficiencies that had to be overcome before the Marine Corps could assume the advanced base force or landing missions.

"Training and Reenacting: The Civil War Battles," 1921-1924

"A doctrine is the theory derived from the body of principles adopted or taught as a basis of action," and this is in turn arrived at through "a careful study of the well known principles of war," while training is the actual preparation for war, and embraces ". . . all arms and branches in marching over unknown terrain under service conditions. . . ."¹

This quote, taken from the text of a larger article regarding Marine Corps training in the mid-1920's written by Brigadier General Dion Williams, clearly delineated the differences between theory and practical application of both new and old military concepts in order to prove or disapprove a theory or idea based on theory or a given doctrinal consideration. In fact, in all of the above-mentioned papers and studies conducted on the

feasibility of using Marines as an advanced base force, the authors repeatedly stressed the necessity of proper training and practical exercises as a means of testing and evaluating the Marine Corps' progress or lack thereof, particularly in regard to the creation of the East Coast Expeditionary Force in the 1920's.

The lack of sufficient manpower and resources proved to be an annoyance though not a hindrance, to Major General Lejeune's plans in creating an East and West Coast Expeditionary force capable of conducting operations on land during the prosecution of a naval campaign. In fact, Lejeune's efforts had been made considerably easier with the presence of many younger officers whom had seen a considerable amount of combat, and had performed a fair amount of staff planning during the World War. The presence of so many officers who had served in the war made his efforts at transforming the Marine Corps into a modern force a much easier task, and greatly assisted Lejeune in creating a more modern advanced base force, familiar in the use of combined arms. Lejeune's task became not only the maintenance of the Corps at a credible strength, but in retaining the experience and further developing and inculcating the advanced base doctrine with a new generation of Marine officers and men.

Despite the budget cutting that had hampered his efforts at building an advanced base expeditionary force, Lejeune nonetheless attempted to make do with what he had in order to prove that the Marines were alive and well. The Major General Commandant's emphasis on training provided both a means of maintaining a semblance of preparedness in this era of austerity, as well as keeping the Marine Corps in the eyes of the public, and more importantly, with politicians including both Presidents Warren G. Harding (1921-3), and Calvin C. Coolidge (1923-9). In fact, a major part of Lejeune's program to make the East Coast Expeditionary Force a reality concentrated on making this same force as ready as the budget and manpower situation allowed him. The Major General Commandant accomplished this by an increased emphasis on participation in both
combined arms exercises, and the annual fleet maneuvers held from January to March. In fact, for Lejeune, participation in actual training was considered more valuable than theoretical classroom work. As he later wrote:

More important even than military education is practical military training. The adoption of this precept brought about renewed training activity everywhere. This was especially the case at Quantico with reference to the Expeditionary Force which, after periods of intensive training, undertook maneuvers on an extensive scale during four successive summers in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and during two winters with the Fleet on the island of Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands. . . .

Thus, the exercises conducted by the Marines had a purpose that far exceeded more than just good public relations. There were, in fact, practical military lessons to be learned and digested by the students at the Marine Corps Schools.

For the next four years (1921-1924), Marines of the East Coast Expeditionary Brigade reenacted a major Civil War battle every year, the first of these being the Battle of the Wilderness. Besides the great public relations he hoped would come about as a result of the maneuvers, Major General Lejeune had "hoped to demonstrate that tactics in modern warfare had changed considerably due to technology and weaponry." The exercise, commanded by Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, was held between 26 September and 5 October 1921, and took place on both the Chancellorsville and Wilderness battlefields, and had in attendance the President and Mrs. Harding [the President was an avid Civil War buff], Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, Major General and Mrs. Lejeune, Brigadier General Smedley and Mrs. Butler, as well as a host of naval officers that included Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert E. Coontz, Rear Admiral W. A. Moffett, Chief of Naval Aviation, and Army Major General William G. Harbord, and a gallery of senators, congressmen, and newspaper and magazine

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2 Lejeune, Reminiscences, p. 463.
3 Bartlett, Lejeune, p. 155.
correspondents, as well as a few surviving Federal and Confederate soldiers that had actually fought there!

Besides the public relations bonanza that the exercise obviously provided, it likewise had some practical military value in that the forces used constituted "the largest armed force of the United States to take the field since the conclusion of the World War." In addition to this large-scale mobilization of men and material, as well as to the demonstration of the Marine Corps's ability to field a sizable force in any emergency, the Wilderness maneuvers . . .

. . . furnished valuable military training along a number of lines. Staff officers and officers detailed to the Marine Corps Officer's School at Quantico received practical training which they could have secured in no other way. Company officers had a chance to try out their company organizations under field conditions, and individual soldiers, particularly younger men and recruits learned lessons in taking care of themselves under field conditions which should prove invaluable to them later in their service.  

Apart from the movement to and setting up of the actual exercise, oftentimes more exacting than the exercise itself, the actual maneuvers began in the pre-dawn hours of 29 September 1921. Broken down into three phases, the actual "battle" itself was to be an advanced base problem with a force of Marines defending, and a force acting as a hostile enemy landing force. The attacking force, transported to the battlefield in "constructive" ships and transports, disembarked from the imaginary transports into "motor-sailers and other boats of the fleet" that had been established prior to the exercise by the Navy's representative at Quantico, Commander Charles S. Keller.

5 Ibid, p. 419.
The first phase ended amidst aircraft dropping smoke bombs, and the disembarked leathernecks having achieved their first day's objectives, which was a firm lodgment on the enemy's "shoreline." The second phase of the exercise took place a day later, when the landing force consolidated its beachhead and eliminated the remaining enemy force. The third phase was held that same afternoon with the fortification of the island, and an attempt by the "enemy" to retake the base from the advanced base force. President Warren G. Harding witnessed this third phase as combined force of Marine infantry and 75-mm artillery pieces launched a combined attack against the advanced base. At the conclusion of the exercise the next day, the entire force passed in review for their commander-in-chief and the other guests.

Apart from dressing up in the Blue and Gray uniforms and the usual sore feet and tired muscles, the Marines learned several valuable lessons that included further development in the employment of combined arms (infantry and artillery), better staff coordination, and the use of signal troops. As Captain John E. Craige later wrote, the exercise was:

a splendid test of the communications service. The signal troops laid nine miles of wire in a very short time and as far as could be observed they functioned perfectly. The force also had three radio tractors which worked without fault. They also had carrier pigeons but these did not work so well.

Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, who represented Headquarters at the Wilderness Maneuvers, reiterated this view when he praised the "remarkable coordination of effort, intelligent appreciation of the work to be done, and a sound military knowledge on the part . . ." of the officers involved in the planning and execution of the maneuvers.6

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6Brigade Commander to All Organizations, 3rd Brigade, Subj: "Commendation for Excellent Showing in Connection with Recent Maneuvers held at Wilderness Run, Va.," Headquarters, 3rd Brigade, Quantico, VA., dtd. 19 October 1921 in the General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, D.C., 271
Summing up this first reenactment, Secretary Denby praised the efficiency of the Marines in his annual report for 1921, when he noted the excellent "execution" and the "conception" of this maneuver. Despite the use of modern weapons, and use of an advanced base problem, however, the exercise in the Wilderness proved that the Marine Corps could "efficiently fight Civil War battles with modern arms." Though it could be added that Marine artillery did get a good workout. Despite the problem of fording the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers with the heavy tractor-pulled 155-mm guns [the bridges on these two rivers could not support these 19-ton guns], as well as using the many unpaved backroads of the area (the Marines used the exact route used by the Army of the Potomac in 1863 and 1864), Marine artillerymen put on a good performance.7 Praising the artillerymen's performance during the exercise, Brigadier General Butler wrote in a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Richard M. Cutts, the commanding officer of the 10th Marines that:

The Tenth Regiment has been uniformly excellent in its behavior during the whole period I have been in command of this post and its conduct during the recent maneuvers was only to be expected in view of its record, but no one would have believed that you could have taken so much material so great a distance over country none too favorable without serious accident to your machinery.8

The Wilderness maneuver likewise served as a training exercise for the Quantico-based Marine Aviation Force. Having only 14 pilots available for this operation [the remainder deployed or grounded], Marine aviators flew a total of 117 hours that equated into 180 sorties (one fight or mission), over an estimated 11,000 total miles. Marine

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7Millett, 'In Many A Strife', p. 88.
pilots flew eight daylight bombing runs, four night bombing raids, and performed scouting, transportation, and communication missions.\(^9\)

The following year, the Battle of Gettysburg became the focus and location for the annual maneuvers held from 1-3 July 1922. Once again under the command of General Butler, Marines of the East Coast Expeditionary Force conducted an 86-mile, seven-day tactical march from Quantico, to the site of the famous three-day battle of Gettysburg, where the force "simulated as closely as possible those of actual war and conducted practice engagements and battle exercises while on the march."\(^{10}\) Upon reaching Gettysburg, the Marines established their camp near the High-Water Monument. They also constructed a number of temporary accommodations for invited guests, including a special five-room canvas and wood-framed structure dubbed the "The Canvas White House," built for the President and Mrs. Harding, whom attended the maneuvers.

The purpose of the maneuvers was to demonstrate the ability of Marines to employ combined arms. What is significant about this exercise, however, was not just in the use of Marine infantry. Accompanying the Marine expeditionary brigade were tanks, artillery, machine guns and airplanes "all the approved appurtenances of modern warfare, the whole comprising a miniature army, small but highly trained and powerfully armed."\(^{11}\)

The Gettysburg exercise commenced with a reenactment of Pickett's charge, which the Marines carried out especially for President Harding, who attended the opening day's activities. The next day (2 July), the Marines conducted a combined arms attack against Cemetery Ridge, the objective General George E. Pickett had failed to take during the actual Gettysburg campaign in 1863. The fourth day of the exercise saw a repeat of the

\(^{11}\)Ibid.
legendary charge by Pickett for the benefit of those who could not attend the first day's events, with the charge preceded by an artillery barrage provided by batteries from the 10th Marines, that had been concealed approximately 2,000 yards behind the ridge.\textsuperscript{12}

While at Gettysburg, Marines of the East Coast Expeditionary Force likewise held classes and lectures on tactics of the actual Civil War battle, as well as that of lessons in American history. While the ground forces exercised and sat in on these classes, Marine aviators flew a total of 500 hours, over a distance estimated at 38,500 miles.\textsuperscript{13} Marine aircraft bombed, strafed, conducted routine training flights, and practiced the art of air-to-ground communications with the Marines on the ground during the march to Gettysburg, and during the exercise itself. Once again, besides the obvious benefits in regards to the Corps' public relations efforts, the maneuvers offered "excellent opportunities in respect to troop and staff training and the testing of equipment and other material."

In 1923, Marines and the corps of cadets of the Virginia Military Academy (VMI), conducted a reenactment of the Battle of New Market from 27 August through 20 September of that same year. While not as large as either the Wilderness or Gettysburg, the Battle of New Market, was nonetheless memorable in its own right, particularly in regard to the history of Virginia and VMI during the Civil War. With the Marines posing as "Union" troops, the cadets assumed the same role they did on 15 May 1864, when their predecessors engaged and defeated a Union Army here in the Shenandoah Valley. A notable feature of this exercise was the presence of Colonels Wesley Kerr, "the man credited with firing the first shot in the original battle 59 years previously," and H. A. du Pont, a former United States Senator and captain of a Federal artillery battery that prevented the wholesale retreat of the Union troops in 1864, as well as a few of the

\textsuperscript{12}Buckner, 10th Marines, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{13}Lejeune, CMC Annual Report for 1922, pp. 825-6.
surviving veterans of the original battle. Kerr and du Pont once again "squared off" as the former pulled the lanyard of a 75mm gun courtesy of the 10th Marines, while the latter commanded a battery of "Union cannons"-this time manned by U.S. Marines.\(^{14}\)

As for the exercise itself, the Marines and cadets engaged in a lively exercise that saw a great deal of small unit operations that involved both company and battalion-level problems. Once again:

The force which engaged in the exercise consisted of the Fifth Marine Regiment of Infantry, a battalion of Artillery, and the field train with such a force would need on an actual campaign, comprising altogether about 3,000 men, including among its units Infantry, Artillery, trench mortars, machine guns, automatic rifles, 1-pounders, several aviation squadrons, a signal and communication unit, and all the most modern appurtenances and equipment of war . . .\(^{15}\)

President Calvin Coolidge, who had succeeded Warren G. Harding upon the latter's death on 2 August 1923, did not share in his predecessor's love of the outdoors and thus did not attend the New Market reenactment. He did, however, review the Marines after their return from Lexington in a large parade on the grounds of the White House, and viewed a static display of tanks, artillery, and other weapons set up on the Ellipse for the President and the general public. As with the previous Civil War reenactments, the Marines once again conducted a tactical march, this time in a torrential downpour from Quantico to Fort Defiance, West Virginia, where they conducted tactical exercises and prepared for the start of the larger maneuver in Lexington.

The last Civil War reenactment of the era was held at Antietam in September 1924. With the infantry moving by barges up the Potomac, and the tanks and artillery moving by roads on 24 August, the Marines first stopped over in nearby Frederick, where the

\(^{14}\) Buckner, *10th Marines*, p. 27.

entire force gathered and organized prior to the "second" Battle of Antietam.
Commanded by Brigadier General Dion Williams, the force of 3,186 officers and
enlisted men arrived in nearby Sharpsburg, Maryland, on 1 September, where it
prepared for the exercise.16

Unlike previous Civil War reenactments, Headquarters issued orders that specifically
stated that, "final plans and orders were not to be promulgated to the troops until the
exercises were to begin," in order to encourage the officers and men involved to use
initiative make their own independent decisions as the battle unfolded.17 As for the
exercise itself, it followed the same pattern in its use of modern equipment scripted to
the moves of both the Union and Confederate forces as best that could be recreated.
Using tanks, airplanes, and artillery, the Marines skirmished, charged, and raced forward
while the tanks maneuvered, the artillery pounded away against "enemy" positions, and
Marine aviators strafed, and dropped smoke bombs on enemy troop concentrations and
emplacements.

Even while Marines fought to the delight of the press and the public, however, the
officers at Headquarters, and at Quantico realized that what mattered was the conduct of
joint exercises with the Navy [and even the Army]. In fact, "The exercises conducted
during the fall of 1921 and June 22 were carried out with the idea that they would be
followed with joint exercises with the Navy. This was found to impracticable." Due to a
lack of money and manpower, the East Coast Expeditionary Force remained at
Quantico, "while the Navy's ships remained tied up to their moorings due to a lack of
fuel for steaming."18 Echoing Secretary Denby's sentiments, was Chief of Naval

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16Major General Commandant, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1925.
17Ibid.
18See the comments made by Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby and Admiral R. e.
Coontz respectively regarding the fleet's state of preparedness and lack thereof in the
Operations Admiral Robert E. Coontz, who cited in his annual report for 1922 what he called the "uncertainty of the current situation" in regards to the Navy and Marine Corps' overall preparedness, due in large part to the austere budgets that Congress had imposed on the military services. The CNO, in fact, openly stated that the naval service was finding its extremely difficult, given the current level of appropriations, to conduct even routine gunnery practice and day-today operations, let alone in holding annual exercises.\footnote{See Coontz' comments, \textit{Annual Report for 1922}, p. 31.} His report frankly stated that the winter maneuvers for that year had to be abandoned "due to a lack of fuel." This, in turn, prevented Headquarters from carrying out its planned joint maneuvers with the Navy until 1923, in Panama, and on Culebra, Puerto Rico, both in January 1924.

The Panama and Culebra Exercises of 1923 and 1924

While the Civil War reenactments provided Marines with good combined arms training and a means of keeping itself in the eyes of the American public, the real test for Lejeune's Marines came during the annual fleet exercises at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and on the island of Culebra, Puerto Rico in 1922, and later in Panama (1923), and once again on Culebra in 1924. In fact, it was on Culebra that the East Coast Expeditionary Force, in its attempt to take "one step forward," ended up instead taking "two steps backward," as the Advanced Base Force concept underwent its first real tests since its organization in 1920, in maneuvers designed to not only test the country's hemispheric defense capabilities as well the defenses of the Panama Canal, but of the postwar emphasis on joint operations between all three services.

U.S. Hemispheric Defenses: The 1920s

While the bulk of U.S. war planning focused on an war with Japan in the immediate postwar period, U.S. planners did, in fact, prepare a range of contingencies against

\footnote{Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1922, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 10 and 31.}
enemies such as Great Britain (Red), China (Yellow), and Mexico (Green), that while unlikely to occur, nonetheless reflected the state of uncertainty that existed between the services, as the budgetary and roles and missions battles between the War and Navy departments heated up in the mid-1920's. These inter-service debates would, in fact, roll over into the ongoing strategic deliberations of both the Joint Army-Navy Board, and the Navy's General Board, as the services scrambled to justify their ever shrinking budgets in the face of further Congressional cutbacks. These debates would, in fact, lead to the formulation of a series of war plans that sought to not only justify the service's present budgets, but to "lock in" that particular service's mission in the execution of that war plan. Justified by mission or not, the strategic formulations of the 1920's, reflected the uncertainty and sense of isolationism that swept postwar America in the decade following the World War.

In fact, of all the plans, only the plan for war against Japan (Orange), and Great Britain (Red), as well as the "remote possibility" of conflict occurring with the two Pacific allies (Great Britain and Japan), remained within the realm of possibility until discounted in the mid-1930's. Still, Army and Navy planners formulated plans that took into consideration the possibilities of a war with either Red or Orange or both, and that in any event, a war with either country would find the U.S. fleet and land forces adopting a strategic defensive posture in both the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean with attacks aimed at both the Panama Canal, and Hawaii and other places in the Pacific, as well as the remote possibility of an invasion of the continental United States itself. The Army and Navy staffs, in adopting their own plans since "no joint plan was ever adopted," were to "concentrate on obtaining a favorable decision in the Atlantic" while

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20 According to an 1923 U.S. Army draft of a Red-Orange War Plan, the likelihood of a war between the United States and Great Britain seemed unlikely at best. Twelve years later the Office of Naval Intelligence ruled out the possibility of a Red and Orange War by labeling it "highly improbable . . . ." See Morton, "Germany First," op.cit, p. 17
remaining on the defensive in the Pacific with minimal forces. As events later turned out, this latter plan became the foundation for Rainbow Five or Plan "D" adopted during World War II, which called for the bulk of the U.S. forces to be directed toward the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe, while delaying the main effort toward Japan until the former had been accomplished.

Thus, the mission of the U.S. military became one of base denial, designed to frustrate "the enemy's assumed objective" of securing hemispheric bases in the Caribbean Sea, and of either seizing or crippling the Panama Canal. In fact, since 1903, the cornerstone of U.S. hemispheric defense centered around the Panama Canal. U.S. military planners had focused the bulk of their efforts at defending the canal, and the surrounding territory and had by the World War, constructed an elaborate interlocking defensive network that ran from the Pacific to the Atlantic Oceans. Not only did the Canal provide the Navy with the ability to rapidly shift its ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific and visa versa, it like-wise served as a raison d'être for the Marine Corps' continued presence in the Caribbean-Central American area. Hence, from the time of the administrations of President Theodore Roosevelt up through that of Franklin D. Roosevelt's, "keeping the Canal open was a major aim of American military planners ever after." More importantly, defense of the canal became a "joint" function of all three services, including the Marine Corps, during the resources-scarce 1920's and 1930's. In fact, as agreed upon in the Joint Action of the Army and Navy (1927), the three services were to act "Cojointly and in cooperation, to defend the territory of the United States."

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21 Morton, "Germany First," p. 16.
., including the Panama Canal and adjacent Canal Zone. While the above-mentioned document clearly delineated the missions of the Army and Navy, the fact remained that many of the duties overlapped, and served as a source of inter-service feuding during this same period. While the two services reached a modus vivendi with the compromise that "Sea operations by the Army or land operations by the Navy are proper only when immediately auxiliary to the normal functions [of each service]," the fact remained that at least on the surface the Army attempted to undercut the Marines' role as an advanced base force. This can be seen in the section that dealt with 'General Functions of the Army,' whereby the Joint Army-Navy Board assigned to the Army the defense of "permanent naval bases required to insure to the Navy freedom of strategic action," and "To conduct land operations in support of the U. S. Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases."  

While the Navy retained all of its traditional warfighting missions including the control of coast zones and sea lanes, as well as sea lines of communications, the Marine Corps, for the first time, had its roles specified by a joint strategy board:

(a) For land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.
(b) For emergency service in time of peace for protection of the interests of the United States in foreign countries.
(c) For Marine detachments on vessels of the fleet and for interior protection of naval shore stations.
(d) As an adjunct of the Army, its general functions require the Marine Corps to perform such duties as the President may direct.

25Ibid.
26na., "Marine Manoeuvres with the Fleet," Marine Corps Gazette, 8 (December 1923), 280
For both the Army and Navy, as well as the Marines, this document is important in that the services agreed to coordinate their plans in the defense of those areas that affected both services. As the *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* stated, "Each specific war plan will provide for the organization of the defenses of the land and coastal frontiers and will designate theaters of operations and the forces employed therein." As were the cases in the Philippines, and Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the Army and Navy had carefully delineated lines of responsibility in time of attack. Nonetheless, *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* specifically stated that the services were to maintain coordination "under the principle of unity of command." The War and Navy departments both concurred that the commander of this force" should be selected from the service to which the general operation is assigned as a function." 27 In short, if the campaign was naval in character with the seizure and defense of advanced naval base during the prosecution of a naval campaign being necessary, the Navy would exercise command. If it were in defense of the Panama Canal Zone, Oahu, the Philippines or, a land-based installation, it was primarily an Army function. The Joint Board was likewise specific about the role of the Marine Corps, which had recognized that its base seizure and defense mission would overlap with that of the Army's land defense mission. Yet even the Joint Board recognized that because of the Marine Corps' "constant association with naval units," it should be given what it termed "special training" in the conduct of land operations. 28

As for harbor and inland defenses the Joint Board assigned coastal defense and the adjoining installations to the Army, while the Navy retained its basic mission of defeating the enemy fleets with special emphasis given to toward the "defeat of any enemy force in

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27 Secretary of the Navy, *Annual Report for 1922*, p. 36; *Joint Action of the Army and Navy (1927)*, Ch. 1., p. 17.
28 *Joint Action of the Army and Navy (1927)*, Ch. 4, p. 13.
the vicinity of the coast." Added on to this last provision, and later a source of great contention between the two services, particularly during the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, was the provision regarding the employment of aircraft. The members of the Joint Board saw the vital role that aircraft would play in both land and sea defense and thus sought to placate both air services with specifically outlined missions. As for the Army Air Corps, the Joint Board specified that it was to operate "as an arm of the mobile army in general coast defense; in support of harbor defenses; or in offshore air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces." As for naval aviation [and Marine aviation as well], it was to provide "Aircraft, suitable for observation, patrolling, and scouting over the sea and for the protection of line of sea communication and coastal zones against attacks by hostile submarines and surface raiders." For the Marine Corps's air component, the Joint Board agreed that since it is a part of naval aviation, "its function is to operate as part of the naval air component, particularly in operations incident to Marine Corps functions, for which operations the Navy may provide land-based aircraft." This same view had been advocated by Admiral Coontz as early as 1 July 1920 when in a memorandum, the Chief of Naval Operations advanced the idea that during a naval campaign Marine aircraft could:

\[\ldots\] leave the ship hours before its arrival at destination, reconnoiter the proposed landing place, report conditions, disposition of the enemy, take photographs to be developed, delivered, the commanding officer plan his landings and give subordinate copies of photographs.\(^{30}\)

Regarding the use of Marine aircraft during an advanced base operation, Admiral Robert E. Coontz wrote that Marine air units could form "offshore patrols to prevent surprise

\(^{29}\)Ibid, Ch. 1, p. 8.
\(^{30}\)Memorandum from CNO, Admiral R. E. Coontz to All Bureaus and Major General Commandant, dtd. 1 July 1920," op. cit. p. 32.
raids by enemy cruisers and conduct Anti-submarine patrols." As for Marine aviation forces supplementing shore defenses, the Chief of Naval Operations noted that such units could perform "spotting for shore batteries in attacks from enemy ships as well as providing communications between our vessels and the advanced base." Marine pilots could likewise "photograph, bomb, and torpedo enemy craft and bases with reach."

Admiral Coontz, in anticipation of development of floating platforms at sea, or later on the aircraft carrier, noted that Marine pilots, working in unison with that of their naval air brethren "will be trained to fly from and land on platforms representing ships' decks and should, when occasion permits, be temporarily assigned to ships so that when they are needed for that work they will be available and trained up to date."31

While critics pointed to the duplication in functions between both Army and naval aviation in defense against enemy shipping, the Joint Board established 'a plan for cooperation and coordination' based upon "paramount interest:"

If an enemy force approaching the coast could be engaged by a U.S. Navy force of approximately the same strength, the U.S. Navy assumed paramount interest and coordinated operations of the Army with its own. On the other hand, if the enemy force was vastly superior to U.S. naval forces available to use against it, the Army held paramount interest and coordinated operations of the U.S. Navy with those of the U.S. Army.32

Despite the approval of both Secretaries of War Newton D. Baker and Josephus Daniels of the Navy problems remained, particularly when Congress intervened and gave the Army "control of aerial operations from land bases, and the Navy control of aerial operations of the fleet, and at naval stations when the operations were for instruction, experimentation, or training."33 The controversy over functions remained, as the tests

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31Ibid, p. 33.
32Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, pp. 110-1.
33Ibid, p. 111.
against the warships and technological advances outpaced the roles and missions debate between the two services, and led to the formation of several committees from 1923 through 1925, which attempted to resolve this issue with little or no success.34

Despite the persistence of the problems over the roles of each service in coastal defense, and in the use of its aviation forces, the services set out to test the viability of the defense of the Panama Canal and the advanced base concepts of the Navy and Marine Corps, in a series of exercises commencing in January and lasting through the beginning of March 1924. As the results of these exercises demonstrated, the services still had a ways to go before truly "joint" or combined operations could be successfully carried out by all three services. Furthermore, for the Marine Corps, exercises in Cuba, the Canal Zone, and on Culebra, indicated the obstacles and hurdles that had still to be overcome before it could claim success in conducting an advanced base mission overseas. Yet the Marines under the leadership of Major General Lejeune had to start somewhere.

34The Lassiter Board (1923), headed by Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Major General William Lassiter, U. S. Army sought to increase the strength of the Army's Air Service as well as divide the functions of Army aviation into Attack and Pursuit aviation; the Florian Lampert Committee (1923-4), named after Wisconsin Rep Florian Lampert, sought to divide the functions of air defense and affirmed the importance of both air services by recommending among other things that both the Army and the Navy should receive $10 million each for new flying equipment as well as recommending that Congress establish the roles that both the Army's and Navy's aviation would play; while the Dwight D. Morrow Board (1925) examined the role of aviation in the nation's defense and concluded that both air and naval power were essential for the nation's defense. General Mason M. Patrick, head of the Army's Air Service, in appearing before the Lampert Committee recommended that the Army be given responsibility for the air defense of the nation's coasts and a two hundred mile limit out to sea. The Navy would retain its role in scouting and protecting the coastal lines of communications. See Maurer, Aviation in the U. S. Army, pp. 73-4, and 111.
The Winter Maneuvers of 1922-24

Even before Marines of the East Coast Expeditionary Force refought the Battle of the Wilderness, Headquarters prepared to test several key concepts of the advanced base force that had been dormant since the 1914 Winter Exercises held off Culebra, ones that would have a direct impact on determining how well Marines understood the shortcomings of the former exercise as well as of those to come.35 Between the dates of 9 January and 25 April 1922, Marines conducted a series of exercises aimed at testing various principles of the advanced base force at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and on Culebra. These exercises included the embarkation and disembarkation of troops and stores, as well as other advanced base equipment.36 Marines also conducted a series of limited field problems on Culebra that included both attack and defense operations that involved both infantry and artillery units.

The Marine detachment, comprised primarily of the 9th Company, 10th Marines, had been designated by Headquarters to "primarily test the possibilities of landing the 155mm gun and accompanying 10-ton tractor from ship-to shore in small boats." Disembarking from the USS Florida, the three officers and 135 enlisted Marines, successfully landed the one 155-mm and two 75-mm field guns as well as the accompanying 5 and 10-ton tractors ashore on Guantanamo Bay. As Lieutenant Colonel Richard M. Cutts, the overall Marine commander during the exercise, later reported to the Major General Commandant, special attention was given to the "training of the gun's crews and special details, the hardening of the men, and the testing out of all material, and communication."

Reembarked aboard the USS Florida, the next objective was the island of Culebra, where Marines had not conducted maneuvers since the 1914 Winter Maneuvers in

35"Marine Manoeuvres with the Fleet," MCG, 8 (December 1923), pp. 241-2.
36Ibid.

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January 1914. The 9th Company, 10th Marines, joined by the three officers and 100 Marines of the 35th Company, once again practiced disembarkation procedures, this time under the guise of an actual landing and defense of an advanced naval base. This later exercise demonstrated that "artillery up to an including 155-mm guns and 10-ton tractors can be transported by battleships and landed in ship's boats." In spite of the optimistic reports submitted by Cutts to Headquarters, the fact remained that the Marines were able to move the guns and equipment ashore only with the greatest difficulty, in conditions that were anything but ideal, and in ships' boats that proved to be totally inadequate to haul the cumbersome artillery pieces ashore. Cutts later wrote that in order for a successful landing to take place, "all conditions must be exceedingly favorable to obtain a successful result at the landing place; more favorable than can be expected." For Cutts, this meant that the sea had to be calm and that the landing take place in a moderate surf. Conditions, one might add, that rarely exist in any scenario, whether it be in peace or war. The exercise nonetheless demonstrated that if provided with proper landing craft, such as artillery lighters for heavy guns that can be brought onto the shore, the necessary equipment could be brought ashore in a timely manner. Operationally, the landings demonstrated that more emphasis had to be placed on developing equipment and techniques that favored the attack versus that of the defense. Major General Lejeune emphasized this latter point when he commented that:

... while the exercises of 1922 were defensive in their nature, they brought out the difficulties of attack in landing operations against hostile opposition and the further presumption that the Marine Corps should be preparing for offensive landing operations in addition to the defensive advanced base work.  

37 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 35.
38 Ibid, p. 36.
When compared with the writings of both Colonel Dunlap and Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, Lejeune's comments illustrated the problems that still plagued the creation of a credible advanced base force, let alone an amphibious assault force. The shortcomings in the disembarkation and landing techniques, nonetheless, pointed toward the fact that not only was Headquarters aware of the problems of landing on a hostile beach, but that the problems were not insurmountable if sufficient resources and studies could be directed at resolving them. The fact remained, however, that while the Guantanamo Bay and Culebra exercises proved of some value, the maneuvers, if they can be called that, showed how much work had to be actually be done before the operation could be called a complete success. The success or failure would have to come under conditions that Marines might indeed face while conducting an actual war time landing.

In March 1923, the Marines returned to Panama, where a consolidated detachment from the Fleet Marine Force conducted a series of landing operations in Panama, when they launched a mock attack against the Panama Canal from the Pacific side. While the exercise, known collectively as Fleet Problem 2, dealt primarily with the testing of the defenses of the Panama Canal, the United States Fleet (consisting of both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets) used the exercise to practice naval gunnery, torpedo delivery and maneuver, ship-to-ship communications problems, as well as test its air doctrine with that of the Army's air defenses. The exercises in Panama, likewise gave the two naval services to conduct joint operations with the Army's 11th Infantry Division, stationed in the Canal Zone.39

Fleet Problems No.'s 3 and 4

The first major test of the newly-constituted East Coast Expeditionary Forces under "conditions for which it was designed," occurred during the Fleet's annual winter

39Kaufmann and Kaufmann, The Sleeping Giant, p. 38.
maneuvers during the months of January and February 1924. Under the overall command of Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, USMC, and divided into both an "attacking" or "mobile" force, represented by the 5th Marines commanded by Colonel H.C. Snyder, and a defensive or "fixed" force represented by the 10th Marines (Artillery) as well as searchlight, tank, and engineer units and led by Colonel Dion Williams, the East Coast Expeditionary Force set out to test not only the defense of the Panama Canal Zone, but to resume its advanced base maneuvers suspended after its first real test in 1914, in the attack and defense of an advanced naval base on the island of Culebra, off the northeastern coast of Puerto Rico [Map 8.1] Aviation units from the 1st Squadron based at Quantico, likewise participated in the exercise, acted as scouts for the land-based force, bombed, and engaged in anti-submarine patrols. While the overall scheme of the exercise revolved around the Marine Corps and the Navy, the winter maneuvers took on a more "joint" nature with the inclusion of the Army and the Army National Guard units in Puerto Rico. 40 Divided into four phases, the winter maneuvers of 1924 gave the Marines practice in:

(a) Forming a landing force for the Scouting Fleet in their attack on the Panama Canal defenses with a view to stopping the Pacific Fleet from passing through the Canal;
(b) Occupation and defense of the island of Culebra;
(c) Forming a landing force, in conjunction with the Fleet, in an endeavor to capture and hold the Culebra Advanced Base;
(d) Military Maneuvers, parades, landing operations, firing, demonstrations, and exhibitions given on Culebra during the visit of the Major General Commandant, a group of high ranking naval officers, and a party of managers and editors of the leading newspapers of the United States. 41

40"Marines Manoeuvres With the Fleet," p. 242.
The Marines set sail from Quantico on 2 January 1924 and headed first for Hampton Roads and from there onto Chiriqui Lagoon, Panama, where they rendezvoused with the Scouting Fleet, approximately 120 miles southeast of the Panama Canal. While aboard ship, the Marines continued to train in such things as infantry drill, bush warfare, field engineering, signals and communications, first aid and field hygiene. While the men trained, the officers attended briefings that covered such topics as ammunition supply, logistics, landings on hostile shores, and protection against hostile aircraft, intelligence dissemination, company weapons, and perhaps the most important disembarkation and embarkation from transports and other means of motor sail. Sailing under wartime conditions, the expeditionary troops arrived at Porto Bello, Panama on 15 January 1924, and shortly thereafter began to disembark using twenty-six sailing launches. As Sergeant Major Clarence B. Proctor, USMC, a participant in the exercise later recounted, the Marines, organized into three 'waves' and issued lifejackets, proceeded toward Fort Randolph on Margarita Island, the site of an Army post which guards the eastern entrance to the Panama Canal, and landed at daylight, some in water that was waist-deep. As pre-planned, the Marines attacked and captured several 'enemy' gun batteries, as well Fort Randolph. Marines likewise captured 700 prisoners as well as several airplanes, 6 submarines, one collier, an airplane tender, and numerous small craft at Coco Solo. After a day and a half of attacking and defending, the Chief Umpire "informed the Commanding General that hostilities would cease on land insofar as related to the landing force. After a few days of liberty in Panama City, the Marines

42Ibid, p. 4.
43Ibid, pp. 4-5.
The Island of Culebra, Puerto Rico.

reembarked aboard the *Henderson*, and proceeded to the island of Culebra, where it was to attempt a landing against the Marines referred to as the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Culebra (MCEF, Culebra), under the command of Colonel Dion Williams.

The scenario for the exercise was that "Blue" (representing the United States), had entered the war against "Black," which had established naval bases in the Caribbean, and threatened the security of the Panama Canal, and blocked the ability of the Blue forces to reinforce its Canal Zone defenses since its fleet had been divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Black Force with its accompanying fleet, the Atlantic or Scouting Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully, USN, was to conduct a landing in the Canal Zone, and disable by a series of raids the locks in order to prevent the exit of the Pacific Fleet of the Blue Forces and their juncture with the Blue Forces in the Atlantic.\(^4^4\) Drawing on the lessons of the World War, the first half of the exercise resembled both the aborted 1918 Sabbioncelli Peninsula operation proposed by Rear Admiral W.S. Sims and Colonel Robert H. Dunlap in conception, and the successful British Royal Marine operations in blocking the German-held Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend (April 1918) in execution.\(^4^5\)

With the 5th Marines as the landing force, the Scouting Fleet attempted to block the transit of the Battle fleet from the west coast through the Panama Canal. Colonel

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\(^{4^5}\)In a mission to block the German submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend as suggested by British Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, RN during the last year of the World War the Royal Marines, supported by the Royal Navy launched an raid against the port of Zeebrugge on 22-23 April 1918 and after a furious fight with its German defenders on top of the Mole, a mile long series of storage facilities and hangars connected to the shore via a viaduct, the Marines succeeded in neutralizing the German shore defenses while the Royal Navy sank two ships that effectively blocked the harbor's future use as a submarine base. See John Mullen, *Zeebrugge, 1918,* in Merrill L. Bartlett, *Assault From the Sea, Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 154-6
Snyder's Marines then conducted a series of amphibious assaults on both Fort Randolph and Coco Solo, "making possible the simulated destruction of the canal locks." Almost from the start, however, the attacking force ran into problems. These problems ranged from the disembarkation of men and equipment, which oftentimes took anywhere from one and one half to five hours, to Marines, many tired, seasick, and cramped, waiting to go ashore in motor sailers that took up to five hours to load from a single gangway, and as well as spending up to three hours in the choppy sea sitting down in an overcrowded whale boat. General Holland M. Smith, who participated in the 1924 Panama landings as a major on the staff of Admiral Coontz stated, that possibly one of the more important problems incurred by the landing force was the lack of junior leadership from both platoon commanders and noncommissioned officers in seating and arranging the Marines properly in the assault boats. The Navy likewise incurred their share of the blame. As General Smith wrote, "Boat officers were young and inexperienced and declined the responsibility," in properly seating the Marines, as well as having "... had but the slightest idea of where the boats were to go." Navy beachmasters assigned to the exercise likewise proved at times to be impatient with the Marines, boat officers, and coxswains transporting the assault force ashore. The confusion likewise continued as the force proceeded ashore. When the timing and distance of the boats in the first waves soon began to outdistance that of the beachmaster, the latter at one point halted the Marine-carrying motor sailers right in order to put the waves in order so as to insure that the boats arrive according to their designated times ashore. In short, the landing was

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neither a surprise nor a complete success with, in fact, much confusion and disarray. It became obvious to all participants that the Marines would have a great amount of work and study in order to eliminate the "bugs" that plagued the landings against a fortified position such as the Panama Canal.

Once ashore, communications with the task force broke down, and Marines stood around until the umpires could bring order out of confusion and put the leathernecks into proper dispositions. Despite these problems, however, both Smith and the other participants attempted to put a good "spin" on the exercises in Panama when they agreed that, "The experience gained in these practice exercises was of inestimable value to both the Navy and the Marine Corps." Meanwhile, the 10th Marines as well as the remainder of the MCEF, Culebra under Colonel Dion Williams, prepared the island of Culebra for an assault by the "Black Fleet" after the conclusion of the first phase of the winter maneuvers. After setting sail aboard the troop transport USS Chaumont from Quantico on 2 January 1924, the Marines arrived six days later (8 January 1924), and unloaded her compliment of 90 officers and 1,500 Marines. The bulk of the Marines' heavy equipment, including a platoon of light tanks, 155mm artillery pieces, trucks, and aircraft, arrived aboard the cargo ship USS Sirius (AK 15) where Marine engineers constructed a pontoon bridge between the ship and the shore in order to facilitate the unloading of the ship.

The mission of Colonel Williams's Marines was twofold:

to protect the harbor mine field with fire, and to oppose a landing by hostile forces, in this case the 5th Regiment fresh from "victory" in the Canal Zone. No infantry was assigned to the force at Culebra, so allocation of units and personnel to the two missions was a challenge.

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47 See Smith, "Umpire Diary," pp. 4-6.
48 Buckner, 10th Marines, p. 24.
49 Ibid.
Concentrated after the first phase of the exercise in the Canal Zone, the U.S. Fleet then set sail for the waters off Culebra in Vieques sound, where the Marines were to "retake" that island from an enemy fleet that had established an advanced base that threatened the shipping lanes and the Panama Canal. [Map #2] The attacking force, referred to as the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, U.S. Fleet (MCEF, U.S. Fleet), commanded by Brigadier General Cole, consisted of a Force Headquarters, Radio and Service Company, Gun platoon, and one regiment of infantry totaling 1,650 officers and enlisted Marines of whom 1,550 actually landed during the exercise. (Table 8.1) The Navy provided 3 battleships, 12 destroyers, 4 submarines, and some 52 aircraft while the defending MCEF, Culebra consisted of:

1 Detachment from Headquarters and Headquarters Company
1 Service Company
1 Gas Company
1 Light Tank Platoon
3 Light Tanks (37-mm guns)

1 Artillery Regiment:
6 155mm Guns 800 Marines
12 75mm Guns

1 Anti-aircraft Artillery Company:
4 75mm Guns 125 Marines

1 Aviation Division
6 D. T. Seaplanes 80 Marines

1 Section Balloon Division

Engineer and Signal:

Total Officers and Enlisted (entire force): 1550 Marines

Table 8.1
Colonel Dion Williams "Blue" Culebra Force
In addition to the combat troops ashore, Headquarters attached additional Marines to serve in support roles which brought the total of Williams' "Blue" force on Culebra to approximately 1700 officers and enlisted men.  

**Fleet Problem No. 4**

Even before Colonel Synder's 5th Marines landed, the 10th Marines took full advantage of the open spaces found on Culebra in order to conduct live fire exercises, something that they had been prevented from doing at Quantico. As Cole's Marines prepared to "assault Culebra," Williams' force dug in, and prepared to repel the landings. As stated above, the object of the "Blue" Force was to "first seize a base in the northern islands of Black territory, and, secondly, to establish a blockade of Black Home Territory." For its part, the "Black" Force was to "frustrate the attempts of Blue to seize such a base and to protect home territory against the attacks of a superior foe." For the East Coast Expeditionary Force, however, the exercise was the first practical demonstration of an advanced base force since 1914, and the first but not the last during the interwar period.

Prior to the maneuvers, the two staffs (attacking and defending) with a Chief of Staff whom oversaw the formulation of the operational plans with the four staff divisions (F-1-

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51 This situation would not be rectified until the period before the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941 [940-41], when the U.S. government purchased the land around Marine Barracks, New River, N.C. in Onslow County from a bankrupt land speculator living in Wilmington, N.C. for the Marines and began construction of what is today known as Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, named in honor of the thirteenth commandant-Major General John A. Lejeune. For historical accuracy, however, the author will use the term Marine Barracks, New River, NC where appropriate.
Personnel; F-2-Intelligence; F-3 Operations and Training; and F-4 Supply) added its annexes. Having had both the experience of staff planning during the World War, and the previous three Civil War reenactments behind them, the officers of the forces involved sought to make the landings, and defense as real as possible by keeping the original plans simple and flexible. In particular, the staffs paid special emphasis on personnel, the scheduling of sailing the transports to an appointed rendezvous prior to the commencement of the maneuvers, the ship-to-shore movements of the troops and logistical support during both the planning and deployment phases of the exercises.

The "Fixed" Defense Force Prepares Culebra’s Defenses

The defender likewise used the natural camouflage provided by the scrub brush located on Culebra in order to prevent 'enemy' air elements from spotting gun and communication positions. With his background in surveying and reconnaissance, Colonel Williams had the Marines establish a string of outposts connected by radio and telephone lines running in two directions in order to provide a backup if one failed or cut, as well conduct extensive patrolling primarily for auxiliary roads to shift the defense forces from one point to another as the landing proceeded.

Marines likewise prepared the beach defenses at Mosquito Bay, Seine Bay, and Firewood Bay, located on the Windward or western side of the island, in order to have all avenues of approach covered in order to meet the enemy landing force. Williams likewise had his engineers implant beach obstacles in the form of wire entanglements underwater as to hinder the landing boats as they came across the shoreline. One major flaw in Williams' defense was, of course, the absence of a "constructive" or real force of infantry. As Sergeant Major Proctor wrote:

As infantry was considered absolutely necessary in the proper defense of the island against any landing attack, the auxiliary troops of the Force were organized into provisional battalions and arrangements were made to withdraw the maximum number of men from the guns after the exact
destination of the enemy main landing should be determined, leaving only enough men at the guns to fire them in place, with the exception of two of the 75mm guns which were fully manned and able to move as desired in the course of the action.52

Besides this emphasis on having a suitable force of infantry for counterattacks, perhaps the most interesting aspect of this exercise, are the references made by Colonel Williams in his post-exercise synopsis of this Fleet Problem of the operational experience gained by Marine officers on Culebra. In comparing the use of artillery on Culebra with that during the World War, Williams wrote that Marine artillery brought the maximum amount of artillery fire to bear "upon the enemy boats carrying troops, while discharging their troops at the beaches, and while forming up on shore." The Marine colonel asserted that this artillery fire under actual landing conditions in time of war could either disrupt and/or delay an attack that would enable the defender to bring forward his reserve battalions or "mobile force" of infantry, to either drive the enemy off the island or to surrender.53 Then in a direct reference of the World War, Williams wrote that:

This plan of defense is based on the system used on the Western Front with such success during the last year of the war by both sides. It was found that the terrific bombardment and barrage preceding an attack, disabled or neutralized effectively a large percentage of troops occupying positions within the zone of bombardment. A plan of defense was gradually developed during the war which exposed as few troops as possible to the overwhelming artillery fire of the attackers, and at the same time, made a systematic advance through a deep zone difficult and costly. This was effected, as above stated, by posting small groups of men staggered throughout the zone; each capable of all around defense and mutually supporting each other with flanking fire.54

52Proctor, "Winter Maneuvers," p. 11.
54Ibid, pp. 15-6; Cole, "Report and Comments, Fleet Problem No. 4."
Brigadier General Cole likewise emphasized the importance of these same tactics advocated by Colonel Williams in his own post maneuver critique:

These tactics are peculiarly adapted to the problem presented to the Culebra Detachment. A strong resistance on the beach appeals with almost irresistible force to the defenders of a coast line. But a close examination will show that the conditions here are almost identical with those existing in a purely land operation and the lessons learned after five years of war should not be disregarded.55

In fact, Williams' emphasis on the use of artillery and the tactics in its employment, as well as its importance to any future advanced base force was not new. At the conclusion of the World War Colonel Robert Dunlap, in fact, criticized the Army for not having used Marine artillery during the World War56, in an extensive analysis of the nonuse [emphasis mine] of the 10th Marines, and their field pieces during the World War, when he wrote that "Many lessons gained during the war by the Artillery which participated, have been lost to us [i.e., Marines] . . . [and that] . . . Only the best organization, the keenest study and the most severe application and training can compensate for this loss."57 Dunlap emphasized the point that during both the World War, and in the postwar restructuring for future wars not only should the Marine Corps have "organized two regiments of Field Artillery " . . . but that one regiment be trained in the use of mountain howitzers, field guns, field howitzers, and field guns as large as 4.7-inch while another one be trained in the use of both the 7 and 8-inch howitzers, 7 inch and larger Naval Guns for advanced base work. Thus, a lesson that Marines learned over and over

55Cole, "Report and Comments, Fleet Problem No. 4."
56General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces of which the Marine Brigade had been a part of, declined the use of Marine artillery because of its lack of heavy calibered guns and general unsuitability to the type of fighting in France. Colonel Dunlap did, however, eventually command the U.S. Army's 17th Field Artillery Regiment during the last two months of the World War. See Buckner, Brief History of the 10th Marines, pp. 18-20.
57Dunlap, "Recommendations," p. 5.
again during the World War came to have a significant place in not only the defense of an advanced base during the 1924 Culebra Maneuvers, but later during World War II in the seizure of islands during an amphibious landing on a hostile shore.

The use of infantry and artillery were not the only lessons Marines learned during the exercises on Culebra that winter of 1924. Even as the "fixed" defense force prepared its positions before the arrival of "Black" in early January the advance elements of Colonel Williams' Marines had already began the tedious process of unloading supplies from both the USS *Sirius* and *Chaumont*, on 7 January 1924. As they unloaded supplies from both ships, the Marines discovered that this could be a daunting challenge, as the swells from the Atlantic Ocean made disembarkation procedures all the more difficult. Having neither the "lighters" advocated by Colonel Cutts, nor suitable landing craft, the leathernecks used a 250-foot pontoon bridge borrowed from the U.S. Army engineers at Fort Humphrey to facilitate the unloading process. As Williams noted in a post-exercise article in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, "it was originally intended to use this material [the pontoon bridge] in constructing temporary floating wharves for landing stores and material and for constructing flat decked lighters for transportation of material by water . . ." Instead of employing the pontoon decks as lighters, the Marines simply brought the ship close-in to shore, and moored the hip securely from head to rear and set the pontoon bridge up from ship to shore. This later became the accepted procedure for landing supplies when no permanent wharving facilities were available to the landing force. As Williams wrote:

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58 As Sergeant Major Proctor recounted, it was not until the actual exercise took place on 1 February 1924 that an experimental "Beetle Boat" or artillery lighter as advocated by Colonel Cutts had been ready for use by the landing force. See Proctor, "The Winter Maneuvers," p. 15; Clifford's *Progress and Purpose*, pp. 31-3.
In future operations overseas this method of handling material between ship and shore, where anchorage in smooth water is available, will greatly simplify the operations of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces at localities where wharves and docks are absent or limited.\(^{60}\)

What Williams did not say, of course, is that the construction and operation of such a bridge could occur only in benign landing environment without the presence of enemy shellfire. Nonetheless, the fact that Marines realized that supplies could be landed absent the availability of ships or lighters after a beachhead had been gained had served to underscore the importance of these fleet exercises or FLEXES."

Even as the transports unloaded the artillery pieces and other equipment of the "fixed" or "Culebra" defense forces, the main body of Marines landed in whaleboats, and within twenty hours had established a tent camp on the beaches of Great Harbor. As Sergeant Major Proctor recalled, the establishment of this camp was in itself, "a record which it is thought surpasses previous performances of this nature."\(^{61}\)

After establishing their campsite, the Marines began to prepare defensive positions for the guns and other advanced base equipment. Directly supervised by Colonel Williams, the Marines quickly learned how to employ both camouflage and proper use of terrain in the preparation of defensive positions during the maneuvers. Because of Culebra's range of low-lying hills and defiles, Williams' force not only had the advantage of forcing "Blue" [Cole's force] to attack along certain avenues of approach, but in the long run, were able to channel the landing into pre-arranged "artillery pockets," and disrupt the attempts by the landing force to advance inland in almost the same manner that Marines were able to disrupt the German attacks during the fighting in the Meuse-Argonne in October-November 1918.\(^{62}\) Marines of the "fixed" defense force were able to emplace

\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{62}\) Robert W. Lamont, "Over There: Key Battles of the 2d Infantry Division," Marine Corps Gazette, 78 (June 1993), pp. 82-3.
the guns so as to enable them to bring sufficient firepower to "bear upon the beaches that the enemy could effect a landing," as well as to prevent their disruption by naval gunfire.

**The Mobile Regiment Prepares to 'Assault' Culebra**

As Colonel Williams' force prepared for "Blue's" landing, Brigadier General Cole's Marines likewise made final preparations aboard the *USS Sirius* and *Henderson* after their arrival in the waters off Culebra. On the night before the main landing took place (30-31 January 1924), a force of Marines occupied Southwest Cay, a small island within machine gun range of the mainland where they conducted a reconnaissance, emplaced machine guns and several 75mm howitzers, in order to better support the main landing the next day. Even before the Marines moved into position, "Black's" airplanes conducted a 150-mile reconnaissance every evening after 5 p.m. of the waters surrounding Culebra, in order that enemy ships would "be in sight of shore planes. Once these planes spotted "Blue's" flotilla or opposing aircraft, a seaplane would drop a flare to alert the searchlight and anti-aircraft artillery crews of the approaching enemy.63

Both the seaplanes from the *USS Jason*, commanded by Captain W. T. Mallison, Sr., USN, and the landplanes from the *USS Langley*,64 performed a similar role for "Blue." The landing force's aircraft flew repeated missions at levels as low as 600 feet as they tested "Black's" anti-aircraft defenses.

As both the aircraft and respective forces afloat and ashore prepared for the main part of the exercise, submarines and other ships of the fleet maneuvered and "fought"

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63Williams, "Winter Manoeuvres of 1924," p. 18.
64 The *USS Jason* and *USS Langley* were colliers and sister ships. As Lt. W. T. Mallison recounted to this author, "The *Langley*'s tower cranes were replaced by a flight deck." In fact, the *USS Jason* had what Lt. Mallison described as "real seaplanes" capable of operating in the water or in the air whereas the *Langley*'s aircraft were strictly landplanes capable of operating only from either the shore or from its flattop deck. Interview Leo J. Daugherty III with Lt. W. T. Mallison, Jr., USNR (Ret), March 1997. See Mallison's "The Jason and the Langley in the Fleet Exercise of 1924," p. 1 in possession of the author. Hereafter cited as Mallison Interview.
each other, even as minesweepers swept Great Harbor and Mosquito Bay, and the "Blue" fleet bombarded the defenses on Culebra Island. The guns ashore likewise participated in this phase of the exercise, as the fixed guns "fired" on the enemy fleet. Then, on the evening and early morning hours of 30 January-1 February, Marines climbed aboard the Henderson's whaleboats as the commander of the task force signaled the commencement of the main portion of the exercise. At precisely 3:15 a.m., the Marines, many of whom had become seasick as they waited to land in the whaleboats that tossed them about in the choppy water, proceeded to shore and upon reaching the shoreline waded ashore in water that was oftentimes neck-high and had completed the movement by 4 a.m.65 As dawn crept over the horizon at Culebra, the two companies that had been put ashore went into action with the capture of an artillery battery located on the beach at Firewood Bay. By 7 a.m., the majority of the force had disembarked from the cumbersome whaleboats and had started to proceed inland in a line "west of a north and south line through the head of Great Harbor." As one Marine private recalled, the march inland was 'memorable':

The main landing was pulled at three o'clock the next morning, with all the fancy do-dads and thrills connected with an operation of this kind. And then followed the hike through tropical jungles. All the rest of that night we hiked-I guess the shore troops [Black] were firing blank ammunition at us, but we didn't know it. We did know, however, that they fired "tear" gas at us. Several times we donned our gas masks for protection.

65Lt Mallison, it might be noted, participated in the landing with the Marines on Culebra. Having had approval from Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby to take his 7-year old son with him during the maneuvers that year, the younger Mallison recounted that "My father arranged for us to participate in the Marine Corps' planned amphibious exercise on Culebra island in 1924. He and I were aboard an ad hoc landing craft, and we made the assault with the Marines." Insisting that he be treated like a "Marine" Lt. Mallison was then placed by his father into the water that was "about up to my ears." As for the assault itself, Mallison stated that "The Marines conducted the assault efficiently, and I did too but with much help." "Mallison Interview.
We poor privates didn't know exactly what this darned thing was all about, but we did know that Culebra hills are steep and high, and that the cactus sticks to the finish. . . .

Even as the Marines sweated and cursed as they marched inland, the main part exercise commenced with artillery fire from the "fixed" defense force aimed at the ships and whaleboats of the "mobile" force. In a scene reminiscent of the recently concluded World War, five hundred Marines of the "mobile force," supported by three light tanks positioned themselves against the flanks of the "fixed" forces flank, which had been likewise reinforced by motorized infantry. While the referees ashore concluded that "no fatigue or casualties had yet occurred, they did rule that the ships' bombardment offshore had caused some casualties, due to "indirect fire." Despite the fact that the Marines used blank ammunition and "tear" gas, they did attempt to make conditions as real as possible, inasmuch they could absent, of course, the presence of the sophisticated monitoring gear that their great grandsons would enjoy seventy years later. Both General Cole and Colonel Williams, nonetheless, strove to make the exercise as worthwhile for the enlisted men as well as for the officers. An enlisted Marine who participated in the assault on Culebra wrote that:

A realistic demonstration of landing troops from a transport on hostile shores was given. Smoke screens were dropped from aeroplanes, artillery fired on the incoming boats, and tanks operated along the beach. The odor of "tear" gas was about, and both the attacking and defending forces showed their stuff. This was out final show-the last act of the play. The next day we started packing up and loading the ships for the homeward bound journey. Now that she is all over, I'm glad I made the trip. Quite true, we had hardships. But what worth-while thing is accomplished anywhere without them.


We all learned many things—not only the commanders, but the "buck" privates as well. 68

As was the case in Panama, the maneuvers on Culebra were "chaotic," with Marines landing on the wrong beaches, waiting in open motor launches for nearly eight hours in choppy seas before heading ashore, and poor tactical coordination once ashore of both the attackers and defenders. Nonetheless, despite the inability to determine "who won and who lost" during the Winter Maneuvers of 1924, the fact remained that the Marines had introduced two very important elements into the exercises, ones in which would enable Marine planners to focus on as being two of the problems associated with an assault landing and refine during the late 1920's, and into the 1930's at the Marine Corps Schools. One of these was the introduction of the Christie amphibious tank, and the other the introduction of an artillery lighter or boat, dubbed by the Marines as the "Beetle Boat, due to its armor- plated shell.

Christie's "Amphibious" Tank

The first of the innovations injected into Fleet Problem 4 was the amphibious tank, designed by inventor Walter G. Christie. Christie, an eccentric New York, self-made automotive engineer, had designed a series of tanks for the U.S. Army's Ordnance and fledgling Tank Corps during and immediately after the World War. These included the Christie Model 1919, all of which the Army rejected due to "a hollow tank development policy, a diminishing interest due to budgetary limitations, and the disarmament mood" that had taken a firm hold in the United States at the beginning of the 1920's. 69

Undeterred, Christie continued to design tanks and armored vehicles, including a

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convertible amphibian gun carriage. Christie apparently came up with this idea for just such an amphibian after being influenced by an article written by British military theorist and tank advocate Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, who had written an article entitled, "Tanks in Future Warfare," in the (Royal) *Tank Corps Journal* (December 1921) about a future war "where tanks could be launched from a floating mechanical base."  

Colonel Fuller later lectured on the same subject to the Royal United Service Institution on 11 February 1920, entitled, "The Development of Sea Warfare on Land and its Influence on Future Naval Operations." In the lecture, the British tank advocate spoke of a scenario whereby an amphibian tank would be launched from what he called a "submarine tank carrier." Ironically this would become a reality several years later during Fleet Problem 4 on Culebra.  

By June of 1921, Christie had constructed a working model of his "amphibian" and had successfully conducted a series of tests under almost near-perfect conditions in the Hudson River near his workshop at the Fletcher Shipyards, located at Hoboken, New Jersey. Christie's amphibious tank, capable of operating on wheels or tracks resembled more of a gun carriage rather than either a tank or later on an amphibious troop transporter. This vehicle, operated in the water by two propellers and steered "by varying the pitch of the propellers and the speed of the track," and while too heavy to be considered solely as a tank nonetheless impressed General John J. Pershing's aide, Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach, who enthusiastically encouraged Christie to continue his work. Despite Brigadier General Rockenbach's enthusiasm for the Christie amphibian, a lack of funds and wane of interest by the War Department ended Army  

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participation in the project not to be revived until World War II. 72 Despite the Army's lack of interest and the first vehicle's poor performance Christie set out to build another version which gained the attention of both Major General John A. Lejeune, and the Commanding General of Quantico, Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, who apparently began to "seriously view its [the tank's] role as an assault vehicle for ship-to-shore and overland operations from the expeditionary force." 73 This professed interest in Christie's amphibious tank on the part of both Lejeune and Butler resulted from a letter from the Major General Commandant to the Commanding General at Quantico on 7 December 1923, whereby the former "instructed General Butler to inquire for a test and be included as a part of the equipment for the 5th Marines, the assaulting force" for the upcoming maneuvers. 73 Brigadier General Butler, who had been designated as the original commanding general of the upcoming exercises, immediately contacted the Sun Shipyards (Christie's company), and requested that an amphibious tank, if proved

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satisfactory to the Marine Corps during a series of pre-tests in the Hudson River, be included in the upcoming fleet exercises. Christie, hoping for a contract from the Marines for his amphibian, readily agreed and scheduled the tests that same month. The tests in the Hudson River went well enough to prompt Butler to contact Vice Admiral N. A. McCully, and inform him that the Christie tank would be placed aboard the USS Wyoming, where it would be transported to Culebra in order to be tested under actual field conditions.

Hoisted aboard the Wyoming, and logged in under the name of "U.S. Marine Corps Tank, GC-2" on 29 December 1931, Butler had hoped that the Christie tank could be used to replace the open motor-powered landing barges that Marines exited from via the sides, in oftentimes ankle to waist-deep water. Butler had likewise hoped to use the "tank" to surprise the defenders, whom he believed would totally off-guard in expecting such an a rapid attack coming ashore. Despite the fact that Brigadier General Butler had been replaced prior to the Wyoming's sailing for the start of the Culebra maneuvers by General Eli K. Cole, himself a strong advocate of the Marines as an advanced base expeditionary force, plans for using the Christie tank during the exercises proceeded ahead.74

Keeping with Colonel Fuller's perceptions in both the transportation ashore, and use thereof of these amphibian tanks, the Marines had planned to transport the Christie amphibian to a location near the shore where the vehicle would then be launched toward the beach. Despite the fact that the Christie amphibian successfully "swam the sea successfully," it failed to reach the beach due largely to its unseaworthiness. Fearful that the vehicle might sink in the swells, the crew on board returned the vehicle to its launching area, and the Christie tank ended up in Chiriqui Lagoon, Culebra where

74Ibid.
members from the 8th Company, 5th Marines "unofficially tested it." The Christie tank likewise "attracted considerable attention," while at Culebra, from the other participants in the exercise. A Marine who witnessed this early amphibian recalled an old mariner's tale about "a battleship crossing the parade ground—it's no longer a joke, but reality. This Amphibious Tank travels on land and on water, and from one to the other without stopping. On land its a regular battle tank, and on the sea it's a miniature Merrimac. She has caterpillar treads, and sea-going propellers. No, no wings. That will probably be the next improvement."  

Judging from the standpoint of the overall success [and failures] of Fleet Problem Four, it can be stated quite frankly that the Christie tank, "had a long way to go" in order to reach operational perfection. And that is saying it mildly. General Holland Smith recorded in his diary during the landings in Panama that despite the good performance of the Christie amphibian in the smooth waters off Panama, "The Commanding General [Eli K. Cole] and the captain of the USS Henderson decided that the Beetle Boat and the Tank would not be used in the landing at Panama on account of heavy sail."  

Despite the mistakes in the fielding of the Christie tank in the exercise itself, the Marines had taken that first crucial, albeit small step, in the right direction in regards to amphibious warfare. All involved in the exercise saw some value in the failures and missteps involved in the 1924 winter maneuvers. Indeed, you have to crawl before you walk, and on Culebra, the Marines' advanced based force concepts definitely were still in the "crawling" stages of development.

Despite the subsequent failure of the Christie tank, there were some individuals such as Brigadier General Cole, who considered the "tank capable of being developed into an

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76 Smith, "Comments on the Winter Maneuvers," p. 1
extremely valuable weapon of war, not only in connection with landing operations, but in a war of movement." Brigadier General Cole, in fact, saw the need for a vehicle capable of not only transporting troops, and supplies from ship-to-shore, but also as a river crossing vehicle, as well as both an armored personnel carrier capable of neutralizing machine gun nests and as an armored overland supply vehicle. Major James J. Meade, General Cole's chief of staff, stated that the Christie tank "has a future but requires remodeling and further demonstration." Captain Robert J. Archibald, the Air Service's Liaison Officer, likewise saw great potential with the armored vehicle pending further development, and the Navy's willingness to develop better methods of transporting the vehicles to the objective area (a source of great controversy up to 1939), as well as enabling the vehicle to operate in both day and nighttime operations. Captain David L. S. Brewster, also of the 5th Marines who had tested the vehicle after its disastrous sea voyage in the Chiriqui Lagoon on Culebra, reported that the vehicle's present design prevented it from affecting a landing in rough water and thus required a better steering system than the two propellers that guided the vehicle in water. Another Marine officer, Captain Clifford O. Henry, commanding officer of the 8th Company, 5th Marines saw

78 In fact, the Marines used the first LVT "Alligators" developed by Donald Roebling as supply vehicles during the Guadalcanal campaign were used as logistics vehicles. There seems to be some controversy, however, in that General Merrill B. Twining stated that the LVT's on "7 August '42" (the day of the Guadalcanal landing during WWII) landed Marines on both Gavutu and Tulagi and not on the main island of Guadalcanal. Major Alfred Dunlop Bailey confirms Twining's assertion when he wrote that while the LVT's were originally designed to haul personnel, on Guadalcanal it was more prudent to use them in hauling supplies. Only on Gavutu and Tulagi were Marines landed in LVT's or "amtracs" as they became to be referred as by Marines. See General Merrill B. Twining, USMC Oral History Transcript. (Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 1975), p.109. Hereafter referred to as Twining Interview; also Major Alfred D. Bailey, USMC, (Ret.), Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters, The History of the Development of the LVT Through World War II. Occasional Paper, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1986), pp. 51-4. Hereafter cited as Bailey, Alligators, Buffaloes, etc.
great potential with a fundamentally redesigned vehicle that would be valuable in "not only landing operations but also for accompanying guns for an infantry regiment, especially where a river might have to be crossed." 79

Overall, the comments Marines made regarding the use of the Christie tank were positive, though all agreed that the vehicle needed much more work before it could be successfully employed in an amphibious landing. Yet the failures attributed to the Christie tank cannot be laid squarely on the vehicle itself. Indeed, it was the overall failure of the Marines to successfully assault and "seize" an advanced base that highlighted the Christie tank's failings. It proved a fault in doctrine, as much as in technology, that would not be partially resolved until the mid-to-late 1930's, and not fully solved until after Tarawa in 1943. Despite the failure of the Christie tank to negotiate the waters off Culebra, there was a realization among Marines that much more work had to be done in the means and methods of transporting men and material ashore during an opposed landing. Yet, as the remainder of the decade demonstrated, Marines paid little attention to the results of the 1924 Maneuvers off Culebra, due largely to the same old story of too many deployments and too little in the way of men and money. Yet one cannot solely blame budgetary and manpower shortages during the interwar era. There was also an institutional disdain toward further development of a suitable landing vehicle that Marines did not correct until the creation of the Fleet Marine force in the 1930's, and the writing of the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934. As for the fate of the Marine Amphibian, after failing to secure a contract from the Marine Corps or the Ordnance Department, Christie sold another version of his amphibious tank to the Japanese-owned Okura Shoji Trading Company, represented first by a Major Ko Daikaki, and later General Katsuichi Ogato, both of whom had witnessed a series of tests

of Christie's amphibian at the inventor's workshop in Chester, Pennsylvania.

Disappointed that his own government had little interest in his vehicle, and strapped with a large debt, Walter Christie sold, without the objection of the War or Navy departments for $250,000, the drawings of an improved amphibious tank to the Okura Trading Company which the Japanese later incorporated into the design and manufacture of their own versions of an amphibious tank.80 Thus, the search for a suitable amphibious vehicle had met with both disappointment, and eventual failure and would have to await the 1930's, and a Florida inventor Donald Roebling, to come up with a suitable landing vehicle for the Marines to employ as an amphibious assault craft.81 In sum, the failure of the Christie tank to navigate the waters off Culebra not only set Marine planners back as they struggled to find a suitable landing vehicle, but compounded the disappointment they experienced over the second type of landing barge tested on Culebra known as the "Beetle Boat."

The "Beetle Boat" and Barges

In assessing the reasons for the failure of the British at Gallipoli, none stuck out so glaringly as the failure to quickly land troops and material ashore under hostile fire. In

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80 Christie, Steel Steeds Christie, p. 27.
81 According to tank historian Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, "The Japanese had already shown considerable interest in Christie's original amphibian and in the Vickers-Armstrongs model of 1931 and in the early thirties began to develop and build amphibious armored vehicles of their own. Two lines of development were actually pursued, one by the Japanese Army and the other by the Imperial Navy. The latter was more successful and produced the best known Japanese amphibian, the Type 2 Kamisha light tank of the Second World War." Interestingly, it was the Japanese Army, however, that developed the water-jet propelled A-lgo, which corrected the defect in steering as experienced by the U.S. Marine Corps's GC-2. Present day amphibious vehicles have incorporated the water-jet propulsion system as opposed to a shaft-driven apparatus. See Ibid, pp. 26-7; Bailey, Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters, p. 17; Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, p. 412; U.S. War Department, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. Introduced by David Isby and Jeffrey Ethell. Second Edition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pp. 250-1.
fact, among the reasons for the failure at Gallipoli, historians focused on the poor operational and tactical execution by the Anglo-French forces. Also cited was the shortages in suitable landing craft compounded by barges inadequately loaded with supplies and overcrowded with troops. Still, there were lessons in the British defeat that Marine officers such as Colonels Dunlap and Williams used as their basis of contention that amphibious operations could succeed if only the proper equipment could be designed to land and protect an adequate number of Marines during, and immediately after an assault. As has been mentioned above, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cutts had assessed during the 1922 Winter maneuvers off Guantaramo Bay, that in order for a proper landing of men, material, and guns ashore, Marines required proper artillery lighters. During the winter maneuvers of 1924, Marines tested two such lighters designed from the ones used by the British in 1915 at Gallipoli.

Prior to the start of the Winter exercises in 1924, General Lejeune requested from the CNO that one of the "fifty foot (50') motor lighter [known as a Beetle Boat], now being built at Norfolk, Virginia," be made available to the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. The CNO complied with Lejeune's request, and had one of the motor lighters placed aboard the USS Henderson for the Marines to test during the maneuvers that winter. The "Beetle Boat," nicknamed for its large armored sides and plywood hull, proved to be both "awkward and too large for the limited load it carried (one 75mm gun and 60 to 100 troops)."82 The most notable features of the "Beetle Boat" included a forward ramp that once lowered formed a gang plank from the boat to the beach, and enabled the lighter to "get much closer to the shore line than a ship's cutter can and offered a certain amount of protection against fire from the shore," to the Marines aboard. One last feature was the fact that it "landed the troops dry."83

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82 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 33-4.
These positive features aside, the boat's awkwardness and size limited not only the number that could be taken aboard ship, but also to the fact that it took up room aboard the transport and limited the number of motor sailers needed to carry an entire assault force ashore in the first waves. As Brigadier General Cole wrote the "Beetle Boat" or 'Troop Barge A', as it had been designated by the Marines was:

... a beginning, but the present design must be altered, if for no other reason than that its stowage on board ship reduces the motor sailers by two—i.e. one 50' and one 40', with landing capacity of 160 men. Some design must be arrived at whereby a transport can carry boats for at least 60 percent of the infantry force on board, with special provisions for artillery, transportation, supplies, etc. These boats should be seaworthy enough to allow them to go 20 miles under their own power, and if possible of a design to permit their being towed by a minesweeper or a destroyer at reduced speed. A design which will give protection against machine gun fire and which provides for some machine gun fire from the boat is desirable.84

In light of the failures of both the Christie amphibious tank and the "Beetle Boat," Brigadier General Cole wrote in his post-exercise analysis that, "We must develop something other than the motor sailing launch for landing purposes, for these are not dependable nor are they good landing boats."85 Despite the failure encountered by the Marines in the employment of the "Beetle Boat" during the Culebra exercises in 1924, the search continued for proper landing craft until the mid-1930's. In fact, it was not until the introduction of the Higgins boat, designed and built by New Orleans shipbuilder Andrew Jackson Higgins in 1936, did the Marines and Navy obtain the boats they had long sought during the exercises of the 1920's and early 1930's. Yet the problem faced by the Marines were not solely just in boats, it was more so in convincing a skeptical naval

84 Cole, "Report and Comments, Fleet Problem 4."
85 Ibid.

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hierarchy that the amphibious assault could succeed if given the proper political and material support.

**Post-Exercise Synopsis**

In the history of the Marine Corps' development of a workable amphibious doctrine, the exercises of 1924 cannot be viewed as successes. Indeed, they were by all accounts, a fiasco.\(^{86}\) If viewed from the perspective of Colonel Williams, who wrote that the purpose of Fleet Problem 4 was to "train the officers and enlisted men engaged therein in the technique of the defense of the advanced base on the one hand, and on the other hand to give them training in the technique of effecting a landing and attacking the defense of such a base," the winter maneuvers off Culebra for 1924, can viewed as a revolutionary step toward the development of a credible advanced base force, though a stillborn attempt at establishing the Marine Corps as a base seizure force.\(^ {87}\) Williams spoke the truth when he wrote that both the Marine and naval officers discovered that the experience on Culebra enabled them to "appreciate what may be required of them when war comes that will require the maximum effort of the Navy and Marine Corps fighting side by side . . .",

"though it remained to be seen if they not only incorporated many of the lessons learned during future maneuvers but undertook a serious attempt to incorporate these into the curriculum of both Marine and Navy schools.

Despite the landings on the wrong beaches, the insufficient or lack thereof naval gunfire support and the bombardment of shore positions prior to a landing, improperly loaded transports, the Marines now at least had a better perspective of the obstacles they had to overcome in order to forge an amphibious assault doctrine. In fact, "it was expected [of the 1924 Winter Maneuvers] that many things would not go right." What

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\(^{86}\) Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, p. 327.

\(^{87}\) Williams, "The Winter Manoeuvres of 1924, Fleet Problem 4,"
the exercise did give Marine officers was the "experience" in conducting a large-scale landing, and of the lessons it offered in order to improve future landings.

The mistakes made by the Marines were "acts of commission," that is, "something you thought was right, but as it turns out you made the wrong choice." Having the luxury of a peacetime exercise unlike the British at Gallipoli, the Marine officers present at Culebra returned to Quantico armed with the many mistakes made during the maneuvers and through time and effort, were able to correct many of the deficiencies identified in the after action reports.\(^\text{88}\) Resolution of several of these deficiencies that included naval gunfire support, embarkation and disembarkation procedures, as well as the perennial search for proper transports and landing craft defied even the peacetime environment of the mid-to late 1920's and 1930's, and remained largely unresolved until midway through the Central Pacific Drive during World War II (1943-1944).\(^\text{89}\) One last problem that served as a "stumbling block" during the Culebra maneuvers and afterwards, was the lack of interest on the part of both the Navy and ironically of the Marines themselves. In regards to the former, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole noted at the conclusion of his report on Fleet Training Problem No. 4, that in regards to the future of amphibious operations "I suppose we shall have to convince the Navy." General Merrill B. Twining, then a newly-commissioned second lieutenant assigned to the 10th Marines and a participant in the exercise and in the writing of the \textit{Tentative Landing Manual} in the mid-1930's, reiterated the comment made Brigadier General Cole that the Navy's difficulty in understanding what the Marines had been trying to do during this exercise and afterward centered on:

\(^{89}\) See Shaw, Nalty, Turnbladh, \textit{Central Pacific Drive}, pp. 103-14.
Complete indifference. They [the Navy] could not understand what we were talking about. They did not believe it was important. They could not see, visualize, sea power except in terms of "crossing the T." They were like our aviators who see air power . . . In air to air combat using deployed fighter planes . . .

