FACTORS INFLUENCING INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COLLABORATION IN PLANNING: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
POST-KATRINA MISSISSIPPI

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
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ABSTRACT

The goal of this study was to identify the factors that promote or inhibit intergovernmental collaboration for planning. While research in planning stresses the value in collaborative planning, there is little attention paid to the factors that form and sustain collaborative relationships for planning. This is important due to the political nature of planning and due to the complexity of land use decision-making that demand collaborative problem solving. Using collaborative planning and network literatures as the theoretical basis, a framework was developed to test the factors that influenced decisions to work collaboratively instead of independently in post-Hurricane Katrina Mississippi.

Following Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour established a framework for planning and rebuilding the Mississippi Gulf Coast that involved an inclusive and collaborative planning approach. The intention was the development of vertical collaboration between local and state governments, and horizontal collaboration between local governments. Because literature suggests that a crisis will increase collaboration, post-Katrina Mississippi offered an important opportunity to understand factors that influence the proclivity for intergovernmental collaboration.

Respondents’ experiences, accounts, emotions, and opinions were documented through semi-structured interviews that were designed to encourage discussion about
decisions to collaborate or to work independently. Data were coded using qualitative methods that tested the theoretical factors. Additionally, these methods allowed for emergent themes that fell out of the framework in order to provide additional explanation for vertical and horizontal intergovernmental collaboration.

While all the theoretical factors influenced collaboration, the highest cited explanations for decisions to collaborate with other entities involved concerns about inclusion of actors, capacity potential, trust, and leadership. Costs of collaboration, planning knowledge, and values and cultural norms emerged as important influences on intergovernmental collaboration. Although more complex forms of collaboration were rare among Mississippi Gulf Coast communities, it appears that facilitated leadership and interdependence played important roles in establishing and maintaining collaborative relationships. Due to the increasing need for collaborative problem solving in land use planning, this study contributes to a more holistic understanding about what factors are important and how they can be utilized to build collaborative relationships for planning.
DEDICATION

To my parents,
For endlessly supporting me in my adventures;

To Chris,
For loving, encouraging, and believing in me;

And to Anna,
For helping me remember my priorities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I thank the people from the Mississippi Gulf Coast who invited me into their homes and temporary offices to share stories about their lives and experiences following Hurricane Katrina. With considerable appreciation I thank Dr. Jennifer Evans-Cowley, my doctoral advisor, for her making the Mississippi Gulf Coast accessible to me by providing the encouragement and financial support necessary to conduct my case study in a post-disaster planning situation. I thank my other committee members, Professor Ken Pearlman and Dr. Trevor Brown, for their expertise and intellectual support in framing this study.

Many thanks go to my friends and colleagues who have provided much needed time for discussion and exploration about my topic of inquiry – a great example of a collaborative process! I am especially grateful to my good friends Will Butler, Rachel Christensen, and Amy Smith for long-distance phone calls, to Aunt B.J. for sharing her wisdom and enthusiasm for building relationships, and to the Grace Central community for constantly reminding me of their support during this process. Thanks also to the late Dr. Jerrold Voss for his important and timely words: patience and perseverance.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapters:

1. Introduction
   1.1 The Governor’s Commission
      1.1.1 The Mississippi Renewal
   1.2 “Getting it Right This Time”
      1.2.1 Hurricane Camille: 1969
      1.2.2 Hurricane Katrina: 2005
   1.3 Intergovernmental Planning Challenges
      1.3.1 Limited Administrative Capacity
      1.3.2 Small Box Planning
      1.3.3 Obstacles to Regional Governance Structures
      1.3.4 Intergovernmental Collaboration as an Alternative
   1.4 Study Justification

2. Literature Review: Collaboration and Networks
   2.1 What Is Collaboration?
   2.2 Why Do Organizations Collaborate?
      2.2.1 Institutional Perspectives
      2.2.2 Transaction Cost Perspectives
      2.2.3 Resource Dependence Perspectives
   2.3 Network Perspectives and Theory
      2.3.1 What Are Networks?
      2.3.2 Types Of Networks
      2.3.3 How Networks Function
      2.3.4 Network Assumptions
   2.4 Interactive Planning Perspectives
      2.4.1 Transactive
      2.4.2 Communicative
      2.4.3 Collaborative
   2.5 Factors Influencing Collaboration

vii
2.5.1 Collaboration Continuum............................................... 43
2.5.2 Pre-Conditions for Collaboration................................... 45
2.5.3 Collaboration Cohesion Factors..................................... 48
  2.5.3.1 Interpersonal Ideology ....................................... 48
  2.5.3.2 Institutional Resources....................................... 51
  2.5.3.3 Leadership.......................................................... 53
  2.5.3.4 Communication and Engagement...................... 55

3 Research Objectives and Design.............................................. 59
  3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses ........................................ 59
  3.2 Research Design............................................................................... 62
    3.2.1 Qualitative Inquiry......................................................... 62
    3.2.2 The Case Study Approach ............................................. 63
  3.3 Case Study Location ........................................................................ 65
    3.3.1 Hancock County............................................................. 67
    3.3.2 Harrison County............................................................. 68
    3.3.3 Jackson County .............................................................. 69
  3.4 Pilot Study........................................................................................ 71
  3.5 Data Collection ................................................................................ 72
    3.5.1 Ethical Issues ........................................................................ 74
  3.6 Establishing Quality Data ........................................................................ 74
    3.6.1 Trustworthiness ........................................................................ 75
    3.6.2 Credibility ............................................................................. 75
    3.6.3 Transferability ........................................................................ 78
    3.6.4 Bias ................................................................................ 80
  3.7 Data Analysis................................................................................... 80
    3.7.1 Data Coding ................................................................... 81
    3.7.2 Inductive and Deductive Approaches ............................ 81
    3.7.3 Analyzing Interviews..................................................... 82
      3.7.3.1 Computer Assisted Qualitative Analysis ........... 83
      3.7.3.2 Analytic Process................................................. 83

4 Findings: What Factors Influence Post-Katrina Collaboration............... 88
  4.1 Is Collaboration Occurring?............................................................. 88
    4.1.1 Primary Actors Involved in Land Use Planning ........ 88
    4.1.2 Cross-Engagement of Primary Actors ......................... 90
  4.2 Phases of Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration................................. 93
    4.2.1 Governor Hires the CNU ............................................... 95
    4.2.2 Mississippi Renewal Forum........................................... 98
    4.2.3 The Governor’s Commission........................................ 104
    4.2.4 The Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal ...... 106
    4.2.5 SmartCode and Plan Implementation......................... 108
  4.3 Collaboration Continuum.................................................................... 112
    4.3.1 Information Sharing......................................................... 113
    4.3.2 Resource Exchange......................................................... 114
4.3.3 Problem Solving............................................................. 115
4.4 Factors Influencing Collaboration........................................... 116
  4.4.1 Communication and Engagement.................................. 119
  4.4.2 Institutional Resources............................................... 134
  4.4.3 Interpersonal Ideology.............................................. 149
  4.4.4 Leadership.............................................................. 164
4.5 Jackson County and the City of Biloxi ....................................... 173
  4.5.1 Jackson County .......................................................... 173
     4.5.1.1 Leading Toward Collaboration....................... 174
     4.5.1.2 Establishing Interdependence....................... 178
     4.5.1.3 The Impact: Intergovernmental Collaboration... 180
  4.5.2 City of Biloxi ............................................................ 184
     4.5.2.1 Missing Local Values ................................ 187
     4.5.2.2 Not Ripe for Collaboration.......................... 189
     4.5.2.3 The Impact: Independent Progress............... 191

5 Discussion.......................................................................................... 194
  5.1 Summary of Findings................................................................... 195
     5.1.1 Communication and Engagement............................. 196
     5.1.2 Institutional Resource............................................ 199
     5.1.3 Interpersonal Ideology.......................................... 204
     5.1.4 Leadership.......................................................... 208
  5.2 Key Factors................................................................................. 210
  5.3 Leadership As Collaboration Manager ....................................... 213
     5.3.1 Collaborative Management.................................... 214
     5.3.2 “Activating” The Inclusion of Actors....................... 215
     5.3.3 “Framing” The Values and Cultural Norms ............... 218
     5.3.4 “Mobilizing” Actor Interdependence........................ 221
     5.3.5 “Synthesizing” Support for Collaboration Costs........... 224
  5.4 Revised Model for Intergovernmental Collaboration.................... 226
  5.5 Policy Recommendations....................................................... 230
     5.5.1 Cost of Collaboration............................................ 230
     5.5.2 Inclusion of Actors............................................... 231
     5.5.3 Interdependence.................................................... 232
     5.5.4 Values and Cultural Norms.................................... 233
     5.5.5 Leadership Through Collaborative Management........... 234
  5.6 Theoretical Implications ......................................................... 236
  5.7 Planning Practice Implications ................................................. 238

6 Conclusions........................................................................................ 241
  6.1 Limitations of the Study......................................................... 242
  6.2 Future Research.......................................................................... 243

Bibliography .......................................................................................... 246
Appendix A: Interview Protocol ........................................................................ 255
Appendix B: Consent for Research Form .......................................................... 258
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Characteristics of collaboration levels, organized by complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Start list of codes and definitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>List of actors interviewed about land use planning in their respective communities or organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Factors influencing collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi, ranked by the number of respondents citing factor. Total number of references shown parenthetically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Identification of factors influencing collaboration distributed over cities* in Harrison County and Jackson County</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Mississippi Gulf Coast. This includes the three counties (Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson) and 11 cities (Waveland, Bay St. Louis, Pass Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, Biloxi, D’Iberville, Ocean Springs, Gautier, Pascagoula, and Moss Point)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Basic chart of vertical intergovernmental collaboration and potential horizontal intergovernmental collaboration for rebuilding and planning the Mississippi Gulf Coast</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Complexity continuum of collaboration, ranging from simple information sharing to more complex problem solving</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Conceptual framework of factors that theoretically influence collaboration for planning</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Vertical intergovernmental collaboration and horizontal intergovernmental collaboration for rebuilding and planning the Mississippi Gulf Coast Arrows show the direction of the communication as one-way or collaborative</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Timeline of the five major phases of collaboration for post-Katrina Planning</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Complexity continuum of collaboration, showing that most of the collaborative relationships were located on the simple information sharing end of the continuum</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Revised framework showing the relationship of the four categories of factors that influenced intergovernmental collaboration in post-Katrina Mississippi. Leadership Factors from the initial framework are replaced with Collaborative Management. The key factors are identified (*)</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Proposed chart of vertical intergovernmental collaboration and horizontal intergovernmental collaboration for rebuilding and planning the Mississippi Gulf Coast, with the state leadership in the role of collaborative manager to facilitate actor interactions..................236
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF POST-KATRINA MISSISSIPPI

In late August, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, one of the largest and most destructive storms ever recorded, destroyed much of the Gulf Coast, from Texas east to the Alabama border. Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Mississippi on August 29, 2005 as a Category 3 storm with wind gusts of up to 155 miles per hour, storm surge of 35 feet, and rainfall up to 15 inches (Smith, 2006). While New Orleans flooded, Mississippi sustained heavy winds and storm surge, reducing much of the communities to slabs and rubble. Some communities, such as Pascagoula, had 90 percent of their housing stocks damaged (Thompson, 2005). Most of the hurricane destruction was sustained in the 11 cities and three counties on the Mississippi Gulf coast (Figure 1). The damage left these communities struggling to plan for rebuilding.

Figure 1: The Mississippi Gulf Coast. This includes the three counties (Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson) and 11 cities (Waveland, Bay St. Louis, Pass Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, Biloxi, D’Iberville, Ocean Springs, Gautier, Pascagoula, and Moss Point).

Hurricane Katrina was the greatest urban and regional planning disaster in U.S. history, and the recovery and rebuilding would require the one of the largest and most complex planning efforts ever experienced (Olshansky, 2006). Immediately following the hurricane, both state and local governments scrambled to identify how to best respond. As part of the State’s initiative for a community-wide planning approach, the focus was
placed on collaborative planning approaches that could increase communication within and between communities regarding the future plans for the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

The objective of this study was to examine the planning processes in Mississippi that followed Hurricane Katrina to determine if intergovernmental collaboration for planning occurred in Mississippi as hoped for by the State, and to determine the factors that promoted or inhibited intergovernmental collaboration.

1.1. Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal

Immediately following the storm, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour established a Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal to identify the options for rebuilding the Mississippi Gulf Coast. This Commission was a privately funded group with significant contributions from Knight Foundation, the charitable arm of the Knight-Ridder newspaper chain (owner of the Biloxi Sun Herald newspaper). The Commission was charged to explore “big ideas” for rebuilding the Coast — and, according to the Commission, was supposed to focus on “doing it right” (Rebuilding Mississippi, 2005).

Through his this Commission, the Governor proposed the establishment of a regional framework for redevelopment and rebuilding; while not mandated, this framework would require vertical collaboration between state and local governments and horizontal collaboration among local governments (Figure 2). In order to complete this task Governor Barbour built the Governor’s Commission with 20 committees comprised of over 500 volunteers of experts and on a field staff that met frequently with community leaders and citizens (Governor’s Commission, 2005). Referencing the intended roles of
the state and local governments, Governor Barbour said, “the Commission will lead, but local governments and the private sector will decide” (Barbour, 2005).

1.1.1 Mississippi Renewal Forum

The Governor’s Commission sponsored the Mississippi Renewal Forum, a six-day Forum that was the first step in creating rebuilding plans for the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Six weeks after the storm, more than 200 volunteer architects, planners, and community leaders from the state and all over the world came together for this Renewal Forum to create rebuilding plans for each of the 11 cities along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. These initial post-Katrina planning processes were important in setting the stage for shaping the emerging character of the Mississippi Gulf Coast communities.

As part of the regional framework, the State requested that Andres Duany, a world-renowned architect and promoter of a community design style called new urbanism, lead the planning efforts according to the State’s intention for the Coast. The intention was that all plans would be designed using a similar framework to advance the key principles of new urbanism – distinct pedestrian-friendly and mixed-use communities. In order to carry out the State’s vision, Duany called on respected designers from an organization called the Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU) to help him lead this initiative. Volunteer teams of CNU architects and designers were assigned to work with each of the 11 cities along the Mississippi Gulf Coast to create long-range redevelopment plans.

Although collaborative planning was not ordered, the State wanted to encourage a community-wide planning approach that took into account local interests and opinions
within the larger vision of the State (Smith, 2006). As part of an effort to integrate vertical collaboration between the state and local governments, the State requested that the CNU base their visionary planning around a “charrette” – or an inclusive, participatory brainstorming session for solutions to design challenges. These charrettes were held throughout the Mississippi Renewal Forum, and then continued in each of the individual communities after the Renewal Forum as a means to integrate local participation and stakeholder interests for rebuilding plans. The CNU consultants were therefore charged to engage communities and local governments in a collaborative planning process via the charrettes, and through this process evaluate what options would be possible for the Coast’s “blank slate”.

The State’s regional vision for the Mississippi Gulf Coast centered on a common land use ordinance called the SmartCode. A new urbanist product, the SmartCode serves as a land development ordinance that is intended to keep communities compact and walkable, while preserving rural and natural areas and combating sprawling development patterns (Mississippi Renewal Forum, 2006). The SmartCode was used as the main tool for creating the rebuilding plans during the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Although it was a local decision, the State encouraged localities to use the SmartCode as the basis for their subsequent planning, by providing financial and technical support to communities who worked to develop plans based on the SmartCode concepts (Loftus, 2006).

Governor Barbour’s vision for the future of the Mississippi Gulf Coast depended on vertical intergovernmental collaboration between the state, the State-enabled CNU consultants, and the 11 local governments (Figure 2). The State’s vision was manifested through the visionary planning and designing process of the CNU. As this vision was
delivered from the CNU to the local governments through the planning process, this placed a level of dependence on the local governments to collaborate with the CNU (and therefore the State) by participating in the community charrettes and proceeding with this initial planning process.

The state and local governments each had concerns about planning and rebuilding the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The State feared that haphazard planning without their vision in place could replace the once charming and distinctive communities of the Mississippi Coast with sprawling strip malls (Conan, 2005). At the same time, the local governments feared that their local needs and concerns would not be implemented into the products of the State-lead process (Conan, 2005). However, a level of interdependence existed between the state and local governments that acted to balance these concerns. The Governor depended on local governments to collaborate with the State in achieving its vision for the coast, based on new urbanist principles. At the local level, communities depended on the State for financial and technical assistance for planning and rebuilding their communities.
1.2. “Getting It Right This Time”

Through the regional framework and process established by the State, the Governor’s Commission was hoping to “get it right this time” (Governor’s Commission, 2005). This became the calling cry of the Commission, and referred to the State’s response to a benchmark disaster that took place over 30 years ago, Hurricane Camille (Sanderson, 2007).
1.2.1 Hurricane Camille: 1969

Hurricane Katrina is not the first hurricane to have devastating impacts on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. In 1906 an unnamed hurricane ravaged the coast, in 1985 Hurricane Elena hit, and then in 1988 Hurricane Georges wrought tremendous damage. However, the benchmark disaster was Hurricane Camille in 1969. Camille was a Category 5 Hurricane, and caused the same level of devastation as Katrina in terms of lives lost, destruction to property, and loss of whole communities (Governor’s Commission, 2005). Coastal counties were completely destroyed. For those who survived, Camille was the benchmark disaster that only was rivaled by Katrina 36 years later. Following Katrina, many communities were starting with literally a clean slate for a second time within only a few decades.

In response to Hurricane Camille, Governor John Bell Williams charged a Commission to compile a list of lessons learned, and chief among them that the coastal communities needed safer redevelopment patterns, needed to strengthen zoning and building codes (Governor’s Commission, 2005). They made recommendations for regional planning approaches, especially in regards to infrastructure and transportation. However, these voluntary recommendations never were implemented, even though the State was aware that lives and money could be saved through proper rebuilding (Governor’s Commission, 2005).

In contrast to Governor Barbour’s Commission, intergovernmental collaboration was not as actively promoted by Governor John Bell Williams’ Camille Commission in 1969 (Robinson, 2006). After Camille, the State made decisions about rebuilding coastal communities without input from the planning communities; the local officials and
planning community had been largely left out of the processes following Hurricane Camille (Sanderson, 2007). The local officials who experienced Camille remember the exclusivity, and recalled their resentment for not being included in the process. Few of the State’s recommendations were implemented at the local level, in part because there was little collaboration (Robinson, 2006; Sanderson, 2007). As a result of this precedent, the State realized that collaborative planning needed to be a major element in the post-Katrina planning efforts if it was going to work. With this in mind, the Governor’s Commission’s mantra was to “get it right this time” (Commission Report, 2005; Sanderson, 2006).

1.2.2 Hurricane Katrina: 2005

Based on this history of exclusive State post-disaster planning, I wondered, are they getting it right with the response to Hurricane Katrina? In 1969, plans for rebuilding following Hurricane Camille were made largely without active and direct input from local governments. The local governments’ inability to participate in recovery of this crisis served as a point of concern and resentment for these communities (Robinson, 2006).

However, after Hurricane Katrina, the State initiated a process for rebuilding and planning that from the start was formulated as a collaborative process. According to the State, the intended process was that the “Governor’s Commission will lead [the initial efforts], but local governments will decide [what is best for their communities]” (Barbour, 2005). Immediately, the goal for vertical intergovernmental collaboration between the state and local governments was established (Figure 2). The State wanted to
achieve its vision for a new urbanist-designed Mississippi Gulf Coast, but barring a mandate, the State needed voluntary collaboration from the local governments for this new urbanist idea to achieve its vision.

In addition, the State provided a regional framework for rebuilding in the form of a common land use ordinance – the SmartCode – that had the potential to establish horizontal intergovernmental collaboration between local communities (Figure 2). The adoption of this ordinance is required to implement the plans that were generated in the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Opportunities for intergovernmental collaboration between local officials or between CNU consultants assigned to each community would theoretically increase due to a similar ordinance because they would all be working through a new concept for the Mississippi Gulf Coast. This new concept could serve as a reason for communities to contact each other to determine how they intended to use the SmartCode to plan their downtown, or how they would apply the SmartCode for parts of their neighborhoods that were still intact. The SmartCode was a new language and a more sophisticated form of land use planning than anyone of the Coast had experienced, so there was much to be learned through information sharing among communities.

The State assigned CNU consultants to each city to help them navigate the SmartCode, and determine how to apply this land use ordinance to design the future of their communities. The counties did not receive initial assistance with recovery planning, but subsequently received funding from the Mississippi Development Authority for planning efforts. Today, some communities have adopted the plans created out of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, others have hired the firms that helped during the Renewal Forum to do further planning, and others have created their own plans. Communities such
as Biloxi who decided to go their own direction following the Mississippi Renewal Forum as opposed to staying with the State’s consulting agency, represent some of the initial barriers to collaboration with the State’s vision for the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

1.3. Intergovernmental Planning Challenges

Mississippi’s response to planning after Hurricane Katrina can be thought of as an extreme example of planning for critical community need. The challenges of planning for critical community needs can be generalized to many intergovernmental planning situations involving rapid land use change. Such changes can range from planning following disasters to planning for areas facing rapid population growth, as they all challenge communities to abruptly address complex issues. However, obstacles such as limited capacity of local governments and fragmented governance structures compromise their ability to effectively manage land use change.

1.3.1 Limited Administrative Capacity

While local government power to engage in land use planning differs by state, local governments are granted the authority by states through enabling legislation to make decisions about land use planning within their jurisdictions. However, many local governments find it difficult to make these land use decisions due to lack of financial or administrative capacity and lack of new infrastructure demanded by growth and change (Heimlich and Anderson, 2001). In many cases, local governments do not have full-time planners on staff to address sophisticated land use issues encountered in high growth
areas. Limitations to administrative capacity present a challenge to managing local land use change in growing areas (Daniels, 1999).

Most of the recent development in the Mississippi Gulf Coast has occurred in small- to medium-sized communities that have limited capacity for planning. For example, Harrison County adopted its first comprehensive plan in 1999 and first enacted zoning in 2000. Although Harrison County has planning staff, many of its small communities do not have professional planners on staff. Harrison County is representative of the administrative capacity limits for land use planning activities across the Mississippi Gulf Coast. In fact, before Hurricane Katrina hit the coast, there were only three full-time planners in cities on the coast, located in cities of Gulfport, Biloxi, and Ocean Springs. In the face of the increased planning needs following Hurricane Katrina, administrative capacity continues to be a challenge for communities.

1.3.2 Small-Box Planning

Fragmented and overlapping governments and special districts represent a key obstacle to coordinated management of land use change (Daniels, 1999). The United States has created one of the most complex systems of government, which is most evident at the local level due to the fragmentation of areas into local governments (Nice, 1987). According to the 2002 Census of Governments, there were 87,525 units of nested local government in the United States, consisting of counties, municipalities, townships, school districts and special districts. This highly fragmented and nested system of government creates a system of “small box” decision-making for land use planning, and limits the ability to make comprehensive policies at the local level (Daniels, 1999).
The challenges associated with small-box decision-making in Mississippi are compounded by the limited planning history or planning expertise in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Planning needs are largely handled by building inspectors or others who do not have formal training or expertise in planning (Carbo, 2006). The limited presence of planners in this region is evident from the membership lists of nationwide planning organizations. The Mississippi Chapter of the American Planning Association (MAPA) has a membership of only approximately 60 planners in the entire state, whereas the Ohio Chapter of the American Planning Association has approximately 700 members in its organization (OPC, 2007).

1.3.3 Obstacles to Regional Governance Structures

Objectives of local government land use management plans should ideally relate to both local and regional concerns, encouraging communities to work beyond the boundaries of their jurisdictions (Porter, 1997). However, while many proponents of planning at a regional level suggest creation of new metropolitan governments (Orfield, 2002), history has shown a general disinterest in formal regional planning. As Yaro (2000, 44) observes, a small number of regions have instituted regional governance structures, but most other places have not been successful due to “insurmountable political and practical obstacles” associated with a perceived loss of autonomy. Many local governments are not willing to forfeit their power to manage land use.
1.3.4 Intergovernmental Collaboration as an Alternative

Given the need to manage land use decisions on a regional basis and local government hesitation to give up local power to a regional governance structure, intergovernmental collaboration may offer an alternative to formal regional planning. Although intergovernmental ties are important to executing public policy programs, factors that influence the formation of intergovernmental relationships have not been tested extensively (O’Toole and Meier, 2004). Intergovernmental collaboration can result in increased financial, intellectual, social, technical, and political capacity to address complex problems because of greater numbers of actors at the table to address an area of concern (Booher and Innes, 2002). Moreover, through the collaborative process, the goal is for facilitated discourse in which all voices are heard and collective interests integrated into the joint strategies (Forester, 1989). As a result, through intergovernmental collaboration, local authority to make land use decisions is maintained while garnering increased capacity to address land use issues on a regional level.

Challenges to local level planning, including limited capacity to address complex regional problems, apply to the Mississippi Gulf Coast and point to the importance of gaining a better understanding of factors that influence intergovernmental collaboration. The success of the State-lead planning process in Mississippi will depend in part on the ability to overcome these intergovernmental planning challenges to plan and rebuild the Gulf Coast. In order to further examine intergovernmental collaboration, my study addresses the following questions:

1. Who are the primary actors involved in local land use planning on the Mississippi Gulf Coast?
2. Is vertical or horizontal intergovernmental collaboration for planning occurring in post-Katrina Mississippi?

3. What are the factors that promote or inhibit collaboration for land use planning in post-Katrina Mississippi?

1.4. Study Justification

My study offers important prescriptions for factors that impact the occurrence of intergovernmental collaboration because it pulls from two well-established literatures. Planning literature discusses collaboration, but frequently focuses mainly on the process elements, such as consensus building and stakeholder involvement (Innes, 1996; Margerum, 2002). While organizational theory does not focus as much on the process and engagement factors, this literature provides extensive propositions as to why organizations collaborate, stemming from resource dependence and transaction costs theories (Pfeiffer and Salancik, 1978; Williamson, 1981). Within this same literature, considerable attention is being paid to networks roles in why organizations work together (Mandell, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Vandeventer and Mandell, 2007). These two literatures are ripe for collectively conceptually enhancing research and discussion about intergovernmental collaboration, but the planning literature is still on the brink of identifying networks as a new context for planning (Albrechts and Mandelbaum, 2005).

Network theories and propositions need to be brought to the forefront of land use planning contexts to better understand intergovernmental relationships. How and why are relationships for land use planning formed? How can these relationships be better established or managed? In this study I adopt a broad definition of intergovernmental collaboration, which includes a range of activities from informal information sharing to
formal, joint policymaking (Gray, 1989). These interactions, no matter how sophisticated or formal, reveal information about the way people navigate shared agendas to achieve benefits and outcomes that would not be possible without collaboration.

It is widely acknowledged that additional examples of collaboration must be examined in order to identify the institutional constraints, techniques that facilitate collaboration, and the roles that planners play in these arrangements (Healey, 1998; Innes et al., 1994; Margerum, 2002). The study of collaboration of this type is changing our society’s traditional view of what is meant by governance, and the roles that these relationships play in solving complex public problems (Mandell, 2001).

Intergovernmental collaboration for planning is one of policy areas that remains challenging based on the tension between the need for regional planning to be able to adequately address land use needs, and the desire to make local decisions. Planning efforts following Hurricane Katrina are extremely complex, involving dependence on large number of different variables and actors, which makes them impossible to be handled alone. Local government actors must rely on these relationships to help them address complex issues of planning and rebuilding.

Unfortunately, public actors are often poorly equipped with the experience or ability to manage competing and collective interests within and among communities in a collaborative manner. As a result, collaborative endeavors often fail (Hillier, 2003). Part of the problem is that more research must be conducted in the field to better understand the challenges and needs of collaborative planning, particularly when it comes to issues of institutional structures, leadership roles, and building relationships. To add to the
knowledge in the field, I identify the factors that influenced intergovernmental collaboration for land use planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW: COLLABORATION AND NETWORKS

The theoretical framework of this research is grounded in the results of other research in collaborative land use planning as well as related ideas from public administration that offer important contributions to collaborative approaches generally. Both disciplines suggest that value in accomplishing common goals may be gained from intergovernmental collaboration.

In this chapter, I summarize selected literature on collaboration from land use planning and public administration as a starting point to understand why groups or actors would theoretically work together. I begin by providing literature that defines collaboration generally. Then I outline some of the key literature from organizational theory to answer the question, Why do organizations collaborate? I summarize key literature defining networks and network theory as a new perspective from public administration for examining the interaction of actors who work together to pursue common goals. I then discuss pertinent literature from planning that adds to the discussion about what prompts actors to work collaboratively for land use issues, and also places these factors in the context of land use planning matters.
2.1. What is Collaboration?

Literature provides different definitions for collaboration, varying on a continuum from extremely inclusive definitions to extremely limited definitions. The limited end of the continuum defines collaboration as only including formal, joint policy-making activities. When considered individually, the outcomes of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are clearly different. At the inclusive end, collaboration is any action that considers the interests of another group.

In his article on the determinants of interorganizational cooperation, Schermerhorn defines cooperation as “deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organizations for the joint accomplishments of individual operating goals.” (1975: 847) Wondelleck and Yaffee (2000) state that cooperation involves actors or groups of actors who move in concert situationally, but have no power to sway the behavior of others.

Mulford and Rogers (1982, 12) define coordination as “the process whereby two or more organizations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established to deal collectively with their shared task environment.” Adopting this definition, they effectively specify that the decision rule could be established by the participants or a third party, highlights the shared task, focuses on the collective, and emphasizes the joint decisions.

Mulford and Rogers (1982) contrast cooperation and coordination on the basis that with cooperation, actor A and actor B informally relate in order to attempt to establish reciprocity in the absence of rules accomplish their respective goals. This can be contrasted with coordination, which they describe as formal relationships where joint
decisions and actions result in joint outcomes that may be different from their preferred outcomes. They further distinguish coordination as more formal relationships, focused on joint goals, affecting vertical and horizontal linkages, involving more resources, and creating higher threats to autonomy than cooperation.

Gray (1989) adopts a more inclusive definition of cooperation, coordination and collaboration. Collaboration, as she defines it is “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.” (1989, 5) Gray states that cooperation and coordination frequently occur as part of collaboration because both informal and formal processes are important to establishing reciprocity. Once initiated, informal interactions need to be managed to lay the groundwork for more formal or sophisticated interactions.

In addition to the distinction in definition between inclusive and limited collaboration, the dimensionality of the collaborative activities must be defined. Provan and Milward (1995, 10) set the basic structure for this definition by stating, “the basic building block of any [collaborative] network study is the linkages among the organization…” Using this as a basis, the dimensionality of collaboration can be defined through its varying linkages. Agranoff and McGuire (2003) differentiate between vertical and horizontal linkages in intergovernmental collaboration; vertical linkages involve collaboration between local-regional-state actors, while horizontal linkages involve peer-to-peer actors.
2.2. Why Do Organizations Collaborate?

Differences in the definitions for collaboration can be attributed to the differences in their theoretical underpinnings. Three established streams of organizational theory explore motivations behind organizational collaboration. This section will introduce institutional theory, transaction cost theory, and resource dependence theory and explain how they contribute to knowledge about why collaboration occurs.

2.2.1 Institutional Perspectives

The institutional perspective of organizational theory has its roots in sociology and emphasizes the impact of norms, as collective rationality in an institutionalized environment, on organizational structure, stability, and chances of survival (Meyers and Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory assumes that organizational structures (the “blueprint” of activities and how they are achieved) reflect a socially constructed reality supported by myths and values rather than efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). According to this theory, the survival of organizations depends on not only efficiency, but more importantly, on legitimacy and resources gained through increased legitimacy with environmental institutions (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999, 172; Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 352). Therefore, the formation of organizations is supported by incorporating accepted norms that create social pressure to comply, as well as institutional rules (ceremony, values, etc.) to gain legitimacy, resources, stability and enhanced survival prospects.

Meyer and Rowan (1977, 348) explore the impact of institutional environments on organizations and propose that isomorphism (or homogenization) with environmental institutions results in organizations incorporating elements that are “legitimized
externally, rather than in terms of efficiency”; employing “ceremonial assessment criteria
to define the value of structural elements; and depending on “externally fixed
institutions” to maintain stability. Isomorphism is therefore argued to promote
organizational success and survival. What is interesting is that Meyer and Rowan (1977,
349) describe the results of isomorphism as the organization being “successful by social
definition.” In a sense, simply through ceremony and process, the organization is
categorized as successful because it fits a prescribed mold of other socially acceptable
and successful organizations. Legitimacy is thus achieved, which further strengthens its
survival.

Following this logic, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) agree that isomorphic
processes (either coercive, mimetic, or normative processes) promote the successful
formation and survival of organizations. Within these processes, organizations become
more alike as they seek social legitimacy in the same environment. Coercive
isomorphism involves pressures to conform to other authoritative organizations on which
the organization depends. Even if these persuaded changes seem only ceremonial,
adherence to these changes may impact power relationships in the future (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983, 150). In this case, organizations may form networks because they are
coerced due to funding that demands partnerships as a prerequisite.

Mimetic isomorphism results from uncertainty, whereby organizations may want
to model or “mimic” themselves after successful organizations. Organizations tend to
mimic themselves after other organizations that they find to be legitimate or successful.
An example of this type of isomorphism was observed in the study completed on inter-
local agreements by Thurmaier and Wood (2002, 595). They observed a phenomenon
that they called “positively connected exchange networks”, where there was an increase in the likelihood that others would agree to participate in agreements once there was agreement to join by two or more jurisdictions. Finally, normative isomorphism stems from similar professional occupations. In this case, organizations may collaborate because they belong to the same professional society.

A culture of trust can be based on norms such as the result of shared values, history of positive interactions, common association of kinship, profession, or education, thereby building a reciprocal network of relationships (Alexander, 1995, 17). The idea of building “norms of reciprocity” through the long-term nature of intergovernmental relationships is explored in related sociological theories of organizations (Thurmier and Wood, 2002). Interestingly, research finds that norms of reciprocity are actually stronger at maintaining relationships than the purely self-interested economizing perspective. In fact, these “norms” also openly allowed for free-ridership from smaller jurisdictions involved in agreements, thereby supporting the culture of cooperation.

Although reasons that organizations collaborate may be rooted in lower transaction costs, institutional factors play an important role. Institutional theory can be applied to explaining the survival of collaborative relationships. As described here, research finds that institutional factors such as the norms of reciprocity act as a strong rationale for the frequency and sustainability of these relationships.

2.2.2 Transaction Cost Perspectives

Transaction cost theory originated in economics. It assumes that uncertainty and efficiency are the prime motivators for behavior. This theory asks the main questions,
why do organizations exist? Which activities should be performed within the firm, and which contracted out? The idea behind this theory is that production of any sort involves multiple transactions among actors. The transactions are costly for many reasons, mostly centering on costs associated with information gathering, and the preparation of negotiation and contractual agreements for each transaction.

In order to reduce these costs, as any rational person would want, Coase (1937) suggested shifting from market arrangements (contracting out) to internal, centrally controlled arrangements (hierarchy). These ideas generated by Coase created an arrangement whereby market relations are substituted for authority relations in order to reduce transaction costs and produce more efficiently (Moe, 1984). Instead of perfect rationality and complete information in the market, transaction cost theory sees bounded rationality, costly information and opportunism (Williamson, 1981). These assumptions lead decision-makers to “satisfice”, and engage in highly structured and patterned behavior. This concept of “bounded rationality” recognizes that people are not omniscient; it assumed that those engaged in economic activity are inherently rational, but that rationality (information, knowledge, etc.) is limited (Moe, 1984). Transaction cost theory explains the emergence of hierarchical organizations as a means for firms to minimize their transaction costs because it theoretically produces the least transaction costs to achieve information, bargaining, and enforcement (Williamson, 1981).

In this sense, transaction costs determine organizational arrangements, and different organizational structures will emerge because they are more economically efficient. Coordination costs are an example of a transaction costs. As coordination costs become too high, hierarchical forms of organization are developed. By contrast, when
costs of coordinating action in complex hierarchies become too high, organizations are
disaggregated into market-like forms of organization (Alexander, 1995).

While the proposition to make more efficient transactions makes sense as
financial resources are becoming less and less available, transaction cost theory assumes
that the other actors in a transaction are opportunists that should not be trusted
(Williamson, 1981). The need to monitor for opportunism makes transactions costly, and
therefore requires formal contracts that will counteract threats of opportunism.
Transaction cost assumptions therefore allow for very formal contracted relationships
given the costs associated with monitoring for opportunism. However, transaction cost
theory leaves room for the ability to establish an element of trust over time through
research areas such as relational contracting, which will be discussed below.

By extending this argument, transaction cost theory can offer support for the
formation and continuance of networks. Coordination among network actors becomes a
way to manage interactions so that the transaction costs are minimized. Applying this to
local governments, research suggests that when transaction costs are low, governments
will use more external production such as joint contracting, but when transaction costs
and opportunism risks are higher, governments tend to be more selective about their
production partners (Brown and Potoski, 2003). Part of the decision to engage with other
governments is based on trust. As their research suggests, lower risk is experienced with
partners that share similar goals. In the case of asset specificity, engaging with other local
governments results in less opportunity for exploiting contracts for profit maximization
than would be experienced with private firms (Brown and Potoski, 2003, 463). Therefore,
the rationale for coordinating in networks may be cost savings to local governments.
Transaction costs are lowered because these relationships may require less monitoring than contracts with private sector. In this case, trust can substitute for monitoring transactions, thereby lowering the transaction costs (Thurmier and Wood, 2002, 586).

