EXPRESSİON OF POLİTENESS/IMPOLITENESS VIA THE ASPECTUAL FORMS IN THE IMPERATIVE IN RUSSIAN

DISSERTATİON

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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2008

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ABSTRACT

Research on how Russian aspect functions in the imperative has revealed contradictory opinions on the emotive nuances that the aspectual forms can express in different contexts. These contradictions, however, turn out to be illusory if we consider the various approaches from the point of view of Functional Grammar, i.e., as complimentary to each other. Context, and intonation in particular, are shown to be of critical importance in resolving these contradictions, especially if there is to be an adequate discussion of the nuances of politeness/impoliteness. However, my study shows that much of the previous research on the issue has continuously neglected contextual factors. The reason for this neglect is shown to be rooted in the fact that most studies of linguistic politeness, including those by Russian scholars, are based on traditional politeness theories, in which lay conceptualizations of politeness merge with scientific notions. Thus, politeness studies become “imposition” theories which are subjective, evaluative and prescriptive in nature. After critiquing the traditional models, I consider alternative approaches to linguistic politeness. The latter view politeness as practice, and focus on how evaluations of (im)politeness occur in real
interaction. I adopt the position reflected in the alternative approaches. However, my study’s narrow focus on imperative utterances dictates the following modification: I analyze examples embedded in movie contexts which prove to be the most reliable data source for obtaining actual hearers’ evaluations. Further, I demonstrate how the alternative models of linguistic politeness can be combined with the insights into aspectual semantics provided by various Russian studies on how aspect functions in the imperative. Though the alternative approach suggested in this work remains relative, as it does not allow researchers to make any definitive claims about the role of the aspectual form itself in the polite/impolite interpretation of an imperative utterance, it allows us to focus on (im)politeness as a discursive struggle which occurs in each particular instance of a real human interaction.
To my dearest husband and son,
Vadim and Daniel Stakhursky
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my adviser, Dr. Daniel E. Collins, for the intellectual and moral support, for the continuous encouragement, patience and commitment which inspired me to start, continue and finish this dissertation.

I would also like to thank him and other faculty and staff members for making the years of study at the Ohio State University interesting and productive, for their eternal support in whatever concerns a foreign student might have. Thanks to all these people, the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures truly felt like home.

I would like to give my special thanks to Dr. Charles Gribble and Dr. Ludmila Isurin for providing invaluable insights and suggestions on my dissertation, and for being great teachers and advisers throughout the years of study at the Ohio State University.

Also, I would like to thank my great friend Larysa Stepanova for her friendship, unconditional dedication and support in all I did at the Ohio State.
Incidentally, she was also the person who handed me an article which inspired me to start working on this dissertation. I thank her and her family for all the warmth and love they have shown me throughout the years that we have known each other.

And, finally, I express my gratitude to my husband, Dr. Vadim Stakhursky, whose warm support, encouragement, help, and love made my work much easier and productive. My dearest son Daniel deserves special thanks for being the most patient baby in the world, for making me work fast, and for traveling with me to Columbus for my defense.
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INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

The first scholarly studies of Russian aspect in the imperative mood clearly point out that the two aspectual forms (Imperfective/Perfective) can fulfill certain emotive/expressive functions. However, the conclusions presented in what Forsyth calls the two “most searching” of the early works (Mazon 1914 and Vinogradov 1972) appear to be rather contradictory. Thus, Mazon calls the imperfective aspect “less categorical and thus often less imperious”, and the Perfective—“more exigent and… more categorical and imperious” (cited in Forsyth 1970: 198). Vinogradov, on the contrary, argues that, in certain situations, the imperfective imperative is actually more concrete, direct, and familiar, whereas the Perfective aspect—in “requests” and “commands”, for example—“appears to be less frivolous [произвольный] and sounds softer” (Vinogradov 1972: 470). Likewise, Vinogradov points out that both aspects can convey completely opposite expressive meanings in different speech situations. Therefore, he considers the character of the speech situation to be the most important factor in the choice of aspect in the
imperative and in its expressive coloring. Vinogradov points out that there is a direct connection between aspectual semantics and the semantics of the speech situation, which merge in the imperative. This prompts certain expressive nuances to be perceived in imperative utterances. Thus, in the speech act “command”, where the result is important, the perfective sounds more categorical than the imperfective because it includes the semantic component “focus on the result”. The imperfective, on the other hand, includes the semantic component “focus on the process” and can thus sound more polite and soft in the speech acts “command” and “persuasion”.

While these first studies make important observations, both Mazon and Vinogradov only touch on the surface of the problem. They specify it without providing any detailed explanations or illustrations. Thus, they do not uncover the mechanisms of the interaction between the aspect and the speech situation.

If native speakers are asked to think on the spot of the differences between the aspectual forms in the imperative, they are likely to respond that they differ precisely in their expressive meanings—in their degrees of politeness, strictness, softness, etc. (Šmelev/Zaliznjak 2000: 39). However, our first serious attempts to analyze the problem will lead to the contradictions that the works of Mazon and Vinogradov demonstrate so well. It becomes clear that “politeness” and other expressive nuances are only secondary aspectual meanings; they emerge as a result of the interaction of the primary aspectual meanings with the modal meanings of the imperative utterance, which, in their turn, depend on specific characteristics of the speech situation. So, the question that we face is
whether the aspectual primary meaning(s) change in any way in the imperative mood, and what factors in their interaction with the environment lead to the appearance of the secondary pragmatic meanings. In this work we will be concerned in particular with the secondary pragmatic meaning of “(im)politeness”.

Chapter 1 discusses how the imperative mood interacts with the aspectual meanings proper (as specified for the indicative mood) and how this conditions changes in the contextual semantics of the imperfective aspect in particular. The modified semantics if the imperfective is shown to be the reason for the imperfective’s great flexibility in the expression of various emotive nuances, ranging from positive to negative. The greater flexibility of the imperfective with regards to emotive nuances is predictable, considering its unmarked character, with no established invariant meaning in the indicative mood. As Bondarko (2002) correctly points out, “if a grammatical form served only one function, there would be as many forms as there are functions. Language, however, shows its flexibility and economy in combining constant and inconstant features within one grammatical form, or by endowing a grammatical form with inconstant features only”¹ (ibid.: 355). Such is the opposition of the Perfective and Imperfective aspects in Russian, in which the unmarked imperfective possesses only inconstant features. The non-obligatory nature of an inconstant feature weakens its expression and leads to more flexibility in the use of the form which contains this inconstant feature. An inconstant feature is expressed only when communication

¹ All translations from Russian are mine unless otherwise noted.
demands it. Thus, the imperfective is entirely context-dependent in the expression of certain meanings (ibid.: 355).

The marked Perfective, on the one hand, apart from the context-dependent inconstant features it possesses, enters a context with its own constant features—the invariant meaning of “event”. Hence, the semantic components of the perfective aspect are more easily perceived in the utterance. Thus, the perfective is shown to be used exclusively in “request”, and preferred in “command”, “advice”, etc.

On the other hand, according to Bondarko, the obligatory nature of a constant feature leads to its redundancy; it is present in the form even when the utterance does not require the expression of this feature (2002: 355). This redundancy leads to the appearance in the perfective of certain emotive nuances which are entirely context-dependent, and which can not be convincingly demonstrated without a discussion of the whole speech situation.

Finally, there is redundancy resulting from the obligatory use of the category of aspect for the Russian verb in general. As Bondarko points out, “all “secondary” functions of the aspect are connected to this redundancy, which includes modality and all pragmatic elements connected to it, including “politeness” (ibid.: 381). The discussion in chapter 1 of aspectual usage in the speech act “permit”, in particular, will demonstrate how this redundancy leads to contradictory opinions among researchers about the emotive nuances that the perfective and imperfective verb forms express in the imperative.
In the course of Chapter 1, I will discuss two approaches to the aspectual functioning in the imperative which I will conventionally call “from the form”, and “from the utterance”\(^2\). These labels are conventional because each of these approaches inevitably contains certain elements of the other\(^3\).

Approaches “from the form” (e.g., Forsyth 1970; Rassudova 1968, 1982; Padučeva 1996) demonstrate the development of emotive nuances within aspectual forms based on the interaction of their aspectual meaning proper, or elements of that meaning, with elements of the context. Thus, these approaches, besides pointing out the importance of the context, also pay due attention to the “form”, i.e., its semantics.

Approaches “from the utterance” (e.g., Xrakovskij 1988, Šaronov 1992, Šatunovskij 2004, Lehmann 1989) start their analysis of aspectual functioning at the utterance level; they classify imperative utterances according to the character of the incitement. The most searching approaches “from the utterance” (Šaronov 1992, Šatunovskij 2004, Lehmann 1989) are concerned with finding specific pragmatic factors which would explain the majority of the emotive nuances of the perfective/imperfective forms and which can serve as a basis for the classification of imperative utterances within the general perfective/imperfective opposition. Some of the pragmatic factors that have been pointed out as particularly important are the speaker’s or hearer’s interest in/benefit

\(^2\) Bondarko (1999: 13) calls the two approaches “from the form” and “from semantics”. However, since in this work “semantics” is often used with reference to the meaning of the form, i.e., aspectual meaning, I will call the second approach “from the utterance” in order to avoid terminological confusion.

\(^3\) Alternatively, see Durst-Anderson (1995) for an approach to aspectual functioning from the point of view of mental grammar.
from the action; the speaker’s/hearer’s desire/will that the action be performed; the hearer’s “choice” to perform the action and what the speaker knows about the hearer’s “choice” when s(he) asks the hearer to perform the action; whether or not the speaker and the hearer both see the action as resulting from the situation; the formality/informality of the situation; the speaker’s power (authority) over the addressee; etc. Thus approaches “from the utterance” question the semantic components of the aspectual meanings proper suggested by the approaches “from the form” and emphasize the situational character of these components (e.g., Šatunovskij 2004: 276-277; Šaronov 1992: 89).

Chapter 1 will briefly demonstrate the major weaknesses of both these approaches, which make the demonstration of emotive nuances and those of politeness/impoliteness in particular quite a daunting task. But foremost, it will demonstrate how both approaches, if we treat them as complementary rather than contradictory, can offer an explanation for researchers’ seemingly contradictory perceptions about the emotive nuances that the imperfective and perfective are able to express.

Finally, Chapter 1 will demonstrate that any discussion of politeness/impoliteness turns out to be a particularly difficult task since the expression of politeness/impoliteness appears to be not just a secondary pragmatic function of the aspectual forms, as opposed to their primary semantic function, but also a pragmatic function of a higher order, as opposed to pragmatic functions of a lower order which require less contextual
information to be perceived and demonstrated. Thus, the demonstration of the pragmatic function of politeness/impoliteness becomes impossible without an appropriate, often very detailed description of the context.

Chapter 2 is devoted to a detailed discussion of some shortcomings in previous studies of linguistic politeness/impoliteness. I will demonstrate how and why theories describing the emotive nuances of politeness/impoliteness in the aspectual forms of the Russian imperative become subjective, evaluative theories whose claims resemble mere speculations. I will apply Bourdieu’s notion of habitus\(^4\) to provide an explanation of why the element of imposition in such theories—imposition of the researcher’s evaluative opinion on the reader—may go unnoticed by the reader, especially if that reader is a native speaker of Russian.

A critique of politeness theories by Eelen (2001) helps to answer several related questions:

- why researchers often neglect such an important factor as context in their attempts to explain the emotive nuances appearing in imperative sentences with the perfective/imperfective;
- why researchers fail to notice that their theories and opinions about politeness-impoliteness and the terms related to them become their own moral judgments;

Eelen points out that politeness theories fail to distinguish the scientific concept of politeness (P2) from the lay unscientific concept (P1) because of their unawareness of the important distinction between emics and etics. As a result, instead of making P1 the object of study, P2 concepts acquire such characteristics of P1 as evaluativity and normativity while ignoring its very important characteristic of argumentativity. Hence the theories fail to capture the “contested” nature of politeness/impoliteness or to reflect the discursive struggle involved in the evaluation of linguistic expressions as polite/impolite. Eelen likewise demonstrates that politeness theories, by focusing on linguistic politeness and by treating impoliteness as an anti-norm, fail to develop an appropriate conceptual apparatus to account for impoliteness.5 A working P2 theory, according to Eelen, should be 1) non-evaluative, 2) non-normative, and 3) able to cover the whole of the continuum between politeness and impoliteness (ibid.: 48). The model Eelen proposes focuses on the evaluator, what this evaluator does, how and why (ibid.:247). Consequently, it focuses on how behavior influences politeness, but not vice versa.

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5 See also Culpeper 1996 who discusses the necessity of creating a descriptive framework to account for impoliteness.
Subsequently in Chapter 2, I use the work of Rosanna Benacchio (1992, 1997, 2002)—the most elaborated discussion of the politeness/impoliteness of aspectual forms in the Russian imperative—to demonstrate the validity of Eelen’s critique. The major P2 theory that Benacchio applies in her research is that of Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987). She complements this with another influential politeness theory by Leech (1983). Brown and Levinson’s and Leech’s theories were the most influential approaches to politeness until recently, when numerous substantive critiques started to appear. In particular, Brown and Levinson’s notions of positive/negative politeness (and positive/negative face accordingly), on which Benacchio bases her own theory, have been heavily criticized. Benacchio does not take this critique into consideration and repeats the same shortcomings that we find in Brown and Levinson. As a result, her theory becomes largely speculative.


Chapter 3 discusses the actual possibility of applying the alternative models to the discussion of politeness/impoliteness of the imperfective/perfective in the imperative. I will demonstrate how the whole methodology of demonstrating these nuances should

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change once a researcher takes the position reflected in the alternative approaches. I will also discuss the limitations on a full application of the alternative models—particularly Watts’ model—which result from this work’s narrow focus on imperative utterances only.

The procedure I suggest of analyzing long movie sequences to obtain actual hearers’ evaluation is shown to be the most effective one—to the extent it can be—in overcoming some of the limitations. The suggested research methodology is shown to be particularly fruitful in exploring linguistic impoliteness. I will also make the point that, although the alternative approach I suggest will result in more grounded conclusions on the role of the imperfective/perfective in the hearers’ evaluations of the imperative utterances as polite/impolite, these conclusions will always remain more grounded assumptions rather than well-grounded facts. The positive side of such relativity, however, is that the contested nature of politeness/impoliteness is preserved; that is, the lay concept of (im)politeness (P1), and not the scientific artificial concept of (im)politeness (P2), remains the object of the study.

Chapter 4 presents a discussion of a pilot study which was conducted based on the methodology that I suggest in chapter 3. The study’s findings clearly demonstrate the challenge of the discussion of the nuances “politeness”/”impoliteness” and of the role that the aspectual froms play in our perception of these nuances.

Further, I will demonstrate how the invaluable insights into the semantics of the perfective/imperfective discussed in detail in Chapter 1 can be combined with the
alternative models of approaching linguistic politeness for a most grounded
demonstration of the politeness/impoliteness overtones. The concepts of politic behavior
(Watts 2003), power (power-over/power-to\textsuperscript{8} and symbolic power\textsuperscript{9}) and the Goffmanian
notion of “face”,\textsuperscript{10} which play a major role in Watts’ analysis, appear to be equally
important for this particular study.

In chapter 5, I will make final conclusions on the ability of the Russian
imperfective/perfective aspectual forms to express politeness/impoliteness in the
imperative. In addition, I will outline some pedagogical implications of my study.

\textsuperscript{8} Ng and Bradac 1993.
\textsuperscript{9} Bourdieu 1991.
CHAPTER 1

ASPECTUAL FUNCTIONING IN THE IMPERATIVE: FROM BASIC SEMANTIC FUNCTIONS TO SECONDARY PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONS

1.1 Changes in the Aspectual Meanings Proper in the Imperative Mood

From the first attempts at a more in-depth analysis of aspectual functioning in the imperative, it became clear that the terminology and research apparatus that had been used to describe aspect in the indicative were not particularly useful to describe how aspect functions in the imperative. Indeed, in the imperative aspectual forms appear in a quite different environment. The following characteristics of the imperative directly influence the meaning and functioning of the aspectual forms (mostly the imperfective):

1) lack of the morphological category of tense, which plays a crucial role in the
establishment of the primary and secondary aspectual meanings in the indicative; 2) the
direct connection of the imperative mood with modality, as it expresses the speaker’s
will/desire to change the situation; and 3) numerous secondary modal interpretations of the main modal meaning of “incitement”, i.e., the great variability of illocutionary functions in the imperative.

1.1.1 The Perfective Aspect in the Imperative

There seems to be mutual agreement among researchers that the Perfective Aspect in the imperative retains the invariant meaning that it has in the indicative. In different formulations, the invariant meaning of the Perfective has been defined as follows:

1) “a complete action limited by a boundary” [ограниченное пределом целостное действие], which always results in a new state of affairs (Bondarko, cited in Zaliznjak/Šmelev 1997: 15-16);
2) “change of situations” (Šatunovskij, cited in ibid.);
3) “transition into a new state” (Padučeva, cited in ibid.);
4) “to begin [to exist]” (Glovinskaja, cited in ibid.);
5) “a total completed event” (Forsyth 1970: 198), etc.

All existing definitions roughly express the same idea: the Perfective expresses an event (Zaliznjak/Šmelev 1997: 16).
The Imperative Mood, with its invariant meaning of “simple incitement”\(^{11}\) [“простое побуждение”] to change the current situation to a new one (Peškovskij 1956, cited in Birjulin 1994: 45), creates perfect conditions for the perfective aspect. In other words, the meaning of the perfective aspect is compatible with (does not contradict) the grammatical context (Šatunovskij 2004: 254).

1.1.2 The Imperfective Aspect in the Imperative

By contrast, the unmarked member of the aspectual opposition, the imperfective aspect, which has no established invariant meaning in the indicative (Zaliznjak, Šmelev 1997: 13,16; Glovinskaja 2001: 16,18) develops new meaning(s) in the imperative. The strongest aspectual opposition in the indicative mood—the opposition between the concrete-factitive meaning of the Perfective (“focus on the result”) and the actual-processual meaning of the Imperfective (“focus on the process”) (Zaliznjak, Šmelev 1997: 17; Glovinskaja 2001: 34)—becomes irrelevant in the imperative (Šaronov 1992: 86). Though the imperfective can still be used in the actual-processual meaning in the imperative, this no longer represents its primary meaning (Padučeva 1996: 67). Since the imperative mood is primarily used to stimulate an action that does not exist at the

\(^{11}\) Birjulin (1994: 46) uses the term “предписание” (directive) – “…the speech act of incitement to an action, uncomplicated by various illocutionary functions like “request”, “order”, “demand”, “advise”, “suggestion”, “permission”, etc., where a major role is played by modal… and also social, benefactive, etc., factors characterizing the participants of a prescriptive situation.”
moment of speaking, the actual-processual meaning of the imperfective is in contradiction with the grammatical context (Šatunovskij 2004: 254).

Past research evinces two basic views on this new, modified meaning of the imperfective. The first looks at the new meaning as a modification of the basic actual-processual (=actual-dynamic) meaning of the imperfective, which adjusts to the grammatical environment created by the imperative mood (Šatunovskij 2004:254-258). The second treats the general-factitive meaning of the imperfective (expression of a one-time action) as its basic meaning in the imperative (e.g., Padučeva 1996: 69, Xrakovskij 1988:282-283). Indeed, the asymmetric relations that exist between the primary and secondary meanings of the imperfective\textsuperscript{12} can readily account for the “exchange” of rank between the actual-processual and general-factitive meanings, considering the more favorable conditions that the imperative creates for the latter. However, this is not the general-factitive meaning of the indicative; it is a modified general-factitive, which acquires new semantic components in the imperative. Thus, scholars have noted that in some cases the general-factitive meaning approximates the actual-processual meaning along several parameters (Xrakovskij 1988:279), so that it is difficult to differentiate the two. Šatunovskij (2004) presumably would say that in such examples we deal with the modified actual-processual meaning.

\textsuperscript{12} The imperfective’s primary meaning, actual-processual (Glovinskaja 2001: 15), is not included in its secondary meanings unlike with the perfective whose primary meaning is included in all of its secondary meanings (Zalisnjak, Smelj 1997: 17).
One way or another, it becomes vital to detect and describe the new semantic components of the imperfective in order to distinguish the new general-factitive meaning of the imperfective from the concrete-factitive meaning of the perfective, which compete with one another in expressing one-time actions. Explanation based on examples of the indicative mood in the past become irrelevant.13

Padučeva’s analysis (1996) of the semantic components of the imperfective in the imperative can serve as a great summary of all previous research on the topic. (It is not by chance that Zaliznjak and Šmelev (2000) in their Introduction to Aspectology use Padučeva’s description of the semantics of the imperfective.) In her study, Padučeva points out three components in the semantics of the imperfective. The first two are its aspectual meanings proper: “focus on the beginning of the action” and “[do the action] immediately”. The third component is pragmatic: “action results from the situation”; this comprises the minimal contextual condition for the realizations of the majority of the functions of the imperfective. Depending on the speech situation, it is now one component, now the other, or their combination that influence the choice of the imperfective aspect by the speaker. Padučeva explains why we find more of one aspect and not the other within certain speech acts by demonstrating the compatibility of the three components of the imperfective with the semantic components of different speech acts. Padučeva identifies the most basic and least evaluative function of the imperative as

13 Thus, Zalisnjak and Šmelev (1997:25) point out that the difference between the imperfective’s general-factitive meaning and the perfective’s concrete-factitive meaning in ты показывал ей это письмо/ты показал ей это письмо is in the following: “…the general-factitive imperfective puts stress on the fact itself, the concrete-factitive perfective on its relevant consequences.”
“simple incitement”, which is not complicated by any modal functions such as “request”, “command”, “advice”, etc. (Padučeva 1996: 79). It is mostly the second and the third components in the semantics of the imperfective that account for the appearance of the imperfective in various modally colored speech acts.

The three semantic components of the imperfective identified by Padučeva appear in previous research with varying degrees of explicitness. Several sources touch on (Vinogradov 1972: 496; Grammatika-80: 1481) or pay particular attention to (Forsyth 1970: 206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 214) the component “[do the action] immediately” in relation to the great variety of expressional nuances associated with the imperfective imperative. The same component is discussed as contextual in works that begin their analysis at the utterance level (Xrakovskij 1988). The component “focus on the beginning” has likewise been discussed in connection with the signal function\(^{14}\) of the imperfective (Rassudova 1982: 132). However, it is the third pragmatic component that has been most useful in both the approach “from the form” (proceeding from the semantics of the aspectual forms) and the approach “from the utterance” (proceeding from the utterance level with the description of the character of “incitement”).

The opposition of the components of the imperfective and the perfective—“action resulting from the situation” vs. “action NOT resulting from the situation”—has had multiple interpretations in the literature. Thus, we find such dichotomies as “old

\(^{14}\) Signal function of the imperfective – the function of simple incitement to an action implied by/known from the situation. An imperfective verb in its signal function is neutral in its modal coloring, i.e., the evaluative factor is reduced to a minimum. (Forsyth 1970: 199, 200, 205; Rassudova 1982: 130, 131, 133, 134; Xrakovskij 1988: 277; Padučeva 1996: 79)
information for the hearer” vs. “new information for the hearer”; “the hearer is aware of, ready for, expects the action” vs. “the hearer is not aware of, not ready for, does not expect the action”; and “the action is clear, known from the situation” vs. “the action not clear, not known from the situation”. All these oppositions, however, represent one and the same idea. The concept of the “old/new information” and its interpretations have been used in almost every study of the aspectual functioning in the imperative.15

1.2 Two Approaches to the Description of Aspectual Functioning in the Imperative

1.2.1 Some Helpful Notions from Functional Grammar

I have already mentioned that there are two approaches to the problem of aspectual functioning in the imperative. In the first approach, researchers start with the semantics of the aspectual forms and then demonstrate how elements of that meaning interact with the lexical meaning of the verb, various contextual elements, and different elements of the speech situation, i.e., with the environment in which the aspectual form finds itself in the imperative. The second approach has a pragmatic orientation. It starts at the utterance level with a discussion of the character of “incitement”. The main difference between imperative utterances with the perfective or imperfective, according to this approach, consists precisely in the character of incitement. The semantic meanings of the two aspectual forms only manifest themselves within concrete imperative utterances.

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Thus, to be able to formulate the rules of asp ectual functioning in the imperative, it is not necessary to address semantic differences between the two forms.

Before I discuss these two approaches in more detail, I would like to introduce a few notions from Bondarko’s Functional grammar.16 These notions prove very helpful in demonstrating the complimentary nature of the two approaches rather than presenting them as contradictory. Since aspectual meanings and the meanings of the imperative merge together in the imperative mood, it is clear that the relationship they enter is one of interaction, rather than a one-way influence of the environment on the system or vice versa. That is, we are talking here of the unity of grammar, the unity “of its structural and functional aspects, of the elements of the language system and elements of speech”—the key principle of Functional grammar (Bondarko 1999: 7). Aspectual forms represent a language system,17 while the imperative mood plays the role of the environment—a variety of linguistic (also metalinguistic) elements, in interaction with which the primary language system fulfills its function(s) (ibid.: 11). The interpretation of environment within Functional Grammar generalizes and integrates different types of environments such as “context, the whole text, the speech situation (in its broad meaning, including the role relations between the interlocutors in the speech act and the background knowledge), the lexical content of grammatical forms and constructions, the grammatical categories that interact with them, and lexico-grammatical categories [разряды]” (ibid.: 11).

17 By a system Bondarko (1999: 10) means “…entire objects (grammatical forms, syntactic constructions, lexical units), which form a regulated complex/plurality of content elements…, correlated with a complex/plurality of elements of formal expression.”
It is obvious that, for a better and more complete understanding of how the system and environment interact, it is necessary to use a two-sided approach: 1) “from the form” (in our case, the semantics of the aspectual forms), and 2) “from the utterance” (the meaning of the whole imperative utterance as intended by the speaker). Bondarko rightly points out that a researcher can start with either approach, from the inside or from the outside, since the factors of grammar remain equal on both sides (ibid.: 13-14). The difference is only in the approach to those factors. The two approaches are complimentary as they reflect the positions of the speaker and the hearer in communication. Thus, the speaker proceeds from the meaning that s/he intends to express to the forms by which s/he can express this meaning, and the hearer—from the forms s/he perceives to the meaning(s) they serve to express. It should be emphasized, however, that the speaker always takes into account the hearer’s position as s/he formulates his/her thoughts, that is, the speaker should be aware of the functional potential (semantic and pragmatic) of the forms s/he uses and the rules of their functioning in speech in order to be able to express the intended thought. This awareness forms the speaker’s linguistic competence.

Obviously, all analyses of the aspectual functioning in the imperative should start at the utterance level, i.e., by studying numerous concrete examples. In this respect, all approaches can be called “from the utterance”. It is only then that researchers either choose to go “down” to the level of forms, as when they try to establish the semantic aspectual meaning(s) proper in the imperative, or “up” to higher language levels, i.e., the
environment in which the aspectual forms function, and discuss the contextual and situational conditions in which this or that aspectual form appears. Thus, I will call those approaches that primarily pay attention to the form and its semantics approaches “from the form”, and those which are mostly concerned with situational pragmatic factors in the distribution of the perfective/imperfective within imperative utterances approaches “from the utterance”. Later, I will demonstrate how these approaches can and should be combined in order to resolve some of the contradictions found in research on the aspectual functioning in the imperative, and in particular on the emotive nuances the two aspectual forms can express.

1.2.2 Approaches “From the Form”

Among the approaches which I call “from the form”, three deserve special attention—those of Forsyth (1970), Rassudova (1982), and Padučeva (1996). All three authors bring to our attention the aspectual form (its semantics) as the basis for the development of certain modal meanings, depending on various characteristics of the speech situation, and juxtapose the imperfective in its most basic neutral “signal” function to the more modally colored perfective form. These analyses treat such semantic

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18 Rassudova (1982: 130,135,136) and Padučeva (1996: 79) call the basic function of the imperfective “incitement”, “neutral incitement”, or “simple incitement”. Forsyth points out that the imperfective is used to give a signal to carry on with an action known from the situation (1970: 199, 205).
components of the imperfective (with slightly differing formulations\textsuperscript{19}) as “immediately” and “focus on the beginning” as responsible for the “signal”, “neutral” function of the imperfective. Likewise, all three studies point out that the minimal pragmatic environment for the realization of the imperfective’s “signal” function is “action results form the situation” or “[the action presents] old information [for the hearer]”. The perfective, correspondingly, is found in the environment where “action does not result from the situation” (Padučeva 1996: 71-75) or where “[action presents] new information [for the hearer]” (Forsyth 1970: 199, 205; Rassudova 1982: 133-134).

These approaches “from the form” demonstrate how each of the aspects is preferred for different speech acts based on their semantic characteristics; in other words, they demonstrate the compatibility of the semantic components of the form with the semantics of different speech acts. The three studies are most successful in demonstrating how certain emotional nuances develop when the “signal” function of the imperfective is combined with or emphasized by certain elements of the speech situation. Thus, the approaches show that the appearance of different emotional nuances conveyed by the aspectual forms is heavily dependent on different factors in the speech situation, including intonation. Thus, such emotive nuances cannot be considered inherent in the aspectual forms (Forsyth 1970:204, 215).

\textsuperscript{19} Forsyth (1970:215, 206-207) emphasizes the imperfective’s “denotative concentration on the immediate performance”; Rassudova (1982: 132) points out “the meaning of incitement to begin the action” and the fact that “the speaker incites [the hearer] to begin acting in the moment of speaking.”
The authors of the three studies mentioned above point out cases of aspectual competition, where both aspects seem to be appropriate in the same context, but they do not provide any substantial explanation of such cases. Though they do mention that certain pragmatic factors may possibly play a role in such cases of aspectual competition, they do not systematize these observations in any concrete fashion. The researchers’ intention is to identify certain tendencies and to reveal the flexibility in the ways that “form” and its environment interact. Their studies suggest that no strict rules can be established; Forsyth (1970: 215–16) explicitly states so.

The given approaches “from the form” start by juxtaposing the “signal” function of the imperfective with the modally colored perfective preferred for actions that do not result from the situation, e.g., for “request”, “command”, “advice”. Consider the examples in (1a)–(1g), below, in which the imperfective appears in its signal function and is modally neutral.20

(1a) Вот она вошла и сдернула с меня одеяло. Вставай,—сказала она (Rassudova 1982: 130).

(1b) Ну, пиши так: сынок, я тут посоветовалась кое с кем … Шурка отложил ручку. (ibid.)

(1c) Включайте телевизор, уже семь часов (ibid.: 131).

(1d) Суп готов, снимай! (Padučeva 1996: 79).

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20 While Forsyth (1970: 199, 205, 208) only discusses the signal function of the imperfective in the context of “already known action,” when the speaker simply names the action which is to be carried out, Padučeva (1996: 79) and Rassudova (1982: 130) also point out that the imperfective in its signal function (= function of “incitement to an action”) is modally neutral in comparison with the perfective.
(1e) Хватит проветривать, закрывай окно! (ibid.).

(1f) Тебе же надо было позвонить? Вот автомат, звони! (ibid.).

(1g) Инженер и техник готовили к испытанию новый станок, уже все было готово. Инженер сказал технику: “Включайте” (Forsyth 1970: 199).

In all these examples, the imperative names actions either expected by/known to the addressee or conditioned by the context itself (linguistic or metalinguistic), i.e., the situation itself contains the information that the given action can be expected (Padučeva 1996: 71, Rassudova 1970: 130–134, Forsyth 1970: 199).

In examples (2a)–(2j), the perfective appears as the modally colored member of the opposition.21 In (2a)–(2f), the illocutionary force is “request”; in (2g), it is “advice”; in (2h)-(2i), it is “order”; and in (2j) it is “demand.”

(2a) В воскресенье пятнадцатого… Я прошу вас, придите все, сделайте этот день для нее счастливым… (Forsyth 1970: 202).

(2b) —Товарищи!- взмолился он.—Я умоляю вас, дайте мне такси! (ibid.: 203).

(2c) Пожалуйста, покажите мне теннисные ракетки (Rassudova 1982: 134).

(2d) Передайте мне, пожалуйста, соль (ibid.: 135).

(2e) Товариц Концов, выпусти мою жену! (Padučeva 1996: 76).

(2f) Сядь сюда! Ну сядь, я тебя прошу. (ibid.).

21 The perfective is “modally colored” in Padučeva (1996) and Rassudova (1982), as opposed to the modally neutral imperfective in its signal function. Forsyth (1970) discusses the use of the perfective in contexts where “…the action is introduced as a new concept in the situation…” ; he does not discuss the modality of the perfective as opposed to the modality of the imperfective in its signal function.
(2g) Здесь дует, пересядьте лучше на ту сторону (Rassudova 1982: 135).

(2h) Егорка, отними ружье у Антошки, я приказываю тебе. (Padučeva 1996: 76).

(2i) Предъявите документы. (ibid.: 77).

(2j) Немедленно развяжите меня! Дайте мне коня, я требую. (ibid.).