While Twining accused the Navy of indifference and a lack of enthusiasm for amphibious operations primarily centered around practical operational concerns, the 'stumbling block" in generating enthusiasm for such operations was also, as he saw it, among many of his fellow Marine officers. Criticizing what he saw as "the lack of interest in the Marine Corps Schools, which was Army-minded and had great numbers of officers in it with Leavenworth training," General Twining stated that these Marine officers:

. . . were able very readily to teach the rudiments and mechanics of planning, logistics, operations, and all those things beautifully. But too many of them were, as I saw, Army-minded and accepted the Army philosophy that amphibious warfare was impossible.

General Twining's comments likewise dispute the assertion of General Holland M. Smith, who wrote in his memoirs that "Marine planners had a far more realistic view of amphibious probabilities than the Navy." If, as Smith asserts that Marines had a far better understanding of the requirements for conducting an amphibious assault in 1920, the results of the Culebra landing would have been far different than what had actually transpired on the island during the 1924 maneuvers. Given Holland Smith's disdain for the naval leadership, and the latter's antipathy toward Marines, his comments are not therefore surprising, and are to be expected.

Indifference aside, the exercise on Culebra during the winter of 1924, left more questions unresolved than it resolved. Nonetheless, there had to be a "Culebra," if the

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90 Twining Oral History, p. 93.
91 Ibid, p. 96.
Marine Corps was to assume the expeditionary assault role. Thus, failure in this case, was not necessarily a bad thing, since it demonstrated the shortcomings of just how far the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force had progressed since its inception in 1920, and just how far it would have to advance in order to attempt a forced base seizure during the prosecution of a naval campaign. Furthermore, if the exercises on both Panama and Culebra are viewed within the framework of Earl Ellis' *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*, it can be stated quite frankly that had war broken out between the United States and "Orange" in the 1920's, both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps would not have been prepared to undertake an offensive naval campaign as called for in the Joint Army-Navy plans of the period. Yet the exercises, amateurish as they were, pointed to the many difficulties yet to be figured out by the senior Marine Corps leadership and the Marine Corps Schools. What the exercises in Panama and Culebra demonstrated, however, was that the Marines had began to conceptually at least the problems of landing a force on a hostile beachhead. It would take, however, more thought, manpower, and technology to make it a reality. Despite these shortcomings, however, the exercise on Culebra and on Oahu in 1925, demonstrated that given the efforts of all concerned, amphibious could succeed if the Marines and the Navy could expend the right amount of resources and time toward figuring out the problems and difficulties of landing an expeditionary force ashore on a hostile beachhead. As Marines discovered, the deployments to China and Nicaragua robbed them of not only the opportunity to exploit the lessons of the mid-1920's, but the ability to generate interest among the Corps' senior and junior officer corps. This last problem in itself proved to be an even greater obstacle as Twining has noted, than in the austere budgets and lack of manpower that characterized military expenditures during the late 1920's and early 1930's.
Summary

As Major General Lejeune attempted to redirect the Marine Corps focus toward its maritime role as an naval expeditionary assault force two very different problems served to hinder his objectives. One of these was, of course, the drastic reductions in the strength of the Navy as a result of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22, and the subsequent reductions in manpower and funds available, in order to build a credible expeditionary force. Lejeune saw the potential for the Marine Corps "being crushed between the larger and the stronger-the Army and the Navy," and so emasculated in strength and power that would possibly hasten its abolition entirely and/or absorption into the Army. Major General Lejeune thus spent the major portion of his time as Commandant testifying before Congress or in a constant round of visits with influential senators and congressmen in order to prevent the Marine Corps' strength from being cut or being drastically reduced. As Lejeune later wrote:

I fought constantly to maintain its [Marine Corps] organization, its functions, and its semi-independent status; to prevent an undue reduction of its personnel; to secure sufficient appropriations to keep it an efficient condition and to . . . retain its status as the Navy's expeditionary force in peace and in war . . . . . 92

Lejeune's battles extended not only to the budget-minded Congress, but to a naval hierarchy that "never believed the Marine Corps could develop an amphibious force and . . . lacked confidence in the Marine Corps," as well as to his own indifferent officer corps that seemed tied to the pre-1917 expeditionary era led by Brigadier General Smedley Butler, as well as those who sought to recreate in the Marine Corps a sea-going

version of the Army, and had been committed to the latter's organization and land warfighting doctrine.  

Even as the Commandant fought Congress, the Navy, and his own officer corps, he looked to the "future" as far as the direction that he wished to point the Marine Corps toward. Part of this plan revolved around the building up of the image of the Marine Corps in the eyes of a war weary, isolationist-minded American public, as well an intensive recruiting campaign that sought to at least maintain a credible sized force that could serve as the foundation of an even larger Marine Corps as occurred during the World War.

The second, and perhaps more important part of this plan was in the maintenance of a vastly reduced Marine Corps, and the strengthening of its officer corps as well as with the direct participation in the formulation of war planning during the early and mid-1920's. The first two proved more challenging than the latter, as both the enlisted and officer strength, as well as the continued resistance to promotion-by-selection, failed to gain support in either the Senate or in the corps. As for the Marine Corps and war planning, the assignment of Colonel Robert Dunlap and later Major Holland M. Smith to the War Plans Department, as well as the latter's appointment to the Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee, signaled the beginning of Marine Corps involvement in the war planning process within the Navy and in a "joint" environment as part of the Joint Army-Navy Board. For the Marine Corps, participation in war planning commenced when Major General George Barnett formed a Planning Section as part of his headquarters staff. Composed of three officers under the direct supervision of the assistant commandant, this section had been assigned the task of handling "all matters pertaining to plans for operations and training, intelligence, ordnance supplies and equipment."  

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Shortly after the World War, the Planning Section expanded into the Division of Operations and Training, and organized into five section comprised of operations, training, intelligence, material, and aviation as part of Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters. With the creation of the Division of Operations and Training, Marines now had a functioning general staff patterned after that of the Army General Staff and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

As mentioned in the previous chapter on Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters, the missions assigned to the Division of Operations and Training was to provide, according to its first director Brigadier General Logan M. Feland:

1. That the peacetime organizations, distribution, and stations of the Marine Corps shall be such as to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the mobilization plans for war.
2. That the training of the Corps in peacetime shall be that which best prepares it for its mission in war.
3. That the military schooling of officers shall be such as to enable them to carry on most effectively this training.
4. That the Corps be supplied with the most suitable material, arms and equipment to enable it to carry on the necessary training in peacetime and to accomplish its mission in war.  

In fact, shortly after he assumed command of the Division of Operations and Training, General Feland noted, that in order for the objectives outlined above to be achieved, the Marine Corps would need to develop, "a study of general war plans and a development of the plans for the Marine Corps dependent upon the war plans of the Navy." Possession of such a plan would thus enable the Marine Corps to "focus on its ultimate military purpose and permit the command and operational elements to be organized to accomplish that purpose."

\[95\]Ibid, p. 20.
Despite the recognized importance of war planning, the lack of sufficient personnel to conduct such planning hampered the formulation and maintenance of such detailed plans. Most of the Marine Corps planning, in fact, took place in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations War Planning Office, by such men as Colonel Robert H. Dunlap and Major Holland M. Smith. Other problems cited for this lack of a war plan, included the lack of proper tables of organization and equipment, as well as embarkation plans necessary for a wartime contingency. The lack of such a plan, one Marine staff officer stated was due to the desire on the part of Headquarters to avoid such a fixed organization in order to "maintaining our flexibility." Major Julius Turrill, a staff member assigned to war planning, stated it more succinctly in that "the real reason . . . ," for the lack of such tables of organization and other such schedules, "is that no one has been charged solely with the preparation of such tables."

Fortunately, for the Marine Corps sake, there were Marine officers thinking in terms of war planning, and the establishment of "fixed tables of organization and equipment." As for the intellectual development of the advanced base concept in the 1920's, Brigadier Generals Eli K. Cole and Dion Williams, as well as Colonel Robert Dunlap, and Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis, continued to write articles in the Marine Corps Gazette, and Naval Institute Proceedings, that advanced their conceptual ideas on the proper organization and use of such a Marine advanced base force in time of war. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, in fact, went a step further during a self-imposed exile within the confines of Headquarters through the preparation of his OPLAN 712-D: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, which in time became the Corps' guidelines for the planning of a future Orange War. Hence, Ellis provided the Marine Corps with a
"realistic appraisal of naval capabilities and the requirements," that it would require in the execution of an advanced base operation in the Pacific. 96

Ellis' Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, approved by Major General Lejeune as Operation Plan 712-D, became the Marine Corps' first Orange Plan, and became the Division of Operations and Training's portfolio, "as a guide for the coordination of all peace activities and training of the Marine Corps towards reaching and maintaining the prescribed condition of readiness to execute War Plans." The adoption of Ellis' war plan, gave the Marine Corps the impetus to direct its efforts toward the development of an expeditionary assault force, though this in itself did not become a reality until the creation of the Fleet Marine Force a decade later in December 1933. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis' ideas wasn't the only officer thinking in terms of the amphibious assault mission. As above-mentioned, Ellis has received the lion's share of attention when, in fact, it was actually a group of several Marine officers most notably Brigadier Generals Dion Williams, Robert Dunlap, Eli K. Cole, Lieutenant Colonel Cutts, and belatedly Major General John H. Russell, who actually propelled the corps toward its role as the navy's assault force. Brigadier General Dunlap's tragic death prevented an otherwise brilliant thinker and planner from achieving the recognition that the enigmatic Ellis achieved in death. While Marines may be unwilling to accept a reevaluation of Ellis' deification, the fact remains that both Dunlap and Williams put pen to paper long before the lieutenant colonel's arrival at Newport. This is not to say that Ellis' writings are irrelevant or not important. They are important, yet have needed to be placed in a better perspective. Both Dunlap and Williams had foreseen the day when Marines would have no choice but to accept the advanced base role, and thus tailored their intellectual thought toward that mission. Ellis, a contemporary of both men,

96Ibid, p. 54.

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benefited from their views on the Marine Corps and the advanced base concepts, and merely collated their ideas, and arrived at the logical conclusion that before Marines had established an advanced base, they would have to forcibly seize the territory before the Navy could use such positions for advanced fleet bases. This last point is seen in the introduction to *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*:

In order to impose our will upon Japan, it will be necessary for us to, project our fleet and land forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its projection and afterwards. . . 97

Despite these differences, however, all agreed that the Marines were the ideal force for just such a role. As Lejeune pointed out in an article in the December 1923 *Marine Corps Gazette*, "the presence of a [Marine] expeditionary force with the fleet would add greatly to the striking power of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet."98 What is even more striking, however, is the fact that even the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert E. Coontz, had been an advocate in the use of Marines as expeditionary assault force. The Chief of Naval Operations, in fact, had addressed this specific topic to Major General Lejeune in a 28 January 1920, letter regarding the function of the Marine Corps in war plans. The admiral had gone so far as to say that in any war planning for either the Pacific or the Atlantic oceans, that planners needed to consider that any advanced base seizure force should be "supplied by the Marine Corps." Admiral Coontz, with an Orange War clearly in mind, likewise suggested that in any future war plans the "same principles be followed by the Marine Corps in its plans for the future."99 As the admiral did regarding the re-direction of Marine Corps air toward close support of

troops on the ground, he likewise recommended that the Marine Corps maintain on both coasts an expeditionary force of approximately 6,000 to 8,000 officers and enlisted men, "fully equipped, ready for service in 48 hours." Yet even the CNO realized that given the austere budgets and postwar demobilization that affected the Marine Corps and Navy, this could not be "implemented immediately," but remained convinced that if the means were made available for the creation of just such a force, it would "furnish a definite point of aim, which will permit of the logical development of the Marine Corps for the duties it will be called upon to perform under the War Plans." Nonetheless, Admiral Coontz's advocacy in the use of Marines as an advanced base force likewise casts some doubt on General Cole's and Twining's later charge that the Navy "was totally disinterested in landing operations." It is possibly more accurate to say that senior Marine officers could be accused of the same attitude.

The redesignation of the old advanced base force in 1921 as the East Coast Expeditionary Force stationed at Quantico, and the establishment of a similar force at San Diego in 1925 (with less manpower than called for), was a start in the right direction. Despite the ever-shrinking appropriations for military spending, Major General Lejeune managed to at least start the process in the redirection of the Marine Corps he had hoped his successors would continue as time went on. Deployments overseas and at home [to guard the U.S. Mails], as well as the constant battle over manpower prevented him from exploiting this support from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Major General Lejeune nonetheless worked with what he had, and by the end of 1924, had not only kept the Marine Corps in the eyes of the public through the Civil War reenactments from 1921 to 1924, but had made the active participation of the Marine

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100 Ibid.
Corps Expeditionary Force in the annual fleet maneuvers from 1922 to 1925, a prerequisite in order to increase the preparedness of the Marine Corps for war when it came. His push for preparedness likewise spilled over into the Civil War battles that the Marines restaged during the early 1920's. As Lejeune later wrote, apart from the immense value in keeping the Marines in view of the American public and press, these reenactments had some practical military value particularly in "respect to troop and staff training and the testing of equipment and other material."\textsuperscript{101}

For the Marine Corps, however, the most significant training came from the fleet exercises from 1922 to 1924. Despite the obvious failures, and they were indeed, failures, the officers present saw first hand what an successful expeditionary had to accomplish in conducting ship-to-shore movements, as well as in the follow-on assault phases of a landing. They also came away with a better appreciation that amphibious assaults unlike land warfare had special needs and requirements that if not resolved in the planning phases could have disastrous consequences when conducting a landing—as occurred at Gallipoli in April 1915.

As time went on, the Marine officers who participated in the maneuvers from 1922 to 1924, discovered that failure in these three cases were a good thing since it wiped away any preconceived notions on how to conduct a landing on an opposed beach. As both Lieutenant Colonel Cutts discovered in 1922, and Brigadier General Cole in 1924, both the theoretical notions and practical applications of landing a force ashore were no good without the corresponding technological advances in armor protected landing craft, troop and artillery lighters, adequate transports, ships capable of transporting an entire Marine expeditionary force, and its equipment to the objective.

\textsuperscript{101} Clifford, \textit{Progress and Purpose}, p. 31.
Like the 1922 maneuvers off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the 1924 Culebra exercises, "brought out the difficulties of attack in landing operations against hostile opposition," and demonstrated that the Marine Corps attention, in both the Marine Corps Schools, and in practical field application needed to be focused more on "preparing for offensive land operations in addition to the defensive advanced base work." As the 1925 Oahu maneuvers demonstrated, the lessons of these early exercises were quickly forgotten, or simply ignored. Part of the blame was due to what General Twining called the "indifference" of his fellow Marine officers. Yet the problem lies deeper than that. Despite the fact that the Major General Commandant had ordained that the raison d'être of the Marine Corps would be advanced base seizure and defense, both the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, and articles found in the Marine Corps Gazette during this era, reflected an internal institutional resistance to this mission. Furthermore, it would not be until 1926, that an "Overseas Expeditionary Course" would be added to the curriculum of the Field Officers' School, and that the orientation toward the subjects taught in the Army Schools remained firmly entrenched at Quantico until the mid-1930's, one last factor that pointed to this lack of interest in landing operations. This supported Twining's contention that much of the opposition to landing operations did not come from the Navy but from inside the Marine Corps, as demonstrated by lack of interest shown by most Marine officers during the 1920's and early 1930's.

Despite the lack of professional interest in the advanced base mission from all but a few influential Marine Corps officers, the period from 1921 to 1924, remains as an important period in the development of the amphibious assault mission from both the

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doctrinal and practical perspectives. Doctrinally, it gave such men as Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, Dion Williams and Colonel Robert Dunlap, further ammunition in their advocacy in the use of Marines as an advanced base expeditionary assault force. Unfortunately, Ellis' death in 1923 and Dunlap's untimely death in 1931 left the Marine Corps without two of its main amphibious proponents. It was thus left to other officers such as Major General John H. Russell, Colonel Ellis B. Miller, Holland M. Smith, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Barrett, as well as a entire new generation of Marine officers who entered the Marine Corps in the late 1920's and 1930's, to carry on where their predecessors left off in the advocacy in corps' ongoing work in the field of amphibious warfare.

Despite the failures of the 1924 Culebra exercises, the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, primarily an Army-Navy joint exercise, served as a "laboratory" of sorts for the officers of the Field Officers' School in General Lejeune's ongoing desire to inculcate the advanced base mission into the hearts and minds of his officers. The Hawaiian exercise, in fact, served as not only the last of the FLEXES till 1932, but represent in a sense, the "last of the old and the first of the new," insofar as amphibious operations are concerned. For it was on the beaches of Oahu that the advanced base concept gave way to purely base seizure mission.

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103 Lieutenant Colonel Ellis died in 1923, while Brigadier General Dunlap died in a mudslide in southern France while awaiting to attend the Ecole de Guerre in the spring of 1931. Major General Lejeune retired in 1929, while Brigadier General Dion Williams retired in 1934.
'TO FIGHT OUR COUNTRY'S BATTLES: AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DURING THE INTERWAR ERA, 1919-1935

VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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2001

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CHAPTER 9

THE 1925 JOINT ARMY-NAVY MANEUVERS

Introduction

The maneuvers that Marines conducted from 1922 through 1924 demonstrated that the advanced base expeditionary force that Major General Lejeune had hoped to create remained an elusive goal that only time, effort, and money could correct. Furthermore, the lack of both suitable landing boats and landing doctrine plagued the Marines just as much as the manpower and budget shortages of the 1920’s served to disrupt the Commandant’s plans for the corps in an Orange war. Nonetheless, the maneuvers off Coco Solo and Fort Sherman in Panama, as well as on Culebra during the winter of 1924, served as the foundation for the 1925 Joint Army-Navy maneuvers, when a force of 1,500 Marine officers and enlisted men participated in the largest exercise of its kind to date. Furthermore, as will be seen in the Oahu Maneuvers of 1925, the exercise itself played a significant role in the evolution of the East Coast Expeditionary Force, as well as in the formulation of both the operational and doctrinal aspects of landing and counter-landing operations. Lastly, the combined exercises, part of the overall defense scheme of the military and naval facilities based on the island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii (T.H.), illustrated to all the participants (Army, Navy, and Marines) the overriding importance of joint operations particularly in the defense of Pearl Harbor. As the maneuvers of 1925 demonstrated, the Army and Navy’s facilities on the main island
of Oahu were not as sound as the service chiefs had desired and, in fact, pointed to the island's *indefensibility* against an enemy attack.¹

On the other hand, the primary value of these exercises to the Marine Corps, were the lessons not only in joint interoperability, and in the delicacies and politics of interservice cooperation—operation, two important points that Major General Lejeune had stressed throughout his commandancy, but in the work that still needed to be done in regard toward the creation of a viable expeditionary force. The results of the exercise also pointed to the deficiencies that existed in the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools during the 1920's, insofar as the inculcation of landing operations in the officer corps. As a result of the exercise, and the changes it fostered in the expanded curriculum at the MCS, one can assert that the Oahu maneuvers served as a critical juncture in the development of amphibious assault doctrine, as well as in the importance of joint and inter-service cooperation during the interwar era.

The goal of this chapter is to provide an in-depth look at the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, and the lessons Marines gained from this first major joint Army-Navy exercise, particularly in the field of landing craft, training, landing procedures and practices, and command and control. Furthermore, it is an examination of the relations between the services in an era of budget battles, and the search for roles and missions between them in what one can properly label as the "first pre-jointness" era. As will be seen, the services were more "joint" in their approach to problems than historians in the past have acknowledged.

The Theory and Practice of Joint Army-Navy Operations-1922-25

Despite the different basic missions of both land and sea services, the U.S. military has a long history of combined or joint operations. As the World War and maneuvers in Panama and on Culebra demonstrated, both the Army and the Marine Corps had operated together in what can be described as in a "joint" environment. Indeed, since the turn of the century, Marine officers had regularly attended Army schools (though many times had been discouraged to do so), with increasing frequency before and after the World War.\(^2\) Nonetheless, despite this exchange between the two services, the animosity that developed between the two services over the publicity the Marines received after the Battle of Belleau Wood set the stage for the bitter fight for the meager budgets and missions that characterized the immediate postwar period up to 1922. Yet it remains a fact that the Marines copied the Army infantry drill manuals, taught Army doctrine and organization at both the Field Officers' Course and the Basic School, as well as trained on the latter's artillery pieces at Camp Meade, Md., and sent its pilots to Kelly Field, Texas where Marine pilots learned pursuit and glide bombing tactics. The result of this influence was the fact that the Marine Corps came to resemble, at least from the operational standpoint, the Army when conducting maneuvers.

As for the Army officers who attended Marine Corps schools, the contributions they made toward the development of amphibious operations was minimal at best. As General Merrill B. Twining recalled, the Army officers who attended the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico thought "They were a better level or more . . . [and were] . . . antagonistic," and came to Quantico:

\(^2\)Interestingly in 1891, Major General Eli K. Cole, then a newly commissioned second lieutenant had applied for the Army's School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas but was turned down due to the urgent need for sea going officers. See Jack Shulimson. The Marine Corps' Search For A Mission, 1880-1898. (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 92.
... with a chip on their shoulders at having to serve with Marines, but usually made some contributions in such things as conducting riding classes and things of that sort that interested them. They were usually cavalry officers. ... 3

What is even more important, however, was the Army’s perceived lack of interest in conducting amphibious operations during the immediate postwar period. In fact, for the Army officers who attended Quantico during this early period their contribution was, as Twining added, "Nothing, nothing. Zero." 4 Despite this perceived lack of interest in amphibious and advanced base operations, closer examination of the records during the interwar period suggest that some Army officers maintained an interest in these early exercises and the doctrinal matters worked on by the Marines. This included General John L. Hines, Major Generals Charles Charles H. "Cowboy Pete" Corlett, Sidney L. Hines, and Colonels George S. Patton, Jr., and Arthur G. Trudeau. 5 If one examines the

3 Twining Oral History, p. 97.  
4 Ibid.  
5 General John L. Hines, USA, in fact, was the umpire during the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, and maintained a detailed scrapbook on these operations, as well later lecturing on the Army and landing on hostile shores. See the General John L. Hines, Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, and Major Generals Sidney R. Hines and Charles H. Corlett, and Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynoweth papers all located at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA. Included in the Chynoweth Papers is a study conducted by then Colonel George S. Patton when the latter had been attached to Scholfield Barracks as an intelligence officer on tactics as well as one on the lessons learned in conducting amphibious operations while serving as the commanding general, Seventh Army during the Sicily campaign in 1943. In the Thomas Holcomb Papers, located at the Marine Corps Historical Center is a letter from Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb to Lieutenant General G. S. Patton, Jr., dtd 14 August 1943 regarding the former’s praise of the Seventh Army’s performance during the Sicily landings. See General Thomas Holcomb Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, Box 3, "Correspondence 1943."). Several Marine amphibious pioneers likewise attended the Army War College or gave lectures there prior to and during the interwar period. This group included John A. Lejeune, Robert H. Dunlap, Eli K. Cole, Richard M. Cutts, Graves B. Erskine, and Thomas Holcomb.
later career of Trudeau and Corlett, one can see the direct link with the Marines, and the impact of amphibious doctrine on Army training during the 1930's, and early 1940's. This latter fact suggests that the Army benefited greatly from the pioneering work done by Marines during the interwar years. The simple fact remains, however, that both Marine and naval officers saw cooperation between all the services as an important ingredient in the success or failure of an advanced base operation, a fact that drove the maneuvers during the 1920's. As early as 1902, Dion Williams, then a captain, emphasized the "joint" nature of advanced base operations, as did Marine Major John H. Russell, who in a paper at the Naval War College wrote that:

Success of an expedition depends on the same elements that insures success in all military operations: thorough consideration, careful preparation, and swift execution. Cooperation between naval and military men influences all these elements, and can only be attained through decisions arrived at during peace, free from the friction and irritation that might ensue if required in the stress of an emergency, when action may be imperative. When the two services have a clear understanding of each others point of view, much will have been accomplished, but even then it will be only mutual and unselfish

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6 Major General Charles H. Corlett later commanded Army forces during the Marshall Islands campaign on Kwajalein Island. For the Army's involvement and interest in amphibious operations see his autobiography "Cowboy Pete," in the Major General P. H. Corlett Papers, (Carlisle Barracks, PA., U.S. Army War College, U.S. Military History Institute); Major General Arthur G. Trudeau was instrumental in the creation of the Army's Amphibious Engineer Corps that assumed both normal engineer and pioneer duties as well as boat handling and beachmaster duties during both the Italian campaign and Normandy landings.

7 The Army, in fact, later during the build up to the invasion of North Africa in November 1942 while at the joint Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet training center at Norfolk, Va., argued in support of the supported the Marine Corps' long-held assertion that once the landing force is ashore the ground commander should assume tactical control of the forces there. See Blanche D. Cool, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment. Second Edition (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975), pp. 356-8.
concessions, that fortunate results may be anticipated.  

As events demonstrated as the century progressed, the relationship between the Army and the Navy, as well as with the Marines, was anything but cooperative, and that true to Russell's words, the "friction" and "irritation" that developed between the services as a result of the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers nearly derailed the already tenuous relationship that existed between the services during the interwar period. In fact, the 1925 Winter Maneuvers can viewed from the vantage point of what Navy Captain W. S. Pye termed "physical cooperation" and effective cooperation," in an article on joint operations in the December 1924 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. In the article, Captain Pye set out to define the term "Joint Operations," as those operations "in which the army and navy forces are employed in the attainment of objectives which have been determined upon by the cooperation in the formation of the plan of operations without regard to whether or not there is actual physical cooperation in the conduct of operations." Captain Pye, in fact, defined "physical cooperation" as being that which "restricted itself to the field of minor strategy or tactics" that could involve overseas transportation, effective disembarkation, successful local engagement, and temporary overseas supply." On the

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9Captain later Vice Admiral William S. Pye would briefly be in command of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet (16-17 December 1941) after relieving Admiral Husband E. Kimmel during the immediate aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and was responsible for scuttling of the relief mission to the beleaguered Navy-Marine garrison on Wake Island. He was, as historian Gregory J. Urwin has written a "great theoretical tactician" and not a "fighting admiral" as was his predecessor or successor-Admiral Chester A. Nimitz. See Gregory J. Urwin, Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege on Wake Island. (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1997), pp. 421-22; and Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. (New York: McGraw Hill Publishers, Inc., 1981. pp. 598-1.
other hand, "effective cooperation" was "dependent upon the effective cooperation between the respective army and naval commanders, proper indoctrination and training of the men involved, and the suitability, in kind and amount, of the personnel and material provided by higher authority for the accomplishment of the task. This latter form of indoctrination may at times operate independently but with the attainment of a single objective by both components, and is dependent upon the cooperation of both the War and Navy Departments in the "formulation of a joint operating plan and upon the loyalty to this plan by the same respective commanders-in-chief within the theater of operations." The maneuvers off Oahu represented a combination of both physical and effective cooperation, and revealed the weaknesses that existed in the cooperation between the Army and Navy during the interwar period. Ironically, the one service that came more as an interested observer—the U.S. Marine Corps, came away from the exercise far more aware of the limitations of joint operations, and of the limited progress the services had made from the lessons learned from the 1924 maneuvers off Panama and Culebra, and advanced base force doctrine itself. Inspite of the "pat on the backs" that Major General John L. Hines, commander in chief of all army forces, and the chief umpire of the maneuvers gave to all participants at the conclusion of the exercise, the Oahu Maneuvers pointed to the work that still needed to be done in regards to both the Marine Corps' advanced base force doctrine, and in effecting joint cooperation in the defense of Hawaii and the Panama Canal. If the exercises proved anything, it illustrated the flaws in the Joint Board's assignment of the responsibilities for coastal defense, the relationship of the different branches of army and naval aviation, as well as to the defense of outlying posts. As the 1930s and early 1940s demonstrated, these were problems that came back to "haunt" the service chiefs particularly in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, as

the Japanese armed forces devastated the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, and overwhelmed the U.S. garrisons in the Philippines, on Wake Island, Guam, as well as spreading its hold on the entire Central and major portions of the South Pacific Ocean areas. The failure of the services to grasp the importance of the necessity for effective cooperation in the field of territorial and national defense, disagreements that began even as the ink dried on the Joint Board's definition and assignment of missions and roles, culminated during this exercise, and as it turned out, the "commonality" that was to exist in the conduct of joint operations served to solidify the debates between the services over naval and army aviation, and more importantly the defense of the outlying territories. Ironically, it would be in the Territory of Hawai'i (T.H.), where the exercises took place in 1925, that the first blows in an Orange war were felt by both services.

The common mission of the Army and Navy, as outlined by the Joint Army-Navy Board, was to act "conjointly and in cooperation, to defend the territory of the United States against all enemies foreign or domestic; to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States at home and abroad, in peace and in war."12 While stressing the different functions of both the Army and the Navy within this concept of defense, both services recognized the fact that in many instances, the missions of both the Army and Navy may indeed overlap, particularly when conducting coastal and joint overseas operations.

This overlap in missions, particularly in conducting coastal and joint overseas operations had been the subject of endless discussion between the Army and the Navy starting in 1903, when the Joint Army and Navy Board had been organized, according to Brigadier General Dion Williams, "in order to establish the defensive sea areas with rules for the Army and the Navy."13 Williams added that this delineation of areas of

13 Colonel Dion Williams, "Co-ordination in Army and Navy Training," U.S. Naval
responsibility "showed the lines along which the training of the two services should be conducted in order to secure effective co-operation in the defense of the coasts and harbors and harbors in which were located navy yards or naval stations or bases. This constitutes the first instances of co-ordination in plans of the Army and Navy in modern times." Hence, both services (really three) all had more to gain in pooling their resources particularly when it came to hemispheric defense (e.g., defense of either the Panama Canal or Hawaii). Williams continued to cite numerous examples where joint Army-Navy coordination (both U.S. and Europe) benefited from this joint cooperation, and in so doing illustrated the necessity "first, for the cooperation between the Navy and the coast defense forces; second, between the coast defenses and the mobile Army; and a third, between the three forces involved in the operations."

In fact, it should have come as no surprise to the Army and naval officers on the Joint Board that effective joint cooperation between the land and sea services oftentimes resulted in the successful prosecution of a campaign, and that the reverse produced just the opposite as Gallipoli well demonstrated. Yet the maneuvers from 1922 to 1924, concentrated on limited objectives as far as joint operations concerned themselves. Yet it must be kept in mind that these same exercises laid the foundation for the joint 1925 Oahu maneuvers that the Army and Naval War Colleges later lectured on (and debated between themselves and the Navy). Indeed, the old cliché among the services that "We are more joint than we like to admit," is, in fact, a truism, particularly if one applied this same statement to the 1920's. Indeed, defense budget cuts and hemispheric defense needs and concerns gave birth to a tenuous working relationship between the War and Navy departments that had it been nurtured in 1925, could have possibly eliminated the

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14Ibid.
bitter and oftentimes acrimonious inter-service relations that occurred prior to and during World War II.

**Background to the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers**

The Oahu Maneuvers of 1925 can best be viewed from the vantage point of both the prewar strategic calculations of naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the post-World War distribution of missions carved out by both the Navy and War Departments by the Plans Division of the General Board of the Navy. More important was the publication of the *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* in 1923 by the Joint Army and Navy Board which contained a comprehensive strategy dealing specifically with the Pacific ocean area. In time, the *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* became "the most important statement on American defense policy relating to the Pacific during the years following World War I (1919-1922)." As early as March 1911, Mahan pointed out in a letter to Admiral Raymond P. Rogers, President of the Naval War College that "Oahu and Guam if possible, should be at once so provided as to make rapid seizure impossible. The whole process of the war will depend on this." 15 As discussed in the previous chapter, Rear Admiral Mahan concurred with the findings of the General and Joint Army-Navy boards in that the Philippines were both indefensible and untenable in any Orange War, and that any expenditure in arming Manila or Subic Bays, would be at the expense of strategically more important Oahu and Guam. Unlike both the War and Navy Departments, however, the celebrated naval strategist firmly advocated the strengthening of Guam's defenses as an advanced base, a move both services deferred until it was way too late to make a difference.

As for the Plans Division Board, headed by Admiral Albert G. Winterhalter, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and spokesman for the board, it sought to work out

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a compromise plan that would appease both Navy and War departments, the latter suspicious of any "Navy-generated" war plan by assigning specific tasks and missions to both services in regard to the defense of Oahu. When formalized by the Joint War Board in late July 1920, the recommendations put forth by the Plans Division 'became the national defense policy' despite the fact that the General Board had yet to put forth its own report on the state and condition of naval bases in the Pacific. These recommendations neither downplayed nor ignored the "traditional" missions of both the Army or Navy and attempted to strike a balance between the two services.

The Plans Division had assigned to Pearl Harbor the role as the main outlying fleet base, putting to rest the debate over Subic Bay as the main naval bastion in the Philippines, the construction of subsidiary bases in Cavite, in the Philippines and Guam as both a subsidiary and main fleet base; the use of San Diego, as the fleet's major Pacific operations and maneuver base; and San Francisco as the main domestic fleet base on the West Coast. The plan, rechristened Operations, envisioned the Army as providing protection for the Navy's facilities on Guam and Oahu, through a vigorous defense of the entire islands, while it provided security to Cavite "to the extent of the capabilities of the Philippine Garrison and the Fortification of Manila Bay." The General Board, in fact, had assigned to the Army the mission of protecting:

the bases during the absence of the fleet. This entailed completing defenses at Manila Bay and Oahu and erecting works at Guam. The total forces believed necessary by the Board to garrison the defenses at Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines was 185,000 men, about double the existing field army.16

Nonetheless, it still fell to the Marine Corps, the responsibility of providing an advanced base force of approximately 500 Marines, as well as an observation squadron

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for Guam's defense. Despite the General Board's assignment to the Army of the mission of providing a garrison for both Hawaii and Guam, General Lejeune lobbied hard and successful for the retention of the Marine Corps's manning of Guam's defenses, inadequate as they were, during the 1920's and into the 1930's. The fact that the Army, like the Marine Corps and the Navy, had been reduced in manpower, and stretched in its commitment to the defense of both the Philippines and Hawaii, left the question of fortification and troop levels on Guam open up to the eve of World War II. Furthermore, as Lejeune himself noted in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in February 1923, the fact that Guam's defense centered upon the Navy's ability to reinforce the island during or before war with Orange, made the Marine Corps the optimal force to be used in garrisoning the island's defenses. The Major General Commandant stressed this latter point when he wrote:

'It is the opinion of this office that it should be the policy of the Navy to provide and retain control of the defenses of advanced Naval bases by having the Marine Advanced Base Forces install and man temporary defenses. Thereby the best cooperation between land and sea defenses would be assured and there would be avoided the disadvantage of dual control with the usual friction between two independent commanders of necessarily different points of view...'

As events illustrated during the first few months of World War II, the neither the War or Navy Departments acted on the General Board's recommendations in regard for an Army garrison, nor on Major General Lejeune's insistence on an adequate force of

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19 Ibid.
Marines be provided for Guam's defenses. With the Marine Corps soon to be dispersed throughout the country in order to guard the mails as well as being sent to both China and Nicaragua on expeditionary duty, it was left to the Army to take responsibility for an adequate defense on Oahu.20 Despite the call in some quarters among members of the General Board to completely abandon all U.S. bases west of Pearl Harbor at the outbreak of an Orange War, neither the Joint Board nor Operations, proposed to abandon the Far East and instead called for a vigorous effort to recapture Guam before the arrival of the fleet if the enemy were to seize it during the initial stages of any war in the Pacific. Admiral William S. Sims, president of the Navy War College (1920-1923), in fact, had long assumed that the United States would lose both Guam and Manila at the outbreak of any war with Japan. Furthermore, the nonfortification clauses of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922 effectively forced the hand of both the War and Navy Departments to concentrate its collective efforts in building up the defenses at Pearl Harbor, thereby position the main striking power of the United States forces there for any contingency in the Pacific Ocean area. For without an adequately sized base on any of the U.S.'s outposts (Wake, Guam, the Philippines, and in the Aleutians) Oahu, as well as the Panama Canal Zone [the latter's role of course factored into the defense of Pearl Harbor in facilitating movement of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet], became the focal points during the 1920's and 1930's of a series of joint Army-Navy fleet exercises dubbed FLEXES that the War and Navy Departments used to test aviation (Army and Naval), naval gunfire, coastal defense, and several amphibious landings that focused on base seizure and defense.21 In these FLEXES, the services (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps), all came away having learnt different lessons, and while there was some attempt

20Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and its Outposts, p. 150.
to forge a consensus (embodied in the Joint Overseas Expeditions manual of 1927 and 1933) in doctrine and roles and missions, the exercises merely confirmed existing arrangements with little desire to innovate or modify the existing roles and missions of each service. It would take the publication of the Marine Corps' *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* (1934), the Navy's *Fleet Training Publication (FTP)* 167, and the Army's *FM 31-5* to incorporate the "lessons learned" from the exercises held in 1925, and during the 1930's in Hawaii and in the Caribbean concerning amphibious operations, and even this with some reluctance despite the ever-growing menace of war. Thus, the inter-service rivalries that had prevented an effective joint doctrine from being formulated in the defense of hemispheric and outlying bases would remain a fixture of inter-service relations until World War II forced if not total acceptance but tacit acknowledgment of each service's role and mission in defense of the nation's interests.

The object of the Joint Army and Navy exercises of 1925 involved the employment of the floating forces of the Navy and the land forces of the Army, was:

- to test out the approved joint operations plans and special Army and Navy plans predicted thereon, to test the sufficiency of the means provided for the defense of various defended localities and areas, and to determine the adequacy of the plans for the employment of the land and sea forces under conditions approximating as closely as possible the conditions that would exist in time of war.
- Another object of such exercises, of equal importance with the ones above stated, is to give an opportunity for the personnel of the forces participating to gain experience in the preparation of the necessary operations plans and in the application of these plans to the problem presented by actually moving the land and sea forces in the selected theatre of operations under conditions simulating those of actual war.

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23 Brigadier General Dion Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Force." (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, Division of Plans and Policies, General Correspondence, Joint Army-Navy Exercise Folder, 1921-1943, 1923-24, Box 1).
The maneuvers themselves consisted of two phases, one purely naval, that is, employment of the entire Fleet in a series of drills with its various subdivisions that tested its battle readiness in such areas as gunnery, minesweeping and maneuvering, as well as the introduction of its newest element—naval aviation. The second phase included participation with the Army in a series of joint exercises that tested not only the coastal defenses but also of the ability of the latter to repel a hostile landing.

The Oahu Maneuvers: Phase One

The Oahu Maneuvers of 1925, better known in Navy circles as Fleet Problem Five, commenced in March of 1925 with the Pacific Fleet (designated 'Black') commanded by Admiral Samuel S. Robinson, conducting fleet maneuvers off the coast of Southern California. The main emphasis of this portion of the overall joint exercise was to practice refueling at sea, anti-submarine, and fleet screening operations. Meanwhile, the Atlantic Fleet (designated 'Blue'), under the command of Admiral Josiah S. McKean, sailed from its Atlantic bases to the Panama Canal in order to "defend" the Canal Zone against the Black fleet. The most notable aspect of this part of the exercise was the participation of the Navy's first operational aircraft carrier the USS Langley, whose performance during the subsequent operations in both Panama and Hawaii so impressed Admiral Robert E. Coontz, the Chief of Naval Operations that he ordered the construction of two more aircraft carriers.24 At the conclusion of the Panama Canal phase of the exercise, the Pacific Fleet then set sail for Hawaii, where it was to participate in a joint operation with the U.S. Army's forces stationed on the main island of Oahu, under the overall command of Major General John L. Hines.

The Marine Corps, despite its severe manpower shortages and deployments overseas, was to provide a 'constructive' force of approximately 120 officers and 1,500

24Kaufman and Kaufman, Sleeping Giant, p. 41.
enlisted men, which the Joint Board quickly converted to a "notional force approximating a landing force of 42,000 officers and men. The Marine force, designated the 1st Provisional Brigade, was drawn primarily from the 4th Marines stationed at the Marine Corps Barracks located in San Diego, and the 10th Marines at Quantico. The bulk of the Marine officers participating in the exercise came from the Field Officers' Course, and participated in the exercise as observers. Overall command of the entire Marine force went to Major General Eli K. Cole, a veteran of the 1924 winter maneuvers and long-time advanced base proponent. Brigadier General Dion Williams was to command the Blue Marine contingent then sailing with the Atlantic Fleet. Major General John A. Lejeune, who had "welcomed the chance for Marine participation in the exercise," in order that the corps could "refute the Army's contention that Marines were incapable of conducting any operation larger than regimental size," appointed three of his most trusted officers (Wendell C. Neville-Lejeune's assistant, and successor as Commandant of the Corps; Logan Feland-a decorated combat officer from the World War and seasoned jungle fighter; and Robert H. Dunlap who at the time was head of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico), to assess and further evaluate the progress or lack thereof, of the ongoing advanced base force doctrine. Also participating in the exercise were the officer-students then attending the Field Officers' School, in order to observe and absorb the lessons stemming from the landings as they took place.26

With General Hine's troops defending the plan called for an assault by the Marines, who were to "seize Pearl Harbor and Honolulu," while the fleet screened the amphibious force, provided air and naval gunfire support, and conducted antisubmarine and mine

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sweeping operations. The U.S. Army forces (Black), numbered 15,000 officers and
men who comprised the Regular Army garrison on Oahu, and included separate of that
total members of the Army Reserve Forces, and the Hawaiian National Guard, who were
to defend and repel the invaders as they came ashore, as well as bombard the enemy fleet
by aviation based on Oahu, and the surrounding islands. The naval forces assigned to
assist the soldiers on included 30 scout and torpedo-bombing aircraft, 20 submarines,
and a few mine sweepers, mine layers, and light auxiliary craft. (Table 9.1)

The Battle Fleet*

11 Battleships
6 Light Cruisers
56 Destroyers
1 Aircraft Carrier
2 Aircraft Tenders
Submarines
Mine Layers
Train

Scouting Fleet
Control Force
Fleet Base Force**
Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (1,500 officers and men)***

* Less Submarine Divisions Nine and Fourteen.
** Less Mine Squadron Two
*** For the exercise purposes, the "constructive" force was to represent
Two (2) Marine Divisions of 42,000 officers and enlisted men.  

Table 9.1
The Blue Expeditionary Fleet

The Blue Fleet consisted of a scouting force, the aircraft carrier USS Langley, the main
body of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and a force of transports and fleet train that

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27 Condit and Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch, p. 107.
28 Ibid.
29 Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Force," Marine Corps Gazette, 10 (September 1925), p. 77. Hereafter cited as Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Force."
consisted of supply, repair and maintenance ships. Assembled at the naval base located at San Francisco, "Blue" had a theoretical landing force that consisted of 42,000 Marines aboard 14 Navy and Army transports with smaller ships representing the other transports. Joined with the other elements of the fleet sailing from the Washington naval base located at Bremerton, the force headed for Oahu.30

As the forces gathered off Oahu, the Army forces assigned to guard the island prepared its defenses for the commencement of the exercise. Already one of the Army's "two greatest outposts of continental defense," the island soon became in lieu of the exercises "one of the largest, and in many respects, its best equipped overseas garrison." In fact, the island's Army garrison, established almost immediately after Hawaii had been annexed by the United States in 1898, and continually reinforced after the 1908 decision to make Pearl Harbor and not Manila, the principal American naval base in the Pacific, had been kept in a state of readiness as tensions between the United States and the Japanese Empire periodically flared up with the island becoming the "springboard" where U.S. military power would be assembled, and deployed in the event of war between the United States and Japan.31 In 1911, after a naval reconnaissance of Oahu by Rear Admiral Chauncey Thomas, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, had determined that the island should be protected from all sides, an Army board, under the leadership of Brigadier General Montgomery M. Macomb, known as the Macomb Board, decided that the garrison on Oahu would, in fact, be strengthened to six infantry regiments with supporting guns.32 The Macomb Board likewise established the "defensive lines on Oahu, beginning at the beaches [nearest Schofield Barracks] and shortest line capable of

31Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and its Outposts, p. 150.

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covering Pearl Harbor and Honolulu." The board warned, however, that unless the island's defenses be strengthened, an enemy force [i.e. Japan] of 100,000 men could take the island. In fact, to both protect Pearl Harbor, and provide for a defensible Pacific bastion that could be used as an advanced base for extended fleet operations, the Oahu garrison was greatly expanded and in 1913, became a separate department (The Hawaiian Department). In time, the Army stationed approximately eleven percent of the its overall manpower at Oahu.33

In regard to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, particularly Oahu, the Army's task was formidable. The main island group, in fact, consisted of four islands, and extended for 400 miles with Hawaii, the largest of the four islands [Oahu, Maui, Hawaii, and Kauaij. in possession of a total land mass of 604 square miles of volcanic soil and plush jungle, a subtropical climate, and two of the finest natural harbors along its southern shore [Map #9.1] Honolulu, the major city on Oahu, likewise has a shallow lagoon several miles to the west. For the Navy, which obtained perhaps its best overseas base, achieved in Pearl Harbor everything that she had been denied in Manila (and Subig Bay) in the Philippines-an excellent harbor that was both defensible and accessible in case of a war with Japan.34 As a result of the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty in 1922, as well as of a revision in War Plan Orange in 1924, the military facilities on Oahu (particularly at Pearl Harbor) took on an increasing importance.

The Army's Schofield Barracks, positioned along the northwestern coast of Oahu, ten miles inland from Pearl Harbor, housed the troops that supposedly were to repel any enemy amphibious landing attempting to seize the naval installations there. Both the Army's airfields, Hickam Field, the home for the Army's bombardment aircraft, flanked

Pearl Harbor on the Honolulu side, with Wheeler Field, located next door to the Schofield Barracks, and which housed the Army's pursuit and fighter aircraft, became during the 1925 Winter Maneuvers the center of activity for all participants and more importantly, the center of the dispute between the Army and Navy over use of its aviation assets in defense of Pearl Harbor.

The 'Black' Forces Prepare

Even as the Blue Fleet assembled for initial operations in the Canal Zone, the Black forces prepared for the defense of Oahu. (Table 9.2) The forces designated to participate in the defense of the island represented a mix of regular and reserve forces, as well as naval forces from the 14th Naval District spread throughout the area to meet any number of a series of landings by the "enemy." All the forces were under the command of the Hawaiian Department and included:

**Regular Army Garrison (Oahu)**

**Honolulu**
Headquarters Detachment, Co. A. 21st Infantry
Detachment of Medical Department
Air Service Department
Engineer Department
Medical Depot
Quartermaster Depot
Chemical Department Service Depot
Ordnance Depot, 74th Ordnance Co.
Coastal Defense Forces

**Ford's Island**
5th Composite Air Group
   Headquarters Co.,
11th Tank Company
11th Ordnance Co.
Motorcycle Co., 11th Signal Co.

Table 9.2
The 'Black' Defense Forces on Oahu, T.H. (CONTINUED)
Schofield Barracks
Table 9.2 (CONTINUED)

Military Police Company
21st Infantry Brigade
11th Field Artillery Brigade
3rd Engineer Regiment
11th Medical Regiment
   Hawaiian Coast Artillery District
   The National Guard of Hawaii
   Army Reserve Forces, Hawaiian Island (2 Infantry Regiments)

U.S. Naval Forces ("Black")
District Forces, 14th Naval District, T.H.
   Submarine Division Nine
   Submarine Division Fourteen
   Mine Squadron Two
   Naval Reserve Forces, Hawaiian Islands, T.H.35

For the defense of Oahu, and the entire Hawaiian Islands during the exercise, as well as for the actual defense of the island in case of war, the Army had a total force of 14,516 officers and men. As agreed upon prior to the commencement of the exercises by the Navy and War Departments, the strategic situation was such that Black could not be reinforced from the mainland 'within the period of time required to complete the exercise', and that the defensive forces ashore would have no other naval assets to break through the enemy fleet ringing the island.36 Major General Hines, nonetheless, the chief

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36 Ibid.
umpire, and commanding general of the *Black* forces, enumerated his strengths as being stronger at the points selected for the landings, and that the positions selected for the landings were tenable, and favored the defender. (Table 9.3)

- A strong land force of 15,000 troops of all arms, supported by a large friendly population.
- A strong air force in actual being, ready for instant action over land or sea.
- A powerful organization for defense based upon a complete knowledge of landing places, and utilizing to the limit the natural obstacles of this terrain.
- Twenty submarines carrying a total of 160 torpedoes with a least 500 additional torpedoes in store.
- Small detachments of light minelayers capable of carrying 500 anchored mines or 1000 floating mines, with the same available for use as fast scouts.
- A powerful and complete system of fixed and moveable coast artillery defenses including a railway battery.
- Normal weather and sea conditions.
- Terrain including sea approaches which restrict favorable landing places to a comparatively few [in other words channeled approaches].
- An excellent network of roads and railroad lines.
- Two excellent harbors for use as naval bases.
- A large number of machine guns in reserve.\(^{37}\)

**Table 9.3**

**Elements of Strength `Black`**

The ultimate mission of *Black* was to defend Oahu `to the utmost' in order to deny the *Blue* Forces the use of the Pearl Harbor naval base and Honolulu harbor. The *Blue* commander contended that if his force lost both a sufficient number of transports and men in the process of attempting to seize either Pearl Harbor or Honolulu Harbor, and that the supply ships could not land the proper amount of supplies or reinforcements, then *Black* would have achieved its mission.\(^{38}\) One last contention on the part of the

\(^{37}\)Case, *"Plan of Attack,"* p. 2

\(^{38}\)Ibid.
Blue commander was that if once ashore the Marines could not move off the beach and advance inland, then the landing would have to be called off. This was, in fact, what the British commanders failed to do at Gallipoli in 1915, with the result being the slaughter of the landing forces.

The Joint Army-Navy Board, in fact, envisioned the exercise as being one to not only test the planned and actual defenses of Oahu against an enemy attack, but to also train the Army and Navy in the conduct of joint operations. A strategic exercise, the Joint Board based the exercise on the premises that:

(1) That a state of war existed between Blue (the United States) and Black.
(2) That the Hawaiian Islands were a Black possession and were defended by the existing armament, the present naval district forces and a garrison of approximately 15,000 men; and
(3) That Blue was desirous of capturing Oahu with the object of making use of it as a naval base. 39

The forces assigned to Black deployed according to the plan laid down and agreed upon by both the War and Navy departments, and later codified by the Joint Board's pamphlet on Joint Army and Navy Action on Coast Defense (1924). General Charles P. Summerall, commander of the Hawaiian Department and Black forces, assumed that Blue would land its forces north of Barber's Point, while at the same time conduct feints


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Map # 9.1

The Island of Oahu during the 1925 Maneuvers.

(Source: Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron Fairchild, United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere: Guarding the United States and its Outposts. Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1989), Map II.

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at Haleiwa on the north coast and elsewhere in that general vicinity, since here the soldiers held a thin defense line along the beaches, and had at their disposal field guns (both fixed and mobile) with strong mobile reserve forces. Black's air assets (both Navy and Army), dispersed to the island of Lanai, in order to form "an observation cordon around Oahu at a sufficient distance to give timely warning of the enemy's approach."\(^{40}\)

Black, in fact, established its defense based upon the pre-World War assumption that any amphibious assault against the naval fortifications on Oahu, would take place as Army Major General Joseph P. Story suggested against Barber's Point. General Story, in fact, had written earlier that "landings along the coast north of Barbers (sic) Point are possible . . . [due to the fact that] . . . good roads lead to Pearl Harbor" from there.\(^{41}\) Major General Story, likewise recommended, that the Army increase the number of artillery pieces and mortars guarding both Honolulu and Pearl Harbors as a means of defending the entrance and the flanks of these two points.

As far as for the naval defense of Oahu, Black had approximately 29 submarines, 1 submarine tender, 6 minelayers, 5 "Eagle" boats of the PE Class, 7 minesweepers, 3 tugs, 3 submarine tenders, 3 submarine chasers, and 1 station ship, the former transport USS Hancock. Much of the naval defense rested upon the naval air forces of the 14th Naval District, which consisted of:

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\(^{40}\)Case, "Plan of Attack," p. 2.

\(^{41}\)Major General Joseph P. Story, U.S. Army, "Memorandum on the Defenses of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu," Army War College Monographs, Problems and Reports, Army War College Studies and Committee Reports, (Washington, D.C., National Archives, Old Army and Navy Branch, RG 165, Serial No. 43, Box 3, Folder, "Miscellaneous Correspondence, Reports, etc., in Regards to the Relative Advantage at Subic and Manila Bays as Naval Bases in the Philippine Islands," Copy 7), p. 375.
Patrol Squadron No. 5

3 - HZ Seaplanes (Observation, Spotting, Gunnery)

Torpedo and Bombing Squadron No. 19

1 - N-9 Seaplane (Training)
1 - R-6-L Torpedo Seaplane
4 - DT Seaplanes (Torpedo, bombing, gunnery)
1 - F5L Seaplane (scout, bombing, gunnery, observation)
3 - JN Land Plane (Training)

A total of 21 officers and 181 enlisted sailors comprised naval aviation's contribution to Black's defense. The Naval Reserve Forces consisted of 13 officers and 152 enlisted men, bringing Black's personnel strength to 101 officers and 1,359 enlisted men. The naval reserve forces manned the ships of the Fourteenth Naval District which had reduced compliments. As for the Marine Force stationed at the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor, consisted of 15 officers and 425 enlisted men, and had been designated by Black as a mobile force of infantry that would be rushed to reinforce Army forces opposing an enemy landing.

The Blue Marines Prepare to Assault Oahu

Even as the Black forces prepared to meet the invading forces on Oahu's shores, Marines of the East Coast Expeditionary Force assembled at the various navy yards and stations along the east coast, and formed into the 1st Provisional Battalion. As a result of the shortage of manpower, "All schools [at Quantico] were discontinued and all units were skimmed for troops." In order to insure Marine participation in the forthcoming exercise, Headquarters "raided" existing units for officers and enlisted men. In one case,

43Ibid.
the 10th Marines "temporarily lost nearly 75 percent of its [enlisted] complement (692 enlisted men) and 11 of its officers, including the commanding and executive officers."44

The Blue Marine Expeditionary Forces that were to assault Oahu, departed from the Naval Base at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 25 March 1925, with the first destination being the Pacific Ocean side of the Panama Canal, where the Marines enjoyed three days of liberty as the fleet prepared for the next phase of the journey to San Diego. After sailing through the Panama Canal to Marine Barracks, San Diego aboard the USS Henderson, the 1st Provisional Battalion added a further 750 Marines from the 4th Marines, then stationed at that installation's Advance Base Training Center, as well as with a provisional company of communications specialists attached. A full battalion from the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, likewise had been selected to land during the actual operations on Oahu. It is interesting to note that the 1st Bn, 4th Marines had, in fact, been "reorganized" for the exercise, and had been built up to full strength by stripping the other units of the regiment.45

Prior to leaving for Oahu the Marines conducted a full-scale rehearsal at Mission Valley, California, along the northern coast near the San Diego River. As the sun rose in the east on 9 April 1925, the Marines attached to the expeditionary forces disembarked from the ships offshore into whaleboats and headed toward the shore line. As Marines scrambled ashore combat and reconnaissance aircraft flew overhead strafing and bombing imaginary enemy targets.46 While field messengers sped back and forth on motorcycles carrying dispatches, orders, field radios, and communications personnel successfully maintained contact with the advancing Marines as they penetrated into the surrounding countryside by early afternoon. Supported by tanks, field artillery, as well as

44Ibid; Buckner, 10th Marines, p. 32.
45Condit and Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch, p. 105.
46Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Force," p. 81.
signalmen who strung miles of telephone lines Marine commanders, in conditions that closely resembled actual combat, fed reserve troops into the action at certain intervals during the "fighting." By late afternoon of the same day, Marine officers declared the exercise a "success" and ordered their forces back aboard the transport where they then headed for their rendezvous with the fleet in San Francisco.

The 1st Provisional Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines then set sail for Oahu on 10 April 1925, with the remainder of the Blue fleet. Temporarily stopping in San Francisco on the 12th to take on fresh provisions, the Marines enjoyed three days of liberty. Reembarked aboard their assigned transports the leathernecks set sail from San Francisco on the 15th for Oahu. While en route to Oahu, the Marines cleaned their rifles and equipment and continued to train for their landings by conducting embarkation and disembarkation drills into ships' boats, as well as attending lectures that outlined the objectives of the exercise. While the enlisted Marines trained and prepared their equipment, the staff officers continued to work on the overall scheme of the exercise, preparing assignment of boats and the orders for actual assault as well as the movement of the Marines inland once ashore. One last task by the staff was to break down the 1500-man Marine Force into small groups designated by international signal and color codes represented by different colored signal flags that Navy coxswains tied to each ships' boat. In order to make the landings as realistic as possible, the pre-assault plan agreed upon by the umpires established the number of troops being landed by the boats of each transport:

- Infantry-
- Field Artillery-
- Pioneers (Engineers)-

One Battalion, fully equipped
One gun with Tractor or animals, or, G.P.F.-one gun with tractor and equipment;
Two companies with equipment, or,
In order to realistically simulate an actual landing of a force of 42,000 Marines from ship to shore:

The landing of all troops from the Blue transports was represented by the actual passage of the ships' boats from ship to shore, and the actual landing on the beach of the units representing the larger constructive organizations, and the boats were required under the conditions of the problem to make the necessary number of trips between ships and shore to land the whole constructive force. The rate of landing of the Blue troops was determined by the umpires by this actual passage of the boats carrying representative units between ships and shore.48

The actual mission of the Blue Fleet was: "To occupy Oahu and to destroy naval and shipping facilities in other Hawaiian Islands in order to secure Honolulu and Pearl Harbor as naval operating bases."49 For the Marines the mission was simple, "To effect a landing on Oahu and capture or destroy its defenses" after the consolidation of Blue's landing forces. One significant feature of the Oahu maneuvers that differentiated it from those held previously on Culebra was the use of naval gunfire. As Brigadier General Dion Williams wrote in an post exercise synopsis:

The plans were drawn with the idea that it is the part of the Navy to put the Marine landing force on the beach, and to prepare the way for them by heavy artillery fire from the ships' guns, and to continue this artillery fire over predetermined zones as the attacking land forces made their advance inland from the beach. Times were predetermined zones for the landing of the successive waves of landing forces, on the beaches selected for the main

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48Ibid.
49Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Force," p. 82.
attacking force, for the secondary attacking force to the southward, and for the flanking forces to the northward of the main attacking force.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus, both the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and Major General Cole had anticipated that Black would probably undertake the following courses of action in order to repel a landing by Blue:

1. Scouting seaward by naval vessels and aircraft to give timely advice of the Blue approach.
2. Submarine attacks by Black on Blue ships, especially transports.
3. Employment of coast defense batteries against Blue ships approaching within range.
4. Holding Black main land forces in reserve in a central area of Oahu until the point of the main Blue attack is developed.
5. Establishment of observation posts to cover all possible landing places for Blue.
6. Establishment of cordons of mobile troops to contest Blue landings at all probable landing places, strengths of such cordons depending upon the importance of such landing places in the Black scheme of defense and upon the probability of the use of such landing places by Blue.
7. Employment of the main Black reserve forces to engage Blue's main landing force after it has been committed to an attack in force.
8. The use of gas to delay Blue advance from landing places and force Blue troops to use gas masks, thus decreasing mobility and speed of advance.
9. The emplacement of obstructions and ground mines at the most probable places for Blue troops.
10. The use of motor transportation to move elements of Black's main reserves to the front lines to meet the well-developed landing attacks on Blue.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite these counter-landing measures, however, it had been agreed by both sides that while Black had the advantage of being able to reinforce its positions quickly though its interior lines of communications, and an excellent road systems that had linked all the probable landing sites, Blue had the advantage of selecting any number of excellent points along Oahu's coastline from which to choose from in order to conduct a landing. This, in turn, made the defense against a landing all the more difficult for, as Frederick

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{51}Ibid, p. 82-3.
the Great himself once wrote, "he who attempts to defend everywhere defends nowhere." 52

The Oahu Exercise Commence

The Advanced Force of the Fleet arrived off the Island of Molokai on 23 April 1925, and prepared to seize the island which Blue intended to use as both an air base in order to conduct operations against Black's air force, and to use in support of its landing operations on Oahu. Despite Blue's successful seizure of the island, and the overpowering by its air element against that of a squadron from Black, the umpires declared that the former's air force could not be "employed in the problem," and confined Blue's air operations to guarding the fleet. As events later turned out, this proved to be one of the major points of contention between the Navy and the Army in the post-exercise critique, and as both Dion Williams and the commander of the 14th Naval District later wrote, had the air attack been a real and not a "constructive" one Blue's aircraft would have successfully protected the landing force.

Blue's plan of attack was to land the main elements along Oahu's northwestern coast while creating a diversion off Barber's Point in the south. Blue's commanders believed that Black's commander would assume that the main landing would take off the latter position because of the excellent road network. Admiral McKean, Blue's naval commander likewise decided that he would risk the Fleet's battleships by having them run the gauntlet of submarines, mines, and shore batteries in order to provide naval gunfire for the assaulting Marines. This latter action a direct violation of British Admiral

Horatio Nelson's dictum that "a ship is a fool to fight a fort," and an action that British naval commanders at Gallipoli balked at as the Turkish guns pounded the Anzac forces ashore. If Navy and Marine officers learned anything from Gallipoli, it was the fact that well-coordinated naval gunfire, during and after an assault, was paramount to the success or failure of a landing. Colonel Dunlap, who represented the Marine Corps Schools at the Oahu Maneuvers had advocated this same point in an earlier Marine Corps Gazette article, dealing with the lessons from the Gallipoli campaign, where he emphasized that this use of naval gunfire required "... exact and careful staff work by a composite staff of Army and Navy officers; ... and the coordination of naval gunfire with the movement of forces on shore."\(^{53}\) Dunlap added that a naval commander should never force itself against land targets without the assistance of land forces, a fact that the British General Staff itself had concluded in 1916. With Dunlap's ideas on naval gunfire and tactics, and Brigadier General Williams' point that the denial of Blue's air cover of the landing force during its seizure of Molokai fleet, leads one to conclude that assault landings on a hostile shore necessitated adherence to the employment, and coordination of combined arms. While the British failed in 1915 to apply these same principles, the U.S. Navy and Marines were learning, albeit very slowly, that the key to a successful landing besides the obvious need for better transports and assault boats was an in-depth knowledge and application of combined arms before, during, and after a landing had taken place.

The landing of troops from the transports in fact, was one of the major highlights of the exercise. The actual landing of the constructive Marine force, represented by the actual passage of the landing boats from the ships to the shore was to take place with the placement of different colored flags mounted in the bows (front) of each boat that

\(^{53}\)Dunlap, "Lesson for Marines," op.cit., p. 238.
represented a strength greater than they actually carried. The rate of landing each complement of Marines ashore as agreed upon by all participants before the exercise began "was to be determined by the time actually employed by a boat in making the trip to the beach, and back to the ship," along with a loading and unloading interval to be determined by the umpires on shore in accordance with existing conditions ashore.\textsuperscript{54}

With only a "constructive" force of 42,000 Marines, the Navy and Marine representatives agreed that the "Blue Force was not strong enough to undertake a simultaneous occupation of all islands" in the immediate area and that the islands could only be temporarily used as staging areas for the main assault on Oahu.\textsuperscript{55}

The actual commencement of the occupation began on the night of 25-26 April, when the submarine \textit{USS S-26} surfaced and transferred a four-man Marine reconnaissance team commanded by First Lieutenant J. N. Frisbie, which had been tasked with the mission of scouting \textit{Black}'s defenses at Barber's Point all the way to Honolulu Harbor, to an awaiting sampan which then transported them to the harbor area. Lying flat on the deck of the vessel, the Marines went undetected by the searchlights that swept the bay, as well as by a pair of patrol boats that by-passed the sampan. Disembarking in the harbor, the leathernecks proceeded about their scouting mission. Proceeding around Honolulu Harbor through the foothills surrounding Fort Shafter, all the while avoiding the defending troops, as well as the Army searchlights scanning the night skies over Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks, Lt Frisbie's team continued their mission, and by 0500 the next morning, had worked their way all the way to Ft. Shafter's north gate. Throughout the day, the Marines headed northeasterly and by the evening hours had worked their way to within site of Pearl Harbor before the soldiers spotted and "captured " them in the pre-dawn hours of the 27th. As First Lieutenant Frisbie

\textsuperscript{54}Case, "Plan of Attack," p. 2.
\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.
later recounted, the team went practically undetected until a group of soldiers from a
field artillery battery that had been taking a cigarette break spotted them.56 Even as
Lieutenant Frisbie's reconnaissance team prepared for its scouting mission, the guns of
the battleship USS Wyoming began a naval barrage on Molokai, as elements of the 4th
and 10th Marines scrambled into whaleboats and ships' boats and waited for the sun to
rise from the east in order to go ashore. Within hours, the Marines succeeded in securing
their objective. Successfully seizing their objective, the Marines reboarded the transports
and awaited for the main assault on Oahu.

During the night of 26-27 the Blue Fleet positioned itself off Oahu, and after feinting
a landing at Maunalua Bay near Diamond Head, the ships prepared for the main landing
off the northwestern coast, while a secondary fleet of auxiliary cruisers prepared to
conduct a secondary landing at Barber's Point along the southwestern corner of the
same island. As the Marines embarked into whaleboats and ships' boats, the Navy
opened up with a terrific bombardment aimed at Black's defenses. Black's searchlights,
simulating heavy artillery, filled the darkened sky as the ships and shore batteries
engaged in a mock counterbattery duel. Even as the Blue Fleet and Black's shore
defenses "fought" each other the Navy crews lowered the Marine transports into the
choppy water. After having been lowered into the ocean in anticipation of a night
landing, the Marines once again fought seasickness and cramped conditions as they
awaited for word to go ashore. With the surf pounding the sides of the ships, naval
officials decided to postpone the night landing until dawn of the 27th, at which time the
Marines were given the order to proceed ashore. Ironically, this was exactly what had
occurred during the Culebra exercises a year ago, and had similar results with Marines

56See Commander, Control Force to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, "Report of
Operations of Marine Corps Patrol from USS Savannah, Joint Army-Navy Problem, No.
3," dtd. 8 May 1925. (Quantico, VA.: Marine Corps University Archives, MCU,
Historical Amphibious File (HAF), No. 28, Box 1, MCCDC).
cursing [and many of them becoming nauseated], as they tossed about in the whaleboats. Once dawn arrived, however, the ocean had calmed considerably and with that came the order to "land the landing force." As the transports raced ashore the calm was broken with the roar overhead of aircraft based at Wheeler and Hickam airfields as the Marines proceeded to the beach. At one point during the landing, however, the boat officer attached to the first wave, shortly thereafter recalled the whaleboats to the starting point as the first wave outdistanced the second and third waves. Regrouping on the line, the assault waves once again proceeded ashore, this time at both a more suitable and orderly pace that was well-timed between the three assault increments.\footnote{Ibid; Case, "Plan of Attack," p. 2.} Reaching the shore almost undetected, the Marines, designated officially as the First Division, and outfitted in full combat gear [including barracks caps], clambered out of the cumbersome whaleboats and onto the beach, where they immediately assaulted the dug in soldiers, who had machine guns and Stokes' mortars pointed directly toward the surf zone in anticipation of the landings.

Despite the rain squalls that soaked the Marines, sailors, and soldiers, the landings continued all morning with a force of "500" Marines [actually 16] being landed, in "front of the Haliewa Hotel 35 miles northwest of Honolulu shortly after the main landings took place on the 27th." After quickly overrunning the numerous machine gun positions manned by the soldiers attached to the Schofield Barracks, the leathernecks proceeded to fight their way inland headed toward the "great central plain" which was their objective. The central plain, which extends north of Pearl Harbor all the way to the south was, in fact, where the Army commander had kept the bulk of his reserves, and had been determined by the naval and Marine staffs to be the key to the island's overall defense. By mid-morning, one Marine recalled that "the greater part of our combat division had
rolled up the enemy defenses, and had penetrated a mile inland, driving the enemy rearguard before them." 58

Even as the Marines and soldiers battled each other, Black's bombers and pursuit aircraft bombed and strafed the fleet whose anti-aircraft guns put up a terrific barrage. During one such attack, "... a squadron of eight roaring Martin bombers, accompanied by six pursuit ships which played about their convoy like wasps in company with a flight of eagles, dropped down out of the clouds from above the peaks of Waianae Mountains which guard the north shore," with the intention of dropping their deadly payloads on the assembled fleet. (54) Just at that time, eight Navy planes appeared in the sky and drove the Black airplanes away. Meanwhile, Blue's battleships continued pounded Black's shore defenses, with the only interruption occurring about noon when a lone 'Black' submarine surfaced in the rear of the fleet, and attempted to torpedo the USS California, Admiral Robinson's flagship. The USS Macdonough and Paul Hamilton, however, quickly spotted the offending vessel, and forced it to surrender. One notable feature of the exercise was the participation of the newly-commissioned aircraft carrier USS Langley, whose aircraft had for several hours, almost free reign over the skies above Oahu, and thus permitted them to bombard shore installations, and fixed gun positions aimed at the Blue Fleet. Within the timespan of a few minutes, Langley's airplanes quickly gained the upper hand over the poorly coordinated and ineffectual efforts of Black's combined air forces. The efforts of the Langley, however, were too good, and eventually led to its "neutralization" by Major General Hines during the first few hours after the first landings by the Marines, thus denying the assault force effective air and ground support as Black's aircraft, flying out of both Wheeler and Hickam Fields sprayed

the landing beaches with machine gun fire, and bombed troop concentrations. In fact, the effectiveness of the Navy's newest weapon led to a bitter post-exercise debate between the Army and Navy aviation elements which had been attached to Black during the exercise over the poor command relationship during the exercise, and contributed largely to the further deterioration in the relationship between the two aviation services that continued up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.59

Even as the Marines of the First Division landed along Oahu's northwestern shore, a smaller task force successfully conducted a feint along the eastern shores of that island "with the hope of drawing some of Black's land forces toward that portion of Oahu, and away from the beaches selected for the actual landing of the main forces near Blue."60 Major General Hines' forces succeeded in repelling another landing by Marines southwest of the main landings at Barber's Point, with the entrenched soldiers inflicting "heavy casualties" on the assaulting troops. The landing at Barber's Point, however, did succeed in drawing away sufficient Army strength from the main landing areas to meet what Army commanders felt would be the main point of the attack on Oahu, thus enabling the main landings near Haliewa.

59Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 37-69 and 89-97; See Reports, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Scouting Fleet to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, dtd. 4 May 1925, Subj.: "Alleged Lack of Cooperation Between Army and Naval Aircraft During Recent Maneuvers," (Quantico, VA., Historical Amphibious File, No. 27, Box 1, MCU Archives, MCU, MCCDC); Commander, Black Naval Forces, Statement of the Commander, Black Naval Forces, Subj.: "Statement of the Commander, Black Naval Forces (Fourth Day of Critique)," dtd. 8 May 1925. (Quantico, VA: Historical Amphibious File, No. 26, Box 1, MCU Archives, MCU, MCCDC); For an excellent result of the breakdown in communications between the two services see Brian M. Linn's, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 198-200. Hereafter cited as Linn, Guardians of Empire.

60Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Force," p. 85.
By noon, it had become apparent to all participants that the landings by Blue, had been a complete success, particularly when the Marines had eliminated all but the remnants of the main forces designed to prevent a breakthrough into the center portion of the island. With the "last elements of the enemy rearguards in a hurried retreat, and the clearing away of mines, machine guns, and other obstacles from the shore, and the foothold which had predestined the success of the attack and eventual advance across the island . . ." it became obvious to all that Blue had, in fact, succeeded in penetrating Black's defenses and that the landings were a complete success.\(^{61}\) In light of Black's precarious position General Hines called an end to not only the exercise itself, but to the illusion that Oahu could successfully repel an enemy attack.

Amidst the usual accidents and injuries commonplace during an exercise of such magnitude, the only fatality that occurred during the two-month long maneuver happened during the voyage home when Marine Major Ralph L. Shepard died on 22 May 1925, aboard the USS Henderson of a massive stroke. Despite this tragedy, the participants of both sides agreed that the overall result of the exercise had been successful.

**Post-Exercise Critique and the Lessons Learned**

The most immediate results of the Oahu maneuvers was the realization to all concerned that the naval and army installations there, and on the surrounding islands were, in fact, vulnerable to a determined enemy assault. While the operation's original intent had been to test the approved joint operations plans and the individual Army and Navy plans as well as the testing, evaluation, and application of new operational and tactical concepts met with success, the maneuvers clearly demonstrated that the services, most notably the Army and Navy had failed either to implement the lessons learned from

\(^{61}\)"Marines Force Landing at Oahu," p. 4.
previous joint and combined exercises due either to a lack of interservice cooperation over roles and missions, or to budget and manpower constraints. The results of the Joint Army and Navy Exercises of 1925 pointed, in fact, in both directions.

The first issue from the joint perspective dealt with the effective utilization of air assets by either side. The fact that Blue could not effectively use its air assets offered by the Langley pointed toward the ongoing conflict between the Army and Navy over the mission of coastal defense, and other aviation-related issues. The debate between Blue and Black over the use of aircraft carriers carried over into the debate between Black's air commanders—Army and Navy. The fact that the Navy could not bring its air assets to assist the Marines during the initial landing and the march inland pointed to both a lack of understanding on the use of this new weapons platform, and its application on the battlefield. Keeping this in mind, one must recognize that the naval commanders remained skeptical on the value and use of aviation in naval warfare. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the umpires limited the Langley's play in the exercise. Furthermore, even if the Langley had been allowed to remain in the exercise, it is doubtful that air would have changed the outcome of the exercise since both the Army and Navy commanders knew very little about the value of the aircraft carrier in support of a naval or joint campaign. In short, the projection of air power from a platform at sea was in its very embryonic stages of development.