Relational contracting, also based on transaction cost theories, can also help inform why networks are formed and why they continue to exist. Relational contracts are based on relationships that are built and maintained over time. While these relationships can be developed between organizations (i.e., two governments) or even within organizations, the contractual relationships are built on repeated, long-term interactions (Bertelli and Smith, 2005). What results from such interaction is a sense of trust, thereby lowering risks of transaction costs as well as a guard against adverse selection, providing incentive to create and maintain these networked relationships due to a decrease in monitoring partners.

In a repeated and long-term relationship, actors will theoretically be more truthful in their transactions, and will be more forthcoming about their limitations (expertise, knowledge, power) in a particular task, preventing failure in obtaining a joint goal and therefore damaging relationships (Bertelli and Smith, 2005). Based on previous and experiences with each other, transaction costs are lowered, producing a network of reliable and trusted actors. In a sense, relationship stability is reached over time through management decisions, much like contingency theory may suggest about managerial decisions.

Based on their review of relational contracting literature, Bertelli and Smith (2005, 22) summarize different elements that provide different perspectives on trust in networks. First, they recognize that structural “embeddedness” is a measure of the past
and future connections within a network including both indirect and direct interactions.

“Multiplexity” is a measure of the strength of relationship between actors, increased with the number of connections between actors. This is an important factor because if one tie is broken, another tie may still bind actors together. As a general trend, ties between actors tend to start out weak as actors “test” commitment and reliability (Provan and Milward, 2001). Finally, despite the important of these institutional factors, they suggest that a manager is essential to foster the level of trust needed in networks.

Therefore, transaction cost theory helps explain the formation of networks because it acknowledges the costs of coordination. Interactions between actors in network can help reduce the costs of uncoordinated actions. Relational contracting, also situated in transaction cost theory, proposes cost savings through networked relationships. In this case, transaction costs spent on monitoring for factors such as adverse selection and opportunism are reduced due to trust built through repeated interactions. Relational contracting provides an important link to the trust element found in my theoretical framework for network maintenance.

2.2.3 Resource Dependence Perspectives

Resource dependence theory sees resource exchange as the key factor that explains organizational behavior and relations. The main incentive for organizational relations is survival, and because organizations typically exist in an environment with limited resources, they are dependent on other organizations to varying degrees for resources needed for survival (Pfeiffer and Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theory therefore examines the role of processes and actors within an organization and how they
interact with the environment. This theory assumes that organizations survive based on their effectiveness in managing demands of resources, that organizational behavior is important, and that organizational existence is always in question due to an environment that is uncertain due to the interdependent nature of organizations. Resource dependence theory therefore proposes resource exchange as the main incentive for forming and sustaining network relationships.

The basic logic of resource dependence theory is that organizations are located in an environment full of other organizations, and organizations are dependent upon this environment for resources. However, the resources needed by the organization are not always readily available, making the environment undependable. Organizations can either die or adjust to the environmental changes for survival. According to resource dependence theory, organizations have to exchange resources with all the other organization in which they are mutually interdependent (Alexander, 1995).

One can explore the influence of this theory on the sustainability of networked relationships. Network actors move into these relationships in order to gain something, as resource dependence theory assumes that acquiring resources are important. A primary hypothesis of resource dependence theory is that an organization survives only to the extent it creates and maintains a coalition of support (Provan et al, 1980). The City of Columbus and Clinton Township found themselves in a similar situation where one entity needed water and sewer and the other needed more fire service. While the City of Columbus would have otherwise annexed the township if it provided water and sewer, it entered into an agreement with the township that it would allow the township to remain independent and would provide water and sewer if the township in turn provided
additional fire service to the City. Their interdependencies supported the formation and maintenance of their collaborative partnership.

Survival of the organization thus results from adjustment to minimize its dependence on other organizations and maximize its own power to survive. In some cases, coping with demands can come from diversifying or expanding organizational domains to ensure survival via more independence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 272). Provan et al (1980) concluded that the degree of resource dependency explains each organization’s power in the network, but it can be modified by other links in the network environment. In this case, an agency with more external funding sources was more powerful in its relationship with the United Way. In this case, network success is solidified when there are multiple players in the network.

Resource dependence theory therefore suggests that organizations form relationships such as networks because they realize or perceive a level of interdependence. Managing and interacting in these interdependencies is essential for survival of organizations due to an uncertain environment.

Each of these theories suggests their own theoretical reasoning for organizational collaboration. The next section will introduce network theory as the theory that pulls from these and other established theories to propose motivations for organizations to work together in networked relationships.

2.3. Network Perspectives and Theory

While Oliver (1990, 242) states that individual determinants may be separate and sufficient causes for collaboration, the decision to collaborate is usually based on
multiple contingencies. Using this argument, network perspectives and network theory were explored because they synthesize contingencies from the three organizational theories just discussed to produce more holistic assumptions about why organizations collaborate.

There is a considerable amount of attention being paid to networks, network perspectives and network theory in the public administration literature. However, there is no consensus on the definition of networks, and theory of networks (O’Toole and Meier, 2005; Provan and Milward, 1995). In the absence of consensus, I have adopted the following definition of networks and identified a number of assumptions that characterize networks.

2.3.1 What are Networks?

Networks are groups or individuals that form to further their common interests through collective action (Olson, 1965). Networks usually consist of a relationship where more than one organization works with another to achieve a joint purpose, where the goal of network is to achieve greater social, economic or political impact than is possible alone (Vandeventer and Mandell, 2007; Mandell, 2001). Networked relationships can differ in the types of organizations involved and can vary in sizes. They can involve both governmental and non-governmental actors. From an intergovernmental perspective, networks can include combinations of agencies within the same government or links between different governments, and can range in size and complexity from a few actors to complex arrangements involving dozens of governmental actors (O’Toole and Meier, 2004). Network efforts can range from simple information sharing to informal resource
sharing among actors to more formal structures involving collective problem-solving (Mandell, 1994). In all cases, these actors are working interdependently to exchange information or jointly formulate policies that would otherwise be completed independently through their respective organizations. (Mandell and Steeleman, 2003).

Actors and organizations join networks when the benefits of the relationships outweigh the costs of forming and maintaining these relationships. The main argument for networks is that two or more interdependent groups who collaborate with one another are more effective at providing community-based services than if they try to accomplish the same tasks on their own (Alter and Hage, 1993). Network actors take a chance to lose or benefit from their participation in a collaborative network. This logic pulls from resource dependence, institutional, and transaction costs theories, as increasing survival through more resources or power (Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978), legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and efficiency through reduced transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) provides the rationale for working collectively. Due to the scale and complexity of societal issues, the capacity of networks exceeds any single organization’s capacity to address them alone (Vandevenetner and Mandell, 2007).

2.3.2 Types of Networks

The major difference among different types of networks is the degree to which the individual actor or organization remains autonomous or forms a new, combined unit (Mandell 2001, 280). Similarly to the continuum of definitions for collaboration, Vandevenetner and Mandell (2007, 13-17) distinguish between three different types of networks. In cooperating networks, the most common form, actors form stronger
relationships and share information, but value themselves as autonomous and
independent and do not necessarily pursue large-scale policy reform. They describe
*coordinating networks* as involving actors who work together as a coordinating
mechanism to perform tasks that will benefit them individually and collectively, while
still maintaining their independent status. Finally, *collaborating networks* work together
on complex issues involving long-term reform, and take large risks of reconstructing their
roles as a collective as opposed to individuals.

2.3.3 How Networks Function

Some scholars make a distinction between mandated and voluntary networks,
both of which exist in the literature (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). This distinction is
significant because the explanation for formation will be fundamentally different,
involving different sets of incentives or forces related to relationships. However, the
relationships in networks rely on a principle of equal partnership, resulting in “shared”
authority (Vandeventer and Mandell, 2007). Equal partnership requires a certain type of
network management to ensure communication, facilitation, and interaction within the
network is sustained (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001a).

Networks therefore represent organized relationships that are not managed under
a single hierarchically arrangement, nor are they situated in a market arrangement
(Mandell, 1994). Instead, we can think of network governing mechanisms existing on a
continuum between the traditional mechanisms of markets and hierarchies. To elaborate
on this, within markets individuals informally engage with one another due to an
assumption of some individual benefit from the interaction, but they do not make joint
decisions or share resources (Mandell, 1994). In contrast, networks form in part due to an assumption of mutual gain, and actors make joint decisions and agree to share resources in the interaction.

Traditional hierarchies exist on the other side of the governing mechanism continuum. Actors in hierarchies participate because they are compelled to interact by their superior in the organization, and they presumably operate to achieve a common organizational goal. In the case of networks, participants are neither coerced as in hierarchies, nor do they act solely as individual units that stand to gain some benefit as in markets. Instead, participation in networks forms around the assumption that individually members cannot derive a benefit for themselves; rather, all the participants stand to gain a benefit that is of collective interest through membership.

Considering networks through the lens of the continuum, there is close link between the forces of self-interest (situated in market governance) and common goal interests (situated in hierarchical governance). A theory of collective action in groups supports this suggestion (Olson 1965, 7). Collective action proposes that group membership (i.e., networks) is attractive because there is something to be gained through membership. Although purely individual interests can be advanced most efficiently through individual, unorganized actions (i.e., markets), when multiple individuals share a common or collective interest (typical in hierarchies), individual action will not be able to achieve this interest adequately. Following from this theory, members in organized networks act in a more consensual fashion than either markets or hierarchies, and achieve individual interests through the attainment of group interests. Observation of differences
in structural and governance mechanisms support this assumption that networks are
different from traditional organizations.

Although the balance between these potentially competing forces may vary
depending on the network goal and the actors involved in the network, a theoretical
threshold exists in which the actors cannot exceed. Therefore, while purely individual
interests can be met in an organized group, there must be a close relationship between
these individual goals and the common interests. Networks will not successfully form and
continue to exist if self-interest and common goal interests are not within a certain
threshold (Mandell, 1994).

Within the public administration literature, networks are categorized as being both
vertical and horizontal in structure (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). In a vertical context
networks emphasize interactions between different levels of government (local, state, and
federal), whereas in a horizontal context, the actors are all local governments representing
different interests. Participation in a formal or informal network therefore theoretically
provides advantages to the actors as they have additional resources to gain and share
information.

2.3.4 Network Assumptions

There are several factors that may play a role in the formation of a networked
relationship. In the absence of an identified or agreed upon theory of networks, I
summarize key underlying assumptions of network perspectives. Based on my review of
the applicable literature, shared goals, interdependence, trust, and network management
therefore serve as my theoretical explanations for network establishment.
Shared goals or visions are the basis for an actor’s commitment to a network. Mandell (1994, 105) calls this commitment a “mindset”, where actors recognize the legitimacy of the separate institutional arrangement of the network, and seek a common goal. It is this commitment to a common goal that acts to counterbalance the individual organization’s interests with interests of the network as a whole. When goal alignment is established and commitment is made to the network, this shared goal serves as the key element that keeps actors together despite other obstacles (Mandell, 1994).

Interdependence among network actors is generally an accepted assumption of networks. Actors are mutually dependent on each other based on resource exchanges and efficiencies (Provan and Milward, 1995). Members in a network participate because they cannot act alone to achieve their goals. Rather, the achievement of the goals is contingent upon the interactions of other actors in the network, and all are critical elements to the network (Mandell, 2001). As such, network theory assumes that actors in networks share resources in their interdependent relationship and all actors will benefit in some way from the exchange (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). While actors are strategically interdependent, some are more dependent on resources than others (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Although the measure of resources provided by actors in the network may vary, all provide some amount of resources needed to achieve the network goals (Mandell, 1994).

Networked relationships as I define them are not legally bounded relationships; therefore, trust plays an essential role of engaging actors in a collaborative network. Agranoff and McGuire (2003, 182) suggest, “in the absence of the legal charter, people join, work and remain together because some element of trust exists.” It is generally
acknowledged that trust develops over a period of time through repeated interactions (Alexander, 1995). Experience with other actors can have a positive or negative impact on the level of trust in the network, depending on the outcomes of the transactions between actors (Mandell and Steelman, 2003).

Finally, the more recent evolution of network management takes observations of intergovernmental relationships a step further by suggesting that collaborative relationships can be managed to support problem solving, coping capabilities and networking (Wright, 1990). Leadership, in the form of network management is an assumption of networks that is getting more recent attention (Agranoff, 2003; McGuire, 2005; Mandell and Steelman, 2003). While networks do not have a formal mechanism of “commanding” actors to participate or interact, they can be thought of as “catalysts and cultivators” (Mandell 1994, 108). Consistent with this logic, Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 2003, 2003a) and McGuire (2002) distinguish four categories of skills that are needed for network leaders or managers: activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing (discussed later in this section) in order to form and sustain a collaborative network.

These assumptions are consistent with what some leaders in the field of collaborative management suggest are forces of legal cohesion in collaboration. Agranoff and McGuire (2003, 182) propose that trust, common purpose, mutual dependency, and factors of collaborative management may be analogous to the force of legal-rational authority found in traditional hierarchies or bureaucracies. In effect, these four assumptions play the key role in formation, facilitation and maintenance of collaborative networks in the absence of a legal authority paradigm.
2.4. Interactive Planning Perspectives

Literature from land use planning complements these organizational theories about why organizations collaborate. This literature is an appropriate follow-up to the organization theory literature because it transitions the theoretical arguments from a general level into a framework that assumes a land use planning context.

There has been an increasing emphasis on the communicative and interactive nature of planning practice over the last two decades (Forester, 1989; Innes, 1996). Language such as transactive planning (Friedmann, 1973), communicative planning (Forester, 1989; Innes, 1996) and collaborative planning (Healey, 1997; Innes and Booher, 1999) all emphasize an interactive approach to planning. In doing so, planning theory offers suggestions as to what factors promote participation in a collaborative planning approach.

2.4.1 Transactive

One of the smaller precursors to the communicative model was Friedmann’s (1973) Transactive Planning. The emphasis of transactive planning was the interactive approach, whereby citizens and civic leaders should be at the core of planning instead of planners. This “transactive” relationship between a planner and client was essential to establishing links between knowledge and action, and was a process of mutual learning. He felt that planning was not just concerned with the efficient instrumentation of technically derived objectives; rather, it is also a process by which society may discover its future. This supports the continued evolution of the decentralized, citizen centered
trend in planning theory. Friedmann further substantiates this trend pushed over from advocacy planning by stating, “…any fundamental change in society must be worked from below. It must originate with those who are without power.” (1973, xvi).

Friedmann proposed a new knowledge of social learning, supporting a relationship of dialogue as a basis for mutual learning between planners and their clients. “In order to adhere to an action-planning model, planners would need to take on different roles. Successful planning…would depend in large measure on the planner’s skill in managing interpersonal relations.” (1973, 20). These ideas were subsequently integrated with planning theorists that have more recently pushed forth communicative and collaborative planning models.

2.4.2 Communicative

Communicative planning theory emerged during the 1980s after decades of thought characterized by the belief that a planner should play the part of the planning technician who delivers objective information to decision-makers (Innes, 1998). Until recently, planning theory focused solely on technical information, while communication and knowledge production through conversation was ignored. Healey (1992) proposed this ‘communicative turn’ in planning based on the dilemma posed by technical and narrow rationalism that compromised the democratic potential of planning.

The ideals of communicative planning are grounded in the belief that communication of information leads to knowledge, which can influence power of planners (Forester, 1989). Thus, power borne from a communicatively rational process that integrates knowledge founded in self-reflection, praxis and discourse can impact the
“success” of planning and planners (Innes, 1996). The communicative or collaborative turn in planning and policy making is a further step toward democratizing an administrative process that previously had been concentrated in the hands of a few, labeled technocrats, experts, administrators, elites or bureaucrats.

Much of the literature on communicative and collaborative planning is grounded in the Habermasian philosophies of “communicative rationality” and “communicative action”. Communicative rationality is an expansion of the modernist thought of reason as pure logic and scientific findings to include all ways of knowing things. Instead of abandoning modernity, Habermas aimed to build on it to include other ways of knowing such as through conversation. He believed that rationality could exist, but as “communicative rationality” (Healey, 1992). In this sense, a decision is communicatively rational to the degree that it is reached consensually through deliberations involving all stakeholders, where all are equally empowered and fully informed, and where the conditions of ideal speech are met (Innes 1996, 461).

“Communicative action” is that which is oriented to reaching understanding, reflecting a communicative rationality, which is collectively achieved through discourse (Huxley, 2000). Communicative action theory suggests that planners are involved in “attention-shaping” (Forester, 1989). Their ordinary actions produce communicative effects that planners can use to avoid problems or improve practice. Forester (1989) suggests four characteristics of good communication in planning: 1) it must be comprehensible and should not use jargon; 2) it must be sincere in order to establish mutual trust; 3) it must be legitimate and be appropriate to situation; and 4) it must be
true to the best of one’s knowledge and ability. Communication that does not include these factors is considered “distorted” and acts to fuel distrust.

A central assumption of communicative planning is that no act of communication is ever purely technical and neutral. Instead, “all technical information is inevitably infused with biases reflecting particular interpretative predilections and normative values.” (Healey 1992, 9) Communicative acts cannot therefore be taken at face value but have to be interpreted to uncover the meanings, values and motives that lie below the surface of technical information. The switch from the rational comprehensive planning to the communicative planning ideals recognized that information was more than just a policy-making tool. In fact, following the communicative rationality model, planners could use information as power to interact and engage in influencing public action (Innes, 1996). Therefore, the individual planner can make a difference and can work to create deliberative circumstances that can address imbalances of power and knowledge (Huxley, 2000).

Several factors have to be met to the best ability to ensure rational results from communicative planning. Innes (1998) lays out specific rules that must be followed to ensure acceptable and “socially worthwhile” discussions, most of which make true communicative planning almost as impossible to achieve as rational comprehensive planning. First, individuals representing all interests should be included in the discussion. Second, discussion must take place, and all stakeholders must be equally informed and empowered to avoid social injustices to those in weaker positions. The process must be one where all assumptions are open to questioning. This requires that the speaker must be sincere, honest and legitimate, have credentials and be ready to speak comprehensibly,
which helps eliminate misinformation in setting agendas and framing issues (Forester, 1989). Finally, stakeholders must seek consensus.

Literature suggests that communicative planning is increasing in its importance due to the power that can be gained through consensus building, as stakeholders realize their interdependence in achieving goals (Booher & Innes, 2002). However, this theory is not without its critics. Communicative theories may be too ideal and unrealistic when applied to practice. Communicative theory assumes that interaction and discourse establishes rationality and reconciles knowledge and values (Wilson, 2003). It also assumes that consensus is possible through communication, and that planners can overcome “distortions” (Forester, 1989), and address issues of unequal power found by facilitating communication (Huxley, 2000). Finally, still others argue that agreement on planning issues does not mean that anything will be implemented and that the communicative process takes a long time and can lead to burnout (Fainstein, 2000).

2.4.3 Collaborative

Collaborative planning draws on Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality by providing the framework for pluralistic and democratic decision-making. This framework is manifested in the structure and process of planning. Habermas (1984) argued that there needs to be a shift towards living together – but differently in shared space in time. This argument drives us to search for ways of finding agreement on how to act in the world to address our collective concerns.

Habermas’ concept can be applied in communicative practice. Information, through the process of planning, is influential because it becomes embedded in
understandings, practices and institutions, rather than by being used as evidence (Forester, 1989). The process by which the information is produced and agreed on is important. Key stakeholders should be included in the process to create these shared understanding to support the collaborative effort – where they can identify mutually acceptable goals. This process must include substantial debate among key players and a social process to develop shared meaning for the information.

Application of collaborative planning is important because it can result in network power (Booher and Innes, 2002). Planning literature has identified the importance of collaborative planning, especially for areas of rapid land use change, social and political fragmentation, and where a high level of interdependence on planning issues exists (Booher and Innes, 2002). In the planning literature, the current model of addressing complex societal issues that demand collaborative arrangements centers on consensus building or evaluates processes used to find consensus (Innes and Booher, 1999; Innes, 1992; Innes et al., 1994; Margerum, 2002a).

2.5. Factors Influencing Collaboration

Current research in planning calls for examples of applied work with collaborative relationships that can contribute to greater clarity about the institutional constraints on the development of collaborative arrangements, the development of techniques to facilitate them, and the roles that planners play in these arrangements (Healey, 1998). In order to complete this task, literature from organizational theory and networks needed to be integrated with the corresponding literature from collaborative planning. By synthesizing the theories from these two different perspectives, a theoretical
framework was established to test which factors influence collaboration in the context of this study.

In this section, I further define collaboration as it is used for this study. I then present the ten factors that form the basis for my theoretical framework that explains factors that influence collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.

2.5.1. Collaboration Continuum

Gray (1989, 5) defines collaboration as the “process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.” Using this as a basis I adopted a broad definition of collaboration that encompasses both cooperation and coordination.

Collaboration can be thought of as occupying a continuum, from loosely formed interactions and interdependencies to structured collaboration toward a common policy goal (Mandell, 2001). For the purposes of this study, collaboration will be defined as a continuum of partnerships. Cigler (1999) proposes that collaborative arrangements can vary along a continuum from simple, informal partnerships to more complex, formal partnerships (Figure 3). Ciglar suggested four levels of partnerships, differing in purpose, intensity of linkage, and the formality of agreements. The higher the level of complexity, the higher the level of trust needs to be to allow for stable commitment and interdependence.
Modifying Cigler’s (1999) partnership continuum, this study proposes a continuum of collaborative relationships for land use planning. This revised continuum is primarily conceptualized based on the level of complexity of the collaborative purpose using main assumptions from network theory (Table 1). According to this table, the higher the level of complexity, the higher the level of trust, commitment, and interdependence. Moreover, Cigler (1999) expects that as partnerships evolve from simple information sharing to more complex relationships, they must be managed by a champion using different skills, who influences interactions between actors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Interaction¹</th>
<th>Information Sharing²</th>
<th>Resource Exchange³</th>
<th>Problem-Solving⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formality</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No formal rules, membership unstable with no noticeable consequences</td>
<td>Few rules</td>
<td>Negotiated rules, agreements in writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdependence for Outcome</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Informal exchange of news, ideas, documents; members remain autonomous</td>
<td>Requires resources beyond information sharing; membership somewhat unstable with noticeable consequences</td>
<td>High interdependence; stable membership; Loss of actor could lead to failure;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared Goals</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low to no commitment; self-interest high</td>
<td>Establishment of specific shared goals; agreement to some loss of autonomy</td>
<td>High commitment; consensus of shared goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td>No trust; no direct interaction; may involve recognition from similar meetings</td>
<td>Low levels of trust; occasional interaction among actors</td>
<td>Moderate levels of trust; regular interaction among actors</td>
<td>High levels of trust; frequent interactions among actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Basic planning, organizing</td>
<td>Mediating, guiding, influencing interactions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Characteristics of collaboration levels, organized by complexity.

2.5.2. Pre-Conditions for Collaboration

Decisions surrounding the formation of collaborative networks will be examined using a dramatic example of local government collaboration for critical community needs following Hurricane Katrina. As a basis for exploring these decisions, Cigler (1999)

¹ Pre-interaction includes information, knowledge, familiarity that an actor has with another before they engage in any level of collaborative activity.
² Information sharing includes simple informal exchanges of information with little to no costs to actors involved.
³ Resource exchange includes seeking resources from other actors beyond information sharing, such as expertise, time, or financial resources.
⁴ Problem-solving includes highly complex, joint policy-making and strategy-making that leads toward tangible outcomes.
completed work on what she considers “pre-conditions” for the emergence of multi-community collaboration. The nine pre-conditions are as follows:

- Occurrence of disaster;
- Fiscal stress;
- Financial capacity building by external agents;
- Emphasis on collaborative skills-building highlights “capacity building”;
- Existence of a policy entrepreneur;
- Building a political constituency for cooperation;
- Early and continued support from elected and local officials;
- Promotion of visible advantages of cooperation for participating communities; and
- Early focus on visible, effective strategies

Applying these nine pre-conditions to post-Katrina planning, justifies this study’s assumption of the emergence of collaborative networks.

Hurricane Katrina was immediately categorized as a disaster on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and it resulted in fiscal stress for all the coastal communities who were left to recover and rebuild. The 35-foot tidal waves and 130-mile-per-hour winds resulted in the total loss of 65,000 housing units and severe damage to 55,000 homes. Between January 2005 and July 2006, more than 24,000 people left the Mississippi coastal counties and, initially, unemployment rose to 25 percent (Mississippi Beyond Katrina, 2006).

The damage left these communities struggling to plan for rebuilding. Immediately following the hurricane, the State created the Mississippi Governor’s Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, a privately funded group with significant contributions from Knight Foundation as the first financial capacity building initiative. The Governor’s Commission sponsored the Mississippi Renewal Forum, a first step in creating rebuilding plans for the Gulf Coast. At the State’s request, this Commission brought together more than 200 architects, planners, and community leaders
to work with communities along the coast to prepare rebuilding plans, thereby creating new *technical and administrative capacity*. In addition to the architects and planners who volunteered their time and expertise, a *Mississippi Rebuilding* and a *SmartCode* listserv were created to provide additional assistance for information exchange and support.

The Governor’s Commission and the Congress for the New Urbanism played the role of the main leaders or *champions* to create and maintain interest in the rebuilding processes. Governor Barbour stated that “the Commission will lead, but local governments and the private sector will decide” (Barbour, 2005). Under the Commission and the CNU, the plans are designed to advance the principles of New Urbanism and promote smart growth. The federal and state government *encouraged cooperation* of all levels of government in the Mississippi Renewal Forum, and voiced support for the common land use model put forward by the CNU, the SmartCode. In many cases, there was *participation by local planning staff and elected officials* in the Mississippi Renewal Forum, and *continued support* for development of the new land use plans and models.

Finally, following the Mississippi Renewal Forum, there was considerable local and national media attention brought to this event. The nation applauded the volunteered time provided by the CNU architects and other planners from around the country. This provided *visible advantages of cooperation* for participating communities. Immediately following the Mississippi Renewal Forum, there were media stories about the ideas and completed plans that were developed for the participating communities. Many of these communities never had long-range plans in place pre-Hurricane Katrina, so this *early focus on visible outcomes* created interest in the process.
2.5.3. Collaboration Cohesion Factors

This section synthesizes the planning and organizational theory literature to determine cohesion criteria that would theoretically play a role in the promotion of intergovernmental cooperation in post-Katrina communities.

2.5.3.1. Interpersonal Ideology

*Interdependence*

Beyond shared goals, collaboration will occur when actors see that they have a mutual dependence for a specific outcome. Mulford and Rogers (1982) state that increased interdependencies lead to a greater need for intra- and interorganizational collaboration. Gray (1989, 27) discusses collaboration as a response to turbulent conditions by suggesting that collaboration is a “logical and necessary response to turbulent conditions”, caused by rapid changes that produce uncertainty. Gray continues to say that under such conditions, “organizations become highly interdependent with others in unexpected but inconsequential ways” and that collaboration allows for collective capacity to adapt. Further, turbulence cannot be managed individually because “disruptions and their causes cannot be adequately anticipated…[and] the ability of any single organization to accurately plan for its future is limited…[because] all stakeholders vie for the same limited resources and block each other’s attempts at adaptation” (Gray 1989, 27-29).

Exchange theory identifies mutual dependence created when organizations in different sectors need services and goods from each other. This dependence on each other may be for scarce resources (Alexander, 1995). Gray (1989, 43) proposes that local, state,
and federal governments by nature of shared jurisdictions form a network of “fused federalism”, and that their blurred roles establish an incentive to collaborate. She proposes that local, state, and federal agencies are dependent on each other for information, resources, and policy decisions. Such interdependencies reduce the capacity for any organization or act unilaterally, and point to the need for cooperation and shared power across traditional jurisdictional boundaries (Gray 1989, 232).

Booher and Innes (2002) suggest that “network power” emerges when actors realize their dependence on each other’s actions to fulfill their desired outcomes. Benefits can be realized in a cooperative arrangement that would not be able to happen if the actors operated individually. Interdependence creates an increase in the frequency and intensity of communication, which forces decisions to be made jointly (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). In this case, interdependence is measured by the presence of actors having something to offer and something they want from the other actors.

**Shared Goals**

While their individual goals and interests are still important to actors, the counterbalance to this is the achievement of collective actions. Mandell (1994) describes shared goals as a “program rationale”, or a commitment to collective goals that serves to bind the network actors together. In this case, although individual goals remain important to the actors, the shared ideology and shared goals factor focuses on the commitment to those goals, which are similar among actors. Such a “program rationale” will be identified when actors point out their perceived or known similarities with other actors.
Oliver (1990) agrees that when a mutual need or purpose is identified, collaboration becomes more likely to occur. She finds that reciprocity is key determinant that motivates organizations to collaborate to pursue common goals or interests.

**Trust**

Establishment of trust is a central factor in the creation of collaborative relationships. Agranoff and McGuire (2003) state that trust acts as the main cohesion factors to bring actors together in collaborative processes. Perrow (1992) finds that there are different forces that build trust in small-firm networks. Chief among these forces are sharing and discussing information, similarity in processes and techniques, experience in working with another entity, long-term relationships, similar size, power, or strategic position, rotation of leadership, similar financial rewards, and economic advantages to support shared meanings.

A culture of trust has to exist for collaboration to occur, which can be based on cultural norms to a certain extent (Alexander, 1995). For example, American individualism and competition are limiting to collaboration (Alter and Hage, 1993, 264). Trust can be the result of a history of positive interactions, but where trust has been diminished over the years by years of adversarial relations, Gray (1989, 243) warns that rebuilding trust requires time and initiative of at least one of the parties involved.

Although actors in a collaborative arrangement can come from different levels of government in various localities, over time actors will have interacted with each other in some regard. Such previous interactions will help build opinions and to a certain extent will determine whether and how actors they interact with each other, creating feelings of
respect or animosity (Mandell and Steelman, 2003). Alexander (1995, 19) states that a history of good relations with other organizations promotes interaction between them, and when such relations are lacking or absent, prospects for collaboration are low.

Previous ineffective interaction can hinder collaborative arrangements, whereas positive historical relationships may facilitate collaboration (Gray, 1989). In some cases, the history of relationship can also include preconceived ideas of others based on stereotypes or reputations instead of actual history together (Mandell and Steelman, 2003).

2.5.3.2 Institutional Resources

Capacity Potential

Benefits of collaboration include increased capacity in varying forms (Gray, 1989). In many cases, small communities do not have the administrative capacity to carry out their larger goals without the assistance of other actors. Innes and Booher (1999) argue that collaboration can result in intangible products such as social, intellectual and political capital. Based on their analysis, social capital includes new or stronger personal relationships and trust that allow for future communication and information sharing to occur, and which leads to better opinions of each other; intellectual capital includes mutual understanding of others’ interests, definitions of problems, and agreement on data; and political capital includes the stakeholders’ combined capacity to influence action in ways they were unable to do individually. Such examples of intangible products may act as a motivator for collaboration in order to increase administrative, technical, and financial capacity.
Research proposes that “network power” grows as players identify and build on interdependencies to create new potential for themselves (Booher and Innes, 2002). This power is described as that which provides a new ability of the actors involved to alter their environments in ways that are advantageous to actors on an individual and collective level, and that the power emerges from improved communication. Booher and Innes (2002) suggest that capacity potential is important to actors with little power or resources, but it remains important for powerful players as well because it acts to increase their options. There is potential for positive impacts in the form of increased individual, organizational, relational, and governance capacity (Innes and Booher, 2003).

Political support

Commitment and involvement of high-level officials or political leaders such as mayors, city council, or city managers is necessary for collaboration to occur (Chrislip and Larson 1994, p. 53). Building external support from those in the political arena is essential because they are the ones who will be charged to enact any collaborative decisions (Gray, 1989). Agranoff and McGuire (2001) call this effort to induce individuals, including politicians and decision-makers to make a commitment of support to collaborative undertakings as “mobilizing”, a key element to collaborative network management.

Political support from elected officials acts to legitimize the efforts and encourage others to engage in the collaborative efforts, as their support brings credibility the effort. Oliver (1990) states that legitimacy is a contingency for collaboration because organizations enter into collaborative relationships to enhance this legitimacy as a means
to justify theory actions or outputs. This is consistent with institutional theory that states that organizations seek to increase their legitimacy to improve reputation, image, prestige, or to conform to prevailing norms in their environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1999).

2.5.3.3 Leadership

Presence of leaders

Given that interactions are a key factor in building trust – and, by extension sustaining networked relationships, it is sensible that management of these interactions also plays an important role. Networks and collaborative relationships do not exist on their own; it is generally accepted that leadership plays a critical role in building and sustaining networks (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Mandell, 1994). Mandell (1994) argues that while commitment and trust assist in network formation, a leader is needed to help establish cohesion and reinforce agreement, commitment, and trust.

While typical leaders are those who can articulate a vision and focus on concrete results, interactions that involve collaboration require a different kind of leaderships that involves facilitating interaction and dealing with potential levels of frustration between different actors (Chrislip and Larson, 1994). There needs to be a delicate balance of guidance provided by a leader in collaborative endeavors. While staff leadership and creative energy are essential, too much guidance can hinder an importance sense of “ownership” of the process (Innes et al., 1994).

Agranoff and McGuire (2001a) identified prescriptions for effective network management that can be used to evaluate the skills and behaviors that influence
collaborative partnership formation. “Activation” refers to a set of behaviors employed for identifying the people and resources needed to achieve program goals, which is important to network formation. “Framing” is defined as the behaviors used to arrange a network by facilitating agreement on participants’ roles, operating rules, and network values. These two factors play an important role in network formation.

In order to garner continued support for network purpose, Agranoff and McGuire (2001a) suggest that network managers need to use “mobilizing” skills to develop and sustain commitment for network processes from network participants and stakeholders. In cases where goal alignment is lacking, network management may play a role in locating the congruence of separate and common goals to help sustain the network. Finally, “synthesizing,” details actions that facilitate the conditions for favorable, productive interaction among network participants. Synthesizing centers around building relationships and interactions that develop trust, resulting in achieving the network purpose.

All collaborative networks depend on one or a few leaders called “champions” who help manage a collaborative network (Agranoff, 2003). The champion helps create a vision, follows through on a plan, contacts key actors, and orchestrates meetings. However, potential for such champions at the local level may be impacted by lack of resources. Innes et al. (1994) found that the costs of participation in regional planning efforts for local government leaders are high and the benefits are uncertain. Therefore, in order to participate or take a leadership role local governments need to be assured that they can represent their interests, requiring staff dedication to the process. In many
situations, local government staff do not have the time or resources to commit to this level of commitment to a process (Innes et al., 1994).

_Promoters_

Although leaders in these collaborative arrangements have little formal control, they act as catalysts who manage interactions, taking responsibility of maintaining momentum of the process, and energy to sustain the effort. Agranoff (2003) finds that all collaborative networks need “promoters”, or vision keepers to support the collaborative network leader. The promoter provides access to information, expertise and organizing energy to support the leader.

While both are needed for a collaborative relationship, Mandell (2001) states that there is a difference between leaders who invest energy in the partnership, and “sponsors” who have the ability to legitimize the partnership with persuasion and influence. In this role, the promoter also works with the leader to broaden participation (Agranoff, 2003).

2.5.3.4 Communication and Engagement

_Inclusion of actors_

There is clear agreement in the literature about the importance of including a full range of government organizations and major stakeholders in the collaborative process (Gray, 1989; Innes, 1992; Innes et al., 1994; Innes, 1996; Margerum, 2002). In her review of group processes while planning for state growth management programs, Innes (1992) found that all stakeholders needed to be at the table to support the collective
effort. In cases when certain stakeholders were missing from discussions and the process, they acted to sabotage the process.

Careful attention to stakeholder inclusion is essential in large group planning processes, as intractable stakeholders can prevent agreement about a process and act to drive away other would-be participants (Innes et al., 1994). Management of stakeholder groups is necessary as highly diverse and large groups can prohibit discussion about in-depth, complex or technical issues. In addition, inclusion of all key stakeholders is important to achieve political support of a proposal (Innes et al., 1994). Stakeholder selection is very important because in cases where there is fraudulent activity in the selection process, it will ruin the credibility of the organizer (Margerum, 2002).

Including stakeholders in the process also involves communicating with them to keep them in the process. Margerum (2002b) states that if collaborative planning is based on communicative rationality, then the process must maintain continuous interaction and communication with all stakeholders in order to generate new and sustained energy for the collaborative process. Margerum (2002) finds that many times government agency stakeholders feel like they play the role of the expert, advisor or technical assistant rather than a true collaborator. Keeping stakeholders involved collaboratively is important as opposed to making them feel like there is a one-way flow of information.

Power Disparities

For the purposes of this study, power may play a role in various factors, such as the status of those organizing the event, or those participating in the event. Positions of power can come from knowledge, resources, positions, and legal authority, and actors
may feel reluctant to collaborate if they feel that their interests will be secondary to more powerful ones (Gray, 1989). Stronger partners may be able to take advantage of weaker partners, resulting in prevention of agreement or possibly leading to forged agreements that move progress forward (Agranoff, 2003).