In all these examples, the perfective imperative names a new action/concept for the addressee (Forsyth 1970: 200; Rassudova 1982: 131, 135). The speaker does not just ask the hearer to start the action, but by using the perfective s/he conveys a certain personal attitude towards the action and the addressee (Padučeva 1996: 76–78).

Further, the approaches “from the form” demonstrate how certain emotional nuances get expressed by the imperfective from its “signal” function when the context itself emphasizes the imperfective’s components “immediately”, “focus on the beginning”, and “action results from the situation”. Consider the examples below. In (3a)-(3d), we find the imperfective in a characteristic context when “...an action is caused which should have been started before the prescription was uttered, and the prescription is aimed at its [the action’s] immediate fulfillment” (Xrakovskij 1988:279-280).

(3a) Дайте мне стакан. (no result)—Давайте же стакан! (Forsyth 1970: 208).

(3b) —Выверните карманы! Ну, живо! Что я вам говорю? Выворачивайте! (ibid: 208).

(3c) … Ну, не рассуждать—исполнайте приказание! (ibid.).

In (4) the imperfective occurs when “… an action is caused which is already known and, thus, actual [актуальное], and the prescription is aimed at this action’s performance in a certain manner” (Xrakovskij 1988:282).

(4) —Я не знаю.
    —Врешь. Отвечай быстро! Смотри в глаза! (Forsyth 1970: 211)

In (5a)-(5c) the imperfective appears when “… an action is caused which, according to the situation, should be performed right after the prescription is uttered, and the prescription only serves to inform the agent about this” (Xrakovskij 1988:280).

(5a) —Высеку—прощу…. Ну-ка, снимай штаны-то (Forsyth 1970: 212).

(5b) —Разрешите доложить.
    —Нуте, докладывайте, голубчик (ibid.: 213).

(5c) —Кажется, придется вас повесить.
    —Вешай! (ibid.).

Finally, in (6a)—6(b) the imperfective appears when “… an action is caused which was interrupted before the prescription was uttered, and the prescription stimulates its immediate recurrence” (Xrakovskij y 1988:279).

(6a) —Смотрю на тебя… и вглядыва ты… и горазда… Да…—он остановился.
(6b) —Ты не стесняйся, налегай на пищу (ibid.).

The contextual environment\(^{22}\) in each examples makes it easy to perceive such emotional nuances as “impatience”, “insistence”, “rudeness” in (3a), “urgency”, “insistence”, “impatience” in (3b), “urgency” in (3c), “encouragement” in (6a) and (6b), “support” in (5b), “defiance= indifference” in (5c), etc.

Scholars have long noted the ability of the imperfective to express a great number of expressive nuances, in particular due to its component “immediately”. Numerous examples have been provided to illustrate both negative and positive emotional nuances that develop from the “insistence” potential of the imperfective, which stems from the meaning “immediately”—“urgency”, “impatience”, “threat”, “insistence”, “entreaty”, “persuasion”, “encouragement”, “defiance”, “indifference”, “courteous invitation”, etc. (Forsyth 1970: 208, 212, 213). The appearance of positive or negative nuances has been shown to be heavily dependent on the situation. Thus, in speech acts where the speaker exercises power over the hearer (e.g., in “exigent command”, Forsyth 1970: 208), or where the speaker demands that the hearer perform an action that is not in the hearer’s interests and will not be beneficial for the hearer in any way, the imperfective will express negative nuances, from “insistence” and “urgency” to “impatience” and “rudeness”. Conversely, by “insisting” on an action that is solely in the hearer’s interest, the imperfective can express cordiality and politeness as in “courteous invitation”—a

\(^{22}\) By the *contextual environment* here I mean the immediate linguistic context to the right or to the left of the aspectual form. E.g., in 1) – the particle же, in 2) – Ну, живо!, in 5) – быстро, etc.
speech act that is considered to be the special domain of the imperfective (Forsyth 1970: 214–15; Padučeva 1996: 77; Rassudova 1982: 136). Here, by contrast, the perfective is opposed to the imperfective as an emotionally neutral, detached, business-like form (Forsyth 1970: 204; Padučeva 1996: 77). It is no wonder, then, that some works ascribe all modally colored nuances to the imperfective only (e.g., Hassman 1986).

Approaches “from the form” seem to have more difficulty explaining the expressive nuances of cases where the perfective or the imperfective aspects appear in conditions which are not characteristic of these forms—e.g., when the imperfective appears in the context of “new information” or “action does not result from the situation”, or conversely where the perfective appears in the context of “old information’ or “action results from the situation”.

When speaking of the imperfective, explanations “from the form” still fall back on its “signal” function and its three semantic components. They propose that the appearance of the imperfective in the context of “new information” (e.g., in “advice”, “demand”)—ordinarily a domain of the perfective—may be motivated by the communicative necessity to “use” its component “immediately”. That is, one can use the imperfective to make the speech act “advice” more encouraging or insistent (as in (7b), below), or to make the speech acts “command” and “demand” more exigent, impatient, etc. In (7a) and (7b), for example, depending on the situation and the relations between the speaker and the hearer, the imperfective may sound either more encouraging or brusque (“бесцеремонно”; Padučeva 1996: 76).
(7a) У ребенка прекрасный слух. *Отдайте/Отдавайте* его в музыкальную школу! (ibid.: 76).

(7b) Это не по моей части. *Обращайтесь/Обратитесь* к психиатру (ibid.: 80).

In such approaches, it becomes particularly complicated to explain the emotive nuances behind the perfective. The seemingly unmarked character of the perfective, as opposed to the imperfective with a specified basic function (that of “signal”), makes it hard to explain the emotive nuances behind this form. In fact, it is here that we find contradictions in the literature as to “how the perfective sounds”. While some scholars claim it still sounds detached and more formal than the imperfective, others insist that it has specific emotive nuances and draw on various pragmatic factors to provide a reasonable explanation of those nuances.

Consider (8a)—(8d) below, where the perfective form performs the function of a “repeated incitement” (вторичное побуждение), which is usually a function of the imperfective. While Forsyth (1970) and Hassman (1986) use examples (8a), (8c) and (8d) to illustrate the neutrality of the perfective in contrast to the “courteous invitation” of the imperfective, it is difficult to see their point, as native speakers perceive certain emotional nuances (“encouragement”? “insistence”? ) attached to the perfective in these contexts.

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23 The perfective forms in the function of “repeated incitement” are underlined and in bold type.
— Раздевайся, пожалуйста. И садись на диван — сказал парень.
— Чтобы не было скучно, почитай книгу… он бросил на диван толстый том…
— Разденься, здесь очень жарко,— заботливо повторил он (Hassman 1986: 29).

— Но почему ты так разнервничался?
— Уйди, Зина.
— Что с тобой? Ты не болен?

Вы садитесь… Давайте, знаете, поговорим попросту. Вы сядьте. Сядьте, сядьте (Forsyth 1970: 217).

— Заходите в дом, Геннадий Иванович! И вы… Валерий Андреевич? Правильно?
— Мы на минутку, познакомиться только. Николай где? Не уехал?
— Нет, он участки обходит. Сейчас, наверное, подойдет. Да вы заходите (Hassman 1986: 29).

If in (8a) the use of the perfective can be explained by the fact that the speaker chooses to present the action as “new information” supported by the motivation “здесь очень жарко”, in (8b) the use of the second perfective is not so clear. Padučeva, for example, explains the perfective in (8b) by the fact that “the speaker…views [his incitement] as motivated not by the situation that has unfolded, but…by benefit for the addressee…” and in (9) below—“…[as motivated] by personal desire…”.

Развяжите меня! Сейчас же развяжите!… Товарищи, но ведь это насилие! Развяжите меня, слышите?... Развяжите, или вы за это ответите (Padučeva 1996: 78).
Likewise, the various other pragmatic factors that authors have pointed out as they try to explain the emotive nuances behind the perfective need more explanation. For example, in (10), where the perfective is used to convey defiance or indifference, and “a more detached attitude”, Forsyth (1970: 213) only mentions the factor of “the recognition of the hearer’s power of decision” without any further discussion of that factor.

(10) —Упрямый ты человек, я смотрю на тебя, Мальшев. А это значит что? Это значит, что я по-настоящему обязан отстранить тебя от должности…
Венька сузил глаза и дерзко взглянул на начальника.
—Отстраните. Я плакать не буду. Это ваше дело, кого отстранить, кого назначить (Forsyth 1970: 213).

In (11), Forsyth (ibid.: 217) points out that “a certain degree of intimacy” makes it possible to substitute “the emotionally neutral, but result-oriented…” perfective for the friendly conventional formulae to “Take a seat” expressed by the imperfective.


Again, it remains unclear what is meant by “a certain degree of intimacy” in the speech act that Forsyth defines as a “result-oriented command”, and not, for example, a “friendly encouragement”.

Xrakovskij’s (1988: 281) explanation of the two possibilities in (12) is, likewise, not clear.
(12) Маврин положил несколько конфет Инне и Даше.—Пробуйте (попробуйте). Вкусные! (ibid.).

Xrakovskij (ibid.) notes that, while both forms put emphasis on the beginning of the action, the imperfective is used when the action is implied by the situation [ситуативно обусловленно], and the perfective is used otherwise. It is unclear, however, what exactly Xrakovskij means by “an action implied by the situation” vs. “an action not implied by the situation”, as this is not self-evident from the example that he provides.

The hardest cases to explain are presented by the speech act “permit”, in which both aspects appear to be used interchangeably.

(13) —Можно открыть окно?
—Откройте. (Открывайте).

Rassudova (1982: 137), who denies that there can be aspectual competition in “permit,” believes, however, that there are certain emotive nuances involved when the speaker uses either the perfective or the imperfective. She notes that, when the speaker uses the imperfective, it is as if s/he were signaling to the hearer that the fulfillment of the action

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24 Xrakovskij’s analysis is discussed in more detail among the approaches “from the utterance”. Example (12) is cited here because Xrakovskij uses for its explanation the situational factor (“action results from the situation” vs. “action does not result from the situation”)—the factor of great importance within the approaches “from the form”. Also, by citing Xrakovskij’s example here, I emphasize, once again, the interconnectedness of both approaches.

25 See 1.2.5 of this work, where I discuss in more detail the transparency of the notion “action results from the situation”.

26 “…a substitution of one form for another does not change the meaning of the utterance” (Rassudova 1982: 137).
is entirely dependent on the hearer’s will. In this connection, Rassudova points out the emotional overtone of *indifference*. By using the perfective, however, the speaker adds his/her own will/desire that the action be performed to that of the hearer. Padučeva supports Rassudova in this interpretation (1996: 78–79).

I believe that these two authors have made a very important finding—that the perfective contains in its semantics the element “the speaker’s will/desire [that the action be performed added to that of the hearer],” while the imperfective does not. I will demonstrate further that a similar finding was made by the approaches “from the utterance”. I will also demonstrate how this very finding (provided context is taken into account, including intonation) helps to resolve the contradictions in the researchers’ opinions about the emotional nuances behind the perfective and the imperfective in “permit”, in particular.

1.2.3 Approaches “From the Utterance”

Approaches “from the utterance” complement those “from the form” in that their authors strive to answer the questions that remain unresolved within the alternative approaches—e.g., the question of whether there is any difference in the emotive nuances of the two aspects when they are apparently in competition with each other. Thus, the authors of the approaches “from the form” point out the importance of factors in the speech situation which can motivate the appearance of certain emotive nuances associated with either the imperfective or the perfective aspects. The authors of the
approaches “from the utterance” seek to discover which pragmatic factors are particularly important in our perception of these emotive nuances.

Analyses done by Xrakovskij (1988), Šaronov (1992), Šatunovskij (2004) and Lehmann (1989) do not pay particular attention to the semantics of the form. Rather, they attempt to classify the imperative utterances in which the imperfective or perfective appear according to the character of the incitement. The pragmatic concept of “old/new information”, once again, appears important in these classifications, in that they assume that the most basic function of the imperfective is a “signal”. While some researchers do not go any further in their search for additional pragmatic factors and leave the questions of aspectual competition and emotive nuances largely unexplained27, others proceed further once they admit that the pragmatic component of “old/new information” is not sufficient for an in-depth analysis of aspectual functioning in the imperative.28

The pragmatic factor of the speaker’s and/or the hearer’s “desire that the action be performed” plays central role in the analyses done by Šaronov (1992) and Lehman (1989). Thus Šaronov, who starts with the concept of “old/new information” in his division of imperative utterances into informative-incitements (информативно-побудительные предложения), which convey new information, and signal-incitements (сигнально-побудительные предложения), which do not, further distinguishes two semantic components in each of these groups, which also define the semantics of the aspectual forms (pragmatic components, in Šaronov’s analysis). Thus, within

27 E.g., Xrakovskij (1988).
informative-incitements, he distinguishes the components 1) S (speaker) desires that A (action) be performed (“desirability modality”) and 2) S needs to receive H’s (hearer’s) agreement to perform A. Both these components comprise the semantics of the perfective aspect. By contrast, signal-incitements contain the components 1) S thinks that A can/ought to be done (two modalities—“modality of possibility” and “modality of necessity”) and 2) illocutionary goal—fulfillment of the action. H is aware of this possibility/necessity, and, thus, S doesn’t have to obtain H’s agreement to perform A. Likewise, these two components comprise the semantics of the imperfective.

While Šaronov takes into consideration both the “speaker’s desire” that the action be done (the semantic component of the perfective), and the “hearer’s desire/awareness” that the action should be/ought to be done (the semantic component of the imperfective), Lehman (1989) focuses only on the hearer’s desire to perform the action. Based on what the speaker presupposes about the hearer’s desire, the speaker uses either the perfective or the imperfective aspect. By using the imperfective, the speaker joins the hearer intentionally in the latter’s desire to fulfill the action. This is the *junctive* function of the imperfective, which is found in “junctive” speech acts such as “permit”, “encouraging”, “urging”, “prohibition”, “courteous invitation”, “declaration of consent”, “reminding”, etc. (ibid.: 79–81). By contrast, the perfective has a non-junctive function and is found in such speech acts as “request”, “order” or “proposal”, etc., where the hearer does not necessarily desire to perform the action (ibid.: 81–82).
Šaronov’s analysis leads him to conclusions similar to those made by the authors of the approaches “from the form” for the speech act “permit” - that the perfective aspect in “permission” signals that the speaker joins the hearer in his/her desire to perform the action (Padučeva 1996: 78, Šaronov 1992: 90, Rassudova 1982: 137), whereas the imperfective aspect expresses non-resistance, “незапрещение” (Šaronov 1992: 90, Rassudova 1982: 137, Padučeva 1996: 78–79). Šaronov explains the nuances by the presence in the perfective aspect of the component “desirability modality” and, correspondingly, by lack of this component in the imperfective (Šaronov 1992: 89–90).

Lehman’s analysis does not prove sufficient to explain the aspectual competition in “permit”. For example, Lehman points out that, when “performing an act of permission,… the speaker presupposes the prospective attitude of the agent”, and, by contrast, “while performing an act of request to do something,…, [the speaker] does not presuppose the prospective attitude of the agent….,” (ibid.: 79). It remains unclear, however, why the speakers still use both the perfective and the imperfective aspects in the speech act “permit”. Also, Lehman’s analysis runs counter to the conclusions made by Šaronov, Padučeva, and Rassudova that, in “permit”, the perfective aspect may sound more considerate and attentive to the hearer’s wants because of the component “speaker desires that the action be performed”, which is characteristic for the perfective form in

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29 Rassudova arrives at this conclusion intuitively; Padučeva connects the above-mentioned nuances to the component “action results from the situation” in the imperfective and the lack of this component in the perfective.
general. According to Lehman’s analysis, the speaker joins the hearer’s desire to perform an action only by using the imperfective form.

Further, in 1.2.4., I will provide a possible explanation of why the two authors have perceived the emotive nuances between the imperfective and perfective in “permit” in opposite ways. I will show that what seem to be contradictory views may, in fact, be two sides of the same coin. After all, there are also a number of points on which Šaronov and the authors of the approaches “from the form” make similar conclusions. Thus, Lehman’s “junctive” and “non-junctive” functions of the imperfective and perfective, respectively, largely overlap with the pragmatic components suggested by other scholars, who suggest that the imperfective conveys “an action that results from the situation”, and the perfective “an action that does not result from the situation.” Lehman demonstrates the rudeness effect of the imperfective when it is used non-junctively, i.e., when the speaker uses the imperfective in a situation where the hearer does not wish the action to be performed. For example, if вставай! is said to the hearer in accordance with his/her prospective attitude (e.g., the speaker has promised to wake up the hearer or does it every day as a rule), it sounds like an act of “encouragement” or “reminding”. By contrast, if the speaker does not presuppose the hearer’s prospective attitude, вставай! might sound rude. Lehman classifies the imperfective’s potential to sound impolite/rude as its “extra pragmatic function” (ibid.: 82, 85).30

30 Compare to the approaches “from the form”: the imperfective вставай addressed to a sleeping person can sound neutral if the hearer in advance has the intention or desire to perform the action (e.g., if the hearer himself asked the speaker to wake him up). In other words, both the speaker and the hearer must see
In another approach “from the utterance”, Šatunovskij (2004) finds it necessary to refine the term “desire”, as it is not always transparent. He introduces the term “choice” (выбор) which should not be equated with “desire”, and cautions against understanding the term “choice”/“выбор” in its direct meaning:

Термин “выбор” имеет достаточно условный характер... Здесь имеет место что-то вроде возникновения намерения, интенции делать P [P = action], но поскольку намерение обычно далеко стоит от осуществления P, и это слово не совсем подходит. Точнее всего надо говорить о возникновении волевого импульса к совершению действия, которое в типичном случае непосредственно переходит в само действие и является его неотъемлемой частью. Поскольку в обычном языке нет слова, которое бы обозначало то, что в данном случае нужно, мы будем употреблять слова выбор, выбрать, имея в виду не только собственно выбор одной из ряда позитивных альтернатив, но также возникновение/наличие волевого импульса-намерения делать/сделать P, противопоставленное осуществлению такого импульса. (ibid.: 258).

Šatunovskij argues that the main difference between the aspects in the imperative lies in the following: when the imperfective is used, the hearer “chooses the action before the prescription” (knows about it and wants, explicitly or implicitly, to perform it), whereas when the perfective is used the action is chosen by the hearer after the prescription. Among the situations in which the imperfective is used, he points out those where the speaker “makes the choice” to perform the action based on some rule, norm in society, order, instruction, law, etc. This is what Šatunovskij calls the deontic imperfective imperative, which serves to overcome the hearer’s resistance, explicit or implicit, to the action as “resulting from/necessitated by the situation”. However, if the hearer has planned to sleep in and someone suddenly wakes him up with вставай, i.e., if only the speaker sees the action as resulting from/necessitated by the situation, the imperfective might sound rude, depending on different contextual factors including intonation (see, e.g., Padučeva 1996: 73, 79, 80; Rassudova 1982: 136).
perform the action, since the speaker presupposes that the hearer understands that s/he should perform the action; in this sense, the hearer has the impulse, i.e., s/he “chooses” to do the action (ibid.: 272).

(14a) Ты почему до сих пор не спишь?! Уже десять часов! Ложись немедленно спать!

(14b) Что ты здесь делаешь? Уходи отсюда! (ibid.: 271).

The deontic imperfective imperative is always preceded by some kind of motivation from the speaker, i.e., why the hearer must/ought to/should perform the action. By providing this motivation, the speaker reminds the hearer of his/her “choice”; in this sense, the imperfective imperative is a secondary incitement to an action. If the speaker’s motivation is not clear to the hearer, the imperfective imperative becomes anomalous (ibid.: 272). Thus, in (14a), Ты почему до сих пор не спишь?! Уже десять часов! serves as a motivation. Apparently, the hearer knows that s/he should be in bed at 10 o’clock—it could be the rule in the house, or the hearer may know that whenever s/he goes to bed after 10:00, s/he wakes up with a terrible headache, etc. Similarly, in (14b) Что ты здесь делаешь? reminds the hearer that s/he, for some reason, mustn’t or shouldn’t come to the place the speaker is talking about—it could be dangerous for the hearer or the speaker; it could be the speaker’s private territory; etc.

By referring to the notion of “choice” (which may/may not include in itself the hearer’s own “wish, desire” to perform the action), Šatunovskij believes we can explain
why the imperfective is used in the stereotypical situations of “invitation” like садитесь, располагайте, берите конфеты, and the like. The perfective in such situations would suggest that the hearer does not “choose” the given action beforehand and that the impulse or choice appears only after the prescription. However, we all have knowledge of the norms and stereotypical behavior in our society; this knowledge allows us to “choose” the given action before the prescription itself is uttered. In Lehman’s terms, the speaker can freely presuppose that the hearer has a “wish, desire” to perform the action; since it is entirely in the hearer’s interests, s/he expects it/ is ready for it. In Padučeva’s terms, “the action results from the situation”.

1.2.4 The Two Approaches as Complementary to Each Other: Resolving the Contradictions

As I suggested before, the two approaches presented above should be considered complementary to one another rather than contradictory. They address the same problem, only from different ends. They both demonstrate very well that it is necessary to take into consideration a host of different factors in order to explain the various emotive nuances of the imperfective/perfective in imperative utterances. Our knowledge of the semantics of the aspects should be combined with our knowledge of the entire speech situation, including intonation. Besides the informative contents of the utterance (old/new information), the speaker’s and the hearer’s positions towards the requested action should be taken into consideration. Thus, researchers have pointed out such factors as the
speaker’s or hearer’s interest in or benefit from the action; the speaker’s/hearer’s
desire/will that the action be performed; the hearer’s “choice” to perform the action and
what the speaker knows about that “choice”; whether or not the speaker and the hearer
both see the action as “resulting from the situation”; the formality/informality of the
situation; and the speaker’s power (authority) over the addressee. Researchers must use
different combinations of these factors to explain various emotive nuances of the
imperfective or perfective in each particular situation.

Likewise, researchers should not overlook the role lexical semantics may play in
the appearance of various emotive nuances. Consider the following example in Padučeva
(1996: 77): more formal *Предъявляйте документы! ~ Пределяйте документы! vs.
less formal Показывайте документы! ~ Покажите документы! Padučeva uses these
examples to demonstrate that the perfective aspect is preferred for the speech act “order”,
since in “order” the social authority of the speaker outweighs the motivation “action
results from the situation” (ibid.: 76). According to Padučeva, the more formal the
authority’s lexicon is, the more his power over the hearer is emphasized. Hence the use of
the imperfective becomes less appropriate, as a form that emphasizes informality, as
opposed to the more formal perfective (ibid.: 76–77). Thus, for example, if a speaker uses
the more formal lexeme предъявлять/предъявить, the perfective member of the
aspectual pair is preferred because the imperfective member would add undue familiarity
to the utterance and would cause “a sensation of impropriety” (ibid.: 77). By contrast,
with the less official lexeme показывать/показать, both the perfective and the
imperfective sound appropriate. However, it remains unclear why the more informal imperfective form combined with the more informal lexeme показывать (показывайте документы) sounds better in a formal situation. Wouldn’t the more formal lexeme предъявлять attenuate, to a degree, the informality of the imperfective in *предъявляйте документы? Hence, one might expect that предъявляйте документы would actually be a better for a formal situation than показывайте документы, in constrast to the actual state of affairs.

It is the combination of the two approaches which allows us to shed light on some contradictions that we find in the literature. Let us turn once more to the perfective form in the speech act “permit”. In particular, I would like to emphasize the role that the intonation plays in our perception of certain emotive nuances behind the imperfective/perfective.

—Можно открыть окно?
—Откройте ~ Открывайте.

Some scholars argue that in “permit” the perfective form sounds strict and official (Šatunovskij 2004: 266), while others called it “friendly” and “supportive” (Šaronov 1992: 90; Rassudova 1982: 137; Padučeva 1996: 78–79). Likewise, the imperfective has been claimed to express different emotive nuances ranging from non-resistance and indifference to solidarity or, on the contrary, extra politeness (Šatunovskij 2004: 266; Šaronov 1992: 90; Rassudova 1982: 137; Padučeva 1996: 78–79).
Šaronov (1992: 90), Padučeva (1996: 78), and Rassudova (1982: 137) believe that the perfective aspect in “permit” signals that the speaker joins the hearer in his/her desire to perform the action. The imperfective, in their view, expresses non-resistance, “незапрещение” (Šaronov 1992: 90; Rassudova 1982: 137; Padučeva 1996: 78–79). While Rassudova’s conclusions are mostly intuitive, Padučeva ascribes the effects to the components “action results from the situation” or “action does not result from the situation”. Šaronov (1992: 89–90) bases his conclusions on the component “desirability modus” (i.e., the speaker (S) desires that the action be performed) in the perfective and the lack of this component in the imperfective. Šatunovskij (2004) claims that, by choosing the imperfective in “permit”, the speaker supports the hearer in his/her pre-existing intention to do the action. Namely, since it is clear to the speaker that the hearer has “chosen” the action, the imperfective becomes a mere “signal” which implies an impossibility of refusal on the speaker’s part (ibid.: 266). In “permit”, the perfective, which is normally used when the hearer has not “chosen ” the action beforehand (i.e., the “choice” is made after the prescription), acquires a connotation of “a “choice”, which is not entirely dependent on the hearer, as the speaker can refuse the hearer in his/her request to perform the action” (ibid.: 266). This explains the strictness and formality of the perfective. In other words, Šatunovskij emphasizes the component “the speaker’s will” in the perfective, which, in fact, overlaps with the “speaker’s desire” in Šaronov, Padučeva, and Rassudova’s analyses.
However, it is possible to find contradictions to these authors’ descriptions of the emotive nuances conveyed by the perfective/imperfective. This is why the factor of intonation proves very important, as it helps to demonstrate that all these contradictions are, in fact, illusory.

Let me first explain why intonation should play such an important role in the case of “permit”, in particular. In the speech act of “permit”, the use of an imperative form is not necessary, in general. Thus the speaker could simply provide such answers for the hearer as *yes, of course*, or s/he could just nod or make a relevant gesture. That is, it is not particularly important which imperative form to use as long as a “signal” is given to the hearer that the speaker gives him/her the permission to do the action. As a result, both imperative forms become redundant. However, the imperfective, given its “signal” function, is a better fit in a situation where a “signal” only is required. Thus, in a way, the perfective becomes more redundant than the imperfective and acquires an additional coloring. However, while both forms are redundant, they need certain contextual emphases for their particular semantic components and, consequently, the expressive nuances related to these components to be perceived. Intonation, in particular, is a forceful tool in bringing out certain semantic components of the perfective or imperfective in a particular situation. Thus, depending on the speaker’s intonation, the perfective may, indeed, sound either strict and official (Šatunovskij 2004: 266), as if the speaker didn’t quite join the hearer in the hearer’s desire to perform the action, or very friendly and supportive, as if the speaker is adding his/her desire to that of the hearer
(Šaronov 1992: 90, Rassudova 1982: 137, Padućeva 1996: 78–79). The imperfective, which signals that the choice is entirely the hearer’s, can also acquire different emotive nuances depending on the speaker’s tone: from non-resistance and “indifference” (“I have nothing against it; it’s up to you”) to solidarity and extra politeness (“the choice is all yours, and by giving my permission I only emphasize that fact”).

1.2.5 Major Shortcomings of the Two Approaches

The major weakness of approaches “from the form”, which approaches “from the utterance” try to circumvent as much as possible, is their use of speech acts to demonstrate aspectual functioning in the imperative. Xrakovskij (1988: 134–36) points out that most classifications of speech acts are either intuitive or are not clearly defined in terms of the classificational features ascribed to them. By contrast, classifications “from the utterance” allow one to observe the speech acts as they flow one into another in dependence on the speech situation: “specific imperative utterances can belong simultaneously to several types [of speech acts]” (Šatunovskij 2004: 263). For example, according to some classifications, an “invitation” can take the form of “command”, “permit”, “advice” (Xrakovskij /Volodin 1986: 144–45), i.e., what we hear might not be a “command proper”, “advice proper”, etc. This is, of course, the classic distinction between locution and illocutionary intent.

However, we also come across such unclear statements within approaches “from the utterance”—for example, that Встань! Сядь! Ляг! догони его! are not commands—
which are not supported by clear explanations (Šatunovskij 2004: 263). Thus, to avoid confusion, any analysis that describes aspectual functioning in terms of “speech acts” must define these speech acts and specify the features that differentiate them. Unfortunately, this has yet to be done in any specific analysis on the topic.\textsuperscript{31}

Also, there is always a degree of unclarity in the concepts that the authors of both approaches employ within the framework of their theories. Thus, it is not always clear what is meant by the concepts of old vs. new information, or action results/does not result from the situation, speaker’s will, hearer’s choice, etc. Thus, for example, Padučeva admits (1996: 72) that “the feature ‘action results from the situation’ is not completely transparent semantically.” She herself seems to be confused with regards to this concept. Thus, when she provides examples of “command” and “demand” (e.g., \textit{Предъявите документы (пожалуйста)}; ibid.: 77), she finds it necessary to explain why the action in these examples does not result from the situation. She bases her explanation on the social authority of the speaker (in “command”, ibid.: 76–77) and the will of the speaker (in “demand”, ibid.: 77).

Likewise, consider the following examples from Xrakovskij (1988: 280), which, he claims, differ in the “old” or ”new” information presented in them. Consequently, the imperfective form is used in the first situation, and the perfective—in the second.

\textsuperscript{31} I am talking of the kind of analysis that we find, for example, in Birylin (1994: 131–156), who describes the semantics of different speech acts using a fixed number of features, so it is at least clear what the author means by a “request”, “command”, “demand”, etc. Also, see the similar analysis in Xrakovskij, Volodin (1986).
(15a) Медведь: Вы, наверное, устали с дороги, проголодались, а я все болтаю да болтаю. Садитесь (*съдьте), пожалуйста. Вот молоко. Парное. Пейте (*выпейте)! Ну же! С хлебом, с хлебом!

(15b) Он [генерал] сбросил стеганку с разрывами на плече, из которых торчала вата.
—Зашей (*зашивай)!—приказал он адъютанту.

According to Xrakovskij, (15a) contains “old information,” as “an action is caused which, according to the situation, should be performed immediately after the prescription is uttered, and the prescription only serves to inform the agent about this” (ibid.: 280). By contrast, (15b) contains “new information,” as “an action is caused which is not determined [не детерминируется] by the situation, and of which the agent is completely unaware before the prescription is uttered” (ibid.: 283). However, it is not quite clear whether example (15a) is really different from (15b) in terms of “old”/”new” information. Why is the action in (15b) not determined by the situation? The general walked into the room in a mood that was most likely clear to the aide-de-camp and took off his torn jacket, through which cotton was showing; that is, we can assume that the aide-de-camp would become immediately aware of the need to repair the jacket. In any case, in a military situation, it is expected “from the situation” that generals will issue orders, and aides-de-camp are specially assigned to attend to their generals’ needs. Thus, “зашей” would not sound like unexpected (“new”) information. Like the bear in (15a), the general does not even need to specify the object after the imperative verb. Also, given the military context, it is very likely that the aide-de-camp should start sewing up the coat...
immediately. Thus, Xrakovskij never makes it clear why the general shouldn’t say imperfective зашияй instead. After all, both зашей and зашияй would mean the same thing in terms of what should happen to the object (the jacket)—“sew up the tear”. However, the general in (15b) choses not to use the imperfective.

Thus, conceptual unclarity becomes the major hurdle in seeing the point that the different authors try to make. Chapter 2 will demonstrate how conceptual unclarity makes the discussion of politeness/impoliteness a difficult, if not futile task. There I will discourse alternative approaches to the discussion of linguistic politeness, which are based on new concepts.

1.2.6 A Note on the Challenge of (Im)Politeness Demonstration

As noted above, it is impossible to explain the expressive nuances of the perfective/imperfective forms—politeness or impoliteness, in particular—without examining the entire speech situation. Politeness/impoliteness is not just a pragmatic function of aspectral forms ancillary to their primary semantic ones; it is also a secondary pragmatic function ancillary to their primary pragmatic ones.

Let me illustrate this point. In examples (17a-17b) below, the context supports the development of what I have called primary pragmatic functions of the imperfective—those of “urgency” and “insistence”—which develop on the basis of the primary semantic function of the imperfective—that of a “neutral incitement” or “signal”. Thus, in the out-
of-context examples below, the minimal linguistic context that the reader is provided with appears to be sufficient to convey these primary nuances.

(17a) …Ну, не рассуждать—исполняйте приказание! (Forsyth 1970: 208).

(17b) —Я не знаю.

—Врёшь. Отвечай быстро! Смотри в глаза! (ibid.: 211)

By contrast, to demonstrate the nuances of politeness/impoliteness in these examples, a researcher will need to describe the entire speech situation to clarify why, for example, “urgency” in (18) boarders on rudeness.

(18) —У тебя есть деньги?

—Немного.


Padučeva provides this example as a demonstration of the “somewhat rude” effect (“грубовато!”) which appears in the imperfective when the speaker presents his intention presumptuously, as if motivated by the situation, if this is a perspective the hearer does not share; thus, the speaker is imposing the action on the hearer (ibid.).