The second matter of discontent over the aviation matters dealt with the relationship between Black's naval and Army air assets. Both the commandant of the 14th Naval District, and the Army air commander can both be faulted for the apparent breakdown in coordination during the pre-exercise period that eventually led to the lack of a unified air commander during the actual exercise. The Oahu Maneuvers, in fact, acknowledged the

bitter, oftentimes acrimonious disagreements over the areas of responsibility of naval and army aviation:

Army and Navy leaders consistently disagreed over such questions as whether the Navy should be permitted to operate reconnaissance and strike aircraft from land bases, and whether army aircraft should operate against targets far out to sea. Army Air Corps partisans claimed that land-based bombers could deal with attacking fleets more effectively and decisively than the Navy could.63

In a lecture given at the Army War College shortly after the conclusion of the 1925 Winter Maneuvers, where he critiqued the exercise from the "Army's point of view," Major General Hines admitted that the controversy between the Army and Navy over "who does what where" was due primarily to, a "... lack of combined air training between the Army and the Navy... [and that]... No combined exercises by our forces had ever been held prior to the maneuver." The general likewise downplayed the Navy's air attack on Molokai, and the effects of the Langley's aircraft on both Pearl Harbor and its adjacent fixed gun installations, as a misunderstanding and a lack of "cooperation" between the two services.64 The Army Chief of Staff freely admitted that the Langley's sudden appearance and launching of its aircraft would have "had a disastrous effect on Pearl Harbor," had this been a real attack. General Hines's comments, in fact, revealed the deep animosity that existed between Army and Navy particularly over coastal and harbor defense as well as aviation matters65, and "glossed" over the rift that had burgeoned during the Oahu landings.

63Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness: Vol. II: The Interwar Years, p. 86.
64Hines, "Lecture," p. 11.
65Ironically, Air Force historian Maurer Maurer discusses only the 1932 and not the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers. It would have been interesting to read his comments on the state of relations between the three aviation services (Army, Navy, and Marines). See Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939. (Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History, 1987), pp. 251-2.
General Hines' comments also revealed the imperative that both services should have placed on resolving the issue over "Who controls what, when, and where." This particular issue developed over the use by both Army and Navy air commanders of small boats to reconnoiter in front of shore detachments. Once again, a "turf" fight nearly scuttled Black's ability to repel a landing:

One of the commanders insisted that he should be allowed to patrol the front line. The Naval District Commander was adamant that was a Navy function. I think that it was settled in the end but there is a question as to just where the Army ends and the Navy begins. The Naval Commander insisted that the mean low water was the beginning of the Army mission and the Army commander insisted that he should be able to send out and find out what was going on his front just as he would if he were in war or on land. It is a question which I think would be solved in time of war; no commander would sit on the beach and not send out to find out what was going on his front.66

General Hines bluntly admitted that the "Air Defense of Oahu" was inadequate, though he blamed this upon not only the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy, but on the lack of "adequate air permanent facilities on the other islands of the Hawaiian Group," a fault he laid squarely on the meager budgets the services had been subjected to by Congress. One last shortcoming the general identified, was the lack of serviceable aircraft that the Army had available for the entire exercise. Army ground crews, able to only put fourteen aircraft in the air for the operation, struggled even with this number, due largely to a shortage of spare parts and adequate maintenance facilities. As for the planes themselves, the general was even more direct when he stated that:

They are war planes that were sent over there as a reserve. It was well known at the time that they probably would not be the best planes that could be produced when the time came for their use, but in order to have some reserve over there, they were sent over three or four years ago. They have had large deteriora-

66Ibid.
tion in storage.

Captain J. K. Taussig, U.S.N. echoed General Hines' comments regarding the antiquated aircraft used in the exercise by both sides when, in address before the Army War College in late 1925, he added the fact that in meeting any attack from Orange, "We must have our Naval Air Forces up to the strength allowed by the limitation of armament treaty." Captain Taussig indirectly defended the Langley's action, by stating that in only such a surprise offensive action [i.e. use of aircraft carriers], could Blue hope to overcome Orange's advantage in any such attack. He also indicated that Admiral McKean had every right to "take routes that place[d] the Fleet in the least jeopardy from them [i.e. Army aircraft or Orange's air force]." Thus, while the Army and Navy seemed to agree on the same point but for different reasons regarding the aircraft involved in the exercise, they remained at odds over the missions and tactics of the respective air forces, and the respective missions each was to perform, a matter that would not be resolved until war forced the issue in 1941.

For the Marines the debate over aviation, and the overall success of Blue's landing coincided with the larger issues of the lessons learned and the progress [or lack thereof] of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in embracing the advanced base mission. The question most Marines had as they prepared to critique the exercise from a purely Marine vantage point was how much progress had been made since the Culebra landings a year ago insofar as landing operations had been concerned. Colonel Robert H. Dunlap had been placed in charge of the post exercise evaluation by Major General Lejeune, and with the assistance of Major General Eli K. Cole, and Brigadier General Dion Williams, as well as all of the staffs of the First Division, sat down at Marine

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Barracks, Pearl Harbor [1-4 May 1925], and later from 1-5 June at Quantico, to evaluate
the staff planning, execution, and overall performance of the Marines in the maneuvers.
The results of Dunlap's critique was, as might be expected, not something that the Major
General Commandant wanted to hear, and in fact pointed to the work that lie ahead by
him, and his successors in order to make the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force a reality.

Colonel Dunlap's presence during the exercises was to "observe and report" his
findings to both the Major General Commandant and the student body at the Field
Officer's Course at Quantico, where they could absorb and learn from the mistakes of
this and the other advanced base exercises. Despite the fact that the Blue Marine
Expeditionary Force had been able to land and drive inland from the beaches of Oahu, a
fact that General Hines acknowledged in both his lecture and in a post exercise
newspaper article, the services committed the same mistakes made at Culebra a year ago.
The landing force of Marines once again had to wait for hours in the choppy seas before
being brought aboard the transports to await reembarkation orders; Marine aircraft
encountered the same problem of miscoordination with their Army and Navy
counterparts; landing craft once again proved ill-suited for the tasks that they had been
selected; the Navy seemed either unable or unwilling to effectively coordinate the
landings once the assault waves headed to shore; individual Marine equipment proved
unsuited for landing operations; and that perennial problem in all exercises-
communications-both shore-to-ship, and land communications broke down just as the
Marines landed on Oahu's beaches, thereby causing delays in supplies and fire support
from being landed or provided.

From the Marine Corps perspective, the overall effect of the Oahu Maneuvers had
both positive and negative benefits. The first, and most important benefit, came from the
length of the post exercise critique, clear evidence of Headquarters more than passive
interest. With the critique taking nearly a month, it appeared at least from the surface
that Headquarters began to take the advanced base mission seriously—more than in previous years. Secondly, the main purpose of the Marines' involvement in the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, was to test the staff procedures implemented during the 1924 Winter Maneuvers on Culebra. In fact, with the inclusion of a landing force staff by Headquarters, "the exercises . . . were completely successful from the standpoint of the Marines. The plans worked to perfection and the landing was accomplished."\textsuperscript{68} Nonetheless, there was a downside with the results of the 1925 maneuvers, with the "negative" outweighing the "positive" benefits. Participation by the Marines in the Oahu exercise revealed organizational, tactical, and doctrinal flaws that highlighted further shortcomings in the Corps' ability to carry out advanced base missions. In fact, Dunlap's critique outlined these, and the other problems the First Division encountered as it assaulted Oahu's shores. Throughout his review of the lessons learned during the maneuvers, Colonel Dunlap's "imprint" as far as his belief in combined arms and proper staff planning prior to an assault can be well seen, as well as that of the Major General Lejeune. In making his recommendations, Dunlap concentrated on organizational matters dealing with the composition of an advanced base force. He likewise made specific references to those issues that dealt with the indoctrination and education of Marine officers in the principles and techniques of amphibious operations. And it was these latter points that Colonel Dunlap made his most important contributions, insofar as his impact on the Marine Corps acceptance of the amphibious warfare mission had been concerned. It is in the points put forward by Dunlap in his after-action report that confirm the idea that for him and the majority of senior leadership of the Marine Corps, the World War, and its impact on the Marine Corps' organizational, operational, and tactical concepts, as well as on the institutional reforms that occurred during the 1920's,

\textsuperscript{68}Williams, "Blue Marine Expeditionary Forces," p. 87.
and contributed to the development of its amphibious assault doctrine in the mid-
1930's. 69

Specifically, Colonel Dunlap advanced the idea that the Marine Corps' adoption of
the Army Table of Organization, and of its methods of training (referred to as infantry
drill) was, in fact, correct. Dunlap based this assertion on the fact, "That the organization
of the Army is based upon a well considered tactical use of arms and men included in any
unit and for the kind of maneuver which it, the Army, is likely to encounter." He
maintained, however, that any change in the organization of the Marine Corps be made
only "after serious consideration or the nature of the campaigns in which the Marines are
likely to be employed is different and that this difference warrants such change." 70
Colonel Dunlap pointed out that a fixed table of organization and standardized
equipment be maintained for just such a force, and in short, called for permanent force to
be trained and organized for all contingencies that the Marine Corps may be called upon
to furnish men and material. This same idea had its origins in the last decade of the
1890's, and first two decades of the 1900's, when Navy Captain [later Rear Admiral]
William F. Fullam, called for the formation of permanent Marine battalions that would
accompany the fleet in time of war. 71 While the Marines and their supporters in
Congress mistakenly saw this as an attempt to abolish the Corps, the idea nonetheless
remained current in Marine and Navy circles, particularly in the minds of those Marine
officers that had lived through the controversy. Dunlap's call for a "permanent" force

69 Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, "Recommendations Based on Repor of Critique on Joint
Army and Navy Problem No. 3 by the Officers of the Marine Corps Schools, June 1 to 5,
1925," (Washington, DC, National Archives, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps General
Correspondence, Entry No., 299, Box 5), p. 1. Hereafter cited as Dunlap, "Recomm-
dendations."
70 Ibid.
71 John G. Miller's "William Freeland Fullam's War with the Corps," U.S. Naval Institute
was, indeed, not new, though it found a more receptive audience as a younger generation of Marine officers assumed staff and senior field billets. He realized that even if the Marines made minor changes to its organization, "they should be made without changing the principles governing the Army organization," though Dunlap realized that because of the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps it required different equipment than that of the Army. For Dunlap, this "expeditionary" nature affected not so much its basic organization, but its method of training its officers and enlisted men, as well as its ability to retain its mobility and by implication, its flexibility.72

Dunlap likewise called for the organization of the Marine Corps into "one or two divisions," not so much a radical idea, since this same idea had been proposed by Major General Barnett during the World War, though the latter had based his decision on the war time emergency and not on a permanent peace time basis.73 Dunlap likewise called for the further subdivision of the Marine Corps by geographical areas, broken down further into brigades, regiments, battalions, as well as the creation of "a permanent Force or Corps staff" to insure progressive work or study. This would insure that in time of war, a rapid build up of forces could occur with a minimum of delay as occurred during the World War.

In regards to training and education, Dunlap was more to the point. The Marine colonel wrote in his post-exercise critique that the 1925 Oahu maneuvers pointed toward the importance of the lessons of the World War insofar as the emphasis on small unit and combined arms training had been concerned. Here, Dunlap reiterated General John J. Pershing's call for the training of the American Expeditionary Forces in "open" warfare as opposed to "trench" or "static" warfare. He wrote that any tactical reorganization of the Marine Corps be made along those same lines made by the Army, in that both the

73 Millett, Semper Fidelis, pp. 295-6
experiences of combat [in the World War], and that this American combat doctrine held fast to the basic principle that "warfare of movement in the open . . . applies in every detail to the missions normal to the Marine Corps Forces." The commanding officer of MCS likewise pointed out that the commanders of each of these organizations "train the specialists necessary to his organization . . .," and that this training be carried out throughout the year within the companies, battalions, and regiments. He likewise stressed the fact that the Marine Corps needed to participate in such maneuvers as the Oahu landings annually or if unable to do this, at least have the command participate in an on-post map or field training exercise simulating such conditions that might be encountered in such a large exercise.

Colonel Dunlap's strongest recommendations came, as one might expect regarding the inculcation and indoctrination of Marine officers throughout the Marine Corps Schools' system. First and foremost, was his insistence that all officers attend the various schools, and receive training that would assist them in their tasks of training the men in infantry and advanced base drill. Dunlap bluntly stated that it would be hoped that "such notable results will be obtained," from such training. He likewise used this critique to criticize the current curriculum in MCS in his assertion that, "the Marine Corps Schools do not instruct the students sufficiently in the details and actual practice of handling the various units which go to make up the Headquarters' details or actually practice the various functions of the staff section." Colonel Dunlap called for the assignment and attachment of a fully-manned battalion to the Marine Corps Schools for demonstrations, and practice by the company and field officers in various training methods and field

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75 Dunlap, "Recommendations," p. 3.
problems. The battalion could represent if necessary, a `notional' division or a force of two divisions, with the said unit receiving valuable training:

During the first part of the school year the battalion would be utilized in putting on demonstrations of all kinds both for Company Officers' School and Field Officers' School. The men and officers of the battalion would have a permanent position in the various Headquarters' details or Headquarters' details or Headquarters' Groups necessary to the Force of one or two divisions.\textsuperscript{76}

Colonel Dunlap recommended that both school courses be shortened one month to May 1st instead of June 1st, with the period from May 1st to June 1st utilized as a school maneuver period at which time, "the entire class and the battalion would leave for previously selected terrain and conduct maneuvers covering the action of an actual battalion and constructively as a Division or a Force of Two Divisions." Most important, however, were his recommendations regarding curriculum. Basing his suggestions on the Army's method of educating its officers, students would spend time studying and preparing orders and annexes "necessary to a problem as per example the capture of an island position for an attack or defense problem of any kind . . . [with]

The map maneuvers necessary to this end would be conducted on Leavenworth maps (which can be secured in the necessary quantity) on that part of the terrain which most nearly represents the island position or other terrain selected as being a probable point in the advance against the enemy. The terrain selected for the maneuver in the last part of the course would be that which could be adapted for bringing out the tactics considered necessary to the proper solution of the problem. It was found in preparation for the Hawaiian Maneuvers that terrain around Quantico and San Diego could be so adapted. Should a Regiment of Infantry, or Battalion or Regiment of Artillery, say the 5th Infantry or 10th Artillery, be available to participate in these maneuvers they could easily be assigned a position in the organization as was done with the 4th Regiment in the Hawaiian Maneuvers.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
Regarding amphibious or advanced base exercises and specific maneuvers in general Dunlap added that:

... the training at the Schools with the Schools Battalion during the first part of the course would, in addition to other studies, prepare for the maneuver. The first part of the maneuver could involve the movement of the actual force of the School Battalion and of such other regiments or battalions as would be attached, by boats to a selected landing- there troops and officers could actually land the material by approved methods-so that all would see and participate in the landing of at least one of each type of gun and tractor, and of the kind of material, etc., which would ordinarily accompany a Marine Expeditionary Force. During this part of the maneuver all personnel would have instruction in the handling of boats. After landing, the School Battalions or regiments could maneuver in attack and defense as a battalion or regiment. Following this the School Battalion would be split up into the various Headquarters' Groups (for which it had been previously trained), the School officers assigned to the previously designated Headquarters Groups for which they had been previously trained, and the maneuvers involving this operation of a Division or 2 Divisions in the capture, defense or withdrawal of the island position in any other problem with all the attending staff work could be carried out. This time should also be utilized for carrying out the major part of the terrain exercises necessary in the school course. This maneuver having been preceded as stated before by the study of the problem by the class in the first part of the school year. During this maneuver attached regiments such as the 10th or 5th could fit into the larger organization of the Marine Corps could when available function as supernumerary to the school staffs. The above is designed for training of officers at the schools and should not be confused with any other maneuver which may take place, and in which of course the staffs as recommended for the organization of the Corps would function directly and not as supernumeraries.

Dunlap believed that with the addition of such a battalion to the Marine Corps Schools, it would better prepare the Marines assigned to this outfit for expeditionary and field duty. While doubting the overall value of such training on preparedness of the entire Marine Corps, it would provide the student-officers 'live' troops to work with instead of simply map symbols or "constructive" Marines, in order to conduct tactical or advanced base problems along the Potomac River.
The most important points by Colonel Dunlap, however, revolved around the lessons the exercise offered, insofar as training the advance base force had been concerned.

Directing his comments toward the fiasco centering around the first wave's landing boats having to turn back midway through their run to the beach, as well as the handling of the logistics build up ashore, the veteran Marine officer suggested:

That the Major General Commandant request a board be ordered, consisting of at least two Marine Officers with tactical knowledge of handling troops once ashore as well as a knowledge of landing troops from ship on an open beach and through the surf, two Naval Officers with experience as beach masters, and an intimate knowledge of handling boats in a sea way and thru the surf and one Naval Constructor. These officers to experiment in handling boats in a surf and to recommend (a) a boat suitable for landing the 1st wave ashore on a defended coast, (b) suitable for handling the type of equipment which will be carried by a Marine Force, (c) capable of being carried on transports, (d) capable of being turned out in quantity once war is determined upon. Having determined upon the type of craft, procure sufficient number to (1) train our personnel and (2) to accompany small expeditions similar to our West India campaigns. Have this board scan the lists of American Ships and determine upon suitable ones which could be beached and to devise a suitable method for unloading such ship once it is beached.

The fact that the need for better landing boats and barges, as well as Navy crews (both officers and enlisted) had been well recognized before the 1925 maneuvers, it came as no surprise to all that Dunlap would mention them in his post exercise critique. What remains important of their mention is, however, the fact that little had been done in the way of addressing this shortcoming by both the Navy, the agency most responsible for designing and acquiring such boats, and the Army—the service with one of the largest "fleets" up to that time with ships and boats of all types, that ranged from tugboats to converted transports.

Interestingly, the Army's after-action report closely resembled that of Dunlap's post exercise critique. Not to be outdone by the Marines, Major General Hines reiterated all
of Dunlap's criticisms, and likewise called for the acquisition of suitable landing craft and transports:

There is no doubt that highly trained, well-led infantry can establish a beachhead once the troops are ashore— but getting ashore, there's the rub. Even when the landings, as in the exercise, are well-planned and covered by naval gunfire, the guns defending the beach will sink many boats, perhaps even transports. Even under the best weather conditions, the critical period of a landing operation is that in which the landing troops are moving in boats from transports to beach. During this period they are exposed helpless to the gun, machine gun, and rifle fire of the defender, and in case he has any aircraft left, to attacks by the latter. This points to the necessity of providing transports with speedy boats capable of negotiating even heavy source in that the critical period referred to may be reduced to the minimum.  

Both Hines and Dunlap recognized the need for faster, better-protected, and more sturdier landing craft and ships capable of coming right up on the beach. Both would enter service with the Navy, Marines and Army during World War II, with the adoption of the Higgins' boats, Donald Roebling's "Alligator," and the Landing Ship Tank (LST). Yet for the time being, however, these means of water-born conveyance had not been developed nor conceived.

While both Colonel Dunlap and Major General Hines clearly saw the requirements for a successful assault landing, Brigadier General Dion Williams expounded upon two other points that both men overlooked in their reports. These include communications and training, two of the more important operational lessons of the 1925 maneuvers missed by both Hines and Dunlap. In an article in the Marine Corps Gazette the following September, Williams' described in detail the joint Army and Navy exercises of 1925, and expounded up the lessons and implications that the Oahu maneuvers had on the Marine Corps. Like Dunlap and Hines, Williams emphasized that the most essential

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factor in conducting a successful amphibious landing was to "... get men and material of the expedition on the beach in the shortest possible time with least confusion, and in the best condition for immediate action... [and thus]... it is therefore vital that every effort should be made to provide beforehand suitable means for transporting men and material from ship to shore." Williams pointed out that despite the numerous landings made by the Marines (and the Army), the use of ships' and whaleboats were not especially suitable for this purpose, and during the last twenty years numerous plans have been made for special craft, but so far little has been done to provide and test such craft. Williams pointed out that the goal of the "notional" First Marine Division should have been to land as many men and as much material ashore during the initial wave or assault so as to insure a permanent lodgment.) He added that:

In general terms, boats or barges for the landing of a modern expeditionary force and its material should be of such size that they can be carried on vessels that will be used in war as transports and in addition they should be of such weight that they may be readily hoisted in and out by the ship's own gear. With these limitations as to size and weight the boats and barges designed for landing on an open coast should carry as many men and as much material as is possible, they should be fairly good sea boats and especially designed to stand beaching where there is some surf running, with means provided for quick hauling off the beach in order to make successive trips between ship and shore. 78

Not to waste the boats already carried by the Navy, he added that:

When such landing boats and barges have been provided especially for its purpose, the ordinary ships' boats will of course be used to supplement the special landing craft, in order that the greatest possible force may be landed in the shortest possible time.

This is where General Williams parted company with both Dunlap's and Hines' findings, however, as he went on to emphasize the need for better training, and

communications equipment and procedures. As for training, Williams' article pointed to the necessity of training personnel in proper disembarkation procedures from landing craft on an open sea and in waters that were often choppy. Here, Williams referred to the recently concluded exercise, as well as to the one held on Culebra the year before, when Marines disembarked from the landing boats only to congregate together, thus making them ideal targets for an enemy mortar or artillery attack. In his article, General Williams stressed: "Without frequent training of the personnel in such operations there will inevitably be great confusion and delay in carrying out landing operations on a hostile coast against strong enemy opposition, especially at night when such landings will have to be made in time of war." Williams' comment here hit upon what for the Marine Corps proved to be the main problem: frequency and having sufficient numbers of troops available for training. With Marines on expeditionary duty in China and later Nicaragua, as well as mail guard duty, Headquarters barely scraped up sufficient manpower to participate in both the Culebra and Oahu exercises. For the Marines, it was the same story of knowing what was wrong and how to fix it, but Headquarters lacked the manpower, and to train in advanced base problems, and for the time being the advanced base force remained just an idea. Colonel Dunlap's request for a detail of enlisted men to be assigned to the MCS, was a start in the right direction but was still insufficient for the scale needed to train Marines not assigned to guard or special duties in advanced base duties.

Brigadier General Williams' post exercise synopsis of the 1925 Joint Army and Navy Maneuvers, likewise reiterated the Navy's criticisms aimed against the umpires for negating the effects of the USS Langley, and its aircraft. Williams, an amphibious visionary, recognized the potential of the aircraft carrier in supporting a Marine (or Army) landing, and emphasized that the exercise demonstrated "the necessity of carrying with the Fleet a larger air force which would be immediately available for supporting a
landing in force and to meet the air force of the defenders which would be very
destructive against landing such force during the early stages of landing operation. This
points to the provision of more and larger aircraft carriers to accompany the Fleet, a
need which is being met by present Fleet building program."

The last lesson offered by the exercise, and one that became obscured in the rush to
discuss the problems associated with the ships' boats and disembarkation procedures,
was with both ship to shore and beachhead communications. Transported in the open
whaleboats, the radio sets carried by the Marines became water-logged and unable to
work once ashore, while telephone wire became tangled and oftentimes disconnected
after being laid on shore, both of which prevented Marines and soldiers to communicate
with higher headquarters or offshore batteries. Major General Hines specifically
commented on communications problem in his lecture when he stated that, the
"communications, road and railway, in the central valley of Oahu were inadequate to
permit the effective employment of reserves . . . [and that] . . . There is a need for a
comprehensive communications project for all defense purposes. . . " The Army Chief of
Staff stated that while the overall communications worked "fairly well in the short period
taken by the Exercises," they would have broken down and possibly "given serious
trouble" in actual combat or an exercise of greater length.79 Dion Williams noted in his
article that, "every effort should be made to provide apparatus of this nature of such
weights and sizes that will allow of easy transportation in the boats and after a landing
has been effected."80 In fact, it would not be until the mid-1930's that the Marines
fielded proper radio gear that was both portable and packed to keep out saltwater, as
well as withstand being knocked about and still able function once ashore. It might be
added, this was a problem that was not new, and is to this day a problem that has defied

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resolution. Interestingly, Headquarters at first ignored this call for better communications equipment as Marines encountered similar problems in the jungles of Nicaragua, as the vacuum tube radio sets they carried succumbed to heat, moisture, humidity, and lack of spare parts. Only during the last year of the Nicaraguan campaign (1932) did better communications gear come on line, much too late to have any effect on the outcome of the campaign. Nonetheless, Marines and sailors took the problem to heart, and once the technology became available, rapidly applied it to meet their needs. Thus, the problems faced by the soldiers and Marines on Oahu are not all that different than their present-day successors!

**Results of the 1925 Maneuvers**

The 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, oftentimes referred to as the Grand Joint Army-Navy Maneuvers, demonstrated the necessity of closer interservice and intraservice cooperation. Despite the stormy Army-Navy relationship that existed during the post-World War battle over roles and missions, particularly in regards to coastal defense and aviation, the fact that the service could work together when necessary was ample proof that there existed a recognition on the part of the Army's and Navy's senior leadership for closer cooperation. The 1925 Maneuvers likewise demonstrated that both services complimented each other's particular specialty, the Navy at sea, the Army on land, as well as the Marine Corps' ongoing interest in the development of amphibious warfare. In short, one could say that one of the most important results of the Oahu Maneuvers was the fact that the services were moving toward an era of jointness which the service chiefs later codified in written form in the publication *Joint Overseas Expeditions* (1927). A fact reiterated in subsequent editions of this and other manuals produced during the interwar era. Constrained budgets, the on-going/off-again inter- and intra-service squabbling over roles and missions, nonetheless derailed the cooperation and spirit of
jointness [Emphasis mine] that existed briefly during the mid-1920's, and in particular during the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers.

For the Marines, the maneuvers demonstrated just how little had been learned since the 1924 Culebra exercises in forging an effective landing doctrine, as well as in the design and development of better landing craft. This was just not the fault of the Marines, since the bureaus inside the Navy that dealt with the design and acquisition of suitable landing craft and ships capable of transporting them, had yet to prioritize the need for their design and construction. More than anything else, the Oahu Maneuvers highlighted the need for proper landing craft and boats, as well as a permanent, well-thought out landing doctrine before Marines and soldiers could assault an enemy-held beachhead. Neither of these were ready in 1925, though beginning in 1926, the Marines and Navy began testing better lighters and landing barges capable of carrying a 155mm gun and its tractor, though did not come up with a workable design until the late 1930's.81 Doctrinally, it was not until the beginning of the 1930's and the production of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual (1934) at the MCS that Marines began a serious, in-depth study of how to conduct an amphibious assault. With the withdrawal of the Marines from Nicaragua in 1933, and Haiti in 1934, there were at least technically more Marines available to conduct serious amphibious training at Quantico, and in the Caribbean. The Great Depression, and the continued tight fiscal policies of the Hoover and early Franklin D. Roosevelt administrations, changed all of this, and forced

81 In July 1926, a detachment from the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines commanded by Major Alfred A. Cunningham boarded at Quantico "travelled to the naval base at Hampton Roads, Va., to observe landing craft tests. The boats under consideration were 50-foot lighters designed to carry a 155mm gun and its tractor. The lighter was self-propelled and head to be beached so the gun could be unloaded over a stern ramp. Although this was an improvement over the pontoon affair tested at Culebra two prior [with the "Beetle Boats"], it was still not the vehicle to use on a contested beach. See Buckner, A Brief History of the 10th Marines, p. 33.
Headquarters to drastically curtail even a modest training schedule. Nonetheless, as Marine General Holland M. Smith later wrote, the failures encountered by Marines on Culebra and later at Oahu, gave "impetus" to the writing of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual, and the further development of an effective amphibious assault doctrine.

The inculcation of the lessons of the Oahu Maneuvers continued on at the Marine Corps Schools during the remaining years of the 1920's, thanks largely to the efforts of such visionaries as Major General Eli K. Cole, Brigadier General Dion Williams, and perhaps most importantly, Colonel [later Brigadier General] Robert H. Dunlap. Through the efforts of these three officers, the students who entered the Field Officers' Course, studied not only the lessons of the 1925 maneuvers, but also how to conduct overseas operations. In referral to his post-exercise critique, Colonel Dunlap further suggested in a letter to General Lejeune that more time be devoted to studying overseas expeditions, and in the actual carrying out of advanced base operations; and that the emphasis on studying overseas expeditions be extended to those enrolled in both the Company Officers' School, as well as those students in the Correspondence Course. Dunlap believed that as many officers as possible should be introduced to the study of landing operations. Colonel Dunlap took into account the fact that due to operational commitments, many officers had been unable to attend a formal school. This same sentiment applied to those officers not appointed to the formal school at Quantico. Dunlap also urged that these same officers be permitted to input their ideas in the work then ongoing "on overseas expeditions," into both the curriculum of the 1926-1927 Field Officers' Course, and any future manual that might be produced on landing procedures.82

82Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, USMC, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools, ltr. to Major General Commandant, Via Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA., dtd. 16 December 1925. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, A/I Office, Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No., 18-1520-30-100, Box 384
While Major General Lejeune threw his whole hearted support to Dunlap’s recommendations and requests for increased emphasis on landing operations, he nonetheless downplayed his other suggestion regarding the inclusion of such studies in an Overseas manual which Dunlap had urgently recommended the MCS produce. While he agreed to the importance of the incorporation of the lessons of the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers into the curriculum at the MCS Lejeune, through a memorandum issued by Brigadier General Williams, his assistant at Headquarters, nonetheless dismissed the idea toward the production of a manual on landing operations. Major General Lejeune pointed out to Dunlap:

That the subjects of Overseas Expeditions and Ship-to-shore operations be developed and made an important feature of the tactical course in both the Field and Company Officers’ Schools. The preliminary subjects will be begun as soon as possible. . . . and the question of preparation of an Overseas Manual will be held in abeyance for the present. 83

Dunlap’s call for more time devoted to the study of overseas operations did not confine itself to the senior ranks. Marine Lieutenant Colonel John C. Beaumont, the Director of the Division of Operations and Training at Headquarters, reiterated Dunlap’s suggestion that more time be devoted to the subject of overseas Expeditions, in both the tactical course at the Company and Field Officers’ Schools. Lieutenant Colonel Beaumont recommended in a similar memorandum to Lejeune that, “. . . more time be devoted to the subject of overseas Expeditions in the tactical course and that the staff of the schools start research and study and add to this course the knowledge and experience of the Marine Corps in this subject,” and that an enlarged course of instruction be introduced

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83 Brigadier General Dion Williams, ltr. to Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA., dtd. 16 December 1925, (Washington, D.C., National Archives, Rg 127, A/1 Office, Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No. 18-1520-30-100, Box 116).
on overseas expeditions, as well as the preparation of a manual on the techniques of overseas expeditions.\textsuperscript{84} The response to this call for more hours devoted to studying amphibious and overseas expeditions did, in fact, occur under the leadership of Dunlap, and his successors up through the appointment of Brigadier General Thomas Holcomb in 1932 at the MCS. The push to increase the study of landing operations was nonetheless a slow, tedious process, that awaited a dynamic and committed Major General Commandant to move the process along. This would come with the appointment of both Major General's Ben H. Fuller and John H. Russell in the early to mid-1930's.

For the Army, the results of the exercises clearly pointed to the need for increased manpower at Oahu. In commenting on the results of the maneuvers, General Hines stated that, "7,000 more men were needed to adequately defend Hawaii."\textsuperscript{85} Ironically, General Hines' call for 7,000 more men coincided with a 1915 Army War College report that called for a full division of 23,000 officers and men to defend the facilities and surrounding areas of Oahu, and its outlying islands.\textsuperscript{86} The 1925 exercises clearly demonstrated that the island's defenses were critically short of men and other means of defense necessary to put up a determined resistance against an amphibious assault, and that more had to be done in strengthening the defenses of Oahu, as well as in the forging of better interservice ties with the Navy. As events at the 1925 Maneuvers demonstrated, the strengthening of the garrison and in creating a better joint environment between the two services had only recent been underway, too recent to have an impact on the recently concluded maneuvers.


\textsuperscript{85}Kaufman and Kaufman, \textit{Sleeping Giant}, p. 42.

One last lesson that both the Army and the Marines failed to learn as a result of the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, was the type of defense to counter such an enemy landing once it occurred. While Marines successfully landed along the island's northern shore line, the Army's use of a mobile defense along the southwestern corner near Barber's Point received little or no mention in both Hines' and Dunlap's post exercise critiques. Here, the lessons of the World War once again came to the fore as critics pointed to the need for the Army's adoption of a well-balanced combined arms doctrine. Whereas the Army had adopted a modified form of a combined arms doctrine with the publication of the 1923 Field Service Regulations, it nonetheless failed to seriously understand the implications of such a doctrine insofar as beach and coastal defenses had been concerned. Indeed, as early as 1916, Captain [later General] John McCauley Palmer, wrote in a report to the Joint Army-Navy War College committee in April 1916, that after observing the fighting in France, mobile forces were the key to repelling any landing on Oahu's [or any beachhead]. Palmer, an strong advocate of mobile defenses, argued that:

mobile forces, properly organized into beach and support troops and provided with firepower and transportation, were far more effective in repelling invaders than fixed fortifications. As at Corregidor, Oahu's defenders had the advantage: they would be on known terrain, they had ample time to prepare, and they could use motorized transport to shift troops to key points. These advantages allowed the defenders to "invite" an enemy when he is at his weakest to enter a battlefield deliberately prepared by us. No matter what his numerical preponderance may be, we may hope to have a superiority at the actual place of contact.87

Palmer believed that because of the vastness of Oahu's shore line, approximately 30 miles, it could be successfully defended in depth. He therefore urged that the Army place its emphasis on laying beach obstacles where an enemy force would be channeled into a

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87Linn, Guardians of the Empire, pp. 96-7. also see Odom's After the Trenches, pp. 37-78.
killing zone, which would leave him so battered that by the time his forces could muster sufficient strength to move inland, the mobile forces could be then employed at the "crucial moment" in a counterattack via motorized transport. This was, in fact, the same situation facing the Germans at Normandy in June-July 1944, as well as the Japanese during the American landings in the Marianas in August 1944, and later on Okinawa in April-May 1945 who both employed a static rather than a mobile defense of their beachheads. The fact remains that had both Axis powers employed a mobile instead of a fixed defense, the successes enjoyed by both U.S. and allied forces might have been different with the results being far more disastrous than what actually evolved in Normandy and on Saipan. Instead, the "fixed" nature of the German and Japanese defenses permitted Allied naval and air bombardment to slaughter them in place, as U.S. and allied forces then poured ashore and engaged them in a battle of attrition both adversaries could not win. Historically speaking, mobile forces have always had the upper hand—even in the defense. Indeed, even Prussia's Frederick the Great had advocated a more mobile defense against a superior force, whether it be a land-based or in this case-sea-based one. While the Prussian king did not have to face a massive enemy force attacking with such offensive power as did the German and Japanese during World War II, the lesson remained the same, never surrender the initiative to your enemy even if you're out-numbered. Indeed, the great eighteenth century military master clearly stated that "One of the falsest notions in war is to remain on the defensive and let the enemy act offensively. In the long run it is inevitable that the party which stays on the defensive will lose."[^88] And this is exactly what Army planners had mind. By ignoring Frederick's, and more importantly Captain Palmer's suggestions for mobile as opposed to

fixed defenses at Oahu [and Corregidor in the Philippines], as well those suggestions made by Colonel Dunlap regarding open versus static warfare in his post exercise critique, the Joint Army and Navy board retained its faith in fixed positions, and an overreliance on aviation to defend Oahu and the Philippines against an Orange attack, much to the detriment of the garrisons on Corregidor, Wake Island and Guam in the Western Pacific. As the early months of World War II demonstrated, had the soldiers and Marines on these islands been able to adopt a mobile strategy, the outcome might have been different. Instead, Japanese army and naval forces overwhelmed the beleaguered garrisons despite the heroic though futile efforts the defenders on these islands put forth. In short, the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers made a mockery of both the Joint and General Board's theses that fixed positions could halt an enemy landing in its tracks.

In sum, it can be stated that the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers pointed the Marine Corps in the right direction. While interruptions caused by expeditionary duty to China, and later Nicaragua severely hampered Headquarters efforts at carrying through with the recommendations of the post exercise synopses made by both General Williams and Colonel Dunlap, the lessons learned would later be absorbed at the MCS as Marines returned from these deployments, and applied to its embryonic landing doctrine in the early 1930's. Insofar as joint operations had been concerned, the exercise demonstrated that the Army and Navy could get along and forge an effective joint doctrine, this despite the ongoing debate over coastal defense roles and missions in regard to Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone, as well as in the outlying naval stations of Guam and Midway. This early form of jointures likewise demonstrated that the Marines had a role in such a combined strategy, and that Headquarters needed to pay more attention to this fact, something, unfortunately it didn't do until it was much too late. While the War and Navy Departments codified this joint doctrine with the publication of Joint Expeditions (1927), the fact remained that inter-and inter-service animosities prevented their full
implementation until, in the heat of war, it was effectively too late to make any
difference. In fact, the easy string of Japanese victories in 1941-42, was the direct result
of this inability to cooperate jointly when the services had the perfect opportunity to do
so in the mid-1920's.

The outcome of the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers sent many in the War and Navy
Departments back to the "drawing board," to search for the answers of "why" the
exercises failed. Yet a common mistake made by historians is to point to the failures
while dismissing the successes of this exercise. While it is true that the assault waves
floundered in the surf in the early morning hours, and that the first wave outdistanced the
others, the Navy boats' officers quickly rectified them and successfully landed the
Marines, who, in turn, moved off the beach through a well-prepared defense in record
time. The success of the landing force is all the more impressive when one considers the
fact that they had no carrier air power supporting them on the ground. Furthermore, the
Marines' successful assault on Oahu, demonstrated the fallacy of the island's claim to
impregnability. If anything, the landings pointed to the island's indefensibility, a fact that
caused Army and Navy officials to struggle with during the remainder of the interwar
era. Finally, the successful assault pointed to the fact that an amphibious landing could
succeed if the forces taking place in the assault had proper equipment and training, as
well as a doctrine that outlined in detail the necessary equipment, items or actions that
would insure the success of a landing.
CHAPTER 10

OFFICER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, 1921-1931

Introduction

While the primary focus of the Marine Corps at the conclusion of the World War centered on issues such as manpower and demobilization, forward-looking officers that included Major General's Barnett and Lejeune looked to the war in order to answer these questions of "What is the role of the Marine Corps in the Nation's defense?, "What lessons could the Marines apply from that conflict to their advanced based force mission?" Inevitably, the answers centered on the and development of a professional school system that concentrated on developing its warfighting capabilities of its officers, and noncommissioned officers that would lead Marines into battle in any future war. Both Barnett and Lejeune sought to draw from the war those lessons that could be applied to the Corps' role as an expeditionary force in readiness, and thus men concentrated their efforts in the immediate aftermath of the war toward restructuring the Corps' pre-war education system that had as its ultimate goal the creation of a school system that was both modern, and based on the lessons of the late war. I would argue, that the two most important lessons that had the greatest impact on the future direction of the Marine Corps in the immediate aftermath of the World War were in officer and enlisted education and training; for it was in both of these areas that Barnett, and Lejeune concentrated the bulk of their efforts during the interwar period. While Barnett's last full year as Major General Commandant revolved around demobilization and officer
and enlisted retention (as well as his own position as commandant), his successor, Major General Lejeune, who had been influenced by the Army School system as both a student and division commander, had nearly eight years as Commandant to initiate a series of educational reforms designed not only to prepare his officers and enlisted men for modern warfare, but also to link these reforms with his overall goal of efficiency and preparedness despite the budget cuts and manpower shortages during the interwar era.

"From Advanced Base School to the Marine Corps Schools, 1919-25"

Even before he became head of the Marine Corps in June 1920, Major General Lejeune realized that it was only through education that the corps could survive and grow as a military institution. Prior to his becoming the Major General Commandant in 1920, Lejeune attended the Army War College (1909-10), then located in Washington, D.C. Attendance at the Army War College, in fact, shaped Lejeune's views on professional military education. Lejeune believed that the quick and accurate thinking ingrained at the Army War College, and other institutions of military learning "produced the ability to formulate sound decisions expeditiously" in both an automatic and instinctive manner. Lejeune believed that it was only through professional military education that, "one acquires the technique and most important of all, sound military judgment without practicing the military art in campaigns and battles, with their accompanying hardship, suffering, danger and death."¹ Thus, with his experience and exposure to the methods and practices of the Army War College, as well as with his service in the World War, Lejeune, once he became the Major General Commandant, set out to organize and implement a comprehensive three-tiered system of professional military education in the Marine Corps that not only contributed to the professionalization of its officer corps, but also to the writing and adoption of a

¹Lejeune, Reminiscences, p. 187.
warfighting doctrine (amphibious operations) that permanently established the Marines
on a solid footing with the Army's, and Navy's professional education system.

Officer Education, 1919-1925

The Marine Corps had begun to modernize its officer education as early as 1891,
when the School of Application opened its doors (largely through the efforts of Brigadier
General Charles Heywood). This process continued with the establishment of the
Advanced Base School at New London, Connecticut in July 1910.\(^2\) The Corps' participation in the World War demanded an improved education and training system
that reflected the changing (and mechanized) nature of modern war. Furthermore,
Lejeune's emphasis on military education had an even greater impact on the promotion
of efficiency, and remained a large part of his effort at securing promotion by selection
and ridding the corps once and for all of promotion by seniority. Both Barnett and
Lejeune were in agreement that only when the Corps shook itself of its antiquated
promotion system could Marine officers accept a new mission dedicated to the role of an
expeditionary advanced base force.\(^3\)

The modernization of the curriculum and the methodology of instruction at Marine Corps Schools began as early as 1910 with the establishment of the Advanced Base
School at New London, Connecticut. The mission of the Advanced Base School had been outlined by Major General George F. Elliott, the Corps' tenth Commandant:

The establishment of a school for the purpose of instructing and training Marine officers along certain well-defined lines of work, pertaining to the attack and

\(^2\)The Advanced Base School later moved to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Parris Island, SC., Norfolk, VA., and finally to Quantico in April 1917. See Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 36.

defense of advanced bases, presupposes a good working knowledge of the
elementary professional subjects and is in the nature of a post-graduate course.

In order to obtain the best results, the instruction in such a course must be both
theoretical and practical, systematic and progressive. The military subjects covered
in the defense of a base are many; and, while theoretical instruction in these subjects
is essential, the training or practical work is none the less important. The subjects
are so varied and their scope so comprehensive that it is considered a year should,
if possible, be devoted to the course.

In general terms, the defense of an advanced base may be divided into:

4) General Governing Considerations.4

Insofar as the Advanced Base Force had been concerned, Major General Elliott
outlined that the Gun Defense instruction should consist of naval ordnance; gunnery;
explosives and projectiles; fortifications, as relating to the defense of the guns; and
communications. In regards to the second half of the Advanced Base Force, know as the
Mobile Defense Force, the Major General Commandant specified that the field of study
was to encompass "construction of more or less permanent field fortifications, obstacles,
and demolitions, map reading, and field artillery." Nowhere, however, did he make any
provision for the study of infantry tactics per say, though he implied that "when studying
field artillery, consideration would be given to ‘the development of this arm in
connection with infantry and for both direct and indirect fire’."5(Emphasis Mine) While
it can easily be misconstrued that Elliott had implied the study of combined arms by his
emphasis on both infantry and artillery, the Major General Commandant did not imply
the study of the employment of both infantry and artillery jointly. That would have to
wait until the World War, and even then there existed only the "seeds" of the Marine
combined arms team—infantry and artillery. Indeed, prior to the U.S. involvement in the

4Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 13.
5Ibid.
World War, a generation of Marine officers had been introduced to infantry tactics and the use of artillery at the both Advanced Base School and the Army Service Schools through Major P. S. Bond's *Technique of Modern Tactics*, which had by the eve of the World War become the officer's primer on tactics. Indeed, during the fighting in Belleau Wood (5-26 June 1918), General Lejeune remarked that what made the capture of the wood possible was the crucial role played by artillery in support of the assaulting Marines. Lejeune added that specifically in Belleau Wood, "Again, was decisively shown the great importance of artillery to infantry. Infantry alone without material, makes little or no progress. If the enemy combines personnel and material, we must do the same or lose the game." Where Marines diverted from the purely ground tactics of the Army was in the study of mine warfare and defense, as well as torpedoes and beach obstacles crucial subjects for a force tied directly to the Navy.

Besides the impact of firepower on Marine Corps tactics during the World War, the necessity of proper staff planning, and its importance on operations had been driven home time and again to Lejeune and his fellow Marine officers in France. During the World War, six Marine officers detached from front-line service in order to attend the Army's General Staff College located at Langres, France. Here, the officers underwent a grueling and intensive three-month course, "covering staff organization, and administration, the Army's system of supply, and the combined employment of all arms and services in combat." Marine Major Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, who led

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6 For a discussion of the tactics employed by the Marines during the World War see Maj. Robert W. Lamont, USMC's *Over There: Key Battles of the 2nd Infantry Division*, *Marine Corps Gazette*, 77 (June 1993), pp. 75-83.
Marines across the Central Pacific during World War II, and would be the first commanding general of all Marine forces in the Pacific, was one of the six Marine officers to attend this school, and the only one to graduate and, "as a result of his ability, previous training and instruction at that school," later served on the staff of the Army of Occupation in Germany.9

What the Marine Corps lost in service autonomy during the World War, it gained in the experience received in staff and administrative training, something that greatly assisted it the 1930's when Marine officers sat down to write the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934 at the MCS. While Marines learned the "army ways" in staff work and the employment of arms, it later grafted its knowledge of mine warfare and beach defense onto the ongoing advanced base studies at the MCS. In fact, as a result of its participation in the World War, the Marine Corps' staff development that took place in the aftermath of the war was directly "...based on the staff of World War I."

The influence of the World War on Marine officer education and training cannot be overstated. Indeed, given the limited nature of training of the thousands of second lieutenants entering the Corps after the declaration of war in April 1917, there is little wonder why Headquarters opted to revamp its antiquated school system at Quantico at the conclusion of the war. Lieutenant General Edward B. Craig recalled that prior to his arrival at Quantico, his training had been limited to that gained at St. John's College's Reserve Officer Training Program. Some officers, though not many, had received prior instruction in infantry drill and marksmanship before having been commissioned Marine second lieutenants, though not many. General Graves B. Erskine, whose career spanned three wars (World Wars I and II, and Korea), as well as involvement in numerous guerrilla wars from Nicaragua to Vietnam, had spent a year prior to entering the Marine

9Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 23.
Corps in 1917 with the Louisiana National Guard. General Erskine was, in fact, very critical of Marine officer training during those first few months of the corps' preparations for service overseas. In one instance Erskine, while undergoing training at Quantico as a newly-commissioned second lieutenant, pointedly told his commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. Rixey, that he was "wasting his time . . .," and that, " . . . I haven't learned a damned thing since I've been here [at Quantico] . . .". After this incident, Erskine vowed that he would never attend another Marine Corps school (though he later served on the staff of MCS as a tactics instructor twice in his long career for extended periods of time during the interwar era). The career Marine instead "sought Army schools which he considered to be more professionally run . . . and . . . pretty damn thorough in their instruction."

The emphasis on schooling and the complexities of modern war likewise affected the training of enlisted Marines. Prior to shipping out for France Sergeant William A. Bihary, a veteran Marine who had served in Haiti and Santo Domingo and assigned to the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion had been sent to a special course in Utica, New York, established by Headquarters to train Marine machine gunners in the tactical employment of the Lewis Gun, and in the setting up of range cards. Already a seasoned machine gun operator in Haiti and Santo Domingo, Sergeant Bihary fought as a member of the

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11 Hollingshead, "The Big E,"

12 Oral Interview of Sergeant William A. Bihary, April 1981. V.A. Hospital, Bay Pines, FLA., Tape 2, Side 1; Also see Leo I. Daugherty III, "And They Thought We Wouldn't Fight: Three Marines Recall Their Service in the War to End All Wars," Leatherneck, 81 (June 1998), pp. 31-7. Hereafter cited as Daugherty, "And They Thought We Wouldn't Fight."
Fourth Marine Brigade, U.S. 2nd Division in all of the major engagements during the World War, particularly at Belleau Wood in June 1918, and at Blanc Mont in October 1918, where his machine gun skills paid off to the benefit of his fellow Marines and doughboys. As in the cases of the Marines mentioned above, as well as with the vast majority of Marine officers [and enlisted men] that served in the World War\textsuperscript{13}, who received instruction to modern infantry drill, marksmanship, small arms, light and heavy weapons, as well as in tactics and field engineering techniques through the schools set up by the Overseas Department during the World War, it is hardly surprising that Headquarters did not abandon them in favor of a return to the more traditional (and one might add limited) forms of prewar training which had confined itself to close order drill, marksmanship, and interior and exterior guard duties.\textsuperscript{14} Major General's Barnett's and later Lejeune's desire to re-orient the Marine Corps toward an advanced base expeditionary force called for a force trained in the employment of combined arms, and retention of the school system that came about as a result of its participation in the World War, caused one Marine commentator of the period to write that the:

War time enthusiasm enabled such schools to accomplish a great deal in a relatively short time. The lessons learned in these brief courses of instruct-

\textsuperscript{13}"Light" Weapons found at the company level included automatic rifles, light machine guns, and light mortars. Those weapons labeled "heavy" could be found at the battalion and division levels. These included heavy machine guns, Stokes or Trench mortars, and flame-throwers. See United States Army in the World War 1917-1919: Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces. Volume 1 (Washington, DC, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 74-5, 80-1, 109, 123, and 339-49.

\textsuperscript{14}In only some instances during the World War did Marine receive their traditional training at Navy Yards. Corporal James Draucker trained at the Brooklyn and Washington, DC, navy yards and in Central Park prior to embarking for France in late 1918. Corporal James H. Draucker, "'Telling it Like it Was' James H. Draucker, WW 1 Marine, AEF France," Unpublished Manuscript, 1983. in possession of the Author, pp. 1-3.
ion not only at Quantico but in France were of course carried over and became part of the stock of knowledge of technique of infantry weapons which become a basic part of our educational system as it was reorganized after the war.15

The school system set up to meet the emergency of the World War was thus retained by the Marine Corps, and became in time the basis for the creation of what became known by generations of Marine officers first as the Marine Infantry Officers' School and later as The Basic School or TBS.16

The Postwar Period 1919-1925

In the rush to demobilize at the conclusion of the World War the Marine Corps left intact the system of schools used to train its newly-commissioned second lieutenants, and its company and field grade officers. As has been mentioned in Chapter Two, at the conclusion of the World War, General Barnett sought the reorganization of the old Advanced Base Force in order to form the nucleus of a vastly improved expeditionary force patterned after the corps' successful performance in the World War. Part of the process of reorganizing the old Advanced Base Force into a modern expeditionary force, centered on the education of its company and field grade officers.

Originally based at Parris Island, South Carolina, and Norfolk, Virginia, before the World War, the training camp established at Quantico to train newly-commissioned Marine officers during the onset of the US's involvement in the war had been in operation for only seven months before the cessation of hostilities in November 1918. In fact, by the time of the armistice on 11 November 1918, only 391 newly-commissioned second lieutenants had been readied for combat assignments to units embarking for

16Anthony Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA., December 1945," Found at Washington DC History and Museums Division, Personal Papers Collection, Posts and Barracks, Box 6, p. 29. Hereafter cited as Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools."
France with the Fifth Marine Brigade. Nonetheless, the lessons of the fighting in the trenches, and on the battlefields of France convinced Marine officers such as Barnett, Lejeune, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, and Colonel Robert H. Dunlap that war had indeed changed, and that the Marine Corps, whether it liked it or not, would have to alter not only the way in which it trained and educated its officers [and enlisted men].

There were a few officers, Brigadier General L.W. T. Waller and Colonel Smedley D. Butler among them, who still clung to the image of the Marine Corps as a colonial infantry force. These officers steadfastly refused to accept the fact that warfare had changed, and that the way future wars would be fought was incompatible with what they had been accustomed to throughout their careers. Based on their views of warfare, it is not surprising that many of these same officers objected to the introduction of newer methods in the education of Marine officers. This, more than anything else, led to the eventual rejection of the introduction of promotion by selection in the Marine Corps during Lejeune's tenure as Commandant. These "old timers" justifiably felt that their promotions had been earned in the field while officers such as Major General Barnett and others sat behind a desk with the noticeable absence of combat duty noted in their record books. Butler's and Waller's criticisms aimed toward Barnett's lack of "powder burns" on his uniform merely revealed the petty personal jealousies and obstacles that prevented the Corps from growing as a military institution in the first two decades of the 20th century. Indeed, Brigadier General Butler's charge is unfair given the fact that these

17The second camp that began on 20 August 1918, and ended 16 December 1918 with 432 officers entering the ranks of the Marine Corps. A last camp [of which legendary Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller was a member] started its training in the winter of 1919 and graduated its last compliment of 235 officers in July 1919 all of whom HQMC either released or placed in the inactive Marine Corps Reserve. See McClellan, *U.S. Marines in the World War*, pp. 22-3; Burke Davis, *Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller*. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1962), pp. 23-4.
same "swivel chair officers" had just as much time on expeditionary duty as he himself had. For his part, Brigadier General Waller's comments reflected the bitterness that lingered toward Barnett, after the latter had eased him out of the running for the Commandancy in 1914, as well as the resentment of having not been selected to go to France in 1917 with the first contingent of Marines. Waller's past record along with his contempt for staff officers was equaled only by Butler's desire to be Commandant and his belief that the Marine Corps should remain as an expeditionary force and not tie its future to that of the Navy as both Barnett and Lejeune had advocated time and again in testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee in the immediate aftermath of the World War. Both Waller and Butler's opposition to the Marine Corps becoming an adjunct to the Navy, in fact, illustrates the depth of opposition that existed inside the Corps to both Barnett's and Lejeune's ideas of modernization and mission realignment. Separate of the Waller-Butler expeditionary faction though closer to it than the Barnett-Lejeune faction, was the group that believed that because of the Marine participation in the World War, the corps "flourished in direct relation to its distance from the Navy."\(^{19}\)

In fact, after the World War, it became the task of first Barnett, and later Lejeune, to not only reconcile the factions that had emerged in the Corps as a result of not only participation in the World War and the ongoing interventions in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but to forge ahead and create an up-dated version of the Advanced Base Force. Their second task became the inculcation among the younger (as well as the older) officers that the Marine Corps' future lay with that of the Navy, and not as an independent service saddled with an antiquated mission. To accomplish this objective, both Barnett and Lejeune had to create the climate that would permit the Marine Corps to embrace the new ways of war without giving up its traditional duties.

\(^{19}\)Bartlett, *Lejeune*, p. 129.
Furthermore, in defense of Major General Barnett, the fact that he lacked the combat experience possessed by both Waller and Butler, did not make him any less an effective leader of the Corps when it appeared that what the Corps needed was a fighter and not a "swivel-chair warrior" as Congressman Thomas Butler called the Twelfth Commandant.\textsuperscript{20} In fact, the World War revealed that modern war demanded both administrators and fighters, both skilled in their respective tasks with one not being better than the other. This had been revealed in a similar struggle between Major General Peyton C. March, Army Chief of Staff, and General John J. Pershing, whereby the former understood the logistical and administrative needs of the AEF while the latter understood the operational and tactical needs of his forces. The same can be said of Barnett and Butler. Whereas Barnett knew the "ins and outs" of Washington politics, Butler had more of a grasp of motivating Marines to fight and of combat itself. Unfortunately Barnett's professional bearing rubbed against Butler's extensive field experience that in the end led to the former's dismissal, and the latter's unfulfilled goal to become Commandant and his forced retirement. Both of these affairs one might add, left a bitter aftertaste in the Marine Corps for years to come, insofar as the adoption of the landing mission had been concerned. For all of Butler's and Waller's criticisms toward Barnett's lack of field time, a brief reading of Barnett's hastily written and unorganized memoirs point to the fact that the former commandant understood the complexities of modern war more so, in fact, than his troublesome subordinate. Barnett's Commandancy nonetheless laid the groundwork for Lejeune's further modernization of the Marine Corps during the 1920's. Not only did the Marine Corps fight in the war as a "co-equal" of the Army during the World War, but that it emerged from the conflict introduced to the concept of combined arms and even more important, the requirements for a

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
supporting infrastructure of logistics and transportation as well as in the theory and nature of war itself. In order to continue the process of modernization begun in the early 1890's by Brigadier General Heywood, and continued by his successors, General Barnett not only retained the infrastructure of the schools established during the World War, but expanded upon them in terms of both the physical plant, as well as the curriculum being taught in those schools in order to meet the country's need in time of war. The first objective of this goal was the establishment of the Marine Corps' version of the Army's newly-established school at Fort Benning, Georgia, in order to train its newly commissioned officers in such fundamental subjects as infantry drill and other field related duties.

"A New Marine Officer's Training Course"

Major General Barnett's first objective in the reorganization of Marine officer training began in March 1919, with the opening of the Marine Officers' Training School, headed by Major Jesse L. Dyer, and located at the Marine Barracks, Quantico. With a complement of twenty-nine students and a staff of six instructors, and a student body that consisted both of newly-commissioned second lieutenants, and combat veterans from the World War and Hispaniola, the students settled down to an intensive twenty-two weeks of instruction that consisted of not only advanced base subjects but musketry, tactics, and topography, as well as lessons learned from the recently concluded World War. (Table 10.1)
- Infantry Drill Regulations
- Physical Training
- Manual of Interior Guard Duty
- Signals.
- Infantry Weapons
- Equitation
- Administration
- Engineering
- Topography
- Law
- First aid and Hygiene
- Tactics
- Musketry

Table 10.1
Curriculum at the Marine Officers Training School
1919-1922

Marine officers also spent additional time in the field undergoing field training in the practical application of what they had been taught in the classrooms. While the main thrust of the school remained to train Fleet Marine officers in their duties and responsibilities aboard ships as well as ashore, the curriculum "understandably, emphasized infantry in land operations, and was strongly influenced by the teachings and methods of the Army."21 Furthermore, "attempts were made to introduce in the course of tactics some of the far-reaching changes in that branch of military learning which had resulted from the World War."22 Nonetheless, demobilization and the Corps' reorganization along the newly-established tables of organization reduced this first class (which had grown to include thirty-seven additional officers) to 31 by the end of the year.23

The last change to take place in the MCS system before Barnett's forced resignation was the creation of a Marine Infantry Officer's School, established on 12 January 1920. While the emphasis at the Marine Officers' Training School had been centered around the

23 Ibid; Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," p. 27.
overall preparation of a newly-commissioned Marine officer, the Marine Infantry Officers' School which consisted of 17 Majors and Captains as its students, focused its attention on developing infantry combat leaders, and thus geared its curriculum toward meeting that goal. Headed by Major Philip Torrey, the school had several officers enrolled who would be instrumental in preparing the Marines for its amphibious epic in the Central and Southwest Pacific. They included Major Ralph D. Keyser and Captain Charles D. Barrett, both of whom would be instrumental in preparing Marines to fight during World War II. The curriculum of the Marine Infantry Officers' School reflected the increased emphasis on purely infantry tactics and operations. In short, the school was meant to duplicate the work being done at the Army's School of Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia, and provide those Marine officers who could not attend the Army Infantry School with a similar education. Headquarters broke the Marine Infantry Officer's School down into three separate departments that included Tactics, Military Topography and Field Engineering, and Military Engineering. As a memorandum from Headquarters indicated, the officers who graduated from this school were to "undertake further military education in the Army Schools at Ft's Leavenworth and Bennings (sic), and the Naval War College, and Army General Staff College."\textsuperscript{24} The methodology used in the classroom was the newly-adapted conference system, supplemented by lectures, tactical problems and field problems. The Marines used both the current \textit{Field Service Regulations} (Army and Marine) as well as P.S. Bonds' \textit{Technique of Modern Tactics} (Third Edition), a text that had been in continuous use in both Army and Marine Schools since 1916.

The Marine Infantry Officers' School as mentioned above, had been broken down into three separate departments with emphasis being placed most on weapons training

and employment as well as combined arms and military topography. The overall scheme of organization closely resembled that of Ft. Benning. (Table 10.2)

**Department of Tactics** - Major Ralph S. Keyser

**Subjects:**
- Military Organization
- Tactics and Techniques of Various Arms
  (a) Infantry
  (b) Cavalry
  (c) Field Artillery
  (d) Machine Guns
  (e) Signal Troops
  (f) Engineers
  (g) Sanitary Troops
  (h) Chemical Warfare
- Plans and Orders
- Solutions of Problems
- Intelligence and Intercommunication
- Tactical Principles and Decisions
- Miscellaneous Lecture

**Department of Military Topography and Field Engineering** - Captain Charles D. Barrett

- Military Topography
  (a) Map Reading
  (b) Military Surveying
  (c) Military Sketching
  (d) Harbor Survey
  (e) Landscape Sketching

**Military Field Engineering** - Captain Charles D. Barrett

- Organization of the Ground
- Miscellaneous\(^25\)

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\(^{25}\) Ibid. pp. 114-5.
The Marine Infantry Officer's School ran concurrently for twenty weeks. In the first class, only eight of the original seventeen student officers completed the required course of study on 30 June 1920, with the remainder either having dropped out due to poor academic standing or reassignment.26 Headquarters, however, still not satisfied with the type of training that Marine officers required for service in the field, proposed to open an Infantry Weapons School co-located with the Infantry Officers School designed to:

... give officers the necessary training and instruction to make them competent instructors in target practice with the rifle, automatic rifle and pistol, and the use of the bayonet, and musketry. And to give them the knowledge necessary for all infantry officers of the functioning and tactical use of the machine gun, hand and rifle grenades, one pounder gun, and trench mortars.27

The staff of this Infantry Weapons School was to consist of approximately 60 officers and a like number of noncommissioned officers. In spite of the apparent redundancy of such a school with that of the Marine Infantry Officer's School, Headquarters, nonetheless believed that such instruction was both necessary and important in the development of Marine combat leader. Nevertheless, at times it did appear that both schools were in competition with each other for students and resources. Furthermore, while the Infantry Weapons School's emphasis was on a more technical and specialized level, the Marine Officers School's emphasis remained focused on the more theoretical and operationally-oriented aspects of warfare. The argument over the types of schools needed to train Marine infantry officers became mute, however, since in the long run the idea of a Infantry Weapons School had to be shelved due to both manpower and budgetary constraints, though the idea persisted when both the

Infantry Officers’ School and later the Company Officers’ Course added courses on company and platoon weapons.

As a result of this redundancy with the Infantry Weapons School and the dual Marine Officers’ courses at Quantico, problems soon arose over the administration of these three schools during the first academic year that these schools were in operation. The main problem encountered occurred in the administration of two separate schools charged with essentially the same mission, and co-located with one another. In order to better manage both schools more effectively Headquarters, in the summer of 1920, consolidated both schools into one, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel John C. Beaumont as commanding officer, Marine Officers' School. This likewise proved, however, to be a temporary solution as the Marine Corps "was still groping for a satisfactory school system."28 A firm proponent of officer education, Colonel Beaumont quickly mapped out "two courses" a field officers' course and a company officers' course." In time these two schools became the backbone of the Marine Corps professional military education system for officer development, as well becoming in the 1930's the testbed for the new amphibious war doctrine. Despite the fact that Major General Barnett had been relieved of the Major General Commandancy of the Marine Corps by the time the full impact of this "revolution" in Marine officer education had taken place, the fact remained that Barnett did not prove to be an obstacle to reform, and inevitably raised the question on whether or not he would’ve been a firm advocate of a more stringent program of professional education for all Marine officers, including the old campaigners themselves. With speculation set aside, the problems of demobilization and appropriations most evident during his last eighteen months at the helm of the Marine Corps pointed toward the simple fact that Barnett would not have been able to devote the time or attention that

28Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," p. 28.
his successor—Major General Lejeune, did to officer and enlisted education, as well as vocational training. To his credit, however, Barnett laid the foundation for the Marine Corps School system with its emphasis on the lessons learned during the World War, and its impact on the curriculum at the Marine Officers School which in turn contributed to a reorientation of the corps' Marine Officers' Training and Infantry Officers' Schools, and pointed it toward the direction that Barnett may have intended had he not been relieved in June 1920. For all of his personal and professional faults, General Barnett, like his successor—General Lejeune, desired to move the Marine officer corps forward instead of allowing it to regress to its pre-war emphasis on the limited duties of Marine officers. With their emphasis on officer and enlisted education during their tours as Commandant, both Barnett and Lejeune admitted that a different, and more modern Marine officer corps had emerged from the World War. Thus, with this in mind, and armed with the desire to inculcate the lessons of the late conflict into the training and curriculum at the MCS, both Generals Barnett and Lejeune strove to prevent a regression toward a largely unproductive, unprofessional past. Participation in the World War pointed the Marine Corps toward the future, and inevitably left its legacy on the MCS's curriculum, and its evolving officer and enlisted training programs. Furthermore, this inculcation of the lessons learned during the World War greatly impacted the way it fought wars. This impact can be seen directly by the Marine Corps's emphasis on linear tactics, a common characteristic of amphibious assault techniques. Thanks largely to the initial efforts of Major General Barnett, the Marine Corps retained these lessons, and expanded upon them under General Lejeune. In fact, unlike the charges leveled against the U.S. Army's failure to develop "a viable doctrine" during the interwar era, the Marine Corps successfully applied its World War experience with that of the emerging landing
operations doctrine during the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, and essentially carved out an entirely new mission, aligned and in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. 29

**The Lejeune Years, 1920-1929**

Upon taking the helm at Headquarters in June 1920, General Lejeune, a strong proponent of improving both officer and enlisted education and training, sought to continue and expand upon his predecessor’s reorganization of the MCS system. In fact, Lejeune’s emphasis on education was part of his wider goal to create a more professionally-guided officer corps and efficient fighting force, a fact noted in his annual report for 1920:

The military education of its officers is essential to the efficiency of a military organization. The acceptance of this dictum caused the establishment of the Marine Officers’ Schools at Quantico, and the school for newly appointed Second Lieutenants at the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia. The Quantico schools embraced both the Field Officers’ School and Company Officers’ School. Each officer was informed that he would be required to take the course appropriate to his rank and length of service, or else to take an equivalent course at the school of an Army branch. In addition, selected officers were detailed annually to the Army and Navy War Colleges, the Army School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth, and to the Army technical schools. 30

Alongside the goal of materially improving the education of its officers was Headquarters increased emphasis on the training and education of its senior and junior noncommissioned officers, as well as its junior enlisted force in not only technical matters but in the profession of arms at the newly-created Sergeants’ Schools at Quantico, and at the various Marine barracks and posts. From the start of his term as Commandant in June 1920, General Lejeune, with the help and encouragement of his patron and friend, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, set out to create a systematic,

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progressive three-tiered education system for the officers and veteran noncommissioned officers in the Marine Corps. Both the Sergeants' School at Quantico and technical schools offered by the Army and Navy, as well as the MCI sought to create a professionally-based officer and enlisted force well-schooled not only in their various military occupational fields, but also in the theories and employment of combined arms during the interwar era.

Lejeune's assumption of the top post in the Marine Corps facilitated this drive toward both a better educated officer and enlisted force, even as the budget cutting by Congress, and demobilization from the World War began to take hold on the corps' readiness. Realizing that he would have to do more with less, the Major General Commandant sought to build up where his predecessor, Major General Barnett had started, with a reorganization and formalization of the steps necessary for Marine officers to progress in their profession of arms. Lejeune's other motive in stressing education was to reform the process of officer promotion and selection.

Even before Lejeune became Commandant, he had already given a preview of what his priorities would be in testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee on 26 February 1920, when he emphasized the importance of establishing a school dedicated to officer education:

We have had to look out for the officers as well as the men . . . a great many of us have had the desire for a long time to see a school established where the officers will learn their duties as captains and field officers. Our officers have to be self-educated. Few of us have had the opportunity of going to Fort Leavenworth or the Army War College or the Navy War College, and the average officers have had no opportunity to learn anything in regard to their higher duties except by studying themselves or what they have learned from practical experience. It is our aim for all of our officers to have as good opportunities to obtain a military education as the officers of the Navy or Army. Education is absolutely essential; an educated
officer makes for educated men and an ignorant officer makes for ignorant men.\textsuperscript{31}

In defense of Major General Barnett, however, many of the actual reorganizational aspects of both officer and enlisted education took place under his Commandancy whereas the shift in the focus of the MCS, and the subsequent curriculum reforms there took place during Lejeune's tenure as CMC. The point is clear, however, that both Barnett and Lejeune recognized the importance and need for reform in the preparation of a Marine officer. Even still, however, is the fact that the idea of Marine officer education, and its association with the corps' roles and mission existed prior to the United States' entrance into the World War, and was not a result of that latter conflict. Colonel Ben H. Fuller, a future Marine Commandant (1930-1934), and the one responsible for the order transforming the old expeditionary force into the Fleet Marine Force in December 1933, had put forward the idea in an article in the December 1916 Marine Corps Gazette of the establishment of a Marine Corps War College.\textsuperscript{32} Major E. W. Sturdevant, the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette in 1919, reiterated Fuller's call for a Marine Corps University, when he wrote in the September 1919 Gazette that, "the Marine Corps system of education should be like a university, which provides a certain number of electives," and that "such education is necessary for the Marine Corps goes without saying, as well as the fact that we cannot rely upon the Army or Navy to give it to us, but must provide it for ourselves." Put another way, the Marine Corps, because of its mission required it to have a method of educating its officers in both land and sea warfare, due largely to the fact that:


\textsuperscript{32}Ibid, pp. 5-6; Major E. W. Sturdevant, "A System of Instruction for Officers of the Marine Corps," \textit{Marine Corps Gazette,} 4 (September 1919), pp. 232-8
The Marine Corps is now called upon to furnish officers equipped for a far wider range of duties than ever before. The Military art in general has also expanded, new forms have appeared, the old familiar branches we have studied for many years have been greatly enlarged and they all need much more thorough study to acquire proficiency.⁴³

Building upon Major Sturdevant's theme was then-Lieutenant Colonel John H. Russell, who emphasized the point that coupled with the need for a mission for the Marine Corps was the requirement to model its education system based on that of the Naval War College since, "It is there that we obtain our conception of war." Colonel Russell added that, "It then becomes the duty of the Marine Corps to establish an educational system and such educational institutions that will enable it to perfect the work as outlined by the Naval War College."⁴⁴

Major Sturdevant's emphasis on officer education, however, was more to the point and within line of what Major General Lejeune had in mind: the entry-level training of its junior officers as well as the up-to-date instruction for its more experienced officers. In his assessment of where the problems in Marine officer education existed, Major Sturdevant outlined three distinct areas where this reorganization of the Marine Corps' school system was to take place:

(a) Completion of the professional training needed for those junior officers who entered the Marine Corps during the war.
(b) Training of the future officers of the Marine Corps.
(c) Provision of opportunities for up-to-date instruction for those older officers mentioned above, who have not had the advantages of

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⁴³Bittner, Curriculum Evolution, p. 6.
modern training camps or active service during the war.\textsuperscript{35}

Major Sturdevant emphasized that while a Marine officer is called upon to serve in a variety of duties and billets, and is required to possess a basic knowledge in all fields, he "should have at least one specialty, preferably two or three." The Marine Corps would base these specialties on three factors: (1) The needs of the Marine Corps; (2) The qualification of the officer; (3) The officer's own wishes. Sturdevant emphasized that because the "main work of the Marine Corps is that of infantry . . . it therefore follows that infantry subjects will take up the largest part of the required course"\textsuperscript{36} He then outlined what essentially became the curriculum at the Marine Infantry Officer's School. Reflecting the lessons learned during the World War, the subjects outlined by the major nonetheless retained some of the curriculum found at the pre-war School of Application, with the emphasis placed on land warfare. Major Sturdevant likewise called for an "Officer's Training Camp," whereby officers already commissioned would attend and refine their knowledge in such fields as "drill regulations, guard duty, bayonet, minor tactics, bombing, field engineering, topography, law, administration and small arms firing regulations."\textsuperscript{37} The last set of courses established would be the specialist schools that included artillery, aviation, as well as a Sea School, whereby all Marine officers would be required to attend regardless of their field of expertise. This would have the effect of creating a "well-rounded" officer.

Keeping in line with Russell's emphasis on maintaining a link with the war and force planning taking place at the Naval War College, Sturdevant likewise urged that, "The whole Marine Corps education system should be coordinated and placed under the direct supervision of the Planning Section of Headquarters. The supervising authority

\textsuperscript{35}Sturdevant, "\textit{Instruction for Officers . . . .}," p. 232.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.
would, subject, of course, to the approval of the Major General Commandant, assign officers as instructors and students to the schools. "38

Despite the retention of courses that included Navy signals and other advanced base related subjects as well as the inclusion of the Sea School, the model the Marine Corps selected to train its officers was, in fact, from the Army's Infantry School of Arms located at Camp (later Fort) Benning. This system included a Basic Course, a Company Officers' Course, and a Field Officers Course, broken down into three departments arranged by subject category that included: General Subjects, Technical Subjects, and Tactical (Infantry) Subjects. As established by the Army The Basic Course encompassed 410 hours of General Subjects that ranged from administration to psychology; 407 hours of Technical Subjects that ranged from Rifle and pistol marksmanship to platoon and company weapons (mortars, machine guns, grenades, etc.); to Technical Musketry (trajectory, communications, estimation of range, etc). Attending The Basic Course would be the newly-commissioned second lieutenants whom the Army required to complete the course of study at Camp Benning prior to their assignment with a regiment.39

The Company Officers' Course intended to lay the groundwork for "such technical, mechanical and tactical instruction for officers of company grade as will enable them to perform capably the duties in training, command, or staff, that may fall to them in peace or war." Here, six departments are provided that included Tactics (325 hours); Engineering (125 hours); Rifle and Pistol (160 hours); Miscellaneous Weapons (166 hours); General Subjects (45 hours); and Machine Guns (113 hours). Here, the training focused solely on infantry combat with a limited amount of time devoted to

administration, field hygiene, camp sanitation, and psychology. It was in this course that the Marine Corps found an answer to its requirements for training its junior infantry officers. Yet even Major General Lejeune noted in his annual report for 1920 that while:

The course to be pursued is being prepared to follow similar lines to the one in the Army School of the Line at Leavenworth, and is based somewhat on the course given in the Marine Officers' Infantry School for 1920. This course is not as extensive nor as advanced as that of Leavenworth, but it is exceedingly well adapted to meet the needs of the field officers of the Marine Corps, and for the purpose for which the school was organized.