The success of a collaborative network is dependent on the support and involvement of top-level personnel and leaders, not just administrative staff (Agranoff, 2003). However, in order to create a credible group process, to the best extent possible all actors should have an equal voice, even if they do not have equal power outside of the collaborative arrangement (Habermas, 1984). In this case, manager or leaders of these interactions must ensure information is available to all groups and that one voice does not dominate the process (Innes et al., 1994).

**Ripeness of Issue**

An actor’s readiness to collaborate may depend on the “ripeness” of the issue. Gray (1989) states that issues that have not generated widespread attention may be premature for collaboration. However, once issues have gained widespread attention, they may be considered “ripe” for discussion, thereby increasing collaboration. Even when an issue is ripe, Alexander (1995, 20) warns that time and complexity can impact collaboration, as it takes a considerable amount of time to develop relationships, especially when issues are too complex.

Ripeness for collaboration is still dependent on what Wondelleck and Yaffee (2000) describe as the basic dilemma for cooperation: the view that competition is the more rational behavior when considering the short-term, individual needs, as compared to
the view of cooperation as the more beneficial long-term approach for the collective interests. Axelrod (1984) discusses game-theoretic models of competition as an explanation for cooperation, and shows that strategies based on reciprocity and cooperation can be forceful. A competitive strategy in these models may bring more gain in the short-term, but with repeated games over the long-term, a competitive strategy will be penalized with a tit-for-tat model; a competitive move will be answered with a competitive move, a cooperative move will be followed by a cooperative move. Using the prisoner’s dilemma, he shows that players involved in repeated games with each other will choose to cooperate to reap more benefits. Axelrod (1984) finds that for cooperation to be a beneficial strategy, there must be existence of reciprocity, sufficient stake in outcomes for both players, and a knowledge that the game will continue.

However, ripeness of an issue can be relative to the level of need in the form of resources of different actors. Mulford and Rogers (1982, 10) argue that organizations with sufficient power may choose competitive strategies over cooperative strategies. Cooperative strategies, such as joint ventures or contracting for services with other organizations are more likely when acquisition of power is difficult.

This literature review provides for an understanding of the factors that theoretically influence collaboration. The factors derived from this literature review are included in Figure 4, which presents the theoretical framework of this study. The next chapter discusses how the study was designed to determine the degree to which these factors influenced intergovernmental collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.
Chapter 3

Research Objectives and Design

Drawing on a variety of literatures from collaborative planning to networks, I have done two things: first, I have pulled together literature that is otherwise generally considered in a piecemeal fashion in these separate literatures. I pull from both literatures because these factors cannot be applied in piecemeal in this context; rather, must be done holistically. Second, as detailed in this chapter, I identify four streams of factors that house these variables in order to establish this framework to explain what factors influence intergovernmental collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.

This study builds on the literature found in collaborative planning and network theory to establish a series of testable hypotheses about factors that lead to intergovernmental collaboration. The research design details how the study will attempt to test the hypotheses about what factors influenced collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi. Guiding questions, proposed hypotheses, and my research design components are explained in this section.

3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study has two main purposes. The first purpose is to collect information to understand the context of the interaction and history of interaction between potential
network actors. Therefore, this study seeks first to identify the actors and the existence of intergovernmental collaboration in the post-Katrina Mississippi Gulf Coast, through the following research questions:

1. Who are the primary actors involved in local land use planning on the Mississippi Gulf Coast?

2. Is vertical or horizontal collaboration for land use planning occurring in post-Katrina Mississippi?

The second and primary purpose of my study is to examine factors that influence intergovernmental collaboration for planning issues in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The primary research question for this study is:

3. What are the factors that promote or inhibit collaboration for land use planning in post-Katrina Mississippi?

Hypothesis 1: The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to interpersonal ideology factors of the potential collaborative network actors.

1a. The formation of the network has a direct relationship to the level of interdependence perceived between actors.
1b. The formation of the network has a direct relationship to the level of shared goals perceived between actors.
1c. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the level of trust perceived between actors.

Hypothesis 2: The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the institutional resource factors of the potential collaborative network actors.

2a. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the potential to enhance capacity.
2b. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the presence of political support.

Hypothesis 3: The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the leadership factors of the potential collaborative network actors.

3a. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the presence and quality of a leader.
3b. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the presence and quality of a promoter or vision seeker.

Hypothesis 4: The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the communication and engagement factors involving the potential collaborative network actors.

4a. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the inclusion of actors.
4b. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the level of power disparities among actors.
4c. The formation of collaborative planning networks is directly related to the ripeness of the network issue.

The hypotheses of factors that influence collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi are summarized and presented in Figure 4. This conceptual framework served as the guide for the research explained in this section.
3.2. Research Design

3.2.1 Qualitative Inquiry

Based on my research questions and the availability of data and data types, I chose to use a qualitative research design. Qualitative data is information gathered in non-numeric form. This can include interview transcripts, videos, audio recording, images, and analysis of other documents. While quantitative studies involve many cases and variables that are measured in a specific way, with numeric data that are summarized easily, studies using a qualitative research approach typically obtain more in-depth, detailed information on a fewer number of cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
The overall goal of qualitative studies is to uncover understanding, description, meaning or discovery in a topic (Merriam, 1998). Qualitative methods were necessary in my study to uncover and understand people’s experiences and intentions in post-Katrina planning processes. Following the suggestions by Mason (1996), I determined that qualitative data sources including people’s experiences, accounts, interpretations, opinions, ideas, emotions, practices, and actions were necessary to answer my research questions.

Merriam (1998, 6) states that the key philosophical assumption on which qualitative research is based is that reality is constructed through individuals interacting with their social worlds. Therefore, qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meanings that people have constructed about their experiences. Rather than doing statistical analysis of numbers and data on a particular part of the phenomenon as in quantitative studies, the qualitative researcher looks for themes and different concepts in the analysis to determine how all the parts work together.

3.2.2 The Case Study Approach

I used a case study approach as my overall research strategy. Case studies are intensive descriptions examining communities, programs, decisions or other elements that have characteristics of interest. Case studies can be used for qualitative or quantitative studies, but the distinguishing condition for use of a case study is the nature of the research question. This design is the preferred research strategy if a researcher wants to learn about how and why something happened as it did (O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1999). I justified using a case study approach, as I wanted to understand influences on
decisions to collaborate or not collaborate for planning issues in the Mississippi Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina.

An important aspect of the case study is that it is considered a “bounded system” in which the researcher sees the case as a thing, a single entity, a unit around which there are borders (Merriam 1998, 27; O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1999). Therefore, in order to qualify as a case, I needed to be able to identify a finite number of people involved that could be interviewed. As applied to my study, I limited the cases to include officials who played a role in land use planning in the three coastal counties in Mississippi following the storm.

In addition, the case under examination must be contemporary and the researcher must have access to people involved in the case (Yin, 2003). The topic of rebuilding post-Hurricane Katrina is contemporary as it has only been two years since the storm. Perhaps more important than time, the topic remains contemporary as the planning efforts are ongoing in all communities within the study area. I was able to establish relationships and contacts in the Gulf Coast communities using important initial contacts as my starting point, which gave me access to the people involved in the case.

I categorized my study as an embedded single-case research design, following the rationales set forth by Yin (2003). The main distinction in case study research is between single-case and multiple-case designs. Prior to my data collection it was determined that the single-case study was appropriate design based on two main rationales. First, as defined by Yin (2003, 40) the Mississippi Gulf Coast represents a “critical case” for studying collaboration within the framework of well-established theory about network formation and collaboration. In order for a “critical case” to be justified, theory must
specify a clear set of propositions (Yin, 2003). The theory previously summarized clearly identifies suggestions for the formation of networked or collaborative relationships. Further, Cigler (1999) and others identify the circumstances under which such propositions would be true. A single case study therefore allows me to test this theory and possibly extend this well-established theory.

A second rationale for the single-case study is if the case represents an “extreme” or “unique” case (Yin 2003, 40). Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster to impact the United States, and therefore represents both an extreme and unique case within which to study collaboration under circumstances of critical community need.

Another distinction within a specific research design is between holistic and embedded case studies. An embedded case study occurs when there are multiple units of analysis within the same case study (Yin, 2003). My study was designed as an embedded case study. The case study is about a single phenomenon – the Mississippi Gulf Coast planning community – which represents the single case. However, this involves a large number of different governmental units – which represent the embedded units of analysis. In this case, there is the State as a unit, the regional agencies as a unit, the counties as units, and the cities as units.

3.3. Case Study Location

Following Cigler’s (1999) “pre-conditions” for the emergence of multi-community collaboration, I chose to locate my study of collaboration in the three coastal counties of Mississippi. Under the circumstances following Hurricane Katrina, this allowed me to consider the factors that promoted or limited collaboration for planning
issues within a context of critical community need. As detailed earlier, this location passed what Cigler (1999) proposed as the nine pre-conditions for collaboration: occurrence of disaster; fiscal stress; financial capacity building by external agents; emphasis on collaborative skills-building highlights “capacity building”; existence of a policy entrepreneur; building a political constituency for cooperation; early and continued support from elected and local officials; promotion of visible advantages of cooperation for participating communities; and early focus on visible, effective strategies.

My sample consisted of planners and elected officials responsible for planning in Hancock County, Harrison County and Jackson County (see Figure 1). I targeted the 11 cities within these counties as well as officials from the unincorporated areas of the counties. My sample was therefore nonrandom, purposeful, and small, which is typical for qualitative studies (Merriam 1998, 8).

Hurricane Katrina struck the Mississippi coast on August 29, 2005 and dramatically impacted all three counties. The eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Louisiana/Mississippi border, and the powerful winds in the upper-right quadrant released the brunt of the hurricane’s force in Hancock County, resulting in extreme winds and storm surge that destroyed thousands of homes and whole communities (Thompson, 2005). The context of the study is important to understanding the influences of collaboration. Because different communities have different needs, and the roles they play in the larger region may be reflected in what factors influenced them to collaborate, a short summary of these counties and their cities is provided. Information used to construct these summaries was based on my synthesis of all the interviews and
conversations I had with the communities. This synthesis was subsequently confirmed with a credible community member (Carbo, 2007).

3.3.1 Hancock County

Hancock County is the westernmost county on the Mississippi coast. Hancock County communities and infrastructure sustained the most intense damage of all the counties. When the eye of the storm hit the county, the county's two cities, Bay St. Louis and Waveland, were completely devastated.

Based on conversations with officials and from my observations while in Mississippi, Hancock County remains at a very different level of recovery than Harrison and Jackson counties. In fact, according to an interview from September 2007 with the mayor of Waveland, very limited recovery or rebuilding is occurring the county due the amount and degree of devastation. This was confirmed by conversations with other officials and planners in the region who all suggested that they have not had the opportunity to work with Hancock County because they are so far behind the other localities on the coast.

More importantly from a land use perspective, a large majority of land in Hancock County is under federal control due to the location of the Stennis Space Center within its borders. This limited the communities in this county from engaging in local land use planning like the other communities. Therefore, Hancock County is minimally discussed in my study.
3.3.2 Harrison County

Harrison County has five cities, Pass Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, Biloxi, and D’Iberville. It is the largest and most populous county on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Biloxi is a former seafood (shrimping) town that is now a casino city. Biloxi is the economic engine of the coast and is an international destination for vacationers, gambling and golf courses. According to locals, wealthy residents have their newer neighborhoods in Biloxi and the poor are segregated into other neighborhoods within the city. Biloxi is also an airforce town with many retirees. Hurricane damage was considerable for the low-lying areas of the city, submerging entire neighborhoods and sweeping away entire structures. Many of the casinos, which were located as floating structures, were transplanted several blocks in-land as a result of the winds and surge.

Pass Christian has a deep history as a location of beach and summer cottages for the affluent and prominent from New Orleans. “The Pass” as locals call it, contains a district of historic mansions along the coastline on Scenic Drive. Pass Christian is a beach town with a commercial fishing harbor with many luxury first and second homes. The downtown served the local market, which was not quite large enough to have numerous thriving businesses. Of approximately 8,000 homes in Pass Christian, all but 500 were damaged or destroyed in the storm, with destruction pushing more than a half-mile inland from the coast.

Long Beach was established in 1905 and is mainly a small (10.1 square miles) bedroom community. There are no large jobs aside from Triton, which makes ATMs and control panels. Most of its residents are employed in other communities. It is located east of Pass Christian.
Gulfport is the largest city on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and shares the county seat with Biloxi. Gulfport is the legal and financial center of the county and is also an industrial and transportation city due to the Ports and industrial parks. Locals suggest that Gulfport wants to be a retail center again, and because the major stores moved to the Biloxi Mall, Gulfport is trying to get specialty stores. Gulfport is also the home of the Naval Construction Battalion (SeaBees).

D’Iberville is located on the Back Bay of Biloxi and has historically been a center for timber and other natural resources. D'Iberville was created by people who had Biloxi roots, but did not want to be controlled by Biloxi politics. Most of the heritage was the seafood industry and many still work on boats. D’Iberville has a good market for apartments for casino workers, and they are a retail center thanks to WalMart and other national chains. However, D’Iberville still trying to find its identity.

3.3.3 Jackson County

Jackson County includes four cities, Ocean Springs, Gautier, Pascagoula, and Moss Point. These four cities are fairly distinct in character.

Ocean Springs has a reputation as an arts community, and its downtown is home to many galleries and unique shops. Ocean Springs is a sought after location in the region due to its architectural heritage, Live Oak tree-lined streets, and small-town, pedestrian scale. As a result of its reputation, it is home to wealthier residents and boasts high property values. Prior to Katrina, Ocean Springs was experiencing high demand for homes and businesses. Ocean Springs was located on high ground, so did not experience
the same level of destruction as many of the other communities, and has been able to recover relatively quickly.

Pascagoula was founded in 1838 along the Pascagoula River, originally as a fishing community. Pascagoula is an industrial center with the shipyard and refinery as major employers. Since the 1930s, Pascagoula has been home to considerable industry with the opening of shipbuilding yards. The state’s largest employer, Ingalls Shipbuilding, is owned by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and is located on the east side of the river. It remains the state’s busiest port, and houses several other industries including Chevron Refinery. Approximately 80 percent of Pascagoula was flooded by several feet of water. With every shipyard town, there are a few very wealthy people and mostly blue collar.

Moss Point is located north of Pascagoula and at the eastern edge of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Moss Point is different from many of the other cities on the coast, as the racial make-up of the city is 71 percent African American. Moss Point was a paper mill town (the mills have since shut down). Many people on the coast compared Moss Point to Pascagoula in terms of its industry and blue-collar workforce.

Gautier, pronounced Go-shay, is located directly west, across the river from Pascagoula. As a community, Gautier was established with a U.S. Post Office in 1898, but the city did not incorporate until 1986. As a result the city is comprised of a series of separate neighborhoods without a real town center. Gautier annexed a considerable amount of land prior to the storm, so has considerable opportunity for new growth and planning. Gautier is a bedroom community for the ship yard that incorporated to capture
the sales tax of a large shopping mall. It has a small town and rural feel and people still remember the farmlands.

3.4 Pilot Study

During September 2006, I engaged four people, with whom I had previous contact, to serve as my test subjects for my interview protocol. I chose these four people because they had considerable knowledge about the Mississippi Gulf Coast planning before and after Hurricane Katrina.

In addition to data collection purposes, the pilot study was used for a number of different purposes. I used my initial set of interview questions that were approved by IRB in this pilot study to determine if these questions were appropriate to guide the conversation in a way that could address my research questions. This study also allowed me to further refine my initial understandings about the culture of planning and the status of collaboration on the coast. In fact, I modified my final interview questions as a result of this pilot study in a way that did not assume such a high level of collaboration as I had anticipated.

Additionally, I had proposed to use a survey to determine the purpose and what Agranoff and McGuire (2003) call “density” in vertical and horizontal collaborative linkages between communities. This would require the interviewee to fill out a survey about the location and frequency of sharing information with other communities. Through the pilot study I learned that the culture of interactions in Mississippi would prohibit me from gathering this data; business is generally done informally as opposed to during scheduled and regular meetings about community or planning issues. This was
indirectly confirmed during each of my interviews, as no one was able to tell me when or how often they typically interact with someone from the neighboring community.

Further, as a result of these initial pilot study interviews, I used what Lincoln and Guba (1989) call the “snowball effect” to expand my list of community representatives, asking each to review and comment on my working contact list. Each were able to identify additional people whom they thought would be receptive to my research and able to represent the history and current planning actions of different communities. This was especially useful because many communities did not have a planning staff, which would typically be the target for my interviews.

These essential changes and additions to my interview protocol provided the information I needed to complete the final human subjects review through IRB, required by Ohio State University. The pilot study also provided me with important information that foreshadowed major themes in my research findings.

3.5 Data Collection

The data collection method for the study consisted of open-ended qualitative interviews. Qualitative interviewing refers to in-depth, semi-structured forms of interviewing, characterized by an informal discussion style as opposed for a formal question and answer format (Mason, 1996). These semi-structured questions served as conceptual guideposts that allowed each participant to reflect on his or her experience, knowledge, and feelings about the issues surrounding collaboration and planning, using an open-ended and less structured format described by Merriam (1998). Because specific information was desired from each interview, there was structured sections to the
interview, but the less structured format allowed me to respond to the situations and ideas on the topic that were generated during conversation.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with planning administrators and other officials in the three coastal counties (Appendix A). Interviews were deemed the appropriate method to use for data collection based on the issues that the research questions were designed to explore. People’s views, experiences, interpretations and interactions with the research questions are the basis of the data collected for this study. Therefore, interviews represented a legitimate way to collect data on these properties. Interacting with people and listening to them about their experiences helped to understand the complexities of my research questions.

More pragmatically, interviews were used because the data required to answer the research questions were not available in any other form. For example, understanding if and under what circumstances collaboration occurred post-Katrina in Mississippi could not be obtained through existing research or document analysis. No known research had been conducted on this topic. Many records of interactions were destroyed in the hurricane, eliminating the option for complete document analysis. Moreover, the culture of interactions in Mississippi remains informal and cannot be quantified based on documents or archival data that may numerically describe the frequency of interactions. Therefore, information sharing and other interactions occur informally and without regulated and structured formal meetings.
3.5.1 Ethical Issues

Interview questions were submitted to and approved by the Ohio State University Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to conducting the interviews. The information collected in the interview protocol was public information. Planning departments and communities were asked to provide information that is available to any citizen upon their request.

Prior to conducting the interview, consent was obtained from each interviewee. In each case, consent was given to participate in the interview, to audiotape the interview, to identify their response as representative of themselves and their community, to use the data generated from the interviews, and to publish and reproduce the data and the analysis.

3.6. Establishing Quality Data

A debate exists on the criteria for good qualitative data analysis. In hard sciences, findings are validated by replication, but this approach cannot be applied to qualitative research methods, as replication is rarely possible; respondents would not have the same responses. The qualitative research community has not developed a consensus as to the appropriate way to assess validity and reliability (Merriam 1998, 201). This is of concern, as qualitative researchers frequently have to respond to challenges of the credibility of qualitative research.

Some qualitative researchers argue that because qualitative research is based on different assumptions about reality and a different worldview than quantitative – or positivist worldviews, then validity and reliability should also be considered from a
different perspective (Merriam, 1998). Consistent with this is the fact that even
terminology about these concepts is different. Lincoln and Guba (1985) for example
contrast positivist and post-positivist terminology of these terms. Validity is called
“trustworthiness”; internal validity is considered “credibility”; external validity is
considered “transferability”; and reliability is called “dependability.” Although there is a
different mindset and different vocabulary, all researchers are concerned with producing
valid and reliable knowledge.

3.6.1 Trustworthiness

A key concern for of quantitative researchers regarding qualitative research is the
extent of “trustworthiness” of these results. As noted by the terminology above, this
concerns the overall validity of the study. The specific criterion for useful or informative,
“credible” research, concerns the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the
causal effects of one variable on another (Hoyle et al., 1999). According to Lincoln and
Guba (1985), for each quantitative methodological procedure of establishing
trustworthiness, there is a qualitative method parallel procedure. In order to address this
important concern in research, I will review a number of strategies that the qualitative
researcher can take to help establish trustworthiness.

3.6.2 Credibility

Credibility, known as internal validity in quantitative methods, is dependent on
the credibility of the researcher because the researcher is the instrument of data collection
and the center of the data analysis process (Patton, 1990). The researcher can assess
credibility by considering the techniques used to ensure integrity, validity, and accuracy of the findings (Patton, 1990). The techniques I used to increase the likelihood of producing credible findings for this study are prolonged engagement, peer debriefing, and triangulation, which are some of the more common strategies used to establish credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1994).

Prolonged engagement is defined as “the investment of sufficient time to achieve certain purposes: learning the “culture”, testing for misinformation introduced by distortions either in self or of the respondents, and building trust” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, 301). My study and job required me to spend a cumulative time of approximately two months in the Mississippi Gulf Coast, over the course of 18 months. During this time, I met frequently with the community, held highly visible community meetings, and established relationships with the communities. This time allowed me to challenge my own preconceived notions about what collaboration should look like and what it should look like in southern Mississippi. This intensive involvement with the community allowed me to build trust with many of the respondents.

In most cases, my identity as a planner and student from a school “up north” would have proven to be a difficult barrier to cross in terms of establishing trust with the respondents. However, given the extensive positive media attention to the planning activities that I was involved with at Ohio State University, and the relationships I had already formed with important players in Harrison County, prolonged engagement proved to be an important tool for me to gain access to local decision-makers who were already too busy with disaster recovery to have time to talk to an academic about their
circumstances, and to break down barriers of distrust with another consultant from “up north”.

Triangulation involves the employment of multiple perspectives to collect and analyze information to increase the probability of credible findings. Using this strategy, the researcher employs multiple investigators, multiple sources of data, or multiple methods to confirm the findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The study’s sources of information were 23 different sources representing 11 communities that played a role in land use planning following hurricane Katrina. Sources included mayors, city managers, consultants, planning commission members, local planners, regional planners, and state officials. Using multiple sources (people), and comparing the responses, the consistency or inconsistency helped reveal the strength of agreement (Merriam, 1994). However, as Lincoln and Guba (1985, 316) discuss, the point of triangulation is not to find a “universal truth”, but to judge the accuracy in exploring the different perceptions about factors that influenced collaboration.

Finally, peer debriefing is the “process of exposing oneself to a disinterested peer in a manner paralleling an analytic session and for the purpose of exploring aspects of inquiry that might otherwise remain only implicit with the inquirer’s mind” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, 308). The major purpose of this strategy is to keep the researcher honest by challenging their interpretations, and by helping to identify gaps, deeper meaning, and clarity of interpretation. For my study, I used peer debriefing with my advisor. Although she was not a “disinterested” peer, she spent considerable time in Mississippi and had similar knowledge about the institutional culture. The questioning that occurred during these meetings allowed me to identify those parts of the findings that were still “implicit”
in my mind. Peer debriefing therefore proved to be a useful tool to help me seek further clarification from the data.

3.6.3 Transferability

“A man may learn a great deal of the general from studying the specific, whereas it is impossible to know the specific by studying the general” (Marjorie Rawlings quoted in Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, 148).

Transferability is the qualitative researcher’s term given to discuss issues of external validity, or generalizability. Overall the issue of generalizability centers on whether it is possible to generalize from a single case or from qualitative research more generally (Merriam, 1998). However, Lincoln and Guba (1985, 110) explain, “generalizations are assertions of enduring value that are context-free.” Generalization to a large population is not the goal of qualitative research (Stake, 1995). Instead, the underlying assumption of qualitative research is that the information gathered is highly influenced by the context – including the researcher’s involvement in the data collection.

Qualitative researchers thus reject the idea of generalizability as a legitimate assessor of trustworthiness because it assumes that the researcher does not need to know anything about the context to know the truth in their generalizations. Instead, the concept of transferability is an appropriate substitute for generalizability. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the degree of transferability is a function of the similarity between two contexts, which they call “fittingness.” According to their logic, fittingness is the degree of congruence between sending and receiving contexts, and if “Context A and Context B are ‘sufficiently’ congruent, then working hypotheses from the sending originating
context may be applicable in the receiving context” (124). In this case, we move from a question of generalizability to a question of transferability, where transferability requires knowledge about the sending context.

In my study of factors that influenced collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi, I realize that the situation of actors I interviewed are not necessarily transferable to other contexts. I recognize, as Lincoln and Guba (1985, 316) state, “For while the [quantitative researcher] expects (and is expected) to make relatively precise statements about external validity (expressed in the form of confidence limits), the [qualitative researcher] can only set out working hypotheses together with a description of the time and context in which they were found to hold.” Although this is considered an extreme case, the findings from this study are transferable to other planning circumstances of critical community need. For example, Hurricane Katrina falls on the high end of a continuum of critical community need, but the same factors that would influence collaboration in this circumstance would also apply in less extreme cases of community need such as communities collaborating to address the crisis of a big box retailer coming to their communities.

Stake (1995) agrees with this assertion and in the context of a case study, explains that single case studies are undertaken to make the case understandable to others, not generalizable. He further states, “But people can learn much that is general from single cases.” (85). Although the exactness of the experiences and decisions made by the interview respondents in my study regarding collaboration following a disaster does not exist elsewhere and so therefore cannot be generalized, I realize that similarities in responses may exist that can be transferable to others in similar contexts.
3.6.4 Bias

An important aspect of qualitative research is that the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis (Merriam, 1998). Qualitative studies describe features of individuals, organizations, jurisdictions, or programs that they analyze, and produce verbal data. This type of research pays particular attention to unique features of each case, and data are transferred by a human “instrument”. A researcher can influence the data that they are given as their interactions, personality, and presence can impact what they are told by subjects.

3.7 Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis is the processes followed by researchers to transform the qualitative data collected into a form of understanding, interpretation or explanation of the subject studied (Mason, 1996). For example, the analysis of interview data may result in an understanding about someone’s interpretation of the world, why they believe that view, how they arrived at that point, or how they classify themselves or others. In order for data to be analyzable, I identified a specific analytic strategy that drove my data analysis. I followed the processes suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) for my data analysis, specifying the types of codes used, how codes were created and revised. Using both deductive and inductive approaches, my overall analytic strategy included relying on theoretical propositions, and exploring emergent explanations.
3.7.1 Data Coding

Coding is frequently the center of analysis in qualitative studies. Codes can be thought of as “tags” or “labels” for assigning meaning to words, sentences, or paragraphs. More than the actual words, it is the meaning attached to them that matters for data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The researcher determines the significance of the word based on a particular conceptual lens. As such, meaning of the same words or phrases would be different for individual researchers basing their inquiry in differing theoretical underpinnings or logic.

Codes therefore organize data into different categories relating to particular research questions, hypotheses, or themes. Using codes as a tool to cluster data allows a researcher to make conclusions about the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Prior to developing the coding procedures, I had to consider the most appropriate way to ‘read’ the data and if I would use deductive or inductive approaches, given my research questions.

3.7.2 Inductive and Deductive Approaches

Both deductive and inductive approaches were used to analyze data, a factor that had to be determined prior to developing the coding procedures. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the way codes are developed depends on whether the study and approach is inductive or deductive. It is possible to start coding from \textit{a priori} ideas such as pre-established theories using a deductive reasoning. Alternatively, the researcher can simply let the new codes emerge as the data is read using an inductive approach.
A priori codes can be identified from sources such as previous research or theory, research questions or hypotheses addressed in the study, or the researcher’s assumptions about the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In this case, a researcher may be seeking to test established theories or to build on them. The researcher may develop codes that represent concepts within the theory before coding of the data begins. Alternatively, grounded coding, or inductive analysis, is based on the concepts of grounded theory where codes emerge from the data without prior assumptions or hypotheses directing the codes (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In this case the researcher focuses on finding new themes in the data.

Many times researchers have codes in mind but also look for other ideas that may be identified in the data, blending both deductive and inductive approaches (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This study began with a deductive approach that tested theories established by the network literature. Therefore, the initial coding procedure integrated the elements behind the study’s research questions and hypotheses. The coding procedure then integrated a process that would allow for the identification of new themes, or explanations for why collaboration occurs or does not occur.

3.7.3. Analyzing Interviews

Data analysis for this study involved transcribing the data from 23 interviews. Because this study focused on deriving the data in an interpretive sense, the interviews were audio taped and transcribed fully so as not to lose any information or meaning in the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990). Much of the analysis involved dissecting
and differentiating between different data and reflecting on how this information informed motivations for collaboration for planning in the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

3.7.3.1 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis

Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) packages and software are tools that only assist in data analysis; software does not analyze data (Patton, 1990). While I completed the analysis, I chose to use computerized methods for my data analysis as a tool to more efficiently complete tasks such as data storage, coding, retrieval, comparing and linking. Coding and categorization of interview data was completed with the use of QSR NVivo 7, a software program designed to manage and organize data for analysis that is not easily reduced to numbers.

3.7.3.2 Analytic Process

To begin the coding process, I created a “start list” of codes prior to reading the data, based on suggestions by Miles and Huberman (1994). This start list or codebook was based on a priori codes originating from my research questions and theoretical hypotheses (Table 2).

A clear definition was required to allow me to consistently apply the codes throughout the data analysis. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994, 63) the definitions were improved and focused as the study proceeded. Although code definitions changed over time, they stayed consistent with the conceptual structure of the study as they related to each other in a coherent way, connecting to the underlying conceptual
framework. After creating this start list, I test-coded a number of pages of the transcribed data and modified the codebook accordingly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Research Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Mutual dependence upon another actor to achieve individual or common goals</td>
<td>1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared goals</td>
<td>Common interests, aspirations or objectives between actors or communities</td>
<td>1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Confidence in one’s integrity, character, and/or ability, based largely on history of relationships</td>
<td>1c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity potential</td>
<td>Recognition of the potential to gain financial, technical, social, intellectual or political capacity and/or capital from collaborative relationships</td>
<td>2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political support</td>
<td>Financial, technical, or other expressed support for collaborative relationships from local or state officials</td>
<td>2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Presence and quality of someone to organize, direct and manage collaborative endeavors</td>
<td>3a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoter</td>
<td>Presence and quality of someone (separate from leader) to advocate, advertise and support the collaborative endeavors</td>
<td>3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of actors</td>
<td>The act of inviting, communicating, or informing all actors regarding collaborative endeavors</td>
<td>4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power disparities</td>
<td>A distinction in the level of knowledge, influence, authority or clout that may influence collaborative relationships</td>
<td>4b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripeness of Issue</td>
<td>Status of a problem or topic (maturity) that results in a readiness for discussion or action</td>
<td>4c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Start list of codes and definitions.
Once my transcriptions were completed, the analytic process included careful reading and re-reading of all of the interview documents to get an initial sense of the themes, patterns, and areas of agreement and disagreement with my theoretical assumptions. Before the coding process began, I considered the most appropriate way to ‘read’ the data. Depending on the author, there are varying names given to these different ways of reading the data, but they all fall along a continuum of interpretation (Mason, 1996; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The first category involves reading to identify specific words or content, the second involves reading to interpret what the data means, and the third involves reading to identify higher level of patterns in the data.

Mason (1996) categorizes codes into three different levels of analysis: “literal”, “interpretive”, and “reflexive” codes. Deriving data in a literal sense, the researcher is interested in the interaction of literal dialog, its form and sequence. Interpretive derivation of data means that the researcher is reading the transcribed data for the meaning behind the words, making meaning of the interview beyond the interaction itself. Deriving data in a reflexive sense means that the researcher wants to read the data for meaning about their own role within the interaction.

Miles and Huberman (1994, 57) identify the three types of codes as “descriptive”, “interpretive” and “pattern” codes. They state that descriptive codes involve connecting a class of phenomena to a certain part of the text. That same text could be analyzed more interpretively, by considering additional background knowledge about the statement. Interpretive codes entail more knowledge about the phenomenon. This stage of data analysis considers embedded or underlying meaning of the data.
Patton (1990) suggests that the first question in analyzing interviews is whether the researcher will use case analysis or cross-case analysis. With case analysis a case study is built for each person interviewed, whereas using a cross-case analysis involves grouping together answers from different perspectives on central issues. Cross-case analysis can lead to categories, themes, or typologies that conceptualize that data from all the cases (Merriam, 1998, 195), which was the goal of this study. I used cross-case analysis, as I wanted to identify a collection of factors across different people in my sample that influenced collaboration.

To start the coding process, I applied the start list of codes to the data in order to determine if they fit, thereby qualifying the value of the codes. This process involved reading and re-reading the transcribed interviews line by line to determine which segments of data would be applied to which start codes. I read the data “interpretively”, as described by Miles and Huberman (1994), looking for more than just key words as my indicator that the data should be linked to certain codes. After this deductive process was completed for each interview document, summaries of the data for each interview were read and compared to identify themes and concepts that were common to all interviews, thereby following the cross-case analysis procedure.

Emergent themes were then analyzed to account for other explanations for collaboration that were not considered in my conceptual framework. The researcher has the freedom to create new codes; these codes are “hunches”, and become meaningful codes while others do not (Miles and Huberman, 1984). In order to complete this process, I read through the data and looked for explanations for decisions to collaborate that went beyond the codes included in the start list.
Following this process in my study, I was able to identify revisions to my original conceptual lens that incorporated additional factors. Lincoln and Guba (1985, 350) suggest that a data processing can stop when categories are “saturated”, and when “regularities” sufficiently emerge. I knew when the coding and recoding were complete when the analysis appeared to have been exhausted according to these suggestions.
CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS: WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCE POST-KATRINA COLLABORATION?

This chapter presents the results of the qualitative data analysis of the key informant interviews. Each of the three research questions is explored, answering the questions regarding who the primary actors involved in land use planning are, if collaboration occurring for land use planning, and finally, which factors are promoting or inhibiting collaboration for land use planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.

My main results are presented for each factor that was hypothesized to influence collaboration, as well as for emergent factors that were not included in the conceptual framework. The results are organized within the four categories of factors presented in the conceptual framework: Communication and Engagement, Institutional Resources, Interpersonal Ideology, and Leadership.

4.1. Is Collaboration Occurring?

4.1.1 Primary Actors Involved in Land Use Planning

In order to determine if collaboration for land use planning was occurring on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, I had to first identify the actors involved in land use planning. In most situations, this task would entail calling City Hall or checking the City’s website for information on the organizational structure and staff biographies in the planning and development departments. In post-Katrina Mississippi, however, identification of the key
actors in charge of land use planning activities was a bigger task. Many websites were inactive and not updated since the storm, or simply had a disclaimer stating that the website was coming back soon. Some sites only had emergency operations and recovery information. City Hall in most of the communities was severely damaged or was washed away in storm.

Due to the limited access of information about city staff, I relied on four primary contacts that worked in planning on the coast that I had already established through personal interactions in Mississippi. Their roles in planning on the coast are explained in the next section. I starting conducting my interviews with these primary contacts in September 2006, a year after Hurricane Katrina hit. In order to determine the primary source of information regarding land use planning for each community, I depended on these primary contacts to make recommendations for subsequent interviews, using a snowball strategy to create my final list of primary actors involved in land use planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.

The following table provides a list of the names, organization affiliations, and titles of each of the people I interviewed in this study (Table 3). Through this process of identifying the key actors involved in land use planning, it became evident to me that some communities had one planner on staff, but that many did not have planners and instead relied on consultants to do their planning. In most cases, the size and capacity of the communities limited their ability to have a professional planning staff. For example, only three cities on the coast, Biloxi, Gulfport, and Ocean Springs had planners on staff at the time of the storm.
4.1.2 Cross-Engagement of Primary Actors

Following the storm there was significant cross-engagement of planners and other professionals on the coast moving from one organization to another and in serving in a consulting capacity to multiple organizations. Due to the engagement across communities the interviewees were able to provide important insight on the planning occurring on the coast from multiple perspectives. For example, my four primary contacts had served in different and important planning capacities in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Patrick Bonck has been the Zoning Administrator for Harrison County since zoning was instituted in 2000. However, before the storm he worked as a planner for the City of Gulfport for several years.

At the time of the storm, George Carbo was the Director of Community Development for the City of Gulfport and strongly engaged in the Mississippi Renewal Forum and the immediate post-Katrina planning. Within a year following the storm he moved to a position as the Planning Director for the City of Gautier and today is a planning consultant with CDM, a firm doing planning on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Ann Daigle was a planner originally from Louisiana who had been a Planning Director in Vicksburg, Mississippi several years before Hurricane Katrina hit. Directly after the storm, Ann served as a special assistant to the Mississippi Development Authority director on planning issues. More recently, she has been a planning consultant for Pass Christian and Gulfport.

Jeff Taylor was the Director of the Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District for several years prior to Hurricane Katrina. He had also worked for the Gulf Regional Planning Commission as the Executive Director since the 1970s, so
was a significant reference on regional planning on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. After the storm, Taylor moved positions to become the Director of Community Development for the City of D’Iberville.