However, it is not clear what exactly in the short dialogue provided by Padučeva demonstrates that the hearer, indeed, does not see the action as resulting from the situation. The very first line of the dialogue, the quite bold “У тебя есть деньги?”, does not perplex the hearer in any way, judging by his reaction. Thus the imperfective неси in
line 3 may well be used exactly because both the speaker and the hearer see the action as “resulting from the situation.” If, however, we accept Padučeva’s interpretation that the hearer does not see the action as “resulting from the situation,” would that mean that the perfective принеси would not sound “somewhat rude” but rather more appropriate? There is no guarantee whatsoever, since only the hearer’s actual evaluation of—i.e., his/her reaction to—the utterance with несешь could be a reliable proof that the utterance was, indeed, interpreted by the hearer as impolite. Even then, we can only speculate that it is the imperfective per se that made the imperative utterance sound rude. Consider the example below (Šaronov 1992: 92):

(19) Глафира: Доктора надо. Таисия, беги наискосок, дом 19, доктор Асанов. Варвара: Прошу... не распорожаться. Как вы смеете!

In this example, the second speaker herself makes it clear that she took the imperative utterance as “rude” and “imposing”. Yet we would have to analyze the whole speech situation to be able to say what prompted her to interpret it as impolite. After all, it could be the informal form of address Таисия (if the speaker had previously used only a formal address with the hearer—Таисия Ивановна, for example), or the inequality of the speaker and the hearer in their social statuses, and, hence their power disparity, etc.
1.3 Summary

I have shown that both approaches “from the form” and approaches “from the utterance” are most successful at explaining how aspect functions in the imperative when the imperfective is opposed in its most basic “signal” function to the modally colored perfective. Likewise, I have shown it is easiest to demonstrate the emotive nuances that develop on the basis of the imperfective’s “signal” function with even a minimal linguistic context that contains additional linguistic elements intensifying the given nuance. Cases in which the two aspects compete and those in which they are used interchangeably (e.g., in “permit”) prove to be much harder to explain. I have shown that various contextual factors and elements of the speech situation are critical for the explanation of such cases.

The two approaches surveyed above discuss the emotive nuances of politeness/impoliteness only cursorily, since these nuances are strongly dependent on the context/speech situation and the speaker’s intonation. While approaches “from the form” emphasize the natural absence of any set of rules to describe how aspect functions in the imperative and emphasize the system’s flexibility, some of the approaches “from the utterance” (e.g., Šaronov 1992, Šatunovskij 2004) seem more ambitious, in the sense that their authors attempt to discover a certain combination of pragmatic factors that would account for the majority of cases of aspectual functioning. However, the concepts that these approaches offer are not always clear and, certainly, cannot account for all the cases of aspectual functioning.
If, however, we combine the findings of the two approaches, we will be able to resolve some of the issues that remain unresolved in each approach if applied separately from the other. Likewise, by seeing both approaches as complementary to each other, we get a better, clearer picture of the complexity of how aspect functions in the imperative.

In this chapter I have shown that the task of illustrating the nuances of politeness/impoliteness is quite a complex and challenging one. In Chapter 2, I will specifically discuss and critique those works that have investigated the politeness of the different aspectual forms in the imperative. I will also discuss and critique particular approaches to the discussion of linguistic politeness/impoliteness in general, and I will examine what I find the two most productive alternative models of addressing linguistic politeness. In Chapter 3, I will make specific suggestions as to how the alternative approaches to linguistic politeness discussed in Chapter 2 can be combined with the data on aspectual functioning discussed in this chapter to yield a more grounded analysis of how polite/impolite interpretations of imperative utterances occur in real interaction and the role that aspectual forms play in those interpretations. I will demonstrate specifically what changes should be made in the methodology of illustrating politeness/impoliteness in concrete examples. I believe that the new approach that I outline to the problem in question will provide more stable grounds for researchers’ claims and assumptions; most importantly, it will do justice to the complexity of the politeness/impoliteness phenomena.
CHAPTER 2
TRADITIONAL VS. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
LINGUISTIC POLITENESS

2.1 How Politeness Theories Become “Imposition” Theories. The Notion of Habitus

In Chapter 1, I suggested that, despite their seemingly contradictory views on the emotional nuances conveyed by the different aspects in the imperative, approaches “from the form” and “from the utterance”, in fact, complement each other. I have shown that it is crucial to consider various contextual factors in order to resolve those contradictions. Indeed, when taken together, the two approaches demonstrate the richness of the factors which influence the interpretation of various nuances and which are largely overlooked in each separate study. I will now discuss the crucial importance of context for politeness theories in particular.

For the sake of clarity I will distinguish between immediate linguistic context (henceforth Cxt) and situational context (henceforth CXT). Cxt, sometimes called co-text, includes all the linguistic forms that surround the imperatives under study. For
example, in Открывайте же скорее окно! Ну, быстро!, the Cxt surrounding the form under study (i.e., the imperfective открывайте) consists of the forms же, скорее, окно, Ну и быстро. These forms, will, of course, differ in their degree of relevance to the verb itself and to the choice of aspect. By contrast, CXT includes the notion of a “speech situation”, i.e., non-linguistic and situational variables—information about the conditions under which the interaction is taking place, information about the participating actors, etc. The term context, without specifying it as Cxt or CXT, will imply both contexts taken together.32

It is surprising that previous researchers, while proposing different theories that could explain the expressive nuances in question, have repeatedly ignored the context, the most important factor in the appearances of any emotive nuances in speech. Cxt has sometimes been mentioned as possibly playing a role: “…такие показатели иллокутивной силы как Ну, же, скорее выражают настойчивость” (Benacchio 2002: 170). By contrast, CXT has largely been ignored or discussed in only a very cursory way. The minimal CXT usually provided is meant merely to clue us in on who is saying what to whom, and is of the type “a little boy is knocking on the door, and an adult voice answers…” (to take an example from Rassudova 1982: 138). Thus the reader is actually left clueless as to the relationship between the participants in the situation; where, when,

32 See also LoCastro (2003: 14), who discusses a dynamic view of context in pragmatics, which includes sociocultural and cognitive dimensions, i.e., linguistic and non-linguistic features. The kind of context that I labeled Ctx has also been defined in pragmatics as co-text - “the language forms that occur before and after the word or part one wants to analyze…” (ibid.: 14). The context that includes non-linguistic and situational variables has not been labeled in any specific way. Thus, for the purpose of clarity, I have labeled this kind of context CXT.
and why the conversation is taking place; what it is about; what prompted it; what goals
the participants had in mind when entering communication; whether there were any other
active or passive (bystanders) participants in the interaction, etc. Moreover, the reader is
often not even provided with the response to the utterance that contains the form in
question; that is, the reader is not even made aware of the addressee’s reaction to the
linguistic expression under study. Thus the reader is left only with the given researcher’s
impressionistic claims on why this and that linguistic expression in this or that example
sounds “rude”, “strict”, “appropriate”, “polite”, etc. That is, we are left only with the
researcher’s judgment of the situation; the researcher uses introspection to predict other
hearers’ reaction to a certain linguistic expression.

The next legitimate question is why readers accept those theories. After all, if
these theories are accepted, they (or at least parts of them) must sound convincing to the
reader. Thus, if a researcher provides me (I will speak for myself here as a reader) with
contrasting examples such as (1a)—an impolite form of address to a salesperson, and
(1b)—a polite form of address, and then provides me with a theory about the role of the
imperfective and perfective forms in the perceived “effects”, I am likely to accept this
theory, as, in fact, I also perceive (1a) and (1b) as impolite and polite, respectively. That
is, of course, if I don’t intend to criticize the theory offered to me.

(1a)  Взвешивайте, (пожалуйста)! (Benacchio 2002: 169).
(1b)  Взвесьте, (пожалуйста)! (ibid.)
Likewise, if I am told that (1c) sounds more direct and ruder than (1d), which is more distant, formal and “корректно”, I may also agree, though not so willingly this time, (which means I may as well disagree).

(1c) Уходите (отсюда)! (ibid.).
(1d) Уйдите (отсюда)! (ibid.).

The question is what makes me agree in some cases with the researcher but unsure of how I perceive the provided examples in other cases? After all, the researchers are very often native speakers of Russian, just as I am, or they have consulted multiple Russian native speakers before drawing their conclusions. That is, if they were claiming complete nonsense, I would notice it right away due to the linguistic and communicative competence I have in my language. Note that we are not discussing examples that require, so to say, a higher order of competence—for example, when different styles of speech are discussed. In our discussion we are dealing with most common, everyday examples of linguistic and communicative competence—so common that native speakers are not even going to think about them consciously: they are not going to think whether to utter (1c) or (1d) above, they will just pick one, whatever intrinsic linguistic reasons might stand behind their choice.
The questions that I posed above are relatively easy to answer. I will use Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*, which proves extremely helpful in dealing with these questions. This notion will be used throughout this work as a concept of much importance in the most recent, and, in my opinion, most productive alternatives (Watts 2003 and Eelen 2001) to the traditional politeness theories available on the market today.

In Bourdieu’s conception, *habitus* is each individual’s social history of communication with other people. It provides an individual with a set of possibilities for acting in certain ways in any new communicative situation. It is an internalized individual vision of “how society works”, acquired in previous experiences of communication. This vision is neither entirely objective, since each social act allows for an individual interpretation of events, nor entirely subjective, since each social act shapes the way in which the individual internalizes social structures as an active participant or a passive observer (Watts 2003: 149–51; Eelen 2001: 221–24). Thus *habitus* is an individual and collective history taken together. It has a very important characteristic which allows one to account for both regularity and individual variability in communication: *habitus* does NOT dictate or determine an individual’s behavior in any new speech act; it only provides the individual with a base from which to start. This base, combined with the present conditions of each new interaction, is transformed over and over again. Thus an action (a new interaction) is relative at the same time to 1) past conditions, 2) present conditions, and 3) the performing actor. Every new speech act

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becomes an expression of the individual’s creativity, structured, to a certain degree, by his/her past experiences. “HABITUS captures a process of structured creativity or collective individuality; in Bourdieu’s words: “regulated improvisation” (Eelen 2001: 222). Habitus is responsible for both the reproduction and change of social structure (Watts 2003: 149).

Consequently, when a researcher offers examples in support of his/her theory, a native speaker reader’s habitus serves as a “treasure chest” of multiple communicative experiences from the past, which tells the native speaker what kind of communication is possible or impossible in reality. Thus, the native speaker’s personal experience of collective living tells him/her immediately that it is impossible—at least, in a speech act of “request”—to address a salesperson using (1a) above without sounding rude. In (1c) and (1d), it is less clear which form sounds more or less distant, polite or rude, formal, etc. My individual experience may be different from that of the researcher. However, being uncertain of “how I feel about it” means that I also entertain the possibility that the researcher might be right. What breeds confusion in this case is, again, lack of any CXT. My individual experience tells me that, depending on the CXT, or intonation, or some other factors, the interpretation may be different. It may be that the distinction between the imperfective and the perfective is of lesser importance in our perception of whatever emotive nuances both utterances may be colored with. Actually, if this is the case, then any assertion on the researcher’s part—e.g., “the Imperfective in this example sounds somewhat rude” or, on the contrary, “more polite than the Perfective”—can actually
make the readers (with their multiple experiences) perceive it just the way they are told to. It would suffice to imagine the right type of intonation that would make it sound “somewhat rude.” Thus the readers do not even notice that the researcher’s interpretation is being imposed upon them, while other possible interpretations are being neglected.

However, more focused thinking about the offered interpretation results in much uncertainty, as in my own case when the purpose is to question everything I read. Thus, the researcher’s descriptions (“ruder”, “more direct”, “formal”, etc.) become unclear to me as, in fact, they appear to be highly contested notions. Moreover, I find support for my uncertainty in other literature. Thus, Padučeva (1996) provides her readers with the example in (2) below, saying that the speech act of “insistence” (implying less distance and, perhaps, less formality) would not necessarily be conveyed by an imperfective form and that the attested perfective is motivated by the speaker’s “own will” (whatever “own will” might mean):

(2) —Но почему ты так разнервничался?
    —Уйди, Зина. 
    —Что с тобой? Ты не болен?
    —Уйди! (ibid.: 78)

Note the limited context in Padučeva’s example, which hardly allows one to understand what “own will” means in her interpretation. In fact, criticizing the existing theories becomes an almost effortless task; the lack of CXT alone makes most theories vulnerable to criticism.
While native speakers can rely on habitus, non-native speakers, whose linguistic, social and cultural experience with relation to the foreign language is so much more limited in comparison to native speakers, will most likely accept the theory, if they don’t come across counterexamples in the literature. Even if they do, confusion is imminent. To begin with, how are non-native speakers to understand such subjective judgments as “polite”, “strict”, “rude”, or, better, “more rude, stricter, more polite”, etc? It is unclear that Russians understand them the same way that, say, English speakers do. No doubt there are multiple other reasons for non-native speakers to get confused over the theories offered in the literature.

2.2 Critique of Traditional Politeness Theories

Several questions have arisen thus far:

1) why researchers often neglect such an important factor as context in their attempts to explain the emotive nuances conveyed by the different aspects in imperative sentences. They tend to keep CXT to a minimum and refer only to those parts of it which support their theories. This leads to the next question below:

2) why researchers confuse their own subjective judgments with theories of politeness/impoliteness;

3) why researchers fail to define what they mean by the terms “polite”, “impolite”, “appropriate”, “strict”, “rude”, etc.;
4) why they all seem to be falling into the same pitfall and whether there is actually a solution to the problem.

In order to answer these questions, I will turn to the critique of politeness theories by Eelen (2001). The majority of the traditional theories (if not all) in the general linguistic literature display the same shortcomings as the Russian scholars discussed in Chapter 1. The critique I am going to outline here is devoted to the “Anglo-Saxon” tradition of exploring (im)politeness; only a few works devoted to Russian (Lehmann 1989, Benacchio 1992, 1997, 2002) ever mention or use these “Anglo-Saxon” politeness theories with relation to the problem discussed in this paper. Nevertheless, I find Eelen’s critique very helpful in answering the questions above, as all these theories, “Anglo-Saxon” or “Russian”, have a common object of study: (im)politeness. Moreover, all the theories inevitably fail to capture the discursive struggle over the value of the terms in question, and thus the individual variability in the understanding of these terms. They fail to demonstrate the internally complex nature of the terms, which cannot be described by any objectified set of criteria that researchers may elaborate.

2.2.1 The Merger of Lay and Scientific Notions of (Im)Politeness

As Eelen (2001) points out, the main reason for the shortcomings discussed in 2.2 is the failure to recognize and keep in focus the distinction between an insider’s (lay speaker’s) concept of (im)politeness (*emics*) and the scientific concept created as a result
of an outsider’s (researcher’s) observation of how lay members use and view (im)politeness (etics). The implicit assumption by the politeness theories of a one-to-one relationship between emics and etics gives the theoretical concepts an ambiguous status. Thus, being etic in origin, politeness theories claim to describe—though, in fact, they often prescribe—how ordinary speakers use the language; that is, they claim to be emic (Eelen 2001: 30–34, 76–78; see also Watts 2003: 4, 8–12).

Here is a more detailed presentation of how emics and etics merge together in politeness theories. Before any theory is constructed, i.e., at the input stage, researchers take a certain number of examples of (im)politeness from real life, using different methodologies to observe and collect the data. Then they analyze the examples in certain ways to create scholarly concepts and, ultimately, theories. In other words, lay conceptualizations of politeness (P1) are analyzed, as a result of which scholarly notions of politeness (P2) are generated. However, by overlooking the emics/etics distinction, these scientific notions take on the characteristics of the lay notions (P1), i.e., they mimic them. So, ultimately, P2 becomes hard to distinguish from P1 (Eelen 2001: 30–48; Watts 2003: 48–49).

What happens further at the output stage (Eelen 2001: 87–98), when P2 theories are finally constructed, is that these quasi-P2 concepts, created on a limited number of observed P1 examples, are presented to the world as if they were able to account for ALL the P1 examples found in real communication within a given culture or even universally. So instead of making P1 the object of a descriptive study, P2 theories merge with
prescriptive P1 notions. As a result they take on such P1 characteristics as 1) evaluativity (ibid.: 35–37) and 2) normativity (ibid.: 42–43). As a consequence, they lose sight of another important P1 characteristic—3) argumentativity (ibid.: 37–41).

In P1, evaluativity and normativity mean that lay members constantly evaluate each other on the polite-impolite (positive-negative) continuum; they fall back on the social “objectified” norms they have internalized (habitux). When transported to the world of P2, this implies that the researchers themselves become judges of people’s behavior, based on their sense of social norms and appropriateness. The default assumption is that this sense is shared (ibid.: 43–48, 129–38). Thus, the researchers and their theories end up telling people how they should behave; that is, they become predictive and prescriptive (ibid.: 96–98, 107–9). As the researcher becomes the evaluator of (im)polite behavior—the role played by the hearer (H) in any authentic interaction—the focus shifts entirely onto the speaker (S), i.e., the one who produces (not evaluates) behavior. Thus models of (im)politeness become production models, which assign to the speaker a certain number of strategies which s/he supposedly uses to produce the expected polite behavior. This is very well illustrated by the most influential work on politeness, Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987). Consequently, it is implied that all Hs are going to react to S’s behavior in the same way. That is, H’s behavior is presented as non-strategic. Thus, H disappears from the picture, as the researcher in effect usurps H’s position. The scholar’s claims are presented as H’s evaluations. Accordingly, the P1 evaluative moment is lost, since H is the one who evaluates. Together with H
vanish the individuality and variability that are always found in Hs’ evaluations of P1 (Eelen 2001: 104–107; Watts 2003: 24–25).

Furthermore, as noted above, when researchers become evaluators, another important characteristic of P1 is lost—argumentativity. The argumentative nature of P1 implies that commonsense distinction between politeness and impoliteness can never be objective (Eelen 2001: 40). As a form of social practice, P1 is always used to achieve some social effect. It has a certain social aim, e.g., approval or disapproval of someone’s behavior based on a social value (ibid.: 37). P1 only occurs “in situations that involve social stakes, situations in which there is something to lose or gain” (ibid.: 38). As Eelen (ibid.: 227) writes,

Politeness becomes an argumentative social tool with which people ethically “structure” or “represent” the world that surrounds them. The terms in which this is done—“well-(ill)-mannered”, “(in)appropriate”, “(im)polite”—are not objective referential, but practical argumentative classificatory terms. They are “relational” (Bourdieu 1991: 60): they only make sense in light of their counterparts, and the oppositions they carry are of the “positive-negative” kind, referring not so much to the linguistic practices they denote, but rather to the people with whom these linguistic practices are associated.

Eelen (2001: 249–250) and Watts (2003: 118) point out that, as an argumentative moral tool, politeness becomes a concept that is sure to entail a social debate (discursive struggle) about its value, just like moral debates about such contested concepts as democracy, beauty, etc. This discursive struggle is always going to be present among members of society; since there is no objective way to decide who is right and who is wrong in his/her understanding of the concepts in question, “there can never be real
winners or losers” (Eelen 2001: 250). However, P2 theories, being predictive and prescriptive, are always going to find some speakers right and others wrong; the latter are not to be trusted because they supposedly lack “competence” (also a highly contested notion that is not treated as such), or do not express the view of the majority (ibid.: 153, 209, 211). Thus, P2 theories tend to discard the unwanted counter-material; by rejecting this “untrustworthy” material, they reject both the individual (ibid.: 213–14) and variability.

In sum, P2 theories start by observing P1 behavior, but, by unconsciously assuming P1’s characteristics, they fail to describe P1 and become what I have called “imposition theories.” Moreover, by describing politeness qua norms, they fail to explain instances of impoliteness,34 because they do not develop a conceptual apparatus that can also cover “impolite” behavior (ibid.: 98–104). Hence politeness theories become one-sided. They lose sight of the discursive struggle as a process, because researchers themselves get morally involved in it by taking the position of the H within this struggle (ibid.: 251, 45–47).

2.2.2 An Alternative Model of Linguistic Politeness

Eelen (2001: 48) points out that, in order to avoid the shortcomings discussed in 2.2.1, a P2 theory should be 1) non-evaluative, 2) non-normative, and 3) able to cover the

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34 For example, see Culpeper (1996), who particularly discusses this oversight in politeness theories. He points to army training and literary drama as contexts in which impoliteness is not a marginal activity and proposes a list of impoliteness strategies.
whole of the continuum between politeness and impoliteness. P1 should become the object of P2, and a clear line should be drawn between emics and etics, though, of course, both these elements will always be present in any P2 theory (ibid: 78).

The benefits of such a P2 theory are clear:

1) The evaluative moment in P1 will be recovered and should become an object of the analysis; S and H are observed “from a distance”, on a par, and their behavior is interpreted through the same criteria (Eelen 2001: 107). It is worth emphasizing here once again that “the very essence of P1 is in this evaluative moment… as (im)politeness occurs not so much when the speaker produces behavior, but when the hearer evaluates this behavior. In practice it proves to be the only way in which (im)politeness can be studied” (ibid.: 105).

2) Centered on evaluation, the theory becomes non-predictive, as the researcher can question the link between behavior and evaluation (ibid.: 111).

3) Impoliteness is not seen in negative terms only. As it can be used to achieve some social effect, the speaker can actually aim for impoliteness (ibid.: 112). Politeness, on the other hand, can be evaluated “negatively”, depending on the hearer’s argumentative goals (ibid.: 113).

With this approach, the researcher makes the negotiation that is present in reality the object of study; s/he is able to place himself/herself above this struggle and to assume
a morally non-involved position (Eelen 2001: 45–46). The new model focuses on the
evaluator, what s/he does, and how s/he achieves her/his goals and why (ibid.: 247).
Consequently, it focuses on how behavior influences politeness, not vice versa (ibid.: 248).

The main tenets of the new model are 1) argumentativity (incorporates evaluativity), 2) historicity and 3) discursiveness (Eelen 2001: 247). The *argumentativity* of politeness consists in the fact that it is always used to produce some social effect and appears in situations in which the interactants have something to lose or gain (ibid.: 37–38). Argumentativity incorporates evaluativity (ibid.: 247), since the production of a polite or impolite evaluation of somebody else’s behavior is always socially motivated. The term “argumentative” is used by Eelen (ibid.: 37) “in a loosely descriptive sense, referring to various forms of ‘involvedness’ or ‘interestedness’.”

*Historicity* is the focus of habitus. Eelen points out (2001: 222) that, if interpreted radically, habitus *is* historicity. Thus historicity is not reduced to an individual’s past experiences; it “describes how past experience mediates present action, creating a new experience which mediates both (the meaning and influence of) past experiences as well as future actions” (ibid.). Historicity allows one to see socialization as an ongoing process which combines the “common world” created by collective history with individual variability. Thus historicity and habitus allow one to have one’s own unique social history throughout one’s life in which past, present and future actions are interconnected (ibid.: 222–23).
The **discursiveness** of politeness consists, in particular, in the fact that polite “norms” are seen as social practices (human behavior) rather than as mental “objects”, i.e., external *causes* of human behavior (Eelen 2001: 236–237).35 Politeness norms as social practices and discursive phenomena are inseparable from the larger social practices within which they occur (with their intended effects and purposes), and can only be analyzed in light of the effects that these larger practices aim to achieve (ibid.: 237). Eelen points out that the most obvious social effect of politeness as a discursive argumentative social tool is approval or disapproval of other people’s behavior (ibid.). By condemning/approving of others, the speaker defines both the position of others in the social world and his/her own position; that is, s/he structures the world in ethical terms (ibid.).

2.3 Benacchio on Politeness/Impoliteness and Aspect in the Russian Imperative

Before I discuss the possibilities of a practical application of this new alternative model, I will give a concrete demonstration of how “Russian” theories that focus on the choice of aspect in the imperative slip into the same pitfalls as the general politeness theories discussed above. For this purpose, I will use the theory that is most elaborated, in my opinion—the one articulated by Rosanna Benacchio in a series of articles (1992, 1997, 2002).

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35 Eelen (2001: 236) turns to discursive psychology which looks at thinking as a form of acting; “norms” are regarded as a form of human behavior. Eelen uses discursive psychology as it provides “a psychological basis for a theory of politeness as social practice”.

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Benacchio attempts to incorporate aspects of two of the most influential traditional politeness theories—those by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) and Leech (1983). She points out that knowledge of the semantics of the imperfective or perfective alone does not suffice to explain the emotive nuances that the different aspectual forms convey in the imperative, especially those connotations connected with “rudeness” (Benacchio 2002: 153). Thus she complements the semantic analysis done by Padučeva (1996) with the notions of positive and negative politeness from Brown and Levinson (1987) and with the notion of a cost-benefit scale from Leech’s theory. As discussed above, Padučeva proposes three components for the imperfective aspect in the imperative: “focus on the beginning”, immediately”, and “action results from the situation”. The Perfective aspect, according to Padučeva, lacks these characteristics; thus its meaning in the imperative is practically the same as in the declarative mood (Padučeva 1996: 66).

Benacchio takes up the hardest cases of aspectual competition—ones in which the differences between the meanings and connotations conveyed by the perfective and imperfective forms are hardly noticeable. She believes that in such cases the two aspects differ from each other only along (im)politeness lines (Benacchio 2002: 162). To prove her point, she demonstrates how the differences in the semantics of the aspects make these forms natural candidates for the expression of “positive politeness” (imperfective) and “negative politeness” (perfective). Further, she uses Leech’s cost-benefit scale as the determining factor in the degree of politeness or impoliteness felt in every concrete
imperative utterance with a given aspect. According to the cost-benefit scale, if a speaker aims at politeness and tact, he should minimize the action’s cost and maximize its benefit to the hearer from the action. Thus the degree of (im)politeness in the speaker’s utterance will depend on whether the action is more or less beneficial for the addressee.

In Brown and Levinson’s theory (1987), as applied by Benacchio, each individual in a society has a positive and a negative face. Positive face is defined as a person’s positive opinion of himself, which s/he wants other people to share; it consists in the need of every member of the society to have his/her wants and actions approved by other members of the society. Negative face represents a person’s wish to distance himself/herself from surrounding people and create his/her own “private” space, on which others do not have the right to encroach.

Brown and Levinson (1987) posit a Model Person (MP) who, depending on his/her communicative goals, can rationalize how to achieve these goals and accordingly chooses specific communicative strategies. Every utterance that the MP produces presents a threat to the addressee’s (and the speaker’s) positive or negative face and thus constitutes a face-threatening act (FTA). Before the MP, the speaker (S), enters communication, s/he estimates the threat that his utterance may present to the hearer (H) and so may choose a particular strategy to soften that threat. There is a repertory of positive and negative politeness strategies from which S can choose, depending on whether s/he wishes to address H’s positive or negative face, respectively. The purpose

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of positive politeness as a strategy is not to “keep one’s distance” but to minimize it, typically by expressing your attention, involvement, and concern about the wishes and desires of the interlocutor (ibid.: 70). The purpose of negative politeness strategies is to defend the negative face of H or S. It is based on concepts of avoidance and unwillingness to perform the given action (ibid.).

According to Benacchio (2002), it is the semantic component “focus on the beginning”, in particular, that accounts for the use of the imperfective to express positive politeness. The shorter time interval in the imperfective between the incitement to perform the action and the performance of the action also leads, according to Benacchio, to “a closeness of a psychological type between the speaker and the action itself, and consequently between the speaker and the hearer” (ibid.: 159). Thus, the imperfective expresses a positive, “informal”, “unofficial”, disposing” [располагающая], “direct” politeness, which focuses on the wants and desires of the addressee and demonstrates a “responsive” [отзывчивое], “obliging” [предупредительное], “sympathetic” [участливое] attitude towards the addressee (ibid.: 162). The perfective, in its turn, serves to express politeness which is “formal”, “official”, “indirect”, i.e., negative, in Brown and Levinson’s terms. When the perfective is used, it is “propriety” [корректность] and formality that come into focus (ibid.: 161). Thus, the perfective can never express the extreme forms of politeness or rudeness. The imperfective, on the contrary, by shortening the distance between the speaker and the hearer, can express both extreme politeness (ibid.: 161) and sheer rudeness, extreme indifference, etc. (ibid.: 164,
Such extreme nuances depend on the cost/benefit that the addressee receives from the action. Benacchio points out that the cost-benefit scale works for the perfective aspect as well; however, the “formal” character of politeness expressed by the perfective prevents it from conveying extreme nuances of (im)politeness (ibid.: 161, 170).

Benacchio (2002) illustrates her claims with the following examples, in which aspectual competition takes place.

(3a) Оденьтесь теплее vs. Одевайтесь теплее (said by a host to a leaving guest) (ibid.: 162).
(3b) Подайте заявление vs. Подавайте заявление (said to someone who needs a piece of advice) (ibid.: 163).
(3c) Дайте лопату vs. Давайте лопату (context not specified) (ibid.).

In Benacchio’s view, these examples differ in positive vs. negative politeness. If the perfective forms in the above examples, in the author’s view, are perceived as distant, formal, cold or neutral, the imperfective forms, on the contrary, are perceived as showing care and attention to H (3a, 3c), or giving friendly advice, encouragement and support (3b).

Another speech act that Benacchio (2002) brings to our attention is “permit”, in which S’s attitude to the action (not to H) plays the key role. Thus, S can either approve of, disapprove of, or remain indifferent to the action that H performs (ibid.: 164). Again, if S approves of the action, the use of the perfective aspect will sound formally polite,
whereas the Imperfective aspect may sound both polite and extremely friendly. If S expresses disapproval or indifference via the perfective verb, it will sound more “detached” or simply “non-resistant” to the action. Only the imperfective can sound openly rude or convey unmasked indifference to whether H will do the action or not (ibid.).

The examples of “permit” that Benacchio (2002) provides are as follows. To a request “можно открыть окно?” one can provide the following answers:

(4)  Откройте, (конечно)! vs. Открывайте, (конечно)! (ibid.: 164–165).

In (4), whether or not the perfective verb is followed by конечно, the utterance sounds formal and neutral. The imperfective, on the other hand, if not followed by конечно, sounds utterly indifferent to H’s desires; if followed by конечно, it sounds very polite and friendly, showing a lot of concern for H’s desires. It is not by chance, then, as Benacchio believes, that the imperfective aspect is used in utterances involving reduplication such as in, for example, “Открывайте, открывайте (окно)!” (ibid.: 165). Since reduplication is more characteristic of informal speech, such utterances allow/are compatible with the imperfective verb only.

Likewise, Benacchio (2002) claims her approach can explain why most polite etiquette formulae involve imperfective verb forms:
(5a) **Входите, раздевайтесь, садитесь! Снимайте пальто! Располагайтесь!**

(found both in such informal situations as “being a guest” and such formal situations as “at the doctor’s”, “at the lawyer’s”)

(5b) **Берите, берите (печенье)! Наливайте чай сами! Ешьте, ешьте!**

Though the use of the imperfective in (5b) can be explained by the aspectual meaning of a repeated action, it can be assumed that the imperfective forms possess some kind of a secondary meaning of “positive politeness” (ibid.: 167).

(5c) **Приходите (к нам в гости)! Приезжайте (в Москву)! Оставайтесь еще! Прощайте!** (ibid.: 167).

(5d) **Выздоравливайте! Набирайтесь сил! Поправляйтесь!** (clichés in wishing good health to somebody) (ibid.).

(5e) **Передавайте привет вашей жене!** (ibid.: 168).

(5f) **Бывайте здоровы!** (ibid.).

The above examples, according to Benacchio, indicate that, in the minds of native speakers, there is a correspondence between “positive” politeness and imperfective forms in the imperative (ibid.).

Speaking of the “rudeness effect” expressed by the imperfective in certain cases, Benacchio (2002) provides examples in which the imperfective not only erases the required distance between S and H by making H perform the action “immediately”, but
also asks H to perform an action s/he does not desire. Benacchio provides the following example, said to a salesperson at a store:

(6)  Взвешивайте, (пожалуйста)! Заворачивайте, (пожалуйста)! (ibid: 169)

In this example, S focuses on his own needs only, and not on the needs of H. Thus, H is pushed to perform the action immediately, though presumably s/he would know to do this on his/her own, by virtue of the fact that this is his job.

Benacchio (2002: 171) summarizes her claims in the table that I reproduce below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perfective aspect</th>
<th>+[Result]</th>
<th>+[Distance]</th>
<th>+/- Benefit</th>
<th>Negative politeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective aspect</td>
<td>-[Result]</td>
<td>-[Distance]</td>
<td>+ Benefit</td>
<td>Positive politeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Benefit</td>
<td>Rudeness effect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.1 Critique of Benacchio’s Approach

2.3.1.1 Neglect of Context

I will now demonstrate how Benacchio’s work repeats all the shortcomings characteristic of the theories devoted to the discussion of politeness, as discussed in 2.1–2.2, above. Her discussion is actually evaluative in its nature, with the author becoming a judge of what sounds more or less (im)polite. Her conclusions become prescriptive rather than descriptive. As I will demonstrate further, this shortcoming alone undermines her
theory of the “positive” and “negative” politeness that she claims are expressed via imperfective or perfective forms, respectively, in the imperative.