Headquarters restricted enrollment in the Company Officers' Course only to those Marine officers commissioned in the Marine Corps since February 1917. The reasoning behind this was the fact that many of those officers commissioned before February 1917, already had the benefits of the School of Application, as well as field duty. Furthermore, Headquarters felt that by providing a course for the seniors first and then concern itself with those of its junior officer corps, it would defeat its plans for modernization of its officer advancement system. Despite Lejeune's desire to retain some aspects of purely Marine and naval subjects in the curriculum such as naval law and naval ordnance the Marine Corps copied the Army's Field Officers' Course materials almost verbatim. In fact, Colonel Robert Dunlap remarked after the 1924-1925 academic year, that it was quite apparent to all that the influence of the Army School system [and materials] remained strong:

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42Frances, "*History of Marine Corps Schools,*" p. 28.
Courses of instruction during this school year was largely founded on the courses prescribed in Army schools and the text books in tactics were largely books, pamphlets, and mimeographed sheets prepared by the Infantry School, Fort Benning, and the Command/General Staff School, Leavenworth.\(^{43}\)

As originally planned, the Field Officers Course which met for the first time on 1 October 1920, and designed for senior captains to lieutenant colonels, was a "first" for the Marine Corps. While the original concept of the Field Officers' Course was to instill the lessons learned from the World War, many of the officers selected to attend this course, veterans of the many wars and expeditions prior to the World War, chafed at the idea that junior officers would instruct them "on how to fight." In time, however, these same veterans became the most ardent supporters of the Marine Corps' officers' schools, a factor that made the integration of the Marine Corps' education system all the much easier.\(^{44}\)

The Company Officers' Course which had been intended as a refresher course for first lieutenants and captains had been delayed in opening its doors due to the problems headquarters experienced in the granting of regular commissions as a result of the findings of both the Russell Board (1919), and later the Neville Board (1920), as well as to "the shortage of first lieutenants and captains" when those offered commissioned either opted to resign or remain in their reverted enlisted ranks. As Major General Lejeune wrote in his annual report for 1920:

\(^{43}\) As quoted in Bittner, *Curriculum Evolution*, pp. 8-9.
\(^{44}\) Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," p. 28; Metcalf, "Education of Marine Corps Officers," p. 50
The company officers' course will not commence until after the Selection Board (now in session) has completed its work, probably not before January 1, 1921. The course to be pursued is now under preparation and will, with a few additions, be similar to the one pursued in the Marine Officers' Training School for 1920.\footnote{Lejeune, *Annual Report for 1920*, p. 1072.}

In either case, Headquarters remedied the situation only when it by-passed the usual procedure of promotion by examination when it promoted a whole class of 29 officers and assembled them at Quantico for a specially-convened class on 1 May 1921, which graduated in June 1922.\footnote{Frances, *"History of Marine Corps Schools,"* p. 28.}

The Basic School or TBS, designed to prepare newly-commissioned second lieutenants in the duties of a Marine lieutenant opened its doors in mid-1922, and closely resembled that of the pre-war School of Application with seventeen second lieutenants and eleven Marine gunners (warrant officers) as students.\footnote{Ibid.} Despite the fluctuation that would take place in senior Marine officer training due largely to deployments overseas, the overall scheme of operation in the Basic School as organized in 1922, remained in effect until the need for officers during World War II forced the closing of the school.\footnote{Ibid.}

One more innovative practice inaugurated by Headquarters was the consolidation of all three Marine Corps Schools under one single commanding officer, Colonel Ben H. Fuller, a former member of the first class at the School of Application (1891), who became the commanding officer of the MCS in July 1922. With this appointment, and the commencement of all three schools simultaneously, the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico now "provided progressive education for practically all officers in the Corps."\footnote{Ibid.} The key word here is "progressive," for it was under the influence of the
former Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels and his two favorite Marine generals, John A. Lejeune, and Smedley Butler, who now commanded the Marine Barracks at Quantico, that this base would be eventually transformed into what amounted to at the time was a "Marine Corps University." Brigadier General Butler, in fact, emphasized this last point in a speech given on 12 April 1920, when he termed the Marine Corps' professional and vocational school system as a:

revolution. It is something new. The old officers of the Marine Corps would turn over in their graves if they knew what we were doing because in the old days, they did nothing but soldier. We want to make this post and the whole Marine Corps a great university.\(^{50}\)

Major General Lejeune, in fact, deserves the lion's share of the credit for the system of professional education established in 1921. General Merrill B. Twining recounted that it was Lejeune who had both a moral obligation and a "keen sense of moral responsibility. . . . [to] . . . do something more for our men than had . . . [been] . . . done by the old vagabonds of pre-World War I."\(^{51}\) More to the point, was the fact that for "the first time in the history of the training of Marine officers, the school assumed the structure and tenor of an institution of higher learning in the military arts and sciences."\(^{52}\) With the addition of faculty trained and educated at the Army's schools at Forts Leavenworth and Benning, the MCS system eventually prospered and met the needs of the Marine Corps. In fact, as both General's Twining and Erskine recalled, Army instruction was "excellent . . . ." Twining specifically recalled that "it opened my eyes, and while I didn't believe in certain phases of it, I found a great deal in the technique to take back to the

\(^{50}\)Fleming, et al., Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, p. 48.
\(^{52}\)Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," pp. 29-30.
Marines. Unfortunately and strangely enough the Army officers despised it." Twining added that what Benning gave him and his fellow officers was an excellent background in weapons training and technique, something the Marine Corps Schools could not give them:

When I went to Benning [1935-36] and saw how a school could be conducted with vast terrain, weapons, all the weapons you needed, things like facilities in which to work, and what fine methods could be developed, it opened, really opened my eyes. I carried some of that back to the Marine Corps.53

General Erskine was more candid in his praise of the Army schools. An instructor in the Department of Tactics at the MCS from 23 June 1927 through 17 March 1928, Erskine stated that the Army's Infantry Officer School which he attended from 6 September 1926 through 31 May 1927 was "...a hell of a good school, and I still think it was one of the outstanding military schools in this country at that time."54 While an instructor in the Department of Tactics then-Captain Erskine had been detailed to instruct the 3rd Reserve Officers Training Camp at Quantico during the summer of 1927, and had left such a favorable impression on his students that one of them, First Lieutenant R. H. Burton, USMCR, felt compelled to write a personal letter thanking him for his excellent instruction, and that "each and every officer who was an Instructor at this Camp showed themselves to be experts in their line and I only wish that as familiar with the automatic rifle fire and machine gun and theory of fire as you demonstrated."55

Another Marine officer and future general, Holland M. Smith, however, had a much different opinion of the course of instruction at the MCS where he attended the Field Officers' Course during the 1926-27 academic school year. General Smith objected

53 Twining Oral History, p. 64.
55 Ibid, p. 53.
to the emphasis the MCS placed on the outdated doctrines of the World War, and its inevitable "emphasis placed on defensive tactics," and accused the instructors and staff at the MCS of being "conservative, no more capable of grasping reality than some of the officers at the Naval War College."  

Yet in analyzing the curriculum and articles in the Marine Corps Gazette of the period one can see that it was not just the linear tactics of the World War, but also the doctrines of elastic defense that highlighted the last months of the war in France. Furthermore, if one were to read the Infantry Drill Regulations and A.E.F. Service Bulletins issued and collated under the direction of Brigadier General Ben Fuller as early as 1922, one can see very clearly that Marines indeed studied both the defense in depth methods and the employment of combined arms on a fluid battlefield that began appearing in the armies of both the Allied [including American] and Central Powers after 1917.

Another problem encountered initially by the MCS system was the less-than enthusiastic reception given the Company Officer's Course by the younger officers. In fact, among the forty Marine officers of the Class of 1923 that included then First

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56 Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 57.
57 See a translation of German Quartermaster Eric Ludendorff's "Elastic Defense" and British Army Captain C. H. Britain's "Notes on Infantry Work on the Western Front," in the Marine Corps Gazette, 3 (September 1918), pp. 213-7 and 218-43 respectively; Historian David Trask, in fact, asserted that the U.S. Army's First Army took advantage of the tactical innovations that had served the British and French armies well during the battles of July-October [1918]. Among these tactical innovation was the creation of "assault teams" that engaged machine gun nests while other elements bypassed them. See Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918. (Lexington, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 151; For the best treatment of this change in Allied and German tactical doctrine see Timothy Lupfer's Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, 1981); and Martin Samuels' Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).
Lieutenant Gerald C. Thomas, there existed the opinion bordering on lethargy and that they would rather be elsewhere than at Quantico going to school. In the case of First Lieutenant Thomas, who had already passed his required promotion examination for first lieutenants which included the subjects of naval law, ordnance and tactics, the Company Officers' Course seemed redundant. To combat boredom he instead spent his evenings reading military history—primarily Civil War history, a passion that he carried with him the remainder of his life. A former sergeant during the World War, and a candidate selected by the Neville Board in 1921 for a regular commission, Thomas did not think highly of the "formal curriculum of the [company] officers' course." In fact, he felt that the course of instruction was "not particularly good . . ." and "ill-suited for officers who already knew all they cared to know."58

Lieutenant Thomas' comments echo a complaint that was quite common during the first decade that the MCS's were in operation. Indeed, as General Twining acknowledged, there existed a common held feeling among some Marine officers that the Army schools better prepared an officer in his profession rather than the Marine Corps Schools. This sentiment existed due in large part to the fact that many of the senior Marine leaders (including Lejeune) "had served in France with the Army and Leavenworth trained officers," and that the corps' experience in the World War, and postwar discussions regarding the adoption of the Army's tables of organization necessitated emulating the Army system. The real difference came when Headquarters instituted the addition of both advanced base force and naval law related-subjects. These gave the MCS a definite Navy-Marine Corps tone that Marine officers were quick to point out when comparing the different service schools and their curriculums. Yet the truth remained that there was little, if any, difference in the schools or curriculum. The

58Millett, "In Many A Strife," p. 91.
wholesale reproduction of Army manuals and drill and infantry regulations at Quantico, in fact, led at one point to a scathing note from the Division of Operations and Training to Colonel Dunlap that the MCS were in violation of copyrights, and were running the schools' budget into the red with the wholesale mimeographing of training materials. While Dunlap agreed to cut down on the reproducing of such bulletins and the like, the practice continued unabated. More to the point, however, was the fact that the Marine Corps' adoption of the 'Army' system contributed to the ongoing controversy inside the Marine officer corps in regards to its identity, as well as its roles and missions as a part of the naval service. Yet it must be pointed out that prior to 1925, when the "shift" in the curriculum began to take place at Quantico toward the study of amphibious warfare under the direction of Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, who became the Director of the MCS, the students at the Field Officers' Course continued to study the World War. Indeed, in his critique of the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers, Dunlap urged the continued study of Army organization and tactics, much to the consternation of some senior and junior Marine officers. Nonetheless, for the time being, "the Field Officers' Course continued on its evolutionary path."  

Furthermore, Major General Lejeune's emphasis on his officers and men attending Army and Navy schools was, from a practical point of view, the only way that he could insure that the Marine Corps remain abreast of the ongoing technical and operational developments in such diverse fields as aviation, ordnance, and tactics. Lejeune based his

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policy of sending as many officers and men that could be spared to Army and Navy schools, on his desire to increase the military efficiency of the Corps without hurting its operational preparedness during the 1920's.\textsuperscript{61} This in itself represented a shift in thinking at Headquarters, though as the Marine deployment to Nicaragua demonstrated, the demand for officers and enlisted men for expeditionary duty many times found the classrooms at Quantico and Philadelphia emptied in order to provide for periods up to two years at a time.\textsuperscript{62} In fact, the demands of expeditionary duty many times cut into the instructor staff as well. In his annual report to the Major General Commandant for 1929, the Commandant of MCS, Colonel James C. Breckinridge expressed the opinion that the Marine Corps Schools had been "materially crippled by having such a small instruction staff which had to carry on the Field Officers' Course as well as the many other Correspondence Courses which by that time were being sent out."\textsuperscript{63} Many student officers found themselves being suddenly detached from schools or other training in the middle of the term in order to lead an expedition only to be returned to resume their school work after returning to the United States. This was precisely the same situation experienced by then Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole early on in his career. While attending the Army War College in 1908, Cole had been detached from his studies for a brief period in September of that year in order to lead an expedition to Panama. He later resumed his studies two months later, completing the course the following spring (1909). The same sentiment remained true for enlisted men, particularly aviators and mechanics. In fact, due to the technical nature of aviation and auto mechanics, Headquarters mandated that enlisted Marines who attended such schools such as the Aviation

\textsuperscript{61} Lejeune, \textit{CMC Annual Report for 1920}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{62} Metcalf, "\textit{Education of Marine Corps Officers}," pp. 50-1.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, p. 50.
Mechanics Schools at Great Lakes, Illinois or Aerology school located at Pensacola, be permitted to complete their studies before reassigned for expeditionary duty.64

Nonetheless, the fact remained that the revolution that later occurred in the Marine Corps in regard to the development of a landing operations doctrine reflected Headquarter's thinking behind the establishment of a systematic approach to professional military education with the establishment of a three-tiered system at the MCS. Despite this, however, the fact remained that the MCS maintained its emphasis on ground warfare as opposed amphibious and amphibious-related subjects. For the Marine Corps, and its survival as a service, this was important since the Corps leaders could point to its acceptance of modern doctrine and technology while still maintaining its operational commitments to the Navy, and not as an independent service, something that officers like Brigadier General Smedley Butler had advocated. Major General Lejeune's awareness of the Corps' needs and familiarity with the Army "way of doing things," coupled with his desire to retain the Marine Corps' ties with the Navy permitted his service to remain outside the fray of the bitter interservice disputes of the 1920's, and gave it the flexibility to further develop the concept of amphibious warfare in the early 1930's.

Adoption of the Army method of instruction, as well as its course content for the MCS likewise had more immediate and visible benefits as General Twining himself acknowledged. Specifically, when asked about the attitudes of many Marines at Quantico regarding the experience and concepts they derived from the Army school systems at both Forts Benning and Leavenworth concepts and the receptiveness they received from Marine officer students, as well as the impact these ideas had on their teaching and staff work, Twining replied that there were:

64Lejeune, Annual Report for 1920, p. 1073.
Terrific benefits. Planning and particularly the Army at Benning knew how to conduct instruction. We didn’t know that. There was no professional knowledge on a high level in the Marine Corps before World War I and World War I only developed the need for it.65

The professional knowledge that Marine officers gained as a result of adopting the Army’s school system and its curriculum resulted in a much better educated Marine Corps officer corps, which in the end enabled them to operate at all levels of command. General Twining is negligent, however, in his failure to mention that use of the Army’s IDR’s and FSR’s inculcated an entire generation of Marine Corps officers in land warfare, and in the so-called "Benning" way of thinking that allowed for flexible decision-making in the application of combined arms on the battlefield, and its obvious influence on the development of amphibious warfare in the 1930’s.

The "technical" aspects that Benning and Leavenworth gave to its Marine students centered itself around the lessons of the World War, and the demonstrated importance of combined arms. Taken one step further, the Army schools offered Marines the chance to study combined arms warfare with a service that had greater financial resources, larger training facilities, and more equipment. Indeed, as General Twining noted, the one major difference with the Marine Corps Schools, and the limited amount space and financial resources at its disposal and those of the Army at Benning was in itself a commentary on the training Marine junior officers received during the 1920’s through the mid-1930’s. He added that, "How could you train officers in the Marine Corps on the level we trained them then, when you had to take them out in Fairmount Park in Philadelphia, when you had only one machine gun to train a hundred officers? That was what we were up against."66

66 Ibid, p. 66.
Differing with Twining was Major Jesse F. Dyer, who, as an assistant head of the Marine Corps Schools, noted in a March 1922 Marine Corps Gazette article, that the goal of the Marine Corps Schools was to provide every Marine Corps officer with:

a basic education which prepares him to function efficiently with a marine command, either as a line or staff officer, and whether the command be serving at sea, or on shore as an infantry command. As a minimum, he should be so educated in accordance with the probable responsibilities of his rank. Such, briefly, and in general outline, is the first objective set for every officer.67

Coupled with the "budding" interest in amphibious warfare in the mid-to late 1920's thoughtful Marine officers devoted a large portion of the Marine Corps Schools, particularly the curriculum in the Field and Company Officers' Courses to the integration of all arms and services.68 Many of the same Marine officers who attended and taught at the MCS in the 1920's and 1930's later applied this same doctrine in the exercises held in 1925 on Oahu, and later in the 1930's, as well as in combat against the Japanese during the island campaigns in World War II.

Administration and Content of MCS 1920-1927

Administratively, there were two directors of the MCS-one for the Field Officers' Course and one for the Company Officers' Course. Charged with the "immediate supervision and coordination of the work in their respective schools," the directors set about to institute the directives and curriculum established by the Division of Operations and Training, as well as integrating the lessons learned from the World War into the education of Marine, as well as eventually Army and naval officers during the decade of both the 1920's and 1930's. In charge of the MCS was the commanding officer, who up to 1931 was a colonel, and had been "charged with the administration of

68Ibid, p. 25.
the school, the coordination of the work of the instruction, and the maintaining of the proper standard of discipline among the students and enlisted men."69

Next in the line of authority of the Marine Corps Schools were the two Directors of Instruction, of who headed the Field Officers' Course and Company Officers' Course. They oversaw the day-to-day functioning of their respective school as well as the coordination of the work being performed by the student body. A School Board, comprised of the commanding officer of the school, the two directors, and the heads of the several departments, determined the course of instruction, as to the subjects and methods of instruction, and the allotment of time per subject. It also made recommendations "as to the policy, character, and scope of the schools."

The curriculum and courses offered at both schools had been modeled both on the Marine Officers' Infantry School of 1920, and that of Fort Benning, with additional course work being carried over from the former School of Application. The period of instruction absent a major deployment for the Field Officers' Course ideally ran for thirty-eight weeks consecutively, four to five hours a day, Monday through Saturday noon, with Sundays and holidays free.70 As stated above, the entire course ran for a total of 750 hours broken down into each department (Table 10. 3

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Department of Tactics .................. 400 Hours
Department of Topography ............... 200 Hours
Department of Law ...................... 140 Hours
Department of Administration .......... 10 Hours

**Table 10.3**  
**Field Officers' Course - Total Hours**

The director of the Field Officers' School arranged the subjects so as to insure that the students completed the essential subjects before progressing onto those of lesser importance. Furthermore, in order to insure that students retained their interest, the School eliminated the more mundane and boring features in order to retain the interest of the officers attending the course. In short, the aim of the Course of Military Tactics was to insure that Marine officers developed a process whereby they could apply the correct applications to both the accepted principles of tactics to situations they might face in the field. While this portion of the course dealt with theoretical situations and solutions the faculty strived to provide situations as realistic as possible in order to retain their student's interests and attention. Yet at all times the faculty in this portion of the course strove to "meet the practical needs of the field officers of the Marine Corps and furnish them something tangible upon which to lean when they take the field as commanders of the troops."

While much of the material used in this portion of the course came directly from Forts Leavenworth and Benning some of the material had been brought over from the former School of Application, and had a "peculiar relation to Marine Corps needs" in order that the MCS did not overlook those "peculiarities of the duties of the Marine Corps and its distinctive characteristics ...." Such being the case, the purely "Marine"

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71Ibid.  
72Ibid, p. 409.  
73Ibid.
subjects retained by the Field Officers' School included the study of the organization, equipment, and functions of Marines "in task that they are likely to undertake." Hence, the subjects found in this category included the study of naval guns and their emplacement; search-lights, and signaling. Insofar as actual "infantry" related subjects went, because of the smaller size of the Marine Corps in comparison to that of the Army, the student officers studied the handling of smaller bodies of troops and their employment.

One important category that closely resembled that of the Army was in the study of both combined arms and the tactics and techniques of separate arms, "and their relation to each other." The students at the Field Officers' School likewise studied tactical and operational doctrine, supply and other related logistics-related topics. Also covered in the course was the functioning and duties of a division commander and his staff. This portion of the course was a "newcomer" to Marine officers. Prior to the World War, very few Marine senior officers commanded troops beyond that of a regiment (2,000-3,000 men). During the World War this changed drastically, however, when Major General Lejeune took over command of the U.S. Army's 2nd Division during the last few months of the war. Marine officers likewise served on the staffs of both the U.S. Army, and in command of other Army outfits, as well as on Admiral William S. Sims' Naval Planning Group headquartered in London, England. What was even more important, was the fact that Marine officers learned how a staff functioned, and "how they are brought

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74 Ibid., p. 410.
75 In October 1918 General Pershing appointed Colonel Robert H. Dunlap as the commanding officer of the U.S. 17th Artillery Regiment as he had promised the Marine colonel in the summer of 1917 when Dunlap accompanied Pershing's initial party over to France as the Marine Corps representative. See Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap's "Recommendations," p. 1, and his biographic sheet in the Reference Section (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, Marine Corps Historical Center).
together to assure cooperation and team-play."76 Because Marine officers came from all different types of backgrounds and measures of intelligence, topography remained basic and elementary in nature "irrespective" of a student's previous training and experience in that subject."77

Military law with an emphasis on naval law was likewise taught by qualified Marine officers [such as General Twining]. As could be expected, however, "The greater part of the time [at MCS] was devoted to tactics." 78 Senior Marine officers likewise took a requisite ten hours in administration that consisted primarily of seven lectures on such diverse subjects as the Adjutant and Inspector's Department (2); the Quartermaster's Department (3) and; Paymaster's Department (2). The main reason for their inclusion in the Field Officers' Course was to "impress upon the students the necessity for cooperation and coordination between the line and staff, and to give them a broader view of the scope and limitation of the work in these departments."79 One last course included horsemanship or equitation—a carry over from the Benning course and one that found most favor with the Army officers assigned to the MCS after 1925.80

The method of instruction, adopted in 1920, consisted of lectures, conference groups, tactical problems, and demonstrations by the instructors and students themselves. The officials at MCS balanced the courses in that the students received both theoretical and practical work in order to prevent an overemphasis on rote memorization. In short, the goal of the MCS' courses was to keep it concise, to the point, and interesting. The staff at the MCS measured a student's performance and

76Ibid, p. 411.
77Bittner, Curriculum Evolution, p. 9.
78Ibid.
80As General Twining recalled the majority of Army officers sent to MCS "were usually cavalry officers and made some contributions in such things as conducting riding classes and things of that sort that interested them." See Twining Oral History, p. 97.
proficiency in the various subjects with a series of tests based on 500 points or units broken down as follows: Tactics (350); Topography (100); and Law (50).  

Commencing in January 1921, the Company Officers' Course began meeting on a regular basis with first lieutenants and captains as the intended student body. The average length of the course was just under six months' duration which the Division of Operations and Training changed later in 1923 to eight months. This course met for a period of twenty-three weeks (January 15, 1921 to June 30, 1921), and met five and one-half days a week for four to five hours daily (two hours on Saturday). Total course hours was 620 hours divided into such courses as Infantry Drill Regulations; Manual of Interior Guard Duty; Wig-Wag and Semaphore Signaling; Naval Ordnance; Tactics; Infantry Weapons; Engineering; Administration; Topography; Law, and First Aid and Medical Hygiene; Musketry; Physical Training; Equitation; Boat drill and duties of a Marine officer aboard ship. Tests and evaluation of the student's progress reflected those given in the Field Officers' Course. In actuality, however, the studies at the Company Officers' Course differed little from those taught at the former Advanced Base School, and sought to prepare its students to lead Marine companies and shipboard detachments. The only difference being of course, was the emphasis the Division of Operations and Training placed on weaponry and an introduction to combined arms warfare. The inclusion of the Infantry Weapons portion of the course reflected Headquarters' insistence on its officers being familiar with small arms and their capabilities and employment and sought make up for the canceled Infantry Weapons School that had been proposed back in 1919.

81Ibid, p. 419.
82Ibid.
As far as the success of both the Field Officers' Course and the Company Officers' Course had been concerned, Major General Lejeune noted in his annual report for 1923, that "so far as it is possible in the available time and available facilities," the MCS had provided an "adequate military and naval education for the several grades [of officers]."

As has been above-mentioned, the first class of the Basic School met in 1922, and met for four months that first year of operation with an additional five months added on by the end of the decade. By 1930, the school, after having moved to the Philadelphia Yard, due to the lack of adequate facilities at Quantico had a firmly established course of study that remained untouched until the school's closure in 1941. (Table 10.4)

Minor Tactics
Infantry Weapons
Rifle and Pistol Marksmanship
Musketry/
Infantry Drill Regulations
Interior Guard Duty
Topography
Field Engineering
Hygiene
Boats and Boats' Handling
Administration
Naval Law
Signals
Naval Ordnance

Table 10.4
The Basic Course Curriculum, 1923-1940

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84 Metcalf, "History of Marine Corps Education," p. 50.
85 Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," p. 28; Memorandum from Major General Commandant Ben H. Fuller to Director, Naval Intelligence, dtd. 23 April 1930, Subj: "Information Relative to Educational Qualifications for Marine Corps Officers;" (Washington, DC, National Archives, RG 127, A/I, General Correspondence of the United States Marine Corps, Acces. No. 18-1975-1520-30, Box 239). Hereafter cited as Fuller, "Educational Qualifications."
The Basic Course's curriculum differed little than that of the Company Officers' Course, though it might be added that the course had been configured to cover the same subjects as covered by the defunct School of Application. In that only selected officers attended both the Field and Company Officers' Courses, attendance in The Basic School was mandatory for all second lieutenants before Headquarters would allow them to lead Marines in the field. Furthermore, while attendance in the two senior level courses remained selective, attendance in The Basic School became a requisite for all new Marine officers regardless of past experience as enlisted men or prior service schooling.

Headquarters likewise made it known that promotion depended upon an officer's level of professional education whether that included sitting in a classroom at Quantico, or in one of the Army's schools, at either Forts Benning or Leavenworth. For those officers who could neither attend the residence courses at Quantico or the Army schools, Headquarters insisted that the officer in question take the Correspondence Course that patterned itself and its curriculum after both senior-level courses. As the 1920's ended a good majority of Marine officers had been enrolled or had completed the Correspondence Courses according to their rank.\(^86\)

In fact, one of the most important innovations in Marine Corps officer education in this era was the creation of the Correspondence Course on 15 December 1926. Started primarily to allow those officers who could not attend either the Field or Company Officers' Courses due to their assignments on expeditionary or sea duty, the Correspondence Course in time became an important "filler" in the career of a Marine officer when professional schooling became as important as field duty when it came to career advancement. Interestingly, tied in with the creation of the Correspondence Course was passage of the Marine Reserve Act of 28 February 1925, which provided for

\(^{86}\)Frances, "The History of Marine Corps Schools," p. 35.
the establishment of two classes of Marine Reserves: the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, and the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserves. As has been above-mentioned in Chapter Two, the Marine Reserve Act gave the Marine Corps for the first time a pool in which to reinforce the Regular Marine Corps in time of war. Shortly after the passage of this Reserve legislation, Headquarters faced the dual problems of where to get the men for such a reserve and how to train them. While the summer camps and weekly drills attempted to cover some of the duties and responsibilities of the Marine Corps, the main problem was in keeping its officers and men proficient in their skills while keeping the cost down. One of the solutions was the organization of a non-resident correspondence course that Reserve officers could take in fulfillment of the now-required attendance in both the Field Officers' School and its companion Company Officers School, much like the vocational courses offered by the Marine Corps Institute though on a much more advanced level. Hence, the birth of the Non-Resident Correspondence Course at Quantico in December 1926.\(^87\) The insistence by Headquarters that these same officers sign up for the non-residence Company or Field Officers' Courses meant that for the first time the reserves would, in fact, play an important part in General Lejeune's attempt to modernize the Marine officer corps, and bring it up to the standards of the Army at least in terms of its professional military education requirements.

As outlined by Major General Lejeune in a circular letter to all officers of both the Regular and Reserve Marine Corps, the Correspondence Course adopted the Army's program of non-resident education for its officers (and some enlisted men) with some of the courses modified to meet the needs of the Marine Corps. The course, who with its first commanding officer Major Harold H. Utley, and his staff of twenty-eight officers assigned to three branches of study: Tactics (18); Topography (3); and Law (2) with an

\(^{87}\)Ibid, p. 33.
additional five officers assigned as administration officers who handled any problem or administrative matter as well as mailing out courses to Marines in the field or with the fleets, opened its doors to its first students that same month. By the end of the first year of operation, the school had 334 students on its rolls as well as having a selection of 24 different courses. (Table 10.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Branch/Department</th>
<th>Level(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps</td>
<td>Basic; Company and Squadron; Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps of Engineers</td>
<td>Basic; Company; Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>Basic; Company; Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Basic; Company; Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>Basic; Company; Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Dept</td>
<td>Basic Advanced Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and General Staff 88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.5
The Marine Corps Correspondence Course in the 1920's.

The Major General Commandant's letter specified that while each course was progressive, an officer "should not undertake a Company Officer's Course unless he has recently completed the basic Correspondence Course in that branch." The same was true for officers taking the Advanced Course, whom the letter specified were not to undertake an Advanced Course in any branch unless he had completed the requirements of the Company Officer's Course in that branch-Marine Corps or Army. General Lejeune outlined that the Command and General Staff Course was not to be undertaken by any officer who has "not completed the Advanced Correspondence Course or Field Officer's

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88 See Major General John A. Lejeune, USMC, HQMC Circular Letter dtd. 15 December 1926, No. 48: Subject: Correspondence Course, in the Major General Clayton C. Vogel, USMC Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, Marine Corps Historical Center, PC #7, Box 1, Folder 11), p. 1.
Course, Marine Corps or Army Schools." Interestings, the first graduate of the Correspondence School was Second Lieutenant Rex Saffer, VMCR, of Orlando, Florida, who completed 130 lessons in the requisite 31 weeks of study, and successfully passed the examination from the Infantry Officers' Course.

The establishment of the Correspondence Course was a short-term expedient to a problem headquarters had hoped to resolve as more funds became available which of course was mandatory attendance for every Marine officer to the appropriate level of school he required for advancement. In fact, Headquarters never intended that the organization of such a school-by-mail could act as a "substitute" for formal attendance in a regular school; nor did it expect the reservist or student taking a course to become an expert overnight. That would require formal schoolroom attendance and an actual command in the Fleet. Rather, Headquarters intended that the Correspondence Course be a "complimentary branch of the main school with the mission of making Marine education a continual process, and at the same time providing interested personnel with pertinent information and knowledge in regard to special subjects." In short, the non-resident courses were to either lay a foundation or bring an officer "up to snuff" on infantry tactics or some other aspect of the Marine Corps. As time went by the staff at the Correspondence Course modified or eliminated many of the purely "Army" courses in favor of those dealing specifically with Marine Corps-type subjects. Unlike the drill regulations and infantry training bulletins that the two upper formal schools depended upon for much of their material officials at the Correspondence Course rewrote many of

\[\text{89}\text{Major General John A. Lejeune, Circular Letter No. 48 "To All Officers of the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve: Subj: "Correspondence Course," dtd. 15 December 1926, in the Major General Clayton C. Vogel, USMC Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, PC #2, Box 1), p. 1. Hereafter cited as Lejeune, Circular Letter No. 48."}\\
\[\text{90}\text{Frances, "The History of Marine Corps Schools," p. 33.}\\

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the older courses or drew up new ones that dealt specifically with Marine-related topics and subjects such as Landing Operations, Boat Handling and Operations, and Small Wars.

By the end of the decade of its first years in operation the Director of the Correspondence Course could report to the Major General Commandant that its "courses and lessons followed Marines to every corner of the globe, as well as to post and stations throughout the United States." Yet the deployment of Marines to Nicaragua and China caused similar attendance and administrative problems that affected their brethren in the formal schools. As Colonel James C. Breckinridge reported in his annual report 1929 to the Major General Commandant, the courses at MCS had been "crippled by having such a small instruction staff which had to carry on the Field Officers Course as well as many of the Correspondence Course which by that time were being sent out." In fact, both the resident and non-resident courses at Quantico suffered as a result of the massive deployments to both Nicaragua and China. The Marine Corps Schools were not "able to return to normal during the maintenance of a large expeditionary force in Nicaragua in addition to consider-able numbers of other foreign duties." The fact, however, remained that under Major General Lejeune and others, including Colonels Dunlap, Breckinridge, and Majors Utley and Samuel H. Harrington, the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico became "the heart" of the Marine Corps educational process of its officers, as well as in laying the foundation for the doctrinal

92 Ibid.
93 The Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, USMC Papers found at the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington, D.C. contain several boxes dealing precisely with the history and origins of were then called by Marines "Small Wars." During his tenure at MCS, Lieutenant Colonel Utley had the students concentrate on the lessons of Marines in their various expeditions to Hispaniola and Nicaragua. See Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 36-8.
and operational innovations of the 1930's and beyond. With the schools established, the
next issue faced by the MCS dealt with curriculum and methodology used in presentation
of the material to the students. As was the case with the establishment of the MCS, the
curriculum writers and instructors once again looked to the Army for ideas. As evolved
in the MCS, the development of curriculum soon became involved in the search for the
missions and roles of the Marine Corps. This in turn led to the tactical and operational
innovations that led to the further refinement and codification of the Marine Corps'
expeditionary amphibious assault role. Furthermore, it gave birth to the one of the
primary functions of Quantico that lasts to this very day—the writing and evaluation of
document for the Marine Corps as a whole.

*Techniques of Instruction and Curriculum at the
Marine Corps Schools 1920-1930*

Even as Headquarters moved to set up the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, the
problems faced by the respective departments there shifted from questions over the
"physical aspects" in the establishment of an institution of higher military learning to
matters regarding course content, doctrinal concerns, and methodology. Despite the fact
that Marines had previous experience in curriculum development with the establishment
of the School of Application and Advance Base School prior to the World War, the
 technological and doctrinal changes brought on by the war negated or, if not negated
definitely altered the Corps' conception of warfare to the point that older officers thought
the postwar changes too radical in the professional education of Marine officers. In
short, the changes instituted by Major General's Barnett and Lejeune in the way the MCS
prepared officers to fight battles permitted both Marine officers and their Navy
counterparts to witness not only the passing of an era in how the Marine Corps educated
its officers, but to the professionalization of its officers' corps. Over time both Barnett's
and Lejeune's main focus became the transformation of the Marine officer corps, an
institution that prior to 1917, had been "locked in the past" to that of an force capable of fighting wars across the then limited spectrum of warfare—from small counterguerrilla or constabulary operations to that of an advanced base or expeditionary force or, as the World War demonstrated, in sustained land combat as an adjunct to the Army. Part of this professionalization took part in the subjects Marines studied, as well as the methodology used at the MCS by Marine instructors to impart that knowledge to the company and field grade officers that would lead the corps into and during World War II.

As above-mentioned, Headquarters had patterned both the Field and Company Officers' courses after those of the Army Schools in both methodology and curriculum though striving to retain those elements that applied strictly to those duties Marine officers would encounter once they left Quantico. While Colonel Beaumont and his successors attempted to introduce new material, as well as better methods of instruction such as critical thinking and analysis, some instructors retained the older "tried and true methods" of rote learning in order to cram what essentially was a two-year course load into six to nine months of intense learning. While getting good grades and committing to memory much of the required coursework presented to them while at the MCS, students often left either course filled with data but with little else. Put another way, students left slavishly tied to the doctrine with which they had been taught with little room left for critical thinking, thus reinforcing the "catechism" taught earlier at The Basic School, and making them resistant or slow to change. In short, while the Marine Corps had come a long way in changing its traditional approach to officer education during the first half of the 1920's, officials at the MCS at Quantico did little to discourage instructors from preaching "the old time religion" insofar as doctrinal and tactical matters had been concerned. Furthermore, in assessing the overall value of Marine Corps during the early period from comments made by Generals Erskine, Thomas, and Twining, one can
conclude that at least for the first decade, attendance at either of the advanced MCS was to merely propel an officer into the next rank or grade while putting on the facade of seeking knowledge. Despite the professed policy to encourage the students at the Field and Company Officers' courses to think, the underlying policy and emphasis of the MCS was to enable the students to do practical work:

There is considerable amount of study and theoretical work required of the student, but his ability to do the practical work of the course is the ultimate goal. This method we believe will have a tendency to prevent too much memorizing and to make greater use of good common sense.  

Despite the desire to eliminate rote thinking as much as they could neither the administration nor faculty at the MCS did little to encourage students to "think outside the box" when it came to special situations. The era of tactical decisionmaking gaming had yet to arrive insofar as official Marine Corps thinking had been concerned!

While Major General John Lejeune had advanced the idea for a change in the way Marine officers were taught at the MCS in 1922, it was Colonel Breckinridge who served as the director of the MCS, and had hoped to modernize the methodology and find a way to promote thinking in the classrooms at Quantico and Philadelphia. Colonel Breckinridge, in fact, argued that "students should be taught to dissect, to analyze, and to think." The then-director of the MCS argued that the then current system in use at Quantico conformed "too closely to ritual of technique and events," in that "tactics and strategy have no place in ritual and precedent." Breckinridge, in short, had called for the introduction of "a technique of instruction that would prepare a student and sharpen his

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95 Ibid.
wits to win the future battles of Borodino.96 Colonel Breckinridge's emphasis on critical thinking and analysis, in fact, reflected what Clausewitz earlier termed the "fog" and "friction" inherent in war. Marine officers, Breckinridge argued, cannot expect to fight a battle within certain accepted rules and a predetermined outcome. Indeed, to do so invited disaster since "There is no formula for waging war or fighting battles. The Director of MCS insisted that his instructors teach their students how to think and not just be able to recite rules and accepted methods in fighting. That was the key to success on the battlefield. In turn:

These students are taught not to learn what is handed to them in a college, and to mold their minds up on precedent and chronology. They are taught to dissect, to analyze, and to think. They are taught how to develop their inherent intelligence and to use their minds for original thinking. . . . We need officers who are trained to reason briefly, clearly, decisively, and sanely.97

Despite Colonel Breckinridge's emphasis on critical thinking and analysis, however, instructors at the MCS continued to use the more familiar rote methodology into the 1930's and beyond. Thinking "out of the box" became a victim of both inertia and the continued deployment of Marines to Nicaragua and China during the late 1920's, and did not change until the appointment of Major General John H. Russell as the Major General Commandant. Furthermore, official pronouncements by Headquarters and MCS officials

96The Battle of Borodino, fought in September 1812 during Napoleon Bonaparte's Russian Campaign slowed the French emperor's advance into Moscow, allowing the Russian commander Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov to regroup and eventually counterattack and hit at Napoleon's weakened legions as they froze and starved in Moscow. Breckinridge, a student of Russian military history used this as an early example of attrition (France) versus maneuver (Russian) warfare since the battle itself is considered to have been a tactical victory for Napoleon and a strategic victory for Kutuzov. See David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 704-10.
regarding their desire to have students "develop initiative" appears to have been for public consumption since these same officers oftentimes "slipped in" or "couched" such terms as "correct thinking" in between the professed desire in requiring "independent thought" among its officers which seemed to indicate that only a certain amount of deviation from the school house solution would be tolerated. Part of the problem revolved around the continued use of Army doctrine as the basis for all courses with the exception of the purely "Marine Corps" subjects.

In fact, one could argue that the continued emphasis on studying Army doctrine served to hinder rather help Marine officers "break out of the box" and formulate a doctrine exclusive to the Marine-Navy part in an Orange war. As long as Marines continued to study and emphasize "small wars" as its raison d'etre, there could be no progress in either advanced base studies or amphibious warfare. This leads one to conclude that the criticism leveled later on against the out-dated nature of the Army's Infantry Drill Regulations and Field Service Regulations is unfair since Marines remained fixated on "small wars" and would've just as soon not concentrated on amphibious warfare possibly at all had there not been a small group of officers determined to modernize the Corps' mission. This explained the slow movement toward academic reforms in the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools, at either of the two senior-level courses. In turn, Major General Eli K. Cole's statement of "leaving it up to the Navy" is likewise an unfair indictment against the naval hierarchy of the time for their lack of awareness in regards to the needs of the Marine Corps. since some senior Marine officers share some of the blame for a lack of seriousness in transforming the curriculum at the MCS. In fact, both Cole's statement, and what transpired at MCS during the 1920's, clearly pointed to the obvious fact that the Marine Corps' senior leadership itself bore some of the responsibility in regards to the lack of emphasis on amphibious or at least advanced base studies in the curriculum of the Field Officers' Course during the early
1920's. Furthermore, when one considers the fact that the amphibious doctrine written from 1931 to 1934 had been accomplished within the austere conditions of the Depression and the tight budgets of both the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, money was not the issue that had stymied doctrinal reform. It had more to do with the failure to work with what it had in terms of manpower and equipment, and a general doctrinal failure to understand the lessons of the World War. As for the Marine Corps, while it lacked both money and manpower, the real debate that affected the Corps during the 1920's focused on the bitter debate that took place between those who wanted the corps to become constabulary troops, and those who saw the Corps' future as an advanced base force, aligned closely with that of the Navy.

Even with the 1926 CMC order directing the MCS to emphasize Overseas Expeditions and Ship-to-Shore Operations (both a result of Colonel Dunlap's "Critique" of the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers), it would not be until 1931 that officials at the MCS, under Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, instituted changes in both the methodology and curriculum that radically altered not only the methodology and curriculum of both courses at the MCS but the Marine Corps itself. While the Marine Corps Schools in both the Field and Company Officers' courses remained focused on the study of "Small Wars," and had, in fact, began to write a manual on this same subject starting in 1922, and published in 1940, the study of landing operations including the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Gallipoli (1915), and the German landings in the Baltic (1917), received greater attention during Lieutenant Colonel Utley's tenure as head of the Field Officer's Course.98

So what then did Marine officers study? As above-mentioned, Marine officers at both the Field and Company Officers' Courses studied subjects that revolved around both

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98See the Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, USMC Papers. (Quantico, VA., Marine Corps Archives, Marine Corps University, MCCDC, PC #127, Folders 1-8, Box 1).
the infantry and combined arms with some additional coursework on administration, law, supply, and field engineering. Further broken down, the Field Officers' Course resembled a duplicate of Fort Leavenworth's School of the Line: (Table 10.6)

Department of Tactics:

Military Organization- This subject comprises the detailed organization of all separate arms and services that compose a division, and a general discussion of the principles that control the organization of each. The organization of the corps, army and service of supply are treated in sufficient detail to assure the student's understanding of their importance and relation to the infantry division.

Tactics and Technique of Separate Arms - This portion of the course covered the characteristics, powers and limitations and the tactics peculiar to each arm and service relation to each other. As a result of the corps' involvement in the World War and of the growing usage of combined and mechanized arms MCS officials believed it essential that the students receive some indoctrination regarding their employment in war.

Table 10.6. (CONTINUED)
Curriculum At The Field Officers' Course-1926-28
Table 10.6 (CONTINUED)

Tactical Principles and
Decisions
- With the infantry division and smaller portions of the division serving the standard units for the tactical problems this portion of the course covered the recognized principles and accepted doctrines of warfare and their correct application to situations common to wartime service. Included in the studies in this course were tactical decision problems in arriving at the "correct" decision in carrying out orders.

Supply
- Recognized as an increasingly important aspect of modern war and its relationship to modern operations, Marine officers studied systems of supply within an infantry division.

Logistics
- Logistics covered in the course included the study of movement of troops by march, rail, bus, and naval transport.

Duties of a Division Commander and Staff
- This portion of the course examined the function of each department of a division headquarters, and the responsibilities of each member of the staff and how they are 'brought together to assure cooperation and team-play' in different tactical situations.

Troop Leading
- The troop leading course endeavored to show the functions, duties, and teamwork of the various elements of a division and their mutual relation as affected by the decisions and orders of the commander of the whole.

Topography Department
Map Reading
- The primary object of this course is to ensure that each student becomes thoroughly familiar with map reading, and its application to military work. One last aspect of this portion of the course was to ensure the student's understanding of the limitations of maps in certain situations.
Table 10.6 (CONTINUED)

Surveying and Sketching - This portion of the course was to ensure that students were aware of the various methods of mapping and became well grounded and proficient with the interpretations of maps in general. To enable the officers to organize and direct topographical work by technical troops in this field.

Law Department Criminal Law - This portion of the course involved the study of court-martial procedure, and all work pertaining to military law. Students studied past cases of the most common offenses.

International Law & Military Government - Students studied the law as it applied to the occupation of Germany at the end of the World War and former occupations. Also studied was the subject of military governments the establishment and maintenance of civil governments by military men. The MCS used examples from Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Germany.

Administration Department
Adjudant and Inspector's, Quartermaster's & Paymaster's Departments - This portion of the consisted of seven lectures and were given in order to "impress upon the students the necessity for cooperation and coordination between line and staff, as well as giving each officer a broader understanding of the scope and limitation in these departments.

Horsemanship
Equitation
Hippology - Instruction included the riding and physical characteristics of horsemanship.99

Thus, while the aim of The Basic School was arbitrary in nature, and mechanistic in content meant to prepare a young second lieutenant for service in the Marine Corps,

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both the Company Officers' Course and Field Officers' Course to an even greater degree had been designed, as Colonel Breckinridge wrote, "to remove the limits and restrictions to originality, and teach the students to apply themselves and their own innate abilities to every situation that demands an analysis and a decision."100

As for the curriculum in the Company Officers' Course, which when broken down consisted of 620 hours of classroom and field instruction, and had been designed as a further refinement of those subjects taught at The Basic School with its emphasis on infantry weapons and their employment, the impact of the World War could be visibly seen. (Table 10.7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infantry Drill Regulations</th>
<th>Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual of the Interior Guard Duty</td>
<td>Topography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals (Wig-Wag and Semaphores)</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Ordnance</td>
<td>First Aid and Medical Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Musketry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Weapons</td>
<td>Physical Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Equitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat Drill</td>
<td>Sea School101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.7
Company Officers' Course, 1921-27

While Marines of the post-World War II generation point to the development of amphibious warfare as the "revolution" of the interwar period in the Corps' operational doctrine, it could be argued that the "real" revolution in fact occurred within the Marine Corps Schools and the introduction of improved learning techniques and procedures that in time contributed to the formulation of a largely untested doctrine of amphibious warfare in the 1930's. Furthermore, the doctrine of amphibious warfare could not have

been developed, or more or less thought of, had Marines retained the pre-World War School of Application in the education of its officers. The World War, and the doctrinal changes that occurred as a result of that conflict, introduced to Marines both the technological and operational concepts that in turn enabled them to "think through" the failures of the pre-World War Advanced Base period, as well as with the failures associated with the landings at Gallipoli in 1915. For without training in staff work, combined arms, and the tactical lessons of the late war it remains doubtful that Marines could have successfully developed a workable amphibious warfare doctrine, let alone assault an enemy held beachhead tied to the concepts put forward in the pre-war School of Application with the advent of armies with increased firepower. Indeed, the very subjects placed into the curriculum of the MCS in both the Field and Company Officers' Courses reflect the fact that Headquarters recognized the not only the failures of Gallipoli, but realized that the World War held the key to successfully landing on a defended beachhead. The exercises held from 1922 through 1925 likewise reinforced the belief among some Marines officers that amphibious operations could succeed if given the proper tools and doctrine. Furthermore, the fact that Marine and Naval officers operated within the framework of the Washington Naval treaties that limited U.S. capital ships and fortification building on the islands in the Western Pacific in time proved to be a "boon" to Marine planners assigned to the Navy's War Planning department and the Division of Operations and Training, particularly Lieutenant Colonel Ellis and Colonel Dunlap, who both now operated with guidelines and at least possessed the basis for orienting Marines for an Orange war. Thus the curriculum incorporated into the MCS reflected the war planning underway at Headquarters toward the end of the 1920's. (Table 10.8)
(a) The Strategy of the Pacific Ocean
(b) Expeditionary Forces
(c) Naval Considerations for an Overseas Expedition
(d) Embarking and Loading Troops and Supplies
(e) Hydrographic and meteorological study
(f) Tactical Principles of Securing a Beachhead
(g) Landing Places (Configuration, terrain, and naval artillery support)
(h) Naval Gunfire
(i) Beach Parties
(j) Shore Parties
(k) Waves
(l) Naval Provisions for Disembarkation
(m) Disembarkation
(n) Boats
(o) Night Landings
(p) Command and Liaison
(q) Exercise and Debarkation
(r) Consolidation and Exploitation
(s) Withdrawal

Table 10.8
Subjects on Overseas Expeditions and Ship-to-Shore Operations at the MCS in 1926

Insofar as war planning itself had been concerned there was an attempt to train Marine officers as war planners. While he was head of the Marine Corps Schools, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap recommended the assignment of a group of officers to duty "For the preparation of the detailed operating plans of our basic war plans, to 'prepare' selected officers for higher executive staff functions and to influence naval thought in connection with war plans." Ultimately, the War Planning Course, was to not only "prepare a group of selected group of field officers in the higher executive staff functions; develop and clarify the role of the Marine Corps in war and qualify Marine officers to present the Marine Corps' interests before the Army and Navy War Colleges, and contribute to those institutions the experience and knowledge that has been acquired

102Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 37-8.
by the Marine Corps." Ultimately, the War Planning Course had been designed to put forth the Marine role in any joint operation.103

Unfortunately, Headquarters never acted upon Dunlap's suggestion nor is there any evidence from either primary sources nor secondary sources that it attempted to incorporate such a course inside the MCS or at headquarters itself. In fact, once Admiral William V. Pratt left the post as president of the Naval War College in 1930, amphibious studies as whole practically ceased while at the MCS, with little movement toward such the incorporation of such a necessary course during the intervening period by MCS officials until January 1933 when General Breckinridge assumed command of the school. In fact, war planning remained inside HQMC within the Division of Operations and Training, the General Board, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Yet the idea never went totally away, and was, in fact, later incorporated inside headquarters after World War II.104

Summary

The real "revolution" in Marine officer education can be seen in the fact that in 1925, Marine officers spent five hours studying landing operations while during the 1926-27 school year, they added a further forty-four hours, with this figure tripling by the commencement of the 1928-29 school year. In fact, it can be argued that this increased allotment to studying landing and ship-to-shore operations marks the commencement of the process that culminated in the writing of the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934. Even with the onset of the deployments to Nicaragua and China, and the loss of many instructors (including Colonel Dunlap who assumed command of the 2d

Brigade in Nicaragua and later Marine Barracks, San Diego, California), instruction in landing operations *did not decrease*. With the onset of the Great Depression that began in October 1929, the MCS had become by 1930, "the center for the development of techniques in landing operations."\textsuperscript{105} Despite the retirement of Major General John A. Lejeune in 1929, and the assumption of the Major General Commandancy by Wendell C. Neville, the seeds planted by both the former and General Barnett had begun to sprout and would, by the mid-1930's, begin to grow into a fully-flagged doctrine. Furthermore, the same emphasis Headquarters placed on officer education that assisted in the development of amphibious warfare doctrine did not confine itself solely to the officer corps. There was, in fact, a similar "revolution" in the Marine Corps' approach toward the development and training of a professional staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officer corps, through the introduction of professional military education and reforms in enlisted training.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid, p. 38.
CHAPTER 11

THE MARINE CORPS INSTITUTE AND ENLISTED EDUCATION

Introduction

While the reforms at the MCS insofar as officer education had been concerned moved forward, there was a similar though much slower movement toward the creation of professional staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officer corps and education system. During the first half of the 1920's, Headquarters attempted to create a system of noncommissioned officer education, though deployments to China and Nicaragua derailed them. Despite this failure, it remains important that Headquarters took the development of its junior leaders seriously during the interwar era. As this chapter illustrates, Headquarters did, in fact, make a half-hearted effort to create a school system geared toward the professionalization of its staff and noncommissioned officer corps during the early 1920's.

NCO Education: the Marine Corps Institute and Vocational Training

While reform in officer education and training remained a priority with both Major General's Barnett and Lejeune, both men likewise gave vocational and technical training of enlisted men equal attention. While some Marine staff noncommissioned (SNCO's), and noncommissioned officers (NCO's), attended the School of Application, the education of Marine enlisted men was almost nonexistent prior to the World War. In
fact, much of the "education" for a new Marine consisted of being placed under the responsibility of a senior corporal or sergeant who:

formed the backbone of the hastily organized regiment of the day. They took the half-trained recruits in hand—with caustic tongue and the example of personal reckless courage and quickly taught them the tricks of the trade.\(^1\)

Among this group of seasoned Marines there were:

... a number of diverse people who ran curiously to type, with drilled shoulders and bone-deep sunburn, and a tolerant scorn of nearly everything on earth. Their speech was flavored with Navy words, and words culled from all the folk who live on the seas and the ports where our warships go.... Rifles were high and holy things to them, and they knew five-inch broadside guns. They talked patronizingly of war, and were concerned about rations. They were the Leathernecks, the Old Timers....\(^2\)

The World War, however, changed this method of training and education for the new recruits and the "old timers" alike. Having been exposed to modern war and the methods in waging it, Major General Lejeune became convinced that Marines, both officers and enlisted men would have to learn how to "fight smart" on the modern battlefield. In fact, Major General Emory Upton's statement in his report on the *Armies of Europe and Asia* (1878) that, "a good noncommissioned officer can no more be improvised than an officer," applied directly to what both Barnett and Lejeune aimed for when they introduced a series of educational and vocational reforms in their attempts to improve the education and training of enlisted Marines. While it is doubtful both men were aware of Upton's writings, their exposure to the Army during the World War seems

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to have convinced them that they would have aim their efforts toward not only at the retention of the veteran enlisted Marines, but at the attraction of qualified recruits whom might be inclined to make the Marine Corps a career if given the right incentives such as travel (which they would, in fact, get plenty of) as well as financial and education inducements. Indeed, as both Sergeant William A. Bihary and Corporal George Donaldson indicated, Headquarters made every effort to retain them and other Marines whom not only had demonstrated leadership but had considerable combat experience, along with some measure of intelligence or education. Such, at least, was the belief and hope of Barnett and Lejeune in the immediate aftermath of the World War in 1919. Yet as was the case of the U.S. Army in the post-Civil War period, the more experienced Marine NCO's either opted for a commission (such as Gerald C. Thomas), or discharge at the conclusion of the World War, in order to return to the civilian work force then in the midst of a bustling economy. Despite the fact that Marine SNCO's and NCO's had achieved some recognition with the appointment to the Advanced Base School in New London, Connecticut, education for its veteran noncommissioned and its junior enlisted ranks remained virtually non-existent prior to 1917. Marine participation in the World War changed this, however, and by war's end, noncommissioned officers attended schools in the United States and in France for instruction on the employment of machine guns, airplane maintenance, and as artillerymen. Furthermore, the number of college-educated men and those with high school diplomas (the latter being no small feat in those

4Bihary Interview, April 1981, loc. cit.; Letter from Sergeant George H. Donaldson to Author, dtd. 15 November 1982; and Daugherty, "And They Thought We Wouldn't Fight," p. 36.
5For an excellent description of the Army's post-Civil War NCO Corps see Ernest F. Fisher Jr.'s Guardians of the Republic, pp. 142-54.
6See Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 13.
days), changed the composition of the Marine Corps' enlisted ranks and left its mark on
the post-war Marine Corps.

During Major General Barnett's last full year as the Major General Commandant, the
Marine Corps instituted two reforms regarding enlisted education that had a far-ranging
effect in the education of its enlisted men, and in particular its noncommissioned and
staff noncommissioned officers that in turn affected its war preparedness, just as the
reorganization of the MCS had at Quantico, in regards to the professionalization and
readiness of the officer corps during this same period. These reforms included the
detailing of Marine aviation ground crewmen to both the Navy and Army schools
located respectively at Pensacola, Great Lakes Training Center, as well as to the Army
Flying Fields of Carlstrom Field, Florida, and Kelly Flying Field in Texas. The other
more significant reforms, however, took place right at Quantico with the organization of
what became known as the Marine Corps Institute or MCI, and the formation of several
vocational and professionally-oriented courses such as the Quartermasters Course,
Automotive Mechanics Course, Clerical Course, and perhaps the most important, at least
from a professional military standpoint-the Sergeants' Courses. These vocational courses
taught Marines from the ranks of privates through Master Gunnery Sergeants various
abbreviated professional subjects such as warehouse and inventory management,
procurement, cooking, auto mechanics, administrative duties such as legal affairs, typing
and shorthand, and filing; infantry weapons and tactics, map reading, close order drill,
marksmanship, patrolling, and customs and courtesies. 7

The Marine Corps Institute

The first change in enlisted education came about with the organization of the
Marine Corps Institute. Formed largely as a response to the espoused progressivism of

Corps Gazette*, 5 (March 1920), pp. 34-5.
both Lejeune and his boss Secretary Daniels, the Marine Corps Institute or MCI has remained to this day (along with other professional Post-school resident military school programs), as one of the primary means of enlisted advancement through the ranks in a non-resident setting. In fact, MCI's primary mission of providing a means of self-advancement for officers and enlisted men has, in fact, never changed.

The establishment of the vocational educational program for enlisted men at Quantico in the aftermath of the World War came as a result of Lejeune's drive for military efficiency in the Marine Corps while they remained in the service, as well as and his predilection toward progressivism that desired to make these same men productive citizens once they left the service. Major General Lejeune noted in his memoirs that:

> It is the clear duty of the military authorities to provide enlisted men with educational facilities for the joint purpose of increasing their efficiency while in the service and of better fitting them for the duties of citizenship when they leave the service.\(^9\)

Lejeune had a powerful mentor in this goal, namely in the person of Secretary Daniels, himself a progressive and champion of enlisted education. Secretary Daniels, the future editor and founder of the Raleigh, North Carolina-based *News & Observer* newspaper, had already established a reputation as an ardent progressive and reformer even before he entered the Wilson Administration in 1913. The secretary's anti-elitism had already been established prior to his part in the Barnett ouster in 1920, and his desire to improve the lives and terms of service of the enlisted men (both Sailors and Marines),

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\(^8\) "Post" schools, a term that came into use in the Marine Corps in the early 1920's simply refers to those schools established at a particular barracks or station in order to duplicate those vocational and military schools for enlisted men such as in the fields of administration, Quartermaster (Supply) and legal affairs being taught at Quantico. Also falling into this category included the *Sergeants' Course* that used the same curriculum taught at Quantico.

remained consistent throughout his term as navy secretary. Being both an admirer and supporter of Major General Lejeune, it is hardly surprising that the secretary became instantly "sold" on the idea of a correspondence course designed for self-improvement. Daniels, in fact, wrote in his annual report for 1919, that with the creation of the Marine Corps Institute (a name that both Headquarters and later enlisted men have since referred to it), the Marine Corps now "had a systematic course of training designed to educate the vocational faculties of the men, and to return them to civil life better equipped for their duties as members of society than they were before their enlistment."¹⁰ In fact, in a reply to a letter sent by Major General Lejeune, then the commanding general of Quantico addressing the issue of the intent and purpose of the MCI, Daniels reiterated the value of such a school when he wrote:

24th of December 1919

My dear General:

I thank you very much for your letter of December 20th and particularly happy to know that you are going to start the schools, and I know that under your direction and Butler's you will be able to make these schools a blessing to all the enlisted men in the Marine Corps and to the Service and therefore the country. I am gratified to learn from many sources of the splendid spirit at Quantico. One of these days I am going to come down and see you all.

With warm regards and Christmas Greetings to you and yours, I am

Sincerely Yours,

/s/ Josephus Daniels¹¹


The background to the Marine Corps Institute, and how the Marine Corps came to adopt it as a means of enlisted advancement remains an interesting story that has been largely forgotten. The actual concept of the MCI originated with the International Correspondence Schools (ICS), of Scranton, Pennsylvania, which in fact provided both instructional and administrative assistance to Headquarters. As First Sergeant George W. Kase commented, the deal that established the MCI with assistance from the ICS provided that while the latter would "... furnish free text books ... the Corps ... in turn would set up their own tuition facilities operated by special trained faculty consisting of enlisted Marines with a Commissioned Officer in overall command. The facility was named the "Marine Corps Institute", (sic) located at Quantico, Virginia. All ICS courses were available to Marine Corps personnel, gratis."12 The first head of the MCI was Lieutenant Colonel William C. Harlee, and initially had a total of 215 courses in its course catalog with 4,500 Marines enrolled.13 Proud of his accomplishments in the fields of enlisted education Major General Lejeune mailed a copy of MCI's catalog to every academic institution in order to illustrate his commitment to the education and self advancement of his Marines. As Secretary Daniels wrote, once released from the service, the Marine who took advantage of such courses were "better equipped physically, mentally, and morally than he was when he entered the military service."14 While enrollment in the MCI was voluntary, "helping men to help themselves," Headquarters issued specific orders that required Marines in certain occupational jobs in the Marine Corps to take certain courses. For instance, as above-mentioned in chapter two, Headquarters required all recruiters to take the MCI course on salesmanship, and officers on recruiting duty to take the accounting course. In time, Headquarters required

all (emphasis mine) administrative clerks, legal clerks, and Marines assigned to the quartermaster's branch to take the MCI's on shorthand, typing, filing, spelling, and mathematics.\(^{15}\) When first organized, courses offered by the MCI were taught by selected instructors at Quantico to the men in the afternoon in keeping with Major General Lejeune's daily training schedule which stipulated that while Marines would perform drills and other military training in the morning, the men could either play sports or study in the afternoon.\(^{16}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stenography</th>
<th>Arithmetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Advanced Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Bookkeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Grammar</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Elementary</td>
<td>Law, General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationary Fireman</td>
<td>Typewriting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band Musician</td>
<td>Draftsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoe and Leather Repairman</td>
<td>Electrician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumbing</td>
<td>Building Foreman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile Mechanic</td>
<td>Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Husbandry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 11.1**
**Courses At the Marine Corps Institute, 1919-1920**

Outlining the advantages of the MCI for enlisted Marines, Secretary Daniels wrote that such courses:

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\(^{15}\)First Sergeant George W. Case, "*Autobiography,*" p. 88; Major General Commandant to CO, Marine Barracks, Quantico; CO, Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Boston, MA., dtd. 15 September 1927: Subj: Assignment to School for Instruction in the Quartermaster's Department Administration. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, A/I Office, General Correspondence of the United States Marine Corps, Access. No. 1520-30-95, Box 113).

\(^{16}\)See Fleming, et. al., *Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps.* p. 39.

\(^{17}\)The two most popular courses were the Auto mechanics course which recruited far in excess of its 100-man limit as well as the Stenography and Typewriting Classes which received well over 110 applications. See First Lieutenant John H. Craige, "Vocational Training in the Marine Corps," *Marine Corps Gazette,* 5 (March 1920), pp. 34-5.
... enables any Marine, wherever he may be stationed, to take the courses without any interruption of his military duties. It is not dependent on teachers or classes, enabling a student to begin his course at any time and makes as rapid progress as his studies justifies. Teachers are not required for its operation, and the system can be put into effect where it is impracticable to establish schools. Operated from a central office, it can be efficiently controlled and organized, and conducted at much less expense than any other method proposed.  

In short, with the addition of the hastily organized "post" schools, a Marine taking an MCI "does not depend on teachers or classes but operates under all conditions."

Taking an MCI course involved the Marine signing up for a course at the company office with the officer or NCO in charge of education or training. After receiving a course packet that included all the required materials to complete the course successfully, the Marine taking the MCI would finish the lesson(s) which were progressively step-by-step, and then turn in the work to be graded by MCI, after which time an examination was sent back out to the Marine. After the education officer or NCO graded the exam, the MCI issued a certificate upon successful completion of the course to the Marine, which the company office then entered in his serviceman's record book or SRB. A copy of the certificate of completion for the respective course was likewise sent to a prospective employer in order to show that the individual had such training or skills. One notable aspect of the Marine Corps' approach to helping the enlisted men was the assistance MCI gave the individual Marine upon discharge from the

18 Daniels, Annual Report 1919, p. 150.
19 An serviceman's record book (SRB) is a complete account of a Marine's service from his time of enlistment until his discharge listing all deployments, medals, awards, qualifications such as rifle and pistol marksmanship, education, allotments, and any non-judicial punishments or courts-martial, as well any other information put there by his command. In the Marine Corps records are maintained by headquarters company office for the battalion's S-1 shop.
service in seeking employment. While he served as the commanding general of Quantico, Major General Lejeune invited representatives of the different industries to talk to the Marines about future employment, as well as having groups of students visit the different industrial cities in order to enable them to plan for their post Marine Corps careers.20

Yet like everything else in the Marine Corps during those post war years, the budget to purchase materials for the MCI was small in comparison to the MCS or other programs in general. Unlike today's MCI, there was no direct budgeting provided for the correspondence schools, instead, it was what ever could be "beg, borrowed, or stolen." In fact, to keep the MCI in operation headquarters borrowed sparingly from the general appropriation fund marked "Maintenance, Marine Corps." Highlighting this latter point, Secretary Daniels wrote in his annual report for 1919, that "While no civilian teachers or assistants are employed, the institute needs funds for the supply of textbooks and students' outfits, and this need will be more pressing during the coming year, as the number of students is rapidly increasing, and indications are that more than half the total number of men in the corps will be enrolled in these courses in a few months."21 Despite the fanfare that followed the creation of the MCI, however, it almost nearly went out of existence due to money problems. Quick action, however, on the part of Headquarters saved the MCI by its immediate intervention and consolidation of its courses and by making it a part of its budget. This in turn enabled the Corps' only correspondence school for enlisted men to survive and prosper. In fact, MCI's survival was due to both the financial support from headquarters and the fact that the correspondence school became part of the larger plan on the part of Headquarters to commission NCO's when it added several courses to its catalog that assisted Marines preparing for commissioning

20Fleming, et. al., Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, p. 39.
examinations, as well as for the clerical schools held at both Quantico and at the different Marine posts. Not only did these MCI's facilitate Marines in the field who couldn't otherwise attend a formal school or class, it gave the individual Marine the "heads up," if he were to later attend the formal school.

The value of the MCI to enlisted education and self-improvement was immense. In fact, among other things, it became one of Lejeune's main accomplishments as Major General Commandant. It likewise served as a huge selling point for Marine recruiters. (Table 11.2) An officer on recruiting duty, in fact, addressed a letter to Brigadier General Smedley Butler who had succeeded Lejeune as the commanding general at Quantico, which stated that the "Institute at Quantico has, without a doubt, been the most attractive inducement offered by any branch of the service to the young men of America."^22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Students Enrolled</th>
<th>Number of Lessons Received</th>
<th>Number of Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>4,396</td>
<td>24,895</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>4,523</td>
<td>38,262</td>
<td>365</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>6,468</td>
<td>47,885</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>7,915</td>
<td>58,932</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>7,760</td>
<td>59,749</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of Students Enrolled .............. 31,062
Total Number of Lessons Received ........ 229,723
Corrected ................................ 2,965
Number of Graduates .................... 2,965

Table 11.2
Summary of Enrollments in the Marine Corps Institute
1921-1925

In sum, these figures point both to the viability and popularity of the MCI and in fact, increased in value as more and more Marines deployed to Nicaragua and later China.24 Despite this, however, as the saying goes, "There's nothing like the real thing," and attendance in formal vocational or clerical school insured promotion and/or training in a better job skill that could be translated into post-service employment, and this being the ultimate goal for both Major General Lejeune and his primary "cheerleader" Brigadier General Smedley Butler.

It is at this point in the discussion of both Headquarters, and its proponency of Marine Corps officer and enlisted education by both Lejeune and Smedley Butler that some clarification is required as to both Marines' commitment to professional military

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23 The figures here were translated into total figures prior to the start of Fiscal Year 1926 (30 June 1925). There is some controversy as to the correct figures since the annual reports to the Secretary of the Navy for 1924 and 1926 differ as to the actual number of students enrolled and with courses completed and graded. These are approximate figures based on a two-year basis for the Marine Corps Institute. See Lejeune, Annual Reports for 1924 and 1926, pp. 672 and 1230 respectively,

education, since it is an area that Butler's two main biographers have credited him without offering substantial evidence to prove otherwise. In fact, both biographers of Butler-Hans Schmidt and Ann Cipriano Venzon in their biographies on the colorful Marine general failed to offer any evidence that Butler was at all involved in the development of enlisted and Marine Corps education beyond involvement in the creation of the MCI while he served as the commanding general at Quantico.

While it remains true that Butler was, in fact, a strong proponent of the MCI, this did not translate into support for the professional development of Marine NCO's. This lack of proof may be a case of either an absence of material available to their research at the time or simply to the fact that there is no evidence to suggest that Butler was a prime mover in the development of professional military education at either the officer or enlisted levels. From the evidence available, it appears that the latter may, in fact, be the real reason for this lack of proof. While Butler's papers are filled with his exploits in Haiti, in France during the latter stages of the World War, and his service in both Philadelphia and China, they offer little insight into his views on either vocational or educational training for Marines. Furthermore, while Hans Schmidt provides perhaps one of the most detailed studies of this controversial Marine-particularly his exploits in Haiti and China, his discussion of Butler's progressive-minded reforms while the commanding general of Quantico and his commitment to Marine Corps education and vocational training for enlisted men offers very little in the way of evidence to support the claim that Brigadier General Butler in fact, was a strong advocate of professional education.

Another biographer, Anne Venzon, in her edited biographic compilation of Butler's letters to his family and friends mentions absolutely nothing of his commitment to reform or education while at Quantico. This leaves her biography of Butler both incomplete and suspect. In fact, she made the totally unsubstantiated and erroneous claim that Butler was a supporter of the "fast-developing Field Officers' Courses, Company Officers and
Basic Officers' Courses, where instructors and pupils were developing the rudiments of amphibious warfare that would play a pivotal role in the next war." Nothing is further from the truth. In fact, Venzon's assertions on Butler's support of professional education is both misleading and largely undocumented. In throwing this fact out to students of Butler and the Marine Corps during this period, Venzon offers very little in the way of evidence that either supports her assertion of Butler's commitment to professional education or, for the organization of an expeditionary force exclusively for service with the Navy. Venzon, in fact, failed to discuss Butler's disregard (and contempt) for the naval hierarchy, nor does she make mention of the basic fact that the curriculum had not even been developed for the study of landing operations until 1926, long after Butler was gone from Quantico and had assumed command of Marine Barracks, San Diego, prior to departing for expeditionary duty in China with the 3d Brigade a year later.25 These facts alone cast doubt on her assertion that Butler was one of the main advocates of enlisted education. The fact remains that it was Lejeune—and not Butler who pushed and fought for the improvement of Marine enlisted men. Butler merely acted as a "cheerleader" in his advocacy of enlisted education. While Butler claimed that he wanted to make Quantico a "great Marine Corps University," a goal it, in fact, continues to strive toward, it can be emphatically stated that the seasoned guerrilla warrior merely maintained

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Lejeune's policies while he himself stressed sports, and the Civil War reenactments of the early 1920's for publicity's sake and nothing else. 26

While it is true that Butler himself was progressively-minded, his interests in vocational education and training enlisted men centered solely upon its value to recruitment, particularly of football and baseball players. For Butler, these were the "selling points" of joining the Marines during the interwar period. 27 It is much closer to the truth that "Butler realized the importance of military education for the core of professional officers and of vocational training for young enlisted men wanting to learn a civilian trade." This was the progressive in him, and it served him and the Marine Corps well during his tenure as commanding general of Quantico. Furthermore, the fact that his father was head of the all-powerful House Naval Affairs Committee made it easier for the Marine Corps to secure the necessary funds for projects such as the MCI during a time of fiscal austerity. This perhaps was Butler's sole contribution toward the development of professional military education. Nonetheless, the fact remained that with his father as head of the House Naval Affairs Committee, his support for education was all the more important from the standpoint of the program's survivability. Despite his own disagreements with the reemphasis of the Marine Corps' ties with the Navy (and with many of the leading Marine officers leading that effort) and the adoption of an Army curriculum that stressed "big land wars" in the Marine Corps Schools despite his own predilection toward "Small Wars," Brigadier General Butler nonetheless "continued Lejeune's concepts and knew that education was a strong drawing point for inducing enlistments." 28 For Butler, education was a "tool" and nothing more for attracting and retaining them in the Marine Corps. While Butler can be credited with the establishment

26 Fleming, et. al., Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, p. 42.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
of the first truly Noncommissioned Officers' Course at Quantico during his second tour of duty there (1929-31), in order to "prepare men for expeditionary duty," this first attempt to set up a system for enlisted men to receive some type of vocational or clerical training appears to have been more of a temporary expedient rather than a permanent solution aimed directly at the professionalization of the Marine Corps' SNCO's and NCO's. Nevertheless, it was a start in the right direction.29 On the other hand, education for Lejeune was a "means" toward a longer-range goal or "end" in the preparation of the Corps for war, and as events demonstrated in the next two decades, it was the latter's emphasis on education that paid the immense dividends.

While Major General Lejeune credited Butler with some of the impetus for reform at Quantico before the House Committee on Naval Affairs on 26 February 1920, some of the credit for the Marine Corps' commitment to vocational and educational reform needs to go to someone not previously connected with the MCI, and that of course is Major General George Barnett, who at the time was still Commandant of the Corps. Nothing could have been accomplished without his approval or consent.

The Sergeants' School

While both the Marine Corps Institute and Army and Navy technical schools provided a Marine with the opportunity to enhance his vocational or clerical skills, and thus make him "marketable" in the civilian work force, Marine SNCO and NCO professional development or "career path" remained nonexistent for those that had decided to make the service a career. As for the importance of providing enlisted men with a much sounder professional educational foundation, Major Jesse Dyer commented that:

With their opportunities for advancement to higher enlisted rank, to commissioned rank in the military police forces of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, to warrant rank and to commissioned rank in the Marine Corps, there is every reason to believe we can recruit able and ambitious young men, that many of them will make the service their life careers, and that they will appreciate and make the most of the opportunities open to them to acquire a military education.\footnote{Dyer, "Military Schooling," p. 29.}

Furthermore, because of the traditional higher ratio of enlisted men to officers in the Marine Corps as opposed to the U.S. Army, both the Marines and its sister service the Navy prided itself on its corps of SNCO's and NCO's, and have relied upon them to fill critical leadership roles in time of war. As the World War demonstrated, the reliance on noncommissioned officers as a "pool" for potential officers remained at the forefront of thinking at Headquarters, and carried over into the postwar thinking of leading Marine officers, particularly Major General's Barnett and Lejeune.\footnote{See Barnett, \textit{Annual Report for 1919}, pp. 2632-3.} While staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officers formed the bulk of junior leadership billets in the Marine Corps, there existed very few educational opportunities prior to the formation of the Advanced Base School in 1910, where enlisted as well as officers attended. This lack of professional training for SNCO's and NCO's changed, however, with the Marine participation in the World War, with its increasing reliance upon more and more of NCO's to fill the "gaps" in platoon level leadership, caused primarily by casualties among second and first lieutenants, and to the ever increasing mechanization of war, and its demonstrated need for trained mechanics and skilled technicians. In fact, the mechanization of war that occurred during the World War illustrated that mechanics were just as important as trained infantrymen. Furthermore, the type of men that entered the enlisted ranks during the World War, primarily high school graduates and first and second-year college students differed remarkably from the stereotypical Marine sergeant.
who could neither read nor write but could shoot and drill a platoon of Marines with a sharp crisp cadence. Indeed, even Major General Barnett remarked in his memoirs that the Marine Corps had perhaps the "finest personnel" in its ranks during the war.\textsuperscript{32} The Commandant attributed this in part, to the fact that "we had an unusually large percentage of young college men" due to the headlines received by the Marine Brigade during the fight for Belleau Wood, "and the reports of it published in this country appealed to the young college men just at a time when they were graduated in June 1918," which influenced a good number of them to enlist in the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{33} Yet it must be kept in mind that many of these college-educated men later became temporary officers that when the postwar demobilization began, a few voluntarily reverted back to their enlisted grade in an appropriate rank. Some of these men opted either to remain in the Corps as officers (later confirmed by the Neville Board), or leave the service entirely, which left a "gap" in the enlisted ranks that Headquarters attempted to resolve with the creation of warrant officers and rapid promotions in the junior enlisted grades.\textsuperscript{34} In any event, Headquarters deemed it imperative that a program of progressive military education be developed for its noncommissioned ranks, in order that it could fill future voids on the platoon and company levels if war came.