All of these primary contacts have had experience doing land use planning in more than one community in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Based on their experiences planning in Mississippi, each of these primary contacts knew each other and had experience working and sharing information with each other. Given their cross-engagement with other actors in land use planning on the coast, all four of these primary contacts served as important advisors to me in knowing who would be the most knowledgeable on planning issues in each of the communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Community or Organization Affiliation(s)</th>
<th>Title(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Bonck*</td>
<td>Harrison County</td>
<td>Zoning Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Shambra</td>
<td>City of Biloxi</td>
<td>Executive Planner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Creel</td>
<td>City of Biloxi</td>
<td>Director of Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Rose</td>
<td>City of D’Iberville</td>
<td>City Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Nichols</td>
<td>City of Gulfport</td>
<td>Chief Administrative Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Carbo*</td>
<td>City of Gulfport/City of Gautier</td>
<td>Director of Community Development; Planning Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Skellie</td>
<td>City of Long Beach</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actors who served as my primary contacts

Table 3: List of actors interviewed about land use planning in their respective communities or organizations. (CONTINUED)
Table 3: CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bill Hessell</td>
<td>City of Long Beach/Harrison County Development Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton Robinson</td>
<td>City of Pass Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michele Coats</td>
<td>Jackson County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christy Wheeler</td>
<td>City of Gautier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Bishop</td>
<td>City of Moss Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donovan Scruggs</td>
<td>City of Ocean Springs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kay Johnson Kell</td>
<td>City of Pascagoula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommy Longo</td>
<td>City of Waveland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Planning Agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Loftus</td>
<td>Gulf Regional Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Taylor*</td>
<td>Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District; City of D'Iberville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Commission/Office of Recovery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Sanderson</td>
<td>Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal; Gulf Coast Business Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jae Park</td>
<td>Governor's Office of Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Longwitz</td>
<td>Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SmartCode/CNU Consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Bounds</td>
<td>City of Gulfport/City of Pass Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Daigle*</td>
<td>Mississippi Office of Recovery and Renewal; City of Pass Christian and Gulfport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Hall</td>
<td>City of Pass Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandy Sorlien</td>
<td>PlaceMakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Planners in MAPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Preziosi</td>
<td>Mississippi American Planning Association (MAPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gretchen Loftus</td>
<td>Mississippi Chapter of the American Planning Association (MAPA); City of Wiggins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92
4.2. Phases of Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration

The second research question driving this study involved determining if collaboration for land use planning was happening to any extent in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Based on the interview data I confirmed that both vertical and horizontal collaboration were occurring for land use planning (Figure 5). Vertical collaboration involved the interactions between the local and state governments, as well as between the local governments and the CNU consultants. Horizontal collaboration involved the exchanges and information sharing between local governments regarding their decisions and thoughts about land use planning objectives and the proper integration of the SmartCode.
Figure 5: Vertical intergovernmental collaboration and horizontal intergovernmental collaboration for rebuilding and planning the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Arrows show the direction of the communication as one-way or collaborative.

In order to thoroughly understand the actors involved in post-Katrina land use planning and their role in various forms of collaboration, I offer a description of these relationships through five difference phases. These five phases described below occur in chronological order: Phase I: Governor Hires the Congress for the New Urbanism; Phase II: Mississippi Renewal Forum; Phase III: The Governor’s Commission Report; Phase IV: The Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal; and Phase V: SmartCode and Plan Implementation (Figure 6).
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------
| January 2006 |                                                                                   |                                                                  |                                                                                            |                                                                     |                                                            |
| December 2005 |                                                                                   |                                                                  |                                                                                            |                                                                     |                                                            |
| November 2005 |                                                                                   |                                                                  |                                                                                            |                                                                     |                                                            |
| October 2005 |                                                                                   |                                                                  |                                                                                            |                                                                     |                                                            |
| September 2005 |                                                                                   |                                                                  |                                                                                            |                                                                     |                                                            |

Figure 6: Timeline of the five major phases of collaboration for post-Katrina planning.

4.2.1 Governor Hires the Congress for the New Urbanism

Seven days after the hurricane, Governor Barbour established the Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal and charged the Commission members with developing "a broad vision for a better Gulf Coast and South Mississippi"
(O’Keefe, 2005). The Governor’s directive to his Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal was to (1) solicit best ideas for recovery, rebuilding, and renewal from both public and private sectors, (2) develop a broad vision for a better Gulf Coast and southern Mississippi, and (3) involve local citizens and elected officials in the process of developing and endorsing these ideas (Office of Governor Barbour, 2006).

Governor Barbour asked Jim Barksdale, a Jackson resident, Mississippi native, and prior President and CEO of Netscape Communications, to chair the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. His mandate was to explore options for the coast and to recommend broad visions and approaches to restore the coast. Barksdale understood that for this broad vision of the State to be successful, everyone had to be involved. In an open letter to the readers of the Sun Herald newspaper, Jim Barksdale said, “The governor intends for this commission to bring people together in a participatory, inclusive process to do something we can all be proud of in the years to come” (Barksdale, Oct 9, 2005).

To accomplish this effort that brought people together in a collaborative process, Jim Barksdale and other members of the Governor’s Commission called on Andres Duany, a founder of the new urbanist movement to lead the planning and design process for the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Andres Duany is a principal architect of the Miami-based Duany Plater-Zyberk (DPZ) firm. Duany had ample experience in orchestrating and facilitating large scale planning sessions. In fact, Barksdale said that he picked Duany based on his experience in organizing planning sessions in 1992 after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida, rather than specifically for his new urbanist values (Hales, 2005). On September 12, 2005, Andres Duany and Jim Barksdale met with the Governor and
described their proposal to design and plan based on new urbanist principles, using the
SmartCode as the implementation ordinance. The Governor responded, “Go ahead. Do
what you do – and do it well” (Duany, 2005).

The directive by the State for Andres Duany’s firm to design rebuilding and
planning proposals for an entire region was beyond the ability of a single firm. Duany
immediately contacted John Norquist, the President of the Congress for the New
Urbanism, to assemble a team of professionals in with various skills including
architecture, planning, engineering, law, retail, public process, and communications
(Duany, 2005). A team of approximately 100 volunteer new urbanist consultants from
more than 50 firms served the Governor’s Commission by preparing plans for the
communities destroyed by Hurricane Katrina.

Collaboration between the State and their CNU consultants is evident, as they
collectively identified the appropriate proposal for the State to follow in their rebuilding
strategies. Describing the vision that the State wanted to achieve in their rebuilding
initiatives, Duany explained, "The architectural heritage of Mississippi is fabulous, ...
really, really marvelous…however, what they have been building the last 30 years is the
standard, tawdry strip developments. The government's vision is to start again and do it
right" (El Nasser, 2005). The CNU was given a directive by the Mississippi Governor to
execute the Commission’s vision for a new urban Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Vertical collaboration from the State and the planning consultants began as they
partnered to execute different, but not mutually exclusive agendas. Representing the
CNU consultants, Duany told the Washington Post, "We'd love to set Mississippi up as
the first 21st-century region…That's the idea." (Hales, 2005). Hurricane Katrina
presented an opportunity to test new urbanism on a regional scale. Although new urbanist projects exist throughout the United States and abroad, this was the first attempt at designing an entire region using new urbanist designs and standards. The CNU jumped at this opportunity to collaborate with the State and assume the position of the State’s consultant for the redesign of the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Likewise, Governor Barbour’s decision to invite the CNU to Mississippi to rebuild the Gulf Coast was a brilliant stroke that moved forward the State’s agenda for national recognition. The CNU brought and continues to bring legitimacy and high-level publicity to Barbour’s agenda of rebuilding the coast. This same attention would not be possible if it the architects were not from nationally-renown firms with a progressive design agenda. Commission Chairman Jim Barksdale described the area as a "tabula rasa" stretching 80 miles from Pascagoula to Waveland (Hales, 2005). Although the storm surge moved miles inland, reducing much of the coast to concrete slabs and crumpled roadways, the destruction has also provided Mississippi with a large urban development opportunity. The State’s selection of the CNU as their consultants, and their collaboration in executing a vision for the state, may in fact endow Mississippi as the new model for coastal development elsewhere.

4.2.2 The Mississippi Renewal Forum

In an information pamphlet published in the Sun Herald newspaper on October 10, 2005, Governor Haley Barbour announced that the Governor’s Commission prepared a weeklong workshop called the Mississippi Renewal Forum. The Forum was organized to be held in Biloxi on October 12-17, 2005, where teams of local and out-of-state
professionals would work with community leaders to design and plan for the Gulf Coast. In his announcement, the Governor signified the role of the State as a leader in helping to form ideas for rebuilding with community leaders. The Governor said “it is important to emphasize that these tools and designs will be made available to the citizens of the Coast, but not forced upon you. The people of the Coast will make the decisions - we only want to provide good ideas and resources that can help us move together beyond the rubble to a bright new future that's in our grasp”(Barbour, 2005).

Invitations to collaborate were extended from the State and their planning and design consultants to local governments with the delivery of invitations to participate in the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Letters of invitation to the Mississippi Renewal Forum were sent to mayors, county supervisors, county planners, and local architects and planners. These invitees decided if they could personally attend or if they needed to send staff representatives to the State’s planning event. In this time of crisis in the immediate weeks following the hurricane there were a mix of responses to the invitations to engage with the State in planning. One planner shared his expectation of the collaborative intention of the Forum. When his mayor was debating about whether he should participate in the State’s event, the planner said:

When I looked at the actual invitation, I said, mayor, you need to be there because they are offering planning assistance that you’re not going to get easily. You’re going to have a technical team that’s thrown to you, and we can guide their work. It’s not that they’re doing it to us. We need to try to take ownership.

Although many local officials felt that the State adequately reached out to them to collaborate for this important planning event, some others felt that they were excluded
from participating. There remains a disagreement between the Governor’s Commission, who suggested that all the key players on the coast were invited, and officials who reported that they did not think that they received an invitation to attend the Mississippi Renewal Forum. There are a number of possible explanations for this disagreement of who was actually invited to the Forum. First, the quick turnaround between the decision to hold the Mississippi Renewal Forum and the start of the Forum must be recognized. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was scheduled to start only three weeks after the final agreements between Andres Duany and Governor Barbour (Duany, 2005). This was a short timeframe for planning the Mississippi Renewal Forum and sufficiently producing and delivering invitations to the workshop. Moreover, delivery of invitations was challenging because communication lines were not yet completely established, and the streets had not been cleared of debris, making direct delivery of invitations a difficult task (Longwitz, 2005).

In other cases, some officials said that they were not sure if they received an invitation or not because the obvious chaos of continued recovery of bodies (Longo, 2006), and the scrambling for the provision of re-establishing basic needs such as clean water and shelter for their community (Coats, 2005). The perception of being excluded – whether accurate or not – later became a point of contention, and a predictor for the level of vertical collaboration between the state and local governments.

The Mississippi Renewal Forum was an unprecedented gathering of over 200 community leaders and committed professionals, who collectively sought design options for rebuilding homes, neighborhoods and whole communities along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The Commission formed eight issues committees for the Forum to begin
discussion on issues ranging from infrastructure to tourism and transportation. The intention was that the Forum would be a highly inclusive and interactive process. Andres Duany said of the participatory nature of the Commission’s efforts in establishing the Mississippi Renewal Forum, "It's democracy in action” (Tortorano, 2005).

The first round of planning charrettes took place at the end of the Forum, presenting the results of the week’s work for each of the city and issue teams. These charrette-style presentations were supposed to involve the invited local officials. Based on my interviews with some of the organizers of the Forum, the intention was that the community officials would participate throughout the week, not just as part-time participants who would drop in periodically. However, based on the official participant list for the Mississippi Renewal Forum, a large percentage of the participants were labeled “part-time participants” (Mississippi Renewal, 2005). The limited interaction involving the part-time participants impacted the potential to establish new collaborative relationships and sources of information exchange. Failure of community officials to invest in the Forum for the entire session proved to be an important limitation for intergovernmental collaboration.

Part of the limited interactions with local officials can also be attributed to the schedule of events planned during the Forum. According to the posted Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal Charrette Schedule, there were only three meetings during the Forum that were scheduled to have local officials in attendance (Mississippi Renewal, 2005a). In some cases, local officials reported that they were able to exchange information about their communities and planning concerns with each other during the Forum. Other officials suggested that there was so much to accomplish during the Forum
for their specific city that there was little time set aside for discussion with other localities (Shambra, 2006). A majority of the schedule for the Renewal Forum was dedicated to designers working in their specific city teams, preparing for the final presentation of the city plans. Limited opportunity for intentional meetings with local officials and opportunities for officials to communicate with each other, coupled with the high number of part-time officials or officials who chose not to participate in the Mississippi Renewal Forum, impacted the potential for effective collaboration. In some cases the limited interaction with local officials compromised the amount of necessary local input in the concept plans produced during the Renewal Forum.

Some actors were involved in collaborative exchanges with the State and their CNU consultant during the Mississippi Renewal Forum, but other relationships were based on one-way information flow as opposed to two-way collaboration (Figure 5). In addition to invited collaborators described above, there were actors who served as contributors rather than collaborators during the Renewal Forum. The Gulf Regional Planning Commission is the Metropolitan Planning Organization for the region and responsible for regional transportation planning. The Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District is responsible for economic development and mapping for the region. These agencies reported that they did not know that they were invited to participate, but that they were later asked to provide data to be used throughout the Forum. According to one regional planner:
We felt like we weren’t asked to come to the table… the State was trying to bring in the experts from outside. We just weren’t thought of, but we ended up participating behind the scenes because during that grand charrette process our GIS department saved the day with bringing over the plotters and providing the base maps of the area.

As illustrated in Figure 5, these agencies were contributors, but it was a one-way delivery of resources as opposed to a collaborative exchange where the regional agencies felt like they were part of the process. Another regional planner summarized the disconnect well by stating that “the regional agencies were not even considered a viable part of the solution at that time, and that’s unfortunate.”

Additionally, local planners were concerned that the State’s planning organizations, the Mississippi Chapter of the American Planning Association (MAPA), was not invited to the Forum or asked for its recommendations. MAPA is the state organization of the American Planning Association, which represents planners nationwide. This was a “slap in the face” to the state level planning organization, which never received a call for their input. Based in Jackson, Mississippi, located north of the intense hurricane damage, MAPA would have been able to provide important local knowledge and resources.

The State-sponsored Mississippi Renewal Forum only lasted six days, but set the stage for subsequent planning efforts. All of the communities that received volunteer planning assistance from the CNU consultants continued to work together over the next two months. While the consultants worked from their firms located in other states, they all returned to these communities several times to hold community charrettes. During this time, they were able to refine and move forward their ideas presented at the Mississippi
Renewal Forum. In early December 2005, the CNU consultants returned to review their revised plans in larger, town hall meetings, with each of the 11 cities (Ziring and Filmanowitz, 2005). All the cities held multiple follow-up charrettes and town hall meetings after the presentation of the CNU consultants’ draft plans. One report stated that groups were meeting weekly in the eleven cities and the surrounding counties during December 2005 (Mississippi Renewal, 2005b).

4.2.3 The Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal Report

The Governor’s Commission was directed to involve local officials in their process of developing ideas for recovery, rebuilding, and renewal. Input for the Commission therefore came largely from local communities, providing an example of ongoing vertical collaboration between the state and local governments. Their input was recorded from over 50 town hall meetings, and based on the issue committees for housing, infrastructure, finance, agriculture, tourism, education, health and human services and governmental and nongovernmental organizations (Office of Governor Barbour, 2006).

In order to include local governments in their recommendations, the Commission worked with local communities as they refined their rebuilding plans. They attended all the charrettes and town hall meetings that were held from October 2005 through December 2005 in all the cities and counties. According to one report, the Commission “scheduled follow-up sessions with local leaders and officials to figure out which parts of the plans work best for them, and how they can begin implementing these ideas” (Mississippi Renewal, 2005b). The state and local governments worked collaboratively
to share their information and opinions about the rebuilding phase and the feasibility of implementation. Once the December charrettes and meetings were complete, the Commission began finalizing its recommendations.

The Commission was asked to prepare a final report that outlined their findings and recommendations. After thousands of hours of input from research and different committees, the Commission submitted its report, *After Katrina – Building Back Better Than Ever* to the Governor. The Commission Report presented the report and a list of 263 policy recommendations to the Governor. Because none of the recommendations proposed by the State following Hurricane Camille were implemented, it was especially important that the Commission prepare recommendations that could be implemented. The recommendations were organized around four broad categories: infrastructure, including land use, transportation, public services, and housing; economic development, including tourism, small business, agriculture, forestry, marine resources, and defense and government contracting; human services, including education, health and human services, and nongovernmental organizations; and other special considerations, including finance, long-term policy recommendations, and a section called a road map to greater accountability that identified the responsible party and funding source for each recommendation (Governor’s Commission, 2005).

Among the Commission’s recommendations were a number of suggestions that were the responsibility of the local government to implement. For example, local governments were asked to revise their land use ordinances to implement new urbanist designs of mixed use and walkability, and to adopt the SmartCode as a model code for rezoning (Governor’s Commission, 2005). However, once the report was turned over to
local governments, they had the authority to decide whether they would collaborate with the State and follow the Commission’s recommendation. As was stressed by Commission members at community meetings, local governments needed to evaluate the recommendations and decide for themselves the best course of action for their community. As one member of the transportation committee for the Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal, explained to Ocean Springs, "We have no authority whatsoever. We are merely recommending. It is up to you and your community to decide what you want to do with it." (Mississippi Renewal, 2005b). The Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal disbanded at the end of December 2005 when it submitted its report to the Governor.

4.3.4 Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal

Vertical collaboration between the state and local governments continued after January 2006 with the establishment of the Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal. This office coordinates government assistance at all levels and offers advisory assistance to state and local governments. The creation of this Office was a first step towards implementing the Governor’s Commission Report, and was charged with encouraging both vertical and horizontal collaboration. This Office of recovery and Renewal was charged with four key tasks: identification of non-state funding for rebuilding; providing policy counsel to state and local governments; implementation of the Commission Report’s policy recommendations; and establishing education, outreach, and training events for the communities such as hosting grant writing workshops and a housing repair and recovery exposition.
The Office of Recovery therefore played a host of different roles in supporting local governments and coordinating communication between the state and local governments. As an example, Harrison County wanted to make it easier for citizens to purchase modular housing. The County amended its zoning ordinance to permit modular housing in more districts, but through conversations with the modular housing industry realized that state regulations made it very difficult for modular homes to be approved for sale. Harrison County contacted the Office of Recovery and Renewal and worked with the government relations coordinator to explain the problem. The Office of Recovery then worked with the State Fire Marshall’s Office and the legislature to put through legislation that resolved this particular problem. As a more typical example, local governments approached the Office of Recovery and Renewal about their staffing needs for building permit officials, zoning officials, and engineering staff. The Office of Recovery and Renewal was charged with helping local governments find funding to support the staffing needs during the time of recovery.

The Office of Recovery and Renewal held a steady dialogue between with local governments by holding forums specifically designed for information sharing. At the local government’s request, the office established regular meetings to discuss recovery issues and unmet needs. A number of outreach events were sponsored by the office in the spring of 2006, including a grants management workshop that described opportunities for federal, states and non-profit grants programs for post-Katrina assistance. A Home Builder’s Workshop was organized by the office, which brought together over 500 home builders to discuss funding opportunities, new policies affecting housing construction, and housing needs (Park, 2006). As another example, the Governor’s Recovery Expo was
held in late summer, which provided a number of services, such as model housing displays, employment services, town hall meetings, and construction techniques. Over 180 vendors were present at this event including federal and state agencies to provide information to local governments and community members (Office of Governor Haley Barbour, 2006).

4.2.5 SmartCode and Plan Implementation

The SmartCode and Plan Implementation phase centered on the moving forward with planning and making the commitment to implementation. Communities had a strong incentive to move forward with their planning quickly because it made them eligible for state and federal planning funds. The State continued to provide resources in the form of technical and financial support, which represented vertical collaborations between local and state government. Horizontal collaboration was initiated during this phase as communities started to share information about how to calibrate and implement the SmartCode ordinances.

New vertical and horizontal collaborations arose in January 2006 when communities began to explore implementation options of their rebuilding plans. As local governments transitioned to the next step of plan implementation, the State provided assistance to the local governments by holding information sessions about the SmartCode in coastal cities to educate staff and elected officials on SmartCode throughout January 2006 (Mississippi Renewal, 2005b). In January alone, a two-day seminar was held in Gulfport, full-day seminars were held in Ocean Springs, Long Beach, Gautier, and Pascagoula. These individual seminars, facilitated by SmartCode teams from the State’s
Mississippi Renewal Forum, continued over the next several months to further understand and evaluate the State-supported SmartCode as an option for plan implementation.

Pass Christian and Ocean Springs took the initial lead in SmartCode adoption and implementation. Ocean Springs started working toward passing SmartCode for the city, and the Pass tasked their planning commission with implementing the SmartCode. The State reported on and celebrated this step toward SmartCode implementation – a representation of city collaboration with the State – by proclaiming that these cities “embraced a key recommendation that came out of the Mississippi Renewal Forum charrettes [to]…prepare a final SmartCode for the city, taking a crucial step toward implementing the vision for rebuilding that the community has shared with planners over the past couple months” (Mississippi Renewal, 2005b). The step forward represented local government efforts in making the State’s vision for the Gulf Coast a reality.

A considerable amount of SmartCode activity continued into spring of 2006, including a coast wide SmartCode workshop. A three-day, instructional SmartCode workshop was held in Biloxi in March 2006, and was intended to be a regional event. A number of planners, officials, developers, and others throughout Mississippi attended this workshop to learn more about how to calibrate the SmartCode and ways in which it could be used for the different communities to implement their plans. As part of this regional event, the Mississippi Model SmartCode was published by new urbanist consultants for free distribution to all of the coastal cities. (Miller and Aurbach, 2006). The Mississippi Model SmartCode was a model code with metrics designed specifically to be used as a template for Mississippi coastal cities that would ultimately be locally customized by
professional planners, architects, and attorneys. This provided another important resource to cities as they moved forward with their plan implementation.

The individual and regional SmartCode events and workshops triggered a small level of horizontal collaboration as the communities started to wonder how other communities were addressing the SmartCode ideas. The regional workshop provided a forum for local governments to interact with each other and share information. As one planner explained:

The kind of involvement that is expected to be required with the adoption of SmartCode is something that we have not experienced in the past. Everybody is looking at SmartCode as a possible way to work together, and with the way the greenfield sectors are laid out we certainly think that will require that more entities work together.

This planner was referring to the fact that the SmartCode is a transect-based code, which moves from higher density urban areas to lower density greenfields. Because the SmartCode is intended to acknowledge the building-scale to regional-scale development, it would require communities to holistically consider how adjacent plans may interact with each other. The low-density greenfields would be located at the edges of the communities in most cases. In this way, the SmartCode would theoretically require some level of intergovernmental communication and information sharing in order to achieve the intentions for the edges of communities.

There appear to be a number of reasons why there was not more post-storm horizontal collaboration. Horizontal collaboration had not occurred before January 2006 in large part because the communities were overwhelmed by the disaster. They had no organized means to contact each other and had to focus on their own issues before they
could consider reaching out to other communities. Outside of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, land use planning was secondary to emergency response and recovery in the months following the hurricane. Horizontal collaboration was limited again when communities started receiving state and federal grants to refine or implement their plans, because they tended to focus attention on their consultant and working with the State to meet requirement for funding.

While a couple of communities, such as D’Iberville, had taken the initiative to approach the state for small requests of planning money to move forward with their plans (Taylor, 2006), most of the significant planning money was advertised in late September 2006. The local newspaper reported that millions were appropriated by Congress and would be administered through the Mississippi Development Authority on a first come, first serve basis. The catch was that the recipients of the planning assistance had to have a plan for what they intended to do with the money and also had to provide “documentation of the commitment to implement the plan” (Wilemon, 2006b). In setting this requirement to be eligible for funding, the State effectively ensured that the rebuilding plans that they had initiated with help from the CNU – and therefore their vision for the coast – would move forward toward implementation.

In May 2007, $7.2 million in grants were approved to help communities implement ideas generated during the Mississippi Renewal Forum and the subsequent charrettes. Included in the planning grants were funds allocated to all 11 coastal cities and three coastal counties to develop updated plans, zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and SmartCode ordinances (WLOX, 2007). With resources to continue work with their CNU consultants, these local governments mainly focused their attention on
vertical collaboration with the CNU consultants and the State and their own communities and did not engage with other communities for information sharing purposes.

This phase of plan implementation continues today. Based on my interview data, there remains limited horizontal intergovernmental collaboration. With resources in hand, most of the local governments are focused on how to refine the SmartCode specifically for their own community. In addition, with the current funds, many of these communities are busy trying to meet deadlines for completing these huge planning activities, mainly working closely with their consultants as opposed to taking time to consider how their neighbors’ plans may affect them.

The five phases presented in this section represent a summary of the types of vertical and horizontal collaborations that were established after Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast. These phases also provide a timeline in order to understand the when the different state initiatives and actions occurred, and how these events may have impacted opportunities for intergovernmental collaboration.

4.3. Collaboration Continuum

Both vertical and horizontal collaboration are occurring in post-Katrina Mississippi, however, collaboration is occurring on the low end of the complexity continuum (Figure 7). Information sharing was the most typical form of collaboration that happened for planning and rebuilding efforts. In fact, only a small number of examples of resource exchange and one example of problem solving were evident from my interview data. Even with the more complex instances of collaboration, institutional factors impacted how these interactions were handled.
Figure 7: Complexity continuum of collaboration, showing that most of the collaborative relationships were located on the simple information sharing end of the continuum.

4.3.1 Information Sharing

When collaboration did occur in Mississippi, it was generally informal and involved spontaneous forms of information sharing as opposed to the product of formal meetings. Respondents to my interviews shared multiple stories about their primary way of collaborating, both before and after Hurricane Katrina. In one case, a City and a County planning official were living next door to each other in FEMA trailers for several months after the storm. Their proximity lead to daily informal collaboration over the barbeque grill as they talked about what issues and strategies each jurisdiction was addressing. The city planner noted that when he was prompted to find out what the county was doing on a particular issue during his day at work, he said that he had the luxury of saying, “well I’ll find out when I get home tonight.”

The planner with the longest tenure on Coast helped me understand that informal information sharing and networking is simply part of the culture in south Mississippi:
The Seafood Museum had their big event on the beach, and it’s amazing how much networking you get to do at a meeting like that. You know, you go out there and say, look I’m going to have some seafood and a have couple of beers and listen to the music and before you know it …we’ll start sharing notes about, well, what are you involved on with this? How are you going to address this point? Are you going to get any more monies from the state on this and this? And pretty soon you’ve got your outline and that’s how you basically know how to function within this environment, because there are a lot of people who do know a lot of things who do not have a lot of capabilities to share that information with you—let’s talk about how that new bridge is going to interact here, and should that ramp go in the east side or should it go in the west side.

Consistently, people I interviewed said this type of informal information sharing is how business is done on the coast. No one could provide me with meeting minutes, or agendas from organized meetings. When I would ask for such materials, or details on frequency of interactions with other communities, most people would pause and smile, and explain, “that’s just not part of the culture here”.

4.3.2 Resource Exchange

A small number of examples of mid-level complexity of collaboration in the form of resource exchanges were revealed in the interviews. Cities in Jackson County met together to exchange resources concerning flood plain management. Pascagoula had a flood plain manager who was highly regarded on a national level, so they exchanged resources with the other cities in Jackson County by providing training to the other cities. This placed additional demands on Pascagoula’s resources, but because they were the only city with this specific resource, they felt it was important to help the larger region develop flood plain regulations. As another example in Jackson County, when Moss
Point’s building official passed away soon after the storm, Jackson County officials offered administrative assistance until the position could be filled.

Resource exchanges are also occurring in regards to adoption of the SmartCode. Although during the time of my interviews no community had formally adopted the SmartCode, today Gulfport, Moss Point and Pass Christian have adopted the SmartCode. The decision to move from conventional zoning to the SmartCode required a high level of vertical collaboration between the CNU consultants and local governments, in an effort to implement the State’s vision for the future of the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

4.3.3 Problem Solving

The single example of high complexity, problem solving forms of horizontal collaboration involved the creation of a multi-community temporary housing ordinance. Directly after the storm, local governments were faced with how to handle the placement of FEMA trailer parks in their communities. This was a regional issue because if one community had less stringent restrictions on temporary housing, then it may impact where they would be placed in the region. A planner from Gulfport acted as the point of contact between cities and the County in Harrison County, in addition to Ocean Springs, in Jackson County. Planners from these communities had formal meetings every day at the Civil Defense Headquarters in Gulfport for a several weeks, in conjunction with the meeting organized by the incident command teams assigned to them by the State.

Different levels of potential collaboration can be considered by thinking about this issue of needing a consistent temporary housing ordinance along the collaboration continuum presented in Chapter 2. At the information sharing level, collaboration may
involve sharing their individual existing zoning ordinances that address temporary housing options. At the resource exchange level, collaboration may entail participation in regular weekly meetings about how to address temporary housing standards, with no official commitment. And finally, at the problem-solving stage, collaboration could include commitment to establishing joint policies that places consistent regional regulations on temporary housing, and working together in drafting these plans.

A regional temporary housing ordinance was created as a high-level collaborative effort between coastal communities. As a Harrison County official explained that this was a concern because investment in new homes would have been slowed with a ton of campers still all around them. As a result, Harrison County shared their ordinance with the other cities in the County and they all used it as the basis for their ordinances. Each community used the Harrison County ordinance as a model and then modified it to take account of specific needs of their communities.

The next section provides the results to my main research question: What factors influence intergovernmental collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi? Because there was not a wide range of examples spanning the complexity continuum, my results focus on factors that influenced a broad definition of collaboration.

4.4. Factors Influencing Collaboration

The complexity of collaboration continuum focuses on the collaborative purpose (i.e., information sharing to problem solving). Influencing this continuum are related underlying factors that impact the formation of collaborative relationships. This section provides the results to my main research goal, to determine what factors promote or
inhibit collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi. Table 4 provides an overview of the results for each factor described in my theoretical framework. This section provides a background, context and associated meaning of the results. In addition, four emergent factors are introduced, which were shown to be important influences in decisions to collaborate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Number of Respondents (Number of References)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Communication and Engagement Factors</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Power disparities</td>
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<td>17(39)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal Ideology Factors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared goals</td>
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<td>Trust</td>
<td>18 (51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Values and cultural norms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Factors</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>19 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoter</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Plain factors: theoretical factors included in framework
  Bolded factors: emergent factors found in case study

Table 4: Factors influencing collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi, ranked by the number of respondents citing factor. Total number of references shown parenthetically. *
Although these factors individually influenced actors in their decisions to collaborate with other entities post-storm, in all cases, multiple factors impacted actor decisions to collaborate (Table 5). While there were no large geographic trends in the factors that influenced collaboration, the results do show that interdependence was a factor only in cities located in Jackson County. This was an important finding, and one that is explored later in the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Harrison County</th>
<th>Jackson County</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>BI</td>
<td>DI</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Communication and Engagement Factors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusion of actors</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Power disparities</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Ripeness of issue</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Capacity potential</td>
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<td>Political support</td>
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<td><strong>Costs of collaboration</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Leadership Factors</strong></td>
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<td>Leader</td>
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<td>Promoter</td>
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* BI = Biloxi; DI = D’Iberville; GP = Gulfport; LB = Long Beach; PC = Pass Christian; GA = Gautier; MP = Moss Point; OS = Ocean Springs; PA = Pascagoula

Table 5: Identification of factors influencing collaboration distributed over cities* in Harrison County and Jackson County.
Each of the theoretical and emergent factors contained in these tables are discussed in this section. Specific data from the interviews are integrated under each factor to provide a range of examples about how and why each factor impacted intergovernmental collaboration.

4.4.1 Communication and Engagement

Communication and engagement factors provided important insight to the formation of intergovernmental relationships for planning. This category of explanation included factors that are important to the actual collaborative planning process, which strengthens commitment to collaborate. Among these factors is the inclusion of all stakeholders or actors surrounding the planning issue, management of the initial propensity to collaborate based on issue ripeness, and the determination that there will be parity among stakeholders involved in the collective planning process.

*Inclusion of Actors*

The case study revealed the importance of inclusion of actors in the planning processes as a factor influencing intergovernmental collaboration. This finding confirms well-established literature that finds the stakeholder selection process and composition of actors is important in promoting collaboration (Gray, 1989; Innes et al., 1994; Margerum, 2002). Based on the respondent data, inclusion of actors ranked as a factor with high importance in the decision to collaborate on planning issues, and set the stage for subsequent decisions to engage in intergovernmental collaboration.

The process used to engage actors following Hurricane Katrina is significantly different from the post-Hurricane Camille process. The 1970 planning processes that
followed Hurricane Camille illustrated the problems created by an exclusive planning process. The State engaged a consultant to develop plans for rebuilding the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The process did not include local officials and planners in their planning process; as a result, many of the communities rejected the State’s proposals for rebuilding. According to a planner who was on the Pass Christian Planning Commission at the time, this important omission lead to a general rejection of any ideas the State wanted to put forth:

The Governor appointed a steering committee and when they came up with the ideas the local political leaders said, well, who’s telling us to do these things? And it was an automatic rejection from the start because it looked like the Governor’s group was going to try to override the elected officials, so they didn’t get too far. This time they’re trying to work together on it.

From the beginning of post-Katrina planning, the goal of the Governor’s Commission was to establish a collaborative process based on the inclusion of as many actors as possible. Given the failures of the State to achieve successful results following Hurricane Camille, the Governor’s Commission believed engaging actors was especially important. According to a respondent who was on the Governor’s Commission for Hurricane Katrina, the State did intend on a collaborative approach in order to garner support from the local communities:

We received copies of the Camille report, and it was very clear, reading that report and talking to some people who were involved in that process after Camille, was that it was a very exclusive group. I seriously doubt it involved community public forums and wide engagement, [and] the end result was a report that largely sat on a shelf for 35 years at the time of Katrina, and, you know, it was really sort of the banner we carried throughout the Governor’s Commission work and still today was the mantra of, we didn’t get it right after Camille. Here’s
another opportunity—we can’t fail again. That’s sort of been our calling cry, if you will, is getting it right this time.

Some literature suggests that inclusiveness is important, but that large groups will reduce workability and effectiveness of collaborative processes (Gray 1989, Innes et al, 1994). However, the Mississippi respondents stressed that inclusiveness was much more important than efficiency during the first planning events because of the gravity of the situation and the extent of the rebuilding efforts needed. The storm leveled several communities along the coast, and displaced tens of thousands of residents. All of the officials who had any knowledge of day-to-day operations for these communities felt they should be involved from the start.

Inclusion of actors was a critical topic mentioned time and time again in relation to the organization of the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Those who did not receive invitations to this event voiced frustration because they knew it was supposed to be a collaborative – and inclusive process. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was an invitation only event, and people could only get into the hotel where it was held if they had an invitation. As an example, several communities on the coast have a city manager structure of government, where the city manager runs the city. However, the mayors generally received the invitations, not the city managers:

I was never invited so I could not participate. I got frustrated about that occasionally. Okay, I’ve got enough to do. I don’t need to engage on that issue. But that is a concern, you know, as a day-to-day operator I don’t get the invitations because the State typically sends them to mayors. So the city did participate but not with the granularity I would liked to have seen… the rhetoric from the consulting agencies is that they are putting this together as a collaborative effort. And, if you can define “collaborative” as in “they ask questions, we provide data,” then perhaps it is. But that’s not my definition.
One of the most serious barriers to collaboration is the omission of actors who hold the power to implement the decisions (Gray 1989). The instances in post-Katrina planning where key actors felt left out of the process may have impacted the State’s ability to garner support for their vision for the coast, as enhanced commitment to plans results from participation in their shared creation and design (Innes, 1992; Innes, 1996; Innes and Booher, 1999).

There appeared to be a discrepancy between the people the Governor’s Commission said they invited, and those who actually recognized the receipt of an invitation. Although several people I interviewed suggested that they were not invited to participate in the Mississippi Renewal Forum, materials distributed by the State suggest some of them may have been invited and just did not receive their invitations. In a Mississippi Renewal Forum Pre-Event Paper published before the Forum was held, a list of local team members was provided, presumably the intended list of local participants. Although the regional agencies told me that they were not invited to the Forum, both agencies are listed on this Team list, suggesting that they were in fact invited, but did not receive the invitation. It should be noted, however, that many offices were no longer physically present. Mail was delayed by weeks in most cases, and phones were frequently inoperable, making communication extremely difficult.

Failure to ensure that regional agencies were well represented at the initial planning events was a pivotal mistake. Their knowledge of the regional issues and the regional players in planning would have brought essential knowledge to the discussion, specifically for a process that was intended to be collaborative and implemented
regionally. Regional staff told me that although they “weren’t even thought of” by the Governor’s Commission, their offices were the ones with the regional GIS databases and maps of the coast. Although they offered considerable resources and information to the CNU consultants and the Governor’s Commission, the regional agencies felt pushed “behind the scenes” while the “outside experts” came in to address the regional planning concerns. Thus, the regional agency actors ended up playing the role of the technical assistant instead of true collaborators (Margerum, 2002).

Inclusion and involvement in this first planning event appeared to be crucial in determining actor’s future decisions to collaborate with the State and to move on with the planning processes. Some communities, such as D’Iberville, said that because of their attendance and positive experience at the Mississippi Renewal Forum, this created momentum for community planning. As an outgrowth of their involvement in the Forum, additional planning initiatives were created, highlighting the positive impact the community. When local officials did not attend the early planning meetings and benefit from learning about the planning process, there was no time later in the process for them to learn about new urbanism, the SmartCode, and collaborative planning processes in general. As a result, these leaders were confused by the concepts when the proposed plans came before the city council or planning commission for review.