In Benacchio’s work, as in other studies, one finds a lack of/attention to CXT. If Cxt is sometimes mentioned as playing a role in the perceived emotional nuances, CXT is virtually non-existent. So is the hearer (H), as the readers are never provided with the H’s reaction to the imperative stimuli. The author herself becomes the covert evaluator of the speaker’s behavior as she presents her negative-positive politeness theory to the reader. Compare Benacchio’s examples of Уходите (отсюда)! vs. Уйдите (отсюда)! ((1c)-(1d) above) with Padučeva’s completely different interpretation of уйди ((8b) in Chapter 1). Brown and Levinson’s and Leech’s theories display the same shortcoming as well; they all become crypto-evaluative. Thus, as Watts (2003: 88–89) points out, for the fictional examples provided by Brown and Levinson, different contexts can be imagined which would actually reveal a discursive struggle over politeness. Thus, unless more of the interactional context is provided “we can know neither how participants might have evaluated the utterances, nor how we, as researchers, might evaluate them” (ibid.: 88–89).

Further, Benacchio’s attempt to rid her theory of the influence of intonation is in itself sufficient proof that hers is a theory that does not reflect how P1 functions in real life.\(^{37}\) However she may try to create a P2 theory about “positive” and “negative”

\(^{37}\) Benacchio (2002: 151–52) states that “the factor of intonation will not be considered in this work…Our attention will be focused solely… on the nuances of politeness/impoliteness in imperative utterances with the same neutral intonation…” Later, she indicates, “Following Bryzgunova [(1980: 100)], we use the term
politeness being inherent in the perfective/imperfective forms in the imperative, Benacchio fails to abstract away from reality and inevitably mixes P2 and P1 together. Thus, though claiming that all of her examples feature “neutral intonation”, she places an exclamation mark at the end of each of her examples. In some examples, this exclamation mark appears in combination with such lexical intensifiers as скорее, ну, же (ibid.: 170). It becomes hard to see what Benacchio really means by a “neutral intonation.” It is indeed easier for the reader to feel “more attentiveness” (ibid.: 163) or else “rudeness” and “more insistence” in the imperfective form (ibid.: 170) when s/he sees an exclamation mark at the end of a sentence. On the other hand, this very exclamation mark could easily prevent a reader from perceiving the “distance” and “formality” that Benacchio claims for the perfective form. For me personally, as a native speaker, the exclamation point conveys a whole array of emotional nuances, but definitely not a “neutral intonation.”

No doubt, the factor of intonation is very difficult to account for, especially in that there is no single intonation or set of intonational patterns in Russian characteristic of the imperative only. Thus, it becomes even more important to observe and analyze the entire speech situation, including the hearer’s reaction to the speaker’s imperative utterance, or even better, their whole conversation from beginning to end. As Watts (2003: 175) has pointed out, “those parts of an utterance that open up the whole utterance to a ‘polite’ interpretation… always realize procedural meaning.” Procedural meaning is the way the

“neutral” to refer to a variety of intonational patterns which do not contain any additional emotionally meaningful nuances” (ibid.: 172).
utterance is said, not what is said, i.e., ideational meaning, which is conventionally conveyed by the structures of the utterance. Procedural meaning provides the hearer with some kind of procedure(s) to infer a certain meaning. Watts points to prosody as one expression of procedural meaning, as it instructs the hearer how to process the propositional meaning of the utterance (ibid.: 182, 190). Thus (im)politeness simply cannot be discussed adequately if prosody is ignored. It becomes a discussion of something else, not of P1.

2.3.1.2 The Validity of the “Positive” vs. “Negative” Politeness Distinction

As politeness can stretch over more than one speech event (that is, of course, if we see it as constantly negotiable in instances of ongoing interactions), within the boundaries of a single interaction we can encounter examples of both “negative” and “positive” politeness (Watts 2003: 93). Thus, Watts rightly doubts the validity of dividing face into “positive” and “negative”. As Benacchio does not take into account the numerous critiques of the politeness theory of Brown and Levinson, with its dualistic notion of face that is “most in need of revision” (Watts 2003: 107), we can demonstrate how this division becomes doubtful in Benacchio’s theory as well.

Consider the etiquette formula that Benacchio (2002) mentions as an example of the imperfective expressing positive politeness, садитесь, said by a host to a guest (ibid.: 166). She compares it to the perfective сядьте, which can rarely be found in such

38 For a more detailed discussion of EPMs, i.e., expressions of procedural meaning, see Watts (2003: 172–76, 182–85).
situations. However, as we know, in everyday practice садитесь is often combined with a negative politeness hedge, in Brown and Levinson’s terms—пожалуйста. In such cases, as it turns out, the speaker addresses both the addressee’s faces in this short invitation to sit down. Why isn’t it enough in such cases to use the positive politeness strategy alone? More importantly, it remains unclear why the speaker would use positive politeness or address the hearer’s positive face at all. Does the hearer really need to have his action approved of in this situation? After all, this kind of invitation does not present any threat to the addressee’s positive face. Why not use negative politeness, especially as this invitation to sit down is quite formal and fixed in practice? Benacchio does not provide any convincing explanation for this.

As a second example, consider the following two utterances cited by Benacchio:

(7a) Сегодня на улице холодно. Оденьтесь теплее!
(7b) Сегодня на улице холодно. Одевайтесь теплее! (ibid.: 162)

Both (7a) and (7b) are said by a host to a departing guest. Benacchio’s claim is that (7a) sounds more distant and formal, whereas (7b) sounds less formal and “болеее предупредительно” (ibid.: 163). By contrast, Šaronov (1992) claims that it is the other way around. When, as a native speaker and a researcher, I try to figure out who is right and who is wrong (temporarily ignoring the fact that communication is a discursive struggle with no winners or losers), my habitus supplies one scenario in which the
imperfective одевайтесь sounds indeed somewhat “better”, “softer”, whereas the perfective sounds—to use Benacchio’s terminology—“more distant and formal.” However (my inner monologue as a researcher continues), одевайтесь may sound “better” simply because it is more relevant for the situation, and not because it expresses positive politeness. After all, the speaker is trying to present the action as resulting from the situation (сегодня на улице холодно “it’s cold outside today”), not from his own personal thoughts on how the guest should dress. Šaronov’s theory tells us that, by using the perfective, the speaker seems to be adding something “from himself,” some kind of personal attitude about the whole situation. This is already no longer just “advice-incitement” based on the weather conditions; it is “advice-recommendation” based on the speaker’s opinion of what the hearer should do in the present situation. Thus, it turns out that the imperfective in the examples above sounds less imposing, more “obliging” (предупредительно), precisely because the speaker is not imposing anything on the hearer—negative politeness, not positive. The perfective sounds stricter, more formal, as there is an element (even if minimal) of the imposition of opinion. What kind of politeness is this—if not negative, then positive? It can hardly be so. Examples like this show how problematic it can be to separate “positive” and “negative” face and “positive” and “negative” politeness.

Moreover, with a different intonation, the whole picture can change. Judging from my habitus, the speaker can pronounce the utterance with the perfective form so that it sounds extremely considerate: not only does s/he mention the weather conditions
explicitly, s/he also expresses a warm, sincere *personal* desire (according to Šaronov, the role of the perfective) to protect the addressee from dressing too lightly. Intonation thus wreaks havoc on the theory proposed by Benacchio; it is no wonder she excludes it by positing “neutral intonation” for all of her examples, so that its role is reduced to a minimum (Benacchio 2002: 151–152).

By excluding the role of intonation, and by providing similar Cxt for her examples with the perfective and the imperfective, Benacchio tries to prove that positive and negative politeness are inherent in the imperfective and perfective forms, respectively. This, however, can easily be shown not to be the case. Consider встаньте с моей сумки, said to a person who has accidentally sat on your bag in the bus (my own example). If said without the appropriate form of address or the softening *пожалуйста*, the phrase will hardly sound polite at all. Thus, встаньте, which, according to Benacchio inherently expresses negative politeness and can never sound utterly rude, actually fails to express politeness, negative or any other, unless accompanied by *пожалуйста* or other politeness markers. Perhaps, if we wanted to exemplify a possible negative politeness strategy in Russian, we could point to the use of the perfective imperative in combination with the negative politeness hedge *пожалуйста* in “request” situations. This is not to say that Benacchio should have formulated any such rule, which would have repeated the fallacies of all politeness theories—offering production models of polite language, and prescribing rather than describing. The point I am trying to make
here is that it is possible to perceive the perfective form as *rude* in the example above. The evaluation of the degree of (im)politeness will vary from one individual to another.

It is worthwhile to point out here that a comparison of the supposedly polite perfective *встаньте с моей сумки* with the supposedly rude imperfective *вставайте с моей сумки* is not even relevant. *Вставайте с моей сумки* is not appropriate in a “request” situation, when new information is presented to the addressee (Padučeva 1996: 76). It is not that it sounds “ruder”; it simply sounds out of place and ungrammatical in the first place (i.e., as an incorrect usage of aspect).

It is not surprising that an insistent/urgent, unexpected command/demand should sound ruder than a formal request, an entirely different speech act. Thus it is a considerable oversight for Benacchio to present similar comparisons while trying to prove her theory. Consider her example when a customer addresses a salesperson *Взвешивайте, (пожалуйста)! Заворачивайте, (пожалуйста)!* using the “impolite” imperfective form (Benacchio 2002: 169). Benacchio suggests that the impoliteness in this example can be attributed to the fact that the salesperson (who knows his/her job) is called on to perform immediately an action which can only be demanded of him/her by his/her superior (ibid.). In fact, in a speech act other than “request” (e.g., “command”, “demand”) the imperfective could sound like anything to a salesperson—from rude to “normal,” at least. For example, it is not clear that the imperfective would sound rude, if used as an insistent form in a repeated request if the salesperson is slow in carrying out

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39 *Вставайте с моей сумки*, if we agree with Benacchio, would sound rude, because for the unaware H the action does not result from the situation and does not present any benefit to him/her.
the buyer’s request. Again, everything will depend on how the imperfective will be pronounced, and more importantly, how the salesperson interprets it. After all, it may well be that the buyer will put all his impatience and insistence into the imperfective, but the salesperson will take it with humility, admitting his guilt. Benacchio’s theory, in which the evaluative component of P1 is lost, does not entertain this possibility.

There are many other unclear moments in Benacchio’s studies that can make us question the applicability of the positive/negative politeness distinction. First, she borrows the notions of positive and negative politeness, based on the positive/negative face distinction, from Brown and Levinson’s theory, but does not demonstrate or explain how and why the content of these supposedly universal notions might change when applied to the Russian language. For example, according to Brown and Levinson, attention to the addressee’s positive face is highly restricted in Anglo-Saxon society (1987: 63–64). Why is it less restricted in the Russian society? What exactly is implied by the informal, “contact” style of communication among Russians pointed out by Benacchio (2002: 171)?

Furthermore, Brown and Levinson do not even consider imperatives to be part of positive or negative politeness, but rather a bald-on-record strategy, which does not minimize the threat to the addressee’s face. In Brown and Levinson’s theory, only indirect linguistic expressions can form positive or negative strategies. Certainly, the fact that in Russian the distribution of negative and positive politeness across various

40 See, e.g., Ide (1989), Hill et al. (1986), Ide et al. (1992), Matsumoto (1988, 1989), Gu (1990), Watts (2003), and Eelen (2001), who argue that Brown and Levinson’s theory is not universal.
linguistic strategies may be somewhat different should not be problematic at all. After all, the Russian language differs significantly from English in its linguistic means, e.g., its aspectual distinction. Thus, the Russian imperative may well sound less abrupt than the English imperative. But it is unclear what would then be examples of a bald-on-record strategy in Russian. Infinitive constructions are hardly so, since they are used in highly specific situations (army, for example, or when talking to animals).

It also remains unclear from Benacchio’s account how we are to understand negative and positive politeness in an informal communication “на ты”; what place these two types of politeness take in family communication, e.g., between spouses, between parents and children, among children, etc., and how we are to understand the “formal distance” associated with the perfective in such situations.

Considering Benacchio’s examples discussed above, it is not hard to see how Benacchio’s theory becomes an “imposition” theory, expressing the researcher’s own subjective opinion as to how the examples should be interpreted. It fails, as many other politeness theories, to capture the nature of P1 and becomes an abstract theory of P2.

2.3.1.3 “Culture” and “Norms” in Benacchio’s Research

Benacchio’s theory, like other theories that don’t separate P2 from P1, likewise mimics P1 notions and relies on them to prove its points. Among these are the notions of culture and norms. Benacchio draws our attention to the specificity of the Russian way of communication; namely, she argues (2002: 171) that there is a tendency in the Russian
According to Banacchio, the existing etiquette formulae (see section 2.3), in which the imperfective is mostly found, can serve as proof that Russian speakers associate the imperfective with the expression of positive politeness (ibid.: 168). However, as the author herself admits (ibid.), her examples are not very convincing, as the character of the actions in these formulae can be a sufficient reason by itself for the use of the imperfective (ibid).

Likewise, the mere fact that Russians use more directives in everyday communication than, say, English people cannot be sufficient to prove that Russians use the informal style of communication more. For example, Australian English demonstrates the highest levels of indirectness (90%) and only 27% or less of direct impositives in comparison to Canadian English, French, German and Hebrew (Blum-Kulka and House 1989: 133–34). However, this high level of indirectness in Australian society is successfully combined with a high value of “informality” (“mateyness”), which “lies in the purposeful rejection of any overt show of respect, with implications of familiarity, friendliness, and equality…” (Wierzbicka 1991: 111). Polish speakers, on the other hand, while using more directives, also widely use titles of respect and do not value “informality” as Australians do (ibid.: 112).

As Blum-Kulka and House (1989: 139) point out, it is not just only indirectness that affects politeness, but also the presence of various internal modifiers like “please”. In their study, though Australian English proves to be the most indirect, it is speakers of German who use the

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41 Also see Sifianou (1992: 97, 201–202) and Blum-Kulka (1992: 267–269) for similar hypotheses about a positive-politeness orientation in Greek and Israeli society, respectively.
highest numbers of internal modifiers. Thus, the question is whether the use of various internal modifiers is a way to compensate for the “directness” present in requests in particular (ibid.). In Russian, too, though the number of directives employed in everyday speech is greater than, for example, in English, we should also remember the Russian “на вы” communication, the use of the first full name and the patronymic name together in formal communication. And, again, it remains unclear what “пожалуйста” actually “weighs” in Russian; perhaps it is also a way of compensation for being direct. As Margaret Mills points out, the word пожалуйста in Russian is “reserved for direct [vs. indirect] imperative requests” (Mills 1992: 67). Thus, we could suggest that пожалуйста, which typically accompanies the directives, “weighs” more in Russian than please does in English.

Culture is not defined at all in Benacchio’s theory, but, as in most P2 theories, she has to use the concept in order to explain her examples, and she needs it to show proof of positive/negative politeness distinction in Russian society. As Eelen (2001) has pointed out, the notion of culture is very vague and hence flexible, as it can be used to explain almost everything, though in reality it explains nothing (ibid.: 165, 169). Unfortunately, politeness theories generally treat such notions as culture, norms, etc., as givens (ibid.: 247), and ignore their argumentative character,42 just as they ignore the argumentativity of (im)politeness itself.

It is also worth pointing out how, even though it purports to bring “culture” into the picture, Benacchio’s theory implicitly denies the possibility of evolution and change

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42 That is, they ignore the fact that these notions are negotiable and depend on a particular social practice with its particular purpose and intended effects (also see section 2.2.2)
in that culture. Thus, she doesn’t seem to assume that the balance between negative and positive politeness or, to be more concrete, between the informal/formal, “contact”/“distant” types of communication may change along with changes in the society. To follow the more productive line of thought based on the recognition of habitus and communication as a discursive struggle, the evaluations of (im)politeness changes in every particular interaction. As Bourdieu (1991) writes,

Since the very motor of change is nothing less than the whole linguistic field or, more precisely, the whole set of actions and reactions which are continuously generated in the universe of competitive relations constituting the field, the centre of this perpetual movement is everywhere and nowhere (ibid.64).

In other words, the notion of (im)politeness is continuously constructed and reconstructed in every particular interaction, and, in this sense it is “everywhere”. On the other hand, because the process of the negotiation of the term in society is continuous, it is impossible to pinpoint “the moment of change” in the perception of the notion; in this sense, the change is “nowhere”. Thus, only by placing evolution and change within the interaction does it becomes possible to recognize individual creativity and make it part of a scientific model of (im)politeness (Eelen 2001: 229).

2.3.1.4 Concluding remarks

Even if the imperfective and the perfective do have the potential to express certain emotional nuances due to differences in their semantics, one should be very careful in
demonstrating those nuances in the framework of politeness theories, for the reasons
mentioned above. The fact that the aspe ctual forms have a certain potential does not
mean that these forms are inherently “polite”, “impolite”, “rude”, “strict”, “distant”,
“inappropriate”, etc. All these notions, being highly contested (i.e., negotiable in
meaning, abstract, disputable) in nature, can only be evaluated as they occur in context, in
an actual interaction. Their content will change to different degrees from one interaction
to another, from one part of the same interaction to another, and from one individual to
another. Politeness should be seen as a discursive struggle, not as a static notion which
can be evaluated according to objective criteria. Lifting the discussion of (im)politeness
out of social reality by ignoring context, intonation, etc., will inevitably result in an
author’s imposition on the reader of his/her subjective opinion of what is polite and what
is not. Thus, the researcher’s main objective should be to focus on P1 as it occurs in real
communication, and on the evaluation by the hearer of the speaker’s behavior.


Let us now discuss in more detail the two alternative models of politeness by
Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003) and their practical application in analyzing of concrete
instances of naturally occurring interactions. Both these models see an urgent need to
separate P2 from P1 in a politeness theory; P1 must become the object of study instead of
being conflated with P2. Thus, both models incorporate such characteristics as a focus on
the individual, variability, argumentativity, evaluativity and discursiveness. Their aim is
not to describe and explain what linguistic expressions are going to sound (im)polite, (in)appropriate, etc., and why, but how the interactants arrive at their evaluations of other people’s behavior, and, possibly, why. Thus, their focus is on the evaluative moment, on people’s reactions to each other’s behavior, on how behavior influences politeness—all aspects that are lost in the traditional politeness theories discussed above.

Since the focus is now on the production of evaluations, which are individual and vary for any particular context, the models are no longer predictive or prescriptive. They allow us to account for contradictory and marginal data, as no informant in these models can be “wrong” in his/her evaluation of (im)politeness. That is, the models have a larger explanatory scope and can generate concepts that can cover both politeness and impoliteness (Eelen 2001: 240). The morally non-involved position of the researcher allows one to focus on the social debate as a process.

It is true that, due to the characteristics mentioned above, the models become rather relative (Watts 2003: 160–161), that is, less specified and less “systematic” (Eelen 2001: 257) in comparison to the traditional theories. However, both Watts and Eelen are convinced that this is the only way we can observe a discursive struggle over the notions polite/impolite, so that these models represent a truer picture of communication among human beings, in which the individual is reunited with the social (Eelen 2001: 257–58, 240; Watts 2003: 160–63).

Since politeness is treated as a contested concept, so are the concepts related to it. Thus, norms, culture, social consensus, social change, power are no longer objective
entities. They become observational facts and exist within the process of communication. They are no longer treated as some external forces, but as aspects inherent in social communication. For example, instead of some preliminary “consensus,” Eelen (2001) talks about a “working consensus”43 that people achieve in the course of actual interaction. Power, though still related to specific cultural positions that people have in society, becomes a form of behavior rather than being a factor that determines behavior (ibid.: 224).

Watts (2003) makes a distinction between power-to and power-over. The former stands for the power that one interactant tries to gain over the other in any ongoing interaction. The latter, which subsumes power-to, comes from the interactants’ cultural and social positions (e.g., professor vs. student, boss vs. employee), which the participants have internalized as part of their habitus. Power-over is the potential to exercise power, but the way and the extent to which this power is actually going to be used depends on every particular interaction (ibid.: 155–56). This is how power becomes practice, i.e., related to behavior, instead of dictating it (Eelen 2001: 224).

Both Eelen’s and Watts’ models were inspired by Bourdieu’s sociological insights, and, namely by his notion of habitus and the presentation of reality as a discursive struggle. Eelen suggests that these insights be combined with insights from discursive psychology, which can serve as a psychological basis for the models described.

43 “A working consensus is an a posteriori rather than an a priori notion: it is not a mental consensus where identical beliefs are the input of interaction, but rather a practical consensus which is the outcome of interaction…it consists of practices rather than beliefs” (Eelen 2001: 219).
above (ibid.: 136). Just as the theory of social practice, discursive psychology treats such notions as *culture, norms*, etc. as argumentative tools, as forms of behavior. In general, it sees thinking as a form of behavior (ibid.: 236–37).

Both Watts and Eelen treat the suggested alternative models as a starting point in the discussion of P1. They acknowledge that their models need further elaboration, as do their fundamental notions of *habitus, variability, norms, sharedness* (Eelen 2001: 251–54; Watts 2003: 262–63). The new models should not mimic P1 notions in their scholarly explanations, and they should maintain focus on the distinction between *emics* and *etics* (Eelen 2001: 253–54).

The next legitimate question is how these models can be used in empirical research, and what such research would look like. Depending on the type of politeness-as-practice (*expressive, classificatory, or metapragmatic*) the methods and treatment of data will be different. *Expressive politeness* refers to the linguistic means that an actual interactant may use in actual communication with the purpose of being or sounding polite: honorifics, terms of address, formulaic expressions, cajolers, downtoners, indirect requests, etc. (Eelen 2001: 35). *Classificatory politeness* refers to an individual’s actual, explicit evaluations of other people’s behavior as polite or impolite in actual interaction. *Metapragmatic politeness* refers to discussions by people of (im)politeness as a concept, what it means and how different people perceive it (ibid.).

Eelen points out that it would be valuable but rather difficult to obtain examples of classificatory politeness (ibid.: 255). Such examples would have to come from a
natural setting and be spontaneous evaluations. However, in actual interaction people seldom explicitly evaluate other people’s behavior as polite/impolite.

Examples of metapragmatic politeness would be easier to obtain, and investigation of actual debates about politeness would be potentially fruitful. However, it would be necessary to analyze these debates as a specific form of interaction with its own contributing characteristics—i.e., as debates. An informal interview in which the researcher led the informant into a discussion of real-life examples of (im)politeness would also be possible (ibid.: 255). However, once again, whatever empirical design is used, the researcher must always consider its discursive and argumentative structure, as these are going to influence the nature and interpretation of the collected data (ibid.: 256).

In Eelen’s work, the discursive structure of a situation “refers to its description in terms of the kind of interactional practices or tasks that are being accomplished.” The argumentative structure, narrower in definition, “refers to the purely argumentative stakes at hand” (ibid.: 255–56):

Whatever the setting, it always needs to be examined in terms of its effects on the involvement, sincerity, frontstage behavior, self-identification, etc. on the part of the informants…The information provided by the informant [in an informal interview design] can be examined in the light of its functionality in the flow of the interaction, in light if its relationship to the researcher’s input…, as a means of self-positioning towards the researcher, etc…The data of such an analysis would no longer simply be the content of the information provided by the informant, but rather the interactional text of the interview as a whole, and the analysis would become a discursive analysis of the interview itself… The search would thus be for the processes or circumstances that bring about an evaluation, as well as for the interactional purposes it serves (ibid.: 256).
2.4.2 Watts’ Model

2.4.2.1 Major Concepts and Theories in Watts’ Model

Eelen (2001) does not provide any concrete examples, nor does he demonstrate how to attend to expressive politeness. However, we find concrete examples of how expressive politeness can be investigated in Watts (2003). The author is able to do this after he elaborates his theoretical perspective—a preliminary requirement, as Eelen (2001: 254) emphasizes, to embarking on any empirical research.

There are two key concepts in Watts’ (2003) model of politeness: 1) politic behavior and 2) polite behavior. Watts (ibid.: 20) defines politic behavior as “that behavior, linguistic and non-linguistic, which the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction… it is always negotiable during the interaction, despite the expectations that participants might bring to it.” Polite behavior is defined as “linguistic behavior which is perceived to be beyond what is expectable, i.e., salient behavior which should be called polite or impolite, depending on whether it tends toward the positive or negative end of the spectrum of politeness” (ibid.: 19). In other words, polite behavior, for Watts, is “behavior beyond what is perceived to be appropriate to the ongoing social interaction, which says nothing about how members evaluate it” (ibid.: 21). Significantly, Watts’ definition of polite behavior implies that “linguistic structures are not inherently polite” (ibid.).
Watts (2003) demonstrates that examples of P2 usually found in P2 theories are nothing but realizations of politic behavior (ibid.: 162). He redefines P2 as politic behavior and potential P1. In other words, depending on a particular speech situation, politic behavior may or may not be interpreted as (im)polite. Thus, politic behavior does not equal P1.

Watts (2003) returns to Erving Goffman’s original conception of *face* and rejects Brown and Levinson’s dualistic version, which inevitably leads to the perception of P1 as facework, since the speaker always calculates his strategy before he addresses the hearer’s positive or negative face (ibid.: 121–25, 259). As Watts notes, Goffman’s *face* is a very flexible notion which changes from one interaction to another. It mainly depends on how others interpret our “face”, not how we ourselves interpret it. Thus, the focus here is on the evaluative moment (ibid.: 124–125, 259). Goffman defines *face* as “‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact’” (cited in Watts 2003: 124). *Line* in Goffman’s definition of *face* means “‘a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which [a person] expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself’” (cited in ibid.: 124). As Watts notes (ibid.: 131), lines “constitute part of the politic behavior associated with the social activity type… Falling out of line constitutes a break in the politic behavior which is interpretable by the interactants as an offence and as damage to the face of one or more of the interactants…this behavior is often evaluated rude or impolite.”
For any specific interaction, the interactants attribute faces to one another and behave both linguistically and non-linguistically so that their interlocutors’ faces are maintained. In doing so, the participants carry out what Goffman calls *facework* (Watts 2003: 125, 131). Watts further distinguishes between *supportive facework* (ibid.: 132, 159, 232–47, 259), the aim of which is to maintain or restore politic behavior in a social interaction (a form of behavior that is open to interpretation as polite), and *non-supportive facework* (ibid.: 133), the aim of which is to disturb the equilibrium of the social interaction and to damage the interlocutor’s face. This form of behavior is open to interpretation as impolite, though it may be just a type of politic behavior if the social interaction type allows for face-threatening (ibid.: 140–41, 218–32, 259).

Watts (2003) bases his social model on two theories: Bourdieu’s theory of practice (ibid.: 147–51) (see the central notion of *habitus* discussed above); and his own theory of emergent networks—an extension of social network theory (ibid.: 153–55). Watts distinguishes between *latent networks* and *emergent networks*. *Latent networks* (or, in Bourdieu’s terminology, *modus operatum*) are part of an individual’s habitus—an individual’s knowledge about behavior in various situations, which s/he has gained through previous interaction (*politic* behavior). In Watts words, they are “a set of objectified social structures produced by ‘historical practice’” (ibid.: 153). In the sense

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44 An example of such social interaction type can be a political affairs program, the goal of which is to disclose a politician’s “real face” to the general public; in other words, the program allows for conflictual discourse. The moderator acts counter to the line that the politician would like to adopt in order to win the audience’s disposition and acclaim. In doing so, the moderator carries out non-supportive facework. For example, Watts (2003: 218) analyzes a political interview with Tony Blair, in which the moderator does not allow the politician to forget “the old Blair” and to present only “the new Blair.”
that the content and structure of latent networks can be affected/changed by an emergent network (i.e., during an ongoing interaction), latent networks are “imagined” networks (ibid.: 154–55). Emergent networks (in Bourdieu’s terminology modus operandi) present a process of network formation. They are “the establishment, reestablishment and reproduction of social links between the interactants, which emerge during the interaction” (ibid.: 153). After this kind of network has been formed, it may or may not have a significant effect on the existing latent network (ibid.: 155).

The notions of equilibrium and power likewise play an important role in Watts’ theory of emergent networks. According to Watts, the politic behavior in a latent network exists in a state of equilibrium—“an idealized state that is necessary for an individual to adopt as part of her/his habitus” (ibid.: 155). Thus, when an individual enters an actual interaction, i.e., when a new network emerges, s/he tries to reestablish that “imagined” equilibrium (e.g., through supportive facework) as part of the politic behavior that exists in the individual’s habitus and is associated with this particular interaction. However, due to the fact that, in any interaction, the participants try to exercise power over each other, the equilibrium may be hard to maintain (e.g., due to non-supportive facework); also, it can be easily changed (ibid.: 155–61).

Watts emphasizes that politic behavior, just like politeness, is a contested notion, as the evaluation is always individual. In addition, he stresses that there are only two ways to realize consciously whether the politic behavior is appropriate (ibid: 164–166): 1) when it is violated, so that the interpretation of behavior as impolite becomes possible;
or 2) when behavior presents structures in excess of what is thought necessary in a particular interaction.

2.4.1.2 Watts’ Suggestions on the Application of the Alternative Model

Speaking concretely, Watts (2003) emphasizes that it is important, when analyzing a long sequence of verbal interaction, to have enough context; hence the researcher should first try to establish the lines taken by the participants and what “face” they are trying to acquire and maintain. That is, the researcher should attend to both the discursive and the argumentative structure of the situation. Accordingly, several questions must be answered. What social stakes are involved for both participants in this situation? What do they have to lose or gain? What are their goals? What public are they trying to reach, and what effect(s) are they trying to produce in that public? How does the setting itself influence the behavior of the participants? For example, is it an entertainment show or a live translation of an election campaign?

I cite Watts (2003: 221) below to provide a concrete example of how a researcher establishes the lines, faces and politic behavior. The excerpt is from his analysis of an interview with Tony Blair, at that time not yet Prime Minister, by David Dimbleby, the moderator of the BBC program *Panorama*.

The communicative situation is public in that both participants know that they have a lot to lose in the eyes of the television audience if they do not put up a good show. Evidence of this awareness can be given from a number of points in the extract. Blair takes the line that he assumes the general public expects him to take, i.e., to present the
revitalized Labour Party as New Labour rather than Old Labour, but at the same time to take care not to frighten off traditional Labour voters by suggesting that Labour’s former policies were wrong… The face that he would like to present… is that of a charismatic leader who has almost single-handedly led the Labour Party into a fast-changing modern world, in which Labour’s former policies have simply been overtaken…

Watts continues on to establish the lines and faces of the moderator in the same fashion. The established lines and faces help the researcher to understand what politic behavior can be expected in this situation (ibid.: 222).

As a further step, the researcher should analyze the conversation (e.g., from a recording) turn by turn with the purpose of finding those instances of politic behavior that are open to interpretation as polite or impolite. In finding such instances, the researcher needs to know what linguistic structures can be open to a polite or impolite interpretation. Watts argues that those parts of an utterance that open up the whole utterance to a polite interpretation always realize *procedural meaning* (ibid.: 175). As noted in 2.3.1.1, *procedural meaning* is the way we say things, as opposed to *propositional* or *ideational meaning*, i.e., what we say. Watts provides the following example. In *You’ve got that wrong, I think*, said by a teacher to her/his student, there are two meanings: propositional (‘I think that p’), and procedural. Speaking of the latter, it is the placement of *I think* at the end of the utterance which makes it possible for the hearer to infer that the speaker is giving the hearer a “politeness payment.” The speaker foregrounds interpersonal meaning; the hearer can perceive that the speaker would like to soften his/her assessment of the the hearer’s work. Note that, in *I think you’ve got that wrong*, the politeness payment is reduced to a minimum, if present at all in the utterance (ibid.: 175–76).
Thus, when analyzing a particular interaction, the researcher should look for EPMs—expressions of procedural meaning. Such expressions form part of politic behavior. Though politeness in not inherent in them, they are open to that interpretation in a particular context. i.e., when they are used (ibid.: 185). Among EPMs we find cajolers\textsuperscript{45}, downtoners\textsuperscript{46}, intensifiers\textsuperscript{47}, committers\textsuperscript{48}, prosody, etc. (ibid.: 168–200).\textsuperscript{49}

Watts analyses the reactions of the interactants to EPMs by using the Relevance Theory (RT) of Sperber and Wilson (1995). Watts (2003: 203) considers this theory of communication and cognition to be “an excellent means to assess how potential violations of politic behavior can be recognized and inference processes can be postulated that result in the interpretation of (im)polite behavior.” This theory complements well the new politeness model, as it also accounts for individuality and variability in communication. Thus, one major principle of RT is that “no utterance can ever be fully determined with respect to its meaning” (ibid.: 210). That is, there are always several possibilities of how one might interpret the meaning of a speaker’s utterance, i.e., the meaning behind an EPM in an utterance. According to RT, the hearer will stop at that

\textsuperscript{45} Cajolers are linguistic expressions which “‘help to increase, establish or restore harmony between the interlocutors’” (House and Kasper 1981, cited in Watts 2003: 184).

\textsuperscript{46} Downtoners “‘modulate the impact’ of the speaker’s utterance, e.g., just, simply, possibly, perhaps, really” (House and Kasper (1981), cited in Watts 2003: 183).

\textsuperscript{47} Intensifiers intensify the degree to which an element of the propositional utterance holds good, e.g., very, so, quite, really, just, indeed, etc. (House and Kasper (1981), cited in Watts 2003: 183).