Captain Roswell Winans, USMC, a company commander in Haiti, reiterated the calls for a better educated NCO's in a Marine Corps Gazette article (September 1925), when he called for an improved method of preparing Marines to assume the

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\textsuperscript{32} Barnett, "Soldier and Sailor Too," Ch. 26, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{33} See Burke Davis' Marine! The Life of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Chesty" Puller, USMC. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962), pp.20-5. Hereafter cited as Davis, Marine!

\textsuperscript{34} A similar situation occurred in the Army with those that reverted back to their original rank thus causing a morale problem that the it attempted to rectify either through rapid promotion by backdating time in grade or making them warrant officers. See Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, pp.216-18.

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responsibilities of commissioned as well as noncommissioned officers. While on duty with the Marine expeditionary forces in Hispaniola, Captain Winans observed that the quality of NCO's being sent to serve there was rather poor given his experience before the World War. He commented that the NCO's were, for the most part, "ignorant of their most elementary duties in such matters as guard duty and close order drills" and, "cannot fail to have proved most discouraging to the men of this organization." Winans stated that while many of these same NCO's were well-meaning, "Their training is, however, a slow process; and should have been given them prior to their promotion . . .

Winans went on to advocate that each rank, from private to sergeant should be expected to meet certain graded criteria in order for promotion to the next rank. For Captain Winans, this involved being able to not only drill a squad of Marines in close and extended order drill and be knowledgeable the use of small arms, but that they should also be expected to be able to read and understand the Infantry Drill Manual, Marine Corps Manual, or any other standard publication; know arithmetic, and have the ability to make an intelligent report, both verbal and written. For sergeants, the author stated that besides the above-listed criteria, they should be able to read maps, know company administration, and have the basic knowledge in the employment of automatic weapons, machine guns, and signaling. Winans emphasized that another problem that plagued Marine Corps NCO, and enlisted training was standardization in both examinations, and the frequency that these were given to prospective candidates for promotion. In fact, this latter problem of standardization affected officer education as well and, until Headquarters and the MCS could agree upon a standardized format for the criteria for promotion as well as for SNCO and NCO education the system now in place would yield

36 Ibid, pp. 100-1.
at best, mixed results. One last problem that had to be resolved was the recruitment of men capable of meeting this criteria, and that of course prompted the intensification of recruitment efforts aimed at securing well-qualified candidates.\(^{38}\)

Even while Headquarters had hoped to continue getting its share of the "cream" of America's male population and thus train another generation of outstanding enlisted Marine leaders such was not to be the case during the postwar years. The postwar demobilization and the rush to 'normalcy' caused a "dip" in the enlistment of such college-educated men. This "dip" did not alter the fact that the Marine Corps still received its fair share of high school graduates and adventurous college-educated enlisted men during the interwar period. Nonetheless, during the immediate postwar period, there was a disproportionate number of high school dropouts, and those who had only had graduated from grammar school enlisting in the Marine Corps. In fact, the quality of the individual entering the Marines in the early to mid-1920's wasn't up to the quality that the Marine recruiters had been accustomed to during the World War. Illustrating this last point was Lieutenant General Craig, who recalled that while serving as a rifle company commander in the Dominican Republic in the early 1920's, the Marines he had under his command were insubordinate to the point of mutinous, and one of the main reasons he slept "with a BAR by my bed most of the time at night" in order to protect himself not from the Dominican guerrillas but from the very men he had under his command.\(^{39}\) The general remembered that for many nights he could hear "these people in the (nipa) shack... (next to my tent) ... making derogatory remarks about the 'goddamned lieutenant' and the officers and everything else and what they were

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\(^{39}\)Craig Oral History, p. 34.
going to do and what they weren't going to do . . . ." It must be pointed out, however, that many of these same men, in fact, had been hastily recruited at the conclusion of the World War, and sent directly to either Haiti or the Dominican Republic [or later in China], in order to shore up the Marine forces there or replace the Marines awaiting discharge or redeployment.

As standards in recruitment dipped, Headquarters initially paid little consideration to the morals or trustworthiness of the men recruited, with the results being an increase in the number of crimes including rape, petty theft, drunkenness, sleeping on post, and violation of other military-related laws and regulations which occurred in greater frequency with the return to garrison duties. Furthermore, with demobilization and a gradual relaxation of recruiting standards, due largely to the failure to attract suitable candidates for the armed services, Marine and Navy recruiters oftentimes "overlooked" an applicant's past history in their attempts to fill the ranks. As a result, the reports of the Navy's Surgeon General for the years 1923 through 1928, point to the many men recruited in both the Navy and Marines who were found by Navy doctors to be unfit for military service either, due in large part to the areas in which they had been recruited, or their susceptibility to "fall in a bad crowd." This led not only to disciplinary problems such as unauthorized absences or fighting and the resultant court martial but to health-related problems such as excessive drinking, chronic stomach, gastro-intestinal, and sexually transmitted disease-related problems (particularly

40Ibid.
41See the Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Navy for the years 1922-28. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 19119-28, for a better view of the types and quality of the Marines and Sailors entering the naval services during the 1920's. Specifically, the reports of the Surgeon General, and the Judge Advocate General, and the supporting documentation and figures for the years 1922-28, reveal the causes and figures for discharges and illnesses in the ranks. These reports support the author's contention that the qualitative edge on manpower declined somewhat for those years prior to the drastic reductions during the Hoover administration (1929-33).
in China), which resulted in lengthy recuperative periods that inevitably caused many of them to miss duty or deployments or lowered unit preparedness.42

Yet, one has to be cautious over figures regarding the Marines recruited during the interwar era, since many of the disciplinary problems that plagued the Corps, in fact, reflected American society during this same time period. Furthermore, if one were to compare the Marines of the interwar period with that of the period immediately after the Vietnam War (1973-1977), one would find a remarkable similarity in both the types of recruits who entered the Corps, and the disciplinary and moral problems that affected its readiness. The similarities included recruits who had failed to complete high school, found it difficult to find work or hold a steady job, or were social misfits. The resemblance occurred with both the quality, and the educational levels of the Marines recruited. If one were to assess the comments by Lejeune and Winans, and compare them with those made by Marine officers during the 1970's, one would notice not only similarities in the manpower problems due largely to the lower educational level of the recruits, but how this affected its operational readiness, as well as its ability to project an image of stability and confidence as it readjusted from a warfighting to a garrison force. Manpower problems inevitably carried over into disciplinary problems. with the problems Headquarters encountered insofar as discipline and in the recruitment during the 1920's and 1930's, not totally exclusive to this era. General Charles C. Krulak, a former rifle company commander in Vietnam, and later Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995-1999), commented that much like the 1920's and 1930's, the 1970's saw

42Specifically, the comments of the Surgeon General for the years 1922-1926, reveal that the Marine Corps discharged far more for illnesses such as gastro-intestinal disorders, alcoholism, and injuries received from fights and sexually-transmitted diseases (gonorrhea and syphilis) as opposed to deaths and injuries due to combat in Nicaragua and China. See the Secretary of the Navy Annual Reports for 1922-26. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1923-1927), specifically the Reports of the Surgeon General for the respective years.
similar problems when, "Our society was in real trouble, and the Marine Corps was a microcosm of that society. We couldn't help but reflect and suffer from those same troubles." Such was the situation in the 1920's and 1930's, and while a breakdown in both discipline and respect for authority occurred during both the interwar and Vietnam-era periods in the Marine Corps of the 1920's and 1930's, there was not the total breakdown of the force during the first period that occurred during the early to mid-1970's where problems such as disobedience, "fragging," drug addiction, and race problems in the ranks were rampant. Like all commandants that proceeded him, General Lejeune's reaction to the disciplinary problems was to tighten the standards of men coming into the Marine Corps, first by increasing the age to twenty-one years, and secondly to give them some incentive to seek both promotion and education while in the service. In short, the Major General Commandant, through his attempts at curbing the desertion and absent without leave (AWOL) rates, sought to restore pride and morale in the ranks during an era when military institutions were extremely unpopular, as well as pushing forward with new ideas.

Despite the discipline problems that existed during the 1920's, there were exceptions to the type of Marine enlistee being recruited. One Marine who typified this category recruited in the late 1920's was Private Russell F. Colbert, USMC, from Boston, Massachusetts. After graduating from the eighth grade, Colbert joined the merchant marine where at age fifteen, he worked aboard a tramp steamer between New York and Caracas, Venezuela. While visiting his brother in South Carolina in early 1928, he enlisted in the Marine Corps where he had hoped to learn a trade as an electrician. While he didn't learn electrical work during his first tour in the Marines, Private Colbert went

on to serve in Nicaragua from 1928 to 1929, as a rifleman attached to Captain Merritt "Red Mike" Edson's famed Rio Coco Patrol. As Private Colbert experienced, the vocational and clerical training that the Marine Corps offered the youth of America during the 1920's, oftentimes had to take a "back seat" to the Corps' commitments in China and Nicaragua, as well as in providing various detachments for sea and shore duty. Despite the commitments both at home and abroad, Headquarters nonetheless set out to establish the rudiments for a professional military education for its NCO's. Major General Lejeune attempted to accomplish this with the establishment of the first Sergeants School in the spring of 1922.

Even though the commandant had been able to push through these reforms that had attempted to advance the welfare and lot of enlisted men through vocational and technical training, the Marine Corps' business remained first and foremost fighting wars, and it thus required a school that could train its junior troop leaders in basic general military subjects as well as administration and basic logistics. The answer to this problem was the establishment of a Sergeants' School at MCS Quantico and the various "Post" schools throughout the Marine Corps. In fact, with the establishment of the Sergeants' School at the MCS, Headquarters laid the foundation for the Marine Corps' pioneering work in the education of its staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officers. While the Sergeants' School established the precedent for SNCO and NCO professional education of a later decade, it must be kept in mind that it was not until 1930, that the Marine Corps organized the first permanent school for its career NCO's.45

Organization of the Sergeants' School

As envisioned by planners at the Division of Operation and Training, the first Sergeants' School was to be up and running by 1 October 1922, with the first session to be underway no later than September of that same year. Placed under the administrative control of the Commanding Officer, MCS, the Sergeants' School was to run for approximately four months (later expanded to nine) with the enrollment of between 40 and 50 students. The students drawn from the ranks of primarily senior staff noncommissioned officers (First Sergeants, Gunnery Sergeants, and Sergeants) had to meet the following criteria in order to attend the school:

(a) They must be under forty (40) years of age.
(b) They must have at least three years from July 1, 1922 to serve in current enlistments; including extended enlistments, which may be entered into after selection, for the purpose of rendering the noncommissioned officer available for the detail.
(c) They must be recommended for the detail by their commanding officer, who will confine his recommendations to those above indicated and, in addition, that, he considers them good material to be prepared to serve as temporary or reserve commissioned officers in time of war.

47 Rough Draft of Memorandum, Re: Sergeant's School to Major General Commandant, Signed by Director, Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, Assistant to the Major General Commandant, nd., (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, A/I Office, General Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No. 18-1520-30-100, Box 477
As for the course of study, Headquarters broke it down just as it had for both the Field Officers and Company Officers' Courses, according to hours of study on a particular subject or subject areas. In fact, the curriculum in the Sergeants' School resembled that of a cross between The Basic School and the Company Officers' Course, in both content and total hours devoted to a particular military subject. (Table 11.3)

**General Subjects:**
- Drill Regulations
- Signals
- First Aid and Hygiene
- Naval Ordnance and Gunnery
- Marksmanship 125 Hours

**Administration**
- 80 Hours

**Topography**
- 50 Hours

**Field Engineering**
- 15 Hours

**Infantry Training**
- Tactics 25 Hours
- Scouting and Patrolling 25 Hours
- Infantry Weapons 100 Hours
- Musketry 30 Hours

**Total Hours** 450 Hours

**Table 11.3**
Proposed Curriculum of the Sergeant's School April 1922

The overall goal of the Sergeants School was to make the students, "proficient in all duties pertaining to the platoon, besides expert scouts and patrol leaders, and first class instructor in the care and use of all infantry weapons." The SNCO's and NCO's attending the school were likewise given classes in company administration, which included maintaining ration cards and basic bookkeeping procedures. The instructors for the Sergeants' School came from both The Basic School and the Company Officers'

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Course. The school itself opened its doors officially on March 1, 1923, after the completion of TBS and was to run from 1 October 1922 to 20 February 1923.\textsuperscript{49}

Despite the soundness of the idea and the encouragement received from Major Dyer, who commented in his \textit{Marine Corps Gazette} article that, "It is hoped it will be possible to soon establish a Sergeant's School at Quantico for sergeants major, first sergeants, gunnery sergeants, and sergeants," little was done after the initial memorandums had passed up and down the chain of command for this first professionally-organized school for noncommissioned officers. Despite the failure to achieve a formal school for both SNCO's and NCO's, a less formal version of the school commenced operation at Quantico in March 1923, and later at Marine Corps Base San Diego, Ca., as a "post" school. Unlike its predecessor, the post schools had no formal requirements like The Basic School or the Field Officers' School. These "post" schools continued, however, to function in this manner until Headquarters ordered the creation of a permanent advanced SNCO and NCO school in 1930.\textsuperscript{50} As for the continuity of a Sergeants' School, Private Russell F. Colbert recalled that there was one "old gunny" (Gunnery Sergeant) in Nicaragua, who talked about being an instructor at an NCO School at Quantico in the mid-1920's, and told him that "being an NCO involves telling them (Marines) and not giving an order. When you start asking them to do something that's when that person gets the stripes!"\textsuperscript{51} Colbert recalled that there was some type of course at Quantico dedicated to NCO education, though was not the original one envisioned by Headquarters. The fact remained that the establishment of a professionally-run school dedicated toward the education of SNCO's and NCO's in the art of their profession had to await an end to the occupation of Nicaragua in 1933, when more Marines were

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50}Dyer, "Military Schooling," p. 27.

\textsuperscript{51}Author Phone Conversation with Staff Sergeant Russell F. Colbert, USMC, 4 October 1988, Subject: NCO Education, 1927-29.
available to attend such an NCO school without being drawn "here and there" on expeditionary duty. Like all other good ideas being discussed at the time at Headquarters and Quantico, the Sergeants' School never went beyond the initial memorandums passed up and down the chain of command between the Division of Operations and Training and the Director, MCS for just such a school.

Despite the objections and limited nature of "post schools to provide adequate schooling for Marine SNCO's and NCO's," Headquarters found these type of schools a temporary expedient to a larger problem that could only be corrected with the creation of a formalized professional school system for its junior leaders. As Major Dyer noted, however, "post" schools could be conducted only at the expense of more essential tasks.\(^{52}\) The post schools proved to be only a temporary expedient to a problem that Headquarters sought to remedy. Despite the repeated references, and calls that Lejeune made in his annual reports and post-Commandancy memoirs in regard to enlisted education, there was no further action taken on the development of a professional NCO School until the 1930's. In fact, for all of his efforts in officer education, General Lejeune failed to institute a professionally-based enlisted education system in the Marine Corps during his tenure. The establishment of a professionally-based, progressive education system for SNCO's and NCO's was, in fact, left to his successors (Major General's Neville, Fuller, and Russell), whom instituted the necessary changes in enlisted professional education at a much slower pace. This is not to say that Lejeune or his predecessors purposefully neglected Marine NCO education. They didn't. In fact, all had sought to create some type of professionally-based school or schools for SNCOs and NCO's since the establishment of the MCI. While Marine enlisted men attended the various Army and Navy technical and vocational schools or the much attended and as

\(^{52}\)Dyer, "Military Schooling," p. 28.
one might add, very popular Marine Corps-run schools for aviation ground crewmen, automotive mechanics, quartermaster sergeants, clerical, cooks and bakers, and perhaps the most important of all for the administrative personnel, there still existed the need for a career-oriented infantry-based Marine NCO advanced schooling. This would be addressed by Lejeune's successor, Major General Ben H. Fuller, who would establish in 1931 at Quantico, and later at San Diego, both an NCO School and Infantry Weapons School for officers and enlisted men.

One cannot be too critical of Headquarters failure to implement the idea of a professionally-organized formal school for Marine SNCO's and NCO's, since certain officers there recognized need throughout the 1920's and into the 1930's for just such a school. Duties guarding the mail, and the Corps' deployment schedule stripped units and posts of trained personnel from all but the essential schooling necessary for the operational side of the Marine Corps. Nonetheless, the idea for a professional school for NCO's remained cognizant in the minds of officers at Headquarters, and at the forefront of post-deployment plans once manpower levels stabilized, and they could once again pay specific attention to the proper training and education of Marine enlisted men, particularly its SNCO's and NCO's. As Marines returned from Nicaragua and China in the early 1930's, the idea for staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned schooling once again surfaced, with the result that by 1931, Headquarters was able to organize a school devoted entirely to the professional development of its enlisted troop leaders.

"A School Realized"

The Non-Commissioned Officers' School opened at Quantico and San Diego in 1931, and was broken down into five separate courses that included; a line school, the staff

53 Major General Ben H. Fuller, USMC (1930-1934) succeeded Major General Wendell C. Neville (1929-1930) in 1930 when the latter died after a prolonged illness during his first year as the head of the Marine Corps.
54 "Quantico NCO School," p. 17.
school for studying infantry drill (patrolling); supply school, communications school, and a machine gun school, and had as its mission to instruct Marine SNCO's and NCO's in the various jobs in an infantry battalion. Each school, led by a captain or first lieutenant, along with technical specialists in each of the fields, covered not only the "the School of the Soldier" as it had been known at this time, but also a requisite hour of equitation, and the Spanish language due largely to the ongoing expedition to Nicaragua. The curriculum required all students to know the nomenclature, how to fire and field strip weapons that included weapons such as the Thompson Submachine Gun, Browning Automatic Rifle, heavy and light machine guns, 37mm field guns, 3" trench mortars, and rifle grenades.\textsuperscript{55}

As far as the course of study for each of the different schools had been concerned, the school had as its mission to train a Marine SNCO or NCO to "take charge," in cases of emergency in war.\textsuperscript{(Table 11.4)} In keeping with the idea behind the originally conceived Sergeants School in the early 1920's, Headquarters structured the first formal NCO School to "mirror" that of The Basic and Company Officers' School, in terms of both courses offered, and the desired results by Headquarters:

\textbf{The Staff School:} Attended by Sergeants Major, First Sergeants and Company Clerks under Captain F. D. Patchen, and covered such topics as scouting, patrolling, map reading, sketching, message center procedures, coding and decoding messages, and combat principles occupied the remainder of the time available. Ten men originally took this course.

\begin{table}[h]
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\caption{Quantico Non-Commissioned Officer's School 1930-31 (CONTINUED)}
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\textsuperscript{55}Ibid.

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Table 11.4 (CONTINUED)

**The Line School:** Attended by Line Gunnery Sergeants, section and squad leaders (Sergeants, Staff sergeants); By using the Training Regulations as a text. Commanded by Captain A.T. Lewis, forty-two (42) students attended this course. The material presented here covered the essential subjects prescribed for examination for promotion of NCO's with special study of their application on expeditionary duty.

**Communications School:** Consisting of fourteen students instructed by Captain R.H. Schubert covered the organization of communication platoon with practical instruction in telephones, visual signalling and air-ground communication. Message center procedures that included coding and decoding messages (as practiced in Nicaragua) was studied in detail. Working hand-in-hand with Aviation, the Marines conducted a patrol that included the air-to-ground liaison. With an air officer (Lt. Chappell) the Marines learned how to call in air-ground resupply, drops, and pick-ups.

**Supply School:** Under Captain W.W. Rogers, with several company mess sergeants and supply sergeants, the nine students learned the expeditionary equipment tables as a basis, prepared lists of supplies to be prepared for an infantry battalion as a whole with each company's requirements outlined. The students then worked in the Depot of Supplies where the supplies were assembled and packed for shipment or storage. Captain H.A. Carr then lectured for twelve hours on how to handle and pack this equipment and supplies on mules. Captain J. F. McVey then gave the students two weeks in classes in mess hall managements and procedures.
Table 11.4 (CONTINUED)

Machine Gun:   
School

Under the direction of H.D. Harris comprised the platoon Gunnery Sergeants, section and squad leaders and transport corporals. Instead of the twelve hours in weapons orientation given to all students, the NCO's in this class received an additional twenty-fours in field firing techniques with six hours given to the firing of the BAR, Thompson submachine gun, and .45 caliber pistol. Marines studied the nomenclature, assembly and disassembly, and tactics in the employment of the machine gun. At the conclusion of this course the Marines fired for qualification on these weapons with seventy-eight percent qualifying as gunners. Despite the budgetary and manpower restrictions placed on training, as well as the lack of funds for replacement ammo, the Marines shot up an abundance of World War surplus ammunition.56

Besides classes on weapons, the NCO's likewise received lectures on pack transportation, bush warfare, supply in the field, air-ground liaison and cooperation, election duties in Nicaragua, establishment of a camp, landing and occupation of foreign town, embarkation and training, evacuation operations, and the mission of the Marines in Latin America. Among the instructors and lecturers at the NCO school included Major Harold H. Utley, an expert on Small Wars in the West Indies, and L.H. Sanderson, a noted Marine aviator who lectured on air-ground cooperation. The lectures they gave to the Marine noncommissioned officers represented their experiences and thoughts on the subjects that many of them had considerable experience themselves. This was particularly true of those officers whom had served on expeditionary duty or in some cases the World War. At the conclusion of each of the schools, "each student was graded on his

56Ibid.
application and proficiency and appropriated entries made in the individual service record books.\textsuperscript{57}

As for the reaction of the Marines taking the course, most agreed that it was well worth attending for the knowledge passed by the instructors. One veteran leatherneck, while in agreement with the majority of the subjects covered at the school, admitted, however, that while "we were ignorant in, or not too familiar with," the material presented, it would have been "much better had more time been devoted to special subjects-no particular ones-but the most important [ones] . . . ."\textsuperscript{58} The sergeant's comments indicated that while the majority of the knowledge "was acquired from books . . . .," he felt that, "one cannot learn that way, nor having seen it done once or twice how to strip a sub-Thompson, nor can he become familiar with its parts or the names of them." In short, nothing can replace actually doing it or firing it. This was the major difference in the attitudes and approaches Headquarters took in devising the types and methods used by the MCS in educating officers and noncommissioned officers. Whereas the bulk of the officers' courses were more theoretical in nature, enlisted education emphasized primarily practical application and rote memorization though much of what Marines learned at the Quartermasters' School, Paymaster's School or Clerical School, remained more book intensive than say, for instance, both the Staff and Line Schools. It is wrong to assume that Marine enlisted men avoided doing or attending classes that required an extensive amount of bookwork-they didn't. It was more in the emphasis of certain topics and the levels of leadership billets that the NCO's had been expected to fill that determined the scope and nature of their professional schooling. For instance, Master Sergeants and Gunnery Sergeants were taught the intricacies of battalion and

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid, p. 18.
company level weapons and administrative duties, while sergeants and corporals learned the fine art of patrolling, running a warehouse, or managing an aviation shop. This likewise held true for officers, who were taught at both the Company and Field Officers' Courses, in how conduct an attack or emplace or employ weapons, as well as learning strategy, tactics, and logistics.

As the World War demonstrated, junior leaders suddenly found themselves running squads, platoons, or companies, which in turn placed an ever-increasing burden on the training system to produce leaders that could assume positions of leadership instantaneously. Furthermore, as the Marine experienced difficulties in Nicaragua, this sort of training was not only necessary but became critical in the preparation for Marines for combat. In short, the NCO School was a microcosm of both TBS and Company Officers' Course, in both scope and content. Designed to teach Marines to lead and fight. The system Headquarters attempted to introduce into the curriculum of the NCO School was an abbreviated form of what came to be known as the "Ft. Benning Method" or in time the "Marshall Method," named after the man most closely associated with teaching company and field grade officers how to think critically and clearly on the battlefield. As Marines discovered in the late war, the fluid nature of the modern battlefield demanded leaders on the squad, platoon, and company levels to be ready to lead if called upon. This then became the goal of Headquarters as it tried to establish the Sergeants Course, and later more successfully the NCO School for as commandants from Barnett through Fuller realized, these would be the men who would lead the Marines into combat during the next war.

There is one last point that needs to be made in regard to the methodology used at the Sergeants Course and NCO School. In regards to the use of texts and the classroom as opposed to going to the field, the sergeant was wrong in his assumption that there was no intrinsic value in learning from books, since they can oftentimes provide more
information than can an instructor can about a piece of equipment's strong and weak points. The sergeant's comments reflect, however, a common view held by of NCO's during the period and beyond, in that they derived more knowledge from actual demonstrations, and a hands-on approach, as opposed to reading about it in books or manuals. To them and many officers, the real value when training with infantry weapons was in actual field firing, since this is where they believed a person gained a better appreciation of a weapon's capabilities, its shortcomings, strengths, and its employment. What MCS attempted to do, however, was to establish a balance in both classroom work, and actual field training. Furthermore, as is demonstrated in the next chapter, books and paper were just as important as bullets. For instance, there are some areas such in quartermaster's or clerical work, however, that demanded attention to bookwork and paperwork, and this is where Lejeune's emphasis on enlisted education had an even greater impact because not only was war more demanding on developing and fostering critical thinking but in administering and supplying it.

Summary

From the end of the World War up through the Commandancy of Major General Fuller, the Marine Corps moved toward the professionalization of its SNCO and NCO corps. Part of this process was the introduction of a comprehensive program of first vocational and technical training through the Marine Corps Institute, and the various "branch schools," as well as Army and Naval technical schools that trained Marines in the various technical and clerical skills. They nonetheless fell short of Lejeune's desire to create a three-tiered level of professional development for Marine enlisted men. This can be seen in the stillborn attempt in the establishment of the Sergeants School at the MCS in 1922. Deployments and domestic duties sidetracked what promised to be a start in that professionalization process. It would not be until 1930, that an NCO School built on a solid military curriculum would be started at Quantico and San Diego, which even then

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met infrequently until permanently established during World War II, as a part of the MCS in order to meet the demand for trained NCO specialists in wartime.

As Marines encountered problems in junior leadership, small unit tactics, and firearms employment in Nicaragua in the late 1920's, an NCO School proved not only to be critical but, in fact, crucial in training enlisted Marines to assume positions of leadership in an emergency. Yet once again bureaucratic infighting and Headquarters' denial of these and other problems in a Marine training had tragic results as leathernecks frequently found themselves either ambushed and cut off in the wilds of Nicaragua, due to inexperience and unfamiliarity in dealing with such situations.

Nonetheless, even as Lejeune and his two successors dealt with these setbacks in the establishment of a professional school for NCO's, in order to teach them in fundamental warfighting skills, the former did enjoy a measure of success in the creation of a professionally-run and administered Marine Corps. This was due in no small part to the school systems established in the fields of Clerical, Quartermaster, Pay, and Cooks and Bakers set up along modern, business-like methods during the first few years of Lejeune's Commandancy, and all designed to improve the Marine Corps internally and lay the foundation for a professional military force.
CHAPTER 12

THE SINEWS OF WAR AND PEACE: MARINE
ENLISTED AND OFFICER TECHNICAL SCHOOLS, 1919-1930

Introduction

During the interwar period, enlisted Marines attended not less than twelve different schools that trained them in the such diverse specialties as ships' detachments (Sea School), armorers, motion picture operators, aviation and automobile mechanics, truck and automobile drivers, radio operators, and cooks and bakers. While the combat arms and aviation still topped the list of the most desired schools among officers and senior enlisted men, the increasing demands of accurate record keeping and paperwork pointed toward the need for trained clerks and administrators at all levels in the Marine Corps. This chapter will examine the reorganization and implementation of a series of reforms in the methods of administration and accounting within the Clerical, Quartermaster, and Paymaster departments that headquarters designed to not only improve the efficiency of the Marine Corps but to implement a program of professional training for its enlisted men, which had as its goal the preparation of a force-in-readiness.

'A Well Administered . . . Ready Force'

The importance Headquarters attached to the administration of the day-to-day functioning of the Marine Corps can be seen in the establishment of three schools dedicated toward the training of clerks, quartermasters, and paymasters, all important

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functions in their own right though confined in the Marine Corps before the World War. to relative insignificance though discovered during that conflict to be no less in importance than the combat arms of infantry and artillery.\textsuperscript{1} In short, for the Marine Corps (and Army), the war highlighted the importance of combat service support functions to the proper day-to-day functioning of men in battle. This emphasis on administration and combat service support carried on into the interwar era by Lejeune, and his successors at headquarters. In fact, as part of Lejeune's reorganization of Headquarters, as well as the 1922 change in the Marine Corps tables of organization, the importance of such matters as pay, supply, legal, and the adjutant and inspector's office had been finally recognized or, "discovered" by Marine leaders, and placed under the umbrella of the "administrative staff" which handled the day to day functioning of the Commandant's staff and administration of the Marine Corps. This special staff "was responsible for directing and coordinating the technical specialists of the special staff, whose functions were to give advice in their respective specialties. Special staff officers could always appeal to the chief of staff if differences with executive staff officers became irreconcilable."\textsuperscript{2}

Along with this change in administrative practices came the recognition that specialists in such diverse administrative fields had to be trained and assigned to such functions on a permanent basis. In fact, as the Marine Corps shifted its focus away from constabulary duty to that of land combat during and immediately after the World War, matters such as administration, logistics, and fiscal matters took on a significantly increasing importance that required an ever-increasing number of men and civilians to

\textsuperscript{1}Condit, et.al., Brief History of Headquarters Marine Corps Staff Reorganization, p. 15.  
possess certain skills that ranged from stenography to accounting, typing, filing, and maintenance of office equipment. As early as 1917, there was already an attempt to establish a school for clerks at Marine Barracks, Port Royal, South Carolina, due in large part to the fact that there existed "many men who have the necessary qualifications for assignment to clerical duty," primarily drawn from the large numbers of college-educated men who enlisted in the Marines when Congress declared war on Germany in April 1917. Accordingly, Major General Barnett ordered the commanding officer at Port Royal, to establish a "training school for stenographers and clerks at the post under your command as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made . . . " with the provision that the "Men from the Recruit Depot will be detailed for this school only after they have completed the course of military instruction . . . ."  

Headquarters then divided the school into two distinct sections-Class 1 and Class 2 in recognition of the different types of administrative requirements in both the line and staff departments:

. . . Class 1, clerks for duty at Headquarters Marine Corps, the various staff offices, brigade and regimental headquarters: the course for this class to comprise stenography and typewriting only. Class 2, for company clerks, and clerks for duty in the offices of brigade and regimental adjutants, quartermasters, and paymasters. The course for this class to comprise typewriting, correspondence, preparation and the use of the various forms, especially muster and pay rolls, Quartermaster's returns, and vouchers, etc.5

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4Ibid.
Students learning stenography were taught on the Ben Pitman system and the typing classes used the touch typing method. Headquarters limited the first class at the Clerical School to twenty-five students which proved very successful. From 1917 through 1921, Headquarters established such schools in order to meet the ever-increasing paperwork that resulted from the Corps' expansion in 1916 and 1917, up through the period of demobilization in 1919. Most schools during this period, in fact, had been established by Headquarters under the administration of the commanding officer of a Marine Barracks (such as Port Royal or Quantico) as "post schools." Assisting Headquarters in the preparation of clerks for clerical school was the MCI, which offered students correspondence courses in shorthand, stenography, spelling, and basic accounting and bookkeeping. By 1922, however, the Clerical School began to take on a more formalized and permanent structure with the centralization of the school at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. It must be kept in mind, however, that the regularization of a permanent and systematic training of clerks for the Marine Corps-at large did not take place until 1926, with the establishment of a formalized school which occurred when the Clerical School moved from Washington, D.C., to the Philadelphia Navy Yard. While

November 1921, op. cit.

6The Ben Pitman system of stenography is named after Benjamin Pitman (1822-1910), a noted English phonographer who on the urgings of his brother Sir Isaac Pitman, introduced the new "phonography" or shorthand system to students in the United States. The Pitman system is based on the sounds heard and a specialized alphabet used by stenographers. Benjamin Pitman taught his method at the Phonographic Institute in Cincinnati, Ohio, of which he founded in 1853, a year after he arrived in this country. See Colliers Encyclopedia, 1980 Edition. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980), p.85.


8Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, By Direction, Memorandum for the Personnel
Headquarters attempted to regularize the training of clerks, deployments to China and Nicaragua stripped the corps of suitable candidates to send to the school until after the withdrawal from Nicaragua in 1933, when more manpower became available for assignment as clerks.

Nonetheless, the process that had begun in 1917 toward the establishment of a permanent school for clerks continued into the 1920's, despite the constant need for Marines for expeditionary duty and fleet exercises. In a memorandum dated 10 January 1922, Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, assistant to the Major General Commandant informed the Personnel Section at Headquarters that "orders are being issued to establish a Stenographer's School at the Marine Barracks, Washington, and it is desired to assemble a class of twenty-five (25) students as soon as practicable after February 1, 1922." ⁹ As for the type of men to be selected for the school, Neville spelled out the requirements that the Personnel Section was to go by in the appointment of enlisted men to such a school [and duty]:

In selecting students, the needs of the service will be kept particularly in mind and no men will be selected as students who have less than one year and six months to serve on current- or extended- enlistment after completion of the course of instruction. So far as practicable, preference will be given to the privates and privates, first class, . . . . Noncommissioned officers will not be eligible for detail as students to the school. In the case of men who now have less than two years to serve on current enlistment, but who otherwise would be selected, the conditions under which they may be detailed should be explained to them and an opportunity afforded them to extend their current enlistments in order to become available for detail as students. ¹⁰

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⁹Ibid.
¹⁰See MGC to CO, MB, Washington, D.C., dtd. 18 Nov 1921, op. cit. 493
Illustrating the temporary nature of this school though underlining its increasing importance to the Marine Corps was Neville's last statement that "arrangements will be made in time to assemble further classes in so far as there appears to be need for such specially instructed men," and that Headquarters would use the same criteria in selecting enlisted men for a clerical course of school. In time, the requirements for Clerical School included that the men selected for this school be:

... of mature age and good conduct record, have a high school education or its equivalent; must have at least two years to serve at the commencement of the course, ... and should express in writing that they are not depended upon for support and that they will not apply for discharge prior to the expiration of their enlistments.¹¹

Whereas before Headquarters required that men be in possession of an eighth grade education, the increasingly substantive and technical nature of the paperwork flowing in and out of Headquarters and in the field, as well as to the increasing requirements of official documentation, called for a well-trained and dependable administrative staff of officers and enlisted men. This entailed the training of a permanent staff of clerks and administrators, an idea that Headquarters had been in the past loathe to, due largely to the fact that it stripped men from the various field commands.

Even prior to Neville’s memorandum on the establishment of Stenographer’s School at Headquarters, the commanding officer of the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., outlined, in a letter to Major General Lejeune the curriculum to be used in this school. (Table 12.1)

Penmanship ........................................ 30 hours
Spelling ........................................... 60 hours
Elements of Grammar .......................... 30 hours
Elements of English Composition .......... 30 hours
Punctuation and Capitalization ............ 110 hours
Letterwriting ...................................... 30 hours
Single Entry Bookkeeping ................... 10 hours
Shorthand ......................................... 240 hours
Typewriting ........................................ 240 hours

Total 780 hours

Table 12.1
Curriculum For A Stenographer's Course 1921-1926

The school itself was to last a total of twenty-four weeks (or approximately six months' duration), and upon completion of their studies the students returned to their original commands where they assumed the position as company and battalion clerks. Headquarters retained those students whose high scores qualified them as instructors for the next class or put to work at either the MCI or, in the Division of Operations and Training, at Headquarters. In addition to the training of clerks at the Stenographer's School Headquarters likewise made arrangements with the Underwood and L.C. Smith Typewriter companies, both of whom offered to train enlisted Marines as repairmen at no cost to the Marine Corps, in order that certain members of the "clerical school be sent there for the necessary instructions. In this manner the enlisted man can get a very thorough knowledge of their work," 13

13 Detail Office, Office of the Major General Commandant, Chief of Educational Section, 495
As for those students who either failed the course or found unsuitable for other reasons [such as disciplinary or personal], Headquarters reassigned them to their original commands where they resumed their regular duties. In fact, as the experience of two such students, Privates Marvin Collins, and John Bouilly demonstrated, Headquarters became alarmed over the fact that while some of the graduates of Stenographer's School performed their administrative duties satisfactorily, their inexperience in the Marine Corps and unfamiliarity with the hierarchical nature of correspondence which "puzzled" some of them, as well as to the basic fact that they were not "experienced soldiers" placed into question whether they could handle routine office correspondence on a daily basis.\footnote{HMQC, dtd. 22 March 1923, Subj: Report on Graduates of Clerical School Detachment. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, A/I Office, General Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No. 1520-30-55-178858, Box 113).}

As for the popularity of the clerical schools with the enlisted Marines, within a matter of a few months after Headquarters put out the request for students many Marines who had been working as clerks and those desiring such training bombarded the Division of Operations and Training with requests through their commanding officers for assignment to the next formal Stenographer's class. Many Marines, were, in fact, willing to take a reduction in rank to private first class or private in order to train as a clerk that would inevitably prepare them for a civilian job later on. In one such case, Corporal Edgar J. Foy, who had been stationed at the Marine Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot in Dover, N.J., submitted a request for reduction in rank in order to attend the Stenographer's School through his commanding officer, Captain Stewart B. O'Neill. In forwarding his recommendation for approval of Corporal Foy's request, the captain

stressed the corporal's diligence and familiarity with "pay-rolls, and muster rolls," as well as his "attentiveness to duty and desire to improve himself." In other cases, such as that of Private Thomas J. Chandler, who had been on barracks duty at the Naval Ammunition Depot, Iona Island, NY, Marines agreed to extend their enlistments in order to complete the same Stenographer's School.\(^\text{15}\)

In short, the necessity for trained clerks, able to handle the pay and muster rolls, official correspondence, and increased paperwork that came as a result of administering an expanded force demonstrated the need for a formalized school that trained Marines on a regular basis had become apparent even before the World War. With demobilization and the reorganization of Headquarters itself, as well as the release of many civilians that had been hired to assist Major General Barnett's small, overworked staff, here was the realization that qualified Marines should be trained in a variety of clerical skills. Furthermore, with the organization of the MCS in 1920-21, the requirements for typists and clerks placed an even greater demand on the Stenographer's School to produce a steady flow of suitable Marines trained with such clerical and technical skills such typewriter, and mimeograph machine repairmen to support the instructor staff at Quantico. This proliferation of support personnel would carry over into the day-today functioning of the Marine Corps in both the establishment of similar schools in the training of quartermaster clerks and pay roll clerks. In fact, the World War demonstrated that modern warfare demanded more than just well-trained infantrymen and artillerists, it required Marines trained in such skills as routine administrative matters, bookkeeping and accounting, and perhaps most importantly, in matters related to logistics. As the Marine Corps returned from France and reoriented its focus and mission

toward service with the Navy Headquarters, armed with the lessons of the World War in personnel matters and logistical matters, renewed its focus on both internal reorganization in both administration and fiscal matters, as well as with improvement in the manner it stored, managed, and preserved the logistical support it required to use in war.

The Quartermaster's School

Prior to the Corps' service in the World War, the Quartermaster had played an important though largely separate role in the equipping, maintenance, and storage of items used by Marine expeditionary forces. With its major offices and warehouses permanently stationed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the responsibilities of the Quartermaster Department expanded greatly during the World War. This can be seen in the number of personnel assigned to the Quartermaster's Department, and the amount of supplies it handled during the war. In regards to the number of personnel at Headquarters dealing with quartermaster issues, from a 1 June 1917 figure of 4 regular officers, 10 civilian clerks, and 43 enlisted Marines totaling 57 the figure tripled within a year [30 June 1918], to 9 regular officers, 12 warrant officers, 2 civilian technical representatives, 8 civilians, 53 enlisted Marines and 111 enlisted reserves, for a total staff of 195 tripling the quartermaster department's representation at Headquarters in terms of both personnel and increased paperwork. The second figure is even more revealing as to the relative importance of the Quartermaster Department in war. The Depot of Supplies at the Philadelphia Navy Yard by war's end had handled over 31,000,000 tons of supplies, and had expanded to a force of 13 commissioned officers, 7 warrant officers, 2 civilians, 102 enlisted Regular Marines, and 21 reservists along with

16 Other areas designated as commissary storage facilities during the World War included San Francisco, Charleston, Baltimore (later moved to Philadelphia), and Norfolk where the Marine Corps maintained reserve supply stores. See McClellan, Marines in the World War, pp. 89-90.
17McClellan, U.S. Marines in the World War, p. 89.
1,095 other employees of all classes for a total force of 1,240. Along with this increase in the size and scope of the Quartermaster’s Department, there also came the added need for trained quartermaster personnel. In fact, as the Quartermaster Department and the Marine Corps itself expanded, it became necessary to promote experienced quartermaster clerks and sergeants to the commissioned ranks that left a number of vacancies in the rank of quartermaster sergeants which Headquarters sought to remedy with the promotion of select enlisted men. While the men selected proved willing and easy to train in the rudiments of the Quartermaster Department, there arose the need for the formation of a "school for the instruction of quartermaster sergeants," which the Marine Corps organized at the Marine Barracks, Norfolk, Virginia. During the war this school conducted three classes, with many of the students serving either at one of the continental Marine quartermaster sites or overseas in France.\textsuperscript{18} Representatives of the Quartermaster’s Department likewise served at Headquarters and attended staff meetings there, and with War Industries Board officials in Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, Ill., and Philadelphia, Pa., where it took notes on such issues as supply, transportation, construction, and finance. Among the most important duties of the quartermaster personnel was the maintenance of accurate records and balances in order to insure that Marine planners had full knowledge of its logistical base in order to keep its forces in France (as well as in Haiti and the Dominican Republic) well-supplied.

Once in France, Marine and Army quartermaster personnel attended specially-created French and British schools, which had as their ultimate objective providing a "constant stream of trained officers and men for service with the troops and at all military establishments."\textsuperscript{19} Back in the United States, Marines attended Army schools that had

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid, p. 90.
been established to train both officers and enlisted men in the various aspects of work in
the quartermaster's department. In fact, as the war demonstrated, the schools-both
overseas and at home proved to be very successful in the accomplishment of its mission.
With demobilization in 1919, it had been hoped that the training schools established
during the war be "resumed as soon as it is possible to assemble the necessary personnel
to continue the school." In fact, as the World War demonstrated, it was not only in
the fighting that changes took place at Headquarters but in the "revolution" in the
conduct of administration and paperwork. This "paper" revolution likewise affected the
way in which the Quartermaster Department maintained, kept track of its inventory, and
stored equipment.

Quartermasters now had to keep track of the incoming and outgoing bids and
contracts as well as in the allocation and distribution of supplies in numbers that previous
to the war would have seemed unbelievable at best. With the arrival of the modern
sinews of war to the Marine Corps, a system had to be developed in order to "follow up"
on bids, orders, contracts, deliveries, and non-delivery of items purchased. In order to
maintain an accurate and thorough records of all of its holdings, Headquarters created a
special section or "follow-up system" where "record was made of all orders, contracts,
purchase orders, and requests for transfer of supplies from other departments." The
actual function of this "follow-up" system or section was to "see that supplies were
delivered in accordance with contract obligations and trace delinquent deliveries." It was
from these records that the quartermaster had available at all times an accurate record of
"all outstanding orders as well as a concise record of completed contracts." Hence,
came the postwar necessity of training Marines in the duties of a quartermaster sergeant

20Ibid.
21McClellan, U.S. Marines in the World War, p. 90.
22Ibid.
that included knowing what forms to fill out, how to fill them out, and how to maintain and file them in order to retrieve them at a later date when the need arose. Part of this need was the training of a force of clerks trained to fill out the endless number of requisition forms, maintenance logs, and in the answering of general correspondence. General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who spent a short tour of duty as a quartermaster officer at the Norfolk Navy Yard in 1918, indicated that the paperwork and massive confusion made him nostalgic for the simplistic quartermaster duty he experienced in Haiti.²³

In order to assess the need and the impact of the Quartermaster's School of Administration, one must examine how Marines handled supplies and kept track of the same at the Philadelphia Depot and elsewhere. Prior to the reorganization of the Quartermaster Department along modern lines, Major General Bennett J. Puryear, who was a company grade officer during the interwar era, recalled the confusion with Marine Corps logistics during the World War. He specifically remembered the scene at the Philadelphia Depot of Supply during demobilization, and stated that the supply problems over inventory and storage didn't change right away during the 1920's, though gradually "improved" over time as Lejeune's reforms began to take hold throughout the remainder of the decade. Puryear attributed part of this improvement to the improved training of quartermaster clerks, and of the further refinements in Headquarters procurement policies. Major General Puryear illustrated one specific example of the confusion that existed in the procurement system for shoes, in order to point out the antiquated bureaucratic practices that the "old timers" were loathe to give up, and replace with newer and sounder methods of inventory control. When Puryear checked into the Quartermaster's Depot in Philadelphia, he recalled that Brigadier General Cyrus Radford

²³Vandegrift, Once A Marine, p. 54.
instructed him to "study all the problems of the depot and make a report of what I found." Starting off in the office on the first floor where Marines prepared purchase schedules, Puryear asked a quartermaster sergeant who prepared the requisition forms, "how do you buy shoes?" The sergeant answered, "Well, we take an inventory of what we have and we buy the things we don't have." Puryear then asked him "Have you any idea of how much you've used of different kinds, different shoes, different sizes?" The sergeant replied "No, it would take another clerk to keep track of issue by sizes." To his amazement, Puryear told the astonished sergeant that "Well, I don't see how you can run the office intelligently without having a record of issue by sizes of shoes, because that's very important. In some sizes very few are used and other sizes are popular in how people use them."24 In his report to Brigadier General Radford, Puryear wrote that some effort had to be made toward "getting some idea as to what sizes are needed, on what you've been issuing." Upon reading Puryear's report, Radford, one of the Marine Quartermasters largely responsible for the creation and expansion of the Marines Supply Depot in Philadelphia, as well as being himself an enthusiastic practitioner in the application of modern business methods to military organizations, recognized that what Puryear said made sense but that it would, in essence, "cost another clerk, $1500 a year."25 Despite Puryear's opinion that in the long run "it would be worth it," to add another clerk, since it would enable the Marine Corps to get a handle on what it had and what it needed, it sadly "didn't have any effect since nothing was done right away," as

25Brigadier General Cyrus Radford, USMC graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1890 and entered the Marine Corps in 1892 as a second lieutenant. After service afloat and on shore, Brigadier General Radford became a Quartermaster in 1903. See Brigadier General Cyrus Radford, USMC Reference Folder, (Washington, D.C., Marine Corps History and Museums Division, HQMC, Reference Section).
Brigadier General Radford temporarily shelved the idea in favor of economy. This incident alone pointed to the Marine Corps' increased requirements for a qualified staff of clerks in order to manage what had become an increasingly difficult task. Eventually, however, something was done, but it was not until the 1930's when Marines began to maintain accurate records of all logistics specifically in this case of issue by size when funding permitted the dedication of the necessary number of clerks toward an accurate accounting of everything in the Marine Corps' inventory.\textsuperscript{26}

The problems Major General Puryear discussed in his report over the proper issuance of shoes in their respective sizes highlighted the larger problems of storage, and accurate record keeping of where, and how Marines stored and kept track of its critical warfighting equipment. The World War, and the demobilization at war's end, necessitated the proper marking and storage of surplus equipment with its storage location annotated so as to render its availability as quickly as possible in time of war. In short, Headquarters had hoped to avoid the confusion that abounded before the World War, as to what supplies it had, and where they had been stored, and in what condition the equipment was in. Instead of having supplies scattered about with an inaccurate accounting of such equipment available to Headquarters, the late war demonstrated that modern war allowed but little time in the location and preparation of equipment in storage.\textsuperscript{27} Insofar as the Marine Corps had been concerned, the problem was both one of a shortage of quartermaster personnel, as well as an antiquated pre-war methodology in storage, inventory control, and maintenance. The problems identified by Puryear

\textsuperscript{26}Puryear Oral History, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{27}The confusion in the Quartermaster Department that Puryear and Vandegrift allude to can be compared to the disorderly state of that department and the Depot of Supplies in general prior to the War with Spain in 1898 and thereafter. See Brigadier General Charles Heywood, \textit{Report of the Brigadier General Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy for 1901}. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 1212-3.
accentuated the need for quartermaster personnel trained in administrative and clerical skills, hence the decision by Headquarters to form a Quartermasters School located first at Quantico, later at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

In a memorandum from the Division of Operations and Training to Brigadier General Logan Feland, then the director of that division, regarding the importance of a school for quartermaster clerks that had more substance to it in the way and subjects it trained Marines for such duty, Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Turrill emphasized that:

The School in question has been in operation at Quantico, V.A., and is a necessity for its continuance. The Quartermaster Department needs trained clerks who are familiar with the work to be carried on in the various offices of the Quartermaster Department. Trained clerks should be in Quartermaster Departments in the small posts of the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{28}

General Feland emphasized these same points in a memorandum to the Quartermaster dated as far back as 25 April 1921, where he stressed the fact that the six weeks given to training clerks in such subjects as typewriting, correspondence, filing, property and subsistence accountability, purchasing and preparation of vouchers, and transportation (passenger and freight) was totally "inadequate."\textsuperscript{29} Feland urged that not only should the course be lengthened to four months, but that an additional ten days be tacked onto the course in order that thorough examinations be given to the students so as to insure the thoroughness of their preparation, and readiness for duty as quartermaster clerks and sergeants once they graduated from school.

\textsuperscript{28} Memorandum for General Feland. Subject: School, Quantico, Master, Administration, dtd. 21 August 1924. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, A/I Office, Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No. 1520-30-95-20, Box 113).

\textsuperscript{29} Major General Commandant to CO, MB, Naval Operating Base, Hampton Roads, VA., Quartermaster's Department, School Administration, dtd. 17 April 1924. 3d Endorsement, Brigadier General Logan Feland, Memorandum, dtd. 25 August 1921. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, A/I Office, General Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No., 1520-30-95-20, Box 113).
Insofar as qualifications of the men attending the Quartermaster School General Feland urged that they should at least possess high school or business college training, have had experience as clerks in either a business or military office for not less than six months, or have sufficient education and training so as to enable them to handle paperwork. At a minimum, Marines selected to attend such a school should have at least one year's service in the Marine Corps. 30 As in the case of stenographers, Feland urged that the men have sufficient knowledge of and in the military (i.e. Marine Corps), and a basic knowledge of military correspondence.

While students attending the Quartermaster School spent the majority of their time in the classroom learning about the different forms and how to fill them out, as well as in typing and filing correspondence, they likewise spent time in the warehouses at both Quantico, and later in Philadelphia where veteran Marine quartermasters instructed them in the proper packing and storage of clothing, subsistence stores, as well as other classes of supplies. Besides being required to perform all of the assigned duties of a quartermaster sergeant in an office of Post Quartermaster the other classes given to the Marines attending this school included subjects on:

- Each student was required to submit requisitions to the Depot Quartermaster for supplies and also to invoice the articles stated, to the offices of the Post Quartermaster requiring same; the establishment of property accounts and the accountability of all Marine Corps Property.
- Establishing and closing Clothing accounts for enlisted men; the filling out the proper forms; Clothing allowances and checkage of uniforms.
- the operation, inspections, and records, etc., of heating plants; accounting for all fuel, allowances of electric current.
- Animal care, forage, and motor vehicles instruction and the necessary forms for requisitioning and repair thereof;
- Purchasing of Supplies and Services; Classes given in contracting, awards, and proposals.

30Ibid.
- Each student was required to prepare an account current, and all papers in connection with or are submitted with the account current, was covered and explained. Each student then being required to state the distribution of each copy, and list of papers or vouchers accompany same.
- Transportation of troops with instructions given in the preparation and distribution of all forms covered under these paragraphs, as to issuing transportation requests, routing, and making out all reports pertaining thereto.
- Transportation of Supplies.
- Quartermaster Sergeants provided lectures on bills of lading, loading of shipments and the routing of such, and the preparation of such forms as necessary.31

At first the average incoming class to the Quartermasters School was twenty students with a drop rate of about three students per class. Eventually, Headquarters increased the quota for incoming classes called for thirty-five students. The average grade per student ranged anywhere from ninety to around the eighty-seven percent range. Upon graduation, students received a certificate of graduation as well as an entry into their record books and then left for the Marine posts scattered throughout the United States or overseas.32

The Paymaster's School

Like the Quartermaster Department, and Marine Corps in general, the Paymaster’s Department during the World War witnessed a phenomenal growth in both size and mission. Accompanying this rapid growth was a tenfold increase in paperwork and records keeping for this expanded force. In order to keep up with this increased paperwork, Headquarters authorized the creation of a school for the instruction as

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31HQMC, Division of Operations and Training: Memorandum on the Course of Instruction at the School of Administration, Quartermaster’s Department, Marine Corps, 11 March 1929 to 31 July 1929. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, A/I Office, Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access No., 1520-30-95-20, Box 113).
32Quartermaster’s Department to Depot Quartermaster, Subj: Increase in the Numbers of Students in School in the Quartermaster’s Administration and Increase in Space Required on that Account, dtd. 31 March 1931. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, A/I Office, Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access No., 1520-30-75, Box 113).
paymasters at Parris Island, S.C. With the demands of war, however, the school could not train the number of clerks required to meet the demand placed on the Marines in all of the duties required of paymasters. This in turn compelled Marine officials to not only shorten the length of the school but to select those recruits at Parris Island who had previous clerical experience as paymasters or clerks in dealing with payrolls or administration and assign them immediately to the paymaster’s department. This not only deprived the combat units of potential officers or NCO’s, but it meant that the Marines themselves were, in effect, half-trained and without the requisite military knowledge desired by many senior Corps officers in the ways and methods of the Marine Corps. As above-mentioned, this became an ever increasing problem during the early formation of the stenographer’s and clerical schools.

With the rush to train as many clerks as was physically possible, much of the training of the paymaster clerks was on the job training, with the result that many of them reported to their next command either totally ignorant of their responsibilities, or half-trained with the result that they made many mistakes. Furthermore, when many of these same paymasters and stenographers left for overseas duty in France or elsewhere, Headquarters found it necessary to enlist or enroll women "Marinettes" as they were known, in order to compensate for the loss of so many men sent overseas. These Women Marines, recruited "from the ranks of young business women experienced in secretarial and clerical duties," and required to meet the same rigid mental, physical, and

33McClellan, U.S. Marines in the World War, p. 86.
34This is known in the Marine Corps as OJT or "On the Job Training."
35Ibid; Included among the subjects taught at the Paymaster’s School were grammar and composition, geography, U.S. History, Arithmetic, Marine Corps Administration (Chapters 23 to 30, Marine Corps Manual), Marine Corps Orders, Circular letters. Marines attending this school likewise received classes in pay and allowances, allotments, extra pay (such as for Marksmanship qualification, settlement of claims and adjustments, legal matters that result in financial deduction from pay), vouchers, accounting, bookkeeping, and typewriting.
moral standards expected of the male Marines, attended a special "boot camp" where Marine drill instructors taught them basic drill, military courtesy, and how to wear the uniform. Entering the Corps as privates, these women worked as clerks and stenographers though they did not leave the continental United States. At the conclusion of the war, the "Marinettes" received honorable discharges and "returned to their former occupations prior to the war." 36 Many of these same women remained in Washington, D.C., where many entered governmental service as federal employees. With the end of the World War, however, and the rush to demobilize Headquarters not only discharged its "Marinettes" but once again found itself short of qualified paymasters and paymaster clerks, hence the origins of a permanent school in order to properly train them as administrative clerks in the paymaster's office as well as with the Adjutant and Inspector's Office, and with the Quartermaster Department. 37 (Table 12.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sergeants</th>
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<th>Private First Class</th>
<th>Privates</th>
</tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Department</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12.2
Assignment of Women Marines to Duty During the World War, 1917-1919

Besides being utilized as clerks in the offices of the Adjutant and Inspector's Office, Quartermaster, and Paymaster, Headquarters assigned several women to recruiting duty

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36 Ibid.
as recruiter's aides. Here they performed both secretarial roles, as well as appearing at war bond and recruiting rallies. As for the reaction of their male peers, Private First Class Edith Macias recalled that the men were actually "glad to have us. We were given a job to do and we did it. We were definitely not considered decorative rather than practical, but were treated as professionals."39 Responding to a question regarding the overall performance of these first Women Marines, Major General Barnett stated unequivocally that the "service rendered by the reservists (female) has been uniformly excellent."

Nonetheless, demobilization brought with it the need to train newly-recruited men to assume the primary role as clerks and paymasters at Headquarters as well as with the Marine Corps in the field. Like the Quartermaster Department, which had achieved great success during the war and in the immediate aftermath in retaining the infrastructure of a school to train its personnel, the Paymaster's Department set out to establish a similar school for its clerks. While its duties differed from that of the Quartermaster Department, the Paymaster's Department adopted a course of study similar in content to that of the Quartermaster School, owing to the fact that the emphasis was on clerical functions not too different than what quartermaster clerks did on a day-to-day basis. Likewise, the change from a year's end-balancing of accounts received and outstanding to that of a month-to-month balancing of the books placed an even greater need for clerks trained in accounting and correspondence matters. The solution Headquarters came up with was the creation of a separate Paymaster's School that prepared Marines to maintain such books. The Paymaster's School which began in 1927, at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., had as its mission to train men for clerical duty in the Pay Department.40 According to Major General Lejeune:

This school was established primarily to supply competent clerical assistants, with two years to serve in their current enlistment, to the offices of this department on foreign stations. The instruction of these men has been under the supervision of a pay clerk or chief pay clerk, and the course has averaged six weeks. 41

Headquarters Marine Corps likewise established a similar course for officers prepared by the Paymaster that covered the duties and functions as an assistant paymaster. Offered primarily to line officers (infantry and artillery) as a means of orientation to the field of

41 Ibid.
disbursing by means of a correspondence course, Major General Lejeune had hoped that more officers would take the course. He noted in his annual report that, "it is hoped that the privilege of this correspondence course will be availed by a large number of the men in the Marine Corps in the future whether or not they are prospective candidates for detail in this department."\textsuperscript{42}

Included among the subjects studied by the Marines at the Paymasters School were Grammar and Composition, Geography, U.S. History, Arithmetic, Administration (Chapter 23 to 30, Marine Corps Manual), and Marine Corps orders and circular letters. Marines who attended this school likewise received classes in pay and allowances, allotments, extra pay (such as for marksmanship qualification), settlement of claims and adjustments, legal matters that result in financial deductions from base pay, vouchers, bookkeeping, typewriting, spelling, and filing. In short, Marines who attended the Paymasters School received a healthy dose of the day-to-day functioning of a pay section on the company, battalion, and headquarters levels.\textsuperscript{43}

One result of the increased emphasis on fiscal and office procedures, as well as the establishment of the Paymaster's School at the Depot of Supplies later on in 1917, was the allowance for an increase in the number of warrant officers which had been authorized by Congress in July 1917 to the Quartermaster's Department. In that piece of legislation, those commissioned officers holding temporary appointments if not found "qualified" for regular commissions could be appointed as warrant officers in the Marine Corps. The establishment of the warrant rank in the Marine Corps among the

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid, p. 1200.
\textsuperscript{43}Circular Letter, Major General Commandant to All Officers: Subject: Examination of Candidates for Appointment as Warrant Officers and Chief Warrant Officer, dtd 24 October 1927; also HQMC Memorandum for Officers in Charge War Plans Section: Subject: Personnel at Marine Corps Training Establishment-War Strength, dtd. 20 February 1928 in the Major General Clayton B. Vogel, USMC Papers, (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, HQMC, PC#2, Box 6), pp. 1-2.
Quartermaster, Paymaster, and other clerical fields was a recognition on the part of Headquarters that this kind of work "was performed increasingly by warrant officers, master sergeants, staff sergeants, and privates first and second class [for the Marine Corps private and privates first class] (with specialist pay). These men were trained at vocational schools established at corps areas and department headquarters." 44

Paralleling that of the Army during the immediate postwar period, the Marine Corps now had a system whereby an enlisted man could "advance through their military career to commissioned officer rank . . . " 45

Much like the Army, the Marine Corps found itself with a surplus of "temporarily" commissioned officers at war’s end. Whereas the Marine Corps was able to appoint a vast majority of those who requested regular commissions at the conclusion of the Neville Board in 1920, the Corps still fell far short of possessing an adequate number of qualified assistant quartermasters and assistant paymasters. To remedy this situation, Headquarters requested that Congress authorize the creation of the ranks of Chief Marine Gunner, Chief Quartermaster Clerk and Chief Pay clerk, all subject to the same methods of promotion and pay as those commissioned officers in the naval services. 46 Congress did, indeed, authorize the establishment of the above-mentioned ranks on 10 June 1926, with the provision that the men so appointed have six years of service, and had passed an examination in order to demonstrate their mastery of certain subjects as well as in their respective fields. 47 During the Second World War (in October 1943),

47Ibid.
Congress abolished the ranks of Chief Gunner, Chief Quartermaster and Pay Clerks and replaced them with today's system of commissioned warrant officer.

**Ordnance, Motor Transport, Cooks and Bakers Schools, and Aviation Mechanics**

The Philadelphia Navy Yard during the interwar period, was a beehive of activity, particularly in the establishment of the Stenographer's, Quartermaster, and Paymaster's schools during the 1920's. While administration had become an ever-increasing time-consuming though necessary function, the Marine Corps remained a warfighting organization, with all of its other functions being subordinated toward that end. During the interwar period, this latter fact remained paramount to all others as Lejeune guided the Marine Corps through the austere interwar period. While the MCS at Quantico trained the officers who would lead Marines in the field, the Depot of Supplies at the Philadelphia Navy Yard trained the Marines who would manage and distribute supplies, handle administrative and pay matters, as well as fix and refurbish its weaponry and motor vehicles.

During the World War, both the Ordnance and Motor Transportation sections came into their own with Marines becoming aware of the vast arsenal of newer and more deadly armaments, and of the mechanization of war. During the World War, the Overseas Depot established a staff school "for the training of first sergeants, mess sergeants, cooks, company clerks, armormers, etc."\(^{48}\) The training of armormers and mechanics expanded greatly, in fact, due largely to the increased firepower available to the combat arms (infantry and artillery), and to the rapid mechanization in motor transport and the newly-established Marine Aviation Force which placed a greater demand on manpower and the need for enlisted men trained in such skills in aircraft and

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basic motor transportation repair. To meet the increased demand for armorers and mechanics, Headquarters sent enlisted Marines to attend a rigorous eight-week school at the Navy's huge training center at Great Lakes Training Station, located in Chicago, Illinois. Other leathemecks attended a similar course for aviation mechanics at San Diego.\textsuperscript{49}

While demobilization took its toll on the enlisted and officer strength alike, Headquarters maintained the infrastructure that the war had created, and continued to send students to both Army and Navy technical schools. At the same time Headquarters laid the groundwork for the creation of its own Marine Corps schools that taught Marines (both officer and enlisted) the basic operating and repair principles of Army ordnance and vehicles (with exception of the Jeffrey quad truck), that the Marine Corps had acquired during the World War.

\textit{The Ordnance School}

One of the most important support functions in a Marine unit is the company or battalion armorer. Trained in the repair and maintenance of firearms, artillery, ammunition, and incendiary devices, armorers keep Marines doing what they do best: fighting. With this in mind, Headquarters opened a school for the instruction and training of armorers. In connection in with the Ordnance Section at the Philadelphia-based Depot of Supplies, an armorer's class had been established there in the winter-spring of 1925. Having possession of over 50,000 Springfield .03's, as well as a large quantity of other small arms, and other unused ordnance such as grenades, and other equipment that had been turned in at the end of the World War, the first priority after demobilization was the maintenance, reconditioning and refurbishing, and storage of this vast quantity of unused equipment. The rifles, for instance, having been exposed to the conditions of trench

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid, p. 74.
warfare in France, were in "varying conditions of serviceability," which in turn prompted Headquarters to order not only the inspection thereof, but if necessary, their repair and preparation for storage. This desire on the part of Headquarters to inspect, repair and store its weapons and equipment in turn gave birth to the organization of the Ordnance Section.\textsuperscript{50} Established by Colonel Cyrus Radford in 1919, and later commanded by Lieutenant Colonel D. C. McDougal, the Ordnance Section soon took charge of the segregation into classes of condition, serviceability, packaging and storage of all firearms and equipment turned over to it by the various supply depots located in the disembarkation ports by Marines returning from France. Given both men and space to work, the Ordnance Section set up shop at the Depot of Supplies. In time, this section saved the Marine Corps thousands of dollars in needless replacement or major repairs.

The mission of the Ordnance Section was the maintenance of rifles, pistols, bayonets, machine guns, and the other ordnance used by the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{51} In order to fulfill its mission, this section established a three-phased process whereby Marines inspected, repaired if necessary, and packaged these firearms for storage. This in turn gave rise for the necessity in training qualified Marines as armorer, in order to maintain and repair this vital equipment. In 1925, Headquarters established at the Depot of Supplies, a school for armorer where students received practical training "at the work benches," under the supervision of experienced instructors on all of the small arms used by the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{52} The Armorers School comprised of ten students each, and met three times a year, lasted twelve weeks, \textsuperscript{53} which consisted of classes in nomenclature,

\textsuperscript{50} Harry L. Smith, "Ordinance Section: Depot of Supplies, Philadelphia, Pa.," \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, 10 (December 1925), p. 184.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{53} Interestingly, the Marine Corps' Ordnance or "Armorers" School is still twelve weeks in duration though it is now located with that of the U.S. Army's Ordnance School at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland.
assembling, and dismantling of weapons and other ordnance including smaller caliber Navy guns. At the conclusion of the twelve weeks, the students took a final examination, whereupon successful completion of the course they either remained at the Depot of Supplies or returned to their original commands as armorers.

**Motor Transportation**

Marines acquired their first motor vehicles in 1909, which was a 1909 Studebaker Model "30." By the time of the World War, the Marines had in service some 79 motor vehicles of all types. Despite the slow advance toward the acquisition of motor vehicles prior to the World War, both the Army and the Marines wholeheartedly embraced mechanization by the time of the U.S.'s entry into the World War in 1917. Even before its involvement in the World War the Marines, traditionally light infantry, used the Jeffrey and Nash "Quad" (quadruple drive) trucks in the counterguerrilla campaigns in Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Because the "Quad" truck had a four wheel-drive, it could be used on, or off a main road, and could operate in the hinterlands of Hispaniola and Nicaragua regardless of the conditions of the road. Despite the problems over the Quad truck's solid rubber tires (which oftentimes sank into the soft soil of Haiti), as well as its differential and universal joints, these trucks performed adequately enough for them to remain in the Marine Corps inventory for nearly a decade and a half. Besides the Jeffrey Quad trucks, Marines likewise utilized one of the first armored cars in combat, the King Armored Car, which they used extensively against enemy strongpoints, and as was the case in Haiti and later China, as a quick reaction vehicle. Unfortunately, the King Armored Car, weighed 3 tons and possessed only a rear-wheel drive which proved totally unsatisfactory for the under-developed nations (Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
and Nicaragua), which oftentimes lacked suitable hard-surfaced roads where Marines found themselves serving prior to and after the World War.54

Along with the acquisition of motor vehicles came the necessity of repair. While both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps later established schools for its mechanics, the problem during this early period was not in the possession of vehicles but their repair. Originally, the two services relied heavily on the trained mechanics supplied by the manufacturers themselves who normally accompanied the Army or Marines to the field in order to perform maintenance of the vehicles.55 Gradually, however, "personnel of the Marine Corps (and Army) picked up the tricks of the trade and were charged with maintenance responsibility."

When the first Marine contingent landed in France in the summer of 1917, it brought with them their Jeffrey Quad trucks. Shortly thereafter, Marines acquired three other types of trucks that included the Liberty truck, produced by the Army; the FWD, and the Nash Quad, the latter two manufactured privately. In time, "motor transportation became an integral part of the training activity" at Quantico, as Marines prepared to go overseas.56 At the end of the war, the huge surplus of trucks coupled with the drive for greater efficiency and austere defense budgets gave the Marines "little choice" in selecting its vehicles over the next decade.57 In time, the Liberty and FWD trucks became the standard trucks used by the Marine Corps at home and abroad. Marines used their motor vehicles in hauling supplies and troops to the front, and in the case of its

57Olson, "Motor Transport," p. 56.

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motorcycles, as message carriers. The importance that the Marine Corps attached to motor vehicles can be seen in the fact that by the end of the World War, it had acquired over 950 motor vehicles of all types.\textsuperscript{58} Paralleling this increased mechanization was the institution by Headquarters sending both Marine officers and enlisted men to the Army Motor Transport Training School located at Camp Holabird, Maryland, until the establishment of a vocational motor training course at Quantico, which coincided with the establishment of the Marine Corps Institute in 1919.\textsuperscript{59} This course, in fact, became one of the most popular of all MCI courses prior to the establishment of a fully-fledged Motor Transport School by Headquarters in 1929, first at the Depot of Supplies in Philadelphia, and later at Quantico. There, enlisted students with officers supervising the work learned the necessary paperwork, repaired the vehicles, and practiced proper maintenance procedures prior to reporting to a Marine post or barracks.

During the Civil War reenactments held in the early 1920's, Marines employed trucks in a tactical troop-carrying role, with many of them becoming stuck in the thick, molasses-like red clay of Virginia. In one instance, during the replaying of the march to the Shenandoah Valley, a convoy of trucks hauling supplies "was caught in a downpour of rain which soon rendered the roads impassable and piled up most of the trucks in the ditches." After being pulled out by elements of the 5th Marines, the trucks resumed the march which took a further two days to arrive at the designated objective.\textsuperscript{60} Concerned over the problems encountered by the trucks, Headquarters convened a special board looking into the problems surrounding motor transport in the Marine Corps that unfortunately made little headway due to the large deployment of Marines to China and later Nicaragua. When the Third Brigade embarked for China, it took with them not less

\textsuperscript{58}"Motor Transportation in the Marine Corps," p. 19.
\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{60}Olson, "Motor Transport," p. 56.
than eighteen different models, and while impressive, proved to be a logistical nightmare insofar as maintenance and supply of parts had been concerned.\textsuperscript{61} Thus arose the need for not only a standardized vehicle, but one that could operate in all types of terrain, and not limited to a particular geographic area.

Reflecting the increased mechanization of the Marine Corps, particularly for the infantry, were the 1924 and 1925 tables of organization, which provided for a transportation platoon for an independent battalion. Included in the Service Company of the battalion, each motor transport platoon consisted of 1 motorcycle, 1 motorized ambulance, 1 5-passenger automobile, 1 FWD truck (a combined passenger and freight vehicle), 5 3/4-ton trucks, and 12 1/2-to 2-ton trucks, 1 750-tank truck, and 1 wrecking truck.\textsuperscript{62} While the Marine Corps had established the organization of a motor transport platoon for an independent battalion, and Marines had been assigned to such units as either mechanics, drivers, or commanding officers of such outfits by 1926, there existed no "officially" designated motor transportation officer or personnel, with the exception of the appointment in that same year to the staff of the Division of Operations and Training of an officer that handled motor transportation affairs.\textsuperscript{63} It was not until 1929, that the Marine Corps opened its own school at the Depot of Supplies in Philadelphia, and later at Camp Kearney, at San Diego, where Marines received instruction as chauffeurs, tractor drivers, mechanics, and machinists in the assembly and repair of vehicles.

Of all the schools established by the Marine Corps during the 1920's the Motor Transport School proved to be the most popular due largely to the increased numbers of automobiles appearing on American roads. The school proved so successful, in fact, that

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{62}"Motor Transport in the Marine Corps," p. 31.

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Headquarters later made it a prerequisite that only those who had previous experience as mechanics or drivers would be accepted as students at the motor transport school.\textsuperscript{64} Nevertheless, motor transportation was here to stay in the Marines, and over time it prospered with many of the original regulations and practices that covered the operation and repair of motor vehicles that remained in service up to the eve of World War II.

\textbf{Cooks and Bakers School}

The school that proved the least popular though as equally demanding with Marines was the Cooks and Bakers School organized in January 1924, and located at the Marine Barracks, Parris Island, South Carolina. A job that demanded long hours, and in conditions oftentimes uncomfortable and confined, the Cooks and Bakers School proved to be the hardest quota to fill due to the length of the course (9 months), and the requirements of education, physical well-being and general aptitude which kept the classes very small (the largest permitted being thirteen students). Besides the standard requirements of possessing the ability to read, write, and do arithmetic, and not showing positive on the Wassermann Test, \textsuperscript{65} Marines had to have at least two years to go on their enlistments before being considered for the Cooks and Bakers School.\textsuperscript{66}

Marine officers who had been selected for Mess Hall Management did not attend the school at Parris Island. Instead, they attended the Army's Quartermaster Corps.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65}The Wassermann Test or "Reaction," was named for German-born pathologist August von Wassermann who developed a diagnosis for syphilis, and attempts to determine the presence of antibodies in the patient's serum. Whenever a chemical substance known as antigen unites with its specific antibody (in conjunction with which the antibody functions to destroy bacteria), if present, is taken into the combine and becomes inactive or fixed, thus indicating a diagnosis of syphilis. See \textit{Collier's Encyclopedia, 1980 Edition}, p. 320.

Subsistence School, located in Chicago, where Army instructors familiarized the students with food production, procurement, preservation, procurement, nutritional values, menu planning, and mess management. While the bulk of this latter school focused on classroom lectures and paperwork, officers practiced setting up menus and running a mess hall. The Subsistence School, attended by officers of all the services, and divided into 16 different subjects for a total of 712 hours of coursework, ran for nine months, and was as demanding as any other school run by the services. the infantry or other branch schools. At the end of the school year as part of the requirements, students prepared a monograph based on original research on some subsistence-related topic.