Lack of involvement can lead to local officials feeling left out, and resulting in their boycotting of the entire state process (Innes, 1992). Whether invitations were not sent to certain actors, or they simply did not reach these people due to circumstances after the storm did not matter. In some instances actors who did not perceive that they were part of a collaborative process from the beginning carried ill feelings or tried to sabotage
the process by publicly criticizing the planning effort. For example, a member of the Jackson County Board of Supervisors boycotted the planning process in the regional newspaper because he claimed that he was not invited to the Governor's planning sessions and charrettes meeting. He said that the charrettes were not worthwhile, and continued on to publicly belittle the collaborative processes by calling them "bull charrettes" and “charades” (Chandler, 2006).

In response to these claims made in the Sun Herald newspaper, Jim Barksdale, chair of the Governor’s Commission wrote a Letter to the Editor that explained that the Commission tried to reach all officials by telephone, cell phone, or e-mail to invite them to the event. If they could not be reached by phone or e-mail, runners were sent to visit them personally to make sure they were invited. He went on to explain that those who participated in the process have been more successful in their planning processes:

I do believe that those communities that participated got more out of the process than those communities that did not, but all were invited…I am sure Mr. Leach could have done more if he had participated more rather than belittling this huge effort by so many of his fellow citizens. But I stand by the fact that our planning process and results are now world-famous and acknowledged by people around the country as a great effort by the "can do" citizens of South Mississippi (Barksdale, 2006).

In fact, all of the officials I interviewed who did participate in the planning events and supported the State’s vision for rebuilding felt like their community benefited from this process.

The Governor’s Commission has largely been successful in combating the negative precedent of the exclusive Hurricane Camille process. In a two-month period the planning process produced over 50 town hall meetings and charrettes to engage local
officials and communities in the process. In the cases where local officials were involved from the start, by being invited to the Mississippi Renewal Forum, the officials took ownership of the planning process and engaged in the collaborative process. In many cases, when officials perceived that they were not included at the beginning of the process, the result was skepticism of the State’s vision and in some instances, localized opposition to the State’s efforts.

*Ripeness of Issue*

If everything’s running kind of normal, you’re running your own little boat, but if it gets a big leak, you’re looking for help. – Public official, City of Long Beach

Collaboration is a “logical and necessary response” to turbulent conditions because turbulence cannot be managed individually (Cigler 1989, 27). During the time immediately following a turbulent event, actors become highly interdependent with each other as they try to make sense of the rapid changes and uncertainty generated by the conditions. Hurricane Katrina qualifies as turbulence, and marks a time period ripe for intergovernmental collaboration. As the following results show, planning for post-disaster rebuilding was important for all Mississippi communities, although the need for collaboration varied depending on the resources of the community. The Governor of Mississippi had to step in and establish a vision for post-disaster planning early, while the issue was still ripe for intergovernmental collaboration.

Several authors have identified this time period after a focusing event, such as a hurricane, as a “window of opportunity” for intervention (Birkland, 1997; Olshansky, 2006; Schwab et al., 1998). During this window of time, issues are ripe for actors to
intervene and to set the stage for a planning framework for post-disaster planning. There is no agreement on the time span for of this window of opportunity as it related to accomplishing post-disaster planning. Some authors suggest that the window ends several months after the disaster (Olshansky, 2006), while others contend that planners only have an approximate 30-day window of opportunity to establish a planning framework for post-disaster planning (Schwab et al., 1998). The urgency and need for direction during this window of opportunity make the issue ripe for collaboration among actors leading way in post-disaster planning and those responsible to implement the new framework.

After Hurricane Katrina, factors of timing, urgency of the need to act, and concern about the problem all work together to make the relationships ripe for intergovernmental collaboration. Disasters are considered examples of triggering events that can cause enough stress on a community to lead to collaborative responses (Cigler, 1999), and Hurricane Katrina represents the greatest urban and regional disaster in the history of the United States. Following Hurricane Katrina, one would expect that communities would have a high degree of interest in collaborative planning efforts for recovery and rebuilding, establishing intergovernmental networks of information and resources for planning.

Based on the short window of opportunity that follows a focusing event like Hurricane Katrina, the State needed to seize the opportunity to engage communities and provide them a common planning framework before communities received their individual resources. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was held only six weeks after the storm. Because it was held so quickly after the disaster, many community leaders were
unable to participate in the Forum, or could only attend periodically. However, the early
timing of the Mississippi Renewal Forum was essential in fostering a sense of
dependence by the local governments on the state for planning assistance. This allowed
the State to take the lead on establishing the regional framework for post-disaster
planning.

The results of this study show that issue ripeness was only of low importance in
community decisions to collaborate with other local governments in Mississippi, mainly
because the window of opportunity for intergovernmental collaboration was short. While
the Governor’s Commission and CNU were trying to take advantage of this window of
opportunity to generate a guiding vision for future rebuilding, respondents shared mixed
reception on the timing of the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Some suggested that they
were interested in participating in the Mississippi Renewal Forum specifically because it
did fall in the “window of opportunity”, where they needed direction on how to approach
the post-disaster planning. However, at least for the communities that were able to
harness resources, this window was rather short and ended soon after the Renewal
Forum:

Right after the storm there were so few resources to do anything that everybody
was sticking together and everybody was on the same page. And then as resources
changed and needs changed you kind of went your own way.

As part of the Forum, each city was given technical, administrative, and financial
resources in the form of pro-bono world-renown consultants, who were charged by the
State to work with the communities to develop rebuilding plans. These significant
resources got the communities back on their feet and placed them on a trajectory toward
post-disaster planning. In this way, the window of opportunity – and the time of issue
ripeness for collaboration – only lasted approximately six weeks. As the quote above
suggests, after the communities received resources for planning, they changed from
“sticking together” to going their “own way”. In a similar way, communities that had
little damage did not feel the pressure or urgency from their constituencies to engage in
collaborative planning:

Because Gautier got less damage than anybody else, there has been less
enthusiasm about, oh my god; we’ve got to fix things. We had no deaths and we
only lost 67 homes. So there has not been the angst that you find in Pascagoula
where they are now quoting 90 percent of the city flooded. As a result of that our
community just has not stepped forward and said, well let’s engage, let’s do this.

It appeared that the ripeness of the issue had its own continuum, which is driven
by resource availability and level of damage in post-Katrina Mississippi. Communities
like Biloxi that had more resources did not have as much incentive to go through a
collaborative planning process. On the other end of the continuum, communities such as
Waveland were paralyzed by the damage received by the hurricane, and had no resources
or capacity to plan on their own. They would still not have had progress in planning if the
State had not taken the lead to provide a vision and resources. Then there were most of
the other communities who had significant damage, limited resources, but some capacity
to participate in a collaborative planning process.

This continuum is consistent with the observations of the Governor’s Office of
Recovery and Rebuilding. They reported that communities that traditionally had fewer
resources or who sustained more damage were more likely to collaborate with the State
on planning and rebuilding. Their observation was that they had less communication with Harrison County and its larger cities because Harrison County is so large and has strong, independent cities. One local planning consultant told me that as a rule, Gulfport and Biloxi do not communicate with other communities on planning issues unless they are absolutely desperate; as a result, they tend to act on their own and are more independent. Resources in the form of planning staff and expertise in some of the cities in Harrison County resulted in less demand for assistance from the State’s field offices. This is consistent with Agranoff and McGuire (2003) who find that larger entities tend to have the “go-it-alone ability” that smaller places lack, making them less likely to collaborate (123).

The turbulent conditions created by Hurricane Katrina provided the opportunity for the State to establish a regional vision for post-disaster planning that was dependent upon local government collaboration. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was held within the “window of opportunity” that was ripe for intergovernmental collaboration. Many communities participated in this event, and all of them used the consultants provided by the State during this Forum. Consequently, vertical intergovernmental collaboration was established between the state and local governments as they worked toward establishing a common vision for the coast. As the planning process continued, however, the level of intergovernmental collaboration waned where communities with more resources and capacity were able to move forward on their own.
Power Disparities

Concern about maintaining an institutional power base can be an obstacle to collaboration. These concerns can be manifested when actors take over the collaborative planning process through control of agendas or through persuasiveness based on capacity or political power. This does not suggest that all actors in collaborative relationships will have equal power, but that a model of shared power must be established (Gray, 1989). Differences in capacity and power of participants in a collaborative process can be managed through facilitation of interactions between actors to ensure equal knowledge and that voices are balanced. It is largely the role of the facilitator of the collaborative planning events to manage such power disparities in a way that can keep all the actors at the table and allow all interests to be heard (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001a). Power disparities played a moderate role in influencing intergovernmental collaboration along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Because not all actors in a collaborative relationship have equal power, at times those in positions of power have to relinquish it in order to collaborate. Through my interviews I found that power disparities were evident between state and local governments, between large and small communities, and between the State and its CNU consultant teams. However, in most cases, actors appeared to manage situations these situations by finding ways to effectively relinquish power to remove feeling of threat and therefore promote collaboration.

The State consciously balanced their interest in providing resources to the local governments while trying not to leave the impression that they were telling local governments what to do. A government affairs director was hired to coordinate communication and requests from local governments and the State. This person was
responsible for handling requests for funds to support staff hiring, supporting local
government requests for legislative assistance, and other requests. When asked about the
frequency with which the State offered their direct assistance to local governments
through their field stations, the Governor’s Office explained that they could not be
proactive; rather, the State had to wait for local governments to request help:

I’m not saying we are reactive, but we do not want to go to a community and give
them the impression that we kind of dominate, and are telling them [what to do].
They don’t like it. In this country, you don’t like the [higher levels of
government] coming to local governments saying, I’m big brother and I’ll tell you
what to do. So we are waiting. Sometimes we approach them when there are
major issues, but otherwise we kind of wait and see what kind of help they need,
and we respond more that way than telling them you should do this and that.

In using this strategy to combat an environment of power inequity, the State is balancing
the perception that they are asserting their power over local governments with providing
for the real needs of the local governments. One of the challenges with the State waiting
for the local governments to approach them for help is the risk that the costs of
collaboration will be too great for the communities to make time to initiate the
intergovernmental collaboration.

In addition to the fear of local governments feeling that the State is imposing its
power and telling them what to do, actors were also concerned about local power issues
as well. Respondents talked about the risk of communities that are smaller or that hold
less political power feeling like they are being told what to do by the larger or more
powerful communities. One respondent told me that in Harrison County small cities
“have a fear of being stepped on” by larger cities. On one occasion, a planning
consultant told me that he was in a community and referenced Gulfport and their planning ideas. The community promptly told him he was “not allowed to say Gulfport” in their community.

Power disparities also exist between cities and the unincorporated communities. The chair of the planning commission in Pass Christian explained that he would be interested in collaborating with the communities outside the cities, but he does not want to appear that he is telling them what to do:

We have some cooperation that we’ve talked to them on certain things, but primarily we stay out of county business and they stay out of ours, at least publicly. For instance, someone asked me, why didn’t you go to the meeting they had about improving Henderson Point, and my answer was, well, they know I’m the chairman in Pass Christian. I don’t want them to think I’m telling them what they got to do in Henderson Point. It’s better not to go into the neighboring area and tell you what ought to be done. I’ve got some ideas and I think we could work together, but they’ve got to be willing to accept it and we don’t want to go out there and act like we’re trying to tell them what to do. That would not be the smartest thing in the world to do. You don’t get along with people by telling them what to do.

He went on to explain to me that he has tried to initiate collaborative planning ideas, but as the representative from the more powerful city, he has to wait for the unincorporated communities to approach him. This sentiment was so strong that even when he was personally invited to a planning event in Henderson Point, he declined the invitation because he feared that the residents attending the planning events would be worried that Pass Christian was playing a role in their planning decisions.

Multiple consultants told me that power also played a role in the decisions of the CNU consultants to collaborate with each other and with the State’s vision for a new urbanist Mississippi coast, governed by the SmartCode. During the Mississippi Renewal
Forum, the Code Team that was in charge of talking about the SmartCode to the CNU consultants and the community officials was asked by the State to “tread lightly” when talking about the SmartCode. The Commission made this request because they were aware that a number of CNU consultants did not like the SmartCode for a number of reasons. First, many of the consultants had limited experience with the SmartCode and with planning in general, because they were primarily architects and designers. Second, because the SmartCode was originally a product of DPZ, Andres Duany’s design firm, the consultants saw it as promoting his company, instead of their own firms. And most importantly, the consultants wanted to write their own code as opposed to having someone else place limits on their designs.

Conflict existed among the CNU consultants in some cases because there were pride and turf issues as the core of these planning events. The SmartCode provides the code that implements the designer’s concepts, but the coding is part of the design – and these designers wanted more freedom than the SmartCode offered. One consultant told me that there were considerable infighting among the designers due to this limitation placed upon them. They wanted to create their own codes because they thought they could do it better that way. The consultants did not think that they should have to use somebody else’s code as a basis for their designs. As a result, during the Mississippi Renewal Forum, the Biloxi team did not use the SmartCode in their design concepts. The consultants assigned to these communities made this decision because they did not want to be boxed in to a pre-determined code. Consultants subsequently explained this decision to me as “professional turf protection” as a reason by there was no real collaboration between the consultants who were assigned to the different communities.
They were reluctant to collaborate because they felt that they were placed at a
disadvantage to adequately represent their interests in the face of more powerful ones.

Power disparities, both actual and perceived, impacted collaboration for planning.
In most cases, power disparity was “invisible”, and manifested in the form of threats to
professional and community authority. Because actors were cognizant of the need to
develop a model of shared power in order to collaborate, power played a moderate role in
limiting the formation of collaborative relationships.

4.4.2 Institutional Resources

As a category of explanation for post-Katrina intergovernmental collaboration,
Institutional Resource Factors provided the most important insight. This category of
factors focused on resource elements, specific to the institutional structure of the
Mississippi Gulf Coast. Three of the four factors in this category ranked as high
importance based on interview data, revealing the important role these factors play in
whether governments decide to collaborate with each other for planning issues.

*Capacity Potential*

An actor’s commitment to collaboration hinges on their perception that engaging
in the collaborative interactions will produce positive outcomes (Gray, 1989). Capacity
potential would theoretically promote collaboration based on the ability of the interaction
to enhance individual or collective capacity. Moreover, through collective action,
communities could build higher-level governance capacity – or a governance system with
capacity can learn, experiment, and adapt in creative ways to address threats and
opportunities found in post-disaster situations. Consistent with literature (Booher and
Innes, 2002; Innes and Booher, 2003), respondents identified that they engaged in low-level intergovernmental collaboration due to the opportunity to increase their administrative, technical, financial capacity, as well as social and political capital.

When Hurricane Katrina hit, a huge burden was placed on communities to respond to rebuilding using a regional planning framework. In all cases, individual communities were absolutely unprepared to handle disaster recovery alone. At this point, coastal communities had not developed good governance capacity with well-networked relationships, trusting actors, or a network to pull together appropriate groups on short notice. Moss Point shared their frustration with a task they felt unable to address on their own:

We did not have ample resources to deal with this phase of the recovery. You know, experts came down to help us formalize our vision. And given that none of the cities had ever rebuilt following a crisis before, it’s safe to say none of us knew what to do, and so we continue to struggle in our efforts to make those plans a reality. None of the elected officials are graduates of MIT or Harvard and none have advanced degrees in municipal government. We’re all butchers and bakers and candlestick makers, and yet we’re asked to do something that exceeds the scope of our ability. You wouldn’t ask that of someone heading a Fortune 500 company, to turn that corporation around and, oh, let’s put the janitor in there and let him be the one to do it. If we were New York or Los Angeles, we would have technical expertise in the private sector, academia, business community to step in, to advise, and to give direction, but we don’t have that resource and so we’re kind of left to our own devices to try and make things work, and we hope, in the end, that it’ll all work out.

Moss Point and other communities in Jackson County acknowledgement that their individual capacities to address the post-disaster situations were inadequate. In response, these communities crossed their jurisdictional boundaries because they realized that they could achieve increased capacity and necessary benefits almost immediately. Their
ability to recognize the potential to increase their capacity by working collectively as a region has allowed them to be more efficient in post-Katrina planning. Today, Jackson County communities have improved governance capacity and they are able to tackle planning activities that were not possible before the storm.

Other communities chose to collaborate with other local governments because they could increase their administrative capacity. They decided to work together due to their limited staff or resources available to complete necessary tasks. One planner described the limited administrative capacity faced by many communities:

Biloxi, Ocean Springs, and Gulfport actually have planners and a staff member under them—at least one. And so they have the luxury of time, of multiple people to cover the office, compared to D’Iberville, which had, essentially, a one-person planning office before the storm. If she were to leave the office for half a day to go meet up with people, her office would be closed down essentially. They’d have a clerk taking in paperwork, but no official decisions could be made. So that is a problem on smaller communities that we overcame through networking [after the storm].

Many local governments reached out to other communities who had more administrative capacity to get the “best information possible” to make more informed decisions. Ing this, they increased their governance capacity by self-organizing and working through shared and distributed intelligence. Respondents agreed that the best information most often came from Biloxi, Ocean Springs, or Gulfport, which were the three cities with planners and additional staff available to do land use planning.

One respondent mentioned that his city was able to use their resources to draft temporary housing ordinances and shared them with other small communities that had no

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Additional details on how this process has worked in Jackson County are provided in the vignettes that follow this section.
technical resources. In this way, a norm of reciprocity appeared to exist among post-
Katrina Mississippi communities. While the smaller local governments looked to the
larger local governments for technical assistance or planning recommendations, these
larger governments also took proactive steps to assist the smaller governments:

We came up with the basic concepts in conjunction with talking to several people
and then we sent our ordinance to two other smaller cities who lost their city halls
altogether. They didn’t have the resources; they don’t have the planners on staff.

In order to address limited financial capacity for planning in several communities
Gulfport offered to share their SmartCode model with other local governments. Gulfport
found the financial resources to hire a separate consultant to draft a model SmartCode for
their city. The city had their consultant calibrate the SmartCode for Gulfport, and then
offered it as a template for the rest of the coast. Most of the other cities did not have the
time and finances available to draft a calibrated SmartCode as quickly as Gulfport,
because Gulfport was able to donate their own money and bonds to this effort. As the
consultant shared with me, this made the SmartCode model and example of coast-wide
collaboration, because it is “workable, out of the box, for the rest of the coast”.

While seemingly altruistic, there remains a quid pro quo intention behind these
actions. The larger communities have something to gain from these transactions; they
likewise see capacity building potential in the form of “intangible” outcomes of
collaborative relationships (Booher and Innes, 2002; Gruber, 1994). Among those
intangible products of collaboration are social capital and political capital that can serve
to benefit communities in the future. Social capital in the form of trust was built between
communities through their interactions and planning processes. Increased social capital
enables communities to work together more readily (Gruber, 1994), which can provide for important future opportunities.

Establishing political capital through collaborative relationships allowed participants to form alliances and agreements on ideas that increased the ability for proposals to get acknowledged or implemented (Innes and Booher, 1999). Gautier explained that collaboration increased the political capacity of the local governments in Jackson County, but also increased the effectiveness of the state agencies because they could depend on the local governments in Jackson County to speak with one voice when they needed information:

We’ve been meeting frequently and we work together with one voice on hurricane related issues so that when the problem with demolition came along and the fight for whether we had to accommodate asbestos or not, we could speak as one voice. From the other side, all these coordinating agencies that we worked with were thrilled because at a regular time they had us all as a captured audience and they could put out information and exchange information all at one place.

A collective voice allowed the local governments to speak as a region to enhance their ability to get the support or resources that they needed from the State. The State also increased their political capacity with the local governments because through the establishment of trust with all the local governments through increased interactions, they improved their ability to get political support from the local governments for their planning initiatives.

Financial capacity was an important motivator to collaborate with the State on their visions for the SmartCode. One local consultant who had done consulting work for
several communities on the coast in the past, shared his insight into why communities were collaborating with the State:

The SmartCode became the popular thing after the storm because I think it was pushed on all these communities whether they wanted it or they didn’t. It was kind of like, this is what you’re going to do and this is what we’re going to fund, because the State was picking up a lot of the tab for it. It was a situation [where the State said], y’all either come with us or we’re going to leave you behind kind of thing…In Long Beach as an example, my understanding was they had even talked to the State about some assistance—non-SmartCode-oriented planning assistance, and they were told, that’s fine. We have no problem with it, but we’re not going to fund it. So whether they dictated it, it didn’t matter. They held the carrot, which was the money, and these towns have no money.

The State did not mandate the use of the SmartCode, but the money that was initially provided by the State through the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) was to be used for implementing the ideas from the initial charrettes from the Mississippi Renewal Forum. These concepts created by the CNU consultants through the charrettes were all based on new urbanist concepts and the assumption of realizing these plans through the implementation of the SmartCode. This idea was confirmed by the regional agencies that received money from the MDA:

Well, MDA, our funding source, asked us for that to be part of our scope—make sure we include the Governor’s [Commission] recommendations, reported in Building Back Better than Ever [the Governor’s Commission report], and then also to look at SmartCode and introduce it where we can.

Local governments saw the State’s financial assistance as an opportunity to rebuild their communities. Based on their limited capacity, even prior to the storm, collaborating with the State offered important opportunities. Aside from Biloxi, all the local governments
saw this as an opportunity to embrace, and the one chance that they had to make this
grand vision a reality for their cities.

Although the attraction to collaborate may be the potential to increase capacity in
tangible ways such as administratively or financial, many respondents explained that as a
result of their initial decision to work together on planning issues, they established trust,
which promoted additional collaboration. Many respondents said as a result of their
working together, they recognized that they had common goals, and established a
network of communication whereby they could just pick up the phone and call people
they had never communicated with before.

*Political Support*

Political support moderately influenced collaboration, but it was important to the
collaborative endeavors because it brought a sense of legitimacy to the collaborative
process. Political support was considered by respondents to be the provision of
resources, time, and attention to planning processes. Results showed that respondents felt
there was high political support from the State for collaborative rebuilding and planning.
However, due to limited planning history in Mississippi, and therefore little experience
with planning, support from local officials was limited in many cases.

All the respondents agreed that the State provided strong support for helping local
governments rebuild after the storm. The State allowed local governments to make their
own decisions, but supplied money for rebuilding, and provided expertise in the form of
the CNU consultants to each of the cities. From the local government perspective, the
State was the most important element of support for their success in rebuilding. State
support for the planning process was apparent not only in the leadership provided, but as
Gulfport describes, the manner in which the State asserted itself to provide the needed
resources:

[Previous to the storm], the state government has basically has left the cities in Harrison County to develop on their own, without a lot of state support. Post-
storm the level of support from the State has just been incredible. They’ve poured a lot of money, resources, everything into the economy. The Governor’s been incredible, what he’s done for the Gulf Coast, it’s been night and day.

While the State provided the necessary political support and therefore legitimacy in the planning process, lack of interest by many local appears to be attributed to their limited knowledge about planning and their limited time to learn about it. The limited history of planning and planning education on the Mississippi Gulf Coast can be demonstrated in the responses of local officials to their invitations to the Governor’s Mississippi Renewal Forum. A planner in Gulfport shared his wake up call to the level of planning knowledge of his elected official when he had to explain why it was important that the Mayor attend the Forum:

The mayor said, we have this [Mississippi Renewal Forum] going on. I don’t know if I need to waste my time going, and pointed over to me – you’re the planner, why don’t you go? When I looked at the actual letter invitation, I said, mayor, you need to be there because they are offering planning assistance that you’re not going to get easily. I mean this is going to be a big process, and just from a cursory review of the invitation—I had to explain what a charrette was.

But Gulfport was lucky in that they had a planner on staff that could explain planning to the Mayor, and why he needed to be represented at the Mississippi Renewal Forum.

Many of the other elected officials did not have the level of resources as Gulfport and
therefore either chose not to participate in the Governor’s collaborative approach, or subsequently chose not to because they did not understand planning. As one consultant from the State observed:

And there’s also not political will [at the local level] to adopt the plans and codes. You’re not going to make everybody happy, but there’s not strong leadership to be there with the plan, to nourish it and carry it through, and that is because elected officials don’t know planning.

This was a typical response from the local officials: because there was little land use planning pre-storm, it was not a priority post-storm. Especially in the face of mass disaster and continued recovery, planning for the future was not of main concern to the local officials.

Multiple respondents said that local officials are generally too busy to dedicate time to planning. And even when there was support for the plans that the State proposed, one planner told me that “there’s too much going on for [local officials] to be educated on [land use planning] right now, and they just don’t get it.” Another respondents shared her concern for the lack of involvement of local officials, starting from their involvement in the Mississippi Renewal Forum:

This is what was discouraging to me, and I still see it—is that a lot of the elected officials did not participate in the beginning and they have never participated or gotten engaged. For instance, we will have one of those big meetings and maybe a quarter of the elected officials that are impacted will be there, and that also includes planning commission—the planning commissions don’t show up.

Local government official’s support for the State’s rebuilding process was limited, yet they wanted plans in place as quickly as possible so they could start attracting
residents and businesses back to their communities. The interviews with public officials revealed a strong desire to “just get something going.” They acknowledge the necessity for speed in the rebuilding process, as their communities continuously risk losing more residents and businesses to communities further inland. One planning commissioner said he has attempted to explain the significance and consequences of land use planning for the community:

> We give them reports but they do not attend meetings and so forth. They’re interested in what we’re doing—they want us to get it done and get it to them, because they know if we don’t get it done quickly it’s slowing down the process. So, yes, they’re interested, but as far as the details are concerned, when you tell them you’ve got to look at every line, every sentence and see how it works and how it interrelates with the rest of it, they don’t want to get down to that level.

Opportunities for additional intergovernmental collaboration were lost due to local level officials’ lack understanding of land use planning and limited time to dedicate to the planning process. Although they may have supported the planning processes initiated by the State, attention to planning was a change in culture for many of these local officials because land use planning was not on their radars before the storm. Because of their limited presence during the planning processes, many local officials missed the opportunity to establish additional or richer relationships with their staff and with other communities. The two following emergent factors provide additional insight into the role that planning knowledge and costs of collaboration had on prospects for intergovernmental collaboration.
Planning Knowledge

The Mississippi Gulf Coast has a short history of land use planning, which translated to limited knowledge about planning. Insufficient technical background and lack of general understanding about land use planning issues limited the ability to share information or exchange ideas about different approaches to addressing or implementing new urbanism and the SmartCode. Therefore, planning knowledge emerged from the interviews, as a factor that strongly influenced intergovernmental collaboration.

There is a limited planning history in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. According to the Governor’s Office of Recovery, only Biloxi and Gulfport had an up-to-date plan in place when Katrina hit, and the other cities that had plans were out of date. Consistent building codes were not even in place until after Hurricane Katrina hit the coast; the building codes were different in each community. Post-Katrina, the six lower counties in Mississippi have now adopted the minimum standards, following the International Building Code.

Even among planners on the coast, or those with a little planning knowledge, there was a huge learning curve to understand the new urbanist principles and the SmartCode, which was intended to implement the new urbanist concepts. Planners on the coast only knew the traditional Euclidian zoning approach to planning, and had little to no experience with form-based planning, which was the basis for the SmartCode. This process represented a learning curve and new vocabulary for planners. One planner recalled:
There were no real champions of the SmartCode or form-based codes on the coast. There were planners who were interested in it, but there is such a radical change of attitude involved with adopting SmartCode because it says, essentially, use does not matter... because if all you’ve ever known is traditional zoning—if that’s all you’ve ever seen—this is scary. And the SmartCode is scary in that it is so specific, and people are very afraid of that.

This sentiment of fear of not understanding transferred to most of the local officials. However, some local officials who took the time – or had the capacity to make the time – to understand the SmartCode changed their opinion about this new way of thinking. One official from Gulfport told that me that once he understood all the concepts, he started to buy into them. Then he started to realize that the SmartCode was promoting the type of development that he grew up with, including the neighborhoods with sidewalks and a grocery store down the street. He thought, “this is how old towns were developed!”

Local officials were quick to note that once people start to understand planning concepts, they embrace them and want to work with the State and others to adopt these ideas for their community. One of the biggest impediments to collaborative planning remains the limited planning knowledge of decision-makers, who would be in charge of deciding whether the community collaborates with the State, with the CNU consultants, or with other communities in adopting versions of the SmartCode that are right for their community. In addition to their limited time, local communities also had limited resources, which made the costs of collaboration an important influence on collaboration.
Costs of Collaboration

Consistent with transaction cost theory, the costs of coordination are an important factor in determining if communities will collaborate, suggesting that efficiency is an underlying determinant of collaboration (Williamson, 1975). Costs of collaboration refer to the high level of time or resources that respondents feel are required to engage in collaborative relationships. This factor overwhelmingly explained why many communities chose not to engage in intergovernmental collaboration.

Literature and theory offer insight into collaboration costs. Anticipated benefits of collaboration, such as increased capacity, must outweigh the perceived risks or costs for communities to decide to collaborate (Alexander, 1995). The limiting costs to collaboration were evident starting from the early collaborative efforts during the Mississippi Renewal Forum, and continued in subsequent opportunities for collaboration among local governments. The first opportunity for collaboration for planning occurred with the start of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, but many people I spoke with said they were unable to collaborate in this planning event at all – or to an extent they felt was satisfactory – because the timing of the Forum was too early in the recovery process. As previously described, the Forum was held six weeks after Hurricane Katrina hit Mississippi. It was the Governor’s Commission’s intention to start the process early so as to engage the communities and provide needed direction for them as they started to consider rebuilding.

While the opportunity to collaborate could bring much-needed capacity for these communities, the costs of collaborating were too high. One leader from Jackson County
illustrated the balancing act that these officials had to consider when they decided whether to attend the Forum:

At that point we had lost our office. I had lost my home. We were working in a room off a folding table with a folding chair and one computer and one phone. We weren’t even getting mail regularly. I’ve got people sitting in front of me that don’t have any place to live and they’re living in tents. Do I stop and go over and plan for something beautiful when I’ve got these people having to deal with everyday issues? At that point, that wasn’t a priority for me.

One planner I spoke with said that from his perspective, the planning efforts were not a priority for communities for at least two months after the storm. Before this point, the focus was more on the response to the “human need”, including housing, water, electricity, and utilities, than on what people wanted their community to be in the future. Two communities told me that they had just finished recovering bodies near the time that the Forum was held, limiting their availability to participate.

As a result of the limited resources and the perceived costs of collaboration, many respondents I spoke with retreated into their own communities following the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Although they continued to collaborate with the State and the CNU consultants to a large extent, horizontal collaboration was limited in many communities because they thought it took to much time and energy to coordinate. One planner from the Governor’s Commission observed this phenomenon:

Right now everybody’s protecting their turf it seems. Or maybe it’s just they’ve got so many problems with their turf. You know, that’s all they can handle, but there definitely needs to be much stronger regional planning.
However, even the cities that tend to have more resources available still made the argument that collaboration costs were too high. While the planning director for Biloxi recognized that they should be working collaboratively, he explained that it is not practical due to lack of time:

To say that we get together on any kind of a basis to be able to share knowledge, you know, I wish I could say that we do it to a large degree. We really don’t, and that’s basically because, again, the practicality of it. We just don’t have the time. Just trying to get through what our days are all about. You know, you get a counter in the day, in the morning, and you’ve got 20 people looking for permits, and they can run the gamut from someone just trying to get their trailer put back to somebody who’s coming in that’s trying to put an addition to their house to, oh by the way, here’s Harrah’s [Casino], and they want to talk to you about their expansion plans over here.

This was interesting, because it suggested that these local governments were either not aware of the benefits that could be realized through collaborative relationships (Mandell, 1994), or they required a means to minimize the perceived costs of collaboration (Olson, 1965). Both remedies require education and leadership. For example, one community told me that she would like to exchange information more regularly with other planners, but only if someone formally organized meetings. She said that it was too much for her to call other communities and ask, “what are you doing on Tuesday at 1:00?”. Many said that they wished the regional agencies would do more to prepare and facilitate such interactions, because the local governments did not have the resources, contacts, or forums to create these opportunities.
4.4.3 Interpersonal Ideology

As a category, Interpersonal Ideology factors ranked as the second most important in determining what influenced intergovernmental collaboration based on respondent citation of these specific factors. These factors were categorized together because they combined the interpersonal elements with basic principles that characterize the values of those living in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Trust and the associated quality of relationships was the most important factor in this category.

Interdependence

An essential ingredient for collaboration is the recognition and acceptance of interdependence among actors. Although interdependence – or perceived interdependence – is a basic assumption of networked relationships and collaboration, interdependence among local government actors was not established by the State as part of their regional planning process. This lack of interdependence was established early in the State’s process during the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Local officials were assigned to their own city teams, where the work was completed specifically for their city by the designers assigned to their city. This separation by city prevented crossover or exchanges with other communities. According to the interviews, even when officials from different communities served on issue committees together, they were not given time to talk together.

The failure to establish interdependence was reflected in the results; respondents largely did not discuss interdependence, and consequently this factor was ranked as low importance with only four references. The high level of importance of this factor is still
revealed, however, through the consideration of the communities that highlighted interdependence as a reason for collaboration. Only cities in Jackson County indicated any significant level of interdependence, as shown in Table 5. This trend was important in highlighting the significance of interdependence, consistent with the literature (Gray, 1989; Mandell, 1994).

Cities in Jackson County established reciprocal interdependence because they defined their own personal success in terms of the success of their entire county. According to existing literature, the extent of interdependence is not always evident by the stakeholders, requiring leaders to call attention to the reasons the stakeholders need each other to achieve their goals (Gray, 1989). This was the case for all local governments in the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but Jackson County communities benefited from an intervention that called attention to interdependence. Immediately after the storm, an Incident Command Team was sent to each County to help with disaster recovery. The Incident Command Team influenced the formation of interdependent relationships in Jackson County by helping them identify how they could benefit from working collaboratively. These communities did not initially jump at the opportunity to work together. Rather, as Pascagoula’s city manager explained, they were all “almost dragged into this kicking and screaming, saying, I don’t have time for another meeting…but we learned to depend on each other.” In Pascagoula’s case, they were no longer located in city hall after the storm so they did not receive their mail. They came to rely upon their regular meetings for information sharing about planning and rebuilding needs and opportunities.
As a result of the Incident Command Team intervention, the cities perceived their interdependence and recognized that it created a need for cooperative action (Wondelleck and Yaffee, 2000). The officials from Jackson County thought of themselves as a collective region – not just as independent cities – that allowed them to develop a sense of mutual dependence that was different from the other communities on the coast. As the city manager of Gautier explained, “We’re trying to do some things right now whereby we get a regional benefit with all of the cities and the County…not in a territorial fashion but in some way that benefits a larger area.” Moss Point shared this outlook, stating that in Jackson County, “We see ourselves as an area, as a region.” This regional conception of the Coast was unique to Jackson County communities and not something identified in the other counties on the coast.

As perhaps the greatest incentive to collaborate, the communities realized that the success of Jackson County as a whole was contingent on all of the cities succeeding. In this way, they identified their reciprocal interdependence on each for post-Katrina planning success, creating a sense of general obligation and responsibility by all members to the whole (Mandell, 1994). Moss Point’s mayor explained:

It does no one any good to have three or two or one of the cities succeed while the others suffer, so I think that has been a reason why we’ve come together, to cooperate and share information. Your existence goes beyond your boundaries, and I think that’s something that’s been easy for the cities here in Jackson County to realize, that what goes on in one city is going to affect what goes on in another, and that we can all benefit from the positive and we can all share our ideas to help overcome the negatives.

The mindset of “we see ourselves as an area, as a region” motivated communities in Jackson County to think of themselves as dependent on each other for success in planning
and rebuilding. Reciprocal interdependence, dependent upon a “mutual goodwill” (Mandell 1994) was the basic underlying factor that kept the Jackson County communities in a high-level collaborative relationship that involved more than just information sharing.

Although the State did not successfully create interdependence between the local governments to encourage them to work as a region, a small level of interdependence was established between the state and local governments, mainly through the State’s offer of resources. The State could not achieve their vision for a better Gulf Coast built using new urbanist principles without the local government agreement to adopt and implement these principles, and the local governments were dependent on the State for resources to fund the planning and rebuilding because they were unable to build back their communities alone. This sense of dependence between the state and local governments was revealed in the interviews, but respondents framed it as capacity potential as opposed to interdependence. As described later, however, lack of perceived interdependence between local governments was perhaps the main obstacle to creating intergovernmental collaboration for planning on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

**Shared Goals**

Shared goals moderately influenced intergovernmental collaboration, in both a positive and negative way. In instances where there were common goals, this factor provided a guiding mission and a focus for actors that helped facilitate the collaborative process. At other times, the assumption that there were no commonalities between communities proved to be an inhibiting factor for intergovernmental collaboration.
Some communities found that Hurricane Katrina opened new doors to collaboration because it gave them the opportunity to realize that they shared similar community concerns (Innes and Booher, 1999). Once they were given reason to come together at the same table to talk about planning and rebuilding, one respondent discovered, “Because we all have different resources, we all have different perspectives, but we have common needs.” The common need is what brought some communities together to discuss their individual strategies and opinions about how to address these concerns.