\textsuperscript{48} Committers are devices by which the speaker can indicate a heightened degree of commitment to the propositional content of the utterance, e.g., I’m sure, certainly, obviously, etc., or can lower that degree, e.g., I think, I believe, I guess, in my opinion (House and Kasper (1981), cited in Watts 2003: 183–184).

\textsuperscript{49} Watts (2003: 186) points out the heterogeneity in the existing taxonomies of politeness structures, especially that such classifications do not explain what makes such structures “polite.” He argues that such structures of linguistic politeness “…are always pragmatised EPMs encoding procedural meaning…” While certainly part of politic behavior, they are not inherently polite.
assumption which will significantly alter the interactants’ mutual cognitive environment (ibid.: 209).

Consider the following portion of the interview with Tony Blair that Watts (2003: 222) analyzes as a concrete example of how his model can be used. Based on his assumptions about the expected politic behavior in the interview, Watts tries to identify possible examples of linguistic (im)politeness (P1). Consider especially turns 1–3:

1 D: **Mr. Blair**
   - in this election
   - you’re asking the electorate to put their trust in you
   - the new Blair isn’t
   - **POLITIC BEHAVIOR**

B:

2 D: **there a problem that there’s an old Blair who believed in quite different things**
   - which makes it
   - **POTENTIALLY OPEN TO INTERPRETATION AS LINGUISTIC POLITENESS**

B:

3 D: rather difficult for people to trust the new one

B: **no**
   - I don’t agree at all
   - I mean
   - we have been through
   - **NEGATIVE EVALUATION**
   - “CAJOLER”
   - **OF “POLITE” UTTERANCE**
   - **POLITIC BEHAVIOR ATTEMPT TO RESTORE HARMONY**

   [a big process of change and modernization of the Labour Party…]

Watts treats Dimbleby’s question in bold type as open to a “polite” interpretation, since it is in excess of what is minimally required by the politic behavior in this situation. The minimally required formulation, according to Watts, would be: “**There’s a problem that there’s an old Blair who believed in quite different things. Doesn’t this make it rather difficult to trust the new one?**” (ibid.: 223). In order to find out how Blair himself might
have evaluated Dimbleby’s question, Watts turns to Blair’s reaction (see turn 3), which should provide clues about the meaning that Blair inferred. On the assumption that Blair expects conflictual behavior on the part of Dimbleby, Watts proposes the following inferential steps (applying Relevance Theory):

<D is asking whether I agree with p>
<p = there’s a problem x&amp;x = there’s a old Blair>
<D believes p>
<s since D did not state p, he is paying with politeness> (ibid.).

Blair’s negative emphatic response to Dimbleby’s question shows that Blair has negatively evaluated the potentially “polite” utterance (ibid.), i.e., he interpreted it as a form of attack from Dimbleby rather than an instance of politeness.

Watts provides a number of similar examples to demonstrate how it is possible to focus on the evaluative moment in the investigation of expressive P1, and how, with the help of Relevance Theory, it is possible “to break out of the limits of Gricean rationality [used by the traditional theories] in which we are constantly measuring what we say against the possible reaction of the addressee…” (ibid.: 212). Watts’s model allows us to see how members of society themselves define (im)politeness (ibid.: 142) and to take the position of an observer, not of an evaluator.
In Chapter 3, I will discuss to what extent Eelen’s and Watts’ models of linguistic (im)politeness described in this chapter can be applied to the discussion of the nuances of politeness or impoliteness in Russian imperative utterances with perfective and imperfective aspectual forms.
CHAPTER 3

ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND THE RUSSIAN ASPECT IN THE IMPERATIVE

3.1 Illegitimate Practices of Traditional Approaches in Light of Alternative Models

In Chapter 2 of this work I proposed that discussing of politeness within the framework of traditional approaches becomes a futile undertaking as notions of P1 and P2 are inevitably blurred in these theories. Hence I described alternative approaches, which, though less clear-cut and more relative, provide a better understanding of what politeness is by focusing on politeness as practice and on the production of evaluations of politeness by actual participants in a natural interaction. The role of the researcher becomes that of an observer, whose aim is to describe how and under what circumstances actual evaluations of politeness occur.

In adopting the alternative approaches, I first need to describe in what way my research will become different from the traditional approaches to the problem in question. A number of things that were allowed by the traditional approaches become illegitimate. First of all, it is no longer possible to speak of “polite/impolite” perfective/imperfective
verb forms without taking context into consideration and without analyzing ample stretches of naturally occurring conversation. Hence only after we analyze all the factors that could have contributed to this or that interpretation/evaluation of an imperative utterance will we be able to make assumptions about how the semantic components of the perfective/imperfective forms contribute to that interpretation. It should be emphasized here that we will not be able to rise above assumptions about the contribution of the verb forms to the obtained evaluations; we will not be able to make any definitive conclusions about these forms alone, simply because they become functional only in combination with all other factors. This is where the relativism of the alternative approaches lies.

Second, in the alternative approaches it is no longer legitimate to bring up cases of aspectual competition in order to demonstrate change(s) in the expressive nuances when one verb form is substituted for another. The simple reason for this is that such substitutions never occur in spontaneous talk; they are only present in researchers’ artificial examples as they try to demonstrate their point. The alternative approaches do not permit us to be interested in researcher evaluations of how this or that imperative utterance sounds, as there is always a risk of an imposition of a researcher’s opinion/evaluation.

3.2 Application of Watts’ Methodology to Analyzing Russian

Let me now discuss to what extent the alternative approaches can be applied to the problem discussed in this work. According to the alternative models, our main goal
should be to observe how hearers arrive at certain evaluations of imperative utterances. As Watts (2003) carries out his analysis, he identifies those utterances within a conversation that contain EPMs (expressions of procedural meaning) (ibid.: 172, 174, 180-182). According to Watts, it is utterances that contain EPMs that traditional theories have pointed out as instances of linguistic politeness. Watts, however, demonstrates that such utterances, while clearly examples of politic behavior, are not inherently polite; they are only open to interpretation as “polite” (or, in the absence of EPMs, as “impolite”), and are interpreted as such only by virtue of the context in which they function (ibid.: 185). Watts distinguishes two groups of EPMs: 1) *formulaic ritualized utterances*, and 2) *semi-formulaic utterances*. The first he defines as

highly conventionalized utterances, containing linguistic expressions that are used in ritualized forms of verbal interaction and have been reduced from fully grammatical structures to the status of extra-sentential markers of politic behavior. They have little or no internal syntactico-semantic structure” (ibid.: 168)

Among ritualized formulaic EPMs, we find terms of address, ritualized expressions of thanking, greeting, leave-taking, apologizing, the English politeness marker *please* and its equivalents, and the like (ibid.: 169, 182, 183). *Semi-formulaic utterances* are defined as

conventionalized utterances containing linguistic expressions that carry out indirect speech acts appropriate to the politic behavior of a social situation. They may also be used, in certain circumstances, as propositional structures in their own right” (ibid.: 169)
Among them we find various hedges (*I think, I mean, I don’t think, actually*), solidarity markers (*you know*), boosters (*clearly, of course*), sentential structures containing specific modal verbs (*may I ask you to accept*) (ibid.: 169, 182-185). Speaking of semi-formulaic utterances, Watts points out that it is often their prosodic structure that contains the procedural meaning instructing the addressee to make certain inferences (ibid.: 181-182).

Watts suggests that one method of classifying whether utterances containing EPMs are open to a “polite” interpretation (or utterances which lack EPMs are open to an “impolite” interpretation) is to identify the linguistic minimum required to carry out the politic behavior characteristic of each specific context (ibid.: 170). This linguistic minimum can be identified after we establish the lines and faces the participants in the interaction may wish to be assigned or may feel they have been assigned by the other participants and by the character of the interaction itself (ibid.: 170, 220). Clearly, establishing lines in this way requires a fine-grained analysis of the interaction, taking into consideration the multiplicity of contextual factors (ibid.: 170).

Watts analyzes utterances containing EPMs to see if they conform to the linguistic minimum required by the politic behavior of the situation. If an utterance contains more linguistic structures than is required, Watts opens it up to a possible “polite” interpretation, and if an utterance contains less than the linguistic minimum required—it is open to an “impolite” interpretation. Watts uses the interpretative mechanism offered by the Relevance Theory (RT) of Sperber & Wilson (1995) to posit inferential steps that
the addressee might go through. In doing this, Watts relies on the EPMs in the speaker’s utterance(s) which instruct the addressee on how to infer the intended meaning(s) (Watts 2003: 208-212, 223). Further, the hearer’s reactions to the utterances already identified as open to a “polite” or “impolite” interpretation prove very helpful in bringing more certainty to Watts’ analysis as they can demonstrate whether the addressee, indeed, has made the inferences suggested by Watts, i.e., whether s/he has or may have interpreted the utterance as polite/impolite.

I will test the workability of Watts’s methodology using concrete examples from a naturally occurring interaction. As material, I will use the movie “Служебный Роман” and will analyze two instances of interaction between its two main characters, the director of a statistical establishment, Lyudmila Prokopievna Kalugina, and an employee who is subordinated to her, Anatolij Efremovich Novosel’cev. The two episodes that I am going to analyze differ in their distribution of “power-OVER” and “power-TO”.

As discussed above, Power-TO can be exercised in any particular interaction on the spot and refers to the power that a communicator uses to achieve his/her goals and to produce certain effects; for example, language can be used in particular ways to influence and impress (Ng & Bradac 1993: 3, 4). Power-TO can be used to produce both positive and negative effects—“Positive”, in the sense that it can be used to realize personal or collective goals; “Negative”, in the sense that it can be used to prevent someone from the

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50 The grounds on which I call the instances of communication that I take from movies “naturally occurring” is that such instances are perceived by the viewing audience as examples of interaction that could well happen in real life. In terms of “real life”, such examples of people’s interaction are “naturally occurring”.

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realization of his/her goals for the sake of hindering (ibid.: 3). Power-OVER is relational; it involves the difference in the communicators’ statuses—those of domination and submission. Power-OVER can be socially recognized and institutionalized and, thus, legitimate (boss-employee, professor-student, sergeant-private, etc.), or it can be non-institutional and illegitimate, e.g., in a hostage situation (ibid.: 3-4). Power-OVER includes Power-TO.

Let us now turn to the analysis of the episodes. The first instance of communication occurs in the director’s office when the subordinate comes to apologize for his behavior the previous night, when he openly told the director what he thinks of her as a person. In this episode (up to the point when the director breaks into tears), the director is armed with her power OVER the employee, which she may or may not choose to exercise explicitly as she talks to him. Judging by these two people’s actions in the previous episodes and by how other people think of them and treat them in the course of the movie, we can assign “lines”/“faces” to these two characters and establish the expected politic behavior for the episode. The following questions, among others, should help the researcher in the establishment of lines and faces: what social stakes are involved for both participants in this situation? what do they have to lose or gain? what are their goals? what public do they try to reach and what effect(s) are they trying to produce on that public? how does the setting itself influence the behavior of the participants?

The “face” of the director Kalugina is that of an organized, fair, strict, and demanding leader who has made the work of her establishment effective by maintaining
discipline. She has power OVER her employees, which gives her the right to demand 100% effective work from them and to criticize them harshly, if necessary. She is equally demanding towards herself and expects respect from her employees. Thus, we can expect Kalugina to act along those lines, unless she would like to change her face during the conversation and display more cooperative behavior towards Novosel’cev, with whom she had previously been very harsh, Novosel’cev is definitely afraid of her and has formed a negative opinion of her as a person. In terms of losses and gains in this conversation, the director has little to lose, as, from the moment Novosel’cev enters her office, it is clear (from the manner in which he enters the room) that he has come to apologize for his behavior. Novosel’cev, on the contrary, has a lot to lose if his apologies are not accepted, including his job. Thus, we can expect only cooperative behavior on his part and no confrontation of any sort. The lines that Kalugina can assume the employee has taken for the duration of the interaction (based also on his usual behavior in her office—always shy, lost, ready to obey commands and criticism) is that of a deeply scared, timid man, who will certainly stumble as he talks to her, who must be ashamed of his behavior, and who understands she has the power to fire him.

Consider the setting and the conversation below. Novosel’cev enters the director’s office in a very indecisive shy manner, which instantaneously should signal to the director that he feels guilty about his behavior. Kalugina gives him a steel-cold piercing look, showing her readiness to confront him without mercy and demonstrating who is the boss—very much like her usual behavior with this employee.

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1 Новосе́льцев: (stumbling, slurring words, not even able to say her name correctly): Здра́вствуйте… Прокопь́я Лю́дмиловна… я пришёл… Меня… не зна́ю… меня́ вч… вчера… вот… Меня вчера́ муха укусила.

2 Калу́гина: Да, я это заметила (strict, harsh tone maintained through turn 27).

3 Новосе́льцев: Или я с цепи́ сорвался.

4 Калу́гина: Это уже ближе к истине.

5 Новосе́льцев: Значит, я с цепи.

6 Калу́гина: Да.

7 Калу́гина: Сади́тесь, товарищ Но́восельцев.

8 Новосе́льцев: Нет, не надо.

9 Калу́гина: Анато́лий Ефре́мович.

10 Новосе́льцев: Лучше умереть стоя.

11 Калу́гина: Сади́тесь, не робейте.

12 Новосе́льцев: Спаси́бо.

13 Калу́гина: Сделайте одолжение, располагайте.

14 Новосе́льцев: Спаси́бо.

15 Калу́гина: Вчера вы...

16 Новосе́льцев: (makes an attempt to rise from his seat)

17 Калу́гина: Сидеть!

18 Новосе́льцев: (sits back down)
- 19 К: позволили себе утверждать… что во мне нет ничего человеческого…
- 20 Н: Ну что вы…Мало ли, что я вчера болтал. На меня не стоит обращать внимание…
- 21 К: Нет… надо… Почему же… Тем более, что вы являетесь выражителем мнения определенных слоев нашего коллектива.
- 22 Н: Неужели…
- 23 К: Вчера вы меня публично оклеветали…
- 24 Н: Да.
- 25 К: Оскорбили…
- 26 Н: Оклеветал.
- 27 К: Все, что вы говорили, возмутительная ложь!
- 28 Н: Возм…
- 29 К: Я с вами катего…категорически не согласна (first signs of nervousness).
- 30 Н: И я категорически…

In turns 9, 11 and 13 Kalugina’s behavior is in excess of the politic behavior that can be expected during the interaction, and can thus be open to a “polite” interpretation. First of all, she had never called Novosel’cev by his full name and patronymic name (an EPM), let alone encouraging him to take a seat taking into account his personal traits of character—don’t be shy (не робейте) in turn 11. The etiquette formula do me a favor, make yourself comfortable in 13 (сделайте одолжение, располагайтесь) is incompatible
with how she confronted Novosel’cev when he entered her office: her tone and look were expressive enough for him to understand that she was going to be merciless. Moreover, 9, 11 and 13 were pronounced in such a way (intonation becomes an EPM) that the only possible interpretation of the director’s excessive politeness is an attack on Novosel’cev. His reaction proves that, indeed, he perceived her behavior this way. Consider his лучшее умереть стоя in 10, which demonstrates his readiness to take any kind of punishment for his actions the previous night. The interpretation of 9, 11, and 13 as sarcasm on Kalugina’s part is further supported by Kalugina’s subsequent harsh treatment of Novosel’cev in 15, 17 and 19. She treats him like a dog uttering the infinitive сидеть!—a form which is appropriate only in military or similar to military situations or in addressing animals. Even though Novosel’cev uses an idiom in 3 that compares humans to dogs when he speaks of his own behavior, an idiom (!) does not give Kalugina the right to treat him like one. Thus, сидеть! is open to a “rude”/“impolite” interpretation, as it is less than what is minimally required by the politic behavior in this situation. Novosel’cev’s reaction, however, does not demonstrate such an interpretation. In fact, he has no way out but to “obey” as his goal in this communication is to avoid any kind of confrontation if he wants to keep his job. Moreover, by pronouncing сидеть! the director drives the point right home, as the only possible inference the employee can make is that “She commands me to obey immediately and without any contradictions”. Thus, from the point of view of the Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995) сидеть! provides
most contextual effects\textsuperscript{51} for the hearer so only one interpretation, that of a “command” or “order”, is possible. In other words, \textit{сидеть!} makes the director’s intention to destroy the man obvious. However, again, Novosel’cev’s reaction does not demonstrate that he has given that command/order a “rude” interpretation. Sperber & Wilson (1995) make a good point that engaging in ostensive communication—i.e., “behavior which makes manifest an intention to make something manifest” (ibid.: 49)—besides its informative intention, also alters the mutual cognitive environment of the speaker and the addressee. Such a change is of “crucial social importance”, since it particularly changes the communicators’ possibilities of future interaction (ibid.: 61,62). Thus, Novosel’cev silently obeys the “command”, thus maintaining and “downgrading” his face to that of an obedient (like a dog!) employee, who is ready to pay for his guilt. All he does in turns 20-28 is admit his unfair outrageous behavior towards the director and present himself as unworthy of her attention. By his behavior he also helps the director maintain her face—that of the “master of the house”. Novosel’cev’s actions are an example of supportive facework (Watts 2003: 159, 239); he tries to maintain the equilibrium in the politic behavior he assumes for the interaction. Thus, though we, observers, may perceive the infinitive in turn 17 as “rude”, we remain clueless as to the hearer’s hidden interpretation.

\textsuperscript{51} Sperber & Wilson (1995) maintain that an assumption (among several available assumptions about the speaker’s intention) is stronger the greater the contextual effects that the information in the speaker’s utterance produces, and the smaller the effort required to process that assumption (ibid.: 123-125). Contextual effects are effects that result from the interaction of old information (already present in an interactant’s representation of the world) and new information, from which further new information can be derived (ibid.: 48), with a following change of an individual’s cognitive environment, i.e., the set of assumptions/facts available to him (ibid.: 39, 46). Sperber & Wilson claim that “all human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible” (ibid.: 49).
of this form, i.e., he may have thought it was rude but was ready to “swallow the pill” in order to obtain the director’s forgiveness. Thus, the director fully demonstrates her power OVER the addressee; that is, power-OVER becomes a form of behavior (Eelen 2001: 224) in this particular instance as Kalugina chooses to exercise it explicitly.

However, it is interesting to note here, as the outcome of the conversation demonstrates (Kalugina breaks into tears), Kalugina, in fact, found Novosle’cev’s agreeing behavior non-supportive—so strikingly different it was from his behavior the night before. She took his behavior as a form of mockery. Thus, Novosel’cev was wrong in assuming that the line and face he had picked for the conversation was the one that Kalugina expected from him. As a result, his “polite” behavior turned out to be excessive, and was taken by Kalugina as “irony” and “impoliteness” as she herself indicates later on in the conversation.

The second episode that I will briefly analyze is quite different. In this episode, the two main characters are in an informal setting (dinner at Kalugina’s place), on a par. Novosel’cev has come to visit Kalugina at home, as it has become clear to both that they have feelings for each other. In fact, he has come with a marriage proposal. The lines that the characters might want to be assigned are quite different from the previous episode. The faces they take on become clear as we observe the interaction. She tries to reduce her power-OVER to a zero by presenting herself as just a woman who deserves to be loved—beautiful and vulnerable, with a soft side to her, capable of being shy and insecure. Her tone is very soft and feminine. He, most of the time, maintains his face of a shy,
disorganized man unworthy of her attention. However, he also appears to be a man who knows how to compliment a woman, who is sensitive to other people’s insecurities, and is able to provide support and encouragement if needed. What we expect to see in this situation in terms of power is the exercise of power-TO in certain instances, with power-OVER reduced to a zero or to a minimum.

The conversation below occurs at the dinner table as Novosel’cev tries to master his courage to make a proposal. The atmosphere is very tense; both are nervous and insecure. Novosel’cev, feeling and acting awkward, spills some wine on Kalugina’s new dress and then tries to rescue it by insisting that some salt be sprinkled on the stain.

(He spills wine on her dress)
- 1 K: Ой ой!
- 2 N: Что же я наделал!
- 3 K: Вы не сделали ничего особенного. Но… Вы испортили мне новое платье…
- 4 N: Нет-нет. Это надо…Это солью..
- 5 K: Красное вино не отмывается.
- 6 N: Где у вас соль …Нет…Это за…замоется..Снимайте платье, живо!
  Живо снимайте! А-а-а! Нет! Не сейчас…не здесь…Что вы!...Не надо…
- 7 K: Что же вы говорите снимайте...

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- 8 N: Нет...Это я не подумал...Люд...мила Прокопиевна...Я сейчас (runs to the kitchen, she runs after him)
- 9 К: А-анатолий Ефремович…! Перестаньте!
- 10 N: Не снимайте платье!
- 11 К: Ну прекратите же! Я все равно носить его не буду…
- 12 N: Быстренько… Садитесь …Я сейчас посыплю вас солью…И все сойдет…только посидите.
- 13 К: Да оставьте вы его в покое…Э.. это…Будь оно проклято, это платье! Черт с ним…Милый, славный…
- 14 N: А потом…Я возьму его с собой и простиру его в..
- 15 К: Ну ей богу, если вы сию секунду не замолчите…Я вы…Я сожгу это платье на ваших глаз…Сядьте!
- 16 N: (he sits)
- 17 К: Анатолий Ефремович …Я так взволнована вашим признанием…Ну какой же вы рядовой…

The first imperative utterance pronounced by the man in the episode is in 6 Снимайте платье, живо! emphasized by an immediate repletion of the command Живо снимайте! The two utterances seem to contain less than could be expected by the politic behavior that was established at the beginning of the interaction: both treated each other with extreme courtesy and consideration, both revealed a great deal of insecurity
and timidity. Note that even though Kalugina tried to emphasize explicitly or implicitly that she and Novosel’cev were on a par in this new situation, she still remains his director—the fact he is not going to forget easily. She is also his hostess, which, likewise, endows her with more power over him as hosts, not quests, usually direct the course of gatherings. Taking all this into consideration, the imperative снимайте платье! in combination with a highly colloquial and informal живо sounds too straightforward. Moreover, said to a woman by a man with whom she is yet distant, снимайте платье, живо! can certainly be interpreted as “impolite”. However, Kalugina obeys Novosel’cev’s command and starts taking off her dress. Novosel’cev timely stops her; both feel embarrassed. What then made the director obey Novosel’cev’s command and prevented her from interpreting it as “impolite”. I believe, the urgency in the situation, though it plays an important role, is not the only factor here. Another important factor is the director’s behavior which allows Novosel’cev to exercise power-TO, i.e., even after the man spills wine on her dress, she continues to maintain the face she has assumed for the interaction—that of a soft person. Consider her Вы не сделали ничего особенного in turn 3. Even though she does admit in 3 that the man ruined her new dress, this is still done in a soft, non-accusing tone. It is this tone and Kalugina’s general helplessness that allow Novosel’cev to exercise power-TO. Combined with the fussiness that he created about the matter, снимайте платье, живо! makes Kalugina act immediately without thinking.
The embarrassment that she feels when he stops her makes the director come to her senses and try to take the situation in her hands. In trying to stop the man who is desperate about saving her dress, Kalugina utters a number of imperatives: *Анатолий Ефремович...! Перестаньте!* (turn 9), *Ну прекратите же! Я все равно носить его не буду...* (turn 11), and *Ну ей богу, если вы сию секунду не замолчите...Я вы...Я сожгу это платье на ваших глаз...Сядьте!* (turn 15). The woman’s tone in 9 and 11 is insistent, but is sooner imploring rather than commanding. She still tries to maintain her face of a gentle woman. For example, Kalugina still obeys Novosel’cev when he asks her to sit so he could sprinkle salt on her dress. However, she becomes gradually more impatient the more fuss the man makes about the dress. Note how her remarks about the dress change in their intensity from *Я все равно носить его не буду...* in 11, to the less patient *Да оставьте вы его в покое...Э. это...Будь оно проклято, это платье!* in 13, to the utterly impatient *Ну ей богу, если вы сию секунду не замолчите...Я вы...Я сожгу это платье на ваших глаз...* in 15 which culminates in the imperative *Сядьте!* If in 13 she still makes an attempt to save her face of a soft, friendly-disposed woman by pronouncing *Милый, славный...*, in 15 she takes the risk and utters the harsh *Сядьте!* Among the imperatives used in this episode this one stands out as open to an “impolite” interpretation. Note, that without knowing the prosodic features of *Сядьте!*, we could just take it as part of politic behavior. After all, it could just be a request to sit down colored in a variety of emotional overtones: imploring, insistent but yet soft, etc. However, the tone with which it is pronounced in the movie and
the gesture which accompanies this tone indicate that this was either an “abrupt request” or an “order” to sit down. In fact, this is one instance in the whole interaction in which it becomes possible to recognize the former harsh director in this now soft and feminine woman. This tone, I believe, for a moment reinstates her power-OVER towards the man, and is used when, apparently, she gave up the hope of calming him down in any other way. The effect was achieved immediately, as the man obediently sits down. Once again, Сядьте!, the way it was uttered, provides most contextual effects52. Thus, the gesture and the tone, which are EPMs here, allow the addressee to make the following inferences:

(1) < Kalugina tells me to sit down. >

(2) <Her tone and gesture make it clear that (1) is a command that allows no objection.>

Note, how in this situation it would be absolutely impossible for the director to use the infinitive “сидеть” as she does in the first episode, as, this time, she has a lot to lose— namely, her softer human self and his attraction to her. Also note that, in turn 17, immediately after Сядьте! is uttered, her tone changes abruptly back to a very soft and friendly one. Thus, she tries to reestablish the equilibrium in the politic behavior of the interaction and demonstrates by her softened tone that she would like to carry on with supportive facework.

52 See also Culpeper (2005) who discusses the key importance of prosody in people’s perception of impoliteness. Thus, for example, he discusses heavy stress, which “in terms of Sperber and Wolson’s (1986) relevance theory,…..makes a claim on our attention, and thus guarantees some informational reward”. (ibid.: 53)
Let me emphasize again that all we can do is open up Сядьте! to an “impolite” interpretation, as it deviates from the politic behavior established by the characters in the previous part of the interaction. However, nothing in the man’s behavior (his non-verbal reaction) shows us that he has, indeed, interpreted the imperative as “impolite” or “rude”.

3.3 Limitations on Watts’ Methodology for Analyzing Russian

What does the brief analysis in 3.2 above tell us about the effectiveness of the methodology suggested by Watts with relation to our particular case of investigation? First, it may seem that I, as a researcher, still act as the major evaluator/interpreter of people’s behavior; that is, there remains an element of subjectivity in this methodology. This, first of all, concerns the establishment of the linguistic minimum required for the interaction vis-à-vis polite behavior, i.e., behavior in excess of that minimum. Clearly, it is easier to speak of the required minimum vis-à-vis impolite behavior; impolite behavior is easily noticed as it violates the expected default behavior characteristic of a specific interaction (a more thorough discussion of such default behavior follows below). In other words, impolite behavior noticeably contrasts with the politic behavior of the interaction. The same can be said about instances of marked53, noticed politeness when the contrast with the expected politic behavior is obvious. Such is, for example, the use of politeness for sarcasm as in episode 1 from the movie “Служебный Роман” discussed above. Or, for example, consider the following episode from the movie “Покровские Ворота”. The

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53 See also a discussion of “marked” versus “unmarked” politeness by Usami (2001a) in Haugh (2003).
action is taking place in a clinic where the man has been given vitamin shots by a nurse to whom he is not indifferent. The episode starts with the man’s wholehearted thanking of the nurse after she has given him the last vitamin shot. The line he assumes for the interaction is that of an eternally grateful patient who admires the nurse both as a professional and person. His goal in the interaction is to demonstrate to the nurse that he likes her. His “face” is that of a very soft, kind man with fine manners who knows how to appreciate people’s kindness. The nurse takes on the “face” that the man expects from her—likewise of a very soft, kind, attentive to other people person. It is interesting to note how she changes her “face” when she has to confront an angry patient who is waiting impatiently behind the door: her imperative utterances in turns 18, 20, and 50 are uttered in a very firm authoritative peremptory voice which clearly demonstrates to the patient the nurse’s power-OVER. She does not even find it necessary to mitigate her commands by пожалуйста or in any other way; her goal is to retort the impatient patient behind the door and to keep him out for as long as possible. Her goal in the interaction with the main character is, however, very different. The goal is to demonstrate her feelings to the man, which she does at the first opportune moment in turn 8. Both main characters speak in a very soft voice (almost a whisper) throughout the whole interaction, both behave very timidly. However, certain instances of the man’s linguistic behavior seem to be in excess of the politic behavior of the interaction. These are the instances when he thanks the nurse for her kindness and professionalism in turns 1 and 26. It is his emphatic О благодарю with the old-fashioned intensifier О and the general tone of his
utterances that make the man’s speech sound elevated and high-flown, very much in contrast to what causes this prolific thankfulness—a vitamin shot, and the nurse’s common health recommendation in 25. This excessive politeness fits well with the movie’s genre—comedy, and, I believe, is intended to be noticed by the viewing audience as an instance of humor.

Episode from “Покровские ворота”.

0: 16: 56

-1HE: Благодарю вас. О благодарю. Мне было так хорошо!
-2SHE: Я… рада.
-3HE: Вы вы так это делали!
-4SHE: А… в самом деле?
-5HE: Вы прекрасно кололи!
-6SHE: Ну что вы…
-7HE: Вы знаете… я ничего не почувствовал.
-8SHE: Жаль.
-9HE: Нет, вы меня не так поняли. Я не почувствовал… там, куда шприц входил… А вообще-то я очень почувствовал.
-10SHE: Но… это был последний укол.
-11HE: Не говорите так! О не говорите так! Я привык приходить сюда… Я привык к вам… Я привык к вашим рукам… к вашим чертам… к их вражению.
-12SHE: Во мне нет ничего особенного.
-13HE: О… Вы ошибаетесь! Как вы ошибаетесь! А помните… Вспомните, когда я к вам пришел первый раз.
-14SHE: (Laughs) Вы забыли направление.
-15HE: Да (laughs)...И любая другая прогнала бы меня прочь, а вы… Позвольте поцеловать вам руку.
-16SHE: Что вы!
-17HE: Один раз. На прощанье...(kisses her hand)
  (Loud nock on the door)
-18SHE: Да? (Sees an impatient patient) Закройте дверь!
-19P: Скоро? (impatiently)
-20SHE: Закройте дверь и ждите.
-21P: (Sighs heavily)
-22HE: Я вас задерживаю?
-23SHE: Нет-нет, ну что вы.
-24HE: Вот уж… и осень… Скоро дожди пойдут. Ветер завоет.
-25SHE: Самое грипозное время. Держите ноги в тепле!
-26HE: Благодарю вас...О благодарю.
-27SHE: А… разве ваша жена за вами не смотрит?
-28HE: Жена? Видите ли, она… Она занятой человек… у нее напряженная
духовная жизнь. Да, а кроме того, мы расстались.
-29SHE: Она уехала?
-30HE: Нет, она не то что бы уехала… Просто ушла.
-31SHE: Боже мой!
-32HE: Да, полюбила другого.
-33SHE: Надо же!!! (puts hands to her face in disbelief)
-34HE: Наверное, так нужно, так надо…(cites a poem) Что нам на прощанье даны
осенний огонь листопада и льдистый покров тишины…
-35SHE: Стихи? Вы написали?
-36HE: Нет… Другой. Он уже умер. От чахотки.
-37SHE: Какой ужас!
-38HE: Я… я бы хотел увидеть вас… вновь
-39SHE: Я не знаю, где мы с вами можем увидеться.
-40HE: Ну… ну мало ли где… Вот здесь на углу лаборатория.
-41SHE: Там сдают на анализ.
-42HE: Если вы разрешите, я… буду ждать вас там.
-43P: (The door opens. The same patient appears and asks angrily his question) Долго
еще?
-44HE: Вы популяры.
-45SHE: Нет! Это витаминизация популярна, не я. Так много нервных больных.
Совсем некому колоть.
-46HE: Так… как же?
-47SHE: Хорошо… После работы.
-48HE: Благодарю вас (kisses her hand) Благодарю. (walks away stumbling)
-49P: (The angry patient enters the room) Ну?! (angrily)
-50SHE: Раздевайтесь!

Speaking of potentially impolite utterances in this interaction, it is possible to
open up the nurse’s imperative utterances in turns 18 and 20 to an impolite interpretation
since they serve to prevent the patient behind the door from interrupting the activity
between the main characters which has caused his anger. Thus her behavior encroaches
on the patient’s social rights and violates the interactional principle of equity.\textsuperscript{54} She exercises her power-OVER and does not make any effort to attenuate the conflict. The angry look on the patient’s face and his demanding \textit{Hy}?! in turn 49 make it clear that he has found the nurse’s behavior inappropriate and, possibly, rude.