The stated mission of the Cooks and Bakers School was to, "standardize the handling of the ration throughout the Marine Corps by training enlisted personnel in the duties of (1) Bakers, Cooks and mess sergeants; and (2) Instructors in the schools for bakers and Cooks." The school itself was broken down into the Department of Baking, Department of Cooking, and Department of Theoretical and Practical Instructions. With the Class of 1929-1930, Headquarters added an additional department that instructed officers in conducting messes, handling the ration, and instructing other officers in the same, and selected enlisted men as instructors in the schools for bakers and cooks, as well as mess sergeants in the management of mess halls. For Reserve Marines, a special course of instruction had been organized, though it was considerably shorter given the constraints and limited period of duty for the students attending this course.

The Cooks and Baker School for enlisted Marines, located at Parris Island, and modeled on that of the U.S. Army's School in Chicago, generally followed closely to the latter's course outlines. (Table 12.3) While the school itself was both physically and

**Cooks**

(1) Theoretical Instruction Covered such topics as:
   (a) Definition of terms used in Cooking.
   (b) The Army Ration, its kind and quantities.
   (c) Elements of Nutrition and Elementary principles of Cooking.
   (d) Recipes.
   (e) Mess Accounts.
   (f) Arithmetic.

(2) Practical Instruction included the Assignment to the kitchen a shift of students operated by the school and instruction in:
   (a) Preparation of Food prior to Cooking.
   (b) Garrison Cooking.
   (c) Field Cooking and Field Expedients
   (d) Meat Cutting.

**Bakers**

(1) Theoretical Instruction covered the following subjects:
   (a) Wheat Classification, grading and competition.
   (b) Flour, kinds of milling, blending, sifting, and bleaching.
   (c) Elementary principles of fermentation in bread making and yeast making.
   (d) Recipes, analytical considerations.

(2) Students received practical instruction in:
   (a) Dough Mixing, molding and proofing.

Table 12.3 (CONTINUED)
The Cooks and Bakers School
Marine Barracks, Parris Island, SC.
Table 12.3 (CONTINUED)

Mess Sergeants
(1) The Mess Sergeants' Course consisted of:
   (a) Mess Management.
   (b) Mess Accounts.
   (c) Duties of Mess Sergeants.
(2) Students were placed in charge of a Mess under the direction of an instructor in the school.
   (b) Operation of post bakery equipment.
   (c) Installation and operation of field bakery equipment.
   (d) Field Baking Expedients.
   (e) Baking field and garrison bread and pastry. 69

academically demanding, those Marines who failed to graduate yet having "demonstrated fitness for the work," could request via the Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Parris Island, an additional month of instruction where every effort was made to qualify the individual student. 70

The Cooks and Bakers School remained by and large unattractive to enlisted men and officers alike. Various inquiries by Headquarters discovered that the school's unpopularity centered on the fact that the various post commanding officers were reluctant to lose a Marine to the Cooks and Bakers School. Another problem often cited was the fact that commanding officers of the various posts were oftentimes reluctant to utilize the services of a graduate of this school once assigned to his command as a cook. The seriousness of the problem is reflected in a lengthy seven-page memorandum dated February 16, 1929, and endorsed by the outgoing Major General Commandant-Major

69Ibid, pp. 6-7.
General Lejeune who encouraged commanding officers to look into and resolve this problem.\textsuperscript{71}

Despite the constant shortages of manpower and the drain on qualified individuals for either combat or combat support Headquarters did, in fact, find sufficient numbers of men to train as cooks and bakers, mechanics and drivers for the motor transportation units, as well as Marines trained as ordnance specialists. While the former occupation as cooks and bakers proved more difficult, and at times almost impossible to fill due to the long hours and other unglamorous aspects of this specialty, the latter two skills attracted more than sufficient numbers of Marines to become mechanics, drivers, chauffeurs, and ordnance specialists, due largely to the high demand in the still robust pre-depression civilian job market that lasted until October 1929.

\textbf{Aviation Repair and Ground Crew School}

During the World War, Marine pilots, whom by-and-large were former enlisted men, received a ten-week course of instruction at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Boston, Massachusetts, and upon completion of that school did their actual flight training at the Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida.\textsuperscript{72} Here, aspiring Marine aviators learned preliminary acrobatic and formation flying, bombing, gunnery and reconnaissance work that included aerial photography. Upon successful completion of the course of instruction, Headquarters commissioned the cadets second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps. Other enlisted Marines trained as riggers, mechanics, and armorers at the Navy's Great Lakes Training Center. Two Marine officers and ten enlisted men likewise attended the Army's Balloon School at St. Louis, Missouri, and later at Omaha, Nebraska for training until the cessation of hostilities in November 1918.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72}McClellan, \textit{U.S. Marines in the World War}, p. 74.
One of the most serious problems facing the Marine Corps in the immediate aftermath of the World War, was the loss of qualified ground crew to the Army and the Navy. In fact, Major General George Barnett noted in his annual report for 1919, that not only was the recruitment of qualified individuals for the air service becoming increasingly difficult, but that those Marines "whom we've spent years training" were leaving and enlisting, "for identically the same duty in the Army and Navy for no other reason than that they can get increased pay" and rank elsewhere. While Congress later alleviated the problem somewhat by the granting of additional pay and specialized ranks to enlisted Marines, the loss of trained manpower continued to impact Marine air operations well into the 1920's.

As Marine officers trained alongside both Naval and Army Air Corps aviators during and after the war, enlisted Marines continued to attend the Navy's Aerology Schools at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center, San Diego, and Pensacola, where they studied aerology, radio, and other aviation-related technical subjects. A select number of Marine officers and enlisted men received lighter-than-air (balloon) training at Pensacola and later at Lakehurst, New Jersey.

While Marine officers attended the U.S. Army Air Corps' Technical School at Chanute Field, Rantoul, Illinois, and at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama, enlisted Marines likewise attended several Army schools including Carlstrom and March Fields to train as aviators when Congress permitted the Army Air Corps to resume the training of qualified cadets for aviation duty. For enlisted Marines, however, the Army's Mechanics School (located within the Technical School at Chanute), which merged in 1922 with the Communications and Photographic School, offered training as crewchiefs

74Johnson and Cosmas, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, p. 38.
75Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939, p. 54.
and ground mechanics. With the training of enlisted mechanics for the Air Service as its primary mission, as well as the possession of larger budgets, more modern equipment and training opportunities there is little wonder that Headquarters sought the admission of enlisted Marines to Army schools, particularly in regards to aviation. By and large, however, because of the nature and mission of Marine air, as well as the simple fact that they received their aircraft (and budget) from the Navy, the bulk of Marine aviators and ground crews continued to attend Navy schools throughout the interwar period. Nonetheless, from 1919 to 1940, thirty-five Marine pilots graduated from the Army's Air Corps Tactical School, \(^{76}\) first located at Langley Field, Virginia, and later Maxwell Field between 1921 and 1940, while other Marines completed the Army's pursuit course at Ellington Field, Houston, Texas. \(^{77}\)

Despite the more "technical" nature of Marine Corps enlisted education, the fact that it existed at all is illustrative of the fact that Major General Lejeune and his successors recognized the need for a well-trained enlisted force schooled in the complexities and intricacies of modern war. While that education itself revolved around an altruistic desire on the part of the Major General Commandant (and Secretary of the Navy Daniels) toward self-improvement of the individual Marine, it nonetheless, served the "needs of the Marine Corps" in that it provided the service with a better educated, better-trained individual who was less prone to disciplinary problems than his predecessors, and was more likely to attract a higher quality of first-term Marine than had been the case in the past.

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\(^{76}\) Prior to 1921, the Air Corps Tactical School had been known as the Air Service Officer's School, located at Langley Field. See Robert T. Finney, A History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940. (Washington, D.C., Center for Air Force History, 1992), pp.9-11. Hereafter cited as Finney, History of Air Corps Tactical School.

\(^{77}\) Finney, History of Air Corps' Tactical School, p. 42.
"'Small Wars' The Course of Study at the MCS in the mid-1920's"

It was during the early formative period of the MCS that Marines began a systematic study of what the Marine Corps later termed "Small Wars." Known today by its more acronymic title of LIC (Low Intensity Conflict), or MOOTW (Military Operations Other than War), the Marine Corps' experience in "Small Wars," has been a profound and enduring part of its institutional history during the interwar period. Having collected a "vast amount of uncorrelated information" over the years prior to and after the World War, there had been no attempt to consolidate it into a usable format. Major Samuel W. Harrington, while a student at the Field Officers' Course in 1922, began to organize on paper what later became a "comprehensive study of small wars." Major Harrington's study, placed in a monograph entitled The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars (1922), was later incorporated into the school's curriculum by Colonel Ben H. Fuller, the commanding officer of the Marine Corps Schools "in order to build up a course strictly [patterned for] Marine Corps work." This study, "presented certain principles of landing operations, the seizure of cities, and operations in the field, as they applied to small wars." Major Harrington's study, in fact, "constituted the first consolidated analysis of small wars available for study . . . [and became] the basis for [a] more detailed writing on the subject later." Both Major Harrington and another Marine Officer, Major Harold H. Utley emphasized the study of small wars in the courses at the MCS during their respective tenures at head of the MCS in the 1920's and 1930's.

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79 Ibid.
80 According to historian Kenneth J. Clifford, "A restricted book entitled 'Small Wars Operations' was published for use within the MCS. In 1940, a revised and corrected version of "Small Wars" was published for the Marine Corps by the Government Printing Office for general use, entitled the Small Wars Manual. See Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 37.
Despite this study of small wars at the MCS during the 1920's, the emphasis in the curriculum remained focused on land warfare and the World War. (Table 12.4) This can be seen in the hours devoted to "Small Wars," which by the late 1920's and into the early 1930's, had been reduced to 10 hours with a corresponding increase in the number of hours devoted to land warfare:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map Maneuvers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Organization</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map Maneuver Solutions</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Tactical Principles and Decisions</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tactics and Techniques of Various Arms:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Air Service</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics and Techniques of Various Arms (Cavalry and Tanks)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Hours** 189

**Table 12.4**

**U.S. Army Courses Offered at The Field Officers' Course 1928-1933**

The influence the Army had on the Marine Corps from the doctrinal level was, in fact, substantial. Marine officers who attended the Field Officers' Course spent a total of 189 hours studying Army doctrine and organization. Contrasting this was the ten hours spent studying "Small Wars," and nine hours devoted to the examination of landing operations which included the studies on Gallipoli, Zeebrugge, the German Baltic Landings, and Maritime strategy and Marine war plans. Thus, despite Major General Lejeune's goal of

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redirecting the focus of the Field Officers' Course in the mid-1920's, the "heart and soul" of MCS during the 1920's remained fixated on the study of land operations during the World War and 'Small Wars', and not where it should've been: on advanced base and landing operations. Thus, added to the ongoing controversy between Brigadier General Butler and his advocacy of "Small Wars," and those who favored a Corps built around the support the Fleet in time of war, was the fight over land versus advanced base operations. Taking center stage over this last controversy was Colonel Ellis B. Miller, an irascible, though brilliant prophet of what later became known as amphibious warfare.

In his advocacy of the use of Marines as an advanced base or landing-oriented force, Colonel Miller criticized the emphasis the curriculum placed on Army doctrine, and most fervently believed that the emphasis on land-oriented operations at the MCS should be replaced by one based wholly on both Marine and Naval doctrine.

Even more to the point was Major General Commandant Ben H. Fuller, who stated that the Marine Corps real mission lie not with the Army but with the Navy. He specifically pointed to the fact that the Marines should prepare for a war based on conducting "land operations with the Navy [i.e. in support of a naval campaign] and small wars." Major General Fuller, who had succeeded Major General Wendell C. Neville as Commandant in 1930, pointed out that "the probability of the Corps being again included in large Army operations," was quite "remote."

Yet the key advocate of amphibious warfare after the death of Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap in a mudslide in France in 1931 was Colonel Ellis B. Miller, who felt that "the Marine Corps is not an Army; and the Army is not the Marine Corps." While Miller provided the intellectual grist for the development of amphibious warfare and its

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82Ibid, p. 16.
84Ibid, p. 17.
85Ibid, p. 18.
study at Quantico, his personality and demeanor worked against him so much so that it
derailed his career and forced him to retire in 1936, with a great deal of lasting bitterness
toward the Corps' senior leadership.\(^{86}\) It was not until the 1930-31 academic year at the
Field Officers' Course that Headquarters increased the number of hours devoted to
landing operations to 216, which as Miller later observed, did little to re-direct the
Marine Corps' orientation away from studying land operations. Miller remained
convinced that the Marine Corps schools system had "become so saturated" with Army
principles, Army organization, and Army thought that the "orientation and foundation of
the Marine Corps was misplaced."\(^{87}\)

While Miller made a valid point regarding the orientation of the MCS curriculum, the
simple fact remained that the World War influenced the operational and tactical
direction of the Corps well into the 1930's, almost to the eve of the U.S.'s involvement in
the Second World War. In fact, it could be said that outside of the operational maneuver
aspects of amphibious warfare after 1943, Marines by-and-large fought the war in the
Pacific along linear lines, first learned during the World War in 1918. Not only did the
MCS inculcate its lessons in the classrooms at Quantico during the interwar period, but it
in turn trained a generation of Marine Corps officers in the ways of fighting large-scale
battles during the island hopping campaigns in the Pacific during the Second World War.
Once ashore, Marines successfully fought a linear battle much like their predecessors did
in the fields of France during the World War in 1918, against a well-entrenched enemy.

\(^{86}\) Colonel Ellis Bell Miller born in December 1879, entered the Marine Corps in 1900,
and retired very bitter from the Corps in 1936. After his retirement, he entered the
practice of law in the Washington, D.C. area where he died on 8 December 1956. He
only emerged only once from retirement in 1940 to act as a pallbearer at the funeral of
Major General Smedley D. Butler, with whom he had served with in China from 1927 to
Also see Schmidt, Maverick Marine, pp. 189 and 246.
\(^{87}\) Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," pp. 30-1.
Furthermore, the fact that Marine officers (such as the future General O.P. Smith and Lieutenant General Charles D. Barrett to name but two) attended the prestigious French Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris, and received a healthy dose of French military doctrine (itself based on the French Army's experience in the World War), there is little wonder why the World War had such a tremendous impact on the operational and tactical performance of the Marine Corps during the Second World War.

Despite the "growing tendency" of Miller and others to shift the focus of the school toward landing operations, as well as the increased emphasis of such operations by the Major General Commandant and other leading proponents during the 1920's, the MCS continued the study of the World War with a focus on land as opposed to `amphibious' warfare. Classes on the World War, in fact, remained the mainstay of the curriculum at the MCS due to the large number of students returning from both Forts Benning and Leavenworth during this period returning to Quantico [and later Philadelphia] as instructors.

Army methods of instruction, pamphlets, drill and tactical procedures, as well as the study of its organizational structure "largely governed the study of tactics" at the various Marine Corps officers' schools until the mid-1930's.\(^{88}\) This was due, primarily to the ongoing debate inside the Corps as to its mission, and lack of focus toward landing operations. This in turn generated debate on whether or not the MCS should "develop a course of study completely geared to the Fleet, or a curriculum which favored Army methods and land warfare."\(^{89}\) Marines would not resolve this debate until the permanent shift toward the study of landing operations in the early-to-mid-1930's, and the writing of the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934, though there was some movement in this direction beginning in 1925 at the conclusion of the Oahu Maneuvers, and the

\(^{88}\)Ibid, p. 31.

\(^{89}\)Ibid.
appointment of Colonel Robert H. Dunlap as head of the MCS that same year. Dunlap’s emphasis on the study of landing operations, particularly Gallipoli, and the German landings in the Baltic in 1917, prompted some though not enough movement toward a curriculum devoted to the study of landing operations until the start of the 1930’s. Once again, however, deployments to China and Nicaragua in the mid-to-late 1920’s, delayed the full implementation of this shift in curriculum until the early 1930’s. Nonetheless, the Marines reached a "happy medium," with the emphasis on training for service with the Fleet and at the same time studying the Army methods of land warfare.90

The Basic School Moves to Philadelphia

One of the more significant changes to effect the training of Marine Corps officers took place in 1923 when The Basic School (TBS), moved to the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia, due to the lack of sufficient quarters and classrooms at Quantico. The school remained here until 1936, when Headquarters moved it back to Quantico just in time for the build up prior to World War II. The length of each class varied with the shortest class lasting one month (1927) while the longest class lasted eleven months (1933-34).91 The numbers of students likewise varied from three in 1927, to ninety-four in 1935-36, with the average number of students in attendance being thirty.

The Basic School was not the only Marine Corps School to endure low attendance. The Company Officers’ Course likewise suffered a similar drain on the number of first lieutenants and captains in attendance, due mainly to the deployment of Marines and the "urgent need for" company-grade officers" in both China and Nicaragua.92 Nonetheless, the MCS carried on despite the lack of both students and instructors.

90Ibid, pp. 31-2.
92Ibid; Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," pp. 31-2.
As for the popularity of the move of TBS to Philadelphia, General Merrill B. Twining summed it up best when he stated that training at the Marine Barracks there was almost impossible, "on the level that we trained them then." General Twining, who attended TBS in Philadelphia during the 1923-24 academic year, in fact, criticized the Marine Corps' failure to provide both space and the necessary physical equipment necessary for the proper training of its officers. The general's criticisms, in fact, contradict General Lejeune's assertion that the accommodations at the Philadelphia Navy Yard were "better than at Quantico." According to Twining, The Basic School lacked proper space for live firing and tactical problems, a factor that hindered its effectiveness in the preparation of Marine officers for the fleet or combat. He specifically recalled the excellent facilities and vast resources that the Army had in training its junior officers at the Infantry Officers' Course at Fort Benning, and stated that this was a significant difference between the Army's approach to educating its officers as opposed to the resources-starved Marine version at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

The Ecole Superieure de Guerre

Institutionally, participation in the World War gave the Marine Corps its much needed introduction to modern war. At the conclusion of that conflict Marine officers, whom included Major General John A. Lejeune, Colonel Robert Dunlap, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb, Majors Holland M. Smith and Earl H. Ellis brought back with them the lessons learned of that war, with the intended goal of introducing them into the curriculum and training of Marines, particularly among the officer corps. A large part of this modernization process resulted in the sending of promising Marine majors

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95 Twining Oral History, p. 67.
and lieutenant colonels to the Army and Navy War Colleges, as well as to other institutions of higher learning. Another part of this professionalization process undertaken by Headquarters was to send officers abroad, to foreign military colleges, notably British and French military schools. Of particular importance was the French École Superieure de Guerre, where arguably French officers, such as Major Charles De Gaulle, introduced Marine officers, many of whom became division commanders during World War II and Korea, the art of war from both the operational and tactical levels, and further inculcated them into the methods of combined arms warfare as practiced by the French Army during the World War.

The École Superieure de Guerre had its origins in the disastrous aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), where France had been soundly defeated by the combined German armies. In the subsequent reorganization of the French Army, French military officials concluded that not only should the General Staff be opened to all qualified candidates regardless of their social origins, but that these same men who had demonstrated leadership on the battlefield as company grade officers, should be afforded the opportunity to attend a school where they could expand their knowledge on the art and science of war, and thus be prepared for duty on the Army's General Staff. With this in mind, the French Army established the École Superieure de Guerre in 1876, a school dedicated to not only absorbing the lessons of the past but in their application to future wars. While the French Army busily prepared itself for its return match with the German Army the École de Guerre soon developed into one of the world's finest institutions of higher military learning. From 1914 to 1918, the graduates of this school distinguished themselves on the battlefields of the World War, despite the serious reverses inflicted on the French armies by the well-trained and well-led German armies. Major Leon W. Hoyt, USMC, who was among the first group of Marine officers to enter École de Guerre in 1926, wrote in the December 1926 *Marine Corps Gazette*, that the World War was "a
thorough test of the [French] General Staff and a chance to see if the School fulfilled its object. 96 In the article, Hoyt noted that the Ecole de Guerre furnished twelve commanders of armies or groups of armies, the Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, and the commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies (Marshal Ferdinand Foch) during the recently-concluded war.

While studies at the Ecole de Guerre had been suspended due to the war, the school resumed operation in 1919, at its same location of the Ecole Militaire, located near the left bank of the Seine River. The curriculum, broken down into two years, devoted itself to the study of the division during the first year, while the second year of study involved more dedicated staff work, and the study of the workings of the Army Corps. In short, Ecole de Guerre had as its basic mission the preparation of officers for higher command. Through the use of lectures (given only in French), map problems, and staff rides, the officers in attendance became familiarized with such subjects as the employment of combined arms, artillery, aviation, logistics, and maneuver warfare. One of the most distinguishing features of Ecole de Guerre was the time that it gave students to absorb, and the freedom to discuss the material presented in the lectures and on the staff rides. Major Hoyt's, as well as those of both Lieutenant General Oliver P. Smith, and Brigadier General Lester A. Dessez comments on the content of the course work at the Ecole de Guerre indicated that there had been an overriding emphasis on the French Army's experiences in the World War. 97 Much like the emphasis in American military schools on the American Civil War, the World War, and specifically the French experience in that

conflict offered many lessons—both operational and tactical that found a ready audience among Marine officers who attended Ecole de Guerre during the interwar period, and later assumed command of regiments and divisions during the Second World War. This reinforced the fact that when Marines went to war in 1941, they took with them many of the lessons of that late war, and applied them with great success as they fought their way across the Pacific in a bloody war of attrition, one not too different one might add, than the fighting during the World War. The fact that Marine officers attended the MCS during the interwar period is evidence that they received a healthy dose of material on the World War, much of which they later passed on to their subordinates as instructors in the Field and Company Officers’ Courses in the 1930’s. It likewise confirms the impact of the World War on the Marine Corps as it went to war in 1941, since its officers had been inculcated with French operational and tactical doctrine that had its origins in the conduct of the World War.

At Ecole de Guerre the courses that had special "appeal" to Marine officers were the ones oriented toward the employment of the division, and its subordinate units in combat. Of special interest to Marine officers were the courses that dealt with infantry, artillery, and aviation, and the coordination of all arms in the attack and defense. In keeping with the theme of the World War, Major Hoyt recalled that:

In one case we studied the operation of a battalion of infantry in the Aisne-Marne offensive on the actual ground and under the command of the officer who commanded the battalion. In another case the class was taken on a one day trip to Compiègne, where a machine gun battalion (half French and half Indo-Chinese) was actually installed in a defensive sector.98

As for the study of the employment of artillery and combined arms, Hoyt wrote that there was, "great attention" paid to the liaison of artillery and infantry; and on

ammunition supply, in each and every situation, offensive or defensive . . . ."99 The Marine major wrote in his after action report that in the Infantry portion of the course, the instructors paid the greatest attention to "the use of fire power, and the plan of fire, that is, where the projectiles are going to fall, both on the offense and on the defense, and on liaison with artillery."100 This observation by Major Hoyt is important since it reflected the view held by Major General Lejeune, who had remarked a few years earlier in a post-battle analysis of Belleau Wood in June 1918, that if anything the battle there demonstrated, "the great importance of artillery to infantry. Infantry alone without material, makes little or no progress. If the enemy combines personnel and material, we must do the same or lose the game."101 With the success of the U.S. 2d Division (spearheaded by elements of the 4th Marine Brigade) at Vaux on 1 July 1918, the importance attached to the coordination of a preliminary artillery bombardment preceding an infantry assault deemed this portion of Ecole de Guerre especially valuable for Marine officers.

Other subjects studied at Ecole de Guerre such as in general tactics and general staff work, as well as in the approach march and the gaining of contact, evacuation operations, supply problems, and in the forming of hastily organized positions made the first year's course of study essential for U.S. Marine and Army officers who went on to lead regiments, divisions, and corps during World War II, and later Korea (such as Majors O. P. Smith and Major Charles D. Barrett]. Tragically, however, one of the most important Marine officers to be appointed to the Ecole de Guerre, Brigadier General

99Ibid.
Robert H. Dunlap died while saving a French woman from a mudslide in southern France prior the commencement of the academic term in May of 1931. One can only speculate that had Dunlap survived and completed Ecole de Guerre, not only would he have been appointed the Major General Commandant in 1934, but that his work on the advanced base force and combined arms would have been worked into the ongoing developments in amphibious warfare, and the writing and revisions in the *Tentative Landing Manual*. Instead, many of the lessons offered by the World War had to be learned all over again in the savage fighting that characterized such campaigns as Tarawa (1943), Saipan and Peleliu (1944), Iwo Jima and Okinawa (1945). As the World War demonstrated, and the Second World War proved, the simple fact remained that:

... Proper use of supporting fires in reducing strong points calls for the artillery-infantry-tank team to be closely coordinated. The great neutralization value is gained by the infantry and tanks moving quickly into the neutralized area as artillery fires lift. The closer the advance behind our own neutralization fires the more the benefit derived from the neutralization. Teamwork, involving firing, must be practiced in training periods to develop thoroughly the use of combined arms.103

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102 Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap was an artillery officer by military occupation and had, in fact, authored a postwar report in 1919 on Marine artillery and its importance to the advanced base force work that the Corps had been involved prior to the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in the World War in April 1917. See Dunlap, "Recommendations Relative to the Organization of Marine Artillery, based on Observations Made Available while a Member of A.E.F., France, 1917-18-19, with particular reference to their Application in Organizing and Training of Field Artillery Elements of the U.S. Marine Corps," Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap Reference Folder. (Washington, D.C., History and Museums Division, Reference Section).


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The key word in this statement written at the conclusion of World War II by General Holland M. Smith is "team work." This emphasis on combined arms in both the Marine Corps schools, as well as those of the U.S. Army reflected the impact of the World War, and in particular a methodical approach to war in the use of combined arms for both offensive and defensive operations. Both General O.P. Smith, who attended Ecole de Guerre from 1934 to 1936 and Brigadier General Lester A. Dessez (1936-1938), confirmed this latter point when they reported that the French instructors stressed the methodical approach to warfare, and that their doctrine was, "in many respects, similar to ours, in others radically different." Similarities included the emphasis on the employment of artillery and infantry and their coordination, use of tanks in the attack and defense, and in the approach and gaining of contact. Dessez and Smith both noted that the differences lay in the French Army's obsession with the centralization of command. Dessez, in particular, noted that Marine officers had been ingrained in the use of initiative, and to take opportunities when presented with them.

Insofar as the study of the use of tanks in combat operations, Major O. P. Smith wrote in his after action report that:

The French contemplate using the Renault [light tank] as an accompanying tank preceding the attacking infantry at about 200 yards. Protection of the infantry against automatic weapons, which have not been neutralized by the fast tanks while en route to the visible horizon, is left to the slow accompanying tanks. In the defensive, the use of tanks is contemplated in the counter-attack and in the attack of enemy tanks, which succeed in penetrating into the position.

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Major Smith's comments confirm the influence of French mechanized doctrine had on the Marine Corps officers who attended Ecole de Guerre and of that doctrine's application to the creation of the Marine tank-infantry team of World War II. This tank-infantry team was born, in fact, amidst the exercises held during the 1920's and 1930's, when Head-quarters added a light tank platoon for each exercise held during that same time period. During these exercises, tanks accompanied the infantry inland, destroyed machine gun emplacements and bunkers. As discussed in Chapter One, Major Smith made specific note of the use of armor in combat, where he wrote that the tank-infantry team included what the French termed the "chars d'accompagnement" or the infantry-accompanying light tank, usually the Renault light tank, and the "chars de manœuvre d'ensemble," which were the more powerful leading tanks characterized in the interwar period by the six-ton M1917. Marines, in fact, used both tactical concepts with devastating effect on Okinawa in April-May 1945 when Marines of the 6th Division cleared the Motobu Peninsula in a classic tank-infantry support action, while members of the 1st Marine Division brought the tactical concept of the tank-infantry to its ultimate perfection.\textsuperscript{106}

As for the study of the defense at Ecole de Guerre, Major Smith wrote that French instructors emphasized the "defense in depth," and the creation of a three-ringed defensive perimeter that consisted of an outpost line, a main line of resistance, and a "ligne d'arrêt" or regimental reserve line.\textsuperscript{107} The perimeter itself is protected by automatic weapons fires, supplemented by pre-registered mortar and artillery fires. In the event of an enemy breakthrough, all efforts are made toward the holding of the regimental reserve line, which according to Smith, usually "protects the artillery observation posts and behind which the artillery is deployed." For the French and later

\textsuperscript{106}Frank and Shaw, \textit{Victory and Occupation}, p. 725.
\textsuperscript{107}Smith, \textit{"Report"}, p. 52.
the Marines, "every effort is made to establish the defensive position behind a stream line or heavily wooded area," protected by antitank mines. Interestingly, Marines effectively used this scheme of defense in the establishment of a defensive perimeter beginning on Guadalcanal and later throughout the entire Central and South Pacific during World War II.¹⁰⁸

For the Marine officers who attended the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, the lessons they learned during the two-year course of instruction proved of immense value in shaping the Marine Corps as it prepared for its Pacific battles with the Japanese during the late 1930's. Yet for the interwar period, the lessons learned while in France merely confirmed the efficacy of the emphasis on the study of the World War, and its many lessons concerning the conduct of modern war. Despite the disintegration of the French field armies in face of the German blitzkrieg in May 1940, it was not French doctrine that failed instead, it was the French high command that prevented field commanders to implement its own doctrine with any effect against the German panzers. This was proven by the Marines in the fighting in the Pacific. Taught at both the MCS and Ecole de Guerre in the ways and means of the methodical battle, whereby a commander fought a step-by-step or, "tightly controlled battle in which all units and weapons were carefully marshaled and then employed in combat," all the while moving toward phase lines, and adhering to strict timetables in order to employ the most men and material, Marine officers later applied these same concepts to not only the amphibious assault during World War II but in the war of attrition they faced after the initial landing.¹⁰⁹ In a large sense, the Marines who landed ashore became a "battering ram" that opened up the door after repeated assaults, which then applied an immense amount of firepower against a

¹⁰⁸Ibid, p. 53.
set of either fixed or mobile positions by artillery and naval gunfire not unlike their predecessors who attacked Belleau Wood, Soissons, or Blanc Mont.

It is apparent from the curriculum of the MCS during the 1920’s and 1930’s, that the Marines paid particular attention to the lessons of the World War, specifically in the employment of the combined attack of infantry and artillery, the formation and use of the infantry-tank teams, as well as to the application of devastating fires by machine gun and mortars in both the attack and defense. Contrary to later criticisms that the MCS was, "too slavish" to the study of the World War, Marines, in fact, had a much more defined use of the lessons of that conflict. One could say, in fact, that during the interwar period at the MCS, Marines religiously studied French doctrine and methods. Despite the fact that French doctrine espoused the defensive nature of the methodical battle, Marines reversed it, and skillfully employed it against the Japanese in the offensive. Both Smith and Dessez noted with some concern, that the French had purposely locked themselves into the idea of a centralized and controlled battlefield, that permitted absolutely no initiative or flexibility on the part of its subordinate commanders.\(^{110}\) Fortunately, the Marine officers attending the Ecole de Guerre recognized the inherent dangers of such a rigid doctrine and sought to avoid it if at all possible in the Marine Corps' emerging operational doctrine when conducting landing operations.

The Army and Navy War Colleges

Marine officers not only attended their own schools at Quantico and Ecole de Guerre in Paris, but also the Army War College then located in Washington, D.C., and the Naval War College, located at Newport, Rhode Island. By the mid-part of the 1920's, Marine officers made up a small portion of the students attending both the Army and Naval War colleges. Heading the list of Marine officers who would attend the Army War College

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prior to and after the World War included Generals John A. Lejeune, Wendell C. Neville, Eli K. Cole, W. P. Upshur, and Thomas Holcomb. Attending or lecturing at the Naval War College prior to the war included Marine officers such as Major General John H. Russell, Brigadier Generals Robert H. Dunlap and Dion Williams, Colonel Richard M. Cutts, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis. Taken as a whole, Marine officers demonstrated that they saw the value in professional military education as a means to further their own careers, as well as that of their service.

The stated mission of the Army War College (AWC), was to train officers in the duties and responsibilities of higher command and advanced staff work, as well as in the regulations and the supplementing of the work studied at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the operational art of war. The course of study at the AWC, a ten-month long program, had been designed to prepare the students attending for higher command and responsibilities in their own services or branches. Besides the heavy emphasis on Army drill and regulations, the Army required of its students to be well-read in the field of military history. This prompted one Marine commentator to note that any Marine officer selected to attend this school should begin preparing about a year in advance, by reading the assigned material in order to allow them to devote more time to the actual course once they arrive at the AWC. Like the course of instruction at the Ecole de Guerre, the curriculum at the AWC prepared Marines such as General Lejeune for higher command during the World War and beyond. In fact, Lejeune commented later in his memoirs that the AWC had, "a far-reaching effect in giving me a standing among Army officers which stood me in good stead when I arrived in France during the World War." Lejeune noted that attendance at

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the AWC not only prepared him for command of the 2d Division during the war, but also served him well during his tenure as head of the Marine Corps during the 1920's.\textsuperscript{112}

As for the Naval War College (NWC), which was the first service college of advanced higher learning to be established in the United States, Marines had been in attendance almost from the beginning of the school in 1884. Charged with the mission of the "study of the conduct of naval warfare and the art of command thereto," the \textit{NWC} put the students selected to attend through an intense course of lectures, classes, and readings on the art and science of naval warfare, international law, and perhaps the most important function-a board or war game, built around a naval theme. This wargame, built around the Prussian concept of "\textit{kriegspiel}," had been designed to teach Navy and Marine officers the resolution of strategic and tactical problems when conducting a joint naval and land campaign.\textsuperscript{113} As time went by, the curriculum taught at Newport came to include the study of joint operations with the Army, as well as combined operations with the Marines in the seizure and defense of island atolls in the Central Pacific Ocean during World War II.

\textbf{Summary}

Despite the fact that after the 1925 Oahu Maneuvers the focus of the MCS gradually turned toward the study of landing operations, the Marine Corps moved slowly though not as fast as some Marines would've preferred in the direction of emphasizing landing operations into its school curriculum. While General Lejeune pointed toward the work being done at Quantico on such operations, he still equated landing operations with the expeditionary mission. This confusion is highlighted in his annual report for 1925, where he wrote that:

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{112}Lejeune, \textit{Reminiscences}, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{113}NA., "Education of A Marine Officer," p. 27.
\end{footnotesize}
Training has at all times been conducted with the end in view of supporting the fleet in the accomplishment of its mission. Experience has proven that there is a necessity for the Marine Corps to be prepared to act with the fleet at a moment's notice. Disturbances which may arrive may require that a landing force . . . be used ashore for the protection of American interests.\textsuperscript{114}

By Lejeune's own admission, the last sentence in his annual report is indicative of the problems that existed in the Marine Corps even as it attempted to redirect its efforts toward landing operations. Part of this problem lay in the fact that it remained fixated on its traditional duties, and not amphibious warfare or, the inculcation of the lessons learned on the beaches of Culebra or Oahu during the FLEXES of the 1920's. It was not until the 1926-27 school year, that Marine officers at the MCS began looking at landing operations. Even still, the study of "Small Wars" still received the "lion's share" of attention with the land operations of the World War following closely behind.\textsuperscript{115} Only during the 1927-28 school year, did the MCS add a "new complete course in overseas expeditionary operations," to the field officers' course. With the deployment of Marines to Nicaragua and China, the schools at Quantico and Philadelphia lost a great many of their students to the expeditionary battalions that Headquarters hastily organized and deployed to the theater of operations, forcing a closure of the Company Officers Course, and a reduction in the staff at the Field Officers' Course with the retention of only a skeletal staff at the Correspondence School until the withdrawal from Nicaragua began after 1929. It was not until 1931 that the MCS, under the leadership of Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, began a systematic examination of "amphibious" operations, which culminated in the writing of the \textit{Tentative Landing Manual} in 1934. Despite this, however, the MCS carried on "as best they could" given the realities of the

\textsuperscript{115}Frances, "\textit{History of Marine Corps Schools}," p. 36.
deployments and the ever-tightening budgets and loss of manpower, and awaited the better days ahead.

Despite these and other problems, the Marine Corps made great strides in the decade of the 1920's insofar as officer education had been concerned. The fact that the Marine Corps started the interwar period with an antiquated system of training and educating its newly-commissioned officers, as well as its junior and senior leaders, it ended the decade of the 1920's with a school system that while not perfect, was one in which laid the foundation for the intellectual ferment that took place in the 1930's. All this was made possible because of the foresight of not only Major General Lejeune but to the efforts of other officers such as General Eli K. Cole, Dion Williams, Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, Lieutenant Colonels Earl H. "Pete" Ellis and Harold H. Utley, and Major Samuel M. Harrington. These men not only laid the foundation at the MCS for the next generation of officer-educators that would propel the Corps toward its amphibious assault mission, but it would give the Marine Corps its raison d'être as a military force, and make it the nation's premier amphibious assault force. Yet the MCS had a more immediate task to perform, and that was to prepare Marine officers, from the rank of second lieutenant to colonel, to lead Marines in combat. By 1922, the MCS system was up and running in order to assure that the officers advanced progressively to the rank of colonel had adequate military schooling, with particular emphasis as line officers as troop leaders.

The emphasis Headquarters placed on educating its officers can be seen in a memorandum that General Lejeune wrote in the mid-1920's to the personnel officer in the Division of Operations and Training, where he placed the functioning of the MCS at the top of his priority list, "over other duty except duty at Headquarters and duty with expeditionary forces actually on, or under orders for foreign stations . . . ."\textsuperscript{116} In fact,
taking aim at the dispersing of Marine field grade officers to the Army and Navy's institutions of higher and practical learning, the Major General Commandant stressed that above all else, "the successful functioning of the Marine Corps Schools is more important to the Marine Corps as a whole than is the higher schooling of a few officers."

Thus, during his tenure as Commandant, General Lejeune partially succeeded in prioritizing officer education and development in the Marine Corps and by doing so, institutionalized the professional development of its officers. While deployments to China and later Nicaragua temporarily stymied the Corps' blossoming intellectual ferment it didn't stop it, and instead, it laid the foundation for the most important phase in the history of the Marine Corps, which was the development of amphibious warfare doctrine. Amplifying Lejeune's comments was General Eli K. Cole, who reiterated Lejeune's comments in an endorsement to the assignment of officers to the staff of the Marine Corps Schools as instructors when he wrote that:

\[ \ldots \text{there is no question but what the best results in the courses of instruction will be secured through the assigning the most competent officers available. As it is believed that the courses of instruction in the schools are improved year by year, the desirability of securing each year, the desirability of securing each year as many of the graduates of the school as may be considered available for relief for members of the staff who are completing their period of duty is apparent.}^{117} \]

\[ \text{Army, see Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, pp. 203-48; Also see Major General Commandant to Personnel Officer, nd. (Washington, D.C., National Archives, RG 127, A/I Office, Correspondence of the U.S. Marine Corps, Access. No. 1520-30-100, Box 116), p. 1.} \]

The other "revolution" that was perhaps even more significant, and is often ignored or hardly discussed was the movement toward the creation of a professional military education system for Marine staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officers. While profound changes were being made within the structure of the U.S. Army's attitudes and education of its NCO's, the impact of the World War, and the increasing technological changes that affected the day-to-day operation and readiness of the corps forced Marine leaders to examine the professional development of its NCO's, and what they discovered surely did not meet with their satisfaction, nor give them confidence in its junior leadership. The creation of a professional system of NCO education, and the elevation of these enlisted noncommissioned officers is where the real "revolution" took place in the Marine Corps during the 1920's.

The creation of the Marine Corps Institute in 1919 and the first Sergeants' School in 1922, coupled with the growth and expansion of the Marine Corps' vocational and technical training beginning as early as the pre-World War era (1910-7), culminated in the organization and expansion of staff noncommissioned and noncommissioned officers' schooling. Yet the fundamental problems in the establishment of a permanent system of professional military education and development for SNCO's and NCO's, was not the lack of desire on the part of Headquarters, but that the rhetoric oftentimes did not match the actual implementation of these programs by officials at Headquarters in the Division of Operations and Training. This lack of implementation, due to both a lack of funds as well as suitable candidates left serious "gaps" in the Marine Corps' junior leadership, particularly in the ranks of corporals and sergeants-the immediate troop leaders. Indeed, a memorandum dated 18 May 1928 from Colonel Louis McCarthy Little, Director, Division of Operations and Training "hit the nail squarely on the head" regarding the shortage of trained NCO's in the Marine Corps, when he wrote that:
Twenty Years ago the Marine Corps was a non-technical organization composed almost entirely of what would now be termed rifle companies, non-commissioned officers of that day being purely leaders of men. Since that time the Marine Corps has been modernized into all the technical branches that exist in the Army, and yet no general and effective attempt has been made to increase the number of non-commissioned officers and distribute them in accordance with the modern requirements of the Corps. Piecemeal and palliative measures have been adopted from time to time in an attempt to satisfy modern requirements but these measures have proved far from satisfactory. It has always been necessarily a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

. . . . The mission assigned the Marine Corps by the Army and Navy Joint Board requires a highly efficient force composed of technical as well as purely combat personnel. In the past the noncommissioned officers in the grades of sergeant and above were looked upon as the backbone of the service. This no longer holds true. While they are still the essential element they must be supplemented by the various combat specialists or we cannot hope to function as a modern military organization and to carry out our mission efficiently when called upon . . . . 118

While Headquarters organized such schools as the Sergeants' School and sent enlisted Marines to the various Army and Navy technical and vocational schools, the emphasis placed on their professional development remained almost totally non-existent through-out the interwar era. The MCI and the creation of a Sergeants School at Quantico was only a temporary solution to a larger problem in not only addressing the shortage of non-commissioned officers, but in fostering a definite career path for enlisted Marines. In short, while Headquarters knew problem existed, they did little to address the problems presented at war's end. While Lejeune and others realized that it was not just riflemen that comprised a modern military force there was an institutional failure to redress the glaring deficiencies in the professional development of its NCO's, and as the war in Nicaragua demonstrated, this had a far-ranging effect on its tactical performance

in the field, as Marines found its junior leadership wanting. Yet Headquarters did make some progress, albeit minuscule, toward the professionalization of its NCO Corps. For as the World War so poignantly demonstrated, oftentimes, it would be the NCO's that carried the day. Likewise, this need for professionalization among its NCO's in time came to include combat-related personnel and trained specialists such as cooks, clerks, mechanics, armorers, and logisticians. This realization among senior Marine leaders provided incentive to push Headquarters to come up with a better plan in being able to retain its best and enthusiastic NCO's. This, in fact, had been acknowledged by Major General Barnett as early as 1919, and later reiterated by Lejeune throughout his tenure as Commandant. The intensification of NCO development, highlighted by the permanent establishment of a Noncommissioned Officers' School at Quantico in 1930, was the beginning of a process of training enlisted Marine leaders, in order to create a professional NCO corps. Taking advantage of not only the combat experience from the World War, but also from the recent expeditions to Nicaragua and China, Headquarters addressed some of the problems Marines encountered in infantry tactics, weapons training and usage that had been highlighted there during the 1920's. General Lejeune, and his three successors later incorporated many of these lessons learned in courses at both the officer and enlisted Marine schools in the 1930's, where they later ruthlessly practiced many them with devastating effect on the atolls of the Central Pacific.119

As is often the case, however, it took two major expeditionary deployments to both China and Nicaragua (1923-1929), as well as an economic depression, and an even more austere Republican administration under Herbert Hoover in 1929, to bring out the "best"

in the Marine Corps as it entered the second "golden era," of doctrinal development. Despite the fiscal conservative or "radicalism" of the Hoover administration, the "seeds" had been successfully sown by Major General Lejeune and other Marine officers during the 1920's, which would "sprout" and "grow" during the 1930's and 1940's. During this era, the Marine Corps slowly absorbed the lessons learned during the World War, and from the "second expeditionary era" in the jungles of Hispaniola and Nicaragua, and applied them to the FLEXES of the 1920's and 1930's, and its landing operations manual in 1934.

\[120\] The author would argue that the "first" era occurred between 1892 and 1914 with the creation of the Advanced Base Force under Brigadier General's Charles Heywood (1892-1903), and George F. Elliott (1903-10).
CHAPTER 13

'TO FIGHT OUR COUNTRY'S BATTLES'

Introduction

While Marines spent the majority of their time in the 1920's reenacting famous Civil War battles, guarding the U.S. Mails, and engaging in peace enforcing and peace keeping operations in Hispaniola, China, and Nicaragua, the mid-to-late period of that same decade, and into the 1930's, ushered in one of the most productive periods in the history of the Marine Corps. It was, in fact, during this era that the lessons of the intervention in these peace enforcing missions, as well as the "shift" in the Corps' thinking and doctrinal emphasis on "defense" to "seizure" of advanced naval bases began to take hold inside the Corps as a return to "normalcy" brought with it training and educational opportunities that Major General Lejeune's three successors capitalized on up through the appointment of Major General Thomas Holcomb as the head of the Marine Corps in December 1936. While Major General Neville lived but a year after his appointment as the Major General Commandant, it was left to his two successors, Major General's Ben H. Fuller (1930-1933), and John H. Russell (1934-36), to institute many of the training programs and doctrinal changes that Holcomb would build upon as Asia and Europe once again exploded into war beginning in 1937. This purpose of this chapter is to examine the legacy of Major General Lejeune and the impact of the reforms enacted during his Commandancy on the Marine Corps during the 1930's. In fact, the Marine
Corps' successes during World War II were a direct result of the hard training, lessons learned from the World War, and astute leadership of General Lejeune and his proteges during the decade of the 1920's and 1930's. During Lejeune's tenure as Commandant, both he and these same officers had fought hard for the institutional survival of the Marine Corps which by the end of the 1920's had weathered "many a storm," and emerged in the 1930's, prepared "to fight our country's battles."

In addition to the "passing of the torch" from Lejeune to Neville in March 1929 through the Commandancy of Major Ben H. Fuller in 1934, the primary focus of this chapter is to examine recruit training in the late 1920's to mid-1930's; the return to the classrooms and the changes in curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools during the early 1930s, and the refocusing of the curriculum at the MCS toward landing operations with the end result being the formation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in December 1933. While the Fuller Commandancy occurred in a period of austere budgets and draconian cutbacks in manpower by the Hoover administration, and has been dismissed as a "transitional" period between the end of the Lejeune era and the beginning of the Russell Commandancy, it was undoubtedly the most important periods in the institutional history of the Marine Corps, since it laid the foundation for the modern Marine Corps. Fuller's Commandancy, in fact, was the 'last of the old and the first of the new' insofar as its impact on training, curriculum, and doctrine in the Marine Corps had been concerned. Furthermore, the changes brought about during Major General Fuller's tenure as Major General Commandant signaled the 'renaissance' of an organization that had teetered on institutional extinction after its constabulary mission had been all but ended due to the announced end of the expeditionary era with the announcement of the "good neighbor policy" in 1933 by President Franklin Roosevelt.

In addition to the focus on Lejeune's legacy, and his impact on the corps, the final purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the changes made from the brief tenure of Major
General Neville through the first year of the Commandancy of Major General John H. Russell Commandancy at Quantico, on the drill and training fields at Parris Island and San Diego. As the author will demonstrate, all of the reforms enacted from Lejeune through Fuller laid the groundwork for the Marine Corps' amphibious assault doctrine, and prepared for its supreme test during the Second World War.

"'The Passing of the Torch': The End of the Lejeune Era 1929-1930"

Major General John A. Lejeune's tenure as the Major General Commandant was eight full years (1920-1929), long by modern standards though short by the years spent by the Corps' fifth commandant-Archibald Henderson, who served in that post for a total of thirty-nine years (1820-1859). Nonetheless, Lejeune's tenure as Commandant were extremely productive, this given the meager resources he had at his disposal in terms of both manpower and funds. Indeed, despite the problems of tight budgets, limited manpower, and too many missions, the Lejeune Commandancy was by far the most productive insofar as the institutional infrastructure of the Marine Corps is concerned. In fact, the accomplishments made in the Marine Corps during Lejeune's Commandancy had been rivaled only slightly in modernization and innovation of the Marine Corps by that of Brigadier General Charles Heywood's Commandancy (1891-1903), which ushered the Corps into the twentieth century, and the directed it toward the advanced base mission. Lejeune's tenure as the head of the corps remains even to this day, the single most important era in the evolutionary development of the Marine Corps as a modern fighting force, unsurpassed in intensity and leadership, as well as in skill and ability. To quote General Merrill B. Twining, "Major General Lejeune did far more for the Marine Corps, and had far better ideas," than any of his immediate predecessors or successors with the possible exception of Major General John H. Russell, to make that service institutionally viable and capable of carrying out its assigned wartime role within
the context of a naval campaign.¹ From the standpoint of military and political
effectiveness, Lejeune's strength lay in his ability to "sway" congressmen, as well as his
relationship with the Butlers, particularly the elder Butler, whose political patronage
guaranteed the Marines adequate yearly budgets and manpower levels in an era of ever-
tightening budgets.² Unfortunately, Congressman Thomas Butler's death in early 1928,
and the continuing expeditionary missions to China and Nicaragua, worked against
Lejeune's plans for modernization and mission reorientation, and appears to have
contributed to his decision to retire.

Major General Lejeune's decision to retire at the end of his second tour as
commandant came shortly after his reappointment by President Coolidge in 1924. While
his published memoirs provide no explanation other than the fact that he had his "full
share of service in that office," one can read between the lines and sense the frustration in
his failure to achieve the adoption of advancement by selection by the Marine Corps.
Indeed, since the time of Archibald Henderson, every Marine commandant upon entering
office has one "pet" goal or project that he hopes to achieve during his tour as head of
the Marine Corps. While Lejeune accomplished much in the way of keeping the budget
knives from cutting too deep into the Corps' strength, the election of Herbert Hoover, a
fiscal conservative, pointed to darker days ahead for the services, particularly the Marine
Corps, and to a lesser degree the Navy.³ I believe that Lejeune's decision to retire came
after a realization that despite his best efforts the next four years (1929-33) would have
been an even greater struggle to keep the Corps intact.

¹See Twining Oral History, p. 48.
²Lejeune, Reminiscences, p. 476.
as Wilson, Hoover and the Armed Forces.
The "struggle to keep the Corps intact" thus fell upon his two successors, Wendell C. Neville and Ben H. Fuller as it had appeared that at least for the moment, one of the Corps' primary missions had been eliminated with the withdrawal from Nicaragua beginning in the winter and spring of 1929 and the arrival of the "good neighbor policy" under President Herbert Hoover. There were other reasons as well, rooted in the Hoover Administration and in the War Department which threatened the institutional survival of the Marine Corps in the early 1930's. Besides its promise to consolidate, "re-organize," and economize government, the Hoover Administration preached a "good neighbor policy" to the countries of Latin America. The War Department meanwhile once again mounted its favorite "hobby horse," and kicked off a not-so-secret campaign aimed at either amalgamating the Marine Corps into the Army line or eliminating it altogether, all for the sake of "economizing." This "second amalgamation crisis," began ostensibly as a result of an internal survey of the military services headed by Army Chief of Staff General George Simonds, that suggested that the Army could assume the mission of landing operations in support of the fleet and, if necessary, the expeditionary mission. Not content to keep this plan under wraps General George Van Horn Moseley, Simond's Deputy Chief of Staff, went so far as to openly advocate the shifting of the Marines to the Army in order to eliminate the overhead and save money. 4 To deflect the legal argument that soldiers could not intervene in an expedition such as Nicaragua without a declaration of war, as well as appease Marine Corps supporters on Capitol Hill, the Army chiefs responded that the Marines would become a "branch" of the Army, thus eliminating the overhead and redundancy of the corps. Furthermore, there had been some, though not too much interest in the Marine Corps School's work on landing operations at the Army's Infantry School at Fort Benning. In a letter addressed to the

4Ibid.

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Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, the adjutant of the Infantry School, Major H. B. Lewis, requested copies of instructional material dealing with the operations of an infantry brigade, regiment, battalion, and company for a course then in preparation on the "Attack and Defense of Coast Lines" at Fort Benning. Despite the pronounced sense of inter-service cooperation that Lejeune and others had attempted to foster during the 1920's, the Marine Corps' reply further soured relations between the two services when Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge replied that due "to the confidential nature of the material requested," he could not authorize the release of such material with explicit permission from the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Compounding the inter-service relations was a similar incident that occurred in 1932, when an Army major attending the Field Officer's Course dismissed the Marine Corps' efforts to-date insofar as landing operations had been concerned as being "a poor duplicate of the Leavenworth course which he had already taken." Given the refusal of the Marines to part with information on landing operations, which at the time was mediocre at best anyway, and the Army major's not-to-flattering comments on the work already done by the MCS, there is little wonder why relations between the two services remained lukewarm during the 1930's. Nonetheless, the fact remains that for a branch of the service that feared amalgamation in 1918, the Army seemed to believe that it was "all right" to do it with a force administered by the Navy in 1930.

Insofar as President Herbert Hoover's sentiments toward defense reorganization, if it in fact can be called that, it appears that whatever ill-feelings he harbored toward the

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Marine Corps, his desire to possibly eliminate the Marines centered more so on the monetary aspects of whether the nation required a sea-going light infantry force or not. Whatever Hoover had in mind, whether it be the elimination or amalgamation of the Marine Corps into the Army, the fact remains that the Republican president was no supporter of the Marines. This was shown with the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur as Army Chief of Staff in 1930, who himself was no supporter of the Marines (at least that is until September 1950). With both Hoover in the White House, and MacArthur at the War Department, the Marines now had two perceived "enemies" in Washington, D.C., seeking ways to either curb eliminate its mission and service through draconian budget and manpower cuts that placed an even greater strain on both Major Generals Neville and Ben H. Fuller's attempts at "holding the line" against any drastic cutbacks in manpower or an elimination of the traditional missions of naval security and expeditionary duties.

The Neville Commandancy, 1929-1930

The selection of Major General Wendell C. "Whispering Buck" Neville, Lejeune's hand-picked successor as the head of the Corps, seemed an insurance policy that guaranteed stability, and a continuation of his predecessor's policies. Unfortunately, Neville's illness and sudden death on 8 July 1930, ushered in one of the periodic battles centering on his successor as the Major General Commandant. While Neville served but only a year in office, he did oversee the withdrawal of the Marines from China, and the beginnings of a phased withdrawal from Nicaragua. Furthermore, as discussed below, Neville managed to introduce several initiatives centering on recruit training and curriculum at the Field Officer's School at Quantico, though these reforms had barely taken hold before his sudden death in July 1930. Then, in a practice that is more secretive, and undoubtedly more political than the selection of the next pope in the Roman Catholic
Church with the secluded College of Cardinals, the Marine Corps set about to select its next Commandant.

While there were several outstanding candidates in the field grade rank at the time, only five officers emerged as serious contenders for that office. The five included Neville's assistant commandant, Brigadier General Ben H. Fuller, who had, in fact, been running the day-to-day affairs of the Marines during Neville's illness, and was a Naval Academy graduate, and had been well-respected by senior officers of Navy (most importantly his classmate at Annapolis—the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William V. Pratt). The other four candidates included Major General Smedley D. Butler, Brigadier Generals Logan Feland, John H. Russell, and Robert H. Dunlap, all of whom had considerable expeditionary service, and had well-developed political connections inside and outside the Navy Department. While Butler was senior to Fuller in rank though junior to him in time of service, and could have waited for the election of one of his erstwhile supporters-Franklin D. Roosevelt as President in 1933 to become Commandant, his inflammatory remarks against Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, as well as U.S. policy in Central America, which prompted inquiries and initial courts martial proceedings against him insured his early retirement in 1931. Brigadier General Logan Feland, who was in reality the only other serious contender for the "throne," and part of the "Second Division crowd" that had served in France under Lejeune and Neville during the World War, brought with him an understanding of the needs and requirements modern warfare. Feland's handicap included his age and proximity to mandatory retirement (three years vice Fuller's four years). Brigadier General John H. Russell's long proconsulship on Haiti, and time away from the day-to-day operations of the Corps were the major factors that worked against his selection as Commandant in 1930. Another factor inhibiting Russell's selection in 1930, was the lingering resentment felt among his peers concerning his activities on the officer retention board in 1919, sentiments that
reappeared when Russell became commandant in late 1933, and later on successfully implemented promotion by selection much to the deference of the old guard in the Corps, who adamantly opposed it. The last Marine officer that remained outside "official" circles, and was possibly the best choice for the job despite his junior rank was Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap. While the Hoover administration debated Neville's successor, Dunlap remained in command of the San Diego Marine Base prior to his departure for the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris, France. While it is remains a mystery why an officer so senior would be selected to attend a school reserved for field grade officers, his untimely death in May 1931, in southern France, left a void in the Marine Corps that was felt deeply in the Corps' senior leadership that went well into the mid-1930's, as it re-focused its efforts toward amphibious warfare. As Major General Commandant, it is conceivable that Dunlap would've played a key role in the inculcation of the amphibious assault mission in the Marine Corps, and would have been far more successful in refocusing its efforts toward amphibious war, and in redirecting it away from its preoccupation with Small Wars in the 1930's. Given the fact that Dunlap had thirteen years of service to serve before mandatory retirement, it is highly conceivable that he would have led the Marines into World War II. Furthermore, Dunlap had an

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6For an in-depth look at the political in-fighting that took place with Fuller's selection as Major General Commandant see Merrill L. Bartlett, "Ben Hebard Fuller And The Genesis of A Modern United States Marine Corps, 1884-1934," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, 24 April 1998, Cantigny, Wheaton, IL. Hereafter cited as Bartlett, "Fuller." and; also the Correspondence and telegrams of endorsements on Brigadier General Butler and Feland's nominations see the Major General James G. Harbord, USA, Papers, (Quantico, VA., MCU Archives, MCCDC, PC #2425, Box 1, Folder 39, Subject: "Marines Nominated to Succeed Commandant Neville"). These are Photostat copies of letters found in the Herbert Hoover Presidential Papers, marked Cabinet Officers; see specifically White House Secretary C. R. Train's memorandum to the President, "In Regards to the Reappointment: Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps," dtd. 21 July 1930, at the (Quantico, VA., MCU Archives, MCRC, MCCDC). 560
appeal to all factions (expeditionary, "traditionalists," and "modernists") in the officer ranks. While it remains speculative at best, it is quite conceivable that given Dunlap's reputation as an outstanding and efficient officer, he would've been able to introduce many of the needed curriculum reforms at the MCS as well as promotion by selection without incurring the wrath and hostility of many senior officers that occurred under Major General Russell.

In the end, Brigadier General Fuller's appointment as Commandant in August 1930, brought to the office a strong minded, professional officer to lead the Corps during what were extremely "lean times," insofar as money and manpower had been concerned. Yet despite the cutbacks and lack of money, Headquarters made do with what it had (which wasn't much), and began to absorb and institute many of the lessons learned in Nicaragua, as Marine officials concentrated their efforts on the drill fields, and the classrooms as they continued to do what they always did best: train Marines for combat.

Recruit, Basic Individual, and Officer Training, 1924-1933

For Marines, training hard has been the key to its success on and off the battlefield. While Marines like to point to what they call a "time-tested" system in preparing Marines for battle, prior to the World War, the only real "training" Marines received was the initial period of recruit training, and what is now called "on-the-job" training with an active expeditionary, or sea-going detachment. While Headquarters had at least on paper required an additional period of basic infantry training tacked onto recruit training in order to familiarize the recently-graduated Marine in the basic infantry skills, as well as with the "School of the Soldier," (i.e., the working and employment of automatic weapons, hand grenades, bayonet usage, and tactical formations), Marines oftentimes found themselves hurriedly whisked aboard awaiting steamers at Parris Island, in order to take part in this or that expeditionary mission in either Hispaniola or Nicaragua. This
in turn led to the problems some Marine units experienced with the newcomers being unable to operate effectively in the field. In fact, as the demand for Marines increased during the 1920's for expeditionary duty in Nicaragua and China, Headquarters cut into the training schedule with the result being Marines who were hastily trained, and ill-prepared for the rigors of combat and occupation duty. An attempt by Brigadier General Dunlap in late 1929 at the Marine Corps Base San Diego, California, to re-institute a period of initial basic infantry training while the new Marine awaited orders had been effectively "killed" by Major General Neville as both too expensive and a drain on manpower needed elsewhere. Yet what is perhaps the most serious of shortcomings in this training, was the fact that there had been no change, at least officially, in the introduction of basic infantry skills to recent graduates of the recruit depots. The tactical failures that occurred in the Marine Corps in the mid-to-late 1920's, were the results of Headquarters' failure to implement the various training regulations it possessed that covered this so-called "School of the Soldier," among not only Marine junior officers, but also Marine recruits at both of the recruit depots. The failure to provide both junior officers and recruits with even a basic introduction to infantry skills during the mid-to-late 1920's had disastrous results in the jungles of Nicaragua in the late 1920's. For as Headquarters officials discovered, an actual "shooting war" is no place to train green recruits.7

This failure is significant in two respects. First of all, the problems encountered by Marines occurred in a training system that had proven itself remarkably adaptive during the World War. When Headquarters modernized and centralized recruit training in 1911, at one of the two recruit depots, as well as the implementation of modern training

methods (such as the "Swedish" system of physical training\(^8\)), and placed an even greater emphasis on marksmanship, the system seemed to justify itself during the build-up prior to and during the World War. With the World War's continued need for troops trained in basic infantry skills, the training system established at Quantico worked well under the strains of that conflict, as an estimated 75,000 Marines, both officer and enlisted, passed through the "crossroads" of the Marine Corps on their way to France, and other posts during the war. With the success in France during the late war, Headquarters had hoped to retain at least the basic portions of this training by introducing all of it, or portions of it into their school system during the interwar era. Secondly, both budgetary constraints, and expeditionary duty in Hispaniola, China, and later Nicaragua, as well as domestic operations such as guarding the mail did their best to derail even a modest upkeep in Marine training. The lapses in training, while attributable to many factors, had at its core the fact that Marine recruiting had slackened, and that the Coolidge and Hoover administrations had slashed the corps' already meager budgets. Nonetheless, the Division of Operations and Training labored under such constraints and still turned out a well-trained Marine. Furthermore, the lapses in training that occurred in the 1920's, were largely the result of the competing, and often disjointed policies enacted at Headquarters and implemented by officials at the Recruit Depots, who either ignored or "modified" training circulars in order to meet operational commitments. In turn, the failure on the part of the Recruit Depots to adhere to official training policies greatly effected its

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\(^8\) The "Swedish" system of training, introduced into Marine recruit training in 1913 places emphasis on developing the entire body in order to insure endurance and physical confidence. It is done in a series of steps in order to build the entire body not just upper body strength. It includes cardiovascular and abdominal exercises such as marching and running, heaving, and lateral exercises. See Captain A. C. Niblack, USN, "The Swedish System-A Further Plea for Physical Training in the Navy," \textit{U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings}, June 1911, Vol. 37, No. 2, Whole No. 138, pp. 425-28 also; Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, Report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1913. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1914).
tactical effectiveness in Nicaragua. One last cause of the tactical "dysfunction" that occurred in the Marines during the last years of the 1920's, can be attributed to the fact that the Division of Operations and Training had failed to adjust itself to the changes in tactical doctrine brought about by the World War, insofar as marksmanship and use of automatic weapons had been concerned. As illustrated below, this failure oftentimes had disastrous consequences in the many firefights with the sandinista guerrillas from 1927 to 1933 in Nicaragua.

It is at this point that a brief description of Marine training is necessary since it points to the failures as well as the successes enjoyed by Marines in solidifying its training methods prior to World War II. Many of the aspects of that training developed in the 1920s, later served Marines very well during the early 1930's, and enabled them to quickly expand as war clouds once again darkened the skies over Europe, and in the Pacific. Furthermore, if one were to apply here the saying that "if it's not broken don't fix it," it is easy to understand why Headquarters retained the system in training, both recruit and basic and branch individual adopted by the Corps during the World War, and how it continued to influence the philosophical tenets of Marine Corps training and education well into the 1930's.

**Recruit Training in the 1920's and 1930's**

The basic concepts that have characterized Marine recruit training since its centralization in 1911 remained unchanged from the time of the World War through the 1920's and 1930's. In fact, many of these same characteristics remain by-and-large intact today though in a modified form. These concepts, based on the instilling of discipline and obedience to orders, as well as in the transformation of a civilian unaccustomed to military life and make him, in the eight to twelve weeks of training mandated by Headquarters a basic Marine, remained solid throughout the 1920's with little or no deviation in either philosophy or methodology. What hampered the Marine Corps during
this era was the constant need for manpower, and its debilitating effects on the recruit depots that forced Headquarters to periodically shorten the length of training in order to facilitate the need for manpower. Also, with the need for specialists, such as mechanics, clerks, and other support personnel, the need to ingrain all Marines (emphasis mine) with basic infantry skills became even more paramount as manpower figures dwindled in the 1920's. In fact, from Lejeune's though Russell's tenure as Major General Commandant, training became the foundation for all of the subsequent modernization plans each man had laid out during his tour as Commandant. The training program implemented by Lejeune though Russell emphasized the changing nature of warfare as experienced by the Marines in the World War. Indeed, no where more so was the impact of the war felt than on the drill fields and in the classrooms at Quantico and Philadelphia, on the training of both its enlisted men and officers. While Lejeune and his successors consistently pushed training and preparedness, their efforts many times nonetheless fell far short of what would be needed in actual war. Likewise, while there were many factors that contributed to this decline, particularly the drastic cuts on the Marine Corps's budget, and its deployments to Nicaragua and China, Headquarters, and Lejeune in particular, oftentimes cited these two factors as the main culprits in order to explain the deficiencies in training as they appeared later in combat in Nicaragua. The fact remains, however, that the Marines made do with what they had, and greatly succeeded in turning out a trained Marine, as well correcting the deficiencies that existed in Marine training during the 1920's and 1930's.

This emphasis on recruit training, a mundane and boring subject, and one that is less likely to be discussed in books concentrating on amphibious developments, is nonetheless important when one considers the fact that any successful amphibious doctrine required a well trained infantrymen, well-inculcated in basic infantry skills, as well as in an instantaneous obedience to orders. Much to Headquarters disappointment, 565
the tactical abilities of Marines in Nicaragua were found not only to be inadequate, and had a direct correlation with the "hurried up" training cycle that negated any familiarization with basic infantry weapons such as BAR's, rifle grenades, grenades, and basic infantry skills, all of which became the subject of intense debate even before Marines deployed to Nicaragua in late 1926. If Nicaragua served as an indication of the tactical training Marines received prior to their arrival in country, the Marine Corps would have to do some quick fixing in order for it to become an expeditionary force in readiness. This in itself pointed to the need for an improved training system both at the recruit, branch, and unit training levels. While one could argue that the eight to twelve weeks of additional training Marines received in what Headquarters called its "Overseas Department" prior to their departure for France during the World War adequately prepared Marines for combat in France, many Marine officials viewed it as a wartime measure not to be repeated. Nonetheless, the experiences by the Marines and U.S. Army during the opening days of World War II suggests that Marine training, at least in the 1920's, suffered more as a result of Headquarters' policies, and tendencies toward expediency rather than budget cuts. In fact, both Marine and Army officials discovered that the World War brought to the fore the need for a thoroughly trained Marine or soldier, schooled in the use of modern and combined arms. Unfortunately, due to expeditionary duty in the 1920's, the emphasis normally given to training lapsed during this era even as the lethality in warfare increased. As the attention turned toward landing operations in the late 1920's and early 1930's, tactical training became even more important, if not critical, in the preparation of Marines for combat.9 From the

9For his emphasis on training, see the address by Major General John A. Lejeune to the General Board of the Navy, "Advanced Bases Including Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces for Shore Operations Essential to the Prosecution of the Naval Campaign," found in the Report of Special Board on Naval Policy, dtd. 5 January 1925. (Washington, D.C., History & Museums Division, HQMC, MCHC, Reference Section, Folder, "Advanced 566
correspondence that went from the Division of Operations and Training to the depots in the late 1920's and 1930's, it is apparent that in order to solve these training deficiencies officials at Headquarters looked back at the system employed in 1917-18, to train Marines for service with the AEF. In fact, any cursory examination of the methods used to train Marines in the mid-to-late 1920's and early 1930's, clearly illustrate that it was the World War system that had succeeded in combat, and offered an appeal to officers such as Lejeune and Dunlap since this type of training emphasized what military trainers call "the basics," or "fundamentals upon which a successful training (and tactical doctrine) is built. This is precisely what Lejeune had in mind in the early part of the 1920's, when he proposed to establish an Officer's Infantry Weapons School and Sergeants School at Quantico, and Major General Fuller followed up on when he established similar courses at not only the recruit depots, but at the other training facilities in the early 1930's.

Marine recruit training has been the subject of both mythology and folklore. For those individuals who enlist in the Marines, however, it is simply an introduction of what to expect for the length of their service in the Corps. Long hard days of constant repetitive close order drill, physical fitness, and endless class after class on personal and field hygiene, combat skills, Marine Corps history and traditions, and the 'holiest of holiest training-marksman ship. With the country divided into two separate districts, those Marines who enlisted from the eastern half of the Mississippi had been insured of a trip to Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, a hurricane-swept island located in Port Royal Sound, \(^{10}\) inhabited by chiggers and sand fleas, known

\[\text{Base Force, pre-1940"), p. 2.}\]

\(^{10}\) Recruit Training throughout the 1920's and into the early 1930's gravitated between 10 and twelve weeks with the former normally being the case prior to the deployments to Nicaragua and China. The lack of suitable NCO's and officers to supervise training due to the deployments later on to Asia and Central America caused a severe shortage of P567
affectionately by all of us who endured "boot camp" there as "P.I." Those who entered the corps from the western half the country ended up at either Marine Barracks, San Diego, or for a brief period at Mare Island, California, and as legend has it, remained there and basked in the warm sunshine and later made movies.