Shortly after the storm, the five communities in Jackson County started meeting regularly to share information, and gave themselves the name, “Jackson 5”, or “J5”. Each one of the participants in the J5 mentioned their collective name to me in their interviews, pointing to the camaraderie they shared through their regular meetings. Although they may share goals, they adopted the strategies that are best for their individual communities. Pascagoula commented on this relationship:

We partnered with the cities of Moss Point and Gautier on our original calibration of our SmartCode. But it’s been different in every city. So, we all talk about it and we all know we’re working on it together, but then we go back to our city and say, okay, what fits for us?

More than one community acknowledged that through the collaborative planning processes, they began to see that their problems were similar to other communities, but that they continued to look at these issues from very different perspectives. Although publicly Biloxi and Gulfport like to “pretend that they are feuding with one another all
the time”, these two big cities on the coast were able to begin to see they shared similar problems and could benefit from discussing their individual ideas.

While at times shared goals play a role in promoting collaboration, many respondents identified a lack of shared goals as a key reason why they did not collaborate with other communities. Getting communities with conflicting objectives or traditions to collaborate is not an easy task (Wondelleck and Yaffee, 2000), as was evident in these communities. In many cases, the absence of similar goals translated to a difference in broader community values rather whether they had common goals for recovery and rebuilding after the storm. A Jackson County planner talked about her inability to find common goals with the City of Ocean Springs:

Ocean Springs is so totally different. They’re very concerned about the environment, they’re very concerned about the way their city looks and the image of their city, and so there’s nothing there in common.

This explanation highlighted the fact that collaborative arrangements comprise diverse communities with different norms and values (Mandell and Steelman, 2003). While describing their differing community goals, the County identified a barrier in collaboration based on differences in core values of Oceans Springs and the County. She failed to identify the common need for larger planning issues such as hazard mitigation plans, flood prevention strategies that the communities could collaboratively design because their inherently different norms and values.

Inability to find commonalities extended to communities who shared borders. Pass Christian and Long Beach, two small and adjacent cities in Harrison County, represent an example of communities who cannot agree on planning strategies that would
lead to collaboration. Pass Christian explains, “…at one point we tried to work out some
tings with Long Beach because of the common border — but the things we were
interested in, they were not interested in doing.” Although they are both working through
ways in which the SmartCode may work for their cities, they do not perceive each other
as sharing similar enough goals to collaborate.

The findings suggest that the inability to identify shared goals limited
intergovernmental collaboration. This points to the importance of a leader or champion
who can facilitate these differences and identify areas of overlap that could satisfy the
interests of all communities involved. The examples shared by respondents point
perceived ideological differences between communities that prevent them from finding
common goals. Enhanced social capital or trust could play a role in breaking down these
barriers to reveal shared community goals.

Trust

Trust is a factor that is built upon over time. In post-Katrina Mississippi, trust
played an important role in influencing collaboration, specifically as it related to history
of relationships (Gray, 1989; Mandell, 1994; Mandell and Steelman, 2003). Collaborative
relationships for planning tended to develop between people who had previously
established personal or professional contacts. Many of the people involved in planning on
the coast have known each other for many years, or grew up in the same town, so they
have a long history of relationships. Respondents suggested that trust was either built on
a positive history of relationships of mutual respect, or previously damaged by a history
of strained relationships. In many instances, those in leadership roles determined how these established relationships could be harnessed to best serve the community.

Some communities acknowledged histories of strained relationships that prevented communication between local governments. Gulfport explained that collaboration between different communities was not an option for them until recently because “personalities of elected politicians had let the turf battles get to a point where it wasn’t healthy.” Other officials from Biloxi explained that they did not even know why they were not supposed to like someone because the histories of relationships get passed down in a sense from predecessors. However, more recently developed relationships and new city leadership helped combat the strained histories. The same was the case in Pascagoula and Gautier, where new leadership allowed for respectful relationships to form, resolving long-term history of distrust and competition:

And we used to laugh about it because apparently Pascagoula and Gautier hate each other, but both of us were new and we could get things done because we didn’t know we were supposed to hate each other.

The Mississippi chapter of the American Planning Association (MAPA) proved to be a lead source of trust that produced intergovernmental collaboration across multiple cities. The planning director from Biloxi said:

Because of my relationship with Pat and George [through our MAPA chapter], we kind of stick together…MAPA is one of the nodes that brings us together.

The planners involved in MAPA on the coast met frequently after the storm to provide moral support, and to explore what planning options their respective communities were
considering. All the planners I met with agreed that because they already had this network of contacts established through MAPA, getting in touch with each other and sharing information after the storm was an obvious goal they achieved. As part of their information exchange, planners in MAPA worked together to write and adopt a similar temporary housing ordinance after the storm. Gulfport was able to create the “best concept” for the ordinance, and sent it to Harrison County as well as the other cities in the County so they all could modify it to their own community needs and adopt it. This helped create a more uniform regulation of FEMA trailers and other temporary housing options along the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Although some established relationships had a positive impact on collaboration, a surge of post-Katrina retirements severed important professional contacts and lessened inclination to collaborate with other communities. This finding is consistent with other authors who find that turnover of personnel acts to limit collaboration (Alexander, 1995). Many people quit their positions due to the stress of the jobs after the storm, leaving either vacant positions or new people on staff. One respondent noted:

We had a good working relationship [with Moss Point] until just recently. The people that we had known and worked together for years are gone…went on to other things.

Communities explained that more intergovernmental collaboration occurred when there was familiar staff. On-going relationships, in which people work together through face-to-face contact help establish social capital. However, with high levels of staff turnover, the same level of communication has not been maintained, and it takes time to accumulate social capital with the new staff members (Mandell, 1994).
It was clear from these results the important role that leadership plays in the formation of positive relationships between communities (Innes, 1992; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). This trend suggests the power that local leadership has in determining the political will to foster positive relationships with other communities and utilize them achieve collective community goals.

Values and Cultural Norms

It just goes against the grain down here. I think people forget the culture. You’ve got to remember where you are, and I like it—I like this culture. – Local planning consultant

I suggest a fourth aspect of interpersonal ideology relates to underlying value and cultural differences. Values and cultural norms is an emergent factor that I identified in the data as influencing collaboration. First, I present the impact of value differences, and then I follow with presentation of the cultural differences.

In interview responses, many of the views that respondents cited as influencing their decisions to work collaboratively with the State appeared to be differences in personal values toward the designs of their new communities, mainly between the local community and the out-of-state consultants. The difference in values focuses actions that incorporate local context and local feasibility. This was important because many respondents failed to collaborate with the State and the consultants because their approach or products did not incorporate local values appropriate to the Mississippi Gulf Coast. In some cases this was a result of respondents perceiving the CNU consultants as proposing designs that would create “Anytown USA” instead of designs that reflected the richness and uniqueness of what they knew as home. In other cases, this was a result of
consultant proposing “pretty pictures” that were not implementable based on their city’s budget.

Through my interviews it became obvious that the CNU consultants did not have enough time to harness the true essence of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Based on the contrast of reflections of the CNU consultants and locals on the first days of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, the need for more local input was evident. One local consultant remembered noticing that the CNU consultants did not have any local information – “Which is the city that has a harbor? Is there a railroad?” He stepped in to provide this basic information that they desperately needed.

However, this apparent lack of information can be contrasted with reflections of the same time from the new urbanists: “You know, the week before we came we got all this [information] put together. In fact, I want to say we knew as much or more than the elected officials.” This overconfidence may have lead to some of the important reasons why local communities were hesitant to collaborate with the State’s new urbanist consulting group. The same new urbanist dismissed this overconfident attitude as products of their dedication to new urbanist principles: “We’re so passionate about it, we’re so committed to it, that I know we come off as totally arrogant sometimes.”

The perceived arrogance of many of the new urbanists resulted in many communities such as Pass Christian, feeling like their were being “sold” the new urbanist ideals without being educated on what these designs would produce for the cities:

Laura Hall sat right here on the couch with me and she said, I really didn’t think they were going to buy the additional population that we were selling, the density. She said, I was surprised they bought it. I told Laura, you’re a good salesman.
You showed a lot of good pictures, and they didn’t hear it. They don’t know that they bought it, and that is a problem. It’s not going to happen.

This was a common issue in many of the communities. “And a phrase you’re going to hear a lot of on the coast now is the devil’s in the details. When [communities] started to look at the details they realized, wait a minute. We’re allowing what? We’re going to force people to have two-story buildings?” The new urbanist consultants focused mainly on style, without providing ample education for the local communities on what details these designs would produce in terms of changing the materials, density, height, and location of buildings. As Gautier shared, “If you look at [the SmartCode] it doesn’t allow vinyl. Well what’s wrong with vinyl? I’m sorry, these are snobs that are talking about this stuff. There really isn’t anything wrong with vinyl.”

Another concern was that new urbanism would result in cookie cutter communities. Planners who knew about the CNU felt like they could predict what their design recommendations would be. Some were concerned that the local values would be removed from these designs:

I think it was Faulkner who said, there are three great American cities in this country. There’s New York, San Francisco, and New Orleans. Everything else is Cleveland. Well that’s what SmartCode seems to be doing.

The local feasibility was also a concern for communities. Many of the SmartCode products that were delivered to the communities had recommendations that were in no way financially feasible. The SmartCode implementation demanded technical and administrative capacity that was beyond the resources of these small cities. In Biloxi when the CNU consultants were presenting their recommendations to the Mayor, they
estimated 40 new employees would be required to be able to implement the code. This additional requirement would be impossible for many large cities. While the CNU consultants were perceived as meaningful and well intended, they failed to produce recommendations that were practical in many respects. According to the Mayor of Long Beach:

I would have liked to have had a little more local planners involved with the firm that worked with us, to have a little better feel about the coast, because I almost feel like we got a pretty picture—actually, almost a year’s worth of that, and we’re getting ready to have to start over. We work off the picture a little bit and if the people were a little more informed, we wanted to move into it this year. But I think some locals should have been involved a little bit more in the charrette process. You know, to get a better feel.

In order to combat this barrier to collaboration, local planning consultants are starting to take the lead on post-Katrina planning. Jeff Bounds, a local resident who became a local expert on the SmartCode, is the prime example of this phenomenon. He has successfully worked with big communities such as Gulfport, and now other communities are hiring him to calibrate their SmartCode. Other consultants recognize the advantage that a local consultant has over the out-of-town consultants. One out-of-town consultant said that Bounds is successful because he has figured out what makes the most sense with different aspects of the SmartCode and what are the important things for that culture of the Gulf Coast. She said that when he speaks with communities, “it resonates so much more than anything we could have ever said.”

The local context is not understood by many of the outside consultants, and they are not taking the time to research and integrate the local values and culture into their planning process and recommendations. As a result, many communities are not
completely comfortable with their planning consultants and the State’s vision for a region planned by new urbanists. Communities would be more willing to collaborate with the State if they felt the consultants were embracing their culture and values and translating this to an improved built environment rather than selling “place-making” to be any other resort town.

Several respondents offered persistent but underlying reasons for not collaborating, based only on, as many respondents told me, “they way we do things here”. This spoke to the differences in cultural norms, which encompasses elements of south Mississippi ways or histories of making decisions.

Respondents tended to explain a culture in the Mississippi Gulf Coast of what others categorize as American individualism and competition (Alter and Hage, 1993, 264) that discourages collaboration. The Mississippi Gulf Coast has a rich past, with some cities such as Biloxi and Pass Christian dating back to 1699. As a result of these distinct histories, there is a culture of independence on the coast, and the communities perceive themselves as being very different from each other, even though they are all small and share borders. One respondent provided this distinction:

If you’re from the Mississippi Gulf Coast, you don’t view yourself as part of a larger region. You view yourself either from Biloxi, from Gulfport, from Pascagoula, and communities even next door to you historically have been viewed as completely separate communities—universes apart. And if you’re from outside the region—even in Jackson, rightly so—they view us as the Coast Region, but we never spoke as the Coast Region.

In every case, my interviews with local respondents revealed a common belief that all the communities were very different from each other. On the surface, I might assume that
because Gulfport and Biloxi share the county seat and are the biggest cities on the Mississippi coast, that they are similar. While they share borders, residents of Gulfport will let you know that Gulfport is where the Baptists live and where real business happens, and Biloxi is homes to the Catholics, and where the sinners gamble.

In addition to the culture of independence, communities on the Mississippi Gulf Coast also tend to share an underlying competition to “go it alone”. Many communities did not want to ask for assistance as a result of this American competitive nature (Alter and Hage, 1993). Two respondents tried to help me understand this cultural norm:

They don’t want to break down and ask for help. They want to go their own way and show everyone they can do it.

[The communities on the coast] are very independent. I don’t really think it’s, ‘I’m better than you’, ‘I don’t need you’, it’s just ‘I should be able to handle this’.

This sense of independence has prevented communities from identifying common concerns or shared goals. There is a sense of pride in taking care of themselves without seeking support from other, perhaps larger or more resource-wealthy communities.

The structure of the collaborative planning process sponsored by the State is also not a cultural norm for the Mississippi Gulf Coast. A few respondents explained that the collaborative process that the Governor proposed, involving interactive and highly attended charrettes simply contradicts the way decisions have historically been made on the coast. In fact, as one local respondent put it, many political leaders are unfamiliar with a democratic planning process:
Most community leaders feel like they are better off having a nice, quiet meeting behind locked doors to speak frankly with the guy in charge. No matter how important or beneficial it would be to do an open forum, there is always a knee-jerk reaction to: just introduce me to the guy who is in charge and can force people to do what I want them to do instead of a broad-based process.

Two respondents said that community officials were hesitant to participate with the State in their process because there is considerable distrust for the democratic process – be it meaningful “citizen participation, community involvement, or anything grassroots”. This is not surprising, however, because many of these officials have never experienced such a planning process before this point. The Mississippi Renewal Forum and the processes that followed it represented one of the nation’s largest, and more progressive community planning efforts. This participatory and inclusive process contradicts the culture of decision-making in south Mississippi. One person told me that he was not surprised at the hesitation of political leaders to engage in the collaborative process because “they grew up here and that is not the way.”

4.4.4 Leadership

Especially after a crisis, when you look at history, the heroes always come during the crisis period, like stars shine when it was really dark. – Governor’s Office of Recovery

Leadership factors were grouped as its own category of explanation for intergovernmental collaboration. Presence of a leader as an individual factor was important in the decisions of communities to collaborate on planning issues. Respondents suggested that the State was the most important leader, but that the CNU consultants and the incident command teams also played important leadership roles. Respondents did not
express the impact of the promoter as a key factor influencing intergovernmental collaboration.

*Leader*

Presence of a leader was a particularly important factor in structuring and encouraging intergovernmental collaboration. Leadership, and the role leaders played in post-Katrina planning can be considered at different levels of government. This section will examine the roles leaders played at the state, regional and local levels.

Respondents recognized the leadership provided by Mississippi Governor Barbour as a key factor allowing them to move forward to planning and rebuilding. His immediate decision and commitment to take steps forward was heralded as a sign of a great leader. The State’s creation of the Governor’s Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal brought much-needed hope to communities, and laid the groundwork for a collaborative and participatory effort. One respondent who has served on the Pass Christian planning commission after Hurricane Camille hit, was able to provide the contrast between the state leadership during the two storms. He explained that the approach taken by Governor Williams after Hurricane Camille was quite exclusive, as compared to the collaborative approach of Governor Barbour for post-Katrina planning:

I think what you had the last time [after Hurricane Camille] is, the Governor appointed a steering committee and they came up with some ideas, but they didn’t have the local political leaders involved, and when they came up with the ideas the political leaders said, well, who’s telling us to do these things? And it was an automatic rejection from the start because it looked like the Governor’s group was going to try to override the elected officials, so they didn’t get too far. This time [after Hurricane Katrina], Governor Barbour is trying to work together with us on it.
Perhaps in response to the collaborative approach, and the resulting support by local governments for the planning ideas, many respondents said that the Governor’s Commission was responsible for the quality of future land use planning decisions. One respondent explained that the leadership and the plans created under their guidance provided a blueprint for thoughtful local land use:

I think had it not been for the Governor’s Commission, things would not be as intentional as they are today—it would have just been shooting from the hip and, hey, let’s get our tax revenue backed up as quickly as we can. We’ll take whatever [development] comes our way.

As an extension of the state leadership, Governor Barbour was responsible for garnering assistance from other state emergency operation teams. Incident Command Teams from states across the country were sent in at the Governor’s request and assigned to each of the counties to assist with recovery efforts. Many communities, especially those in Jackson County, attribute part of their success with intergovernmental collaboration for planning issues to the leadership provided by their Incident Command Team. The Teams provided the framework for them to work intergovernmentally, and challenged the city officials and County CAO to continue using the multi-jurisdictional structure that they established to achieve benefits of collective action. This leadership proved to be an important factor in promoting collaboration. More detail on the role of the Incident Command Team is provided in the next section of the results.

When the State hired the CNU as their consulting group for the coast, they did so to bring a sense of hope and an idea of what could be for the coast, even when they still had tremendous immediate needs for debris clean-up and water. The hiring of Andres
Duany and the CNU consultants put the visions for the future in motion. In looking back at the initial charrettes and collaborative planning processes, Long Beach expressed the importance of this process:

I think it brought hope, it brought people to the table to see how to improve their community as they rebuild, because in most cases the coast was devastated. I mean, at least the beachfronts for three or four blocks inland was just about a clean slate. So then that does give you something to work with and it gives the people maybe something to look forward to. You know, what you’re going to try to do as you rebuild.

Many communities saw the consultants as an extension of the State’s leadership. The CNU leadership and their ability to illustrate what the future of these communities could look like provided momentum for the collaborative process. The locals depended on the CNU because there was a lack of planning expertise on the coast, and they did not have the staff to be able to navigate the SmartCode and other planning initiatives the State was encouraging for adoption.

At the regional level, many respondents looked to the regional planning agencies, especially the Gulf Regional Planning Commission as their “rallying point” for information sharing. However, others, including the regional agencies themselves, expressed concern that the regional agencies did not have a more important and apparent leadership role in collaborative post-Katrina planning as they had technical expertise of the entire region. These agencies traditionally work within a multi-jurisdictional agenda, and had the ability to represent more of a leadership role in this effort. According to the regional agencies, although they were eager to serve, they were not utilized by the State
to the best of their ability. Their leadership role was therefore stifled because they felt they needed to wait for the State to solicit their expertise.

Local officials served a limited leadership role. Reliance on local leadership was delayed until later in the post-storm planning process. It was the local official’s responsibility to decide whether to press forth with the concepts that originated with the Governor’s Commission. In many ways, the local leaders depended on the leaders from higher levels of government to direct them. Local officials were unable to handle the problems alone because the issues were beyond local communities abilities, and because they had limited knowledge about land use planning. Due to limited knowledge about planning, and a lack of technical or financial resources to initiate or implement the State’s vision, local leaders could not provide strong leadership and were dependent on the leadership of higher levels of government.

These findings suggest that while the importance of training for leaders who would be facilitating collaborative planning events is emphasized in the literature (Innes and Booher, 1999, 11), this was not evident in post-Katrina planning. Training and support require funding and time, which were not made available. Agranoff and McGuire (2001) lay out specific behaviors that leaders should adopt when planning, facilitating and maintaining collaborative endeavors. These four behaviors provide insight into recommendations for how the state leadership could have better facilitated the actors involved in post-Katrina planning to more successfully establish a collaborative process. Because leadership played such a strong role in influencing collaboration, policy recommendations related to this factor will be discussed in the next chapter.
Promoter

Amid the rubble, hope grows. The reason is, we have a plan. – Sun Herald Editor

Promoters are described in the literature as people who provide support for the leaders and provide additional motivation for the collaborative endeavor (Agranoff 2003, Mandell 2001). Local government respondents did not mention the presence or impact of a specific person as a promoter to support the State. However, representatives from the Governor’s Commission mentioned one important and influential promoter – the regional newspaper – that helped maintain interest and belief in the Governor’s vision. In addition, the Congress for the New Urbanism also played an important role in promoting the State’s vision on a local and national level.

The Governor’s Commission identified the publisher of the Sun-Herald, Rickie Matthews, as a promoter of the Governor’s vision for the Coast. Matthews was a Vice-Chairman of the Governor’s Commission and publisher south Mississippi’s biggest newspaper:

He [Matthews] continues, through his editorials, to put forth those big ideas, to raise expectations on the coast of what can be and remind people not to settle, not to let the momentum die.

For a long time, the Sun Herald became the prime source of information for Mississippians about rebuilding and planning on the coast. Many went without televisions and other amenities, but had access to the Sun Herald to keep up with the progress of the Governor’s Commission, the charrette processes, and the next steps in planning.
Matthews was largely responsible for helping distribute this information and keep communities engaged and believing in the collaborative process established by the State. He has publicly explained his unique opportunity to serve the coast: “Because I am both publisher of South Mississippi’s principal newspaper, the Sun Herald, and vice-chairman of the privately funded Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, I’ve been in a unique position to watch -- and to encourage -- this transition from despair” (Matthews, 2006). Several local governments depended on the information from the Sun Herald for information when they were unable to attend meetings. Many said they felt connected to the planning events because of the paper, and used it as a prime means to exchange information.

Although the respondents did not mention other promoters, one of the biggest promoters of the State’s vision for a new Mississippi Gulf Coast was the CNU. The CNU brought high-level visibility to the Governor and the state of Mississippi with their reputations alone. In addition, because the new urbanists are able to communicate their concepts and visions for design using sophisticated illustrations and drawings, the State’s mission for a better gulf coast could be promoted visually across the world.

As promoters of the State and its planning process, Andres Duany and the new urbanist consultants have faced a high level of criticism from local officials, outside critics, and citizens of Mississippi. Many critics focus on the expectations of the planning processes conducted by the CNU – how can communities think about future planning while they are still in recovery mode? The CNU has pushed through this criticism to support the State’s mission of recovering and rebuilding simultaneously. They are proponents of the idea that each short-term recovery decision results in a long-term
rebuilding impact. This was evident in their criticism of Biloxi as they approved new
development of casinos before they had a plan in place of how this would impact the
quality of life in Biloxi.

A key theme I did hear from many respondents was that the CNU played an
important role in bringing hope to the coast – its residents, local officials, and state
leadership:

What the New Urbanists brought to the table was hope. They brought a belief that
the obliterated communities that make up South Mississippi could emerge bigger
and better. They introduced common-sense principles and approaches to planning,
like the SmartCode that links so many of our rebuilding ambitions together and
can help us recapture the essence of what was lost. They gave us a strong
understanding of how to create a sense of place through design (Matthews, 2006).

Hurricane Katrina hit the coast and destroyed communities as a heavy force. As
promoters of the State’s vision, the CNU used their skills of process and visioning and
brought this to the coast with equal force.

The results of this study show that a number of the theoretical factors influenced
decisions to engage in intergovernmental collaboration for planning. The four theoretical
factors that scored as highest importance were inclusion of actors, capacity potential,
trust, and presence of a leader (Table 4). According to the interview data, the presence or
absence of each one of these factors played an important role in whether collaboration
occurred between actors. When actors did not perceive that they were invited to
participate in the planning processes, in many cases they failed to engage in future
planning events and in some cases they acted to sabotage the planning process. Many
actors decided to collaborate with other actors if they determined that they could benefit
from increased capacity or resources from the collective action. Trust played an important role as history of relationships helped connect actors to others in order to form collaborative exchanges. Finally, presence of a leader who could initiate planning efforts was discussed as an important factor in determining if the local actors would collaborate with the State actors on the planning process. The five other theoretical factors also played an important role in decisions to collaborate, were simply not cited as frequently.

As the following discussion will reveal, however, a collection of five key factors that influenced intergovernmental collaboration in post-Katrina Mississippi are identified – some of which did not quantitatively score as most important, but that the data showed were qualitatively more important to the development of collaborative relationships.

In addition to the theoretical factors, the analysis of the interview data revealed other emergent factors that influenced intergovernmental collaboration. These three emergent factors strongly impacted collaboration (Table 4). Many respondents suggested that the costs of collaboration were too high following the disaster, which limited their interactions with each other and therefore limited collaboration. Planning knowledge played a role in collaboration as local actors with little education about land use planning failed to identify opportunities for intergovernmental collaboration. Finally, values and cultural norms represented a barrier to vertical collaboration between local communities and the State’s outside planning consultants.

Although these factors individually influenced actors in their decisions to collaborate with other entities post-storm, in all cases, multiple factors were at play. In the next section, short vignettes are offered to illustrate the role that multiple factors played in different communities.
4.5. Jackson County and the City of Biloxi

Current research suggests that although individual factors can impact collaboration, the decision to collaborate is commonly based on multiple factors (Oliver, 1990). According to my results, it is evident that multiple factors contributed to decisions to collaborate. This section focuses on factors that impacted collaboration in two different locations. In the first example, the presence of effective leadership and interdependence positively influenced intergovernmental collaboration between Jackson County and its cities. In the second example, the absence of issue ripeness and local values in the State’s planning process limited intergovernmental collaboration between the City of Biloxi and the State’s CNU consultants. The following vignettes offer further detail into how these factors influenced decisions to collaborate in these communities.

4.5.1. Jackson County

My interviews revealed that actors in Jackson County were influenced to collaborate with each other based on two main factors, leadership and interdependence. This is a story about how an outside leader was able to work with Jackson County, and the cities of Gautier, Moss Point, Ocean Springs, and Pascagoula to create a framework for collaboration in the county. The existence of strong leadership helped established a sense of interdependence based on recognition of common goals and the potential for resources gained through collaborative relationships.
In response to Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi requested emergency assistance from Incident Management Teams from a variety of states. In large part, these teams are trained to manage natural disaster emergencies, including floods, fires, and earthquakes. California entered into a state-to-state mutual aid agreement through their Office of Emergency Services (OES), and as a result teams were activated to go to Mississippi, where each of the six southern counties received assistance. Following Hurricane Katrina, full Incident Management Team consisting of 20 people was sent to the counties, including Jackson County.

After the first command team completed their time, Jackson County requested that a follow-up team be sent to the County because they needed continued assistance. Due to the high cost of sending a full command team, a second team consisting of six, handpicked officers was sent to Jackson County. On September 29, 2005, the six-member team, designated CA – OES Region II IMT, was sent to Jackson County to continue assistance with Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts. All the members of the new command team were selected because they had extensive knowledge in incident command, and were known for their ability to manage disaster situations and have strong personalities.

4.5.1.1 Leading Toward Collaboration

The primary objective of the command team was to establish communication, coordination and cooperation between Jackson County and its four cities. Upon arriving in Jackson County, the team observed that the current recovery structure was failing the communities in Jackson County. After an incident, a command team can establish recovery responsibilities based on geographic or functional branches. The first command
team that was assigned to Jackson County directly after the storm organized recovery under geographic branches, resulting in five branches for the five different governmental units. Consequently, the communities were dealing with their own issues, trying to get their own resources, and because of this the recovery was failing. In fact, when the communities did not get the resources fast enough, the mayors would call Senators and Representatives in Jackson attempting to use their respective political clout to get what they wanted and needed (Negro, 2008).

The command team observed that long-standing political issues had been obstructing the potential for “the five government agencies and their individual members from working closely together not only on a daily basis but also during emergencies” (CA-OES, 2005). As one example of the political tension, an overly assertive County Supervisor would consistently order the County CAO and city officials around. The other community leaders were frustrated by this treatment to a point that they “started doing their own thing” because they did not want to listen to the Supervisor anymore (Negro, 2008). The command team recognized that the Supervisor felt like his turf was being invaded because the teams were doing what he would otherwise be doing, so they found strategies that defused the situation temporarily and created an atmosphere less stifled from political tension.

In order to address these political and relationship obstacles in the longer term, the command team decided to organize in a manner that would act to break down barriers as well as build relationships and social capital. In order to successfully achieve the objective of establishing communication and cooperation, the team implemented a Unified Command Team approach. A Unified Command approach would equip the
communities with the ability to collaboratively manage future recovery efforts without further direction from the command team (CA-OES, 2005). Under the Unified Command structure, everyone that has been impacted by the incident has the responsibility to look out for and represent their respective jurisdictions. This approach requires everyone who has been impacted to be at the table to work together to develop objectives and strategies.

The implemented Unified Command approach was responsible for establishing collaboration between the five governmental units in Jackson County by structuring their tasks intergovernmentally. The command team realized that a functionally branched organization structure (e.g., housing, debris removal) – as opposed to a geographically branched organization – was needed to promote collaboration between the five entities. As a result of this approach, each functional branch included members from each community. For example, the Housing Branch and the Infrastructure Branch each included representation from all the cities and the county. Due to the functional branches, intergovernmental ties existed at the community leadership level, through to the individual functional branch level.

In order to implement this collaborative structure, the team educated the community leaders about Unified Command and its purpose. Establishing collaboration in Jackson County and its cities was an especially challenging task for the command team because the National Incident Management System (NIMS) had not been adopted in Jackson County, which would have provided an existing organizing structure for collaboration. NIMS is a national approach to incident management that provides a consistent organization to disaster recovery for different levels of government (NACO,
NIMS would have provided a structure for Jackson County governments to work effectively and efficiently together in recovery after the storm.

The leadership role assumed by the command team – an outside leader – was essential to the successful implementation of the intergovernmental framework. The team challenged the community leaders to adopt this collective approach, but they had to “provide proof that working together was to their collective benefits” (CA-OES 2005, 6). This involved providing information about the benefits of following NIMS and utilizing the Unified Command, providing information about obtaining grants, disaster cost reimbursement, and the benefits of coordination and sharing of resources in recovery efforts. On Friday October 7, 2005 all five members of the Unified Command signed an Incident Action Plan that signified their intent to work together to manage the recovery efforts from Hurricane Katrina.

The command team spent two weeks of intense training with the community leaders to teach them about the individual and regional benefits that could be achieved with this structure. Lessons and examples were provided so the community leaders could understand how efficiency and effectiveness of their recovery goals could be increased through collective action (Negro, 2008). In order to make sure that the community leaders were ready to take over the Unified Command approach when the team left, they implemented the structure and handed responsibility to the community leaders after the first week. The team was in charge of the process the first week while the community leaders shadowed them. The following week the community leaders ran the morning briefings and the team shadowed them to ensure that they understood the process and their responsibilities.
4.5.1.2 Establishing Interdependence

Another component of the command team’s objectives involved identifying issues that could prevent the community leaders from working within the Unified Command structure. This was especially challenging because up to that point there was a lack of progress and an absence of measurable plan elements for the recovery process. The team realized that there was “no quick fix to any of the issues due to the magnitude of the damage” (Negro, 2008). The slow progress tempted the community leaders to retreat within their own connections to solve problems. In their After Action Report (CA-OES 2005, 5), the command team reported:

Because solutions could not be achieved quickly each [community leader] had developed an attitude that allowed for “back door ordering”, using political pressure to solve individual problems. Once these non-conforming processes began to yield success, it was difficult to convince the [community leaders] that working together within the Unified Command would be to their individual and collective benefit.

In order to successfully integrate the community leaders into the Unified Command, the team realized that they had to develop trust with and between the community leaders. The command team therefore established a clear process to help establish a sense of interdependence among the community leaders. They had already identified a functional branch structure for the Unified Command, but now the community leaders had to engage an in interactive process where they were asked to look inside their respective organizations to determine who would be the best person to be put in charge of each branch (Negro, 2008). As part of this process, the community leaders
collectively set their objectives and priorities, and were asked to use their collective resources to determine what personnel would serve on each functional branch:

We had several standing committees. One was on housing, and we had a representative from every jurisdiction in the county and somebody had to lead that. So each jurisdiction would nominate someone to sit on the committee and then we’d kind of go, okay, out of that group who do we think has the best leadership skills to handle it?

The tangible result of this process was a collectively completed organization chart based on talents within all cities and county. The important intangible result was much-needed trust in the leadership and in the other community leaders (Negro, 2008).

The command team said that their task to establish interdependence was eased in some respects because many of the community leaders in Jackson County were new to their positions. All four of the mayors/city managers were recently appointed at the time of the storm, and had little or no experience managing large-scale problems like disasters. The command team’s ability teach the new community leaders how to lead under a collaborative vision was instrumental in setting the tone for how they would interact in their new positions. Because they were new to the positions, they did not have the burden of the past to contend with when formulating their interdependence as a region.

I talked with the community leaders about why they thought that this process made such a big difference in the way they governed their communities, and no one could tell me exactly why. Why was their experience with the command team so different from that of Harrison County communities? One city said, “I don’t know, it just worked. It’s because immediately we could see the benefit.” Establishing interdependence was a
pivotal moment for Jackson County communities. They all credit the leadership and the process for helping them see the benefits of collaboration, and the dependence that they all had on each other to achieve their larger goals.

As part of the outcome of successfully establishing interdependence among Jackson County and its cities, the community leaders are defining themselves as a region. One official explained to me that after the storm they realized that their existence goes way beyond the boundaries of their city – what goes on in one city will affect the other and that they all needed to share ideas to help overcome the challenges. He said, “you know, that’s probably the most important thing: we see ourselves as an area, as a region”.

4.5.1.3 The Impact: Intergovernmental Collaboration

The recovery processes established by the command team were transformative for the community leaders in Jackson County because it introduced the benefits and feasibility of collective action for recovery efforts. The act of bringing the community leaders to the same table, and challenging them to consider their available resources as an interdependent region, changed their attitudes and increased their knowledge about collaboration. There have been positive long-term consequences of this initial leadership intervention by the command team.

The communities in Jackson County held regular meetings for over a year after the storm, which was considerably longer than any other entities on the coast. They had regular meetings in the aftermath of the storm, meeting twice a day—8 o’clock in the morning and then 5 o’clock in the evening. Several months out they reduced these meetings to once a day. Those meetings during the first several months were mainly to
share vital recovery information. After the main recovery period ended, their meetings decreased to once a week. Because it was a process that they all benefited from, they continued them outside of an emergency response and recovery purpose. As they described it to me, part of why they continued to meet was because they had developed a strong “sense of camaraderie, a sense of reassurance in just being around other people who were going through the same thing”. They explained that this brought them “comfort and some security…in being with the other city leaders and realizing that we were all having some of the same challenges and dealing with them in much the same way.” As they established stronger relationships, they started calling themselves the ‘Jackson 5’ because they represented five jurisdictions within Jackson County. This name eventually shortened to the ‘J5’. The J5 officially disbanded in October 2006, but because they found the exchanges so valuable, they decided to keep meeting informally by occasionally having lunch together.

Jackson County and its cities were able to transfer their Unified Command structure from recovery efforts to planning efforts. As a result of the interdependence established by the command team, Jackson County became an example of how intergovernmental collaboration should work on the coast. A number of newspaper articles were published, celebrating the collaborative efforts that the community leaders were accomplishing. In response to Jackson County’s collaborative efforts, planners and SmartCode advocates used Jackson County as a case for the many opportunities that could be opened on the Coast if there was more intergovernmental collaboration (Daigle, 2006b).
The process of organizing and establishing a Unified Command resulted in the creation of a large and strong network of relationships that cross jurisdictional boundaries. All the leaders explained that they had minimal communication with each other before the storm. They collaborated on transportation efforts through the regional planning agencies, and attended council of government meetings, but as one official said, “I think it’s sad, but we didn’t know each other”. Because of the relationships they formed through the unified command, they developed a huge network of connections across the county. One official from Gautier explained some of her experiences with how business has changed as a result of their new collaborative relationships:

So my finance director ran our housing committee. Andre Coffman, the public works director in Ocean Springs, ran the infrastructure committee, and my guy served on it. But as a result of Andre being in that position I saw him on a regular basis, so now when there’s issues regarding infrastructure between the city of Gautier and Ocean Springs, I can pick up the phone and call Connie, the mayor, or I can pick up the phone and call Andre…and now Linda, my finance director, is talking to people from each city, and she’s seeing them in meetings and talking to them. So all of a sudden she’s communicating with people outside of her usual sphere of influence and when she needs something she goes, oh, I’ll just call Karen Rocko over in Pascagoula and I’ll get that, no problem.

The city officials explained to me that examples like this are exciting because they feel like instantaneously they have built relationships that allow them to share information, and partner on activities that “they would not have been doing had it not been for the storm and the opportunities it’s provided” to them.

One highly publicized example was when the County and city leaders from Jackson County traveled to Chattanooga, Tennessee to see how planning can work when local governments collaborate. The article reported that 26 City and County officials “felt
a renewed interest in teaming up to make a success of their post-Katrina development plans”, and that they will continue to work together to develop a centralized plan for Jackson County and its cities (Baker, 2006). Although not meeting on a daily or weekly basis like they did directly after the storm, community leaders from Jackson County and its cities have experienced an increased social and intellectual capital as a result of their increased communication with each other, a deeper understanding of each other’s issues, and a lessen in the benefits of collaboration.

The leaders in Jackson County shared ideas with me that they are discussing for future collaborations. By considering their resources as a whole, they are actively strategizing about how to share resources in a way that produces the most efficiency for them as a region. During our interview, one official explained that she had just got off the phone with Ocean Springs to explore how her city could better use an infrastructure asset that the other city was currently underutilizing. They were trying to determine how to implement a procedure for this type of intergovernmental partnership for Jackson County communities.

Because of the strong relationships that they have built with each other and the knowledge they now have about the needs and strengths of each of the jurisdictions, the J5 is hoping to find ways to share staff resources in the future. They feel that there are high demands on local governments to succeed in the aftermath of Katrina – through recovery and now rebuilding – that has placed an enormous strain on local governments. They are expected to “accomplish all of those things successfully with very limited resources—no additional staff, no budgets”. One official explained that if the five of them were in a position to hire staff, they would all be competing for the same resources
– additional building inspectors or code enforcers. Because of their common needs and established relationships, they are looking to find a way to share those resources among the five jurisdictions. For example, they all agree that they are in need of technical resources, so want to explore ways of sharing staff to hold down costs.