Returning to the question of politeness, it should be noted that even though the researcher still does not often have direct access to the characters’ own verbally expressed evaluations of what I have called \textit{marked} politeness, the researcher’s comments, I believe, sound less subjective when s/he opens this or that utterance to a polite/impolite interpretation. It is likely that such marked behavior will be noticed by other viewers as a deviation from the “norm”, and thus, the researcher’s grounds for opening an utterance to a polite interpretation become more clear for those who try to understand the proposed theory. The element of researcher subjectivity is quite strong, however, when the researcher opens up an utterance for a “polite” interpretation without making it clear why this/that particular instance of behavior is in noticeable contrast to what is expected. Thus, the researcher sounds subjective in what is “minimally required” for the interaction. Consider Watts’ example of the interview with Tony Blair discussed above in 2.4.1.2 (Chapter 2), which I repeat here for convenience.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{D:} Mr. Blair\textbackslash in this election\textbackslash you're asking the electorate to put their trust in you\textbackslash the new Blair isn't \textbf{politician}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{54} Spencer-Oatey (2002, 2005) discusses interactional principles from which behavioral expectations can result. The equity principle consists in that “…people have a fundamental belief that they are entitled to personal consideration from others and to be treated fairly; …that they are not unduly imposed upon, that they are not unfairly ordered about, and that they are not taken advantage of or exploited (Spencer-Oatey 2005: 99-100).
BEHAVIOR

B:

2 D: there a problem that there’s an old Blair who believed in quite different things which makes it POTENTIALLY OPEN TO INTERPRETATION AS LINGUISTIC POLITENESS

B:

3 D: rather difficult for people to trust the new one

B: \textit{no} I don’t agree at all \textit{I mean} we have been through NEGATIVE EVALUATION “CAJOLER” OF “POLITE” UTTERANCE POLITIC BEHAVIOR ATTEMPT TO RESTORE HARMONY

[a big process of change and modernization of the Labour Party…]

Watts opens up Dimbleby’s utterance \textit{isn’t there a problem that there’s an old Blair who believed in quite different things which makes it rather difficult for people to trust the new one} to a potentially “polite” interpretation. His grounds for doing so is that the utterance could have been put in a different way and still be politic: \textit{There’s a problem that there’s an old Blair who believed in quite different things. Doesn’t this make it rather difficult to trust the new one?} (Watts 2003:223). However, Watts’ point is rather hard to see as it remains unclear why the more straightforward utterance is more politic than the original one. Even if we take into account the conflictual character of the interaction, it does not make things more clear. In fact, Dimbleby’s original indirect utterance can be seen as more provocative than the one suggested by Watts. Thus, the original utterance seems to conform quite well to the politic behavior (conflictual discourse) of the interaction. Also, Watts does not demonstrate how Dimbleby’s behavior contrasts with the conflictual behavior expected by the audience from the interaction and
from Dimbleby in particular. Thus, for example, it could have been helpful to know that in previous programs with Dimbleby the moderator was always straightforward, etc. An additional discussion of kinetic or prosodic clues in order to make the point clear could have likewise been supportive of Watts’ interpretation.

Yet despite the critique above, I find Watts’ methodology very useful in that it demonstrates very well the contested nature of the notions of politeness/impoliteness—the point of major importance in this work. In this respect, the researcher subjectivity should not present a big problem as the researcher **does not claim** that all of his/her assumptions are right. The researcher only allows himself/herself to **open up** certain linguistic utterances to **possible** interpretations. Moreover—and this is important—s/he gives grounds (even if they sound subjective) for opening up utterances to certain interpretations. In fact, the researcher, by being his/her own guinea-pig as a hearer, demonstrates on what grounds the hearers may interpret this or that utterance as “polite”/”impolite”, etc. The difference is that lay interpreters will often not be able to explain coherently why they interpret this or that utterance as “polite”/”impolite”, etc. Thus, the researcher only tests his/her **hypothesis** against the reactions of the addressee and does not make any definitive claims. After all, Watts (2003) is fully aware that “politic behavior”, too, is as contested a term as “polite” and “impolite”, and that there is no objective way to define politic behavior (ibid.: 166). This alternative model of approaching linguistic politeness only shows us how actual hearers, based on their **habitus** and present circumstances, may arrive at certain evaluations.
What the discussion above does suggest, however, is that opening utterances for a “polite” interpretation in particular is going to be quite a challenging task. I discovered this as I watched various movies searching for examples with a “polite” (in Watts’ terms) potential. I found myself making a lot of effort in trying to pick out such instances from the general flow of conversation—quite unlike the instances of potential impoliteness that I would instantly notice. This suggests that I was not noticing such instances, i.e., all positive behavior seemed normal and appropriate to me for the given context! It is not by chance that some researchers refuse to accept Watts’s differentiation between polite and politic behavior.\textsuperscript{55} I, however, find the term politic behavior useful for the present discussion as it serves very well as an umbrella term for that normal behavior that is non-polite (not to confuse with impolite) and that normal behavior that contains EPMs and would probably be called “polite” by lay interpreters if they were asked to point out “polite” linguistic expressions. These kinds of behavior are normal exactly because they pass unnoticed with the hearers during the interaction. Consider turns 1 and 5 of the example below from the movie “Место встречи изменить нельзя”. The action is taking place in the department of fight with crime. The conversation is between the investigator Žeglov and Gruzdev Ivan Sergeevič who is suspected of the murder of his wife Larisa Gruzdeva. Several of Žeglov’s men are present in the room during the conversation. The imperative utterances in bold type in turn 1 are examples of “polite” (in laymen terms)

\textsuperscript{55} E.g., Terkourafi (2005:252) points out that by differentiating between polite and politic behavior, Watts “…downplays their similarities, i.e., the fact that both politic and polite behavior achieve face-constituting.” See also Haugh (2003: 403-404) who discusses anticipated politeness versus inferred politeness as different from Watts’ differentiation between politic behavior and polite behavior.
politic behavior as they contain EPMs (пожалуйста) or are themselves an EPM (e.g., присаживайтесь). The examples in italics in turns 1 and 5 are examples of non-polite politic behavior. Both bold-typed and italicized examples represent normal, unmarked politic behavior which usually goes unnoticed with the hearers. Thus, Watts’ term politic behavior allows us to avoid confusion between laymen “politeness” (P1) and the marked, noticed politeness discussed above.

Episode from “Место встречи изменить нельзя”.
0: 55: 12

-1Ž (to Gruzdev) Проходите, пожалуйста…
(to Nikolaj, one of Zheglov’s men) Коля, заходи, присядь.
(back to Gruzdev) К столу, пожалуйста. Присаживайтесь. Попрошу вас...как можно подробнее изложить историю вашей жизни с Ларисой Груздевой...а также ваши соображения по поводу происшествия...ну, о ее знакомых, всех кого знаете… Отдельно, пожалуйста, опишите весь ваш вчерашний день по часам и минутам...буквально

— 2G Моя жизнь с Ларисой—это мо личное дело...А что касается ее при ятелей...то увольте меня...Попишите других желающих писать на нее доносы.

—3Ž Послушайте...Вы не доносчик, вы по делу свидетель...пока, во всяком случае... И давать показания, интересующие следствие, обязаны! Поэтому пишите, что вам говорят.

— 4G На чье имя писать и как сей документ озаглавить?

—5Ž Пишите… Пишите на имя начальника московской милиции...
(Žeglov and his team leave the room for Žeglov’s office)
Let me summarize, once again, the challenges that the discussion above suggests for our particular case of investigation. First of all, it has been shown time and again that it is impossible to discuss the impoliteness of imperative utterances in isolation from context, especially that impoliteness is often generated over several speech acts or even speech events and cannot be reduced to the speaker’s single utterance. Secondly, the suggested alternative methodology for the discussion of (im)politeness seems to be more fruitful for the discussion of impoliteness. And even then, it could be quite hard to discuss what role the imperfective/perfective forms played in the general perception of impoliteness. Consider the example below from the movie “Ирония Судьбы”. The conversation below occurs between a woman, Nadya and her fiancé Ippolit in Nadya’s apartment. Ippolit is very upset and angry because when he came to visit Nadya he found another man in her apartment. Nadya says (and it’s true) that she sees this person for the first time in her life, and that she discovered him sleeping in her apartment when she came home from the store. The intruder confirms Nadya’s words. An incredible thing happened: the man’s own apartment is an exact copy of Nadya’s as well as the key to the apartment. Even after the intruder leaves Ippolit remains angry as he finds it hard to believe the story. His line is that of a deeply wounded and angry man. Nadya’s line is that of an understanding woman ready to forgive her fiance’s anger and do everything to restore harmony in their relationship. Ippolit is fully aware of Nadya’s intention to forgive him his anger (see

turns 5 and 7) which allows him to exercise power-TO and utter 8, 10 and 12. Certainly, 8, 10 and 12 can be open to a potential impolite interpretation as they damage the other participant’s quality face\(^{57}\): shutting up Nadya in 12, calling her безалаберная and непутевая. As this example demonstrates, impoliteness arose before the imperative utterance was uttered. Thus, it becomes quite impossible to discuss the weight that the imperfective imperative might have added to the perceived impoliteness. And again, the actual hearer, Nadya, does not demonstrate that she has evaluated Ippolit’s behavior as impolite; such an evaluation would undermine her goal—to calm down the angry fiancé.

Episode from “Ирония судьбы”.
0: 59: 30

Heavy silence. He stands by the window looking away from her. She breaks the silence.

—1N Ну перестань дуться. Не смей меня ревновать.

—2I Хммм…

—3N Если я кого-то и полюблю, ты узнаешь об этом первый.

—4I Хммм… Не смей ревновать...Интересно....Да нет я не серюсь....Но просто ты тоже...тоже...должна понять....Я прихожу а тут…

-5N Я тебя прекрасно понимаю.

-6I Чe[прт] (hisses trough his teeth)

-7N Я тебя очень хорошо понимаю. Я на твоем месте закатила бы такое! (she hugs him)

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\(^{57}\) According to Spencer-Oatey (2002: 540-542), it consists in that “we have a fundamental desire for people to evaluate us positively in terms of our personal qualities…”
—8I То что он появился в твоем доме, это вполне соответствует твоему характеру.

-9N Почему?

—10I Потому что ты безалаберная!

-11N Аа ...Но...

—12I Молчи. Ты непутевая...В моем доме он вряд ли мог бы повиться. Странно, что ты его вообще обнаружила. Мало ли что...там...вяляется.

—13N (she bends her head guiltily; takes his present in her hands) Ты угадал. Я его не сразу заметила.

—14I Угу (agreeing sound)

-15N Ах! Это же настоящие французские духи! Axxx! (she kisses him on the cheek) Они такие дорогие!

—16I Ну… хмм…(still appears to be angry)

—17N Я тебе тоже кое-что приготовила.

—18I Что?! Еще один подарок?!

-19N Пожалуйста (stands on her knees as she presents her present to him).

—20I Что это? (his tone softens a bit, he smiles)

-21N Бритва самой последней марки.

—22I Ой …зачем, Надя....(said very softly)

It seems, then, that the most desirable examples for our particular discussion would be those in which impoliteness arises (at least, the way the analyst perceives it) in single imperative utterances that stand in sharp contrast to the rest of the context—like
сидеть! and сядьте! in episodes 1 and 2 discussed above in 3.2 from the movie “Служебный Роман”. Such instances of impoliteness are probably the ones that give us more right to discuss the possible contribution of the semantic components of the perfective/imperfective to the perceived emotive nuances expressed by the imperative form (detailed discussion follows in 3.5). It should also become clear that prosody plays a major role in the perception of such single imperative utterances as polite/impolite. That is, intonation (marked intonation) of such utterances becomes an EPM in its own right guiding the hearer through the inferential process. In fact, the major role of prosody in the perception of impoliteness in speech has been emphasized in most recent impoliteness research (Culpeper 2005; Wichmann, A. in Culpeper et al. 2003).

Lastly, there is another challenge that Watts’ methodology presents for our research. It is that Watts’ data do, in fact, contain the verbal reactions of the addressee. By falling back on these reactions, Watts can bring more certainty into his deductions about how the addressee may (have) interpret(ed) the utterances that Watts opens up for “polite”/”impolite” interpretations. In our particular case with a narrow focus on the “politeness”/”impoliteness” of imperative utterances, it is very hard indeed to find instances where the addressee, actually, reacts verbally to imperative utterances. Since imperative utterances usually request an action from the addressee, a verbal response is not even necessary; or, if present, it can be very limited. The issue of power is of crucial importance here. Thus, verbal reactions (especially those that contain an impolite evaluation of the speaker’s behavior) will most likely occur when the hearer does not
recognize the speaker’s power to request/command/order, etc., a certain action. However, the form of power that is exercised on everyday basis (unlike rude physical force) is one with which the hearer is generally ready to comply. Bourdieu (1991) calls this recognized legitimate aspect of power “symbolic power” or “symbolic violence” (ibid.:23). This aspect of power, I believe, pertains to both power-TO and power-OVER. This is “…an invisible power, which is “misrecognized” as such [i.e., people perceive it as socially appropriate behavior] and thereby “recognized” as legitimate” (ibid.:23); it is “built into the institution [e.g., of education, military service, health care, etc.] itself” (ibid.:24). Symbolic power can be exercised only under the condition that both the dominating and the dominated party in the interaction share the belief that the dominating party has the right to exercise power (ibid.:23). Hence, the dominated participant is active in his compliancy with the power exercised over him and uses linguistic capital that reveals his “sense of his place” in the interaction (ibid.:23, 235). A vivid example of this is the behavior of the director and the employee in the first episode when the employee, by his behavior, endows the director with the right to utter the infinitive сидеть!, no matter whether he finds it rude in his heart of hearts. Thus, it is quite natural that most of the time and in the majority of situations we will be lacking verbal evaluations on the part of the hearer, so that our deductions about a certain interpretation become rather hard to test. The positive aspect that, however, remains is that we will not be able to make claims such as this utterance sounds impolite or polite; we will take the position of the hearer
3.4 Politeness as a Contested Notion: Obtaining Examples of Classificatory Politeness

Since we do not have direct access to actual hearer’s evaluations unless the hearer explicitly expresses such evaluations in the course of interaction, the researcher interpretations are valuable in that they demonstrate an individual’s *habitus* at work. But since *habitus* includes not only an individual experience but also a social one, it would be interesting to obtain other hearers-viewers evaluations of the utterances under study in order to test the researcher’s interpretations and to reveal to what extent they can be considered objective. This experiment should also demonstrate to what extent norms are shared and at the same time contested among different members of a single society. Thus, it has been pointed out as a downside of Eelen’s theory in particular that he treats norms as contested notions and declines their sharedness (Terkourafi 2005: 243). This does not agree with the fact that the alternative theories make extensive use of the Bourdieuan HABITUS one major aspect of which is that it “…shapes the ways in which the individual internalizes *objectivised social structures* in order to use them in dealing with ongoing interaction” (Watts 2003: 149).\(^{58}\) Thus, it remains unclear what happens to these “objectivised social structures” in Eelen’s model, and how members of a society acquire their “feel for the game”. In recent works on politeness the notion of *frame* has become

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\(^{58}\) Added emphasis is mine.
popular as able to explain the nature of norms. Frames are defined as “structures of expectation based on past experience” (Locher and Watts 2005: 11). Terkourafi characterizes frames as “schematic, minimal (as opposed to fully actualized, nonce) contexts capturing what constitutes “normal circumstances” in which generalized implicatures of politeness arise” (Terkourafi 2005: 259) and calls them “psychologically real implementations of the habitus” (ibid.:253). That is, we know about people’s predispositions to act in specific ways depending on the situation (Locher and Watts 2005: 11, 17). Thus, even before entering an interaction we must assume some default behavior for that interaction based on our various communicative experiences from the past, i.e., we expect what linguistic and non-linguistic behavior should be normal (appropriate) for his interaction. In other words, we expect certain social norms to be acted out by the participants. Then, depending on the extent that our expectations are justified, our repertoires of frames (and our view of social norms) either remain the same or change to various degrees. Certainly, our repertoires of frames overlap to various degrees. But before we enter an interaction, we must assume some sort of agreement about norms of behavior (Terkourafi 2005:244-245, 247, 253; Locher and Watts 2005: 11, 17). Otherwise, interaction would be nothing but continuous misunderstanding.
Related to the question of norms, is the question of prediction in the “post-modern” theories of politeness. Terkourafi who has proposed a frame-based view on politeness\textsuperscript{59} critiques the post-modern views on this point. She is worth citing in full:

Predictions (and so the theories that engender them) are by nature \textit{probabilistic} and \textit{temporary} and are only useful to the extent that they are ratified by the data. But an a priori denial of the possibility of prediction amounts to denying the possibility of politeness at any level (even at the level of participants’ folk theories about politeness). What we are then left with are minute descriptions of individual encounters, but these do not in any way add up to an explanatory theory of the phenomena under study. (Terkourafi 2005:245)

I agree with Terkourafi as I find it possible, for example, to predict that Kalugina’s \textit{сидеть!} from episode 1 of “Служебный Роман” will be noticed by the majority of viewers as negative in terms of politeness and norms of behavior in society in general (macro-level). However, I would not claim the same for the form \textit{сядьте!} (uttered by the same character in episode 2) as it does not violate any general norms of behavior (as I have internalized them in my \textit{habitus}) but only the politic behavior of this particular interaction (micro-level). To borrow Terkourafi’s terminology, the impoliteness in the first episode is frame-based/achieved-via-generalized implicature\textsuperscript{60}, while in the second episode it is non frame-based/achieved-via-particularized-implicature.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} An alternative view on politeness, a “frame-based” view, admits the existence of norms to the extent that they can be observed. The analysis is carried in a bottom-up fashion (it is data-driven) by establishing regularizes of co-occurrence of certain linguistic forms with certain types of contexts. (Terkourafi 2005:246-254)

\textsuperscript{60} The frame-based view (Terkourafi 2005:255-256) introduces the notion of generalized implicatures of politeness.

\textsuperscript{61} Terkourafi (2005: 252) uses this terminology with reference to politeness.
that I propose below should make it clear to what extent the researcher is right in his/her interpretations.

The experiment’s goal is to compliment Watts’ methodology so it becomes possible to obtain more reactions of actual hearers (i.e., laymen who are unaware of the details of the experiment) to imperative utterances. I suggest that, by using movies as material, we can obtain other viewers’ reactions to the episodes in question and to the imperative utterances in particular. Viewers, unlike the characters in the movie, are not actual participants in the situation, and so, unlike the characters, they do not have to recognize the power of the speaker over the addressee—just as I, as a researcher and viewer, did not recognize the director’s power and right to utter сидеть! in the first episode of “Служебный Роман” and was able to open сидеть! to an impolite evaluation. By obtaining more viewers’ reactions/evaluations to the same utterance, I would be able to test my assumptions about the possibility of an impolite evaluation of сидеть! provided other viewers reveal the same sensitivity to the context and more or less the same expectations from the main characters. More importantly, since the experiment I suggest below should reveal what different people associate (im)politeness with, it will support the view of (im)politeness as a contested notion. Let me now explain in more detail how I view this kind of experimental procedure.

A researcher could start by asking the actual viewers to assign faces and lines to the main characters based on what they know about them from having previously viewed the movie. Of course, the viewers would not be told to assign “faces/lines” per se, as it
would not be necessary to familiarize them with the terminology used by the researcher. The researcher can simply ask the viewers about the image they perceive behind the director’s and the employee’s behavior in the movie based on their behavior and on how other characters in the movie think/expect them to behave. That is what kind of image the main characters are trying/would like to/have to maintain, create, disprove, depending on the specificity of the situation in the two episodes that the viewers are asked to evaluate.

The next step would be to play the episodes to them once again. After the participants finish watching each episode, the researcher would ask how the viewers characterized the characters’ behavior. This would be the first step in obtaining their evaluations of the character’s behavior without any imposition of a researcher’s opinion on them. What a researcher is looking for in these evaluations is the actual pronouncement of behavior as “polite” or “impolite”/”rude”, and not just “strict”, “crazy”, etc. Then, the researcher would offer the participants an additional list of descriptive adjectives (among which are “polite”, “impolite”, “rude”) and ask the participants whether they could expand their evaluation of the whole episode further by using any adjectives from the list. The participants would be asked to circle the adjectives which they believed/would apply to the situation. The purpose of such a list would be to see if the viewers consider it possible to apply the “polite/impolite” terms to the situation. Thus, for example, a viewer could describe the director’s behavior in the first episode as “bossy, obnoxious, mad, tactless, haughty”, etc., but we would actually want to see if the viewers would use the terms “polite”/”impolite”. By using a list of adjectives, and not
just the “polite”/”impolite” terms, we do not emphasize out focus on (im)politeness as we want the reactions/evaluations to be more or less spontaneous.

The researcher could proceed further by playing the dialogue to the viewers line by line and by asking them to apply to each line as many of their own adjectives as possible (from the ones they have used before to characterize the whole situation) and any of the additional adjectives that they did or did not circle in the list of descriptions provided by the researcher. Thus, the viewers would remain unaware of our interest in their interpretation of the imperative utterances only, while we would be able to see whether the imperative utterances had, indeed, been interpreted as polite/impolite. To proceed further, we could ask the participants what exactly in the character’s behavior/words made them perceive this/that particular utterance as “polite/impolite” (plus “strict, considerate, outrageous, sarcastic…”—whatever their string of descriptions is); we could observe whether they would point out the imperative verb itself as playing a role in that interpretation. Further, the researcher could ask a participant about any possible changes in the wording of the utterance to make it begin to sound “considerate”, “nice”, “appropriate”, etc. and “polite” (if, for example, the participant gave the utterance an “impolite” evaluation). Again, we would be able to see if the participant changed the imperative verb (its aspectual form) itself.
3.4.1 Discussion of the Choice of Data Source

The choice of data source in this study is largely dictated by the study’s narrow focus on the evaluation/interpretation of imperative utterances only. Thus making recordings of naturally occurring conversations done by a researcher (e.g., see examples in Watts’ (2003) study) become a painstaking and rather futile task. There are several reasons for this. First, it would be quite difficult for any researcher to predict with any degree of certainty which interaction in which setting would yield any sufficient amount of imperative utterances to be analyzed. Should a researcher embark on such a task, s(he) would have to record for hours on end in hope of obtaining enough data. The second limitation is that it would be physically difficult for a researcher to achieve extensive variability in the recorded situations, participants, etc. On top of it, add the “observer’s paradox” (Labov 1972b: 113) when participants in the experiment are aware of being recorded, with the consequence that the researcher might never obtain any examples of impoliteness at all. Clearly, such research methodology becomes too complicated to be considered. Likewise, there is no guarantee that already recorded excerpts or whole interactions from, for example, TV or radio programs (see Watts’ study) will provide the researcher with enough imperative utterances to be analyzed. Plus, again, TV or radio excerpts rarely allow us to observe participants in a variety of settings when they communicate with people of different backgrounds or are engaged in a discussion of various life issues. Let me emphasize that this kind of variability is crucial for our study as we are trying to obtain examples not only of politic behavior or polite behavior, but
also of impolite behavior expressed via direct imperatives. Even long TV or radio recordings of conflictual discourse do not promise us any such data.

The question now is what sources can provide us with the much desired variability in settings and situations, with characters coming from different backgrounds whose interactional goals change in every particular interaction. We need sources which might provide us with the participants’ moral evaluations (i.e., examples of classificatory politeness\(^\text{62}\) which are so hard to obtain in naturally occurring interactions) of people’s behavior. We need sources which will acquaint us with the participants’ individual histories so we can understand the stakes involved in this or that interaction for each participant.

Sifianou (1992) points to drama (namely, plays) as such a rich source of data. Plays can be considered examples of spoken speech, as they are meant to be heard. They provide us with the kind of variation discussed above “[which] is very difficult to capture in any manageable corpus of fieldwork data” (ibid.: 6). Though I agree with Sifianou, I can see two potential problems with using this kind of source in our particular study. First, scripts do not provide us with all the prosodic features and non-verbal behavior that we need in order to be able to open imperative utterances to a polite/impolite interpretation. A playwright always leaves some room for the actors’ imagination of how they might convey this or that emotion. The second problem is technical and concerns the second part of the experiment that I suggest above—the part when we try to obtain

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\(^{62}\) Classificatory politeness refers to the actual explicit evaluations by an individual of other people’s behavior as polite/impolite in actual interaction (Eelen 2001: 35).
evaluations of the characters’ behavior from the audience, i.e., viewers. It would be quite hard to find enough people who have read this or that play in its entirety and thus have an idea about what is going on in the excerpt that they are asked to evaluate. Thus, the familiarity of the participants in the experiment with the material is also an issue.

Therefore, as a source I suggested using particular movie excerpts with which the participants are well acquainted. After all, no participant will agree to watch a whole new movie to participate in the kind of experiment suggested here. Of course, movies contain the prosodic information that we need as well as the non-verbal behavior. Prosodic features become especially important since, as researchers point out, there is no intonation patterns characteristic exclusively of imperative utterances (Xrakovskij & Volodin 1986: 146; Bryzgunova 1980: 115-116; Bryzgunova 1988, cited in Benacchio 2002: 151).

3.4.2 Advantages and Limitations of the Experimental Procedure

The experimental procedure that I suggest for obtaining hearers’/viewers’ evaluations of the movie characters’ behavior has the following advantages. First, we never focus the participants’ attention on politeness/impoliteness alone but obtain strings of descriptive adjectives, first for the whole situation, and then for each line in particular. Thus we solve the dilemma of having the participants define politeness/impoliteness as concepts. As research has shown, people have trouble defining these concepts out of context and find the task disturbing and unclear see e.g., Sifianou (1992: 86). Obtaining
strings of descriptive evaluations also allows us to see what different participants associate politeness/impoliteness with. We can also see which elements are shared in the perception of (im)politeness.

Second, having the participants evaluate someone else’s behavior reduces the effects of the observer’s paradox to a certain extent. No doubt, the participants can still “darken” or “brighten the colors” in their evaluations, as they may consciously or unconsciously demonstrate to the researcher their own politeness and their knowledge of manners and norms (Eelen 2001: 38-39)—for example in comparison to the characters’ impoliteness. However, the lack of direct linkage to their own behavior may make their evaluations relatively more objective and spontaneous. Thus, we are not asking the participants to “imagine” themselves in this or that situation, and so imposing far-fetched roles on them by so doing. (e.g., “imagine you are a professor”, “fill in the blanks”, or “choose the most appropriate answer from the given variants (a),(b),(c)) This kind of concoction of artificial situations has been a downside in many (im)politeness studies; we certainly do not want to replicate it here, as our goal is the analysis of naturally occurring discourse.

One downside of the suggested procedure may be that, by offering the terms “polite” and “impolite” among other adjectives when we ask the participants to evaluate each line of the conversation, we may force the participants constantly to characterize “polite behavior” as “polite”. It would be of interest to see which behavior they actually perceive as “normal” (i.e., politic), which goes unnoticed, and which behavior they notice
as particularly “polite”. Then we could pay closer attention to the contents of the utterances classified as “polite” and see what the participants associate this “politeness” with. This can be achieved, however, if the researcher first lets the participants assign their own evaluations to each line; only then should s/he offer the participants additional strings of descriptions to add to each line’s evaluation.

No doubt, this procedure will be most productive in obtaining impolite evaluations. As I pointed out above, “polite” behavior and “politic” behavior will most likely merge in laymen’s evaluations. However, “impolite” evaluations should present more interest to researchers, as people are quicker to determine what makes a given utterance sound impolite then what makes it sound polite. Thus, in the case of the “wrong” imperative form, they should be quick to point it out along with any other factors. In our turn, we will be able to proceed further and focus on the properties of the imperative form itself (perfective or imperfective) as contributing to the impolite evaluation. With “polite” evaluations, however, the task becomes harder, as the participants have to rely on what is present in the utterance or context. This second task may be a perplexing one for the participants as, again, “there is no objective criteria to define politic behavior”, so that the hearers will have to rely on their intuition, their “feel for the game” (Watts 2003: 166).

In chapter 4 I will discuss the findings of an empirical pilot study which was conducted based on the experiment suggested in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL STUDY

4.1 Goals

A pilot study was conducted based on the experiment suggested in Chapter 3. The study’s major goal was to test my earlier prediction that a discussion of how aspectual forms contribute to the perceived nuances of (im)politeness in imperative utterances presents a great challenge for researchers. A more concrete goal was to obtain more actual hearers’-viewers’ evaluations in order to test my assumptions about the possibility of a polite/impolite evaluation of the utterances from the two episodes of the movie “Служебный Роман”, which I opened up for such evaluations.

4.2 Working Hypothesis

Considering the contested notion of politeness/impoliteness—the major point of this whole work—I do not expect all participants to confirm my interpretations, but rather to demonstrate individual variability in these interpretations. Thus, my hypothesis is that
the study will demonstrate that no researcher can be entirely objective in his/her evaluations of various linguistic utterances as (im)polite.

However, since I decided to take into consideration the critique by Terkourafi (2005) of post-modern theories’ denial of the possibility of prediction in a politeness theory, I have also decided to test whether a researcher, armed by his/her knowledge of shared norms as they are present in his/her habitus (“objectified social structures”), can attempt to predict with a greater or lesser degree of certainty which utterance is more or less likely to be interpreted as polite or impolite, or, at least, as more or less positive or negative. That is, I am testing for whether researchers can actually predict which utterance, among all utterances opened up for example, for negative evaluation, is more or less likely to be interpreted as negative. This will demonstrate to what extent researchers can rely on their sense of the sharedness of norms as they present examples of politeness/impoliteness to their readers. Thus, I have made an attempt to predict that the utterance with the infinitive сидеть from the first episode is more likely than any other utterance to be interpreted as impolite.

Secondly, since I did not open any utterances for a positive “polite” evaluation, it was extremely interesting to see whether such evaluations would occur among the participants in the experiment and whether they would reveal any consistency in such evaluations.

In 3.4.2 I expressed the concern that, if we offer the terms “polite” and “impolite” among other adjectives in part 4 of the questionnaire (when the participants
are asked to evaluate each line of the conversation), we may force the participants to constantly characterize “politic behavior” as “polite”. To the contrary, it would be of interest to see which behavior they actually perceive as “normal” (i.e., politic), which goes unnoticed, and which behavior they notice as particularly “polite”. Then we could pay closer attention to the contents of the utterances classified as “polite” and see what the participants associate “politeness” with.

4.3 Participants

Five native speakers of Russian, three female and two male, took part in the experiment. All five have a college education, and two have post-secondary professional education. The daily exposure to Russian for all the participants is more than 50%; for three of them it is more than 80%. The subjects were recruited randomly from the researcher’s acquaintances by a personal call. The only requirement for the eligibility of the participants was that they be familiar with the movie contents. I ensured that all the participants had the opportunity to view the movie shortly before the experiment. This was important, since I was interested in seeing on what grounds the participants evaluate the chosen instances of behavior, i.e., how their expectations about the characters’ behavior would influence their evaluations of the characters’ subsequent behavior.
4.4 Material

As material I used the two episodes from the movie “Служебный Роман” discussed in detail above in 3.2, focusing on the imperative utterances in bold type (see below).

1 N[ovosel’cev]: (stumbling, slurring words, not even able to say her name correctly): Здравуйте… Прокопья Людмиловна… я пришел… Меня… не знаю… меня вч… вчера… вот… Меня вчера муха укусила.

2 K[alugina]: Да, я это заметила (strict, harsh tone maintained through turn 27).

3 N: Или я с цепи сорвался.

4 K: Это уже ближе к истине.

5 N: Значит, я с цепи.

6 K: Да.

7 K: Садитесь, товарищ Новосельцев.

8 N: Нет, не надо.
9 К: Анатолий Ефремович.

10 Н: Лучше умереть стоя.

11 К: Садитесь, не робейте.

12 Н: Спасибо.

13 К: Сделайте одолжение, располагайтесь.

14 Н: Спасибо.

15 К: Вчера вы... (he makes an attempt to rise from his seat) Сидеть! (sits back down) позволили себе утверждать... что во мне нет ничего человеческого...

16 Н: Ну что вы...Мало ли, что я вчера болтал. На меня не стоит обращать внимание...

17 К: Нет... надо...Почему же... Тем более, что вы являетесь выразителем мнения определенных слоев нашего коллектива.

18 Н: Неужели...

19 К: Вчера вы меня публично оклеветали...

20 Н: Да.

21 К: Оскорбили...

22 Н: Оклеветал.

23 К: Все, что вы говорили, возмутительная ложь!

24 Н: Возм...

25 К: Я с вами категор...категорически не согласна (first signs of nervousness).

26 Н: И я категорически...
In this first episode, I pointed out turns 7, 9, 11, and 13 as instances of politeness the way Watts defines it, i.e., as behavior in excess of the expected politic behavior of the interaction. However, the sarcastic tone with which the director Ljudmila Kalugina pronounces these utterances, as well as kinetic clues, allow the hearers to make the following inference: the goal of this excessive politeness is to produce a negative effect. Thus, we can expect that other viewers will also perceive this sarcasm and may associate it with impoliteness.

The second example from the first episode which I opened up for an impolite evaluation is the imperative utterance which contains the infinitive imperative form сидеть in turn 15. I ventured to predict that this utterance is more likely to be interpreted as impolite by other viewers than any other utterance in the episode (see 3.4 for details).