While Marines have historically stressed the physical differences of the two recruit depots, the training at both locations during the interwar era was both uniform and grueling. During the interwar era, recruit training had been broken down into a seventy-seven day training cycle (technically ten-later extended to twelve weeks) that included an administrative forming period known as "herding," a period of physical training and conditioning, three weeks of marksmanship training, and a three-week period where the newly-trained Marine learned such skills as infantry tactics, weapons employment, and use of the bayonet, all interspersed with an endless repetitive cycle of close order and extended drill. Depot officials placed approximately fifty-six to sixty recruits under the care and charge of two noncommissioned or staff noncommissioned officers led by a company grade officer (usually a first lieutenant or captain), who insured that the NCO's employed proper training procedures. There were even then, at least officially, regulations that insured that an NCO, or officer did not maltreat or unduly punish a recruit undergoing training.11

While the San Diego recruit depot offers nearly a year-round uninterrupted cycle of perfect weather, recruits who had the good fortune to be assigned to Parris Island

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oftentimes endured hurricanes, humidity, isolation, and the knowledge and constant reminder that one was, indeed, on an "island," connected then only by a ferry (later a causeway in the 1930's), that transported the recruits to the wharf near Lyceum Hall, where they received the customary greetings by a receiving sergeant or corporal. Private Russell F. Colbert who joined the Marines at age seventeen, recalled that in January 1928, after a brief train trip from Columbia to Yemassee, South Carolina, he and a group of recruits then took a small narrow gauge railroad to Beaufort where they then boarded an awaiting Navy barge draped with a curtain in order to prevent the recruits from seeing the island. After a late night trip across the sound, the barge anchored at the marina next to the Lyceum Hall on Parris Island, where the recruits looked up to find a rather tall, gruff-looking gunnery sergeant standing above them. Shortly thereafter, this imposing figure barked at the Navy coxswain to "Take'em back, I don't want any of'em. Take'em back to where the hell you got'em." Momentarily after that, Colbert recalled the receiving sergeant "relented" and said, "Oh, Okay, bring'em up here, I guess I'll try to make something out of them."¹²

After having been issued the standard blue overalls which caused one Marine, Sergeant George MacGillivray, to comment that they resembled those issued to prisoners in state penitentiaries, underwear, a campaign hat, leggings, hobbled nailed shoes known as "boondockers," and a steel bucket that contained a straight razor, blades, toothbrush, tooth powder, soap, and a scrub brush the recruits or "boots" then marched to the infirmary where they received one final physical and a haircut done with sheers before being turned over to their drill instructors or "DI's." Colbert recalled that his senior drill instructor was a sergeant named Casey, and his assistant, a rather lean and leathery corporal who "rarely talked except when calling cadence or disciplining us, and

looked at us with contempt whenever he drilled us.\textsuperscript{13} Placed into a platoon that numbered fifty-six men, Colbert recalled that the initial period was one of endless hours of close order drill, health and hygiene inspections that he and his fellow recruits called "monkey inspections," and physical training. The emphasis and highlight of their training was, of course, rifle marksmanship broken down into three weeks of "snapping in" or "grass week" which covered the first week where recruits learned to sight in their weapons, familiarized themselves with their weapons, the various positions and targets, as well as learn how to adjust their slings. During the second week of rifle marksmanship training, recruits fired live rounds all of which led to the third and final week or "Qualification Week." Here recruits fired for actual scores and qualification as a marksman, sharpshooter or expert. Due to the Marine Corps's emphasis on marksmanship, the three weeks that recruits spent on the rifle range were technically at least supposed to be stress-free, that is, absent of the pressures and concerns normally associated with recruit training since the emphasis here was on qualification with the service rifle. Colbert recalled that the DI's were both patient and informative during the three weeks on the range. When the time came for live firing, known as "Qualification Week," Colbert remembered the difficulty he had in achieving a proper sitting shooting position, a problem Sergeant Casey, his senior drill instructor, solved by first placing him in the correct position, and then sitting on his shoulders "as if I were a lounge chair" in order to keep him in that position, and said to the recruit, "Ok Private Colbert, now you can fire!"\textsuperscript{14} (Table 13.1)

Expert Rifleman ..................... 300 and Over
Sharpsniper .......................... 285 to 299
Marksman ............................. 250 to 284
Unqualified ........................... Under 250

Table 13.1
Rifle Marksmanship Qualification
Course "A" Scores 1924

In spite of the emphasis the Marine Corps placed on marksmanship in recruit training during this period, many recruits and veteran Marines, in fact, failed to qualify or in the case of veterans "re-qualify" as even as basic marksmen. Counter to the much adhered standard that both officers and enlisted men were to be pistol and rifle marksmen (officers were required to qualify with both the rifle and .45 caliber pistol), Marines oftentimes failed to meet even this minimum standard. This in turn prompted a flood of memorandums from Headquarters to the commanding generals of the training depots which urged them to place an even greater emphasis on shooting and qualification of Marines as marksmen and sharpshooters. In fact, in a memorandum dated 14 December 1925, Brigadier General Dion Williams, Assistant to the Commandant, turned down a proposed increase in the recruit training schedule by Brigadier General Harry A. Lee, Commanding General of Parris Island, who had recommended that range week be extended to four weeks, a policy that he unofficially enacted in order to increase marksmanship proficiency. A few months later Major General Lejeune issued a much

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stronger rejoinder to General Lee, and ordered that the three-week range time be re-implemented. Lejeune emphasized in this letter to Lee the waste in both ammunition, and time that would result from such an extension of marksmanship training during the recruit training cycle. This confusion in marksmanship policies underscored the criticism leveled by Colonel John Beaumont, and others that Headquarters oftentimes "did not know what the training depots were doing," and gave some validity to the reasons why Marines had problems in using their weapons.16

On the other hand, as time on the range slightly decreased, emphasis on bayonet training increased. Colbert recalled that a good portion of training after the rifle range was given to use of the bayonet. His comments are reinforced by the change in the Recruit Training Schedule for 1927 (Summer and Winter), for both recruit depots, and clearly illustrated Beaumont's later comments in a report on the state of Marine training that Headquarters was more interested in issuing training regulations rather than controlling, and overseeing their implementation Corps-wide.17 Major Ralph Keyser, who wrote a stinging article in the Marine Corps Gazette, reiterated Colonel Beaumont's remarks that while Headquarters maintained a separate office for marksmanship training and competitive shooting, it maintained only a facade of endorsing marksmanship when, in fact, other aspects of Marine Corps training were in need of greater direct supervision, and attention than they were at present given.18 Supporting both Beaumont's and

17Colbert Interview, dtd.. 1 July 1998.
18Colonel John A. Beaumont, Director, Operations and Training, Report to Major
Keyser's concerns over rifle marksmanship were, of course, the breakdown of the actual numbers and percentage of those Marines who qualified with the service rifle for the years 1924-1926, prior to the implementation of changes in the marksmanship. The figures reflect Headquarters commitment toward rectifying a problem that had grown acute in the years after the World War. (Table 13.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fired</th>
<th>Expert Rifleman</th>
<th>Sharpshooter</th>
<th>Marksman</th>
<th>Unqualified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>16,972</td>
<td>3,682</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>2,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>16,343</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>7,699</td>
<td>1,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>14,650</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>3,116</td>
<td>7,190</td>
<td>1,311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fired</th>
<th>Expert Rifleman</th>
<th>Sharpshooter</th>
<th>Marksman</th>
<th>Unqualified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>14,650</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13.2

**Marine Corps-Wide Rifle Qualifications 1924-1926**

Another reason for the lapse in qualified marksmen, insofar as the Regular Marine Corps had been concerned was field duty and the lack of available firing ranges. Brigadier General Butler informed Headquarters from Tientsin that the men attached to

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the Third Brigade had no place where the entire brigade can re-qualify, nor could be concentrated to allow for unit-wide marksmanship training. At Parris Island, the problem was not one of space nor ability to train recruits per company or platoon, but the lack of qualified marksmanship instructors. Furthermore, the constant demand for trained Marines in 1927-28, virtually stripped Parris Island and San Diego of trained rifle range officers, as well as enlisted instructors and coaches. Besides this constant turnover in manpower, this decline in adequately trained recruits can be attributed to the emplacement in the vacant slots of men who either had rotated back from expeditionary duty or were deemed unfit for either field or garrison duty in the handling of troops. Nonetheless, despite the lack of both money and qualified marksmanship instructors, Headquarters introduced several reforms that had an immediate effect in correcting the deficiency in marksmanship among recruits. Initiated during FY1928, the first major reform included a new marksmanship program, whereby recruits fired .22 caliber ammunition instead of the standard .03 ammunition. This resulted in the qualification of 10,116 Marines out of the 11,203 that fired that fiscal year, with 1,087 going unqualified. Major General Lejeune enthusiastically reported to the Secretary of the Navy that ninety percent of the Marine Corps had qualified for that period. (Table 13.3)

The other major reform was a cash incentive in the form of extra pay for qualified shooters. Depending upon the qualification score a Marine received (marksman, sharpshooter, or expert), standing War and Navy Department regulations authorized the payment of an additional five to ten dollars per month to a Marine or soldier who

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qualified with the service rifle. Despite the lapse in the number of Marines who qualified with their service rifle and pistol in the 1920's, both the depot commands and expeditionary units attempted to modify the existing regulations in order to provide incentives for Marines to qualify annually on the rifle range whereby the Marine Corps would establish its own standards for determining qualification, and thus determine the amount paid to qualified marksmen. Headquarters rejected this proposal and cited the regulation signed into law by President Warren G. Harding in 1922, that placed enlisted Marines under the same regulations as those followed by the War Department regarding "qualification pay." Brigadier General Ben H. Fuller, then Lejeune's assistant, pointedly told Brigadier General Feland, among others, in a memorandum, that only the War Department (i.e. the Army), could modify the existing regulations as they now stood.22

I. Recruits are sent to the Rifle Range after a course of Instruction of twelve periods. Upon arrival at the Range, the regulations of the Range are published, rifles inspected and repaired, and if they are found unserviceable, they are exchanged. Men are issued coats and pads. All men are required to have a book.

Table 13.3 (CONTINUED)
Synopsis of System on Instruction of Recruit
Rifle Marksmanship, 1921-1925

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Table 13.3 (CONTINUED)

II. Instruction then begins as laid down in Rifle Marksmanship #1021 WD, Par #105. All scores are kept from the beginning and no man is allowed to fire more than thirty rounds per day for the first three days, nor over fifty rounds per day for the next two and one a half days, of the first week.

III. Monday and Tuesday of the Second Week the complete course is fired as laid down in Regulations. All men who are shooting poor are given special attention by selected coaches. [Wednesday and Thursday] all other men are given instruction at their hardest ranges.

IV. Friday, record firing. Saturday-Estimating distance and pistol firing.

V. Monday and Tuesday of third week, Automatic Rifle Instruction and firing. Returning to barracks Tuesday Evening.

VI. All men are required to snap in at least twice for each shot fired before coming to firing point.

/s/J. E. Snow

The last contributing factor to the poor showing in marksmanship during the late 1920's and early to-mid-1930's, were the effects of budget cuts and expeditionary duty on Marine training. Unable to expend large amounts of ammunition during range week, Headquarters raised the points necessary for qualification which resulted in a "considerable" drop in the number of Marines qualifying with the service rifle. Nonetheless, Major General Fuller was able to report to the Secretary of the Navy, that for fiscal 1933, "... 11,755 (86%) qualified as marksmen or better." General Fuller likewise noted that the one positive sign he noticed with this increased emphasis on marksmanship and weapons training, was that in both machine gun and automatic weapons training there was a "decided increase in qualification firing with these two weapons . . .

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," with a total of 3,053 Marines firing the BAR, and 69 firing machine guns. Thus, even with a limited budget, the Marine Corps was able to slowly correct the deficiencies in training and marksmanship though more would have to be done to correct the problems in weapons handling and shooting that plagued the Corps in the mid-to-late 1920's.

Besides marksmanship, the influence of the World War can be seen in the recruit training schedule from weeks eight to ten. Bayonet fighting, grenade throwing, gas and chemical warfare instruction, clothing on the bunk (known in the jargon as "things on the springs" or "junk on the bunk") inspections, one day of classes on the automatic rifle (removed from the schedule in 1927), entrenching, physical drill, field and barracks military courtesy (rank structure, rifle and hand saluting), first aid, personal hygiene, wall-scaling (a throwback to the pre-World War days), more inspections (rifle and equipment) and as always, close order drill. In short, while there were some problems in the emphasis in marksmanship and weapons familiarization, Headquarters sought to "cram" into a ten-week period all of the subjects it believed necessary to train a basic Marine for service in the fleet. While Marines received some elementary classes and field training in infantry skills (such as forced marches), learning how to pack the field marching pack, introduction to weapons used by Marines, and basic tactical movements, it was left to the recruit's next command to teach him what he really needed to know insofar as patrolling, scouting, and the employment and maintenance of weapons had been concerned. Insofar as far as the emphasis on rifle and bayonet training at the recruit

depots, the desire for Marines to remain "first and foremost riflemen," along with the notion that the bayonet fostered aggressiveness, and the spirit of the offensive (i.e. open vs. trench or defensive warfare), is one logical explanation for Headquarters insistence that these two subjects remain as the core of Marine training. As the Division of Operations and Training absorbed the lessons of Nicaragua, it became apparent to all concerned that deficiencies in enlisted training did indeed exist, and that before the Marine Corps could assume a role in any war plan, these problems had to be corrected. The problems Marines encountered in Nicaragua clearly demonstrated that the lack of not only a structured "school" or program of individual instruction at the recruit depots hindered Marines in the field, and that unless Headquarters undertook some steps to implement a coherent and progressive training program, its efforts at reviving the moribund advanced base concept let alone adopting amphibious assault as its primary function would've floundered on the beaches of Culebra as they did in 1925 at Oahu. In sum, until Marine training focused on what are called the "nuts and bolts" of preparedness, the assumption of any a new mission or doctrine would've have been catastrophic had the leathernecks been called on to perform the defense or seizure of an advanced base let alone a Gallipoli-style landing. The amphibious assault would have awaited not only a manual on "how to do it" but also a better-trained force to execute it. This became Headquarters' focus throughout the first half of the 1930's.

Branch Individual and Unit Training
1927-1934

While recruit training laid the foundation upon which the Marine Corps further developed its enlisted personnel to become well-schooled infantrymen, it was left to both branch individual, and unit training to "refine" what recruit training had initiated, insofar as training had been concerned. Even if the Marine Corps could not compete for the resources and funds that the Army had allotted for individual training, its "building
block" approach to the training small units (squad through company) was, in the long run, infinitely more successful in an era of tight budgets and less manpower, in training the basic rifleman. Having to "do more with less" became codified in the Marine Corps advanced individual training during the late 1920's and early 1930's, and proved to be far more successful in creating an infrastructure that proved itself capable of "grafting" itself onto a new doctrine rather than taking a large, cumbersome organization, and redirecting its tactical and operational focus away from its normal operating procedures. In short, "small was better," insofar as the Marine Corps had been concerned, since it gave them more institutional flexibility in absorbing the lessons of the recently-concluded guerrilla war in Nicaragua (1933), and a further inculcation of the lessons learned during the World War, that Marines incorporated into their advanced training prior to World War II.26

Doctrinally, at least, the Marine Corps during the 1920's attempted to maintain its adherence to the Army's Infantry Drill, and Field Service Regulations (IDR's and FSR's), as formulated by the Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry schools with regards to land combat. Later on, Headquarters acknowledged its acceptance of the Army's IDR's and FSR's, in its own analysis done on the U.S. Army's tables of organization for its infantry and cavalry combat divisions. The bulk of this study, dated 25 April 1922, spent a considerable amount of time in the discussion and emphasis on offensive warfare with the infantry being able to fight its way through several layers of defense in almost continuous action with the use of combined arms (artillery, infantry, and air) and, in essence, by "fire and maneuver." After having acknowledged the utility of combined arms during the opening phases of an attack, the study concluded that it was left to the

individual infantrymen to close with, and reduce enemy positions beyond the immediate reach of artillery that had to be brought forward as the offensive proceeded ahead. This, in turn, meant that the infantry would rely upon its own means to engage an entrenched enemy. As the Germans discovered with their stosstrupp tactics during the *Michael Offensive* in March 1918, once the breach had been achieved the problem became one of momentum and proceeding forward. This is where the German offensives floundered, due mainly to the fact that its infantry lacked sufficient firepower to reduce enemy defensive positions and emplacements.\(^{27}\) Despite the fact that the German high command had decentralized its command structure, and expected its men to use tactical initiative, the *stosstruppaktik* nonetheless lacked the firepower or logistical support to maintain the momentum of the attack which in turn gave the British and French forces time to regroup and eliminate the isolated pockets of *stosstrupp*. Unlike the Germans in 1918, the shortcomings Marines experienced from 1927-33 did not come from the lack of sufficient firepower but in its employment. When it came to 'cutting some time off BAR training here' and 'rifle marksmanship there', or in the neglect of machine gun firing or grenade throwing altogether, there is little wonder that Marines had problems using these same weapons in the field.\(^{28}\) Furthermore, while one cannot say that the Marine Corps

\(^{27}\) There is evidence to support the fact that Marines read and disseminated the lessons offered by German "stoss" tactics as early as 1918 though there is little indication that these same lessons were passed on at the MCS during the 1920's. See Eric Ludendorff's, "German Principles of Elastic Defence," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 3 (September 1918), pp. 215-7.

had been directly influenced by German *stoss* tactics, Marine officers were, in fact, aware of the tactical innovations taking place on the battlefield as early as May 1918. War Department bulletins and pamphlets on defensive measures undertaken by the British and French defensive in response to the German spring offensive in 1918, suggests more than just a cursory interest in these battlefield innovations, though there is little evidence to suggest Marines either implemented any responses of these changes in its own warfighting doctrine during, or after the war. Nonetheless, it is a fact that Marine officers knew about these *stoss* tactics, and of the changes in infantry doctrine that had taken place in the months prior to their own involvement in the fighting, and points to the fact that Marines had some interest in foreign developments affecting infantry combat.

Part of this interest might explain the concerns raised at Headquarters surrounding the shortcoming in individual infantry training. This in turn points toward the obvious fact that Marine officials from Lejeune on down, realized the changes in warfare that the World War brought. It likewise led them to conclude that in any future war, infantrymen would have to be well-trained, and able to employ combined arms such as automatic weapons and light artillery, even if it was in a jungle against a poorly-armed adversary instead of facing a veteran enemy army like the Germans [or Japanese]. It would take time, effort, as well as money and sufficient manpower to effectively train an infantrymen in such combat skills, none of which the Marines had in the decade of the 1920's.

Access. No., 1520-30-100, Box 16, Division of Plans and Policies, 1921-1943, Folder 39A); For a comparison with the changes in German Tactical Doctrine see Timothy Lupfer, *Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, July 1981; a more up-to-date study is Martin Samuel's, *Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992).
Unlike the luxury of time that the Marine Corps had during the World War, or with the jungle warfare schools in both Haiti and Santo Domingo, established by brigade officials to train Marines new to the area in basic infantry and jungle warfare skills (weapons employment, patrolling and scouting), the intensity of the fighting in Nicaragua coupled with the heavy deployment schedule to China and points elsewhere, prevented the adequate training of Marines in advanced infantry skills. Of course, there were exceptions to this lack of emphasis in even the most rudimentary of infantry skills.

Despite the confinement of its training to the lot provided by the Standard Oil Company, and the race track attached to the International Legations area, the Third Brigade, much to the credit of Brigadier General Butler, had established a regular training schedule that while not perfect, was both regular and thorough that at least attempted to instruct or maintain the basic infantry skills that Marines on duty there would need in combat or an emergency. Ironically, these were the same skills that the recruit depots had failed to pass on to the Marine recruits while at Parris Island and San Diego. Unfortunately, however, Nicaragua was a different story. Marines like Russell Colbert were immediately rushed to the field to combat the sandinistas from boot camp, and thus did not receive the customary introductory combat training before going into the bush. This had disastrous effects in combat as Marines found themselves sometimes overwhelmed by guerrillas armed with rudimentary weapons. While Marines had the advantage in firepower, the sandinistas were able to at least initially hold the upper hand in some firefights. Marine airpower and reinforcements armed with automatic weapons and small field pieces many times saved Marine patrols, or outposts cut off and surrounded by the guerrillas. Marines in Nicaragua had to relearn the basic lessons of combat acquired during the World War, that firepower correctly and effectively employed is better than that either incorrectly employed, or not used at all. In Nicaragua, the deficiencies and absence of advanced training became all too apparent to officers in the field, and by
observers from Headquarters. Furthermore, as the U.S. Army discovered during World War II, combat is not the time nor place to teach an untrained soldier. Both unit effectiveness and morale oftentimes suffered when this occurred. Combat in Nicaragua was no different. Whereas Marines received constant training in basic and advanced infantry techniques once they arrived in France during the World War, and in Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in what brigade officials called special or "division" schools, designed to train the recently arrived graduate of boot camp in the ways and methods of jungle warfighting, no such organization existed in Nicaragua until late 1928. Instead, the newly-arrived recruits were immediately thrown into the fighting oftentimes against an enemy more skilled in jungle warfare than themselves.

By late 1928, the combat situation in Nicaragua in regards to individual training had deteriorated to the extent that Headquarters authorized the creation of a special school outside of Managua, that taught Marines the tactical employment of hand grenades, rifle grenades, machine guns, BAR's, Thompson submachine guns, 3-inch trench mortars, and 37-millimeter guns. Lejeune's comment that "It is felt that the training which our expeditionary forces received either while actually engaged in combat operations or in preparations thereof has been of invaluable aid in raising those forces to a high peak of efficiency," indicates the effect that this reemphasis on basic individual infantry skills had

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on the later fighting in Nicaragua was, in fact, beneficial to the Marine's chances of surviving a firefight against the sandinistas.\textsuperscript{31} What was unfortunate, however, was that Marines had to find out about such shortcomings as they incurred casualties in fighting the guerrillas. It also signified that there existed a realization at Headquarters that deficiencies did exist in the use of combat arms by Marines of the Second Brigade, and thus forced Lejeune and others to initiate remedial action in order to meet the present needs of the Marines in Nicaragua. The tactical shortcomings likewise pointed to the fact that a more permanent solution would have to be found in order to avoid similar problems in the future. Headquarters, in fact, addressed these problems as more Marines became available for such training with the creation of an Infantry Weapons Training School, at the two recruit depots and at Quantico, as well as in the opening of an NCO School at Quantico in January of 1931, where weapons employment and maintenance were taught to veteran sergeants.

The last noticeable effect of the deficiencies in the use of platoon and company-level weapons, was an ever growing reliance on firepower. In Hispaniola, and more importantly in Nicaragua, Marines called upon aircraft to strafe and bomb enemy positions which in many instances permitted them to fight their way out of an ambush or encirclement. Yet reliance on firepower alone is no substitute for well-trained infantry, and this remained the stumbling block in Headquarters attempt to forge an effective combined arms. In order to train Marines in combined arms or even advanced base work, the shortcomings and lack of individual training of a recently graduated Marine "boot" would have to be addressed before the Corps could talk about base seizure and defense let alone the amphibious assault role since as the fleet exercises of the early to mid-

\textsuperscript{31}Lejeune, \textit{CMC Annual Report for 1928}, p. 1229.

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1920's demonstrated, well-trained infantry was the key to a successful amphibious assault.

Marine advanced or branch individual training during the World War consisted of close order drill, musketry to include marksmanship, bayonet training, entrenchment (building field fortifications), anti-gas warfare, tactical marches, assembly and disassembly of the machine gun, automatic rifle instruction, combat formations, and attack and defensive maneuvers. That Marines had problems in Nicaragua using such weapons, particularly automatic weapons, it is interesting to note that prior to the employment of U.S. troops in the World War, French Marshal Henri Petain noted in a training circular in May 1918, that while American troops were "drilled in the use of the rifle and the bayonet . . . the value of the automatic weapon and grenade is not generally fully appreciated . . . ." 32 As Headquarters evaluated the tactical performance of Marines in Nicaragua, it appeared that the French marshal's words were, indeed, prophetic. In fact, as General Lejeune indicated in his annual report for 1928, it was only when Marine commanders in Nicaragua opened the school to train leathernecks in the use and tactical employment of these and other weapons, that the tactical situation reversed itself in favor of the Marines and Guardia. Furthermore, outside of the company and platoon training that took place in China, interestingly under the leadership of Major Keyser who served as the Third Brigade's S-3 or training officer, there was little if any unit training during the 1920's back in the United States since there were, as the latter noted, "few units available" to train" in the first place.

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In sum, the problems Marines encountered in Nicaragua, reflected the absence of any semblance of a stateside-imparted advanced training program during the 1920's, a deficiency that Lejeune sought to correct midway through October 1927. While his goal in the establishment of a weapons training course at the MCS had been nixed by the lack of funds in the early 1920's, the Commandant had hoped to re-institute a rigorous system of progressive training or a "building block" approach in a Marine officer's or enlisted man's training. In a memorandum to Colonel Charles H. Lyman, the commanding officer of Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Lejeune all but admitted that the root cause of this problem rested with the fact that Headquarters lacked a definite and coherent training policy, a charge ironically brought forth by his own Division of Operations and Training head, Colonel Beaumont, and emphasized that only through the institution of a rigorous and "progressive" system of training officers and enlisted men, could the apparent deficiencies in advanced branch individual training be corrected. In the same memorandum, he likewise called for the creation of "specialist schools" at the recruit depots and MCS as well as a continual cycle of training in order to keep Marines abreast of the latest developments in the profession of arms. Major General Lejeune, in part wrote:

..... At the present time a definite policy is being carried out with regard to the training of officers in basic, specialist and higher command training. However, no approved policy has heretofore been in effect relative to a comprehensive and progressive training for our enlisted personnel. The training of this class naturally divided itself into three classes; basic individual training, branch individual training, and unit training. In order to establish, therefore, a proper training policy for these enlisted men, it becomes necessary to establish, initially, the plan for basic individual training which should be carried on at the recruit depots. Upon completion of the basic individual training at the recruit depots by enlisted men, the plan contemplates for the training of these men, specialist schools during which time they will receive the branch individual
In the memorandum, Lejeune stressed that the enlisted man's education was to be "progressive," in that once the recruit left one of the two depots, additional training supposedly was to take place not only in the specialist schools but once the Marine reported to his first command, where unit training would continue to "hone" the skills learned in basic and branch individual training. Colonel Beaumont, in fact, however, "beat Lejeune to the punch" when he recommended that a "progressive" training schedule be implemented in order to address the shortcomings in Marine training. He pointedly wrote that most of the schools already existed in the Marine Corps that promoted progressive training, and that what the Corps needed was closer control and supervision of existing agencies by Headquarters, and a coordination of the whole. Beaumont proposed that while the details of "unit training should be left to subordinate commanders, definite standards of accomplishment should be prescribed Marine Corps Headquarters," with annual inspections to insure that the training is being carried out.\textsuperscript{34} The Director of Operations and Training outlined in the same memorandum what he thought a Marine's training program should resemble.(Table 13.4)


\textsuperscript{34}Beaumont Training Memorandum, dtd.. 9 February 1927, pp. 10-11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Individual Training</th>
<th>Branch Individual Training</th>
<th>Unit Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers TBS Company Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted Men Recruit Depots at Parris Island, and San Diego, and various Rifle Field Officers Schools Range Detachments Schools</td>
<td>Officers Army Branch Training centers for Infantry, Artillery, Engineers; Communications; Tanks; Aviation; Chemical Warfare; Quartermaster; Paymaster; Sea School; Norfolk and San Diego; Cooks and Bakers; Band, Clerical, Field Music; Army Branch schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>Officers &amp; Enlisted Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organizations of the East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces; maximum peace effort; Detachments Afloat; all other tactical organizations of the Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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Table 13.4
Colonel John Beaumont's Proposed Training Program (1927)

While Colonel Beaumont's letter pointed to the problems in recruit, branch individual, and unit training in the Marine Corps during this period largely caused, he asserted that these difficulties occurred largely as a result of the inconsistencies that existed at all three recruit depots. This in itself was more of an indictment of Headquarters' inability to standardize its training program. Furthermore, the sometimes shoddy tactical performance of Marines in Nicaragua, is ample evidence that Headquarters' neglect of advanced individual training was the result of not only bureaucratic in-fighting, but of little or no inter-communication between the field and headquarters.\(^{35}\) The tactical shortcomings likewise pointed to the failure to impart the lessons of the World War in some sort of

\(^{35}\) See Chapter Ten.
NCO or Sergeants' School, or a Weapons Training School at the Company Officer's Course, an idea drawn up, respectively by Colonel Beaumont, and Major General Lejeune, but never fully implemented when both men proposed it back in the early 1920's. This failure on the part of the recruit depots to fully prepare the Marines for combat in the jungles of Nicaragua, and the resultant high casualties (as compared to the fighting in Hispaniola), were a direct result of the inconsistencies that existed in recruit and basic individual training during the decade proceeding the World War. Furthermore, the inability of the troops to tactically employ the firepower they had at their disposal negated any advantage the Marines had over the sandinistas. In effect, where the Marines succeeded thirty-three years later in Vietnam with the firepower at their disposal, as well as four additional weeks of advanced infantry training which prepared them for the rigors of combat against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, the training system employed in the 1920's, proved to be tactically ineffective at times against an enemy that carried nothing more than an odd assortment of rifles, machetes, and hand-made bombs.

An interesting comparison could be made with the question centering on the performance of the Marines against a well-trained German Army during the last year of the World War, and the sandinistas on why there was such a wide discrepancy in training, and tactical proficiency. My conclusion is simply that the Marines took the Germans seriously, and thus trained as if it were a heavyweight world championship bout. Insofar as the 2d Brigade's performance against the sandinistas had been concerned, it might be said that the Marines considered Nicaragua an isolated (and unwanted) intervention, and the Nicaraguan guerrillas more of a nuisance than a serious threat, that is, until the bandeleros ambushed and killed some of them. Armed with this superior attitude, training suffered with nothing being corrected until Headquarters and brigade officials established a specialist school to train Marines and Guardia in the use and employment of small arms, as well as platoon and company weapons. Only when
Marines and *Guardia* members began employing combined ground arms effectively after January 1928, were they able to reverse the tactical situation on the ground, and even then it was too little, too late to have any effect on the outcome of the fighting in Nicaragua against Sandino.

The failure on the part of Marines to effectively employ its advantage in firepower was a direct result of the lack of training in weapons handling, employment, and maintenance on the part of the individual leathernecks. These failures stemmed by-and-large from the inadequate training Marines received at the recruit depots, and officers at the Basic School at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. In fact, of all the lessons learned in Nicaragua and China, perhaps the most important was the realization on the part of Headquarters that weapons employment, handling, and maintenance had slipped considerably among both officers and enlisted men since the World War. Both General Graves B. Erskine, who commanded a Marine company in China, and Private Russell Colbert, who served in Nicaragua, acknowledged that the service rifle worked well if properly maintained. While Erskine blamed the availability of cheap labor and the tendency by Marines to let their "boy" clean their rifles, Colbert recalled that the long patrols in the jungles of Nicaragua had a debilitating effect on weapons maintenance.  

36 Marine officials, in fact, discovered upon the withdrawal from Nicaragua and China, equipment and ordnance maintenance had, in fact, suffered considerably during the Marine's respective services in those two countries. This then became the focus of Headquarters even before the final withdrawal from those countries beginning in March 1929, with the establishment at both Quantico and San Diego of an Infantry Weapons School, something Headquarters had wanted to do as early as 1920 at Quantico for

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company grade officers, as Marines sought to incorporate the lessons learned in France during the World War.

This concern on the part of Headquarters had been reflected in a memorandum from the Director of Operations and Training, Colonel Louis McCarthy Little to Major General Neville, who pointed to the inability of Marines arriving in Nicaragua in handling infantry weapons, a condition he attributed to the improper training they received prior to their arrival "in country." In the memorandum, dated 29 April 1929, Colonel Little referred to the remedial measures Brigadier Dunlap had instituted at Marine Corps Base, San Diego, insofar as re-introducing Marines (both officers and enlisted men) to the importance of weapons handling and employment. Little referred to the fact that Dunlap, who commanded the 11th Regiment in Northern Nicaragua (1928-29), had himself emphasized the necessity of just such a school in order to correct many of the deficiencies that were, "... forcibly brought to his attention during his recent tour of duty in Nicaragua," whereby:

A great percentage of the men, it is stated, arriving for duty in that country, which duty required the ability to handle infantry weapons, including automatic rifles, Thompson submachine guns, hand and rifle grenades, were without training in the use of these weapons. It is further stated that in this reference that this lack of knowledge existed not only among men in their first enlistment but also among reenlisted men who had previously been engaged in duties of a non-military nature.37

In his memorandum to the Division of Operations and Training, Brigadier General Dunlap had proposed to "train recruits in the proposed infantry weapons course" once they completed the required entry-level basic recruit training while they awaited transfer

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to a permanent command. Due to the fact that once the Marine arrived at his parent command he would receive little or no training with such weapons, Dunlap recommended that the time between transfer be used to familiarize the new Marine with such weapons. General Dunlap based the need for such a school on the poor performance of Marines in patrolling in Nicaragua, and the susceptibility they had to higher-than-normal casualty rates. He stressed in his recommendation that these high casualty rates, particularly among automatic riflemen, and due mainly to guerrilla ambushes, necessitated all Marines being familiar with the handling of such weapons in case of a tactical emergency.38

Dunlap and Little both based their recommendations to Major General Neville on the fact that during the World War, an intense training program had been established at Quantico, whereby upon the completion of recruit training, Marines went on to receive additional weapons familiarization prior to their assignment to a permanent combat unit destined for France. Both Marine officers pointed to the fact that this changed in the decade following the war, with expeditionary duty and budget cuts cutting into valuable training time. Dunlap went even further in his assertion by charging that Headquarters had placed too much emphasis on bayonet training by cutting the classes devoted to the automatic rifle during the second and third weeks of recruit training. Despite the fact that by mid-1928 Headquarters had re-instituted many of the changes Dunlap had called for, particularly with the addition of five hours on the automatic rifle during the seventh and eighth weeks of recruit training, this increased emphasis on automatic weapons came too little too late to affect the situation in Nicaragua until 1929, when the tactical situation on the ground there improved considerably.39

38 Ibid, p. 3.
39 See Commanding Officer, Major A. Young to Major General Commandant via the Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Parris Island, S.C., Subj.: "Schedule of Recruit Training," dtd.: 18 October 1927. (Washington, DC, National Archives, RG 127, 592
For its part, Headquarters officials justified the cutback in automatic weapons training based on their assessment of a recruit's physical fitness and attentiveness in learning how to use a bayonet, since it would instill in the basic Marine a more aggressive spirit that would enable him to "close with the enemy." Headquarters further argued that recent experiences in China, where Marines served primarily as peacekeepers, and more specifically as guards, and in riot and crowd control necessitated the emphasis on bayonet training. Nonetheless, the fact remains that automatic weapons training "took a hit" in the recruit's schedule during basic training just as Marines had started to deploy to Nicaragua, and this fact alone would come back to haunt them as Marine casualties mounted. While there were officials at Headquarters who had served in the World War, and understood the necessity of Marines being familiar with the functioning and employment of automatic and basic infantry weapons, expeditionary service, and the reductions in manpower and budgets prevented such training from being fully implemented during the 1920's. This in turn led to the problems in the usage of infantry weapons in Nicaragua and Hispaniola.

For his part, Major General Wendell C. Neville, whom had replaced Lejeune in February 1929 as Commandant, initially rejected Dunlap's suggestion for just such an Infantry Weapons School. The Commandant based his opposition on the grounds that

40Ibid, p. 2.
such a school would not only dictate on how long a recruit could remain in the training pipeline, but that it would severely interrupt the flow of replacements to Nicaragua and China. The Commandant cited one last problem with the establishment of just such a school that dealt specifically with manpower concerns. In rejecting Dunlap's suggestion, General Neville, in a reply to Colonel Little's memorandum, stressed that while such a school was important:

Recruit Depots are to confine their efforts to basic individual training and a departure from this plan will give the Recruit Depot Commanding Officers, as in the past, excuse for retaining a certain number of men at the Depot after the prescribed recruit training course is finished . . . . Furthermore, our expeditionary forces located at San Diego and Quantico or on expeditions, (the conditions now existing) have plenty of opportunity to instruct the replacements who join them in small numbers, in all details of infantry weapons.42

Despite Neville's initial rejection of the idea of an attached infantry weapons course or school as part of the recruit training process, further clarification by Dunlap, and the Division of Operations and Training, eventually brought General Neville's approval for just such a school, whereby both Dunlap and Little agreed to separate it from the initial recruit training phase, and instead bring it under the aegis of a separate Marine Corps specialist school. As Little wrote in his 29 April 1929 memorandum, "It is believed that the formation of an infantry weapons school as proposed by the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, entirely without the Recruit Depot, would be quite in line with the established training policy of these Headquarters and would in no way delay or interfere with the transfer of personnel nor possess any of the bad features commented upon in . . . . relation to the infantry weapons school proposed."43

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42 See Colonel L. M. Little ltr. to Major General Commandant, dtd. 29 April 1929, loc. cit., p. 2.
Brigadier General Dunlap did not confine his efforts to weapons training. In a follow-up memorandum, he placed even greater emphasis on the needs for a reemphasis on marksmanship and weapons maintenance among both officers and enlisted men (primarily noncommissioned officers). Dunlap urged that specific steps be taken to stress the various techniques of tactical shooting, and weapons employment, deficiencies that he noted among the Marines in Nicaragua.\(^{44}\) In short, as Dunlap and Little noticed, the problems Marines had with small arms can be dated back to the early 1920's when Headquarters "de-emphasized" such training due to expeditionary and domestic duties. Both officers agreed that only until a re-inculcation of such basic combat skills such as marksmanship, weapons maintenance and employment, as well as patrolling and small unit tactics could Marines effectively fight on the battlefield. Whereas prior to and during the World War, Marines enjoyed a well-deserved reputation as well-trained light infantrymen, the postwar decline in combat skills, attributable to many factors, not the least of which were low budgets, manpower shortages, due mainly to the Corps' two major expeditions to China and Nicaragua, and Headquarters' inconsistent training policies and guidelines, had disastrous results in the jungles of Nicaragua.

In fact, from the institutional standpoint, Nicaragua served as a "wake up" call for a reevaluation of the need for a reinstitution of training programs in such basic infantry skills such as marksmanship, patrolling, and small arms employment and maintenance. Despite his many faults, and his subsequent erratic behavior prior to his retirement form the Corps in 1931, Brigadier General Smedley Butler's emphasis on small unit training while on expeditionary duty to China, confirmed the importance of a "building block" approach to training, primarily with the fundamental combat skills Marines had

\(^{44}\)Ibid, p. 2.
apparently taken for granted as they shipped out for Nicaragua. General Butler's institution of a rigorous training schedule with the 3d Brigade in China, designed to not only "hone those skills deemed essential to maintain the brigade's combat edge," but to keep the focus of the leathernecks on their mission and off the many "pleasures" in exotic China, was essentially what the Marines in Nicaragua lacked. This trend in Nicaragua persisted, in fact, until mid-1928, when Headquarters became so concerned over the frequency of ambushes and losses incurred by the Marines that it ordered 2d Brigade officials to establish a "Brigade" school outside of Managua in mid-1928, in order to correct many of the deficiencies in weapons handling and employment. In short, only when Headquarters adopted Butler's advice of "training from the bottom up" to heart, were the problems Dunlap identified in combat in the jungles of Nicaragua corrected.

Even as Dunlap and Little implemented the Neville's approval of the organization of an Infantry Weapons School officials at Headquarters concluded that the establishment of a specific course or school to correct the problems identified in combat was commensurate with a reemphasis on the necessity to train both officers and noncommissioned officers in such skills since these were the men that would lead Marines into battle. Here, Headquarters undertook two important measures designed to correct the deficiencies in training, and in particular weapons handling and employment. The first of these measures was the establishment at both Quantico and San Diego of a Infantry Weapons School for noncommissioned officers. The second measure was the increased emphasis in the training of its company and field grade officers at Quantico and Philadelphia (the home of The Basic School). The end of expeditionary duty in the early 1930's, gave the Division of Operations and Training a golden opportunity to focus the reform and modernization of its training program, particularly of its career NCO's. The efforts Headquarters placed here gave the Marine Corps a strong tactical foundation upon which to build its amphibious warfare doctrine. Yet even the Infantry Weapons
School established at San Diego was temporary, dependent on both manpower and money, items in short supply in the early 1930's. In a move to both consolidate branch individual and unit training Brigadier General David C. McDougal, Director of the Division of Operations and Training, recommended a "discontinuance" of the Infantry Weapons School at MCB, San Diego, this after Major General Fuller had, in fact, in May 1930 ordered the reinstitution of training with automatic rifles and grenades as part of a recruit's basic training, and the consolidation of the training at Quantico at the Noncommissioned Officer's School then located there. General McDougal likewise recommended that "whenever a unit can be assembled for training at Quantico a special program will be proposed with such additional ammunition allowances as may be desirable." He added that when such allowances in manpower and ammunition be provided that a similar training unit be established on the West Coast.  

Major General Fuller readily approved McDougal's recommendations based on the fact that enlisted men received such basic individual infantry training and weapons familiarization while undergoing recruit training, and that this would economize both on ammunition (hence funds to purchase other more critical items), and manpower.  

**Advanced Officer Individual Training**

The failure on the part of Headquarters to establish a consistent, and permanent training program for enlisted men extended over as well to company and field grade advanced officer training. This was essential if the Marine Corps was to ever hope of

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getting a significant role in War Plan Orange by the Joint Board since it was the responsibility of the officer corps to train the enlisted force, write the multitude of training regulations and procedures, as well as craft a warfighting doctrine. Thus, it became the goal of Lejeune and his successors to institute a sound training program for its company and field grade officers in the methods of modern land warfare. In turn, this emphasis on officer education served as the springboard that prompted reforms in officer education and retention at the MCS. For Major General's Lejeune, Fuller, and particularly Russell, this meant that an emphasis would be then placed on company grade officer education with not only an ever-increasing number attending Army schools but a "pruning of the vines" of the officer corps by adopting promotion by selection vice seniority.

Major General John Lejeune succinctly stated in January 1920 that "Infantry is the fundamental and basic arm" of the Marine Corps. For Lejeune and others, the education of a newly-commissioned, or career-bound officer centered around the basic infantry skills, and weapons employment as found in the IDR's, and other training regulations of the time. As the number of articles in the Marine Corps Gazette from 1917 onward illustrate, this interest among Marine officers in the primacy of infantry combat was both deep and lasting. This reinforces my earlier contention that it was the World War that set the training standards for a generation of Marine officers in the immediate postwar period, and later after the withdrawal from Nicaragua in 1933. Colonel C. J. Miller, a proponent of training young officers the skills and techniques of "small wars" in the MCS system, and who had urged increased attention to teaching basic infantry skills to the young lieutenants, emphasized this primacy of weapons training, and the impact of the World War on Marine officer training when he wrote that "In the study of tactics young officers should be instructed in accepted and well established methods of combat. Principles have little significance if their application is not illustrated by sound tactical
doctrine." Hence, the Marine Corps' young officers should be "first trained in the use of all infantry weapons before being permitted to specialize in other arms and services."

It was in the re-familiarization with the study of infantry weapons and their employment that Headquarters sought to focus the majority of its effort as it trained a new generation of officers that would guide the Marine Corps for the next three decades that reached well into the 1960's, to include a "world war" in the Pacific, a "police action" in Korea, and Vietnam. This re-inculcation of basic infantry skills became the main motivation behind the temporary establishment of infantry and weapons training schools for officers and enlisted men.

What dogged Marine officer training during this period was not a lack of training but a lack of space for adequate training and field exercises. While Marine officers such as Captains Merrill B. Twining, Lewis B. Puller, Fred Beans, and others received excellent advanced infantry training at the Army's Infantry Officer's Course at Fort Benning they returned to a Marine Corps School system still strapped for cash, lacking in the modern training facilities that the Army Schools had to offer, and in uniformity. While Twining and Beans attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Lieutenant General Edward Craig returned from his stint with the Guardia Nacional to attend the Infantry Weapons Course at San Diego, which he stated was "organized to take care of an excess number of officers at the Marine Corps Base at the time." Craig recalled that many of these officers were "sitting around doing nothing with no real assignment except to a casual company," since there were few troops to lead during this period. General Craig stated that this particular Infantry Weapons School had been organized in order to, "employ these officers and advance their training." It included training with mortars,

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48 Craig Oral History, p. 100.
heavy machine guns, BAR's, rifle grenades and so forth, and was "conducted at both the Marine Corps base and out at the Marine Corps rifle range at Camp Matthews."

General Twining recalled that what hampered him at The Basic School was the lack of space. With students packed into large classes with very few training aids such as machine guns and other weapons, as well as the lack of suitable space to conduct tactical exercises such as experienced by Twining at Philadelphia in Fairmount Park, Marine instructors made do with what they had. Later, Twining remembered that when he came to Quantico, as an instructor at the Infantry Officer's Course and had been refused permission to use a portion of the golf course near the main gate for a tactical problem [on a Saturday morning at that], he then drew up a plan for the acquisition of a large training area where today both The Basic School and Camp Upshur are located. While the Quartermaster Calvin Matthews nixed the idea at the time (the land would eventually be turned over to the Marine Corps during World War II by the Department of the Interior), Twining laid the blame squarely on both the "reactionaries" at Headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel Shepherd, who was assistant to the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools and had refused to push the idea any further for fear of offending the powers "that be," at Headquarters. As with the problem of infantry training itself, the solution was identifiable, yet at the same time unworkable due not only to the same bureaucratic in-fighting at Headquarters that characterized other problems in Marine Corps training at the time, but the refusal of the older officers to even listen to those who had been to school at Fort Benning, and had some idea on how to correct these deficiencies. Twining bluntly said: "The people who had been to Benning knew what a school could do and how to run a school, but were too damn junior to be listened to."49

49*Twining Oral History*, p. 68.
The other problem Marines encountered was the lack of troops for officers to use in tactical field problems. While officers such as Major General Eli K. Cole, and Brigadier General's Robert Dunlap and Dion Williams, had recommended the stationing of a certain number of Marines, anywhere from a platoon to a company at Quantico in order that the officers of the Company and Field Officers Courses had troops to practice with in the field, deployments during the mid-to-late 1920's prevented this recommendation from being carried out. Headquarters corrected this problem by the mid-to-late 1930's, as the leathernecks returning from Nicaragua and China found themselves reassigned either to Quantico or San Diego as a part of tactical formations, in order to assist in the training of Marine officers and reservists.

The last problem that existed in the training of Marine officers besides lack of a suitable training area, troops to conduct those same exercises, and training aids to practice on was the lack of suitable Marine-oriented training manuals. Since the end of the World War, Marine officers, from second lieutenants to colonels, had been trained and schooled with the Army's IDR's and FSR's, as well as War Department training bulletins. In fact, in any cursory examination of Marine Corps training bulletins from the 1920's, one can see the flood of IDR's, FSR's, and training bulletins issued by War Department on all sorts of related [and nonrelated] combat and combat support subjects. Led by the so-called "2d Division clique" at Headquarters, these bulletins appeared to

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satisfy the Division of Operations and Training requirements set forth in training Marine
officers and noncommissioned officers. There was, nonetheless, growing opposition by
the early 1930's to the influence of the Army's IDR's, and FSR's at the MCS, led in part
by Colonel Ellis B. Miller, an officer both Craig and Twining remembered as being
"hated by nearly everybody in the Marine Corps."^{51}

Colonel Ellis B. Miller, one of the Corps' foremost proponents of amphibious
warfare, and one of the author's of the Tentative Landing Manual, had a long though
checkered career in the Marine Corps, and at one point had been considered one of that
service's "rising stars." During the World War, however, Miller did not go to France, and
instead served as the executive officer of the Eighth Marine Regiment as part of the
Advanced Base Brigade sent first to the U.S.-Mexican Border, and later Cuba. He later
served in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and China with the Third Brigade, and
graduated from the Army War College before returning to the MCS in 1932. It was here
that he teamed up with C. J. Miller (no relation), and Captain Charles Barrett to write,
under the direction of Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, a preliminary draft
landing manual in 1931. Fortunately, while Miller left no personal papers for researchers,
his officer qualification record, articles, lectures, and correspondence on expeditionary
and advanced base operations in the Marine Corps Gazette and in the amphibious
historical files at Quantico, provides an excellent overview of his career and some
background on his conceptual ideas on amphibious and expeditionary warfare.
Notwithstanding his professional disappointments, Miller's open resentment of not
having not been sent to France, as well as his prickly nature, and deserved reputation as a
martinet, may have played a large part in his disagreements with the curriculum at the
MCS and its widespread use of the Army's IDR's, FSR's there, as well as the Army's

^{51}Craig Oral History, pp. 5 and 15; Twining Oral History, p. 78.
tables of organization used in the Marine Corps. From documents in his officer record book, Colonel Miller's bitterness appears to have been directed toward both the Navy, and that group of officers influenced by the likes of Brigadier General Robert Dunlap, Colonels Louis McCarthy Little and Thomas Holcomb, and the rest of the "2d Division clique" whose influence over the Marine Corps direction remained fairly strong at the MCS in the late 1920's, and early 1930's. Whatever the case may be, and until Miller's diary or other personal papers surface, much of what we can ascertain about the quixotic Marine Corps officer can be only be found in his writings and lectures delivered at the MCS in the early 1930's. Yet what is apparent here, is the simple fact that Ellis B. Miller's views would have directly clashed with those of Robert Dunlap, and the other proponents of a land war versus that of those who favored the constabulary mission as the corps' raison d'etat.

Colonel E. B. Miller's views on the Army's overriding influence in Marine training and school curriculum is reflected in a detailed letter sent to the Major General Commandant via the Commandant of Marine Corps Schools, then Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley on 15 August 1932. In this letter, Miller prefaced his attack on the MCS's curriculum with a reiteration of Major General Fuller's call for a definitive mission and doctrine for the Marine Corps as a land force that would operate with the Navy, and the conduct of Small Wars. He then enumerated in detail his opposition to the studying of Army doctrine at the MCS and listed as the main reason for this was the simple fact that the Marine Corps did not place enough emphasis on this particular mission, and instead wanted to re-fight the World War in its classrooms. Colonel Miller then gave a

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detailed synopsis of the history of the Marine Corps School system, and the slavish dependency on the Army's infantry drill regulations, as well as to the study of the "tactical situations developed in war as fought by the Army in the World War." He pointedly stated that Headquarters missed a golden opportunity to design a whole course of study for its officers concentrating on landing operations and small wars, and instead opted "to take the line of least resistance," and went to the Army School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth for its material on land warfare. While he acknowledged that the Army and Marines shared the same weapons, had been organized along somewhat similar lines, and tactically used the same exploitation methods in the extension of any beachhead inland, that is where the similarities stopped. In the end, Miller argued, the MCS had become so saturated with Army materials that it ceased being a Marine Corps School and merely became an extension of Fort's Leavenworth or Benning. While the Marine Corps interjected some subjects "pertinent only to Marine Corps activities," Miller maintained that the MCS's "very foundation is still resting on army principles, army organization, and army thought." In short, Colonel Miller asked, "Why teach them army? Why? Why? Why? If fighting on land is a Marine's job then why not teach Marine? It's all a matter of text books. The Army have them. We have not." Colonel Miller believed that in teaching Marine officers, Marines can still teach land tactics as outlined in the Army IDR's, FSR's, and manuals but that "the application of those tactics; the background surrounding the fundamental and basic ideas and principles that go to make up those tactics; must involve Marine organizations, Marine equipment, Marine problems, Marine operations, with a Naval, not Army background." Miller's conclusion was twofold: one, that the Marine Corps is not an Army; and that the Army is not like

53 Colonel Ellis B. Miller ltr. to Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, dtd. 15 August 1932, Subj.: "Field Officers Schools, Marine Corps 1932/33," in Historical Amphibious File No. 274, p. 2.
54 Ibid.
the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps, he argued, needed to take seriously not only its role as an adjunct to the Fleet; but its expeditionary work both missions of which call for a school established to study those subjects that would assist the Corps in the refinement of these two missions. With this in mind, Miller made a series of recommendations, all later incorporated into the MCS.

Colonel Miller's questioning of the validity of the MCS's use of the Army's IDR's, and FSR's is important when one considers the fact that at one time he himself had been a strong advocate of using them in the education of Marine officers. As far back as August 1921, Miller addressed a letter to Major Jesse Dyer at the Marine Corps Schools in August 1921, where he wrote that "despite the fact that AEF's IDR's are not up to date, as to the present organization, the principles outlined therein are sound, and as such will be taught under any organization. The use of the machine guns and infantry weapons have changed, but we have nothing in print that can be used . . . ."55 He added that:

In order to appreciate the proper function of the platoon and company it is essential that an officer have a picture of how it functions in the battalion and regiment. I know of no new book that better outlines this, in a few pages, than the AEF's I.D.R. The F.S.R. for 1914 have been little used because the Army is in the process of publishing a new F.S.R. and I thought it might be less confusing to leave it alone.

The use of the IDR's and FSR's had been too pervasive at the MCS, and at the recruit depots to totally eliminate their use in training Marines for combat. Even Miller admitted as much in his letter to Major Dyer. The system implemented by Lejeune, and continued by his successors insured that the IDR's and FSR's, remained an important part of the curriculum at Quantico for nearly two decades, this despite the attempts by Miller

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to completely "purge" the MCS's curriculum of what became known as the "Army Method." Until someone drew up a "Marine Corps method," there was nothing to substitute it with, a factor Miller took up in his recommendations in his letter to Brigadier General Breckinridge in August 1932.

The recommendations made by Colonel Miller, drawn up by the Field Officers Course of 1932-33 for the next incoming class (1933-34) included:

b. The Study of Marine Corps Organization.
c. Study of a Marine Corps-Navy Staff.
d. Study of a Marine Corps-Navy Supply System.
e. Study of a Marine Corps Equipment and Armament peculiar to our [i.e., Marine Corps] needs.
f. A great expansion in the study of expeditions in situations not involving war.
g. Greater development of the subject of Naval gunfire support needed for various types of operations under varying conditions.
h. Study of a Naval-Marine communications peculiar to our type of operations.
i. By a study of the joint and separate preparations to be made by the Marine Corps and the Navy prior to embarking on a Naval-Marine operation on expedition.
j. By writing our own tactics and technique for our own units, and our own armament and equipment.
k. By preparing problems based on our own probable mission and on our own organization.
l. By writing, as far as we can go in the time, our own text books for guidance for both instructors and students.
m. By collecting available data, at Headquarters and elsewhere, on past expeditions and past maneuvers, in which Marines have taken part.\(^56\)

Miller's suggestions received the full backing of General Breckinridge who, like Miller did not go to France in 1917, but instead remained in the Dominican Republic, and had been a proponent of a change in the way the MCS prepared Marine officers for service in the fleet at the MCS. General Breckinridge acknowledged that the change

\(^{56}\text{Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," pp. 38-40.}\)

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would be difficult though necessary, in order to break from under the "universal leadership" of the Army schools," and that the time had come for both a new mission and a new curriculum since, ". . . we have been on our own feet for twelve years and we no longer need to be led by anyone." 57

Counter to both Miller's and Breckinridge's argument was the one offered by Colonel Robert Dunlap at the conclusion of the 1925 Hawaiian Maneuvers in his post-operation synopsis who had called for the Marine Corps-wide adoption of the Army tables of organization, its methods of training, as well as its IDR's and training regulations in the curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools. While Dunlap did not differ radically from Miller's points of view, both viewpoints "converge" in the agreement that what the Marine Corps had to do was to define its role and mission, and then from there design a force and training program different from that of the Army or, in Miller's words, "one where the tactical use of such units is different or the nature of the campaigns in which the Marines are likely to be employed is different and that this difference warrants such change." Dunlap argued, however, that until these latter changes occurred, the Marine Corps had no other choice but to accept Army training and drill methods, as well as its tables of organization. 58 He likewise defended the Army's training program, in that it reflected the "American doctrine of combat," that is, "warfare of movement in the open," and that this doctrine applies in every detail to the missions normal to Marine Corps Forces." Finally, both Dunlap's call for a "board" to examine the requirements in handling troops ashore, and the types of equipment to be carried by this Marine force differ little from what Miller later advocated. This in turn casts doubt on the latter's originality of ideas on amphibious warfare, since there exists plenty of evidence to suggest that Miller's were mere reiterations of what Marine officers knew though had

57Bittner, Curriculum Evolution, p. 21.
failed to act upon in the intervening period between the Oahu landings, and the return to the classrooms in the 1930's.\textsuperscript{59}

At least from 1925 to 1930, it could be said with some justification that Dunlap's argument carried the day. With Neville dead, Fuller about ready to turn over the Commandancy to Russell, another officer who also did not go to France; Logan Feland's retirement in 1933; and Dunlap's untimely death in May 1930, left only Thomas Holcomb as the most likely candidate to succeed Russell. This in turn pointed to the obvious fact that while the influence of the "2d Division clique" on the Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine was on the wane in the curriculum in the Field and Company Officers' Courses at the MCS, it was far from being expunged from the MCS system as a whole. While this goes beyond the scope of the dissertation it is important to point out that when Holcomb had been reappointed as the Major General Commandant in 1940, he insisted that the recruit depots institute a weapons familiarization course to be give to all recruits. This in itself points to the fact that the lessons of the World War remained alive inside the Marine Corps despite the best efforts of officers such as Colonel E. B. Miller to have them eliminated from the curriculum at the MCS. While changes, in fact, occurred in the curriculum of the MCS in the mid-1930's with the emphasis directed toward landing operations, they did not entirely eliminate the lessons learned in land warfare gained in France. Nonetheless, even before Ellis's arrival at the MCS in 1932, there was some inkling of a redirection of the curriculum of the Field Officer's Course as early as 1926, when the MCS instituted several courses centered around landing operations. More importantly, General Breckinridge wrote in the December 1929 \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, that the schools needed to teach the mission of the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, the officials at

the MCS required no prompting by either Breckinridge's comments or E. B. Miller's stinging letter to the Commandant of the schools at Quantico to re-focus the curriculum at the MCS toward landing operations, since this had began as early as 1926 after the Oahu Maneuvers.

*The Marine Corps Schools: 1930-1933*

"A Direction Changed,"

Brigadier James C. Berkeley's appointment as Commandant, Marine Corps Schools in August 1930, signaled the re-focus of the Marine Corps toward landing operations. The schools at Quantico had gradually begun to integrate the study of landing operations as part of its curriculum as more and more officers returned from expeditionary duty, beginning with the return of Butler's Third Brigade from China, and later the 2d Brigade from Nicaragua starting in 1929. In effect, by 1931, the staff at the MCS became an "experimental board" for the development of landing craft, small boats, and other equipment believed necessary to carry out a successful assault on an enemy beachhead. 61

While the Marine Corps did not possess a sufficient training area, the school utilized the adjoining area and practiced landings along the Potomac River.

Part of this "re-direction" of the MCS was the creation by Brigadier General Berkeley of a board, suggested by Colonel Charles F. B. Price in August 1931, who as head of a group of officers began work on a tentative manual for "Marine Corps Landing Operations," suggested that the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (CMCS), assign Majors Charles D. Barrett and Lyle H. Miller in the writing of this landing operations manual. 62 In the assignment of these officers to write this manual, Colonel Price emphasized to Brigadier General Berkeley that:

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62 Clifford, *Progress and Purpose*, p. 43.

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the most important part of this preliminary work will be rather extensive practical experiments to determine the capacity for personnel and equipment of all the various types of boats in use in the Navy which might be employed in actual operations.63

Acting on Price's suggestion, Brigadier General Berkeley appointed a board to write what in time became the first draft of the Tentative Landing Manual for Landing Operations and Small Wars, that included two other officers, one Marine-Major Pedro del Valle, an artillery officer, and Navy Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel, an authority on naval gunfire. The appointment of a naval officer should have come as no surprise given Major General Fuller's Naval Academy ties with the CNO-Admiral William Pratt, and recognition of the simple fact that one of the most critical elements would be in securing approval (and funds) from the Navy Department for this landing operation mission. The Major General Commandant, in fact, let it be known that the appointment of Ansel was important, since he "doubtless will be in a position to obtain informally naval thought on questions of naval doctrine which may arise . . . ."64

While the work on this manual was slow, it nonetheless proceeded ahead, as faculty members in the Field Officers Course continued to teach and lecture on land warfare using Army-provided texts and regulations. Besides the creation of a specially-appointed committee for landing operations, the CMCS likewise appointed a board to examine and begin the revision of the MCS's curriculum with the expressed desire to re-orient it toward landing operations and the study thereof. The board also recommended that all of the lessons and work done at MCS was to be done around the Marine Corps' Table of Organization and Equipment.65

With the revision in the approach of the MCS there came about a "revolution" of sorts with the result being the gradual abandonment of the Army-dominated curriculum

63Ibid.
64Ibid, p. 44.
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as well as its tables of organization and equipment. Instead, Marine instructors began to revise Marine Corps tactics, formations, doctrine, and the use of weapons and material geared specifically for the conduct of landing operations. Without actual field testing, the instructors couldn't be sure that the new theories and subjects would, in fact, work in a field environment. This would take a reinstitution of the fleet exercises, the first of which resumed in February 1932, when a battalion of seven hundred Marines participated in a joint Army and Navy exercise off Hawaii and Culebra.  

Major General Fuller noted in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1933, that while the revolution in the Marine Corps Schools was small it was still, nonetheless, significant in its reorientation toward landing operations. He noted several important changes in the curriculum in the Field Officers' Course many of which were suggestions made by Colonel E. B. Miller, and implemented at the MCS:

b. Problems were based on Marine Corps units and equipment.
c. Certain personnel were designated to prepare text books and pamphlets to cover fields of service for which no Marine text existed.
d. Support by naval gunfire and other naval agencies was developed in greater detail, and a closer relationship with the Naval War College was maintained.
e. More effort was placed on the development of comprehensive courses on landing operations and small wars.
g. The Marine Corps Schools library was enlarged and its scope increased.
h. Both staff and students were intensely indoctrinated in the peculiar mission and functions of the Marine Corps.  

Thus, armed with a new though untested curriculum, as well as with an instructor staff that included among others Colonel E. B. Miller, the MCS began to implement the new course of instruction in landing operations though the pace was slow, and the results

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66 Fuller, CMC Annual Report to the Secretary of the Navy for 1932, p. 5.
67 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 44-5.
largely untested due to the manpower and budget situation. Nonetheless, the students that entered the Field Officers Course for the academic years 1932-3 and 1933-34 classes, became the first to receive a heavy dose of coursework on landing operations. The seriousness attached by school officials at Quantico on the study of landing operations is evident in the fact that each student entering the MCS received a copy of the official British history of the Gallipoli campaign (1932) in order to, "acquaint the students with the Gallipoli Campaign: to train them military research; and to provide the Schools through them the Marine Corps with the material of value on a campaign which is in many respects the type we are expected to be experts in."68

Summary: A Path Taken

While Brigadier General Breckinridge struggled with the implementation of this new curriculum at the MCS a similar change in study likewise occurred at the Naval War College, where Marine and Navy students began to analyze a particular aspect of an "Orange" war. In a series of yearly combined exercises that commenced with the 1931-32 academic year, students from the Field Officers Course at Quantico and the Naval War College examined, and put together an Advanced Base Problem that concentrated on the Pacific Ocean Area. Students were to envisage the possibility of conducting both base seizure and defense of these same islands. Among the islands by the students at both institutions were the Marianas Islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, Truk in the Palau Islands group, and the Dumanquillas in the Philippines. Sergeant Carl Seaberg, who worked at the MCS during the late 1930's as a graphic artist, and who later saw action on Saipan later recalled, "It was unknown to me at the time [1937], but I had carried around the very terrain modules of where I would later fight during the war, and thus was quite familiar with the island's topography when it came time to land there." Seaberg

68Ibid, p. 45; Bittner, Curriculum Evolution, p. 22.
likewise remembered vividly officers such as Major Gerald Thomas (of whom he was a driver for when war broke out in 1939), and Captain David Shoup, who taught in the Base Defense School and would many times come down to his graphics department in the basement of the MCS at Quantico, to study the maps he and his fellow Marines had made of the islands.\textsuperscript{69} The culminating effect of these changes at the MCS, however, was not just in the curriculum in the Field Officers Courses but in the actual organization and reorientation of the Marine Corps' mission with the formation of the Fleet Marine Force in December 1933. This was the real "revolution" in the Marine Corps Schools during the 1930's.

\textsuperscript{69}\textit{Interview with Sergeant Carl Seaberg, USMC, 1937-1945, Handwritten Notes to Author, dtd. 15 August 1996, pp. 1-2.}
CHAPTER 14

"... TO THE FAR SHORES..."

Introduction

The culmination of the reforms undertaken by Headquarters during the 1920's and early 1930's was the formation of the Fleet Marine Force in the mid-1930's. In fact, all of Major General Lejeune's reforms, particularly in the field of officer education and training had been undertaken with the intended objective of preparing the Marine Corps to fight in the next war as it did during the World War as an adjunct of the Navy. The culmative by-product of Lejeune's reforms was not only the formation of the Fleet Marine Force in 1934-35, but the reorientation toward the conduct of landing operations during the commandancies of both Major Generals Ben H. Fuller and John H. Russell, Jr. In fact, without the reforms in the ways in which it trained and studied for war undertaken in the 1920's, the Marine Corps would've remained a constabulary force detailed to guard naval installations, or assigned as a floating naval security force aboard the Navy's fleet of battleships and new aircraft carriers. Gone were the days when the hastily-formed Marine detachments came together to form a brigade of infantry to fight alongside the Army. As the World War demonstrated, the process of mobilization and training had changed the face of war preparation forever. Indeed, All of the measures undertaken by Lejeune and his successors had as their ultimate goal the codification of not only its special relationship with that of the Navy, but in expanding its role as a sea-
going expeditionary assault force in readiness, capable of fighting on land as it did during the World War.

*The Formation of the Fleet Marine Force, 1931-1933*

The origins of the Fleet Marine Force date back to the ships' detachment controversy, and the formation of the Advanced Base Force in 1912, when Rear Admiral William F. Fullam had called for a Marine battalion to accompany the fleet, as well as for the organization of both a "fixed" and "mobile" advanced base battalion of approximately 1,200 officers and men each. In fact, the Fleet Marine Force or FMF, while largely credited to the efforts of Major General John H. Russell, was in actuality the fulfillment of the efforts of Major General Lejeune who, in 1925, had called for the organization and equipping of the Marine Corps for just such a mission. Major General Russell, who in August 1933 had served as Assistant Commandant to Major General Fuller, had likewise been a major advocate for a specified role for the Marine Corps. In fact, General Russell had first articulated this view in a December 1916 *Marine Corps Gazette* article entitled, "The Plea for A Mission and A Doctrine," which had essentially called for the reorientation of the corps towards a specific mission with the Navy. In fact, all of the subsequent efforts of Lejeune, and later Fuller had been concentrated on the reorientation of the Marine Corps toward the eventual acquisition of the landing mission. Both men fully realized that unless the Marine Corps had not only solidified and improved the training of its enlisted men and officers, but also revise and reorient its school curriculum toward landing operations, it could not even hope to assume the

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responsibility of a naval landing force, and execute a landing on the scale of a Gallipoli on an enemy held beachhead. This also brings to the fore the question on whether or not Colonel E.B. Miller's thoughts were, in fact, original. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it appears, at least from the surface, that Colonel Miller had merely reiterated a long established "laundry" list of "things that needed to be done," instead of having advocated a radical reorientation of the MCS's curriculum, as well as that of the Marine Corps's mission. This had already been done, in fact, as early as the mid-1920's, with Marines such as Lejeune, Fuller, Berkeley, Breckinridge, Russell, Richard M. Cutts, and a host of junior officers, who knew where the problems existed, and had labored under extreme conditions to change them. Budget and manpower cuts, coupled with a deployment schedule in the early 1930's, continued to prevent a serious effort toward force organization and mission reorientation that had hampered the Marine Corps throughout the 1920's. While Miller had been correct in his assertion that the MCS's curriculum was "too much Army," the move had already been underway at Quantico and Newport to reorient the Marine Corps toward landing operations. Despite the validity of his criticisms, which were, in fact, valid, the simple fact is that Miller made too many "waves" and in the end possibly "torpedoed" his chances of promotion to flag rank, and any larger part in the newly-created FMF.2

Colonel Miller's criticisms aside, Lieutenant General Alfred M. Noble who, as a major, was part of the original group of officers assigned to study the feasibility of conducting landing operations, asserted that the Marine Corps' reorientation toward this mission began as early as 1929, when he arrived at the MCS from Nicaragua as a student at the Field Officers Course. General Noble recalled that Major General Fuller specifically assigned him and his fellow classmates to a study group examining the British

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2"Ellis Testimony," p. 24
failure at Gallipoli. Noble stated that when he arrived at Quantico, "I really was dipped into the fountain with the people who were building up the ship-to-shore operations, the landing operations of the Marine Corps." He frankly admitted that at Quantico some of the best minds ever put together were already "thinking ahead" on the question of amphibious operations, and had completely rejected the notion that this type of maneuver couldn't work because of the failure at Gallipoli. General Noble recalled one instance where Captain Charles Barrett stunned one group of officers when he stood up before a class and said, "If Gallipoli has proved anything it's proven that landing operations even against opposition are comparatively simple. It has also proven that keeping troops ashore and keeping them fighting is even more difficult than the landing. Well, that raised the prestige of the people who were teaching logistics."

Lieutenant General Noble's comments on logistics here are important, institutionally for the Marine Corps in two respects. The first and perhaps most important institutional change that affected the Marine Corps' eventual success in the conduct of landing operations was Brigadier General Cyrus Radford's reorganization of the Quartermaster Department in the 1920's, a move that at least brought order to a system that had grown antiquated over time, and thanks largely to his innovative improvements and modern means of accounting and storage, and had been since functioning on a modern basis with the better accounting and management procedures installed by the Quartermaster. The second institutional change was the realization that the MCS would have to insert a block of instruction into its Field Officers Course on supply or logistics, as well as design tables of organization and combat loading tables tailored to Marine Corps equipment and needs according to naval shipping capabilities. In fact, if Marine planners during the

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early days of the writing of the *Tentative Landing Manual* had any hope to devise a workable landing doctrine, all of the problems encountered with the advanced base force in the pre-World War era, as well as the British problems at Gallipoli, insofar as the availability of naval gunfire support, proper landing craft, and logistical sustainment once ashore would have to be resolved before such a doctrine could be implemented. Though, in all fairness, until a doctrine is tested in war, Marine and naval planners could only "assume" what would be required during an actual landing on a fortified enemy beachhead. This was proven during the first two years of World War II. The logistics mess on Guadalcanal and Tarawa illustrated, that speed in the unloading of transports coupled with the proper handling, storage, and marking of essential items needed by the ground assault forces by personnel in such procedures in designated areas were essential to the sustainment of a force ashore. Also, as demonstrated on Tarawa, accurate, pinpoint naval gunfire on specific targets as opposed to the saturation bombardment that occurred would be essential in neutralizing well-fortified emplacements. These were items that Marine planners couldn't foresee during the early days at the MCS in studying landing operations. Yet at least, with the urgings of Brigadier Generals Berkeley and Breckinridge, Marine officers began to look at these questions long before E.B. Miller's letter to the latter in 1932. Noble hit the proverbial "nail on the head" when he commented that the study and emphasis on combat support and specifically combat service support by Marine officers was critical, in that during a landing operation "logistics was a terrifically big thing. The rest was mostly gunnery and timing."\(^5\) Noble likewise noted the shift in the curriculum at the MCS during this period, when he specifically stated that Marine and naval officers at the schools "really developed the first

\(^5\)Ibid.
extensive landing operations map problems and wrote them themselves. Leavenworth had nothing to do with this: these were Marine Corps-Navy problems."

In fact, the importance attached to logistics by both Noble and specifically Barrett reflected the reforms in the quartermaster and clerical fields that took place during the first half of Lejeune's Commandancy. These reforms enacted in the administrative and technical fields pointed to the realization by Headquarters that pencils, typewriters, ledger sheets and equipment tables, as well as trained personnel reflected the growing complexity of waging modern war. Whereas some may dismiss this as being unimportant to the fighting side of the Marine Corps, one must understand the power of perception on the part of the public and the realities of war as experienced by the Marines in the World War. Prior to and after the World War, the Marine Corps traditionally had been identified in the public's eye as a fighting service, the experience in the World War, and the growing complexity in logistical support changed this image. No longer could the Marine Corps depend on a quartermaster system whose methods dated back to the pre-Spanish-American War era. The advent of modern war and the technological changes of mechanization, coupled with an ever-increasing lethality in firepower brought newer, and much improved administrative requirements for this equipment and ordnance that the old system had proven incapable of handling. Furthermore, it could be said with some accuracy that a "mini-information age" had affected the Marine Corps' method of administration during the World War, especially with modern office machinery and practices, rapid communications (i.e. telephones, telegraphs, and radio's), particularly with its rapid growth, and later contraction at the end of the war. The impact of the World War likewise had introduced changes in the methods the Marine Corps employed in the acquisition and storage of clothing, ordnance, and other essential war-making items, and the necessity of preserving and maintaining them for field service. As discussed in chapter ten, the changes in the quartermaster department, and the ever-
growing need for trained clerks came about as a result of the need for better methods of accountability and management of existing and acquired equipment at the Philadelphia Depot of Supply. This in turn created the need for a school of some sort to train both officers and enlisted men in such subjects as accounting, filing, basic clerical skills of typing and shorthand, and the management of this vast array of equipment—all of which Headquarters introduced into the Marine Corps School system during the early 1920's, that emphasized such practices and procedures that were similar to those established principles by the Army, and later adopted to meet the specific logistical and administrative needs of the Marine Corps. Thus, these "institutional" changes in how it supplied its forces, maintained it's equipment, and administered personnel were all part of the "jigsaw puzzle" that culminated in the writing of the landing manual. Without such reforms in these previously unimportant areas, the Marines would not have been able to assume such a complex doctrine as landing operations. Thus the reason why these reforms by Major General Lejeune in the 1920's, were so critically important in the institutional development of Fleet Marine Force in 1933. In short, the changes introduced by Lejeune into the corps in the early part of his Commandancy particularly in the fields of administrative and clerical matters, had been designed to make the Marine Corps more efficient and able to wage modern war. The internal reforms initiated by Major General Lejeune's continued even while he maintained his emphasis on redirecting the focus of the Marine Corps toward the advanced base expeditionary mission due largely to his belief that in order, "To make a successful assault on a heavily defended enemy shore, and to support the operations of the assaulting force," the Marine Corps would require "a higher order of technical skills in a great variety of specialties."6 This is, what I believe, Lejeune had in mind when he began his reforms in the 1920's,

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with the culmination of this process being in the formation of the FMF in 1933, and in the writing of the landing manual the following year (1934).

The creation of the FMF, and the writing of the *Tentative Landing Manual*, was a long, laborious process that began long before E. B. Miller wrote his letter to Brigadier General Breckinridge. In fact, from the evidence examined, this process began in earnest in 1928-29, at the Army War College and continued through the 1932-33 school terms. For it was at the Army War College that the Marine students-Lieutenant Colonel Walter N. Hill, (1928-29), and Colonel Thomas Holcomb (1931-32), had authored two significant theses where they picked up and expanded upon the themes then current in the Marine Corps on the need for a "permanent" Marine force to be set aside for emergency expeditionary use.

Lieutenant Colonel Hill’s study, "A Marine Corps Expeditionary Force: It’s Employment in A Major Emergency" (1929), while reflecting earlier studies done on the need for a Marine expeditionary force, departed from past studies in that he laid out in detail the roles that this force would play during a naval campaign, in seizing bases as the fleet fought its way across the wide expanse of the theater in question (i.e. the Pacific), and its relationship with the Army and the Navy during just such a campaign. (Table 14.1) In fact, Hill’s paper reflected both Lieutenant Colonel Ellis’ *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*, and contained the basic premises of an Orange war.

Specifically, Lieutenant Colonel Hill divided overseas expeditions into two categories: one consisted purely of naval expeditions which do not contemplate permanent occupancy of enemy territory, and might be preliminary to others of a combined nature, and aim at the trade routes an enemy force may be dependent upon. The second type of operation was the invasion of hostile territory which necessitated the command of the sea by the Navy, in order that the Army’s line of communications be kept continuously open.
and secure. Failing either one, Lieutenant Colonel Hill wrote that the subsequent operations on shore will eventually fail. Hill maintained that in either event:

... a Marine Corps expeditionary force will accompany the fleet on its overseas campaign. This force will be organized and equipped as a landing force to seize and hold temporary operating bases for the fleet. Fleets alone cannot capture land bases, troops must be landed. Thus, the expeditionary force must be available as soon after M day as the fleet is ready to sail.7

Throughout the paper, Lieutenant Colonel Hill stressed the combined nature of these expeditionary operations when he wrote that not only should a "Marine expeditionary force be utilized to seize bases for future Army operations," but is highly probable that "the Marine Corps will require the support of an early Army expeditionary force, for it is doubtful if the Marine expedition, although reinforced, would be strong enough to meet the strength of the enemy might develop in his homeland." He then laid out the prerequisites of such a Marine Expeditionary Force and its relations with the Fleet commander, and its operations to the shore and its objective on land which was to seize a beachhead and fight inland until relieved by an Army occupation force.8 Lieutenant Colonel Hill, likewise, outlined the organization of such a force to be used during a landing:

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8Ibid, pp. 2-5.
One Marine Division:
Two Marine Brigades (two regiments each)
One 75mm Artillery Regiment
One Marine Engineer Battalion
One Naval Medical Unit
Total personnel all ranks .............. 12,918

One (1) Reinforced Brigade:
Two Marine Infantry Regiments
One Separate 75mm Marine artillery regiment
One Marine Engineer Company
Total Personnel all ranks ............... 5,219

One (1) Base Defense Force (Auxiliary Troops)
One Antiaircraft Marine Artillery Regiment
One 155mm Marine Artillery Regiment
One Marine Barracks (Advance Base)
Total Personnel all Ranks .............. 1,298

Table 14.1
Lieutenant Colonel Walter Hill's "Constructive"
Marine Expeditionary Force 1929

Colonel Thomas Holcomb, who succeeded Brigadier General Breckinridge as CMCS in 1934, and later became the seventeenth Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1936, picked up and expanded on Hill's theme in his thesis "The Marine Corps' Mission in National Defense, and its Organization for a Major Emergency," while a student at the AWC, for the years 1931-32. (Table 14.2) After providing a brief outline of Marine Corps roles and missions within the Department of the Navy, Holcomb's thesis detailed the size, composition, and organization of a Marine expeditionary force that near approximated the actual Fleet Marine Force when fully organized in 1934. Colonel Holcomb's "constructive" Marine Corps expeditionary force consisted of:

9Tbid, pp. 8-9.
One Division:
One Infantry Brigade (Three regiments) ......... 6,904
One Artillery Regiment (three battalions of three batteries each for a total of 36 guns) .... 1,611
Aviation Group of Observation and One Pursuit Squadron of 25 airplanes ................. 735
Engineer Battalion .................................. 397
Medical Regiment .................................. 483
Division Service Company ......................... 135
Signal Company .................................. 124
Military Police Company ......................... 76
Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company 280
Division Train .................................. 234
Tank Company of 15 light tanks .................. 106
Total Strength .................................. 11,085

Base Defense Force:
Headquarters Company .............................. 58
Heavy Artillery Regiment (consisting of 24-155mm divided into three battalions of two batteries each) ... 741
One Antiaircraft Regiment of 12-3-inch antiaircraft guns consisting of one Machine Gun Battalion with 24 .50 caliber machine guns .......................... 861
Aggregate Total .................................. 11,946

Table 14.2
Colonel Thomas Holcomb's "Constructive"
Marine Expeditionary Force 1932

Manpower differences aside, the major difference between Holcomb's and Hill's Marine Expeditionary Force organization was the former's inclusion of an aviation detachment.