Although it may take time to establish more sophisticated intergovernmental collaboration structures, the J5 feels confident in their ability to pull from the lessons learned from the command team who taught them how to work collectively. The leadership provided to them after the storm, and the independence that was established through the process of creating a Unified Command was instrumental in opening up subsequent opportunities for collaboration.

4.5.2. City of Biloxi

My interviews revealed that actors in the City of Biloxi were not influenced to collaborate with the State and the State’s CNU consultants due to the absence of two main factors, issue ripeness and local values in the planning process. This is a story about how outside experts were not able to effectively work with the City of Biloxi to develop a collaborative relationship. Biloxi’s significant financial and administrative capacity did not lead to a situation ripe for collaboration with the State’s consultants. The perceived absence of local context in the CNU planning process and plans, coupled the absence of issue ripeness for collaboration, could not foster intergovernmental collaboration between the city and the CNU consultants.

The City of Biloxi is the economic engine of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, fueled by the gaming industry. Before the storm, Biloxi housed nine casinos, which provided
significant tax revenue for the city. Biloxi did not establish a large number of collaborative relationships with other local governments. Biloxi was the only city that did not continue a relationship with its State-appointed CNU consultant who was assigned to create rebuilding plans for Biloxi during the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Based on my interview data and archival analysis, Biloxi did not engage in collaborative relationships in large part because the situation was not ripe for collaboration. They had more resources and capacity than any of the other communities and therefore did not feel compelled to work together to achieve the benefits of collaborative action. In addition, Biloxi felt that the local values of their city were not acknowledged in the plans proposed by the CNU architects.

During the Mississippi Renewal Forum, the State and the CNU consultants assigned Biloxi to Liz Moule and Stefanos Polyzoides, an architecture and planning team based in Pasadena, California. At the end of the Forum, the plan for Biloxi was presented to the community and local officials, displaying “a picturesque little city, with graceful boulevards and pretty streets flanked by neat houses and stately mansions and even the casinos concealed in stylish towers” (Lewis, 2006). The local Sun Herald reported that Polyzoides suggested that Biloxi could “either scrape the town and move north, or create a town that can take a swim every 30 years” (Pender, 2005). This meant that the houses and structures would be submersible; strong enough to sustain storm surge, be able to dry out, and then be available to move back in.

The CNU consultant recommendation for submersible structures also meant that the city would effectively ignore the FEMA Advisory Base Flood Elevation (ABFE) requirements. The CNU consultant felt that the city’s anticipated adoption of the FEMA
requirements was a mistake because it would be “ugly and expensive”, and would ruin
the city’s character if buildings were raised above sea level (Pender, 2005). Following the
recommendation of the consultant would have lead the city into political battles with
FEMA and delayed new construction and rebuilding.

The CNU consultants also felt strongly about eliminating Biloxi’s focus on the
casinos. They said, that the “messy cocktail of high-rise casinos and condos, and multi-
level parking garages…will be an unpleasant place to live” (Newsom, 2006). But casinos
and gaming have become essential for the Gulf Coast economy. Since gaming was
legalized in Biloxi in 1992, Biloxi has worked to market itself as a casino resort
destination (Creel, 2008). Mayor A.J. Holloway sees the gaming industry as the engine
for long term development in Biloxi, and said, “That’s the tide that’s going to lift all the
boats in the city of Biloxi – the gambling industry” (Wilemon, 2006a).

The City of Biloxi was not happy with either of these visions proposed by the
consultants, and was not convinced that the SmartCode – the implementation tool
promoted by CNU consultants and the State – was the best approach for Biloxi.
Consequently, Biloxi started attempting the rebuilding plans without their New Urbanist
consultants. In February 2006, Biloxi’s Mayor Holloway announced his own commission
called Reviving the Renaissance, with assistance from a consulting firm called Living
Cities, which would lead the rebuilding planning for the city. The head of the Reviving
the Renaissance commission shared his opinions on the inappropriateness of the New
Urbanist plans for Biloxi with the New York Times Magazine, “There are some good
ideas in there…[but] it kind of got off into la-la land” (Lewis, 2005).
In establishing the new Reviving the Renaissance commission for Biloxi, the Mayor effectively asked the CNU consultants to leave. In late March, Moule and Polyzoides angrily resigned, citing that the city leaders were letting developers drive the rebuilding process (Newsom, 2006). By letting go the State-appointed consulting firm, the City of Biloxi chose not to collaborate with the State in their effort to achieve a coast-wide plan based on New Urbanist principles and the SmartCode.

4.5.2.1 Missing Local Values

Biloxi removed their CNU consultants and started work on rebuilding plans through their own group that would reflect the local values of Biloxi. While Biloxi did not embrace the assistance of the outside experts provided by the State, the other coastal cities pushed forward with their own CNU consultants. Many of the cities welcomed the assistance from the State’s consulting group and started the process of holding subsequent charrettes adopting their initial rebuilding plans with the assistance of their State-appointed consultants. Long Beach and Gulfport “embraced visionary goals and objectives developed with expert assistance”; D’Iberville “never seemed to doubt the value of the assistance” offered by the CNU consultants; Ocean Springs, Pascagoula, and Moss Point “each saw and seized an opportunity to enhance their status” with the assistance of the outside consultants (Sun Herald Editorial Board, 2006).

As a result of the city refusing to collaborate with the State on the established rebuilding process, Biloxi was farther behind the other coastal cities in their planning
efforts. Biloxi started to receive bad press about their apparent falling out of step as the lead Coast city. One city official explained Biloxi’s position:

And, of course, everybody keeps saying, well it looks like things are going to happen in Pascagoula or Moss Point, but Biloxi’s not going to do this. And, of course, you know, Biloxi kept taking the hit because early on we didn’t just jump onto the bandwagon of saying SmartCode is the savior of the world.

The Sun Herald Newspaper reported that it was “time for Biloxi’s leaders to again lead, and remove uncertainty from the lives of their constituents” regarding the rebuilding process (Sun Herald Editorial Board, 2006). In September 2006, Biloxi City Council voted unanimously to accept the Reviving the Renaissance report. The goal of this plan was to create a realistic plan, with a realistic timetable and a realistic price tag – a backlash against the visionary plans produced by the CNU consultants. The plan included the input of over 200 Biloxi residents who served on issue committees – a backlash against the absence of local values and culture in many of the CNU consultant plans. Residents were hopeful that this new plan would more accurately reflect the local identity of Biloxi.

While everyone was eager for Biloxi to start their planning process, the City did not want to follow the lead of the State on a process that was not appropriate for Biloxi. City officials acknowledged the good intentions of the State’s sponsorship of the SmartCode, but expressed concern that the State did not fully understand what the CNU-driven planning process would mean for the local context:
You know, the State really meant well when they came up with the whole SmartCode. The Governor’s Office has really done a tremendous thing to try to get this on the table and get it promoted. I just don’t get the feeling that they have a full appreciation of how the SmartCode, in the format that it’s been presented, will actually work at the local level.

Review of the Reviving the Renaissance document illustrates this balance of good intention and concern for local context well. Biloxi actually did include a number of the recommendations suggested by the State in the Governor’s Report. In addition, Biloxi is even considering new developments using the SmartCode (Creel, 2008). The city simply decided that the planning processes provided by the CNU consultants were not grounded in and could not capture Biloxi’s local values. Biloxi has decided to ensure that the overall visions for Biloxi authentically reflect the city by breaking off from the State’s vision for a new urbanist region.

4.5.2.2 Not Ripe for Collaboration

In many ways, Biloxi was the best-prepared city on the Coast to deal with the rebuilding and planning after Hurricane Katrina. Biloxi had a large number of elected and appointed officials, and a Community Development department that employed planners. Overall, Biloxi had more financial, technical, and administrative resources than the other cities on the coast. When the storm hit, this resource advantage translated into a city that was not as needy as the other cities for planning assistance. As a result, Biloxi’s status was not as ripe for collaboration with state and local governments as some of the other communities on the coast.
Biloxi’s hurricane preparation was also beyond those of the other cities, as the city purchased Business Interruption Insurance and contracted for stand-by storm debris removal two months before the storm. In June 2005, the Biloxi City Council approved Mayor Holloway’s request that the city buy a $10 million insurance policy to protect the city against tax revenue loss in the event of a storm, such as a hurricane, would close its casinos for an extended timeframe. In addition, Council approved the funding for a stand-by contractor to allow the city to respond to storm debris within 72 hours instead of competing with the other cities to find contractors immediately.

The decision to buy the insurance policy was a stroke of luck for the City of Biloxi. The policy was designed to provide a “six-month cushion” to give the casinos time to return to business, and would begin payments within 15 days from the time the claim was filed (Newsom, 2005). Less than a year following the storm, the city had received $7.5 million in payments, and was continuing to pursue the remainder of the policy (Wilemon, 2006a).

The decision to purchase business interruption insurance and to establish a contractor for debris removal placed Biloxi in an even more advantageous position that lessened its need to collaborate. The insurance policy paid a third of Biloxi’s annual operating revenue (Newsom, 2005), while some of the other communities, such as Harrison County, lost 25 percent of the tax base in the storm (Bonck, 2005a). Most of the other communities did not have planners on staff, and many could not afford to keep support staff due to diminishing tax bases. Biloxi did not have to lay off staff, and was not reliant on the State for money to function (Creel, 2008). In addition, with invaluable
support from the state Legislature, Biloxi’s primary employer – the gaming industry – was able to establish itself with land-based casinos.

Several of the other communities on the coast recognized that Biloxi did not need the support or resources brought by collaboration. Gulfport recognized the key role of the casinos in funding Biloxi’s quick recovery:

[Biloxi] didn’t have as much incentive to collaborate as the others, like us. You know, right after the storm the casinos come in and say, we’re going to build back bigger and better. We’re going to spend a gazillion dollars rebuilding, and we’re sitting over here going, gosh, our downtown looks like hell. Looks like a storm hit us. So they didn’t have as much incentive to go through the [State’s] planning process as we did and the other cities across the coast.

In my discussions with local officials, Biloxi recognized that their resources allowed them to make the decision to break off from the State’s planning process and adopt their own process. They had the financial and technical resources, as well as adequate staff to initiate and implement a planning process and product that accounted for their local values and needs. Biloxi also proposed that based on their knowledge, other cities would have liked to follow their lead in pursuing their own planning one of the processes with their own consultants (Creel, 2008). The main obstacle was that none of the other communities had the money, knowledge, or staff to undertake an equivalent process.

4.5.2.3 The Impact: Independent Progress

There remains lingering tension between Biloxi and the new urbanists as a result of Biloxi’s decision not to collaborate with the CNU and the State. In a recent newspaper
article, new urbanist Andres Duany said that Biloxi committed “urban suicide” by rushing into rebuilding with “big, bland and boxy buildings” (LaFontaine, 2008), as opposed to being more patient and embracing new urbanism and the SmartCode. In a published response, Mayor Holloway stated that Duany’s comments were insensitive to the Biloxi residents who worked on the Reviving the Renaissance – “a plan of action that is addressing the quality-of-life issues important to our residents”. He went on to explain again reasons behind Biloxi’s decision not to collaborate with the CNU consultants. While the city welcomes developers who embrace new urbanism, the mayor explained that he agreed with residents who “preferred a doable and realistic plan that was affordable” (Holloway, 2008).

As a result of all the resources available to Biloxi, it was expected that Biloxi would be on the fast track for planning and rebuilding. However, Biloxi took the time to create a resident-based planning process as a means to create a plan appropriate for the City. In February 2008, over two years after the storm, Biloxi announced that it hired a nationally recognized planning firm to develop a comprehensive plan for Biloxi. While not a new urbanist firm, Wallace Roberts & Todd has planned other coastal cities such as Atlantic City and Hilton Head. The plan for Biloxi will largely integrate many of the recommendations provided in the Reviving the Renaissance report, and will be complete in early 2009.

The City of Biloxi is prospering, despite its break from collaborating with the State’s vision. In April 2008, Mayor A.J. Holloway gave his State of the City address and touted that the Biloxi economy is recovery faster than expected. In fact, in the 2007 calendar year, Biloxi’s casino market reported a billion dollars in gaming revenue, which
was the largest figure in the 16 years of legalized gaming in Biloxi (City of Biloxi, 2008). The city currently has 11 casinos open, three casinos under construction, and six casinos proposed and under review. The Reviving the Renaissance steering committee continues to lead the recovery and rebuilding of Biloxi. In his address, the Mayor expressed his pride in the city’s ability to reach into their own community to produce a plan for their future: “We can all be proud of how our city has responded to the largest disaster ever to hit the United States. We can also be proud that we have a plan and continue to stick to it.”
CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question “What factors influenced intergovernmental collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi?” In order to answer this question, I interviewed local, regional, and state actors involved in planning and rebuilding efforts following Hurricane Katrina in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Qualitative analysis of these interviews reveals that many of the hypothesized factors from network theory and planning literature help explain decisions to engage in intergovernmental collaboration.

In this chapter I provide a summary of the findings of this study, and compare these results with those of existing literature. I identify the five key factors that played the most crucial roles in promoting or inhibiting collaboration, and further examine how these factors impacted decisions to collaborate for planning. Focusing on these five key factors, I propose recommendations on how planning policy and process could be improved to increase the quantity and quality of intergovernmental cooperation in future regional planning events. Finally, I suggest how the findings of this study contribute to the theory and practice of planning.
5.1. Summary of Findings

The State of Mississippi created a plan to encourage vertical and horizontal collaboration. In the absence of a mandate for planning, this was a state experiment in strongly influencing planning and planning process on the Mississippi Gulf Coast to create higher quality plans and an inclusive and participatory planning process. However, collaborative networks were not established as widely or as deeply as theory would suggest following a disaster. The results of this study help to discern the factors that contributed to decisions to collaborate, and therefore explain the failure to establish strong intergovernmental ties.

The overall results support the hypotheses that the formation of collaborative planning relationships is related to the interpersonal ideology factors, institutional resource factors, leadership factors, and communication and engagement factors impacting the potential collaborative actors. The responses to open-ended interview questions presented in Chapter 4 indicate that overall respondent propensity to engage in collaborative planning was influenced most importantly by selected factors within these four categories of factors. Specifically, inclusion of actors, capacity potential, trust, and leadership were ranked highest among cited reasons for collaboration and therefore played important roles in the decisions for governments to collaborate with each other on planning issues.

The examination of the interview data also revealed additional variables that were not included in the theoretical framework used for the data collection of this study. Three new factors emerged from the interview responses: costs of collaboration, planning knowledge, and values and cultural norms. Although not all of these factors were cited by
a large number of respondents, it is necessary to examine the importance of these factors in relation to existing literature.

5.1.1 Communication and Engagement

Factors related to communication and engagement of actors before and during the planning process were included in this study. This category of factors consisted of the individual factors: *inclusion of actors*, *power disparities*, and *ripeness of issue*. The results show that inclusion of actors ranked as highly important, power disparity as moderately important, and ripeness of issue as low importance in influencing collaboration. However, it is important to consider these results in the context of the situation. Based on the information provided by respondents during my interviews, I argue that inclusion of actors and ripeness of issue both played important roles in understanding the implications of the State’s decisions in planning and implementing the rebuilding processes, while power disparity was less influential.

*Inclusion of Actors*

Based on the interview data, *inclusion of actors* was one of the most essential factors in promoting or inhibiting intergovernmental collaboration. When the State through its Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal sent out invitations to attend the Mississippi Renewal Forum, this was a crucial moment in actors’ decisions to collaborate. Through respondent interviews, I was able to determine that those who were not invited to participate in the planning process – or those who may have been invited but did not successfully receive an invitation from the State – harbored animosity against
the State and viewed this as a major slight. This complaint regarding the lack of involvement of local and regional actors extended from the early planning stages to the later stages of implementation efforts. Margerum (1999) in his analysis of collaborative planning in Australian cases found that developing a clear and effective process for actor inclusion throughout the planning and implementation process was critical in moving toward implementation of collaborative planning.

Respondents may have understood the obstacles in post-storm communication, but reiterated that they felt disrespected by the State and the Commission. Many were surprised to hear about the Mississippi Renewal Forum through communication with others or the newspaper as opposed to receiving direct communication with the Commission. As a result, several respondents expressed that they did not feel the process was as collaborative as the State suggested it would be, and some went to lengths to publicly criticize the planning process. This finding that all actors needed to be at the table for discussions is consistent with existing literature involving public officials in planning processes. The implication of a planning process that is not inclusive is discussed by Innes (1992), who found that for state growth management planning processes, even unintentional exclusion of stakeholders resulted in backlash against the planning process. In another study, (Innes et al., 1994) suggested that intractable stakeholders could prevent agreement about a process and act to drive away other would-be participants. This was the case with some county officials in Mississippi, who resorted to public admonishment of the planning process through his editorials in newspapers, which many attributed to this frustration of not being at the table for the first discussions.
Power Disparities

Based on respondent interviews, power disparity limited some potential collaboration because more powerful players chose not to overstep their boundaries to influence the less powerful ones. For example, while the State wanted to create a regional framework for planning, the State was careful not to impose their will for planning agendas on local governments, and therefore chose to provide assistance mainly on request instead of taking more proactive measures to establish additional lines of communication. As presented in the results, this was also this case between cities and the unincorporated communities, where city officials chose not to participate in the county planning process despite their interests in how the county planning may impact the city.

These results revealed a different finding regarding power disparity than is provided in the existing literature. Literature on collaboration generally is concerned with less powerful actors failing to participate in a planning process because they feel that their interests are being overshadowed by more powerful interests. As a result, much of the existing literature on collaboration spends considerable time discussing process and facilitation skills to overcome actual or perceived power differences that might hinder collaborative process (Gray, 1989; Wondelleck & Yaffee, 2000). However, my findings suggest that the more powerful players are hesitant to initiate communication because they do not want to impose on the less powerful players. The findings of this study may be different from existing research due to the planning context in Mississippi. Many actors are sensitive to the history of the planning process following Hurricane Camille, which hit the coast in 1969. Because that process was significantly top-down, where the State made all the decisions and the local governments simply received their
recommendations, many of the respondents suggested that with post-Katrina planning, people were especially sensitive to authoritative actions.

Ripeness of Issue

Another important factor was the timing of the initiation of the collaborative effort and the ripeness of the issue. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was held six weeks following the disaster. Some respondents suggested that this was too early for them to effectively participate in the first planning process event because they were still in large-scale recovery mode, identifying bodies and restoring basic community utilities. While it may have inhibited collaboration with the harder hit communities, the early timing of the State’s kick-off to the planning process was necessary in order to capture the opportunity for commitment – however limited – to their process when the issue was still ripe. This finding is similar to that of Gray’s (1989) assessment that when the issue is ripe for collaboration (i.e., there is agreement among the parties about the importance and urgency of the matter) then there will be more likelihood of collaboration. Issues that have not yet gained widespread public attention may be premature for collaboration. In the case of post-Katrina Mississippi, six weeks was ample time for widespread public attention to the community needs following the hurricane, but continued recovery priorities and other capacity limitations made collaboration efforts less appealing.

5.1.2 Institutional Resources

Institutional resource factors as a category of factors played the most important role in influencing decisions to collaborate. The incentive for capacity potential and the
legitimacy found through political support were two hypothesized resources factors that were important for intergovernmental collaboration. Two emergent factors, the costs of collaboration, and planning knowledge were revealed through the interviews as issues that overall tended to limit the establishment of collaborative relationships.

*Capacity Potential*

A highly important determinant for intergovernmental collaboration was the lure of capacity potential available through collaboration. Many respondents suggested that they participated in intergovernmental planning process because they had the opportunity to increase their administrative, technical, or financial capacity. Most of these local governments did not have the resources to plan for rebuilding efforts for their communities, so they were highly dependent on the State’s support. Within the umbrella of capacity potential, the findings also show that the potential to enhance social capital was an important factor, allowing respondents to call other communities for assistance or for general information sharing in ways they were not doing before their involvement in collective planning. This finding follows those of Gruber (1994) who found that the creation of capital acted as a viable incentive for participation. Likewise, Booher and Innes (2002) suggest that collaborative processes are used in situations of political fragmentation where actors are dependent on each other for resources.

Many communities chose to continue the planning processes with the State even if they were not completely satisfied with the plans, because they saw the opportunity for funds to implement a rebuilding plan. Limited resources to implement the outcomes of collaborative planning processes are common in the literature. Lack of funding was the
most often cited inhibitor to collaborative processes in Margerum’s (1999) survey of Australian environmental management cases, and similar results were obtained from U.S. case studies as well (Margerum, 2002). With the State’s available funding mechanisms for implementation of the planning process, local governments continue to move toward on plan implementation.

*Political Support & Planning Knowledge*

Results showed that political support and planning knowledge both influenced decisions to collaborate. Based on respondent explanations, these two factors were related in a number of respects, so they will be discussed simultaneously. Many respondents shared that lack of political support by local officials was an inhibitor to collaboration in large part because the officials were not educated sufficiently on planning issues. Land use planning does not have a long history in south Mississippi, and therefore the local politicians are not deeply familiar with the planning process or planning concepts. Limited knowledge interacted with political support to reduce the level of intergovernmental collaboration. Much of the existing literature on collaborative planning discusses the impact that limited political support has on commitment to a process (Wondelleck & Yaffee, 2000). In cases where there was disagreement over the importance of the planning issue or the necessity to take action, there was not sufficient incentive to participate or commit to the planning effort.

The limited planning knowledge by local politicians precluded them from prioritizing planning as an important, and long-term investment in their community. Respondents noted that local politicians wanted to see progress, but did not always invest
themselves in ways needed to make important collective decisions about planning. Limited knowledge about the basic concepts of planning created a frustrating environment for the local officials who did not want to waste their talking about technical issues that were out of their scope of understanding. Respondents also explained that due to their limited knowledge about planning, political leaders in some cases were not able to provide adequate attention, input or direction that was needed by consultants and planners to move the planning processes forward. These findings can be informed by observations made by Olshansky (2006) in his study of post-Katrina planning in New Orleans. He noted a tension between “speed and deliberation” in post-disaster planning, where there is need to move rebuilding forward as quickly as possible, but that thoughtful and deliberate planning is needed for long term benefits to the community. In post-Katrina Mississippi, my results suggest that due to lack of knowledge about planning, there was less than adequate political support for deliberate collaborative planning processes established by the State.

*Costs of Collaboration*

One of the most cited reasons for failure to establish collaborative relationships was the *costs of collaboration*. Some respondents realized the benefit to communicating and sharing information about planning challenges and opportunities, but they could not reconcile the time and therefore resources demanded by collective action. Although costs of collaboration is an emergent factor, it is consistent with transaction cost theory that suggests that the potential costs of collaboration are an important determinant for involvement in collaboration. Alexander (1995) proposes that the anticipated benefits of
collaboration must outweigh the risks for collaboration. Applied to local governments in this study, the risks to collaboration were the demands on administrative and technical resources. Margerum (2002) also found that a lack of resources was one of the most commonly cited constraints to information exchanges needed to build consensus in collaborative planning.

My results therefore suggest a point of concern regarding local capacity to collaborate. In order for local governments to participate in intergovernmental conversations, they need to dedicate staff time. If they were to participate in intergovernmental actions, they would need to use the little resources that they have to prepare technical analyses. Local governments in the Mississippi Coast do not have large staff – and many do not have planners on staff – which limits their capacity. These findings match those observations of Innes et al. (1994) who find that local government involvement in regional consensus building is crucial to the success of regional planning and growth management, but that the costs of participation are high and the benefits are uncertain. Further, Wondelleck & Yaffee (2000) recognize that self-interest maximization is the basis for all decisions to collaborate, and they found that agencies often “retreat into their core activities” where building relationships with other governments is not seen as an essential activity (63). In Mississippi, the resources expended to “pay” for the costs of collaboration are weighed against the resource needs to cover the day-to-day activities of city hall.
5.1.3 Interpersonal Ideology

Factors largely informed by network literature were included in the interpersonal ideology factors. Interdependence, shared goals, and trust are characteristics of theoretical collaborative networks, and therefore represent important determinants to the creation of intergovernmental collaboration. In addition to these factors, an emergent factor, values and cultural norms, was identified through the interview data as highly influential on collaboration.

Shared goals

The factor called shared goals was moderately important in explaining why many communities largely did not seek collaborative relationships after the storm. In limited instances, respondents found that Hurricane Katrina provided the opportunity for communities to consider their shared interests. This is consistent with Mandell (1994) who finds that when goal alignment is established, the shared vision is central to developing and fostering collaborative relationships despite other obstacles. Similar to my findings, Innes and Booher (1999) also determined that collaborative planning can lead to shared goals among actors who would otherwise not talk with each other.

However, while some actors could identify common interests, aspirations or objectives between communities, many respondents suggested that they could not work together due to a lack of shared goals. Although other authors have found that collaborative arrangements comprise diverse communities with different norms and values (Mandell and Steelman, 2003), my findings show that many communities identified principled differences between communities that precluded them from finding
common ground on basic planning needs. Others research acknowledges that establishing collaborative relationships between communities with conflicting objectives or traditions is challenging for facilitators (Wondelleck & Yaffee, 2000).

Interdependence

Although a large number of respondents did not cite interdependence as a factor for their decision to collaborate in planning processes, interdependence is a basic assumption of any collaborative network. Interdependence goes beyond shared goals, recognizing that their interests are actually interdependent. Only actors in Jackson County showed any sense of interdependence, whereas most others felt their goals could only be achieved by focusing inward on their own communities. The absence of discussion about interdependence supports the conclusion that true networks were not widely established for collaborative land use planning after Hurricane Katrina. While other authors suggest that local, state, and federal governments by nature of shared jurisdictions form a network of “fused federalism”, and that their blurred roles establish an incentive to collaborate (Gray 1989, 43), this was not the case in post-Katrina Mississippi, where there has never been a history of interdependence. The State’s process was not effective in building this basic need between entities in order to promote long-standing collaboration.

In many senses, interdependence was the most critical factor in establishing commitment to collaborative relationships initiated by the State’s process. Booher and Innes (2002, 228) find that actors have to “recognize the reciprocal nature of their relationship” in order to understand and build on their interdependence. Mandell (1994) observes that as opposed to interconnected relationships, the actions of true
interdependent relationships have costly effects on member actors. Most actors did not recognize mutual dependence, and the State did not establish processes that would build motivations for true independent relationships.

**Trust**

This study operationalized the concept of trust as confidence in the integrity, character, and ability of another, based largely on a history of relationship. The results showed that trust was a highly important factor in actor decisions to form collaborative relationships with others. Many respondents cited the fact that they had known another person for years, or had grown up together on the coast. Some respondents had worked in other communities previously, so still had strong contacts with staff in these other communities. These positive histories of relationships were reasons why respondents in one community initiated communication and information sharing with another. Other researchers (Mandell and Steelman, 2003) likewise find that previous relationships provide actors with a mutual understanding of each other that contributes to decisions to rely or trust others.

The evolution of collaborative behavior was challenged in cases where actors did not know each other before the storm so did not have time to build and foster relationships. This is consistent with Alexrod (1984), who suggests that time and repeated interactions are required to develop trust that allows actors to work toward a collective end. Post-disaster planning is characterized by high instability and limited time to attend forums that would nurture relationships of trust. The expectations of the State that
governments would simply establish collaborative relationships out of need were too high, as there was little time to develop trusting relationships.

*Values and cultural norms*

A factor that emerged from the data as highly important in decisions to collaborate is called *values and cultural norms*. This factor captured the institutional norms that remain strong in south Mississippi, and played a role in preventing more collaboration between communities and between communities and the State’s consultants.

A strong culture of independence exists in the coastal communities that even a disaster could not reduce. Many respondents expressed a sense of pride that made them pursue independent solutions to the disaster as opposed to soliciting assistance from other communities. Zebrowski & Howard (2005) found the same phenomenon in their study of post-disaster recovery following Mississippi Hurricane Camille, where “tensions between pride and gratitude, xenophobia and hospitality, and self-reliance and gratitude muddied many of the interactions…” (211). Other research confirms that collaboration is determined by regional culture. For example, Putnam (1993, 167) finds that “cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement”, and Nunn and Rosentraub (1997) state that the level of collaboration possible in different regions is a function of local history with collaboration. The fact that the same sentiments were experienced during Hurricane Camille and then 36 years later during Hurricane Katrina suggests that south Mississippi has not inherited norms of social capital that support
collaboration between communities and with outsiders. In fact, this suggests that their local norms do not support collaboration with outsiders.

As part of the culture of independence, there was a mistrust and suspicion of the volunteer consultants brought in by the State. Architects and designers from the CNU were invited by the State to create new plans for rebuilding. Repeatedly, respondents identified cultural and values differences between south Mississippians and the CNU consultants. While their objective to create rebuilding plans were the same, one of the biggest barriers involved the skepticism about the visioning and participation processes. The communities were not comfortable with large-scale participation brought by the charrette process, and did not feel like the outside consultants were integrating the culture and feel of south Mississippi into their plans for rebuilding. Other researches have found that even when formal objectives of organizations do not conflict, informal norms of values and behaviors can prevent them from collaborating when those factors feel threatened (Wondelleck & Yaffee, 2000; Forester, 1999).

5.1.4 Leadership

Two leadership factors, presence of a leader and promoter, were justified as important factors, mainly from the network management literature. While presence of a leader was important in influencing collaboration, those in positions of leadership did not help facilitate the collaborative planning initiative in ways that were evident to many of the respondents. Most respondents did not discuss the presence of a promoter as a reason why they decided to form collaborative relationships.
The results showed that most local and regional government respondents did not discuss the presence of a promoter of the leader as a factor in collaboration. However, the State, which served as the main leader in the collaborative planning vision for the rebuilding process, identified that the local newspaper editor was a key promoter of their vision for collaborative planning on the coast. This finding is consistent with Agranoff (2003) who finds that all collaborative networks need “promoters” to support the collaborative network leader. This factor did not seem to impact the respondents as much as literature would suggest, as local and regional governments did not identify the CNU as a promoter for the State’s vision. Rather, most officials categorized the CNU as a representative for the State, which may have played a part in limiting the influence or recognition of the promoter factor.

Presence of leadership from various levels of authority was a highly cited factor influencing collaboration on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. In the cases where leaders positively influenced decisions to collaborate, the leaders played the role of initiator, motivator, or supporter. For example, respondents were grateful for the State’s effort to initiate commitment to recovery and rebuilding, and for taking a strong stance to working together to overcome the disaster. Respondents found much-needed motivation from leaders such as the Incident Command Teams and in some cases the CNU who challenged communities to push forward in their determination for replanning the coast. Finally, local-level leaders, such as mayors and city managers stepped in to accept the
role of supporter, providing positive leadership for the rebuilding process when needed. Existing literature highlights the importance of leaders who provide forward-looking messages of positive support to the collaborative process, guiding as opposed to controlling the collaborative process (Wondelleck & Yaffee, 2000; Chrislip & Larson, 1994).

My findings do not suggest that leadership played a large-scale role in post-Katrina Mississippi to manage potential and existing collaborative relationships, as suggested in network management literature (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Mandell, 2000; Mandell, 1994). While the Incident Command Team in Jackson County practiced collaborative management, most leaders – specifically the State – did not manage interactions in a way to promote collaborative and interdependent relationships. Further discussion about the potential role of the State as the collaborative manager is provided in the next section.

5.2 Key Factors

Although all the factors in this study influenced decisions to collaborate, there are five factors that should be further discussed due to their significant impact on limiting the potential for intergovernmental collaboration: costs of collaboration, inclusion of actors, interdependence, leadership, and values and cultural norms. In this section I will briefly explain why these five factors were essential to establishing intergovernmental collaboration in post-Katrina Mississippi.

Costs of collaboration, inclusion of actors, interdependence, leadership, and values and cultural norms were the five key factors that inhibited the development of
more extensive or more complex intergovernmental collaboration in the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Although capacity potential, planning knowledge, and trust were also numerically cited as highly important in influencing collaboration (Table 4), the content of the interview data for the five key factors suggests that these five key factors are more essential to intergovernmental collaboration in post-Katrina Mississippi.

Interdependence is an important factor because it is the basis of the definition of active collaboration. A basic assumption of networks is that all actors share a level of interdependence between them, which provides commitment to continue communication and tie all the actors together. There was only limited dependence among local and regional actors, with the case of Jackson County. There was a small level of dependence between the state and local actors because the State needed local governments to implement their vision for the coast, and the local governments needed resources provided by the State to start rebuilding. However, this interdependence was not managed in a way to create commitment, and it started to fall apart when outside resources were made available to local governments.

Failure to ensure inclusion of actors was a pivotal mistake made by the Governor’s Commission. Although they made considerable effort to contact all essential actors to be included in the Mississippi Renewal Forum, many people felt that they were not included. This factor was critical because it was the first impression of the State’s vision and process, and many actors established their opinions about the collaborative process during the Mississippi Renewal Forum, whether they were invited or not. Failure to include all actors left some feeling insulted by apparently not being considered
important by the State, and consequently contributed to future obstacles for intergovernmental collaborations.

*Costs of collaboration* was an essential factor in determining if actors would collaborate, and results showed that this factor was the most prohibiting for intergovernmental collaboration. While all of the other factors contained positive and negative influences, all respondent citation of the costs of collaboration discussed obstacles to collaborating, and points to limited capacity issues common at the local government level. Many local governments suggested that they would consider sharing information and meeting about planning issues but that they could not afford the time or personnel required to communicate and collaborate.

*Values and cultural norms* was important because it is the factor that has slowed implementation of the collaborative planning concepts. There is a distinct cultural difference between the south Mississippians and the more cosmopolitan CNU consultants. When the State invited the CNU to come to lead the planning efforts, the architects and designers were outsiders to the Mississippi coast, not familiar with the terrain or the culture. Because there was not time for the CNU to get acquainted with the culture before the first major planning event in October 2005, their plans did not incorporate the local values of Mississippi. As a result, some communities did not collaborate with the State as much as they would have because they did not think the plans were practical or representative of their communities. Considerable time has been spent revising the plans to make them more practical for the communities, which delayed implementation.
Leadership is the key factor that ties the other key factors together. The critical importance of leadership became apparent because in consideration of the other factors, the state leadership had the opportunity to facilitate and manage the interactions of all the other factors. Before the planning started, the State and its Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal publicly announced that they intended this planning process to be inclusive, participatory, and collaborative. When the State intervened to take a leadership role, it was their responsibility as the leader to establish a framework for collaboration. Leadership needed to be the factor that managed the interaction among actors in such a way to help achieve this vision of a collaborative planning process for the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

5.3. Leadership as Collaboration Manager

The most important factor in influencing intergovernmental cooperation for post-disaster planning of the Mississippi Gulf Coast was the state leadership. Those in leadership positions had the opportunity to establish and foster many of the other factors that theory suggests are important to collaboration. In support of this proposition, research in network management proposes that “collaboration does not just happen,” rather, it must be managed in order to establish deliberate strategies for active intergovernmental collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 3). In this section I consider the key factors discerned from this study through the lens of network management, identifying examples of state leadership success in establishing strategies for collaboration, and areas where more deliberate management may have promoted more collaboration. In doing so, I explore how network management can be integrated into a
revised framework for intergovernmental collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi.

5.3.1 Collaborative Management

Interorganizational network management has gained recent attention in the public management literature, providing best practices on how to manage cross-boundary interdependencies of public functions. Leaders in this field have summarized manager behaviors identified in the public management literature to propose four different classes of behaviors: activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Subsequent research has expanded on these groupings, initiating a more developed dialogue in the network literature about managing network structures in the form of interorganizational collaboration (Mandell, 2003; McGuire, 2002). For example, McGuire (2002) finds that these four managerial behaviors are “fluid” in that they vary depending on the context of the project. Therefore, he suggests that a manager would have to strategically pair the appropriate behavior with the specific situation.

The framework for collaborative management established in the network literature can be applied to management of intergovernmental collaboration in planning to offer new or reconstructed insights. The integration of this language into planning theory and practice could complement the well-established planning literature that focuses mainly on process criteria for consensus building (Innes and Booher, 1999a; Innes and Booher, 1999b; Forester, 1999). Collaborative management, however, expands this knowledge base to agendas broader than consensus building, providing a structure for how leaders can act to holistically manage collaborative planning processes that reach
across jurisdictional boundaries, and how these behaviors may vary given the “fluidity” of the governing context (McGuire, 2002, 604). I explore the four behaviors put forth by the network management literature in the context of post-Katrina planning. I consider if and how specific tasks within these categories of behaviors were achieved by the state of Mississippi in their leadership role, and discuss how these behaviors integrate the key factors identified in this study.

5.3.2 “Activating” the Inclusion of Actors

According to Agranoff and McGuire (2001), activation tasks focus on the process of identifying actors to include in the network. In doing so, resources such as knowledge and skills of actors should be utilized to benefit the network. All interests should be included in the network processes in order to identify and address the network agenda. Activation is used during the formation of the network and as a management tool when the network effectiveness is impacted. As such, selective activation of certain “necessary” actors is essential, as is the deactivation of “wrong” actors. This activation behavior, therefore, identifies the key factor inclusion of actors, within its main tasks. Considering the State’s leadership role as the manager of intergovernmental collaboration for post-Katrina planning processes, it is apparent that they did not meet the prescriptions for activation tasks. While they allocated a certain share of its managerial resources to activation, the State did not thoroughly identify actors to be included, tap skills and resources, or make sure all interests were included.