In the second episode I opened up two utterances in turns 6 and 15 for a possible impolite interpretation. Both were considered to be less than what is minimally required by the interaction (see 3.2 for a detailed discussion).

1 К: Ой ой!
2 Н: Что же я наделал!
3 К: Вы не сделали ничего особенного. Но… Вы испортили мне новое платье…
4 Н: Нет-нет. Это надо…Это солью..
5 К: Красное вино не отмывается.

7 К: Что же вы говорите снимайте...

8 N: Нет…Это я не подумал…Люд…мила Прокопиевна…Я сейчас (runs to the kitchen, she runs after him)

9 К: А-анатолий Ефремович…! Перестаньте!

10 N: Не снимайте платье!

11 К: Ну прекратите же! Я все равно носить его не буду…

12 N: Быстренько… Садитесь …Я сейчас посыплю вас солью…И все сойдет…только посидите.

13 К: Да оставьте вы его в покое…Э.. это…Будь оно проклято, это платье! Черт с ним…Милый, славный…

14 N: А потом…Я возьму его с собой и простирну его в..<

15 К: Ну ей богу, если вы сию секунду не замолчите…Я вы…Я сожгу это платье на ваших глаз…**Сядьте!**

16 N: (he sits)

17 К: Анатолий Ефремович …Я так взволнована вашим признанием…Ну какой же вы рядовой…

My expectation was that the participants should notice the imperatives in turns 6 and 15 as a deviation from the expected politc behavior and as a demonstration by the movie
characters of power-to (in turn 6) and power-over (in turn 15). However, I did not expect all the participants to evaluate the imperative utterances that contain the imperative forms as impolite. I only assumed that it was possible.

A questionnaire (see Appendix) was composed for this study based on the suggestions discussed above in 3.4. In order to avoid study bias, the concrete topic of investigation was not revealed to the subjects. Thus, the participants were not aware of the researcher’s interest in their polite/impolite evaluations of imperative utterances. The participants were asked to analyze ALL utterances from the episodes (not just imperative) in order to minimize the risk of their figuring out what exactly interested the researcher.

In part 1 of the questionnaire, the participants were asked whether they liked/disliked the movie in general. This question was asked in order to reveal any predisposition among the participants to produce more negative evaluations should they dislike/hate the movie. Parts 1, 2, 3, 5, and partly part 4 required the subjects’ oral answers, which were digitally recorded on the researcher’s computer. Part 4 also required the completion of a multiple-choice task.

Questions 1-3 in part 2 of the questionnaire helped the participants to assign “lines” and “faces” to the movie characters, so I could see what the participants expected from the movie characters, i.e., on what basis they produced their evaluations.

Questions 4-7 in part 2 were asked to elicit the participants’ evaluations of the characters’ behavior in the whole episode. They were asked to support their answers with examples from the movie. This was the first step in my search for “polite”/“impolite”
evaluations. In part 3 of the questionnaire, the participants watched the episode line by line and were asked to characterize the movie characters’ behavior in each line using as many adjectives or adverbs as came to their mind. Again, I was looking here for the actual pronouncement of the adjectives “polite” and “impolite”.

In part 4 of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to characterize the characters’ each turn once again. This time, however, I provided the participants with a list of adjectives (6 positive and 6 negative), among which were the adjectives “polite” and “impolite”. I asked the participants to apply as many adjectives to each line as possible. My interest here was to see whether they will apply the adjectives “polite” or “impolite” to any of the characters’ utterances. I emphasized to the participants that they should look through the whole list as they characterized each line to ensure that they did not accidentally skip any of the adjectives. They were also encouraged to add any other adjectives/adverbs that came to their mind as they completed the task. This was intended to help me to see with what the participants associated politeness/impoliteness.

In part 5 of the questionnaire, I asked the participants to explain their evaluations of selective utterances. As a researcher, I was primarily interested in those that received polite/impolite evaluations among other evaluations. Thus I asked the participants, for example, what made them perceive such and such an utterance as “respectful, polite and considerate”. They were asked to explain each characteristic so it would be possible to see what in the speaker’s utterance made them perceive it as (im)polite. To avoid bias, I asked the participants to explain their characteristics not only for those turns that received
a polite/impolite evaluation, but also for those which did not contain such evaluations. Thus, the participants did not become aware of our interest in the utterances which received polite/impolite evaluations among other evaluations. Also, I ensured that I did not miss any spontaneous talk on (im)politeness, which was very important for the analysis of how actual hearers arrive at their evaluations.

Finally, once I obtained as many spontaneous evaluations and explanations as possible, I could ask directly what in this or that utterance made the participants perceive it as polite/impolite or why, for example, they did not characterize such and such utterance as polite/impolite. I was interested in seeing whether the participants would point out the imperatives themselves as polite/impolite. Also, by asking these questions, I could obtain the participants’ valuable comments on what they understood by politeness/impoliteness.

Since the goal of all politeness theories, according to Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003), should be to demonstrate how actual hearers arrive at their evaluations, the experiment was constructed so we could obtain explanations from the participants of the grounds on which they made such evaluations.

The sequence in the completion of the questionnaire was as follows. The participants were asked to complete each part of the questionnaire for both episodes; that is, they completed part 2 for both episodes, then part 3 for both episodes, etc. This sequence was important to ensure a methodologically equal survey/discussion of both episodes.
4.5 Procedure

Before the participants took part in the study, they were familiarized with its details and signed a consent form for participation. Each one of them had one individual meeting with the researcher which lasted approximately 2-3 hours, depending on how much spontaneous talk each one of them produced. Upon arrival, each participant was asked to complete the questionnaire discussed in detail in 4.4. The participants did not have to complete the questionnaire in writing, as all their answers were digitally recorded on the researcher’s computer. The participants were aware of being recorded at all times.

The sequence in the completion of the questionnaire was discussed in detail in 4.4 above. Each episode was played to the participants 3 or 4 times. The first three times were obligatory for the completion of parts 2, 3, and 4 of the questionnaire. The fourth playing of the episodes was necessary when the participants explained their answers given in parts 3 and 4 of the questionnaire and when it was clear to the researcher that the participants could not remember exactly why they produced this or that evaluation. When the participants were asked to explain their evaluations of different utterances form the episodes, the researcher did not pick only those with received a “polite” or “impolite” evaluation among other evaluations. This was done in order to ensure that the participants did not become aware of the researcher’s sole interest in those utterances that were evaluated as “polite” or “impolite”. It was only after the researcher had collected as many unbiased spontaneous evaluations as possible that the participants were asked
directly why they did or did not evaluate such and such utterance, and the imperative forms under study in particular, as “polite” or “impolite”.

In the course of the experiment, the researcher paid close attention to everything that the participants were saying in order not to miss any spontaneous comments on what they thought was polite/impolite. They were encouraged to produce as many comments as possible and were not interrupted at any time as they spoke. The researcher encouraged the participants to elaborate on their comments by asking them such questions as “What do you mean by ‘he is being formally polite’?” “You mentioned ‘impolite’ but then decided not to circle it; why did you change your mind?”’, and the like.

Upon completion of the questionnaire, the researcher notified the participants that she didn’t have any more questions for them, thanked them for participating in the study and made sure they were aware that the recording had been stopped.

4.6 Findings

Let me first report the findings on turns 7, 9, 11, and 13 from the first episode (see 4.4 above). Turn 9, though it does not contain an imperative, should also be taken into account, as the director’s sarcastic attitude is initiated by this phrase. When the results of parts 3 and 4 of the questionnaire are combined, the prevailing descriptions for the utterances in 7, 9, 11, and 13 are язвительный, высокомерный, снисходительный (mocking, haughty, condescending). That is, the sarcastic attitude of the director was surely perceived. Likewise, the participants pointed out the director’s bossy behavior and
her power over the addressee. There is only one deviation in the overall evaluation of the
director’s behavior in turns 11 and 13: one participant gave a positive characterization to
the director’s behavior in these turns: уважительный and терпеливый (respectful and
patient) for turn 11, and терпеливый and уступчивый (patient and acquiescent) for turn
13. However, in her explanation of the given characteristics, the participant did say that
the director was высокомерная (haughty) but that she was “терпеливый” (patient) as
she waited for Novosel’cev to calm down.

Participant 3
уважительна и терпелива… она смотрела на него свысока…тем не менее, она терпеливо выжидала, когда же он успокоится, и эта фраза не совсем высокомерно прозвучала, она сказала терпеливо и спокойно…

[she was] respectful and patient… she looked down upon him; nevertheless, she	patiently waited for him to calm down, and this phrase did not sound entirely
haughty…she said it patiently and calmly…

Another participant did interpret turn 11 as impolite along with haughty. She pointed out that
the impoliteness of the phrase is in the lack of the word “please” and of the imperative being in the
first place in the utterance.

Participant 1
невежливость в том, что не прозвучало вежливого слова «пожалуйста», опять-таки повелительное наклонение на первом месте;… высокомерность в том, что она подчеркнула свое такое неприветливое отношение к его
состоянию… эмоциональному в данный момент.

The impoliteness is in that she did not use the polite word “please”…and, again, the imperative mood is used first;… the haughtiness is in that she emphasized her so unfriendly attitude towards his …. emotional state at the given moment.
Another participant characterized turn 7 as *polite* along with the negative *mocking* and *haughty*. According to this participant, the director’s politeness consisted in that she offered Novosel’cev a seat, whereas the tone of the phrase made it sound haughty.

Participant 2
Она вежлива, язвительна и высокомерна. Она все-таки вежливый человек, и как бы он не был ей неприятен, она ведет себя вежливо, потому что «садитесь»…. она могла сказать ему и «не садитесь», и все таки, она пригласила его сесть. Я считаю, что она проявила свою вежливость… а язвительна по тону голоса, когда она сказала «товарищ Новосельцев»—было слышно, что хотя она и вежлива, она пытается его уколоть.

She is polite, mocking and haughty. She is a polite person, and no matter how unpleasant he is for her, she behaves politely, because of “sit down” (imperfective)…she could have said “don’t sit”…but she did invite him to take a seat. I think she expressed her politeness…. [She sounds] mocking—it is in the tone of her voice, when she said “Comrade Novosel’cev” you could hear that even though she is polite, she is trying to mock him.

In spontaneous talk, i.e., as the participants explained some other characteristics, two mentioned politeness for turns 7, 9 and 13. For one participant, the politeness (along with снисходительность/condescension) in 7 consisted in the director’s offering a seat to Novosel’cev. Phrase 9 was called “formally polite” because the director called Novosel’cev by his full and patronymic name. Turn 13 was also called polite in its structures; however the participant pointed out that its tone made the phrase sound haughty and unfriendly.

Let me now report the findings on turn 15 of the first episode. The form Сидеть! (infinitive *sit!*) was noticed by all the participants even before they were asked to characterize the
dialogue line by line. It was mentioned by the participants as an example of the director’s haughty behavior which demonstrated her power over Novosel’ev, i.e., she showed to him who the boss was. Further on, in parts 3 and 4 of the questionnaire, turn 15 was characterized mostly in negative terms as требовательная (demanding), строгая (strict), жесткая (harsh), командно (commanding), бесцеремонная (unceremonious), нетерпимая (resentful). However, surprisingly, none of the participants called the director’s attitude in turn 15 impolite. Moreover, when asked directly in part 5 of the questionnaire whether they would call the director’s behavior in 15, and the form Сидеть! in particular, impolite, only two participants said that, maybe, “impolite” was also a suitable description of the director’s behavior. Participant 1 said that she did not see anything impolite in this phrase; participant 2 said that an unceremonious attitude prevailed in this phrase; participant 3 said the description “impolite” did not seem suitable for her, and participant 4 said the director sounded “normal”.

Participant 1
Ну, в этой фразе высокомерного я ничего не увидела, здесь она просто неприветлива и жестка… это «Сидеть!» комментирует то, что произошло в предыдущем эпизоде. Здесь невежливого ничего нет….«садитесь» предполагает какое-то вежливое предложение «сесть», а «сидеть» это уже другая степень приказа, что ли, который не терпит каких-либо возражений.

Well, I didn’t see anything haughty in this phrase, she is just unfriendly and harsh…this “Сидеть!” refers to what happened in the previous episode. There is nothing impolite here… “Садитесь” presumes a kind of polite invitation to sit down, whereas “Сидеть” is a different degree of command, isn’t it, which does not tolerate any contradictions.

Participant 2
Ну, может эти вещи [жесткий, бесцеремонный, неприветливый] доминирует в этой фразе… что она ему говорит «сидеть»—бесцеремонно совершенно… она же не спрашивает его желание сесть или нет, она ему приказывает
сидеть и конечно неприветлива, потому что, как говорится, она не спрашивает его мнение, она говорит свое мнение.

Maybe, these things [harsh, unceremonious, unfriendly] dominate in this phrase… that she tells him “сидеть” is utterly unceremonious… it’s not that she had asked about his wish to sit or not, she commands him to sit, and of course she is unfriendly because, how can I say it, she does not ask his opinion, she says her own opinion.

Participant 3
высокомерие и невежливость… здесь для меня они не подходят.

*Haughtiness* and *impoliteness*—to me they don’t fit here.

Participant 4
[“сидеть” прозвучало] нормально… ну, может быть, да ты—права, нетерпеливо, невежливо… ну я считаю… ну, неприветливо, невежливо, может быть, это одно и то же.

[“сидеть” sounded] normal…well, maybe, yes, you’re right—impatient, impolite… well, I think… well, unfriendly, impolite, maybe it’s one and the same thing.

Participant 5
Ну, может быть, невежливо тоже, наверное, сюда подходит… ну как бы что первое приходит в голову—это бесцеремонно…а невежливый… это трудно сказать, что является следствием одного другого… ну, конечно, это невежливо… я согласен, что так вот обрывать резко—это невежливо, но первое впечатление это больше что бесцеремонно.

Well, maybe, impolite also probably fits here… but what first comes to mind is unceremonious… whereas impolite… it’s hard to say which is the consequence of which… well, surely, it’s impolite… I agree, to interrupt so abruptly, it’s impolite, but the first impression is that it is more unceremonious.

The findings on turn 6 from the second episode are as follows. Turn 6 was mostly characterized in positive terms, and Novosel’cev’s behavior was called уверенный
(confident), решительный (decisive), услужливый (obliging), заботливый (caring).

Though three participants also found it to be бесцеремонный (unceremonious), they did not consider it impolite because Novosl’cev’s intentions were positive.

Participant 2
С одной стороны, он хочет сделать как лучше, бесцеремонность начинается с фразы «снимайте платье», там и тон изменился он стал таким приказным, с другой стороны, может, быть он действительно верит, что он может исправить положение.

On the one hand he means only well, his unceremonious behavior starts with the phrase “take off the dress”, his tone also changed there, it became commanding; on the other hand, maybe, he truly believes that he can mend the situation.

Participant 3
Он не был невежлив… он не сказал, чтобы посмотреть на нее голую или еще что-нибудь, он об этом не думал в данный момент, он хотел просто ей помочь.

He was not impolite…he didn’t say this to look at her naked or anything like that; he didn’t think about it at that moment, he just wanted to help her.

Participant 4
Бесцеремонно, потому что он побежал искать соль, не спросив разрешения, не церемонится, в тоже время у него есть желание помочь…ну, ни «пожалуйста»… бесцеремонно начал ей приказывать, вот «живо»,
например: «живо снимай».

Unceremonious, because he ran to look for salt without asking her permission, he is being unceremonious…at the same time he has a desire to help… [he didn’t say] “please”… he started to order her unceremoniously, saying “hurry”, for example, “hurry, take off [the dress]”.

Вопрос: а почему эта фраза не прозвучала невежливо?

Question: why didn’t this phrase sound impolite to you?
Ответ: невежливо? он не подразумевал… он вежлив был, просто бесцеремонен… здесь он же не показывал свое отношение к ней.

Answer: impolite? He didn’t intend it… he was polite, just unceremonious…he didn’t demonstrate his attitude to her here.

Last, the findings on turn 15 of the second episode are as follows. The perfective form сядьте (sit) was definitely noticed by the participants as a form that contrasted with the rest of the context. They all noticed the change in the director’s tone from soft and friendly to harsh, demanding, irritated, and decisive. Though three participants directly connected the above connotations with the form сядьте, none of the participants thought that turn 15 was impolite. The common explanation was that impoliteness is not presupposed by the situation in this episode.

The following utterances in the two episodes were characterized as polite with the following explanations by the participants.

Episode 1, Turn 8 (Participant 3)
7 K: Садитесь, товарищ Новосельцев.
8 N: Нет, не надо.

Он это сказал спокойно, это скорее спокойно связано с вежливостью.

He said it calmly, and his being calm is most likely connected to politeness.

Episode 1, Turn 26 (Participant 4)
25 K: Я с вами категори...категорически не согласна (first signs of nervousness).
26 N: И я категорически...

Может быть, он звучит вежливо, но он соглашается, не противоречит ей, старается быть вежливым, всю вину принимает за свое поведение.
Maybe, he sounds polite... well, he agrees, does not contradict, tries to be polite, accepts all the guilt for his behavior.

Episode 1, Turn 12 (Participant 5)
11 K: Садитесь, не робейте.
12 N: Спасибо.

Ну, в самой фразе не резко пытается возразить а все-таки вежливо, т.e предлагили сесть, и он вежливо говорит “спасибо”.

Well, in the phrase itself he does not contradict harshly but politely, i.e., he was offered a seat and he says “thank you” politely.

Episode 2, Turn 2 (Participant 1)
1 K: Ой ой!
2 N: Что же я наделал!

вежлив в том, что раскаяние звучит, он раскаивается в том, что совершил. Любезность—в его готовности исправить то, что он совершил.

He is polite in that he sounds repentant, he is repenting for what he did. There is courtesy in his readiness to correct what he has done.

Episode 2, Turn 3 (Participant 1)
2 N: Что же я наделал!
3 K: Вы не сделали ничего особенного. Но... Вы испортили мне новое платье...

Эта фраза состоит из двух частей: первая, я посчитала, что она вежлива и терпелива в том, что она пыталась успокоить его взволнованность... Она пытается его успокоить, но в то же время она не может удержаться от того, чтобы не съязвить по этому поводу и сказать, что “вы испортили... ничего такого особенного”.

This phrase consists of two parts: the first one, I thought, is that she is polite and patient in that she is trying to calm his agitation... She is trying to calm him down, but at the same time she cannot refrain from being mordant about it all and says “you ruined [the dress]... you didn’t do anything out of the ordinary”. 

203
Episode 2, Turn 4 (Participant 1)

3 K: Вы не сделали ничего особенного. Но… Вы испортили мне новое платье…

4 N: Нет-нет. Это надо… Это солью…

Он был услужлив, любезен и вежлив. Вежливость и любезность в том, что он хочет помочь.

He was obliging, courteous and polite. Politeness and courtesy are in that he wants to help.

Episode 2, Turn 7 (Participant 1)

6 N: Где у вас соль …Нет… Это за… замоется… Снимайте платье, живо! Живо снимайте! A-a-a! Нет! Не сейчас… не здесь… Что вы!... Не надо…

7 K: Что же вы говорите снимайте...

Вежливость в том, что она не выразила раздражение по отношению к нему, а просто вежливое недоумение.

There is politeness in that she did not express irritation towards him but just a polite embarrassment.

Episode 2, Turn 9 (Participants 1 and 3)

8 N: Нет...Это я не подумал… Люд… мила Прокопиева… Я сейчас (runs to the kitchen, she runs after him)

9 K: А-анатолий Ефремович…! Перестаньте!

Participant 1: Вежливо… хотя здесь употребляется глагол в повелительном тоне, в то же время ему предшествует ее вежливое, и по интонации в том числе, обращение к нему по имени отчеству.

Polite... even though she uses a verb in an imperative tone, it is preceded at the same time, including the intonation, by her polite address to him using his first and patronymic names.

10 N: Не снимайте платье!
11 К: Ну прекратите же! Я все равно носить его не буду...

Participant 2:
Пос отношению к нему она звучит довольно вежливо, как мы ведем себя, когда у нас гости, например, скатерть обольют? Мы пытаемся это не заметить и все обернуть в шутку; в этом эпизоде она уже не проявляется как начальница, скорее как хозяйка… гостеприимная.

She sounds quite polite towards him …like we behave when we have guests, for example, and they spill something on the tablecloth? We try not to notice it and turn everything into a joke; in this episode she does not appear as a boss any more, but as a hostess... hospitable.

Participant 4:
Ну, потому что она говорит «нун прекратите же», вежливо отказывается от платья ради отношений с ним.

Well, because she says “stop”, politely sacrifices her dress for the sake of her relationship with him.

Episode 2, Turn 17 (Participant 3)
17 К: Анатолий Ефремович …Я так взволнована вашим признанием… Ну какой же вы рядовой…

Ну, просто по тону мне показалось, что вежливо.

Well, simply, her tone seemed polite to me.

Episode 2, Turn 4 (Participant 4)
3 K: Вы не сделали ничего особенного. Но… Вы испортили мне новое платье…
4 N: Нет-нет. Это надо… Это солью…

Он пытается это сделать вежливо, то есть говорит «нет, нет».

He tries to do it in a polite way, that is, he says “no-no” [“you don’t have to”].

Episode 2, Turn 5 (Participant 4)
4 N: Нет-нет. Это надо… Это солью..
5 K: Красное вино не отмывается.
Она ответила, чтобы он прекратил волноваться, суетиться.

She answered so that he would stop worrying, fussing about it.

There seem to be three factors that influenced the participants’ evaluation of the utterances above as polite. The first factor is prosody or “tone”, as the participants called it (turns 8, 9, 17). The second factor is the participants’ knowledge of some generalized basic etiquette norms— for example, the use of “thank you” when you are offered something (turn 12); the use of full name and patronymic name when addressing somebody (turn 9); and refusing something politely using the etiquette “нет-нет” (“you don’t have to”) (turn 4). The third factor is the participants’ more individualized knowledge of what is polite or not; thus, in turns 2, 3, 4, 7, 11 and 26 they make it clear what behavior they consider polite. In 26, for example, politeness consists in not contradicting the person, admitting one’s own guilt; in 11 the participant explains how she thinks one should behave with a guest, etc.

Only one phrase from episode 1 was characterized by one participant as impolite:

Turn 19 (Participant 1)
19 K: Вчера вы меня публично оклеветали...
20 H: Да.

Она была нетерпима, невежлива, неприветлива, обидчива. Да, не смотря на то, что ее голос уже как бы задрожал…. Ну, почему нетерпимая? Она не хочет слышать никаких возражений, невежлива—потому что она это слишком прямо говорит… прямо и строго. Ну, потому что для меня, все-таки, вежливый тон более мягкий, а здесь не прозвучала какая-то мягкость.
She was resentful, impolite, unfriendly, and touchy. Yes, even despite her voice already kind of quivered… Why resentful? She doesn’t want to hear any contradictions. Impolite - because she is too straightforward in saying all this…straightforward and strict. Well, because for me, anyway, a polite tone is softer, and there wasn’t some softness here.

4.7 Discussion of Findings and Study Limitations

The findings above demonstrate that, indeed, evaluations of various utterances as polite/impolite vary across individuals. Thus, a researcher can never be fully objective in his/her interpretations of certain utterances as polite/impolite. Thus, the interpretations of the utterances discussed above that I suggested did not find support with other actual hearers/viewers, despite the fact that all of them revealed similar expectations about the characters’ behavior and assigned similar “lines” and “faces” to the characters.

The most striking example of individual variability in polite/impolite interpretations is the example with the infinitive “сидеть”, which I predicted would be the form most likely to receive an impolite evaluation. None of the participants, however, evaluated the utterance with this form as impolite. Even when asked directly, only two participants agreed that this utterance could be evaluated as such.

This supports Watts’ and Eelen’s idea of the highly contested nature of (im)politeness. Some other spontaneous remarks by the participants lent further support to this idea. Consider the following remark by Participant 2, revealing her uncertainty about the definition of the notions *polite* and *respectful*.
Меня смущают прилагательные «уважительный» и «вежливый». Я все время думаю о смысле... в каком бы случае я их бы употребила... ну то есть, «вежливый»... можно быть вежливым очень формальным и искренним.... Вежливый—это больше как воспитание, а уважительный—“я ощущаю уважение к этому человеку”... ну это для меня.... то есть, я не могу себя вести по-другому, а вежливый—не знаю... просто как формальное поведение.... ну это я так понимаю... поэтому в данной ситуации мне трудно ее судить... с другой стороны, я чувствую, что она искренняя здесь, поэтому я бы сказала, что она пытается быть не вежливой, а уважительной...

I don’t feel certain about the adjectives “respectful” and “polite”. I keep thinking about their meaning... in what cases I would use them...well, that is, “polite”... you can be polite, very formal and sincere... “Polite” is more like an upbringing, and respectful—“I feel respect towards this person”... well, it is like that for me... that is, I can’t behave otherwise, but “polite”—I don’t know... is simply like formal behavior... well, I understand it this way... that is why it’s hard for me to judge her in this situation... at the same time I feel she is sincere here, that is why I would say she is trying to be not polite here, but respectful...

My concern that by providing the adjective polite among other adjectives in the suggested to the participants list would make them characterize every instance of politic behavior as polite proved to be of minor importance. First of all, the participants did not characterize every instance of politic behavior as polite. Second, they started to use the adjective “polite” only when it was offered to them. In their previous spontaneous evaluations of all utterances in the dialogues, the participants did not evaluate them as polite. This suggests that all these utterances seemed quite normal to them—“politic”, to use Watts’ terminology. Third, when offered the term polite as a description, the participants did not reveal any consistency in their polite evaluations. First of all, they did not pick the same utterances for polite evaluations. Second, each one of them was
inconsistent in his/her own evaluations of, for example, etiquette norms: sometimes they would say that “please” was polite, at other times that “thank you” was normal. This proves that the participants saw the characters’ behavior as politic most of the time; only when they were provided with a list of adjectives did they sometimes use the term polite to characterize the characters’ behavior. The participants’ inconsistency in their polite evaluations proves, once again, the contested nature of the term “polite”.

Since none of the participants evaluated as “impolite” the utterances that I opened up for an impolite interpretation, I cannot discuss the contribution of the aspectual forms to the perception of impoliteness behind the imperative verb forms in these examples. It is possible, however, to discuss the emotive nuances of harshness, intolerance, unfriendliness, unceremoniousness for the example with the infinitive command сидеть and the nuances of harshness, impatience, decisiveness, intolerance for the example with the perfective imperative сядьте. These two forms were noticed by the participants as forms that contrasted with the expected politic behavior of the interaction, which demonstrated the director’s power over the man. I will demonstrate in 4.8 on what basis we can theorize about the possible contribution of the aspectual forms to the perceived emotive nuances, including the nuances of impoliteness/politeness (if we assume that such evaluations did occur).

The main goal of the study was achieved. The results supported the idea of the contested notion of politeness/impoliteness, which varies across individuals. The experiment’s results ruled out the idea of making predictions about whether a certain
polite/impolite interpretation was more or less probable—at least, definitely not on the basis of an individual’s/researcher’s experience. This proves, once again, the extreme challenge that a researcher faces as s/he tries to present his/her readers with examples or theories about the contribution of the aspectual semantics to the perception of the nuances of (im)politeness behind a verb form in the imperative.

I should now mention a few limitations of the study. As the experiment was carried out, it became clear that the experimental procedure could further be improved to avoid possible bias in the experiment. Thus, in part 4 of the questionnaire the participants, besides being presented with a list of adjectives, were also presented with each line from the movie excerpts in a printed form. Thus, despite the fact that the participants still viewed each line of the movie excerpts, they sometimes did not pay close attention to each line because they had a typed script in front of them. Thus, for example, participant 4 evaluated the phrase Нет-нет. Это надо...Это солью... (said by Novosel’cev in the second episode) as polite on the basis of the etiquette expression “нет-нет” (“you don’t have to”). However, I believe the prosody of “нет, нет” as pronounced by Novosel’cev was different from the common etiquette expression “нет-нет”, and it was actually the way “нет-нет” was typed that made the participant perceive it as an etiquette expression. Therefore, should a similar experiment be carried out, I suggest that the participants be presented only with the list of adjectives to characterize each line, but not with a typed script of the movie.
Another limitation of the experimental procedure consists in that there is always a chance that the participants, though constantly reminded to look through the whole list of adjectives as they characterize each line, may, in fact, ignore this instruction. One reason may be a participant’s being pressed for time or being tired and inattentive. After all, the experimental procedure is lengthy (2–3 hours) and may be rather tiring. Last, the number of participants should be increased in order to claim validity for the experiment’s results.

4.8 On the Possibility of Theorizing about the Role of the Aspectual Imperative Forms in the Perceived (Im)Politeness.

4.8.1 Speech Acts Revisited

Last, but not least, I would like to demonstrate how our knowledge about the semantics of the imperfective/perfective can aid researchers in identifying those imperatives that are likely to be open to a polite or impolite interpretation. Of course, this knowledge can be helpful only in combination with the methodology suggested above. To clarify my point, in this section I will revisit the discussion of speech acts with reference to the meaning of the perfective/imperfective forms in the imperative.

As should be clear from my discussion in Chapter 1 of the problems that arise when researchers assign certain speech acts’ meanings to the meanings of either the imperfective or the perfective aspect, I will not attempt to classify which aspect expresses which speech act. As has been pointed out repeatedly, both aspectral forms can be found with one and the same speech act. A further problem, is the never-ending dispute about
the number of speech acts (the major difficulty is terminological—Hamblin 1987: 26) and the paramount importance of the context in defining a speech act. Thus, it becomes a difficult task even to provide examples of “requests”, “commands”, “demands”, etc., if we do not provide the context “... without which they [“requests”, “commands”, “demands”] could be either or neither” (ibid.: 6–7). So, “the test of what is or is not a “command”, or any sort of imperative, is ultimately functional” (ibid.: 6).

Nevertheless, we can gain some valuable insights into the modality of the imperfective and the perfective forms from studies that attempt to generalize about the speech act(s) characteristic of the imperfective and the perfective. This research is very valuable in that it gives us an idea (if only intuitive) of what the “core meaning” (invariant meaning) of the aspectual forms might be. Ultimately, we are better able to provide some explanation of why, for example, there arises a question of interpersonal distance between interlocutors depending on the aspectual form used, with the perfective being called more “distant”, “formal” and “appropriate” (“корректно”), etc. (Benacchio 2002: 163, 164, 169, 171).

Padučeva’s (1996) analysis of the semantics of the imperfective, once again, proves helpful. As noted above, she points out the components “focus on the beginning”, “immediately”, “action results from the situation” in the semantics of the imperfective. She argues that the general speech act that the imperfective carries out based on these components is that of a “signal” to perform the action. No such generalized meaning was posited for the perfective. Likewise, Rassudova points out (1982) that the perfective, in
comparison with the imperfective, is modally colored and brings into speech acts the nuances of “request, command, advice” (ibid.: 130–31), etc. True, it was pointed out by both scholars that in certain contexts both aspects can be used to perform the same speech acts. Yet, these discussions convey quite a discernable message: there is a preference for using the perfective for “requests, commands”, etc., and the imperfective for neutral incitement, the signal to perform the action, as well as for the speech act of “invitation” (ibid.: 136).

I believe we can combine the knowledge of this preference with the knowledge of the impossibility of aspectual competition in certain cases to get closer to the “core meaning” of the perfective. Namely, it has been pointed out (Padučeva 1996: 76) that it is irrelevant to compare the emotional nuances resulting from the substitution of the perfective for the imperfective in cases like the following.63

(1a) Взвесьте мне 3 килограмма помидор, пожалуйста.
(1b) Скажите, пожалуйста, как пройти к метро.
(1c) Пробейте мой билетик, пожалуйста.
(1d) Передай мне соль.
(1e) Дай мне вон ту книгу.

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63 These examples are mine. See For more examples, see in Padučeva (1996: 76).
Let us call the above speech acts “requests” (“request” is used here as a generalized term, and, depending on the context, it can turn into a “demand”, “command”, etc).

Padučeva points out that the imperfective is impossible in the speech act of “request” (ibid.: 76). To be more exact, it is the “request” of the type that we find in the utterances above. What are the characteristics of such “requests”? What makes them the domain of the perfective exclusively? If “requests” in this sense is the “core meaning” (invariant meaning) of the perfective, we are justified in opposing it to the meaning (semantic elements) of the imperfective. Thus, apparently, this “request” is performed when the hearer does not expect it (as opposed to the component “action results from the situation” in the imperfective’s meaning). In the example at the store above, the salesperson knows s/he can expect a request of some sort, but can never be fully certain of what exactly s/he will be asked (взвесьте мне пол кило колбасы, пожалуйста; отрежьте мне 200 грамм сыра; дайте мне пакет молока, etc).

This “non-expectancy” of the perfective request may be the main feature that differentiates it from an imperfective request. The reason I say “may be” is that I did not make it my goal to carry out a fine-grained analysis of the semantic components of the perfective “request”. For the purpose of my discussion here, it is enough to know that this kind of “request” exists and that the perfective form in it cannot be replaced by the imperfective. It is my assumption that this type of “request” is the main function of the perfective, and that it is this “underlying” meaning which is carried on to the situations in which the perfective can be used interchangeably with the imperfective. It is this
underlying core meaning that is responsible for the emotive nuances so often attributed to the perfective in such cases (e.g., in giving permission: Можно..? —входите/войдите; открывайте/откройте [окно], etc.).