Even as Marine officers attending the AWC in the mid-1920's and early 1930's wrote on the composition and missions of a proposed Marine landing force, the Army likewise examined the problem, and the results are rather surprising in that they closely resembled

those written by Marines, though the Army War College studies contemplated an expeditionary force both larger, and based on a Regular Army nearing 280,000 men with the defense of the Philippines clearly in mind.11 Like the Marines, Army leaders envisioned no more than a division set aside, preferably with its individual units located midway between the eastern and western seabords, and comprised of a "balanced force" of infantry, artillery, cavalry (horse and tanks), air and antiaircraft assets. The author of one of these Army studies, Lieutenant Colonel A. F. Commiskey, outlined in his study, "Strength and Composition Of An Expeditionary Force) (R.A.)," that one of the prerequisites of any force set aside as an expeditionary force must be organized from "units already in existence," and that the force when finally configured must be at least a corps in size.12 Marine Colonel Frank F. Evans argued in a paper of a similar title that not only should an Army expeditionary force come from existing field organization, but that the force be configured so that it not only balanced but that it should be "light," exclusive of heavy tanks, howitzers, in order that it could be rapidly, or as rapid as the availability of rail to the various ports of embarkation aboard ships existed in that era.82 (Table 14.3)

12Ibid, p. i.
### One Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>3,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Field Artillery Regiment of 155mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzers</td>
<td>1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Artillery Regiment, Anti-aircraft</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Light Tank Company</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Attached Combat Units</strong></td>
<td>6,331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Attached Air Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Pursuit Group</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Bombardment</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Attack Group</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Balloon Company</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Attached Air Units</strong></td>
<td>2,865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aggregate Strength of Force**: 20,135

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**Table 14.3**  
Colonel Frank E. Evans, USMC's  
'Construcive Army Expeditionary Force'  
November 1925

Other studies undertaken at the AWC during the same period likewise reflected not only the Army's interest in expeditionary warfare but the realization that they would themselves have to form an "expeditionary" force to liberate the Philippines during an "Orange" War. In fact, the Philippines were just one area mentioned in these early studies. In the pre-Good Neighbor Policy era, Colonel Evans' paper openly discussed the need for an Army expeditionary force due to the political instability in the West Indies, Latin America, and Cuba. This may, however, have been more "positioning" than anything else on the part of the Army though it must be remembered that hemispheric defense was clearly within the legitimate responsibility of the Army, particularly in regard to the defense of the Panama Canal and coastal defense both defined by the Joint Army

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13Ibid, p. 4.
and Navy Boards in the 1920's and early 1930's. In fact, according to Lieutenant General Twining, the Army actually taught "something about amphibious operations," in their curriculum for their Infantry Officer's Course at Ft. Benning, which tacitly admitted that "Marines will be used to occupy small undefended islands."

Yet what the Army plans proposed was to have an expeditionary force assemble from its various components scattered on various Army posts throughout the southwest before being sent to a prospective theater. This force was not to be permanent, in the sense that its component parts remained separated unlike what Marine planners had envisioned for an expeditionary force. Marine planners, in fact, had hoped to create a force "in being," capable of accompanying the fleet, capable of overcoming enemy defenses prior to the establishment of an advanced naval base. Original plans for the FMF called for the creation of what amounted to a brigade-sized force—totally inadequate as it proved to seize and defend an advanced base. All of the landings in the Pacific during the Second World War demonstrated that point. Major Generals Fuller and Russell, wanted a "force organized and trained for service with the Fleet and capable of moving out on short notice" for instant service with the fleet.

Prior to the existence of the FMF, Marine planners had envisioned a campaign whereby Marines would, as in the past, be taken from every garrison and detachment, and sent to a central rendezvous point where they would then be organized into a larger tactical unit under the command of a commanding general, not unlike that which

occurred in the World War as part of the Fourth Brigade. A similar difference existed between the advanced base force concept, and that of the FMF. For the first time, a Marine force would be directly under the command of a Marine general, and that even if the Marines lacked the manpower and equipment, a headquarters could be assembled at Quantico, and that the staff that would guide this force would be comprised of some of the Corps' best officers. As for the primary mission of this newly-assembled headquarters, Major General Russell's memorandum suggested that these same officers were to, "familiarize themselves with all mobilization plans and be prepared at short notice to mobile with troops," and base the FMF's training on accomplishing that mission.\(^\text{16}\)

It is important to note that as early as 1909, then-Major John H. Russell, who had been detached to the Naval War College as an instructor, had authored several papers dealing with the advanced base force concept where he laid out many ideas that he later carried out when he became the Major General Commandant in February 1934. The first paper, written in October 1909, and entitled "An Outline Study of The Defense of An Advanced Naval Base," introduced the idea that for both the seizure and defense of such an advanced naval base the force ideally suited for this role would be two regiments of Marines.\(^\text{17}\) Russell emphasized the point that this force of Marines should be kept in a "constant state of readiness," for just such a mission. It was, however, in a subsequent study, entitled, "The Preparation of War Plans for the Establishment and Defense of a Naval Advance Base," written prior to his departure from Newport in 1910, that the future Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps made his most significant contribution to the idea of a permanent Marine expeditionary force. In this latter study, Major General Russell wrote that, "It is intended that the personnel and equipment

\(^{16}\)Ibid, p. 6.

necessary for the establishment of a Naval Advance Base should be maintained at suitable points in the Atlantic and Pacific where they would be ready for instant use."

Russell downplayed the role of the Army in such a mission, when he cited the Army's lack of compatibility in working with the Navy, despite the original plan to have soldiers assigned to such a role by the Joint Army and Navy Board. Russell emphasized the fact that Marines were ideal for such a force, due largely to their naval heritage. He likewise emphasized that "It was in the Pacific . . . " more specifically at Pearl Harbor, where such a force should be "held in readiness, for advanced base duty. With these ideas in mind, Russell had clearly outlined his plans for the Marine Corps if and when he became Commandant.

With the approval of Major General Fuller, Brigadier General John H. Russell, then assistant to the Commandant, who had long advocated that "the Marine Corps should have a striking force working as a part of the fleet, under the direct orders of the commander-in-chief," drafted a letter addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the creation of just such a force. In this letter, written largely on his own initiative, Russell "expressed his ideas on the subject" for a specified force of Marines being assigned permanently to the Fleet for the purpose of seizing and defending advanced bases. This letter, dated 23 August 1933, became essentially the letter of instruction that established the FMF. According to Russell's letter, the FMF, "had, as its principal mission the establishment of an advanced base. In time of war this force advances with the fleet in offensive operations. It gives the fleet essential striking power against land objectives that it otherwise would not possess. It should be considered an integral part of the fleet." While the bulk of Russell's letter outlined other duties of this

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19Thacker, "Amphibious War," p. 7; See also Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and
force, ones that were essentially a reaffirmation of traditional Marine duties (seagoing detachments, naval security forces, and base defense force), the Assistant Commandant re-emphasized the importance in the maintenance of close ties with the fleet. With this in mind, the most important point Brigadier General Russell made in his letter was, "that the expeditionary force be included in the fleet organization as an integral part thereof, subjects to the orders, for tactical employment, of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet."²⁰ Eventually, on 8 December 1933, the Navy Department codified the FMF with General Order 241, which authorized the Commandant of the Marine Corps, "to submit proposed instructions for establishing appropriate command and administrative relations between the commander in chief and the commander of the Fleet Marine Force."

Besides establishing the command relation-ship of the FMF, this order outlined the specific duties of this new organization in that "it shall constitute a part of this organization of the United States Fleet and be included in the operating force plans for each year." As for the strength of this force, the Navy Department maintained that the "Fleet Marine Force shall consist of such units as may be designated by the major general commandant and shall be maintained at such strength as is warranted by the general personnel situation of the Marine Corps."²¹ As was the case in 1919 through the decade of the 1920's, the major stumbling block to the creation of the FMF proved once again to be shortage of personnel. The lack of personnel did not, however, curtail the planning for employment nor the resumption of the fleet exercises (which had already taken place in 1932), though it did affect training since all of the component parts of the newly-constituted force remained "notional." Yet Marines made do with what they had, hoping

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for better times ahead, and continued to plan for the day when they had sufficient manpower and equipment, including suitable transports and boats for landing.

Organization of the FMF, in fact, was slow. Given the manpower shortages and lack of suitable transports, the new force remained primarily a "paper" entity with a small force assembled around it. While Russell noted the shortage of enlisted men for such a force, he stated that attempts would be made to make this force a reality in 1934.

Russell, who succeeded Fuller as the Major General Commandant in December 1933, noted in his first annual report (1934), that the FMF for that year, "was approximately 3,000 enlisted men," organized into one regiment of infantry, two batteries of 75 m/m pack howitzers, one battery of 155 m/m guns, one battery of .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns, and Aircraft One and Two (observation and pursuit aviation squadron respectively)," a full regiment short of the two-regiment brigade considered necessary to adequately man just such a force. In fact, despite both the withdrawal of Marines from Nicaragua in 1933, and the end of the U.S. occupation of Haiti (1934) Headquarters still struggled to fully man the FMF as Russell sought to maintain the Marine Corps' commitment to the Navy, insofar as sea going detachments had been concerned. In fact, despite Russell's plea for more manpower, the age-old problem of rhetoric versus reality served to once again deter the Marines from organizing full expeditionary battalions for service with the fleet.22 Major General Russell noted in his 1934 report that due to the number of sea-going detachments, the FMF could not be fully-manned. He added that, "The Marine Corps, under its present strength, cannot maintain the component units of the Fleet Marine Force required by its mission with the fleet." Major General Russell's complaint sounded as if it had been scripted from past annual reports by the former Marine commandants as far back as Brigadier General Heywood to his most recent

predecessor Major General Fuller, insofar as the reasons for the shortage of available Marines had been concerned. In fact, Russell's complaint over chronic manpower shortages due to "sea duty" confirmed in many respects the charges made by Rear Admiral William F. Fullam, and others during the ships' detachment controversies (1890-1908), that the Marine Corps seemed uninterested or unable to redirect its efforts toward forming permanent sea-going battalions and forgo this concern over an archaic mission. If that wasn't enough, the dispatch of one battalion of the FMF to the Navy's Special Service Squadron 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the Atlantic fleet to Cuban waters to protect American lives and interests in that country, further underscored Russell's "never-ending" dilemma over manpower. With 760 Marines still in Haiti (at least until September of 1934), and a further 1,762 leathernecks still on duty in China, there is little wonder why the FMF couldn't be fully manned.23 Despite these shortages in manpower, however, the Marine Corps now had a force that by 1935, resembled the one proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Walter N. Hill, though in a skeletonized format (Table 14.4) Nonetheless, the Marines now had the foundation for their initial wartime strength used during the early days after Pearl Harbor.

\[23\text{Ibid, p. 3.}\]
1st Brigade, FMF, Quantico, VA.
Headquarters Company, 1st Marine Bde
5th Marines (less 3d Bn)
1st Bn, 10th Marines (75-mm Pack howitzers)
1st Chemical Company
1st Engineer Company
1st Tank Company (Marmon Harrington Light Tanks)
Battery "B" 15th Marines (Antiaircraft)
Aircraft One
St. Thomas Virgin Islands
VMS-3 Squadron (Aviation)

2d Marine Brigade, FMF, San Diego, CA.
Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, FMF
Headquarters Company, 2d Marine Brigade
6th Marines (less 3d Bn)
2d Bn 10th Marines (75-mm pack howitzers)
2d Chemical Company
2d Engineer Company
2d Bn, 15th Marines (Antiaircraft)
Aircraft Two²⁴

Table 14.4
The Fleet Marine Force 1935

Lieutenant Generals Twining and Craig rightfully credit Russell with being the man mostly responsible for the creation of the FMF. Despite this accomplishment, however, Russell's failure to break with past procedures, along with his calls to the State and War Departments to garrison China with additional Army units, as well as to maintain a semblance of a Marine presence in Haiti (albeit a token force), points to the fact that he was more in line with the other Marine "traditionalists" on these crucial issues rather than

being on the front line of change. Major General Russell's major contribution, and it was a large one, was to take the initiative (and courage one might add) in implementing the system of promotion by selection, and making administrative changes in the curriculum at the MCS in order to facilitate the Corps movement toward landing operations. Russell's views on reform had been well known and circulated at Headquarters even before he left for Haiti in 1922, in his article "A Plea For a Mission and Doctrine," written in 1916, while attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C. Lieutenant General Twining, a strong supporter of Russell, in fact, awarded him much of the credit for forcing the acceptance of the amphibious warfare mission on the Marine Corps despite the opposition he received inside both Headquarters, and with the Navy's senior commanders who were "hostile" to conducting landing operations. 25 There remains a strong case, however, that Russell has received praise for reforms that he was not responsible for, such as curriculum and training reforms. The reforms in the curriculum at the MCS and in the training at the various training depots were undertaken, by and large through the efforts of Major General's Lejeune and Fuller, and started way before Russell returned from his proconsulship in Haiti. The reforms undertaken by both Lejeune and Fuller culminated in the writing of the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934, during Russell's watch. Russell's greatest contributions lay in the administrative changes that brought about the codification of the FMF as well as the adoption of promotion by selection, and the institution of better methods to train and recruit new Marine officers-through the Platoon Leader's Class, Reserve commissioning, institutional changes that did more for the Marine Corps in modernizing its archaic promotion system and officer recruiting and training. This is not to say that Russell's letter that led to the creation of the FMF was not important. It was, for it refocused the

25 Twining Oral History, p. 76.
attention of the Marine Corps toward "thinking" in terms of waging war within maritime strategy, at least from an operational point of view, and in the re-establishment of ties with the Navy, something that Colonel E.B. Miller and others had expressed concern about in reviewing the curriculum and training at the MCS and the training depots.

Besides the internal opposition to the landing operations mission inside the Marine Corps at this time, there is also some doubt as to the Navy's commitment to amphibious operations during this period. Whereas as early as the 1920's, Rear Admiral Coontz had outlined to General Lejeune that the advanced base force mission was the mission of the Marine Corps in time of war, there appeared to be a "disconnect" as to what the Navy actually defined as a "landing mission." Notwithstanding Twining's comments regarding the Navy's total disdain and lack of interest to the conduct of landing operations, Rear Admiral Walter C. Ansel, USN, who wrote the chapter on naval gunfire found in the Tentative Landing Manual after graduating from the MCS in 1931, recalled that as early as 1921, Rear Admiral William Sims had told his students at the Naval War College, that a landing consisted of "little more than the appearance offshore of a large naval force whose overwhelming display of might would render the enemy incapable of resistance... Marines would emerge from the surf to accept their surrender."²⁶ Ansel added that the Navy's whole concept of conducting landing operations centered on the Landing Forces Manual, a text that still called for the landing of ships' detachments, and its Marine complement as opposed to a permanent force or forces designed to seize and defend bases. This same attitude among some senior naval leaders unfortunately prevailed well into World War II, as a statement attributed to Admiral Richmond Kelly

Turner, who, during one point of the Guadalcanal campaign boasted that he was "well qualified to command troops ashore because he had commanded a cadet battalion at Annapolis." In fact, Turner's view reflected an opinion that was rife among other naval officers at the time, who saw Marines as merely an extension of ships detachment afloat, and not as a separate or autonomous force ashore. While this problem was eventually resolved in early 1943, after a major conference between the Marines and Navy on the island of Noumea, this statement as well as others demonstrated the misperceptions held by many in the Navy [and Marines as well], as to what was actually involved before, during and after an amphibious landing. Ansel is likewise critical of the Marines whom he stated had a misconception about what a landing operation consisted of. As Ansel recalled, while he was at Quantico, "a struggle occurred for the 'heart and soul' of the Marine Corps" on the development of an offensive amphibious mission for the Marine Corps, leading to the seizure and not just the defense of advanced bases as part of a naval campaign. This struggle would not be resolved until midway through the Second World War when both the Marines and Navy discovered what constituted an amphibious assault, and not just a "landing operation." Taken in this light, Guadalcanal, touted as the first "amphibious operation" of World War II, was in reality the second advanced base force operation under wartime conditions, with the first operation being the landing at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in June of 1898.

In short, the criticism leveled toward the Marine Corps's inability to find a mission or direct its efforts toward a wartime mission with the Navy, as well as the Navy Department's reluctance to commit resources to the development of the Marine Corps as

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28Smith, "Rear Admiral Walter C. Ansel," p. 29.
a landing force can be laid at the doorstep of the Chief of Naval Operations. Despite Major General Russell's efforts at creating the FMF and call for "a real mission," it took Russell's 1933 memorandum and Fuller's ties with the Navy to convince an otherwise skeptical CNO and other heads of the Navy bureaus to authorize the creation of the FMF and assign it a real wartime mission. This in turn highlighted Rear Admiral Ansel's criticism of the senior naval leadership of the era as his comments were directed not just with their inability to not only "see the light" insofar as using the Marines as its main landing force but toward their lackluster dedication of resources to outfit just such a force during the 1930's. This in turn gives some validity to the charges later made by both Generals Twining and Holland M. Smith that while the Navy touted the "seizure and defense" of advanced bases, it was more concerned with fighting the decisive Mahanian battle with Orange with little if anything but "lip service" paid to base seizure or defense.

Yet what historians have failed to point out in their rush to point to ongoing feud between the Navy and Marines over landing force doctrine and equipment, is the fact that both Twining and Smith curiously ignore the fact that the struggle for the "heart and soul" for the conduct of landing operations during the late 1920's and 1930's was not just an issue of contention between the Marines and the Navy. There, in fact, existed some opposition inside the Marine Corps itself toward the adoption of the landing mission. The bulk of this opposition can be seen through Colonel E. B. Miller's criticism of the out-dated curriculum at the MCS. Miller and others, attacked what they viewed as an antiquated and out-dated course of study that had remained in place too long, and one that time and technology had radically changed. Echoing the charges made against the French Army of 1940, the critics of the MCS's Army-drive curriculum saw a Marine senior leadership wedded to outdated methods of preparing for "yesterday's" and not either "today's" or "tomorrow's" battles. In short, as Twining noted, the senior leadership
of the Marine Corps was both "lethargic" and uninterested in change. On the other hand, one could state that perhaps Lejeune, and the instructors at the MCS were not too far off the mark with the insistence of studying the lessons learned from the World War. As has been the central theme of this dissertation, the World War changed the Marine Corps during the 1920's, and provided many lessons that during the Second World War greatly assisted Marines in their war against Japan. Contrary to Brigadier General Dessez's comments that the World War had no inherent value the fact remained that the Marine Corps Schools, and its methods of officer and enlisted training, had been organized around the lessons learned in that late conflict. Furthermore, despite the tactical "disjunction" that occurred in Marine Corps training during the 1920's, the World War proved to be pivotal to the modernization of the Marine Corps during the interwar era.29 This last fact was not lost on Major General Thomas Holcomb, a veteran of the war, and erstwhile protege of Generals Lejeune and Russell. If anything, Holcomb realized the significance and the lessons of that war on the Marine Corps' operational and tactical effectiveness, and thus continued to insist on the inculcation of that late war via the curriculum at the MCS and in the training of its enlisted men when he became Commandant in December 1936.

Summary

The creation of the FMF, and the publication of the Tentative Landing Manual, came as the Marine Corps returned from a decade-long period of expeditionary field service. The most important result of the organization of this force was the incorporation of the lessons learned during the World War. This was due, in large part, to the fact that the majority of reforms undertaken by General Lejeune came from the Corps' involvement in that late conflict. As Lejeune's reforms illustrated, the impact of the war

was, in fact, significant on the Marine Corps' institutional structure. From the administrative, tactical, and operational standpoint, the impact of the Marine Brigade's participation in the war could be felt on every institution inside the Marine Corps during the 1920's and 1930's. The greatest impact of the war, however, was on the curriculum at the MCS where after much internal debate, the Corps began a decided "shift" in its orientation away from *Small Wars* to major land operations in the conduct of an assault landing. None of this could have succeeded had Lejeune not introduced the reforms on the Marine Corps' institutional infrastructure, particularly on its training and education curriculum that he and his successors inaugurated after 1928, at the recruit depots, and in the classrooms at the MCS. The impact of these reforms were both significant and lasting, long after Lejeune had retired from the Marine Corps. This can be seen in the improvements in the Corps during the 1930's, for as Lieutenant General Twining noted, that the Marines who formed the FMF after 1933, were noticeably much better trained in weapons handling and employment, as well as in the basic forms of patrolling and in handling tactical organizations than their counterparts only a few years ago.\(^{30}\) This improvement was a direct result of the reemphasis placed on training, and the reinstitution of teaching the "basics" to Marine recruits and veterans after the return from Nicaragua, beginning in 1929. The military effectiveness of these FMF units after 1933, began to be marked by a slow but a steady professionalism, inculcated with a confidence that only a training program can provide. In fact, it was through this reemphasis on training that permitted Marines to handle the ever-growing complexities of FLEXES held, beginning in 1932, and lasting throughout the 1930's.

The emphasis in the previous chapter training, and the emphasis here on the creation of the FMF has been to illustrate the importance of the need for a force well trained in

\(^{30}\) *Twining Oral History*, p. 87.
the art of modern warfare, organized and administered along modern lines. The major points above mentioned illustrated how after a slow start, Headquarters was able to do just this despite the limitations on manpower and funds during the early 1930's. It has also been the author's intent to illustrate the close relationship between the training reforms and creation of the FMF. In fact, "you couldn't have one without the other," for it would've been hard to train a force barely able to employ its organic weapons and sustain an advance inland from the beach once a landing took place, in all of the complexities of landing operation without first having mastered basic individual and branch and unit combat skills and coordination. As the problems in recruit training and combat operations in Nicaragua demonstrated, only when the Marine Corps overcame these deficiencies could it assume a new mission. Furthermore, only until Marines had demonstrated a marked tactical and operational proficiency that had existed prior to and during the World War, could they ever hope to execute a successful landing operation, and hold a beachhead. In sum, without these and other reforms, as well with the earlier work done in the realignment of the quartermaster and administrative branches during the Lejeune era by Brigadier General Cyrus Radford, the Marine Corps would have required a longer period of force and administrative modernization before it could have embarked on a further development of its landing operations doctrine and for its ultimate test "to fight our country's battles" during the Second World War.
CHAPTER 15
PATHS TAKEN, PATHS FORSAKEN
A RETROSPECTIVE

Toward ‘A Military Effectiveness:
Strategic Effectiveness

The bulk of this dissertation has focused on the impact of the World War on the Marine Corps on both the tactical and operational levels. It was on these levels that Headquarters concentrated the bulk of its institutional reforms during the interwar era. While very few officers at Headquarters concentrated upon the "bigger questions of strategy," particularly in regard to War Plan Orange, the bulk of its efforts during the interwar era dealt primarily with the day-to-day operations of a service that spent a great deal of the 1920's on expeditionary duty, far removed from the questions of national defense that faced the country during the era. In fact, only in a broad, general sense, did Marine officers find it necessary to touch upon general strategy at all, and this only rarely, and primarily through articles in the Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings. While Lejeune realized that in order to survive as part of the naval forces the Marine Corps would have to redirect its efforts toward participation in a naval campaign, little progress was made toward this end as a busy deployment schedule, and low budgets placed planning for a wartime mission at the bottom of his list of things to accomplish before he vacated the Commandancy. Instead, it was left to Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis' masterpiece, Advanced Base Operations Against Micronesia (1921), which
outlined both the strategic and operational nature of a potential war between the United States and Japan. This plan, in fact, kept the Marine Corps "in the loop" within the Navy Department insofar as the formulation of war plans had been concerned. While *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* touched upon the strategic environment upon which the United States would wage in the Central Pacific area, it quickly went off into a lengthy discussion of the operational and tactical aspects of a war in the Central Pacific Ocean areas.\(^1\) For the most part during this era, the Marines remained by-and-large focused on both the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' aspects of military effectiveness and seldom ever ventured above the operational level.

Marines cannot be blamed for either ignorance or unwillingness to deal with the larger issues of national strategy since it had been assumed by Marine planners that they would operate within the confines of a naval campaign. While Marine officers attended the Army, Navy, and Industrial War Colleges, sat on the General Board of the Navy, and had a small role in the writing of the *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* (1927), specifically on those aspects that concerned the seizure and defense of an advanced naval base, they remained primarily concerned with the day-to-day affairs of the Corps with little thought given to the larger, strategic issues of the day. In fact, when it came down to viewing war from the "strategic," or the "big picture," such as the impact of industrial output of the country on military readiness, Marines concerned themselves with such issues only when these appeared in lectures at the MCS or the other staff colleges. Only after the reforms began in the late 1920's at Quantico did Marines receive lectures on strategy, and even then it was the exception and not the rule. Hence, the Marine Corps can be seen as only having been strategically effective in a limited sense during the interwar period.

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\(^1\)Clifford, *Progress and Purpose*, p. 38.
In fact, if one were to judge the Marine's Corps's overall strategic effectiveness from the viewpoint of the maritime strategy of the era, that is, if War Plan Orange can be labeled as such, one could say with some degree of truth that the absence of adequate naval transport rendered the Marines strategically ineffective. In reading all of the reports of the Major General Commandant, as well as articles in the Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings, one would've been hard pressed to find any articles or references in regard to the need for suitable amphibious shipping. While the focus of Major General Lejeune, and his two successors had been placed upon the reorientation toward the ability to conduct landing operations, little thought was given at the time to the question as to how the Marines would be transported to the intended theater of operations. General Lejeune did, in fact, see some potential in the maintenance and "upbuilding" of the merchant marine immediately after the Naval Armament Limitation Treaty of 1922, which he categorized as the "only other outlet for progress in efficiency" in the development of the Navy and the Marine Corps during his tenure as Major General Commandant. Yet given the isolationist sentiment of the time, and not to mention the budget cuts that the Harding and Coolidge administrations, as well as the Congress imposed on the services, he more than anybody else concluded that this was a "Navy problem." Moreover, Lejeune was a realist, and thus recognized that with the naval limitations already cutting into the Navy's operating strength, it would have made little sense to pursue such issues as building up the merchant marine, or building new transport ships given Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby's lamentation in his annual report for 1922 that, "The number of these [i.e. transport] vessels has been reduced to a minimum."² Denby's referral to the fact that any future transport needs would come

"from the War Department," in fact, appears to be wishful thinking, given the Army's mission of defending the Philippines, since it was unlikely that the War Department would have shifted any of its shipping assets to the Navy in order to transport Marines to "seize or defend" advanced naval bases. This shortfall in adequate naval transport was, indeed, a problem that only time and a global war would resolve. It was, in fact, left to Major General John H. Russell, who recognized the need for a sufficient number of naval transports, a fact which he specifically mentioned in his final report as Major General Commandant. 3 In this report, Russell pointed to the need for two additional transports in order "to meet the needs of the Fleet Marine Force." By and large, however, Navy officials inside the Bureau of Construction and Repair (renamed Bureau of Ships in 1940) concerned themselves very little with the situation of providing adequate naval transports for the Marines. This situation persisted well into World War II, when even with the exigencies of war, the naval leadership preferred to concentrate its building program on aircraft carriers and other types of ships. Marines had low priority insofar as naval transport is concerned, a situation that persists even to this day. For their part, however, this was a serious omission on the part of Lejeune, and the other amphibious pioneers of the day who failed to as much as raise the issue with the Navy hierarchy. Nonetheless, there was, in fact, sufficient blame to go around, insofar as the construction of an adequate transport fleet had been concerned. Just as within today's discussion on the need for sufficient transport and amphibious shipping, rhetoric oftentimes did not match the necessary resources dedicated to a vigorous shipbuilding program. Even while


Marines laboriously searched for suitable landing craft, little thought was given toward the construction or need for suitable naval transports. While budgets, naval limitations, and the Hoover administration hampered the Navy Department from building even a "treaty" Navy, there remained, even as late as the mid-1930's, little incentive to convert older cruisers and destroyers over to what were then referred to as "attack cargo ships" or AKA's, formerly four-stacked destroyers whose accommodations caused one Marine to characteristically refer to as being worse than living in a "cheap Bowery flop house."

In sum, given the lack of strategic mobility, as well as the lack of attention toward issues such as mobilizing the nation's resources to meet the needs of the Marine Corps, its strategic effectiveness was less than adequate to meet any international crisis during the interwar era let alone a general war.

*Operational and Tactical Effectiveness and the Impact of the World War*

For the most part, however, the focus of Marine leaders was where it needed to be during this era: on the training and preparation of Marines for combat; educating Marine officers in the art of war; and in supporting the foreign policy of the United States in Hispaniola, China, and in Nicaragua. Most important, however, Marines spent the bulk of the interwar era in the inculcation and dissemination of the many "lessons learned" from its participation in the World War. This war remained at the forefront of Marine training and education, and in the consciousness of its leaders during the interwar era. This was due, in large part to the use of the Army's FSR's and IDR's for 1923, which Marines used at the MCS and training depots, as these documents reflected the "primacy of infantry and combined arms," two important ingredients" necessary in a landing operation.

Furthermore, despite the operational and tactical problems Marines experienced in Nicaragua, the Marine Corps can be said to have been operationally and tactically
effective, though perhaps not as proficient as Headquarters would have desired, given its hard earned reputation as excellent light infantrymen. Part of the reason for this operational and tactical effectiveness stemmed from its participation in the World War. Brigadier General Lester A. Dessez recalled that the curriculum of the Company Officers Course of which he attended from 1922 to 1923, had been dominated by the lessons of the World War, a point he raised during a brief meeting with Brigadier General Ben H. Fuller, then Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (July 1922 to January 1923). When asked by Fuller about his standing in the course, the young captain, who disliked the orientation toward the World War, pointedly told the CMCS that, "World War I is over. It's in the history books. It'll never be fought again the way it was . . . ."\(^4\) Despite Dessez' and other Marine's opposition in using the World War as the basis for the training of young officers that conflict's influence on the Marine Corps remained strong up through and including the Second World War, a war that this author argues was fought, at least once a landing took place, exactly as "it was" during the World War. In the final analysis, the latter conflict forced Marines to modernize its entire institutional approach to fighting wars from both a technological and doctrinal standpoint. Despite his opposition to studying the war, Dessez, nonetheless, admitted that the World War's impact on his classmates, and the Marine Corps as a whole was tremendous. He stated that this in turn prompted them to interpret "everything in terms of WWI," since it was from the lessons learned in the war that Lejeune, and his successors built the foundation of the modern Marine Corps on. Furthermore, as Headquarters belatedly realized in mid-1928, as Marine casualties increased in Nicaragua, the lessons learned in the World War had all been but forgotten, insofar as marksmanship and the use of automatic weapons had been concerned. This in turn led to the creation of an infantry weapons school at

\(^4\) *Dessez Oral History*, p. 89.
both Quantico and San Diego in 1930-31, that attempted to correct some of the deficiencies that occurred in the fighting in Nicaragua.

While the adoption and use of the Army's FSR's and IDR's had its critics, most notably Colonel Ellis B. Miller to name but a few, the fact remains that the Division of Operations and Training at Headquarters modeled its training program on the Army's FSR's, and IDR's. These same FSR's and IDR's were, in fact, written directly from the original AEF training bulletins without any discernible change geared toward the Marine Corps' role as a naval expeditionary force. This in itself points to a continuity of the impact of the World War on the Marine Corps well into the 1930's.

Besides Miller's charge that the Marine Corps had become too dependent upon the Army for its training doctrine and regulations, their were other critics of this slavish dependence on another service's tactical doctrine. Despite the loud praises heaped on the Army Schools by such notable Marine officers as Major Graves B. Erskine and Captain Merrill B. Twining, one other Marine office besides Ellis B. Miller who was most vociferous in his criticism in the use of Army training regulations in the MCS and in the Marine Corps in general was Major John Gray. Major Gray, whose views, in fact, reflected a number of Marine officers of the day, wrote in a Marine Corps Gazette article that the Army's FSR's and IDR's, while admirably suited for the Army, "have neither the flexibility nor the scope that a course of instruction for Marine should have . . . ."5 Captain Dessez seconded Gray's comments when he pointedly told Brigadier General Fuller, in the same interview that the Company Officers Course lacked "imagination and foresight."

The question remains, however, would it have mattered if there had been a "Marine way of doing it" insofar as infantry drill regulations or tactics had been concerned? As

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Lieutenant General's Craig and Puller mentioned, the Marines in the Dominican Republic, and later in Nicaragua, made changes as the situation dictated, thus allowing some flexibility among tactical commanders that often conformed to the 1923 Field Service Regulations. Furthermore, despite the slavish adherence to Army methodologies and tactics by Marine officers in the 1920's, the FSR's and IDR's gave Marine Corps training policy was a framework in which to "hang its hat" when all else failed. Added to this, thoughtful Marines such as Lejeune, and later Fuller and Russell, saw a finite end to the expeditionary era, and the need to modernize its tactical principles. Thus, despite their rigid inflexibility and "school solutions," the Army's FSR's and IDR's held the key to force and doctrinal modernization. If anything, adoption of the Army's field service regulations and doctrine by the MCS resolved the debate between the "land war and small wars" advocates once and for all during the 1930's. For all the above-stated objections to the adoption of Army doctrine and regulations in the MCS, it pointed the Marine Corps decidedly away from thinking in terms of preparing to fight "small wars," during the 1930's, even though the Small Wars Manual, in fact, would be published during this same decade. This move on the part by Headquarters was something the "Butlerlites" surely lamented since they had advocated the constabulary mission as being the true raison d'être of the Marine Corps. The latter group nostalgically looked back to the past, where many of them had "earned their spurs" in either the Philippines, Hispaniola, or Nicaragua, and saw this as real "soldiering." Likewise, many of these same critics who attacked the slavish adherence to Army doctrine had never left the States or had been on expeditionary duty during the World War, and could only read about the carnage of the Western Front in 1918 in the newspapers (that is, whenever they got American newspapers!). These same officers likewise fostered a resentment toward the Marines who had been to France, and had earned battlefield honors and promotions while they fought gavilleros or cacos. In time, this resentment developed into
a serious cleavage in the Marine officer corps between those who had served on expeditionary duty during the war, and the so-called "2d Division clique." It was this same cleavage that prevented the Marine officer corps from advancing to the next level of professional development as advocated by General Lejeune during the 1920's, in his desire to adopt promotion by selection.

While the debate between the two groups remained internal, it affected the Corps in more ways than one, as both the Barnett ouster in 1920, and battle for the Commandancy in 1930 demonstrated. While the bitterness associated with Major General Barnett's removal dissipated with the selection of Lejeune as Commandant in June 1920, expeditionary duty delayed the inevitable showdown over the Marine Corps roles and missions between the two constituencies represented by Smedley Butler, and Logan Feland for the "heart and soul" of the Marine Corps, and its roles and missions as a part of the Navy. In the end a compromise candidate, Major General Ben H. Fuller, assured Marines of not only a smooth transition but one of continuity in the way it fought wars, though it must be added, that his selection was in no way a period of conservatism, or further retrenchment in the thinking or actions by Marines as the corps entered the 1930's. Indeed, Fuller's Commandancy represented in many ways "the end of the beginning," in that the Marine Corps took the next step toward modernization during his tenure as Commandant. This was all part of a process that began during the waning days of the Barnett, and later the Lejeune years and continued up through Holcomb's tour as Commandant.

In fact, the force modernization that the corps underwent continued even as Marines battled cacos, sandinistas, and warlords. During the 1920's, for instance, the Marine Corps Schools remained busy, that is when not interrupted by mail guard or expeditionary duty, with much of its focus turned toward training officers and enlisted men in the basics of their profession as sea-going infantrymen. While both the Army
IDR's, FSR's and Small Wars received the lion's share of attention at the MCS in the 1920's, there was some movement toward the study of landing operations, though such operations did not receive the priority that Colonel Robert Dunlap, and others thought they should have received during this period. The conduct of landing operations nonetheless received some attention as the decade of the 1920's ended, and it was at this point that the Marine Corps began to refocus its efforts starting in late 1929, at least doctrinally, once the withdrawal from China, and later Nicaragua had been completed. Despite the opposition and "dubbing Thomas's" that abounded in both the Navy Department, and Marine Corps itself, the "visionaries" at Headquarters, and at the MCS persisted in their belief that a landing operation, if properly planned could succeed. Though this remained largely untested until mid-1943 during World War II, the doctrine developed at the MCS beginning as early as 1931, was the blueprint that the authors of the Tentative Landing Manual used to write what eventually became the "bible" on how to conduct a landing operation.

In fact, the writing of the Tentative Landing Manual of 1934, was the culmination of a process that began, if we are to believe Lieutenant General Twining, in the late 1920's, when the students at the MCS began to examine landing operations as part of their curriculum. Of this, there is plenty of evidence to support this assertion. Nonetheless, while Marines studied landing operations after the Oahu maneuvers, this did not lead immediately to the amphibious doctrine that emerged in the late 1930's, or early 1940's. It was, however, a start in the right direction. Even as Marines wrote down the tenets of landing operations at Quantico in the early 1930's, they were still conceptually thinking "advanced base force," as opposed to an "assault striking force," of which a mobile seaborne assault force is in actuality. In paraphrasing General Twining, the idea of an assault force had to be "sold" to the "powers that be" at Headquarters, and inside the Navy Department during the decade of the 1930's. Even then it was a long, and
somewhat laborious process that had many obstacles to overcome before both the
Marines, and the Navy could agree upon common practices and procedures that would
ensure that this new landing doctrine received money and men. Nonetheless, the
doctrinal "shift" in the Marine Corps thinking began, in fact, as early as the
Commandancy of Major General Lejeune, and culminated with that of Major General's
Russell in the mid-1930's, and Holcomb in the early 1940's. In fact, it was only through
the force of personality and skill of both Lejeune and Russell that the both the Navy's
senior leadership, and the internal opposition inside the Marines that an amphibious force
and doctrine came into being in the first place. General Twining noted that without the
efforts Lejeune or Russell and their intense lobbying efforts within the Navy Department,
it would've been the Army that assumed the landing role:

Initially they listened to Lejeune because they liked and respected him. They never believed the Marine Corps could develop an adequate amphibious force. They lacked the confidence in the Marine Corps. At one time they accepted an offer from General MacArthur, then C of S, USA, to provide an expeditionary force of 30,000 men to take over the role that the Marine Corps had foreseen for itself (circa 1930). The Navy refused to include our amphibious warfare offensive capability as a mission in the naval policy sheet which published annually. When we finally secured recognition of this it was a great breakthrough. This was done by Russell in convincing various officers of the Navy that we meant business and had a capability and what we had to say was important.6

Part of this capability included a force organized, administered, well-trained and educated, in order to wage modern warfare. This brings us to central focus of this dissertation, which is the impact of the World War on the operational military effectiveness of the Marine Corps during the interwar period, and of the continued influence that war had in the development, and refinement of its training and educational institutions.

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6Twining Oral History, p. 94.
This inevitably raises the question again on whether or not the Marine Corps was "militarily effective." While the primary focus of Lejeune, and his successors during the interwar period remained the maintenance of the Marine Corps' strategic, political, operational, and tactical military effectiveness it can be said that they had mixed results with some successes and many failures. Whereas strategically the Marine Corps was less effective during the interwar era, politically they "held their own," largely through the efforts of General Lejeune who with the assistance of Thomas Butler, and other congressmen, and with the support of both Secretaries of the Navy Edwin Denby and Curtis Wilbur, as well as his own political astuteness and budget-mindedness, was able to retain the Corps' fighting strength at least at a bare minimum. While he failed to secure his most prized goal of adoption of a system of promotion by selection and merit, it can be said that the Corps under Major General Lejeune was politically effective in maintaining its support in Congress and with friendly administrations.7 As for its operational effectiveness, both Lejeune and his three successors experienced mixed results. Indeed, if one judges operational effectiveness against the backdrop of how a service "emphasizes the importance of doctrines and tactical systems and their proper utilization on the battlefield," then the Marine Corps can be said to have at least met the minimum standards of military effectiveness given the budgetary, and manpower problems during the interwar era. While the Marine Corps had no real "doctrine" per say during this period Headquarters continued to train and prepare for the day when it in fact formulated one in the early 1930s. Thus, to say that the Marine Corps was "operationally effective" is in actuality a misnomer, and requires further definition since it did not possess an actual wartime mission until the 1930's. Nonetheless, Marines still trained, went to school, and prepared for the day when it did have a wartime role with

7Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, Vol. I, pp. 4-12.
the Navy, and thus can be judged from at least this standpoint as having been
"operationally" effective.

The Impact of the World War

From the tactical point of view, the Marine Corps was very effective, though budget
cuts and manpower shortages hampered it from totally exploiting this "effectiveness"
until more Marines were available after 1933. This tactical effectiveness, in fact, began
even before the Marines returned home from France in 1919, and continued throughout
the interwar era culminating in the FLEXES of the late 1930's, and early 1940's.
Participation in the World War introduced Marines to the growing complexities of
waging modern war, with an ever-growing emphasis on combined arms warfare, a new
concept for a branch of the service that had been considered a "light" infantry sea-going
force prior to the war. This acknowledgment in the changing nature of warfare brought
about the requirements in the realignment of its antiquated officer education systems
with that of the U.S. Army's School of the Line, Command and General Staff College,
and most importantly the Infantry Officers Course at Ft. Benning, a process that began
as Marines returned home from France. The Army model was, as Colonel E. B. Miller
stated, the only one around at that time, and thus it is not hard to understand why
Marines copied it almost verbatim. Furthermore, the majority of the Corps' field and
company grade officers, particularly men such as Lejeune, Robert Dunlap, Logan Feland,
W.C. Neville, Holland M. Smith, and Earl H. Ellis, as well as a host of junior company
grade officers who would lead the Corps for the next thirty odd years or so had served in
France, and had experienced the technological advancements that had completely
changed the nature of the way that future wars would be fought. In sum, all of these men
had seen what it took to wage war in the modern era. Part of this realization was that the

\[8\text{Ibid, p. 12; Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," pp. 25-8.}

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education system Marines had been accustomed to before the World War would have to be changed to accommodate the changes brought about by involvement in this conflict. Whereas officers such as Colonel Ellis B. Miller, and Majors Holland M. Smith, and John Gray at the time decried the influence of the Army's IDR's and FSR's on the Marine Corps Schools and training during the interwar period, they had failed to see the obvious benefits that the 1923 Field Service Regulations brought to the conduct of landing operations, particularly in fire support and infantry tactics once the beachhead had been secured, and the push inland had begun. In fact, this point may have some validity given the comment by one U.S. Army World War II veteran who recalled after watching the Marines in action on Guadalcanal that, "The Marines were terrific near the beach. Get them 100 yards inland, and they're lost." Nonetheless, Marines continued to study Army tactics and field operations though with, as Miller pointed out, "a Marine twist to them."

The World War likewise had a tremendous impact on Marine enlisted training and increased professionalism of its NCO corps. As the training schedules at the recruit depots indicate, the inculcation of the lessons learned during the World War remained an essential, though later neglected, part of the training of a Marine during this era. The turbulence in manpower, appropriations, and expeditionary duty likewise had their impact on Marine training, oftentimes much to the detriment of the Corps' operational readiness. This in turn pointed to the "tactical ineffectiveness" that occurred in some units in the 2d Brigade in Nicaragua, as far as tactical and weapons training had been concerned. The failure to standardize its recruit and branch training, as well as the lack

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9 See Colonel E. B. Miller, Lt.. dtd.. 15 August 1932, loc. cit., p. 3; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, pp. 57-8.
of proper infantry training, due primarily to cutbacks in the training schedules, had repercussions later in Nicaragua, as Marines oftentimes found themselves cut off, surrounded, or unable to use its advantage in firepower simply because they had platoon leaders unfamiliar with basic infantry skills of the kind necessary in small unit actions. This points to the "tactical disjunction" that reduced the effectiveness of the Marines which in turn led to frustration in fighting the sandinistas.12

One positive area that Headquarters was unfortunately not able to pursue with more vigor due to the constant deployment was the establishment of a progressive program of enlisted education. While Lejeune and Butler established the Marine Corps Institute in 1919-20, the Sergeant's School that Brigadier General Neville, and Colonel Beaumont attempted to establish during the early 1920's at Quantico, and later the Infantry Weapons School in the early 1930's at both the MCS and San Diego, reflected a positive step toward the professional development of its career enlisted Marines. Unfortunately, deployments to China, Nicaragua, and the Mail Guard derailed this early attempt at professional enlisted education. Thus, from the evidence presented, one can conclude that during the 1920's the Marine Corps, if you include the problems that occurred in the "training and leadership" of officers and enlisted men, as well as the deficiencies in its "weapons utilization" in Nicaragua, as highlighted by the need for the reemphasis on basic infantry fundamentals at the recruit depots in the late 1920's, was not, in fact, "militarily effective." In fact, as a result of this "ineffectiveness," Marines met with both failures, as well as successes during the 1920's, many of which had catastrophic consequences, as was specifically the case in Nicaragua with regard to poor marksmanship and infantry skills.

Despite this "ineffectiveness," however, the Marine Corps of the 1920's recruited, trained, and equipped the young men entering the corps in the 1920's for expeditionary service in China, Hispaniola, and Nicaragua. While there occurred problems within the institutional organization of the Marine Corps, the budgets of the era precluded any major sudden change in the way that it carried out its missions. It is a matter of fact that Headquarters knew problems existed, but the scramble for adequate funding prevented it from enacting wide-scale changes. Instead, Marine Corps officials attempted to effect changes incrementally in order to correct these deficiencies, though the results were often inconclusive, and were thus not often immediately seen. This is especially true in the case of recruit training. The reforms enacted in recruit training by Major General Lejeune starting in mid-1927 insofar as marksmanship and basic infantry training had been concerned, began to show positive results by the early 1930's. This can be seen in the comments made by Major General Fuller, who wrote in his annual report for 1933 that, "On the basis of qualification scores attained during the fiscal year, a greater degree by firers prevails."\(^{(13)}\) Besides the problems with marksmanship, Headquarters likewise addressed the issue of weapons handling and employment, with the establishment of the Infantry Weapons Course at San Diego, and Quantico. While the schools remained in operation only a short time, they nevertheless made positive inroads in correcting some of the deficiencies identified in Nicaragua, with the establishment of an all-too short but intensive school for NCO's, and officers in order to train them in the use and tactical employment of automatic weapons, mortars, and grenades.

**The Downside: Military 'Ineffectiveness' and the Marine Corps**

One of the reasons for the military ineffectiveness that existed in the Marine Corps during the interwar period centered around a lack of coordination between the

operational and tactical levels. First of all, this can be seen in the problems that occurred in the Corps' training programs. The lack of coordination at Headquarters insofar as an effective, standardized training program for enlisted men and officers alike, as well as the possession of proper training facilities, served to undermine some operational aspects of the training programs at the recruit depots, at The Basic School and the Company Officers' Course which in turn led to problems in the field. While officers such as Lejeune, Dunlap, and Butler blamed inadequate funding and too many deployments, Colonel John Beaumont hit the "nail on its proverbial head," when he pointed his finger at Headquarters' inconsistent policies, insofar as its training policies had been concerned. Beaumont argued that it was not lack of resources or adequate facilities that hampered training, but an unwillingness among senior Marine officers to effectively coordinate and implement a unified training program for both its officers and enlisted men. Colonel Beaumont repeatedly stated that some members of Headquarters used the excuse of low budgets and inadequate facilities in order to deflect criticism toward their own actions and policies, when in fact, the Marine Corps possessed an adequate training infrastructure given both the size of the Corps and the lack of financial and material assets lavished on the Army during the same period.

What distinguished Marine training from that of the Army during this period [and even today], however, is the fact that Marine Corps' training mission focused then as it does now on preparing the individual basic Marine for combat. This idea, in fact, has never changed, and remains as an integral part of the Marine Corps' philosophy on training to this very day. In comparison to the situation that existed in the 1920's at the recruit depots, this last statement can be seen amidst problems of a similar nature in the mid-1970's, when General Louis H. Wilson, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, and a Medal of Honor winner during World War II, testified before Congress that "Recruit training is designed to produce basic Marines who are: disciplined; physically fit;
proficient in marksmanship and other military skills; and imbued with self confidence, pride, a sense of duty, and a love of corps and country. " Marine training, in essence, Wilson told the congressmen, "rests on a basic premise: That Marines must be able to fight-to survive-and to win in the first battles in any future combat we may face. The traditional force-in-readiness role of the corps demands this. Accordingly, we must provide our young Marine with the skills and with a mind set which enables them to face hazard and uncertainty without hesitation." Major Arthur Racicot echoed these same sentiments on Marine training in his letter to the Commanding General of Parris Island in 1925, some fifty-four years before Wilson's testimony before Congress, when he wrote that the main mission of the recruit depots is to make Marines, and with that he implied-combat infantrymen imbued with self confidence and discipline. I think that Racicot would agree with Wilson's general premise that "Poorly trained and undisciplined troops-unable to cope with combat fears and acting in fear of their leaders, as well, would be unlikely to survive. They would be even less likely to carry out their mission."14

The second deficiency in the Marine Corps during the interwar era were the "technical" problems that existed in the Marine Corps Schools. These included problems over curriculum, the methodology of instruction and grading, While Marine officers concentrated on the Army's IDR's and FSR's, little appreciation or thought had been given to the study of naval warfare in conjunction with land operations. Colonel E.B. Miller's criticism that "Marines took the easy way out" by adopting the Army curriculum with little if any thought paid to naval warfare or "combined operations" during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which had been filled with examples of such operations [especially the Napoleonic and American Civil Wars], had validity. Miller's

comments likewise suggest that Marine instructors failed to use both imagination, and a
sense of mission in the adoption of a curriculum at the MCS during the 1920's. It also
points to the fact that the curriculum at the MCS remained stagnant, and somewhat
irrelevant, given the direction that Major General Lejeune and others wanted to point the
Marine Corps toward. Headquarters, in fact, failed to heed the advice of Major General
John H. Russell, who as an instructor at the Naval War College in 1910, wrote that while
the training of an advanced base force was the first priority of American naval and
Marine leaders, the officers and men must "have a sufficient naval education . . . a
certain amount of useful knowledge and so affiliated with the Navy, its traditions, its
officers, and its men, as to make him an essential part of the Navy." In short, both E.B.
Miller and Russell, as well as Brigadier General J. C. Breckinridge, believed that
Marines needed to 'start thinking outside the box', and more in line with their own
service's requirements. This "thinking outside the box" meant the study of advanced
base expeditionary missions. While Marine officers at the MCS studied subjects that
ranged from Small Wars to landing operations, there had been, in the view of Miller and
others, an inordinate amount of time devoted to the conduct of land operations, and less
time spent on studying advanced base or landing operations. Furthermore, instructors at
the MCS placed too much emphasis on what both Breckinridge, and later Major William
P. Upshur decried in his personal correspondence to his wife as the pre-conceived
"school" solutions which, according to both Marine officers, left little room for
independent thought. In fact, in regard to the rote methodology of instruction used by
both the Marines and the Army Upshur was even more critical than that of Breckinridge,
when he wrote in a letter home that while at Fort Leavenworth students could deviate
slightly from the school 'solution' "if you do something that is simple, direct, and
forceful, and which does not violate sound tactics . . . and that you carry out your
mission," the same was not true at Quantico.\textsuperscript{15} Upshur and the other Marines who attended either the Field Officer's or Company Officer's Courses, in fact, complained of the anachronistic method of instruction that left little room for original thought. In the 1930's, both General Breckinridge and Major Upshur attempted with some success to introduce a curriculum and methodology of teaching that allowed some independent thought built around upon the premise that the MCS trained Marine, and not Army officers.\textsuperscript{16}

As important as it needed to reform its officer education curriculum at the MCS Headquarters belatedly recognized the need to "professionalize" its NCO corps. During the early 1920's, it set about to do just this with the establishment of the Sergeant's School at MCS, an effort which proved in the end to be both half-hearted, and at the same time a daunting challenge to implement in the face of the deployment schedule of the 1920's. While the MCI achieved a firm footing insofar as enlisted education had been concerned, it was no substitute for a sound professional school system much like what had developed in the Army after the World War, with both its branch and technical schools.\textsuperscript{17} Despite the ever-growing technical nature of war, the Marine Corps was slow to modernize its various branch schools and NCO education, a process reversed by Major General Lejeune with his reforms of the Quartermaster, Clerical, and Ordnance departments and later by Major General Fuller, with the establishment of a Sergeant's School at Quantico, and San Diego in 1930. While Marine enlisted men, particularly aviators and motor transport mechanics went to various Army and Navy branch schools,

\textsuperscript{15}Bittner, \textit{Curriculum Evolution}, p. 21; Major William P. Upshur ltr. to his Mother, dtd. 26 October 1924, Major General William P. Upshur, USMC Papers, (Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Entry No. 2645, Box 3, Folder 24), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{16}Frances, "\textit{History of Marine Corps Schools}," pp. 37-47.
\textsuperscript{17}Fisher, \textit{Guardians of the Republic}, pp. 177-248.
the fact remained that the Marine Corps would have to, much like Miller advocated for officers, create a school system "unique" to its own requirements and needs for its NCOs. In fact, outside of the MCI, and technical schools, some Marine posts established what they called "post schools," which taught the rudiments of clerical, administrative, and leadership skills, though proved to be totally inadequate for the complexities of modern war. The implementation of a professionally-based technical school system for enlisted men would not, in fact, occur until the late 1930's, and during the first two years of World War II. The reason for this lack of advanced NCO school system was simple: there were no Marine officers or staff noncommissioned officers capable of instructing enlisted men in such subjects at the time, and thus professionalism suffered in the enlisted ranks.

'Vertical and Horizontal Development'

Despite the problems in the MCS and Marine Corps training in general during the interwar era, when examined from the "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions of organizational military effectiveness, my conclusion is that given the resources at hand at the time, the Marine Corps didn't do too bad. If judged from the "horizontal" dimension which

... consists in the numerous, simultaneous, and interdependent tasks that military organizations must execute at each hierarchical level with differing levels of intensity in order to perform with proficiency. These tasks include manpower procurement, planning, training, logistics, intelligence, and technical adaptation as well as combat. An adequate definition of military effectiveness must include all of these aspects of military activity . . . .

the Marine Corps achieved some uniformity in its schools system, as well as its training program though the results remained inconclusive during the 1930's, and thus meets the
definition of this "horizontal" military effectiveness. It would nonetheless take the test of combat in the Pacific to fully assess whether or not the training and tactical problems encountered in Nicaragua had been corrected, or even had been properly addressed by the Division of Operations and Training, by the introduction of better and more intensive training in fundamental infantry skills. A partial answer to this can be found in the comments of Colonel Merritt A. Edson, who claimed that as late as 1943, Marines still had problems in jungle and small unit warfare. In an after action report at the conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign in 1943, Edson had written that there remained some minor deficiencies in training Marines in basic infantry skills such as scouting, patrolling, and small unit operations. After some basic adjustments, however, Headquarters corrected the vast majority of these problems by the time of the landing on Peleliu in September 1944.

Specifically, during Major General Lejeune's tenure as Major General Commandant, Headquarters addressed all of these problems and had a great deal of success in correcting some but not all of these deficiencies that obstructed the Marine Corps' drive toward force modernization. This can be seen, for instance, in the reforms of the totally revamped quarter-master department. Here, Headquarters introduced modern accounting and storage practices, up-to-date recordkeeping, and above all else, better maintenance of equipage such as tents, motor vehicles, and ordnance. This in turn permitted the Marine Corps, once these reforms took firm root in the mid-to-late 1920's, to turn its attention to conducting landing operations. Given the antiquated state of the

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quartermaster department prior to the World War, it is highly unlikely that the same system could have sustained a landing operation under similar wartime conditions as occurred at Gallipoli in April 1915. The introduction of modern business methods that included accounting, records keeping and filing, as well as purchasing practices, and the disposal of surplus material into the Marine Corps during the interwar era greatly assisted its drive toward modernization. While it still had problems, as Assistant Quartermaster Brigadier General Bennett J. Puryear admitted, it had come a long way from the days of inadequate bookkeeping, sloppy storage, and damaged material remaining in the system. At least now, there was proper storage facilities and a better system in surveying and disposing of damaged and out-dated equipment.

Besides the innovations in the quartermaster department, other reforms vastly improved the clerical and administrative practices that greatly complimented each other, all designed to make the Marine Corps a more efficient fighting force. This did not mean that the Marine Corps was becoming like the Army, it wasn't. Instead, Headquarters geared its internal reforms toward supporting what it considered the "heart and soul" of the Marine Corps, and that is, its fighting component. To this end, Major General Lejeune set out to totally revamp an antiquated institution, and in the process of these reforms introduced new practices and techniques that paved the way for the doctrinal reforms of the early 1930's, and to insure that the Marine Corps would be there alongside the Navy during the prosecution of a naval campaign.

Summary and Conclusion

This purpose of this dissertation has been to examine both the impact of the World War on the Marine Corps, and institutional reforms enacted during the interwar era by Headquarters due to the involvement in the war. The reforms enacted by Headquarters

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20Puryear Oral History, pp. 78-81.
came about largely as a result of the Marine Corps' participation in the World War. As has been demonstrated throughout this study, the impact of the World War was, in fact, substantial on the Marine Corps during the interwar era. From areas that included Lejeune's staff reorganization of Headquarters, to the various administrative departmental reforms (quartermaster, administrative, and aviation), and in the training and educational reforms, the experience, and impact of the World War could be seen in almost every aspect of the Marine Corps increasing professionalization as a modern combat force from 1919 to 1941. While the expeditions to Hispaniola, China and Nicaragua, as well as mail guard duty, detracted Lejeune and his successors from their efforts at the redirection of the Marines toward the conduct of landing operations, Headquarters never lost sight of its ultimate goal of force modernization. While Major General Wendell C. Neville's tenure as Commandant was too brief to have any impact on the Marine Corps, it was thus left to his two successors, Major General's Ben H. Fuller and John H. Russell, to undertake the reforms at the MCS, in training, and in the Corps' wartime role and mission.

It is at this point that I would argue that besides Lejeune, it was, in fact, Major General Fuller, who "kept the Marine Corps afloat" during an extremely critical period in its institutional history, and had more than anybody else realized the importance and the significance for the Marine Corps to redirect its efforts toward the conduct of landing operations. Furthermore, as Brigadier General Dessez himself stated, it was Fuller who realized the significance and study of the World War on the way Marines fought and trained for war. This can be seen in the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools, and of the influence from the Army schools that Marine company-grade officers brought back with them to the FMF.  

21Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools," pp. 29-50; Twining Oral History, p. 94.  

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adherence to the operational and tactical doctrines that came from that war via the Army's FSR's (especially the 1923 edition), and IDR's, as well as Dessez's comment that "The second war is never like the first," the lessons Marine took away from the World War proved invaluable during the fighting in World War II. Thus, the criticism leveled at the curriculum of the MCS during the 1920's and 1930's, in regard to operational and tactical doctrine is both unfair and unwarranted, since Marines fought a war of attrition not unlike that waged at Soisson, Blanc Mont, or in the Meuse-Argonne, on the many Pacific atolls during the Second World War. Contrary to Dessez' statement Marines, indeed, were correct to interpret the next war in terms of WWI since it very closely resembled that conflict, and when it came, they had been well-prepared doctrinally to fight it.

One last point in defense of Major General Fuller's impact on the Corps, is the fact that many of the reforms credited to Fuller's successor Major General John H. Russell, actually began during the former's three-year tour as Major General Commandant. Hence, Fuller deserves more credit than historians have given him. To some this might be heresy, but the facts remain that the ideas credited to Russell were, by and large, those first advanced officially by General John A. Lejeune, specifically in the fields of training and curriculum reforms, and had been placed into effect by Fuller. Most importantly, however, it was Fuller, who implemented many of the changes at the MCS upon his ascendancy to the Commandancy in July 1930, changes one might add, that had far more significance in correcting the problems that existed in the Marine Corps' training system particularly those identified in Nicaragua, than those enacted by Russell four years later in the creation of the FMF.

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22Dessez Oral History, p. 140.
Historians have correctly labeled the 1920's as the "Roaring Twenties." Indeed, this was a period of substantial technological change on American society. No more was this true than in the Marine Corps, particularly in regard to the redirection of the curriculum at the MCS and in the technological advances in the fields of mechanization and aviation. These advances, largely a result of the World War, had its greatest impact on the training of both Marine officers and enlisted men, and ultimately in the Corps' warfighting mission. Major General Fuller's selection as CMC greatly positioned the Marine Corps, despite the Hoover administration's draconian cutbacks of that service's budgets, for even greater achievements in the 1930's, as it laid out the tenets of landing operations in codified form through the Tentative Landing Manual in 1934, and the Small Wars Manual in 1935. In short, the 1920's and early 1930's truly were "the golden age" of the Marine Corps. It was an exciting and exhilarating time in the Marine Corps as the MCS introduced new methods and techniques employed during the World War, into the curriculum and training programs inside the corps. Many of these methods and techniques found their way into the Marine Corps's warfighting doctrine in the 1940's. While a handful of historians have likened this era to a "dark age" where little had been accomplished in terms of military advancement, Lejeune and his successors proved this theory wrong. During the interwar period, Marines experimented with theory and doctrine, trained, and fought as they had done throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century. Armed with their experience in the World War, Marines returned from France to "reconstruct" an entirely new Marine Corps, different in so many ways than the one that they had left back in the United States in 1917. Through the efforts of Major General's Barnett, Lejeune, and Fuller, the Corps was ready to take on its most challenging era, a period dominated by austere budgets, expeditionary and mail guard duty, and a "revolution" or sorts in the way that it would fight in future wars. More importantly, as the MCS and training departments absorbed the lessons of the fighting in
France during the World War, a modern, well-led professional military force emerged. This can be seen through the careers of the officers who entered the Marine Corps after that conflict as second lieutenants. Many of these same officers went on to command battalions and regiments during the Second World War, as well as divisions and in one case, a corps. Called the "Benning Boys" by General Merrill B. Twining, because of the influence of the Army schools at MCS during the 1930's, these same Marine officers were much better at their job "even if they were not better... or even braver than their predecessors," since they had the advantages that the latter did not have: a professional military education. Thus, the significance of one of the major themes stressed throughout this dissertation; that it was the World War, and its inculcation that shaped the Marine Corps in the twentieth century, and not World War II.24

For Marines, the 1920's and 1930's were, "the best of times, and the worst of times." The "best of times" in that Headquarters adopted newer, and more innovative methods in its administration, education, and training of Marines. It was the "worst of times," as manpower shortages, austere budgets, and a ceaseless round of expeditions prevented the Marine Corps from further developing a credible landing operations doctrine. Marines nonetheless persisted in their efforts, and in the end this persistence paid off with the reforms in the MCS and in Headquarters' reemphasis on landing operations after 1926. This process began even while Lejeune was still the Major General Commandant, and remained constant up through the eve of World War II under General Thomas Holcomb.

Furthermore, while the Fuller Commandancy has been seen as an interim prior to the ascendancy of Major General John H. Russell, it also enjoyed a period of achievements

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that hastened the process of developing a credible landing operations doctrine. Most notable was the codification of the Fleet Marine Force. Added to the doctrinal "shift" that began under Fuller, were the changes Headquarters introduced into the curriculum at the MCS and in its efforts and encouragement in the writing of a basic Tentative Landing Manual in 1931, under the leadership of Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley at Quantico. All of these reforms, in fact, began during Fuller's tour as Commandant, and not that of Major General Russell. While Russell is rightfully credited with initiating the letter to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Pratt, it was with the approval of Fuller that it went forward to the admiral's desk for his signature. While Russell made the FMF a reality, it was Fuller who should be credited with its actual birth.

While the Marine Corps during the interwar era experimented with its advanced base force concept, further developed its air arm, and revised its curriculum, and introduced many changes in the way that it taught and trained its officers and enlisted men in the art of war, it was, in fact, the impact of the World War on the very institutions of the Marine Corps that forever changed that service. With the departure of Major General Lejeune from the Commandancy in 1929, it was left to his two successors—Major General's Wendell C. Neville, and Ben H. Fuller to build upon his reforms, and take the Marine into the next decade. While Neville died shortly after his appointment as Commandant, Fuller struggled to keep the Marine Corps "afloat" in the face of massive cutbacks, austere budgets, a hostile Hoover administration, a War Department that sought to encroach upon the Marine Corps mission of expeditionary warfare, and an indifferent Naval leadership that cared little about landing operations, as they themselves struggled for funds and manpower.25 In the end, it was the impact and

lessons learned during the World War that sustained the corps as a warfighting organization even as critics sought to either eliminate or cut its strength even further during the interwar era.

Insofar as the implementation of necessary reforms on the antiquated Marine Corps antiquated education, promotion and selection system, it was ultimately left for Major General John H. Russell to capitalize on what Lejeune had initiated, and Fuller had continued. Thus, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, Major General Fuller's Commandancy was not, "the beginning of the end" of the old Marine Corps, but was instead the "end of the beginning" for a new and better Marine Corps. Born on the blood-soaked battlefields of the World War, nurtured during the 1920's on the beaches of Culebra and Oahu, as well as in the jungles of Hispaniola and Nicaragua., the Marine Corps slowly modernized through a series of educational and training refinements in the classrooms at Quantico, and on the drill fields of Parris Island and San Diego during the interwar era. Armed with the experiences of the World War, the Marine Corps that emerged from that late conflict, studied, trained, and steadily prepared "to "fight our country's battles" for what was to be an even larger, more devastating war than it experienced on the battlefields of France in 1918. In a large sense, participation in, and inculcation of the lessons learned during the World War contributed, and eventually culminated in the development and refinement of the Marine Corps' specialty in amphibious in the 1930's. This was a process that began shortly after the leathernecks returned from France in 1919, and continued up through the eve of World War II under Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, a Lejeune protege and veteran of the World War.
Appendix # A

Present Authorized Temporary Strength of the
Marine Corps By Terms of the Naval Appropriations
Act of 11 July 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General Commandant</td>
<td>Sergeants Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>QM Sergeants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. General, Adjut &amp; Inspector</td>
<td>Drum Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. General Quartermaster</td>
<td>1st Sergeants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. General, Paymaster</td>
<td>Gunnerly Sergeants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. General, Line</td>
<td>Sergeants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels, Line and Staff</td>
<td>Corporals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonels, Line and Staff</td>
<td>Drummers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors, Line and Staff</td>
<td>Privates First Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>Privates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants</td>
<td>Leader of the Band</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Commissioned</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Warrant Officers                      |                        |
| Marine Gunners                        | 50                     |
| Quartermaster Clerks                  | 50                     |
| Pay Clerks                            | 42                     |
| Total Warrant Ranks                   | 142                    |

Source:
Memorandum from Major General George Barnett,
dtd. 6 April 1920, Barnett Papers, PC 247, MCU
Archives, Marine Corps University, MCCDC,
Quantico, Va., Box 1, p. 1.
Appendix # B (CONTINUED)

United States Marine Corps 1919
Strength and Distribution June 30, 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular Service:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Posts within the United States</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>13,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On duty at Foreign Stations</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>8,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Board Cruising Vessels</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Expeditionary Duty</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>17,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>41,001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Marine Corps Reserve:** |          |              |
| At posts within the United States | 161      | 1,750        |
| On Expeditionary Duty      | 107      | 893          |
| **Total**                  | 268      | 2,643        |

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**Distribution of the Force September 30, 1919**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Marine Gunners</th>
<th>Quartermaster Clerks</th>
<th>Pay Clerks</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Posts within the U.S.</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On duty at Foreign Stations</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Board Cruising Vessels</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Expeditionary Duty</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20,574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

672
Appendix # B (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marine Corps Reserve</th>
<th>At Posts Within the U.S.</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>392</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On Duty at Foreign</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On Board Cruising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On Expeditionary Duty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures in the above tables giving the distribution of the enlisted men of the Marine Corps Reserves are approximated; The totals, however, are the exact figures.

U.S. Marine Corps
Enlisted Strength 1919

Gains and Losses in the Enlisted Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Force</td>
<td>25,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reenlisted From Marine Corps</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reenlisted From Army</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reenlisted From Navy</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined From Desertion</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners Restored</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discharged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deserted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prisoners Sentenced to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dishonorable Discharges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Gains            | 28,214                  |
| Total Losses           | 31,916                  |

Appendix C (CONTINUED)

Recruiting and Distribution of the Marine Corps
February-April 1920

February 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Reenlist.</th>
<th>Applicants, Accept</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Division</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Division</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Division</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Division</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enlistments</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Period of Enlistment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2-Year</th>
<th>3-Year</th>
<th>4-Year</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Division</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Division</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Division</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Division</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>848</td>
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March 1920

674
Appendix # C (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Reenlists</th>
<th>Applicants Accept</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Division</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Division</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Division</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Division</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enlistments</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Period of Enlistment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2-Year</th>
<th>3-Year</th>
<th>4-Year</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Division</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Division</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Division</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Division</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>897</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**April 1920**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Reenlists</th>
<th>Applicants Accept</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Division</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Division</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Division</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Division</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enlistments</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix # C (CONTINUED)

*Period of Enlistment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2-Year</th>
<th>3-Year</th>
<th>4-Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Division</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>316</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Division</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Division</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Division</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Enlistments</strong></td>
<td><strong>828</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>911</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix # D (CONTINUED)

Desertions, Discharges, and Courts Martials
1922-1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Absent Without Leave</th>
<th>Desertions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Courts Martials, Discharges*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Deck Courts</th>
<th>General</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,186</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,809</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,521</td>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,914</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1929</td>
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<td>1,356</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,370</td>
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</tbody>
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Appendix # D (CONTINUED)

Desertions, Discharges, and Courts Martials (CONTINUED)
1922-1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Desertions</th>
<th>Discharges</th>
<th>Courts Martial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,205</td>
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Marine Officers Separated For Various Offenses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Offense</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Embezzlement, Fraud, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer/Gentleman, Theft, Forgery, Scandalous Behavior, Violation of Orders, Dereliction of Duty, Drunkenness, Disrespect, Liquor Violations (Prohibition Laws).

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Lieutenant General Thomas E. Bourke, USMC
Brigadier General Austin R. Brunelli, USMC
Brigadier General William W. Buchanan, USMC
Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., USMC
Major General Marion E. Carl, USMC
Colonel Justice M. Chambers, USMCR
Major General George H. Cloud, USMC
Lieutenant General Albert D. Cooley, USMC
Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, USMC
Brigadier General Donald E. Curtis, USMC
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Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer, USMC
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General Graves B. Erskine, USMC
Lieutenant General George F. Good, USMC
Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, III USMC
Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC
Lieutenant General Leo D. Hermle, USMC
Sergeant Major Edgar A. Huff, USMC
Sergeant Major Gilbert H. Johnson, USMC
Major General Louis R. Jones, USMC
Colonel Alva B. Lasswell, USMC

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Major General August Larson, USMC
Colonel William A. Lee, USMC ***
Lieutenant General Frederick E. Leek, USMC
Colonel John P. Leonard, USMC
Lieutenant General Robert B. Luckey, USMC
Lieutenant General John N. McLaughlin, USMC
Lieutenant General John C. McQueen, USMC
Major General John H. Masters, USMC
General Vernon E. Megee, USMC
Private Richard B. Millin, USMC
General Alfred A. Noble, USMC
Major General Henry R. Paige, USMC
Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC
General Edwin A. Pollock, USMC
Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC ***
Major General Bennett Puryear, USMC
Lieutenant General William J. Van Ryzin, USMC
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, USMC
Brigadier General Frank H. Schwable, USMC
Lieutenant General Julian C. Smith, USMC
Lieutenant Edward W. Snedeker, USMC
General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC
General Merrill B. Twining, USMC
Brigadier General Daniel W. Torrey, USMC
Brigadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC
Colonel Ralph M. Wiseman, USMC
Major General William A. Worton, USMC

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Sergeant William A. Bihary, USMC, (1915-1919)
Colonel Jeff De Blanc, USMCR, (Ret.) (Written)
Sergeant Russell F. Colbert, USMC (1928-32, 1941-45)
Colonel Alfred M. Croft, USMC, (Ret.), (1951-77)
Colonel Frank Drury, USMCR (Ret), (1941-1953)
Staff Sergeant Frank Gardner, USMCR, (1941-1945)
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (1930-1967)**
CWO4 John Hanson, USMC (Ret), (1940-1970)
Sergeant Donald Kinsman, USMCR, (1941-1945)
Private First Class Blaine Jackson, USMCR, (1941-1945)
Sergeant George T. MacGillivray, USMC, (1940-1945)
Lieutenant W. J. Mallison, USN (Ret), (1941-1945)
Captain W. R. Parks, USMCR, (1941-1945)
LtCol Rolf A. Pederson, USMCR, (1941-1972)
Colonel Paul H. Sackett, USMC, (1935-1945)
Sergeant Carl Seaberg, USMC, (1937-1945)
Sergeant Ray Schneider, USMCR, (1941-1945)
Sergeant Frhive Smith, USMC, (1940-1945)
MGySgt Ray Stock, USMC (Ret), (1941-1965)
Lt Colonel Robert S. Stubbs, II, USMC (Ret), (1942-1962)
Private Jack Wiggins, USMCR, (1943-1945)
Lt Colonel Simon L. Webb, USMC, (1941-1952)

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Notes

*Research for this dissertation took place insofar as use of the Marine Corps Personal Papers was concerned at the History and Museums Division, located at the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. During the course of this research the personal papers transferred to the repository at the Archives, Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA.

** While General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.'s papers are closed to researchers at this time he kindly agreed in April 1998 to answer a series of questions regarding Marine activities in China during the late 1930's when he was a company commander with the 4th Marines in Shanghai. The general granted this historian access, and the use of several research papers on the Marine occupation of Shanghai and of the Marines' deployment to China in the 1930's. The author would like to kindly thank General Greene for his participation, support and interest in this dissertation.

*** The oral histories of Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller and Colonel William A. Lee have been combined in one volume. Lieutenant General Puller died in 1973, while Colonel Lee, known Corps-wide as the "Ironman," died in 1999.