Directly after Hurricane Katrina hit, the Governor of Mississippi began activating the right players with the right resources to be part of the collective planning and
rebuilding of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. First, the State identified the CNU as an essential player in the planning process. This group was chosen to be a main part of the process because it had needed resources – the knowledge and ability to facilitate collaborative planning processes with large groups. In a strategic move, the State invited the CNU to also establish a sense of hope for the communities impacted by Hurricane Katrina through their ability to produce plans quickly, which was largely accomplished (Sanderson, 2007).

Several weeks later, the State activated public officials to be included in the collaborative planning processes. However, at the time of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, the initial planning event, there was limited participation from public officials in a number of the communities, suggesting that their task of including all key actors was not successful. Findings from my study show that local and regional government respondents were concerned that they were not included as participants in the State-led planning process; sufficient resources were not placed into activating all the “right” actors. The State responded to criticism regarding who was invited to the first planning event with the excuse that they had used all the resources possible to contact officials to invite them, but in some cases it was not possible to reach everyone by phone or mail due to the circumstances of the disaster. The State did limit the number of people and the specific interests who were represented; developers and casino representatives were not invited to this first event because the ability to accommodate all these voices was limited in the post-disaster context. While some authors suggest that large groups can reduce efficiency (Gray, 1989, 68), respondents focused on the importance for inclusiveness in this important first planning event. McGuire (2002, 602) identifies some network
management decisions as more consequential than others; the failure to include all actors in this first planning event was one that resulted in long-term consequences for successful collaborate with the State on this project.

Deactivating wrong actors is also a task required of collaboration managers. The State assigned CNU consultants to help the cities with creation of their rebuilding plans, and in some cases, consultants who were not a good fit for certain communities were assigned. Respondents found these unsuitable consultants did not listen to the priorities of the city officials, and were not helping the city create an appropriate plan that could be implemented in the future. These consultants were examples of the players that needed to be deactivated from the planning process because they were negatively affecting progress. The State did not deactivate players that were inappropriate for the network actors, and therefore the network did not perform as desired.

By not activating all the necessary local and regional participants, the State was not able to tap their resources in the form of local information, maps, and knowledge about local concerns and interests (Gray, 1989). Failing to deactivate ineffective consultants stifled progress and influenced the perceptions of the cultural norms set by the State’s planning process that subsequently required leadership attention (framing behaviors). As a result, the planning processes and the resulting plans were largely driven by the consultants and limited additional participants involved in the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Consequently, not all the interests were included in the planning process (Innes and Booher, 1999), which set the stage for limitations of future commitment (mobilizing behaviors) to the collaborative process.
5.3.3 “Framing” the Values and Cultural Norms

Behaviors categorized under the task of framing include those that establish the operating rules of the network. As part of this behavior, leaders start to shape the purpose of the network, and identify the network values and norms – even if they are just temporary. Network managers also must help alter the perceptions of network actors. This framing behavior therefore addresses the key factor *values and cultural norms*, identified in this study. Similarly to activation, framing behaviors must be met during the formation and as a management tool to ensure continued network effectiveness. The State established the operating rules and shaped the network purpose, but struggled to identify values and norms of the collaborative network that could accommodate the different interests of the network actors. In the end, they did not reframe in a way that supported an effective network described below.

Starting with their first communications about the establishment of the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, the State made a concerted effort to establish the operating rules of the network. In all of the advertisements about the Mississippi Renewal Forum and interviews with state leadership, the same message was reiterated: the planning process was intended to be inclusive and collaborative, and while the State would lead the planning process and encouraged all governments to work together in this effort, the local governments would ultimately decide what recommendations they would implement for their communities. The State clearly shaped the purpose of collectively planning for rebuilding, and established the non-authoritative operating rules.
Although the operating rules were based in local decisions, when the State hired the CNU as the facilitator of the planning process, they effectively brought an outsider identity to the network values and norms. Two local officials said that as soon as they heard that the CNU was facilitating the planning process for the State, they knew what the plans would look like and what the process would entail; local officials who were familiar with the work of the CNU believed that their plans looked the same and incorporated the same key elements into every plan, no matter the city. Respondents felt that the State allowed for outsiders to shape the values and norms of the collaborative network, which would ultimately produce “anytown, USA” for their beloved Mississippi Gulf Coast. The involvement of the CNU was an immediate red flag for many actors based on their perceptions of what the CNU might recommend for the coast, and based on the strong – and at times arrogant – personalities the CNU that clashed with the south Mississippi culture.

The State made small but unsuccessful attempts at minimizing the impact that the CNU had on influencing the cultural norms of their planning process. As part of the framing behavior, it was the State’s responsibility to maintain a vision for the network, despite the influences of the different participants. One person involved on the Governor’s Commission spoke of the State’s efforts to fulfill this task:

You know, at times it was a balancing act of not having CNU sort of mandate in a top-heavy way—a sort of a philosophy—but temper their resources and tools and ideas with the community needs and the communities’ experiences. We had to be careful through the Governor’s Commission work that CNU did not create this impression of a dogma. And I think we did that.
Based on specific context of the strong local values of the communities in Mississippi, the State needed to focus more of their attention on this framing task (McGuire, 2002). Based on this circumstance, it is likely that the State would have faced a perceived challenge to local values no matter which national consulting firm they hired they are not based out of Mississippi. For example, the American Planning Association or the Urban Land Institute could have been hired because they are familiar with large-scale planning and visioning, but the consultants from these organizations would have also been seen as outsiders if they were simply assigned to communities by the State without having had experience with communities.

According to the framing behaviors, it was the State’s responsibility to help these two groups communicate better to align their differing perceptions about what the plans for the coast should look like. The local participants felt that the State was not honoring the local values and culture when they brought in the CNU. The depth of value commitments to the communities in the Mississippi Gulf Coast runs deep; because people stay in south Mississippi and generations of families have lived in the communities, these communities define the people who live there. One of the things many respondents suggested was that the consultants may have heard local concerns, but they did not listen. Some researchers have found that many communities are skeptical about trying new approaches, and want to stay with old practices because they are familiar and understood (Wondelleck and Yaffee, 2000, 122), but that active listening to stories can help address issues of values that tend to create obstacles to collaborative processes (Forester, 1999). As part of the framing behavior, the State did not manipulate the rules of interaction
between the CNU and the local participants to help integrate local values and culture that could improve perceptions of the planning process.

The State did not address the task of framing to a degree that maintained network effectiveness. The results of the Renewal Forum plans and those that followed were beautiful urban design plans that focused on rebuilding an urban core. However, many of the local participants were not satisfied that their interests were adequately considered by the State. For example, when one official was asked about his community’s plan, which received a 2007 CNU Charter Award for design, he said that he views his community’s plan is just a “pretty picture” and not implementable because the consultants did listen to interests of the local community (Skellie, 2007). Ultimately the values and norms that the State adopted to drive their network were not framed in such a way that could create a shared purpose or vision among all network actors.

5.3.4 “Mobilizing” Actor Interdependence

Network managers encourage individuals to make a commitment to the collaborative endeavor – and to keep that commitment – through mobilizing behaviors. As part of this task, a leader has to sell ideas of the network. Additionally, they must ensure that a human relations component is incorporated that acts to inspire actors and to motivate them to stay connected to the network vision. This network management task therefore incorporates the establishment of the key factor, *interdependence*, which helps create commitment of actors to the network. While the State was able to initially sell the ideas of the collaborative network, they did not invest in processes that would help
establish commitment to the network, which was a missing element to the State in their role as leader and manager of the collaborative process.

The State was somewhat successful in their ability to initially “sell” its vision for the collaborative network across the coast, through the work of their CNU consultants. Numerous respondents noted that the CNU was able to create impressive renderings and designs of future coastal cities within the six-day timeframe of the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Because their visions could be illustrated so effectively in such a short timeframe, these ideas quickly became sources of hope for these communities that were in shock by the complete loss of their communities and identities. Although the illustrations did not look anything like a traditional south Mississippi city, the CNU’s well-illustrated visions captured attention of the local governments and provided the needed motivation to commit to the State’s idea of a “bigger and better” Mississippi Gulf Coast.

The ability of the State to mobilize initial commitment to its process and vision was not long-lasting, because they did not institutionalize interdependence that would have given actors tangible reasons to stay connected to the network vision. They were able to hold commitment with most network actors during the first several months after the storm because local actors were tied to the State for needed resources. However, after funding was allocated to communities, commitment to the overall vision was impacted. As part of this mobilizing task, the State failed to establish commitments by actors to construct forums of interaction that would “encourage experimentation with collaborative solutions” – and therefore institutionalize the collaborative processes (Gray, 1989, 275). Funding from the state was not allocated in the form of grants that would encourage
regional collaboration and interactions for planning; suggestions for such procedures are proposed in the following policy recommendation section.

In rare instances when a one-on-one “human relations component” was included in leadership actions interdependence was successfully institutionalized. Respondents from Jackson County said that the only time they felt inspired toward interdependence was when the Incident Command Teams came to their communities to work with them, one-on-one. They reacted to the “human relations components” discussed as part of the mobilizing task because they were challenged to work through an approach that allowed them to functionally integrate with each other, thereby establishing interdependence among the actors. Other research has found when local level program coordinators facilitate collaborative processes, they become the “glue” that holds these network actors together (Margerum, 2002, 246).

The State was able to mobilize actors well at the beginning of the planning process, but did not realize the “fluidity” of this responsibility – mobilizing tasks must be revisited throughout the collaborative process. Part of the effectiveness of generating long-term commitment in Jackson County was that there was a facilitator who could teach them how to functionally integrate to achieve their common goals. The State did not allocate its resources to be able to fulfill a more intimate human relations element that would have provided more presence to teach interdependence, so missed the opportunity to create commitment to their vision and the need to work collaboratively.
5.3.5 “Synthesizing” Support for Collaboration Costs

Finally, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) identify synthesizing as a distinct category of managerial behavior that focuses on furthering productive interactions by creating supportive environments for communication and collaboration. This action involves promoting information exchange and developing procedures for interaction. Because the State did not provide sufficient capacity for local governments to interact, they did not achieve synthesizing tasks. The synthesizing task highlights the importance of the key factor, costs of collaboration, because it represents the greatest obstacles in the State’s ability to encourage future interaction for collaborative planning.

The State provided numerous opportunities for interaction and information exchange among different levels of government. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was one early example, where local and regional officials were brought together for the first time to brainstorm ideas for rebuilding the coast. Later, in January 2006, the State established the Governor’s Office of Recovery and Rebuilding, which was charged with providing information and resources to state, regional, and local actors and to promote interaction among these actors. As part of this Office, state agents organized numerous region-wide events to promote interaction and to bring actors together to exchange information, such as grant writing workshops to link up officials with funding sources for rebuilding and educational events about policies affecting new construction. While this was a utilized resource, it did not provide commitment to intergovernmental collaboration for a shared goal to implement the Governor’s Commission recommendations, because the mobilizing tasks discussed previously were never fulfilled.
While the State focused on creating opportunities for further interaction, they did not create a supportive environment for productive interactions. One of the main reasons there was not more interaction was because actors felt that the costs associated with collaboration were too high. Local officials did not have the administrative, financial, or technical resources to capitalize on these opportunities for interaction. Many of the local actors complained that they were expected to continue day-to-day operations in addition to recovering and rebuilding – but with no additional personnel (Bishop, 2006). Many respondents felt that they would have interacted more and worked more productively with the state and other local officials is they had the resources. The State did not provide support in the form of payment for additional temporary staff, which would have allowed local governments to take on leadership roles in the regional planning processes (Innes et al., 1994).

In addition to creating opportunities for interactions, as part of the synthesizing tasks, the State was responsible for establishing procedures for interaction. Many respondents said they would be willing to meet informally on occasion with other planners and local governments if there was a forum to have this interaction. The regional governments would have been an appropriate actor to engage as the organizer of planning forums, but these regional meetings were largely non-existent. The State did not successfully provide procedures for interaction that worked to promote additional interactions. The costs of collaboration – including initiating and participating in collaborative interactions – overwhelmed local governments and served as a main obstacle to interaction, and continue to limit interactions today.
5.4. Revised Model for Intergovernmental Collaboration

Although formal networks were not established in post-Katrina Mississippi, the literature on network management provides important insight into the roles and responsibilities of leaders or managers in collaborative relationships. Activation behaviors outline the importance of inviting the right actors to the table and tapping their respective resources in a manner that is most productive for the goals of the network. Framing behaviors set and reset the cultural norms and operating procedures of the network. Mobilizing behaviors build commitment to the process and among network actors. Finally, synthesizing behaviors set the stage for productive and continual interactions among network actors. Each one of these categories of behavior has the potential to help shape and manage the factors that were shown in this study to be important for intergovernmental collaboration.

Although leadership factors were originally included in the theoretical framework to explain factors that influence collaboration, the findings of this study suggest that the structure of the framework should be revised to highlight the role of leadership in collaborative endeavors. In considering leadership tasks in relationship to the context of post-Katrina Mississippi, I propose that a new factor called collaborative management should be added to the original framework (Figure 8).
This revised model for collaboration captures the “fluidity” that McGuire (2002) discusses in relation to network management behaviors. While each of the factors identified in this model are important to the promotion of intergovernmental collaboration, the collaborative manager facilitates interactions to ensure these factors are properly integrated into the collaborative endeavor.

Scenarios of how collaborative management might work in practice in the case of post-Katrina planning can be played out, utilizing factors from different categories in the model. As one example, the inclusion of actors into the collaborative network will have a
number of effects on the network. Roles are rearranged with the addition of the new actors, so the collaborative manager could respond by identifying other ways to establish interaction and interdependence among this new set of actors. Interdependence could be established by highlighting incentives for interaction through the focus on capacity potential that can be realized only through collective action. As another example, in areas where there is a low level of political support, a collaborative manager would emphasize support-building activities that would involve educational components to highlight the importance of collaboration for that particular city. As a secondary effect of the support-building activities, the collaborative manager could increase the planning knowledge of the local governments through focused dialogue. The interactive activities would also provide a platform for the collaborative manager to facilitate communication between actors with varying levels of power to help establish a shared-power network, to avoid obstacles to collaboration created by power disparities. Finally, the collaborative leader would have to create environments for continued interaction among network actors. Where the network consists of actors who do not have an element of trust between them based on previous interactions, the manager may create opportunities for sharing and discussing information, and establishing areas of shared belief or common purpose in order to build productive relationships.

The revision of this model to explain influences on intergovernmental collaboration reveals the importance of facilitation and orchestration of collaborative interactions by the collaborative manager. Findings from this study support the proposition that “collaboration does not just happen” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, 3). It is evident that a collaborative manager is critical to the formation and maintenance of
intergovernmental interactions, especially where there is no mandate or significant financial incentive for collaboration.

It is therefore possible that other theoretical models should be integrated into planning literature in order to make more effective approaches for collaborative planning. Collaborative planning is rooted in planning through consensus building. The plethora of literature on consensus building has successfully set the stage for issues of conflict resolution and problem solving, but more planning literature is now recognizing that consensus building may not be the only way to approach collaborative planning. In her 2004 article, Innes clarifies the history of consensus building and acknowledges that it may be the ideal form for collaborative planning, but that it is not possible in all cases. It is grounded in the theory and practice of interest-based negotiation and mediation, which is not practical in all cases of collaborative planning. I propose that collaborative management is an example of another approach that can be integrated into collaborative planning to facilitate interactions.

While collaborative planning is rooted in a focus on consensus as an end product, collaborative management can be thought of as focusing less on achieving consensus, but on developing shared visions, capacity, and resources. In this way, there is a distinct difference between “consensus” and “consensus-oriented” approaches. The goal of collaborative management is not necessarily an outcome of consensus; rather, actors are brought together in purposeful relationships to solve multiorganizational problems within a given set of constraints including knowledge, time, and money (Agranoff & McGuire 2003, 4). A collaborative management approach can therefore possibly produce more efficient outcomes for planning, and begin to incrementally develop a network mindset
for those involved in land use planning. The next section focuses these findings to offer policy recommendations about collaborative planning influences in post-Katrina Mississippi.

5.5. Policy Recommendations

This study allowed me to examine and understand the breadth of factors that influenced decisions to collaborate across jurisdictional boundaries for post-Katrina planning. Analysis of the data points to five key factors that impacted decisions for collaboration: costs of collaboration, inclusion of actors, interdependence, leadership, and values and cultural norms. In the previous section I proposed that state leadership had the opportunity to manage the key factors in this study in the role of collaborative manager.

Consideration of the leadership behaviors through the lens of network management helps to identify and focus a set of policy recommendations for the State. While there are a number of recommendations, the most important recommendations for policy changes are listed and explained in this section. These are the factors that should be present or deliberately built into the planning processes in the Mississippi Gulf Coast in order to help promote intergovernmental collaboration:

5.5.1 Costs of Collaboration

Costs of collaboration was identified as a key factor in limiting intergovernmental collaboration. Respondents said that although they may have wanted to engage in information sharing with other entities, they perceived that the costs of collaboration outweighed the benefits of collaboration. In response to this key finding, I propose the following:
• **Provision of state-level administrative assistance to local governments.** Although communities received assistance for recovery to go towards infrastructure, what they really needed was additional personnel and staff to handle the increased demands of the planning and rebuilding. The State provided financial and technical resources through the CNU consultants, and also provided short-term administrative staff in some locations. However, after the Mississippi Renewal Forum local governments were left on their own to find resources and staff to work to implement the plans. Additional funding for follow-up planning, plan refinement, and implementation should have been provided within the first 18 months after the storm. The State should provide temporary professional staff to provide knowledgeable administrative assistance to local governments to allow for opportunities for future interaction.

• **Creation of a regional planning listserv for public officials.** Although there was a listserv for the CNU consultants about community planning updates, local officials were intimidated to use this as a communication tool. Creation of a listserv to enhance communication between local, regional, and state officials could have offered opportunity for increased collaboration through continuous flow of information. Implementation of this tool would currently offer lower-cost options for interaction, and promotes collaboration by offering information.

5.5.2 Inclusion of Actors

Many actors felt that they were not adequately included in the planning process, which limited their interest in collaboration. Specifically, because many actors were not invited to the first planning event, the Mississippi Renewal Forum, they felt disconnected with the State’s vision and planning process. In response to this key finding, I propose the following:

• **Improved communication between different levels of governments in developing a planning vision.** The failure of the State to sufficiently engage the regional and local level officials in planning the Mississippi Renewal Forum lead to long-term consequences of limitation in collaboration. Before the Mississippi Renewal Forum was announced, the State should have held a conference call with the regional officials and local mayors and city managers to establish inclusive operating procedures in the creation and execution of the collaborative vision for rebuilding the Mississippi Gulf Coast.
Utilization of local communication networks. When the State created the Governor’s Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, many of the key members were high profile businessmen and lawyers as opposed to local people familiar with the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The State should have included more local people that had established relationships with the people on the coast. Inclusion of more locally known people on the Commission would have facilitated the ability to identify the key actors to be at the table, and could have also helped in ensuring that invitations were delivered to all the key actors. It remains important to stay tapped into the local communication networks as the State proceeds with its planning process.

5.5.3 Interdependence

One of the lessoned learned from this analysis is that interdependence was not established between actors. The underlying reason for this was because communities did not identify the need to interact to achieve common goals for their communities because there was no institutional interdependence for planning. Most communities operated in isolation and did not engage in regional planning efforts. In response to this key finding, I propose the following:

- Established procedures for institutionalizing interdependence. Improved procedures for regional planning should have been in place to help introduce communities to institutional interdependence. As part of this procedure, the regional planning organizations should facilitate collaborative agreements by providing regular forums for interaction. As part of these forums, they could act to facilitate sharing information about local policy needs and funding sources to implement plans and regional needs such as revised hazard mitigation plans. Establishment of forums that support the recognition of shared needs and planning goals will help create active interdependence between actors on the coast in the face of future disasters.

- Provide incentives for regional planning. Collaborative planning is typically successful where there are incentives for key players to act collectively. In order to incentive collective action and regional planning, the State needs to provide funding opportunities that focus on their interdependence for regional planning goals. As part of this recommendation, the State could provide specific funding for planning that could only be allocated when recipients are communicating to
create land use plans that are consistent and compatible, and include action elements for intergovernmental collaboration.

- **Development of functional branch planning teams.** One of the post-storm activities that generated interdependence between actors in Jackson County was and buy-in and adoption of the functionally branched planning teams. This structure should have been implemented in all of the counties after the storm, following the procedures of a Unified Command Team. Through funding sources, the State could provide incentives for local governments to create functional branch teams across jurisdictions that work together to coordinate branch planning needs and actions.

5.5.4 Values and Cultural Norms

Based on feedback from communities, the initial planning processes arranged by the consultants were not as inclusive as they could be, and therefore plans did not reflect the true interests of communities. There was a disagreement between the cultures of the CNU consultants and those of the local Mississippians that acted to limit the effectiveness of the planning process. In response to this key finding, I propose the following:

- **Adopt an interactive procedure for selecting planning consultants.** A number of local officials said that they were unhappy with their consultants, but felt compelled to keep the consultants because the State had assigned this free assistance to the communities. Instead of random assignment to the communities, the State could have followed the procedures adopted in New Orleans that allowed communities to pre-approve their consultants. This procedure would have allowed communities to interview and select their perspective consultants, giving them experience and trust in the consultant, and a sense of ownership in the planning process.

- **Provision of local information to out-of-town consultants.** Many actors mentioned that when the CNU consultants formulated their visions for the planning concepts during the Mississippi Renewal Forum, they did not have adequate access to local information such as maps, pictures of the coast before the storm, or the types of amenities previously existing in the communities. As a result, local knowledge and values were not integrated into the plans to the degree that would have been more acceptable to communities. The State could have arranged to have a packet
of information available to the consultants to provide them with this background knowledge before they started the planning process. In the absence of local planners who understood the residents of the coast, background information would have given the consultants a sense of the culture of the coast.

- Adopt visioning techniques that match with the local culture. In some communities, the charrettes and visioning process was one of the biggest barriers to collaboration because this process did not match well with the south Mississippi culture, which is more comfortable with face-to-face interaction. Utilizing more intimate modes of participatory planning such as the integration of small group discussion would have promoted more collaboration with the CNU consultants because it honored the ways that interaction occur in south Mississippi.

5.5.5 Leadership through Collaborative Management

Leadership was an important factor in promoting collaboration between jurisdictions, but could have played a more effective role. The results of this study support the need for leadership to manage collaborative interactions in a way that supports the development of the other key factors. In response to this key finding, I propose the following:

- Place and maintain state representatives on location. The Governor’s Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal should have had their main offices in Biloxi or Gulfport as opposed to several hours away in Jackson, Mississippi. There was a disconnect in communication between the recovering Gulf Coast and the state offices and representatives who were making decisions about funding, programs, and assessing needs. If the Commission had their office on the coast they would have been more tapped in to the factors that were contributing to success in their network vision and others – such as the need to deactivate certain consultant – that were creating obstacles to collaboration. A similar limitation in communication occurred after Hurricane Camille because the State did not establish field stations on the coast.

- Establish an official chain of communication. Local governments were frustrated because they could not get consistent information from the State; one official would give one answer, and another would present a different answer. An official chain of communication should be established so credible and accurate information can be communicated from the state to local governments. As part of this effort, a disaster communications network should be established to provide an
official framework for how communication is channeled from different levels of government. This network could be modeled after the chain of command structure established for emergency response in other states.

- Develop leadership roles following a collaborative management structure. The State could have more effectively managed the various factors that were important for promoting intergovernmental collaboration if they adopted the role of facilitator in these interactions. As part of this organization, the State could have maintained their role as the lead agency initiating the recovery and rebuilding of the coast, but would have restructured the Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal to follow a chain of command structure. This structure would not only promote collaboration, but also provide consistent state representation that could broker the collaborative interactions and respond with appropriate behaviors given the context of the interactions.

The findings and subsequent discussion show that both the factors involved and the organizational management style adopted by the state influenced intergovernmental collaboration. If the factors tested in this study were built into the planning process, there may have been more vertical and horizontal collaboration between governments. In addition, the results suggest that more direct attention needed to be placed on the facilitation of these factors and the interactions between actors.

Figure 9 shows the proposed organizational chart of intergovernmental collaboration, identifying the State as a facilitator between different levels of government in the planning process. While all the actors interact with the CNU consultants who lead the physical planning process, they do so in managed way in order to ensure effectiveness of the collaborative interactions. All the interactions are two-way as opposed to one-way information exchanges as was the case during the planning process.

235
5.6 Theoretical Implications

To further develop a theory of collaborative planning, a more holistic look must be taken in regard to the collaborative planning process. Current literature on the theory of collaborative planning focuses largely on the process and evaluation of consensus building (Innes and Booher, 1999a; 1999b). Major contributions of this study to the theoretical literature include (1) the identification of a framework for intergovernmental collaboration involving four categories of factors that focus on issues broader than
engagement and consensus building, and (2) the inclusion of factors from literature on networks to create a more holistic framework to test for factors that influenced intergovernmental collaboration in post-Katrina Mississippi.

Collaborative planning is grounded in a theory of communicative rationality that sets forth ideal conditions for dialogue that engages different interests about a specific planning problem. The goal of communicative planning is to reach consensus after thorough discussion. Therefore, much of the literature on collaborative planning finds itself focused on factors that influence the consensus building process, as opposed to broader relation-building processes that influenced how actors are affected by factors that promote collaborative behaviors and impact implementation of collaborative planning initiatives. My study contributes to the literature by considering these broader factors that influenced collaboration through the entire collaborative process: problem setting, direction setting, and implementation stages (Gray, 1989, 57). I synthesized literature to create and test a theoretical framework of four categories of factors that influence intergovernmental collaboration.

Integration of factors proposed by network management literature offer additional insight into how actors work together to approach shared decision making tasks to implement public programs that work across organizational boundaries. This study integrates factors from network management as a means to cross-fertilize across disciplines. Similar tasks to work across jurisdictional boundaries are required in land use planning, so the theoretical contributions from network management offer a new or revised analytical context for planning. A stronger theoretical connection should be made between collaborative planning and network management literature to further inform how
interactions can be managed to encourage collaborative relationships. As a means to push forward this merging of literatures, I include factors promoted by network literature in my theoretical framework in terms of the interpersonal orientation of actors as well as the roles of leadership in facilitating interaction.

A substantial literature in both collaborative planning and networks has emerged that is ready for theoretically enhancing intergovernmental collaboration. There should be more exploration of the potential contribution of network management to planning theory and practice. A stronger understanding of the factors that influence intergovernmental collaboration beyond consensus building is an important step toward blending theoretical approaches to multi-jurisdictional planning and policymaking. Understanding literature on networks and how it may be integrated into planning theory and practice may help reveal ways to make collaborative planning more effective and efficient.

5.7 Planning Practice Implications

Exploration of what influences intergovernmental collaboration is not only important to planning theory, but also has significant implications for planning practice and policymaking. Understanding the ways in which intergovernmental collaboration can be developed and sustained is a critical component of larger strategies to correct longstanding regional issues. The results of this study provide some insights on what factors can help promote decisions to collaborate as well as what can be done to enhance the likelihood of intergovernmental collaboration. The implications are not only limited to collaboration for post-disaster planning. The results can inform planning for a number of intergovernmental planning needs where there is a level of critical community need.
Included in this may be planning for growth management, economic development, and regional planning generally.

Results from this study provide insight into when collaboration should be attempted and what factors play a part in the decisions for actors to collaborate. Results suggest that actors are more likely to collaborate when they already have good interpersonal relationships with other actors, when actors understand and recognize the resources that could be gained through collective action, when communication and engagement opportunities are established, and when leaders are present to be champions for the collaborative endeavor. This information and how it impacts actors is important for planners, administrators, and leaders as they work to form intergovernmental linkages.

Results suggest that it is possible to establish intergovernmental collaboration where some of these factors are absent. As applied to planning practice, this allows planners to focus on the factors that can be manipulated or guided to increase the likelihood of collaboration. Utilizing collaborative management behaviors, planners can act to help build essential factors into collaborative interactions. For example, improving communication between actors through establishing more opportunities for interaction may increase trust and social capital, resulting in increased likelihood for collaboration. Better process design, including which actors to involve in the planning event, how they are represented, and how decisions are made can impact decisions to continue collaborative relationships.

Findings from this study are important for planning practitioners as they work to craft cooperative initiatives. Despite differences in culture, circumstance, and location,
the challenges to collaboration for planning are similar in terms of the human dynamics of the issues. The factors that make shared visions for collective action difficult in one area is similar in other areas. This research has advanced knowledge for planning practitioners who strive to build collaborative planning relationships by identifying factors that influence decisions to collaborate. By integrating the factors in this framework, planners can learn different strategies for how interactions can be managed to build better relationships.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

This is an exploratory study to determine the factors that influenced intergovernmental collaboration for planning in post-Katrina Mississippi. The Governor of Mississippi set up a framework for intergovernmental collaboration for post-Katrina planning efforts, but while the situation was ripe for intergovernmental collaboration, high-level collaborative relationships have not developed among between local, regional, and state governments. The results of this study show that several factors may have created obstacles to collaboration.

This study does not presume to describe the circumstances that influence collaboration in all planning contexts. However, by providing insight into how different factors influenced actors in the post-Katrina context, and comparing the results with observations in the literature, this study illuminates the important issues that impact intergovernmental collaboration in many planning contexts.

The implications of these research results are extensive, both theoretically and practically. Findings from this study confirm many of the factors found in planning and network literature, but should be integrated together to create a new, more holistic theoretical framework for collaboration. Practical application of the findings can be focused on sharing results with Mississippi’s Office of Recovery, as well as other states.
that hope to initiate intergovernmental collaboration. Additionally, these research findings could serve to instruct those in leadership roles for local level collaboration about the importance of network management.

6.1 Limitations of the Study

While this study provides important insights into why intergovernmental collaboration was not adopted to the extent that the State expected in post-Katrina Mississippi there are a number of limitations to this study. Given the context of a post-disaster planning situation, the findings in this study cannot claim to be generalizable to other planning situations. However, the challenges of intergovernmental planning for critical community needs can be generalized to many intergovernmental planning situations involving rapid land use change. Although the exactness of the decisions made by respondents will not exist elsewhere and so therefore cannot be generalized, similarities in responses from this study can be transferred to other contexts of planning for critical community need.

Due to the circumstances of a disaster and the culture of the place, I was unable to complete additional data collection that would have helped establish quality data. Triangulation involves the use of multiple perspectives to increase the probability of credible finings. While the point of these strategies is not to find a universal truth, it aids in judging the accuracy about factors that influenced collaboration. In addition to the personal interviews with actors involved in planning, I had anticipated using a survey instrument to collect data on frequency and strength of ties between actor communications and collaborations. This additional data would have served as a good
complement to the qualitative data and provided additional insight into which communities interacted before and then during the planning process. When I attempted to administer the survey, respondents told me that they did not keep records of communications and meetings in south Mississippi, and if they did these records were literally washed away in the storm. I also wanted to use member checking as an additional check to the data, but due to the post-disaster circumstances, government officials were not willing to read through my interpretations of their interviews.

While the findings from this study offer significant insight into the factors that played a role in respondent decisions to collaborate for planning, the limitations of this research point to the need for important future research. More work should be completed to account for the limitations of a single-case study, and the context of a disaster situation, which may impact the factors influencing collaboration. It is important to use these findings as a benchmark for future research findings.

6.2 Future Research

This was an exploratory study conducted to understand more about intergovernmental collaboration and the factors that are important in influencing actors to participate in collaborative planning processes. Although this study contributed to the knowledge about what makes actors engage in collaborative relationships for planning, there are still many unanswered questions.

One of the contributions of the study was a holistic look at the factors that matter to respondents throughout the collaborative planning process. Given the complexity of the issues underlying each factor revealed in this study, a logical next step would be to
explore each of these factors in more depth and to examine the influence these individual factors have in different contexts.

A comparison of successful collaborative planning initiatives with failures will further inform the factors found in this study. Because this study was a single-case study, there was not a comparison case to distinguish differences. In non-disaster contexts, there would be resources to complete quantitative data analysis about the factors that impacted the formation of voluntary collaborative planning initiatives. I suspect that other cases would not be as complicated and involve as many actors as this study. Therefore, the level of complexity of the collaboration should be examined further to determine if different prescriptions for collaborative planning may exist based on the complexity of collaboration.

Based on the results of the study, a next step of inquiry should be to discern what leadership behaviors as collaborative manager are necessary to successfully form and sustain intergovernmental collaboration for planning. Collaborative management where leaders act as facilitators of operations still needs to be explored as the feasibility of this model will vary depending on the context and the actors involved. The involvement of different actors – both vertical and horizontal – will impact the constraints as will the capacity of the collaborative manager. More work should be done to integrate the network management literature to develop strategies for collaborative management that appropriate for intergovernmental planning contexts.

Additional work should be done to test these finding in different planning contexts, such as regional planning and growth management. It would be important to test the proposition that these findings can be transferred to other situation of critical
community need that are relevant to both the regional planning and growth management arenas that involve other non-governmental actors.
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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

PART I: Background Information on Early Planning Efforts

Question 1: Before the Renewal Forum was held last October, was your community involved in planning efforts that crossed community boundaries (i.e., a bicycle corridor plan, regional transportation plan, etc)? If so, describe.

Question 2: Did your planning organization initially participate in the state-initiated Mississippi Renewal Forum? Why or why not?

2a. If your planning organization participated in the Renewal Forum, which individuals from your organization participated?
2b. If your planning organization participated in the Renewal Forum, as a result of the Forum did you begin discussions about planning issues with others that you had not worked with before? If so, whom?

PART II: Community Planning Before and After Hurricane Katrina

Based on conversations with individuals involved in planning efforts along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, it was suggested that some communities changed their level of attention to community planning after Hurricane Katrina. The questions in Part II will focus on these issues.

Question 3: How often was community planning discussed in your community before Hurricane Katrina versus after Hurricane Katrina?

Question 4: How many planners did you have on staff or as consultants before versus after the Hurricane?

Question 5: Have you seen a change in the level of attention to planning along the Mississippi Gulf Coast since the Hurricane? If so, was this only immediate or has it continued?

Question 6: Did your community use the plans created out of the Renewal Forum? If so, have you engaged in any follow-up planning (individualized charettes, additional public meetings)?

6a. On average, how much has your planning post-Katrina cost? How much of this has been paid for through outside funding in the form of grants or other support?

Question 7: Has your community considered adopting the SmartCode? Why or why not? If seriously considering adoption, when is adoption expected to occur?
PART III: Informal Relationships
Based on conversations with individuals involved in planning efforts along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, it was suggested that there are informal relationships among
planning organizations that involve high levels of collaboration at times and lack of
collaboration at other times. The questions in Part III will focus on these issues.

Question 8: Are you involved in or are you aware of informal relationships between
communities whereby organizations contact each other to share information or ask for
advice on planning matters?

8a. Which communities have formed these relationships and why?
8b. Has contact with other planning agencies increased, stayed the same or
decreased since the Hurricane?

Question 9: Are there organizations that tend to collaborate better with one another on
planning issues?

9a. On which issues do these organizations tend to collaborate?
9b. On what factors do you think these relationships depend? For example, are
they already established relationships, are they like-minded communities, were
they dependent on each other for desired outcomes?

Question 10: Are there organizations that tend to compete with one another on planning
issues? On which issues do they tend to compete?

Question 11: Do you think the regulations in the form of the SmartCode proposed by the
state led to more cooperation and/or less competition among organizations?

PART IV: Citizen Participation in Planning Efforts
Based on conversations with individuals involved in planning efforts along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, it was suggested that citizens have become increasingly engaged
in community planning efforts following Hurricane Katrina. The questions in Part IV will
focus on these issues.

Question 12: To what degree have you seen citizens in your community participate in the
planning efforts under way in the region?

Question 13: To what degree are citizens affecting the decisions being made by planning
agencies?

13a. To what degree have planning organizations and elected officials implemented
citizen interests and goals shared at community meetings and charettes into their plans?
APPENDIX B

CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH
Mississippi Coast Collaboration

Meghan Z. Gough
Ph.D. Student, City and Regional Planning
Ohio State University

I consent to participating in research entitled: Mississippi Coast Collaboration

Meghan Gough, the researcher on this project, has explained the purpose of the study, the procedures to be followed, and the expected duration of my participation. Possible benefits of the study have been described, as have alternative procedures, if such procedures are applicable and available. I understand that information gathered from this research will be published as part of a dissertation in academic journals.

I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction. Furthermore, I understand that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue participation in the study without prejudice to me.

Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it freely and voluntarily.

This project has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at the Ohio State University. Approval of this project signifies that the procedures adequately protect the rights and welfare of participants. Should you have any questions or concerns for the Institutional Review Board, you may contact them at the Office of Responsible Research Practices at (614)688-8457.

Date: ____________________________

Consent to audiotape interview:
☐ Yes
☐ No

Consent to researcher using name of interviewee and/or organization:
☐ Yes
☐ No

Signed: ____________________________

(Principal Investigator or his/her authorized representative)