My further assumption is that it is this very distinction between the imperfective-perfective—“signal” (neutrally colored) vs. “request” (modally colored)—which allows Russian speakers to use more imperatives than, for example, English speakers. Thus, when a Russian speaker addresses someone in the street starting with the perfective скажите…the meaning of request is instantly there, whereas the English bare imperative will not signal any such thing “Tell me…”. Hence, the majority of requests in English are done indirectly, whereas bare imperatives tend to be associated with commands, instructions and orders (Lyons 1969: 307; Hamblin 1987: 3).

4.8.2 “Willfulness” of the Perfective Imperative

In regard to the assumptions that I have made above, Hamblin’s (1987) classification of imperatives in English deserves special attention. He classifies the imperatives “…in a quasi-sociological way, according to the kind of ‘authority’ they carry… and according to the aims and expectations putatively entertained by their issuers and recipients” (ibid.: 5). Depending on whether the speech act is concerned with the hearer’s interests and wishes or not, Hamblin classifies imperatives into willful (requests, demands, commands), and non-willful (e.g., advice and instructions as in recipes). However, there remain speech acts which do not fit his dichotomy and which he (like
other researchers) fails to classify, as he himself admits—for example, *invitations, wishes* (ibid.:24–25) and what he calls the “immediate” imperatives, where “in some cases the interest of the addressee provides a rationale, in others of the issuer…Because of the immediacy or urgency, the question of rationale is academic…” (ibid.: 26): Help! Mind your head! Run! Ssh!

The interesting observation here is not so much the distinction between willful and non-willful imperatives but between these two groups and the third, unclassified one, which includes *invitations, wishes* and “immediate” imperatives. Hamblin also points out that this kind of distinction, which is difficult to classify, exists in other languages as well, e.g., Hindi and Japanese, which distinguish between “polite” and “abrupt” imperatives (ibid.: 7), or Latin and Bengali, which have “present tense” and “future tense” imperatives to express actions that should be performed immediately or after a period of time, respectively (ibid.:25).

In Russian, too, according to various researchers’ observations, we mostly find imperfective imperatives, which have the semantic component “immediately”, in *invitations* and *wishes* (the adherents of both approaches “from the form” and “from the utterance” point this out), which seem to fit very well with the “signal” function of the imperfective. The perfective, though found with both willful and non-willful imperatives, to use Hamblin’s terminology, has the core meaning of a willful imperative—that of “request”. Possibly, it is for this reason that, when comparing the imperfective and the perfective in, say, “permission”, for example (Можно взять эту книгу?—
some feel that the perfective form is more “formal”, “cold”, “more distant”, etc., and in одевайтесь теплее vs. оденьтесь теплее (Benacchio 2002: 162) that the perfective is more distant (войдите is more formal than входите, сядьте is stricter than садитесь, etc.). There are numerous such out-of-context examples to demonstrate the “formality, distance, etc” of the perfective. Such emotive nuances, I believe, could be felt because of the “willfulness” present in the perfective. On the other hand, it is this willfulness (presence of the speaker’s opinion, attitude, partiality to the situation) in the perfective that, depending on the context, makes it sound “softer and more caring”, as has been pointed out by various scholars (Šaronov 1992: 90; Rassudova 1982: 137; Padučeva 1996: 78-79). Thus, “formality” and “distance” should not become the main characteristics of the perfective, as Benacchio (2002), for example, claims. The interpretation, once again, will depend on the context.

Another point that I would like to make is that the examples of “stricter”, “more distant”, “formal” perfectives, come, as a rule, from institutional situations, in which the speaker’s power OVER the addressee is evident (see Watts 1991: 53). Such are the speech situations “at the doctor’s”, “in the office” (e.g., when the boss says “войдите”),

64 The willfulness of the perfective (e.g., Šaronov’s (1992) “desirability modus” in the perfective) as well its “formality” and “detachment” (Forsyth 1970, Padučeva 1996, Šatunovskij 2004) have been noted by both approaches “from the form” and “from the utterance”. See the detailed discussion in Chapter 1.

65 See my discussion in Chapter 1 of the contradictions in researchers’ opinions about the emotional nuances of the perfective in the speech act “permit”, and of the importance of intonation in resolving those contradictions.
and the like. In such situations, the “willfulness” of the speaker is justified by his/her power in the situation (ibid.: 57), and so are his/her distance and formality. Thus, a doctor, for example, has all the right to make requests, commands, demands like сядьте, встаньте, разденьтесь, as well as for the signal imperfectives раздевайтесь, садитесь, вставайте. Again, depending on the doctor’s intonation and overall behavior, the perfectives can express attention and consideration towards the addressee as well. Moreover, the qualities of “less distance and friendliness” assigned to the imperfective are not necessarily coterminous with politeness in different cultures (see, e.g., Ide et al. 1992: 291). Thus, when I asked a Russian native speaker on the spot about how “входите” and “войдите” sound to him, he was quick to answer that “входите” is friendlier, but “войдите” is more formal and, therefore, more “polite”. This takes us back to the discussion of politeness as a discursive struggle.

Based on the points made above, I would like to suggest that the “distance” and “greater formality” of the perfective will be easier to perceive in the imperative in institutional situations where the speaker’s power OVER the addressee is evident: in the military, at the doctor’s, in professor-student interactions, in boss-employee communications, etc. Thus, some scholars argue that in these situations (with the military at the top of the list) the discussion of politeness/impoliteness is irrelevant, as the situation itself—to be more exact, in speech acts like “orders”, “commands”—does not presuppose “politeness” (see Haverkate 1988 cited in Eelen 2001: 26; Leech 1983: 83; Brown & Levinson 1987: 65). That is, of course, if one considers speech acts out of
context. Otherwise, no speech act is inherently polite or impolite—a point that has been made throughout this work. Thus, in the army situation, for example it is possible to use the infinitive form to address a lower rank: сесть, встать, лечь, etc. Such infinitive forms present examples of politic (expected and normal) behavior, whereas examples containing imperatives and EPMs like встаньте, пожалуйста, may sound more like sarcasm, as they are in excess of politic behavior. Of course, the range of “situations” in the army is also immense, and I am not saying here that it is impossible to hear “пожалуйста” in the army. Certainly, an “order” or “command” can be impolite as well. The tone of the command or order itself or certain aspects of non-verbal behavior may be enough for the hearer to interpret the commander’s behavior as expressing, for example, condescension towards the soldiers, and for some this non-respectful behavior can mean “rudeness”, and “impoliteness”.66

The point I am trying to make is that, the more distance there is between the speaker and the hearer and the more power-OVER the hearer the speaker has, the easier it is for the researcher to illustrate the “strictness”, “formality” and “distance” of the perfective in out-of-context examples, when the readers are informed only about the institutionalized social roles of the speaker and the hearer. However, such illustrations of the researcher’s point are quite problematic when it comes to informal situations, when the speaker and the hearer are on a par, and when they can only exercise power-TO as

they interact. These include informal interactions within a family, between, for example, a husband and wife, or communication between friends, two students, etc. Since the majority of the examples that researchers present to illustrate the formality of the perfective are not supplied with adequate context, it becomes hard to see the “distance” and “formality” that the researcher claims for the perfective.

Bourdieu (1991), too, points out that “the more formal the situation is, the more it is able to impose by itself alone the recognition of the dominant mode of expression” (1991: 70). He points out the “markets” (contexts) that deal with law, medicine or school as “those most completely subjected to the dominant norms” (ibid.: 98), where the degree of autonomy in minimal (ibid.: 7, 98). These are “markets of high tension” which impose a degree of censorship on the behavior and language of those who participate in the interaction (ibid.: 77, 79, 81). Thus, for example, the dominated party in particular is limited in what s/he can or cannot say. On the contrary, such censorship is minimal, and the autonomy is maximal, in informal private exchanges (e.g., within a family), “where independence with regard to the norms of legitimate speech is marked above all by a more or less complete freedom to ignore the conventions and properties of the dominant speech form” (ibid.: 98).

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67 See also Culpeper (1995: 354), who points out the difficulty of demonstrating impoliteness in equal relationships, as opposed to power relationships.
4.8.4 The Ultimate Role of the Context in Polite/Impolite Interpretations

Let me take you back to the two examples from “Служебный Роман” discussed above. In the first episode the director Kalugina, armed with her power OVER the addressee Novosel’cev, uses the infinitive сидеть!, which would be absolutely impossible in the second episode, when the informality of the situation puts her on a par with the man. However, in the second episode, pressed by the development of the events, the director for a moment exercises power OVER Novosel’cev (including power-TO) to achieve immediate obedience from him. The tone with which сядьте is uttered makes it sound like an abrupt request, order, or command. It is this tone, I believe, that highlights the “willfulness” of the perfective, which comes from its core meaning of “request”, i.e., the speaker’s sole interest in the action which, ultimately, leads to the emphasis on “distance” and “formality”. The hearer’s reaction, i.e., his immediate obedience, proves that the illocutionary force, indeed, was that of an abrupt request, order, demand, or command, which he did not expect in this informal situation. Again, however, nothing explicitly indicates that he may have interpreted this behavior as “rude” or “impolite”. The perfective form by itself could not have achieved the same effect, as it could be uttered in a much softer way. It was the tone and the gesture that accompanies it that instructed the addressee about the procedural meaning and brought out the “underlying” core property of the perfective—that of a “willful” imperative.68

68 See also Arndt & Janney (1985, 1987), who emphasize the relationship between politeness and non-verbal behavior.
Thus, the context actually helps to bring out the core underlying semantics of the imperfective/perfective—knowledge that can be very helpful when we make deductions about the possible polite/impolite interpretation of imperative utterances. For example, the immediacy” and “urgency” of the imperfective can be emphasized by скорее, быстрее, же in the Ctx, or, again, by the tone with which the imperfective imperative is pronounced, or by some other contextual linguistic or paralinguistic factors.69 This “emphasis”, depending on the context, can be perceived as “plain normal” or as an imposition, and, thus, as impoliteness. But, again, we would have to go through the kind of analysis which I suggest in section 3.2 to be able to make any deductions and to open up an imperative utterance to a polite/impolite interpretation.

69 See e.g., Šatunovskij (2004: 276–77), who demonstrates the influence of the context and other situational factors on the emergence of the component “immediately” in the imperfective.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

In this work I have demonstrated why any discussion of the nuances of politeness/impoliteness in the imperfective and perfective imperative presents a more challenging task for researchers than has been acknowledged in the existing literature. Apart from considering the changes that occur in the semantics of the imperfective/perfective forms when interacting with the imperative mood, I have shown that it is essential to focus on linguistic politeness/impoliteness as contested notions for an ultimate grounded demonstration of the emotive nuances of politeness/impoliteness in imperative utterances.

Previous researchers have not distinguished between scholarly (P2) and lay notions of politeness (P1)—i.e., between etics and emics. This has resulted in one-sided politeness theories, which become evaluative, subjective, and, consequently, speculative.
in nature. Such theories lose sight of the discursive struggle involved in the evaluation of politeness/impoliteness.

Though the “traditional” politeness theories of Brown, Levinson, Leech, and others do admit the crucial importance of context and speech situation in the appearance of various emotive nuances in linguistic expressions (in this study, in utterances with perfective and imperfective imperatives), their one-sidedness does not allow for an appropriate usage of the contextual information that is indispensable for explaining how and why actual hearers’ evaluations of politeness/impoliteness occur. As a result, the researchers’ examples of “what sounds polite and why” resemble speculations, in which they impose their intuitions on the reader. I have likewise demonstrated in this work why readers may not notice such impositions and why they may “buy” the out-of-context illustrations offered to them.

Traditional approaches to linguistic politeness have been criticized as creating an artificial scholarly notion of politeness, which does not reflect the ways in which politeness and impoliteness occur in real communication. I have demonstrated how the notions of positive/negative politeness offered by Brown and Levinson, the most influential traditional approach to linguistic politeness, can become particularly misleading when applied to particular languages, Russian in our case.

In Chapter 3 I discussed alternative models of linguistic politeness/impoliteness. Such models focus on how and why actual hearers’ evaluations of politeness/impoliteness occur, rather than on what sounds polite/impolite and why. The notions of *habitus*
(Bourdieu), *power, politic vs. polite behavior* (Watts), and Goffman’s notion of *face* proved to be very important and helpful in helping the researcher not to lose sight of P1 (lay notion of politeness/impoliteness) as the object of study in a P2 linguistic theory.

I also demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4 the applicability of and limitations on the alternative models of linguistic politeness to the specific problem discussed in this work—the ability of the imperfective/perfective in Russian to express politeness/impoliteness in the imperative. I showed how, due to this work’s narrow focus on the imperative utterances only, the alternative models need to be modified to yield productive results and grounded deductions. I also proposed how the results of the research of many years on the semantics of the aspectual forms in the imperative can be combined with the insights into linguistic politeness reflected in the alternative models in order to produce a more reliable analysis of politeness/impoliteness in the imperative.

The modified alternative approach to the problem in question that I have suggested in this work is relative in the sense that it does not allow researchers to make any definitive claims about the role of the aspectual forms in the interpretation of imperative utterances as polite/impolite. However, this relativism is actually the strength of this approach, since it accurately reflects the discursive struggle involved in the evaluations of politeness/impoliteness. That is, the alternative approach suggested here allows us to study linguistic politeness/impoliteness as a form of practice.

5.2 Pedagogical Implications
It should become obvious from the discussion in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 that it is impossible to teach foreign students explicitly how to express politeness/impoliteness via the imperfective/perfective forms in the imperative. Their knowledge of what is appropriate/inappropriate in a given situation, i.e., their understanding of what constitutes polite behavior, should increase as their linguistic competence in Russian grows and expands, which, of course, depends on the amount of practice the students have in the language.

As for aspectual functioning in the imperative, there are, again, no strict rules, as a lot depends on the context and the semantics of the verbal lexeme. It does not mean, however, that teachers of Russian have nothing to offer to their students to prevent them from arriving at the conclusion that “there is no rhyme or reason to why a native speaker uses one or the other aspect form in the imperative” (Hassman 1986: 28).

If class time does not allow the teacher to go into too much detail about how aspect functions in the imperative, the rules suggested by Xrakovskij (1988) seem to be the most reasonable for pedagogical purposes. Students can learn these rules without having to turn into linguists somewhat when they have to understand the aspectual semantics proper of the imperfective/perfective.

Thus, the students will have to learn that there are three types of positive imperative utterances. In the first type, factitive imperative utterances, the imperfective is used in the context of “old” information and mainly performs a signal function, whereas the perfective is used in the context of “new information” and is thus found in such
modally colored speech acts as “request”, “command”, “advice”, etc. Thus, the students can simply learn the sub-rules for each aspect that Xrakovskij offers. In the second type, *utterances that express a “wishing that H be, stay, get well”*, where the action that cannot be controlled, only the imperfective is used. In the third type, *permissive imperative utterances*, the two aspects can be used interchangeably; whichever aspect you choose, your utterance will not sound ungrammatical or odd. Additional information should be given on verbs of mental activity, for which the imperfective only is used. It is also necessary to point out how powerful a tool intonation is in expressing different emotional nuances. This should suffice to give students an idea of how aspect functions in the imperative and prevent them from making pragmatic mistakes.

If, however, a teacher has the time to turn her/his students into linguists somewhat (after all, these can be graduate students in a Slavic Department), s/he will have to acquaint them with aspectual semantics and will have to demonstrate how certain emotive nuances result from the interplay of the semantic elements of the aspectual forms with different elements of the context. The easiest demonstration, of course, will be in those cases where the immediate linguistic context (*ctx*, as defined in Chapter 2) itself emphasizes the semantics of the imperfective, in particular, or, in case of the perfective, in the speech act “request”. After all, it has been advised by some linguists that students should always use the perfective to be on the safe side. In cases in which the contextual support is not so obvious, the teacher will have to resort to a demonstration based on the alternative approach which I suggested in Chapter 3, especially if s/he wants to show the
students the possibility of a polite or impolite interpretation of a certain imperative utterance. In any event, emotive nuances should always be discussed in a context. Only discussions of this kind can help students to build their linguistic competence in the language.

Certainly, there have been other suggestions on how to teach students the emotive nuances of the perfective/imperfective in the imperative. Less complicated at first sight, these suggestions can later become confusing. For example, Hassman (1986) suggests we first consider the criteria of “old/new” information as underlying the aspectual distribution in the imperative. Second, he suggests that all modal notions be associated with the imperfective. Consequently, the perfective form becomes a “neutrally” colored form. Thus Hassman suggests the oppositions “advice” (perfective)—“skeptical, concerned, impatient, etc. advice” (imperfective). Hassman points out that intonation is going to “aid” the imperfective form in expressing all the emotional nuances which can be possible within a certain speech act.

Though this approach may explain why the imperfective form садитесь exists both in courteous invitations (“садитесь, пожалуста”) and in rude exclamations such as “Садись! Тебе говорят!” (29), it can make them (mis)use the perfective form сядь in all other “neutral” contexts, without telling them anything at all about the expressive nuances that have so often been noted in сядьте! Also, it may not be clear for the students what, for example, a “neutral invitation” is or what a “courteous, and polite invitation” is. Isn’t an invitation always “courteous”? In other words, Hassman’s proposal
also poses a danger of terminological confusion. It would be less confusing, it seems, to point out that the imperfective is used in Russian in such etiquette formula as садитесь ("an invitation to sit down"), проходите, раздевайтесь, располагайтесь, угощайтесь ("invitations expressed by a host in the situation “в гостях”).

If students raise the question “What if I sound rude?”, the teacher can always teach them how to be polite by using different EPMs (e.g., forms of address, the politeness markers пожалуйста, извините, etc.). In combination with a friendly tone, such EPMs will never fail to sound appropriate. To show the danger of “too much politeness” bordering on “irony” and “sarcasm”, the teacher can certainly provide concrete examples of what can be “too much”. There is a very slim chance, however, that a native speaker will take a foreigner’s “excess” politeness as irony or sarcasm. Likewise, a foreigner addressing a salesperson using an imperfective in a “request” (e.g., Девушка взвешивайте (instead of взвесьте) мне пол кило колбасы) will most likely sound odd or even funny, but hardly rude.

Ultimately, the teacher’s main task should be to provide the students with a well thought-out form of practice so that their linguistic competence grows and their use of the imperfective/perfective forms in the imperative becomes automatic.
APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE (in English and Russian)

Participant 1

Gender_______
Age________
Years lived in the U.S.A._______
Education_______________________

Amount of exposure to Russian every day in America:

a) less than 10%
b) 20-30%
c) 50-80%
g) more than 80%

PART 1

1. When did you see this movie last?

2. Do you remember the contents of the movie well? YES/NO

3. Do you like this movie? YES/NO

   Why do you like/dislike the movie?

PART 2 (episode 1)

Watch episode 1 and answer the following questions.

1. What goals do the main characters pursue in this episode?
2. How do these goals impact the behavior of the main characters, i.e., how do they behave, what roles do they assume for the interaction?

3. Does the behavior of/ the role chosen by each of the main characters correspond to their behavior/image in previous episodes. Explain.

4. Characterize the behavior of the main character Ludmila Kalugina in this episode towards Anatolij Novosel’cev. Begin you answer with “Ludmila Kalugina’s behavior towards Anatolij Novosel’cev is…” Use as many adjectives and adverbs in your answer as you can.

5. Provide several examples from this episode in support of your characteristic of Ludmila Kalugina.

6. Characterize the behavior of Anatolij Novosel’cev in this episode towards Ludmila Kalugina. Begin you answer with “Anatolij Novosel’cev’s behavior towards Ludmila Kalugina is…” Use as many adjectives and adverbs in your answer as you can.

7. Provide several examples from this episode in support of your characteristic of Anatolij Novosel’cev.

PART 3 (episode 1)

Watch/listen to episode 1 turn after turn. The researcher will pause after each turn. Try to characterize/ describe, to the extent it is possible, each turn and the characters’ behavior towards each other. That is, answer the question HOW the main characters behave towards each other. Use as many adjectives and adverbs in your answer as you can. You can be repetitive in your characteristics.

PART 2 (episode 2)

Complete the same task for episode 2 which you did for episode 1 above in PART 2 (episode 1).

PART 3 (episode 2)

Complete the same task for episode 2 which you did for episode 1 above in PART 3 (episode 1).
PART 4

Now look through the list of possible additional characteristics provided by the researcher below (some of them may repeat your characteristics).
The researcher will play to you episodes 1 and 2 turn after turn and will pause after each turn. The researcher will also provide you with the printed version of the dialogues for the convenience of the experimental procedure. You should add to each turn those characteristics from the list: circle them. If you don’t find any of the characteristics from the list suitable, circle “nothing fits” and add that which, in your opinion, characterizes the turn. Please, look through the entire (!) list each time you characterize a turn. This is important for the research.

1) attentive 2) respectful 3) amiable 4) polite 5) patient 6) obliging 7) acquiescent 8) courteous
9) inattentive 10) harsh 11) unceremonious 12) mocking 13) resentful 14) impolite 15) haughty 16) unfriendly

17) nothing fits

episode 1

1 Н(овосельцев): Здравуйте… Прокопья Людмиловна… я пришел… Меня… не знаю… меня вч… вчера… вот… Меня вчера муха укусила.

1) attentive 2) respectful 3) amiable 4) polite 5) patient 6) obliging 7) acquiescent 8) courteous
9) inattentive 10) harsh 11) unceremonious 12) mocking 13) resentful 14) impolite 15) haughty 16) unfriendly

17) nothing fits

2 К(алугина): Да, я это заметила.

1) attentive 2) respectful
9) inattentive 10) harsh

17) nothing fits
### 3 Н: Или я с цепи сорвался.

| 1) attentive | 9) inattentive | 17) **nothing fits** |
| 2) respectful | 10) harsh |
| 3) amiable | 11) unceremonious |
| 4) polite | 12) mocking |
| 5) patient | 13) resentful |
| 6) obliging | 14) impolite |
| 7) acquiescent | 15) haughty |
| 8) courteous | 16) unfriendly |

### 4 К: Это уже ближе к истине.

| 1) attentive | 9) inattentive | 17) **nothing fits** |
| 2) respectful | 10) harsh |
| 3) amiable | 11) unceremonious |
| 4) polite | 12) mocking |
| 5) patient | 13) resentful |
| 6) obliging | 14) impolite |
| 7) acquiescent | 15) haughty |
| 8) courteous | 16) unfriendly |

### 5 Н: Значит, я с цепи.

| 1) attentive | 9) inattentive | 17) **nothing fits** |
| 2) respectful | 10) harsh |
| 3) amiable | 11) unceremonious |
| 4) polite | 12) mocking |
| 5) patient | 13) resentful |
| 6) obliging | 14) impolite |
| 7) acquiescent | 15) haughty |

233
8) courteous                         16) unfriendly

6 K: Да.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                         16) unfriendly

7 K: Садитесь, товарищ Новосельцев.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                         16) unfriendly

8 Н: Нет, не надо.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                         16) unfriendly

9 K: Анатолий Ефремович.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive

2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

10 Н: Лучше умереть стоя.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

11 К: Садитесь, не робейте.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

12 Н: Спасибо.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

235
13 К: Сделайте одолжение, располагайтесь.

| 1) attentive | 9) inattentive | 17) nothing fits |
| 2) respectful | 10) harsh |
| 3) amiable | 11) unceremonious |
| 4) polite | 12) mocking |
| 5) patient | 13) resentful |
| 6) obliging | 14) impolite |
| 7) acquiescent | 15) haughty |
| 8) courteous | 16) unfriendly |

14 Н: Спасибо.

| 1) attentive | 9) inattentive | 17) nothing fits |
| 2) respectful | 10) harsh |
| 3) amiable | 11) unceremonious |
| 4) polite | 12) mocking |
| 5) patient | 13) resentful |
| 6) obliging | 14) impolite |
| 7) acquiescent | 15) haughty |
| 8) courteous | 16) unfriendly |

15 К: Вчера вы... Сидеть!... позволили себе утверждать… что во мне нет ничего человеческого…

| 1) attentive | 9) inattentive | 17) nothing fits |
| 2) respectful | 10) harsh |
| 3) amiable | 11) unceremonious |
| 4) polite | 12) mocking |
| 5) patient | 13) resentful |
| 6) obliging | 14) impolite |
| 7) acquiescent | 15) haughty |
| 8) courteous | 16) unfriendly |
16 Н: Ну что вы…Мало ли, что я вчера болтал. На меня не стоит обращать внимание...

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17 К: Нет… надо…Почему же… Тем более, что вы являетесь выразителем мнения определенных слоев нашего коллектива.

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18 Н: Неужели...

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19 К: Вчера вы меня публично оклеветали...

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20 Н: Да.

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21 К: Оскорбили...

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22 Н: Оклеветал.

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5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                            14) impolite
7) acquiescent                         15) haughty
8) courteous                           16) unfriendly

23 К: Все, что вы говорили, возмутительная ложь!

1) attentive                           9) inattentive  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                         10) harsh
3) amiable                            11) unceremonious
4) polite                             12) mocking
5) patient                            13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                        15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

24 Н: Возм...

25 К: Я с вами категорически не согласна.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                         10) harsh
3) amiable                            11) unceremonious
4) polite                             12) mocking
5) patient                            13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                        15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

26 Н: И я категорически...

1) attentive                           9) inattentive  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                         10) harsh
3) amiable                            11) unceremonious
4) polite                             12) mocking
5) patient                            13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                        15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

239
episode 2

1 (К)алугина: Ой ой!

2 Н(овосельцев): Что же я наделал!

1) attentive                           9) inattentive                  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                        15) haughty
8) courteous                           16) unfriendly

3 К: Вы не сделали ничего особенного. Но… Вы испортили мне новое платье…

1) attentive                           9) inattentive                  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                        15) haughty
8) courteous                           16) unfriendly

4 Н: Нет-нет. Это надо…Это солью..

1) attentive                           9) inattentive                  17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                               12) mocking
5) patient                             13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                        15) haughty
8) courteous                           16) unfriendly
5 К: Красное вино не отмывается.

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6 Н: Где у вас соль …Нет…Это за…замоется..Снимайте платье, живо! Живо снимайте! А-а-а! Нет! Не сейчас…не здесь…Что вы!...Не надо…

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7 К: Что же вы говорите снимайте...

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8 Н: Нет...Это я не подумал...Люд...мила Прокопиевна...Я сейчас

1) attentive 9) inattentive 17) nothing fits
2) respectful 10) harsh
3) amiable 11) unceremonious
4) polite 12) mocking
5) patient 13) resentful
6) obliging 14) impolite
7) acquiescent 15) haughty
8) courteous 16) unfriendly

9 К: А-анатолий Ефремович…! Перестаньте!

1) attentive 9) inattentive 17) nothing fits
2) respectful 10) harsh
3) amiable 11) unceremonious
4) polite 12) mocking
5) patient 13) resentful
6) obliging 14) impolite
7) acquiescent 15) haughty
8) courteous 16) unfriendly

10 Н: Не снимайте платье!

1) attentive 9) inattentive 17) nothing fits
2) respectful 10) harsh
3) amiable 11) unceremonious
4) polite 12) mocking
5) patient 13) resentful
6) obliging 14) impolite
7) acquiescent 15) haughty
8) courteous 16) unfriendly
11 К: Ну прекратите же! Я все равно носить его не буду…

1) attentive                           9) inattentive   17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                             12) mocking
5) patient                           13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                       15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

12 Н: Быстренько… Садитесь …Я сейчас посыплю вас солью…И все сойдет…только посидите.

1) attentive                           9) inattentive   17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                             12) mocking
5) patient                           13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                       15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly

13 К: Да оставьте вы его в покое…Э.. это…Будь оно проклято, это платье! Черт с ним…Милый, славный…”

1) attentive                           9) inattentive   17) nothing fits
2) respectful                        10) harsh
3) amiable                           11) unceremonious
4) polite                             12) mocking
5) patient                           13) resentful
6) obliging                           14) impolite
7) acquiescent                       15) haughty
8) courteous                          16) unfriendly
14 Н: А потом… Я возьму его с собой и простирну его в..

1) attentive 9) inattentive 17) nothing fits
2) respectful 10) harsh
3) amiable 11) unceremonious
4) polite 12) mocking
5) patient 13) resentful
6) obliging 14) impolite
7) acquiescent 15) haughty
8) courteous 16) unfriendly

15 К: Ну ей богу, если вы сию секунду не замолчите… Я вы… Я сожгу это платье на ваших глаз… Сидите!

1) attentive 9) inattentive 17) nothing fits
2) respectful 10) harsh
3) amiable 11) unceremonious
4) polite 12) mocking
5) patient 13) resentful
6) obliging 14) impolite
7) acquiescent 15) haughty
8) courteous 16) unfriendly

16 (Новосельцев садится)

17 К: Анатолий Ефремович … Я так взволнована вашим признанием… Ну какой же вы рядовой…

1) attentive 9) inattentive 17) nothing fits
2) respectful 10) harsh
3) amiable 11) unceremonious
4) polite 12) mocking
5) patient 13) resentful
6) obliging 14) impolite
7) acquiescent 15) haughty
8) courteous 16) unfriendly
PART 5

The researcher will ask you several questions depending on your answers in part 4 of this questionnaire.

АНКЕТА

Участник 1

Пол
Возраст
Сколько лет в Америке
Образование
Сколько времени в день вы общаетесь на русском языке в Америке
а) менее 10%
б) 20-30%
в) 50-80%
г) более 80%

ЧАСТЬ 1

1. Как давно вы смотрели этот фильм?

2. Хорошо ли вы помните содержание фильма? ДА/НЕТ

3. Нравится ли вам этот фильм? ДА/НЕТ

Почему вам нравится или не нравится этот фильм?

ЧАСТЬ 2 (эпизод 1)
Просмотрите эпизод 1 и ответьте на следующие вопросы.

1. Какие цели преследуют главные герои в этом эпизоде?

2. Как эти цели влияют на поведение главных героев, т.е. как они себя ведут, какие роли играют?
3. Соответствует ли поведение/избранная роль каждого из главных героев их поведению/имиджу в предыдущих эпизодах? Объясните.

4. Охарактеризуйте поведение главной героини Людмилы Калугиной в этом эпизоде по отношению к Анатолию Новосельцеву. Начните свой ответ с “по отношению к Анатолию Новосельцеву Людмила Калугина ведет себя...” Используйте в своем ответе как можно больше прилагательных и наречий.

5. Приведите несколько примеров из этого эпизода в поддержку данной вами характеристики Людмиле Калугиной.

6. Охарактеризуйте поведение Анатолия Новосельцева по отношению к Людмиле Калугиной. Начните свой ответ с “по отношению к Людмиле Калугиной Анатолий Новосельцев ведет себя...” Используйте в своем ответе как можно больше прилагательных и наречий.

7. Приведите несколько примеров из этого эпизода в поддержку данной вами характеристики Анатолию Новосельцеву.

ЧАСТЬ 3 (эпизод 1)
Просмотрите/прослушайте эпизод 1 еще раз реплика за репликой. Исследователь будет нажимать кнопку “пауза” после каждой реплики. Постарайтесь охарактеризовать/описать, насколько это возможно, каждую реплику и поведение героев по отношению друг к другу. То есть, ответьте на вопрос КАК ведут себя главные герои по отношению друг к другу. Используйте в своем ответе как можно больше прилагательных и наречий. Вы можете повторяться в своих характеристиках.

ЧАСТЬ 2 (эпизод 2)
Проделайте работу с эпизодом 2 аналогичную той, которую вы проделали в ЧАСТИ 2 с эпизодом 1.

ЧАСТЬ 3 (эпизод 2)
Проделайте работу с эпизодом 2 аналогичную той, которую вы проделали в ЧАСТИ 3 с эпизодом 1.
ЧАСТЬ 4
Теперь просмотрите предоставленный исследователем ниже список дополнительных возможных характеристик (некоторые из них могут совпадать с вашими). Исследователь будет проигрывать вам эпизод реплика за репликой и нажимать кнопку “пауза” после каждой реплики. Исследователь также предоставит вам печатный вариант диалога для удобства эксперимента. Вам нужно добавить к каждой реплике по-вашему подходящие дополнительные характеристики из списка: обведите их кружком. Если вам кажется, что ни одна характеристика из списка не подходит, обведите кружком “ничего не подходит” и добавьте то, что по-вашему характеризует реплику. Пожалуйста, просматривайте весь (!) предоставленный список, характеризуя каждую новую реплику. Это важно для исследования.

| 1) внимательный | 9) невнимательный | 17) ничего не подходит |
| 2) уважительный | 10) жесткий |
| 3) приветливый | 11) бесцеремонный |
| 4) вежливый | 12) язвительный |
| 5) терпеливый | 13) нетерпимый |
| 6) услужливый | 14) невежливый |
| 7) уступчивый | 15) высокомерный |
| 8) любезный | 16) неприветливый |

ЧАСТЬ 5
Исследователь задаст вам несколько вопросов исходя из ваших ответов в части 4 данной анкеты.

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